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==Philosophy==
{{main |Kantianism}}
{{more citations needed section|date=April 2017}}

In Kant's essay "[[What is Enlightenment?|Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?]]", he defined the Enlightenment as an age shaped by the [[Latin]] motto ''[[Sapere aude]]'' ("Dare to be wise"). Kant maintained that one ought to think autonomously, free of the dictates of external [[authority]]. His work reconciled many of the differences between the [[rationalism|rationalist]] and [[empiricism|empiricist]] traditions of the 18th century. He had a decisive impact on the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] and [[German Idealism|German Idealist]] philosophies of the 19th century. His work has also been a starting point for many 20th century philosophers.

Kant asserted that, because of the limitations of argumentation in the absence of irrefutable [[Evidence#Evidence in Problems|evidence]], no one could really know whether there is a God and an afterlife or not. For the sake of morality and as a ground for reason, Kant asserted, people are justified in believing in God, even though they could never know God's presence empirically.
{{quote|text=Thus the entire armament of reason, in the undertaking that one can call pure philosophy, is in fact directed only at the three problems that have been mentioned [God, the soul, and freedom]. These themselves, however, have in turn their more remote aim, namely, '''what is to be done''' if the will is free, if there is a God, and if there is a future world. Now since these concern our conduct in relation to the highest end, the ultimate aim of nature which provides for us wisely in the disposition of reason is properly directed only to what is moral.<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|674-5 (A 800-1/B 828-9)}}}}

[[File:Kant017.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant by [[Carle Vernet]] (1758–1836)]]

The sense of an enlightened approach and the [[scientific method|critical method]] required that "If one cannot prove that a thing ''is,'' he may try to prove that it is ''not.'' If he fails to do either (as often occurs), he may still ask whether it is in his ''interest'' to ''accept'' one or the other of the alternatives hypothetically, from the theoretical or the practical point of view. Hence the question no longer is as to whether [[perpetual peace]] is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must ''act'' on the supposition of its being real."<ref name = "SoR Concl">''The Science of Right,'' Conclusion.</ref> The presupposition of God, soul, and freedom was then a practical concern, for
{{quote|text=Morality in itself constitutes a system, but happiness does not, except insofar as it is distributed precisely in accordance with morality. This, however, is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise author and regent. Reason sees itself as compelled either to assume such a thing, together with life in such a world, which we must regard as a future one, or else to regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain ...<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|680 (A 811/B 839)}}}}

Kant drew a parallel between the Copernican revolution and the epistemology of his new [[transcendental philosophy]], involving two interconnected foundations of his "[[critical philosophy]]": 
* the [[epistemology]] of [[transcendental idealism]] and
* the [[moral philosophy]] of the autonomy of practical reason.

These teachings placed the active, rational human [[subject (philosophy)|subject]] at the center of the cognitive and moral worlds. Kant argued that the rational order of the world as known by science was not just the accidental accumulation of sense perceptions.

Conceptual unification and integration is carried out by the mind through [[concept]]s or the "categories of the [[Understanding (Kant)|understanding]]" operating on the perceptual manifold within [[space and time]]. The latter are not concepts,<ref>In the first edition of the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' Kant refers to space as "no discursive or...general conception of the relation of things, but a pure intuition" and maintained that "We can only represent to ourselves one space". The "general notion of spaces...depends solely upon limitations" (Meikeljohn trans., A25). In the second edition of the CPR, Kant adds, "The original representation of space is an ''a priori'' intuition, not a concept" (Kemp Smith trans., B40). In regard to time, Kant states that "Time is not a discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts of one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition" (A31/B47). For the differences in the discursive use of reason according to concepts and its intuitive use through the construction of concepts, see ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (A719/B747 ff. and A837/B865). On "One and the same thing in space and time" and the mathematical construction of concepts, see A724/B752.</ref> but are forms of sensibility that are ''a priori'' necessary conditions for any possible experience. Thus the objective order of nature and the causal necessity that operates within it depend on the mind's processes, the product of the rule-based activity that Kant called, "[[A priori and a posteriori|synthesis]]." There is much discussion among Kant scholars about the correct interpretation of this train of thought.

The 'two-world' interpretation regards Kant's position as a statement of epistemological limitation, that we are not able to transcend the bounds of our own mind, meaning that we cannot access the "[[thing-in-itself]]". However, Kant also speaks of the thing in itself or ''transcendental object'' as a product of the (human) understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters have argued that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone{{spaced ndash}}this is known as the two-aspect view.

The notion of the "[[thing in itself]]" was much discussed by philosophers after Kant. It was argued that because the "thing in itself" was unknowable, its existence must not be assumed. Rather than arbitrarily switching to an account that was ungrounded in anything supposed to be the "real," as did the German Idealists, another group arose to ask how our (presumably reliable) accounts of a coherent and rule-abiding universe were actually grounded. This new kind of philosophy became known as [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]], and its founder was [[Edmund Husserl]].

With regard to [[morality]], Kant argued that the source of the [[Goodness and value theory|good]] lies not in anything outside the [[human]] subject, either in [[nature]] or given by [[God]], but rather is only the good will itself. A good will is one that acts from duty in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself. This law obliges one to treat humanity{{spaced ndash}}understood as rational agency, and represented through oneself as well as others{{spaced ndash}}as an [[end in itself]] rather than (merely) as [[means (philosophy)|means]] to other ends the individual might hold. This necessitates practical self-reflection in which we universalize our reasons.

These ideas have largely framed or influenced all subsequent philosophical discussion and analysis. The specifics of Kant's account generated immediate and lasting controversy. Nevertheless, his theses{{spaced ndash}}that the [[mind]] itself necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to its [[knowledge]], that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological, that philosophy involves self-critical activity, that morality is rooted in human freedom, and that to act autonomously is to act according to rational moral principles{{spaced ndash}}have all had a lasting effect on subsequent philosophy.

===Theory of perception===
{{Main|Critique of Pure Reason}}

Kant defines his theory of perception in his influential 1781 work the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', which has often been cited as the most significant volume of metaphysics and [[epistemology]] in modern philosophy.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ |title=Archived copy |access-date=29 May 2019 |archive-date=14 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191114014720/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Kant maintains that understanding of the external world had its foundations not merely in experience, but in both experience and ''a priori'' concepts, thus offering a ''non-empiricist critique of rationalist philosophy'', which is what has been referred to as his Copernican revolution.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Kant%2c+Immanuel |title=Kant, Immanuel definition of Kant, Immanuel in the Free Online Encyclopedia |publisher=Encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com |access-date=26 February 2014 |archive-date=2 March 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140302135203/http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Kant%2c+Immanuel |url-status=live }}</ref>

Firstly, Kant [[Analytic–synthetic distinction|distinguishes between analytic and synthetic propositions]]:

# '''Analytic proposition''': a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept; ''e.g.'', "All bachelors are unmarried," or, "All bodies take up space."
# '''Synthetic proposition''': a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept; ''e.g.'', "All bachelors are alone," or, "All bodies have weight."

An analytic proposition is true by nature of the meaning of the words in the sentence — we require no further knowledge than a grasp of the language to understand this proposition. On the other hand, a synthetic statement is one that tells us something about the world. The truth or falsehood of synthetic statements derives from something outside their linguistic content. In this instance, weight is not a necessary [[predicate (grammar)|predicate]] of the body; until we are told the heaviness of the body we do not know that it has weight. In this case, experience of the body is required before its heaviness becomes clear. Before Kant's first Critique, empiricists (cf. Hume) and rationalists (cf. [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]]) assumed that all synthetic statements required experience to be known.

Kant contests this assumption by claiming that elementary mathematics, like arithmetic, is synthetic ''a priori'', in that its statements provide new knowledge not derived from experience. This becomes part of his over-all argument for [[transcendental idealism]]. That is, he argues that the possibility of experience depends on certain necessary conditions — which he calls ''a priori'' forms — and that these conditions structure and hold true of the world of experience. His main claims in the "[[Critique of Pure Reason#I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements|Transcendental Aesthetic]]" are that mathematic judgments are synthetic ''a priori'' and that [[space]] and [[time]] are not derived from experience but rather are its preconditions.

Once we have grasped the functions of basic arithmetic, we do not need empirical experience to know that 100 + 100 = 200, and so it appears that arithmetic is analytic. However, that it is analytic can be disproved by considering the calculation 5 + 7 = 12: there is nothing in the numbers 5 and 7 by which the number 12 can be inferred.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kant |first1=Immanuel |title=Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics |url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52821/52821-h/52821-h.htm |access-date=22 March 2020 |at=§ 2 |archive-date=1 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801234756/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52821/52821-h/52821-h.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Thus "5 + 7" and "the cube root of 1,728" or "12" are not analytic because their reference is the same but their sense is not — the statement "5 + 7 = 12" tells us something new about the world. It is self-evident, and undeniably ''a priori'', but at the same time it is synthetic. Thus Kant argued that a proposition can be synthetic and ''a priori''.

Kant asserts that experience is based on the perception of external objects and ''a priori'' knowledge.<ref>The German word ''Anschauung'', which Kant used, literally means 'looking at' and generally means what in philosophy in English is called "perception". However it sometimes is rendered as "intuition": not, however, with the vernacular meaning of an indescribable or mystical experience or sixth sense, but rather with the meaning of the direct perception or grasping of sensory phenomena. In this article, both terms, "perception" and "intuition" are used to stand for Kant's ''Anschauung''.</ref> The external world, he writes, provides those things that we sense. But our mind processes this information and gives it order, allowing us to comprehend it. Our mind supplies the conditions of space and time to experience objects. According to the "transcendental unity of apperception", the concepts of the mind (Understanding) and perceptions or intuitions that garner information from phenomena (Sensibility) are synthesized by comprehension. Without concepts, perceptions are nondescript; without perceptions, concepts are meaningless.  Thus the famous statement: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions [perceptions] without concepts are blind."<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|193-4 (A 51/B 75)}}

Kant also claims that an external environment is necessary for the establishment of the self. Although Kant would want to argue that there is no empirical way of observing the self, we can see the logical necessity of the self when we observe that we can have different perceptions of the external environment over time. By uniting these general representations into one global representation, we can see how a transcendental self emerges. "I am therefore conscious of the identical self in regard to the manifold of the representations that are given to me in an intuition because I call them all together '''my''' representations, which constitute '''one'''."<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|248 (B 135)}}

===Categories of the Faculty of Understanding===
{{See also|Category (Kant)}}
[[File:Immanuelkant.JPG|thumb|Kant statue in the School of Philosophy and Human Sciences (FAFICH) in the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), [[Belo Horizonte]], Brazil]]

Kant deemed it obvious that we have some objective knowledge of the world, such as, say, Newtonian physics. But this knowledge relies on [[Analytic-synthetic distinction|synthetic]], ''a priori'' laws of nature, like causality and substance. How is this possible? Kant's solution was that the [[Subject (philosophy)#The subject in German idealism|subject]] must supply laws that make experience of objects possible, and that these laws are synthetic, ''a priori'' laws of nature that apply to all objects before we experience them. To deduce all these laws, Kant examined experience in general, dissecting in it what is supplied by the mind from what is supplied by the given intuitions. This is commonly called a transcendental deduction.<ref name="Prolegomena">Immanuel Kant, ''Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'', pp. 35–43.</ref>

To begin with, Kant's distinction between the ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' being [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]] and particular knowledge, and the ''a priori'' being universal and necessary knowledge, must be kept in mind. If we merely connect two intuitions together in a perceiving subject, the knowledge is always subjective because it is derived ''a posteriori,'' when what is desired is for the knowledge to be objective, that is, for the two intuitions to refer to the object and hold good of it for anyone at any time, not just the perceiving subject in its current condition. What else is equivalent to objective knowledge besides the ''a priori'' (universal and necessary knowledge)? Before knowledge can be objective, it must be incorporated under an ''a priori'' category of ''understanding''.<ref name = "Prolegomena"/><ref>[http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=66&groupe=Kant&langue=2 Deleuze on Kant] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071114091656/http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=66&groupe=Kant&langue=2 |date=14 November 2007 }}, from where the definitions of ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' were obtained.</ref>

For example, if a subject says, "The sun shines on the stone; the stone grows warm," all he perceives are phenomena. His judgment is contingent and holds no necessity. But if he says, "The sunshine causes the stone to warm," he subsumes the perception under the category of causality, which is not found in the perception, and necessarily synthesizes the concept sunshine with the concept heat, producing a necessarily universally true judgment.<ref name = "Prolegomena"/>

To explain the categories in more detail, they are the preconditions of the construction of objects in the mind. Indeed, to even think of the sun and stone presupposes the category of subsistence, that is, substance. For the categories synthesize the random data of the sensory manifold into intelligible objects. This means that the categories are also the most abstract things one can say of any object whatsoever, and hence one can have an ''a priori'' cognition of the totality of all objects of experience if one can list all of them. To do so, Kant formulates another transcendental deduction.<ref name = "Prolegomena"/>

Judgments are, for Kant, the preconditions of any thought. Man thinks via judgments, so all possible judgments must be listed and the perceptions connected within them put aside, so as to make it possible to examine the moments when ''the understanding'' is engaged in constructing judgments. For the categories are equivalent to these moments, in that they are concepts of intuitions in general, so far as they are determined by these moments universally and necessarily. Thus by listing all the moments, one can deduce from them all of the categories.<ref name = "Prolegomena"/>

One may now ask: How many possible judgments are there? Kant believed that all the possible propositions within Aristotle's [[syllogism|syllogistic]] logic are equivalent to all possible judgments, and that all the logical operators within the propositions are equivalent to the moments of the understanding within judgments. Thus he listed Aristotle's system in four groups of three: quantity (universal, particular, singular), quality (affirmative, negative, infinite), relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive) and modality (problematic, assertoric, apodeictic). The parallelism with Kant's categories is obvious: quantity (unity, plurality, totality), quality (reality, negation, limitation), relation (substance, cause, community) and modality (possibility, existence, necessity).<ref name = "Prolegomena"/>

The fundamental building blocks of experience, i.e. objective knowledge, are now in place. First there is the sensibility, which supplies the mind with intuitions, and then there is the understanding, which produces judgments of these intuitions and can subsume them under categories. These categories lift the intuitions up out of the subject's current state of consciousness and place them within consciousness in general, producing universally necessary knowledge. For the categories are innate in any rational being, so any intuition thought within a category in one mind is necessarily subsumed and understood identically in any mind. In other words, we filter what we see and hear.<ref name = "Prolegomena"/>

===Transcendental schema doctrine===
{{See also|Schema (Kant)}}

Kant ran into a problem with his theory that the mind plays a part in producing objective knowledge. Intuitions and categories are entirely disparate, so how can they interact? Kant's solution is the (transcendental) schema: a priori principles by which the transcendental imagination connects concepts with intuitions through time. All the principles are temporally bound, for if a concept is purely a priori, as the categories are, then they must apply for all times. Hence there are principles such as ''substance is that which endures through time'', and ''the cause must always be prior to the effect''.<ref name="Prolegomena"/><ref name=Hackett>Immanuel Kant, ''Critique of Judgment'', the Introduction to the Hackett edition.</ref> In the context of transcendental schema the concept of transcendental reflection is of a great importance.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Balanovskiy |first1=Valentin |title=What is Kant's Transcendental Reflection? |journal=Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy |year=2018 |volume=75 |pages=17–27 |doi=10.5840/wcp232018751730 |isbn=978-1-63435-038-9 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326377298 |access-date=29 May 2020 |archive-date=20 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201220055819/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326377298_What_is_Kant%27s_Transcendental_Reflection |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Moral philosophy===
[[File:Immanuel Kant.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant]]
Kant developed his moral philosophy in three works: ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals]]'' (1785), ''[[Critique of Practical Reason]]'' (1788), and ''[[Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1797).

In ''Groundwork'', Kant' tries to convert our everyday, obvious, rational<ref>The distinction between rational and philosophical knowledge is given in the Preface to the ''Groundwork'', 1785.</ref> knowledge of morality into philosophical knowledge. The latter two works used "practical reason", which is based only on things about which reason can tell us, and not deriving any principles from experience, to reach conclusions which can be applied to the world of experience (in the second part of ''The Metaphysics of Morals'').

Kant is known for his theory that there is a single [[moral obligation]], which he called the "[[Categorical Imperative]]", and is derived from the concept of [[duty]]. Kant defines the demands of moral law as "categorical imperatives". Categorical imperatives are principles that are intrinsically valid; they are good in and of themselves; they must be obeyed in all situations and circumstances, if our behavior is to observe the moral law. The Categorical Imperative provides a test against which moral statements can be assessed. Kant also stated that the moral means and ends can be applied to the categorical imperative, that rational beings can pursue certain "ends" using the appropriate "means". Ends based on physical needs or wants create [[hypothetical imperative]]s. The categorical imperative can only be based on something that is an "end in itself", that is, an end that is not a means to some other need, desire, or purpose.<ref name="Beck 421">Kant, ''Foundations'', p. 421.</ref> Kant believed that the moral law is a principle of [[reason]] itself, and is not based on contingent facts about the world, such as what would make us happy, but to act on the moral law which has no other motive than "worthiness to be happy".<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|677 (A 806/B 834)}} Accordingly, he believed that moral obligation applies only to rational agents.<ref name="Beck 408">Kant, ''Foundations'', p. 408.</ref>

Unlike a hypothetical imperative, a categorical imperative is an unconditional obligation; it has the force of an obligation regardless of our will or desires<ref name="Beck 420-1">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 420–21.</ref> In ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'' (1785) Kant enumerated three formulations of the categorical imperative that he believed to be roughly equivalent.<ref name="Beck 436">Kant, ''Foundations'', p. 436.</ref> In the same book, Kant stated:

:Act only according to that [[maxim (philosophy)|maxim]] whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.<ref name="Ellington">{{cite book |last=Kant |first=Immanuel |translator-first=James W. |translator-last=Ellington |orig-year=1785 |title=Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals |edition=3rd |publisher=Hackett |year=1993 |page=[https://archive.org/details/groundingformet000kant/page/30 30] |isbn=978-0-87220-166-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/groundingformet000kant/page/30 }}. It is standard to also reference the ''Akademie Ausgabe'' of Kant's works. The ''Groundwork'' occurs in the fourth volume.  The above citation is taken from 4:421.</ref>

According to Kant, one cannot make exceptions for oneself. The philosophical maxim on which one acts should always be considered to be a universal law without exception. One cannot allow oneself to do a particular action unless one thinks it appropriate that the reason for the action should become a universal law. For example, one should not steal, however dire the circumstances{{mdash}}because, by permitting oneself to steal, one makes stealing a universally acceptable act. This is the first formulation of the categorical imperative, often known as the universalizability principle.

Kant believed that, if an action is not done with the motive of duty, then it is without moral value. He thought that every action should have pure intention behind it; otherwise, it is meaningless. The final result is not the most important aspect of an action; rather, how the person feels while carrying out the action is the time when value is attached to the result.

In ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'', Kant also posited the "counter-[[utilitarian]] idea that there is a difference between preferences and values, and that considerations of individual rights temper calculations of aggregate utility", a concept that is an axiom in economics:<ref>Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) ''Ecosystems and Well-being: A Framework for Assessment''. Washington DC: Island Press, p. 142.</ref>

<blockquote>Everything has either a ''price'' or a ''dignity''. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. But that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i.e., price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e., a dignity. (p. 53, italics in original).</blockquote>

A phrase quoted by Kant, which is used to summarize the counter-utilitarian nature of his moral philosophy, is ''[[Fiat justitia, pereat mundus]]'', ("Let justice be done, though the world perish"), which he translates loosely as "Let justice reign even if all the rascals in the world should perish from it". This appears in his 1795 ''[[Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch]]'' ("''[[:de:Zum ewigen Frieden|Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf]]''"), Appendix 1.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.constitution.org/kant/append1.htm|title=Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch: Appendix 1|publisher=Constitution.org|access-date=24 July 2009|archive-date=2 May 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090502223705/http://www.constitution.org/kant/append1.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LykHAAAAQAAJ&q=pereat+mundus+inauthor:Kant&pg=PA61|title=Project for a Perpetual Peace, p. 61|access-date=24 July 2009|year=1796|last1=Kant|first1=Immanuel|archive-date=20 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201220055819/https://books.google.com/books?id=LykHAAAAQAAJ&q=pereat+mundus+inauthor%3AKant&pg=PA61|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/immanuelkantswe01kantgoog|quote=pereat mundus Kant.|title=Immanuel Kant's Werke, revidirte Gesammtausg |editor-last=Hartenstein|editor-first=G. |page=[https://archive.org/details/immanuelkantswe01kantgoog/page/n475 456]|access-date=24 July 2009|year=1838|last=Kant|first=Immanuel |language=de}}</ref>

====First formulation====
[[File:Immanuel Kant (painted portrait).jpg|thumb|In his ''Metaphysics'', Immanuel Kant introduced the [[categorical imperative]]: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."]]
The first formulation (Formula of Universal Law) of the moral imperative "requires that the maxims be chosen as though they should hold as universal [[natural law|laws of nature]]".<ref name="Beck 436" /> This formulation in principle has as its supreme law the creed "Always act according to that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will" and is the "only condition under which a will can never come into conflict with itself [....]"<ref name="Beck 437">Kant, Foundations, p. 437.</ref>

One interpretation of the first formulation is called the "universalizability test".<ref>"Kant and the German Enlightenment" in "History of Ethics". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Vol. 3, pp. 95–96. MacMillan, 1973.</ref> An agent's maxim, according to Kant, is his "subjective principle of human actions": that is, what the agent believes is his reason to act.<ref name="Beck 400 429">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 400, 429.</ref> The universalisability test has five steps:

# Find the agent's maxim (i.e., an action paired with its motivation). Take, for example, the declaration "I will lie for personal benefit". Lying is the action; the motivation is to fulfill some sort of desire. Together, they form the maxim.
# Imagine a possible world in which everyone in a similar position to the real-world agent followed that maxim.
# Decide if contradictions or irrationalities would arise in the possible world as a result of following the maxim.
# If a contradiction or irrationality would arise, acting on that maxim is not allowed in the real world.
# If there is no contradiction, then acting on that maxim is permissible, and is sometimes required.

(For a modern parallel, see [[John Rawls]]' hypothetical situation, the [[original position]].)

====Second formulation====
The second formulation (or Formula of the End in Itself) holds that "the rational being, as by its nature an end and thus as an end in itself, must serve in every maxim as the condition restricting all merely relative and arbitrary ends".<ref name="Beck 436" /> The principle dictates that you "[a]ct with reference to every rational being (whether yourself or another) so that it is an end in itself in your maxim", meaning that the rational being is "the basis of all maxims of action" and "must be treated never as a mere means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, i.e., as an end at the same time".<ref name="Beck 437-8">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 437–38.</ref>

==== Third formulation ====
The third formulation (i.e. Formula of Autonomy) is a synthesis of the first two and is the basis for the "complete determination of all maxims". It states "that all maxims which stem from autonomous legislation ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with a realm of nature".<ref name="Beck 436"/>

In principle, "So act as if your maxims should serve at the same time as the universal law (of all rational beings)", meaning that we should so act that we may think of ourselves as "a member in the universal realm of ends", [[legislating]] universal laws through our maxims (that is, a universal [[code of conduct]]), in a "possible realm of ends".<ref name="Beck 438-9">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 438–39. See also [[Kingdom of Ends]]</ref> No one may elevate themselves above the universal law, therefore it is one's duty to follow the maxim(s).

====''Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason''====
{{Main|Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason}}
Commentators, starting in the 20th century, have tended to see Kant as having a strained relationship with religion, though this was not the prevalent view in the 19th century. [[Karl Leonhard Reinhold]], whose letters first made Kant famous, wrote "I believe that I may infer without reservation that the interest of religion, and of Christianity in particular, accords completely with the result of the Critique of Reason.".<ref>Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy (1786), 3rd Letter</ref> [[Johann Schultz]], who wrote one of the first Kant commentaries, wrote "And does not this system itself cohere most splendidly with the Christian religion? Do not the divinity and beneficence of the latter become all the more evident?"<ref>Johann Schultz, Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1784), 141.</ref> This view continued throughout the 19th century, as noted by [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], who said "Kant's success is merely a theologian's success."<ref>"The Protestant pastor is the grandfather of German philosophy...German philosophy is at bottom – a cunning theology...Why the rejoicing heard through the German academic world – three-quarters composed of the sons of pastors and teachers-at the appearance of Kant? Why the Germans' conviction, which still find echo even today, that with Kant things were taking a turn of the better? Kant's success is merely a theologian's success". Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 10</ref> The reason for these views was Kant's moral theology, and the widespread belief that his philosophy was the great antithesis to [[Spinozism]], which had been convulsing the European academy for much of the 18th century. Spinozism was widely seen as the cause of the [[Pantheism controversy]], and as a form of sophisticated pantheism or even atheism. As Kant's philosophy disregarded the possibility of arguing for God through pure reason alone, for the same reasons it also disregarded the possibility of arguing against God through pure reason alone. This, coupled with his moral philosophy (his argument that the existence of morality is a rational reason why God and an afterlife do and must exist), was the reason he was seen by many, at least through the end of the 19th century, as a great defender of religion in general and Christianity in particular.{{citation needed|date=July 2018}}

Kant articulates his strongest criticisms of the organization and practices of religious organizations to those that encourage what he sees as a religion of counterfeit service to God.<ref name="Immanuel Kant 1793">Immanuel Kant. ''Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone'' (1793), Book IV, Part 1, Section 1, "The Christian religion as a natural religion."</ref> Among the major targets of his criticism are external ritual, superstition and a hierarchical church order. He sees these as efforts to make oneself pleasing to God in ways other than conscientious adherence to the principle of moral rightness in choosing and acting upon one's maxims. Kant's criticisms on these matters, along with his rejection of certain theoretical proofs grounded in pure reason (particularly the [[ontological argument]]) for the existence of God and his philosophical commentary on some Christian doctrines, have resulted in interpretations that see Kant as hostile to religion in general and Christianity in particular (e.g., Walsh 1967). Nevertheless, other interpreters consider that Kant was trying to mark off defensible from indefensible Christian belief.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Pasternack|first1=Lawrence|last2=Rossi|first2=Philip|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/|title=Kant's Philosophy of Religion|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|edition=Fall 2014|access-date=18 October 2019|archive-date=9 July 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100709212423/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/|url-status=live}}</ref> Kant sees in [[Jesus Christ]] the affirmation of a "pure moral disposition of the heart" that "can make man well-pleasing to God".<ref name="Immanuel Kant 1793"/> Regarding Kant's conception of religion, some critics have argued that he was sympathetic to deism.<ref>For example Peter Byrne, who wrote about Kant's relationship with deism. Byrne, Peter (2007), ''Kant on God'', London: Ashgate, p. 159.</ref> Other critics have argued that Kant's moral conception moves from deism to theism (as moral theism), for example Allen W. Wood<ref>Wood, Allen W. (1970), ''Kant's moral religion'', London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 16.</ref> and Merold Westphal.<ref>Westphal, Merold (2010),''The Emerge of Modern Philosophy of Religion'', in Taliaferro, Charles, Draper, Paul and Quinn, Philip (editors), ''A Companion to Philosophy of Religion'', Oxford: Blackwell, p. 135.</ref> As for Kant's book ''[[Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason]]'',<ref name="KReligion"/> it was emphasized that Kant reduced religiosity to rationality, religion to morality and Christianity to ethics.<ref>Iţu, Mircia (2004), ''Dumnezeu şi religia în concepţia lui Immanuel Kant din Religia în limitele raţiunii'', in Boboc, Alexandru and Mariş, N.I. (editors), ''Studii de istoria filosofiei universale'', volume 12, Bucharest: Romanian Academy.</ref>

====Idea of freedom====
In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant distinguishes between the transcendental idea of freedom, which as a psychological concept is "mainly empirical" and refers to "whether a faculty of beginning a series of successive things or states from itself is to be assumed"<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|486 (A 448/B 467)}} and the practical concept of freedom as the independence of our will from the "coercion" or "necessitation through sensuous impulses". Kant finds it a source of difficulty that the practical idea of freedom is founded on the transcendental idea of freedom,<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|533 (A 533-4/B 561-2)}} but for the sake of practical interests uses the practical meaning, taking "no account of... its transcendental meaning," which he feels was properly "disposed of" in the Third Antinomy, and as an element in the question of the freedom of the will is for philosophy "a real stumbling block" that has embarrassed speculative reason.<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|486 (A 448/B 467)}}

Kant calls practical "everything that is possible through freedom", and the pure practical laws that are never given through sensuous conditions but are held analogously with the universal law of causality are moral laws. Reason can give us only the "pragmatic laws of free action through the senses", but pure practical laws given by reason ''a priori''<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|486 (A 448/B 467)}} dictate "what is to be done".<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|674-6 (A 800-2/B 828-30)}} (The same distinction of transcendental and practical meaning can be applied to the idea of God, with the ''proviso'' that the practical concept of freedom can be experienced.<ref>Ibid.  The concept of freedom is also handled in the third section of the ''Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals'';  in the ''Critique of Practical Reason'' see § VII and § VIII.</ref>)

====Categories of freedom====
In the ''Critique of Practical Reason'', at the end of the second Main Part of the ''Analytics'',<ref>5:65–67</ref> Kant introduces the categories of freedom, in analogy with the categories of understanding their practical counterparts. Kant's categories of freedom apparently function primarily as conditions for the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be understood as free and (iii) to be morally evaluated. For Kant, although actions as theoretical objects are constituted by means of the theoretical categories, actions as practical objects (objects of practical use of reason, and which can be good or bad) are constituted by means of the categories of freedom. Only in this way can actions, as phenomena, be a consequence of freedom, and be understood and evaluated as such.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien]], 'Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant', in ''Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik'' Vol. 1, 1988, 193–220.</ref>

===Aesthetic philosophy===
Kant discusses the subjective nature of aesthetic qualities and experiences in ''[[Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime]]'' (1764). Kant's contribution to [[aesthetics|aesthetic theory]] is developed in the ''[[Critique of Judgment]]'' (1790) where he investigates the possibility and logical status of "judgments of taste." In the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," the first major division of the ''Critique of Judgment'', Kant used the term "aesthetic" in a manner that, according to Kant scholar W.H. Walsh, differs from its modern sense.<ref>Critique of Judgment in "Kant, Immanuel" ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol 4. Macmillan, 1973.</ref> In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', to note essential differences between judgments of taste, moral judgments, and scientific judgments, Kant abandoned the term "aesthetic" as "designating the critique of taste," noting that judgments of taste could never be "directed" by "laws ''a priori''."<ref name = "CPR A22 B36">Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A22/B36.</ref> After [[Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten|A. G. Baumgarten]], who wrote ''Aesthetica'' (1750–58),<ref>Beardsley, Monroe. "History of Aesthetics". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol. 1, section on "Toward a unified aesthetics", p. 25, Macmillan 1973. Baumgarten coined the term "aesthetics" and expanded, clarified, and unified Wolffian aesthetic theory, but had left the ''Aesthetica'' unfinished (See also: Tonelli, Giorgio. "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol. 1, Macmillan 1973). In Bernard's translation of the ''Critique of Judgment'' he indicates in the notes that Kant's reference in § 15 in regard to the identification of perfection and beauty is probably a reference to Baumgarten.</ref> Kant was one of the first philosophers to develop and integrate aesthetic theory into a unified and comprehensive philosophical system, utilizing ideas that played an integral role throughout his philosophy.<ref>German Idealism in "History of Aesthetics" ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol 1. Macmillan, 1973.</ref>

In the chapter "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the ''Critique of Judgment'', Kant states that beauty is not a property of an artwork or natural phenomenon, but is instead consciousness of the pleasure that attends the 'free play' of the imagination and the understanding. Even though it appears that we are using reason to decide what is beautiful, the judgment is not a cognitive judgment,<ref>Kant's general discussions of the distinction between "cognition" and "conscious of" are also given in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (notably A320/B376), and section V and the conclusion of section VIII of his Introduction in ''Logic''.</ref> "and is consequently not logical, but aesthetical" (§ 1). A pure judgement of taste is subjective since it refers to the emotional response of the subject and is based upon nothing but esteem for an object itself: it is a disinterested pleasure, and we feel that pure judgements of taste (i.e. judgements of beauty), lay claim to universal validity (§§ 20–22). It is important to note that this universal validity is not derived from a determinate concept of beauty but from ''common sense'' (§40). Kant also believed that a judgement of taste shares characteristics engaged in a moral judgement: both are disinterested, and we hold them to be universal. In the chapter "Analytic of the Sublime" Kant identifies the [[Sublime (philosophy)|sublime]] as an aesthetic quality that, like beauty, is subjective, but unlike beauty refers to an indeterminate relationship between the faculties of the imagination and of reason, and shares the character of moral judgments in the use of reason. The feeling of the sublime, divided into two distinct modes (the mathematical and the dynamical sublime), describes two subjective moments that concern the relationship of the faculty of the imagination to reason. Some commentators<ref>{{cite web |last=Clewis |first=Robert |year=2009 |title=The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item2326741/?site_locale=en_US |access-date=8 December 2011 |archive-date=20 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121020224616/http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item2326741/?site_locale=en_US |url-status=live }}</ref> argue that Kant's critical philosophy contains a third kind of the sublime, the moral sublime, which is the aesthetic response to the moral law or a representation, and a development of the "noble" sublime in Kant's theory of 1764. The mathematical sublime results from the failure of the imagination to comprehend natural objects that appear boundless and formless, or appear "absolutely great" (§§ 23–25). This imaginative failure is then recuperated through the pleasure taken in reason's assertion of the concept of infinity. In this move the faculty of reason proves itself superior to our fallible sensible self (§§ 25–26). In the dynamical sublime there is the sense of annihilation of the sensible self as the imagination tries to comprehend a vast might. This power of nature threatens us but through the resistance of reason to such sensible annihilation, the subject feels a pleasure and a sense of the human moral vocation. This appreciation of moral feeling through exposure to the [[sublime (philosophy)|sublime]] helps to develop moral character.

Kant developed a theory of [[Humour|humor]] (§ 54) that has been interpreted as an "incongruity" theory. He illustrated his theory of humor by telling three narrative jokes in the ''Critique of Judgment''. He told many more jokes throughout his lectures and writings.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Clewis|first=Robert|title=Kant's Humorous Writings: An Illustrated Guide|publisher=Bloomsbury|year=2020|isbn=9781350112797|location=London}}</ref>

Kant developed a distinction between an object of art as a material value subject to the conventions of society and the transcendental condition of the judgment of taste as a "refined" value in his ''Idea of A Universal History'' (1784). In the Fourth and Fifth Theses of that work he identified all art as the "fruits of unsociableness" due to men's "antagonism in society"<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''Idea for a Universal History''. Trans. Lewis White Beck (20, 22).</ref> and, in the Seventh Thesis, asserted that while such material property is indicative of a civilized state, only the ideal of morality and the universalization of refined value through the improvement of the mind "belongs to culture".<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''Idea for a Universal History''. Trans. Lewis White Beck (26).</ref>

===Political philosophy===
{{Main|Political philosophy of Immanuel Kant}}
{{Liberalism sidebar}}
In ''Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch'',<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190406161945/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm |date=6 April 2019 }}'' (1795)</ref> Kant listed several conditions that he thought necessary for ending wars and creating a lasting peace. They included a world of constitutional republics.<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''Perpetual Peace.'' Trans. Lewis White Beck (377).</ref> His [[classical republicanism|classical republican]] theory was extended in the ''Science of Right'', the first part of the ''[[Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1797).<ref>Manfred Riedel ''Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy'', Cambridge 1984</ref> Kant believed that [[universal history]] leads to the ultimate world of republican states at peace, but his theory was not pragmatic. The process was described in "Perpetual Peace" as natural rather than rational:
{{quote|
The guarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less than that great artist, nature...In her mechanical course we see that her aim is to produce a harmony among men, against their will, and indeed through their discord. As a necessity working according to laws we do not know, we call it destiny. But, considering its designs in universal history, we call it "providence," inasmuch as we discern in it the profound wisdom of a higher cause which predetermines the course of nature and directs it to the objective final end of the human race.<ref>''On History'', (ed. L.W. Beck, New York: Bobbs Merill, 1963, p. 106).</ref>}}

Kant's political thought can be summarized as republican government and international organization. "In more characteristically Kantian terms, it is doctrine of the state based upon the law (''[[Rechtsstaat]]'') and of eternal peace. Indeed, in each of these formulations, both terms express the same idea: that of legal constitution or of 'peace through law'. Kant's political philosophy, being essentially a legal doctrine, rejects by definition the opposition between moral education and the play of passions as alternate foundations for social life. The state is defined as the union of men under law. The state is constituted by laws which are necessary a priori because they flow from the very concept of law. "A regime can be judged by no other criteria nor be assigned any other functions, than those proper to the lawful order as such." <ref>History of Political Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 581–82, 603</ref>

He opposed "democracy," which at his time meant [[direct democracy]], believing that majority rule posed a threat to individual liberty. He stated, "...democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which 'all' decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, 'all,' who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom."<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''Perpetual Peace.'' Trans. Lewis White Beck (352).</ref> As with most writers at the time, he distinguished three forms of government i.e. democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy with [[mixed government]] as the most ideal form of it.

===Anthropology===
[[File:German 5 DM 1974 D Silver Coin Immanuel Kant.jpg|right|thumb|5 DM 1974 D silver coin commemorating the 250th birthday of Immanuel Kant in [[Königsberg]]]]

Kant lectured on [[History of anthropology|anthropology]], the study of human nature, for twenty-three and a half years.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=Holly |title=Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology |url=https://archive.org/details/kantspragmatican00wils |url-access=limited |date=2006 |publisher=State University of New York Press |location=Albany |isbn=978-0-7914-6849-4 |page=[https://archive.org/details/kantspragmatican00wils/page/n21 7]}}</ref> His ''[[Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View]]'' was published in 1798. (This was the subject of [[Michel Foucault]]'s secondary dissertation for his [[State doctorate]], ''[[Introduction to Kant's Anthropology]]''.) Kant's Lectures on Anthropology were published for the first time in 1997 in German.<ref>Thomas Sturm, ''Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen'' (Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 2009).</ref> ''Introduction to Kant's Anthropology'' was translated into English and published by the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series in 2006.<ref>''Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View'', ed. Robert B. Louden, introduction by Manfred Kuehn, Cambridge University Press, 2006</ref>

Kant was among the first people of his time to introduce anthropology as an intellectual area of study, long before the field gained popularity, and his texts are considered to have advanced the field. His point of view was to influence the works of later philosophers such as [[Martin Heidegger]] and [[Paul Ricoeur]].

Kant was also the first to suggest using a dimensionality approach to human diversity. He analyzed the nature of the [[Hippocrates]]-[[Galen]] four temperaments and plotted them in two dimensions: (1) "activation", or energetic aspect of behaviour, and (2) "orientation on emotionality".<ref>{{cite book|year=1798|last1=Kant|first1=I.|title=Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. trans. Mary Gregor). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974 (VII)}}</ref> Cholerics were described as emotional and energetic; Phlegmatics as balanced and weak; Sanguines as balanced and energetic, and Melancholics as emotional and weak. These two dimensions reappeared in all subsequent models of temperament and personality traits.

Kant viewed anthropology in two broad categories: (1) the physiological approach, which he referred to as "what nature makes of the human being"; and (2) the pragmatic approach, which explored the things that a human "can and should make of himself."<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gregor|first1=Brian|title=Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. By Immanuel Kant. Translated and edited by Robert B. Louden.|volume=Heythrop}}</ref>

====Racism====
Kant was one of the most notable Enlightenment thinkers to defend [[racism]], and some have claimed that he was one of the central figures in the birth of modern "scientific" racism. Where previous figures such as [[Carl Linnaeus]] and [[Johann Friedrich Blumenbach]] had supposed only "empirical" observation for racism, Kant produced a full-blown theory of race. Using the [[Four Temperaments]] of ancient Greece, he proposed a hierarchy of four racial categories: white Europeans, yellow Asians, black Africans, and red Amerindians.<ref name="Bernasconi"/><ref name="Eze"/><ref name="Eze2"/><ref name="Slate"/><ref name="UMass">{{cite web |last1=Kant |first1=Immanuel |title=Kant on the Different Races of Man |url=https://blogs.umass.edu/afroam391g-shabazz/files/2010/01/Kant-on-the-Different-Races-of-Man1.pdf |website=UMass Amherst |access-date=15 June 2020 |archive-date=1 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801194450/https://blogs.umass.edu/afroam391g-shabazz/files/2010/01/Kant-on-the-Different-Races-of-Man1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Mills">{{cite book |last1=Mills |first1=Charles W. |title=Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-024545-0 |pages=169–193 |url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245412.001.0001/acprof-9780190245412 |access-date=15 June 2020 |archive-date=16 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200616003829/https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245412.001.0001/acprof-9780190245412 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Kant wrote that "[Whites] contain all the impulses of nature in affects and passions, all talents, all dispositions to culture and civilization and can as readily obey as govern. They are the only ones who always advance to perfection.” He describes South Asians as "educated to the highest degree but only in the arts and not in the sciences". He goes on that Hindustanis can never reach the level of abstract concepts and that a "great hindustani man" is one who has "gone far in the art of deception and has much money". He stated that the Hindus always stay the way they are and can never advance. About black Africans, Kant wrote that "they can be educated but only as servants, that is they allow themselves to be trained". He quotes David Hume as challenging anyone to "cite a [single] example in which a Negro has shown talents" and asserts that, among the "hundreds of thousands" of blacks transported during the [[Atlantic slave trade]], even among the freed "still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality". To Kant, "the Negro can be disciplined and cultivated, but is never genuinely civilized. He falls of his own accord into savagery." Native Americans, Kant opined, "cannot be educated". He calls them unmotivated, lacking affect, passion and love, describing them as too weak for labor, unfit for any culture, and too [[Four temperaments|phlegmatic]] for diligence. He said the Native Americans are "far below the Negro, who undoubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate the different races". Kant stated that "Americans and Blacks cannot govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves."<ref name="Mills"/><ref name="Eze"/><ref name="Eze2"/><ref name="KantRaces">{{cite web |title=Kant on the different human races (1777) |url=https://blackcentraleurope.com/sources/1750-1850/kant-on-the-different-human-races-1777/ |website=Black Central Europe |access-date=16 June 2020 |language=en |date=4 February 2016 |archive-date=16 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200616003834/https://blackcentraleurope.com/sources/1750-1850/kant-on-the-different-human-races-1777/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Kant was an opponent of [[miscegenation]], believing that whites would be "degraded" and the "fusing of races" is undesireable, for "not every race adopts the morals and customs of the Europeans". He stated that "instead of assimilation, which was intended by the melting together of the various races, Nature has here made a law of just the opposite".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kant |first1=Immanuel |title=Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View |date=1798 |page=236}}</ref> He believed that in the future all races would be extinguished, except that of the whites.<ref name="Mills"/>

[[Charles W. Mills]] wrote that Kant has been "sanitized for public consumption", his racist works conveniently ignored.<ref name="Mills"/> [[Robert Bernasconi]] stated that Kant "supplied the first scientific definition of race". [[Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze]] is credited with bringing Kant's contributions to racism to light in the 1990s among Western philosophers, who often gloss over this part of his life and works.<ref name="Slate"/> He wrote about Kant's ideas of race:

{{Quote
|text=Kant’s position on the importance of skin color not only as encoding but as proof of this codification of rational superiority or inferiority is evident in a comment he made on the subject of the reasoning capacity of a “black” person. When he evaluated a statement made by an African, Kant dismissed the statement with the comment: “this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.” It cannot, therefore, be argued that skin color for Kant was merely a physical characteristic. It is, rather, evidence of an unchanging and unchangeable moral quality.
|author=[[Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze]]
|title="The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology"
|source=''Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader'' (1997)<ref name="Eze2"/>
}}

Pauline Kleingeld argues that while Kant was indeed a staunch advocate of scientific racism for much of his career, his views on race changed significantly in the last decade of his life.<ref name=Kleingeld/> In particular, he unambiguously rejected past views related to racial hierarchies and the diminished rights or moral status of non-whites in ''[[Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch]]'' (1795). This work also saw him providing extended arguments against European [[colonialism]], which he claimed was morally unjust and incompatible with the equal rights held by indigenous populations.<ref name=Kleingeld/>

Return to Immanuel Kant.



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