OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VICSNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
W. TODDAKIN, Missouri
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
LORRY FENNER, Professional Staff Member
THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member
ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member
SASHA ROGERS, Research Assistant
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A THIRD WAY: ALTERNATIVES FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE
(PART 1 OF 4)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 12, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:06 £ in room
2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICSNYDER, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVES-
TIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. I think there is a
pretty long line outside, so if any of you in the audience go to the
restroom, you may lose your seat. Who knows? But we appreciate
you all being here.
I want to welcome everyone here today.
This is the first hearing which I have presided over as the sub-
committee chairman since Mr. Meehan left. Mr. Akin and I have
worked on things together in the past and we are intent on doing
that with this subcommittee and look forward to working with him
and the rest of the committee members in this new role.
I want to welcome everyone to this first in a series of four hear-
ings we are going to have this month at this subcommittee level
on alternative strategies for Iraq.
I was listening to NPR yesterday morning, and they had an
interview with troops that were deploying overseas and what serv-
ice to America means. One woman was briefly interviewed, Staff
Sergeant Nicole Walden. She said, “I am Staff Sergeant Nicole
Walden. I dropped my kids off one and a half weeks ago because
my husband and I are both deploying, so my kids had to go stay
with their grandparents.” And the interviewer says, “Tell me again
their ages? And she says, “Three and one. I wake up in the morn-
ing and they are not there and I just—it is unreal.”
And she goes on to say that she is not complaining because she
gets so much support. But if you think of the tremendous sacrifice
that this family, this mother and father are making to leave off
those two young toddlers with grandparents, my own view is that
we in the Congress owe those men and women everything we can
do to have the right strategy of foreign policy and our national se-
curity, but particularly with regard to Iraq.
Mr. Akin and I have both been frustrated and have shared our
frustrations to each other about the tone of the debate for this first
six months of the year in terms of the polarization that has oc-
(1)


5
levels in Iraq, and none of which can be addressed satisfactorily if
we just pull the plug and leave Iraq. So we can't use the Vietnam
analogy appropriately in this region.
The problem, though, isn't troop levels. That was the problem
initially, along with the nation. We always needed more troops in
Iraq than what we had. The problem now is, first and foremost, the
U.S. national strategy in the region. So here is my alternative: I
would like to see a different U.S. national strategy first.
Why? Because General Petraeus, before him General Casey, be-
fore him General Abizaid, and everyone of us who have had any
military experience, have said you cannot win this war with mili-
tary power alone. Military is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingre-
dient # the solution. So you have to frame the military activities
properly.
e problem is that when we went into Iraq, we began with the
assumption that Iraq was the first of a series of dominoes which
could £ knocked off or overturned or replaced. As many as seven
states were in the running as the dominoes, starting with Iraq,
£ Syria, then Lebanon and Libya, then Somalia, Sudan and
Iran.
The word was out in the region that Iraq was just the first. And
so those states on the hit list had an incentive to cooperate early
to make sure we didn't move to the next domino. Immediately, they
began to become involved and take action.
We have been very careful publicly in trying to not overplay their
role, and certainly there is an insurgency going on internally in
Iraq. But the point is that there has always been outside regional
involvement. So what I would like to see the U.S. strategy include
is a full diplomatic and political, as well as military, component. To
do that, we have to start with a different mindset in the region
strategically.
So here is my alternative. I would like us to renounce our aim
of regime change, just renounce it. We are not interested in chang-
ing regimes in the region. We are not interested in overturning
governments. We already have our hands full trying to deal with
Iraq and Afghanistan. We don’t need to try to simultaneously redo
governments in three or four other countries. It is just not there
in terms of what we can afford to do.
We need to engage in sustained diplomatic dialogue with these
states in the region even if we disagree with their policies, even if,
as some say, they are in a state of war against us. From their per-
spective, we are probably in a state of war against them. That is
not an issue. We can still talk and we can still find common inter-
ests, and we should be talking to Syria and Iran. We should be lis-
tening to our friends in the region like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
the Emirates and Qatar.
We have to understand that the work with Israel and the Pal-
estinian issue is part of this problem, because it has to deal with
Iranian reach. We have to find an alternative to the isolation of
Hamas in Gaza, because we are going to end up with another de-
stabilizing humanitarian catastrophe on our hands there that fur-
ther aggravates the U.S. strategic position if we don’t. Then we
have to link these regional efforts to political efforts on the ground
to deal with people.


6
Now, those are the principles, and that is the change that I be-
lieve we need. In terms of how that interfaces with the troop strat-
egy, well, the troop strategy is great. I mean, we are sitting on an
insurgency right now and the more troops you put out, the harder
it is for insurgents to move and fight and organize and intimidate
people. So sure, I am happy to have the troops there, but I think
we have overcommitted ourselves.
So what I am recommending to the committee is this: I think we
need over a six-month period to pull a couple of brigades out so we
have the possibility there of a strategic reserve in the United
States. There are no magic solutions on creating more brigades,
and the Army is having trouble recruiting now. I think that Con-
gress needs to demand of the Administration a suitable strategy for
the region, a realistic strategy.
The idea that we can continue to bludgeon away in Iraq with the
blood and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform, while invit-
ing the clear occupation of Iraq in an adverse way by Iran and
Syria and other regional actors is counterproductive. It is not going
to lead to the conclusions we are looking for. To be honest with
' we have to raise this debate above the troop levels to have the
ind of impact on the outcome of the mission that the American
people seek.
So I am delighted to be here. I look forward to participating in
the dialogue, Mr. Chairman, but I hope this committee will do its
duty in helping to raise the dialogue above troop strength and into
the fundamental aims and purposes of U.S. engagement in the re-
g10n.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Clark.
Mr. Boot, I am not entirely sure the red light is going to come
on. We seem to be having little clock problems, but Max, try not
to be longer than that anyway.
STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL
SECURITY STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. BOOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me
to testify. I am glad that you are holding this hearing to look seri-
ously at third-way options and what we can do in the future in
Iraq.
I will talk about that in a minute, but first let me just caution
you against too precipitous a pullout or draw-down of U.S. troops
in the pursuit of a third way option. That runs a very real risk of
disaster. Let me quote to you one prediction of what will happen
from a rather surprising source.
Americans must be clear that Iraq and the region around it could
be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave. There
could be reprisals against those who worked with American forces,
further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially destabilizing
refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran and Turkey could
be tempted to make power grabs. Perhaps most importantly, the
invasion has created a new stronghold from which terrorist activity
could proliferate.
- -


8
But there is disagreement on how fast to draw-down troops and
how many we need to leave behind. The Center for New American
Security, a Democratic think-tank here in town, has outlined a
credible model for an advisor-centric approach along the lines of
the ISG recommendations, but I think it is low-balling troop esti-
mates.
The Center for New American Security says its recommendations
will require 60,000 troops. Based on my conversations with mili-
tary strategists, I think the troop figure might be more along the
lines of 80,000 to 100,000 troops or maybe even a little more once
you factor in the need for force protection, logistics and other de-
mands to maintain our advisors and special forces in Iraq. That is
the long-term end state that I think we ought to try aiming for.
I think withdrawing all of our combat forces by April 2008 would
be a very big mistake and would have very grave consequences. A
lot of suggestions have been made to cushion the shock. For exam-
ple, there are calls for diplomatic offenses, for diplomatic moves
that we can make, including some that General Clark just outlined.
Now, in theory I think these are all good ideas to pursue, but I
don’t think any of them have much chance of working in the short
term if we are losing the battle on the ground. I outlined the
plusses and minuses of a lot of those options in my written testi-
mony at much greater length.
I also don’t think that concentrating solely on advisory and spe-
cial forces missions right now, which would require a radically
stripped-down force presence, could work in today's climate. That
would be essentially repeating the mistake of 2005 and 2006. As
the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. We know that didn’t work.
Just look at what happened in Baqubah where jihadists set up
their own Islamic state, while we were moving troops out. That
happened at the Joint Special Operations Command stationed only
a few miles away at Balad. Our special operators couldn't prevent
the emergence of an Islamic state under their noses. What would
they have if they were stationed in the Kurdish region or in Ku-
wait many miles away?
Our conventional troops, however, have managed to clean out al
Qaeda strongholds in Baqubah, just as they have previously done
in Fallujah, Ramadi, Tall'afar and other cities. In the past, we
didn’t have enough troops to consolidate those gains. Now, we may
finally have enough troops to do all phases of a classic
counterinsurgency campaign. But that takes time.
There is no good alternative, unfortunately, unless we are willing
to accept the disastrous consequences described by the New York
Times editorial. The longer you allow the surge to run, the greater
the likelihood that the advisor-centric approach will work down the
road.
Now, I realize patience is running out here in Washington and
across the country. But keep in mind, we are not staying with the
same old failed strategy right now, a strategy that I strongly criti-
cized last year. We are trying a new approach that has not been
tried before. The surge is plan B. The surge is the third way, and
it has just started.
General Petraeus deserves a chance to succeed or fail with his
carefully thought-out plans, without being second-guessed from


9
thousands of miles away. If he succeeds, that will make possible
the responsible draw-down of U.S. forces without risking the col-
lapse of the government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. But
if we draw down right now, I think that the consequences would
be very negative, not only for Iraq and the region, but also for
America's national security interests.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot can be found in the Appen-
dix on page 67.]
Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Khan.
STATEMENT OF DR. MUQTEDAR KHAN, ASSISTANT PROFES-
SOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FEL-
LOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOK.
INGS INSTITUTION
Dr. KHAN. Dr. Snyder, I am deeply honored to be addressing this
committee. I want to thank you and Representative Akin for not
only holding this important hearing, but also for the diversity of
opinion that you are soliciting.
I would like to open with two general observations, which I think
are necessary to provide a context. In the past four years, we have
been fighting three hot wars: one in Iraq, against the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and against al Qaeda globally. We have been fighting
one cold war against Iran, and two proxy wars against Hezbollah
and Hamas, and all of this only in the Muslim world.
The scorecard is not exactly comforting. We have enjoyed partial
success against the Taliban in five and a half years. We have failed
and are failing in Iraq. Al Qaeda is back to pre-9/11 strength. It
will be a long time before the U.S. will be back to pre-9/11
strength. Iran, on the other hand, is far from it. Iran has consist-
ently out-maneuvered us in the cold war, and our proxies did not
exactly distinguish themselves against either Hezbollah or Hamas.
So the question that we ask as we seek alternative strategies is
how do we factor the monumental incompetence of the current Ad-
ministration? Even if you have a good third alternative, will that
good third alternative be effectively and efficiently implemented?
This is another question I think the Congress should consider. It
is not enough to have a good idea. Can we trust the current Admin-
istration to execute that good idea effectively is another important
question.
I think that we all know why we need to withdraw from Iraq,
but I believe that if we were to withdraw immediately, it will not
only lead to a humanitarian crisis of genocidal proportions, but a
tiny or mini-al Qaeda state will emerge in the Anbar Province. Al
Qaeda is planning to use European citizens as their actors, and I
think that the war against the West that al Qaeda is waging will
be much, much tougher.
I think the conditions in Iraq would grow so bad that the very
public today that is demanding that the U.S. troops come back,
there will be pressure both at home and worldwide for the United
States to return to Iraq to fix the mess that it created. The world
will blame the United States for the mess in Iraq if we withdraw,
because before we went to Iraq, Iraq was a tyranny, but it was sta-


10
ble. The population of Iraq was growing. After we brought democ-
racy to Iraq, Iraq's population is diminishing. It is in chaos. Noth-
ing works there.
So it is important for us to realize that we are in a predicament
where we cannot stay in Iraq and we cannot withdraw from Iraq.
We need to find a third way. That is, we need to find a way to have
troops in Iraq without having American troops there. We must re-
member that we have more than 250,000 troops there—150,000 to
160,000 U.S. troops and nearly 100,000 mercenaries, who are un-
able with nearly a quarter-million forces to stabilize Iraq.
How do we replace this? I think this is where we have to call in
the chips. In the Arab and Muslim world, we have so-called “al-
lies”—Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We have been spending bil-
lions of dollars over the past few decades supporting these regimes.
This year alone, we are paying Egypt $1.8 billion in military and
economic aid; $468 million to Jordan in economic and security aid;
$370 million to Pakistan in military assistance; nearly $100 million
to Indonesia. We should demand that these allies of ours replace
the #er that we will withdraw. They need to put troops on the
ground.
We need nearly 300,000 to 400,000 troops to patrol Iraq, to
squeeze the insurgency out. If we were to withdraw, not only will
the insurgency escalate into a civil war, but al Qaeda will become
a prominent player in that region. It is not in the interest of Iran
or Egypt or Saudi Arabia to have a destabilizing force in the heart
of the Middle East.
The countries in the Middle East are delighted that the U.S. is
failing, but are horrified at what is happening in Iraq. Their de-
light at U.S. failure trumps their horror at what is happening in
Iraq. They believe that if the U.S. is successful in Iraq, then the
U.S. would go after them. So it is essential for most countries in
the region that the U.S. fail.
--~ And so what it really means is there has to be not just a tactical
change in Iraq, but a fundamental change in American security
and foreign policy in the region. We have to say that we are not
a global check to the Muslim world. We want to work with the
Muslim world to stabilize the Muslim world.
If the threat, or perception of threat that Saudi Arabia, that
Syria, that Iran, that Egypt perceive from this whole strategy of
democracy promotion in the Middle East diminishes, then they will
be more willing to address the horror in Iraq. If we provide logis-
tics, if we provide financial support, then I think we could compel
these countries to put troops on the ground. They don’t have a
choice. Either they work with the U.S. now to stabilize Iraq, or get
involved in a regional conflict if the U.S. were to withdraw imme-
diately.
On the issue, it is most important for us to re-think our strate-
gies toward Iran and Syria. Iran is essential to the stability of Iraq
now and after our withdrawal from Iraq. If we need a strong Iran
to stabilize Iraq, bombing Iran or weakening Iran as we pull out
of Iraq will essentially lead to chaos in the region. We will be creat-
ing a power vacuum. We have to determine who is going to fill the
power vacuum.
*


11
I think it is important for the Muslim world to stop just criticiz-
ing the U.S. and step up to the plate and dealing with the mess
that exists in the Muslim world. I think it is important for us to
call upon our allies to help us. We have helped them for decades.
We are in need, and it is time for our friends to step up.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your comments.
We will begin the round of questioning. We are having some
clock problems. The timer works, but the lights don't work, so
when you hear a gavel come down, that will be about your five
minutes and it will give you a chance to wind up.
Mr. Akin and I are going to put ourselves on the five-minute
clock so that we won’t ramble on, I guess, is the bottom line. We
want to give everybody a chance.
So go ahead and start the clock there.
I have always enjoyed a good bar fight, and so my first question
is, I would like to give each of you an opportunity to comment on
anything that you heard from the other two.
General Clark.
General CLARK. You know, I am all in favor of great work by the
military. Most of these guys have worked with me or for me, and
we have all been to the same schools. I admire our leadership, our
military leadership. Both Petraeus and Odierno worked for me at
times.
I understand, I think, what their motivations are and where they
are headed. Of course, they want more time. Of course, other peo-
ple in the chain of command below them see the progress. It is in-
evitable that when you put more troops in, you sit on an insur-
gency. It is harder for them to move; harder for them to resupply;
harder for them to organize; harder for them to intimidate.
There is no question that you gain when you put troops on the
ground. The question is, what is resolved? The plan behind the
surge was that the presence of the troops, the sitting on the insur-
gency, would lead to a political outcome that ended the conflict and
£ the motivation for the fighting. That is what hasn’t hap-
pened.
Now, is it a lagging indicator? My guess is it isn’t. The motiva-
tion behind the surge was that people are fighting because they are
afraid, and once you stop the killing, they won't be afraid. I don’t
think that is the sum of the motivations inside Iraq. Instead, it is
a combination of an opportunity to grab power. It is personal ambi-
tion. It is regional incentivization with contacts with outside pow-
ers. Without a diplomatic strategy for the region, those motivations
will not be addressed.
So I don’t think it is adequate simply to say, let's defer any stra-
tegic discussion, support the surge, and then we will see what hap-
pens. This Congress needs to be heard that this Administration
needs a regional, diplomatic strategy different than the current
diplomatic strategy.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Boot.
Mr. BOOT. Well, I certainly agree that we need a regional diplo-
matic strategy, and we can always use more effective diplomacy.
But I think it would be a mistake to oversell what diplomacy can
do when our troops are not seen as winning on the ground. In fact,
the perception is that they are being defeated and are on their way


12
home. That does not create great incentives for those countries in
the region, those players in the region who don’t like us, to nego-
tiate with us.
When you look at things from the standpoint of Iran and Syria,
why would they want to cut a deal with us right now? They have
us exactly where they want us. They are bleeding us slowly. Their
proxies are expanding their spheres of control within Iraq. They
have no reason to compromise.
The Iraq Study Group suggested they have a theoretical interest
in the stability of Iraq. That may be the case or that may not be
the case, but they have a greater interest in expanding their sphere
of influence, which they are doing at the expense of the stability
of Iraq, and they have an interest in keeping the United States tied
down and fighting us by proxy. That is what they are doing very
effectively.
Unless they see that their strategy is not going to work, I don’t
see any reason why they should become any more accommodating
with us. There are also major concessions that would be required
in order to win Syrian or Iranian cooperation that don’t generally
get mentioned by groups like the Iraq Study Group or others.
For example, what about the Iranian nuclear program? Are we
going to allow them to go nuclear? Is that going to be the price of
some help that they might give us in Iraq'? What about Syria? Are
we going to allow them to dominate the democratic state of Leb-
anon? That is what they want. Are we going to allow that as the
price of some Syrian help in the case of Iraq’
Those are very, very hard compromises to make. In fact, the Iraq
| Study Group shied away from making those very compromises be-
cause they know how unpalatable they would be to most Ameri-
cans, when you think seriously about what is the price of coopera-
*
tion.
- Dr. Khan also raised the issue of getting cooperation from some
--~~ of our so-called moderate Muslim allies in the region. I am all in
favor of it. If we could convince the Egyptians, Saudis, Indonesians
and somebody else to send hundreds of thousands of troops into
Iraq to take up what our troops are currently doing, God bless
them. I am in favor of it. That would be a wonderful idea.
However, I think the odds of that actually happening are basi-
cally a snowball's chance in hell. We tried to get those troops when
we initially invaded, which looked like a much easier proposition
than what we are asking them to undertake right now. There is
no chance that those countries are going to willingly send their
troops to face the kind of challenges that our troops would face.
Even if they did send them, you have to think about the political
repercussions of that. Would the majority Shiite population of Iraq
welcome primarily Sunni troops coming from countries that have
expressed their fear and abhorrence of Shiite control of Iraq—coun-
tries that basically want to help the Sunni minority? That is very
unlikely. Would the Sunni minority in Iraq favor troops coming in
from Shi'ite countries like Iran? That is very unlikely, too.
So I don’t think that there is an easy way out of this where we
can say some other troops will come in, or some kind of diplomatic
offensive. We have to face the harsh reality, which is that we have
*- -


13
#
to win or lose this war on the ground, and no amount of diplomacy
can make up for that hard military reality.
Dr. SNYDER. Let's give Dr. Khan time to make any comments he
wants to make, and then we will go to Mr. Akin.
Dr. KHAN. Thank you. Time to take the gloves off. [Laughter.]
Dr. SNYDER. We call these “vigorous discussions.”
Dr. KHAN. Let me put it very bluntly as to what the U.S. pres-
ence in Iraq today is. What the jihadists and insurgents have ac-
complished in Iraq is amazing. They have contained the United
States in Baqubah and in Anbar province. These are a bunch of
fighters. They have held a superpower and completely contained
and boxed the United States in Iraq for four years.
They are providing a public good for all these rogue regimes and
all these regimes that we don’t like by creating conditions where
the U.S. is unable to do anything to any of these regimes—the
dreams of reforming Syria, the dreams of containing Iraq, the
dreams of transforming Saudi Arabia and Egypt—all of those are
now down the drain.
The only thing that the U.S. now wants is to get out of Iraq with
its pride and not lose people. This is what these people have accom-
plished, and this strategy of continuing with the surge, with the
United States unilaterally, with the rest of the world hating us,
and unwilling to cooperate with us, is, as I have said, a disaster
for the region as well as for the U.S.
So there has to be a fundamental change. Yes, we have to man-
age to keep stability in Iraq, but we have to recognize that our
strategies, our stated goals, have created more enemies in the re-
gion than allies. The reason why Egypt, the reason why all these
countries do not want to cooperate with us in 2003 was because we
were telling the rest of the world that you are next.
Look at the Pew study report. We created an environment of fear
in the rest of the Arab world that we were going to come after all
of them. That is why they didn’t cooperate in 2002 and 2003. Now,
they are laughing at us because we are not even able to go after
and democratize Anbar province.
So we need to be able to come out and say that these goals have
changed, and we are real. I would call for a new America with a
new strategy. And then people will work with us. Nobody wants a
nuclear Iran in that region. Nobody wants al Qaeda dominant in
the world.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, for five minutes.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thought your
question was great.
I guess the thing we were hoping to do was to say, are there al-
ternatives? It seemed like Dr. Khan, you got pretty close to it by
saying we are just doing to replace the troops with the troops in
these other countries.
I have to share with Mr. Boot, you probably have a lot more
knowledge of the area than I do, but I am a little skeptical whether
or not all these countries are going to send troops in to replace
ours, or whether they could be as effective as ours, but it is at least
an alternative. I think it is good.
We are here first of all to define some distinctly different things.
None of you talked about a three-nation Iraq. Is that even an alter-


14
*
native? Or is that something that is not an alternative? I thought
of a completely wacky idea, but I think this is a place where we
throw out some ideas and talk about them and say, what I have
been encouraging this committee to do, if it were up to me, and I
am not in charge, but if it were up to me, I would have a list of
different possibilities and then I would test those in terms of what
is the proposed success; what is our goal; and what it is going to
cost us, and all of that.
So we basically weigh a series of alternatives. We don’t have to
pick on here. That is not the job of this committee, but it would
be helpful if we had some of them defined. Is a three-nation Iraq
even a possibility or not?
Here is the wacky idea: What happens if you change the capital
of Iraq'? Baghdad is a big pain in the rear. Why don’t you move the
government to some other place, and then let Baghdad, if they
want to just fight among themselves, at least it is not the center
of government. You can at least let government functions go on
without terrorism of Baghdad falling into it. I don’t know, maybe
# doesn’t make sense, but we need some innovative kinds of so-
utions.
General Clark, your proposal in terms of standing back from the
forest to getting a little further back and defining what our overall
strategy is, that is fine. It still doesn’t really answer a whole lot.
You are saying we are still going to have to take on the chin that
we have to beat the insurgents on the ground, even if we have a
little different strategy, we still have to fight on the ground.
I think I am hearing Mr. Boot, you are saying the same thing,
that there is really no getting away from that. You just have to
beat these guys on the ground, and if you have enough troops and
given some time, we will succeed in that.
I think Dr. Khan, you are saying, I don’t think you are ever
going to do that, you have to get the other nations in the region
more involved so that they have some buy-in.
So I just wanted you to respond to that. Give me some alter-
natives and some differences.
General CLARK. First of all, let me respond in reverse order, if
I could. Yes, you must succeed in creating an impression of
progress on the ground. That is important for a whole host of rea-
sons. But I disagree that you have to hold up on the dialogue and
diplomacy with Iran and Syria until you have completed the surge.
The truth is, we have the greatest leverage that we could pos-
sibly have. We are the United States of America. We are the most
powerful country in the world. We are the most legitimate country
in the world. We dominate every global institution. What Iran
wants, even more than a nuclear weapon, is the blessing of the
United States of America and the West and the world system, of
their civilization and their economic opportunities and political op-
portunities in the future.
I know the statements of Ahmadinejad, but Ahmadinejad is not
the only guy in Iran. We have plenty of negotiating leverage. What
I continue to hear from some people associated with the Adminis-
tration is that there is not enough leverage, if they could just get
more leverage on Iran, they would be happy to talk to them. I
think it is the wrong approach.


15
I know I am taking up this time to explain this, but it is an odd
thing that you have a retired general who is an advocate of diplo-
macy, and I am sitting next to a representative from the Council
on Foreign Relations, which is a specialist in diplomacy, who is an
expert on combat.
What I am trying to suggest is that if you are going to use diplo-
macy, use it now, while there is some hope of progress on the
ground, while you can save a few more lives, and prevent a little
more heartbreak. But you cannot do it, as Dr. Khan says, unless
you sincerely change the U.S. strategy.
From Iran's perspective, they think we are at war with them,
and £f to destroy their regime. They don’t think we can
do it. Ahmadinejad would like us to try, because we strengthen him
when we do that. What we need to do is undercut him the same
way we undercut these east European communists in the 1970's
and 1980's, through a host of other political measures. If you do
that, the strength of the resistance on the ground will slacken. The
diplomacy will enhance our ability to cope with the insurgency and
with al Qaeda. It is mutually reinforcing.
I think the idea of splitting Iraq in to three nations, it is a gim-
mick. I cannot support it in good conscience. I have seen what par-
tition does in the Balkans. Yes, we divided Bosnia, but it was al-
ready divided. The pain of that ethnic cleansing was enormous, and
for us to propose it in Iraq, I know it is happening, but for us to
be the sponsor of it and the author of it, and to own the con-
sequences, and to have Iraqis 30 years and 60 years from now say-
ing, Mr. Bush gave away my home in Baghdad. Why take that on
ourselves? It is not going to bring a solution to the violence. It is
just a recipe for another blame-America thing.
As far as the moving of the capital is concerned, it is another ef-
fort. I don’t think there are any short-cut answers on this. We have
a mistaken strategy in the region. It has caused us the problem in
Iraq. Until we go to the heart of that strategy, all the political gim-
micks we try and all the military tactics we enhance are only mar-
ginal to a solution.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, do you want to hear from Mr. Boot and
Dr. Khan?
Mr. BOOT. I would be happy to weigh in and support with com-
plete agreement with General Clark that I don’t think that parti-
tion offers the way out of Iraq. It is impractical for a variety of rea-
sons, including the fact that the population is so intermixed, espe-
cially in major metropolises like Baghdad and Mosul and others.
Baghdad is the capital. The population would still be there, and
you have to figure out what to do with that. If you tried to separate
it, as General Clark said, the result would be mass suffering on a
terrible scale.
The only way it would really work I think is if it were imple-
mented the way it was in Bosnia, where you had an accord among
all the different sides, which was then enforced by a heavy outside
troop presence, which in the case of Iraq would probably mean
400,000 to 500,000 troops. But that is a recipe for keeping more
American and foreign troops in Iraq, and not getting them out.
So I don’t think that would really accomplish the objective that
we are trying to achieve with partition in any case. It is not a real-


16
* * * *
istic solution right now because most Iraqis themselves oppose par-
tition. You don’t have a situation as you had in Bosnia where all
the parties were exhausted by the conflict and therefore were will-
ing to come to the table and agree on partition. That is not the case
in Iraq today, so I don’t think that offers a very workable solution.
Let me, since you do want a full and frank exchange of views
here, while I am agreeing with General Clark in one area, let me
disagree with him on another, which is that while I completely
agree on the general importance of diplomacy, I don’t know that it
really offers a way out of this.
What General Clark is basically suggesting is that—and what
Dr. Khan is also suggesting—is that we renounce goals of regime
change, and we basically say that we are happy with the status
quo in the Middle East; that we will work with the existing re-
gimes, and therefore this, in turn, will lead them to work with us.
I am not sure it would be that easy. Keep in mind that this is
the strategy we were more or less pursuing prior to 9/11. There is
a reason why we changed strategy after 9/11 because what we had
seen prior to 9/11 was that we were in bed with the dysfunctional
status quo in the Middle East; that we were backing these despotic
regimes that were hated by their own people. As a result of that,
many of their own people hated the United States.
Now, today it is true that we are at odds with the regime in
Tehran, but keep in mind that by all evidence, the United States
is very popular with the people of Iran, precisely because we are
at odds with the regime in Tehran, because they know that we
stand for liberty and against the oppression, which they hate,
which emanates from their own regime.
Even if we wanted to, I am not even sure we could cut a deal
on any acceptable terms with the regime in Tehran. Those who say
that we ought to reach out to them think that they want to reach
out to us. That is not the evidence that we see. When our ambas-
sador and the Iranian ambassador held talks in Baghdad on May
28, what did the Iranian regime do at that very same time? It was
grabbing four Iranian-Americans and jailing them on trumped-up
charges of espionage, which was basically a giant “up yours” to the
United States. And that is what they think of diplomacy. That is
what they think of political negotiations. They are going to take
these hostages.
And certainly the statements that you hear from President
Ahmadinejad are not those that would be conducive to a real dia-
logue. In fact, I am not an expert on Iran, but a lot of Iranian ex-
perts will tell you that the Iranian regime basically depends upon
keeping the great Satan as this bogeyman. They don’t want to es-
tablish relations because that would undermine the rationale for
their dictatorship.
So I don’t think that the short-term prospects of reaching a deal
with Iran are very good. In any case, I go back to a point where
I think General Clark and I agree, that if you are to have any
chance whatsoever of reaching any kind of deal, you have to im-
prove the status on the ground in Iraq. You have to stabilize the
situation and negotiate from a position of strength, not of weak-
neSS.


17
Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Khan, I will give you a chance to respond. I
think we are going to need to pay a little more attention to our
time. We have seven more members that all will have questions.
Dr. Khan.
Dr. KHAN. I don’t disagree with anything that General Clark had
to say. On the three-nation Iraq idea, I want to just point out that
the struggle in Iraq is not about territory, so a territorial separa-
tion will not solve the problem. The struggle is for power and re-
SOUlrCeS.
So for the first time in 500 years, the Shiites have an oppor-
tunity to dominate Baghdad. The Ottomans kept them away for
500 years. For the Muslim world, this is not a small thing. This
is a major shift in power, with psychological implications for the
Arabs, as well as for Muslims in general. So it is not a territorial
issue that can be resolved through territorial separation. That is
the first thing to keep in mind.
Second, we do not want to become the new Great Britain, the in-
heritor of the colonial and imperial legacy of Britain. That is impor-
tant for us to keep in mind. Even though I am from Senator
Biden's state, I disagree on this issue very strongly.
And finally, on the relocating of the capital, where would you re-
locate it to? Basra? It will further underscore the idea that we are
trying to hand the whole of Iraq to the Shiites. So to think of alter-
£e capitals, quickly you realize that that it is not a very good
101ea.
As far as the insurgency is concerned, we must realize that we
do not think very clearly about insurgency. There are three or four
kinds of things that are going on there: one, those who oppose U.S.
occupation; two, those who oppose Shiite domination; and then
those who are against the West in general, that is al Qaeda. We
have to separate all the three dimensions of that insurgency and
how we do it.
If we withdraw, then the insurgents who oppose U.S. occupation
will diminish, but there will be an escalation in those who oppose
Shiite domination. So we need a political solution so that the
Sunnis realize that they not going to live in a Shiite-dominated
Iraq after we withdraw, and that will eliminate all forms of insur-
gency, and that will only leave al Qaeda, and that we have to deal
with, and we would have a major ally in Iraq.
One, I just want to make this point, that Iran is out to get us.
Iran wants to bait us. So it is really very important for us to re-
member Iran wants us as a friend, as an ally. They want to go out
with us. They want to be seen with us in the U.N., et cetera, et
cetera. The reason why Ahmadinejad says all those things is very
simple. We have made more concessions to Ahmadinejad than we
ever made to the moderate Khatemi, who did great things which
are pro-democracy.
So apparently, playing the bad boy seems to be getting more re-
wards for Iran than playing the good guy, and of course, but also
partly moderated by our diminished position as a result of what is
happening in Iraq.
Dr. SNYDER. We will now go to Ms. Sanchez for five minutes, and
hopefully we will be rededicating ourselves to the five-minute rule.
Ms. Sanchez.


18
Ms. SANCHEZ. I love how you call up the five-minute rule after
you are done.
Dr. SNYDER. I know it. [Laughter.]
Mr. Akin and I, we are done, so go ahead. [Laughter.]
Ms. SANCHEZ. Anyway, gentlemen, thank you for being before us.
I want to thank the new chairman of this committee. I have had
the pleasure of serving with you on personnel as my chairman of
the Armed Services Committee. I think you do a great job, so I am
real excited to have you head this.
And welcome to all of you, especially General Clark. Good to see
you before us again today.
Oh, gosh. You know, I think our troops are doing what they have
been asked to do. I think they are doing a great job for what they
have to do. I think from a military standpoint, this really isn't
about the military anymore. Unfortunately, Mr. Boot, when you
said they are bleeding us slowly, that is what they are doing to us
- militarily out there.
* So I really come back to what do we do about the economy out
there, and what do we do with this government, and what kind of
=| government do we have there. What do we need to see from these
people? I go back to in March, I led a delegation over to Iraq, and
Ms. Shea-Porter was with me.
Because we were all women, we sat down with some of the par-
liamentarians of Iraq who were women. It was really interesting to
be in that room, because these three women—one a Christian, one
a Shiite, one a Sunni—was like they had stolen each other's boy-
friends. They weren’t looking at each other. They weren’t talking
to each other. We certainly couldn’t get anything done in a 435-
member body if we couldn’t stand each other in the same room. I
mean, we still have to move forward.
It was very interesting, because if you listened to each of them,
each had a different interpretation of what was going on in their
country. The Shia woman thought everything was wonderful. Of
course, because that is really who is controlling that government.
And before, when we were under Saddam, you know, her people
were at the receiving end of something not very nice. So for her the
world was wonderful, and wasn’t it wonderful? And we were all
women and it is all wonderful, and Ms. Pelosi got elected. The list
went On.
And then we talked to the Sunni woman from Anbar province.
She said, “My people are starving. You want to do something for
us? Feed us. You took the troops out. We can’t get convoys through.
My children are starving out there. Everybody is starving. Do
something. You want to help us? Get food to us.”
And then the Christian was like, “Well, I think we can all get
along. We are going to work this out.” They are not going to work
this out.
So my question to you, each of you, whoever, maybe starting with
the general and going down the list: What do we do about a gov-
ernment that doesn’t want to talk about dividing the oil up, which
is their main asset? What do we do about a government that
doesn’t to each other? What do we do about a government that
doesn’t want to redo the constitution?
- -


20
These people just hate each other; they want to kill each other.
Well, we saw that with farsighted American policy, implemented by
General Clark, with troops on the ground providing security, we
were able to solve those problems, and I think we are able to do
the same thing in Iraq if we just focus on security first.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Dr. Khan.
Dr. KHAN. I have a question for you. After that woman told you
that her people were starving, what did you do? Did you step out
of the room and immediately call for an aid truck or food to her
constituency?
Ms. SANCHEZ. No, certainly not.
Dr. KHAN. Why not?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Because I am not in the executive branch. I don’t
control the troops. That is what the President controls.
Dr. KHAN. Well, this is exactly the thing. If we are doing things
like that, then the message would go that we really care about the
people to whom we have decided to bring democracy and stability.
If we really cared about the suffering under Saddam Hussein, we
will surely care about the suffering when they are starving. An ini-
tiative such as that would have done a lot more for winning hearts
and minds. And believe you me, it will have cost us far less than
a single cruise missile.
This is really an important issue. The President promised three
steps when he talked about the surge. He talked about fighting in-
surgency, moving development and a political solution. And on the
other two things, we have hardly achieved anything. It is like this,
we spent $600 billion on defense, and we spent $100 million on
public diplomacy in his budget, and all of it was redirected toward
Katrina—no money to do nothing.
The rest of the world knows this. It also tells us very clearly that
we actually do not have any intentions to have a sincere dialogue
with these people. You know what the best argument about not at-
tacking Iran is? The best argument for not attacking Iran is the
bombing will not work. The message that it sends is that our first
choice is bombing. If bombing works, why do we talk? But if bomb-
ing cannot work, let's try diplomacy.
This is the message which really resonates very strongly in the
Middle East, and it is important for us to sort of get behind that.
We have to convey the message that America is America. It is the
city on the hill. We care about people regardless of who they are.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Khan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. SNYDER. I want to recognize Mr. Johnson for five minutes,
but first acknowledge that he is Mr. Skelton's appointee to this
committee, following the resignation of Marty Meehan.
We welcome you, and you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to serve
on this committee and under your leadership, sir.
I would say that I think it is important for us to understand how
we got to this point. It was indeed a lack of diplomacy that got us
in this hot water that we are in. On the flip side of it, it was actu-
ally aggressive behavior by our executive branch, and the motiva-
tion of that aggression, what was it?
-
- - -


22
. ****
over provinces of Iraq, and preventing a civil war that will spill
over into the neighboring region and destabilize friendly states.
I think all three of us basically agree that if we just pull out now,
the results would be catastrophic. What I disagree with is I don't
think that diplomacy offers some kind of magic way that we can
somehow draw down our forces and still achieve our objectives. I
just don’t think that there is that magical solution. I wish there
Were.
Dr. SNYDER. We will now go to those members who arrived after
the gavel. We will go in the following order in which people ar-
rived: Susan Davis, Geoff Davis, Mr. Gingrey, Mr. Cooper, Mr.
Bartlett, Mr. Miller and Mr. Jones.
Ms. Davis, for five minutes, and then to Ms. Shea-Porter, without
objection from the committee members.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome you as chairman of this committee as well.
Thank you all for being here. Actually, we don’t always get a
chance to mix things up a lot, so we appreciate the fact that you
are disagreeing; that we can hear really the nuances of that as
well. It is important.
I just came back from Iraq as well, a very quick snapshot, but
there are a few things that certainly were clear to me. One was
that, yes, I agree, we need more time, but the reality is that nobody
could really put a finger on what that is, and certainly short of five
to ten years in terms of the development of leadership, that prob-
ably wouldn’t get the job done.
The other thing that I think was apparent to me is the threat
is real. I don’t think we can sugarcoat that in any way. But then
the reality is, what greater threat are we not addressing because
we are so focused on Iraq. If you could also talk about that, that
would be helpful.
But my question really is around the reality that no matter what
we do, I think, short of quashing our adversaries in every way pos-
sible, that it would be seen as a victory by them. So the question
is, if that is the case—if you agree with that, and perhaps you
don't—how do we then manage that, without accelerating or fur-
ther creating even greater problems down the line? I am not talk-
ing about just a good PR campaign. In reality, how do we manage
that message?
My guess is that no matter what happens, it is going to be a lit-
tle like Russia in Afghanistan. I mean, that is going to be a mes-
sage. If you agree or disagree, and how do you manage it?
Whoever wants to go first—Dr. Khan?
Dr. KHAN. I find your question very intriguing. You are basically
asking what are the larger implications of Iraq. I think it is not
just about Iraq or U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It is about
the status of the U.S. as a dominant moral leader in the world, as
well as a major player economically. What has clearly been happen-
ing in the last five or six years is that we are bleeding economi-
cally. We are also bleeding militarily.
What Iraq has succeeded in doing is exposing the limits of U.S.
power. The single most important lesson that we can draw from
Iraq is that the United States is no longer capable of achieving po-
litical goals through military means. Look at what has happened?


23
Israel's failure in Lebanon is another lesson, that Israel cannot
achieve political goals through military means. Our proxy fight
with Hamas in Gaza is another lesson that we are not achieving
political goals through military means.
So in spite of the fact that when the U.S. is unquestionably the
most dominant military power, our ability to achieve political goals
through military means has completely diminished. This is the
most important lesson for us to draw.
And while we are bleeding in Iraq, China and India are growing
and growing and growing. The challenges to U.S. domination is not
coming from the Middle East. It is coming from Asia. Europe is be-
# economically very strong. The pound today is $2.25 or
2.23.
So we have to recognize that are we going to lose the larger pic-
ture by pursuing these goals of regime change and transformation
in Iraq, partly motivated by a vendetta post-9/11. These are some
very serious questions about which we need to have debate.
And on diplomacy, we must understand—the diplomacy is some-
thing that the State Department does. No. Diplomacy is a way of
doing business. So we can go to Egypt and say one thing, and then
Rumsfeld or somebody else says something completely
#lomatic simultaneously, and let's hope that diplomacy has to
Work.
We have to understand that diplomacy is the way of doing busi-
ness. The President is not just the commander-in-chief, but also the
diplomat-in-chief. It is time he recognized that.
Mr. BOOT. Well, unfortunately I don’t think that pulling out of
Iraq too soon will in any way help us to achieve other vital objec-
tives around the world. In fact, I think it would imperil
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can you just define for me “too soon”?
Mr. BOOT. I will come to that in a second.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay.
Mr. BOOT. Because I think if we pull out of the situation, given
what it is today, that would be seen as a victory for al Qaeda and
Iran. I think that would be a blow to American interests around
the world and it would cause our enemies to redouble their efforts
to hurt us elsewhere. For example, in Afghanistan, where a lot of
£e say if we get out of Iraq, we could focus on Afghanistan.
Well, I think if we get out of Iraq right now, the situation in Af-
ghanistan will deteriorate even further because al Qaeda will pour
more resources into there and they will feel more empowered to
come after us the way they felt empowered after the defeat of the
Russians in Afghanistan in the 1980's.
Now, how do we avert that? I think we have to realize that at
this point, there is no responsible alternative to a long-term Amer-
ican presence in Iraq—five, ten years, something like that—the
way we have had a long-term presence in places like Bosnia,
Kosovo, South Korea and elsewhere.
Now, obviously it is untenable to have American troops fighting
at this level of intensity and suffering these losses for five to ten
years, but the hope is, and the plan is that if the surge can try to
stabilize the situation somewhat over the next year or so, and as
Iraqi security forces increase in effectiveness, they can take on
more of the burden and our forces can downsize.


26
~
your officers put together—that actually got it only 50 yards down
the field—the football field analogy—and there was no other agen-
cy support to do this, even though the military force was there. I
think that is one of the missing pieces.
If you could continue?
General CLARK. Having said that, once you develop these tools,
you have to use them wisely. The problem we have in the United
States if we have been leading with our military. The military
should be the last instrument used. It became the go-to instrument
in the 1990's because it had communications and logistics, and be-
cause it could provide for its own security.
It is far better to have the civilian intervention capacity, to be
able to do real strategic planning on preventive diplomacy.
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I agree. I agree wholeheartedly with
what you are saying. But would you admit, though—and I think it
is very important for the record to depoliticize what I think is going
to define our policy as a nation for the next 25 years—would you
admit for the record that in the 1990's, the problems that you faced
as a commander-in-chief are very similar to the ones that Admiral
Fallon and Dave Petraeus are facing right now, where our let's say
the more expeditionary or deployable aspects of what I think are
our greatest strengths as a country—our values, our outreach, our
ability to provide continuity to people's lives.
So your troops had to improvise and do things that frankly were
outside the operational purview, in a way more fitting with the
small wars doctrine that we experienced at other times in our his-
tory.
General CLARK. Well, I am not sure why you are asking me to
make this comparison and make this admission
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. The reason that I have is because you
have been very, very prominent nationally in using your prior mili-
tary experience in our common ground and common heritage, to ex-
coriate, and I think in many cases rightly so. I have been a critic
of Administration policies myself that have led us to where we are.
However, I think it is important that we transcend that as Amer-
icans versus Democrats or Republicans, and ask the bigger ques-
tion. If the same problem was there in the 1990's that is there now,
it is simply much bigger because we see it in the state of this envi-
ronment.
What we need to do is offer a solution, rather than generalities,
and say what are some of the reforms practically that we could do
and personnel policy. What are the things that we could do that
would allow us to go to the doctor's point, the soft spectrum coming
across that military force is the absolute last, but we have a strong
military deterrent were that needed.
General CLARK. I agree with where you are driving, but I want
to explain something. I didn't come to this dialogue as a member
of the Democratic Party. I became a Democrat because of this Ad-
ministration and its preference for using military force. The dif-
ference is that in the Clinton Administration, military force was a
last resort.
In this Administration—and my friend Max Boot illustrates some
of the attitudes that I have heard from others in the Administra-
tion—there is a reluctance to talk to people that we disagreed with.


27
|
".
:
:
:
Look, before we went into Haiti, we actually sent Sam Nunn and
Colin Powell down there to negotiate, and we didn’t have to do the
airborne drop in Haiti. We were able to talk it out, rather than in-
vading. We did not do the bombing at the outset, and we tried ev-
erything to stop the bombing—
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Let's stop right there. I am reclaiming
my time, General.
General CLARK. I just want to make sure there is a clear distinc-
tion. I am agreeing with you on the need for the tools, but I am
explaining the difference, and I think the difference is fundamen-
tal, because it is too late, even if you reform the United States gov-
ernment, to use those same tools to get us out of where we are in
Iraq. It is too late.
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. What we are talking about, again, the
political posturing aside, I think that one of the points that I would
come back to is you had the same fundamental national security
process and system, and you can’t say, well, we were diplomats
then versus now, because all I want to do if you have agreed that
in fact the process was broken. The same issues were in fact in
place at that time.
It doesn’t hide leadership errors, but I think it is important that
the American people understand that this is not simply a personal-
ity-driven crisis that we are in. We have a deeper crisis and the
process of how we proceed with national security needs to be ad-
dressed that transcends all of this.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I just can’t let the point go be-
cause I want to make it clear, there is a difference between the Ad-
ministrations. In the Democratic Administration, there was every
effort made to learn from Haiti. PDD 56 was created and we inter-
vened in Bosnia and Kosovo in a much different fashion and a
much greater awareness of our limitations than we did in Haiti.
Now, when I went to the joint staff in 2002 and talked to the J–
5 before the operation in Iraq, I said, what about PDD 56? And
what about the planning process, and what we learned from the
Balkans, because he had been there? And he pointed to the third
floor of the Pentagon and he said to me, “Can't do it. It is them.
They don’t want it.”
We know now from all the work that has been done how this
Pentagon under Secretary Rumsfeld reporting to President Bush,
refused to do the post-war strategy planning that was doctrinally
required and that we did prior to the Kosovo campaign.
So I agree with you on the need for governmental reform and the
tools, but I want to make clear there was a distinction in the Ad-
ministrations.
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Mr. Chairman, could I indulge you for
30 seconds?
Dr. SNYDER. You certainly can, Mr. Davis. I like a good bar fight.
I have already expressed that, actually. Go ahead. [Laughter.]
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. The only thing I am asking you to
make clear, because it is obvious I think the record is fraught with
ineptitude in various areas, but the one thing that I would come
back to is the process allowed that. It wasn’t a matter of personal-


28
T
ities. I would tend to disagree from the operational perspective that
the Administration is gentle-handed in its use of the military.
The bigger issue, and I think really for the record where we need
to leave this with, is we have a much bigger issue that transcends
personality, it transcends political party, that can somewhat mini-
mize mistakes in this process—to your point earlier—that will
allow us to use the full spectrum of our instruments of power to
get to a proper end for a true national strategy, which I personally
£ believe we have had as a country since the end of the Cold
ar.
I yield back, and thank you.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Davis, to make a very mundane minor point
that agrees with part of what you are saying, is you may have seen
on page three of the interim report that came out yesterday, this
one sentence: Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete,
with only about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT per-
sonnel deployed to date. A full complement of civilian surge person-
nel will be completed by December 2007.
This is something Geoff and I have talked a lot about, the frus-
tration. This is not a Rumsfeld problem. This is not a Gates prob-
lem. It is a problem that somehow in our system that the State De-
partment, USAID, or whoever it is, can’t get civilians on the
ground, and here we are at the interim report time, and they don’t
even have half the personnel yet.
We are giving Iraqis a bad time because they are hitting less
than 50 percent on their satisfactory/unsatisfactory, and we only
have half of the civilian personnel in the PRT, which is an issue
not talked about.
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I think it points to the issue we have
discussed, the State Department authorizations for manning, the
lack of appropriations for costs, and the same officer that did the
Harvard Graphics presentation also made the point quite clearly
the night before the President's speech that the State Department
would not comply with those personnel capabilities because they
didn’t have them, and that it would be ultimately the military.
Thank you for your indulgence.
Dr. SNYDER. It was really Dr. Gingrey’s indulgence.
Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.
Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. That was
very interesting.
First of all, let me thank our witnesses, Dr. Khan, Mr. Boot,
General Clark. I am sorry I missed a lot of this. We had a little
activity going on on the floor, which is very important.
General Clark, you said you didn’t want to let that last point go.
I need to also say that I want to not let a point go. You said under
President Clinton, maybe the reason you became a Democrat was
that he used the military as a last resort and not a first resort. I
would say that that probably was the appropriate posture, being
that he had weakened the military to such a drastic extent, as well
as our national intelligence capability.
But that being said, let me start by saying that I appreciate that
you have put forth specific details in your redeployment plan. It is
not a vague troop reduction amounting to a limited presence within


31
Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, if we have a second round, I may
have an opportunity to pursue this with Dr. Khan.
Dr. SNYDER. I might say, too, members may have questions for
the record, and we would hope to get those back timely. We are
going to be interrupted with votes at some point.
Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
Do each of you have something to write with and a piece of
paper? Could you write four things down for me? First of all, “hate
each other”; “hate al Qaeda”; “hate us”; and “something else,” as
a fourth line, “something else.” Just write that down, “something
else,”—“hate Bush.” Again, “hate each other, hate al Qaeda, hate
us, and something else.”
Now, if you will write down a percentage by each of those that
you think accounts for the total violence that we see in Iraq. How
much of that violence comes from hating each other; how much of
that violence comes from hating al Qaeda; how much of that vio-
lence comes from hating us; how much of that violence comes from
something else.
Can you write down those four numbers for me: “each other, al
Qaeda, us, and something else”? Have you finished?
General Clark, if you would give your paper to Mr. Boot, and—
[Laughter.]
Dr. SNYDER. Roscoe, would you like me to be humming the theme
song from a game show? [Laughter.]
Mr. BARTLETT. All right. This should really be in writing for me
because this is a question I have wanted answered for a long time,
and we have three really good experts here, for which I am very
appreciative.
Are all of your numbers written down?
Okay. Mr. Boot, if you will hand your paper to Dr. Khan. And
Dr. Khan will hand his paper to General Clark.
Okay. General Clark, what were the numbers that Dr. Khan had
for “hate each other”?
General CLARK. Fifteen percent.
Mr. BARTLETT. How many?
General CLARK. Fifteen percent.
Mr. BARTLETT. Fifteen percent. What is his percentage for “hate
al Qaeda”?
General CLARK. Five percent. -
Mr. BARTLETT. Five percent. What is his number for “hate us”?
General CLARK. Sixty percent.
Mr. BARTLETT. Sixty?
General CLARK. Sixty.
Mr. BARTLETT. Sixty percent. And “something else”?
General CLARK. Twenty percent.
Mr. BARTLETT. Twenty percent. What is the “something else”?
Dr. KHAN. The fear the Sunnis have of transition of power in a
Shia-dominated Iraq.
Mr. BARTLETT. Okay.
": KHAN. We call them “hating each other.” It is a strategic
thing.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Boot, you have General Clark's paper.
Mr. BOOT. Correct. It says—


34
If we hurt them, they hate us. If we help them, they like us. And
that is a positive thing.
There are lots of people. I did see President Clinton in one
speech in Doha where he postulated a speech that Brookings had
written for him, and started reciting from memory verses from the
Quran. I could see people in the Arab world who had tears. They
seemed to respond to him antithetically. And people like Colin
Powell, or even Jim Baker from the Republican side, will have a
lot of legitimacy in the region.
I have a feeling that President Bush's father probably too still
has a lot of reservoirs of good will in the Arab world in the places
where his son doesn’t have. So it is all that is not lost. I mean, this
is not a place which hates us.
But we must also remember that there is a cognitive dissonance
in the Muslim mind. Even those who love to hate us would still
love to live with us and live here. So there is a lot of hope for us
to build bridges very quickly.
Mr. BOOT. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a very brief state-
ment on behalf of myself, and I will let Vice President Cheney
speak on his own behalf. You know, I agree with Dr. Khan that the
people of Iran are the most pro-American in the Middle East, and
as I mentioned before, why are they the most pro-American in the
Middle East? Because their government hates us.
Whereas if we adopt the policy, which has been advocated here
by General Clark, of aligning ourselves with the government of
Iran, we will probably turn the people of Iran against us, as we
have turned the people of Egypt and Jordan and so many dictator-
ships around the region—Saudi Arabia—against us.
Let me just make one other point, if I could, because what I see
here is a groundswell of people saying we want a diplomatic solu-
tion to the crisis that we face in Iraq. As I said before, I completely
agree. But let me give you very briefly two examples of seeking a
diplomatic solution, one of which worked and one of which didn’t
work; one in 1953 and the other one in 1973.
In 1953, General Eisenhower got us out of the Korean War, not
by saying we are going to bring the troops home and try to make
nice with China and the Soviet Union and others. What he did was
he said we are going to keep the troops in and we are going to esca-
late if necessary. We are going to do anything that it takes to win.
And he even dropped hints that he would use atomic weapons.
Within six months, the North Koreans came to the table and we
have an armistice that has now lasted these many decades that
has been stable.
In the early 1970's, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger said
we are going to bring the troops home, no matter what. And by
1972, they had brought the last American combat troops home. At
that point, the North Vietnamese were happy to sign the Paris
peace accord because they knew it wasn't worth the paper it was
printed on. They knew that as soon as it was signed, they were set
to violate the accord and they would go on to invade and conquer
and occupy South Vietnam within two years of the signing of the
accord. And Henry Kissinger claimed this was a great triumph of
diplomacy. He got a Nobel Peace Prize.


35
Well, let me tell you, the South Vietnamese boat people don’t
think it is such a great triumph of diplomacy. The millions of Cam-
bodians killed by the Khmer Rouge don’t think it was such a great
triumph of diplomacy.
Now, the difference between the two is that in the case of Korea,
our diplomacy was backed by force, and as Congressman Davis
said, the very important point, it is not a question of diplomacy or
force. The most effective diplomacy is that when used in conjunc-
tion with force.
But if we start withdrawals now, that would be toothless diplo-
macy that would not achieve our goals, but will only convince Iran
and Syria and al Qaeda that we are a paper tiger that can be at-
tacked with impunity, and we will pay a very high price for it, not
only in Iraq, but around the world in the future.
Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Shea-Porter for five minutes.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.
Dr. SNYDER. We will go to Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay.
Mr. Boot, how many times have you been to Iraq'?
Mr. BOOT. Three.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Three. And yet you said that you have no idea
what the people were thinking. When you were talking about a dip-
lomatic solution, and kind of pooh-poohing the idea, I would have
been happy with a diplomatic understanding to begin with.
This is a problem that I think that we don’t even understand
who the people of the Middle East are. You, I am very certain, are
aware of the fact that half of the Iraqi parliament, more than half
of the democratically elected Iraqi parliament signed requests ask-
ing the United States to leave. Right?
Mr. BOOT. I am not aware that the Iraqi parliament has passed
legislation asking the United States to leave.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Did you know that they signed a petition ask-
ing us to leave, and do you think that would be a good enough rea-
son to leave?
Mr. BOOT. Actually, I don’t think there is a single major faction
in Iraq other than possibly al Qaeda that actually wants us to
leave. Although if you look at public opinion polls, they say that
the vast majority of Iraqis do want us to leave, but then the next
question is, when do you want Americans to leave. And they say,
as soon as you stabilize the situation, because if you leave now,
there will be a disaster.
I have talked to many Iraqis over the course of the last four
years, and they are all virtually unanimous in saying that, and
that is the position of the Maliki government, the elected rep-
resentatives of the people of Iraq.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Reclaiming my time. They did ask us.
Mr. BOOT. They have not. The Maliki government and the con-
gress and the parliament of Iraq have not asked us to leave.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER, Okay. Well, we will follow up on that, but the
idea that we don’t know what they think is what is so disturbing.
In the past couple of days, I have had the opportunity to sit in a
couple of hearings. One of them involved people from the CIA, so
I can speak about it.


39
ciety is going to be doing, when you make those kinds of state-
ments, how much reliability can we place on it? How much reliabil-
ity do you place on your statement?
Ambassador Crocker a few days ago I think in a New York Times
interview made some very strong similar statements. How much
reliability do we place on that, that those kinds of bad things will
occur? Thirty years from now if things go differently we could be
surprised and say, well, bad things didn’t happen. Tell me how you
analyze it as a scholar and how that will go?
Mr. BOOT. Well, I think it is based on my general knowledge of
the situation and arraying the probabilities. I think everybody un-
dertakes that. Of course, there is no certitude in these kinds of pre-
dictions, and I hope that I am wrong. I hope that we could with-
draw and things would work out much better than I expect.
The problem is that we went into Iraq based on rosy scenarios.
We went in there expecting the best and we got the worst. I don’t
think we can afford to leave expecting the best and be surprised
by the worst. Whereas, if we expect the worst and plan for it, we
can be very pleasantly surprised and things may work out much
better than we feared.
Dr. SNYDER. Do you have any comments, Dr. Khan?
Dr. KHAN. Yes. I think the United States has a long record of not
finishing business. After the Gulf War I, we did not finish the job
then. In Afghanistan, we just up and left after the Soviet Union
left. We did not finish the job of dealing—we did not disarm them.
' did not relocate them back to where they had come. We left
them.
On 9/11, and contemporary al Qaeda is a consequence of the fact
that we did not deal with the first problem of Afghanistan. If we
do the same thing—and I mean we are talking of an Administra-
tion who did not have a plan in Iraq, but if you do not deal with
the post-withdrawal phenomenon in Iraq, we will be facing some-
thing which is much more devastating and much more horrific
than what al Qaeda brought upon us. It is just not about dealing
with the public opinion.
We must also demand responsibility from the American citizens.
Over 70 percent support for this war. It is not just President
Bush’s fault or Dick Cheney's fault or this Congress's fault. They
also supported this war, and now they want to run away without
thinking about it.
We need to think this thing through, and the civilians need to
back it up on what needs to be done in Iraq in the long term as
well as in the short term. It is important for the leadership, work-
ing with Congress and the White House, to stand up and demand
from the Americans more responsibility.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Johnson for five minutes—a strict five minutes.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clark, you have mentioned a couple of times, several
times, that we need to change the strategy before we redeploy. You
gave some examples of changing the strategy, renouncing regime
change, engaging in dialogue with the stakeholders over there, pur-
sue a solution to the Palestinian issue between Israel and the Pal-
estinians.


43
the American people. Perceptions overseas certainly are—and poli-
cies for that matter—are being derived based on our reaction to
certain things.
Our debates now, our troops all over the theater last week were
commenting to me about things they were watching on television.
Our comments are interpreted through the filters of different cul-
tures as well. My concern at the moment is one that relates iron-
ically back to the friendly discussion that I had with the General
earlier regarding our ability to integrate and to cooperate effec-
tively, which I believe is less a personality issue and more a proc-
ess issue—rightly the United States government, but what is that
now other than a bunch of silos that don’t work well together?
This is a question I would throw out to the group. I think one
thing that is critical regardless of what we do—and I preface my
remark by saying I do not believe that the President right now has
a lot of credibility with the American people to be able to enunciate
this vision of where we need to go, regardless of what solution that
is, whether it is the current one or a new one.
But in reality, we have a deep-root problem of how do we articu-
late to our people to give them context? When I meet with the
many families that I have of young people who have lost their
young men—and I meet with every one in the district—they have
a context, a very clear message articulated from that young person
back to them of the filter of their experience. It is sober. It also has
a message of understanding being part of a bigger context.
In talking to people out in the street with no connection with the
military, there is a dissonance that is very real. They don't under-
stand the end-state of the policy. We talk about intolerable casual-
ties. What does that mean? I lost nine of my West Point class-
mates. Nobody talked about them in the past. That was intolerable
to me. But in World War II, we lost 440,000 of our citizens out of
a population of 130 million, when 10 percent of our population was
under arms. People understood a context.
My question for you, to open it up, is most important of all ex-
plaining to the American people in a democracy how do we get to
where we are by giving them a vision of what it needs to be, not
in generalities, but why—not just what—but why we are doing
what we are doing.
I will start with Dr. Khan.
Dr. KHAN. Frankly, I don’t understand, myself, why we are doing
' we are doing, because of what the President says and what
he does
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I agree. We have a broken process, but
what would you articulate specifically to the American people?
Dr. KHAN. I think there are a couple of things that we need to
understand. There is turmoil in the world and we have to under-
stand that as America we have an important role to play. It is our
responsibility to play the role of the underwriter of stability in the
world as a sort of police officer because we benefit from stability
in the world.
But we must also realize that the threat to the United States is
not just a threat to the U.S., but it is also a threat to the global
order that we exist as Americans and it is our responsibility to try


44
*
to understand this. But our response has to be much more compas-
sionate, much more understanding.
Like, for example, our immediate reaction was to seek security
for the United States by making everybody else feel insecure. That
is the biggest philosophical error that we have committed. We
should have fought for the security of all. Everybody in the world
should have felt secure by the initiative that we would take in the
post-9/11 world, and we would have the world on our side. Even
today when I go across Europe, I find that even those who are
fighting the war on terror—the intelligence community,
counterterrorism—they have absolutely no cooperation from the
U.S. The cooperation is one-sided.
And all of these things continue to undermine our unilateralism.
The biggest thing that happened to the U.S. was we were an invisi-
ble empire before 9/11. We showed our fangs after 9/11 and nobody
£at And how do we tell the American people what hap-
pened:
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. And I appreciate that perspective.
General, what would your message be to the American people if
you had a clean slate completely, and were dealing with the cir-
cumstance, to give them context of why we need to do whatever
that let's say next strategy would be?
General CLARK. At this moment in history, the United States is
the preeminent power in the world. We can’t be safe in our own
values and institutions and interests at home unless we reach out
and help others abroad. We need to be helping. We need to be pro-
moting and supporting our friends and those who share our ideas.
That is what we need to be doing.
Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you.
Dr. Boot.
Mr. BOOT. I agree that we have a vital and important role to
play in the world. I think our top priority at the moment has to
be to attain an acceptable solution in Iraq. I think it is naive to
think that we achieve our other objectives if things come apart in
Iraq in the middle of the Middle East.
Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.
Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I want to say to Dr. Khan and to my colleagues on this side—
Mr. Davis—that he was talking about the President having very
little credibility. I would remind both of them and everyone present
that Abraham Lincoln, President Lincoln, in 1864 had very little
credibility as well. President Truman didn’t have a lot of credibility
in 1945. And here we are talking about the court of public opinion.
I want to remind everybody that in April of 1941, 80 percent of
the American people felt that we should not get involved in the sit-
uation in Germany, and what was going on within imperial Japan.
That was 7 months before the unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor.
So I just would throw those points out there for food for thought
and consideration.
I will direct my question to again, General Clark.
First of all, again let me just say that I appreciate your forth-
rightness. I think if you looked up the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) report when you ran for President, you probably


45
wouldn't see me as a contributor. You may see Dr. Khan's name,
from some of the remarks that he has made.
But since you are not a candidate for President this time around,
let me ask you this question. You talked about the stress and
strain on the military and the end strength—
General CLARK. I want to warn you. I haven’t said I won’t run.
[Laughter.]
Dr. GINGREY. Reclaiming my time, because you certainly seem
very prescient in regard to your plan. In fact, indeed, I think that
after we get General Petraeus's report, what it should outline to us
today at this hearing may very well be what the Administration
has in mind and needs to do. So I commend you for that.
Now to my questions, though. In regard to the cost of the war
and the strain on our troops, do you think that we should institute
a war tax? And do you think we should reinstitute the draft?
General CLARK. I think that the United States needs to distrib-
ute the burdens of the war more equitably. I don’t have any prob-
lems with asking the American people or elements of the American
£ or through some mechanism to collect the funding that is re-
quired.
The government is running a deficit right now. We are not fund-
ing the full support of this war. I think we need to take a real look
at the cost. You know, the cost isn't $400 billion. The cost is prob-
ably between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion when you look at the total
cost of what is going to take to recover from it. That cost is going
to have to be recaptured. The government should responsibly start
doing that.
As far as the draft is concerned, I don’t favor conscription, but
I do believe that it is the obligation of the government to have the
kind of dialogue about how we are going to man and support our
armed forces if the volunteer force doesn't draw in the people we
want, and if we sustain our commitment there. I think it is our ob-
ligation to have that dialogue before the armed forces fail.
Right now, I am concerned. I know quality men and women are
leaving. I know we are not getting the kinds of recruits we need.
More importantly, we are allowing the United States Army to be-
come unrepresentative of the United States of America. It is the
obligation of the Congress and the Administration to raise those
1SSueS.
So I am not advocating conscription, but I am advocating a dia-
logue about how we are going to maintain our troop strength other
than simply raising the enlistment and reenlistment bonuses.
Dr. GINGREY. General, I thank you.
I have a little bit of time left, if Mr. Boot would like to respond
to the question, and Dr. Khan. I have 30 seconds left.
Mr. BOOT. Your question is about the war tax and conscription?
Dr. GINGREY. Absolutely.
Mr. BOOT. I don’t think under the present circumstances I would
favor either one, because I think that the economy is proving to be
very robust in the last few years, and though the war is extremely
costly, we are absorbing the cost from the financial perspective
from the economic perspective, and we are continuing to grow very
strongly.


47
Mr. BOOT. First, Congressman, you are citing a CIA prediction
of what would happen in Iraq. I think as we have seen in recent
years, the CIA is hardly an infallible oracle about what will happen
in Iraq.
Mr. JONES. So is this Administration's policy.
Mr. BOOT. I agree. I have been critical of the Administration, too,
but let me cite you another intelligence estimate which was leaked
almost a year ago from the chief Marine intelligence officer in
Anbar province, where he wrote that Anbar province was lost;
there was nothing we could do to retrieve the situation in Anbar
province.
Well, guess what? In the last year there has been a turnaround
which nobody expected. The unpredictable happens.
Mr. JONES. Okay. Please. Reclaiming my time. Go back, because
I want the other two gentlemen to speak, and give me what you
see and how you would explain to the American people what the
£n of “victory” is. How would you explain what is “victory”
in Iraq'
Mr. BOOT. I think victory is a sustainable representative govern-
ment in Baghdad that is able to police its own soil and to prevent
international terrorist from using it as a staging ground. I think
that is essentially what we are looking for. You are right about the
cost of the war. It is heavy in both blood and treasure.
In terms of the treasure, I think that is not to sustain, given how
robust our economy is and how strongly it is growing. The question
of the sacrifice of our young men and women is harder to sustain,
but the question we have to ask is: As opposed to what? If we could
end the war by simply pulling out and everything would be great
afterwards, I would say pull out. But my concern is that we will
lose far more people in the future if we pull out today.
Mr. JONES. Reclaiming my time. First of all, the robust economy
is that to the Chinese we have sent thanks to two Administrations
more manufacturing jobs to China than we ever have. We have had
a classified briefing on Red China and how much money they are
putting into their navy and air force, and most of that money is
coming from the trade deficit with China which is over $200 billion.
Real quickly, General, what would you say to the American peo-
ple?
Mr. BOOT. If I could just for 30 seconds on the trade deficit?
Mr. JONES. I am going to lose my time. Let the general speak
and then the doctor.
I mean, how would you explain victory so that we would recog-
nize it?
General CLARK. Well, I don't think it is possible to at this point
claim there is going to be a victory in Iraq. I think you have to ask,
what is an acceptable condition that we could live with. It us a gov-
ernment that doesn't harbor terrorists, doesn't commit acts of ag-
gression against other states in the region, and that will partici-
pate in the normal diplomatic intercourse and trade and so forth
in the region. That is all.
I don’t think that you are going to get a long-term sustainable
representative government. I think it is unlikely. If we got it, it
would be great. I just think it is unlikely and I don’t think it is


49
only one who shifts the wording around, because in March when
I was in Baghdad we asked General Petraeus how much time did
you need. And he said at that time, early summer, and he would
know clearly whether it was working or not, the surge. And he
used the word “surge,” and I have trouble remembering which
surge you are talking about, because we have had quite a few
surges.
Mr. BOOT. The one that started on February 15.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, because you named another one that
you dated back to June. But the issue is that—
Mr. BOOT. The surge of operations—Operation Phantom Thunder
started on June 15 using the surge force—
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. This is the problem I think that we are hav-
ing, that we are talking past one another. But it is really way past
time to stop saying General Petraeus deserves more time. It is
interchangeable, depending—Secretary Gates deserves more time.
Deserves more time for what? What we are asking right now is
for a responsible strategy to not necessarily win in the terms that
you use, but certainly stabilize Iraq. The very first hearing that I
attended we asked what the goal was—this was back in January–
and it was to stabilize Iraq. Nobody used the word “military vic-
tory” except the President. It is stabilize Iraq.
So how can we have a dialogue here—what can we really do that
would get at that sort of
Mr. BOOT. You won’t find anything about the surge strategy. The
President has launched a new strategy. I was very critical of his
previous strategy a year ago. We have started a new strategy. The
surge of forces began on February 15. The last troops in the surge
arrived in mid-June. Operations using those troops began on June
15. That is why I said it is too soon to judge the results of the
surge. However, there are a lot of early indications have been posi-
tive, as I mentioned before.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Reclaiming my time. We are in year five of
this war—year five.
I yield back.
Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Davis, are you just dying to ask a question?
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I really was, just in terms of numbers,
because one of the I think concerns that people have was that the
surge was likely too little and too late. Had there been the ability
of more troops, longer deployments, God forbid—I mean, would we
be in a different position even today in your estimation than we are
had we actually truly surged with a lot more troops?
General CLARK. I am not sure if the occupation was ever going
to succeed once we used military force, disbanded the army, and let
the anti-Baathists take charge. At that point, it was just a matter
of time. What we had to have done is thought through the occupa-
tion, pre-identified that people who were going to be important
movers and shakers on the ground, the institutions that had to be
retained, the city leaders that had to be identified—and dealt with
those people.
It wasn’t just a matter of troop strength, but it was partly a mat-
ter of troop strength. It was more an attitude of just total mis-
understanding of the situation. To be instructive on this, you
should look at how the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland in the


A P P E N D IX
JULY 12, 2007





PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
JULY 12, 2007





Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and investigations
Hearing on "A Third Way. Alternative Futures for Iraq."
July 12, 2007
Good morning, and welcome to the first in a series of four hearings that the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will hold on alternative strategies for
Iraq. We currently have over 160,000 U.S. forces on the ground there. Additionally
there are over 5,000 government civilians assigned in Iraq, and most recent reports
indicate we are paying over 180,000 contractors throughout the country.
The costs of the war to the American people, both in terms of the lives of their sons
and daughters, and the dollars they entrust to the government, are mounting. U.S.
casualties have spiked in recent months. The number of American troops killed in
action has risen by 37% in the last three months over the previous three. The U.S.
government has spent over 350 billion dollars in Iraq to date and the monthly cost of
the war is now up to 11 billion dollars and is likely to rise further.
The House is considering, and will soon be voting on, legislation calling for the
redeployment of troops from Iraq. Our intent with this series is to have practical
discussions that avoid the extreme positions of immediate withdrawal or staying the
course indefinitely. By doing so we hope to both enhance the public debate and
inform future full committee deliberations. We have invited retired senior military
officers, defense policy experts, and academics who specialize on the Middle East.
The full committee is holding complementary hearings on a broader scope.
Yesterday it heard witnesses give their views on the "Global Security Assessment".
Upcoming ones will address Middle East regional security issues, the "interim" Iraq
report and General Petraeus' September report on the surge. The subcommittee will
ask witnesses to discuss the implications of their alternative ideas or what the
strategy post-surge should emphasize.
We've asked our witnesses to look forward rather than backward. We are not intent
on rehashing how we got to where we are. They have all been asked to address
similar aspects of their alternatives so members and the public can more easily draw
comparisons in key areas. The areas we are interested in include:
Financial and personnel requirements,
The impact on the people of Iraq.
The affect on regional stability,
The bearing on U.S. national security generally, and
What it means for the U.S. military
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60
With these parameters in mind, I look forward to hearing our
| witnesses' statements.
Again, thank you for being here today.
[Yield Back to Chairman Snyder]
|


66
within Iraq, and assuming continual recommendations by
military commanders to retain the enhanced troop levels,
then Congress should support the "current less two
brigades" force through March, 2008, after which the US
forces should begin a twelve-month transition out of direct
combat operations, except against Al Qaeda, with a residual
training, security, and counter-terrorism force sized in
the 50-80,000 range, which will gradually phase out.
This is the force which would effectively under gird US
diplomacy, assist the Iraqi's, maintain US capabilities
against terrorists, and provide sufficient relief for the
US to regain strategic military maneuverability.
However, if the Administration refuses to change its
strategy appropriately, then I would see the need for a
more rapid withdrawal of US forces, commensurate with
reduced chances of success and the greater likelihood of
having to reengage militarily within the region at a later
time.
To underscore the obvious, the struggle in Iraq can
certainly be lost militarily, but it cannot be won
militarily, and certainly not with the limited US forces
currently deployed. The hour is late, but not yet too late,
to leave behind an integral, developing, and stable Iraq.
But it is also true that the Administration has
demonstrated its incompetence in designing and carrying out
a strategy for success. And so I appeal to members of this
committee to do your duty: help save our military, and help
rescue our nation from the periless consequences of our
strategic blunders.


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*
would be any more peaceful or stable than today's (nominally) unitary
polity. Note that there is considerable turmoil right now in southern and
western Iraq even though the former region is almost exclusively Shiite
and the latter region is almost exclusively Sunni. It is to be expected that
bitter struggles for power would continue in partitioned Iraqistans and
that, in addition, the mini-states would be at war with one another. To
name just one potential source of future discord: No Sunni state, lacking
its own natural resources, could possibly trust a Shiite-dominated
government to equitably share its oil wealth absent some kind of ironclad
outside guarantee.
This brings us to the one situation in which a partition might make
sense and be stable: if it were to come about as a result of negotiations
among the major participants and if it were to be enforced by a sizable
foreign troop contingent. The model 1 have in mind is Bosnia. But recall
that the Dayton Accords occurred only after years of terrible bloodletting
that exhausted all of the parties, and, even then, the accords required a
NATO troop presence and quasi-colonial international governance that
Continue to exist more than a decade later. We are nowhere close to such
a solution in Iraq, and even if it were achieved it would not accomplish
what most advocates of partition want, which is a withdrawal of American
troops. A serious partition plan would, on the contrary, require an
indefinite, long-term presence by our forces (at least 450,000 soldiers, if
we are to achieve the same troop-to-civilian ratio as in Bosnia), because
few if any other nations would volunteer to send their own troops into this
cauldron.
Saddam Life
A third possible political solution has been less widely discussed:
ending our support for the current democratically elected government in
Baghdad and backing a military strongman instead. What we might call
the “Saddam Lite" policy has been advocated by Middle East scholar
Daniel Pipes and a few others. At this point I wouldn't rule it out on moral
grounds (soft authoritarianism is preferable to violent chaos), but it
doesn't seem terribly practical. A military dictator demands, by definition,
the support of a strong army. Yet the Iraqi Security Forces are too weak
and too divided to control their own country even when fighting on behalf
of a representative government. It is hard to imagine why they would be
more effective fighting on behalf of some dictator drawn from one of
Iraq's sectarian communities. Moreover, no one has seriously suggested
how this would-be strongman might gain the allegiance of the ethnically
and religiously divided armed forces and police forces. The one name
that has been mentioned as a possible strongman is Ayad Allawi, who
was briefly Iraq's appointed prime minister in 2004-2005, but he appears
to have more support among neighboring Sunni states than in Iraq itself. I
wouldn't be opposed on principle to Allawi becoming a dictator if he could
impose law and order, but there is no reason to think he would be able to
win the loyalty of the Iraqi Security Forces, much less to use them to
impose his diktat on the rest of the country. The Maliki government may


73
be frustrating and ineffectual, but it would be a mistake to give in to our
impatience and repeat the mistake we made in South Vietnam, where the
overthrow and murder of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 made the government in
Saigon less, not more, effective.
Civil war and its consequences
In short, neither calls for a diplomatic offensive nor calls for the
partition of Iraq nor even calls for a military dictatorship offer a serious
prospect for lessening the shock if all or almost all American troops were
to leave Iraq anytime soon. It is, of course, impossible to know what
would happen if we were to pull out anyway, without a stable political and
security structure in place, but few serious analysts in or out of uniform
think that the results would be pretty. Some advocates of withdrawal
airily predict that if the U.S. were to leave the "Iraqis would get their act
together," and with American troops no longer acting as a crutch, they
would have to resolve their differences through political compromise.
Such rosy scenarios are highly improbable if not entirely impossible. Far
more likely would be an all-out civil war.
This would be a humanitarian tragedy for which the U.S. would
bear indirect responsibility. We would have blood on our hands—the
blood of countless Iraqis who trusted us with their lives only to have that
commitment cruelly betrayed, as in generations past we betrayed the
South Vietnamese, the Cambodians, the Hungarians, and too many
others. Beyond the troubling moral implications there are equally
troubling strategic implications. Advocates of withdrawal pretend that this
would not constitute defeat. They call it "redeployment." The world would
not be fooled. In particular our enemies would see through such
transparent public-relations ploys. If we are seen as the losers in Iraq-
and we would be if we withdraw anytime soon--al Qaeda and the Islamic
Republic of Iran would be seen as the winners. The perception of
American weakness fed by a pullout would surely lead to increased
terrorism against the U.S. and our allies, just as occurred following our
ineffectual response to the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979, the murder of our
Marines in Beirut in 1983, the taking of additional hostages in Lebanon in
the 1980s, the ambush of our Special Operations Forces in Mogadishu in
1993, the bombing of our African embassies in 1998, and numerous other
outrages perpetrated by Islamist hate groups over the past several
decades.
Besides the general psychological boost for radical Shiite and
Sunni extremists around the world and the concomitant blows to
American prestige and credibility, there would also be a concrete price to
be paid on the ground. In the chaos that would follow an American
pullout, it is quite possible, even probable, that al Qaeda would succeed
in turning western Iraq into a Taliban-style base for international
terrorism. Although the momentum at the moment is running against al
Qaeda in Anbar Province, the tribal forces that are now cooperating with
the Iraqi government would be incapable of defeating al Qaeda on their


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T-4
this point. You are looking for a Plan B, a third way between staying the
course and leaving altogether. Well that's precisely what the surge is
designed to deliver—it is an alternative to the failed strategy employed
over the previous three years of trying to draw down U.S. troops as fast
as possible without first establishing minimal security on the ground.
General David Petraeus is now trying to implement a new approach
utilizing not only more troops but utilizing them in different ways. He is
pushing troops off large Forward Operating Bases and into smaller Joint
Security Stations and Combat Outposts where they can carry out a
classic counterinsurgency strategy focused on population security. The
last of the surge forces only arrived in early June and it was only on June
15 that the U.S. command launched Operation Phantom Thunder to take
advantage of the increased forces to simultaneously apply pressure
against multiple insurgent strongholds around Baghdad and its
periphery—something that has not been done before. Counterinsurgent
operations cannot be concluded as swiftly as an armored blitzkrieg. This
is not a three-day or three-week or even a three-month offensive. It will
take many months (six to twelve months is a good estimate) to see if
current operations are bearing fruit, and I hope that Congress will give
General Petraeus the time he needs to implement his carefully
considered strategy.
The strain on U.S. forces, especially the army, is great, but under
current plans the surge can be maintained through at least spring of
2008. Thereafter, we could move to a pre-surge force of 15 Brigade
Combat Teams for at least another year. Larger call-ups of National
Guard and Reserve forces, however politically difficult, would expand our
options even further.
It would be a serious mistake—a tragic mistake--were Congress to
use its power of the purse to try to cut off the surge prematurely. If the
surge succeeds in improving the security situation, especially in
Baghdad, that could create the condition for political compromises that
aren't possible in today's lawless climate. And that, in turn, could lead to
a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces to a long-term level of around
80,000-100,000, with the bulk of those forces focused on advisory efforts.
To end the surge too soon and transition to an advisory strategy right
now, in such an insecure environment, risks the very catastrophe our
troops have fought for years to avert.
The only responsible course for the time being is to continue
backing General Petraues and the surge while at the same time laying
the groundwork, political and military, for a lower-level commitment that
could run for years, even decades if need be. This would require
substantially increasing the number of embedded American advisors
within the ISF from today's level of under 5,000 to an estimated 20,000,
and we would have to see that these advisors are well-trained for their
tasks and given the logistical and security support they need to operate
safely and effectively.
12