“Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam” Jerrold M. Post, M.D. Amatzia Baram, Ph.D. Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 17 “Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam” Jerrold M. Post, M.D. Amatzia Baram, Ph.D. Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 17 IXS 7% .4% //37 “Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam” P 47 2002 ////// Jerrold M. Post, M.D. and Amatzia Baram, Ph.D. November 2002 The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Copies of No. 17 and previous papers in this series are available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 361 12-6427. The fax number is (334) 953- 7530; phone (334) 953-7538. Counterproliferation Paper No. 17 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 361 12-6427 The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm Con Disc The , Intro Poli Sad, Sad Thr Fau Slſ. Disclaimer The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do necessarily not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. ii Saddam is Iraq. .. 5 radical anti-Qassem activist on his side, and refrained from any harsh IIlCaSUITCS. Saddam returned to Iraq after the Ba'ath took over in Baghdad in February 1963. In March 1963 the party came to power also in Damascus. In Baghdad, Saddam then became a middle-level operative in the party’s security apparatus. Afalq, the ideological father of the Ba'ath party, admired young Hussein, but Saddam still had a long way to go to get to the top. In November 1963 the party lost power in Baghdad, and Saddam and his comrades were arrested, then released, remaining under surveillance. In July 1968 they came to power again through a military coup d’etat. Rivalry with Assad to be Supreme Arab National Leader Rivalry over who is the true representative of the Ba'ath party and the rightful leading elite of the Arab world, the Ba'ath regime in Damascus or the underground party in Baghdad, emerged in 1966, but it reached a political crescendo soon after the Iraqi Ba'ath came to power for the second time in 1968. At first, this was a three-way struggle between Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, but Abd al-Nasser’s death in September 1970 left only two contenders. Until Saddam became president, in 1979, this was a contest for legitimacy and Arab leadership essentially between an Iraqi duo: Vice President Saddam Hussein and his boss and distant relative, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, on the one hand side, and President Hafez al-Assad in Damascus on the other. Afterward this became a more bitter and acrimonious sparring between Saddam and Assad. Some thawing in the late 1990s notwithstanding, the split and rivalry persisted until the death of the Syrian leader in 2000. Back in July 1968, with the crucial secret assistance of military intelligence chief Abdul Razzaz al Naif, Saddam helped mount a successful coup in 1968. In gratitude for services rendered, within two weeks of the coup, Saddam had arranged for the capture and exile of Naif, and subsequently ordered his assassination. It is important to observe that Naif was ambitious, and that after he was ousted and exiled he was engaged in anti-regime activity. In 1970 Saddam ousted Minister of Defense Hardan Abd al-Ghafar al-Tikriti, another senior and an ambitious associate, and a year later he had him assassinated. In 1979 Saddam forced his senior partner, President Bakr, out of office and made himself Saddam is Iraq. .. 7 Capable of Reversing His Course Saddam’s practice of revolutionary opportunism has another important characteristic. Just as previous commitments must not be permitted to stand in way of Saddam's messianic path, neither should he persist in a particular course of action if it proves to be counterproductive for him and his nation. When he pursues a course of action, he pursues it fully; if he meets initial resistance, he will struggle all the harder, convinced of the correctness of his judgments. Should circumstances demonstrate that he miscalculated, he is capable of reversing his course. Yet, he sticks to his guns on the strategic level: he never gives up a dream. He will wait until circumstances change, and then he’ll strike again. In these circumstances of a momentary reversal he does not acknowledge he has erred but, rather, that he is adapting to a dynamic situation. The three most dramatic examples of the revolutionary pragmatism and ideological flexibility concern his ongoing struggle with his Persian enemies. Yields on Shattal Arab To Quell the Kurdish Rebellion In March 1975, Saddam signed an agreement with the Shah of Iran, splitting the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway along the thalweg line, thus stipulating Iranian sovereignty over the Iranian (eastern) side. This he did in return for Iran’s ceasing to supply the Kurdish rebellion. In 1970 Saddam signed an autonomy agreement with the Kurds, but in 1973 he declared that the Ba'ath party represented all Iraqis, that the Kurds could not be neutral, and that the Kurds were either fully with the people or against them. In 1975 he destroyed the Kurdish autonomy and established a pseudo- autonomy, fully controlled from Baghdad. In 1979 he made the same point in regard to the Communist Party of Iraq, with whom he had a common “Patriotic Front.” “Are you,” he asked them, “with us in the same trench, or against us?” Then he cracked down on them with full force, imprisoning, torturing and executing many. Indeed, this is another of Saddam’s basic principles - “He who is not totally with me is my enemy.” By 1975, the war against the Kurds had become extremely costly, having cost 60,000 lives in one year alone. Demonstrating his revolutionary pragmatism, despite his lifelong hatred of the Persians, Saddam’s urgent need to put down the Kurdish rebellion took (temporary) precedence. Saddam is Iraq. . . 9 the disputed Shatt al Arab waterway. Never is a short time when revolutionary pragmatism dictates, which was important to remember in evaluating Saddam’s vow of 1990 to never relinquish Kuwait, and his continued intransigence to Western demands. Reversal of Hostage Policy The decision to release all foreign hostages fits this pattern. As with other misdirected policies in the past, Saddam initially pursued his hostage policy with full vigor, despite mounting evidence that it was counterproductive. When it became clear to him that it was not protecting him from the likelihood of military conflict, as initially conceived, but was actually unifying the international opposition, he reversed the policy. The announcement followed an especially strong statement by Secretary Baker concerning the use of “decisive force,” but the anger of his former ally, the Soviet Union, was undoubtedly important as well. Moreover, the timing was designed not only to play on perceived internal divisions within the United States but also to magnify perceived differences in the international coalition. As it turned out, releasing the hostages did not help, but it seemed like a good idea, and the chance that it would prevent the attack against him was sufficient for Saddam to do it. Saddam's Psychological Characteristics: Malignant Narcissism The labels “madman of the Middle East” and “megalomaniac" are often affixed to Saddam, but in fact there is no evidence that he is suffering from a psychotic disorder. He is not impulsive, only acts after judicious consideration, and can be extremely patient. Indeed, he uses time as a weapon. While he is psychologically in touch with reality, he is often politically out of touch with reality. Saddam’s worldview is narrow and distorted, and he has scant experience outside of the Arab world. His only sustained experience with non-Arabs was with his Soviet military advisors, and he reportedly has only traveled outside of the Middle East on two occasions, a brief trip to Paris in 1976 and another trip to Moscow. Moreover, he is surrounded by sycophants, who are cowed by Saddam’s well-founded reputation for brutality and who are afraid to 12... Saddam is Iraq Paranoid Orientation While Hussein is not psychotic, he has a strong paranoid orientation. He is ready for retaliation, and, not without reason, sees himself as surrounded by enemies. But he ignores his role in creating those enemies, and righteously threatens his targets. The conspiracy theories he spins are not merely for popular consumption in the Arab world, but genuinely reflect his paranoid mindset. He is convinced that the United States, Israel, and Iran have been in league for the purpose of eliminating him, and finds a persuasive chain of evidence for this conclusion. His minister of information, Latif Nusayyif Jassim, who was responsible for propaganda, his Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan, his Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim, and more generally speaking, his internal security apparatus probably helped reinforce Saddam’s paranoid disposition and in a sense are the implementers of his paranoia. It is this political personality constellation of a messianic ambition for unlimited power, an absence of conscience, unconstrained aggression, and a paranoid outlook which makes Saddam so dangerous. Conceptualized as malignant narcissism, this is the personality configuration of the destructive charismatic, who unifies and rallies his downtrodden supporters by blaming outside enemies. While Saddam is not charismatic, this psychological stance is the basis of Saddam’s particular appeal to the Palestinians who see him as a strongman who shares their intense anti- Zionism and will champion their cause. Views Self as One of History's Great Leaders Saddam Hussein genuinely sees himself as one of the great leaders of history, ranking himself with his heroes: Nasser, Castro, Tito, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong, each of whom he admires for adapting socialism to his environment, free of foreign domination. Saddam sees himself as transforming his society. He believes youth must be “fashioned” to “safeguard the future” and that Iraqi children must be transformed into a “radiating light that will expel” traditional family backwardness. Like Mao, Saddam has encouraged youth to inform on their parents' anti- revolutionary activity. As God-like status was ascribed to Mao, and giant pictures and statues of him were placed throughout China, so too giant pictures and statues of Saddam abound in Iraq. Asked about this cult of KRO Wäml Pr0|| { Mºb. WOſk tº: Wis |V3S liſi. Pºliſ Rºg Saddam is Iraq . . . 13 personality, Saddam shrugs and says he “cannot help it if that is what they want to do.” Probably Over-reads Degree of Support in Arab World Saddam Hussein is so consumed with his messianic mission that he probably overestimates the degree of his support in the rest of the Arab world. He psychologically assumes that many in the Arab world, especially the downtrodden, share his views and see him as their hero. He was probably genuinely surprised at the fairly wide condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He was right, though, when it came to many Jordanians, Palestinians and Syrians. Political Personality Shapes Leadership Style Saddam’s leadership and operating style can be summarized in what Regis Matlak has dubbed “Saddam's Rules for Survival.” 1. Innocence is No Defense; Guilt is More Secure: Although not necessarily the first recourse, Saddam has ordered execution of innocent officers to insure the removal of all coup plotters rather than be vulnerable to a residual threat. On the other hand, official complicity in crimes, that is to say “authorized” corruption, arbitrary arrest, and “official” torture and mutilation, are required to establish bona fides. 2. Be Eternally Agnostic on Matters of Family and Loyalty: For Saddam, it is an article of faith to be vigilant on appointments to coup-sensitive positions in his personal bodyguard and the broader palace-controlled personal, protective infrastructure. 3. Never Trust a Fellow Conspirator. 4. Beware Dangerous Liaisons: Saddam believes a coup plotter with luck and audacity is more likely to succeed than a conspirator with an extensive organization. 5. Pre-empt the Building of Personal Power Bases or Political Factions, Particularly in Military and Security Organs: Despite key assignments being restricted to family members and other members of the Tikrit power structure, Saddam does not permit a long tenure in any one position. Saddam views 14. . . Saddam is Iraq the establishment of a single independent power base as a de Såd, facto challenge to his leadership. 6. Disregard “Intelligence" at Great Peril: Saddam takes iſ | seriously the human and technical information gathered from .. his pervasive intelligence and security networks. Saddam has also learned that acting on such intelligence with leniency has ºp led the same conspirators to try again at a later time. 7. Redundancy is “Security Effective," if not Resource Efficient: (Qlm There exist visible and shadowy organizational structures hism mean to pre-empt, control, or react to threats to regime irp stability. This security apparatus is well practiced at penetrating military and intelligence centered cabals. what 8. Trojan Horses and Other Deceptions: Saddam is not content º to pursue only those who actively plan his removal. He also º u seeks out those who might be tempted to join a coup ſ conspiracy if given the opportunity. This is done both 0|| through setting up “disloyal” senior offices to gather * potential coup plotters, as well as the “perceived” Trojan º Horse where a friend or family member hears unfavorable commentary about Saddam or the regime and is unclear ſig whether this is a regime test knowing that if it is and they don’t turn the person they will pay the price. Sad 9. A Cult of personality and A Perception of Invulnerability. Sp Saddam and the regime have fostered a cult of personality. ºp One of the primary objectives, at least for Saddam, is to create Its a perception that only Saddam can save Iraq from internal chaos, anarchy, and foreign encroachment; that Saddam and Of the regime are everywhere and all-powerful; and that it is W futile to even think beyond Saddam. Saddam icons are Kl located everywhere. U. 10. Retribution is Good: Individuals must know that there will fe be a high price to pay for taking action against Saddam. This § characteristic is so strong in Saddam's operating style that it serves to define Saddam’s response to betrayal or attack. Saddam is Iraq . . . 15 Saddam at the Crossroads It is not by accident that Saddam Hussein has survived for more than three decades as his nation’s preeminent leader in this tumultuous part of the world. While he is driven by dreams of glory, and his political perspective is narrow and distorted, he is a shrewd tactician who has a sense of patience. He is able to justify extremes of aggression on the basis of revolutionary, pan-Arab and anti-imperialist needs. Yet, if the aggression is counterproductive, he has shown a pattern of reversing his course when he has miscalculated, waiting until a later day to achieve his destiny. His drive for power is not diminished by these reversals, but only deflected. Saddam Hussein is a ruthless political calculator who will go to whatever lengths are necessary to achieve his goals. His survival in power, with his dignity intact, is his highest priority. Soviet Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, after meeting him in Baghdad during the Gulf War, suggested that Saddam was suffering from a “Masada Complex,” which would cause him to jeopardize Iraq rather than compromise with other nations, preferring a martyr's death to yielding. This is assuredly not the case. Saddam has no wish to be a martyr, and survival is his number one priority. A self-proclaimed revolutionary pragmatist, he does not wish a conflict in which Iraq will be grievously damaged and his stature as a leader destroyed. Moreover, Primakov summed up his visit to Baghdad stating that Saddam had a sense of confidence in his military due to the technical Superiority of his land forces in the Iran-Iraq war." After all, Saddam reportedly felt that his chances of survival, even victory, or maybe a respectable draw, were excellent. However, another aspect of a “Masada Complex” suits him well, that of frequently feeling that formidable hostile forces are besieging him. When he and his spokesmen argue that Iraq had little choice but to attack Kuwait in 1990, they explain that Kuwait had been conspiring with the U.S. to destroy Iraq, and an escape forward was the only way to save regime and country. At the same time, however, Saddam also complained that the U.S. gave him a carte blanche to attack Kuwait, and when he took it at its face value the U.S. pounced on him. However, one wonders, if he knew the U.S. was adamant about destroying him, how could he possibly believe anything they told him? Saddam is Iraq . . . 17 verbal expression and the act threatened. Nasser gained great stature from his fiery rhetoric. Moreover, the fiercely defiant rhetoric was another indicator of the stress on Saddam, for the more threatened Saddam feels, the more threatening he becomes. By the same token, Saddam probably hears the Western words of President Bush through a Middle Eastern filter. When a public statement of resolve and intent was made by President George H. W. Bush, Saddam may well have discounted the expressed intent to act. This underlines the importance of a private channel to communicate clearly and unambiguously. The mission by Secretary of State Baker afforded the opportunity to resolve any misunderstandings on Saddam’s part concerning the strength of resolve and intentions of the United States and the international coalition. There may be no doubt that, even though he refused to deliver President Bush’s letter to Saddam, Tariq Aziz, who met with Baker in Geneva, delivered the message that the letter contained. Still, Saddam remained inclined to believe that the U.S. would not attack." This, like his more general assessment that invading Kuwait was a safe bet, demonstrates Saddam's predilection for wishful thinking. The Iran-Iraq War and Gulf Crisis Promote Saddam to World-Class Leader Until he invaded Iran Saddam Hussein had languished in obscurity, overshadowed by the heroic stature of other Middle Eastern leaders such as Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Ayatollah Khomeini. But, with the invasion of Iran, he assumed the role of the defender of the Arab world against the Persian threat “the Guardian of the Eastern Gate” of the Arab homeland. But when the war was over, his economy was in shambles, his population was seething as a result of a crisis of unfulfilled socio- economic expectations, and his prestige in the Arab world was lower than it had been before he invaded Iran. In the Gulf crisis, at long last, Saddam was exactly where he believed he was destined to be, a world- class political actor on center stage commanding world events, with the entire world's attention focused upon him. When his rhetoric was threatening, the price of oil rose precipitously and the Dow Jones average plummeted. He was demonstrating to the Arab masses that he is an Arab leader (qa'id) of historical proportions with the courage to defy the West and expel foreign influences. Now that he was at the very center of international attention, his appetite for glory was stimulated all the more. The glory-seeking Saddam 20. . . Saddam is Iraq quintessential survivor. The key to his survival in power for 22 years was his capacity to reverse his course when events demonstrated that he had miscalculated. We believed he could again reverse himself if he concluded that unless he did so his power base and reputation would be destroyed, and if by so doing he could preserve his power base and reputation. How can it be, then, that this self-described revolutionary pragmatist, faced by an overwhelming array of military power that would surely deal a mortal blow to his nation, entered into and persisted in a violent confrontational course? Cultural factors probably contributed to his calculation and miscalculation. As pointed out above, Saddam may well have heard President Bush's Western words of intent through a Middle Eastern filter and calculated that he was bluffing. It is also possible he downgraded the magnitude of the threat, likening the threatened response to the characteristic Arab hyperbole. Even though he expected a massive air strike, he undoubtedly was surprised by the magnitude of the destruction wrought on his forces. But more importantly, the dynamic of the crisis affected Saddam. What began as an act of naked aggression toward Kuwait was transformed into the culminating act of the drama of his life. Although he had previously shown little concern for the Palestinian people, the shrewdly manipulative Saddam had wrapped himself and his invasion of Kuwait in the Palestinian flag. The response of the Palestinians was overwhelming. They saw Saddam as their hope and their salvation, standing up defiantly and courageously to the United States to force a just settlement of their cause. This caught the imagination of the masses throughout the Arab world and their shouts of approval fed his already swollen ego as he went on a defiant roll. Intoxicated by the elixir of power and the acclaim of the Palestinians and the radical Arab masses, Saddam may well have been on a euphoric high and optimistically overestimated his chances for success. For Saddam's heroic self-image was engaged as never before. He was fulfilling the messianic goal that had obsessed him--and eluded him--throughout his life. He was actualizing his self-concept as leader of all the Arab peoples, the legitimate heir of Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin, and especially Nasser. His psychology and his policy options became captives of his rhetoric and self image. He became so absolutist in his commitment to the Palestinian cause, to not yielding even partially over Kuwait until there was justice for the Palestinian people, and U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 . 22. . . Saddam is Iraq Sadat had won great honor in 1973 by his leading the attack against previously invincible Israel, even though Egypt lost the military conflict. Indeed, his enhanced prestige permitted him to approach Israel as equal negotiating partner, and ultimately led to the Camp David Accords. Saddam’s political hero and model, Nasser, gained great honor for confronting the imperialists in the 1956 Suez campaign. Even though he lost militarily, politically he was the winner, and this is how history remembered him. In 1967 Nasser was totally routed, and this destroyed his reputation and started his way downhill, but Saddam was certain that this could not happen to him. Saddam hoped to consolidate his place in history as Nasser's heir by bravely defying the U.S. and, if there was no other way, confronting the U.S.-led coalition. On the third day of the air campaign, his minister of information, Latif Nusayyif Jassim, declared victory. To the astounded press he explained that the coalition expected Iraq to crumble in 2 days. Having already survived the massive air strikes for 3 days, the Iraqis were accordingly victorious, and each further day would only magnify the scope of their victory. It was revealed in January that under Saddam's opulent palace was a mammoth bunker, fortified with steel and pre-stressed concrete. The architecture of this complex is Saddam’s psychological architecture: a defiant, grandiose facade resting on the well-fortified foundation of a siege mentality. Attacked on all sides, Saddam remains besieged and defiant, using whatever aggression is necessary to consolidate his control and ensure his survival. Threats to Saddam’s Survival After the Conflict Iraqi domestic support for Saddam Hussein was drastically eroded after the Gulf War. By late 1996 a series of betrayals, failures and disappointments had left him in a more precarious domestic position that at any time since March 1991. A principle of Saddam’s leadership that has always been true has, if anything, been intensified in the post-war period. In particular, ensuring his domestic stability and eliminating internal threats to his regime is Saddam’s central concern, and, in a clash between his international position and internal security, internal security will win out. Moreover, precipitating international crises can strengthen Midam ſtmaſ Riklit Fiv illy Will intº Ch Saddam is Iraq . . . 23 Saddam’s internal position. The most damaging consequence of a setback internationally that proves him to be a failure as a leader is the consequent reduction in his internal prestige and threats to his regime's stability. Five events could lead his power base to seriously question Saddam’s ability successfully to lead Iraq: • If Saddam’s actions were to provoke the West to conduct a sustained powerful military campaign that destroyed important elements of his military power. This could happen if Iraq was unable to mend its fences with at least some of its Arab sisters, with Turkey and some great powers. • If he could not demonstrate to his power base that he will soon be able to bring to an end, or, at least, to substantially erode the U.N. inspections regime and with it the oil embargo. • If he were unable to guarantee the functioning of the national economy and to continue to support the relatively extravagant life style of his bodyguards and ruling elite. • If he were unable to retain Iraq’s WMD arsenal. • If he were to lose the propaganda campaign he has waged within Iraq. Accordingly, in addition to attempting to strengthen internal vulnerabilities, he also has worked assiduously to strengthen his international position, both with his “far abroad,”—Russia, France, and China—as well as his “near abroad,” Middle Eastern neighbor states. Weakened Military Immediately after the conflict terminated in March 1991, the military, Saddam’s major source of support, was gravely weakened, its once proud reputation as the most powerful military in the Gulf shattered, its ranks and material depleted, and its morale destroyed. • Declarations of victory and medals distribution notwithstanding, the Iraqi armed forces, including the Republican Guard, became disillusioned with Saddam. • The standard of living for soldiers had reached the lowest level ever. Logistical supplies were unavailable for the most part. 30. . . Saddam is Iraq member, then Speaker of the National Assembly. Udayy and Qusayy, too, are sometimes summoned to the “kitchen.” Cousin Ali Hasan al- Majid is almost always there as well. But this inner circle is more balanced than before. In the first place, Ali Hasan is a party old timer. Secondly, other members are all old party hands: Tariq Aziz (whom Udayy had attacked viciously a few times before, demanding his ousting), Izzat Ibrahim, who since 1991 has been Deputy Chairman of the RCC, and Vice President Ramadan.” It should be emphasized that some distant cousins, and many tribe members and Tikritis are still placed in very important security positions, and they are indispensable as a security shield for the regime. However, save for Qusayy, the role of the extended family has clearly been reduced and the party old timers are becoming more prominent in the political arena and in the seam between the political and security realms, the ministries of defense and the interior. To placate Udayy, in 2002 Saddam reportedly agreed to imprison briefly a few of the sons of some party luminaries, Tariq Aziz’s son being one of them. The reason was, apparently, corruption, but more likely it was their business competition with Udayy. But this did not change the overall picture. By mid 2002 Saddam relied on a more balanced party- Tikriti-tribe-family power base than in the early 1990s. Redemption and Restoration of Morale Courtesy of the Kurds In late August 1996 Saddam Hussein authorized elements of the Republican Guard to attack the Kurdish city of Irbil following the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)'s securing of limited military assistance from Iran. The Guard smashed the PUK and the U.S.-backed INC, as well as some CIA operations in Kurdistan. The seizure of Irbil was a major success for Saddam. This triumph, coming after a series of setbacks and reminders of their diminished status, restored the morale of the Republic Guard and their faith in Saddam. It demonstrated the regime was still very much in control and was a major power throughout the country. It also showed the fractioned nature and impotence of the opposition movements in Iraq and was a powerful demonstration of the risk of rising against Saddam. This was a major turning point for the regime in terms of restoring its power position. Had the Guard not taken Irbil it is likely that Saddam's support would be so undermined that his position would have been in Saddam is Iraq . . . 39 infringing on its sovereignty. Finally: the Iraqi regime is very critical of the strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel. At the same time, though, Saddam is aware that Ankara would like to have sanctions lifted because it too has suffered from the cut-off of trade and oil trans-shipment revenues from Iraq. He is doing everything in his power to wet the Turkish appetite, including an open call to breach the embargo. In 1997 the two countries signed an agreement to lay a 1,300 kilometer natural gas pipeline. Additionally, the Turks are deeply wary of the possibility that, if the Iraqi regime is toppled, the Kurds will declare independence. This will provide Turkish Kurds with a successful example and might result with a renewed Kurdish revolt. The Turks also are often unhappy with the indecisive way in which the Iraqi Kurds are stamping out the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish rebels in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Saddam is pragmatic enough to take full advantage of all these nuances. The lure of his business and the fear of Kurdish independence being his main charm points in Ankara, he is playing it up continuously, Jordan While it did not participate in the international anti-Iraqi war coalition and was unwilling to confront Iraq politically either, since the early 1990s Jordan has consistently distanced itself from Iraq. This it did in order to mend its fences with the U.S. and to make peace with Israel. This represented a major blow to Saddam’s efforts to end his international isolation. When Hussein Kamil defected in 1995 he went to Jordan, where King Hussein publicly supported the notion of a regime change in Iraq. This Support for the Iraqi opposition, however, appears to have diminished significantly as Jordan remains heavily dependent on Iraq for cheap oil and trade.” By 2002 Jordan was carrying out regular flights to Baghdad four times a week, in breach of UNSC resolutions.” Jordanian “popular” delegations are visiting Baghdad regularly, and expressing support for Saddam and vitriolic criticism of the United States. It would seem, then, that much like Turkey, Jordan, too, is getting the best of both worlds. It keeps excellent relations both with the United States and Israel. Jordan receives U.S. economic aid; and thwarts, as best it can, Iraqi attempts to Smuggle weapons through its territory to the Palestinians. There is no Saddam is Iraq. . . 47 Busting the Embargo After Saddam reversed his initial decision to reject U.N. Security Council Resolution 986, once the Iraqi oil started to flow again to the world's markets, the Iraqi president was under some pressure to demonstrate to his followers that the embargo, if not dismantled, was, at least, dissipating. Doing this took time, but Saddam and his advisors eventually proved their competence. The embargo's main purpose, to prevent Saddam from being the sole arbiter where Iraq’s oil revenues would go, is still very much alive, but he managed to shatter some of its restraints. Eroding the oil embargo has been done essentially on four different levels. By far the most important one was a substantial increase in the amount of oil smuggled out and sold illegally. The smuggling route through Turkey by tanker lorries has been functioning almost since the end of the Gulf War, but this was a limited avenue due to obvious logistical limitations. Oil sales to Jordan, too, to the tune of around 100,000 barrels per day, started a short while after the Gulf War except that they were approved by the United Nations. The official reason provided was that this was the only way that Iraq could repay its national debt to Jordan of about $800 million, but after a few years this debt was paid back in full, yet the arrangement continued. By the late 1990s the Iraqi leadership felt the need to perform a quantum leap in its illicit oil sales, Indeed, this happened through two new avenues. One was the Syrian pipeline, and the other was a maritime route from a specially constructed oil terminal South of Basra through the Shatt al-Arab, hugging the Iranian coast within Iranian territorial water and then crossing the Gulf to the ports of the Arab Emirates.” By early 2001 the most reasonable assessment of how much the Iraqis were Smuggling, excluding the U.N.-approved Jordanian part, came from Dubai and cited the quantity of 350,000 barrels a day. If this rate was to continue throughout the year, and the current prices for a smuggled oil barrel, around $12, roughly half the world market price, was to remain the same, then the annual revenue that is expected to go into Saddam's private pocket is around $1.5 billion.” This was, indeed, a quantum leap as compared to the assessment of Iraq’s illicit revenues of $600 million for the year 2000." Another avenue through which Iraq managed to earn illegal petrodollars was through a surcharge of between 15-30 cents per barrel Saddam is Iraq . . . 53 Last but not least, the regime is worried about Shi'i loyalty in the case of a military confrontation with the United States. General religiosity that applies to both the Sunni and Shi'i creeds is believed to help, but Saddam feels the need also for some special gestures towards the Shi'a in particular. Most notably, since the rise of Ayat Allah Khomeini to power in Iran, Saddam “nationalized” the main Shi'i occasions and presented himself as the genetic offspring of the first and third Shi'i Imams, Ali and Al-Hussein, and of the Prophet.” In January 2001, Udayy Saddam Hussein declared that he is studying “Shi'ite rite in depth” and Shi'ite thinking in general, and he criticized his own ministry of religious endowments for not building enough mosques in the Shi'i areas.” It is not clear how helpful all these religious practices have been to Saddam, but they do show how flexible he is in his approach to his own ideology, tossing it overboard whenever expediency dictates. At the same time, however, Saddam has not tossed overboard his associate and supporter of many years, the Christian Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. Apparently, this would look like total capitulation to the Islamic fundamentalists, and this is where concessions stop. Also, there are Christians among his bodyguards. It would be a mistake to arouse their wrath. However, it should be remembered that loyalty with Saddam Hussein is a one-way street, and only those who are seen to be Serving him with total loyalty will survive. Why Weapons of Mass Destruction? Beginning in 2001, apparently in response to the Bush administration's declaration of resolve to change the regime in Baghdad, Saddam started meeting regularly and publicly with his nuclear scientists. In these meetings he and his scientists have been dropping hints that can only be interpreted as intended to tell the United States that, in a case of an attack on Iraq, the latter may have some nuclear surprises up its sleeve. Thus, for example, when Saddam met with his Head of the atomic energy organization, Dr. Fadil Muslim al-Janabi and his men in February 2001, he told them, “the bottom line is to defend Iraq. In so doing, we defend the Arab nation. . . . We will never hesitate to possess the weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation.” In a similar meeting a few months later, Dr. Janabi made a pledge in the name of his 54. . . Saddam is Iraq organization, “We swear to be a formidable force . . . in the service of Iraq and its proud people when the confrontation and noble battle against the Zionists and the Americans would start.” It is very clear that to Saddam, the first reason for developing non- conventional weapons is to deter external enemies. Not only the USA is considered as an enemy. On Iraq’s Eastern front there is Iran, with a long history of confrontations and with three times Iraq’s population and territory. To the north there is Turkey, with a bigger population and land area, in possession of a much larger and better-equipped armed force. Iraq is locked in an unresolved dispute with Turkey over the water of the Euphrates. Indeed, in May 1990 Saddam threatened Turkey’s Prime Minister, Yilderim Akbulut, asserting that Turkey is exposed now that NATO has begun falling apart. But Saddam’s modus operandi implies that such weapons are necessary also for domestic purposes, and for regional offensive purposes. In the first place, the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, especially in March 1988, which caused widespread panic in Iraqi Kurdistan, proved to be an extremely effective weapon against an unprotected population. It is not far-fetched to suggest that, in the case of another wide scale Shi’i revolt in the south, a few chemical bombs or artillery shells on a densely populated area may be used to nip in the bud any popular revolt. Biological and nuclear weapons are far less useful in a domestic context because they contaminate an area for a long time. Such weapons, however, are very useful for anyone aspiring to regional hegemony and international recognition as a great power. Indeed, in April 1990 Saddam already threatened Israel with annihilation, stating that, “I shall burn half of Israel,” an idea unthinkable without weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is every reason to believe that, when he has a number of nuclear weapons, he will be rattling them and offering every Arab and Islamic State that requested his protection the Iraqi nuclear umbrella. In fact, even before he became a nuclear power, Saddam already promised the Arabs such an umbrella against Israel and even promised Arafat to use the Iraqi missiles in order to push Israel out of Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories. In a 1979 meeting between Saddam’s younger half brother, Watban Ibrahim Hasan, and Iraqi nuclear physicist, Ali al-Shaharastani, his sibling said that Iraq needed nuclear arms “to change the map of the Middle Saddam is Iraq . . . 69 83. Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Jan. 10, 2001, 3, in FBIS-NES-Serial GMP 2001 01 10000146, Jan. 10, 2001. 84. Baghdad Republic of Iraq TV, in Arabic, Feb. 1, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 0227000217, Feb. 27, 2001. 85. Babil, (internet version in Arabic), July 8, 2001. 86. For details about Saddam's non-conventional strategy see, Amatzia Baram, “An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy” in The Non-Proliferation Review (Summer 2001), Vol. 8, No. 2., 25-39. RETURN TO --> l 2 LOAN PERIOD º 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO RECALL RENEW BOOKS BY CALLING 642-2452 (NO PHONE RENEWALS FOR 2-HOUR LOANS) DUE AS STAMPED BELOW JUN 08 2003 MAY 0.9 2007 FORM NO. DD19 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY CA 94720-6000