5
those capabilities can be measured by the well-over $100 billion in
national income that the leadership has chosen to forego rather
than to meet its disarmament obligations and have the sanctions
removed.
No inducements or blandishments, not even the growing prospect
of military action by the Bush Administration, are likely to produce
a genuine change of heart and a decisive and credible change of be-
havior as far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned.
Given these considerations, one must conclude that the only reli-
able and durable way of preventing Iraq from regenerating and en-
hancing its weapons of mass destruction and proscribed missile ca-
pabilities is to replace the current regime with one that is prepared
to abide by its international obligations. A consensus seems to be
developing in Washington in favor of regime change in Iraq. The
debate is no longer over whether but over when and how.
This hearing has not been convened to discuss the questions of
when and how, but because a strategy for regime change is likely
to take additional time to develop, to prepare for, and to execute,
anywhere from several months to perhaps a year or even more, we
should give consideration to the interim steps we should be taking
now to address the Iraqi WMD threat.
An important interim step is scheduled to be taken May 30. It
is to revise the current UN sanctions regime so as to expedite the
delivery of a wider range of civilian goods to the Iraqi population
while focusing the trade restrictions more narrowly on dual-use
items that could contribute significantly to proscribed weapons pro-
grams. By reducing the workload for U.S. reviewers, these smarter
sanctions could enable them to give closer scrutiny to the most sen-
sitive cases. And by reducing delays in the approval of goods for
the Iraqi people, they could help shore up international support for
the remaining more tightly focused restrictions on Iraqi imports.
Another interim step would be to minimize Iraq's illegal oil sales.
The proceeds from these sales go directly to Baghdad rather than
to the UN escrow account. They give Iraq the income to purchase
clandestine imports for its military programs. Because Iraq makes
these illegal sales at heavily discounted prices, it will be hard to
get the purchasers, including Syria and U.S. friends, Jordan and
Turkey, to limit them or to put them under the Oil-for-Food Pro-
gram. But it is important that we press them to do so.
The United States should also seek to reduce Iraq's illicit im-
ports. It should urge Iraq's neighbors to adopt a much more serious
approach to j trade and should offer them tech-
nical and material assistance to help them screen cargos more ef-
fectively.
The administration should also press key states that trade with
Iraq, including Russia and China, to exercise much more rigorous
scrutiny and control over exports to Iraq. And we should be work-
ing aggressively with other governments to interdict sensitive car-
gos headed to Iraq when we receive information about such ship-
ments.
Another possible interim step would be the return of UN inspec-
tors to Iraq. In recent weeks, President Bush and his advisers have
repeatedly called on Iraq to readmit the inspectors. But at times,
including in Secretary Rumsfeld's recent appearance on “Face the


6
Nation,” administration officials have expressed skepticism about
the value of resuming UN-mandated verification in Iraq.
Among the concerns expressed about UN inspections is that the
inspectors wouldn't have the same intrusive inspection rights as
the UN teams that operated before December 1998. Another con-
cern is that they wouldn't find or learn much of value and that
they would end up giving Iraq an unwarranted clean bill of health
and actually facilitating the removal of sanctions.
Much of this concern is exaggerated. The new UN Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, would have the
same inspection rights, at least on paper, as their predecessors. UN
resolutions make clear that Iraq must cooperate in all respects and
make progress in resolving key remaining disarmament tasks be-
fore the Security Council can even give consideration to suspending
sanctions, and sanctions cannot be lifted altogether until all out-
standing disarmament issues are resolved.
Moreover, suspending or lifting sanctions would require an af-
firmative decision by the UN Security Council, and, of course, the
United States will have a veto in any such decision.
Now, it is true that inspectors would rarely, if ever, be able to
find anything that Iraqis have taken pains to conceal. If they ap-
proach anything incriminating, we would expect the Iraqis to deny
them access. But even if the inspection teams are unable to ferret
out and expose hidden capabilities, they may nonetheless be of
§. in terms of understanding and constraining the Iraqi WMD
threat.
In particular, the installation of sophisticated monitoring equip-
ment at hundreds of locations and the constant movement of in-
spection teams around the country would complicate Iraq's covert
programs, making it somewhat harder and more expensive to keep
those efforts hidden and probably slowing the pace and decreasing
the scale of those programs.
Monitors would give us a better appreciation of Iraq's missile
programs and their breakout potential. They would also provide as-
surance, as long as they had access and their equipment was oper-
ating, that illicit production was not taking place at known dual-
use and other suspect facilities. But this brings me to the most se-
rious shortcoming of renewed UN verification.
At their very best, the inspectors can complicate, constrain, and
slow down Iraq's clandestine efforts and give us a better picture of
what is going on in Iraq than we have today. But they cannot com-
pel Iraqi compliance and, therefore, cannot put an end to the WMD
threat posed by Iraq. In other words, they can contain the problem,
but they cannot solve it.
Moreover, having the inspectors in Iraq could complicate a strat-
egy of regime change. It would give other countries, including the
Europeans and states of the Middle East, an excuse for arguing
that military action should be deferred while inspections are given
a chance to resolve the WMD problem.
All this said, the debate about whether the inspectors should re-
turn is probably moot. So far, Iraq has given no indication that it
is willing to allow the inspectors to go back on terms that the
United States could conceivably support.


8
Second was that Iraq's WMD capacities were not extensive nor
really significantly indigenous. I still remember the intelligence
briefs I received as we were ending up the nuclear side of the in-
spection about what Iraq had. It was a program that had spent a
lot of money, had accomplished very little, and most of which had
been taken care of anyway by the air campaign.
Third, it was a post-Saddam Iraq–and that was the assumption
of most people as we entered the inspection—that a post-Saddam
Iraq would declare to UNSCOM all of its WMD capacities.
And, fourth, that UNSCOM would be able to “destroy, remove,
or render harmless” in terms of the UN resolution Iraq's WMD ca-
pacity, leaving an Iraq that did not have such a capacity. And the
assumption going in was this was probably a 90-day effort or, at
most, 6 to 9 months. How wrong assumptions can be.
Let me just dwell on one of those assumptions that is still be-
deviling us today. We did not understand the impact that the dis-
covery of such a gigantic spread and indigenous WMD program
would have on our future efforts to, in fact, contain that program.
Iraq's nuclear program—and it is true of the BW, chemical, and
missile program as well—spanned over a decade, spent over $20
billion, employed 40,000 Iraqis, and accomplished much—all of the
technical steps on these programs are well understood, and most
of the production steps where the real problems arose, in fact, had
been overcome.
Iraq is not like a Libya. Iraq that we face today is much more
like Germany at the end of the First World War under a Versailles
regime and inspectors. It is an indigenous capability.
The capability to produce weapons of mass destruction that
arises from a national program on this scale is one that to elimi-
nate by inspection is, quite frankly, a fool's errand. We have under-
estimated entirely what inspections—we have overestimated at the
beginning what inspections could accomplish. And let me hesi-
tate—stop here to say inspectors accomplished a great deal. In the
nuclear area, for example, UN inspections destroyed more nuclear
facilities than were destroyed by the coalition air force during the
Gulf War, simply because we were able to find facilities that were
not known before.
But to compress a lot of history, in December 1998, when the
United States conducted military actions against Iraq, all inspec-
tions ended. It took a year later to bury UNSCOM, but, quite
frankly, inspections had been net down to an almost insignificant
point by 1996 and 1997. The ending of UNSCOM was almost a hu-
manitarian effort.
The regime that replaced UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, which it took a
year to negotiate, was to be more acceptable to Iraq, led by a com-
missioner that Iraq and Iraq sympathizers on the Security Council
would find acceptable. Indeed, the Secretary-General's first choice
for that job was rejected by the Russians and the French.
Even under these more favorable inspection regimes, Iraq has
still refused to this day to allow inspections into Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, you posed a series of what I think are critical
questions about the Iraqi nuclear program, where it is today, what
impact UN sanctions have had on it, and what are the options for
dealing with this in the future. Let me try to just quickly give you


14
and smallpox virus, as well as anti-animal and anti-crop agents.
We cannot forget the economic devastation that could be wreaked
upon the United States with the import of anti-crop and anti-ani-
mal agents.
Iraq clearly places a very high priority on its BW program, not
only the monetary cost but they considered it was vital to their na-
tional security and, perhaps more important, the security of the re-
gime.
A senior Iraqi official stated that BW was perceived as a power
weapon and would influence its neighbors to see things Iraq's way.
Senior Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated that BW was a vital
armament step, at least until it had a fully developed nuclear capa-
bility.
The continued Iraqi interest in BW terrorist research and devel-
opment would undoubtedly evolve to meet changing situations and
can be expected to be retained even after the development of its nu-
clear capability.
The opinion by international experts after Iraq's program was
disclosed has not significantly changed. But at the political-diplo-
matic level, some countries' experts' concerns were not reflected in
the verbiage and actions by the respective leaders and diplomats
that Dr. Kay touched upon.
In spite of the lip service that is given to getting inspectors back
into Iraq, there does not seem to be any material change in the dis-
parity between the experts' concern and the diplomatic imperatives
and, consequently, in the support that an inspection regime might
expect from P-5 members.
Most of the proposals for getting inspectors back into Iraq are
based on the premise that any inspectors are better than none. To
be blunt, that is pure garbage, just an illusion of inspections.
Iraq's past behavior in restricting monitoring and inspectors' ac-
tivities is likely to be repeated. Such limitations would make a
monitoring regime a farce, which would be worse than no inspec-
tors at all, because it would provide an inappropriate illusion of
compliance to the world community.
I was told by a senior diplomat in 1998 that it would not matter
if a BW-laden Al Hussein warhead were placed on the Security
Council table. It would not change opinions about lifting sanctions.
He added further, if the CW and missile files are closed, the world
will not care about biology.
It appears to me that this may still be the viewpoint of several
nations. This attitude does not address the terrorist threat posed
by Iraq's WMD programs. One would think after September 11 a
more realistic appraisal of Iraq’s capability and willingness to use
WMD as terrorist weapons would be forthcoming. The public rhet-
oric is not encouraging.
Iraq’s BW component from its inception, I would like to remind
this panel, included a terrorist component. Sanctions had very little
impact on the maintenance and expansion of Iraq’s BW capability.
New equipment and supplies were continuously being seen at sites
under monitoring by both resident as well as non-resident BW in-
spection teams. Such items should have been declared to the Spe-
cial Commission but were not.


17
The only way to end the Iraq WMD program is to end the rule
of Saddam Hussein. The appropriate application of military force
is to achieve a regime change. You will never accomplish limiting
a WMD program by striking facilities, deception, denial, and all.
And I must say I do not think time is on our side in this regard.
I am convinced that if Saddam believes we are going to end his
rule, he will use WMD. I do not see any advantage to giving him
additional time to prepare for that use of WMD against U.S.
troops.
Senator AKAKA. Dr. Spertzel.
Mr. SPERTZEL. I pretty much agree with what Dr. Kay said. I be-
lieve Iraq would actually set up a confrontation just to have the
United States—if they thought the United States would do it, end
up bombing a nursery school. They have been known to do that in
the past. There is no reason to believe that they would do other-
wise in the future.
Furthermore, this requires, again, the UNMOVIC knowing that
a site needs to be inspected. And I don't see that happening.
Senator AKAKA. Dr. Spertzel, UN Resolution 1284 states that the
new UN inspection team will be staffed by mostly new and, there-
fore, inexperienced personnel. Under these conditions, how effective
and how reliable do you think the new team's findings will be?
Mr. SPERTZEL. The new team's—I should start out by saying that
I helped to teach the first team, and it is a question mark how new
that first group of trainees were, because I knew them all on a
first-name basis.
But having said that, they have received additional new ones,
and they have gone through extensive training. The value of that
training to the real situation in Iraq, I think, is pretty much of a
moot point.
New inspectors are going to fumble in the beginning. I think I
can illustrate this best by stating what happened on one of our in-
spection teams, when we got out of Iraq and a new member who
had been to Iraq for the first time said, “Why were you so tough
as a team on Iraq” They sounded perfectly plausible to me, the ex-
planations they were giving.”
We had this same individual on another inspection about 2
months later, and about halfway into the second day, he turned to
me and said, “Now I know why you were so tough the first time.”
It takes that learning curve that is only gained by actually on-
the-ground doing it. So the simple answer to your question is, in
the beginning it is going to be a tough job for them. This comes
back to a statement that Dr. Kay made about rebaselining. I don't
think they can do it in 6 to 9 months' time.
Senator AKAKA. Mr. Einhorn, there have been reports about Iraq
developing an unmanned aerial vehicle program. How concerned
should we be at this time about this program, especially as it re-
lates to biological or chemical weapon agent delivery?
Mr. EINHORN. Mr. Chairman, I think we should be concerned.
We are aware that the Iraqis have taken trainer aircraft and
sought to adapt them for unmanned use. I believe they have had
special modified spray tanks that they have tried to hook up to
such a vehicle. And the assumption is that this was for delivery of


20

ly for a few weeks or months, but sooner or later, I think the
inspectors will be prying, will be demanding and so forth, and Iraq
will not be cooperative, and there will be another confrontation.
And Saddam recognizes that will be used by the administration as
a very good reason to use military force to try to resolve the prob-
lem. So he can look down the road and see that this is not going
to lead anywhere very—
Senator THOMPSON. Even if we can’t get unanimity in the UN
Security Council.
Mr. EINHORN. I think he knows—he may be confident, as Dr.
Spertzel says, that the Bush Administration will be dissuaded by
some of the concerns of Europeans and so forth. He may feel that
now. But I think as time goes on, he will recognize that this admin-
istration is committed to move forward, and that will put him even-
tually in a pretty tight spot. And I wouldn't rule out his making
certain conditional offers to admit inspectors. I don't think he is
there yet, but I think he will make those offers.
Senator THOMPSON. That is very interesting.
Could I ask the indulgence of my colleagues for one more quick
question? This is the idea, Dr. Kay, that you alluded to or the point
you made concerning the public relations battle that I believe we
are losing, if not lost, in terms of the starving children. I have had
people from Tennessee come up and say that they have talked to
Iranian officials. Some of them have been down there and, you
know, pointed out the effects of what we are doing are having on
the poor people down there. Is there any objective thing that we
can point to? Is the oil-for-food account set aside with money in it
under the auspices of the United Nations that you can point to and
say here is $1 billion he is not using? Obviously we know he is
smuggling oil in and getting a lot of money from that. I mean,
maybe that is a little bit more difficult for people to buy. But what
do we do about that? That is the mantra that you hear all the time
now in terms of our terrorist activities.
Mr. KAY. Senator, it is a very sore point. There are factual things
you can point to. The program was never—the limitation of imports
never applied to food and medicine. In fact, sometimes I resort to
pointing out what is actually imported—a liposuction machine. One
would not think that a liposuction machine in Iraq would be a
high-priority import, although if you look at some senior Iraqi offi-
cials, you can understand their desire for it. [Laughter.]
Mr. KAY. But, look, I confess, Senator Thompson, this is a battle
I think we didn't fight. We certainly at least didn't fight it well. It
is a battle that is lost. I think we now need to focus on the main
issue, that is, getting rid of the regime. The thing that will improve
the health and well-being of Iraqis today more than anything else
is the removal of Saddam Hussein and his family from power.
Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Einhorn.
Mr. EINHORN. Yes, Senator Thompson, there are some objective
things you can point to. You are correct, the Oil-for-Food Program
allows Iraq to export oil, but the proceeds must go into a UN es-
crow account, and those funds are to be used for the civilian, hu-
manitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
The balances have remained very high. At the beginning, the
Iraqis drew down those funds for civilian products. Now they have


25
tantly, I was actually flying back from Honolulu on Sunday and so
didn’t hear what he said on “Meet the Press” or “Face the Nation.”
Inspectors—and Bob Einhorn referred to it. There is no sub-
stitute for people on the ground. We certainly used information
from defectors. We used information, at least while I was there,
from any source we could. But we made genuine discoveries. The
Iraqis made stupid mistakes, and we unraveled them. They lied
and we detected those lies and pulled them apart. It is not true
that all the information was discovered as a result, at least in the
nuclear area, as a result of defectors—although I welcome defec-
tors, let me be clear.
Mr. SPERTZEL. And with all due respect to Secretary Rumsfeld—
and thank you for asking that question because I welcome the op-
portunity to reply to his statement. In bio, that absolutely is not
the case. If I had to cite one single item that may be the most im-
portant, it would have been the import of supplies and equipment,
the records that we were able to obtain from suppliers. That be-
came the crucial item that forced Iraq to acknowledge their pro-
gram, and the information that we had up until July 1, 1995 when
Iraq first acknowledged their biological warfare program, none of
it came from defectors.
Now, as Dr. Kay said, certainly I would welcome defector infor-
mation. Now, Hussein Kamel Hassan's defection did not add any-
thing to the bio program other than perhaps stimulate Iraq to
make further elaboration, but it wasn’t information that we ob-
tained from him.
Now, there were later defectors and one very crucial one that
would have led us to a site in January 1998 that the information
received from that defector, as well as corroborating evidence from
other sources, would have indicated an active bio research and de-
velopment facility, except the whole system came to a screeching
halt in challenge inspections in January 1998 and unfortunately
got billed as a palace issue, which it had nothing to do with pal-
aces. We had arranged to have three bio teams in-country at the
same time, and we were going to join the inspection team of Scott
Ritter to go to that site. But they got blocked the day before.
So, yes, defector information is valuable, but I think it played a
minor role, not a major role.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you.
Mr. Einhorn, an Iraqi defector said he personally worked on ren-
ovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons in underground wells, private villas, and under a hospital
in Baghdad as recently as a year ago. Do you believe that these
sites are used primarily to hide activities or to discourage military
action against the sites in the future? And what recourse does the
United States have against such facilities?
Mr. EINHORN. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of the specific re-
ports. They are certainly plausible to me, given past Iraqi behavior.
They may feel that by hiding proscribed materials in places like
that, it would be difficult to inspect without arousing public opin-
ion, that they could have some degree of immunity from the effects
of inspection. So it is entirely plausible to me that they would
adopt that strategy. These gentlemen (the other witnesses) are


27
material that Iraq had in 1990 is still there and that the IAEA
teams can come in and still cite, oh, yes, there is X number of
pounds of substance X, and it is aimed at that, not whether they
have accumulated anything else.
Mr. KAY. That is absolutely the case.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Thompson.
Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator AKAKA. More questions?
Senator THOMPSON. Yes, sir.
Dr. Spertzel, you made reference to the fact that from the very
beginning their WMD program—perhaps you were referring spe-
cifically to the biological program—had a terrorist component.
What did you mean by that? Could you elaborate?
Mr. SPERTZEL. Yes. I was referring to the bio, although at least
initially it was true for the chemical as well. When the bio program
was established by Iraq in 1973, perhaps late 1972, under the Al-
Hazen Ibn Al Haithem Institute, the program was established to-
tally by the intelligence organization with some technical input as
well by the military, but all funding and guidance came through
the intelligence.
The nature of the studies that they were conducting, the types
of organisms that they were evaluating and so on indicated two
types of delivery: Those that would be of interest to the military
for tactical and strategic reasons, and those that would be only of
value used in a clandestine terrorist fashion.
And, in fact, the initial efforts with the wheat smut, wheat cover
bunt, anti-crop agent was developed to be delivered covertly and
was the initial efforts in an unmanned, albeit in this case a very
small drone as a delivery means. The initial efforts appear to have
been aimed at Iran, but later the interest changed.
There was also a variety of interesting other agents that are of
only utility for terrorist application.
Senator THOMPSON. Their biological program is still under the
intelligence organization, isn't it?
Mr. SPERTZEL. Yes, sir. There was a period perhaps from about
1979 to 1983—I am sorry, 1986 or 1987 when the military piece
was under DOD–Ministry of Defense, and then brought—in 1987
it was brought back under the umbrella of the intelligence service.
By that time the intelligence service had split into two different or-
ganizations. In this time, it was under the special security organi-
zation that is currently headed, I believe, by Saddam's oldest son.
Senator THOMPSON. So you attach significance to that, the orga-
nizational structure, and looking at it from a terrorist or potential
terrorist standpoint. That would be the main reason you think that
it would be organized that way, because it would not strictly be
military or defense usage.
Mr. SPERTZEL. That is right. The program, as it appears to be de-
signed, is for either the last-gasp, if you like, protection of the re-
gime as well as the second side, which appears to be from the very
beginning aimed at terrorist application, terrorist usage, wherever
the regime felt necessary.
Senator THOMPSON. Could you elaborate on that a little bit? I
guess to me that issue would depend upon, of course, its usage. De-
veloping the biological weapons themselves, I suppose, could be


28
done under any structure. But is there anything that you see in
terms of their usage or their preparation that would indicate an of-
fensive intent? You mentioned maybe a last-gasp situation where
it is a fallback to be used in case they are about to be overrun or
something, which would be serious enough in and of itself. But is
there anything in addition to that that would indicate to you some
potential offensive usage?
Mr. SPERTZEL. From the military standpoint or terrorist stand-
point? The military—
Senator THOMPSON. From a terrorist standpoint.
Mr. SPERTZEL. From the terrorist standpoint, because the Com-
mission made almost an active effort not to delve into the terrorist
side of it, we have very little information to go on.
Senator THOMPSON. Why was that?
Mr. SPERTZEL. It was deemed that it was not part of the mandate
of Resolution 687.
Senator THOMPSON. So we don't know as much about potential
terrorist capability or intention as we perhaps could have.
Mr. SPERTZEL. Absolutely.
Senator THOMPSON. That leads me to something else. You men-
tioned—I think, Dr. Kay, it was you who indicated that in terms
of what they were doing from a nuclear standpoint, that our intel-
ligence estimates were off. Would you elaborate on that a bit, and
Dr. Spertzel also, in terms of bio? How does what we found when
we were in over there or anything that we may have determined
later compare with our intelligence estimates that we had going in?
We know from the Rumsfeld Commission, for example, that we
were off quite a bit in terms of some countries, in terms of some
capabilities. Dr. Kay, I assume that was the case that you alluded
to. Could you elaborate on that a bit?
Mr. KAY. Well, in the nuclear program, the prevailing intel-
ligence estimate was that the Israeli action against Osiraq reactor,
which occurred in June 1981, had substantially derailed the Iraqi
nuclear program, that the principal evidence seen in the period
from 1981 to the Gulf War was a shop-until-you-drop mentality,
that is, Iraq had a lot of money and they were buying a lot of
things and that there wasn't substantial doubt that they were try-
ing to pursue a nuclear program, but that it seemed to be chaotic
and not very close and not focused.
And there were less than a dozen facilities identified as target
points during the course of the coalition air campaign as being de-
j. known to be nuclear facilities or thought to be nuclear fa-
cilities.
When we got on the ground, we found that instead of that, what
the Iraqis had done is they had pursued a systematic Iraqi Man-
hattan Project designed to procure high-enriched uranium using lit-
erally all the known methods, the Tarmiya, the central—the first
place we found the centrifuge—or, pardon me, the calutron pro-
gram, EMIS program, electromagnetic isotope separation program,
was, Senator Thompson, you will be happy to know, an exact dupli-
cate of a facility that exists in your §t. What the Iraqis had
done is come here, and quite openly because it was unclassified,
buy the blueprints of where we produced high-enriched uranium at
Oak Ridge using calutrons, and just built a plant. They had also


29
had a centrifuge program that had produced a building, what is
called Al Furat, that was not known to U.S. intelligence until in-
spectors discovered it. And let me make this point: This was not
as a result of a defector. We discovered that in the course of an in-
spection because an Iraqi official made a mistake in how he de-
scribed the program, and we went there. It was larger than any
centrifuge plant that exists in Western Europe or the United
States, that if the war had not intervened, right now we would be
facing an Iraq, if they had overcome the production problems, that
would be producing a very large amount of high-enriched uranium.
They also produced a chemical enrichment program. They were
trying laser enrichment, which probably would have only consumed
a large amount of money and not produced nuclear material. That
has been our experience with it. But it was an all-encompassing
program. The scope, scale, and dimension was much larger than
was known by anyone.
Let me not throw stones at the U.S. intelligence community. I
did not receive a briefing from any other country's intelligence com-
munity that indicated they knew that scope.
Senator THOMPSON. This plan with regard to the Oak Ridge facil-
it...was this a blueprint you discovered, or what was it, did you
say:
Mr. KAY. We actually discovered the plant, and—
Senator THOMPSON. They had duplicated the plant?
Mr. KAY. They had duplicated the plan. They built it to the plan,
and the way we discovered it is a testimony to actually the knowl-
edge in the U.S. program, although the individual has since passed
away. We brought the photos back, spread them out on the table,
asked one of the Oak Ridge designers, who was still alive and still
working there, 80 years old, in that plant, didn't tell him what it
was except a facility in Iraq. He walked around, looked at the pic-
tures, and said—and I will never forget the statement—“I know
this plant. I work in this building every day of my life.” And sure
enough, as we took the plant apart and then we discovered the
blueprints later, it had been built to a set of U.S. plans.
Senator THOMPSON. How do you account for that?
Mr. KAY. Well, the plans are openly available. You could go today
and buy them. We declassified—the calutron program, the EMIS
program, was one that the United States abandoned because gas-
eous diffusion came on line and was far more efficient. When we
were doing calutrons during the course of the Second World War,
it took approximately one-half of the available U.S. electric supply
and all the silver that was stored by the Treasury to use to wrap
magnets in. It was a very inefficient way. The Iraqis had improved
on it. They pursued it because they correctly guessed that no one
would think anyone would be so stupid as to use that means of en-
richment.
And, in fact, the first assessment that came back to the United
States, two Nobel Prize winners were asked to evaluate it, and
their exact comment was, “It can’t be that. No one would be so stu-
pid to do that. There are better ways to produce.”
There is a lesson for us here. There were some very old ways and
still are very old ways of producing weapons that are quite destruc-
tive.
78-624 D-3


40
countries, including the Europeans and states of the Middle East, an excuse for arguing that
military action should be deferred while inspections are “given a chance” to resolve the WMD
issue.
Risks are not as great as feared
Some of the concerns of the skeptics are exaggerated. On paper, at least, UNMOVIC has
the same rights as UNSCOM. Security Council resolution 1284 states that “Iraq shall allow
UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas,
facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect.”
Moreover, while UNMOVIC’s operating style would be less aggressive than that of UNSCOM,
what we know about UNMOVIC's leadership and its plans for resuming work in Iraq suggests
that the new body would carry out its mandate in a meticulous and thoroughly professional
manner. Hans Blix, UNMOVIC’s Executive Chairman, has taken the view that “cosmetic
inspections are worse than none,” and that the Security Council has not authorized him to
provide Iraq any “discounts” on its obligations.
With respect to concerns about the hasty suspension of sanctions, Security Council
resolution 1284 prescribes a necessary sequence of milestones that must precede any decision on
suspension. Given the need to set up equipment, re-establish a monitoring baseline at hundreds
of sites throughout Iraq, approve a work program, and evaluate the degree of Iraqi cooperation
for a required length of time (120 days), such a decision could come no sooner than about 9-11
months after the inspectors returned.
With respect to concerns about Iraq receiving an unwarranted clean bill of health, resolution
1284 makes clear that no decision to “suspend” sanctions can be taken until UNMOVIC and the
LAEA report that Iraq is cooperating “in all respects” and making progress in resolving “key
remaining disarmament tasks.” The mere absence of new discoveries of non-compliance would
not constitute cooperation; Iraq would have to provide the necessary access to locations and
people and work actively to help solve remaining issues. In the event that Baghdadblocked
inspections, refused to turn over documents, or rebuffed attempts to interview specialists,
UNMOVIC and the IAEA would have a powerful weapon at their disposal. They could simply
report that Iraq is not cooperating -- in which case resolution 1284 specifies that sanctions could
not be suspended or, once suspended, would be reinstated. No decision to “lift” sanctions
altogether could be taken until all remaining disarmament issues, not just the “key disarmament
tasks,” are resolved. Moreover, decisions to suspend or lift sanctions must be taken by the
Security Council, and an affirmative U.S. vote would be required.
The critics are probably right that the inspectors would rarely, if ever, be able to find -- or be
allowed by the Iraqis to gain access to -- proscribed weapons, equipment, and facilities that
Baghdad has taken pains to conceal. But even if the inspection teams are unable to finish the job
of disarming Iraq and bringing it into compliance with its obligations, their presence in Iraq
would still be of value in terms of understanding and constraining the WMD threat -- especially
compared to the current situation.
The installation of sophisticated monitoring equipment at hundreds of locations and the
constant movement of inspection teams around the country would complicate Iraq's covert
programs, making it harder and more expensive to keep those efforts hidden and probably
slowing their pace and decreasing their scale. By closely monitoring Iraq's missile production


41
and testing facilities, the inspectors would gain a better appreciation of the nature of Iraq's
missile programs than we now get through remote means. With respect to known dual-use
chemical and biological facilities and other installations now considered suspicious, special
sensors and site visits could provide confidence -- at least while the monitoring equipment was
operating and the inspectors had access -- that prohibited activities were not taking place at those
locations. U.N. monitors could also do post-delivery checks within Iraq to verify that potentially
sensitive dual-use equipment and materials imported through the Oil-for-Food Program have
been put to their declared use rather than diverted to weapons programs.
These benefits do not add up to stopping Iraq's illegal weapons programs. But in terms of
keeping track of WMD-related developments in Iraq, they would constitute a significant advance
over what we can do today.
But some concerns are well- ded
While the critics tend to exaggerate the risks and minimize the benefits of resuming U.N.-
mandated verification in Iraq, they do make some telling arguments.
In particular, they are right that U.N. inspectors cannot compel compliance and therefore
cannot end the WMD threat posed by Iraq. At their very best, U.N. monitoring and inspections
can complicate, constrain, and slow Iraq’s clandestine efforts and give us a better picture of what
is going on in Iraq than we currently have. But that amounts to containing or managing the
threat, not eliminating it.
Moreover, the critics are right that a resumed U.N. verification effort in Iraq would hardly
be a stable or durable arrangement. The Iraqis, in the expectation that sanctions would soon be
dropped, might be on their best behavior, at least at the outset. For example, they would
probably not interfere with the installation of equipment at previously monitored facilities. But
as UNMOVIC and the IAEA sought to monitor and inspect new sites, and as they pressed Iraq
for documents and interviews to help resolve outstanding issues, the “cat and mouse” game
would begin. Iraq's lack of cooperation might be passive at first (e.g., failure to produce
documentation) but could be expected to grow more active (e.g., blockage of inspection teams).
When UNMOVIC and the IAEA reported Iraq's non-cooperation to the Security Council and the
prospect of suspending sanctions was pushed further into the future, Iraq would grow
increasingly impatient and frustrated. Sooner or later a confrontation would almost surely take
place. Iraq might evict the inspectors again or the U.N. might decide to withdraw them because
their situation had become untenable. If this is an accurate forecast -- and the experience of the
1990s gives little reason to believe it is not -- it raises serious questions about the value of
sending the inspectors back at all.
The resumption of U.N. inspections could also lead to serious disputes within the P-5,
especially between Russia and the United States. We could expect Russia and perhaps other P-5
members to minimize the significance of unresolved disarmament issues, find excuses for Iraqi
non-cooperation, and seek the earliest possible suspension and lifting of sanctions. The Russians
would be supported by many countries that have long favored the removal of sanctions and the
avoidance of a confrontation with Iraq at any cost. While the U.S. could, if necessary, exercise
its veto to prevent a premature and undeserved removal of sanctions, pressures for removing
them could build (regardless of the extent of Iraqi cooperation) and the U.S. could find itself
increasingly isolated for what would be portrayed as an excessively demanding position.


45
Page 3
nuclear area. When UNSCOM inspections managed, as they often did, to
penetrate this web of deceptions, Iraq resorted to physical denial of access and
threats of violence to neck down the scope of inspections. By 1997 effective,
sustained inspections in Iraq had come to an end. The final ending of all
inspections in 1998 was in fact an anti-climax. Lacking on-site inspections, with
unfettered access to all of Iraq, for over three years has meant that it is
impossible to be sure where their nuclear program stands today. It also means
that even if inspections were to begin tomorrow it would be impossible to answer
this question without a very long, sustained period of unfettered inspections. The
baseline of Iraq's nuclear program is broken and it will be impossible to quickly
re-establish that baseline.
Based on Iraq's activities before 1998 and sketchy insights available from
defectors and exposure of continued Iraqi attempts to acquire nuclear related
capabilities, one can say a few things with confidence:
• Iraq's pre-war nuclear accomplishments have ensured that it can
acquire fissionable nuclear material from any outside source it will
be able to fabricate at least a crude, improvised nuclear device in
months not years. For Iraq, just like every other aspirant to nuclear
status, the key obstacle is the acquisition of fissile material. Iraq
had a viable weapon design and the capacity to produce all the
elements of a weapon. If Iraq has to rely on its own efforts to
produce nuclear material then one can do little better than the
public estimate by German intelligence authorities last year in
which, citing major Iraqi procurement efforts that the Germans had
knowledge of, that Iraq could, in the worst case, have a nuclear
weapon in 3-6 years.
• Iraq will have dispersed and shielded with elaborate deception
arrangements its nuclear activities.
• Iraq understands the methods used by inspectors and will be ready
to frustrate all efforts to get close to activities they are determined
to shield.
• Iraq has not abandoned its efforts to acquire WMD. A recent
defector has stated that an explicit order to reconstitute the nuclear
teams was promulgated in August 1998; at the time Iraq ceased
cooperation with UN-led inspections. There should be no doubt that
Iraq, under Saddam, continues to seek nuclear weapons capability
and that given the time it will devote the resources and technical
manpower necessary to reach that goal.
• Economic sanctions no longer significantly restrict the financial
resources that Iraq can devote to WMD programs and over the last


49
How has the Iraqi biological weapons program changed from the Persian Gulf War
and UNSCOM inspections to today? On three separate occasions in 1997 and 1998
panels of international experts reviewed all the information available to
UNSCOM. These panels were able to get an extensive albeit undoubtedly
incomplete picture of Iraq's BW program. The program was far more complex and
extensive than that which Iraq had acknowledged. Iraq asserts that the
program was obliterated in 1991 but this is patently not true. UNSCOM
monitoring while useful in hindering Iraq's program, was not successful in
preventing some degree of continuation of Iraq's BW investigations.
Iraq's BW program in 1990: By any definition, in 1990/1991, Iraq's BW program
was in an accelerating expansion phase. An international panel of experts
convened at the UN headquarters in New York in 1997 had concluded that the
program had not yet reached maturity (this phrase has been advertised by Iraq,
including a 2002 submission to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as
meaning that the program was inadequate and not capable of producing BW
weapons). Actually, the panel was stating Iraq had not yet attained its
desired level of expansion. Iraq's bacterial BW capabilities was reasonably
well established including its ability for production, concentration, spray
drying, and delivery to produce a readily dispersable small particle aerosol.
Iraq was well underway in establishing a virus research, development, and
production capability, but had not reached weaponization potential. Iraq had
demonstrated an anticrop capability. It had demonstrated a mycotoxin
capability. There was no information on an anti-animal program. Along with
its agent production, Iraq was developing a weapons delivery capability,
apparently for both short range and intermediate range delivery. The agents
included lethal, incapacitating, and agricultural biological warfare agents.
There is a major disparity between the amount of agent declared as produced by
Iraq and that estimated by UNSCOM experts.
A serious issue concerns Iraq's interest in and weaponization of
aflatoxin. It is apparent that Iraq's interest was in its long-term
carcinogenic and liver toxicity effect rather than any short term effects.
One can only wonder what was the intended target population.
Field tests encompassed point source releases, small area contamination,
and large-scale line source release and were evaluated both for tactical and
strategic use. The weapons and range of agents considered provided Iraq with
a variety of options for their use.
Iraq had deployed R400 aerial bombs to at least three locations in
western and southern Iraq, and had also deployed Al Hussein (SCUD) missiles
BW-filled warheads and at least one "droptank." Additionally Iraq had field
tested BW agents in 122mm rocket warheads and 155mm artillery shells.
Iraq also had an interest in landmines, flechettes, fragmentation
weapons, drones, missiles, thin-skinned aluminum weapons, fibre glass-coated
weapons, and Supergun projectiles. No investigation of field testing is
acknowledged for these weapon types although there are indications that
interest had developed in such weapons for biological warfare purposes.
Iraq’s BW program in 1998: Although Iraq claims that it "obliterated" the
program in 1991 (without the supervision by the UN as was set out in the
ceasefire resolution 687 (April 1991), and in so doing it destroyed all
weapons and bulk agents unilaterally without any further documentation. The
evidence indicates rather that Iraq continued to expand its BW capabilities.


50
Expert panels concluded that it was not certain that Iraq had indeed
"obliterated" its BW program. Documentation recovered by UNSCOM indicated a
continued build up of Iraq's BW program capability. The organizations
associated with its BW program continued to acquire and attempted to acquire
equipment that would enhance its BW capability and that seemingly would have
relatively little utility for Single Cell Protein (SCP) production as alleged
by Iraq. From 1991 to 1995, Iraq was actively expanding Al Hakam, its major
BW agent production facility, with additional infrastructure and facilities.
Iraq tried to explain these as being for SCP production for animal feed
supplement. Particularly notable were clear expansion plans that were more
reminiscent of an expanded BW facility than a development of an SCP factory.
Among the expansion plans were design and construction of 5,000 and
50,000 liter fermentation units for Al Hakam and Tuwaitha. Countries and
companies where SCP is being produced do not consider worthwhile any fermenter
with capacity less than 100,000 liters up to 500,000 liters. Disturbingly,
such procurement actions included a rather large production plant in
association with external assistance. Joint negotiations centered on the
design, construction, and operation of a 50,000 liter fermentation facility
consisting, not of one 50,000 liter fermenter and associated lesser fermenters
and tanks as might be expected for scale up of a SCP plant, but rather, five
10,000 liter fermenters and associated lesser fermenters and tanks. It is
believed this unit was not delivered although definitive evidence is lacking.
The key players from Iraq on the negotiating team were the head of botulinum
toxin production in 1990, two BW facility engineers and a MIC representative.
Iraq has also developed the capability to produce critical equipment
(fermenters, centrifuges, spray dryers, etc.) and to produce critical
supplies, e.g., standardized growth media. Interestingly, Iraq only developed
standardized media of direct importance to its BW program rather than media
types that would have more generalized medical/hospital applications. This
effort continued at least through 1998.
It is also noteworthy that Iraq's experienced senior personnel who were
active in Iraq's BW program in the 1980s remained intact as a unit throughout
the inspection period.
In essence, Iraq retained the personnel for its BW program. It tried to
retain equipment and supplies. When UNSCOM forced the acknowledgement of
Iraq's BW program and subsequent destruction of equipment, facilities, and
supplies, Iraq developed the indigenous capability to produce critical
equipment and supplies. Although Al Hakam was completely destroyed, not all
production capable equipment in Iraq was destroyed or rendered harmless.
Iraq's reluctance to fully and openly declare the full extent of its BW
program only enhances the perception that Iraq still maintains a BW program.
What impact has UN sanctions had on the (BW) weapons program? Very little!
In some respects it has made it more difficult for Iraq to attain critical
equipment and supplies, yet in other ways it has had relatively little effect.
Even the difficulty to obtain critical supplies is a two-edged sword in that
it has forced Iraq to develop an indigenous capability that otherwise might
have been ignored. In so doing it has increased the difficulty in obtaining
overt evidence of cheating. Iraq tried to maintained the essential elements
for its BW program. Having failed in that effort and with increased scrutiny
by the world community concerning its imports, Iraq has developed the
capability to obtain and/or manufacture critical requirements. There was no
restriction to prevent Iraq from developing such capability.


53
officials have also repeatedly stated that BW was (and is) a vital armament
step at least until it has a fully developed nuclear capability.
Also, clearly, their pursuit of both military and non-military BW
programs is indicative of a BW terrorist application as well. Such
application would undoubtedly evolve to meet changing situations and can be
expected to be retained even after the development of its nuclear capability.
Regional military power, global strategic power? The size of Iraq's BW
program and what appeared to be its desires for an expansion of its
capabilities still suggests a regional power rather than global aspirations.
This perception is also consistent with the "power weapon" concept cited
above.
Options and Consequences:
What options does the US have to address the Iraqi biological weapons threat?
Several options could be considered, return of inspectors to Iraq or
continuation of sanctions, smart or otherwise, as well as various military,
diplomatic, and political initiatives. I will principally address the
inspectors and sanctions issues.
Inspectors return to Iraq: This is very difficult on which to comment. The
success or failure depends too much on uncontrollable elements. What will be
the conditions under which the inspectors return? What support will the
inspection regime have, given Iraq's recalcitrance and the likely lack of
unanimous support in the UNSCP Will Iraq truly cooperate and reveal or
destroy all its BW activity? Or will Iraq continue its established pattern of
deception, denial, and concealment?
1. Established pattern of denial and concealment: I have already detailed
above Iraq's denial and concealment of its BW program even after it
acknowledged that it had conducted such a program. However, the pattern
continued (s), not only through December 1998 but it now appears into 2002 as
well. Increasingly, beginning in 1996 Iraq was attempting to portray its BW
program as a minimal program conducted by ignorant scientists, although
testimony and documentation implied the contrary. Then in 1997, Iraq began to
deny significant items to which it had already acknowledged. On 5 August
1998, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, reported in a letter to the
UNSC: The programme (sic BW program) was newly established. Its planning was
not complete and it lacked the necessary personnel and expertise, particularly
in respect of weapons. Because of the lack of specialized senior personnel,
it had not become operational. By Iraq's definition it may not have been
"operational" but, by Iraq's own admission, it weaponized at least 157 R400
aerial bombs and 25 Al Hussein warheads, in addition to successfully testing
large-scale drop tank delivery and fixed or rotary wing release of BW agents.
The equipment used in the context of the programme could not produce
biological agents, and Iraq was not able to import the necessary equipment for
this purpose. Again, it is amazing that the equipment "could not produce
biological agents, " yet, by Iraq's admission, Iraq produced 19,000 liters of
20x concentrated botulinum toxin and 8,500 liters of 10x anthrax spores.
UNSCOM believes the quantity was much larger. Aziz went on to lament that
UNSCOM refused to "recognize the truth" of Iraqi statements.
In 1999, Iraq submitted a report to the UNSC in preparation for the UN
convened panel to review the status of Iraq's WMD programs which continued
this pattern of denial. More recently, an updated version of this report has