(2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that
Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly
and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of
the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to-
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regard-
ing Iraq.
(b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.-In connection with the exercise of the au-
thority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exer-
cise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exer-
cising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that,
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful
means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the
United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely
to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions regarding Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United
States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against
international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, orga-
nizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.-
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of
the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended
to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.-Nothing in this joint resolu-
tion supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) REPORTS.—The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the
Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions
taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of
planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are com-
pleted, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of
1998 (Public Law 105–338).
(b) SINGLE CONSOLIDATED REPORT.-To the extent that the submission of any
report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report
on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to
Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution
(Public Law 93–148), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated re-
port to the Congress.
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—To the extent that the information required by
section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
(Public Law 102-1) is included in the report required by this section, such report
shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of such Resolution.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
SUMMARY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION
On September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush characterized
the Iraqi regime as “a grave and gathering danger” in his speech
before the United Nations General Assembly. The Committee
agrees with this characterization, and recommends, as provided in
House Joint Resolution 114, that the President be authorized to ad-
dress that danger by using military force against Iraq under cer-
tain circumstances.
The Committee hopes that the use of military force can be avoid-
ed. It believes, however, that providing the President with the au-
thority he needs to use force is the best way to avoid its use. A sig-


nal of our Nation's seriousness of purpose and its willingness to use
force may yet persuade Iraq to meet its international obligations,
and is the best way to persuade members of the Security Council
and others in the international community to join us in bringing
pressure on Iraq or, if required, in using armed force against it.
House Joint Resolution 114 contains a preamble setting out im-
portant milestones in the recent Iraqi defiance of international law
and other matters relating to the United States response to it and
to the realities of our global war on terrorism.
The Joint Resolution's operative paragraphs-
(a) express Congressional support for the President's efforts
to strictly enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq and the hope of the Congress that the United
Nations Security Council will be able to obtain Iraq's compli-
ance with them;
(b) provide authority for the President to use the Armed
Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate to (1) defend the national security of the
United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Reso-
lutions regarding Iraq;
(c) require that prior to the exercise of authority to use
armed force or as soon as feasible (but no later than 48 hours)
thereafter, the President shall make available to the Speaker
and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination
that (1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or
other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately pro-
tect the national security of the United States against Iraq or
(B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and (2)
using that authority is consistent with the United States and
countries continuing to take the necessary actions against
international terrorists, including those responsible for the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States;
(d) conform the provisions of the Joint Resolution with re-
lated provisions of the War Power Resolution by providing that
the relevant section is intended to constitute the specific statu-
tory authorization required by the War Powers Resolution and
provide that nothing in the Joint Resolution supercedes any
provision of the War Powers Resolution; and
(e) require reports every 60 days on matters related to the
joint resolution, including the status of planning for a post-con-
flict Iraq.
IRAQ'S RECORD: 1990 THROUGH 1998
In 1990, in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and ille-
gal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of
nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the na-
tional security of the United States and enforce United Nations Se-
curity Council resolutions relating to Iraq.
Congress, in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Pub. L. 102-1), authorized the President “to use
United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation


of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667,
669, 670, 674, and 677”.
After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United
Nations-sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq un-
equivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, bi-
ological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver
and develop them, and to end its support for international ter-
rorism. The Iraqi government also agreed to completely disclose its
programs, past and present, relating to the production and develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them. Iraq did not comply with those agreements. In December
1991, Congress expressed its sense that it “supports the use of all
necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization
of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution," that Iraq's re-
pression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security
Council Resolution 688 and “constitutes a continuing threat to the
peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region, and that
Congress, “supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the
goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688”.
The efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States in-
telligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that
Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale bio-
logical weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear
weapons development program that was much closer to producing
a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indi-
cated. For example, after the defection of two of Saddam's sons-in-
law, UNSCOM discovered significant, previously-unknown, weap-
ons development programs. The two men were persuaded to return
to Iraq, after which they were summarily killed.
Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the 1991 ceasefire, at-
tempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and
destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and develop-
ment capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of in-
spectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998.
In 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of
mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests
and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in "mate-
rial and unacceptable breach of its international obligations" and
urged the President “to take appropriate action, in accordance with
the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring
Iraq into compliance with its international obligations” (Pub. L.
105–235). The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Pub. L. 105_338) ex-
pressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the
United States to support efforts to remove from power the current
Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic govern-
ment to replace that regime. The Act also authorized funds for the
democratic opposition.
THE CURRENT THREAT IN PERSPECTIVE
Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of
the United States and international peace and security in the Per-
sian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach
of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing
to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weap-


ons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and
supporting and harboring terrorist organizations. The continuing
threat posed by Iraq is the motivation for the Committee's favor-
able action on H.J. Res. 114.
Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its ci-
vilian population thereby threatening international peace and secu-
rity in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for
non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an Amer-
ican serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully
seized by Iraq from Kuwait.
The question of the use of weapons of mass destruction is critical.
The current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and will-
ingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations
and its own people. For example, Iraq used chemical weapons
against Kurdish civilians of Iraq at Halabja (March 16, 1988), and
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's.
The current Iraqi regime clearly sees itself as being at war with
the United States, and has engaged in hostile acts toward our Na-
tion. The current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hos-
tility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, includ-
ing by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush
during his visit to Kuwait.
Moreover, although United Nations Security Council Resolution
688 of April 5, 1991 led to the creation of “no-fly zones” over sec-
tions of Iraq, Iraq has engaged in numerous attacks on United
States and Coalition aircraft enforcing it. Since 2000, Iraqi forces
have fired on U.S. and British pilots 1,600 times. American and
British pilots have been fired on at least 67 times since September
18th, when Saddam promised to "allow the return of the United
Nations inspectors without conditions."
Iraq also aids terrorists who have attacked the United States
and its allies, including terrorists who use weapons of mass de-
struction. The Administration has concluded that members of al
Qaida, a terrorist organization that committed the attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, and other attacks, are
known to be in Iraq. Iraq also continues to aid and harbor other
international terrorist organizations, including organizations that
threaten the lives and safety of American citizens, such as the
Mujhedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion (ANO).
The attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, under-
scored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations. The
current Iraqi government's demonstrated capability and willingness
to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi
regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise at-
tack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them
to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme mag-
nitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citi-
zens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United
States to defend itself.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United
States to "work with the United Nations Security Council to meet


9
our trading partners would suffer from economic depression. We
would be stuck with agricultural and manufactured goods we could
not sell; tourism would dry up; few would seek the benefits of our
service industries. For these reasons, safeguarding the free flow of
energy supplies has been recognized as a vital national security
concern of the United States for scores of years.
OTHER MATTERS
The Committee emphasizes that the people and Government of
the United States have no quarrel with the Iraqi people but, rath-
er, with the Iraqi regime and its policies. Neither the people and
Government of the United States nor the world community will be
satisfied with a cosmetic change at the top of the regime resulting
in the replacement of Saddam Hussein by a similarly bloody-mind-
ed relative or general. The people and Government of the United
States hope that the Iraqi people will achieve in the near future
a full measure of human rights and that Iraq will take is rightful
place in the world. This matter was brought to the Committee's at-
tention during markup by Mr. Smith of Michigan.
The Committee has supported and will continue to support legis-
lation aimed at bringing Saddam Hussein and his henchmen to jus-
tice in a specially-constituted, United Nations Security Council-
sponsored, ad hoc international criminal tribunal, similar to the
one sponsored to deal with the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The
Committee believes that Saddam should be held to account for his
many horrific, crimes. If, however, the people of Iraq propose,
through a democratic mechanism, another approach to address the
acts of who aided Saddam's regime, the international community
should consider their proposal seriously. This matter was helpfully
brought to the Committee's attention during markup by Mr.
Delahunt of Massachusetts.
The Committee emphasizes its approval of the President's deci-
sion to seek United Nations Security Council approval of a robust
inspection and disarmament force prior to the use of United States
Armed Forces; this matter was included in the introduced resolu-
tion. Helpful additional language on this point was proposed by Mr.
Blumenauer of Oregon and received favorable discussion during the
markup but the language was withdrawn as an unnecessary com-
plication to the delicate balance that had been reached on the un-
derlying text.
In the course of the Committee's consideration Mr. Sherman of
California offered an amendment, which was defeated, to remove
certain provisions from the joint resolution and recast it as being
aimed solely at the removal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
In the Committee's view, Mr. Sherman's amendment was a well-
thought out, carefully crafted, and on the whole an excellent at-
tempt to deal with the issue. However, it was the view of the Com-
mittee that the underlying joint resolution represented the best ap-
proach.


UNSCR 1115 - JUNE 21, 1997
:
•
"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a
"clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and
unrestricted access.
Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors
want to interview.
UNSCR 1134 - OCTOBER 23, 1997
"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a
"flagrant violation of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
· Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and
unrestricted access.
Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors
want to interview.
UNSCR 1137 - NOVEMBER 12, 1997
"Condemns the continued violations by Iraq' of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to
the safety of aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring
equipment
Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and
unrestricted access
•
UNSCR 1154 - MARCH 2, 1998
•
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional
and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."
UNSCR 1194 - SEPTEMBER 9, 1998
"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with” UN and IAEA
inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR
687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional
and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1205 - NOVEMBER 5, 1998
.
"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a
flagrant violation of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
Iraq must provide 'immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation with UN and IAEA inspectors.
•


24
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Saddam Hussein launched a large-scale chemical weapons attack against Iraq's Kurdish population in the
late 1980s, killing thousands. On at least 10 occasions, Saddam Hussein's military forces have attacked
Iranian and Kurdish targets with combinations of mustard gas and nerve agents through the use of aerial
bombs, 122-millimeter rockets, and conventional artillery shells. Saddam Hussein continues his efforts to
develop chemical weapons:
•
Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest
that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard.
Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled
munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads.6
•
Iraq has not accounted for at least 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred vehicle for
delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent?
•
Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical
weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants.
•
Iraq is seeking to purchase chemical weapons agent precursors and applicable production equipment,
and is making an effort to hide activities at the Fallujah plant, which was one of Iraq's chemical
weapons production facilities before the Gulf War.
At Fallujah and three other plants, Iraq now has chlorine production capacity far higher than any civilian
need for water treatment, and the evidence indicates that some of its chlorine imports are being
diverted for military purposes.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf War and
continues his work to develop a nuclear weapon:
A new report released on September 9, 2002 from the International Institute for Strategic Studies - an
independent research organization - concludes that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb
within months if he were able to obtain fissile material. 8
Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials
to make an atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially
designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich
uranium
Serveis ser
6 UNSCOM Report, January 25, 1999
7 lbid
8 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment, September 9, 2002; The International Institute for Strategic Studies


26
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPRESSION OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE
UNSCR 688 (April 5, 1991) "condemns" Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi civilian population -- "the
consequences of which threaten international peace and security." UNSCR 688 also requires Saddam
Hussein to end his repression of the Iraqi people and to allow immediate access to international
humanitarian organizations to help those in need of assistance. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated
these provisions and has expanded his violence against women and children; continued his horrific torture
and execution of innocent Iraqis; continued to violate the basic human rights of the Iraqi people and has
continued to control all sources of information (including killing more than 500 journalists and other opinion
leaders in the past decade). Saddam Hussein has also harassed humanitarian aid workers; expanded his
crimes against Muslims; he has withheld food from families that fail to offer their children to his regime; and
he has continued to subject Iraqis to unfair imprisonment. 10
REFUSAL TO ADMIT HUMAN RGHTS MONITORS
The UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly issued a report that noted "with
dismay" the lack of improvement in the situation of human rights in Iraq. The report strongly criticized
the "systematic, widespread, and extremely grave violations of human rights" and of international
humanitarian law by the Iraqi Government, which it stated resulted in "all-pervasive repression and
oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror." The report called on the
Iraqi Government to fulfill its obligations under international human rights treaties.
Saddam Hussein has repeatedly refused visits by human rights monitors and the establishment of
independent human rights organizations. From 1992 until 2002, Saddam prevented the UN Special
Rapporteur from visiting Iraq. 11
In September 2001 the Government expelled six UN humanitarian relief workers without providing any
explanation. 12
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
•
Human rights organizations and opposition groups continued to receive reports of women who suffered
from severe psychological trauma after being raped by Iraqi personnel while in custody. 13
Former Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-Janabi reported that a Mukhabarat unit, the Technical
Operations Directorate, used rape and sexual assault in a systematic and institutionalized manner for
political purposes. The unit reportedly also videotaped the rape of female relatives of suspected
oppositionists and used the videotapes for blackmail purposes and to ensure their future cooperation. 14
10 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; www.state.gov
11 Page 2-3, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; www.state.gov
12 bid, Page 6
13 Ibid. Page 5
14 Ibid, Page 5


28
•
Refugees fleeing to Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving governments, and displayed
scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims.23
in August 2001 Amnesty International released a report entitled Iraq -- Systematic Torture of Political
Prisoners, which detailed the systematic and routine use of torture against suspected political
opponents and, occasionally, other prisoners. Amnesty International also reports “Detainees have also
been threatened with bringing in a female relative, especially the wife or the mother, and raping her in
front of the detainee. Some of these threats have been carried out. "24
Saad Keis Naoman, an Iraqi soccer player who defected to Europe, reported that he and his
teammates were beaten and humiliated at the order of Uday Saddam Hussein for poor performances,
He was flogged until his back was bloody, forcing him to sleep on his stomach in the tiny cell in Al-
Radwaniya prison 25
EXECUTIONS AND REPRESSION OF POLITICAL OPPOSMON
·
Former UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur Max Van der Stoel's report in April 1998 stated that Iraq
had executed at least 1,500 people during the previous year for political reasons
The government continues to execute summarily alleged political opponents and leaders in the Shi'a
religious community. Reports suggest that persons were executed merely because of their association
with an opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison populations.26
•
In February 2001, the Government reportedly executed 37 political detainees for opposition activity.27
In June 2001, security forces killed a Shi'a cleric, Hussein Bahar al-Uloom, for refusing to appear on
television to congratulate Qusay Saddam Hussein for his election to a Ba'th Party position. Such
killings continue an apparent government policy of eliminating prominent Shi'a clerics who are
suspected of disloyalty to the government. In 1998 and 1999, the Government killed a number of
leading Shi'a clerics, prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999 to express his concern to the
government that the killings might be part of a systematic attack by government officials on the
independent leadership of the Shi'a Muslim community. The government did not respond to the
Special Rapporteur's letter. 28
There are persistent reports that families are made to pay for the cost of executions. 29
Saddam Hussein destroyed the southern Iraqi town of Albu 'Aysh sometime between September 1998
and December 1999.30
23 Page 4, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, March 4, 2002; US Department of State: www.state.gov
2* Iraq - Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners, Amnesty International, web amnesty.org
25 Page 4, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, March 4, 2002; US Department of State, www.state.gov
26 ibid. Page 1
27 lbid, Page 2
28 ibid. Page 2
29 Ibid, Page 4
30 Iraq - Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners, Amnesty International; web amnesty.org