D 101.146: K 96 LES SSI Strategic Stu Strategic Studies Institute KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM Alle W. Andrew Terrill Prudens Futurt UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA LIBRARY X 006147672 TE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis. The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on: • Strategy, planning and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces; • Regional strategic appraisals; • The nature of land warfare; • Matters affecting the Army's future; • The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and • Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community. In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically-orientated roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick reaction responses to senior Army leaders. The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation. ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This work has benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions that friends and colleagues provided on earlier drafts. Space and privacy limitations prevent me from acknowledging everyone, but some individuals deserve my special gratitude. I would particularly like to thank Professor Mary Ann Tetreault of Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, for detailed and exceptionally helpful comments based on her deep understanding of Kuwaiti issues. Sarah E. Womer provided a number of useful and insightful comments that allowed me to benefit from her strong understanding of the region and previous time in Kuwait. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Friedenberg of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait was an indispensable source of support and assistance on my 2006 and 2007 visits. He has been an especially helpful and informed source of insight, contacts, and information based on his long and valuable service to the United States in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Middle East. I would also like to thank Mary J. Elias and U.S. Army War College Professor Steven Metz for valuable suggestions and insights. I need to further thank Mary for some early assistance on this project when she was my research assistant at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College before moving on to increased responsibility elsewhere. I would also like to thank former Kuwaiti information minister, Dr. Saad Bin Tiflah, for allowing me to speak at his diwaniya on two separate occasions where I had the opportunity to subject my views to the critique of informed Kuwait audiences. I also owe a special thanks to Major General (retired) Saber M. al Suwaidan of the Kuwaiti Air Force for his willingness to meet with me on numerous occasions and share many valuable insights, as well as the stories that accompany an exceptionally interesting life. My friend, Colonel Ahmad Hashem of the Kuwait Army, was another valuable source of insight on Kuwait during the year he spent at Carlisle Barracks as a student at the U.S. Army War College. Finally, I would especially like to thank Major General Khalid Jarrah al Sabah of the Kuwaiti Army for taking time from his extremely busy schedule to discuss Kuwait security issues with me. Despite this help, all errors of facts, opinions, judgment, or speculation are absolutely and entirely my own. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: www.Strategic StudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www. Strategic StudiesInstitute.army.mil/ newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-305-1 FOREWORD The United States has found no shortage of difficulties in recent years as it has moved forward in implementing its security policies toward the Middle East and especially the Persian/ Arabian Gulf. Security threats resulting from an Iraq in turmoil and an assertive Iran are near the top of U.S. concerns about its future security. Efforts to deal with terrorism and to encourage and support the efforts of regional states to stem the rise of violent terrorist groups are also important. Kuwait, while a small country with a limited population, nevertheless has many of the same concerns as the United States in that part of the world. While Kuwait cannot act as a major regional power, it can nevertheless still serve as a valuable ally, whose contributions to regional security and democratization should not be overlooked. These contributions center on strategic geography, economic strength, and a willingness to host U.S. forces that is long-standing in a region where such actions can sometimes be seen as controversial. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill provides a comprehensive and nuanced examination of Kuwait defense and security issues including a consideration of the importance of the current security relationship with the United States. He approaches this task by carefully documenting historical and ongoing security threats to Kuwait. Of special importance, Dr. Terrill considers the history of difficulties seen in Iraqi- Kuwaiti history and illustrates in detail how Kuwait's problems with Iraq which culminated with Saddam Hussein are much larger and more complex than the ruthlessness of one individual. Dr. Terrill outlines the Iranian move to acquire nuclear capabilities, which they view as an environmental and security threat. Nor would Kuwaitis like to see the United States depart from the Gulf and thereby remove the most serious countervailing influence to Iranian dominance. Turning to the issue of terrorism, Dr. Terrill notes that Kuwait has shown considerable flexibility in managing actual and potential problems. The Kuwaitis have been especially effective in managing groups such as the Peninsula Lions who have sought to overthrow the Kuwaiti government and have also attempted to kill U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait. This Kuwaiti governmental dexterity needs to continue. Should future problems develop between Kuwait and Iran or southern Iraqi Shi'ite radicals, Kuwait must respond to those problems in ways that do not alienate its own large Shi'ite minority. A crisis in Kuwait's Sunni-Shi'ite relations would be a catastrophic setback to the region, since Kuwait currently is universally viewed as having the best Sunni-Shi'ite relations of any Arab Gulf state containing large elements of both communities. Finally, on the issues of reform and democracy, Dr. Terrill notes the ongoing efforts at Kuwaiti political modernization and inclusiveness. Kuwait represents an important example to the region of a partial democracy that is expanding and further entrenching democratic approaches and procedures to contemporary problems. Such moves are not easy and backsliding is always possible. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti approach illustrates the potential of the kind of evolutionary reform that too often fails to interest political theorists and journalists examining the region since such occurrences are much less dramatic than violent regime change and revolution, both of which are processes that do not carry an automatic default to post-revolutionary democracy. vii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in October 2001, and is the General Douglas MacArthur Professor of National Security Affairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is a former faculty member at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and Foreign Area Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons, and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commando operations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Department invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the Middle Eastern Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Track 2 talks, which are part of the Middle East Peace Process. He also served as a member of the military and security working group of the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group throughout its existence in 2006. Dr. Terrill holds a B.A. from California State Polytechnic University and an M.A. from the University of California, Riverside, both in Political Science. He also holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California. SUMMARY The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam's later defeat and removal from power in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post- Saddam era, some of which will require both Kuwaitis and Americans to rethink and revise previous security approaches, particularly to meet the shared goals of reducing terrorism and regional instability. Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has struggled to manage a number of difficult challenges related to protecting its citizens and its territory from the predatory designs of large and dangerous neighbors. The most menacing neighbors have been Iraq and Iran. While Iran has proven a threatening and subversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even more problematic. Kuwait has maintained a long and often extremely difficult relationship with Iraq, and a series of Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait for territorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lost province of Iraq. Additionally, within Kuwait a widely held belief is that large, if not overwhelming, portions of the Iraqi public share this viewpoint. Iraq-Kuwait tensions are therefore unlikely to disappear in the aftermath of Saddam's trial and execution. Iraq, even without Saddam, is often viewed as a danger to Kuwait given this history, and ongoing Kuwaiti concerns about Iraq underscore the need for continuing U.S.-Kuwait security ties. Furthermore, both Kuwait and the United States fear a rise in region-wide terrorism and sectarian violence resulting from the current civil strife in Iraq, as well as other factors. Should Iraqi's sectarian strife reach new levels of intensity, it is important that it does not spread to other nations such as Kuwait. Kuwaiti diplomacy and security planning must seek ways to minimize the impact of the Iraq civil war in ways that do not cause the vast majority of loyal Kuwaiti Shi'ites to become alienated from their government. Kuwait must also cope with a newly-empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq's political crisis. Kuwait, as a small country, has little desire to offend a major regional power such as Iran, and has occasionally sought Iranian support in its dealings with Iraq. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait's Shi'ite community and therefore can be viewed as supporting Kuwaiti national unity. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. For that reason, Kuwait and Iran will never fully trust each other. Moreover, the Kuwaitis, like other Gulf Arabs, are deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, although they also oppose U.S. military strikes against Iran, fearing that they will be placed in the middle of an intense cycle of regional violence. Kuwait would probably view such strikes as an appalling breech of faith unless all diplomatic and economic options for dealing with the crisis were thoroughly explored and exhausted first. nn xii The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Ku- wait has also shown a commitment to expanding de- mocracy inanevolutionary way that supports U.S. aspir- ations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standing democratic tradition that they have attempted to blend with the continued authority of a ruling monarchy that has been in power since the 1750s. The existence of this monarchy and the history of democratic expression are key components of the Kuwaiti national identity. Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concerned about maintaining their democratic image abroad because of their continuing need for international support against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearly the most democratic country among the Gulf Arab states, and the Kuwait democratization effort serves as an important if still incomplete example to the region. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particular vitality over the last year, and the United States needs to continue supporting such efforts to ensure that they are not ephemeral. The United States must also remain aware that democracy and moderation are not the same thing, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered a number of Islamists who appear deeply unsympathetic to U.S. goals for the region. This monograph notes that the United States can, if insufficiently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti relationship and fail to adequately consult the leadership and take Kuwaiti interests into account. Kuwaitis have the potential to become more jaded and less cooperative in their relations with the United States if they view themselves as taken for granted or dealt with as subordinates. The United States has a long history xiii it a vital economic ally. More recently, and also of interest to the United States, the Kuwaiti experience is emerging as an especially important ongoing experiment in democratic institution-building and the expansion of democratic practices. This approach to governance is being implemented in ways that support U.S. goals for increased democratization of the region, although elections have also helped to empower some extremely conservative Islamists, such as members of the Kuwaiti Islamic Constitutional Movement, which is the political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood.4 In April 2003 the United States and Kuwait reached an important milestone in their national security relationship due to the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. From Kuwait's 1991 liberation until Saddam's ouster from power in 2003, Kuwaiti fear of Ba'athist Iraq decisively influenced virtually all of that country's major foreign and defense policy decisions. The removal of Saddam is consequently a significant development for the strategic situation in the Gulf in general and most especially for Kuwait. More than just a hostile and dangerous tyrant, Saddam was viewed by most Kuwaitis as an archenemy. In large part, these views were a direct result of the 1990-91 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in which Saddam ruled by torture, fear, and execution. Nevertheless, his standing as Kuwait's primary enemy had other aspects to it. He came to power and remained Iraq's undisputed leader despite that country's previous vulnerability to recurring coups. As dictator, Saddam was able to maintain power through a wide array of rewards and sanctions directed at the Iraqi population. Part of his system of control was to avenge every slight to both punish his enemies and more importantly to deter potential foreign and domestic plotters from moving against him. Revenge for Saddam was a fundamental aspect of practical governance that helped him maintain his unyielding domination of the Iraqi military and population. Consequently, in the 1991-2003 time frame, Saddam was widely viewed as harboring hopes that he would eventually be able to punish and perhaps destroy Kuwait for its unwillingness to accept Iraqi rule and its ability to rouse the world against the Iraqi dictator in 1990-91. Saddam's removal from power in March 2003 eliminated this personality-specific aspect of Kuwait's Iraq policy and provided at least a temporary respite from the terror generated by a known enemy. His execution by hanging in 2006 was greeted with undisguised joy in Kuwait. 5 Yet, despite an enormous sense of relief, Kuwait's national security problems have not disappeared with Saddam's removal and death on the gallows. Rather, the end of his dictatorship has created new and extremely serious national security challenges for Kuwait. Iran has viewed Saddam's replacement with a weak and divided Iraqi government as an opportunity to expand its political influence throughout the Gulf in ways that are potentially threatening to Kuwait. Moreover, a variety of alternative Iraqi political futures concern Kuwait, and whatever future Iraq eventually finds will occur only after a prolonged period of instability and violence that could well involve Kuwait. Additionally, Kuwaitis are concerned about an expansion of terrorism in the Gulf due to increased regional sectarianism and radicalism that may emerge as a by-product of Iraqi factional and intercommunal warfare. All of these problems are of special concern to the United States as well, and addressing them effectively is vital to both nations. style model of government due to the dominant role of the ruling family in the country's governance. The other important component of the political system is the National Assembly (often called the parliament), which was created by the 1962 Constitution and serves as the legislative arm of the government. As will be discussed below, this body has been a vital institution with a turbulent history since it was formed shortly after Kuwait's 1961 independence. Kuwait's ruling Sabah family has been in power since the mid-1700s, although there have often been formal and informal curbs on the family's authority to govern. Foreign policy was the responsibility of the British under a protectorate relationship that was applied to Kuwait from 1899 until 1961. Other curbs on the ruling family were a direct result of the internal distribution of power within the emirate. Kuwaitis, throughout their history, have shown respect for the special historical role and leadership of the Sabahfamily, whilefrequently rejecting theconceptofabsolutistrule.12 Kuwait also developed a strong system of consultation and consensus in part due to the influence of the local merchant class and also because of the leveling effects of pre-oil poverty. In the early 20th century, successful Kuwaiti merchants, upon whom the economy rested, usually considered themselves the social equals of the ruling family, and they often successfully demanded to be treated that way. The power of the merchants later faded as oil wealth strengthened the autonomy of the ruling family and allowed them to gain further popular support through the provision of increasingly lavish government services. Prior to its 1961 independence, Kuwait had ongoing experience with various quasi-democratic institutions, and the establishment of the 1962 Kuwaiti Constitution was widely viewed as continuing and codifying indigenous Kuwaiti values of democracy and consultation. Newly-independent Kuwaitis did not regard democracy as imported or imposed from abroad.13 Rather, many citizens viewed it as indigenous and important. Previous experiments in pluralism included various advisory councils to the emir, some of which were quite assertive.14 Moreover, on November 1, 1960, elections took place for the first time in Kuwaiti history. These were for the position of “mukhtar," a kind of local leader in each of Kuwait's villages and municipalities. Every Kuwaiti citizen male over age 21 had the right to participate.15 Another strong and viable democratic pillar is the diwaniya. The diwaniya is a Kuwaiti custom whereby friends and acquaintances gather to discuss various, often political, subjects, sometimes with particular speakers, and with dinner for those attending. In recent years, these gatherings have sometimes been covered by the press.16 Traditionally, only men attend diwaniyas, but this situation now seems likely to change since women were granted the right to vote and hold office in 2006 (see below). As women become more involved in political life as a result of their newly-established rights, it is expected that either mixed gender or parallel diwaniyas for women will become more important to Kuwaiti political life. On November 11, 1962, Emir Abdullah al Salim al Sabah signed the newly created constitution, thus becoming the first constitutional monarch in the Gulf.17 The Kuwaiti Constitution specified that succession to the position of emir is limited to members of the Sabah family who are descendents of Emir Mubarak al Sabah, known as Mubarak the Great (1896-1915). Emir Mubarak broke with the Ottoman Empire in 1899 and is considered to be the founder of modern Kuwait. The monarchy also has an unusual tradition of succession which, when called upon, makes direct father-to-son succession unlikely. Tradition, but not the Constitution, stipulates that an effort should be made to alternate the position of emir between members of the two main branches of the Sabah family. These branches are the Jabir branch and the Salim branch, which trace their lineage back to separate sons of Emir Mubarak. After a serious 2005 succession crisis, the ruling family decided that this approach would not be used in empowering the current leadership.18 Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad al Sabah, the current emir, appointed Sheikh Nawaf al Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah, his younger brother as crown prince, thus seemingly ignoring the long-standing principle of alternating succession.19 Both the current emir and crown prince belong to the Jabir branch of the royal family. An earlier change that now appears to be increasingly institutionalized is the separation of the offices of the crown prince and prime minister. Previously, both offices were held by one individual. In the aftermath of the most recent succession, the offices remained separated, at least for the time being. The prime minister presides over the constitution- ally-established unicameral National Assembly which both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis often refer to as the parliament. Kuwait held its first national legislative elections in 1963, and the existence of the parliament remains a continuing source of pride for most Kuwaitis. There is, however, an ongoing conflict between those Kuwaitis who seek a strong and viable parliament providing oversight of the ruling family's public policy, and those who would prefer to see it reduced to a rubber stamp and democratic ornament to impress foreign countries, such as the United States, that publicly support global democratic development. and function under the guise of associations, cultural groups, and other fronts. Who can vote is also an important issue in Kuwaiti politics. For most of Kuwait's history, the right to vote was denied to women, recently naturalized citizens, and members of the armed forces.23 Kuwaiti women received equal political rights in 2005, including the rights to vote and run for office, through an amendment to the election law. They voted in national legislative elections for the first time in June 2006 when they officially represented 57 percent of the electorate.24 Previously, women had voted in the April 2006 local elections.25 Following this reform, the parliament is seeking to expand the franchise to military personnel and lower the voting age from 21 to 18.26 Both moves are controversial, with a number of active duty and retired military officers opposing extending the franchise to the armed forces, due to a fear of politicization and strongly-held views on the meaning of nonpolitical military professionalism. Nevertheless, the search for reform and greater government accountability has been a recurring theme of Kuwait politics which has reached a particularly important stage in recent years and is examined in more detail later. Additionally, for purposes of this monograph, it is important to understand that Kuwaitis maintain a strong sense of national identity and patriotism. Kuwait is not an artificial state, nor does it lack a legitimate indigenous political structure. The Nature of Iraqi Claims against Kuwait. Kuwait has faced numerous actual and potential enemies throughout its existence and has been forced to develop strategies to identify its most dangerous adversaries at any particular time and then respond to them. Scholar and former senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Graham Fuller has stated that prior to the 1990 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait maintained a “rotating enemies list" of countries seeking to dominate, overthrow, or subvert the government.27 According to Fuller, this list has at times included Iraq, Iran, Egypt (under President Nasser), and even Saudi Arabia and Syria.28 In more contemporary times, Saudi Arabia has been an ally rather than an enemy, although a radical change in the Saudi government could lead to existential danger for Kuwait. Syria currently has limited ability and no clear interest in subverting the government of Kuwait. In recent years, the most dangerous adversaries Kuwait has faced are Iran and especially Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Unfortunately, Iraq- Kuwait relations have been so dominated by the figure of Saddam Hussein in recent years that it is possible to lose sight of the larger trends and problems, which are significant. Moreover, it is often easy to assume that Saddam's departure from the scene is the beginning of an inevitable upward trend in Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations. Such developments are by no means assured. While Kuwait has maintained historic differences with a number of nations, only Iraq has a history of intermittent but nevertheless overt challenges to the right of the Kuwaiti state to exist as a sovereign entity. There are several key reasons for this antagonism. Kuwait has an approximately 120-mile land border with Iraq, and Kuwaiti territory severely limits Iraqi access to the sea. Iraq's quasi-landlocked status has been a source of frustration and resentment to a variety of Iraqi regimes, and this situation becomes especially problematic for Baghdad when difficulties exist with Iran, with which it shares the Shatt al Arab waterway. Perhaps not surprisingly, under these circumstances, there are some key historical instances where Iraqi leaders have claimed all or part of Kuwait. These events will be examined later. At this point, it is important to highlight that the case for Iraqi ownership of Kuwait, for reasons noted below, is not based on any valid interpretation of history or international law, although it is often viewed as credible by Iraqi writers, politicians, and probably many ordinary Iraqi citizens. Iraqi claims to Kuwait are based upon Kuwait's former status as a qaza (lesser district or dependency) of the vilayet (province) of Basra under the Ottoman Empire. Since Basra is now part of Iraq, various Iraqi leaders have asserted that past links between the two areas serve as a basis for claims that Kuwait is a part of their territory. Unfortunately for these same leaders, such assertions do not capture the actual nature of Ottoman-Kuwaiti relations. According to historian Frederick F. Anscombe, who has conducted extensive archival research using Ottoman documents, Kuwait was not integrated with or dependent upon Ottoman Basra. Moreover, Ottoman officials in Basra were quick to express their unhappiness about this situation during the period of Ottoman sovereignty. Kuwaiti possession of the best port in the area was a continuing irritation to Basra officials who complained that Kuwait was independently ruled by sheikhs, and not “proper officials." 29 This historical research suggests that during the Ottoman period, Kuwait was not ruled from the territory included in present day Iraq, and its status as a gaza was administrative convenience rather than a working relationship. Ottoman officials in Basra wanted control of Kuwait and were disgruntled that they did not have it. To the extent that they were subordinate to any other authority, Kuwaiti rulers were subordinate to the Sultan in Istanbul. In contrast 11 to Iraq, modern Turkey has unequivocally renounced sovereignty over the Arab countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire.30 Just as important, Kuwait severed its political ties to the Ottoman Empire in 1896 and asserted this independence by concluding a treaty with the United Kingdom in 1899. The driving force behind this change was Emir Mubarak the Great, who was able to bargain with the British for some significant concessions in exchange for the protectorate relationship that both sides sought. The United Kingdom (UK)-Kuwait agreement, which was initially secret, included written guarantees that the UK would intervene with military force should Kuwait be attacked by a foreign power. The Kuwaitis also received some British financial support and placed their foreign and defense policies in UK hands. The demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 led to an increasingly public relationship between Kuwait and the UK, with British forces occasionally being used to protect the Kuwaitis from attacking tribal enemies in the 1920s and 1930s. 31 Finally, and perhaps most importantly in assessing the validity of Iraqi territorial claims, Kuwait has a vastly different political culture and history than Iraq. Kuwaiti nationalism has sometimes been described as more developed and nuanced than that of Iraq, and Kuwaiti citizens do not view themselves as a lost province of Iraq. Historical claims of one state seeking to absorb another seldom outweigh the will of the population, even in much more compelling and legally valid instances than the Iraq-Kuwait case. 32 In this regard, Kuwait's ties with the UK did not interfere with the continuing development of an indigenous political culture or distinct Kuwaiti national identity vastly different from that of Iraq. The British were 12 primarily concerned with supporting and protecting their trade route to India and ensuring that no other external powers attempted to displace their influence in Kuwait. So long as these goals were met, they usually did not bother to interfere with Kuwaiti internal politics or political development. 33 The Looming Threat: Iraq's Long-standing Interest in Kuwait. Iraqi interest in Kuwait predates the later country's independence going back to the era when both nations had special relations with the British. Iraq was created from the unification of three Ottoman provinces in 1920 and was made a British mandate until 1932. It was also placed under the governance of key members of the Hashemite family, which had supported the British military during World War I, and continued to rule Iraq until 1958. The discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1937- 38 (and suspicions that it existed prior to that time) seems to have led to a strong upsurge in Iraqi interest in the future of the emirate and may have been the basis for later calls to annex Kuwait by Iraqi government leaders.34 Although oil was not to be exploited until after World War II, Kuwait was beginning to show real economic potential, which was of interest to the Iraqis. Hashemite calls for Kuwaiti unification with Iraq are closely associated with Iraq's second monarch, King Ghazi ibn Faisal. Ghazi became king in 1933 following the death of his father, King Faisal. According to Hanna Batatu, a leading historian of this era of Iraqi history, Ghazi had “little experience" in governance and “no political understanding."35 He did, however, have strong anti-imperialist views as well as a predatory was 13 interest in Kuwait. King Ghazi made public statements demanding the annexation of Kuwait and attempted to incite Kuwaitis against the al Sabah family through his tirades made from a private radio station maintained in his Baghdad palace.36 No serious consequences resulted from these broadcasts, and King Ghazi's 1939 death in an automobile accident led to a respite in Iraqi claims against Kuwait. Ghazi's death also led to an upsurge in Arab nationalist speculation that the king had really been murdered by the British for opposing an array of their interests.37 There were also suspicions that British plots against Ghazi's life might have been abetted by veteran Iraqi politician Nuri al Said. The two Iraqi leaders were known to detest one another for a variety of personal as well as political reasons.38 Nevertheless, as late as January 1939, the British opposed the removal of Ghazi from the throne when they were apprised of maneuverings by Nuri to do so.39 The exact circumstances of Ghazi's death remain controversial, and the conspiracy theories remain unproven. Although the Kuwaitis were in no position to influence these events, it is difficult to imagine that Ghazi's death was a cause of sadness for them. Kuwait, in partial reaction to Ghazi's earlier threatening behavior, continued to reach out to the Iraqis during its later years as a British protectorate in an effort to establish normal relations and thereby reduce the danger of Iraqi subversion or military action against it. In March 1952, the Kuwaiti ruler visited Baghdad as a guest of the Hashemite government, where he hoped to improve relations between the two countries to the point that Iraq would no longer question Kuwait's right to exist as a separate, independent state.40 This visit went well and gave the Kuwaitis some hope for better relations. Unfortunately, in early 1958 the Iraqi 14 IL monarchy again indicated how quickly Baghdad's goodwill could dissipate when Kuwait was viewed as insufficiently supportive of Iraqi priorities. At this time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Said became especially interested in encouraging Kuwait to become part of a projected union of Jordan and Iraq in what was called the “Arab Union."41 This effort was designed by the Iraqi and Jordanian monarchies to help to limit the Egyptian propaganda victory resulting from the 1958 Egyptian/Syrian union into one country, the United Arab Republic (UAR). The Baghdad government was then engaged in a bitter, losing struggle for Arab leadership with President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, and the Egyptian merger with Syria helped Nasser to consolidate his already lofty image as a pan- Arab hero.42 The Arab Union scheme was designed to negate some of the propaganda value of the formation of the UAR, while building a foundation for a conservative, anti-Nasser Arab bloc. The 1958 Iraqi revolution destroyed the Baghdad monarchy and ended plans for the union with Jordan, thereby halting the pressure on Kuwait to associate itself with this effort. During the early stages of the uprising, key members of the royal family, including the young king, were massacred at the palace. Prime Minister Nuri al Said, the consummate symbol of the old regime, was killed in the street by an Iraqi Air Force sergeant, while attempting to flee the country.43 After burial, his body was disinterred by an angry crowd and dragged through the streets, hanged, torn to pieces, and finally burned.44 While this revolution ended the Iraqi monarchy's pressure on Kuwait, it also set the stage for a new and more threatening encounter with a much more dangerous regime. The leader of the Iraqi revolutionaries who became prime minister 15 after the Hashemites' fall was Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, an erratic and unpredictable army officer who was to emerge as one of Kuwait's most threatening enemies, just as the small emirate was preparing for independence. On June 19, 1961, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899 was terminated and replaced by a treaty of friendship in which the UK acknowledged Kuwaiti independence. Six days later, Prime Minister Qassim pounced on the situation by stating that Kuwait was an “integral part of Iraq” and that the UK had “declared an oil well a state” by granting Kuwait full independence.45 The Iraqis declared the 1899 agreement between Britain and Kuwait illegal on the grounds that Kuwait did not have the right to end its relationship with the Ottoman Empire or Iraq as a successor sovereign. While Qassim did not clearly threaten an immediate military invasion, some of his public statements were so confusing and contradictory that it was difficult to discern how he planned to unify Kuwait with Iraq and what the Iraqi military's role was to be in implementing such a unification.40 More ominously, June press reports stated that Iraqi troops had moved towards the frontier. These reports were later discredited, but the prudent path at the time was to treat the danger of invasion as serious.47 As the crisis unfolded, it is possible that Qassim may have believed that average Kuwaitis sought liberation from the rule of the Sabahs and hoped that Kuwait would be unified with Iraq. It is not clear how the Iraqi leader might have arrived at this belief, although the late 1950s were a heyday of Arab unity rhetoric, and Qassim's own hatred of the Iraqi monarchy might have led him to believe that such beliefs were ubiquitous throughout the Middle East. One senior SU 16 Iraqi army officer, on his own initiative, contacted a Kuwaiti friend in Beirut during the crisis in order to ascertain the correctness of Qassim's assumption.48 He was told that Kuwait was viewed as a distinct country by its citizens who had no interest in becoming part of Iraq.49 The Iraqi colonel considered this answer surprising and quickly conveyed it to Qassim.50 There is no evidence that Qassim was prepared to be receptive to this information, but no evidence that he made any effort to look into the matter more deeply, either. In the face of the Iraqi threat, the Kuwaiti govern- ment sought British military assistance, and the UK responded with Operation VANTAGE, the deploy- ment of 8,000 troops in or near Kuwait along with supporting air units. 51 This was a serious deterrent force at the time. The size of the Iraqi army was then around 60,000 troops, although most of these were far from first rate. Iraq was further undergoing the difficult process of transitioning from Western to Soviet weapons and equipment. Moreover, Iraq's already limited ability to conduct a military invasion was quickly complicated by domestic problems. Just as Qassim was attempting to present a credible threat to Kuwait, Iraq's Kurds, who had initially welcomed the new Iraqi regime, were increasingly at odds with Baghdad over the issue of Kurdish autonomy. When Qassim issued his claim to Kuwait, many Kurdish leaders saw this as an opportunity to rollback government authority in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq.52 By September 1961, Iraqi military forces were in open conflict with Kurdish militias, and Iraqi Air Force units were bombing Kurdish villages. The new military requirements of a Kurdish rebellion enormously complicated any potential invasion of Kuwait The Kuwaitis, for their part, were uneasy about relying on British troops for their protection, since 17 this dependency harmed their country's claim to have emerged from a colonial relationship. In addition to seeking military protection from an outside invasion, Kuwait also sought world recognition as an independent, sovereign state. A major pillar of this goal was achieved when Kuwait was unanimously accepted for membership in the Arab League on July 20, 1961.53 Iraq, the only state opposing this action, made the surprising blunder of not having a representative present for the proceedings that allowed Kuwait to join the League. 54 Had the Iraqis attended these meetings, they should have been able to prevent Kuwaiti membership since the acceptance of new members is supposed to be unanimous under Arab League rules. Kuwait was, however, blocked in its efforts to join the United Nations (UN). The Soviets contended that Kuwait remained a British colony in all but name due to the British military presence. Moscow correspondingly vetoed Kuwaiti membership in the UN until October 1963 after the death of Qassim and the establishment of a new and more constructive Iraqi- Kuwaiti relationship. While the Soviets had based their objections to Kuwaiti UN membership on the issue of British influence, the primary reason for their actions was to support their ally in Baghdad.55 In addition to being anti-Western, Qassim usually had excellent relations with the large and important Communist Party of Iraq.56 Kuwait responded to these difficulties by seeking an Arab League military force which would politically overshadow although not actually replace the British military deterrent. This action would clear the way for Kuwaiti UN membership and wider global acceptance. Egypt's President Nasser strongly supported the concept of an Arab League force for Kuwait due to COW 18 annexation to an interest in border modifications and adjustments. When Kuwait's emir visited Baghdad in March 1965, he was asked to relinquish Bubiyan and Warba islands which Iraq claimed it required for national security. The emir refused, but the Kuwaitis did provide Iraq with a continuing flow of foreign aid and made other economic concessions which helped to limit their problems with Baghdad.62 If Iraq could not obtain the islands outright, the new Iraqi leadership was especially interested in leasing Warba and at least part of the larger island of Bubiyan as a way of mitigating Iraq's nearly landlocked status. The Kuwaitis strongly resisted these overtures in the belief that such an Iraqi presence would evolve into a permanent occupation if Baghdad was ever allowed such a foothold. Iraq was unable to press its claims as it remained interested in Kuwaiti aid and also fell victim to a series of internal coups, eventually leading to a Ba'ath party government in 1968. This government included Saddam Hussein, who built and consolidated his power until he publicly established himself as undisputed leader in 1979. Against this background, another important inci- dent occurred in March 1973 when Kuwaiti and Iraqi troops became engaged in a border clash at an Iraqi military installation inside Kuwait at al Samita.63 The Iraqi soldiers had been stationed within Kuwaiti territory since 1969 with the passive acceptance of the Kuwaiti government on the grounds that this presence was a temporary response to Iraqi problems with Iran. In March 1973, Baghdad attempted to expand this presence and perhaps make it permanent leading to a skirmish in which two Kuwaiti troops and one Iraqi soldier were killed. Kuwait responded to the incursion by declaring a state of emergency, closing the border, and recalling its ambassador to Iraq. The Iraqi foreign guarantee its sovereignty and protect its borders prior to the attack. Iraq, as has been seen, posed a danger to Kuwait even prior to Kuwaiti independence, while a number of other regional states also presented serious security concerns. Normally, a small state attempting to protect itself from large regional neighbors seeks to do so through alliances and where possible through the development of indigenous military capabilities. The ability to develop such capabilities will be examined later, but this has always been limited due to Kuwait's small population base. Alliances are a more complex matter. When Kuwait became independent in June 1961, the United States, which had maintained a consulate there since October 1951, formally upgraded its representation to that of an embassy. 68 Nevertheless, as has already been noted, the UK, not the United States, was Kuwait's most important ally in the early years of that country's independence. The United States was interested in commercial relations with the emirate but played no serious role in defending Kuwait during this time frame. In the years between 1961 and 1990, relations between the United States and Kuwait were usually normal and sometimes good, although never special. The Kuwaitis wanted to avoid the charge of being overly supportive of Western rather than Arab regional interests. The strong and vociferous support that Kuwait gave the Palestinians also led the government to condemn the pro-Israeli policies of the United States.69 Kuwait continuously sought to polish its Arab nationalist credentials through strong support of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations and by allowing Palestinians preferential entry to Kuwait as noncitizen workers. Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat launched his Fatah movement from Kuwait in the late 1950s, and cheap oil. Such actions, according to Baghdad, played a critical role in reducing the price that Iraq was able to obtain for its oil. Saddam also claimed that Kuwait was “slant drilling" into Iraqi oil fields, and then stealing Iraqi oil along the Kuwaiti border.77 While Kuwait was almost certainly involved in oil overproduction, it was not the worst violator of OPEC quotas, and Saddam had clearly over-dramatized the influence of Kuwaiti actions on the Iraqi economy.78 Additionally, no evidence exists that Kuwait was involved in slant drilling into Iraqi oil fields. The leadership, for its part, did not seem to comprehend the danger Kuwait faced from Iraqi troops massed on the border. Many other Arab leaders, such as Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar, also believed that Saddam was merely flexing his military muscles to intimidate the Kuwaitis into financial concessions while not planning to invade.79 Kuwaiti leaders may have believed that the $13-20 billion they supplied to Iraq during the war with Iran had purchased them some good will. More gravely, they may have fundamentally misunderstood the criminal nature of Saddam's personality and regime. Kuwaitis may also have felt that high-level efforts at Arab mediation would calm the situation. Egyptian President Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd were fully engaged in an effort to reach a diplomatic compromise between Iraq and Kuwait. As a result of what seemed to be diplomatic progress, the emir stood down the army to avoid provoking Saddam. Until the last minute, the Kuwaitis seemed to have believed Saddam could have been bought off. So far as they were concerned, it was only a question of price. 80 Saddam's forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and rapidly brushed aside disorganized Kuwaiti resistance. By the end of the day, Kuwait had been fully conquered, and Saddam, through his dominance of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti economies, controlled one-fifth of the world's known oil reserves. Iraqi spokesmen declared that the invasion had occurred in response to pleas from Kuwaiti revolutionaries for support in establishing a new and “free” government. This story quickly fell flat, and no Kuwaitis of any stature were prepared to cooperate with the Iraqis. While Saddam at first appointed a puppet government, he rapidly changed his mind and annexed Kuwait on August 8. After Kuwait was annexed, members of the Iraqi- appointed Kuwaiti government disappeared from public view. Their leader, “Colonel” Ala Hussein Ali, was not someone Kuwaitis or members of the world community had ever heard of, and his actions did nothing to bolster the legitimacy of the invasion. The annexation was widely perceived as even more illegitimate than the installation of a puppet government and declared null and void by the UN Security Council. Tellingly, some informed commentators suggested that most ordinary Iraqis believed that Kuwait was part of Iraq, and they supported Saddam's decision to seize the small country.81 Saddam apparently believed that he could obtain worldwide acceptance or at least tolerance for the invasion, perhaps with a minimum of trouble. Kuwait was small and often unpopular since its vast wealth was often a source of jealousy and resentment to the poorer countries of the Arab World, despite an expansive foreign aid program carried out by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED).82 Saddam further maintained that he would be a better and more authentically Arab custodian of Kuwait's oil wealth than the Kuwaitis would be. Saddam's self-image as a man of action in command of a powerful emerging 27 among themselves on political issues. This approach was consolidated in October 1990 when the emir met with Kuwaiti opposition groups in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, and they agreed to present a united front against Iraqi aggression. Around 1,200 Kuwaiti oppositionists attended this meeting, where the emir promised to restore parliament and expand political participation in the government. Both sides would work together to gain international political support for the liberation of Kuwait.84 Kuwaitis remained uncertain about the prospects that the world community would take meaningful steps to rollback the Iraqi aggression against their country. U.S. Political and military leadership was united behind the need to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq, but there appeared to be much more uncertainty about the need to invade and liberate Kuwait. It was by no means certain that the United States would be willing to commit itself to a military solution to the occupation, and it was doubtful that any other approach would work. It also remained to be seen if the United States was interested in reinstating the Sabah ruling family rather than some Kuwaiti opposition figures. President George H. W. Bush's “This will not stand” statement of August 5, 1990, staked out the President's anger, but not his approach. Yet, even as the situation was becoming more complicated, Saddam increasingly foreclosed some of his own options for leaving Kuwait without a war against the U.S.-led coalition. The Iraqi leader was especially unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait after he made significant territorial concessions to Iran in order to be able to move his troops away from the Iranian border and into the Kuwaiti theater of operations.85 Saddam's intransigence meant that President Bush was not faced with any subtle or reasonable sounding proposals that may have split the coalition. Kuwait's wealth was systematically plundered, and the Iraqi military also engaged in gratuitous vandalism and destruction of the Kuwaiti infrastructure. Iraqi forces conducted summary executions and made extensive use of torture against any Kuwaitis showing resistance, and against Kuwaitis at random as a way of terrorizing the population into submission. Much of the violence against Kuwaitis and the large numbers of reported murders and rapes may have appeared to be as much the fault of the Iraqi army as of Saddam Hussein.86 Some Iraqi soldiers may have hated the Kuwaitis because of their wealth and opportunities, which contrasted greatly with the years of Iraqi deprivation and suffering during the 1980-88 war with Iran. Supplementing random violence, spec- ial Iraqi military units appeared to have been assigned the task of ensuring that the occupation quickly broke the Kuwaitis' will to resist incorporation into Iraq. Saddam may have been attempting to eradicate the concept of a separate Kuwaiti identity, and he may have been personally angered over the Kuwaiti unwillingness to play the role he had scripted for them as grateful subjects who wished to be reunited with the Iraqi homeland. Saddam also remained unconvinced that the Americans would attack him for the sake of Kuwait. A constant theme in the Iraqi media was that the Americans could not cope with the demands of a long war such as he expected that a new Iraq conflict could become.87 Additionally, the Iraqi dictator may have wondered how much the United States cared about who ruled Kuwait so long as cheap oil continued to flow from the region and so long as other U.S. regional allies such as Saudi Arabia were protected and placed off limits to any further predatory inclinations by 30 Saddam. The dictator strongly indicated that Kuwait was a special case, and Iraqi history seemed to indicate a pattern of interest in Kuwait that was not matched by territorial aspirations elsewhere (except along the Iranian border). Kuwaitis could perhaps be forgiven for being uncertain that the United States would confront rather than accommodate the dictator. The U.S. congressional decision to authorize potential military action against Iraq by President Bush was a close series of votes that may have failed had it not been for a final U.S. effort at a diplomatic solution in Geneva that was not accepted by the Iraqis. The Senate vote to authorize military action passed by a narrow 52- 47 margin, while the House passed a similar measure by a much stronger vote of 250 to 183.88 The war began on January 17, 1991, with a prolonged air campaign followed by 100 hours of ground combat in which the Iraqis were defeated and driven from Kuwait. Later, when Iraqi Army units surrendered en mass to the U.S.- led coalition forces, many Iraqi soldiers claimed that they never believed in the war. As suggested earlier, this is not a claim that is subject to easy confirmation or denial. During the occupation, Saddam hanged an Iraqi colonel who was widely believed to have been helping the Kuwaiti resistance, indicating some level of humanity by a high ranking military officer in Kuwait.89 Additionally, some Kuwaitis reported other instances of collaboration of Iraqi soldiers with Kuwaitis under occupation.90 As they prepared to retreat, Iraqi forces set 732 oil wells on fire. Some observers suggested that the torching of the Kuwaiti oil fields was done for military reasons such as the effort to obscure troop movements. The Iraqis would have been especially interested in masking troop movements from overhead aircraft and mounted Many Kuwaitis emphatically believe this story and are inspired by it, while others have expressed doubt.104 Clearly, this is “how Kuwait's leaders and defenders ought to have acted,” but beyond that, events become very difficult to verify.105 After liberation by a U.S.-led international coalition in 1991, the Kuwaitis had to develop a new approach to national security that addressed many of the same problems that they had encountered in the pre-war era and now included an array of additional difficulties. While the Kuwaitis did not plan or expect to defend their country alone, they nevertheless needed to make it clear they would do their share of the fighting in any future conflict as an important part of alliance maintenance. Thus, Kuwait faced the task of rebuilding its army and air force to the point that it could contribute more effectively to the national defense of the country. In doing so, the Kuwaitis did not wish to be seen as asking their allies to make sacrifices that they were unprepared to make themselves. Additionally, rebuilding and improving the Kuwaiti military after the war was a staggering challenge. Kuwait's wartime losses complicated the pre-war readiness problems associated with limited human resources. Kuwait's military infrastructure was intensively bombed by coalition forces during the war since Iraqi troops were using Kuwaiti bases. 106 Kuwaiti military rebuilding goals were exception- ally ambitious, especially given the staggering nature of their wartime losses. The bulk of Kuwait's weapons and military equipment were lost, destroyed, or stolen driving the Iraqi invasion and its aftermath. Some combat aircraft and limited supplies of land forces equipment were saved in the retreat to Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, the Kuwaitis were essentially starting 36 to Kuwait in response to Saddam's decision to move a two division Republican Guard force toward the Kuwaiti border with the apparent aim of undermining the sanctions regime directed at Iraq.114 While this effort was unsuccessful in achieving Saddam's goals, it deeply alarmed both the Kuwaitis and the United States. As the problems with Iraq continued, the effort to rebuild and upgrade Kuwaiti defenses proved to be much more difficult than first had been expected. Kuwait's revenue flow was initially disrupted by the need to repair the nation's oil infrastructure and pay for a variety of costs associated with the 1991 Gulf war. These problems were partially dealt with through Kuwaiti funds deposited in foreign banks, investment income, and loans. Some purchases were also delayed by differences between the Sabah family government and the parliament. These disagreements centered on the parliament's demands for a more transparent military purchasing procedure. Clearly, some members of parliament believed there was considerable corruption in the conduct of military purchases which involved billions of dollars.115 The Kuwaiti military rebuilding effort therefore went forward but took time. The effort at military rehabilitation was also backed by the Desert Spring series of trainingexercises which defense writer Michael Knights describes as maturing in the late 1990s.116 Kuwaiti military purchasing programs continued throughout this time frame, but the levels at which they could be supported were vulnerable to fluctuations in the international oil market. The “Intrinsic Action" exercise rotations of U.S. combat forces into Kuwait also provided valuable joint training and interface as well as deterrent value. 39 as a result of the 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait.150 The Kuwaitis are particularly adamant that the families of those killed or missing in the 1990-91 invasion and occupation must be compensated.151 In even more striking contrast to the Iraqi requests for debt forgiveness, some Kuwaiti members of parlia- ment have objected to the generosity of their govern- ment's current policy on this issue and have suggested that Iraq should pay its entire debt in a timely manner.152 This is not a realistic proposal due to the sectarian crisis in Iraq and the existence of numerous Iraqi priorities higher than debt repayment. It is even possible that at some point the Kuwaitis will again consider aid to Iraq if they feel that this is being done in conjunction with other wealthy states and has a reasonable chance of helping to stabilize Iraq. Nevertheless, the unresolved anger with Iraq remains and will influence any plan to ease Iraqi financial difficulties. Moreover, there are other budget priorities of interest to various Kuwaiti constituencies that government leaders will also have to consider. Military leaders, for example, have suggested that they would like a larger budget to be used in “refurbishing the army."153 Of even more interest are various schemes to provide cash awards or pay off the bank loans of Kuwaiti citizens. There are also proposals to raise the salaries of government employees who comprise the majority of the Kuwaiti citizen workforce. Debt forgiveness or aid to Iraq is not particularly popular when matched against these programs. 154 Iraq's new leaders have publicly renounced the idea that Kuwait is part of Iraq, but sometimes they have done this in the ways that concern Kuwaitis. In July 2005, Iraq's then National Security Advisor Muwaffaq al Rubei stated: The fascist Ba'athist ideology of the past era fed the thought that Kuwait is part of Iraq. I admit that there are still some who have been influenced with the propaganda of the defunct regime and continue to harbor this thought in their minds. Therefore, we in Iraq and Kuwait have to work together to foster the idea of twining and integration between the two countries and nurture Kuwait's pioneer role in the reconstruction of Iraq because this is the only way to debunk this idea 155 Such statements seem more like a veiled threat about the need for Kuwaiti aid for Iraq than a final renunci- ation of territorial claims to Kuwait. Adding to current problems, the end of Saddam Hussein's regime did not lead to a resolution of many of the outstanding problems between Iraq and Kuwait.156 Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, for example, has been a critic of the current Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, as have other leading figures in the Iraqi government.157 Maliki suggests that the border was adjusted in 1993 as a way of punishing the Saddam regime, and that the original reason for the adjustment no longer exists. Now that Saddam has been executed, the border should be renegotiated in Iraq's favor. While there is a certain logic to Maliki's arguments, this is a familiar and disconcerting line of reasoning to most Kuwaitis. To some, Maliki looks like one more in a long line of Iragi leaders casting envious eyes on Kuwaiti territory. The reassuring thing about Maliki for Kuwaitis is that he is not in a position to press for border changes. At the time of this writing, Kuwait is clearly safe from an Iraqi conventional military attack even without the U.S. alliance. The Bagdad government is currently unable to control its own capital and is certainly not in a position to undertake foreign military adventures. The Iraqi Army is weak and divided, and the Iraqi Air Force has very little offensive capability (beyond 48 a few helicopters).158 Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis are psychologically unable to rule out a future threat from Iraq. The current Iraqi political system is widely viewed in Kuwait and the world as transitional and it is not impossible that a strong and dictatorial government will once again emerge. This may occur only after a prolonged civil war in which a victor emerges and consolidates power. While Iraq is in turmoil now, it may eventually become much stronger. Moreover, if the future of Iraq is defined by intense and protracted civil war, the parties left standing are likely to be radical, militarized, and inclined to violent confrontation. Radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, for example, is a strong Iraqi nationalist who could conceivably threaten Kuwait in the future, although he would almost certainly be deterred from a direct conventional invasion. Sadr has called upon Kuwait to end its relationship with the United States and evict the U.S. troops currently in that country on the grounds that they are no longer necessary to protect the emirate from Saddam.159 Kuwaiti Concerns about Iraqi Insurgency and Sectarian Warfare. The Iraqi insurgency, which began in 2003, introduced a major new element into the U.S.-Kuwaiti strategic relationship in which both parties retain a stake. Despite overwhelming Kuwaiti enthusiasm for Saddam's ouster, some Kuwaitis for a considerable time have blamed the United States for what they describe as a mismanaged occupation.160 This blame is often private, and some Kuwaitis also temper it with a belief that Iraq is an inherently violent society that is almost impossible to rehabilitate. Additionally, the Kuwaiti the chief training ground for the next generation of “professionalized” terrorists.170 In particular, a danger is that radical Kuwaitis who infiltrate into Iraq will then return and apply their terrorist skills against the Kuwaiti government and society.171 Such a situation would recreate the problems that Saudi Arabia and other Arab states had in coping with returning veterans from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. These individuals in many cases were both radicalized and professionalized with a variety of military and terrorist skills. Currently, there are believed to be about 120 Kuwaitis who participated in the Soviet- Afghan war living at home in Kuwait.172 A handful of Kuwaitis have also participated in various other Islamic military causes such as the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya. All of these individuals are believed to be under surveillance, and they currently present no clear threat to the Kuwaiti government.173 An uncontrolled civil war in Iraq's near future could change everything. Such a conflict would attract much more serious attention from Kuwait's radical fringe, and present a significantly less manageable problem for Kuwait authorities once these radicals begin returning home. Many Kuwaitis also fear a possible spillover of Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian warfare from Iraq through the incitement of intercommunal hatreds within Kuwait. In his opening address to Parliament in October 2006, Emir Sheikh Sabah al Ahmed urged his people to put aside any sectarian differences that could endanger Kuwait security. The emir asserted that, “Kuwait does not belong to one group only or to one sect only, it is for everybody."174 He further urged Kuwaitis to shun “any behavior that results in division."175 These statements were widely interpreted as a renunciation of divisiveness over sectarian issues. In Kuwait, unlike 52 On the positive side, Kuwait is often viewed as having the best Sunni-Shi'ite relations of any Gulf state, and Kuwaiti Shi'ites publicly acknowledge that they are better off than their brethren elsewhere in the Gulf.181 Shi'ites are free to practice most of their religious rituals in public and to educate their children according to Shi'ite religious precepts. They have also played an important role in the Kuwaiti business sector, and a number of Shi'ites have become extremely wealthy as a result of their economic activities. This prosperity has provided the Kuwaiti Shi'ites with a significant “stake in the system” which helps to ensure their loyalty to the state. Kuwaiti Shi'ites are also consistently elected to the parliament, although not in the numbers that might be expected as a result of their proportion of the population. There is also a continuing effort to appoint at least one Shi'ite minister to the government. Further, many of the problems that developed between the two Kuwaiti communities during the Iran-Iraq war were quickly and decisively put to rest as a result of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the unswerving Shi'ite loyalty to their country. The Iraqi invasion and its aftermath powerfully vindicated the Shi’ite distaste for the policy of supporting Saddam in the conflict with Iran. While the Shi'ites still have a long way to go before achieving complete political equality, they nevertheless have a great deal of encouragement to work within the system so long as Kuwait does not adopt an Iraq policy that they would view as completely one-sided in favor of Iraq's Sunnis. Some Kuwaitis have suggested that a division of Iraq may be an acceptable outcome. One prominent Kuwaiti Sunni attorney has stated, as c O In terms of the division of Iraq and its impact on the neighboring Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait and 54 Saudi Arabia, I think it is in Kuwait's strategic interests for Iraq to remain weak ... I am not worried about the establishment of a Shiite state in southern Iraq on the border with Kuwait because such a country would not be strong enough to harm Kuwait, no matter how influential Iran might be.182 There is a clear logic to this approach since another conventional invasion is Kuwait's greatest nightmare. Yet, there is no evidence that this viewpoint has a significant following, and it stands in contradiction to official Kuwaiti policy. Moreover, other Kuwaitis have suggested that a divided Iraq would further empower Iran which would seek to dominate the Shi'ite rump state in the south.183 Contemporary Political Differences between Kuwait and the United States. Although relations between the United States and Kuwait remain strong, differences occasionally flare over issues that are not related to Iraq, Iran, or Gulf security. Recently this has involved Kuwaiti views on Israeli and Palestinian issues. Kuwait, as has been noted, was one of the strongest supporters of the rights of the Palestinians prior to the 1990 invasion. Yassir Arafat's decision to side with Saddam in that crisis was never forgiven by the majority of Kuwaitis, and various Kuwaiti officials were sometimes criticized by the Kuwaiti press for even speaking to Arafat in a civil manner at international gatherings. Additionally, many Palestinians living in Kuwait during the 1990 invasion were widely viewed as supporting Saddam and Arafat, although there were notable and heroic exceptions to this approach. Either fairly or unfairly, Kuwaiti anger against the Palestinians in the early 1990s was white 55 hot, and almost all Palestinian workers were required to leave the country. Against this legacy of lingering distrustand angerthe Kuwaitis do evince some concern about the Palestinian population. Young Kuwaitis do not remember all of the problems of 1990-91 well and often tend to get a lot of their information about Israeli-Palestinian issues from Arab satellite television. Some such sources include both the Israeli and Palestinian points of view, and various Arab editorialists have criticized the Qatar-based al Jazeera station for speaking to Israelis and giving them large blocks of time to explain their views and priorities. 184 Nevertheless, a great deal of extremely disturbing footage finds its way to these cable programs, and the influence on young Gulf Arabs is undeniable. An increasing number of Kuwaitis are critical of U.S. support for Israel, although others are more open to normalization with the Israelis.185 The official Kuwaiti policy is that they will not fully normalize relations with the Israelis until a successful settlement of the Palestinian issue occurs. Serious differences with Kuwait have also emerged over U.S. support for Israel's summer 2006 confrontation with the Lebanese Hizballah. In protest of U.S. support for Israel's strikes into Lebanon, hundreds of people rallied outside of the U.S. Embassy, burned the U.S. flag, and demanded the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador. Chants of “Death to America” were joined by a number of members of the Kuwaiti parliament, and various speakers in the parliament denounced the United States.186 There are a number of reasons for this flare-up, including the anger of Shi'ite Kuwaitis and Lebanese residents within Kuwait who might feel special sympathy for the Lebanese Shi'ite organization Hizballah. Such people appear to have only after the Kuwaiti leadership received a letter from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) scolding them for their ingratitude for the 1991 liberation.190 This matter could have been settled satisfactorily without such harshness which is often more painful when a powerful state addresses a weaker ally, since it implies a subordinate status relationship. Other problems exist as well, including a past tendency of some policymakers to stop in Kuwait on the way to Iraq without spending any time there. This approach has sometimes caused the Kuwaitis to feel their views are not appreciated. Recently, significant progress was made in reversing this perception when the United States helped to organize a January 2007 conference with America's Gulf allies (and Egypt and Jordan) to discuss Iraq and Iraq-related problems. The U.S. Secretary of State attended this conference to present President Bush's priorities and to listen to the concerns of the attending Arab states. While some disagreement occurred on the issue of Iran (discussed later), all parties considered the discussions important, and the value of these sorts of activities should not be underestimated.191 Additionally, congressional delegations are showing a much increased interest in Kuwaiti opinions on regional security, probably as a result of ongoing problems in Iraq. Previously, Kuwaitis would at times become irritated at U.S. political leaders who would call for a strategic redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Kuwait without any hint that the Kuwaitis might seek input into such a matter. Kuwait and Iran. In addition to the United States and Iraq, Kuwait's interactions with Iran are especially significant. In 58 Nor were Iranian actions confined to the activities of its terrorist surrogates. Iran's military also attacked Kuwaiti targets while either claiming the attacks were Iraqi or that they were the result of battlefield mistakes or miscalculations. In May 1984 Iran attacked and damaged two Kuwaiti oil tankers and then denied they had done so.201 As these problems continued, Kuwait sought the reflagging of its ships as noted earlier. There were also “accidental” Iranian bombing strikes against Kuwaiti territory, although these were not as serious as the attacks against tankers. The end of the Iran-Iraq War removed the immediate cause of conflict from Kuwaiti-Iranian relations, although each side continued to view the other with the utmost suspicion. After the Iran Iraq War, the Kuwaitis almost certainly believed that Iran would not make an acceptable ally and that its potential for political extremism made it an undependable neighbor at best. This outlook changed dramatically in August 1990 when virtually all Kuwaitis realized that Iran was not their deadliest foe. At this time of crisis, Kuwaitis were grateful for Iran's neutrality in the emerging conflict between the anti-Iraq coalition and the Baghdad regime despite Saddam's strong efforts to seek wider support from Tehran by offering the Iranians a number of key concessions. The Iraqi leader surrendered previously touted Iraqi wartime gains including control of the Shatt al Arab waterway. Tehran accepted Iraqi concessions and formally reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq, but Iran did not side with Iraq in the conflict. The Iranians did not issue the ferocious condem- nations of the U.S. and coalition deployments to Saudi Arabia, although that might have been expected given their past history. Rather, they portrayed the operation Iranian relations to become cordial because of the U.S.- Kuwaiti relationship. The Iranians are extremely interested in ensuring that Kuwait refuses to cooperate with any potential U.S. plan to bomb or otherwise attack Iran. On an April 2006 visit to Kuwait, former Iranian president Rafsanjani stated, “We are certain the Gulf countries will not back the United States in waging an attack on Iran."206 Various other Iranian leaders have also reassured the public that the position of the Kuwaiti government is that it will not allow its bases to be used against Tehran for a military strike again their nuclear facilities. Kuwaiti officials let these public statements pass without direct comment, although they have publicly stated their opposition to a U.S. attack on Iran. It is not clear what they would do to try to prevent it or to distance themselves from the United States if such an attack occurs. Mostly, Kuwait spokesmen such as Speaker of the National Assembly Jassem al Khorafi have stressed that “[t]he region cannot bear the serious consequences of military action." 207 Kuwait and the other Gulf Arab states are known to be deeply apprehensive about the Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear technology, although they are also worried about appearing too confrontational with Tehran.208 The concern about an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not surprising given that such a system could increase Iranian self-confidence and strongly embolden Tehran in its desire to play a more assertive regional role with conventional and unconventional forces. While Kuwaitis probably do not fear being attacked with nuclear weapons, they are aware that the large and powerful Iranian army is a serious threat that may be employed more readily if Tehran has a nuclear option to protect itself from “regime change” by the United States.209 Moreover, the Iranian danger could be amplified if the United States is seen to be faltering in its commitment to Kuwaiti security due to isolationism that could result from Iraq war setbacks and traumas. The Kuwaitis and other Gulf Arabs have sought techniques to express their concern about an Iranian nuclear capability without implying a threat of Iranian aggression. One of the central ways in which they have done this is to treat the Iranian program as an environmental issue rather than a security issue in their overt diplomacy. In particular, they suggest that a nuclear accident in Iran would have dramatic implications for their own countries if massive amounts of radiation were released into the atmosphere as a result of such an occurrence.210 The Kuwaitis also stress dangers to their desalination plants which are their primary source of fresh water. This approach to the problem also allows Kuwaiti diplomacy and that of the other Gulf states to sidestep the issue of whether or not the Iranian nuclear energy program is also a nuclear weapons program. Not surprisingly, the Gulf states do not have much ability to slow down the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons. Some thought has been given to a GCC declaration of a nuclear free zone in the region in the hopes of pressuring Iran to renounce nuclear technology, but this effort is unlikely to show the technology, but this effo slightest sign of success.211 Additionally, there is every reason to believe that the Kuwaitis are sincere in their public opposition to U.S. military strikes against Iranian suspect facilities. Such an action would force the Kuwaiti leadership to choose publicly between the United States and Iran rather than to try to maintain good ties with both states. While they would certainly choose to maintain the U.S. alliance, Kuwaiti leaders n would prefer not be presented with such a dilemma. The Iranians could also find a variety of ways of retaliate against Kuwait for hosting U.S. forces during a U.S.- Iranian war.212 Kuwaiti national security analysts are aware that a U.S.-Iranian war would have extremely serious consequences for their country, including possible Iranian missile attacks against U.S. military forces on Kuwaiti soil.213 Thus, the Kuwaitis are without any good options in dealing with the Iranian nuclear weapons effort beyond continuing their current policy of attempting to balance their relations with Iran and the West. Many Kuwaitis have also been concerned about the Iranian role in post-Saddam Iraq.214 A recent response to this concern was a January 16, 2007, Kuwaiti-hosted Foreign Ministers Conference on Iraq which included U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as well as representatives of the GCC states and Egypt and Jordan. The conference issued a statement that expressed support for the “principle of noninterference” in Iraq's internal affairs, as well as the need for “mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” in the region.215 Kuwait Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad al Sabah acknowledged to the press that the joint statement was aimed at Iran.216 Nevertheless, at that same conference the Kuwaitis encouraged the United States to seek dialogue with both Iran and Syria as recommended by the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group.217 The Kuwaiti emir stated that dialogue with both countries was important, and that a dialogue with Iran was in the “interest of Gulf security in general." 218 Kuwaiti calls for U.S.-Iranian dialogue may be designed to impress the Iranians with the potential of Kuwaiti “good offices” as well as to seek to minimize tensions between two countries that the Kuwaiti leadership views as important to its future. Tehran has sometimes 66 present Kuwaiti citizens with its point of view on a number of regional and international questions. Tehran's ambassador to Kuwait is Ali Jannati, the son of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the hardline chairman of Iran's powerful Guardian's Council.225 In Kuwait Ali Jannati speaks to the local press and strongly maintains Tehran's position that Sunni-Shi'ite troubles in the region have been provoked by the United States and Israel.226 He and others also continuously reiterate that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons and is helping resistance against the “crimes and atrocities of the Zionist regime."227 Both official and academic Iranian speakers also address university audiences and sometimes give presentations at Kuwaiti diwaniyas.228 Kuwait's approach to education and politics often encourages a variety of points of view and Iran's actions in this realm are only part of a much wider effort to present large numbers of divergent views within these sorts of forums. The Terrorist Threat in Kuwait. Kuwait has faced a number of dangers from terrorism and subversion throughout its existence, as has been noted earlier. Fears of Nasserite subversion were taken seriously in the early days of Kuwaiti independence, although the newly independent government managed to play off Nasser and the Iraqis to some extent. The Iranian-backed terrorist campaign in the 1980s was another instance of a serious internal security threat. Moreover, from 1991-2003 the Kuwaiti intelligence services were especially concerned about the dangers from Saddam Hussein's agents. Now, with Saddam gone, new threats have come to the forefront of Kuwaiti concerns. Additionally, a small number of violent Kuwaiti extremists have engaged in isolated and usually ineffective attacks on U.S. military personnel in Kuwait. These actual and planned attacks have occurred both before and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In most cases, they appear to be the work of a few disgruntled radicals rather than a highly organized terrorist network. Most of the plots are broken up prior to being implemented due to the amateurish operational security of the would-be terrorists.229 A few attacks have caused American injuries, and a U.S. Marine was killed by terrorists on October 8, 2003, on Faylaka Island.230 Kuwait may have been slow in recognizing an internal Sunni extremist terrorist threat due to its preoccupation with Saddam and a belief that Kuwait's democratic institutions would channel dissent in nonviolent directions.231 Some informed observers have suggested that Kuwaiti counterterrorism capabilities have been slow to adapt to the new threat. Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al Rodhan have stated that Kuwait's internal security apparatus largely has the same force structure that it had in 1990, and the Kuwaitis have a serious need to “start rethinking their internal security apparatus."232 The fact that Kuwait is a small country is sometimes considered to give security forces a counterterrorism advantage. A few Kuwaitis became members of al-Qai'da prior to the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks and participated in al-Qai'da operations outside of Kuwait before the government fully realized the danger posed by this organization.233 The spokesman for al-Qai'da, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, was a native Kuwaiti citizen until the government stripped him of his citizenship in 2001 after he appeared on television threatening Westerners with attack. As noted earlier, a limited II 69 Ministry of the Interior.247 Border penetration by land or sea is also a serious concern of Kuwaiti authorities.248 Therefore this is hardly a time for Kuwaiti authorities to become complacent about terrorism. Nevertheless, small countries such as Kuwait may find it much easier to establish security - especially since Kuwait is wealthy enough to meet a variety of expensive security tasks and has a manageable land mass and population where it can apply anti-terrorist measures. Political Tensions and Political Reform in Kuwait. noven Kuwait's tenuous but steady movement toward a more democratic political system is not well-under- stood in the West, although it is important for the overall process of Middle East democratization. According to Mary Ann Tetreault, “Serious news about Kuwait rarely penetrates far beyond the region in the best of times. When the story is about democratization rather than invasion or terrorism, even the most encouraging news can evaporate without a trace." 249 In considering Professor Tetreault's critique, this problem frequently tends to be a shortcoming of the Western media rather than the U.S. Government. The media seems unimpressed by slow, evolutionary changes despite their importance. Unfortunately, these democratic developments are not irreversible, and Kuwait could still choose to go backwards rather than moving forward to consolidate and expand reform. It should also be noted that at least some Kuwaitis view democratization as a national security as well as a political development concern. Kuwait remains interested in maintaining the backing and support of the United States and other nonregional allies against any regional states that might threaten it. These 73 areas. The two groups often tend to live in different neighborhoods, creating a situation where candidates may be tempted to use polarizing rhetoric in a way that would not occur in a larger and more diverse district.259 The reduction of the number of districts was a major demand of the Kuwaiti reform movement and especially the young people who demonstrated in favor of these reforms and identified their political movement with the color Orange 260 The most recent elections in Kuwait have been lively with opposition candidates who feel free to criticize the Sabah family for such things as failing to provide adequate services and sponsoring corruption.261 No major candidates have seriously challenged the legitimacy of Sabah authority, but they have criticized its behavior, sometimes in exceptionally tough terms. One candidate even criticized the “dictatorial behavior" of Prime Minister Nasser Mohammad al Ahmad al Sabah.262 Such statements would be swiftly and brutally punished in a variety of other Middle Eastern states. Kuwaiti political culture is much more generous, perhaps because of the strength of Kuwaiti institutions. Additionally, a significant amount of the initiative for certain types of reform comes from the ruling family rather than the parliament. This is the case with the effort to provide women with the vote. The motives for this move may have had an idealistic component, but the Sabahs may also have believed that women voters would produce a friendly parliament with fewer hardline Islamists. This trend did not materialize in 2006 to the clear surprise of some liberal candidates who had counted on the “women's vote." 263 Instead, many women voted for Islamists, who ironically had opposed giving them the right to vote in the first place. It is unclear what long-term impact women voters will have on the make-up of parliament. A best case scenario would suggest that a majority of women will eventually emerge as less tolerant of Islamic extremism, but this scenario has yet to be played out. Beyond the 2006 election, other evidence has been put forward suggesting that women voters may not cause the increased liberalization of parliament in the near term. Kuwait University's student union, the elected student government, is dominated by Islamists despite the fact that both men and women students (totally 18,000) may vote in the student elections.264 Some members of the Islamist groups dominating the campus harass young women over what they consider non-Islamic dress and have forced the university to build expensive separate facilities for male and female students.265 Moreover, the women who vote for the Islamist student government are college students who would normally be expected to be more liberal and nontraditional than other less educated Kuwaiti women. Nevertheless, another important trend must be considered before reading too much into these votes. This factor is the large number of Kuwaiti students choosing to go abroad for education, especially to the United States and Europe. Thousands of students attend overseas schools each year, often on state scholarships. Such students, almost by definition, are more open to liberal ideas, and some have returned to become leaders in the reform movement. Both men and women who study overseas are not included in the Kuwait University Student Union voting, and their absence from the country during their educational years naturally skews the voting. A number of Kuwaiti women students have risen to become student officers in the overseas branches of the National Association of Ile IO Kuwaiti students, with some moving on to important academic, political, and other leadership roles in Kuwait once they return. Unfortunately, by 2007 the number of Kuwaiti students studying in the United States was only around 2,500, and this low figure may show the lingering effects of Kuwaiti concerns about U.S. perceptions of the Arab world after 9/11. The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait has responded to this problem by strongly and continuously assuring Kuwaiti students that they are welcome in the United States, supporting educational fairs, and simplifying on-line application procedures for students interested in study in the United States.266 Some students, however, continue to believe that they will face serious problems with visas and that unreasonable security demands against them will occur while on travel to the United States. 267 Clearly, it is in U.S. interest to have large numbers of Kuwaitis study in the United States and gain a strong and nuanced view of U.S. policies. Everything that can reasonably be done to help support this goal would appear to be worth consideration. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly when considering reform, the Kuwaiti parliament continues to press forward in asserting its constitutional role. In early 2007 parliamentarians were moving forward with a vote of no-confidence on Health Minister Sheikh Ahmad Abdullah al Sabah, of the ruling family, to determine the validity of accusations of incompetence and mismanagement. Sheikh Ahmad had been questioned in parliament on February 19, 2007, but failed to convince a number of legislators not to call the vote which centered on issues of financial mismanagement and “grave medical errors that led to the death of several patients."268 Rather than allow this 13. Tetreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 65. 14. Miriam Joyce, Kuwait 1945-1996, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. xiv. 15. Ibid., p. 80. 16. The author has had the honor of speaking at several Kuwaiti diwaniyas. 17. Joyce, p. 123. 18. The first time this approach was violated was in 1965. See Robert L. Jarman, Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, 1965-77, A Political Biography, London: The London Center of Arab Studies, 2002, Chapter 8. 19. “Kuwaiti Emir Names Surprise Heir,” BBC News, February 7, 2006, internet. 20. John Keegan, World Armies, Detroit, MI: Gale Research Company, 1983, p. 350; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi'a: The Forgotten Muslims, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, p. 167. 21. “Middle East Koran Misprint Sparks Kuwaiti Crisis,” BBC News, May 4, 1999, internet. 22. “Kuwait MPs Elect Loyalist Speaker,” BBC News, July 12, 2006, internet. 23. “Kuwait Liberals Suffer Poll Blow," BBC News, July 6, 2003, internet. 24. The actual percentage of women in the electorate may be closer to 52 percent, with the higher number resulting from some of the initial problems the voter registration system has faced in registering women. 25. “Kuwait women Vote for the First Time,” BBC News, April 4, 2006, internet. 26. “Panel Nod for Vote to Military, 18 Year Olds,” Arab Times, January 17, 2007, internet. 27. Graham E. Fuller, The “Center of the Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, p. 87. 28. Fuller, “The Center of the Universe," p. 87. 29. Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 3, 92-95. 86 Officers and soldiers captured while actively resisting the Iraqis were often subjected to vile and barbaric torture by officials of the Saddam regime. 102. Tetreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 81. 103. Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis, p. 207. 104. Tetreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 83. 105. Ibid. 106. “Rebuilding the Kuwaiti Military,” International Defense Review, February 1993, p. 157. 107. Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait," in Ami Ayalon, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, Vol. XVI, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 570. 108. Tim Ripley, “Rebuilding the Kuwaiti Military," International Defense Review, February 1993, p. 158. 109. “Kuwait Rewards Allies,” International Defense Review, September 1992, p. 803. 110. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 155. 111. Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris, New York: Crown Publishers, 2006, pp. 115-116. 112. Robert Fisk, The Great War For Civilization, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005, p. 714. 113. Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2000, p. 333. 114. Michael Jansen, “Saddam's Phony Crisis," Middle East International, October 21, 1994, pp. 4-5. 115. Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XX, 1996, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, pp. 459-461. 116. Michael Knights, Troubled Waters: Future U.S. Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Middle East Policy, 2006, p. 127. 117. Charles Aldinger, “U.S. Honors Kuwait as Major Non- NATO Ally,” Reuters, April 1, 2004, internet. 118. “US Worker in Kuwait Faces Bribery Charges," Washington Post, June 10, 2006, p. 7. 91 134. “'Least He Deserves;' Kuwaitis Hail Sentence,” Arab Times (Kuwait), November 6, 2006, internet. 135. “MPs Call for Cutting Off Ties with Libya, Yemen,” Kuwait Times, January 9, 2007, internet. 136. “They Have No Regard for Suffering of Kuwaitis: MPs," Arab Times, January 4, 2007, internet. 137. Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near, Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005, pp. 39-42. 138. Al Jazirah Satellite Television, “Behind the Events,” April 22, 2003, as cited by Open Source Center, internet. 139. “Interview with Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister,” Monday Morning (Beirut), May 17, 1999, as quoted by Open Source Center, internet. 140. Financial Times as quoted by Kostiner, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 2000, p. 362. 141. For examples of Kuwait's anti-Iraq diplomacy, see Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait" in Bruce Maddy-Weizman, Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XXI, 1997, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, pp. 505-506. 142. Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2000, p. 117. 143. “Iraq Accuses Kuwait and Saudi of Treachery,” BBC News, January 10, 1999, internet. 144. Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War, p. 11. 145. “Iraq-Kuwait Border Is One of the Best Defined in the World-Sheikh,” Kuwait News Agency, August 6, 2005, internet. 146. Kuwait News Agency, “Iraqi FM Lauds Progressive Bilateral Ties with Kuwait,” as quoted by Open Source Center, July 17, 2005, internet. 147. “Jordan Envoy Is First Fully Accredited Arab Ambassador in Iraq,” Associated Press, August 18, 2006, internet; Tarek al-Issawi, “Report: Iran Appoints Ambassador to Iraq, Associated Press, May 10, 2006, internet. 93 212. “Gulf Not Ready to Face Aftermath of Conflict,” The Daily Star (Kuwaiti version), April 10, 2007, p. 2. 213. Ahmad al Khaled, “Kuwait Preps for Regional Flare Ups," Kuwaiti Times, November 15, 2006, internet. 214. “Kuwait Urges Iran to Stabilize Region,” Kuwait Times, February 14, 2007, internet. 215. AFP, “GCC + 2, U.S. Tell Iran: Hands Off Iraq," The Peninsula, January 17, 2007, internet. 216. Glenn Kessler, “Arab Group Signals Iran to Avoid Meddling in Iraq,” Washington Post, January 17, 2007, p. 13. 217. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton (co-chairs), The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward-A New Approach, New York: Vintage Books, 2006, pp. 51-58. 218. “Kuwait Urges U.S. To Talk To Iran, Syria,” Kuwait Times, January 18, 2007, internet. 219. “Tehran Seeks Riyadh's Help To Ease Tensions with Washington,” Jordan Times, January 16, 2007, internet. 220. Anthony H. Cordesman, The British Defeat in the South and the Uncertain Bush ‘Strategy' in Iraq: “Oil Spots,' 'Ink Blots,' 'White Space' or Pointlessness? Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 21, 2007, p. 2; Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul Zahra, “Mahdi Army is Breaking Apart," Philadelphia Inquirer, March 22, 2007, internet. 221. “Pack-up Time,” Bahrain Tribune, February 22, 2007; and “The Politics of the Brit Drawdown,” Newsweek, March 5, 2007, p. 8. 222. The Kuwait press has reported that British bases “still come under almost daily mortar or rocket attack.” See “Iraqi Soldiers Move Into British Base,” Kuwait Times, March 13, 2007, internet. 223. Al Iraqiyah television, “News Conference by Basra Governor Muhammad Musbih al Wa'ili,” February 22, 2007 as quoted by Open Source Center, February 22, 2007, internet. 224. Alexandra Zavis, “As British Draw Down, Violence in Basra Is Up," Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2007, p. 1. Also see Joseph Giordono, “British Unit Gives Basra Back to Iraqis," Mideast Stars and Stripes, April 10, 2007, internet. 98 225. Jamie Etheridge, “America to Blame for Shiite-Sunni Tensions: Jannati,” Kuwait Times, March 14, 2007, internet. 226. Tehran IRNA, February 8, 2007, as cited in “Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait: U.S., Israel Behind Religious Clashes,” Open Source Center, February 9, 2007 internet 227. Ibid. 228. The author of this report has similarly spoken to a variety of Kuwaiti audiences and was sometimes told by students and others that his presentation followed those given by Iranians in a part of a series to emphasize multiple points of view. 229. Agence France Press, “Kuwaiti Soldiers Plotted To Attack U.S. Forces,” January 5, 2005, internet; “Military Personnel Questioned over Possible Plot To Launch Violent Attacks,” Kuwait News Agency, January 3, 2005, internet; “Planned Attacks on U.S. Troops; Court Jails Three Bedouns,” Arab Times, January 16, 2007, internet. 230. “Kuwaiti Faces Death for U.S. Killing,” BBC News, June 4, 2003, internet. 231. “Fears Increase that Kuwait May Face Saudi-Style Violence After Clashes,” Daily Star, January 19, 2005, internet. 232. Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Kuwait,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 28, 2006, p. 19. 233. Diana Elias, “Kuwait Interrogates al Qaida Member," Associated Press, November 17, 2002, internet. 234. Agence France Press, “Two Kuwaiti Prisoners Return from Guantanamo," The Peninsula (Qatar), September 16, 2006, internet; “Two Kuwaitis to Leave Guantanamo Soon: Group," Reuters, September 10, 2006, internet. 235. Maddi Allam, “Kuwait, Terrorism's Alms-Box," La Repubblica (Rome), December 22, 2001, pp. 14-15, as cited by Open Source Center, December 23, 2001, internet. 236. Josh Martin, “Arabs Wage War on Money Laundering," The Middle East, July 2006, p. 9. 237. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 28, 2005, internet. 99 238. Ibid. 239. Ibid. 240. “Kuwait to Revise Its School Curriculum,” Jordan Times, November 28, 2002, internet. 241. “Today's Encounter Interviews Kuwaiti Preacher Dr. Hamid Bin Abdullah al Ali, Former Secretary General of the Kuwaiti Salafist Movement by Ali al Zufayri,” al Jazeera Satellite Television, March 27, 2007, as cited by the Open Source Center, March 27, 2007. 242. Andrew Hammond, “Kuwait: Tensions Bursts,” Middle East International, February 18, 2005, p. 24. 243. “Kuwait Warns Terror Could Spread Through Gulf," Jordan Times, February 8, 2005, internet. 244. Stephen Ulph, “Gulf-Islamic Militancy Kicks Off in Kuwait," Jane's Defense Weekly, February 1, 2005, internet. 245. “Kuwait Goes on Alert after Saudi Attacks, Gulf Times (Qatar), January 1, 2005, internet. 246. “Kuwait On Top of Al-Qaeda Hit List,” February 26, 2007, internet. 247. “Group Targets 'East Arabs'; Kuwait Alert to Qaeda Threat,” Arab Times, February 26, 2007, internet. 248. “Kuwait: A State on Alert,” The Middle East, October 2005, p. 17. 249. Mary Ann Tetreault, “Kuwait's Annus Mirabilis," Middle East Report Online, September 7, 2006, internet. 250. Velina Nacheva, “American-Kuwaiti Alliance Deepens Bilateral Relations,” Kuwait Times, November 1, 2006, internet. 251. “Tribal MP Indirectly Supports bin Laden,” Kuwait Times, September 19, 2006, internet. 252. “MP Demands Sharia,” Kuwait Times, March 8, 2007, internet. 253. Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait,” Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XX, 1996, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, p. 463. 254. N. Janardhan, “Kuwait Radical Islam Is Partly the Government's Doing,” The Daily Star, February 16, 2005, internet. 100 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General David H. Huntoon, Jr. Commandant ***** STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 19 Director Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director of Research Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II Author Dr. W. Andrew Terrill Director of Publications Ms. Marianne P. Cowling Publications Assistant Ms. Rita A. Rummel ***** Composition Ms. Gretchen S. Smith