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===Moral philosophy===
[[File:Immanuel Kant.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant]]
Kant developed his moral philosophy in three works: ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals]]'' (1785), ''[[Critique of Practical Reason]]'' (1788), and ''[[Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1797).

In ''Groundwork'', Kant' tries to convert our everyday, obvious, rational<ref>The distinction between rational and philosophical knowledge is given in the Preface to the ''Groundwork'', 1785.</ref> knowledge of morality into philosophical knowledge. The latter two works used "practical reason", which is based only on things about which reason can tell us, and not deriving any principles from experience, to reach conclusions which can be applied to the world of experience (in the second part of ''The Metaphysics of Morals'').

Kant is known for his theory that there is a single [[moral obligation]], which he called the "[[Categorical Imperative]]", and is derived from the concept of [[duty]]. Kant defines the demands of moral law as "categorical imperatives". Categorical imperatives are principles that are intrinsically valid; they are good in and of themselves; they must be obeyed in all situations and circumstances, if our behavior is to observe the moral law. The Categorical Imperative provides a test against which moral statements can be assessed. Kant also stated that the moral means and ends can be applied to the categorical imperative, that rational beings can pursue certain "ends" using the appropriate "means". Ends based on physical needs or wants create [[hypothetical imperative]]s. The categorical imperative can only be based on something that is an "end in itself", that is, an end that is not a means to some other need, desire, or purpose.<ref name="Beck 421">Kant, ''Foundations'', p. 421.</ref> Kant believed that the moral law is a principle of [[reason]] itself, and is not based on contingent facts about the world, such as what would make us happy, but to act on the moral law which has no other motive than "worthiness to be happy".<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|677 (A 806/B 834)}} Accordingly, he believed that moral obligation applies only to rational agents.<ref name="Beck 408">Kant, ''Foundations'', p. 408.</ref>

Unlike a hypothetical imperative, a categorical imperative is an unconditional obligation; it has the force of an obligation regardless of our will or desires<ref name="Beck 420-1">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 420–21.</ref> In ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'' (1785) Kant enumerated three formulations of the categorical imperative that he believed to be roughly equivalent.<ref name="Beck 436">Kant, ''Foundations'', p. 436.</ref> In the same book, Kant stated:

:Act only according to that [[maxim (philosophy)|maxim]] whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.<ref name="Ellington">{{cite book |last=Kant |first=Immanuel |translator-first=James W. |translator-last=Ellington |orig-year=1785 |title=Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals |edition=3rd |publisher=Hackett |year=1993 |page=[https://archive.org/details/groundingformet000kant/page/30 30] |isbn=978-0-87220-166-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/groundingformet000kant/page/30 }}. It is standard to also reference the ''Akademie Ausgabe'' of Kant's works. The ''Groundwork'' occurs in the fourth volume.  The above citation is taken from 4:421.</ref>

According to Kant, one cannot make exceptions for oneself. The philosophical maxim on which one acts should always be considered to be a universal law without exception. One cannot allow oneself to do a particular action unless one thinks it appropriate that the reason for the action should become a universal law. For example, one should not steal, however dire the circumstances{{mdash}}because, by permitting oneself to steal, one makes stealing a universally acceptable act. This is the first formulation of the categorical imperative, often known as the universalizability principle.

Kant believed that, if an action is not done with the motive of duty, then it is without moral value. He thought that every action should have pure intention behind it; otherwise, it is meaningless. The final result is not the most important aspect of an action; rather, how the person feels while carrying out the action is the time when value is attached to the result.

In ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'', Kant also posited the "counter-[[utilitarian]] idea that there is a difference between preferences and values, and that considerations of individual rights temper calculations of aggregate utility", a concept that is an axiom in economics:<ref>Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) ''Ecosystems and Well-being: A Framework for Assessment''. Washington DC: Island Press, p. 142.</ref>

<blockquote>Everything has either a ''price'' or a ''dignity''. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. But that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i.e., price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e., a dignity. (p. 53, italics in original).</blockquote>

A phrase quoted by Kant, which is used to summarize the counter-utilitarian nature of his moral philosophy, is ''[[Fiat justitia, pereat mundus]]'', ("Let justice be done, though the world perish"), which he translates loosely as "Let justice reign even if all the rascals in the world should perish from it". This appears in his 1795 ''[[Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch]]'' ("''[[:de:Zum ewigen Frieden|Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf]]''"), Appendix 1.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.constitution.org/kant/append1.htm|title=Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch: Appendix 1|publisher=Constitution.org|access-date=24 July 2009|archive-date=2 May 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090502223705/http://www.constitution.org/kant/append1.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LykHAAAAQAAJ&q=pereat+mundus+inauthor:Kant&pg=PA61|title=Project for a Perpetual Peace, p. 61|access-date=24 July 2009|year=1796|last1=Kant|first1=Immanuel|archive-date=20 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201220055819/https://books.google.com/books?id=LykHAAAAQAAJ&q=pereat+mundus+inauthor%3AKant&pg=PA61|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/immanuelkantswe01kantgoog|quote=pereat mundus Kant.|title=Immanuel Kant's Werke, revidirte Gesammtausg |editor-last=Hartenstein|editor-first=G. |page=[https://archive.org/details/immanuelkantswe01kantgoog/page/n475 456]|access-date=24 July 2009|year=1838|last=Kant|first=Immanuel |language=de}}</ref>

====First formulation====
[[File:Immanuel Kant (painted portrait).jpg|thumb|In his ''Metaphysics'', Immanuel Kant introduced the [[categorical imperative]]: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."]]
The first formulation (Formula of Universal Law) of the moral imperative "requires that the maxims be chosen as though they should hold as universal [[natural law|laws of nature]]".<ref name="Beck 436" /> This formulation in principle has as its supreme law the creed "Always act according to that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will" and is the "only condition under which a will can never come into conflict with itself [....]"<ref name="Beck 437">Kant, Foundations, p. 437.</ref>

One interpretation of the first formulation is called the "universalizability test".<ref>"Kant and the German Enlightenment" in "History of Ethics". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Vol. 3, pp. 95–96. MacMillan, 1973.</ref> An agent's maxim, according to Kant, is his "subjective principle of human actions": that is, what the agent believes is his reason to act.<ref name="Beck 400 429">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 400, 429.</ref> The universalisability test has five steps:

# Find the agent's maxim (i.e., an action paired with its motivation). Take, for example, the declaration "I will lie for personal benefit". Lying is the action; the motivation is to fulfill some sort of desire. Together, they form the maxim.
# Imagine a possible world in which everyone in a similar position to the real-world agent followed that maxim.
# Decide if contradictions or irrationalities would arise in the possible world as a result of following the maxim.
# If a contradiction or irrationality would arise, acting on that maxim is not allowed in the real world.
# If there is no contradiction, then acting on that maxim is permissible, and is sometimes required.

(For a modern parallel, see [[John Rawls]]' hypothetical situation, the [[original position]].)

====Second formulation====
The second formulation (or Formula of the End in Itself) holds that "the rational being, as by its nature an end and thus as an end in itself, must serve in every maxim as the condition restricting all merely relative and arbitrary ends".<ref name="Beck 436" /> The principle dictates that you "[a]ct with reference to every rational being (whether yourself or another) so that it is an end in itself in your maxim", meaning that the rational being is "the basis of all maxims of action" and "must be treated never as a mere means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, i.e., as an end at the same time".<ref name="Beck 437-8">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 437–38.</ref>

==== Third formulation ====
The third formulation (i.e. Formula of Autonomy) is a synthesis of the first two and is the basis for the "complete determination of all maxims". It states "that all maxims which stem from autonomous legislation ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with a realm of nature".<ref name="Beck 436"/>

In principle, "So act as if your maxims should serve at the same time as the universal law (of all rational beings)", meaning that we should so act that we may think of ourselves as "a member in the universal realm of ends", [[legislating]] universal laws through our maxims (that is, a universal [[code of conduct]]), in a "possible realm of ends".<ref name="Beck 438-9">Kant, ''Foundations'', pp. 438–39. See also [[Kingdom of Ends]]</ref> No one may elevate themselves above the universal law, therefore it is one's duty to follow the maxim(s).

====''Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason''====
{{Main|Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason}}
Commentators, starting in the 20th century, have tended to see Kant as having a strained relationship with religion, though this was not the prevalent view in the 19th century. [[Karl Leonhard Reinhold]], whose letters first made Kant famous, wrote "I believe that I may infer without reservation that the interest of religion, and of Christianity in particular, accords completely with the result of the Critique of Reason.".<ref>Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy (1786), 3rd Letter</ref> [[Johann Schultz]], who wrote one of the first Kant commentaries, wrote "And does not this system itself cohere most splendidly with the Christian religion? Do not the divinity and beneficence of the latter become all the more evident?"<ref>Johann Schultz, Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1784), 141.</ref> This view continued throughout the 19th century, as noted by [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], who said "Kant's success is merely a theologian's success."<ref>"The Protestant pastor is the grandfather of German philosophy...German philosophy is at bottom – a cunning theology...Why the rejoicing heard through the German academic world – three-quarters composed of the sons of pastors and teachers-at the appearance of Kant? Why the Germans' conviction, which still find echo even today, that with Kant things were taking a turn of the better? Kant's success is merely a theologian's success". Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 10</ref> The reason for these views was Kant's moral theology, and the widespread belief that his philosophy was the great antithesis to [[Spinozism]], which had been convulsing the European academy for much of the 18th century. Spinozism was widely seen as the cause of the [[Pantheism controversy]], and as a form of sophisticated pantheism or even atheism. As Kant's philosophy disregarded the possibility of arguing for God through pure reason alone, for the same reasons it also disregarded the possibility of arguing against God through pure reason alone. This, coupled with his moral philosophy (his argument that the existence of morality is a rational reason why God and an afterlife do and must exist), was the reason he was seen by many, at least through the end of the 19th century, as a great defender of religion in general and Christianity in particular.{{citation needed|date=July 2018}}

Kant articulates his strongest criticisms of the organization and practices of religious organizations to those that encourage what he sees as a religion of counterfeit service to God.<ref name="Immanuel Kant 1793">Immanuel Kant. ''Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone'' (1793), Book IV, Part 1, Section 1, "The Christian religion as a natural religion."</ref> Among the major targets of his criticism are external ritual, superstition and a hierarchical church order. He sees these as efforts to make oneself pleasing to God in ways other than conscientious adherence to the principle of moral rightness in choosing and acting upon one's maxims. Kant's criticisms on these matters, along with his rejection of certain theoretical proofs grounded in pure reason (particularly the [[ontological argument]]) for the existence of God and his philosophical commentary on some Christian doctrines, have resulted in interpretations that see Kant as hostile to religion in general and Christianity in particular (e.g., Walsh 1967). Nevertheless, other interpreters consider that Kant was trying to mark off defensible from indefensible Christian belief.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Pasternack|first1=Lawrence|last2=Rossi|first2=Philip|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/|title=Kant's Philosophy of Religion|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|edition=Fall 2014|access-date=18 October 2019|archive-date=9 July 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100709212423/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/|url-status=live}}</ref> Kant sees in [[Jesus Christ]] the affirmation of a "pure moral disposition of the heart" that "can make man well-pleasing to God".<ref name="Immanuel Kant 1793"/> Regarding Kant's conception of religion, some critics have argued that he was sympathetic to deism.<ref>For example Peter Byrne, who wrote about Kant's relationship with deism. Byrne, Peter (2007), ''Kant on God'', London: Ashgate, p. 159.</ref> Other critics have argued that Kant's moral conception moves from deism to theism (as moral theism), for example Allen W. Wood<ref>Wood, Allen W. (1970), ''Kant's moral religion'', London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 16.</ref> and Merold Westphal.<ref>Westphal, Merold (2010),''The Emerge of Modern Philosophy of Religion'', in Taliaferro, Charles, Draper, Paul and Quinn, Philip (editors), ''A Companion to Philosophy of Religion'', Oxford: Blackwell, p. 135.</ref> As for Kant's book ''[[Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason]]'',<ref name="KReligion"/> it was emphasized that Kant reduced religiosity to rationality, religion to morality and Christianity to ethics.<ref>Iţu, Mircia (2004), ''Dumnezeu şi religia în concepţia lui Immanuel Kant din Religia în limitele raţiunii'', in Boboc, Alexandru and Mariş, N.I. (editors), ''Studii de istoria filosofiei universale'', volume 12, Bucharest: Romanian Academy.</ref>

====Idea of freedom====
In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant distinguishes between the transcendental idea of freedom, which as a psychological concept is "mainly empirical" and refers to "whether a faculty of beginning a series of successive things or states from itself is to be assumed"<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|486 (A 448/B 467)}} and the practical concept of freedom as the independence of our will from the "coercion" or "necessitation through sensuous impulses". Kant finds it a source of difficulty that the practical idea of freedom is founded on the transcendental idea of freedom,<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|533 (A 533-4/B 561-2)}} but for the sake of practical interests uses the practical meaning, taking "no account of... its transcendental meaning," which he feels was properly "disposed of" in the Third Antinomy, and as an element in the question of the freedom of the will is for philosophy "a real stumbling block" that has embarrassed speculative reason.<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|486 (A 448/B 467)}}

Kant calls practical "everything that is possible through freedom", and the pure practical laws that are never given through sensuous conditions but are held analogously with the universal law of causality are moral laws. Reason can give us only the "pragmatic laws of free action through the senses", but pure practical laws given by reason ''a priori''<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|486 (A 448/B 467)}} dictate "what is to be done".<ref name="CPureR Cambridge"/>{{rp|674-6 (A 800-2/B 828-30)}} (The same distinction of transcendental and practical meaning can be applied to the idea of God, with the ''proviso'' that the practical concept of freedom can be experienced.<ref>Ibid.  The concept of freedom is also handled in the third section of the ''Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals'';  in the ''Critique of Practical Reason'' see § VII and § VIII.</ref>)

====Categories of freedom====
In the ''Critique of Practical Reason'', at the end of the second Main Part of the ''Analytics'',<ref>5:65–67</ref> Kant introduces the categories of freedom, in analogy with the categories of understanding their practical counterparts. Kant's categories of freedom apparently function primarily as conditions for the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be understood as free and (iii) to be morally evaluated. For Kant, although actions as theoretical objects are constituted by means of the theoretical categories, actions as practical objects (objects of practical use of reason, and which can be good or bad) are constituted by means of the categories of freedom. Only in this way can actions, as phenomena, be a consequence of freedom, and be understood and evaluated as such.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien]], 'Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant', in ''Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik'' Vol. 1, 1988, 193–220.</ref>

Return to Immanuel Kant.



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