COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DANA ROHRABACHER, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio JOE WILSON, South Carolina MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas TED POE, Texas MATT SALMON, Arizona TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois MO BROOKS, Alabama TOM COTTON, Arkansas PAUL COOK, California GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas RON DESANTIS, Florida DOUG COLLINS, Georgia MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TED S. YOHO, Florida SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin CURT CLAWSON, Florida AMY Porter, Chief of Staff ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa BRAD SHERMAN, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KAREN BASS, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ALAN GRAYSON, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts AMI BERA, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California GRACE MENG, New York LOIS FRANKEL, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director (II) Heari, Hearin The H 2 heavy weaponry, the cash, the personnel that ISIS does today, which includes thousands of Western passport holders. The Iraqi population is terrorized. They have suffered mass exe- cutions and harsh sharia law. Last week, the remaining members of the ancient Christian community in Mosul fled on foot in face of ISIS' demand that they convert or face death. To be clear, ISIS takeover has been aided by Prime Minister Maliki's malfeasance and incompetence. Maliki has disastrously failed to reconcile with key Sunni groups. Many, including myself and Ranking Member Engel, urged him to form an inclusive gov- ernment—and this was quite some time ago and on several occa- sions—so that ISIS could not exploit legitimate Sunni grievances. Maliki has only proven himself to be a committed sectarian, cer- tainly no statesman. It is time for Iraqis to move forward in form- ing a government that serves the interests of all Iraqis. What started as a crisis in Syria has become a regional disaster with serious global implications, including credible threats of inter- national terrorism, humanitarian disaster, and upward pressure on energy prices in a fragile global economy. Meanwhile, terrorist forces and the Iranian Government are gaining power at the ex- pense of regional security and power at the expense of friendly gov- ernments. Of course only Iraqis can control their future. Only they can make the decision to replace Maliki. And the performance of the battlefield of certain Iraqi units was abysmal. That is to be ex- pected when you put your son in charge and sack the officer corps and replace them with cronies. Americans have spent enough blood and treasure in Iraq, and that is exactly why the administration should have taken the op- portunity to inflict decisive damage on ISIS from the air through drone strikes while its fighters were encamped in the desert months ago. This morning we are joined by a senior State Department official who has been in Baghdad for several weeks, and an official from the Department of Defense involved in the current assessment of Iraqi security forces, to learn of the path forward in dealing with this national security emergency. And I will now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Engel of New York, for any opening comments. Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing about the latest developments in Iraq. In recent months, a path of violence and chaos has burned across the Middle East. The unrest has left thousands of dead in its wake and driven tens of thousands from their homes. A civil war in Syria has spilled across the border and now Iraq teeters on the brink. Since December, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL or ISIS, has marched across Iraq with lethal efficiency. Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul have fallen under their control. Hundreds of Iraqi soldiers have been killed or have laid down their weapons and the military equipment they left behind. Some even supplied by the United States is now in the hands of these fanatics. The border between Iraq and Syria is gone, ISIS is advancing to- ward the Jordanian border, and ISIS' leaders have declared an Is- lamic caliphate, promising to rule with a brand of barbarism out 3 of the darkest chapters in human history. ISIS is an existential threat to our allies in the region and it is a threat to the United States. We have seen this story before and we know how it ends. When Russia withdrew from Afghanistan in the late 1980s that country was allowed to become a no man's land. Violent extremists found a safe haven in which to strengthen their ranks, train their recruits, and plan attacks on the United States and our allies. We cannot allow Iraq to follow the same path to become another safe haven from which another September 11th could be launched. So how are we going to meet the challenge? In my mind, we need to use all the tools at our disposal because in the end there is no military solution to this problem. We need to see real political changes in Iraq, more inclusive policies, and a greater effort to avoid sectarian conflict. I have real doubts that Prime Minister Maliki can lead Iraq into this new era. In fact, Maliki must go and the sooner the better. I have real concerns about Iran's support for the Iraqi regime. Even if the United States and Iran seem to share a mutual concern over ISIS, I don't see how Iranian and American goals can be aligned either in the short term or the long term. I don't think the U.S. should deal with Iran in this regard. We also need to bear in mind that this is not solely an Iraqi problem. While ISIS grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS grew in strength and numbers while fighting in Syria. ISIS is a regional problem. This is a spillover from the Syrian civil war and fighting ISIS will require a regional solution. The right time to train and equip the moderate Syrian opposition was well over a year ago. That is when I introduced the Free Syria Act. It would have assisted moderate rebels to fight against both the §º regime and the extremist elements of the opposition, like I am glad that a few weeks ago the administration announced its support for a $500 million training and equipment program for the moderate Syrian opposition. But we waited so long, and by now ISIS has gained so much territory and momentum they are far more difficult to stop than they were 1 year, 1% years or 2 years ago. I cannot help but wonder what would have happened if we had committed to empowering the moderate Syrian opposition last year. Would ISIS have grown as it did? Would the opposition have been able to apply enough pressure to Assad to compel him to a diplo- matic transition? And by the way, we passed a bill of the House yesterday, unanimously, slapping sanctions on Hezbollah. Hezbollah has moved in as a puppet of Iran and they have moved into Syria on the side of Assad and have helped tip the balance in Assad's favor. The hypotheticals and the what-ifs break my heart, because even if do the right thing now it will mean small consolation to the or- phan child, the grieving mother or the family in a refugee camp in Syria. I supported the President's decision to send assessment teams to Iraq, but I am cautious about future action. We cannot end up in another sectarian quagmire in Iraq. And so I am interested in learning about the administration's vi- sion for how to meet this challenge. I am grateful to our witnesses 6 and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter- national Security Affairs, Ms. Elissa Slotkin. Ms. SLOTKIN. It is Elissa Slotkin. Chairman ROYCE. Elissa Slotkin. Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you. Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Elissa. Prior to his current assignment, Mr. McGurk served as a special advisor to the National Security Staff and a senior advisor to Am- bassadors Ryan Crocker, Christopher Hill, and James Jeffrey in Baghdad. He also served as a lead negotiator and coordinator dur- ing bilateral talks with the Iraqi Government in 2008. Since July 2013, Elissa Slotkin has been performing the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Pre- viously, Ms. Slotkin worked at the State Department on Iraq policy i. served on the National Security Council Staff as director of raq. Without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements will be made part of the record. Members will have 5 calendar days to sub- mit statements or questions or any extraneous materials that they wish to put into the record. And Mr. McGurk, if you would please summarize your remarks, we will have you testify first. STATEMENT OF MR. BRETT MCGURK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR IRAQ AND IRAN, BUREAU OF NEAR EAST- ERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. MCGURK. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Rank- ing Member Engel, and members of this committee. I want to thank you for inviting me to discuss the situation in Iraq with a focus on the U.S. response since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, attacked Mosul nearly 7 weeks ago. Let me first review the bidding on why this matters, as this com- mittee well knows. ISIL is al-Qaeda. It may have changed its name, it may have broken with senior al-Qaeda leadership such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, but it is al-Qaeda in its doctrine, ambition, and increasingly, in its threat to U.S. interests. In fact, it is worse than al-Qaeda. Should there be any question about the intentions of this group, simply read what its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi says. And it is important to pay attention to what he says because we cannot risk underestimating the goals, capacity, and reach of this organization. Baghdadi, in May 2011, eulogized the death of Osama bin Laden and promised a violent response. ISIL training camps in Syria are named after Osama bin Laden. In his audio statements, Baghdadi regularly issues veiled threats against the United States promising a direct confrontation. And in his feud with al-Zawahiri, Baghdadi clearly is seeking to lead the global jihad. Additionally, ISIL is no longer simply a terrorist organization. It is now a full-blown army seeking to establish a self-governing state through the Tigris and Euphrates valley in what is now Syria and Iraq. It now controls much of eastern Syria. In January, in Iraq it moved into Anbar Province taking control of Fallujah, and, on June 10th, it moved on Mosul. I arrived in Erbil, about 80 kilometers east of Mosul, on June 7th, and I will begin there. In meetings with local officials from dic sta Cel not plo for. eve llat meſ an cide the led gris Bal; 7 Mosul and with Kurdish officials on June 7th, we received early in- dications that ISIL was moving in force from Syria into Iraq and staging forces in western Mosul. We immediately asked and re- ceived permission from Kurdish leaders to deploy peshmerga forces in the eastern side of the city, but the government of Baghdad did not share the same sense of urgency, and did not approve the de- ployments. Iraqi military commanders promised to send nine brigades of force to Mosul in response to our warnings, and we stressed, how- ever, that the forces would not arrive in time. On June 9th, the sit- uation remained extremely tense, and we continued to urge the im- mediate deployment of additional security forces to protect against an ISIL attack from west to east. In the early morning of June 10th, ISIL launched a complex sui- cide bomb attack across a strategic bridge and poured forces into the eastern part of the city. Iraqi resistance totally collapsed, which led to a panic and a snowballing effect southward through the Ti- É. jailey and through the cities of Tikrit, Samarra and into ala.01. The result was catastrophic. Five Iraqi divisions nearly dissolved, and the approaches to Baghdad were immediately under threat. I flew to Baghdad first thing that morning with a focus on ensuring that our people were safe, and that the northern approaches to the city of Baghdad were bolstered. My written testimony sets forth in detail the critical elements of our immediate crisis response. We first made certain that our people would be safe, including contractors working on bases outside of Baghdad who were evacu- ated with the help of the Iraqi air force. At the Embassy and the airport we rebalanced staff to manage the crisis, and brought in ad- ditional Department of Defense resources to ensure the security of our facilities. In parallel, importantly, and at the President's direction, we worked to urgently to improve our intelligence picture throughout western and north central Iraq, surging surveillance flights from one per month to nearly 50 per day; establishing joint operations centers and deploying special operations forces to assess Iraqi units particularly around the capital of Baghdad. These intelligence and security initiatives were undertaken in parallel with regional diplo- macy led by Secretary Kerry to better focus attention on this seri- ous threat. We finally sought to stabilize the Iraqi political process, recog- nizing that this attack took place at the most vulnerable moment in that process following national elections that were held on April 30th in which nearly 14 million Iraqis voted, but before the forma- tion of a new government. This process of forming a new govern- ment remains extremely challenging but it now has some traction. A new speaker of Parliament was chosen last week, overwhelm- ingly with the support of all major communities in Iraq, and Iraqis are now proceeding along the constitutional timeline to choose a new President and Prime Miniser. The current situation in Iraq re- mains extremely, extremely serious. ISIL remains in control of Mosul and it is targeting all Iraqis— Sunni, Shia, Christian, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Shabaks and ev- erybody who disagrees with its twisted vision of a 7th century ca- 8 liphate. It is also joined in an unholy alliance with militant wing of the former Ba'ath Party known as the Naqshbandi network, and ; some former insurgent groups such as the Islamic Army of raq. Going forward, the Iraqis, with our support, must seek to split the latter groups from ISIL and isolate ISIL from other hardcore militant groups from the population. The platforms that we have established through the immediate crisis response are now pro- viding additional information to inform the President and our na- tional security team as we develop options to further protect our interests in Iraq. Any future decisions in this regard will be made in full consulta- tions with this committee and the Congress. Any efforts we are to take, moreover, must be in conjunction with Iraqi efforts to isolate ISIL from the population. This is because, while we have a very se- rious counterterrorism challenge in Iraq, Iraq has a very serious counterinsurgency challenge and the two are inextricably linked. Based on my last 7 weeks on the ground in Iraq, there is now a clear recognition by Iraqis from all communities that substantial reforms must be undertaken and undertaken urgently. This will re- quire the formation of a new government together with the restruc- turing of the security services. The emerging consensus in Iraq, which we can fully support, is a functioning federalism consisting with Iraq's Constitution, adapt- ive to the new realities on the ground, and based on the following five principles. First, local citizens must be in the lead in securing local areas. Second, local citizens defending their communities, however, must be provided full state benefits and resources, per- haps modeled along the lines of a national guard type force struc- ture to secure provincial areas, and areas in which ISIL is seeking to gain further footholds. Third, the Iraqi army should focus on Federal functions such as protecting international borders and rarely deploy inside cities. It should however provide overwatch support for local forces where they confront ISIL, which is able to overmatch tribal forces in areas such as Ninewah and Anbar Province. Fourth, there must be close cooperation between local, regional, and national security services to gradually reduce operational space for ISIL, particularly in Ninewah Province. And finally, the Federal Government, through its new Par- liament and a new cabinet, which will be established, must work diligently on a package of reforms to address legitimate grievances from all communities, and ensure adequate resources to restructure security services. These five principles could begin to address many of the core grievances in the Sunni majority areas of Iraq while also, importantly, denying space for ISIL to operate and thereby ::::::: the Shia majority and other vulnerable groups from ISIL attacks. Restoring stability and degrading ISIL will require smart, inte- grated central or regional, and provincial approaches led by a new Iraqi Government with an appropriate level of support and assist- ance. I can report that Iraqi leaders from all communities have asked for this assistance in implementing such a program, and General Austin, commander of CENTCOM, will be in Iraq tomor- 18 crisis, they cleared most of the highway from Samarra to Tikrit, although sophisticated IED emplacements, ISIL snipers, and repeated suicide attacks have halted progress." These operations remain extremely challenging, and we have differed with the Iraqis on some of their tactical objectives, such as moving into the city of Tikrit, which did not seem militarily essential given the need to focus on supply routes. They have, however, gradually allowed the Iraqis to move out of a defensive crouch and pressure the ISIL networks north of Baghdad, which had been poised to advance further to the south towards the capital. We are also urging the Iraqis to immediately focus security efforts to the west, where tribes continue to hold out against ISIL near Haditha, blunting what had been a rapid ISIL advance following the fall of al Qaim, on the Syria border, on June 21. The tribal situation in western and north-central Iraq remains fluid. Many tribes are now actively fighting ISIL – but lack the resources to do so effectively. According to our regular contacts in these areas ISIL is able to over-match any lightly armed tribal force. The complete withdrawal of the Iraqi army from these areas, together with the lack of coverage by Iraqi aviation in the border regions, provides ISIL free rein to move manpower and heavy weapons to areas where tribes resist. The result has been many longstanding enemies of ISIL and its earlier incarnation AQI – such as Albu Mahal tribe in western Anbar: Shammar in western Ninewa: Obeidi south of Kirkuk: and Jabbouri in central Salah ad-Din – risk making accommodations to ISIL due primarily to the reality of battlefield dynamics. These tribes may have issues with the central government, but that alone is not why ISIL infiltrated their areas. In al Qaim, for example, the Albu Mahal resisted ISIL for months, before the town ultimately fell after waves of attacks from across the Syrian border weakened Iraqi defense forces. A tangible example of this dynamic is the Sunni town of Zowiya, near Tikrit in north- central Iraq. The residents there, a mix of Jabbouri and other tribes, resisted ISIL and would not accept their presence in the town. The result, as reported in the media and confirmed by our own contacts, was an ISIL military assault to kill all the residents of the village, starting with an hour-long artillery barrage. ISIL fighters then swept into the village, forcing surviving residents to flee, and sending the message to surrounding areas that any tribal resistance to their movement would be futile – and crushed. As a result, absent some military pressure on ISIL, we are unlikely to see a broad-based tribal uprising against the movement, as happened between 2007 and 2008. This tribal uprising was enabled by U.S. military forces. which applied consistent and relentless * During this period of crisis, Iraqi forces have increasingly relied on vol s from hem Iraq to hold stretches of the highway cleared by security forces. Many of these volumeers have affiliations with Shi'a militia groups, and in the carliest wecks of the crisis, they operated in the open ſor thc ſirst time in y cars. Since then Grand Ayatollah Sistani has stated clearly that any volunteers should only join established state security services, and emphasized that militias or individual gunmen should not be accepted on the streets. The United States will continue to encourage Iraqi leaders to establish legal and practical mechanisms to incorporate volunteers, including tribal fighters, into the state secunty structures where they can be trained to protect the population consistent with the rule of law. 25 Added Forces to Protect our People: First, we have added forces to protect U.S. personnel in Iraq. The safety of U.S. citizens and personnel in Baghdad and throughout Iraq is our highest priority. The Department of Defense is meeting all requests from the Department of State for security support to U.S. Embassy Baghdad. As described in the War Powers notifications we transmitted to Congress on June 16 and 26, DoD has sent a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST), a Crisis Response Element (CRE), and additional military assets and personnel to reinforce security at our diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and the Baghdad International Airport. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also ordered the amphibious transport ship USS MESA VERDE into the Arabian Gulf. Its presence in the Gulf adds to that of other U.S. naval ships— including the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE HW BUSH-and provides the President additional options to protect American citizens and interests in Iraq, should he choose to use them. Intelligence. Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR Second, as part of this effort, we have surged intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in Iraq. At the request of the Government of Iraq, we surged ISR over Iraq after the fall of Mosul and also increased information-sharing initiatives. These ISR sorties provide us a better understanding of ISIL operations and disposition and allow us to help the ISF counter ISIL. We are now capable of around-the-clock coverage over Iraq and have been focusing our efforts on ISIL-controlled territory as well as Baghdad. U.S. Assessment Teams and Joint Operations Centers (JOC's) Third, we continue to assess the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). On June 19, the President announced additional measures—including the deployment of up to 300 additional U.S. military advisors to evaluate how we might best train, advise, and support the ISF. These small teams of special forces are working to evaluate the Iraqi Security Forces in and around Baghdad. They are armed for self-defense—but do not have an offensive mission. 26 And ſouth, following the President's direction, two Joint Operation Centers (JOCs), one in |ghdad and one in Northern Iraq, have been established to help support our efforts on the Mound | he initial assessment mission is not unlike many others that DoD performs around the world. We vulnently maintain special operators in more than 70 countries, in Africa, the Americas, and Asia Fultheuuote, sunce the U S troop drawdown in December 2011, a small presence of ultav personnel has been located at the Fmbassy in Baghdad, consistent with the 2008 Nuatesºv tramework \steement Nevivtat v Hasel and Channan Dempsey received the draft assessment of the ISF last week from \'vutual Countand Department leaders are undertaking a deliberate and rigorous review of the assessment, which wall untown recommendations to the President. Meanwhile, additional assessment wwk continues with respect to the developing situation on the ground be clowns l want to eterate that there is no exclusively military solution to the threats posed by Nil blowever, we do have a vital security ºnterest in ersunns that Iraq, nor any other country, Nºtes a Jºe Naver tº servorsts who Soulc threster our horne's rc or U S interests and cºs served 31 est friends in the region. We have to have a very close, close part- nership with the Kurds, and we do. But there is also a pragmatic element given the realities, given the economic realities, and other things in which we want to work very closely with the Kurds on their future. And I think the future within the constitutional structure, the Kurds right now, for exam- ple, are choosing their nominee to be the next President of Iraq, and we hope to have that sorted out over the coming days, but again within the constitutional framework. And we have had conversations with Masoud Barzani and others just over the last week when I was in Erbil, and then Sulaymaniyah with the leadership of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan about their future, about how we can work with them on their future, and about a future within the constitutional frame- work. And at least in the near term I think that is the best way to go. Mr. ENGEL. I just don’t feel that it is fair to hold the Kurds hos- tage. Because we have unfortunately screwed up things in Iraq and everything is falling to pieces, we are essentially saying to the Kurds, you know what, you have to be the glue that keeps Iraq to- gether and therefore we are going to deny you your aspirations. I am not sure that is quite fair. Ms. Slotkin? Ms. SLOTKIN. So I will just speak to it from the security aspects. Given the ISIL threat, the strongest single blunt to that threat would be a strong, capable Federal Government in Iraq that is ac- tually able to exert control and influence to push back on that threat. And while, I guess, it is sort of, there has long been this idea that Iraq can split into three pieces, I just sort of ask the question: Who is in charge of that western and north central part of Iraq in that model? So while I think, as Brett described, there certainly are lots of folks in the Kurdish regions who have aspirations of independence, think about what that means in that neighborhood and territory that they are left in if you don't have a strong, capable government in Baghdad that is able to blunt these ISIL threats. They have got Syria, they have got the situation on their south- ern border right there. They have got Iran on the other side. That is a tough neighborhood. So from a security point of view, the sin- gle best blunt, frankly, to both ISIL and to a strong, dominant Ira- nian influence in Iraq is a strong, capable Federal Government based in Baghdad. Mr. ENGEL. Well, I was going to ask you about Iran, but I see my time is up. Let me just very quickly say that I hope that the United States does not think that it can be lulled into some kind of partnership with Iran in Iraq. There are some people who feel that because our interests may come together, converge, that maybe we should partner with Iran. I couldn't disagree more. I think that Iran is major, the lead supporter of terrorism in the world. I think we look at what is happening now with Israel in Gaza and all the weapons of Hamas, which is a terrorist organiza- tion provided by Iran, and I just think it would be a tragic error if we somehow thought Iran was a viable partner in Iraq. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 33 clear then that our advice to the Iraqis was not to move into Fallujah, it was to set a cordon. And that cordon remains in place although it is fairly loose. Second, we wanted them to hold the provincial capital of Ramadi. So far they are still holding the provincial capital of Ramadi. What has changed significantly in Anbar is a very sophisticated attack that happened late last month on Al-Qaim, the strategic border crossing in Anbar, which again proves that ISIL is really an army. It is a militarily capable force. It was a multiple day assault. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And to your written testimony, ISIL also generates $12 million a month through illicit business in Mosul. That is a lot of money for terrorists. Quite an economic entity. Mr. MCGURK. They are a self-sustaining organization. And what we had seen in Mosul for some time was a bit of a modus vivendi in which they were in control of the city at night but they were not openly in control. And that was why the assault into Mosul last month did catch everybody off guard. We saw some indications of it coming. As I said, we had sources on the ground who told us about 3 days before that they were see- ing indications of it coming. But we did not envision the assault nor the collapse of security forces up there. I will say I have had a number of conversations with the Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am out of time. I apologize. I threw a lot of questions at you so that you could give me some written re- sponses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I am out of time. Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Albio Sires, the ranking member on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for our wit- nesses to have been here. Ms. Slotkin, I have been here since 2006, and I have come to hate the word “assess and train.” We seem to be assessing and training Iraqi soldiers, assessing the situation in Iraq, and I think the situation is worse than ever after spending billions of dollars. We train an army, they fire a shot at them, they run for the hills. Where did we go wrong with these people? We put all this money into training them and they can't even defend a sec- tion of their own country? I just, it is mind boggling to me. Now we have this situation where we have ISIS moving in all sorts of direction. I am concerned that in Jordan, for example, we have about 2 million refugees, and if we have a situation where they destabilize Jordan, the whole area it is just a mess. What did we do with all that money that we put to train all these people? Where are these trained people that—and I have been here since 2006 so it is not just this administration. I am talking from 2006 On. Can you just, or Mr. McGurk, can you also assist me in under- standing this? Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, so let me address the issue of the training. I think anyone who has watched the news or been a part of our ef- forts in Iraq was disappointed by what we saw in Mosul. And I think the biggest thing that we looked at and we were surprised by was the dissolving of, frankly, four Iraqi divisions up and around that area and some areas where they did not fight, in con- trast to western Iraq where they were putting up a serious fight. 36 And my question is, especially in light of what has happened with Guantanamo, where as a result of the 2012 intelligence legis- lation it was required for the administration to tell us how many of those who were released from Gitmo went back into battle—and the report suggested that of the 614 that were released, 104 were confirmed to go back into the battle against Americans and our al- lies. Seventy-four probably went back but they couldn't confirm it, for a total of 178 which is a huge number of potential American and allies' death to service members, and we had them in custody. So the question there with regards to Bakr al-Baghdadi, did we in any way see this coming? Why was he released to be allowed to go and re-form or to form ISIS and to do the terrible things they are doing today? Mr. MCGURK. Let me, first, on the formal, I am not playing with words on formal or informal request. The conversation, I can just, it kind of goes like this. You will sometimes hear from an Iraqi offi- cial they want direct U.S. air strikes. You then talk about this is what that would mean, access to your air space, et cetera, and then it is like, well, wait, let us find a way for us to do this on our own. And so that is why we worked with the Caravans and the Hellfires. The formal request very clearly—access to air space, direct U.S. air sºrt—came in May. Very clear and unequivocal, that came in ay. I do not have information on the release of Baghdadi, but I can obviously get back to you on that. And again, in terms of 2011, I can just speak to my own experience on this. I was out of govern- ment. I came into the process extremely late. We had a legal re- quirement that SOFA would have to go through the entire Iraqi Parliament, and I can report from my own experience that none of the political blocks in the Parliament were going to support that request given our own requirements, so therefore it was just not possible for us to stay. The rise of AQI, as I think I testified in my last hearing here, it really regenerated in Syria and on the battlefields and battle- grounds of Syria. And so that is where we saw the massive regen- eration, the massive influx in foreign fighters, and then we started to see it come back into Iraq over the course of last spring and summer. So that was really what led to the regeneration of al- Qaeda in Iraq which we now know as ISIL. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, if I could ask you—and I appreciate that and if you could get back on al-Baghdadi I would appreciate that. The Iraqi requests started coming in in August 2013 for as- sistance. Is that true? Mr. MCGURK. Yes, for enhanced assistance in terms of sharing information, in terms of enabling some of their units, yes. Mr. SMITH. Did we respond to it in an affirmative way? Mr. MCGURK. We responded immediately. We set up intelligence fusion sharing centers. We helped with the Hellfire missiles preci- sion strikes. We helped them in terms of training forces on the ground, the special operations Mr. SMITH. Because I am almost out of time, are there items or requests that went unfulfilled? Mr. MCGURK. Again other than this most recent request in May, in fact, in January we got a list of requirements and things that 50 So this is time where we have to say, look, we are the United States of America with a very robust military capability, surely we can have the intelligence if we decided that May was the time we were going to start looking at this, surely in 3 months we could have figured out a picture and begun to get engaged at that point. I also want to talk about the issue of Hellfire missiles. A Hellfire missile has a warhead of 20 or 18 pounds depending on what kind of a missile it is and what its target is. These Cessnas that have been retrofitted in Iraq, I don't know how many they can carry but I guess it is not that many. An Apache helicopter carries, I think, 16 of these Hellfire missiles. The idea of an Apache helicopter, one, taking out an entire camp of ISIS or ISIL is unrealistic with 16 of these Hellfire missiles. So the idea of a Cessna with one, maybe two, Hellfire missiles being the thing that destroys these camps in Syria and in Iraq is crazy. I think we need a robust air strike campaign on behalf of the United States. When our troops on the ground get engaged in combat we are very good. The Marines and Army are very good at fighting off the enemy. But the first thing they do is call for robust air support to help them win that engagement. This idea that the Iraqi military melted away or that the Iraqi military can take back ground with a Hellfire missile is unrealistic when our own troops, who are very well trained and who have a great background and know how to fight wars, call on A–10s, F-16s, B-52s, B-1s to come in and do close air support in order to retake ground. So I just am saying that I am renewing the call to the adminis- tration for massive manned military air strikes to push back this very, very bad cancer that is encroaching on the Middle East and also to target those in Syria, to understand that the Syrians are a very good fighting force and ISIS is getting their training in Syria and then spilling it out to the rest of the place. So I do appreciate you all's service to your country. I appreciate tº heing here. I know it is a tough time, but with that I yield aCK. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kinzinger. Ms. Frankel of Florida. Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the panel for being here. I think two or three questions. First, could you ex- plain what makes the ISIL terrorists such a greater threat than the other terrorists that we hear about all the time? And what is the most immediate threat to the United States and to our allies? Second, I have heard a lot of questions which I think are appro- priate as to what did we know, what could we have done maybe to have avoided the threat of ISIL in Iraq and in Syria. My question is how far back should we go? Could you give me your opinion of the war in Iraq, the invasion of 2003, and how that relates to the rise of ISIL? Because I think there are many of us in this country who think that was an act of malfeasance by our country, by our President at the time who is not the current Presi- dent, and by this Congress, to send our country to war in Iraq. So I would like you, if you could answer those two questions, and if you have time to explain to me the difference between what might be some people say is paralysis versus first doing no harm? 55 for 30 days to choose a President. Once there is a President there is a 15-day clock to name a Prime Minister, and then 30 days to form a cabinet. And we will get through, the Iraqis will get through this process along their timeline, and they will come out of it with a new government. And again we remain hopeful that that government will reflect a fairly broad consensus among the principal groups. Right now the presidency, for example, is a choice. The Kurds are coming up with their nominee for the presidency, and we hope to have that done soon, and then that will kick off the timeline to choose the Prime Miniser. That happened to be in this political vacuum period in which they have to form a new government, but once they have a new government it will begin a process of a very genuine dialogue about these very important issues you face, and I hope that with this committee we can be a part of that dialogue and inform them as best we can. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, my time is up. I just hope that the State Department and the Pentagon both hear bipartisan skepticism. Goodwill, hope you are right, but the skepticism being expressed in this committee today is very bipartisan. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. And now we turn to Mr. Perry of Pennsylvania. Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. McGurk, in violation of U.S. and U.N. Security Council sanctions, what material support is the Maliki government receiving from Iran currently that you know of Mr. MCGURK. The question of sanctions under those provisions is something we are looking at very closely because it is a very complicated question, actually. Mr. PERRY. All right, then just tell me what kind of material sup- port you know of and then we will try to figure it out from there. Mr. MCGURK. Well, it is another question I think I would like to maybe follow up with you in a closed session and we can discuss it in some detail. Mr. PERRY. All right. Ms. Slotkin, do you know? Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I really do think in a closed session we can much more specifically answer your question. Mr. PERRY. All right, I get your point. Well, knowing that Iran is supporting the insurgency in Yemen, is the Yemen model as sponsored in some sort by the President, is that realistic or viable for Iraq” Isn't it fairly complicated, knowing that Iran is essentially an adversary, an enemy of the United States that we are barely working with on a treaty regarding their nuclear program which many Americans, myself included, disagree with? I mean what position do we put ourselves in and how can we trust the Maliki government to move forward knowing they are complicit and relying on Iran, and can we expect the folks in Camp Ashraf to receive better treatment knowing that they are collabo- ºg, the government is collaborating with Iran than they are In OW! Ms. SLOTKIN. So I would say, I want to make sure I understand your question about the Yemen model and whether, it seems like 59 airplane tonight. He has gone to countries throughout Europe, Scandinavia, East Asia, everywhere, and we are making some progress. But we need to keep at it, and we need the support from the international community. That is why we have put $1 million into a new U.N. trust fund, so even countries that might not have the resources are able, and able to take these people in and bring them to safety. Mr. WEBER. Ms. Slotkin, I have 30 seconds left. What do we need to do? Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, we are trying to figure that out right now. Mr. WEBER. You are trying to figure that out? How long have they been over there? Ms. SLOTKIN. They have been over there since mid to late June. And I believe it is important to have a prudent, thoughtful, respon- sible approach before we just jump in. As someone who has worked— Mr. WEBER. It is not going to be very prudent if they all get killed before we do something now is it? Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think that it is critical that we have a thoughtful regional approach to this problem before we jump in. Mr. WEBER. Well, I hope you will encourage the administration to get real thoughtful real fast. Madam Chair, I yield back. Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Weber. And pleased to yield to our new member of our committee, Mr. Clawson of Florida. Mr. CLAWSON. Those from Camp Liberty, thank you for coming. You have made your point with the newest congressperson here. The two of you, thank you for coming, and thank you for your serv- ice to our country. And I am sure that this is not an easy moment for you, and it is never easy to be the point of the spear in this kind of situation, so I respect you for coming and speaking straight and ask you to speak straight to me too. To use your words, Mr. McGurk, there is some hard realities here, right, and I cannot overestimate those realities. People are dying and these are people that don’t deserve to die. And we have been there for awhile. It feels like a perilous situation to me as our enemies consolidate friends, allies, and territory which will cer- tainly someday threaten our friends—Israel—and maybe even us, if I am getting the drift of what is going on here as the newcomer. And then in that backdrop it feels like we have bet on a team that is divided, right, maybe artificial, artificially put together, and a coach that we and you as an administration don't have full con- fidence in. That sounds like a bad situation for us to be in. As I hear the talk today, it also feels that this lack of leadership there- fore causes a deterioration in safety, and where there is a deterio- ration in safety there is even a deterioration in culture. People los- ing lives in their own culture feels like a bad situation and it threatens us in the longer term, if I am capturing correctly what is going on here. So in that vacuum of chaos, you all are making decisions that will affect us eventually and people on the ground immediately. 63 I am appalled at the fact that we did so little in the SOFA agree- ment and do not accept the political answer that politically we couldn't have got it through. Because also there was a political issue here at home in which the President had made a promise to get out. And so there was political aspects on both sides, so let us not kid each other at least in this committee that we are doing that. So I will be honest about that and I won't go back. But I want to go forward and look at this, because that is very much of a concern for me for the price that, madam, you shared, maybe your own hus- band in being over there. We spent a lot of blood and treasure, and to leave it like it is now is very, very concerning for those of us who were there. Going forward is a concern for me and one other part is the March, in Iraq. Iran has used its close relationship, frankly, with Iraq and it was growing toward the end anyway to use airspace to fly weapons to Hezbollah and other partners in their fight in Syria. The U.S. has time and time again asked Iraq to stop allowing Iran to use their airspace. What is the most recent activity the Obama administration has taken to have Iraq cease these flights? Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, we continue to discuss that issue in some detail with the Iraqis. It is a very complicated question be- cause it is unclear in terms of what is on specific flights, and the Iraqis aren't going to completely shut down their airspace. It is an ongoing conversation. Again it is a conversation that contains some sensitive information, which I would be happy to follow up with you in a different setting. Mr. COLLINS. And I agree, and there is a lot of conversation that might not be needed to have here in an open forum such as this. But I will also say there is a lot of things we are dealing with the Iranians on right now that there could be some issues that we could use and pressure points and other sides that I am very con- cerned about their continued involvement in this basically messed up soup of Syria. I want to move though to the AUMF. I want to move to the President's 775 men, which 475 of course are there for additional Embassy security and advisors to the Iraqi army. Under what au- thority is the President deploying this force? Ms. SLOTKIN. So as part of our, the 775 in total were notified in the three War Powers Notifications that came over to the Hill. Mr. COLLINS. All right. Using in, so Article II still adheres to the War Powers Resolution. They have been there for roughly 30 days at this point. After we are at the 60-day mark, which authorizing force will the President use? Is he going to try and use Iraqi AUMF or is he going to try to use the GWOT AUMF? Which one is going to, because I mean which one are we looking to use? Catch one of you. Mr. MCGURK. I will just say, Congressman, exactly what the President said, that any future decisions regarding our military posture in Iraq will be done in very close consultation with the Congress. And obviously one of those issues to be discussed will be the specific legal authorizations through which the administration determines the President has that authority. 66 FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman July 23, 2014 TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at http://www. Foreign Affairs house gov). DATE: Wednesday, July 23, 2014 TIME: 10:00 a.m. SUBJECT: Terrorist March in Iraq. The U.S. Response WITNESSES: Mr. Brett McGurk Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs U.S. Department of State Ms. Elissa Slotkin Performing the Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy US Department of Defense By Direction of the Chairman The Committee on For, gn Affairs sºcks to make its facilitics ºrcessible to rerººns with disabilitics. If you are in need of ºrccial ºn comm at it ns plºw call Cº. 22*.50. at kºist fºur tº arºss in in atºwice ºf the event whenever practicable, Questions with regard to special accºmmodations in general (including avaiahility of ommittee materials in alternative formers and assistive histening devices) may he directed to the Committee