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Theories of knowledge and epistemology (75)
Valentin Balanovskiy
Abstract: The concept of transcendental reflection’ has been under-studied despite its crucial
significance for philosophical system. Kan transcendental reflection is an instrument
inherent in our consciousness. Without this instrument, one would be unable to distinguish
between representations/fantasies and the reality; to have self-consciousness; to identify the
functions of the human soul; to distinguish between the effects of the senses, the understanding,
and reason within these functions, including identifying the a priori forms of the senses, the
understanding, and reason; and to classify representations by the faculty of cognition to which
they belong. This study aims to reconstruct the transcendental
reflection and to define this notion through analysing the Critique of Pure Reason and the other
fundamental works of Kant.
Key words: transcendental reflection, Immanuel Kant, critical philosophy, transcendental
rationalism, a priori forms, functions of consciousness, self-consciousness, transcendental and
formal logic
Text: The issue of the nature and functions of transcendental reflection is quite complex;
moreover, it remains insufficiently explored. The main problem is that, in most cases, the
information Kant gives about this concept is implicit, which leads to a certain ambiguity in
understanding this phenomenon. For example, Karin de Boer writes
transcendental reflection are notoriously obscure1. Indeed, Kant did not provide much
information on transcendental reflection. As a result, researchers have not paid significant
attention to the issue. Apparently, Kant assigns the meta-reflective function to transcendental
reflection, i.e. he uses it to construct and describe his system as a whole addressing this notion in
brief notes. E.g., in the Critique of Pure Reason, the most comprehensive information on
transcendental reflection is contained in the Appendix on the amphiboly of the concepts of
reflection through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the
transcendental2 (B 316-349). Stefan -Walter calls it the part of the Critique of Pure
Reason that is least understood by researchers3. Some useful information can be found in
What objective unity of self-consciousness is4 (B 139-140), the chapters The discipline of pure
reason5 (B 736-822) and The architectonic of pure reason6 (B 860-879), and the Critique of
Judgment.
At the same time, the importance of transcendental reflection is beyond doubt. In this
respect, one cannot but agree with Kenneth Westphal that the lack of attention to this notion
suggests that we have overlooked something very important for understanding and assessing
7. However, there have been several attempts to look into the matter. For
1 Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Refl, Kant Yearbook, 2
(2010), 53.
2 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 366-383.
3 -Walter, S.,
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (2004), 146.
4 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 250-251.
5 Ibid, 628-671.
6 Ibid, 691-701.
7 Westphal, K., Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, 3.
instance, Martin Liedtke pays special attention to the notion of reflection in the systems
developed by Kant and his predecessors8. Kenneth Westphal criticises the inadequate
transcendentalism in the analytical tradition9. Stefan -
Walter examines the connection between the notion of reflection in the transcendental topic
and the concept of (Vorurteil) in logic10. Anja Jauernig11 and Karin de
Boer12 scrutinise the issue representations through examining the
mechanism of transcendental reflection. Kurt Walter Zeidler13 and Rudolf Malter14 consider a
range of issues pertaining to the difference between transcendental and formal logics and
between transcendental and logical reflection. Nevertheless, these attempts have not been
sufficient to give a full picture of transcendental reflection. Therefore, let us turn for Kant
assistance.
It can be easily established that, in his texts, Kant refers to the reflexive phenomena of
consciousness both explicitly and implicitly. E.g., the fundamentally reflexive nature of the
understanding follows implicitly from the passages where Kant calls understanding the
representation of a representation15 (B 93).
The first explicit definition of reflection given in The Amphiboly of Concepts of
Reflection suggests that Kant assigns two basic meanings to this notion, namely:
1) the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective
conditions under which we can arrive at concepts (B 316)16, and
2) the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of
cognition (ibid)17.
In the first citation, Kant defines reflection as the state of mind, which serves as the basis
for all findings of the Transcendental Analytic. In particular, he identifies the first action that
activates our self-consciousness. Without this reflection, the original synthetic unity of
apperception is impossible18 (B 131-133), since, in this state of mind, an individual is aware that
they are they and everything else is not them. Indeed, according to Kant, if we were not able to
distinguish between the outer world and ourselves using transcendental reflection, we would not
be conscious beings, and hence we would never be able to cognise, assess, or motivate ourselves.
Therefore, the first function of transcendental reflection identified explicitly in the text is that of
a means to distinguish between the subject and an object of any activity.
In the second citation, Kant calls reflection a means to identify the status of
representations based on their source and place in consciousness. This is the second most
important function of transcendental reflection
emergence of the transcendental topic a doctrine designed to assign a place to all concepts
depending on whether it is used in the realm of senses/the understanding/the unity of both, or in
8 Liedtke, M., Der Begriff der reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Univ., Phil. Fak.,
Diss., Hamburg, 19Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie, 48 (1966), 207-216.
9 Westphal, K., ,
Kant-Studien, 94.2 (2003), 135-171, and Westphal, K., Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
10 -Walter, S., Topik, Reflexion und Vorurteilskritik: Kants Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe im
Kontext, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (2004), 146-175.
11 Jauernig, A., , in
D. Garber and B. Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns, Princeton, Oxford, 2008, 41-63.
12 Boer, K., Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant's first Critique, Kant Yearbook, 2
(2010), 53-73.
13 Zeidler, K.W., Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1992.
14 Malter, R., Logische und transzendentale Reflexion. Zu Kants Bestimmung des philosophiegeschichtlichen Ortes
der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Revue internationale de philosophie, 35 (1981), 284-301.
15 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 205.
16 Ibid, 366.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 246-247.
the realm of reason, or in the unity of the senses, the understanding, and reason19 (B 234-326).
meaningful transcendental topic and
Aristotle formal logical topic20 (B 324-325). Therefore, without transcendental reflection as a
universal differentiation tool, one would not be able either to establish adequate correlations
between representations and notions, to distinguish between representations according to their
sources, or to understand transcendental deduction of categories, without which an
adequate cognition of the outer world is impossible.
Thus, in the first explicit definition of reflection, Kant stresses its two most significant
and general functions characteristic of the whole Critique of Pure Reason:
I) , through which the subjective
conditions for concept formation are determined. Its product is the transcendental unity of self-
consciousness, which makes it possible to carry out the synthesis of the manifold given in a
sensual intuition (since it assigns the identity of the subject to itself) and to maintain the integrity
of the subject in the process of cognition. It protects the subject from dissolving in the object of
cognition and preventing the objective world from dissolving in a subjective consciousness21 (B
134). II) Reflection as a tool for differentiating between, analysing and comparing the elements
of consciousness, uncovering the structure and functions of consciousness, classifying the
information contained in the consciousness by the place in its structure. In this sense,
transcendental reflection has a multilevel structure. With some reservations, one can also
attribute to this meaning of reflection analytic of concepts as a method adapted to the
needs of critical philosophy used not for a formal study of concepts, but for the analysis of the
faculty of understanding itself, in order to research the possibility of a priori concepts22 (B 90).
It is necessary to emphasise that this division of reflection functions in system is
not traditional for Kant studies. Most studies focus only on the second function, since it is rather
evident. Indeed, in most cases, Kant explicitly calls the processes pertaining to the second
meaning reflection or transcendental reflection. Moreover, Kant scholars usually limit the scope
of inquiry to the Critique of Pure Reason neglecting the fact that transcendental reflection is
connected to the reflective power (faculty) of judgment and, thus, to all human activities.
system must be considered as a whole; the fragments that are not clearly explained by Kant
should be reconstructed. The author of this study attempted to reconstruct certain fragments of
his PhD thesis. Some updated results and conclusions will be presented
below. This study will concentrate on the second application of the notion of transcendental
reflection and attempt to consider the issue in a wider context.
As mentioned above, reflection as a means of differentiation is
more clearly and explicitly than reflection as a condition for the synthetic unity of apperception.
Most researchers agree that, in this sense, the notion constitutes an important key to
as a whole23. To help his readers to understand the essence of the
new concept, Kant distinguishes between two types of reflection transcendental and logical
ones. The difference between these types is considered in detail in Rudolf Malter24. This
study will focus only on certain aspects thereof, since logical reflection is a necessary part of
reflection as an all-embracing multi-level mechanism ensuring the functioning of human
consciousness.
Alongside transcendental reflection, Kant identifies logical reflection defined as a mere
comparison, for in its case there is complete abstraction from the cognitive power to
19 Ibid, 305-371.
20 Ibid, 370-371.
21 Ibid, 247.
22 Ibid, 202.
23 Pure Reason's Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant's first Critique, Kant Yearbook, 2
(2010), 62.
24 Malter, R., Logische und transzendentale Reflexion. Zu Kants Bestimmung des philosophiegeschichtlichen Ortes
der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Revue internationale de philosophie, 35 (1981), 284-301.
which the given representations belong25 (B 318). Moreover, logical reflection deals with
notions and never with objects or things (Gegenstand), which is the main difference between
logical and transcendental reflection.
Logical reflection is governed by the principles of general (formal) logic, which has
nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather considers representations, whether they are
originally given a priori in ourselves or only empirically, merely in respect of the laws according
to which the understanding brings them into relation to one another when it thinks, and therefore
it deals only with the form of the understanding26 (B 80). Thus, the purpose of logical reflection
is manipulating the formal logical content of consciousness regardless of its origins or
correlations in the outer world. This function is important but not exhaustive for a human being
in the world depicted by Kant.
In its turn, transcendental reflection is governed by the principles of transcendental logic,
which unlike general logic has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason,
but solely insofar as they are related to objects a priori27 (B 81-82). The main advantage of
transcendental reflection is its connection to objects and, therefore, the reality, since
transcendental reflection takes place in the realm of not only the understanding, but also the
senses and reason, although Kant explicitly places transcendental reflection within the
boundaries of the understanding and the senses.
Indeed, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the notion primarily in the contexts that
emphasise the facts that transcendental reflection belongs to the understanding and that it is used
to coordinate the senses and the understanding28 (B 316). Thus, most researchers focus only on
the epistemological significance of transcendental reflection. However, this does not exhaust the
issue and there is a need to address the other works of Kant. In this respect, the Critique of
Judgment and the Critique of Practical Reason are also important sources of information about
the very essence of transcendental reflection. How can one reconstruct
explicit definition of transcendental reflection?
Firstly, there is a close connection between transcendental reflection and the reflective
power of judgment embracing all levels of our consciousness from the senses to reason. In effect,
the functions of transcendental reflection go beyond the understanding, since the main
contribution of transcendental reflection is facilitating reflective judgments. This is the only
thing that ensures the adequacy of reflective judgments. However, reflective judgments are the
teleology, aesthetics, and morality. Therefore, according to Kant, transcendental
reflection permeates all conscious activities.
Secondly, Kant definition of understanding in general incorporates the power of
judgment and reason alongside the understanding, whereas together they comprise the higher
faculties of cognition29 (B 169).
Thirdly system suggests a close connection between transcendental reflection and
the ideal of pure reason. Based on the analysis of all Critiques, it is demonstrated that the ideal of
pure reason can be described as a goal that determines the form of knowledge for each human
activity, whereas transcendental reflection is a means to put the ideal of pure reason into practice
i.e. to apply it to concrete disparate and multifarious empirical material30. Therefore, it is
system, transcendental reflection pertains to all content of human
consciousness involved in fulfilling the functions of the soul. Therefore, transcendental reflection
should have a multi-level structure. However, this creates a complication transcendental logic
is a complex discipline, which poses an obstacle to formalisation. Moreover, manipulation with
25 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 368.
26 Ibid, 196.
27 Ibid, 196-197.
28 Ibid, 366.
29 Ibid, 267.
30 Transcendental reflection and the ideal of pure reason in Kant's works, Vestnik IKBFU, 6
(2014), 7-13.
reflective judgments remains an urgent issue. These circumstances, make the Critique of
Judgment the most oeuvre to interpret31.
Kant demonstrates the functioning of both types of reflection through analysing the four
pairs of concepts of reflection32 (B 317-324) identity and difference, agreement and opposition,
the inner and the outer, and the determinable and the determination (matter and form)33 (B 317).
Kant conducts this analysis not only to criticise idealism, but also and primarily to
define transcendental reflection more precisely and accurately as compared to logical reflection,
as well as to stress the advantages of meaningful consideration of objects as compared to the
formal one.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that logical reflection is an ugly duckling in
has an important function. It helps to analyse the relations
between notions contained in consciousness for the compliance with the laws of general logic.
Without this act of formal comparison (as well as without transcendental reflection), one can be
confused by the reflective power of judgment. Without logical reflection, it is impossible to deal
with large amounts of abstract information contained in the consciousness of the modern
individual.
It is worth noting that, before Kant created his system, there had been no need for
transcendental reflection. Indeed, if one deals with only one function of consciousness the
epistemological function and relies on the understanding or the senses, logical reflection
proves to be sufficient, since the main task of such reflection is to analyse relations between
representations for the compliance with the laws of logic. However, according to Kant, one will
not suspect that they are surrounded by an illusion if one does not distinguish between their
thinking, the process of cognition, and the outer world. Therefore, if one wants to cognise the
reality, according to Kant, one should understand that thinking and cognizing are not the same
and that there are two other functions of consciousness alongside the epistemological one. As
one can see, the situation becomes increasingly complicated. Obviously, errors stemming from
the confusion about the ways to use the cognitive mechanisms become possible. A correct use of
the cognitive faculties requires a more delicate tool than logical reflection. Kant demonstrates
that such tool transcendental reflection is inherent in our consciousness.
According to Kant, transcendental reflection makes it possible to avoid many mistakes in
the process of judgment formation. Moreover, it is well known that human knowledge consists
of judgments. How does it work? Transcendental reflection makes it possible to answer a
question on the nature of representations crucial for the adequate cognition before forming a
judgment, namely, In which cognitive faculty do they belong together? Is it the understanding
or is it the senses before which they are connected or compared?34 (B 316). This allows us to
wake up from the dogmatic dream, where all judgments are accepted out of habit, or connected
through inclination35 (Ibid).
Transcendental reflection takes the central place in consciousness, especially when it
considered in the context of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Therefore, one can
suppose remembering the primacy of practical reason over theoretical one that transcendental
reflection is rooted in reason. But in the Critique of Pure Reason there is only one indirect proof
of this statement. In this place Kant underlines the deepest difference between logical and
31 These results were obtained from an expert survey undertaken by the author in 2014. For more information in
English, see: http://www.kant-online.ru/en/?p=719. The survey results were published in Russian in 2014:
Prioritetnye zadachi kantovedenija na blizhajshee desjatiletiePriorities of Kant Studies for the
Next Decade), Kantovsiy Sbornik, 4 (2014), 116-122.
32 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 367-370.
33 Ibid, 367.
34 Ibid, 366.
35 Ibid.
36 (B 319).
Hence, if both types of reflection belong to different faculties, and, surely, none of these faculties
are the senses, consequently, logical reflection belongs to the understanding and transcendental
reflection belongs to reason or, less likely, the power of judgment.
The basis for transcendental reflection is a universal property of human beings, namely,
activeness, since, according to Kant, the faculty of arbitrariness (or the self-motivation ability) is
a fundamental characteristic of human consciousness and thus of reason. Nevertheless, certain
doubts about the absoluteness of activeness for all faculties of the soul can arise if we consider
the nature of the senses. It is an interesting issue, since Kant constantly emphasises certain
passivity of the senses, which are permanently influenced by things in themselves; he also
stresses that objects are given to us through the senses37 (B 74-75, 129, etc.). In fact, the senses
are also active, although to a lesser degree than the understanding or reason.
Finally, let us answer the question: w
Transcendental reflection is a complex differentiation tool that is inherent in our consciousness.
It functions at three different levels: meta-level, transcendental level, and the level of formal
logic. The first level is characterised by transcendental meta-reflection, which makes it possible
to: a) identify the fundamental functions of the soul (axiological, epistemological, and practical
ones); b) distinguish between the effect of the senses, the understanding, and reason in the
framework of these functions, including identifying a priori forms of the senses, the
understanding, and reason.
The second level is characterised by transcendental reflection, which makes it possible
to: a) determine the contribution of the senses, the understanding, and reason to constituting
concepts; b) classify representations according to the faculty of cognition to which they belong;
c) identify to what extent representations and concepts correspond to the reality (objects) using
transcendental logic.
The third level is represented by logical reflection making it possible to compare
representations and concepts and ensure the compliance with the laws of general logic regardless
of the content of cognition. The second and the third levels are described by Kant more explicitly
than the first.
An effective process of cognition requires all types of reflection applied within a systemic
unity. The first two types of reflection should be used at the early stages of cognition and data
processing in judgments, whereas the third type should be used when dealing with ready
knowledge analysed for the compliance with the laws of formal logic.
transcendental reflection has long outlived its creator. It contributed to the theory
of judgment meeting the phenomenology in the development of the crucial
notion of phenomenological reflection38. However, some authors focusing on reflective
phenomena seem to legacy. E.g., Patricia M. King and Karen
Strohm Kitchener wrote a book entitled Developing Reflective Judgment, where they construct
a model of cognitive development that describes how people justify their beliefs when they are
faced with complex or vexing problems39 and argue that real problems cannot be solved by
formal logic alone without true reflective thinking40. concept of
transcendental reflection. However, the book contains no mention of either Kant or Husserl. It
means that there is a strong need for the notion of reflection, which proved to be useful in
philosophy and psychology, therefore, Kant's system retains a high heuristic potential.
36 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1929, 278. In this place I have to refer to
the Critique, because in this concrete case it is more adequate the German original
text, then modern Cambridge Edition.
37 Ibid, 193-194, 226.
38 Loidolt, S., Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders, in S. Hartimo, T. Miettinen (eds.),
Phenomenology and the Transcendental, Routledge, New Yourk, 2014, 198-210.
39 King, P.M., Strohm Kitchener, K., Developing Reflective Judgment, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1994, 5.
40 Ibid, 6.
References
Balanovskiy, V., Prioritetnye zadachi kantovedenija na blizhajshee desjatiletie (Priorities of
Kant Studies for the Next Decade), Kantovskij Sbornik, 4 (2014), 116-122.
Balanovskiy, V., Transcendental reflection and the ideal of pure reason in Kant's works,
Vestnik IKBFU, 6 (2014), 7-13.
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Kant Yearbook, 2 (2010), 53-73
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Reflexionsbegriffe im Kontext, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (2004), 146-
175.
Jauernig, A.,
Leibniz, in D. Garber and B. Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns,
Princeton, Oxford, 2008, 41-63.
Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
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Liedtke, M., Der Begriff der reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
Univ., Phil. Fak., Diss., Hamburg, 1964.
Loidolt, S., Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders, in S. Hartimo,
T. Miettinen (eds.), Phenomenology and the Transcendental, Routledge, New York,
2014, 190-217.
Zu Kants Bestimmung des
philosophiegeschichtlichen Ortes der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Revue internationale
de philosophie, 35 (1981), 284-301.
Westphal, K.,
Response to Skepticism, Kant-Studien, 94.2 (2003), 135-171.
Westphal, K., Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
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Zeidler, K.W., Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Junghans, Cuxhaven, 1992.
Dr. Valentin Balanovskiy
Russia, Kaliningrad
Email: v.v.balanovskiy@gmail.com
