OEfOSITORX
NOV 091990
Iraqi Power and U.S. Security
in the Middle East
Stephen C. Pelletiere
Douglas V. Johnson II
Leif R. Rosenberger
1990
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5050


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD vii
SUMMARY ix
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Background 1
The Old Iraqis 4
Assessment 4
Implications for the United States 5
Report Organization 6
Methodology 7
Chapter 2. The Turning Point 9
Al Faw, 1986 9
The Extraordinary Congress 14
The Air War 18
The Missile War 23
Chapter 3. Tawakalna ala Allah: Strategy and Tactics ..25
Background 25
AlFaw 25
Fish Lake 29
Majnoon 30
Dehloran-Zubiadat 30
Qasr-e-Sherin/Kermanshah 30
Evaluation 31
Overall Assessment 36
Conclusions from the Campaign 38
Chapter 4. Role of the Iraqi Army in Postwar Era 41
Introduction 41
Iran 41
Syria 44
Israel 45
Iraq's Economy and the Army 47
The Lean-Mean Mobile Army 48
iii


Chapter 5. U.S. Security and Iraqi Power 51
Introduction 51
Human Rights 53
Missiles 54
Chemicals 54
Iraqi Fears 56
Chapter 6. The Soviet Factor 59
Background 59
Origins of Moscow's Tilt to Iran 62
Limits to the Relationship - 1987 63
In Summary 67
Chapter 7. The U.S. Dilemma 69
The Ultimate Threat 70
Recommendations 72
ENDNOTES 77
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 95
iv


FIGURES
Page
1. Map of Iraq 2
2. AlFaw 10
3. Iraqi Air Strikes in the Gulf 22
4. Battle of Al Faw 26
5. Battles of the Last Campaign. 27
6. Umm Qasr and Approaches 43
7. Missile Ranges 55
TABLES
Page
1. Comparative Ground Force Strengths at Ceasefire 3
2. Growth of Iraqi Military Force Structure 16
3. Comparative Equipment/Weapons Holdings
of Middle Eastern Armies 45
v





FOREWORD
The authors of this report look at the last campaign of the
Iran-Iraq War and show how the Iraqis were able to turn that
war around, inflicting a crushing defeat on the Iranians. As a
result of their victory the Iraqis were able to set themselves up
as the pre-eminent Arab military power in the Middle East. The
authors go on to explain how the emergence of Iraq as a
formidable power has affected the balance of power in the
region, particularly addressing the tense relations between the
newly powerful Iraq and Israel. They conclude with
recommendations for U.S. policy makers and military
commanders for dealing with Iraq.
This report should be a useful guide not only for specialists
in the Middle East but also for any officer interested in the
operational art and the relation of the military to civilian policy
making.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
vii





SUMMARY
This report is an examination of the Iraqi defeat of Iran in
the 8-year-long Iran-Iraq war and the implications of that
outcome on future U.S. Middle East policy. It concludes that
Iraq's achievement in forcing Iran to accept a truce represents
an authentic victory. The victory was attained because the
Iraqis planned for and successfully executed complicated,
large scale military operations and shrewdly managed their
resources. Claims that they won simply by using massive
amounts of chemical weapons cannot be substantiated.
Iraq's success was facilitated by the collapse of Iranian
civilian morale. The collapse, however, was not entirely
fortuitous. Iraq's breakthrough in developing long-range
missiles opened the way to strategic bombardment of the
Iranian capital, which in turn produced the collapse.
The report further concludes that—contrary to general
belief—Iraq's rulers enjoy significant popular support. The
authors base this conclusion on the Ba'thists' ability to order a
general call-up during what was perhaps the darkest period of
the war. The willingness of the population to comply with the
regime's order in effect confirmed its legitimacy.
In the specific sphere of military operations, the study
concludes that a cadre of genuinely competent professional
officers exists within the Iraqi military. This group is fully
capable of keeping pace with the latest innovations in weapons
technology. The officer corps understands and is committed
to the conduct of combined arms operations to include the
integration of chemical weapons. It commands soldiers who,
because of their relatively high education level, are able to
carry out such operations.
The authors believe that the future of the Iraqi military will
be conditioned by the performance of the economy. Iraq is a
ix


potentially wealthy country with huge reserves of oil, a highly
trained work force, and a manageable population.
Nonetheless, it went deeply into debt to defeat Iran. Its debts
must now be paid, and the regime is striving with all its energies
to reach accommodation with its creditors. For the foreseeable
future, debt repayment will fully occupy the regime; it will have
neither the will, nor the resources to go to war. In addition,
although the regime claims that it is in the process of
developing a national arms industry, the authors do not believe
that it has the resources for this at present.
Iraq's leaders see their country as beleaguered. On one
side is Iran, which almost certainly will seek revenge for its
humiliating defeat. This will take time, however; at present
Tehran is militarily prostrate. The Ba'thists will need to keep a
close watch on the Eastern Front, but in the near to midterm
they seem secure from that quarter.
To the north is Syria, which, like Iran, does not pose a
serious immediate threat. Because of their Lebanon
involvement the Syrians are currently too preoccupied to
threaten anyone. Still, the Syrians and Iraqis are implacable
foes, and here, too, the Iraqis dare not totally let down their
guard.
The real threat, as the Ba'thists perceive it, is Israel. The
Israelis have been impressed with Iraq's victory, which they did
not anticipate. Moreover, the development of long-range
missiles by Baghdad somewhat offsets Israel's previous
advantage in these weapons. There is no doubt that Tel Aviv
will try to maintain superiority over Iraq by developing newer,
more lethal arms, and there is even the possibility that it will
seek to wreck Iraq's bid for technological parity by destroying
Iraqi missile sites and research facilities. The report concludes
that any such pre-emptive attack on Iraq by Israel would be a
most dangerous gambit, and could precipitate a major war in
which U.S. interests would be jeopardized.
Given this high degree of tension, Washington needs to
decide whether its present policy towards Iraq is well judged.
x





CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background. After 8 years of combat, the end of the
Iran-Iraq War came with astonishing suddenness.
Commencing in April 1988, Iraq unleashed a blitzkrieg that
virtually wiped out Iran's army. Five major battles were fought
between April and August 1988, and in each the Iranians were
badly beaten (see Figure 5). In the first battle, 17-18 April, the
Iraqis retook the Al Faw peninsula which they had lost to Iran
in 1986. The second battle saw Iran surrender land around the
pressure point of Basrah. The Iranians had seized this territory
in 1987 after a desperate campaign that went on for over 3
weeks and cost them some 70,000 casualties.1 The Iraqis took
it back in 7 hours. One month later the Iraqis struck at Majnoon,
the site of one of the Middle East's largest undeveloped oil
fields.2 The Iranians occupied this site in 1984, and had
threatened to pump it dry to exact reparations from Iraq for
having started the war. Again the Iraqis retook it in a matter of
hours. The fourth battle occurred in the vicinity of Dehloran
and effectively removed any remaining threat toward Baghdad.
In the fifth and final battle the Iraqis drove some 40 miles into
Iran to Qasr-e Sherin/Kermanshah. Iraq's military
commanders apparently were prepared to penetrate farther,
but were recalled by the civilian leadership. After the recall the
war was essentially ended. Several minor engagements
followed, but on July 18,1988, Khomeini drank the "poison cup"
of defeat and agreed to a truce.
The defeat for the Iranians was harsh. At the beginning of
1988 they had been offered favorable peace terms by Iraq's
President Saddam Husayn and had spurned them, claiming
that they would crush Iraq and put Saddam on trial as a war
criminal.3 After this, they boasted, they would dismantle the
regime of the Ba'thists4 and set up an Islamic Republic to rule
in its place.
1



Figure 1. Map of Iraq.


Iran is now militarily prostrate. Its military machine
collapsed after four months of battering by the Iraqis (see Table
1 on force comparison). It now has almost no frontline artillery
and only a hundred or so operational tanks.5 Fleeing Iranian
units abandoned so much equipment in the last days of combat
that Iraq has been able to give away captured weapons to its
allies.6 Iran's casualties in the final battles were low, but this
apparently was because—unlike in earlier battles—the Iranian
troops either fled or surrendered.7
Most galling to the Iranians was the loss of their precious
land. In the closing days of the conflict, the Iraqis seized a strip
of territory along the border, which to date they have refused
to return.8 It does not seem likely that they will give this area
back; they certainly will not do so under compulsion from the
Iranians. According to western analysts, Iran can no longer
defend itself, much less take on the Iraqis in another war. It
will be another five years, observers believe, before Iran can
recoup something of its former military strength.9
Iraq Iran
Total Armed Forces 1,000,000 604,500
Army 955,000 305,000*
Tanks 5,500 500
Reconnaissance Vehicles 600 100±
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BMP) 1,000 100±
Armored Personnel Carriers 7,100 500±
Towed Field Artillery Pieces 3,000 800±
Self-Propelled Field Artillery Pieces 500 140±
Multiple Rocket Launchers 200 Unknown
*Estimated to include approximately 250,000 conscripts.
Source: The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London:
Brassey's, 1989, pp. 99-101.
Table 1. Comparative Ground Force Strengths at Ceasefire.
All of this adds up to a significant alteration of the Middle
Eastern balance of power. Iraq is now the most powerful state
in the Persian Gulf and one of the most powerful in the Middle
East. (See Table 1.) It is being hailed as a regional
3


superpower,10 a considerable change from its prewar
reputation as the "awkward squad" among Middle Eastern
armies.
The Old Iraqis. Prior to the war the Iraqi Army's record was
anything but distinguished. Its only experience had been
acquired fighting Kurds in a decades old rebellion that it was
unable to quell.11 The military also saw action in the 4th
Arab-Israeli War, but only briefly and with evident confusion.12
When the war with Iran flared, the Iraqi battlefield
performance appeared to be incredibly inept. Badly beaten in
its initial attempt to invade, it barely turned back a
counterinvasion by the Iranians. For 6 years the Iraqis fought
a war of purely static defense, refusing to attack, even when
given the opportunity.
When, in April 1988, the Iraqis finally took the offense, most
observers refused to accept that this was actually happening.
It was assumed that the Iraqis would soon run out of steam or
would fumble in some egregiously inept fashion.13 It seemed
incredible that they could so quickly develop their offensive
capabilities. When it became clear that the Iraqis would win,
theories emerged to explain this extraordinary turn of events.
For example, it was suggested that they had relied on chemical
weapons and, in so doing, had overcome their enemy.14
Another theory was that they had received help from the
Soviets or the Egyptians.15 Examination of the evidence
behind these claims reveals that, by and large, it is
unconvincing.
Assessment Because the majority views of the Iraqis'
victory were unconvincing, an investigation was conducted to
determine how good the Iraqis are militarily, and whether Iraq
poses a threat to U.S. security interests in the Middle East.
Research was concentrated on the last campaign of the
war, when the Iraqis performed most effectively. The authors
believe—after a thorough investigation of the last five
battles—that we know how they managed to win. As a
4


In December 1989, the United States passed what analysts
have come to refer to as "the peril point," at which we imported
more than 50 percent of our oil from overseas.19 Of this
amount, 15 percent comes from the Gulf. The figure has been
steadily rising and almost certainly will continue to do so. It
does not seem sensible under such conditions to antagonize
what is now the strongest power in so vital an area of the world.
The authors cannot state this conclusion too forcefully, and, in
the latter part of the study specify how they believe the United
States can remedy some of the damage that has been done.
Report Organization. The report consists of seven
chapters. Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 describes the
state of the war in 1986, the year that Iraq decided to scrap its
defensive orientation and go on the offensive. The authors
examine the new strategy that the Iraqis devised (which they
dubbed Tawakalna ala Allah),20 and explain its
implementation. The focus is on changes that the Iraqis made
in their force structure that would permit them to take the
offense.
Chapter 3 analyzes the battle tactics employed in the final
campaign and evaluates the proficiency of the Iraqi
commanders. It includes a discussion of what are viewed to
be their weaknesses, and ends with a profile of the military's
major features.
Chapter 4 deals with the uses to which the Iraqi military is
likely to be put now that the war is over. Iraq, which is currently
experiencing a severe financial crisis, will not be eager to go
to war with anyone in the near term. At the same time,
however, it has enemies who might provoke it into armed
confrontations. Some possible danger areas are cited. The
major threat to Iraq—the Iraqis feel—is Israel, and the study
tries to show exactly how they perceive this threat.
Chapter 5 deals with U.S.-lraq relations, and describes how
they have gone sour in the aftermath of the war.
6


Chapter 6 contrasts recent Soviet advances in the Persian
Gulf with American setbacks, and suggests that Moscow is
outperforming us diplomatically.
The final chapter makes specific recommendations for U.S.
policymakers and military leaders on dealing with Iraq.
Methodology. The reader should bear in mind that until at
least May 1988, it was generally agreed by most Western
observers that Iraq was going to fare badly in the war.21 At
worst it would lose; at best it might achieve a stalemate. Thus,
practically all opinion up to the eleventh hour was predicated
on this gloomy assessment. This report, inasmuch as it
challenges the conventional interpretation—albeit in
hindsight—should be read as an alternate view. Like many
earlier assessments, it draws primarily on raw intelligence.
Unlike them, however, it reaches a quite different set of
conclusions.
A great deal of the report is based on interviews with
individuals who were either in Baghdad at the end of the war
or arrived there immediately afterward and were therefore able
to give insights into what had actually occurred. Among these
were Americans, Europeans and Arabs. The authors also
interviewed some Israelis,22 but were not able to interview any
Iraqis because the strained relations between our two
countries had temporarily interrupted contacts.
Finally, the team consulted periodicals and newspapers.
There are sharp differences in the quality of these accounts.
Both sides throughout the war restricted journalists and
academics by either withholding information from them or
distorting it for partisan purposes.23 These sources must be
interpreted with extreme care.
As with any study of this kind we proceed from a basic
approach, assuming that nations have vital interests that they
act to protect and to enhance, and that, in the international
arena, everything is subordinated to this activity. Additionally,
we make the following assumptions. Iraq will try to expand its
7


influence in the Middle East, with or without the concurrence
of its neighbors. It will strive to defend itself by any means
necessary against what it perceives as threats from those
neighbors. And, finally, the current regime in Iran has been
extremely weakened by the war, and could at any time
collapse.
The report begins with a discussion of the Iranian capture
of Al Faw in 1986, the act which, the authors believe,
galvanized the Iraqis to make the bold changes in their military
doctrine, which led to their ultimate victory in the war.
8


CHAPTER 2
THE TURNING POINT
Al Faw, 1986. In February 1986 the Iranians took Al Faw,
a city on a peninsula in the northern Gulf. Once the site of a
major oil facility, Al Faw had been practically destroyed in the
first weeks of the war. At the time of Iran's occupation it was
virtually abandoned. Iraqi forces acted quickly to counter the
breakthrough. They set up blocking lines to the west and north
of the occupied area. At the cost of quite considerable
casualties (largely to Iraq's elite Republican Guards units) they
stemmed the Iranian thrust, but were not able to do much more.
Al Faw is honey-combed with defense works which were
utilized by the Iranians to foil repeated Iraqi assaults. Thus a
stalemate developed as the Iraqis kept up pressure on the
peninsula, while the Iranians kept the besiegers at bay by
resupplying themselves across hastily constructed pontoon
bridges which spanned the Shatt al Arab. (See Figure 2.)
This situation was awkward for the Iraqis, but not a disaster.
Al Faw occupies dead space in the Gulf, and up to this point in
the war had been of no military significance. As long as the
Iranians could be kept penned up there, their military
effectiveness would be nil. Indeed, they could be left there for
the duration of the conflict. Saddam, however, wanted them
driven off the peninsula immediately, for at least two reasons.
He was personally embarrassed by the Iranians' seizure of
Al Faw.24 Since at least 1982 he had been insisting the Iraqis
could win the war by merely holding the line against repeated
Iranian invasions. Sooner or later, he maintained, Iran's
leaders would realize that they could not prevail militarily, and
would seek a peaceful solution. This strategy had
considerable appeal for the Iraqi public since implicit in it was
the aim of keeping casualties down. Other political
considerations were involved, but from the standpoint of the
9


Iraqi people the strategy's greatest attraction was that it
promised a minimum of suffering.
This static defense strategy—as it came to be
called—seemed sound for a time. Iraqi generals were able to
turn back successive Iranian offensives, and, in the process,
kill a fairly large number of the enemy who threw themselves
futilely at the Iraqi line in the now notorious human wave
attacks. (See Chapter 3)
But after Iran's capture of Al Faw in 1986, the static defense
approach lost its appeal. Not only had the Iranians succeeded
in capturing an Iraqi city—albeit an empty one—but also they
had seized the initiative and promised to exploit this to gain
other victories. Specifically, they swore to capture Iraq's
second largest city, Basrah, within the year.25 This was too
serious a threat to be taken lightly; if Basrah fell, Iraq would
most likely be forced to concede defeat. Iraq's inability to
regain Al Faw spread a pall of gloom over Baghdad. Western
observers in the capital reported that the normally stolid,
unflappable Ba'thists were for the first time since 1982 looking
sullen and morose.26
A second factor was driving Saddam to recapture Al Faw.
The war had wrecked Iraq's economy. Iraq had been funding
itself since at least 1983 with borrowed cash—principally from
its rich Arab neighbors. By 1986 an estimated $20 billion had
been received from the Saudis and Kuwaitis.27
Iraq justified its borrowings by claiming to have held back
the Iranian hordes, thus saving the Gulf monarchs from Shiite
Fundamentalism—an effective propaganda line. Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, for all their vast wealth, lack formidable armies.
Kuwait has a force of only 16,000 troops.28 Saudi Arabia has
a considerably larger army, but it is completely untested in
battle. Thus neither was in a position to take on the "legions of
Islam" perceived to be available to the Iranian army.29
As long as Iraq appeared to be winning the war, the Gulf
states were amenable to financing the effort. After Al Faw,
11


perceptions changed markedly. Iranian Revolutionary Guards
were now positioned at a relatively short distance from Kuwait's
capital, which rendered the Kuwaitis distinctly uneasy (and,
indeed, within the year the Iranians began launching Silk Worm
missiles from Al Faw at Kuwait City).30 There was strong
incentive for the Gulf monarchs to rethink their options—at
least they might wish to hedge their bets by seeking conciliation
with the Iranians—a step which would have undermined Iraq's
war effort.31
Iraq also had a large non-Arab debt problem. Aid from the
Gulf states was not enough to cover Iraq's expenses, and so
it had borrowed from international banks as well. By 1986, Iraq
owed Soviet, European and Japanese bankers nearly as much
as it owed to the Arabs.32 Just before Al Faw's loss to Iran,
Iraq had rescheduled these loans.33 The bankers had agreed
on the assumption that Iraq would survive the war and would
then become a lucrative market for foreign
investment—seemingly a safe bet since Iraq has the second
highest proven reserves of oil in the world.34
As had been the case with the Saudis and Kuwaitis,
however, the loss of Al Faw caused uneasiness within the
international banking community which now saw its
investments jeopardized. Certainly the bankers would be
unwilling to negotiate further rescheduling unless Iraq
somehow recouped its loss.
For all these reasons Saddam felt the need to score a
significant victory, yet when his army tried to push the Iranians
off the peninsula they were frustrated. At the time of year that
Iran had invaded, Al Faw was virtually under water. The Iraqis,
as they sought to reach the enemy emplacements, were
restricted to traversing three roadways, the only areas not
submerged. Unable to stray off these roads, they presented
ideal targets for Iranian gunners on the east bank of the Shatt.
Lieutenant General Maher Al Rashid, whom Saddam had
tasked with the recapture, sought to protect his advance by
laying down a wall of fire behind which his troops inched their
12


The Ba'thists appear to have hit upon an effective scheme
for luring the youth into the service. In effect, they structured
a situation in which this might actually appear to be an
appealing prospect. Shortly after the Extraordinary Congress
ended, the regime announced a further call-up for the regular
army. Non-college men born in the years 1970 and 1944 were
summoned.42 As can be seen from the ages of the draftees,
there were very few Iraqis—outside of the students—who
remained to be inducted.43 Along with this, the regime ordered
an increase in recruiting for the Popular Army. The Popular
Army's modus operandi was to form press gangs which literally
dragged men off the streets.44 Although this tactic was
abhorrent, the regime permitted it to go on, apparently because
it was an efficient way to counter draft dodging. The regime in
effect had ordered a mass mobilization, without formally
declaring it. Having done so, it next began to turn the screws
ever so subtly on the students.
The Ba'thists announced that schools would not reopen in
the fall. Instead, the students would be required to attend
summer camp where they would undergo basic military
training. This training was presented as somewhat of a morale
building exercise. It was felt, the regime's leaders said, that the
students would profit from the physical exercise and discipline.
The Ba'thists did not specify when the schools would reopen,
creating the impression in the minds of the students that their
deferments were about to be phased out. At this point the
Ba'thists unveiled their snapper, so to speak. They announced
that the army would accept volunteers for the Republican
Guards, and that youths from anywhere in Iraq could
serve—previously only young men from Tikrit, Saddam's
hometown, were eligible.45 In a country like Iraq, where
practically all power is vested in the President, a Palace
connection is extremely useful, and thus service in the Guards
was an attractive proposition.46
The move to reconstitute the Guards apparently was
successful because, shortly thereafter, a phenomenal growth
was seen in its size.47 (See Table 2.) There were only three
Guard brigades when Al Faw fell, but by April 1988, when the
15


Inf/
MedV
Corps
Armd
Mtn
Mtr
RepGd
SF
Year
ManX103
HQ
Divs
Divs
Divs
Bde/Div
Bde
Res
1973
102
1
4
1
9
1980
200
3
4
4
4
1/
2
250K?
1981
210
3
4
4
4
1/
3
250K?
1982
300
4
6
4
3
1/
3
?
1983
475
4
6
6
4
2/
3
?
1984
600
4
6
9
5
2/
3
?
1985
?
4
6
9
5
4/
6
?
1986
800
7
5
10
3
5/
6
?
1987
955
7
5
30
3
5/
6
?
1988
1035
7
7
39
*
/4
20/1 Mar**
?
1989
1000
7
7
42
*
6/
20+
850K
NOTES:
This table displays the growth of the Iraqi ground forces
although it portrays only a best estimate. They have a three
brigade per division structure on paper, but, operationally, one
division headquarters may control more brigades. The
Republican Guard structure is even more flexible.
*The seven armored divisions figure represents a combination
of armored and mechanized division equivalents. The decline
in armored divisions from six to five in 1986 probably reflects
a rearrangement of armored and mechanized brigades rather
than the destruction of divisions although the Iraqis suffered
enough casualties in the attempt to recapture Al Faw to raise
that possibility.
**The Special Forces (SF) and Marine (Mar) brigades are
actually believed to be under Republican Guard control which
effectively raises the total Republican Guard structure to about
25 Bdes.
Source: The Military Balance for the appropriate year.
Table 2: Growth of Iraqi Military Force Structure.
16


Iraqis retook the peninsula, that number had swelled to
twenty-five. It appears that the Ba'thists had correctly gauged
the psychology of Iraqi youth. Faced with what appeared to be
the certainty of military service, many elected to get the best
deal that they could. By signing up for the Guards they
received what were felt to be worthwhile rewards.48 The
campaign to expand the Guards, in our view, was one of the
more adroitly managed operations of the war. The Ba'thists
could easily have blundered and the whole affair would then
have miscarried. Moreover, a failure at this critical juncture
might have had the most far reaching adverse consequences.
Instead the plan was a political and eventually a military
success. The students who did not elect to join the Guards
reported for their summer training, in the process of which
many more were persuaded to join the Guards. It appears that
the ultimate mission of the Guards was closely held at this time;
it was not generally known that it would become the spearhead
of the campaign to end the war.49
Recruiting college students resolved another problem for
the military, and that was how to raise morale. The Ba'thists
wanted men who would wrest the initiative from the Iranians.
This would take some doing, since the enemy was riding the
crest of what appeared to be a great victory. Iran's
Revolutionary Guards, the most fanatical element of the
Islamic Revolution, were openly boasting that they would crush
the Iraqis and then march to Jerusalem. To counter fanaticism
of this sort, aggressive spirits were needed. One could not rely
on draftees for this because they had been pressured to serve
and were unlikely to be highly motivated or aggressive.
Volunteers were also preferable to soldiers already serving
in the army for another reason. Men at the front had already
been conditioned by the static defense strategy. That is to say,
they had become overly cautious and unwilling to commit
themselves to risk-taking. Getting such individuals to take the
offensive would require extensive mental reconditioning.
It is important to realize the breadth of influence that static
defense had over the lives of all the Iraqis. The strategy did
17


Previously, they had served in confidence that their loved ones
at home were protected. Now, as they began to receive word
of destruction at home, many began to desert.
By April 1988—when the Al Faw offensive was
launched—the military postures of Iran and Iraq had been
reversed. The Iranians—after the capture of Al Faw in
1986—had been elated by the prospect of achieving an early
defeat over Iraq, and now their hopes had been dashed.
Morale was probably at the lowest point in the war. Conversely
Iraq had rallied after its disastrous setback and was growing
confident that it could achieve victory.
24


CHAPTER 3
TAWAKALNA ALA ALLAH:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Background. Early in the morning of April 17, 1988, the
Iraqi Army's VII Corps and major elements of the Republican
Guard charged out of their positions around the Al Faw
peninsula and into the Iranian lines with a force that shattered
the Iranian defenses. The battle, which was expected to have
taken perhaps 5 days, was over in 36 hours and was a
complete victory for Iraq.73
This was the start of a campaign the Iraqis dubbed
Tawakalna ala Allah.74 The campaign consisted of five major
battles, accompanied by lesser engagements which ranged
over the whole 730 miles of the Iraq-Iran frontier. Tawakalna
ala Allah lasted 4 months and resulted in the absolute
destruction of Iran's military machine.
A reprise of the main five battles, and an evaluation of the
Iraqi military's strategy and tactics in the overall campaign
follows, plus comments on other aspects of the Iraqis'
performance in the closing days of the war.
Al Faw. Of the five main battles (Al Faw, Fish
Lake/Shalemcha, Majnoon, Dehloran/Zubaidat,
Qasr-e-Sherin/Kermanshah) (Figure 5), the first was the most
stunning and complex. The Al Faw attack was a two pronged
operation. There was a thrust by elements of the regular army
(VII Corps) through palm groves that skirt the Shatt al Arab
(see Figure 4). Coincident with this was an attack by the
Republican Guards along the Khor Abdullah Channel. With
the two main thrusts came amphibious landings behind the
Iranian lines.75
25



26



Figure 5. Battles of the Last Campaign.
27


had some initial success, but the Iraqi juggernaut was not long
delayed and it was a matter of hours before the Iranians were
once more in retreat.85 In the end the Iraqis captured several
hundred Iranians and seized large stocks of weapons.
Casualties were light on both sides. Again, because of the
nature of the attack, the Iranians were able to flee and relatively
few were killed or captured.
Majnoon. The third battle was for the Majnoon islands.
There the tactical approach showed more subtlety. While the
Republican Guards attacked to clear the two islands, III Corps
swept around behind the islands, protecting the Republican
Guards' east flank and severing the Iranian defenders' links to
the dry mainland.86 Initial reports reflected capture of 2,115
prisoners of war87 and other indicators of a complete collapse
of Iranian morale. In addition, large quantities of equipment
were captured, much of it abandoned. Again overkill was a
major factor. Sun Tzu cautioned that huge numbers can
become an embarrassment; Clausewitz, on the other hand,
recommended—in a theoretical context to be sure—the
maximum possible.88 Here, with adequate maneuver space
and good command and control, Clausewitz would appear
vindicated. As in the two previous battles, Iraqi troops
outnumbered the Iranians by an enormous margin, probably
as high as 20 to 1.
Dehloran/Zubiadat. The Iraqi Army's IV Corps and
Republican guards attacked at 0715, July 12, 1988, and
completed the decimation of the Iranian forces facing them by
1100.89 This battle resulted in a 45 km penetration along a 130
km front clearly shattering any remaining Iranian forces.
Massive quantities of equipment were captured, requiring four
days to evacuate. The Iraqis then withdrew declaring they had
no territorial ambitions.90
Qasr-e-Sherin/Kermanshah. The fifth and last major
engagement actually took place after the ceasefire was
declared. It was a deep penetration raid, designed to send a
strong message to the Iranian leadership that their situation
was hopeless. The Iraqi Army smashed across the border
30


where it had 8 years earlier at Qasr-e-Sherin and Sar-e-Pol
Zahab. After advancing quickly toward Kerend, some 40 miles
inside Iran, the National Liberation Army, the
Mujahidin-al-Khalq, was launched toward Kermanshah. It
penetrated as far as Islamabad (another 20 miles) and held
that town for 72 hours, systematically looting all Iranian
equipment in the area. The National Liberation Army was then
abandoned by the Iraqi Army and Air Force and was destroyed
as a fighting force by a last gasp Iranian mobilization in the
region.91
Evaluation. Because of the secrecy that surrounds
everything in Iraq it is impossible to make definitive judgments
about the Iraqi tactics. Nonetheless there are certain key
questions that can—and indeed must—be addressed. For
example:
• Was Tawakalna ala Allah conceived as a Grand
Design?
It does seem that the Iraqis planned the campaign ahead
of time, as indicated by the several references to training on
full-scale terrain models, actions which take considerable time
to develop and prepare.92
The accelerated buildup of Republican Guard troops also
argues for a Grand Design Theory, indicating that the Guard
was expanded and trained specifically for these final battles.
It played prominent roles in each of them. Table 2 shows the
growth of the Iraqi army during the war and reflects a spurt of
growth in 1988 which was accomplished in fact between 1986
and 1988. Other evidence is the fact that the battles came one
month apart; also they were fought at points farther and farther
north along the border. As the weather became hotter, the
ground dried sufficiently to facilitate the Iraqi forte in armored
operations; then, as it became too hot in the extreme south,
the Iraqis moved progressively north to fight in cooler areas.
Finally there is the Iraqis' own claim that this was all conceived
as a single large campaign. The one factor that casts doubt
on this theory is the individual naming of the campaign to
31


recapture Al Faw. This operation bore the title in public
broadcasts of "Blessed Ramadan." All other operations were
referred to as phases of the Tawakalna ala Allah campaign.
The authors speculate that Al Faw was indeed the first phase
of the larger campaign, but not announced as such. This was
done in order not to signal a larger campaign to the Iranians
and also to preclude raising Iraqi expectations too highly before
success was assured.93
• Did the Iraqis receive help planning this campaign?
The Soviets could have helped as could the Egyptians, or
the Jordanians. In the Soviet case, however, it is doubtful. The
Soviets had just refused to support a United Nations' proposal
to apply sanctions against Iran, which Iraq very much wanted
(see Chapter 6), and as a consequence, at the time of the final
campaign, Iraqi-Soviet relations were strained. The Egyptians
and Jordanians were undoubtedly present as advisors, but we
have strong reasons for believing that their advice was not
critical or solicited. In any event, we do not believe that any
foreign mercenaries were employed by the Iraqis.
• Why did the Iraqis commit such large numbers of
troops?
In every instance the Iraqis used four men when they might
have gotten by with one. They also used unusually large
numbers of tanks at Fish Lake and Majnoon, where they also
fired unusually long artillery preparations.
This probably goes back to the 1986 Congress of the Ba'th
(see Chapter 2). Most certainly a major portion of the debate
that went on at the Congress involved how to keep casualties
down. That issue appears to have been a key consideration
throughout the war and goes a long way toward explaining the
generally passive Iraqi tactical behavior. It is unlikely that the
Ba'thists ever seriously contemplated being prodigal with their
troops, i.e., taking risks with them. The authors believe that
overkill was resorted to as a way of lowering casualties: by
overwhelming the enemy the Iraqis hoped to reduce the loss
32


rate. We also have to keep in mind that when the Iraqis started
planning Tawakalna ala Allah, after the July 1986 Congress,
Iran did not have a recruitment problem. In the 1986-87
timeframe Iran recruited some 200,000 men to storm Basrah.
Recruiting did not fall off until the following year, after Iraqi
planning was well along.
• How were the Iraqis able to outperform the Iranians,
after behaving so timorously in the past?
The authors believe that the Iraqis' performance in the first
half of the war has been unfairly denigrated. The Iraqis
suffered from severe handicaps going into the war, but by 1986
many of these were being remedied.
For example, at the start of the war, the civilian leaders kept
a tight rein on the military. The civilians, who did not want total
war, refused to surrender control over battlefield operations to
the officers, fearing that they would expand the war out of
control. An examination of Iraq's performance in the initial
weeks of the war seems to prove this. Iraq's military behaved
as if it were on strings, manipulated by the civilians back in
Baghdad. Consistently, Iraqi units would move forward, seize
an objective and stop, as though waiting to be told by Baghdad
what to do next.94 This restrained behavior proved extremely
demoralizing. It confused the officers and almost broke the
spirit of the men.95
In addition, prior to 1980, Iraq had little experience with
conventional war. Its only real previous experience had been
fighting Kurds in the northern mountains. Anti-guerrilla
operations are not the same as conventional war. Iraq saw
some conventional-type combat in the 4th Arab-Israeli War in
1973; however, this experience was extremely limited.
Despite these limitations the Iraqis did not fare badly in the
initial invasion of Iran. They managed to occupy the Iranian
city of Khorramshar. Since 1948 there has been only one other
city in the Middle East that was occupied despite resistance.
The Iraqis also conducted an excellent campaign at Susangerd
33


in 1981. Here they drew an Iranian tank division into a trap and
then destroyed it, a battle along the lines of Hannibal's famous
victory at Cannae.96 The Iraqis' performance in these two
actions tells us that they had competent officers and brave
troops. They only needed to be given the freedom to perform
as they were capable.
After 1982, when the Iraqis fell back across the international
border, Saddam conducted a wholesale purge of the military,
and in the process many political hacks were cashiered from
the Army.97 After this, officers were more likely to be promoted
for merit. This provided an officer corps able to command
respect of the troops.
The repetitive dilution of the Iraqi Army through one
expansion after another also had a negative effect.98 Such
expansions always reduce the competency of a force as the
professional cadre is spread thinner and thinner.
(Commanders of the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917
and 1918 would have been completely sympathetic with Iraqi
problems.) While the Iranian force expanded as well, it was
essentially a light infantry force while the Iraqi army was heavily
mechanized with many sophisticated weapons systems, which
had to be mastered. Because of the enormous buildup of
troops, Iraqi officers also found themselves confronted with
larger formations than they had been trained to handle. The
first such spurt was from roughly 1973 to 1980. During this
period the Iraqis engaged in an arms race with the Shah of Iran.
Baghdad swore that it would match the Shah man-for-man,
tank-for-tank. The second big spurt came after 1982, when the
Iraqis realized that they were in for a long war and began to
expand their forces to meet this threat. The final expansion
came after 1986. (See Chapter 1 and Table 2.) Thus the army
at least quadrupled between 1973 and 1988. The Iraqi
commanders no sooner had accustomed themselves to
handling units of one size, than they were forced to take over
bigger ones. And, of course, the Iraqis were continually buying
more and more sophisticated arms, which had to be integrated.
34


All of this experimentation went on during the static defense
phase of the war, during which the Iraqi commanders
developed innovative tactics and superior defense works."
Some of these innovations were quite impressive. For
example, during this period they learned to neutralize the
notorious human wave attacks by developing so-called killing
zones. The Iraqis would wait for the Iranians to rush their line
and then give way slowly. They would next lay concentrated
artillery fire on the Iranians which effectively pinned them to the
ground. Finally they would counterattack with heavy
mechanized forces whose armor-protected firepower
slaughtered the lightly armed Iranians.100 Using this scheme,
the Iraqis inflicted enormous casualties on Iranian forces, the
basically defenseless Basij and lightly armed Pasdaran
(Revolutionary Guards) in particular—20,000 in the February
22- March 2, 1984 Battle of Majnoon, and 15,000 in the 1985
Battle of Badr. In 1987, the Iraqis killed between 20,000 and
45,000 Iranians outside Basrah in the terrible "Karbala V" battle
which lasted from January 9 to February 26.101
During the static defense phase, the Iraqis also built up
elaborate defenses outside Basrah. In this undertaking, they
employed the French Maginot concept. They established a
series of defensive regions which were connected by earthen
berms. Within the regions were numerous strong points. The
Iraqis, however, outdid the French by making certain that this
entire system was not only connected by an excellent road
network102 and dispersed with ammunition dumps, but that it
was backed up by a large, mobile counterattack force.103 The
armored and mechanized units of the regular army corps and
the Republican Guard performed the counterattack role with
efficiency and crushing impact.
• Did the Iraqis use gas during the blitzkrieg and was that
the decisive factor in their success?
A major component of the Iraqi defensive doctrine which
emerged during the static defense phase was the integration
of chemical fires. It was apparent in 1982 that the Iraqis were
not mentally or organizationally prepared to deal with the
35


corps in offensive battle management. The authors view this
as the key to the maturation of the army.
When they decided to take the offensive, the Iraqis correctly
assessed that the major difficulty to be overcome was inertia
(see Chapter 2). There were two keys to dealing with this
problem. The first was realistic, intensive training, which was
accomplished in part by using terrain very similar to the actual
terrain of the attack.105 The second key was exploitation of
new fighting force built upon the traditions of the already
offensively-minded Republican Guard Corps.106 As this force
was expanded, it received not only intensive training, but the
best equipment. When the time came to employ the
reconstituted Guards, no measure to insure success was
withheld. The Al Faw operation reminds one of the program
Marshall Petain resorted to following the 1917 mutinies of the
French Army. Assuring the soldiers that their lives would no
longer be wasted in futile assaults, he began a program of
strictly limited offensive operations whose success was
beyond doubt. Such an operation was the recapture of Al Faw.
Force ratios cannot be determined with certainty, but estimates
run in the range of 50 to 1 in manpower and only slightly less
in tanks and artillery. The team believes that after the initial
battle, Al Faw, the Iraqis perceived that the Iranian army had
dwindled to a shell, hence their straight ahead attack at Fish
Lake. The outstanding mystery, as we see it, is whether Al
Faw was originally conceived as the kick off of an overall
operation to end the war, or was a discrete event. The fact that
newspaper and broadcast accounts refer to it as "Blessed
Ramadan" with all subsequent operations designated as
phases of Tawakalna ala Allah seems to us to be significant.107
This would appear to support the contention that at the time of
the Al Faw battle the Iraqis had not definitely made up their
minds to seek a military solution to the war, but that after they
perceived their enemy's weakness, they went ahead.
What Were Iraq's Weaknesses? When dealing with Iraqi
weaknesses, the conclusions must be speculative since, as
noted earlier, very little is known of the decisionmaking process
that directed the transformation from defense to successful
37


In possession of a very large, mostly modern air force
which has shown itself capable of conducting deep
interdiction and battlefield interdiction missions.
Capable of, and doctrinally attuned to, employment of
chemical weapons by all available means to include
mortars, helicopter fire, rockets, aerial delivered bombs,
and rockets and artillery. These chemical fires would
routinely be integrated in defensive fire plans and might
occasionally be employed in offensive situations. If
used offensively, they would normally be fired on
artillery positions, logistic facilities in-range, suspected
assembly areas and any detected command posts.
Capable of firing large quantities of Scud variants with
conventional and possibly chemical warheads with
moderate accuracy. Whereas none of these weapons
were used in tactical roles during the Iraq-Iran War,
there is no reason to assume that they would not be
employed against the rear areas of any hostile force.
Such weapons pose significant risks to naval forces
conducting off-loading operations at some port facility
and would be likewise useful against almost any airfield
within range.
Capable of tenacious defense of their homeland and
well practiced at the tactical level with intricate defensive
systems.
Capable of, and doctrinally inclined towards fighting
set-piece battles seeking to lure their enemy into
prearranged killing zones where, once Iraqi artillery had
broken the momentum of an attack, an armor heavy
counterattack would be launched.110
Routinely practiced in the art of strategic deception.
Capable of raising the banner of pan-Arabism against
an outside force by identifying it with Israel.
39


• Viewed with ambivalence by its neighbors who see Iraq
not only as the bulwark against Persian expansionism
and Shi'a fundamentalism, but also as a potentially
ruthless adversary.
• Equipped with some of the Arab Middle East's best
educated troops. (Iraq boasts a literacy rate of over 55
percent, superior to Iran, Syria or Egypt.)
• Capable of considerable adaptation to changing
circumstances as evidenced by the tremendous
speed-up of the Al Faw operation and the successful
execution of five major operations, apparently
according to some timetable, at the rate of one a month
until the end of the war.
Based on this assessment we believe Iraq's military would
be vulnerable to a well-integrated combined arms force able to
seize the initiative and conduct battle on its own terms, avoid
the killing zones, subject the counterattack formations to
interdiction, use high quality electronic warfare, and be capable
of bringing the air war directly to Iraqi cities, thus demonstrating
the relative power of the enemy. Indeed, the authors'opinion
is that wresting the initiative from the Iraqi army is the key to
neutralizing its operations, but that would be a costly
undertaking well beyond the capability of any light force, and
would depend in large measure on substantial air assets. The
air battle could be won fairly quickly if adequate assets were
on hand, but just as any ground force will have to contend with
masses of artillery and tanks, the air forces will be faced with
substantial numbers of MIRAGE and MiG-29 aircraft with
combat experienced pilots. In short, operations against the
Iraqis would require high intensity conflict conducted by heavy
ground forces with air superiority.
40


CHAPTER 4
ROLE OF THE IRAQI ARMY
IN THE POSTWAR ERA
Introduction. The role that the Iraqi military is likely to play
in the postwar era is a critical variable in assessing regional
stability. In the authors' view, Iraq's military policies will be
restrained. Baghdad should not be expected to deliberately
provoke military confrontations with anyone. Its interests are
best served now and in the immediate future by peace. Iraq is
a resource-rich country; revenue from oil sales could put it in
the front rank of nations economically. A stable Middle East is
conducive to selling oil; disruption has a long-range adverse
effect on the oil market which would hurt Iraq.111
At the same time Iraq has enemies. In that sense, the war
solved very little. Indeed, some formerly not-too-active
foes—such as Israel—have now come to constitute a much
greater threat (see below). Iraq will seek to protect itself
against these, and to the extent that it is able it will deal with
them on a diplomatic basis rather than through force. Force is
only likely if the Iraqis feel seriously threatened.
Iran. Iran has experienced the outcome of the war as a
national humiliation. The Iranians almost certainly cherish the
possibility of revenge. Unfortunately for them, there is little
likelihood of this under present circumstances. Their country
is prostrate—simply incapable of making war against the
Iraqis, at least in the near term.
Moreover, the clerics have lost significant support among
the Iranian people for their mismanagement of the recently
concluded hostilities.112 To recoup, Iran's new leader,
Rafsanjani, must show progress on the economic front, where
he is certain to encounter opposition from entrenched interests
41


who have no wish to see the country's economy redirected.113
It is likely, therefore, that for the foreseeable future,
Rafsanjani's time will be taken up with economic matters, to
which the restoration of Iran's war-making capability will be
subordinated. Iran's leaders may bluster, but essentially Iraq
is secure on its eastern front, for at least the next 5 years.
There is, however, the outstanding problem of the Shatt Al
Arab.114
Iran almost certainly is not going to negotiate seriously on
this issue. It recognizes that as long as the Shatt is closed,
Iraq cannot use its major port at Basrah. At the same time,
inaction on the Shatt will hurt the Iranians since their major port,
Khoramshahr, is situated there. But Iran has hundreds of miles
of coast on the Gulf, and other ports; Iraq has a mere 37 miles,
and as of now no really adequate alternative facility. Iraq,
therefore, will suffer most. Despite this the authors do not
believe that Iraq will try to force a decision over the Shatt. To
do so it would have to reoccupy the eastern bank of the
channel, which it would be extremely loathe to do. Having
been badly burnt over this once, it will avoid bogging down
there again.
Iraq instead will develop an alternate port at Umm Qasr.115
Admittedly, there is a problem here—the port is poorly located
(see Figure 6). For optimum use, it will have to be expanded
greatly, and this cannot be done without encroaching on
Kuwaiti territory. Ideally, the Iraqis would like to see Kuwait
give up two islands at the mouth of Umm Qasr, which would
permit them to widen the harbor entrance. Kuwait has refused
their request, and also has refused an Iraqi offer to lease the
islands for 99 years. Following this last rejection, Iraq changed
tactics and invited Kuwait's crown prince for talks in
Baghdad,116 where it appears that the two states agreed to
disagree. Iraq is expanding the port—and in the process, we
believe, violating some portion of Kuwaiti sovereignty—and
Kuwait, in effect, is looking the other way.117
In addition to a commercial port, Umm Qasr will become
the future home of a flotilla that Iraq has bought from Italy.118
42



Figure 6. Umm Qasr and Approaches.
43


The Italians will deliver these vessels as soon as Iraqi crews
are trained on them. Once this is done, Iraq plans to sail them
into the northern Gulf—a move that Iran has sworn to oppose.
This could lead to a significant naval confrontation, to which
the United States should probably be prepared to respond. A
clash between Iraq and Iran would certainly interrupt oil traffic
from the area, and this would mean a repeat of 1987, with the
United States once again called on to safeguard the oil lanes.
With this exception, however, the authors see no likelihood
of a military confrontation between Iraq and Iran. However, we
should add this qualification—Iran will do whatever it can to
acquire the means to strike back at Iraq at a time and place of
its own choosing. Baghdad will therefore have to carefully
monitor Tehran's weapons acquisitions, particularly in the
missile and chemical fields.
Syria. Iraq has a score to repay against Syria for backing
Iran in the war, and to this end has been arming the Lebanese
Christians.119 The latter contest the Syrians' presence in their
country and make natural allies for the Iraqis. Iraq's strategy
is a sound one since it exploits Syria's basic weakness:
Damascus, which has been land poor since World War I,120
covets all of Lebanon and parts of Jordan; at the very least it
regards this area as its sphere of influence. Syria's loss of the
Golan Heights to Israel after the 1967 War was a formidable
blow to it—although its subsequent move into Lebanon's
Bekaa Valley in the late 1970s compensated it somewhat.
Iraq's strategy has been to expose Syria's continued
presence in Lebanon as self-serving. Baghdad contends that
Syria is aiding Israel in partitioning the country—a strong
argument to take to the Arab League, where Iraq aims to isolate
Syria among its fellow Arab states. Practically, it would like to
see wealthy states like Saudi Arabia discontinue, or at least
sharply decrease, their aid to the Syrians. Money set free in
this fashion could then be redirected to Iraq to help in its present
financial crisis.121 It is unlikely, however, that Iraq would go to
war with Syria over Lebanon. There is nothing vital in Lebanon
that Iraq wants.
44


Israel. The greatest threat to Iraq—as the Iraqis perceive
it—is Israel. Israel backed the Iranians throughout the war. It
practically initiated the Irangate conspiracy whereby it supplied
Tehran with TOW and Hawk missiles, and, had the Israelis their
way, they would have tipped the balance of power to the
Iranians.122 Iraq is aware that of all the Arab states it probably
constitutes the most serious threat to Israel, largely because
of its long-term potential. Iraq has vast reserves of oil, an
adequate river system and a largely literate population. It has
a battle-tested army, and great pride in its accomplishment in
the war. This adds up to a powerful state, if Iraq can ever solve
its economic problems.
Israel is most concerned by Iraq's growing missile capability
since this undercuts its strategy of being able to defeat any
combination of Arab states under any circumstances (see
Table 3). There were signs immediately after the war ended
that Israel might try to destroy the Iraqi missile sites, as it did
the Osirik Nuclear Research Reactor site in 1981.123 Iraq
responded by warning the Israelis not to try this and apparently
the threat was effective.124 There have been no further threats
along this line.
MSLS
TANKS
FA
A/C
HELOS
Libya
(SCUD)
1,980
1,720
510
53
Sudan
175
170
40
Egypt
(SCUD)
2,425
1,560
520
90
Turkey
3,730
200
500
15
Jordan
1,130
250
110
24
Israel
(Jerico l&ll)
3,790
1,400
680
77
Syria
(SCUD)
4,050
2,500
510
130
Iraq
(SCUD)
5,500
3,700
510
160
Saudi Arabia
(CSS-2)
550
450
180
20
YAR
660
380
120
Kuwait
275
90
36
18
Iran
(SCUD)
500
900
190
110
UAE
130
155
60
19
PDRY
(SCUD)
480
430
110
12
Oman
39
75
62
Source: "Middle East Conventional Forces," The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1989.
Table 3. Comparative Equipment/Weapons Holdings
of Middle Eastern Armies.
45


The problem for the Israelis is that their options are limited.
They cannot, as things presently stand, hope to destabilize the
Ba'thists with a limited Osirik-type operation. In the past such
raids were effective in embarrassing Arab rulers, who found
that they could not retaliate and so personally lost face. In the
case of the Iraqis, however, this is not possible. The Iraqis
have taken pains to scatter and harden their missile sites.
They almost certainly would strike back. In the worst case
scenario, they would release a barrage of long-range missiles
at Tel Aviv. This, of course, would precipitate an international
crisis.
Israel appears to be moving on two fronts to counter the
Iraqi threat. On the one hand it has concluded an arrangement
with the United States to develop the so-called Arrow
anti-missile missile.125 This could be viewed as the defensive
option. The Arrow could intercept Iraqi missiles targeted at the
Jewish state. Along with this, Israel is attempting to develop a
satellite system. This is a potentially offensive strategy—with
the satellite, Israel could acquire real time intelligence, and this
in turn would enable it to take out Iraqi missiles in a preemptive
strike.
In the authors' view the character of future relations
between Iraq and Israel will largely be determined by Tel Aviv.
If Israel remains determined to exert hegemony over all the
Arab states—and to this end seeks to acquire more lethal
weapons—then the present arms race will accelerate, adding
fuel to an already volatile situation. The possibility of an
accidental war cannot be excluded. Indeed, this may be
shaping up now along the Jordanian-Israeli border. Tensions
there have escalated recently due to joint surveillance
operations carried out by Iraqi and Jordanian aircraft. Israel
objects to these flights and—by way of retaliating—has begun
overflying Jordanian territory.126 This situation could easily get
out of hand.
46


Despite the tensions, however, it is our belief that Iraq is
basically committed to a nonaggressive strategy, and further
that it will, over the course of the next few years, considerably
reduce the size of its military. Economic conditions practically
mandate such action.
Iraq's Economy and the Army. Iraq currently has over a
million-man army. During the war this was required to match
Iran's mobilization, which—although sporadic—could at
intervals create large force levels (in addition to outnumbering
Iraq three to one, in percentage terms Iran has one of the
world's most youthful populations).127 There seems no doubt
that Iraq would like to demobilize now that the war has ended.
And, indeed, it has made one or two assays in this direction
but to date nothing really significant has been accomplished.128
Iraq's problem appears to be its current financial position,
which blocks the transition from a war- to a peacetime
economy. In order to mount its end-of-the war blitzkrieg Iraq
had virtually to restructure its society. It ordered a total
mobilization, a most costly operation both in human resources
and in cash. For example, the Iraqis bought large quantities
of specialized equipment for use in Tawakalna ala Allah.^29
They also greatly enlarged their arsenal of Scuds to wage the
war of the cities.
All this put the Iraqis further into debt. Now the piper must
be paid; the bankers want their money, or at least the interest
payments. The Ba'thists argue that they should be allowed to
invest in economic recovery and industrialization so that they
can become productive again and then pay off their debts. The
banks want their money now.
The failure so far to find a solution to this problem has put
Iraq into a classic bind. It cannot easily bear the burden of so
many men under arms, but neither is it abl? to return them to
civilian life as long as there are so few jobs awaiting them. And,
of course, every day that passes in which this situation is
perpetuated only aggravates Iraq's problem.
47


Iraq appears to be trying to resolve the situation on a
piecemeal basis. By bargaining hard with its creditors, it has
been able to reschedule some of its debts. Money freed in this
fashion has been invested in industrial projects. As areas of
industry are built up, Iraq demobilizes a portion of its troops.
Assuming that nothing occurs to derail the process, we would
expect to see a steady but incremental drawdown of Iraq's
forces over the next few years.
The Lean-Mean Mobile Army. Ideally, Iraq would emerge
ultimately with a lean-mean army, quite unlike the one that it
now has. The new army would function as a fire brigade,
capable of coping with internal disorders. In the event of a
more substantial, external threat, it would form the core of a
larger force.
We expect Iraq to develop a reserve system on the order
of the Israelis'. It has one of the more efficient security forces
in the Middle East, and thus-keeping tabs on reservists—and
inducing them to return to service in emergencies—should not
pose difficulties.
Under the setup that we envision, the Republican Guard
would play a crucial role. It would remain at close to its present
strength, while the brunt of force reductions would come in the
regular army. Saddam would certainly favor this option. He
regards the Guards as his personal institution since they began
as his bodyguards. Moreover, throughout the war the President
went out of his way to maintain his association with them.130
At the same time, he cannot afford to gratuitously alienate the
regular army leaders and thus will act to appease them, most
probably with large grants of cash and other rewards.131 As
long as he does not cut too deeply into the army's power base,
we do not think such changes will be disruptive.132
A move like this, to build up the Republican Guard at the
army's expense, is logical under Iraq's form of government.
Saddam is the only powerful figure in the country and the
Palace is the premier institution. It follows that the
Guard—which is an arm of the Palace—should be favored.
48


This should not be viewed as a phasing out of the army or its
disappearance as an important institution in Iraqi life. Like the
party, which also goes through down periods and then springs
back, the army will endure.133 In time of danger, or when there
is a particular need for it, it will quickly be remobilized.
Iraq will also attempt to develop its technological edge, by
continuing acquisitions in the field of missiles and other
electronic weaponry. A special department, the Ministry of
Industry and Military Production (MPA), is in charge of this.
MPA is directed by Saddam's son-in-law, a gauge of the
importance that he attaches to its work. MPA has made
grandiose boasts,134 promising to make Iraq self-sufficient in
arms within the decade. To buttress its claims, the MPA put on
an arms show just after the war, and a number of
product—which the Iraqis claimed were natively
produced—were displayed, some of which were quite
impressive. For example, they showed off an Iraqi AWACS,
actually a Soviet plane that they had refitted. They also had
on display modified MiG-23 fighters (equipped for in-flight
refueling), and naval mines. The authors do not believe,
however, that Iraq has the cash to develop a major arms
industry. The most it can do is lay the groundwork for such an
institution, which it can then build on when it gets back on its
feet financially. In the meantime Iraq will seek to acquire
whatever technology it can from the West, and from the United
States in particular. This brings us to an examination of the
central problem of our report—the future of Iraqi-U.S.
relations.
49





Thus, in our view, the Congress acted more on the basis of
emotionalism than factual information, and without sufficient
thought for the adverse diplomatic effects of its action. As a
result of the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq is now the most
powerful state in the Persian Gulf, an area in which we have
vital interests. To maintain an uninterrupted flow of oil from the
Gulf to the West, we need to develop good working relations
with all of the Gulf states, and particularly with Iraq, the
strongest.
The whole episode of seeking to impose sanctions on Iraq
for something that it may not have done would be regrettable
but not of great concern were this an isolated event.
Unfortunately, there are other areas of friction developing
between our two countries. Three are particularly
worrisome—human rights, chemicals and missiles.
Human Rights. This issue relates to the Kurds. The Iraqi
government undertook to relocate broad sectors of its Kurdish
community after the war. The intent was to clear a security belt
along the border with Iran. Initially, reports circulated that the
Kurds were being forcibly driven from their mountain homes
and relocated in the desert lands of the south. Subsequently
it developed that this was not the case. In fact, they were being
directed to new towns which the Iraqi government had built
throughout the Kurdish area. The forced relocation galvanized
various human rights groups into conducting investigations,
and articles have appeared in national publications—all of
which could be the prelude for a move in the Congress to revive
sanctions.138
The Ba'thists maintain that the security belt is necessary,
and that not only Kurdish areas have been cleared, but Arab
territories as well. Be this as it may, the Kurdish problem has
afflicted Iraq since at least 1961. The persistent revolt of this
minority has helped to factionalize Iraqi society. Baghdad has
granted a measure of autonomy to the Kurds; it is unlikely that
the Ba'thists will do more.
53


Missiles. The United States is against proliferation of
long-range missiles in the Middle East. Their presence raises
the level of violence in a region of already-considerable
instability. More specifically, the possession of such weapons
by the Arabs undercuts Israel's technological superiority and
drives it to acquire weapons of even more lethal capabilities.
This in turn puts pressure on the Arabs to seek parity with the
Israelis, and a cycle of increasing instability results.139
The Iraqis maintain that they need long-range missiles if
they are to achieve strategic depth against Iran. Because of
geographic asymmetries, all of their major cities are within
missile range of the Iranians, while Iraq—without missiles of
the range of the modified Scuds—cannot reach Tehran or cities
located farther east. Any move, therefore, by the Israelis to take
out Iraq's long-range missiles would be seen by the Ba'thists
as a causus belli, since it would, in the Iraqis' view, expose
them to Iranian attacks. Moreover, since Israel has missiles of
even greater range than the modified Scuds, the Iraqis would
regard themselves as vulnerable from that quarter as well.140
The situation has been recently complicated by Iraq's claim
to have successfully tested an intermediate range missile.
This has yet to be confirmed, but it appears from initial readouts
that the Iraqis are not bluffing, and that they have made a
significant advance.141 If true, this complicates the whole
security picture in the Middle East. With effective IRBMs the
Iraqis could erect a virtually impregnable wall around their
country, behind which they could develop an atomic bomb
(something they may have been on the way to achieving before
Israel destroyed their atomic research facility in 1981). Were
Iraq to become a nuclear power, Israel's hegemony over the
Middle East would be at an end. (See Figure 7.)
Chemicals. The United States promoted a world
conference last January in Paris to argue for a ban on chemical
weapons.142 Washington claimed that they violated canons of
civilized society, and called for a total prohibition against their
production. Iraq—and all of the Arab states—refused to go
along with the ban unless nuclear weapons were also included.
54


Middle East

— — — Jerico I & II
Modified SCUD
Notional Firing Points
Figure 7. Missile Ranges.
55


The Arabs claimed that it was unreasonable to ask for a ban
on chemical weapons when Israel possesses a large nuclear
arsenal.143 The United States refused to expand its proposal
to include nuclear weapons, and the conference ended without
taking any significant action.
In the specific case of Iraq's possession of chemicals,
Baghdad cited national security as a justification, arguing that
chemical weapons are the answer to Iranian zealotry. The
chemicals inspire panic in the fanatical Iranians, and are thus
effective in breaking up their human wave attacks. Viewed in
this light, gas can be seen as the Iraqis' most significant
deterrent.
Iraqi Fears. Iraq suspects the motives behind repeated
attempts by the United States to interfere in its internal affairs.
It is particularly uneasy about the suddenness of the American
turnaround—after seeming to support them throughout the
war, Washington flip-flopped practically overnight. Moreover,
the interference is hardly benign. The aforementioned
economic sanctions proposal could prove to be devastating to
the Iraqis. For example, under one of its provisions, the United
States would withdraw support for International Monetary Fund
loans to Iraq, virtually killing its credit rating. Along with this,
trade is to be halted, which would interdict tons of grain
currently being exported there from the United States. And the
proposed sanctions would also have halted all technology
transfers.
Of immediate concern to the Iraqis is the fear that the United
States will abort their economic recovery. As noted earlier, this
is a particularly bad time for them, when they are struggling
with an acute liquidity problem. Were the United States to
impose sanctions at this crucial juncture the recovery might be
doomed, which obviously would turn them against us. Rather
than accept this passively we believe they would try to hurt us
where we are most vulnerable, in the Gulf. They would be likely
to declare the area off limits to us. Before the war, Iraq
promoted a so-called Arab Charter to close the Gulf to foreign
military forces. It later dropped the idea because it suited it to
56


have foreigners patrolling the Gulf. But, the Iraqis could easily
raise the proposal again. To make the move effective, they
would have to line up support of the other Gulf powers. Iran is
already on record favoring such a move, and the Soviet
Union—although not a Gulf state—is as well. This would leave
only the Gulf monarchs as supporters of a continued U.S.
presence in the region. The monarchs would almost certainly
not want us to depart. At the same time they would be hard
put to resist a really determined effort by Iraq to drive us out.
The issue of foreign bases is an inflammatory one in the Middle
East, and the monarchs would not wish to be attacked on this
ground.144 Moreover, they could not look to Washington for
support, after the treatment they have received from the
Congress, which consistently refuses to supply them with
protective arms. We believe that, under pressure from the
Iraqis, all the Arab states of the Gulf—with the possible
exception of Oman—would tacitly support a move to withdraw
U.S. privileges in the Gulf.145
We stand to lose a great deal if this comes about—our naval
facility at Bahrain and the use of both Saudi airfields at Dharan
and Saudi AWACS. All of the inroads that the United States
had hoped to make into the area would be
blocked—contingency planning, for example, would be
unilateral and isolated. Moreover, there is even a possibility
that the Iraqis would invite the Soviets to take our place by
giving them port facilities at Umm Qasr. Before we draw
conclusions from this particular line of argument, we will briefly
explore the involvement of Moscow in Gulf affairs. The Soviet
factor is potentially disruptive to U.S. interests.
57





CHAPTER 6
THE SOVIET FACTOR
Background. The Soviet Union was primarily disposed to
aid Iraq throughout the war, which strained relations between
it and the Iranians. Then just before the war ended Moscow
had an opportunity to redress its ties to Iran, which it exploited.
The warming trend started during the U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti
tankers in 1987. But it was the Soviet troop withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the end of the Iran-Iraq War that really moved
it along. Iran and the Soviet Union appear now to be
developing a military, as well as an economic relationship, the
nature and extent of which remains unclear.
In Soviet eyes, Iran has strategic importance in the Mideast
arena because of its location on Moscow's southern border, its
size and its potential oil wealth. Ideally, Moscow would like to
see a pro-Soviet regime in Tehran. It would be content,
however, to prevent its adversaries from achieving
predominant influence there. Above all, the Soviets want to
lock out U.S. influence, which was paramount in the days of
the Shah.
Historically, the Soviets have been concerned about foreign
interference in Iran, believing that this would threaten its "soft
underbelly." For their part, the Iranians have generally been
distrustful of their strong Russian neighbor to the north,
notwithstanding those periods when Soviet-Iranian relations
were relatively friendly on the surface.
While the former Shah ruled Iran, the Soviets usually were
kept at a distance. The Shah saw himself as a strong ruler who
could contain Soviet expansionism, not only in Iran but
throughout the Middle East. Thus he sought support from the
United States and Western governments interested in the
region. As far back as the 1950s, Iran acquired generous
59


supplies of arms and economic assistance from Washington
to help it fight internal Communist subversion. This assistance
was matched, however, by Soviet aid to Iraq.
In the early 1970s, after the Arab oil embargo sent the price
of oil skyrocketing—and in the process brought undreamed of
wealth to the oil producers—the Shah sought to turn Iran into
a regional superpower. At precisely this juncture President
Nixon was looking for a surrogate to contain Soviet advances
in the Gulf.146 The Shah eagerly took on this role. During the
years 1972-78, he bought about $20 billion worth of U.S. arms,
which Nixon gladly supplied since he viewed the Shah as a
pillar of stability and a firm friend of the United States. Few in
Washington were aware of the potential strength of the Shah's
opponents at this time.
At the end of the 1970s the Shah adopted a more
even-handed policy toward the East and improved
Soviet-Iranian economic ties.147 The Soviets welcomed the
initiative, evidently in the hope that political gains would follow.
The warming trend could not have come at a better time for
Moscow. Once the Shah fell, the Soviets moved to capitalize
on the loss of U.S. influence in Iran. In fact, exploiting the
strategic windfall of the Shah's overthrow became, in the early
1980s, a major Soviet policy goal.
The overthrow of the Shah's regime in 1979 was carried
out by religious followers of Khomeini and numerous anti-Shah
groups, some of whom were sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
Moscow sought to work through these pro-Soviet elements to
influence the revolution. However, in an ensuing power
struggle Moscow's clients were defeated by the clerics.
Thus by 1981 Soviet-Iranian relations were chill, and at the
root of the estrangement were four factors: 1) the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and its inherent threat to Iran; 2) the
religious nature of the Iranian Islamic fundamentalist
movement (and its concomitant mistrust of Soviet
propaganda); 3) Soviet aid to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War; and 4)
60


The sales dropped off, however, in 1985.150 Direct Soviet
deliveries of small arms and ammunition also occurred through
the mid 1980s, but only randomly. All Iranian requests for
advanced Soviet weaponry were rebuffed by Moscow. The
Soviets were greatly upset when Libya sent Iran Soviet-made
Scud surface-to-surface missiles in the spring of 1985. Soviet
reluctance to provide major weapon systems to Iran was
probably due to two factors: first, it did not want Iran to expand
the war, and, second, it wanted to avoid alienating Iraq.
Origins of Moscow's Tilt to Iran. Soviet-Iranian policy
differences over the Iran-Iraq War and over Afghanistan were
the two most significant issues separating Moscow and
Tehran, and seemed to be the least likely areas for change.
But as the war wound down, and as the Soviets began to
withdraw from Afghanistan, relations improved significantly.
The origins of this improving relationship could be seen as early
as 1986. A Soviet willingness to abide by the OPEC decision
to cut oil production paved the way for a Soviet-Iranian
protocol, at the end of 1986, which provided for the resumption
of Iranian natural gas deliveries to the USSR. The protocol
was followed by a visit to Moscow in February 1987 of Iranian
Foreign Minister Velyati, the first high ranking Iranian official to
visit the USSR since the Iranian revelation began.
The reflagging controversy of 1987 gave Moscow the
opportunity it perhaps was looking for to solidify its relations
with Iran. In early 1986 Moscow agreed to a Kuwaiti request
to protect its tankers.151 The prospect of the Soviet fleet
defending Kuwaiti shipping, and thereby improving its
influence with moderate Arab states, proved so troubling to
Washington that it took on the much more ambitious and visible
effort of reflagging a number of Kuwaiti tankers. In this way
Washington was able to outbid the Russians for the favor of
the moderate Arabs. At the same time, however, Moscow was
able to exploit America's entry into the Gulf by expanding its
ties with Iran.
This was an astute move since it enabled Moscow to cater
to Iran's need for international diplomatic support. The Soviets
62


criticized the United States for militarizing the Gulf, which, they
claimed, had the effect of expanding the war. Moscow's
expressed unhappiness was no doubt genuine, inasmuch as
the Soviets are extremely fearful of any U.S. military activity
close to their borders. Further, it would appear to provide a
lesson for U.S. military commanders about Soviet perceptions
in this part of the world. Because of its geographical proximity,
the Soviets view Iran as a special case and not necessarily part
of Gorbachev's "new thinking."152
Further evidence of this occurred in August 1987 when the
two countries signed an economic accord which called for the
building of a new rail line and oil pipeline connecting the
countries.153 If realized, the oil line would be of considerable
economic value to Iran, giving it a route other than the Persian
Gulf for exporting its crude oil. The rail line, however, could
also have strategic significance for the Soviets. It could give
Moscow access to large parts of Iran, and—for those who
subscribe to the Warm Water Ports Theory—this would be an
alarming development. Even if the strategic concerns prove to
be overstated, the Soviets have, with this accord, enhanced
their position in the region.154
Limits to the Relationship—1987. During the fall of 1987,
it was unclear whether or not the Soviets would be able, or
even inclined to capitalize on their gains in Iran. At that point
it appeared that the Iranians had only sought out the Soviets
for transitory tactical reasons related to reflagging, the tanker
war, and limiting Soviet support for Iraq. Soviet-Iranian
differences still persisted over the resolution of the Iran-Iraq
War, Afghanistan, and Iran's treatment of the Tudeh Party. In
Iranian eyes, the Soviet Union was still a satan, albeit a lesser
one than America. Islamic distrust of its northern neighbor was
still a factor in the bilateral equation, although a difficult one to
measure in relation to other factors.
But if Tehran had reason to be cautious about getting too
close to the Soviet Union, Moscow also had reason to be
cautious in its overtures to Iran. The Soviets had worked hard
at broadening and deepening their relations with the moderate
63


Arab states in the region. All of these relationships would be
put at risk if Moscow moved to some form of overt military
cooperation with Iran. In addition, the Soviets did not want to
give up a bird in the hand—Iraq—for a very uncertain bird in
the bush—Iran. Soviet overtures to Iran in the fall of 1987
therefore seemed to be part of a larger balancing act
throughout the Gulf as a whole, rather than a prelude to a major
military alliance or influence relationship. Nevertheless, there
was no doubt that the improving Soviet-Iranian relationship
during the tanker war infuriated the Iraqis and made them less
willing to go along with Soviet efforts to mediate an end to the
war.
By the end of 1988 it had become clear that the motivations
behind the improving Soviet-Iranian relationship had expanded
beyond simply a tactical response to the U.S. reflagging policy
in the Gulf. Two major developments changed the strategic
picture and solidified the Soviet-Iranian relationship. First,
Iranian perceptions of the Soviet threat diminished significantly
after the Soviets began withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.
Second, the devastating Iraqi defeat of Iran left the Iranians
weak militarily and in need of a strong international ally.
Improvement of ties between Moscow and Tehran was
evident at the joint economic talks in Moscow in early
December 1988. The Soviets and the Iranians entered into an
agreement on a number of significant economic endeavors.
These include Iranian natural gas exports to the USSR, joint
expansion of the Isfahan and Ahvaz electric power stations,
and a joint effort to increase steel production at Isfahan. In the
area of transportation, the agreement calls for the free transit
of Iranian trucks to and from Baku in order to transport needed
material from Europe. Finally, it calls for joint construction of
a railroad between Serakhs and Mashhad in Iran to facilitate
intercountry travel and transport.
The more benign Iranian view of Gorbachev's new thinking
and the Soviet strategic defensive became clearer as 1988
ended. In Khomeini's first and only personal correspondence
to another head of state, the Iranian leader sent a letter to
64


Gorbachev in early January 1989 signalling his approval of the
warming trend in relations. While the letter included criticism
as well as praise of the Soviet Union, Khomeini's message was
clearly intended to defuse Tehran's ideological dispute with
Moscow in order to help expand Iranian relations with the
Soviet Union.
At a press conference upon his return from delivering
Khomeini's letter to Gorbachev, Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Larijani said the message had opened a new chapter
in Iran-USSR relations at the highest level. He expected the
economic ties between the two countries to increase threefold
in 1989. He also said that Gorbachev had expressed Soviet
readiness to participate in Iran's postwar reconstruction. The
Soviets also beguiled Tehran by signaling their intention to
implement "glasnost" in Islamic Central Asia, thus allowing Iran
some influence among the millions of Soviet Muslims living
along the southern border with Iran. (This policy will almost
certainly be reconsidered after the recent explosion in
Azerbaijan.)
The Soviets made other concessions to Iran on the
Afghanistan front where they called for increased participation
by local Shias in negotiations between the Mujahidin forces
and the Kabul government; the Afghani Shia tribes are clients
of the Iranians. There appears to be a trade-off operating here:
In return for having been invited into the Afghan political
process, the Iranians will prevail upon their Afghani
co-religionists to be more sympathetic toward the Soviets'
clients in Kabul.155
The Soviets' Afghan strategy appears to be paying off. In
the military arena, Iran had exerted influence on its clients (the
Shias, as well as other unspecified groups from among the
Mujahidin forces) to remain neutral rather than fight the Kabul
government. Many of these groups are complying with Iran's
wishes, which in turn has contributed to the pro-Soviet Kabul
government remaining in power, despite predictions by experts
that it would fall. (Of course, the massive Soviet airlift to
65


Afghanistan has also helped solidify Kabul's political
position.)156
The Soviets also shrewdly exploited another opportunity to
make inroads into Iran at the West's expense. When the
Salmon Rushdie incident erupted in February 1989, Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Iran and indicated that
Gorbachev was as anxious as Khomeini to improve
Soviet-Iranian relations. The Iranians responded positively
and in May 1989 the Iranian foreign ministry announced
publicly that Iran would sign an arms deal with the Soviet Union.
Finally, in June 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then the
speaker of the Iranian parliament—and shortly thereafter the
elected President of Iran—visited Moscow and signed a
communique which hinted at a resumption of Soviet military
sales to Iran.157
Reports on the actual discussions between Gorbachev and
Rafsanjani remain inconclusive. The Kuwaiti Press cited
alleged CIA sources saying Moscow had agreed to provide Iran
with 300 T-72 and 150 T-54 tanks as well as 200 artillery pieces
and 21,000 military vehicles.158 Other substantiated U.S.
press reports said the Soviets concluded a $2 billion arms deal
with Iran. Tehran reportedly was to pay for these arms with
shipments of natural gas to southern areas of the USSR.
These reports must be treated cautiously. Most observers
take Gorbachev at his word when he says the USSR will begin
shipping weapons to Iran, but the nature of these weapons is
all important. It is unlikely that Moscow would give Tehran
anything that would significantly destabilize the region.
In March 1989, an Iraqi paper with ties to the regime blasted
Moscow for allowing its East European friends to arm Iran.159
The Iraqis were apparently reacting to reports that
Czechoslovakia and Romania have agreed to provide Tehran
with tanks, armored vehicles, missiles, antitank rockets,
antiaircraft missiles, a naval base at Qishum Island and two
nuclear power stations. The paper charged that such
"double-dealing" on the part of the Soviet Union and its East
66


European allies serves to undermine the Soviet-Iraqi
relationship.
We do not believe that Iraq's displeasure would be sufficient
cause for Moscow to rethink arms sales to the Iranians. A
certain amount of arms-selling is bound to go on. But, in our
view, the Soviets will mainly seek to promote economic ties.
For example, during 1989 the Soviet Union and Iran began
negotiating the resumption of Iranian gas exports to the USSR.
However, substantial investment is still needed to prepare the
infrastructure, and pricing may prove contentious.
In Summary. Moscow saw the conclusion of the Gulf War
and the end of its involvement in Afghanistan as changing the
strategic equation and also providing an opportunity to improve
relations with Iran, thus stealing a march on the United States.
Moscow and Tehran are now in the process of defining the
nature and extent of their new relationship. The recent
disturbances in southern Russia do nothing, in our view, to
change this picture. It is significant, we feel, that the Rafsanjani
government did not try to exacerbate the unrest in Azerbaijan,
even though the Azeris are Shias, and thus co-religionists of
the Iranians. This tells us that the regime in Iran, as well as the
Soviets, are looking for a calm, peaceful frontier. Indeed, we
would say that Azeri unrest should drive Moscow and Tehran
closer together—the radical Iranian clerics, who are a source
of a great deal of the trouble in Azerbaijan, are Rafsanjani's
chief foes. This gives him cause to cooperate with Gorbachev
against the radicals.
But Soviet interests in the Middle East go beyond Iran.
Moscow is seeking good relations with all the countries in the
region. While Moscow views Iran as geostrategically more
important than Iraq, the Soviets do not want to lose Baghdad
as an arms customer, especially since Iraq has been among
Moscow's largest sources of hard currency earnings.160 Iraq
also has vast oil potential—the second largest oil reserves in
the world—which at least begins to offset the greater
geopolitical importance Iran has for the Soviets. This factor
will become increasingly important as the world's supply of oil
67


drops off sharply in the 1990s and Moscow and Washington
compete for Middle East oil.
Moscow's intention therefore would appear to be to develop
smooth relations with the two strongest states in the Gulf, a
delicate operation but one that is by no means beyond its
capabilities. Recent reports that the Soviets are preparing to
broker peace talks between Baghdad and Tehran in
Moscow—if true—would reinforce this view. Such talks would
not be beneficial for America's standing in the region.
Moscow's influence throughout the area would be considerably
aggrandized, particularly if the talks were to produce a
settlement, or even progress toward an eventual settlement.
To sum up, then, the Soviets appear to have played a
shrewd game of diplomatic maneuver which has left them in a
position to exploit ties with all the Gulf states. They clearly have
repaired their relations with Tehran. And, what is in many ways
as important, they have done this without completely alienating
the Iraqis. In addition, they have made inroads into the Gulf
monarchies—Kuwait has established diplomatic ties with
Moscow, as have the UAE and Oman, and it appears likely that
within the next 2 years the Saudis will open an embassy in
Moscow as well. Once the Saudis move, the remaining Gulf
states will certainly follow.
The United States, on the other hand, is, in our opinion,
losing ground. Thanks to the unremitting animosity of the
radical clerics, we remain estranged from the Iranians; due to
Congress's unwillingness to approve arms sales, our relations
with the Arab monarches of the Gulf are correct but not cordial.
And now, since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, our relations with
Baghdad have been deteriorating. We fear that,
diplomatically, the Soviets are scoring gains at our expense.
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We do not see how the flow of oil to the West could be
maintained, in the event of an Arab-Israeli war in which Iraq
and Israel were the main protagonists.161 Both states are
extraordinarily well armed, and, barring an early resolution of
the conflict—which we believe would be unlikely—the war
probably would expand to outlying areas, including the Saudi
Peninsula, where the major source of the West's oil supply is
found.
As noted above, we do not believe that a war is inevitable.
Absent any serious effort to defuse the arms race, however,
one could come about. Therefore, assuming that shutoff of the
arms race does not occur, it is prudent to consider the
consequences.
At the present time were we to try to introduce American
troops into a Middle East conflict, we would be placing them at
great risk. To begin with, we could not field a force of the size
required to adequately protect itself. We lack the necessary
air and sea lift facilities to deploy troops from bases in CONUS
and Europe to the area.162 And, as discussed above, we
probably could not count on the Gulf monarchs for support,
which means that we would have to operate from somewhere
outside the region. To be sure, if we put our whole energies
into the operation we could bring it off, but it would be
tremendously costly.
If this were almost any other part of the world we might get
by with doing nothing, but this is not possible with the Middle
East—not as long as we are dependent on the area's energy
supplies. Moreover, our dependency on oil from the region is
growing. At the start of the Iran-Iraq War we drew only 3
percent of our oil from the Gulf. By the war's end this was up
to 10 percent. And, by 1992, it is anticipated that the Gulf will
account for 15 percent of our oil imparts.
Even a temporary cutoff would cause considerable
hardship in the United States, since we recently passed what
oil experts call the peril point. We are now importing more than
50 percent of our total energy supply. It will not be long before
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A policy review should focus on defusing tensions caused
by the present arms race. Ideally, we should work for a ban
on missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons throughout the
region, with procedures for conducting spot inspections of the
facilities that produce these arms. Clearly, there are problems
with this approach: Israel and its supporters in the United
States will object strenuously to any attempt to open the
Dimona facility to inspection. (In line with this, Iraq has
indicated that it will open its missile sites and chemical
weapons plants, if Israel agrees to open Dimona.164)
Nonetheless, the attempt should be made, on the basis that
vital U.S. interests are at stake. Washington cannot tolerate a
shutoff of Middle East oil, which—as we have tried to
show—would be the likely result of a sixth Arab-Israeli war.
In working for peace, we should first try innovative
diplomacy, including the use of economic influence and
whatever nonmilitary means of persuasion we have. By all
means, we should work in conjunction with regional states.
And, in this connection, we should develop ties to the newly
formed Arab Cooperation Council, a coalition of moderate Arab
states, including Egypt, Jordan, North Yemen and Iraq.165 This
would be a way of indirectly influencing the Iraqis, perhaps
through the agency of the Egyptians.
We believe that the Soviet Union and China should also be
involved in our effort. No ban on weapons will be effective that
excludes Iran, and Iran certainly will resist complying with any
such restriction; the Soviets and the Chinese might be able to
exercise some influence here. In any event, we should not be
daunted, no matter how formidable the task may appear. Even
though we may not be able to solve the problem, we can at
least act as a catalyst to assemble the necessary forces to
launch an attack upon it.
At the same time we must be prepared to fail; in spite of our
best efforts to promote stability and peace, conflict may erupt,
in which case—as we have discussed—not only our interests
but those of our allies will be threatened. Should we have to
intervene we should seek the widest possible support,
73


including the Soviets. Even so, we must recognize that ours
will be the major effort, and therefore we must have the
necessary troops and materiel to act effectively. We are going
to need force structure, logistics, and transport. In addition,
there is worst case planning and preparation to be done. At
present we are not prepared for a test like this; at the same
time, should it come, we cannot ignore it, given our need—and
that of our allies—for oil. The choice as presented may appear
stark, but we believe our assessment is a realistic one.
In conclusion, we would like to address a word to American
policymakers on the specific question of our relations with Iraq.
The fundamental point to keep in mind, we feel, is that Iraq won
the war with Iran because of its greater sacrifice. Whereas Iran
never mobilized more than a small percentage of its population,
the Ba'thists in 1986 ordered what amounted to a total
call-up—knowing that their order could backfire on them. The
Iraqi people might have refused the regime's demand, which,
under the circumstances, would likely have caused the
downfall of the Ba'th. By complying—that is, by going along
with the regime's appeal—the Iraqi people in effect gave the
Ba'thists a vote of confidence. The regime now has a broader
political base than at any time in its history.166
The second point is that diplomatic aid from the United
States and financial support from the Arab monarches
notwithstanding, Iraq won the war through its own efforts and
skill, and a substantial amount of credit for this must go to the
Iraqi military. The officers developed the doctrine needed to
take the offensive and then drilled their troops to bring them to
a high level of proficiency. Overall, the Iraqi officer corps is
professionalized and obviously has pride in its
accomplishments. There is virtually no sign that the Iraqi army
is estranged from the regime; if anything it appears to be its
mainstay.
Thus today in Iraq we have a regime that views its rule as
legitimate, and an army that is confident and supportive of the
regime's policy; on top of which, all opposition inside Iraq has
collapsed. The Kurdish movement has been crushed, and
74


whatever Shia opposition may formerly have existed has long
disappeared. What all this adds up to is this: The Iraq of today
is not the same entity that existed when the war broke out in
1980. We should not deny the changes that have occurred.
In fact, we must do everything in our power to gain appreciation
of the scope of these changes, and of its possible effect on our
security.
75





ENDNOTES
1. This is the Battle of Karbala V in which Iran in January-February
1987 tried to capture Basrah, and in the process was badly defeated by the
Iraqis. The battle originally was viewed as a significant victory for Iran,
because it was believed that Iran, by pushing its forces to within ten miles
of the city, had exposed it to bombardment which would eventually drive
the Basrawis to flee, which in turn would destroy Iraqi popular morale
(Basrah is Iraq's second largest city.). The battle is now seen as the actual
turning point of the war, in Iraq's favor. Iran lost so many men and gained
so little territory during the battle that Iranian popular morale soured, and
recruitment fell off sharply (to be discussed later in this report). For two
divergent interpretations of Karbala V written one year apart by the same
author, see Bernard Trainor, The New York Times, March 6,1987, and July
7,1988.
2. Iraq's oil minister has claimed that Majnoon holds at least 7 billion
barrels of oil, with an estimated reserve of perhaps as high as 30 billion.
3. According to The New York Times of July 22, 1987, Saddam laid
down five principles for ending the war, including a total withdrawal of troops
to internationally recognized frontiers, a prisoner exchange, the signing of
a nonaggression treaty, a ban on interference in each other's internal affairs,
and respect for each other's way of life.
4. The Ba'th (Renaissance) Party has ruled Iraq since 1968. The best
organized and disciplined party in the Arab Middle East, the Ba'th is
structured along the lines of the Soviet Communist Party. It is extremely
hierarchical, with practically all authority vested in the party leader, Saddam
Husayn, who is also the head of state. The party controls Iraq through an
elaborate security network, of which the party cadre is an integral
component. There are probably about one million members, although only
a relatively small percentage of these are full members. One becomes a
full member by advancing through a series of stages in which one is
increasingly indoctrinated in the ideology and practices of the Ba'th. For
details on the Party see Phebe Marr's The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1985.
5. This is the opinion of Western observers in Iraq in part based on a
survey of captured Iranian arms displayed in Baghdad toward the end of
the war. Also see The Baghdad Observer, July 18, 1988, for an Iraqi
account of the weapons roundup, plus The Armed Forces Journal
International, September 1989.
6. The Iraqis gave away tanks and other equipment to their allies the
Jordanians, and all sorts of weapons to the Christians fighting Syria in
77


1988—just before the Iranians stopped fighting—said that Iran might
voluntarily end the war, not because it faced military defeat but because it
wanted to get on with the more important task of rebuilding the revolution.
Jim Muir, in a related article appearing in the same publication on the same
day, criticized the Iraqis for behaving as if they were winning the war.
14. The Washington Post, July 19,1988.
15. David C. Isby, "Arms for Baghdad," Amphibious Warfare Review,
Winter 1988, p. 53.
16. For stories on Iraq-U.S. cooperation, see The Christian Science
Monitor, November 19,1984; The New York Times, July 11,1984; and The
New York Times, September 9, 1983.
17. Other disturbing incidents were the U.S. decision to cooperate with
Israel in the production of the Arrow anti-missile missile (see
FBIS-NES-89-078, April 25, 1989), a series of articles reporting that Iraq
was developing A-weapons (see The Washington Post, March 31,1989, p.
A1), and Washington's sponsorship of a conference in Geneva to ban
chemical weapons, which the Iraqis felt was aimed at chastising them. All
these issues will be discussed later in the report.
18. For example, Iraq in 1988 expelled a U.S. diplomat, and the United
States retaliated by expelling one Iraqi from the United States. The New
York Times, November 18,1988.
19. The Washington Post, February 16, 1989.
20. "In God We Trust."
21. Public accounts tended to be negative about the Iraqi military,
although there were exceptions. The New York Times' Charles Mohr
produced some perceptive and supportive reporting. On the other hand,
The Times' John Kifner, and The Washington Post's Patrick Tyler were
consistently negative.
22. Dr. Rosenberger conducted interviews in Israel; Dr. Pelletiere in
the Arab Qtates.
23. Because the belligerents drastically censored the news, newsmen
came to depend on diplomats in Baghdad and Tehran for information. Often
these diplomats were not much better informed than the newsmen
themselves, but that did not stop them from giving their views which often
clashed wildly with reality. It was an unfortunate feature of this war—from
the standpoint of gathering accurate information—that Iran and Iraq are
probably two of the world's most closed societies.
79


24. The Washington Post, February 11,1988.
25. The New York Times, January 19, 1987.
26. The Washington Post, March 3, 1986.
27. The Economist, August 20, 1988, estimated that Iraq owed about
$10 billion to the Soviet Union, and about $26 billion to the West. The
Economist further estimated that in 1988 Iraq would have to meet debt
service payments to the Western bankers of around $7 billion, with only
about $2 billion in available funds.
28. The Military Balance, 1988-89, London: IISS, 1988.
29. David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1988, p. 961.
30. The Washington Post, April 19,1988, reported that 16 Silkworms
had been fired from Al Faw into Kuwaiti territory since Iran had captured it.
31. Saudi Arabia did briefly seek to conciliate Iran by yielding to it on
setting oil pricing in the summer of 1986, which enabled Iran to stave off
financial crisis for a year.
32. Frederick W. Axelgard, "Iraq and the War with Iran," Current
History, February 1987, p. 59.
33. The Economist, August 20, 1988.
34. Iraq has 100 billion barrels in reserve, Saudi Arabia 170 billion, the
Soviet Union 58.5 and the United States 26.5.
35. The Washington Post, February 19,1986, and February 25,1986.
36. David C. Isby, "Arms for Baghdad," Amphibious Warfare Review,
Winter 1989, p. 53.
37. The Washington Post, February 11, 1988.
38. An Extraordinary Congress would have brought together about 250
top party leaders.
39. See Frederick Axelgard, "Iraq and the War with Iran," Current
History, February 1987. This account, while overall quite good, differs from
our interpretation of what went on in a number of important particulars.
40. The Washington Post, March 22, 1987.
80


41. Efraim Karsh, Adelphi Papers 220, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military
Analysis, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987,
p. 49. Note: This and the following footnotes 42-46 are based in part on
conversations with a variety of sources in Baghdad during Dr. Pelletiere's
visit.
42. Conversations with Iraqis in Baghdad.
43. The year group 1970 would have represented 16 year olds; 1944,
42 year olds. This comes close to scraping the barrel.
44. The Popular Army was the militia of the Ba'th Party. Initially it was
manned strictly with party members. Originally it was used as a regular
fighting arm of the service, and fought in the front ranks, but it fared so badly
it was withdrawn and used to guard rear areas. At top strength it had about
750,000 troops. David Segal, "The Iran- Iraq War: A Military Analysis,"
Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988, p. 955; also Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf
War, London: Brassey's, 1988, pp. 28 and 80; also see Patrick E. Tyler,
"Western Aides Dispute Iraqi's Charge," The Washington Post, January 22,
1987, p. A27.
45. This information came to light during conversations with a variety
of people in Baghdad. It was plainly evident that the need for manpower
had exceeded the capability of the Tikriti to provide it. In this deft fashion,
the President may have also sought to use this device to bind a greater
segment of the population to him.
46. The move to entice the students into service was risky from another
aspect. Throughout the war, Iraq—unlike Iran—had forbidden Iraqis to
emigrate overseas, or even to go abroad for brief periods. This prohibition
would have fallen heaviest on the wealthy, who, presumably, would have
sent their sons abroad to escape military service. Thus, the regime had no
idea what to expect when it assayed to induct middle class youths into the
armed forces. Iran, on the other hand, which had permitted the wealthy to
emigrate—after paying exhorbitant bribes—could fairly well count on the
fact that any youths remaining in the country were willing to serve because
otherwise they would have emigrated, or else they were too poor to resist
effectively.
47. The Guard effectively went through three transformations over the
course of the war. At the start of the war it was Saddam's personal
bodyguard. As the war began, it became an elite unit, entrusted with
missions the regular army might not be able to perform. After 1986, it
became the Iraqi Army's offensive/counter-offensive arm. Edgar
O'Ballance, The Gulf War, London: Brassey's, 1988, p. 70.
48. Besides the enticements we have cited here there was also what
we might term psychic rewards for serving in the Guards. There was a
81


considerable mystique about them. Among Iraqis the Guards were the elite
of the elite. To wear the red triangle emblem of the Guard distinguished
someone as far above the ordinary. Further, according to a source in
Baghdad, some of the privileges extended to the Guardsmen were quite
extraordinary, given the nature of Iraqi society which is in all respects a
police state. Republican Guards are able to bear sidearms in public
anywhere in the capital without hinderance. To the average Iraqi this is
viewed as a remarkable concession.
49. The most intriguing aspect of planning for the final campaign is that
it was kept so secret. In a less security-conscious society than Iraq's this
would not have been possible.
50. Bob Levin, "Death in the Garden of Eden," MacLean's, January 26,
1987, p. 19; also Godfrey Jansen, "Iraq—Quietly Confident," Middle East
International, December 19, 1987, p. 10; also Alan Cowell, "Iraq's Dark
Victory," The New York Times Magazine, September 25,1988, p 34.
51. Iraq's annual per capita income when the war began was $2600.
The high living standard of before the war surely influenced many Iraqis to
go on supporting the regime, believing that a victory would bring back the
good times.
52. Iraq's leaders adopted wearing uniforms, even those not in the
army. From Saddam down to minor bureaucrats, everyone in Iraq was
militarily garbed.
53. David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1988, p. 955.
54. See for example Anthony Cordesman's critique, "Lessons of the
Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," in The Armed Forces Journal
International, April 1982.
55. The Washington Post, March 14, 1986.
56. The best exposition of this line is the Graham Fuller memo
contained in the "Report on the President's Special Review Board (on the
Iran-Contra hearings)," p. B-6.
57. Ramadan alleged Washington deliberately fed the Iraqis false
intelligence reports which led to the fall of Al Faw in 1986. The Washington
Post, January 22, 1987.
58. Ramadan consistently pushed the line that the United States was
trying to perpetuate the war to "bleed Iraq white."
82


Masses, FBIS-101, 25 May 88; War Communique #3,192, 1510 GMT 25
May 88, FBIS-102, 26 May 88, p. 13.
75. Muhieddin Rashad, "Faw-Occupation, Liberation, Reconstruction,"
The Baghdad Observer, June 25,1989, p. 4; also John Laffin, The World
in Conflict 1989, War Annual 3, London: Brassey's, 1989, p. 107.
76. Jim Muir, "Rout of the Revolutionaries," The Sunday Times
(London), April 24,1988, p. 13; also John Laffin, The World in Conflict 1989,
War Annual 3, London: Brassey's, 1989, p. 107.
77. Numbers of corps and divisional headquarters are not particularly
useful indicators of the number of troops actually employed. The Iraqis
have been silent as to the actual numbers of units committed to this
operation. On the basis of our interviews we feel confident in saying the
Iraqis overwhelmingly outnumbered the Iranians in all battles.
78. John Laffin, The World in Conflict 1989, War Annual 3, p. 106.
79. FBIS-NES-88-107, 3 June 1988.
80. Patrick E. Tyler, "Rout of Iran From Faw Still Puzzling to West,"
The Washington Post, May 3, 1988, p. A-20; also Richard Reynolds,
"Iran-Iraq: The Winning of the War," unpublished article 1989, p. 5; also
Jim Muir, "The Gulf War—Catching Them Napping," Middle East
International, April 30, 1988, pp. 4-5.
81. "Iraq's Victory Rewrites Military Science for the 29th Century," The
Patriot News, Harrisburg, PA, October 10, 1988, p. A-7; Frederick W.
Axelgard, "Iraq: Looking Beyond the War," Middle East International,
January 24, 1988, p. 19; Jim Muir, "The Gulf War—Catching Them
Napping," Middle East International, April 30,1988, p. 4; Jim Muir, "Rout of
the Revolutionaries," The Sunday Times (London), April 24,1988, p. 13; G.
H. Jansen, "Gulf War—Ominous for Iran," Middle East International, July 8,
1988, p. 14; Nadim Jaber, "The Gulf War—Contemplating Pain?" Middle
East International, June 24, 1984, p. 11; Godfrey Jansen, "The Gulf
War—Iran in Disarray," Middle East International, June 1988, pp. 10-11;
also James A. Bill, "Why Tehran Finally Wants A Gulf Peace," The
Washington Post, August 28, 1988, p. B1; Alan Cowell, "Iraq's Dark
Victory," The New York Times Magazine, September 25,1988, p. 34; Alan
Cowell, "Cease Fire Takes Effect in 8 Year Iran-Iraq War," The New York
Times, August 21, 1988, p. 6; Dilip Hiro and Kambiz Foroohar, "Upheaval
on All Fronts," The Middle East, July 1988, p. 18; and Safa Haeri, "Iran: At
A Crossroads," Middle East International, June 24,1988, p. 12.
82. War Communique #3,189, 0743 GMT 25 May 88, FBIS-101, 25
May 88, p. 15; War Communique #3,191,1217 GMT 25 May 88, FBIS-101,
25 May 88, p. 16; War Communique #33,193, 1616 GMT 25 May 88,
84


pointedly that the Gulf Arabs are not as forthcoming now that the danger
from Iran is past.
122. The Israelis were planning to sell the Iranians 3,300 TOW missiles
with which the Iranians could presumably have overcome the Iraqi's
advantage in armor. Just after Irangate was revealed, the Israeli's defense
minister, Yitzhak Rabin, blasted the United States for its "tilt" toward
Baghdad in the war (The Washington Post, October 29,1987). Rabin made
it clear that, in his mind—and presumably that of other Israeli leaders—of
the two belligerents, Iran was much to be preferred. This anti-Iraqi attitude
is not, however, shared by all Israelis. See Ze'ev Schiff's article in Haaretz,
July 22, 1988, in which he argues that Israel lost a golden opportunity by
failing to abandon its support of Iran before the war ended. At the same
time, individual Israeli scholars, like Amazia Baram, also have disputed the
wisdom of backing Iran: "If you are ready to risk an Iranian victory, then you
could be risking the very existence of Israel," he told The New York Times,
October 31,1987.
123. The Washington Post, on December 19,1988, published a report
claiming that Israel's Air Force is planning to destroy not only Iraq's missile
sites, but those of Syria and Saudi Arabia as well. The Saudis, toward the
end of the Iran-Iraq War, purchased missiles from China with a range of
2,000 miles. The same story claimed that this is why Israel is now
developing a satellite system—to provide it with real time intelligence that
would enable it to set up these raids.
124. Saddam stated in an interview in February 1989 that "direct
aggression from Israel is expected but Iraq's capabilities will certainly halt
Israel from doing what it wishes." FBIS-NES-80-032.
125. The Washington Post, June 29, 1988.
126. FBIS-NES-89-160, 21 August 1989.
127. It was a peculiarity of the Iranian mobilization process that they
would call up troops for specific offensives. The Basij would volunteer to
spend three months at the front. Those who survived had then fulfilled their
military obligation and need not return to service. In this way the Iranians,
unlike the Iraqis, never gained experienced troops. To be sure, the
Revolutionary Guard were permanent and experienced, but this cadre was
drastically reduced in numbers after Karbala V.
128. "Iraq Halts People's Militia Recruitment," Jane's Defence Weekly,
Vol. 10, No. 19, December 11,1988.
129. David C. Isby, "Arms For Baghdad," Amphibious Warfare Review,
Winter 1989, p. 53; also Alan Colwell, "Iraq's Dark Victory," The New York
Times Magazine, September 25, 1988, p. 43; also James A. Bill, "Why
89


Tehran Finally Wants A Gulf Peace," The Washington Post, August 28,
1988, p. B-1.
130. Saddam, in his speeches, refers to the Guards using the
possessive pronoun. There is also an increasing tendency to refer to them
as the "Presidential," rather than the "Republican" Guards.
131. General Rashid's daughter is married to Saddam's son. Air Force
General Shaban has been made a Presidential advisor for the military.
132. After eight years of war many of the officers would probably be
glad to quit the Service, if good jobs in the civilian sector were assured.
133. For example, after the setback of the initial invasion, 1980-1982,
the party, which had been pushed to the background, became a highly
visible presence again. For a while the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC) seemed to have equal weight with the President, and all decisions
were arrived at through a consensus of the nine member RCC. Now, the
President is once more ascendant, and the party and RCC have receded.
134. International Defense Review, 6/1989.
135. Schultz made his announcement two hours before Iraq's foreign
minister was set to appear at the State Department for official talks. The
minister walked unprepared into a barrage of media questions about Iraq's
alleged activity. In FBIS-NES-88-180, 16 September 1988, Sa'dun
Hammadi, the Iraqi Foreign Minister on the receiving end of Schultz's blast,
discussed this incident with a reporter from Al Sharq Al Wusat, and said, "I
do not understand the true motives behind this campaign. Why at this
particular time and on this scale? There seems to be a desire to punish
Iraq because it emerged victorious from the war." What Hammadi is
implying is that the whole affair was orchestrated by some group inimical
to Iraq. It is beyond the scope of this report to speculate about this.
136. The evidence rests on the interpretation of some language which
does not translate directly into specific weapons systems and leaves
considerable room for doubt. We also feel that in a matter as serious as this
there must be corroborating evidence, and there is none. At the same time,
we recognize that there are observers who do not share our view on this.
137. "Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive," A
Staff Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21,
1988.
138. The Christian Science Monitor, August 31,1989, carried two long
articles on the plight of the Kurds. It is important in evaluating reports of
atrocities to keep in mind that Iraq never denied using gas, but has claimed
that this was absolutely essential if the nation was to survive. Thus, at
90


161. Then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy said in
testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on
the Middle East on June 11,1984, that two of America's foreign policy goals
in the Middle East were to safeguard Israel and to maintain the integrity of
friendly Arab states. He added that some saw these two goals as
contradictory; however, he said, "they are complementary." We are
suggesting that, following the Iran-Iraq War, the policy is contradictory in
another area.
162. Ted Cimral and Douglas V. Johnson, The Impact of Prepositioning
on U.S. Southwest Asia Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 1987; also The New York Times, July 22, 1988, and "Navy
League's 1989-90 Resolutions," Sea Power, July 1989, pp. 49-50.
163. The Christian Science Monitor, February 2,1989; The New York
Times, February 16, 1989; The Christian Science Monitor, January 26,
1988, and The Washington Post, March 10,1988.
164. FBIS-NES-89-074, 19 April 1989.
165. An interesting article in The Washington Post, May 13, 1989,
detailed Iraq's attempts to align itself with the Arab moderates and the West.
The story concluded that under Iraq's new pragmatic stance, its foreign
policy would emphasize stronger alliances with moderate Arab states, fresh
appeals for Western technology and a less bellicose relationship with Israel.
This, of course, was before the campaign over gassing erupted in the media
in the United States.
166. Saddam told his people in a speech last November that "you
entered the war with 12 divisions . . . now we have about 70. The entire
world has not seen such a development. Neither in World War I or World
War II . . . has the world witnessed a country of 19 million producing 70
divisions. We could have formed more than 100 divisions and still
continued normal life had the war continued." FBIS-NES-88- 221, 16
November 1988.
93