（SO NI BOTYW Cį į ZįÄNT 9/97-9€/-939-1 （GUOud uuooºd.Oſe Suenſuſ Kuuſae^^^^ |OSJēAUn WILS GOVU S. HRG. 112–349 Y 4.AR 5/3:s.HRG.112-349 FGHANISTAN AND IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services § UNIVERSITY OF MINN ESOT GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS tºw JUN 27 2012 U.S. DEPOSITORYP RO Jºint. Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 73–877 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JACK REED, Rhode Island DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JIM WEBB, Virginia CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri MARK UDALL, Colorado KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina MARK BEGICH, Alaska JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts ROB PORTMAN, Ohio KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JOHN CORNYN, Texas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut RICHARD D. DEBOBEs, Staff Director DAVID M. MoRRIss, Minority Staff Director (II) - ** , , , , , , C O N T ENTS CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES THE U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 Page Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 8 Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................... 16 (III) THE U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SH- 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Akaka, Webb, McCaskill, jail. Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, and Vitter. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff di- rector; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research as- sistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Le- vine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, profes- sional staff member. Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and Mi- chael J. Sistak, research assistant. Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Maggie K. McNamara, Brian F. Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson. Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, as- sistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Sen- ator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon Peter- son, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Sen- ator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, as- sistant to Senator Shaheen; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor TV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bow- man, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Sen- ator Collins; Matthew Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Russ Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Charles Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee re- ceives testimony this morning on the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan (1) 2 and in Iraq. This morning's hearing is Secretary Panetta's first ap- pearance before this committee as Secretary of Defense and we welcome you, Mr. Secretary. It's also likely to be Admiral Mullen's last appearance before he retires at the end of this month. Since the Admiral's appointment by President Bush as the 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2007 and his reappoint- ment by President Obama in 2009, Admiral Mullen has led our Armed Forces through one of the most complex 4-year periods of security challenges in recent history. Among the challenges occurring on Admiral Mullen's watch have been the following: A drawdown of forces in Iraq; a shift to a counterinsurgency strategy and the surge of U.S. troops in Afghani- stan; the reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan; support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Libya; management of a volatile relationship with Pakistan's military; and counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups, including the extraordinary raid by our Special Operations Forces (SOF) this past May that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Throughout his chairmanship and more than 4 years of extraor- dinary service to this Nation, Admiral Mullen has provided steady, dedicated leadership and thoughtful, principled, and courageous military judgment. Admiral Mullen has been joined throughout this time by his wife, Deborah, who has been equally tireless in pro- moting initiatives on behalf of our military families and wounded warriors. On behalf of everyone on this committee, Admiral, thank you. The strategy the President charted in December 2009 in his West Point speech is on track to achieving its objectives. These include disrupting, dismantling, and degrading al Qaeda and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide security for their country, so that Afghanistan will not again serve as a safe haven for extremists plotting attacks against us. As outlined in the West Point speech, the President's strategy called for a surge of an additional 33,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to break the insurgency's momentum and to help build the capacity of the ANSF. He stated at that time that 18 months later these U.S. surge troops would begin to come home. Our military men and women have performed magnificently in Afghanistan. Coalition and Afghan forces have reversed the insurgency's momentum in much of Afghanistan and seized the ini- tiative in key areas, including Taliban strongholds in the south. At the same time, the NATO training mission has added 100,000 sol- diers and police to the ranks of the ANSF, which are partnered with coalition forces in the field and are increasingly in the lead in operations. The Taliban has been reduced to suicide attacks and roadside bombings. In this regard, the assassination of Mr. Rabbani, the leader of Afghanistan's High Peace Council tasked with pursuing reconciliation talks with the Taliban, was tragic. However, that despicable act only highlights that the Taliban can no longer hold territory and are detested more than ever by the Afghan people be- cause of their attacks on civilians. 3 The President's decision to bring home the U.S. surge forces by 2012 maintains the sense of urgency at the highest levels of the Af- º Government. Further, as 33,000 U.S. troops draw down y next summer, the Afghan army and police at the same time will grow by another 70,000, to a total of over 350,000, and these forces will increasingly be in the lead, be more capable and equipped, and more than willing to take on the Taliban. . The growing capabilities of the ANSF represent the best chance for success of the mission, creating a secure Afghanistan which can no longer be the staging ground for an attack against us. This committee has heard directly that the military commanders charged with implementing the President's decision say that they support it. This includes Admiral Mullen, General Martin Dempsey, who will succeed Admiral Mullen as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General John Allen, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ANSF have now assumed the lead in seven areas throughout Af- ghanistan. NATO and ISAF participating countries have agreed with President Obama and President Karzai that ANSF should as- sume responsibility for protecting the Afghan people throughout the country by 2014. This transition to Afghan control does not mean that the United States will abandon Afghanistan. The strategic partnership agree- ment currently being negotiated between the United States and Af- ghanistan will help define the long-term relationship between the two countries and play an important role in demonstrating to Af- ghanistan and its neighbors that the United States intends to re- main engaged in this region and that we're not about to repeat the mistakes of 1989, when the United States turned its attention else- where following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Clearly, great challenges remain. Foremost is the threat posed by the militant extremists launching attacks against Afghan and coa- lition forces from sanctuaries in Pakistan, particularly the Haqqani group in North Waziristan and the Afghan Taliban shura in Quetta. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, has said that a series of recent attacks, including the deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul, were the work of the Haqqanis operating out of Pakistan. Our Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, said that there is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan Govern- ment. The Ambassador added that: “This is something that must stop.” Secretary Panetta recently said: “The message they need to know is we're going to do everything we can to defend our forces.” I was glad to read a few days ago that Pakistan's leaders have been personally informed that we are, in fact, going to do just that, and act more directly. Now, I've repeatedly written to Secretary Clinton to press to have the Haqqani group added to the Department of State's (DOS) list of foreign terrorist organizations in order to make more tools available to our government agencies to sanction that organization. This step is long overdue. I hope DOS will move quickly to des- ignate the Haqqanis as a foreign terrorist organization. When Senators Shaheen, Merkley, and I visited Afghanistan in August, we heard repeatedly how the insurgents' safe havens in 6 - In Iraq, U.S. forces are on a course to withdraw the remaining over 40,000 U.S. . by December 31 of this year, as required by the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement concluded by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in 2008. After more than 8%2 years of conflict in Iraq, the end of this year will mark the completion of the transition of responsibility for Iraq's security to the Government of Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi officials are discussing a possible small residual U.S. military force to remain in Iraq after the December 31 deadline. I have a number of concerns about these negotiations, both in terms of process and substance. First, any con- tinuing U.S. troop presence in Iraq should be pursuant to an Iraqi request for that assistance. It is inappropriate in my view for the United States to be publicly solic- iting a request—sometimes sounding like we're pleading for one—from the Govern- ment of Iraq for the retention of U.S. troops in Iraq. Instead, the United States should set a date by which the Iraqi leaders need to make their request for U.S. forces in order for us to have sufficient time to consider that request. More importantly, I am concerned about the size of some options for a U.S. resid- ual force reportedly under consideration. News accounts cite proposals varying from around 3,000 to as large as 18,000 U.S. troops or more. The fundamental question that must be answered, however, is what would be the mission or missions of any U.S. force retained in Iraq past the end of this year. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno, who previously commanded U.S. Forces in Iraq, has warned that the larger the residual force the greater the risk of creating the impression of a U.S. “occupation force” in Iraq. Leaving behind a stable Iraq, capable of providing for its own security, may be assisted by our having a continuing training mission in Iraq. There may also a role for a small U.S. contingent to support Iraq's counterterrorism operations and to protect our diplomats. ome have cited the need for significant numbers of U.S. forces to be retained in northern Iraq to maintain the peace along the internal boundary under dispute be- tween the Kurds and the Government of Iraq. General Odierno has suggested that one option may be to have a multilateral peacekeeping force maintain stability along this boundary while the political and security issues are addressed. I hope our wit- nesses will address the merits of a multilateral approach to addressing the internal boundary dispute in northern Iraq. In addition, protecting Iraq's most vulnerable— those in religious minority groups—must also be a concern after December 2011. The administration needs to come forward with a clear explanation of what mis- sions any residual U.S. troop presence in Iraq would be intended to carry out. I be- lieve any such force should §: limited in purpose, scope, size, and the duration that they would be deployed to Iraq. It would É. a mistake, as the December 31 deadline set by President Bush for the withdrawal of U.S. troops approaches, to retain a large number of troops in Iraq in an open-ended commitment. Chairman LEVIN. I now call upon Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning and for their continued service to our country. I also want to echo the chairman in recognizing Admiral Mullen in his final appearance before our committee as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and thank- ing him for a lifetime of devoted service to our Nation and to his fellow men and women in uniform, who do everything we ask of them and more to keep us safe. This is an important time for this committee to consider the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we continue on our current trajectory, all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq in just over 3 months. In that same time, 10,000 U.S. forces will depart from Afghanistan to com- ply with the President's aggressive drawdown schedule. I have deep reservations about both of these looming deadlines. In Iraq, during my repeated visits to that country, every military commander I have spoken with and every knowledgeable civilian expert I have consulted with has told me that the United States must leave at least 10,000 troops in Iraq beyond this year to sup- port the Iraqis in safeguarding their country's stability, which both 7 of our nations have paid a huge price in blood and treasure to achieve thus far. For this reason, many of us were very concerned to see recent media reports suggesting that the administration had dramatically reduced the number of troops that it was considering for a post- 2011 force in Iraq, perhaps as low as 3,000 troops. Administration officials have since insisted that such a number is not final and that no ultimate decision has been made. I hope this is true be- cause everything I have heard from our military commanders on the ground, leads me to believe that such a minimal force presence in Iraq after this year would significantly jeopardize the real but tenuous gains we have made in that strategically important coun- try. As Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin testified to this com- mittee in February, the Iraqi security forces (ISF) still have major gaps in their capabilities that will persist beyond 2011. This leads to a set of missions in which Iraqi forces will require sustained U.S. military support, from intelligence collection and fusion, train- ing and maintenance, counterterrorism cooperation, air Sov- ereignty, and perhaps most importantly, a continued need for U.S. forces in the disputed territories of northern Iraq. If U.S. military support is not forthcoming in 'helping Iraqi forces to fill these gaps in their capabilities, the country's stability will be put at grave risk. I understand that Americans are war-weary, but I would urge the President to listen to the advice of our military commanders and to maintain the necessary presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, that all of the major political leaders in Iraq have told many of us they need and want. In short, the administration must ensure that it does not withdraw from Iraq as irresponsibly as they often claim that the Bush administration invaded Iraq. I would also urge the administration to listen to our military commanders in Afghanistan and to consider slowing the pace of the President's announced drawdown. The fact is, as General Petraeus recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence, no military commander recommended the plan that the President adopted, to draw down 10,000 troops this year and the remaining 23,000 surge troops by next summer. Admiral Mullen, you yourself have stated that the President's plan would incur more risk than you had been prepared to accept. The reason none of our commanders recommended this draw- down plan is because it would take vital combat power out of the hands of our commanders on the ground just when they need it most, during next year's fighting season, which will continue through the summer. After achieving so much after 10 hard years of fighting and with the prospects of success finally being within reach, at exactly the moment when we should be limiting the risk to our mission, the President's plan would do the opposite. It would increase the difficulties and risks to our mission. I visited Afghanistan in July again and it was clear that our counterinsurgency strategy is working at a tactical military level in all of the ways that Admiral Mullen outlines in his prepared testi- mony. Our counterterrorism operations are inflicting enormous damage on al Qaeda and their Taliban allies. We and our Afghan partners have taken critical terrain away from the insurgency. Af- º 8 ghan security forces are growing bigger, better, and more profes- sional. The Taliban can still launch spectacular attacks like the one that tragically killed former President Rabbani on Tuesday and these send a damaging signal to our Afghan friends, who fear that our security gains are fleeting and that the Taliban will return to power. But such attacks are occurring from a position of growing weak- ness, not mounting strength, and now is not the time to put our security gains at unnecessary risk. This is especially true in light of the ongoing strategic challenges we face in this campaign, chal- lenges that, if not seriously addressed, could limit and even jeop- ardize the tactical gains that our troops are making at such great cost. One such challenge is the persistence of weak, corrupt, and pred- atory Afghan governance. The other, far larger challenge is the problem of Pakistan, in particular the fact that insurgent groups like the Haqqani network continue to enjoy sanctuary in the coun- try as well as active support from Pakistan's intelligence service, which they continue to use to attack and kill Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, and Americans. This is the fundamental reality from which we must proceed in reevaluating our policy towards Paki- stan. But we must also recognize that abandoning Pakistan is not the answer. We tried that once. We cut off U.S. assistance to Pakistan in the past and the problem got worse, not better. I say this with all humility, not recognizing just yet what a bet- ter alternative approach would be. I hope this hearing will provide some clarity on how to proceed in this critical matter, which likely will have the largest bearing of all on our national security and in- terests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta. STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my full statement be made part of the record. Chairman LEVIN. It will be. Secretary PANETTA. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of this committee: It is an honor for me to appear before you for the first time as Secretary of Defense and to represent the men and women of the Department of Defense (DOD) of our Armed Forces. I want to thank you on their behalf for your dedication and for your support, particularly in a time of war, and for your determina- tion to join me in doing everything possible to ensure that they suc- ceed in their mission of protecting America and keeping us safe. When I testified before this committee as the nominee for the Secretary of Defense, I pledged that I would treat Congress as a full partner, and in the months since, I’ve had the opportunity to consult with you, many of you, on all the challenges that DOD faces, and I will continue to do so. It's important to have your guid- ance and your counsel as we deal with the challenges facing DOD. 9 Before turning to the pressing issues of the challenges of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would like to briefly address the challenge of the defense budget, which relates to, obviously, every- thing we do. DOD has been undergoing a strategy-driven process to prepare to implement the more than #6 billion in savings that will be required over the next 10 years as a result of the debt ceil- ing agreement. While this review is ongoing and no specific deci- sions have been made at this point, I’m determined to make these decisions strategically, looking at the needs that DOD has to face, not just now, but in the future, so that we can maintain the most dominant military in the world, a force that is agile, ready, capa- ble, and adaptable. These reductions will require hard decisions. Those decisions will force us to take on greater risk in our mission of protecting this country. My goal is to try to make those risks acceptable, but that is the reality. The guidelines that I will be putting in place as we move forward on these decisions are the following: First of all, I want to maintain the best military in the world. Second, I do not want to hollow out the force. Every time we have gone through these reductions in the past the danger has al- ways been that we’ve hollowed out the force. I am not going to do that. Third, it requires a balanced approach in order to achieve the significant reductions that I’m required to do. So I am going to look at all areas. I’m going to look at efficiencies, reducing overhead, and duplication. There are opportunities to try to achieve savings, additional savings, in those areas. Procurement, looking at the whole process of tightening up on our contracting, creating greater competition with regards to our procurement area. I'm also going to look at the compensation area. The fact is that in some of those areas the costs have increased by 80 percent. Health care alone in the military costs some $53 billion. But I have to do it in a way that does not jeopardize the volun- teer force, and to that extent I have to maintain faith with those that have gone deployment after deployment, put their lives on the line. We cannot undermine the commitments we have made to them. Nevertheless, we do have to look at reforms in these areas. Lastly, as I said, we do have to maintain faith with those that are out there fighting every day. We are going to have to look at how we turn a corner. We have gone through a decade of war, in which the defense budget has more than doubled. Now we have to look at a decade where we have to prevent war, but be able to fight wars and win wars if we have to, recognizing we will have less resources. That's the chal- lenge that we face as we confront this budget issue. DOD is taking on its share of our country's efforts to achieve fis- cal discipline and we will. I want to caution strongly against fur- ther cuts to defense as we go through that, particularly with the mechanism that's been built into the agreement called sequester. This mechanism would force defense cuts that, in my view, would do catastrophic damage to our military and its ability to protect this country. I know you share my concern about the process of se- 10 quester. It is kind of a blind formula that makes cuts all across the board and guarantees that we will hollow out the force. Working with this committee and others in Congress, I am con- fident that we can meet our national security responsibilities and do our part to help this country get its fiscal house in order, but at the same time maintain a strong national defense. We do not have to make a choice between fiscal security and national secu- rity. Even as DOD grapples with the budget, our most immediate challenges are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. My submitted statement goes into more details on the progress we are making and the challenges that remain to achieving our strategic objec- tives, but let me just briefly address both of these efforts. I'll begin with Iraq, where our focus has been on ending the war in a responsible way that allows Iraq to become a secure, sov- ereign, stable, and self-reliant nation and a positive force for sta- bility in that region. Today, fewer than 50,000 U.S. forces remain in Iraq and, based on the November 2008 security agreement reached with the Iraqi Government and the last administration, we are planning to draw down our combat troops in Iraq by the end of the year. Still, last month, the Iraqi political leadership indicated publicly that they are interested in an ongoing training relationship with the United States in the post-2011 period. As a result, General Austin and Ambassador Jeffreys have been in the process of negoti- ating with Iraqi leaders as to what their needs are and how we can address that. We are seriously considering this request and I want to make clear that no final decisions have been made. We'll con- tinue to consult extensively with the Iraqis, but we will also con- sult with Congress before such decisions are made as to what a post-2011 training presence will look like. - I want to be clear that, obviously, any future security relation- ship in Iraq will be different from the one that we’ve had since 2003. The United States wants a normal, productive relationshi and a close strategic partnership with a sovereign Iraq and j. other countries, similar, frankly, to the partnerships that we have with other countries in the region and around the world. This kind of security assistance would be a means of furthering our strategic partnership with Iraq that looks to the kind of future role that can best address their security needs. But there's no ques- tion that challenges remain there. They have to stand up a council for higher policies. They have to develop a resolution to the Kirkuk situation and dispute. They have to pass a hydrocarbons law. They have to promote security efforts to deal with Iranian-supported Shia extremist groups that have been attacking their forces as well as ours. They have to have security efforts to go after the remnants of al Qaeda which still remain in Iraq. They have to work at a po- litical process that builds a safer and stronger Iraq for the future. As we moved decisively since 2009 to end the war in Iraq, we have also turned our attention, our focus, and our resources to Af- ghanistan and the effort to build a stable and secure country there that does not provide a safe haven to al Qaeda or to its extremist affiliates. Because of the hard work and the sacrifices of Afghan and coalition forces, we have established conditions that are put- 13 will look first to reduce overhead and duplication, make no mistake that the reduc- tions will require hard decisions that will force us to take on greater risk in our mission to protect the country. My goal is to make that risk acceptable. This Department is taking on its share of our country's efforts to achieve fiscal discipline, but I want to caution strongly against further cuts to defense, particu- larly through the mechanism known as sequester. This mechanism would force de- fense cuts that, in my view, would do catastrophic damage to our military and its ability to protect the country. I know you share my concern about sequester. Work- ing with this committee and others in Congress, I am confident we can meet our national security responsibilities and do our part to help the country get its fiscal house in order. Even as the Department looks to maintain the ability to protect our core national security interests over the long-term by making these budget decisions strategically, our most immediate challenges are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today I will update you on the progress we are making in these efforts, and the challenges that remain to achieving our strategic objectives. IRAQ Let me begin with Iraq, where our focus has been on ending the war in a respon- sible way that allows Iraq to become a sovereign, stable, self-reliant nation and a positive force for stability in the region. Given i. importance, situated strategi- cally in the Middle East, it is profoundly in the American national interest that it emerge as a strategic partner for the United States, and our broader goal moving forward is to build an enduring partnership with the sovereign Iraqi Government. The fact that we are in a position to build this kind of relationship is a reflection of how much progress has been made over the past 4 years, and a tribute to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform and the Iraqi people, who have fought to build a stable and secure country. I visited Iraq in 2006 with the Iraq Study Group, at a time when the country was in considerable turmoil. Return- ing on several visits over the last 2% years, first as CIA Director and then as Sec- retary of Defense, the change in the situation on the ground has been profound. Today fewer than 50,000 U.S. forces remain in Iraq, and based on the November 2008 Security Agreement reached with the Iraqi Government under the last admin- istration, we are planning to remove all of our troops from Iraq by the end of the year. Under the capable leadership of General Austin, we are moving ahead on im- plementing that agreement and withdrawing our forces. Still, last month, the Iraqi political leadership indicated publicly that they are interested in an ongoing train- ing relationship with the U.S. military post-2011. Since we believe a relationship with the ISF will be an important part of a broader enduring partnership with the Iraqi people, we are now negotiating with the Iraqi Government about the future nature and scope of our military-to-military ties. Whi. we are open to considering this request, no final decisions have been made, and we will continue to consult ex- tensively with Congress before such decisions are made about a post-2011 training presence. At the outset of these negotiations, it's important to make clear that any future security relationship with Iraq will be fundamentally different from the one that we have had since 2003. The United States wants a normal, productive relationship and close strategic partnership with a sovereign Iraqi Government going forward— similar to the partnerships we have with other countries in the region and around the world. Moreover, Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain internal stability. We have drawn down more than 100,000 U.S. forces without a significant or sustained uptick in attacks, and with the ISF in the lead for security, levels of violence have remained dramatically reduced from where they were in 2006 and 2007. Our commanders in the field believe that the ISF are competent at conducting counterinsurgency operations, but that the Iraqis will have gaps in their ability to defend against external threats and in areas such as integrated air defense, intel- ligence sharing, and logistics. It is the Iraqi interest in filling these gaps that is guiding our conversations about a post-2011 training role. This kind of security as- sistance would be a means of furthering our strategic partnership with Iraq that looks to the kind of future role that can best address Iraq's security needs. While Iraq today is closer than ever to being a stable and secure country, we are mindful of the challenges that remain to achieving our strategic objectives. The Iraqis are taking critical steps to resolve ongoing political issues, but internal divi- sions remain. For example, they still have to stand up the National Council for Higher Policies and implement other power sharing arrangements. The status of Kirkuk and the disputed territories also remains unresolved and they have yet to 14 pass a hydrocarbons law. These issues must be addressed to avoid potential con- flicts, and Iraqi leaders are talking about ways to address these challenges. Regard- less of DOD's post-2011 training role, our civilian mission will be focused on helping address these issues through a robust and representative political process, which is the best safeguard against a return to violence. Another ongoing challenge in Iraq is the push for influence by Iran, and the ac- tivities of Iranian backed militias that have attacked U.S. forces and the Iraqi peo- ple. We take this issue very seriously, as does the Iraqi Government, and the ISF have been more active and successful against this threat in recent months. We have also worked with the Iraqi Government to conduct joint operations against Iranian- backed militias, and we reserve the right to take other steps as necessary and ap- Fº based on right of self-defense consistent with the security agreement we ave with the Iraqi Government—a point I made very clearly when I visited the country in July. tºl. Iran, the United States is working to build a safer and stronger Iraq, and it is that shared interest that gives me confidence we can build an enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government. AFGHANISTAN As we have moved decisively since 2009 to end the war in Iraq, we have also turned attention, focus and resources to Afghanistan, which has become our mili- tary's main operational effort. The core goal of President Obama's strategy in Af- hanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, to deny it safe aven in the region, and to prevent it from again attacking the United States and our allies, as it did on September 11, 2001. Earlier this month, in observances large and small, the Nation came together to mark the 10 year anniversary of that hor- rific attack—one planned and #. by al Qaeda from the safe haven they were afforded in Afghanistan by the Taliban Government. In our determined response to September 11, our military quickly toppled the Taliban regime and drove al Qaeda's leadership from the country. But in the ensu- ing years, as the war in Iraq drew attention and resources, we lost our focus and allowed the Taliban and insurgents to regroup and threaten to topple Afghanistan's legitimate government—a recipe for regenerating the conditions that enabled the planning and execution of the September 11 attacks. Although we have achieved significant success in weakening al Qaeda, particu- larly with the operation that took down Bin Laden, and the threat from al Qaeda and violent extremism has spread to new geographical centers such as Yemen, So- malia, and North Africa, a central part of the mission to defeat al Qaeda remains our effort to build a stable and secure Afghanistan that does not provide them safe haven. Under President Obama's strategy, this effort finally has had the resources and focus needed to achieve these objectives. It also has an extraordinary leadership team in General Allen and Ambassador Crocker, who this summer assumed lead of our military and civilian efforts. This has been a difficult º for our country, our coalition partners, and the Af- ghan people. Significant challenges remain. But, because of the hard work and sac- rifices of Afghan and coalition forces we have established conditions that are puttin Afghans on a path to assume lead responsibility for security nationwide by the j of 2014. The insurgency has been turned back in much of Ée country, including its heartland in the south, and Afghan National Security Forces are increasingly strong and capable. This undeniable progress allowed us to begin transitioning to Afghan security con- trol in seven areas of the country in July. As a result, nearly 25 percent of the Af- ghan population now lives in areas of the country where Afghan forces have the lead responsibility for security. As this transition commenced, we began implementing the responsible drawdown that is essential to the success of that transition process, and the lasting security and stability in Afghanistan. The drawdown of the surge forces began on schedule with July's redeployment of two Army National Guard bat- talions. Through the remainder of this year, a total of 10,000 troops will redeploy, and another 23,000 troops will come home by the end of summer 2012. This is a measured drawdown of our surge forces that provides our commanders with the right mix of flexibility, resources, and time to continue building on our progress on the ground. The reduction in roughly 33,000 American personnel takes place as we are adding more than 50,000 new personnel to the Afghan National Se- curity Forces. That means by the time we have finished drawing down our surge forces, the insurgents will face more forces than they did during this summer's fighting season—and substantially more of those forces will be Afghan. The development of the Afghan National Security Forces over the past 2 years has been one of the most notable successes of the campaign, and it has only been 15 possible with the solid support of Congress—especially the leadership and members of this committee. Surveys conducted regularly for ISAF now show that 86 percent of the Afghan population see their local shuras and village elders, the Afghan Na- tional Police and the Afghan National Army as bringing the most security to their areas. The police and army achieved their respective October 2011 growth targets of 134,000 and 171,600 personnel ahead of schedule, and they are i. movin out on their respective October 2012 targets of 157,000 and 195,000 toward a tota force of 352,000. This growth in numbers occurs as we continue to strengthen the emphasis on quality. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has completed the cºś. of all 12 branch schools where Afghans are now developing . enabling capabilities in logistics, engineering, medical, intelligence, signals, and other specialty dis- ciplines. Together with steady growth in the officer and non-commissioned officer ranks, as well as the experience gained through partnered operations with coalition forces, Afghan units continue to improve their ability to carry out operations with decreasing levels of advice and assistance. Despite this progress, we recognize the work that remains before us in developing the A. National Security Forces. Attrition rates in particular have ...f too high—sometimes as much as 3 percent per month. Although some of these per- sonnel subsequently return to the force, overall attrition still impedes the develop- ment of experience and leadership that are essential to force professionalization. Likewise, we know that the long-term sustainment of these forces will outstrip Afghanistan's own resources and will require continued support from the United States and our international partners for years to come. Given our growing budg- etary constraints, we need to ensure that our support for the Afghan National Secu- rity Forces is fiscally sustainable at home. To §. end, already we are looking at : we can take additional steps to reduce the costs of these force development efforts. Even as the growth in the credibility and capabilities of the Afghan National Se- curity Forces are allowing a responsible transition to proceed, another critical com- ponent of a durable transition will be for the United States to address concerns about America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan's security and stability. To that end, we are putting into place the long-term architecture that will support and sustain security and stability in the region beyond 2014. This Strategic Partnership Declaration, which the Department of State is working with the Afghans to develop, is a framework of mutual commitments that will help focus the sovereign efforts Af. ghanistan will take in the years ahead to develop its government, expand its econ- omy and improve its security. ile my overall assessment is that our effort in Afghanistan is heading in the right direction, we must also take a clear-eyed look at the challenges ahead. irst, as the Taliban lost control of territory last year, as expected, they shifted away from large attacks on our forces to greater reliance on improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, assassinations, and headline-grabbing attacks. In re- cent weeks we've seen a spate of such high-profile attacks, including the attempt to attack the United States embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul last week and the assassination of former President Rabbani, the Chairman of the High Peace Council, on Tuesday. At this time of loss, I want to extend my condolences to the family of Professor Rabbani and the Afghan people. We're concerned about these at- tacks because of the loss of life and because they represent an effort to disrupt the F. we have made. These kinds of attacks were not unexpected and we have een able to prevent the vast majority of the Taliban's efforts to carry them out. Overall, we judge this change in tactics to be a result of a shift in momentum in our favor and a sign of weakness in the insurgency. Still, these attacks show the adaptability of the insurgents and can have powerful psychological effects on the Af- ghan people and on public sentiment in coalition nations, creating the appearance of increased violence and insecurity, even when the opposite is increasingly true. While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down—and down substantially in areas where we concentrated our "... must be more effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of insurgents to create perceptions of decreas- ing security. We are working with our Afghan counterparts to discuss with them how we can provide better protection against these attacks. But the bottom line is that we can't let these sporadic events deter us from the º that we've made. Second, we have a difficult campaign ahead of us in the east, where the topog- raphy, cultural geography, and continuing presence of safe havens in Pakistan give the insurgents advantages they have lost elsewhere in the country. º aS relations with Pakistan have become strained over the past year, and as we have met Pakistan's requests to reduce our training and liaison presence in their country, our diminished ability to coordinate respective military operations in the border re- 17 It is easy to lose perspective in this town, to forget what really matters. You haven’t, and for that, Deborah and I are eternally grateful. Now, let me turn to some of those fights I talked about. In Af- ghanistan, I believe the security situation is steadily improving. The military component of our strategy, to the extent it can be sep- arated from the strategy as a whole, is meeting our objectives. Af- ghan and ISAF forces have wrested the initiative and the momen- tum from the Taliban in several key areas. The number of insur- gent-initiated attacks has for several months been the same or lower than it was at the same time last year. We are on a pace and even slightly ahead of our end strength goals for the ANSF. The process for transition to Afghan lead of certain districts and provinces has already begun, with seven localities now in Afghan hands. We are well-postured to begin the withdrawal of 10,000 American troops by the end of this year. As we have advanced, the Taliban have adapted. More than ever before, they are concentrating their efforts on attacks that will produce a maximal psychological impact for a minimal investment in manpower or military capability. The recent truck bomb in Wardak falls into this category, as do the attacks last week in Kabul, including the one on our embassy and the assassination Tuesday of former Afghan President Rabbani. These acts of vio- lence are as much about headlines and playing on the fears of a traumatized people as they are about inflicting casualties, maybe even more SO. We must not misconstrue them. They are serious and significant in shaping perceptions, but they do not represent a sea change in the odds of military success. We will continue to work with the Af- ghanistan Government to improve the protection of key leaders. We will continue to put pressure on the enemy and expand the ANSF, their capability, and the territory they hold. But as I have said many times, Mr. Chairman, no amount of military success alone in counterinsurgency is ever enough. Other critical challenges plague us, challenges that undermine our efforts and place at risk our ultimate success in the region. First among them in my view is the pernicious effect of poor governance and corruption. Corruption makes a mockery of the rule of law. It delegitimizes the very governing institutions to which we will be transitioning authority and it sends an aggrieved populace further into the waiting arms of the Taliban. If we continue to draw down forces at this pace—while such pub- lic and systemic corruption is left unchecked, we risk leaving be- hind a government in which we cannot reasonably expect Afghans to have faith. At best, this would lead to localized conflicts inside the country. At worst, it could lead to government collapse and civil War. A second, but no less worrisome, challenge we face is the impu- nity with which certain extremist groups are allowed to operate from Pakistani soil. The Haqqani network for one acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Internal Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and con- ducted that truck bomb attack as ...if as the assault on our em- bassy. We also have credible intelligence that they were behind the 18 June 28 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller, but effective operations. In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the Government of Pakistan and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI jeopardize not only the prospect of our strategic part- nership, but Pakistan's opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence. They may believe that by using these proxies they are hedging their bets or redressing what they feel is an imbalance in regional power, but in reality they have already lost that bet. By exporting violence they have eroded their internal security and their position in the region. They have undermined their international credibility and threatened their economic wellbeing. Only a decision to break with this policy can pave the road to a positive future for Pakistan. I have expended enormous energy on this relationship and I’ve met with General Kayani more than two dozen times, including a 2%2 hour meeting last weekend in Spain. I have done this because I believe in the importance of Pakistan to the region, because I be- lieve that we share a common interest against terrorism, and be- cause I recognize the great political and economic difficulties Paki- stan faces. I have done this because I believe that a flawed and dif- ficult relationship is better than no relationship at all. Some may argue I’ve wasted my time, that Pakistan is no closer to us than before and may now have drifted even further away. I disagree. Military cooperation again is warming. Information flow between us across the border is quickening. Transparency is re- turning slowly. With Pakistan's help, we have disrupted al Qaeda and its senior leadership in the border regions and degraded its ability to plan and conduct terror attacks. Indeed, I think we would be in a far tougher situation in the wake of the frostiness which fell over us after the bin Laden raid were it not for the groundwork General Kayani and I had laid, were it not for the fact that we could at least have a conversation about the way ahead, however difficult that conversation might be. What matters most right now is moving forward. While the rela- tionship must be guided by clear principles to which both sides ad- here, we can no longer focus solely on the most obvious issues. We should help create more stakeholders in Pakistan's prosperity, help the Pakistani people address their economic, political, and internal security challenges, and promote Indian-Pakistani cooperation on the basis of true sovereign equality. It can't just always be about counterterrorism, not in the long run. Success in the region will re- quire effort outside the realm of security. We must agree upon a strategic partnership declaration with Af- ghanistan that will clarify and codify our long-term relationship. We must work toward a reconciliation process internal to Afghani- stan that provides for redress of grievances and a state-to-state interaction between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve matters of mutual concern. We must make clear to friends and enemies alike that American presence and interest and commitment are not de- fined by boots-on-the-ground, but rather by persistent, open, and mutually beneficial engagement. 19 That leads me briefly to Iraq, where we are now ending our mili- tary mission and setting the stage for just such a long-term stra- tegic partnership. We are on pace to remove all American troops from Iraq by the end of the year, per the strategic framework agreement and the orders of the Commander in Chief. We are also in discussions with the Iraqi Government about the possibility of leaving behind a residual training force. No final decisions have been made by either our government or theirs, but I can tell you the focus of those discussions remains centered on capability, the sorts of capabilities for which the Iraqis believe they need help and the sorts of capabilities we believe we can offer them. I know you share my conviction that, having shed the blood we shed in places like Mosul, Fallujah, Tikrit, and Basra, we owe it not just to the Iraqi people, but to the memory of those who never made it home, to ; : this partnership right for the future. Mr. Chairman, I came into this job humbled by the scope of these efforts and the sorts of challenges that exist by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that weren't heading in the right direction. I leave sat- isfied in the knowledge that one of those wars is ending well, while the other one certainly could if larger and more local issues are ad- dressed. I leave humbled now by the performance and the resil- ience of men and women in uniform and their families, who did not shrink from duty when duty sent them in harm's way. Again, thank you for all you have done to make possible what they have done. [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM MICHAEL MULLEN, USN Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for the op- É. to testify on the situations in Afghanistan, where nearly 98,000 U.S. orces are currently deployed; in Pakistan; and in Iraq, where we are transitioning to a more normal military-to-military relationship. As this should be my last ap- pearance before you, I want to thank you for your unwavering commitment to our national security and especially to our servicemembers and their families. I greatly appreciate the tremendous support you have consistently given our military. he security situation in Afghanistan is steadily improving. The military compo- nent of our strategy—to the extent it can be separated from the strategy as a whole—is meeting our objectives. Afghan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces have wrested the initiative and momentum from the Taliban in several key areas of the country and have forced them out of critical population cen- ters, particularly in the .# and southwest. Some of these areas have been Taliban controlled for years. Our combined forces are placing sustained pressure on insurgent groups. As a result, the number of insurgent-initiated attacks has for sev- eral months been lower than it was at the same time last year. Security is holding in most cleared areas, particularly in those districts where governance and economic opportunity were also playing a constructive role. Critically, NATO members and other coalition partners remain committed. As a result, the insurgents have predictably shifted tactics. Rather than confront Afghan and iºnºi security forces directly, insurgent groups have and will in- creasingly focus on high profile attacks as j as assassination attempts against high-level officials. Like the recent complex attack in Kabul and the assassination of former President Rabbani, these incidents are designed to reap a maximum stra- tegic and psychological effect with minimal input. Make no mistake, combating an insurgency is about combating perceptions. We must not attribute more weight to these attacks than they deserve. They are serious and significant, but they do not represent a sea change in the odds of military success. We will step up our protec- tion of key officials, continue our pressure on the enemy, and patiently, inexorably expand the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), their capability, and the terri- tory they hold. I expect that following the consolidation of gains in Kandahar in the south and Helmand in the southwest, our forces will increasingly focus on eastern Afghanistan going into next year's campaign season. Given the sequencing of this 24 Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Now, relative to Iraq. Admiral, let me ask you this question. There is a security agreement which was entered into by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in 2008, which set a deadline of December 31 of this year for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops in Iraq. After 8% years of conflict in Iraq, the end of this year is going to mark the completion of the transition of responsi- bility for Iraq's security to the Government of Iraq. What you've testified to here today is that what we are consid- ering is a training mission, at the request of the Iraqis, so that that particular part of our presence could remain if it is negotiated and agreed to. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, has cautioned publicly that we should avoid creating the impression of a large American presence in Iraq by agreeing to have too many U.S. soldiers in that country after the deadline to withdraw this December. Have you read those comments of General Odierno or have you talked to him about this, and do you basically agree that that ap- pearance needs to be avoided? Admiral MULLEN. I actually did talk to General Odierno about his comments and we had a very good discussion about that. Chairman LEVIN. I assume you urged him to keep the comments private while the President is considering his decision? Admiral MULLEN. There was no one more sensitive when he was a commander on the ground over there on comments from some of us in Washington. So I think we just all have to be very careful. Chairman LEVIN. I agree with that. But putting that aside, in terms of a mission in Iraq, would you agree that we must be care- ful to avoid keeping a large number of troops in Iraq as being, number one, inconsistent with the agreement that President Bush has entered into; and number two, that it could unleash some street demonstrations which possibly could result in instability, but that whatever we are negotiating should be at the request of the Iraqis and we should be very careful in terms of the numbers that we might negotiate? Admiral MULLEN. I think we have to be very careful about the numbers. For me at a very high level, the most critical part of this is to get the strategic partnership right, as the Secretary testified, and that we really are in the middle of negotiations right now with respect to what do the Iraqis want and what, quite frankly, can the Iraqi political leadership deliver. As the Secretary said, there has been no determination and no decision at this point. Chairman LEVIN. The issue is not what the Iraqis want; the issue is what we believe is going to be appropriate, if any, after they make a request. It's our decision; is that correct? Admiral MULLEN. I think it will be, certainly. But that's part of the negotiation. Chairman LEVIN. Of course. Secretary Panetta, do you want to add anything to that in terms of a continuing training mission in Iraq'? Secretary PANETTA. I think it's important that the whole purpose of these negotiations is to listen to what it is that they need in order to ensure that they can provide security, and that they can 25 deal with the threat of terrorism, in order to ensure that they can take the steps necessary to be able to deal with security threats within their country. We have to listen to their needs, take them into consideration, indicate what can be provided in order to meet those concerns, and then, obviously, through a process of negotiation, arrive at what that is going to look like. That's the process that's going on now. Clearly, it's going to be limited. Clearly, it's not going to reflect the numbers that we’ve had there in the past. But it does have to meet their needs, and that's what's being negotiated by General Austin, as we speak. Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Panetta, I don't want to waste the time of the committee in my questioning, but the fact is that one of the reasons why this has been delayed as much as it has been is because the Iraqis wanted to know what our assessment was as to how many troops should be there and that has not been forth- coming, and it's very difficult for the Iraqis to make a decision without our input into what those needs are. If we are basing it all on Iraqis’ needs, that to me is an incomplete picture, because we need to know what America's national security needs are as paramount reason for leaving American troops in harm's way. Admiral Mullen, do you believe that U.S. forces should remain in the gisputed territories of northern Iraq as part of a post-2011 mis- SIOIn : Admiral MULLEN. Again, Senator, I think certainly that is a very contentious area and it Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe or not believe that we should Admiral MULLEN. I think the security posture in that area has to be such that that doesn't in any way, shape, or form, blow up. It's a very tough area, and the exact composition of how that should happen is a product of these negotiations. Quite frankly, I’ve gotten— Senator MCCAIN. So you will not give your opinion as to whether we need to have a residual peacekeeping force in northern Iraq post-2011? Admiral MULLEN. Quite frankly, very recently there is still a very contentious debate about that issue. Senator MCCAIN. I understand there's a debate. I was asking for your opinion. Admiral MULLEN. That an issue that a security force is going to have to be there to resolve, yes. Its composition is to be deter- mined. Senator MCCAIN. Every number that I have heard and been briefed on has stated that at least 5,000 troops would be needed in that area, U.S. troops, to prevent what has already been a very volatile area and if we weren't there, there probably would have been conflict. Admiral Mullen, from a military and strategic standpoint, how beneficial would it be if the President decided to delay the depar- ture of the remaining surge forces from the summer of next year to the end of next year? * I-m- 27 As I said, I don't know exactly what the way through this is. As I mentioned earlier, we all know that we tried cutting off all rela- tions with them once and that didn't turn out well. But I strongly recommend that you start discussing with Members of Congress what our options are to try to bring about a change in the status Quo. Finally, doesn't Tuesday's killing of former President Rabbani show that the Taliban doesn't want to reconcile; it wants to murder and maim its way to victory? Secretary PANETTA. There's no question that when that happens and it's done by the Taliban that it certainly is an indication that at least that particular faction, that that individual was from, is not interested in pursuing reconciliation if they're blowing up a peacemaker in that process. I think it does raise concerns. It raises suspicions. Nevertheless, I think, obviously, we have to continue to try to pursue the oppor- tunities that are out there, but we ought to do it with our eyes open. We ought to do it understanding who we're dealing with and where they're coming from, and not expect that this is by any means going to be easy in dealing with them. Senator MCCAIN. My time has expired, but General Allen said that it's pretty clear that the Taliban still has their highest priority winning on the battlefield. Would you agree with that? Secretary PANETTA. I think from everything I’ve seen they con- tinue to pursue their goals, and I don't think we can, as I said, un- derestimate where they're coming from. The best signal we can send to the Taliban is that we're going to continue to fight them and that we're going to continue to be there and that we're not going anywhere. If we can send them that clear signal, I think that more than anything would influence their willingness to develop reconciliation. Admiral MULLEN. Senator McCain, to some degree that's becom- § more and more aspirational. In a discussion I had with General Allen earlier this week and with Secretary Panetta, he sees their leadership parked in Pakistan. The fighters in the field in Afghani- stan are more and more disgruntled. Their morale is down. It's harder to resource them. So I would agree that that is what they would like to accomplish. They're just moving further and further away from accomplishing that part of their mission. Senator MCCAIN. I wish we were sending as clear a signal as you just described, Mr. Secretary. - Again, I want to thank Admiral Mullen for his outstanding and dedicated service to the Nation. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary, and let me also thank Admiral Mullen for his extraordinary service to the Navy and to the Nation, his great integrity, intelligence, and remarkable service. So thank you very much, sir. In fact, I think in your opening comments you mentioned how you have been the principal intermediary with General Kayani, 28 and I think when the history is written your contributions will be extraordinary, particularly at the time when they had to redeploy from their border with India into the tribal areas, your efforts and others were critical in making that happen. But in your dialogue with General Kayani—and I think you've expressed the complex relationship we have with Pakistan. They are at times helping us immeasurably and at other times aiding people who are attacking us. Correct me if I’m wrong, but there's two points that I think I hope you're making. One, is that we will have a presence in Afghanistan after 2014, a robust counter- terrorism presence, a training presence, an assistance presence, be- cause one of the notions running around is that we’re going to be all out by 2014 and it'll be Pakistan's exclusive enclave. The second point, if you have raised or not—and correct me if you think I'm wrong—is that when we come out or come down, I should say—let me say “come down”—in 2014, we will not have to rely upon the lines of communications through Pakistan and other support mechanisms they provide, which would give us more oper- ational flexibility to strike anywhere in the region. Is that accurate and have those points been made? Admiral MULLEN. At least from my perspective, I think it's im- portant to know that we continue on this path to shift lead security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014. While there may be some ongoing discussions about what's next, the discussions that I've seen essentially model, if not unlike, Iraq–a shift to a training mission and then obviously a negotiation with the Afghans about what the long-term strategic relationship will be. That's why I think this strategic partnership declaration cur- rently being negotiated is so important, because that really is a commitment we're going to be there longer than 2014. Not unlike Pakistan, we left Afghanistan in 1989. They remember that. So that long-term commitment is absolutely critical. The pieces of it, we just haven't put that together. We can specu- late about what the composition might be. I honestly don’t know, and there's been no determination, except to say that there is this long-term commitment, and how we do that, which I think will be critical, is going to be important. If we leave, if we leave the region, it's my view, not unlike what happened before, we'll be back. It'll only get worse, and you have two unstable countries, quite frankly, one with nuclear weapons, terrorists who seek nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of them without any question should we de- part will bring us back in a much more difficult situation. Senator REED. Before I ask the Secretary to comment, though, we are going to have a long-term presence, but it's not going to be the same footprint we have today. Admiral MULLEN. No. Senator REED. We're not going to be supplying 150,000 troops, we're not going to depend upon the gasoline being trucked from Ka- rachi up through there, et cetera. That, I would think—and again, correct me if I’m wrong—would give us more operational flexibility, which I would hope the Pakistanis would appreciate. Admiral MULLEN. I think they will. Certainly we will have more operational flexibility because we just won't have as many troops. That said, we're working hard to create other options even right 31 Let me just ask both of you. Senator Reed talked about the fact of the long-term commitment and something that a lot of the Amer- ican people don’t think about, and that is if we have to come back a year from now, each month that goes by the terrorists gain great- er capability. We're talking about nuclear capability, delivery sys- tems, and all of that. I know that when Israeli Prime Minister Ben- jamin Netanyahu paid his visit here, his concern is that as time goes by—he was referring to Iran—the capability of the other side is increasing. So to me, that ties into something that I have thought was a mis- take, whether it's this President or past presidents, in making withdrawal dates, just the general concept, the fact that we are telling the enemy what to do—what we're going to do and when we're going to do it. If they know the time line, and thinking about the mentality that we're dealing with—we think in terms, Ameri- cans generally do, of hours and days. They think in terms of years and decades. Last week, Ambassador Crocker said, and I’m going to quote now, he said: “What we have to do is, I think, demonstrate the strategic patience that is necessary to win a long war. It's going to require more resources, it's going to require more time.” I hope we can bring those to bear, because it's hard and painful. As expensive as it has been in blood and treasure, it's cost us a lot less actually than 9/11 did. In terms of the concept of setting these dates, I would just say, that when the dates were set, one already gone by us, that is July 2011, then the summer 2012, and then December 2014, do you think that demonstrates the strategic patience that he was talking about? What's your feeling about the withdrawal dates as a con- cept? Secretary PANETTA. I understand your view on that. I guess my approach to it is that the most important signal we can send is if we do this right and we pay attention to conditions on the ground and make sure that it works. Whether we have a date or not, the key here is making this transition work, making sure that the areas that we transition remain secure, making sure that stability is put in place, making sure that we don't allow that country to ever again become a safe haven for the Taliban. In many ways, that's my test for whether this works or not. Whether there's a date or not, obviously we'll have differences over that. But I think the real key is how do you conduct this transition in a way that makes it clear that we're headed in the right direc- tion. Senator INHOFE. Right. I think it's a difficult thing to deal with. I have to say this, that during every visit I’ve made over there the Afghan and coalition personnel unanimously said that setting the dates was a bad idea. I know that you take that into consideration. We've talked a little bit about something I want to elaborate on, and that is we seem to concentrate on the bad things that are hap- pening, but, Admiral Mullen, this thing that's happening over there in terms of the training program—I was over there on New Year's Day and I spent a long time going over and looking at what they are doing in this—in the Kabul Military Training Center. You look __ _ _ _- - 32 at that, it mirrors what we're doing in this country, the segregation between infantry and artillery. I just applaud everyone who had anything to do with that. The last figure I got was about $12 billion a year, the cost. I would hope that you would look at the successes we're having there, not just in the abilities of these guys that we're training, but in their atti- tudes, because in each case they'd stop and say, why are you doing this, and they were very proud. They are looking for the day when they are going to be able to do the very job that they're being trained for. Do you have any comments to make on that? Admiral MULLEN. Senator, I visited the police academy there, and one of the things that I took away was exactly what you said. What I didn't understand was, clearly we've focused so much on il- literacy, but in fact the officer corps is a literate force, an 85 to 90 percent force. So the illiteracy challenge has obviously been on the enlisted side, and we've made great improvements there, against what seemed to be impossible 2 years ago, as we used to discuss it. This year, General Caldwell has actually returned, because of the analysis, $1.6 billion in 2011. We know $12 billion a year isn't going to work. There has been a lot of detailed work now to look at how to get that significantly down. Actually, John Allen has a lot of confidence in that work. We know that there has to be some- thing there long-term, but it can't be at that level. So do the Af- ghans. They understand that. So from that model standpoint, I’m very encouraged with where we are and where we’ve come from in less than 24 months. Senator INHOFE. I am too. I know, Secretary Panetta, you're new in this particular job, but you're fully familiar with what we're talking about there and the successes. I would just hope that noth- ing is done that's going to change that successful pattern that has been developed. - My time has expired, but I do have a question for the record hav- ing to do with coalition forces, which I will submit. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. It will be asked for the record. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Webb. Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by joining everyone else in thanking Admiral Mullen for his many years of service and adding a particularly per- sonal note in that we’ve had the pleasure of knowing each other for more years than I can count, since we were plebes at the Naval Academy, trying to figure out what entropy was and how you can measure the thermodynamic properties of steam. It's been a long journey and Mike Mullen from day one all those years ago has al- ways been known for his forthrightness and for his integrity. It's been just a great honor to be able to work with you in your present capacity. I also wish your family and Deborah well. She has done enormous things for veterans and for wounded warriors in those other areas. So again, thanks so much for your service and we look forward to seeing you on other occasions. 33 It occurred to me when listening to the exchanges that we tend to go tactical when we have these discussions. At the same time, I think from my perspective we should be struggling here with the strategic and operational model, that we should be using looking into the future in order to address the issue of international ter- rorism. There's not a cure-all, but I think if we look at the models of the past 10 years, how we have struggled with this issue, we ought to have a better idea in terms of how we're going to move into the future on these things. We can start with the model of Iraq. Certainly the discussions that I’ve listened to today clearly indicate that we have inherited certain ºf...". as a result of what in my view was a great strategic blunder. There was no al Qaeda activity in Iraq when we invaded. We ended up as an occupying force in the middle of sec- tarian violence that followed our invasion. We've spent well over $1 trillion. At the same time, as I and oth- ers were predicting, we have seen the empowerment of Iran in the process. We can then go to the Afghanistan model, where there were le- gitimately issues in terms of international terrorism, but more re- cently we have assumed the risk and the expense clearly of nation- building. It's costly, it's casualty-producing. I quite frankly don't know what the outcome is going to be. I'm going to ask a question about that in a minute. Then we've seen recently an addition to this model in Libya, where we have seen unbridled presidential discretion in terms of the decision when to use military power beyond all normal histor- ical precedent. I’ve spoken about this many times. We have a defi- nition of humanitarian mission in order to unilaterally introduce the American military into a theater of operations. I worry about that. It's a vague and worrisome standard when you apply it into the future and when an administration comes for- ward and says, this isn't conflict, we don't have to discuss that with Congress, I think we all ought to be thinking hard about the impli- cations down the road. Then we have, especially recently, the use of special operations, and more particularly Predators, from remote bases, attacking ter- rorist targets in highly secret missions in remote locations, and all of these occurring in areas which have fragile governmental sys- tems or, quite frankly, no governmental systems. So really what I come back to is what have we learned from this? What is the model now for the future in terms of how we define the existential threats to the United States and how we apply mili- tary force to them? Admiral, this is your final voyage here on the . Armed Services Committee. I’d like to hear your thoughts on that. Admiral MULLEN. As I listened to you, Senator Webb—and I ap- preciate not only your comments, but obviously the friendship that is pretty special just because of where we both came from. I think, honestly, we're to some degree learning as we go here. Obviously, decisions get made about where we go to fight and how we fight, and we learn lessons from that. Clearly, Iraq–this is notwithstanding whether we should have gone there or not, but certainly, once there, with a conventional 34 force that needed to dramatically shift, and a development of an understanding which we'd lost. We've forgotten about what counterinsurgencies were. Now evolution in that regard to where we are, and in my view, which I spoke to very early in this job, left us underresourced in Afghanistan. Clearly, the main effort has shifted there. In ways it's the same kind of fight, but it's a much different place and the complexities are enormous, and it's not just one country any more. Just back to Iraq for a second, I hear the Iran emboldenment piece and I get that, but I’ve watched them. In ways, what's hap- pened in the Arab Spring is just rejected al Qaeda, rejected Iran. So as they've tried to insert themselves even in the opportunities in the Arab Spring, in fact, it's continuing to be rejected. Then the President's decision with respect to Libya, obviously it was a completely different way to support the overall effort. We have in these hearings and historically, we've beaten NATO to death. We haven't heard a word today about NATO support, nega- tive word today about NATO support in Afghanistan. I met with all my counterparts last weekend. It's extraordinary where NATO is on these kinds of things versus where they were 2 or 3 years ago. I would argue there—and I was delighted to see Europe take the lead there—again, I don't get to decide what we do; that's some- body else—and, quite frankly, have an impact, however we got to that decision. But I think all of that—and I take the tactical counsel well, but there are strategic implications for all these things, significant dif- ferences. I guess I would want to really carefully look at the les- sons and integrate that into the longer-term strategic view, how do we get ahead of this? Right now it's very much one at a time. For me, there's only two existential threats to our country right now. One, the nuclear weapons that Russia has, and I think we have that very well-controlled inside New START. Two, is cyber, quite frankly. So, you pose very important and difficult questions that, out of all this, if we can step back from day to day, we owe ourselves some answers about how to move ahead, because it's not going to get any easier. I think there will be situations where the use of military force will continue to rise, maybe not in the scale that we have right now. But taking what we’ve learned, as difficult as this decade has been, and figuring out what that means for the future is a very im- portant effort. Secretary PANETTA. Senator, if I could? Senator WEBB. Mr. Secretary. Secretary PANETTA. Senator, you've raised some very important issues. This is really a very appropriate time to raise those ques- tions, as we're in the process of trying to trim over $450 billion from the defense budget. We have to look at larger strategies here as to what kind of defense system do we need to build as we con- front those challenges and as we look to the future. Part of this has to be based on the threats that are out there. Clearly, we're going to continue to have a threat from terrorism and we're going to have to confront that. I don’t think it necessarily means that we put 150,000 people into different countries in order 35 to deal with that. We have ways to do that that are much more effective, much more agile, much more efficient, that can confront that. But that's an area we need to talk about. We continue to have the threat of nuclear capability from both North Korea and Iran. We have to be prepared to deal with that threat. We have to be able to confront China. We have to be able to deal with the cyber threat. We have to deal with the challenge of other rising powers. All of these things are the kinds of threats that we're going to confront. What kind of force do we need to have that would make us effective at dealing with those threats? That's something clearly I need your advice and guidance on as we try to structure the fu- ture in DOD. Senator WEBB. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I'd just like to—on that point, Mr. Secretary, just one sentence, that if we or you indeed want the country to have the patience with respect to fighting a long war, I think it's going to be even more important to define very clearly what is the vital national interest in terms of our current operations in Afghanistan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Mullen, Mike, good luck to you. Admiral MULLEN. Thank you. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. Senator Sessions. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Thank you for that good discussion. It's the kind of thing that we do need to be talking about. It's critical to the core of our strategic world positioning. Secretary Panetta, you said that DOD had doubled in the last 10 years. Actually, I find that to be an 84 percent increase, not quite doubled. Over 10 years—that's the base budget. That's a significant increase, but not as much as a lot of the other accounts in our gov- ernment have had over the last 10 years. The war costs are beginning to come down. This year it's $159 billion. Next year we expect $118 billion, thereabouts, the cost of both wars, overseas contingency operations. The 10-year cost for both wars was about $1.3 trillion and that's less than this year's deficit. Our total deficit this year will be about $1.4 trillion and the war costs will be a little more than 10 percent of that. So, I guess, I think it is important for all of us to realize we will not balance the budget by the war costs coming down. Secretary PANETTA. That's true. Senator SESSIONS. They just will not. It did cost us a lot of blood and a lot of treasure and we should never underestimate that. But in terms of balancing the budget—and I’m ranking on the Budget Committee, so I'm seeing these grim numbers. They are really tough. They are really tough, and I believe DOD has to tighten its belt, as I think both of you do. Admiral Mullen, you've been quoted frequently about the great- est threat to our national security is our debt, and I think it is. So you've used today, I believe, Secretary Panetta, $450 billion as the amount that was part of the debt ceiling that we've already voted. So the vote we did on the debt ceiling takes the defense budget down about $450 billion over 10 years, which is pushing 10 36 percent. However, the challenge I know that you are faced with is what happens if there's not an agreement within the committee and the sequester takes place. Admiral Mullen, it looks to me like it'll be about $850 billion over 10 years, maybe $800 billion, some have said, reduction in spend- ing. In your best military judgment, is that acceptable? Is that an acceptable reduction in spending? Admiral MULLEN. Absolutely not. Actually, our estimates go to about $1.1 trillion if sequester goes into effect. But it's not only just the amount; it's how it's executed, because it's peanut butter, it's everything. From my perspective, it has a good chance of breaking us and putting us in a position to not keep faith with this All-Vol- unteer Force that's fought two wars and that needs to be reset in everything else that we look at for the future. It will impose a heavy penalty on developing equipment for the future. If we're not able to-and it will hollow us out. So I think we do need to participate, and I have argued for doing that in roughly the current amount. Secretary Panetta said a very important thing in his opening statement, that whatever changes we make, and this also is at the heart of this discussion with Senator Webb, we have to be strategi- cally focused. We have to have a strategy, and having that strategy or different views of the future, and then what is it going to take to meet that. This is not the 1970s, it's not the 1990s. This is from my perspective a much more dangerous time because of the world that we're living in, and the world keeps showing up on our door- step for the use of the military. So we have to be very judicious about that. I think the work that we've done to look at how we would do this at the $450 billion plus level has forced us to look into the abyss of what it would be if we - had to roughly double that. I think it would be incredibly dan- gerous for our country's national security to go there. back of DOD. You can't do it if you zeroed the budget. To your point, we are not going to solve that debt problem on the Senator SESSIONS. That's correct. We have a $1,400 billion deficit . year and the total defense budget is $529 billion. It's not pos- S1016. Admiral MULLEN. Senator Sessions, just one other thing. We have the same problem you have here. Yes, it's 10 percent, but we have our own discretionary accounts and our own mandatory ac- counts, and in fact, if we can't get at some of the mandatory side, pay, benefits, those kinds of things, we're way above 10 percent on the accounts that we can affect modernization, which is where we always end up going, modernization and force structure, the people accounts. So we get smaller faster, which again, I think, would be significantly smaller faster, and I think it would be very dangerous. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Mullen, just briefly, you said you could break the military. I have a sense about our fabulous men and women in uniform. They’re willing to do tough things. They're willing to take their share of the cuts. But it could be very demor- alizing if there is a perception that they’ve been targeted for excep- tional cuts that others aren't taking. Would not you agree? Admiral MULLEN. I would, completely. I think the Service Chiefs would tell you, and I’ve seen it myself, we've all talked about tight- *- - 37 ening our belts and we don't get much pushback. There can be some specific areas. There is concern for changing the retirement system and that isn't on the immediate horizon. We, Secretary Panetta and I, both agree we have to figure out, if we make these changes, that we grandfather them properly to keep faith with those that we contracted with that are in the force right now. But yes, they are extraordinary and I think they are willing to do their fair share here, but they would not be willing and should not be willing to do that at an exceptional level. Senator SESSIONS. Let me just point out for my colleagues, the sequester is not an across-the-board sequester. DOD, even though last year we went up, it was a flat budget, from $528 billion to $529 billion, got no increase basically last year in the base defense budget. So you're talking about 15 or more percent, maybe more percent than that, whereas in the last 10 years defense has gone up 84 percent, but the food stamp program has gone up 297 per- cent, the Medicaid program has gone up 113 percent. In the last 2 years, nondefense discretionary went up 24 percent. So, I guess, what I’m worried about is that our committee, they really do need to reach an agreement that can produce some reduc- tions in spending that are significant and meet the goal that the committee was given. But it would be unacceptable, I think, to allow these unfair cuts, because Medicaid, for example, and the food stamps, earned income tax credit, are exempted under the se- quester from any cuts. Secretary Panetta, thank you for your strong opening statement that represents a mature, solid view of where we are. Would you like to comment before we wrap up? Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I'm probably one of the few people here that, having worked on a number of budget summits, ulti- mately did achieve a balanced budget. Let me tell you, if the idea is that you can rely on sequester in order to get there, that's an irresponsible view. Sequester was always fashioned—I actually was present at the conference in Gramm-Rudman, when we fashioned the first sequester, and it involved, incidentally, entitlement pro- grams as part of the sequester. That's why it never happened. But when you develop these kinds of doomsday mechanisms that are supposed to blow everybody up, in the hope that they'll do the right thing, very frankly, it doesn't work very well. The responsi- bility does lie with the people on that committee to look at the en- tire Federal budget. You can't deal with a Federal budget that's close to $4 trillion and expect that you can do it through sequester on the discretionary side alone. Discretionary accounts for one- third of that budget. Two-thirds of that budget is in the mandatory area. You have to be willing to put all of that on the table if you're serious about reducing the deficit. I hope the committee does do that when they look at all these issues. Senator SESSIONS. Briefly, one quick question. Based on your ex- perience in the previous effort that succeeded in balancing the budget, would you agree that the depth of our challenge this time is far greater than it was when you made that achievement last time? 38 Secretary PANETTA. It sure is. The last time we balanced the budget, I thought we were in Valhalla and that we'd be able to con- tinue to operate on a balanced budget and that it would stay in place and we wouldn't dare put us back into a huge deficit again. Unfortunately, that happened and now it's much worse than it was when I faced that issue. It's a huge challenge. But nevertheless, this Congress has the responsibility, working with the administration, to get us on a track to ultimately reduce that. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Akaka. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to say good morning and, Admiral, welcome to our wit- nesses this morning. Admiral Mullen, please convey my aloha to Deborah as well. I join my colleagues in thanking you and your family for the many years of outstanding service to our country. To my classmate, Secretary Panetta, I want to say aloha to you, too, and to Sylvia, and wish you well in your responsibilities. I want to thank our men and women in uniform, as well as the families, for all of their sacrifices. As we both know, we face dif- ficult decisions regarding our future in Iraq and Afghanistan. How- ever, the one thing that is not in doubt is the fact that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines continue to serve with honor and dis- tinction, and we are proud of them. Secretary Panetta, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan released an audit showing that efforts to track the billions of dol- lars in aid provided to Afghanistan since 2002 has been hampered by numerous factors. As we look to the future, what are some of the adjustments that are being made to increase the accountability of how these dollars are being spent? Secretary PANETTA. Senator, one of my concerns is that, I think, we have to be able to audit the books of DOD. While this is done now in each of the areas, we don't have an overall auditability for DOD. The effort right now, I think, is on track for something like 2017 in order to complete that process. I think that's too long. I think we have to be able to be auditable, we have to be accountable to the American people about how these dollars are being spent. So for that reason, I've basically urged all of the people in our budget shop to do everything necessary to try to speed that process up so that we can track these dollars and make certain that the taxpayers are getting the best bang for the buck. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Secretary Panetta, last quarter ISAF rated three additional units within the Afghan National Army that are capable of operating independently. As we continue to transition regions of Afghanistan back to host nation control, what is the state of the remaining units that are attempting to achieve this high rating level? Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I'll yield to Admiral Mullen, who has worked directly with this issue. But my understanding now is that the number of units that had that capability has gone up, gone up dramatically. What I’ve seen, both in the trips I’ve taken there and listening to General Allen, is that there are more and more units that are operational, that are able to go into battle, that - - 39 are able to conduct the kind of operations that have to be con- ducted in order to defeat the Taliban. So we are seeing—it's taken a while, it's taken a lot of training, it's taken a lot of work. But what we are seeing are units that are increasingly capable of engaging in battle. If we're going to be able to make this transition, we have to make sure that all of their units have that capability. Admiral MULLEN. I'd just say, Senator Akaka, that over 70 per- cent of the police units are rated in the top three proficiency levels. 90 percent of the overall ANSF units are partnered with ISAF and the ANSF lead occurs in about 60 percent of our operations. That is just a far cry from where we were 12 or 18 months ago. So, as the Secretary says, the trends are all in the right direc- tion. I don't want to overstate this. There's an awful lot of hard work that's left, but in this area in particular it has been extremely successful over the course of the last year and a half, and we look for that to continue and we see nothing that gets in the way of them continuing to take the lead, become more proficient, so that they can have the lead throughout the country by the end of 2014. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Admiral Mullen, the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created in 2006 to reduce or eliminate the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and coalition forces. What is your overall assessment of how the organization is achieving its three-part mis- sion: attack the network; defeat the device; and train the force? Admiral MULLEN. I think JIEDDO has been an enormous suc- cess. I’m not unaware of the amount of investment that it's taken. What strikes me is when it was stood up and heavily focused, al- though not exclusively on Iraq, it had an enormous impact across all three of those mission sets. It's currently being led by somebody who's been in the fight. As we shifted the main effort to Afghanistan, the IED threat is still extremely difficult, and yet the enemy is shifting more and more to these spectacular attacks, on the one hand, and to a very heavy focus on IED implants. It's a different IED set. We've needed this organization, I think, to be in touch with the fight and to be able to respond as rapidly as we can. Actually, I appreciate the efforts on the part of many here in the Senate, Senator Casey leading the effort to continue to put pres- sure on the ammonium nitrate piece in Pakistan, so that we can cut that down as rapidly as possible. There is a view that we should integrate this into our overall or- ganization. I’m not there yet. I think we need to wait until it's much more obvious that we fully integrate JIEDDO, because often- times in our big bureaucracy that can bring an outfit to parade rest or elimination, and it's too vital for our overall fight to do that at this time. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Admiral Mullen, you are an outstanding leader and have served your country with honor over the last 4 decades. In your view, aside from budgetary issues, what do you see as the biggest chal- lenge facing our military in the future? Admiral MULLEN. I think when people ask me about the future, as we look in the discussions that we're hearing right now, I think 41 Secretary PANETTA. Senator, the approach now in dealing with that is very much looking at a case-by-case approach. We did it re- cently with Warsami, who was a terrorist who we located and cap- tured. We were able to gather a great deal of intelligence from him. As we developed that case, there was a decision made that he could be prosecuted in the courts, so he was transferred for the purpose of being prosecuted. With regards to the issue of ability to detain individuals under the law of war provision, that is an area, frankly, that I think we need to work with Congress to decide how we do that, because the answers to that aren't very good right now. Senator AYOTTE. I would agree with you. I think we need a long- term detention policy. Right now, would you both agree with me there isn't an alternative to Guantanamo that exists right now? Admiral MULLEN. First of all, I agree with the thrust of what you're saying. There's not a military commander out there that wants to see anybody back, and the return rate is far too high. Sec- retary Panetta as well. None of us want to see that happen. We do need a long-term detention policy. I think the Warsami case actually is instructive. In that case, we actually kept him at sea for a while. Now, that has limits. You don’t want your Navy completely tied up and this is a case-by-case basis, and in fact, moving in that direction. There is a way to keep him and he is being kept right now, having gotten to the point where he can be prosecuted. But the law of war piece, it's a very hard problem that is going to, from my perspective, take everybody getting together. It's been very contentious. We understand all that. But without that, it's given us this return rate and it puts people on the ground who are in the fight in a pretty tough spot. Senator AYOTTE. When you talk about the situation with Warsami, we couldn't do that with every single individual, though, put them on a ship, could we, in terms of a practical reality? Admiral MULLEN. No, not really. Senator AYOTTE. I think we're going to need more ships if we're going to do that. - One of the concerns that I have that brings me to this is Attor- ney General Holder pledged this week that the administration would close Guantanamo Bay prior to the 2012 presidential elec- tion. My concerns about his comments are that, hearing what you have said and what our military leaders have said before this com- mittee, right now we don't have an alternative, and we have a re- cidivism rate that's unacceptable. So I would just say to both of you, I think it's very important that we not put political considerations ahead of making sure that these individuals don't get back in theater to further harm us, our allies, and our troops. Secretary PANETTA. The bottom line here, Senator, is we have a real conflict here. Obviously, the President is very intent on closing Guantanamo and not adding to the Guantanamo population. At the same time, Congress has made very clear that there's no other place that we're going to be able to put these individuals through legislation of one kind or another. 42 We have to be able to resolve that for the benefit of this country, and I would hope that, working together with Congress, we could find a way to deal with these conflicts. Senator AYOTTE. I hope so, too. I firmly believe we should keep Guantanamo open. I think that it is a top-rate detention facility. I've been there, and I think that is the best way to move forward. I am hopeful that we will resolve. It must make our troops so angry when they come across someone that we released, and they're confronting them again. So I don't want them to be in that position. I wanted to ask you about Iran, and in particular Iran's influence on Iraq right now. Admiral Mullen, how would you describe Iran's surrogate activities in southern Iraq, and is Iran providing weap- ons to Shiite militias in Iraq who are in turn attacking our troops, and how much is Iran contributing to increased violence in Iraq.” Admiral MULLEN. I think over the summer there was a signifi- cant spike, what the Secretary said earlier, with respect to Iran supporting two Shia extremist groups, Asa'ib al-haq (AAH) and Kata'ib Hizballah (KH). They have control of that, very clear, be- cause we went by several channels, but politically to Iraq. Iraq went to Iran and it stopped. So it is—there's no question that Iran can control this, and it’s a very dangerous potential. They’re ship- ping Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP) and Improvised Rock- et-Assisted Munitions (IRAM) in particular, and the IRAMs are getting bigger and bigger. So there is a great down-side potential for destabilizing, particu- larly southern Iraq, that actually I think Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi leadership are concerned about. So in that regard, it is on the one hand up to them. It's very clear that if they want to do it they can do it. They have been warned about continuing it and, consistent with what the Secretary has said about the Haqqani network, that if they keep killing our troops that will not be something we will just sit idly by and watch. Senator AYOTTE. My time is up, but I appreciate your answer, and I would suggest also that as we look at troop levels that it is in our national security interest, particularly with respect to Iran, that we have a government in Iraq that is independent of Iran and that we do not allow Iraq to be in a situation where Iran has a greater influence than we would want them to, given our posture toward Iran, our concerns about Iran. So I'm hopeful that we will take that into consideration and make sure we have enough troops to secure Iraq. - Thank you. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Senator McCaskill. Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're all sounding like a broken record, Admiral Mullen, but you're the real deal. You have been an incredible leader for our military and your family has been terrific. I haven't always liked every answer you've given, but I never doubted for a minute you were giving me absolutely your most honest assessment of any question that was being put your way. That's all we can ask for as the U.S. Senate, is that kind of forthright, this isn't always easy, real good information. So thank you for that. 45 who's in charge of this reconstruction and who is making the deci- sion as to whether or not there's sustainability and security that is adequate enough for us to begin to invest hard-earned Missouri and U.S. taxpayers' dollars in these various infrastructure projects. I'm not confident about the process of approval, especially in light of some of the things that have been built that clearly have been a giant waste of money. Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I don't disagree with a thing you said. My job is to try to make sure that we take a hard look at all of those issues, because frankly, based on the budget constrictions that we're facing, we simply can't afford to operate that way. We're going to have to go back, we're going to have to look at these infra- structure issues. We're going to have to look at reconstruction funds. We're going to have to look at every area to determine just exactly what is needed, are we doing this right, are we getting the ...; bang for the buck, or is it something we just simply don't have to do. For example, on the whole issue of sustainability of the force, in looking at what now is an unacceptable cost of about $12 billion a year, they’ve been able, by virtue of looking at infrastructure— we don't have to build the level of infrastructure in Afghanistan that we built here in this country. It doesn't have to be that. So we can find savings there. We can find savings in other areas to try to reduce those costs. We are going to have to implement much better discipline in order to make sure that we not only are accountable to you, but to the American people. Senator MCCASKILL. I just want to make sure we circle back and make sure that the CERP funds and the infrastructure invest- ments we've made, I hope someone is tasked to going back to Iraq and actually trying to document what difference it made in the suc- cess or failure of our mission. I don't think we should hold onto the notion that we have to spend a huge amount on building schools and health centers and hospitals and roads and power plants, that the American people have to spend a lot of money on that under the rubric of counterinsurgency. I just want to make sure that that strategy has been borne out as successful, and I frankly haven’t seen that documentation yet. Admiral MULLEN. I think it's, and we can certainly do the work. From my perspective, when I go back to the origins of CERP, while there certainly were those projects that were more expensive than others, but the vast majority of it was, particularly at the height of the surge, in that timeframe, was turned to enable young sol- diers in the field. Senator MCCASKILL. Right. Admiral MULLEN. It wasn’t just windows and store fronts. It was a lot of other things that really did make a difference. While it may not be documented to the degree that we need to, there's no ques- tion in my mind that it was significant in turning the tide and get- ting Iraq to where we are right now. Some of the bigger projects we can certainly take a look at and answer that question. Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 47 country. The backgrounds are deep and very contentious histori- cally, and that Iraq has to take concrete steps, and they are taking some. They're clearly consumed in the political battles right now to figure out how they're going to move forward here, to include that kind of balance. In the end, and I don't know if it's next year or the year after that, Iraq is going to have to figure that out. That's part of what I think needs to be tied to the strategic relationship we have, that they know from a strategic level we're not going anywhere, we're going to be there with them in support. We certainly want to con- tinue to push back on Iran in every single way, not just in what they're doing in Iraq. - Secretary PANETTA. Senator, when I last went to Iraq it was right in the middle of these IRAMs being provided that we were taking heavy casualties as a result of that. I made very clear to them that that was unacceptable. I think, as the Admiral has pointed out, we actually did have some encouraging results. Prime Minister Maliki was concerned. He indicated that concern, but, more importantly, his national se- curity adviser and he made very clear to Iran that that had to stop. That was a very important message to the Iranians. Second, there were operations. General Austin conducted oper- ations. The Iraqis conducted operations against those groups as well, to make clear that we were not going to give them a free li- cense to be able to conduct those kinds of attacks. The combination of that did result in a hiatus in terms of what was taking place. We don't assume, however—and General Austin has made clear—that this is a temporary thing and that Iran is going to come back and try to do the same thing. I think Prime Minister Maliki, he understands that his country cannot allow Iran to be able to conduct that kind of influence with- in his country, provide those kinds of weapons, and basically un- dermine his government. That's what's happening, and I think he gets that message. But we're going to have to continue to make sure that they take the right steps, and I think Iran needs to un- derstand that we're going to be around a while here, making very clear to them that we're not simply going to ignore what Iran is doing in Iraq. Senator COLLINS. Another troubling player which all of us have discussed is Pakistan providing safe havens and undermining the efforts in Afghanistan. Senator Graham and I are both members of the Senate Appropriations Committee and last night we met late and approved the foreign operations bill that places several condi- tions and restrictions on the Pakistan counterinsurgency capability fund. One of them is that the Secretary of State must certify that Pakistan is cooperating with U.S. efforts against the Haqqani net- work and other terrorist groups. Do you, Mr. Secretary, support putting that kind of restriction on our assistance to Pakistan? Secretary PANETTA. I'm going to let DOS reply to you directly, but as far as I’m concerned, anything that makes clear to them that we cannot tolerate their providing this kind of safe haven to the Haqqanis and that they have to take action, any signal we can send to them, I think, would be important to do. 48 Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I had a feeling you might defer to DOS on that. But I do think it's really important, and the best way to send a strong message is to start conditioning the funding. Admiral Mullen, a successful transition in Afghanistan depends in part on the Afghan forces' willingness and motivation to fight for their own country. I know you’ve told me before that the Afghans are fierce fighters, and I’ve heard that from troops on the front lines as well. But attrition in the ANSF continues to run very high, as much as 32 percent per year. Between January and June of this %here were more than 24,000 Afghan soldiers who went What troubles me is that is more than twice as many as for the same period a year ago. So that to me does not represent progress. DOD has noted in its most recent 1230 report that if levels of attri- tion seen throughout the last 5 months continue there is significant risk to the projected ANA growth. What efforts have been undertaken to increase the long-term commitment among Afghans? After all, as with Iraq, ultimately both of these countries' citizens are going to have to take responsi- bility for their own security. Admiral MULLEN. Ma'am, it wasn't that long ago that we had those kinds of numbers and that kind of percent in the police as well. I think you've seen the attrition rate in the police come down to meet our goal. We're not happy with that. I know on the army side in particular that this is an issue that General Allen, General Caldwell, and the command address regularly. Some of it got better tied to how we pay them. But it still is, as you've described, a significant issue that's approaching roughly, at least my numbers are, about 30 percent per year. We do find an awful lot of Afghan soldiers who want to be there and who want to provide for their country. But there's clearly a lot that don’t have that message yet. We need to continue to work on that. I know this is a huge priority for Minister Wardak, the min- ister of defense, for General Karimi, who is my counterpart there, and that they continue to work very specifically to reduce this. But we don’t have all the answers. To your point, clearly it is a significant risk factor in the overall strategy. But at least I haven't seen, nor has any commander told me, that it puts the strategy at risk. So it's significant, but it's something we think we can continue to address over time and know we have to. Senator COLLINS. Thank you both. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Udall. Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen. I know it's been one of those mornings on Capitol Hill when we have a lot happening, but I think it's illus- trative of the importance of this testimony today that I think every member of the committee is finding time to come and ask questions and engage in a dialogue with both of you. I think, Admiral—and I wasn't here, but I think in your testi- mony you said that we need to reframe our relationship with Paki- stan. I want to build on Senator Collins' line of questioning about sanctions, with a bit of a focus on how sanctions or reductions in military aid to Pakistan might hinder our mission in Afghanistan. 50 So much of it is far beyond just the security issue. He has 2,000 detainees in Swat, roughly. He has no place to put them, no place to take them into a legal system that can't handle them. So there's a whole rule of law piece here. There's a chairman of accountability for corruption in this country that needs to sign off on corruption charges. It’s a terribly corrupt country in many ways, and that chair's been vacant for the last 18 months. So there's a series of things that I think we need to look at and have some patience. I get this has been a long time. It's just not going to be solved overnight. But I think we need to broaden it, cer- tainly to include the security issue, the support. They have, quite frankly, supported us to significantly impact al Qaeda. But they're pretty choosy about which terrorists they support with us and the ones that they won't support. Senator UDALL. Thank you for that comprehensive overview. It strikes me—and I wouldn’t want to pin the two of you down, but at times it appears like Pakistan and its leadership are both playing the role of arsonists and firemen, and that’s problematic. Admiral, you mentioned the economic policy change tied to their textile industry. It would, I think, still be worth considering on be- half of Congress, or on the part of Congress, and that's some home- work for us. Let me move in the time I have remaining to reports of fraud, waste, and abuse in Federal contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission on Wartime Contracting estimated that at least $31 billion has been lost to fraud and waste. This is not a surprise to you two. It's not acceptable in good economic times, certainly not when we're in tough times. But at the same time, I think we have to be careful that we don’t in putting in place more oversight bog down the good projects that are under way. How do we get the right amount of money to the right projects on time? Mr. Secretary, what other steps are we going to take to ensure that tax dollars are not squandered by con- tractors? Secretary PANETTA. There actually were some pretty good rec- ommendations in that report. I've asked our people to implement those recommendations. I think the key here is that, without bur- dening the operation with additional bureaucracy, the fact is in the contracts themselves, when you develop the contracts, that's the first point where you put the right requirements in and you do the kind of immediate oversight at that point that assures you that these contracts are being handled right. There's a series of other steps that they've recommended. But my goal is to try to put those into effect because, frankly, that kind of waste, that kind of loss, is something that's intolerable. Admiral MULLEN. Can I just make one quick comment? When General Petraeus took over there out at ISAF, he put in place a Navy two-star admiral that had done this work in Iraq for him to run a task force over the course of about, I think, 6 or 8 months, to attack this issue. She came up with many good recommenda- tions, and those now are being implemented against existing con- tracts. Some contracts were cancelled as a result of that because we recognized we were feeding the enemy in too many places. 54 about the engagements we have. But it's my deep belief that we should be rebuilding America, not Afghanistan or Iraq. Today, with our Nation facing a stagnant economy and a death spiral of debt, I don't believe we can have it all, or pretend that we can. We must choose what as a Nation that we can and cannot afford to do. We must make a choice whether we will spend hundreds of billions of dollars to rebuild our own Nation, or build other nations. Some may believe that making the choice will weaken our secu- rity and I truly don't believe that. Admiral Mullen, as you have said yourself, debt is the greatest threat to our national security. If we as a country do not address our fiscal imbalances in the near- term, our national power will erode, and the cost to our ability to maintain and to sustain influence could be great. This Nation cannot in good conscience cut billions in services and programs at Home or call on Americans to pay more in taxes in order to fund nation-building in Afghanistan that is estimated to cost $485 billion just over the next decade. Let there be no mistake, we are at a crossroads in our Nation's history and, I think, every one of us in Congress and the President and, Secretary, yourself as Secretary of Defense, we all have choices to make. I, for one, will not ask Americans to pay to rebuild another na- tion, and I have simply said I choose to rebuild America. To be clear, I want to share with you just a few of the facts and insights that have helped me formulate my opinion that we must, for the good of our Nation and our national security, fundamentally shift from the President's strategy in Afghanistan to a pure mission of counterterrorism. I will be specific for the record. At the current rate of our deficit spending, the Congressional Re- search Service (CRS) projects our national debt will exceed $23.1 trillion by 2021. By the next decade, we will spend more on interest on our debt than defense, education, and energy combined. At the same time, the Afghan economy is growing at leaps and bounds, while our economy stagnates, and that's only because American tax dollars are funding the Afghan economy. Preliminary estimates suggest that Afghanistan's GDP growth rate was 20.4 percent in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, while the U.S. growth rate of GDP was 2.2 percent. Also, in 2011 Afghanistan's growth rate was 8.2 percent, while our United States of America's growth rate was only 1.6 percent. This might be worthwhile if we were building a stable and self- sufficient Afghanistan. But instead of building capacity, the World Bank reports that Afghan imports and exports have declined for the last 4 years. Domestic revenues funded only 9 percent of Af. ghanistan's public expenditures from 2006 to 2010. This isn't an economy that can function on its own in any way. It's an economy that is entirely fueled by American tax dollars. In the coming days and weeks, we will engage in endless par- tisan fights over whether we could and should be investing $50 bil- lion more to rebuild American transportation infrastructure, fund- ing that I do support. But we could have already paid for that and more with the $72.7 billion we have already invested to build Af. ghanistan infrastructure since 2002, not to mention the billions more that we are projected to spend in the years ahead. 55 We will debate how to pay for the billions needed to modernize American schools, while the Commission on Wartime Contracting estimates that $30 to $60 billion has been wasted on corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is money wasted and stolen from the taxpayers that could pay for all the school modernization that the President has proposed and again that I support. Perhaps the greatest insult of all is that, in spite of the blood and treasure that we have invested in Afghanistan, we are still not their preferred partner of future economic growth projects, and I'll be specific. In 2007 the state-owned China Metallurgical Group Corporation won a contract to develop the Aynak copper deposits in Logar Province. This deposit may yield up to $88 billion of cop- per ore. To my knowledge, China does not have one boot on the ground and has not contributed one penny to security of Afghani- stan. Instead, we are directly and indirectly helping China profit while we lose our brave men and women fighting to keep Afghani- stan safe. Secretary Panetta, as I’ve said, I have great respect for you, I truly do, and for your service, Admiral Mullen. I know that this is a new challenge for you, Secretary Panetta, but I hope that you would take these concerns to heart. I am truly sincere about what I believe and what I’ve said, and I’ve given it great thought and I have researched the best that I can with all of the different infor- mation available to me to come up with the conclusion that I have come up with, that we should get out as quickly as we can, go and fight terrorism anywhere and everywhere it may take us to keep it from the shores of America, and I think the American people will be behind us. But I do not believe that we can win and change the Afghans or the Iraqis or the Pakistanis from what they believe in. With that being said, I hope that we really do prevent that from happening here again as happened on 9/11, and we will support that effort. So, with that I have a statement for you on that, if your people would like to respond to that. If either one of you would want to, you're more than welcome. Secretary PANETTA. Senator, you've shared those views with me before and I understand your concerns. I think all of us, as the Ad- miral has expressed, are concerned about the economic situation in this country and that it is a threat to our national security, and that we have to pay attention to it. At the same time, it's important that if we're going to protect this country, protect our economy and protect our people, that we also have to be able to respond to those threats to our national se- curity, and that it would not behoove us to just focus on the eco- nomic challenges without focusing on the national security chal- lenges as well. That's our responsibility. I think the reality is that from 9/11, we just celebrated the tenth anniversary of 9/11, we were attacked. This country was attacked and a lot of people died as a result of that attack. We had a respon- sibility to respond to that. What we have to do now is to make sure that places like Afghanistan and Pakistan don't become safe ha- vens so that al Qaeda can again plan those kinds of attacks against the United States, particularly with regards to Afghanistan. 58 Do you agree with me, Secretary Panetta, that if things continue to go like they're going in Afghanistan, the likelihood of Afghani- stan ever becoming a safe haven for terrorists to attack this coun- try is very remote? Secretary PANETTA. That's correct. The whole point is for them to achieve sufficient stability so that never happens again. Senator GRAHAM. Simply put, isn't it better to fight them in their back yard, with the help of people who live in their back yard, than having to do it all from home? Secretary PANETTA. Yes. Senator GRAHAM. All right. So those who've served in Afghani- stan and Iraq, you are changing the world. It is costly, it takes more time, it's more labor intensive, to build will, capacity to will, than it is to kill a single individual. Drone attacks are part of a strategy, but the ultimate blow to this ideological movement called the war on terror is to have the good people over there fight back and win. You know what? They want to fight back. With our help, they'll win. So that's my two cents worth. Back here at home, you're trying, Secretary Panetta, to go through the defense budget and over the next decade take out a substantial amount of money because we're broke as a Nation, right? Secretary PANETTA. That's what they tell me. Senator GRAHAM. It's painful. Secretary PANETTA. It is. Senator GRAHAM. You do it with a smile on your face, but you have to-and I want to help, because the defense budget should be on the table. Nothing is sacrosanct. The Senator from West Vir- ginia is right, we're broke. But you don't become wealthy by allow- ing your enemies to grow in strength and come back and get you the second time. So, we're going to put the defense budget under scrutiny. Wheth- er it's $400 billion, $350 billion, $450 billion, it's going to be sub- stantial over the next decade. Triggers in the debt ceiling bill, are you familiar with them? Secretary PANETTA. Yes. Senator GRAHAM. As I understand this legislation, if this super- committee can't find the $1.4 trillion they're charged with finding in terms of savings over the next decade, there will be a trigger pulled to achieve those savings, and $600 billion will come out of DOD. Is that correct? Secretary PANETTA. Roughly in that area. Senator GRAHAM. On top of what you're trying to do. Secretary PANETTA. That's right. Senator GRAHAM. If we pull that trigger, would we be shooting ourselves in the foot? Secretary PANETTA. We'd be shooting ourselves in the head. [Laughter.] Senator GRAHAM. That's why I like you. It would be the dumbest thing. Do you know why Congress would do such a dumb thing? You don't have to answer that. I don't know either. 60 Admiral MULLEN. I would, I have confidence that whatever, as- suming there is a number, that force protection will be, that our force protection will meet the needs of whoever might be there. So in that regard, yes. Senator GRAHAM. Okay. One last question. I know my time has expired. Secretary Panetta, we've come up in the Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee markup with some conditions and benchmarks on Pakistan. I want to provide it to you and would you write me a letter and see if you think we're on the right track? Secretary PANETTA. Sure. Senator GRAHAM. Simply put, you have informed the Pakistanis that enough is enough. I believe we can't trust them or abandon them. Do you agree with that simple statement? Secretary PANETTA. That's where we are. Senator GRAHAM. You can't trust them, but you can't abandon them. But would you agree with me, if something doesn’t change in Pakistan substantially that we're on a collision course with Paki- stan? Secretary PANETTA. It has to change. We can't continue the situ- ation that's there now. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your service. Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Thank you all very much, Sec- retary Panetta, Admiral Mullen, for being here this morning and for your endurance. Hopefully, this is the end. I want to echo all of my colleagues, Admiral Mullen, in express- ing my deep appreciation for your leadership and for your service to the country. Thank you. I would like to pick up from where Senator Graham ended on Pakistan, because, as you both pointed out in your comments, what happens in Pakistan has a great deal to do with what happens in Afghanistan. I had the opportunity to accompany Chairman Levin to Afghanistan in August. Senator Merkley was with us as well. One of the things that we heard from our military leaders when we were there was the growing influence of the Haqqani network and the impact that they were having, because of not only their own operations, but because of their support for the Taliban and ; terrorist groups, not only in Afghanistan, but inside Pakistan itself. So my question, Admiral Mullen, is first to you, and that is, do you think that General Kayani, the Pakistani leadership, recog- nizes the threat that the Haqqanis present not only to Afghanistan and to our forces there, but also to their own internal security and to their own military? Admiral MULLEN. You said something very important, Senator, and I think the Secretary would agree with this, which is what we've seen over the course of the last several years is the coming together of many of these terrorist organizations in ways that— years ago, they didn't like each other much at all. But we see more and more of that, including recently the attack on our embassy, and that's worrisome. With respect to the future, it's very clear the toughest fight's going to be in the east, and the Haqqani network is embedded in Pakistan, essentially across from Khost, Paktia, and Paktika, 62 -- south for next year. The specifics of that I think he's still working his way through. So, in that regard, my expectation is that there will be some net increase in the east, not coming from outside the country but from inside the country, as things have gotten better in the south and he looks to the tougher fight in the east in the next couple of years. Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate your mentioning the new team there. They were very impressive. I think both of you also mentioned the confluence of India and their impact in the region. One of the things that we heard from the leadership in Pakistan was their overtures to try and reduce tensions with India. How much of that do you think is real and has the potential to have a real impact, and how much of it is show and not going to have any real impact? Secretary PANETTA. I think it is real. I think they are making an effort at trying to see if they can find a way to resolve the issues between Pakistan and India. They've made efforts at that. I think what has to happen is that they really do have to make this a high- er priority. They have to really focus on this. I think in terms of the security of Pakistan that if they could find a way to resolve their differences with India that country would be a different country. But to do that, to achieve that, I really do think that they have to put a much larger effort into trying to resolve those differences with India. You can't meet one day and then wait a long time and then come together. It has to be constant, and that's something that they're not doing right now. Senator SHAHEEN. My time has expired, but just a final follow- on. How receptive do you think India is to those kinds of overtures? Secretary PANETTA. India has in some ways resisted engaging as well. I think both sides need to roll up their sleeves and get to work on this. It's tough. It's tough politically in both areas. But in the end we are never going to achieve stability in that region until the issues between Pakistan and India are resolved. Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you both very much. At this time we'll close the hearing. We are adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL STRATEGIC STEWARDSHIP 1. Senator McCASKILL Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, as much as I'm concerned about finding specific savings, I strongly believe we have a new impera- tive for strategic stewardship of our national treasure by the Department of Defense (DOD) and its leadership. I am sure we are in agreement that DOD must continue to aggressively look for ways to save º without compromising its ability to fight and win the Nation's wars, but what really concerns me is that DOD has not fully and thoroughly come to embrace the fact that the way it spends money is just as important as the way it fights because we can't win if we continue to waste money. In fact, I believe we will erode the will of the American people if we are not good stewards of both the lives of our servicemembers and the treasure of our country. As you are fully aware, without the trust and confidence of the American people we can win every tactical fight on the ground and still not be strategically successful. Given the incredibly challenging financial times in which we find ourselves and the hard slog of the past 10 years at war, how does DOD, and each of the Military Serv- ices, ensure leadership at every level pay as much attention to how it uses its re- sources as it does to how it takes care of its men and women? Secretary PANETTA. I am confident DOD can meet its national security respon- sibilities and do its part to help the country get its fiscal house in order. To do this, 63 DOD must work even harder to overhaul the way it does business. An essential part of this effort is improving the quality of financial information and moving towards auditable financial statements. To that end, I directed DOD to cut in half the time it will take to achieve audit readiness for the Statement of Budgetary Resources, so that in 2014 it will have the ability to conduct a full budget audit. This focused approach prioritizes the information used to manage DOD, and will give financial managers the key tools needed to track spending, identify waste, and improve the way DOD does business as soon as possible. This is a priority for me across DOD. I will engage in this effort personally and directed the Deputy Secretary, in his role as DOD's Chief Management Officer, to conduct periodic reviews. Auditability is a goal that every commander, every man- ager, and every functional specialist must understand and embrace to improve effi- ciency and accountability within DOD. Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) goals are being included in Senior Executive performance plans throughout DOD in fiscal year 2012 and DOD is working to include them in General and Flag Officer performance plans as well. Admiral MULLEN. DOD is adapting to the changing fiscal environment and will continue to strengthen its analytical processes for making difficult budget choices. DOD will also reinforce a culture of cost discipline, which will enhance our ability to be good stewards of our national resources. These focused approaches will give our financial managers, at all levels, the key tools they need to track spending, iden- tify waste, and improve the way DOD does business. The Chief Financial Officer and the Military Departments play an integral role in the financial governance processes, including overseeing the processes and imple- mentation of new systems. Senior leadership within DOD is committed to, and ac- countable for, accomplishing the goals of FIAR. LEADERSHIP IN CONTRACTING POLICY 2. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, it seems to me that part of the problem is that contingency contracting continues to be side-lined in DOD as something it requires and therefore something it must do, but something to which it does not give adequate oversight or priority. As a case in point, in June the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of the Committee on Homeland Secu- rity and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) had a hearing on this issue, where I ad- dressed this concern with DOD officials. I simply asked who's in charge of contin- gency contracting within DOD–its planning, its oversight, et cetera. To put it mild- ly, the answer was lacking and elusive. Who is the most senior official, aside from the Secretary of Defense, in charge of contingency contracting policy, planning, and execution within DOD'? - Secretary PANETTA. Specific to contingency acquisition and contracting, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) is the senior official in DOD responsible for supervising acquisition and establishing policies for acquisition, to include contingency contracting efforts in DOD. Within AT&L, these responsibilities are discharged by the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisi- tion Policy, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support. The importance of contingency contracting is recognized within both operational and acquisition communities and currently being institutionalized across DOD in policies, doctrine, and plans. Operational Contract Support (OCS) has been defined as the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provisions of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force within a designated operational area. OCS responsibilities within DOD are set forth in DOD Directive 3020.49, “Orches- trating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Ac- quisition Planning and its Operations Execution,” which recognizes the roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Services, and the combatant commanders with respect to OCS. Admiral MULLEN. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for AT&L is the senior offi- cial in DOD responsible for contingency contracting policy, oversight, and execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Assistant Sec- retary of Defense for Policy, is responsible for issuing strategic planning guidance to the combatant commands, planning system automation support, and review of operational plans for adequacy and compliance with said guidance. The combatant commands develop and execute operational plans and the Military Services provide actual contracting in accordance with Title 10 authority. 64 AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE FUND 3. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, DOD and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are now planning for the implemen: tation of the †. Infrastructure Fund, which will spend $400 million in DOD funds and hundreds of millions more from the Department of State (DOS) and USAID. The É. include maintaining and operating power generators in Kandahar, building power transmission networks, and $23 million for a new road connecting Nawa to Lashkar Gah. I have asked questions about this fund before in hearings in the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of HSGAC and I continue to have serious concerns about the fact that DOD is building these projects that the #. Government cannot possibly sustain, particularly in a time of º short- falls and real needs here at home. Can you tell me how DOD plans to ensure that this $400 million doesn't go down the drain? Secretary PANETTA. Sustainability is critical to the success of infrastructure projects. Recognizing this, DOD continues to develop and implement a number of processes to ensure that the infrastructure it builds can, and will, be sustained by the Afghan Government and people. For example, the electrical, water, and other infrastructure projects funded by the Afghan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) are re- viewed for sustainability by a variety of stakeholders, including DOS, USAID, inter- national donors, the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), and regional and local gov- ernment officials and citizens. All AIF projects must also have sustainability plans, which identify local responsibilities, non-U.S. funding sources, and maintenance and operation requirements. In addition, to help ensure that the electrical projects are sustained, §§ is engaged in a robust initiative to build the capacity of the na- tional power utility company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, to generate revenue and sustain necessary infrastructure. Through ... and intergovernmental partnerships such as this, DOD is working to ensure that all infrastructure projects are sustainable by the GoA. Admiral MULLEN. We acknowledge that, if unassisted, the Afghan Government would likely have challenges maintaining these infrastructure projects. However, there are capacity-building efforts underway to assist the Government of Afghani- stan in developing the required abilities to maintain these infrastructure projects. In the case of Kandahar power generation, the Afghan Public Utility has made great progress in the last few years training the necessary maintainers for some of these projects. USAID has been engaged in training and capacity development, and has planned $300 million over the next 5 years to work specifically on capacity develop- ment in order to provide the depth of manpower needed to manage operations. In the cases cited, future plans for additional power generation from more sus- tainable sources, like an additional turbine planned for the Kajaki Damn and inte- gration of the power transmission networks, serve to reduce the requirements for sustaining the diesel power generation stations in Kandahar. Twelve-month con- tractor warranty periods have also been added for such projects as the Nawa to Lashkar Gah ...]”These types of projects, coupled with capacity development ef- forts, and the security efforts provided by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will contribute toward the long-term sustainability desired. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE IRAQ STRATEGY 4. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, there are approximately 46,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. The 2008 security agreement between Baghdad and Washington requires all U.S. forces to be out of Iraq by December 2011. The Iraqi Government must ask for and approve the presence of U.S. forces beyond 2011, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki ań other Iraqi leaders have indicated they would like a U.S. presence be- yond 2011, focused on training their forces, intelligence, and º; their air space and borders. Massoud Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan, said if American troops leave, the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq after U.S.-led operations began might erupt anew and called on the Iraqi Government to sign an agreement with the Americans to keep forces in the country. The Obama administration is fi- nalizing several options that could leave as few as 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. Forces in Ira beyond December 2012. No official decision has been made by Iraq or the Uni States. This number is significantly lower than the 14,000 to 18,000 recently pre- sented at DOD by General Lloyd Austin, Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq. I believe leaving 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq increases the risk to those forces and jeopardizes the successes achieved by the Iraqi people and the coalition of na- 66 down of U.S. Forces began in July 2011. Almost 1,000 soldiers from the 45th Infan- try Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) from Oklahoma were rerouted at the 11th hour to Kuwait. This strategy of not replacing units as they rotate out of Afghanistan is disruptive and increases risk as the Oklahoma 45th IBCT is required to complete a mission at about two-third strength. Since July 29, 13 Oklahoma soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan—they are doing a great job, are well-trained, and are executing the mission we have given them. President Obama has ordered the with- drawal of 10,000 U.S. forces this year and another 23,000 by the summer of 2012, leaving about 68,000 forces on the ground. What rationale drove the drawdown at the height of fighting season? Secretary PANETTA. The surge of U.S. forces ordered by President Obama in 2009 was never intended to be open-ended, and has always been connected to the transi- tion process, which began in 2011. Campaign progress has set the conditions that allowed us to begin recovering surge forces, marking an important milestone toward the completion of the transition .# lead security responsibility to the ANSF by the end of 2014. Further, decisions over the pace and timing of the drawdown, within the designated milestones, have been delegated to Commander, USFOR-A/ISAF. DOD is carefully monitoring campaign progress, and will ensure that decisions about force strength support our strategy. Admiral MULLEN. President Obama's decision to begin the deliberate, responsible redeployment of 10,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan over the course of this year, with a further recovery of the remaining 23,000 by the end of summer 2012 was based on clear progress in our strategy, particularly in our core goal of dis- rupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda. We are seeing steady rogress in the Hºt of the ANSF, and there has been a clear decline in vio- ence in 2011 when compared to the previous year. At the end of summer 2012—when the recovery of U.S. surge forces is complete— there will be a greater number of Afghan and coalition forces in the fight than there are today because we will have added an additional 55,400 members to the ANSF. Additionally, over the coming year, we will continue to develop and professionalize an even more capable ANSF. º well-trained, operationally effective ANSF will allow Afghans to assume greater responsibility as we redeploy the U.S. surge forces, maintain a necessary level of combat operations against anti-coalition forces, and repare for the successful transition of i. security responsibility to the Afghans É. the end of 2014. 8. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, Ambassador Crocker said earlier this month that the United States must demonstrate strategic patience to win this long war in Afghanistan. Do you believe setting withdrawal dates of July 2012 and December 2014 demonstrate strategic patience and shows U.S. long-term commitment? Secretary PANETTA. The date of July 2011 marks the beginning of the transition to Afghan security lead, which will be completed by December 2014. July 2011 also marks the beginning of our withdrawal of 33,000 U.S. surge forces, which will be completed by the end of summer 2012. At that time, the United States would still have 68,000 forces in Afghanistan. Our approach demonstrates strategic patience and long-term commitment. When the surge began, there were roughly 190,000 personnel in the ANSF. Today, there are more than 305,000 members, and by the time we complete the withdrawal of our surge forces, the ANSF will be approaching their approved level of 352,000 per- sonnel. The ANSF of today and the future benefits from extensive training and partnering by U.S. and coalition forces that is producing a far more capable army and police force than we had in 2009, and that has already begun proving itself in transitioned areas. Finally, the strategic partnership document that we are negotiating with Afghani- stan is a clear message that the United States will not abandon Afghanistan when transition is done. tºg forces will continue to train and advise the ANSF and sup- port them with important enabling capabilities. This is a patient and strategic ap- proach focused on securing our long-term security interests. Admiral MULLEN. President Obama's decision to begin the deliberate, responsible redeployment of U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the end of summer 2012 was based on clear progress in our strategy, particularly in our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda. We are seeing steady progress in the development of the ANSF, and there has been a clear decline in violence in 2011 when compared to the previous year. The United States and the international community have sacrificed an extraor- dinary amount—in lives and resources—for the Afghan people. We remain com- mitted to assisting Afghanistan in seeking a secure country that is free of al Qaeda 67 safe havens. Ultimately, however, the Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for security in their country. The transition process supports this objective. President Obama and President Karzai have agreed that the United States and Afghanistan should have an enduring strategic partnership beyond 2014. NATO and the international community have also made clear that their commitment to Af- ghanistan is enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the transition to Afghan security responsibility. We are currently engaging with the Afghans to out- line, in broad terms, a vision for our long-term cooperation and presence. Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to come; this is the reality of over 30 years of war. Our assistance, however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that, as a nation, they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need to reduce their reliance on international aid. 9. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, do you believe that a stable Afghanistan will help prevent future attacks on this country like that of 9/11? Secretary PANETTA. Yes. President Obama's strategy—as laid out in his West Point address on December 1, 2009—focuses on the core goal, which is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and prevent al Qaeda's capacity to threaten the United States and our allies and partners in the future. To accomplish this, DOD is pursuing three objectives that will secure and sta- bilize the country: deny al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. The United States made substantial progress on these objectives. We have exceed- ed our expectations on our core goal of defeating al Qaeda, removing 20 of its top 30 leaders from the battelfield, including Osama bin Laden. We have broken the Taliban's momentum in their heartland in Kandahar and Helmand. We have trained more than 305,000 ANSF personnel, who are now in the lead for security responsibilities in seven areas of the country, with more to follow with the imple- mentation of the second tranche of transitioning areas currently scheduled for De- cember 2011. This undeniable progress is important to American security because it helps foster an Afghanistan that is stable and secure—a country in which extremists will not find a safe haven or a platform for launching attacks on the United States and our allies and partners. Admiral MULLEN. I believe that a stable Afghanistan, one that denies our enemies a safe haven, will prevent future attacks from Afghanistan on our country like those experienced on 9/11. BOYCOTTS OF CERTAIN U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS BY FOREIGN INTEREST GROUPS 10. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, in recent years, global activists, forei business enterprises, and certain governments have demonstrated an increased will- ingness to advance de facto foreign boycotts on contractors and subcontractors of }; that provide certain products. If successful, such actions would not only harm the U.S. defense iñºf base, but also impede the military strategy and tactics of our Armed Forces and allies in regions where our forces are deployed or our inter- ests are at stake. Such endeavors include a recent effort to classify the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) as a prohibited weapon under the terms of the Convention on Clus- ter Munitions (CCM), and ongoing attempts today to pressure investors and sup- pliers to terminate their relationships with U.S. manufacturers that provide key SFW components to DOD. Meanwhile, similar but less reliable weapons possessed by other governments are permitted for use under the CCM. The motivations and efforts of those now seeking to enforce the CCM-which was forged outside recog- nized international bodies—contrast sharply with ongoing efforts by our government and others to address the true humanitarian impact of cluster munitions while rec- ognizing the SFW’s enduring and critical importance to our military strategy on the Korean Peninsula, Persian Gulf, and other sensitive regions. I understand that in the coming weeks, U.S. diplomats will have an important opportunity to advance a responsible course of action with regard to cluster munitions during preparations for a review of the United Nations (UN) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Given the potential negative impact of the CCM on the SFW, its role in our military strategy, the defense indus- trial base, and foreign military sales (FMS) to allies in key regions, what actions 68 º will you take to support and reinforce U.S. diplomatic efforts to achieve tangible progress on an alternative agreement under the auspices of the CCW2 Secretary PANETTA. The administration supports concluding a comprehensive and binding protocol to the Convention on CCW that addresses all aspects of cluster mu- nitions, including use, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction, and that will have a significant humanitarian impact on the ground while preserving an important mili- tary capability. The draft protocol presented by the §§ Group of Governmental Experts Chair provides the basis for such a protocol. I am committed to protecting the U.S. defense industrial base and our national security interests. To that end, DOD is actively supporting current DOS efforts to contact CCW High Contracting Parties to urge these states to seize the opportunity to conclude a new protocol regulating cluster munitions at the CCW Review Con- ference in November. This includes targeted ministerial-level engagements with key detractors of the proposed protocol, as well as pressing major users and producers of cluster munitions for increased transparency. I will join in these efforts to engage foreign governments on such issues, as appropriate. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM/AFGHANISTAN BENCHMARKS 11. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, on April 10, 2008, the Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee held a hearing on the situation in Iraq, progress made by the Gov- ernment of Iraq in meeting benchmarks and achieving reconciliation, the future U.S. military presence in Iraq, and the situation in Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates were the witnesses. The hearing focused on Iraq, conditions on the group post-surge, and status of Iraq meeting specific benchmarks. The afore- mentioned was one of many hearings and discussions this committee had regarding progress being made in Iraq. The weekly updates on benchmarks along with 10 vis- its to Iraq allowed me to understand what was going on in Iraq and how we were executing our mission—which often differed drastically from what was being re- ported in the news back in the United States. During a press conference with Gen- eral McChrystal on June 10, 2010, he was asked about benchmarks and what metrics where being used to determine conditions on the ground and how the United States is meeting strategic objectives in Afghanistan. His answer did not give specifics but touched on a variety of metrics such as capacity of Afghan govern- ance, basic rules of law, freedom of movement, combat capacity of ANSFs, IEDs, and price of goods. In 2009, Congress imposed a new reporting requirement in the Sup- plemental Appropriations Act. It required the President on behalf of the administra- tion as a whole to submit regularly a policy report on Afghanistan and Pakistan. An initial report submitted on September 2009 listed eight objectives. It was fol- lowed by a March 2010 report that provided some metrics, additional reports, and classified briefings to Congress. The reports describe developments in each objective area. However, ãº; if enough progress has been made in each area to be successful and how that translates into achieving our overall strategic objectives in Afghanistan is difficult at best. Like in Iraq, Congress and the American people want to know how we are doing in Afghanistan and how that is being determined. What are the benchmarks being used in Afghanistan? Secretary PANETTA. In summer 2009, the National Security Staff (NSS) coordi- nated the interagency effort to develop a series of indicators and metrics to measure progress against the objectives in the administration's Afghanistan-Pakistan Stra- tegic Implementation Plan (SIP). The NSS worked with—and received input from— congressional staffs, and, in fall 2009, the NSS provided both classified and unclas- sified metrics and indicators (or benchmarks) to Congress. The SIP metrics track progress in Afghanistan against: • disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates; • reversing the Taliban's momentum; • building the ANSF capacity to enable transition; • building the capacity of the Afghan Government to allow the Afghans to solidify security gains in transitioning areas; and • involving the international community more actively to forge an inter- national consensus to stabilize Afghanistan. The SIP for Pakistan assesses three main focus areas, which are the following: • Status of security (level of militant-initiated violence in Pakistan; and ex- tent of militant affected areas in Pakistan); • Perceptions of security and stability (internally displaced persons popu- lation; population perception of security in the community; and, economic opportunities in the community); and 69 • Security forces capability and capacity (effectiveness of Pakistani COIN operations). 12. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, what are the trends and status of those benchmarks? Secretary PANETTA. Overall, the United States and our coalition partners are see- ing clear progress with regard to the benchmarks as a result of our strategy in Af- ghanistan, particularly with regard to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates. As was reported in the September 2011 metrics report, our surge forces—along with those of our allies and partners and the expanding ANSF–have broadly reversed the insurgency's momentum. There has also been a marked decline in violence in Afghanistan so far in 2011, compared to the same period last year. We have also made steady progress in assist- ing Afghanistan's development of its own forces, which have begun assuming the lead for security for more than a quarter of the Afghan population, with the transi- tion of seven provinces and municipalities having occurred this past summer. Presi- dent Karzai is expected to announce the second tranche of areas to transition later this fall, which would result in the ANSF having security lead for as much as 50 percent of the Afghan population. 13. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, what do we need to do to achieve success in each of the benchmarks? Secretary PANETTA. Achieving and sustaining success in each of the benchmarks requires continued congressional support for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, for Overseas Contingency Operation funds, and for our counterparts in civilian agencies whose efforts are central to developing Afghanistan's capacity for govern- ance and sustained economic growth. Sustained support will ensure U.S. and Af. ghan forces have the resources needed to maintain our security gains, complete the process of transition, and build an enduring partnership with the Afghan Govern- ment. In turn, a secure and stable Afghanistan—bolstered by an enduring partner- ship with the United States—will further enable the Afghans to deny safe haven to terrorists. Additionally, continued financial support to the Afghan campaign will signal to the Afghans and the region that the United States remains committed, and that the hedging strategy used by some in the region is futile. Thus, a positive polit- ical environment in Afghanistan will better enable coalition and Afghan forces to meet the operational benchmarks in Afghanistan. We must also continue our efforts to professionalize the Afghan forces, especially in the areas of literacy, leadership, and operational performance. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) estimates that the ANSF will achieve 50 percent overall literacy rates at the third-grade level in 2012, with more than 70,000 police and 55,000 soldiers having received some level of literacy training. Achieving a 50 percent literacy rate in the ANSF will not only increase the ANSF's operational ef- fectiveness, but it will also contribute to Afghanistan's overall economic development in the longer-term. Equally important is maintaining our focus on improving the quality and quantity of leaders in order to further accelerate the ANSF's develop- ment. Lastly, DOD must continue to work alongside the DOS to engage the inter- national community to help build Afghan governance capacity and ensure stability in that country (and the region) over the long-term. Afghanistan will require inter- national assistance for many years to come. Our assistance, however, must be fo- cused on helping the Afghans take full responsibility for their own future. 14. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, how does achieving these benchmarks translate into meeting overall U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan? Secretary PANETTA. The benchmarks were created as a mechanism for measuring progress against strategic objectives, so achieving benchmarks translates directly into meeting overall strategic objectives. Military doctrine states that measures of effectiveness (including benchmarks and indicators) are criteria used to determine if operations are achieving strategic objectives. While strategic objectives are broad, complex, and often abstract, ... and quantitative metrics represent a tan- gible translation of objectives into benchmarks that can be measured and tracked over time. These measures of effectiveness are intended to answer the following questions: • Are we doing the right things? • Are our actions producing the desired effects? • Are other actions required? 70 With this in mind, these benchmarks—taken as a whole—are a representation of strategic objectives, so that when success is assessed across the benchmarks, the strategic objective is achieved. Conversely, they also provide a mechanism to adapt operations that are not showing progress toward the objectives. With regard to the SIP, the National Security Council assigned DOD with lead responsibility for the Afghanistan strategic objectives associated with defeating the extremist insurgency, securing the Afghan populace, and developing a self-reliant, capable Afghan security force. If DOD sees success in all of the benchmarks de- scribed in its response to Question for the Record #11, it will assess that the stra- tegic objectives have been achieved. AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 15. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, the United States pays over $12 billion a year for Afghan security forces training. I personally saw the fruits of that labor during my latest visit to Afghanistan over New Year's Day. I observed the training of Afghan soldiers at Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and spoke with several of the new recruits and new leaders of the Afghan Army. I was impressed with what I saw and with the leadership Afghan Brigadier General Patyani, KMTC Commander, British Brigadier David Patterson, and U.S. Major General Gary Patton, then Commander and Deputy of NATO Training Mis- sion Afghanistan (NTM-A). The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report last month highlighted the significant progress that the Afghan National Army is making in recruiting and training. However, shortfalls remain and they need signifi- cant amounts of trainers and support for many years to come. Is it correct to say that the capability of the Afghan Security Forces is the decisive point of our Afghan strategy? Secretary PANETTA. The development of capable and sustainable ANSF is indispensible to strategic success in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will only be able to continue developing and providing credible and capable governance and economic º: if it has a foundation of army and police forces that are able to deal effectively with the insurgency, secure the nation's sovereignty, and enforce the rule of law. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has made remarkable strides in devel- oping the ANSF, but developing specialized capabilities such as logistics, medical, and intelligence remain essential to the ANSF's future ability to sustain itself and reduce its dependence on coalition forces. The ANSF's success in the transitioned areas where it already has the security lead is a promising indicator of the progress made to date and the prospects for a full transition process by the end of 2014. Nonetheless, even after transition is complete, DOD will have a continuing interest in Afghanistan's sustainment of capable security forces. Admiral MULLEN. Yes. The ANSF are a critical element in the accomplishment of our strategy in Afghanistan. The ANSF are the most highly developed component of the Afghan Government. Our literacy programs are making the ANSF one of the largest literate populations in Afghanistan. Polling data indicates that the popu- lation considers the ANSF the most professional element of the Afghan Government. The ANSF will enable ISAF to transition responsibility back to GIRoA and the peo- ple of Afghanistan. 16. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, will they be ready by the 2014 timeline that President Karzai has requested? Secretary PANETTA. The ANSF are on track to reach the goal of completing transi- tion by the end of 2014—as proposed by President Karzai and confirmed by our al- lies and partners at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. This is because the ANSF continues to grow in quantity, professionalism, and operational effectiveness. Both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) reached their October 2011 end strengths of 171,600 and 134,000 personnel, respectively. Further, literacy training—an invaluable force mul- tiplier—continues to expand; more than 86,000 ANSF personnel are in various stages of literacy training. The ANSF continues to translate this training into oper- ational effectiveness, as 72 percent of ANA units and 70 percent of ANP units have been assessed as “effective with coalition assistance” or better. This progress became readily apparent as the ANSF began to assume lead security for over a quarter of the Afghan population, with the transition of seven provinces and municipalities an- nounced this past summer. This transition continues to move forward. The ANSF personnel in the lead in these areas proved to be capable and resilient, and met the insurgency's challenges to security. 71 I expect that, in mid-November, President Karzai will announce the next tranche of districts and provinces to enter the transition process. After implementation be- gins on this next tranche, approximately half of the Afghan population could be liv- ing in transitioned areas where the ANSF is in the lead for security, with con- tinuing coalition support. Admiral MULLEN. The decision to begin security transition in a geographic area is determined by four assessed conditions: 1. ANSF must be capable of handling additional security responsibilities with less assistance. 2. Security in a given area must be at a threat level that permits the population to pursue routine daily activities. 3. Local governance must be sufficiently developed to provide a complementary layer of stability as ISAF assistance is .. reduced. 4. ISAF must be properly postured to reduce its presence as ANSF capacity and capabilities increase ...”the security environment improves. Meeting these conditions will enable the ANSF to assume security responsibility for Afghanistan according to President Karzai's timeline. 17. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, can the Afghan Gov- ernment continue to fund and equip these robust security forces in the future? Secretary PANETTA. The cost of sustaining the ANSFs will continue to outpace the Government of Afghanistan's near-term resourcing abilities. The ANSF will need continued international assistance until new national sources of revenue can be brought on-line. To that end, DOD is currently looking at how to reduce the remaining ANSF de- velopment and long-run sustainment costs. This effort includes looking into changes to the force size and shape that might be possible in a post-counterinsurgency envi- ronment, as well as avoiding redundancies and building only to the standards re- quired in Afghanistan. As we transition areas to Afghan lead for security, we have emphasized to our allies and partners the importance of maintaining their overall financial commitment to security in Afghanistan. In addition, our allies and part- ners continue to make contributions to ANSF sustainability through multi-donor trust funds, such as the U.N. Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which supports the ANP. DOD has also implemented programs through its Task Force for Business and Stability Operations to connect outside investors to potential Afghan producers, and to help Afghanistan build the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural resources in environmentally sound and sustainable ways. DOD also continues to participate in a concerted interagency effort to develop an overall economic strategy for improving Afghanistan's economic sustainability, eco- nomic development, revenue generation, and budget execution. Over time, such ef- forts will help enable the Afghans to take on increasing financial responsibility for their own security forces, wº decreasing reliance on donor support. Admiral MULLEN. We are currently working with the Afghan Government and our coalition partners to develop long-term plans for the ANSF. Part of the plannin process will include identifying the forces required to secure Afghanistan at a leve that they are capable of sustaining with their internal resources and limited inter- national contributions. REINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN 18. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, 1,700 Taliban fighters have accepted the offer of reintegration from the Karzai Government. Estimates of the strength of the various Taliban factions vary from 20,000 to 40,000. The reintegration program is aimed at the so-called º guerillas” for whom fighting in the insurgency is just a job. What is the status of the reintegration program? Secretary PANETTA. Since the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) was created in the summer of 2010, the Afghan Government has made steady progress in establishing structures at the national and sub-national levels to support the program. Several groups have reintegrated in recent months, bringing the number of former insurgents formally enrolled in the APRP to 2,657 (as of late October). The High Peace Council has conducted extensive outreach activities to spread awareness of the APRP. To encourage greater reintegration in the South, the igh Peace Council convened a conference on September 12–13 with more than 300 representatives of civil society, local elders, and local government. A shared under- standing of reintegration is important for a ºff. that centers on community sup- rt for the reintegration candidates. Almost all provinces now have access to donor É.i. provided for program implementation, and APRP officials have been trained 72 == on proper execution of these funds. Furthermore, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 authorized DOD to use its funds to support reintegration. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS DEFENSE CUTS 19. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Panetta, in your testimony, you stated DOD will be implementing more than $450 billion in savings over the next 10 years in order to comply with the spending caps in the Budget Control Act (BCA). Please provide a table showing the estimated $450 billion in cuts to the base on a year-by-year basis. Secretary PANETTA. The BCA does not specify budgets for DOD. Rather it speci- fies limits for broader categories of funding. If DOD takes a proportional share of cuts, DOD's reduction appears to be roughly $450 billion over the next 10 years. All cuts are relative to the President's fiscal year 2012 budget plan. During our com- prehensive review, which is anticipated to be completed this fall, we will accurately determine how the $450 billion impacts each of the fiscal years. We will provide the requested data with the fiscal year 2013 budget request. 20. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Panetta, on July 31, 2011, the White House stat- ed that the BCA required savings of $350 billion from DOD's base budget. Is the $350 billion figure part of the $450 billion figure? Secretary PANETTA. The $350 billion reduction is equivalent to the $450 billion cut but it is measured against the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline, which OMB and Congress often use, rather than the fiscal year 2012 budget plan. The CBO baseline is about $100 billion lower than the fiscal year 2012 budget plan, which makes these two cuts roughly equivalent in size. d # Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Panetta, why do these two estimates of savings liter: Secretary PANETTA. The $350 billion reduction is equivalent to the $450 billion cut but it is measured against the CBO baseline, which OMB and Congress often use, rather than the fiscal year 2012 budget plan. The CBO baseline is about $100 billion lower than the fiscal year 2012 budget plan, which makes these two cuts roughly equivalent in size. 22. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Panetta, in August, the CBO released “The Budg- et and Economic Outlook: An Update” that noted that the BCA set separate caps on security and non-security funding for fiscal years 2012 and 2013, but no such distinction was made for appropriations for fiscal years 2014 to 2021. While the pro- grams funded under the security cap, which comprises not only DOD but also the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Intelligence Community management account, and all accounts in budget function 150, would face a total cut of $48 billion over the initial 2-year period, CBO stated that the BCA's caps could be met in the future through many different combinations of defense and non- defense appropriations. Do you agree with CBO's assessment that the BCA's caps could be satisfied through different levels of defense and non-defense spending? Secretary PANETTA. Yes, it's possible the BCA caps could be satisfied through dif- ferent levels of defense and non-defense spending, but DOD is exploring the best way to reduce our budget by more than $450 billion over the next 10 years in ac- cordance with the direction provided in the BCA of 2011. 23. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Panetta, how did DOD arrive at the $450 billion figure you cite as being consistent with the reductions required by the BCA2 Secretary PANETTA. If DOD takes a proportional share of cuts, DOD's reduction appears to be more than $450 billion over the next 10 years (fiscal year 2012—fiscal year 2021). All cuts are relative to the President's fiscal year 2012 budget plan. 24. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Panetta, what is the baseline DOD is using for the reduction of $450 billion? Secretary PANETTA. All cuts are relative to the President's fiscal year 2012 base- line budget plan. 73 QUESTIONs SUBMITTED BY SENATOR Roger F. Wicker IRAQ 25. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq calls for the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by the end of 2011. However, the security environment in Iraq continues to deteriorate. Iraqi political leaders realize the need for continued presence of U.S. troops but are unwilling to publicly discuss this possibility. What is your assessment of the situation in Iraq as far as the Iraqi Government's desire to extend the U.S. mission there? Secretary PANETTA. In August, the Iraqi political leadership indicated publicly that they are interested in an ongoing training relationship with the United States post-2011. We believe that an enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the interest of the United States, and a relationship with the ISFs will be an important part of that partnership. Any future security relationship will be fundamentally different from the one that we have had since 2003. We are currently in discussions with the Iraqi Government about the nature and scope of that relationship. Those discussions are ongoing, and no decisions have been made at this point. In the meantime, we are drawing down U.S. forces in ac- cordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. 26. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, how can we encourage the Iraqis to ex- tend the U.S. military mandate? Should we encourage them to do so? Secretary PANETTA. The U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement will expire at the end of this year, so any potential relationship with the Iraqis will be different from the re- lationship we have had with Iraq since 2003. The Iraqis stated in August that they are interested in a long-term relationship, so we are discussing with Iraq the nature of U.S. military training that might be provided to the ISF. The primary objective of this training would be to improve ISF capabilities in furtherance of the Presi- dent's objective of a sovereign, stable, self-reliant Iraq that is a force for security in the region and a long-term strategic partner of the United States, in accordance with the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). 27. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, how can the United States best nurture the Iraqi security forces should this mandate not be extended? Secretary PANETTA. We are currently in discussions with the Iraqi Government about the nature and scope of a future relationship. Those discussions are ongoing. Any future security relationship will be fundamentally different from the one we have had since 2003. Regardless of how the discussions evolve, a cornerstone of our relationship with Iraq and with the ISF will be the transformation of the U.S. train-and-equip mission under the leadership of the Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission authority—similar to security cooperation offices in other countries in the region— to maintain a robust security assistance and cooperation relationship. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is also planning to propose regional training and combined exercises with the ISF. No decisions have been reached at this point. We are drawing down U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. 28. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, the administration's current strategy is to complete a near total withdrawal from Iraq, leaving only 3,000 troops in the country by the end of the year. Iraqi Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin, Commander U.S. Forces Iraq, have both acknowledged before this committee that Iraq currently lacks the ability to adequately defend itself from attacks against its sovereignty. It is unlikely that Iraq will possess such capability by the end of the year. Both Am- bassador Jeffery j General Austin agreed that the U.S. military would be the best force to support and nurture the Iraqi armed forces. However, the Iraqi Government has not yet been able to reach agreement on SOFA modifications that would allow American troops to stay past the end of 2011. In light of recent violence and unrest in Iraq, do you anticipate the Iraqi Government requesting an extension to the American military presence there? Admiral MULLEN. Iraq's political bloc leaders expressed a desire for U.S. trainin and assistance beyond 2011. However, absent a follow-on agreement, the § States will withdraw our forces from Iraq by 31 December 2011 in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. • Iraq has the capability to defend against internal threats and possesses a con- fident and capable counter-insurgency force 74 • Iraq does have capability ſº that effect its ability to adequately defend against an external threat such as: • Iraqi Army combined arms capability • Cross-ministerial and interagency intelligence and information sharing • Strategic logistics and sustainment operations • Air sovereignty and integrated air defense • Counterterrorism force professionalism • Despite episodic high-profile attacks by AQI, overall attacks in Iraq have de- creased significantly • Absent a SOFA we will reduce our footprint to a small Office of Security Co- operation to manage the extensive FMS program • The United States will still have considerable military capabilities in the re- gion that will deter threats against Iraqi sovereignty • The U.S. military will continue to develop the ISF through a robust Office of Security Cooperation. U.S. and Iraqi leaders agree that we can adequately con- tinue . development through rotational training and exercises and through arms sales 29. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, how extensive is our engagement with the Iraqi political and military leadership towards pursuit of a modification to the SOFA to enable our presence in Iraq.” Admiral MULLEN. Ambassador Jeffrey is the lead agent for engagement with the Government of Iraq to pursue a new security agreement to facilitate a U.S. military resence beyond 2011. Senior leaders throughout the government including the resident and Vice President have been extremely engaged in the process. The interagency met weekly on Iraq to ensure a whole-of-government approach on this issue. Additionally, Secretary Panetta and I both visited Iraq in recent months and met with senior Iraqi leaders including Prime Minister Maliki. Iraqi lawmakers ex- ressed a desire for U.S. training and assistance beyond 2011. However, without a ollow-on security agreement, we will—in accordance with Article 24 of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement—withdraw all our forces from Iraq by 31 December 2011. A very small office of security cooperation will remain to manage the exten- sive ($6.4 billion) FMS program. 30. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, we are quickly approaching the point where such a decision must be made. How much longer can we wait .#. our plannin and logistics capabilities cannot adjust for a change in the current withdrawal plan? Admiral MULLEN. As the President has stated, we intend to fulfill our obligations under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which requires all U.S. forces to with- draw by the end of the year. We are on track to meet that objective and are rapidly approaching the time where a follow-on agreement, would create significant logistical costs and challenges for our forces. Although changes to the current plan would likely increase costs, the U.S. military has sufficient planning and logistics capacity to react to changes. 31. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, do you believe our servicemembers and their families are prepared to deal with a continued presence in Iraq should that eventuality come to pass? Admiral MULLEN. We intend to fulfill our obligations under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Se- curity Agreement, which requires all U.S. forces to withdraw by the end of the year. A small number of servicemembers will remain in Iraq to support the U.S. Embassy and manage the extensive FMS program as . of the Office of Security Coopera- tion-Iraq (OSC–I). The servicemembers working in the OSC-I will not be oper- ational in nature. Instead, they would perform functions such as managing FMS cases, just as servicemembers do in our embassies around the world. The men and women are prepared to handle these deployments like every other military assign- ment: with strength, fortitude, and character in support of U.S. strategic objectives. We are also working to ease the deployment burden on our troops and their fami- lies. For example, in 2012, the Army will shorten unit deployment times from 12 months to 9 months. 32. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, what is your assessment of the security situation on the ground in Iraq” Secretary PANETTA. Iraq ſºonger needs large numbers of U.S forces to maintain internal stability. The ISFs have had the lead for security for some time, and levels of violence have remained dramatically reduced from where they were in 2006 and 2007. U.S. commanders in the field assess that the ISF are competent at counter- 76 new kinds of weapons and weapons systems that the Iraqis have purchased in re- cent years, including F-16s. OSC-I will also facilitate future FMS with Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi leaders agree that we can adequately continue ISF development through rotational training and exercises and through arms sales. OSC-I, training, and exer- cises coupled with thousands of U.S. forces stationed throughout the Middle East, will help maintain stability in Iraq and the region. The transition and drawdown of troops in Afghanistan is a conditions-based ap- proach. Unfortunately, Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to come—a difficult reality stemming from over 30 years of war. Our efforts to date have been aimed at developing Afghan capacity and resources to reduce their reliance on international support and aid. President Obama and President Karzai have agreed that the United States and Afghanistan should have an endur- ing strategic partnership beyond 2014. Our enduring presence in Afghanistan must be focused on helping the Afghans take full responsibility for their own future. NATO and the international community have also made clear that their commit- ment to Afghanistan is enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the transition to Afghan security responsibility. We are currently engaging with the Af- ghans to outline, in broad terms, a vision for our long-term cooperation and pres- ence. 37. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, what efforts are you making to ensure our allies continue their commitment to the mission in Afghanistan? Admiral MULLEN. We have maintained a thorough engagement strategy with our coalition partners to achieve unity of effort with respect to our mission in Afghani- stan. This engagement is founded on the basic expectations jointly expressed in the NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration of 20 Nov 2010: “Transition will be conditions- based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Look- ing to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan.” This understanding has been reinforced by the Secretary of Defense's strategic en- º: with the contributing nations to ISAF (most recently with the NATO de- ense ministers in Brussels) and the Secretary of State's engagement with inter- national partners for the New Silk Road Initiative. Additional engagements in Bonn, Istanbul, and Chicago will further solidify our relations with our allies. Finally, the ISAF commander continues his ongoing program of senior leader vis- its in Kabul facilitating the strategic dialog with our allied partners. TRAINING OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES 38. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, since fiscal year 2005, annual funding to train Afghan forces has grown rapidly from $1.3 billion to $7.4 billion in fiscal year 2007. In 2008, DOD announced plans to double the size of the Afghan security forces over the next 4 years at a cost of about $20 billion. Building the capacity of the Afghan security forces is a key element of the administration's Afghanistan pol- icy. Beyond measuring the number of graduates of Afghan security training pro- grams, it is difficult to gauge the capacity and effectiveness of these troops. How capable are graduates of our training programs in Afghanistan? Admiral MULLEN. NTM-A’s efforts at expanding ANSF capacity and building a professional ANSF that will transition to a lead security role through 2014 continue to show significant gains. Prior to 2009, 86 percent of the ANSF were illiterate. Since 2009, over 50,000 members of the ANSF have gone through officer and NCO training programs, over 134,000 ANSF have attended literacy training, and over 116,000 have graduated from literacy programs. Moreover, the ANSF's internal training capacity continues to grow. The ANA has opened all 12 of its branch schools and 7 regional training facilities, and the ANP are running 37 regional training facilities. The ANSF's increased leadership, literacy, and training capacity have i. the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior to generate their own forces internally. These institutional improvements are indicators of the in- creased capability and capacity of the ANSF. 39. Senator WICKER. Admiral Mullen, I believe we must do all we can to avoid a “garbage-in/garbage-out” situation with regard to our training programs in Af- ghanistan. How are we screening applicants for our training programs? Admiral MULLEN. All recruits currently go through an 8-step vetting process prior to entering the ANSF training pipeline. The vetting process includes the following critical steps: 79 Secretary PANETTA. DOD's “sourcing” of functions and work between military and civilian personnel, as well as contract support, must be consistent with workload re- quirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, and applicable laws. These staffing decisions for jobs must also be consistent with departmental º such as those regarding workforce mix and risk criteria which are governed y DOD Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, and cost, governed by Directive Type Memorandum-09–007: Estimating and Com- paring the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support. Consistent with these policies, and all applicable laws, DOD is committed to con- duct an annual inventory and review of its contracted services, identifying those that may not be most cost effectively performed by the private sector. Some of these services may be determined to be no longer required or of low priority, and as a consequence may be eliminated or reduced in scope, while others may be identified for insourcing to government performance. While the use of Active and Reserve Duty military personnel is considered in making staffing decisions, functions that are commercial in nature are designated for civilian performance. The exceptions are when one or more of the following con- ditions apply: military-unique knowledge and skills are required for performance of the duties; military incumbency is required by law, executive order, treaty, or inter- national agreements; military performance is required for command and control, risk mitigation, or esprit de corps; and/or military staffing is needed to provide for overseas and sea-to-shore rotation, ensure career development, maintain operational readiness and training requirements, or to meet contingencies or wartime assign- ments. In making staffing decisions, commanders must be mindful of using military personnel to perform tasks that limit their availability to perform the operational mission. 47. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, why are these people performing mainte- nance or conducting training that has traditionally been performed by the Active- Duty Force? Secretary PANETTA. The withdrawal and drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghani- stan, respectively, and decreasing operational tempos, as well as current national fiscal realities, have resulted in decisions to decrease end-strength and make force structure revisions. As a result, certain functions which in the past may have been performed by military personnel, to include maintenance and training, are being re- aligned to civilian performance. In conjunction with the comprehensive review called for by the President and implementation of the fiscal reductions called for in the BCA, DOD is assessing mission requirements, associated workload, and necessary force structure decisions. Recommendations for sizing the force will be based on mis- sion requirements and informed by our combatant commanders' needs to meet the national military strategy and maintain necessary a state of operational readiness while minimizing and mitigating any risks. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SCOTT P. BROWN PROTOCOL ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 48. Senator BROWN. Secretary Panetta, a proposed Sixth Protocol to the Conven- tion on Conventional Weapons (CCW) is currently being negotiated in Geneva. This protocol would establish sensible controls on the production, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions. The negotiations which produced the current draft protocol have been ongoing for several years with the active involvement of the U.S. delegation to the CCW. The current draft is widely-supported within the CCW, and would sig- nificantly advance global efforts to minimize the risks to civilian populations of mod- ern warfare while simultaneously preserving the ability of the United States and its allies to utilize munitions that will limit American casualties in future conflicts. The draft is opposed by some nongovernmental organizations (NGO), however, and several governments participating in the CCW may block approval of the protocol at the CCW Review Conference in November, thereby killing it. Does the Obama administration support the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions? Secretary PANETTA. The administration supports concluding a comprehensive and binding protocol to the Convention on CCW #. addresses all aspects of cluster mu- nitions, including use, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction, and that will have a significant humanitarian impact on the ground while preserving an important mili- tary capability. The draft protocol presented by the §§§ Group of Governmental Experts Chair provides the basis for such a protocol. 81 it this campaign and support U.S. defense contractors that have been targeted by it? Secretary PANETTA. If notified of such a boycott, it is my understanding that DOS would be willing to raise the issue with the appropriate foreign officials. With re- spect to particular steps taken in responses to action by specific foreign govern- ments, I defer to the Secretary of State. 55. Senator BROWN. Secretary Panetta, if the Obama administration opposes for- eign boycotts of U.S. defense contractors, what steps do you intend to take to resist this campaign and support U.S. defense contractors that have been targeted by it? A. you committed, for example, to raising this issue with foreign government offi- clais ! Secretary PANETTA. The influence of activists and foreign governments on the U.S. defense industrial base is a complex issue. Protecting the U.S. defense indus- trial base and national security interests will require DOD to collaborate effectively with other executive branch agencies and Congress. We must do more to understand and communicate the risks to the industrial base and work closely with other na- tions to preserve domestic industrial capabilities. I will join in our administration's efforts to engage foreign governments on such issues, as appropriate. 56. Senator BROWN. Secretary Panetta, do you believe the U.S. Government should continue to do business with foreign banks and other foreign businesses that are engaged in boycotts of U.S. defense contractors? Secretary PANETTA. The influence of activists and foreign governments on the U.S. defense industrial base is a complex issue. Protecting the U.S. defense indus- trial base and national security interests will require the DOD to collaborate effec- tively with other executive branch agencies and Congress. Before taking action, such as ceasing business with a particularly entity, we must ensure we thoroughly under- stand potential risks and communicate those risks to our industrial base. We will §: closely with industry and foreign nations to preserve domestic industrial capa- ilities. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN AL QAEDA 57. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, in your prepared testimony you note that “al-Qaeda and violent extremism has spread to new geographical centers such as Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa.” In July, you said that the United States was “within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda.” How has your assessment changed since July? Secretary PANETTA. My assessment hasn't fundamentally changed. In my July comments, I also acknowledged that al Qaeda operates in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. If we maintain pressure on key leadership, while also building partner nation counterterrorism capacity and undermining al Qaeda's ideology, I still believe we can strategically defeat al Qaeda. Our success stems from a steady pace of oper- ations over the past 3 years against core al Qaeda leaders and external operations planners in Pakistan. We've recently intensified our efforts in Yemen as well, and the deaths or detentions of several al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula top leaders in the past few months have negatively impacted the group's capabilities. Likewise in Somalia, the loss of al Qaeda leaders combined with increased effectiveness against al-Shabaab by our regional partners has forced our adversaries to focus more on their personal security than on external operations planning. In North Afri- ca, al Qaeda's efforts to exploit the Arab Awakening lack resonance, and our counterterrorism partners in the region are steadily improving their capabilities to control remote regions exploited by terrorists and other extremists. 58. Senator CoRNYN. Secretary Panetta, do you equate dispersal to regions outside. Afghanistan with defeat? Secretary PANETTA. While we have done much, particularly in the past 3 years, to degrade core al Qaeda in Pakistan, we must continue the pressure until the orga- nization is operationally dismantled and then strategically defeated, meaning that they no longer function as an organization and do not find sanctuary from which to conduct external attacks. This includes operations and activities to disrupt, de- ade, and defeat key al Qaeda affiliates that pose a direct threat to the United tates and its allies, wherever they may operate. 83 counterinsurgency interests, and providing a high return on investment. Nonethe- less, although an increased presence of these personnel would strengthen Pakistan's counterinsurgency capability, the United States must also use other means to ad- dress these challenges. 64. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, in prepared statements and during your testimony, you and Admiral Mullen made very strong statements regarding Paki- stan's active and passive support for insurgent groups. In light of your allegations, wºul, you agree that aid to Pakistan is naïve at best .# counter-productive at worst? Secretary PANETTA. Our relationship with Pakistan is both vital and consequen- tial. Pakistan remains a critical country in the fight against terrorism, and it pro- vides critical counterterrorism cooperation that we hope will continue to expand over the coming months and years to bring about the regional stability that is in the interests of both of our nations. We provide Pakistan with assistance in accordance with our national security in- terests. Security-related assistance—such as the PCF and Coalition Support Fund reimbursements—have been an important component in pursuing the near-term ob- jective of improving Pakistan's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities and enhancing cross-border coordination. It is vital, however, that Pakistan own up to its responsibilities, including cooper- ating more fully in counterterrorism matters, expanding its counterinsurgency cam- paign against all extremists that have found safe haven in the Federally Adminis- tered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and ceasing to provide sanc- tuary to Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. In the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, we asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a cooperative and mu- tually-beneficial relationship. The future provision of security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan taking concrete steps that demonstrate its continued com- mitment to cooperation. 65. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, do you agree that continued uncondi- tional foreign aid to Pakistan serves to undermine the diplomatic efforts of yourself and Admiral Mullen? Secretary PANETTA. Our civilian and security-related assistance to Pakistan di- rectly advances U.S. national interests in Pakistan, but that assistance is not un- conditional. This assistance is designed to promote a stable and prosperous Pakistan that is democratic and able and willing to address the scourge of extremism. As President Obama has said, it is in our national interest to support Pakistan's efforts to develop democratic institutions, foster economic growth, and reject violent extre- mism. To this end, we are continuing our civilian assistance to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the United States is committed to a long-term relationship with them ...] their civilian-led government. We are also closely reviewing our secu- rity-related assistance to Pakistan, largely because Pakistan has directed a draw- down of our military trainers, harassed our personnel in country, and demonstrated insufficient cooperation with us on core objectives. We have communicated to Paki- stan's civilian and military leaders that we are committed to improving their mili- tary's capabilities, but that we cannot continue to provide this assistance at the same pace we have been until our relationship improves. 66. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, why or why not would conditional forei aid to Pakistan serve as an incentive for the Pakistani Government to disrupt ISI support for terrorist groups and deny insurgents their safe havens? Secretary PANETTA. We have communicated to Pakistan that it cannot pick and choose among extremists, that terrorism remains a common threat to both of our countries, and that support for extremists who are crossing the border and attacking our forces in Afghanistan must end. That said, we must remember that Pakistan remains a critical country in the war against terrorism and does cooperate with the United States. Since 2009, Pakistani military operations in Swat, South Waziristan, and other areas have put continued pressure on insurgent ups. Pakistan's level of commitment is reflected in the enormous casualties it has suffered as a result of military operations and acts of terrorism in the last few years, including more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilians killed or wounded. As the President has said, we could not have been as successful as we have been in going after al Qaeda in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan without the cooperation of the Pakistan Government. Placing additional conditions on security- related assistance to Pakistan would minimize the flexibility needed to provide such 84 assistance, which contributes to Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign and its abil- ity to disrupt support for terrorist groups and deny insurgents their safe havens. INDIA 67. Senator CoRNYN. Secretary Panetta, estimates show that the budget for the ANSF is over $11 billion for this year. Conversely, the Afghan Government collected only $1 billion of tax revenue in 2010. It is clear that the Afghan Government will require continued financial assistance to support endurin SF efforts against in- surgents, many of whom find refuge and assistance in Pakistan, after U.S. forces depart in 2014. To pay the enduring costs of supporting the ANSF, should the United States pursue a financial partnership with India to defray the expenses that are expected? Secretary PANETTA. The United States supports enhancing the international com- mitment to the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan. As noted, the costs of the ANSFs will require international financial support, which India and other international j may contribute tº established trust funds, such as the NATO-led Afghan National Army Trust Fund or the U.N.-led Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, supporting the ANP. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Kabul in May 2011—his first since 2005—underscored India's enduring commit- ment to diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan. During his visit, PM Singh announced to a joint session of the Afghan parliament an increase in Indian economic support to Afghanistan. PM Singh's pledge of an additional $500 million in aid—to be spent mainly on development projects—raised India's overall assist- ance pledge to a total of $2 billion. Durin ‘. June 2011 visit to New Delhi, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak and Indian fense Minister A.K. Antony discussed .# cooperation to train ANSF personnel. India's assistance to the ANSF is currently limited to training per- sonnel in Indian institutions and some transfers of mostly non-lethal materiel. India currently provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in India, and the In- dian Government is also exploring options for training female Afghan police in India. However, the recent strategic partnership a ment reiterated India's inter- est in .# efforts to build the capacity of the ANSF. Indian support to Af. ghanistan could help defray the enduring costs of supporting the ANSF. IRAQ WITHDRAWAL 68. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, earlier this month, it was reported that you would support a plan to keep 3,000 to 4,000 troops in Iraq after December 31, 2011, to train Iraqi security forces. Reports also indicate that the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, General Lloyd J. Austin, is advocating º: as many as 14,000 to 18,000 troops in Iraq next year. What is your rationale for supporting this plan? tary PANETTA. The post-2011 U.S. forces presence and mission, if any, will be addressed through U.S. discussions with Iraqi leaders. Discussions are ongoing, no final agreement with Iraq has been reached, and no final decisions have been made. U.S. forces continue their scheduled redeployment from Iraq. Again, we have made no final decisions, nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq. 69. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, how does your evaluation of the current situation in Iraq differ from General Austin's, who is the senior U.S. commander on the ground? Secretary PANETTA. I am not aware of differences between our assessments. I rely on General Austin and his staff for regular updates, and his judgments are essential to informing my own. 70. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, in your opinion, what effect would 3,000 troops have in Iraq, and what are the benefits and risks of this proposal? Secretary PANETTA. The post-2011 U.S. forces presence size and mission, if any, will be j through U.S. discussions with Iraqi leaders. Discussions are ongo- ing, no final agreement with Iraq has been reached, and no final decisions have been made. U.S. forces continue their scheduled redeployment from Iraq. 71. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Panetta, do the perceived benefits outweigh the risks? Secretary PANETTA. We believe that an enduring partnership with the Iraqi Gov- ernment and people is in America's interest. A relationship with the ISFs will be