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A THIRD WAY: ALTERNATIVES FOR
IRAQ'S FUTURE (PART 3 OF 4)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
JULY 25, 2007
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7.4
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VICSNYDER, Arkansas Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
GREG MARCHAND, Professional Staff Member
THOMAS HAwLEY, Professional Staff Member
ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member
SASHA ROGERS, Research Assistant
-a- - , **
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2
*
ligence to receive testimony regarding implications of the recent
NIE with respect to al Qaeda.
We have asked our witnesses to look forward rather than back-
ward. We are not intent on a rehashing how we got to where we
are. They have been asked to address alternative strategies, and
have been given guidance that should allow the subcommittee and
the public to draw comparisons in key areas.
Each witness today has provided us with a written statement,
and I think it is clear from these statements that we have a variety
of backgrounds, perspectives and ideas. And I hope that today will
bring a vigorous discussion not only between the subcommittee
members and the witnesses, but between the witnesses themselves.
Anyone who was here two weeks ago for our first hearing will tell
you that is the kind of productive exchange that we had and are
looking for.
Today's hearing will begin with a statement from the Honorable
Bing West, an award-winning author, correspondent for the Atlan-
tic Monthly, former Marine Combat Commander, and Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the
Reagan Administration.
Mr. West will be followed by Major General Paul Eaton, who re-
tired from the Army in 2006 after 33 years of military service, in-
cluding command of the initial effort to develop a new Iraqi army
in 2003 and 2004.
Our third witness is Colonel Paul Hughes, whose resume in-
cludes a distinguished military career and also, since retiring from
the Army, work on the Iraq Study Group's military and security ex-
pert working group.
Finally, we have with us Dr. Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for
defense policy and the top analyst on Iraq at the Council on For-
eign Relations.
We welcome you all.
And Mr. Akin is recognized for any opening comments he would
like to make.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND IN-
VESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning to the witnesses, and thank you for joining us here
today.
The hearing is the third in the series aimed at breaking out of
the false construct about Iraq, and that is to look at it either while
we have a choice of a precipitous withdrawal or stay the course. We
think there are going to be some better alternatives.
While these hearings have been constructive, I would like to em-
phasize and reiterate the purpose of the exercise: that we are here
to discuss alternatives that truly offer a different plan to the cur-
rent strategy. Just critiquing the current approach is not the point
of this hearing, and it is helpful only as it suggests other possibili-
ties.


5
to the others, and speak just a little bit more about the option of
partial withdrawing of U.S. forces and a reorientation of what re-
mains to training and supporting the ISF.
Right now, the U.S. troop presence in Iraq isn’t enough to control
the environment completely or stabilize the country, but it does cap
the level of violence. If you substantially withdraw the U.S. combat
presence, you can reasonably expect the level of violence to in-
Crease.
If we are going to take seriously the prospect of training and ad-
vising the ISF, that means we are not going to have the trainers
sequestered somewhere safely in the rear in a classroom. They are
going to be out with the ISF, advising them, operating with them,
serving as mentors to them. If the environment they are operating
in gets less secure, one can reasonably expect that the vulnerability
of those advisors is going to go up, and they are going to continue
to suffer casualties as a result.
Second, though, and perhaps just as important, the smaller our
combat presence in the country, the harder we make the training
and advising mission. There are a lot of constraints facing our abil-
ity to train, advise and create a capable asset. Arguably, the bind-
ing constraint among them, however, is political rather than pro-
ficiency. It is sectarianism in the Iraqi security forces.
As the country around them breaks up into factions, it is very
difficult to hermetically seal a military organization from the soci-
ety from which it is drawn. And what is pulling the country apart
into factions is the sectarian violence level in the country.
If the reduction of the U.S. combat presence causes the level of
sectarian violence to increase, the centrifugal pressures on the soci-
ety are going to increase as well. And that, in turn, is going to
make the job of creating a disinterested nationalist security entity
that can defend the interest of all Iraqis harder, not easier.
Now, what that does is create a risk of self-fulfilling prophecy
where, the smaller our combat effort, the harder we make the
training effort and the more difficult it becomes to switch from the
one to the other.
I think if we judge that the surge is too unlikely to succeed—and
again, I am a pessimist on the prospects for this surge. I don’t
think it is impossible it could succeed, but I think it is a long shot.
If you think the odds of that long-shot are too long, I think a
stronger case can be made for going to the opposite extreme and
totally withdrawing the U.S. presence from Iraq on a timetable of
ten months to two years. People vary on how long it would take
to get out everything that we have deployed to the country, and be-
ginning the reset sooner and cutting our losses in the process.
The one other recommendation that I would offer to the commit-
tee is I think it is terribly important that not just the management
of a withdrawal but also the investigation of various partial with-
drawal options be undertaken in the serious, rigorous way that
only properly staffed, military planning process can do.
And I am afraid that, right now, the perceived politics of the sit-
uation are such that it is very difficult for military staffs to plan
out any of these options in the level of detail that is necessary, es-
pecially given so many of the issues involved are diplomatic, politi-


6
cal, economic and regional in ways that will inevitably tax the skill
set and the capabilities of any orthodox military planning staff.
In an environment where people are worried that an effort to
plan out something other than Plan A could be viewed as a sign
of disloyalty, it makes that planning effort very, very difficult for
the military to conduct.
One thing that I think would be of particular value for the U.S.
Congress to do is to remove the political Hobson's Choice associated
with the sort of planning by mandating by law and by requiring
that military £ whether in theater or in the Pentagon, develop,
with a proper level of rigor and detail, a set of alternative plans
for either partial or complete withdrawal alternatives to the surge,
not mandating that they be executed, but mandating that they be
planned out in a way that can permit full evaluation of their pros
and cons by those outside the planning process itself.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Biddle can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 71.]
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Biddle.
Colonel Hughes.
STATEMENT OF COL. PAUL HUGHES (RET.), SENIOR PROGRAM
OFFICER, CENTER FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABIL-
ITY OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
U.S. ARMY
Colonel HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
present my thoughts about what I call consolidating gains in Iraq.
While I remain very engaged in Iraq through my work at the
United States Institute of Peace, what I present today reflects my
own personal views based on almost 30 years of service in the
United States Army and the time that I have spent in Iraq, where
I served with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian As-
sistance, the coalition provisional authority. I advised General
Eaton on the organization of the Iraqi military and served as my
institute's chief of party on two separate occasions. My comments
do not reflect the policies of the institute, which does not take pol-
icy positions.
As you well know, the Nation is seized with the war in Iraq, one
of the most complex wars it has ever fought. This complexity can
be characterized in many ways, but one fundamental aspect that
must be understood for the United States to successfully interact
over the long term with the Muslim world is that we need to un-
derstand this war involves issues rooted in power redistribution
among groups of people who have never experienced the dynamic
processes that the United States now demands that they imple-
ment quickly, namely those of political reconciliation.
By saying that, I want people to understand that the notion that
this is purely a sectarian war is a false notion. There are other
causes here that are more related to power redistribution.
Understanding this fundamental nature of the war is crucial to
the development of our war aims and our national interests. So far,
there have been several changes in both, and these changes have
only served to confuse our regional friends and worldwide allies as


8
To meet those challenges, the United States should reassess its
strategic goals in light of its regional and global interests. It should
announce a date certain for beginning the redeployment of forces
from Iraq. It should conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the
government of Iraq. It should resource and invigorate a comprehen-
sive, political reconciliation program in Iraq.
It should immediately act to restore and increase both the size
of the Army and Marine Corps refit and reset units that have been
in combat, ensure our special operations forces are being properly
resourced, and care for the families of our military personnel.
The United States should also repair damage done to our rela-
tions with our allies and special partners, and it must more clearly
articulate U.S. policy in order to regain the confidence and support
of the American people.
In conclusion, we must maintain our focus on our primary chal-
lenges: the proliferation of WMD and the threat from extremists
who threaten our homeland. We should not allow ourselves to ex-
pend our military forces, national credibility and treasure on a
ground war that does not deal with our primary threats.
Thank you for your attention and time.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Hughes can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Colonel Hughes.
General Eaton.
STATEMENT OF MA.J. GEN. PAUL D. EATON (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDER, COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING
TEAM, IRAQ, U.S. ARMY
General EATON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the in-
vitation to speak here.
I can’t leave this room without commenting on the state of the
American Army. I am going to talk about the American Army, the
Iraqi army, current operations in Iraq, and the deficient diplomatic
efforts that we have in the region.
First, the American Army: We are under-funded, we are under-
manned, and we are overextended. And we have to correct all three
of those points.
We have to grow the Army and the Marine Corps to meet the
foreign-policy demands of our country. We have to commit the re-
sources necessary to rebuild, refit our equipment, and to properly
equip our forces both in the theater of operations and in training
right now. We are having to shuffle equipment back and forth from
units to conduct the training for deployment. So we have to correct
that situation.
The Iraqi army: We started the Iraqi army program to recruit
nationally, make the army representative nationally, ethnically and
religious, and to employ locally. The original plan was that we
would recruit these men to defend the Nation from enemies from
without. And that evolved into what we have to do right now in
a counter-insurgency environment.
The Iraqi army is still not properly equipped, and we still don’t
have enough men under arms to meet the demands placed upon
the Iraqi army.


9
And we have departed from a nationally unifying system. Origi-
nally, the army would have been a nationally unifying force, an in-
Strument to £ for the unification and the integration of the
country. We have departed from that, and I am not sure that is a
good decision.
My last information is that we are talking about reinstituting
what we did with the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), locally re-
cruited, locally employed, which gives us basically militias under a
national uniform.
Current operations: I think that what General Petraeus is doing
right now is absolutely on the mark. It follows a very good article
by Lieutenant Colonel Doug Ollivant about inserting forces into the
region, into the neighborhoods, into the communities that need the
security operations, and a departure from these very large forward-
operating bases that heretofore we had been restricted to.
I think what General Petraeus is doing is absolutely on the
mark. The surge was very small, and it was actually a compromise
with the Army because that is all we could do. We have not grown
the Army to meet the requirements in Iraq or elsewhere. So the
surge was a compromise, and the Army cannot sustain it.
The Army status right now drives us to a reduction in forces in
theater, and we have to lay it out. And I think that a 24-month
period is about right to draw down combat forces in theater.
If we don’t do it and if we don’t start it now, we are going to go
back to something that General “Shy” Meyer talked about back in
the 1970's, the hollow army. And his comment recently is, “You
may not know the Army is broken until after the Army is broken.”
The real issue is we have not surged diplomatically in order to
meet the military surge, the military increase.
A case study is up in the northern part of Iraq. The three north-
ern provinces have their own economy, have their own government,
have their own security forces. The Kurdish region is stable. What
is not stable is outside the borders of the Kurdish region. We have
a very large number of Turkish units massed on the borders, and
that is a source of concern.
We have to regionally divide Iraq and identify strong actors in-
ternal and strong actors £ them to a Camp David-
type situation and hammer our the requirements to keep the enti-
ties outside and inside from falling apart.
So that would mean you bring Barzani, Talabani, and the presi-
dents of Iran and Turkey into the room and hash out the interests
that both parties have, repeat that process with the Sunni region
and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, repeat that with the
Shia region and Iran.
Regional debate, regional meetings orchestrated by the United
States—that type of £ surge is overdue and is the only
way out.
The best article I have seen lately is, “The Road Out of Iraq Goes
Through Tehran,” and this Administration has heretofore refused
to talk to Tehran. We have something going on right now, but our
road out is through Tehran.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Eaton can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]


11
those highways, and can move 400, 600 kilometers in 1 day, and
they do. And we were fighting them in Fallujah in April of 2004.
They moved out and went to Ramadi, 60 miles away. When we
went back in with the Marines in November of 2004, they went to
Mosul, 300 miles away, and did it in 3 days because you can just
drive up and down the highways.
So in order to keep after AQI, you have to stay on them and stay
on them and stay on them. And that is what I believe General
Petraeus is doing now.
I don’t believe we intend to keep the kinds of troops we have over
there for the long haul, but I am really interested in what he is
going to say in September because I think he can give us a better
military judgment than any of us can.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary West can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your thoughtfulness in
being here and thoughtfulness of your statements.
Members, what I suggest we do—and in the other hearings, we
have been pretty flexible in our five minutes. We have eight mem-
bers here. I know of at least one other member coming. I would
suggest that we are fairly strict about the five minutes so we can
circle around and go through a second or even a third round if we
get to it.
What we will do is, if I start my questions, which is already ap-
parently on, I have got five minutes. If I ask one question and you
all get to respond to it, if you each take three minutes, we get to
one-and-a-half of you. If you all could limit your answers to about
one minute, given that we have got some flexibility here, but if can
get to the point, then we will be able to get more of the thoughts
out there.
My question is, in the time that we have left, if you all—I just
want to give you a chance to respond in the spirit of intellectual
exchange here on anything you have either read from the opening
statements or have heard today from the folks at the panel you
think need to be fleshed out a little bit more or that concern you
or that you agree with.
Let us start with you, Dr. Biddle, and just go down the line
again.
Dr. BIDDLE. Okay, well, with a minute I will respond mostly to
Secretary West, with whom I am in a surprising degree of agree-
ment.
I don’t think things are hopeless. I mean, the written statement,
to a greater degree than I was able to do in the spoken statements,
says there are two defensible alternatives, and they are either/and.
Where I think I probably disagree is over how much better than
hopeless it is. I think it is an extreme long-shot.
AQI is not the totality of the problem. The President doesn’t
think that totality is the problem either. It is an accelerator of sec-
tarian violence and factionalism. Unfortunately, sectarian violence
and factionalism is a bit like the toothpaste in the tube. Once you
have created a condition of radical fear among groups, it is then
very difficult to overcome that and reverse the process.


14
Secretary WEST. Mr. Congressman, General Eaton began a sys-
tem with the advisors on the military side that is now working ter-
rific. All the way down to every single company, there is an Amer-
ican advisor but he is also a conscience.
The State Department, as General indicated, lagged badly, and
it has only been under Ambassador Crocker that they have begun
to insert some smart guys at different levels to say, so-and-so is a
bum and you have to get rid of him. But they have begun that.
I think if you had a classified hearing and brought some of them
in and say, “Do you know who the bad apples are at the top that
have to go?”, they could say, “Yes.”
My feeling is that Maliki isn’t that strong. But I think you are
going to have a lot of sloppiness at the top if you don't have this
level of violence.
General Eaton is right. We are behind it in terms of the diplo-
macy and struggling to catch up. But I think you can tolerate that
if we don’t have 135,000 Americans in the country.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you.
Anybody else want to comment on the same question?
Dr. BIDDLE. Sir, the issue of federalism is something that is part
of their constitution. It focuses on the idea of federalism. The issue
is the mechanics and the implementing laws that provide for that
sort of thing.
And that is being worked out through the constitutional reform
committee's work, which has recently reported back to the council
of representatives and has again been given some more homework
assignments to work. But that is a very active issue among the
Iraqi government right now.
Mr. AKIN. Are they starting to get the concept? Because when I
talked to the State Department three years ago on a couple tours
back, they said the whole idea of federalism under these guys is
just like somebody from Mars. They just didn't—everything was
top-down from their point of view.
Dr. BIDDLE. Correct.
Mr. AKIN. But you take a look at the Kurds and the Shia and
Sunni, it seems like it is ready-made for a central constitution that
says, “All we are going to do is this, this and this, and everything
else is going to be regional.” I should think that would help a lot.
Dr. BIDDLE. The constitution recognizes just one Federal entity
at this time, and that is the Kurdish regional government. It does
provide for the creation of other regional governments, but the im-
plementing laws have yet to be worked out.
But the U.S. Institute of Peace has worked at it for many years
now with the national government, and we are as frustrated as
anybody with the results that we are seeing. And that is why now
we are pushing out into the provinces.
And, for example, the work I did in March with the Baghdad pro-
vincial council was astonishing. It taught me an important lesson
that we all need to understand. The Iraqis do not possess the tools
with which to tackle these kinds of issues. And so they need the
training. They need the mentoring in political reconciliation and
the ideas of working through these various issues.
But the provincial council members soaked this up like a sponge.
It was amazing to me.


17
I want to first of all say welcome to the committee to General
Eaton in particular, who was former commander of Fort Benning,
home of the infantry, and I represented that area in Columbus,
Georgia.
I like you better as a general than I do as a civilian. General
Eaton, I have to say that. I wish you were still in the military. I
don't agree with everything that you have said since you have got-
ten out.
I want to ask a couple of questions.
And first of all, to General Eaton and to the Colonel and to Dr.
Biddle, it seems that all three of you in your testimony, your pres-
entations to us here this morning take a pretty dim view of the
current situation and that you are in favor of getting out ASAP.
I think the comment has been made, General Eaton, you said the
road to withdrawal is through Tehran, through Iran. I would sug-
gest the road of withdrawal will be through Kuwait, and on the
highway of death. I think you understand that very well, General
Eaton.
And I would like to ask the three of you to comment on that in
regard to the mass casualties that could occur with 160,000 of our
troops with all of their equipment going from Baghdad to Kuwait,
trying to get out of that country.
And also, General Eaton, you said very clearly that you think
that we need to lay out the draw-down plan, not to give it to the
enemy but to give it to the Iraqi people. How do you think the
enemy is not going to obtain that plan as well and make it even
more devastating? So comment on that for you, if you will.
And then to Secretary West, who I am very much in agreement
with, I would ask you what are your thoughts about permanent
basing in Iraq. That bill is going to be probably presented to the
House to vote on later this week in regard to whether or not we
should have permanent basing, particularly in light of the embassy
that we have there now.
General EATON. Congressman, thank you very much.
And I will tell you the retirement has been liberating. I have en-
joyed myself a lot here. And I have said some things that are fairly
difficult to state, particularly with two sons in the Army.
First, I do not advocate a precipitous withdrawal. I advocate a
very methodical and very measured withdrawal of combat forces.
The missions providing for the development of the Iraqi army and ,
security forces and providing for the security of those men and
women, I believe, is a continuing effort that we need to maintain.
Second, I advocate that we lay this out for the Iraqi people, and
the message is really to the Iraqi government to get their house in
order, to fulfill the benchmarks that they said they would fill, and
to get this thing moving forward. And the message is not to the
enemy that we are leaving precipitously; the message is to the
Iraqi people, we have to discipline the process. If we don’t, we will
be dragging through this for years and years, and we have got to
have a force in function.
As far as the withdrawal of troops, if you don't plan your way
out of something, it will look a lot like Dunkirk, and any time you
go in, you have to plan for your extraction. And the extraction


18
while you are under pressure, while you are in contact, is very dif-
ficult indeed. And we are very exposed right now.
If the Iranians thought that it would be in their interest to at-
tack in great numbers, we would have a very, very difficult situa-
tion. I am confident that we have plans on the shelf right now to
avoid that.
Dr. GINGREY. General Eaton, thank you.
With apologies to the other two witnesses, I am going to shift to
Secretary West because I want the answer—and my time is run-
ning out—I want the answer in regards to your opinion on the bas-
1ng.
Secretary WEST. Sir, I think it would be so incendiary I would
see no reason to even discuss permanent bases. By definition, our
embassy is a permanent base, the way we are putting that thing
up.
But beyond that, I cannot imagine us not being in Iraq for about
as long as we are going to be in Afghanistan. But we don’t have
to wave a huge flag about it. It is just going to be a fact of life.
Dr. GINGREY. And we can go to the other two witnesses regard-
ing the other question.
Dr. BIDDLE. Sir, one of the things I said in my statement is that
any withdrawal, any redeployment discussion of U.S. forces from
Iraq must be done in close consultations with the Iraqis and re-
gional partners, and that we would have a remaining element
there, as Secretary West just indicated. Because we still need to do
the training and the equipping of the Iraqi military.
Just as important, we need to be able to conduct counter-terror-
ism operations. And the Iraqi military is not going to be set to ac-
tually provide surveillance or security along their borders for many
years if they are going to be tied down fighting internal insurgency.
So I am not in favor of a precipitous withdrawal. This does have
to be methodically based.
In fact, as the withdrawal is planned or as the redeployment is
planned, I would even suspect that there would need to be an in-
crease of U.S. force structure to provide security along that particu-
lar avenue you just described.
Colonel HUGHES. Two very quick points. The first is, I think ei-
ther of the two extremes are defensible. I mean, I don’t think there
is a clear case for withdrawal precipitous or otherwise. I think you
can also make a case that a one-in-ten long-shot—and I think that
is kind of the ballpark of the odds here—is worth taking if you
think the costs of failure are high enough. It is the middle-ground
options that I think are the weakest on the analytics.
As far as the withdrawal itself goes, I don’t think anyone would
support a precipitous withdrawal, but if one is going to argue for
withdrawal—and, again, I think it is a defensible case, I think we
have to expect that we are going to have to fight our way out. And
that withdrawal for it to be other than a rout is going to be a slow
TOCeSS.
p Again, I have heard estimates ranging from ten months to two
years. I think the case of withdrawal, if one is going to make it,
is you are going to face that sooner or later anyway. I mean, if the
surge is, let us say, a one-in-ten long-shot, that means you have got


20
I mentioned that this is a campaign, just as we had World War
II with many campaigns and Vietnam with many campaigns. And
even in Desert Storm, we had three separate campaigns. You
know, you can have varying levels of success in a campaign and
still win the war, as long as you have strategic thought and guid-
ance and vision about what you ultimately want to achieve.
If we are going to focus on fighting a ground war in Iraq, I have
to ask, what does this contribute to our ability to dissuade Iran
£obtaining nuclear weapons or from getting after AQI in Paki-
Stan'
If the al Qaeda like any that we are fighting in Iraq is not a
threat to our homeland, their goal is simply to get us out of Iraq.
Their goal is to force us out. There were 33 insurgency groups that
have been identified in Iraq, and the one common identifier among
all of them is get the foreign occupation out of Iraq.
Once the Americans leave, there could be a lot of gun-play be-
tween these guys, and I suspect there will be. But principally, they
and all the other groups, want us out of Iraq because we are a for-
eign occupation force. And that has been a traditional earmark of
Iraqi nationalism for many, many decades. I mean, just ask the
British.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back and wait until the
second round for my next question. Thank you.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Sestak for five minutes.
Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.
Let me tell you what I heard that fell upon me.
First, Dr. Biddle, you said, as well as the general, our leaving is
going to be challenging if not done deliberately. You remember,
General, it took us to get out of Somalia, 6 months after Blackhawk
Down, 6,300 troops, and we inserted another 19,000 personnel. The
160,000 troops in Iraq and over 100,000 contractors, anyone who
thinks we are going to turn around tomorrow and not do it an a
deliberate way without a turkey shoot on that one road, that is
what fell upon me here, is a timetable withdrawal can’t be precipi-
tous.
Then you spoke about training, and so did you, Dr. West. We
have about 48,000 combat troops out of the 160,000 that is over
there. That is all. We have got 8,000 advisors over there. Do we
really think we are going to come down to 60,000 troops and build
up the 20,000 advisors and have how many combat troops to pre-
vent another Blackhawk Down?
And that is what I heard from you. The head of the National In-
telligence Council told us the other day that it is an art, not a skill,
to determine which of those Iraqi forces would be loyal or moti-
vated to protect our troops once embedded there.
So those who want to leave behind a touch back, sort of like im-
migration touch back, you know, you kind of give it—okay, we will
leave some training troops behind. Well, I tell you, that really wor-
ries me after watching Somalia.
And then, I step back and I hear, sir, about Al Anbar province
and been there. That started before this surge started. They were
coming over to us, those tribal chiefs after watching their 15-year-


26
So it is a remarkably confusing situation for any policy maker
but if you could help enlighten me on that issue, I would appreciate
it.
Dr. BIDDLE. I think it is very hard to make progress lasting after
a complete departure of U.S. troops. Historical analogies are al-
ways problematic but I think the best analogy to the situation we
have in Iraq are civil wars back in the Balkans where the route
to civil war termination is negotiate some sort of settlement among
the parties but because the parties don’t trust each other with
guns, a third party to act as peacekeeper is required for those deals
one reached to be stable so the spoilers don’t blow them up within
a week of the ink drying.
And I think unless, if one takes seriously the idea that we are
going to stay, do our best to produce stability, the route to it is
going to be through bi-lateral deals through something like the
Anbar Awakening. I think the implication of all that is to make it
stable is going to require a third party presence over a generational
duration as it has in other situations where we have seen similar
ethnic, sectarian, and other civil conflicts.
Mr. COOPER. The reducing our forces might make it more sus-
tainable because there would be less op tempo stress or
Dr. BIDDLE. Reducing our forces enables us to reset our forces
faster. Reducing our forces removes one of the primary caps on the
violence levels in Iraq if we do it prior to negotiated settlements
through some significant fraction of the country. Reducing our
forces to the point where they cannot act as effective peacekeepers
following a negotiated settlement to the conflict makes that very
negotiated settlement of the conflict unstable and unlikely to per-
sist.
Colonel HUGHES. Sir, the notion that the United States can be
a peacekeeper in Iraq is weak because we are a belligerent and
Iraqi people see us as belligerent. The notion that the United
States can assist, for example, in the demobilization, disarmament,
and reintegration of insurgence back in the civil society is faulty
on the same basis. We need a third party. I agree with Dr. Biddle,
but it cannot be the United State because we have as much blood
on our hands as any of the insurgent groups have over there.
Mr. COOPER. I just have a moment remaining. I am not sure if
anyone has asked the warfare and information age question yet.
But I worry that we have made the al Qaeda brand unintentionally
and that encourages their almost automatic network franchising
that is something that perhaps our military is not as adept at deal-
ing with as they should be. Am I mistaken in the view?
Dr. BIDDLE. I am not sure we understand your question, sir.
Mr. COOPER. By focusing on a few people in Pakistan, that we
apparently did not succeed in routing out in Tora Bora and the
massive worldwide publicity, gave a certain celebrity status
Dr. BIDDLE. Yes.
Mr. COOPER [continuing]. To those folks. And then, even Euro-
pean countries claim some association or affinity through the Inter-
net with these folks, claim training techniques and others. Then all
of a sudden we have metastasized the problem. So in today's infor-
mation-age world, brand is important and a lot of people get self-
fulfillment and identity in that.
-


27
And then, you add the free franchising capability—
Dr. BIDDLE. Right.
Mr. COOPER [continuing]. No payment is due. All they have to do
# '' affinity then somehow there own self-esteem is bolstered
y this.
Is this a different way of dealing with the enemy?
Dr. BIDDLE. You are correct in your understanding of that, sir.
They are very savvy in their ability to handle the media.
Mr. COOPER. But are there any effective U.S. countermeasures to
that? We recognize what they are doing but how do we oppose
that? It almost seems like beyond the comprehension of—
Dr. BIDDLE. Well, one possible approach to this at the level of na-
tional foreign policy £f strategy is with the enemy we have de-
clared war on in this conflict is very ill-defined. Al Qaeda is the
best-known brand, if you like, within this vaguely-defined group.
But we have thrown the net very broadly over a large collection
of terrorist organizations that might or might not have thought be-
forehand that they are allies of al Qaeda.
Arguably what we have done to make this problem, you know,
worse than it might be, is by creating a very recognizable brand
and then encouraging lots of others who weren't—I don’t know how
far I want to force this marketing metaphor—who weren’t nec-
essarily part of the company before to think about becoming affili-
ates because what we have told them essentially is the only dif-
ference we see between you, Hamas, Hezbollah, whomever else in
al Qaeda is the ordering which we mean to destroy you.
That makes that brand of al Qaeda substantially more appealing
to organizations that normally have a great deal of difficulty col-
laborating with one another.
If we were clearer on the definition of the enemy in the war, per-
haps we could affect not necessarily the salience of the brand per
se but the attractiveness of the brand in bringing in marginal and
infra-marginal actors that might otherwise be disinclined to cooper-
ate with them.
Mr. COOPER. My time has long since expired.
Thank you.
Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Sanchez for five minutes.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I am sorry I arrived late. I had a Homeland Security Com-
mittee at the same time. And so excuse me, gentlemen, if I ask a
question maybe you answered earlier.
I did read your testimonies and, you know, I personally I believe
we are getting out of Iraq. We just don’t have the resources to stay
there much longer and it is just a matter of time so I think these
hearings are incredibly important.
And I say that, you know, having, you know, looking at the lead-
ership that we have out there that we keep touting, Petraeus,
Odierno, and all of these others and I just have to say, you know,
I was there the day after we caught Saddam in Iraq and I asked
General Odierno, how many insurgents are left and he said, oh, we
have turned the corner. We are done. We have just got a few left,
Congresswoman. So how many would just a few be? We went back
and forth and finally he told me 357. So Odierno is the general out
there running some of this stuff and Petraeus. Petraeus was there


28
when I was there and he was training up the Iraqi and doing the
Iraqification of the army.
It hasn’t gone anywhere. And recently, I was out there and saw
General Petraeus's operating engineer in Baghdad and the four
provinces there, and I said, “Well, how many policemen and Iraqi
army do you have in your provinces?” And he told me, “About
36,000.” I said, “I think you are completely wrong.” And an hour
later, I saw Petraeus, and Patraeus said, “He is completely wrong.
It is double that.”
I mean, I, quite frankly, don’t think even the people on the
ground know what is really up out there. It is just a matter of
time.
So here is my question—because we are going to get out—what
are we going to leave? How are we going to leave? I think that is
what much of this we are all grappling with, what is the best plan?
And we go back to this whole intent, I look at, Dr. Biddle, your
testimony said each of Iraq's neighbors have vital interests in Iraq.
Syria and Iran. How do we get them into talks to make them un-
derstand we need to leave to leave this place without it going to
hell? Or do you just think that they want to see that happen?
And maybe we can start with Dr. Biddle and go down the list?
Dr. BIDDLE. Well, with respect to Syria and Iran, but also the
neighbors generally, each of them, obviously has vital interest in
Iraq. They also have some degree of shared interest with us and
some degree of conflicting interest with us.
The ideal outcome for Syria, Iran, and Iraq is not the same as
our ideal outcome. But at the same token, none of us wants chaos
and ongoing condition of anarchy in the country.
But the challenge in diplomacy with respect to the Syrians and
Iranians is to take the bit of this where our interests and their in-
terests converge—nobody wants anarchy—and somehow or another
deal with the parts where our interests are in conflict. Iran wants
a safe proxy with a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq for exam-
ple, and we would prefer not to have an Iranian proxy in the form
of the Iraqi government.
That is a very challenging diplomatic problem in part because of
all the other problems in our relationships with these two countries
and the natural temptation on the part of both Syria and Iran to
use our interests in Iraq to extort from us things that they want
in other areas. And given that our leverage over them is weak, we
have already been trying to apply leverage to Syria and Iran to
change their policies on all sorts of things for a generation. We
have shot most of our ammunition in that sense.
Given that we don’t have a lot of easy alternatives to turn to,
economic sanctions, for example, I think what we are probably
going to face is a situation where if we really want them to come
a long way in our direction in this negotiation, it is probably going
to require quid pro quos on other issues that we are likely to find
very expensive. I think some of the more important dimensions of
quid pro quo are, for example, the nuclear program for Iran, and
for the Syrians, for example, influence in Lebanon.
I think it is terribly important that we engage them diplomati-
cally as a way of exploring just how big is the common interest
zone, if you like, in this bargaining space as opposed to the conflict-
-


33
we had before could be replaced by one that will serve the United
States no better.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. SNYDER. We have been joined by Mr. Saxton, and without
judgment, he will be allowed to participate in the questions at the
end of this round.
Mrs. Davis for five minutes.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, again, for being here.
And I appreciate the fact that you brought up, you know, are we
a military at war are we a nation at war? The veterans in my com-
munity ask me that question and I think that it is something we
need to address and we somehow kind of pushed that aside and
had we approached it differently, perhaps we would be in a dif-
ferent spot today. I don’t know if any of us know that.
I wonder if you could continue perhaps a little of the comments
you just made because I think the lessons learned is something cer-
tainly in the services that we know is applied. And what do you
feel that the Congress has really missed in all this?
Is there some opportunity here to address issues whether it is
the leaving, the part of leaving and I think Secretary West, I think
you mentioned that the Congress plays a role in this obviously, in
the way that we talk about it.
At the same time, we have an issue of whether any way that we
talk about it is a sign of weakness. I think, Dr. Biddle, you men-
tioned Congress should mandate it. -
What is it that we need to do that perhaps different from the
conversation, the discussion today?
Dr. BIDDLE. Maybe I will start at this end this time.
I think the perception that discussion and debate is weakness is
much more sustainable when there is not much discussion and de-
bate going on. If it is an ongoing every-day feature, the national
dialogue about national security, then it doesn’t get represented as
because it is something that only happens when failure is appar-
ently looming, it is therefore a signal of failure.
I think a healthy debate at all times in which people's patriotism
is not called into question by their willingness to question the very
complex subject matter at take here, is terribly, terribly important.
But again, both within the Congress, but within the executive
branch. One of the difficulties we have now is because this debate
has been muted until fairly recently, there is now a great deal of
concern within the executive branch that thinking through all the
alternatives in the rigorous, well-supported, carefully staffed out di-
verse ideas represented way we would like it to be done, will be
read as a sign of lack of confidence in their own policy.
We have gotten ourselves into this fix because we have not here-
tofore been examining all possibilities with the degree of rigor and
intensity that they deserve. At the moment, again, I think the way
to get us out of this fix is for the Congress to legislate something
so that it no longer becomes an apparent sign of lack of confidence.
I think more broadly, we just need a healthier debate at mo-
ments prior to looming potential catastrophe. And there are two
--


41
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|
I actually think the most useful role that Congress can play at
this point is causing ideas to be discussed that otherwise won't be.
And again, I don’t want to return to the same idea too often but
in an extremely complex subject matter problem like how in the
world do we mitigate the costs of either total or partial withdrawal
from Iraq, the natural tendency of the government, especially in a
situation as polarized as this, is not going to be to examine an all
possibilities with the kind of rigorous, multi-disciplinary approach
that we would all like.
The political catch-22 in doing that kind of planning can be over-
come by law and that notion of creating ideas and information
around which policy can be made, not just for lawmakers but also,
for officers and strategic planners and people in the executive
branch. I think that is a way that Congress can at this point in
time, help us move forward in addition to just thinking about
should we get out, should we not, what should the force level be.
Colonel HUGHES. Sir, that is an excellent question and I am glad
you asked that.
The biggest issue that confronts General Petraeus and Ambas-
sador Crocker today is how do you wrap your arms around the po-
litical reconciliation issues of Iraq'? And this nation lacks that abil-
ity because you don’t have an Office of Political Reconciliation in
the Department of State Foreign USAID. There are certain entities
in the town and maybe this is a shameless advancement for my
own institute but that is what we do.
You need to empower entities like the Institute of Peace that do
political reconciliation work so we can get out there and, you know,
have a broader net to cast over Iraq and its provinces. We are see-
ing progress there but it is slow and it is very, very consuming in
terms of resources for us.
General EATON. The issue before Congress is the President of the
United States and his stubbornness and unwillingness to deviate
from stay the course.
That is the drama. I hear too much about the commanding gen-
eral in Iraq and less about the Combatant Commander Fallon. Ad-
miral Fallon has the entire region. He has all the countries that
have a factor on the problem.
The President of the United States will not shift off his definition
of victory. His definition of victory is not going to happen. It is
going to be something else crafted with the countries of interest
around Iraq. You have got to reach out to the Republican Party to
help the President shift off of his notion of victory.
Mr. SESTAK. I agree.
Secretary WEST. I believe, sir, that the House Armed Services
Committee, as I said earlier, is probably the only committee that
really has the credibility inside the military. That if you were to
say why don't we have some fulsome discussion about Plan B that
you could get it.
Mr. SESTAK. You are saying we should be saying that.
Secretary WEST. I believe you could do that, sir.
Mr. SESTAK. That is
Secretary WEST. I think this committee is probably the only com-
mittee that could do that.


A P P E N D IX
JULY 25, 2007


52
commander, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
during the Reagan Administration.
Mr West will be followed by Major General Paul Eaton, who retired from the Army in
2006 after 33 years of military service, including command of the initial effort to
develop a New Iraqi Army in 2003-2004.
Our third witness is Colonel Paul Hughes, whose resume includes both a distinguished
military career and, since retiring from the Army, work on the Iraq Study Group's
Military and Security expert working group.
Finally, we have with us Dr. Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defense policy and the
top analyst on Iraq at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Welcome to all of you.


55
Finally, according to previous witnesses, increased violence,
humanitarian tragedy, a failed state, emboldened terrorists and regional
actors will all result in the wake of the withdrawal or significant drawdown
of American forces. I’d like to know how our witnesses will ensure that their
plan will not to make the situation worse. For those concerned about
readiness, how will we ensure that subsequent to withdrawal the U.S. will
not find itself in a situation where U.S. forces will have to return to Iraq in
five or ten years? I would also appreciate it if you would take some time
this morning to discuss how the U.S. should manage the consequences of
withdrawal.
Again, thank you for being here today.
[Yield Back to Chairman Snyder]