id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_i7bpgrh6lfgepmousgl7a6r37y	Parikshit De	Incentives and justice for sequencing problems	2016	23	.pdf	application/pdf	10563	1907	88	We show that a sequencing rule for which agents are served in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs sequencing problem it is possible to get budget balanced (or first best) implementation with the outcome efficiency (see Mitra[25] and Suijs [33]). Therefore, if we have a two-dimensional incentive problem, where waiting cost and processing time are private information, ex-post implementability of the just sequencing rule is Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame [18] proved that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations are For each profile the outcome efficient sequencing rule selects an order to minimization the aggregate cost of completion time. The VCG transfer τ∗i (θ) (in condition (2)) for which the agent specific constant functions hi(.) are always zero for all agents gives us the pivotal mechanism for implementing the outcome efficient order σ∗.	./cache/work_i7bpgrh6lfgepmousgl7a6r37y.pdf	./txt/work_i7bpgrh6lfgepmousgl7a6r37y.txt