(PDF) Kant and Jung on the prospects of Scientific Psychology success fail Aug DEC Jan 20 2019 2020 2021 2 captures 01 Aug 2020 - 20 Dec 2020 About this capture COLLECTED BY Collection: Save Page Now TIMESTAMPS ArticlePDF AvailableKant and Jung on the prospects of Scientific Psychology July 2017 Estudos Kantianos [EK] 5(01):375-390 DOI: 10.36311/2318-0501.2017.v5n1.26.p375 Authors: Valentin Balanovskiy Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University Download full-text PDFDownload full-text PDFRead full-text Download full-text PDFDownload full-text PDF Read full-text Download citation Copy link Link copied Read full-text Download citation Copy link Link copied References (21) Abstract This study aims to show a similarity of Kant’s and Jung’s approaches to an issue of the possibility of scientific psychology, hence to explicate what they thought about the future of psychology. Therefore, the article contains heuristic material, which can contribute in a resolving of such methodological task as searching of promising directions to improve philosophical and scientific psychology.To achieve the aim the author attempts to clarify an entity of Kant’s and Jung’s objections against even the possibility of scientific psychology and to find out ways to overcome those objections in Kant’s and Jung’s works. The main methods were explication, reconstruction and comparative analysis of Kant’s and Jung’s views.As a result it was found, that Kant and Jung allocated one and the same obstacles, which, on their opinion, prevent psychology to become a science in the strict sense. They are: 1) coincidence of subject and object in psychology; 2) impossibility to apply quantitative mathematic methods in psychology; 3) pendency of the issue of psychophysical parallelism. However, Kant and Jung indicated ways to resolve formulated by them fundamental difficulties. All those ways lay through the searching a principle of interaction and connection between the psychic and the physical. Discover the world's research 19+ million members 135+ million publications 700k+ research projects Join for free Public Full-texts 2 Balanovskiy_Kan t&Jung.pdf Content available from Valentin Balanovskiy: Balanovskiy_Kant&Jung.pdf Balanovskiy_Kant_Jung.pdf Content uploaded by Valentin Balanovskiy Author contentAll content in this area was uploaded by Valentin Balanovskiy on Apr 04, 2018 Content may be subject to copyright. Balanovskiy_Kan t_Jung.pdf Content available from Valentin Balanovskiy: Balanovskiy_Kant&Jung.pdf Balanovskiy_Kant_Jung.pdf Content uploaded by Valentin Balanovskiy Author contentAll content in this area was uploaded by Valentin Balanovskiy on Apr 04, 2018 Content may be subject to copyright. I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 375 I.Kant and C.G.JunG on the ProsPeCts of sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy Valentin Balanovskiy1 Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University IntroduCtIon As some researchers note (Wilber, 2000, p.viii), one of the most important stages in the formation of scientic psychology is the publication of G.T.Fechner’s Elemente der Psychophysik (Fechner, 1860). e revolutionary character of Fechner’s ideas consisted in the fact that it was the rst attempt to apply mathematical methods to examine such a complex and subtle matter as the human soul. In this way it was shown that a psyche can be an object of exact sciences, which methods formerly seemed to be suitable only for the studying of natural objects. In connection with this discovery I recall Kant’s words2, that “in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper science as there is mathematics therein” (MAN, 04: 470). Immediately afterward I recall the following text in which Kant criticize even a possibility of a scientic empirical or experimental study of the soul (MAN, 04: 470- 472). Here it should be noted that Kant’s objections have not any instrumental or historical character, as if someday through the improvement of measurement methods psychology could become a ‘proper’ science. Instead, these objections have a fundamental nature. If so, how was it possible that Fechner and other generations of theorists and practicing scientists overcame Kant’s methodological restrictions? To answer this question, it would be fruitful to consider some ideas of C. G. Jung who, despite his own achievements in scientic psychology, shared Kant’s views on the issue, although he used somewhat dierent arguments. e issue concerning the scientic status of psychology is extremely complex. at is why some common remarks are strongly required. 376 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. Firstly, there is a diculty of determining the criteria regarding the scientic nature for one or another sphere of intellectual activity, particularly psychology. e fact is that scientic criteria have crucially changed since XVIII century. at is why criteria, which were adequate in Kant’s time, are inadequate for Jung, not to mention modern science. at is why it may be suspected that the historical-comparative method, which I use here, is inapplicable because of the impossibility to nd a common base for comparing Kant’s and Jung’s views on the scientic status of psychology. But the suspicions are groundless. ere is the criterion of proper science, common to Kant and Jung, which they applied to clarify the scientic status of psychology. is criterion consists in the applicability of mathematical quantitative methods to the object of one or another science. It is still subject to doubt, whether this criterion is applicable in psychology. One of the main issues of the discussion concerns the objective unit of measurement in psychology (like unit of force in physics), which would help to formalize a description of every investigated phenomenon. Secondly, the issue concerning the scientic status of psychology in some respect is directly connected with the issue of psychophysical parallelism3. Indeed, as long as scientists do not nd out, how exactly body and soul interact, we can believe that it is legitimate to examine the soul through some body signals, but it would remain just a kind of belief. Hence such methods as the pulse curve, the respiration curve, and the psycho-galvanic phenomenon, which have an accurate mathematical apparatus, do nothing to approximate psychology to a proper science. Also, Jung noted that polygraph data cannot be considered as a source of information about psychic life, because polygraph detects bodily states only (Jung, 1975, pp.13-14). It should be noted that the issue of psychophysical parallelism arose a long time ago. For example, the Wolan follower, F.Ch. Baumeister (1789, pp.296-298, 310-319) in his lectures on Metaphysics expressed very pessimistic views on the historical and methodological prospects of decision the question how exactly soul and body are connected with. e same was relevant for Platner (1772, pp.ix-xii). According to T. Sturm, Kant also shared such pessimistic view, at least we can nd that perspective in his Lectures on anthropology of the rst half of the 1770s (Sturm, 2008, p.499). Since the second half of the 19th century this topic became very popular among philosophers and psychologists of dierent schools. L.Busse (1913/2012, pp.67-118) and other researchers (Hartmann, 1901, pp. 435-444) described this situation scrupulously. Unfortunately, in this article I cannot consider the issue in detail, because it goes beyond my purpose. e only thing I want to point out is that Jung many times attempted to examine the issue of psychophysical parallelism. In the beginning he tried to avoid strict judgments and exact answers (Jung, 1975, p.17), but later on – with the ‘invention’ of the concepts of synchronicity and psychoid factor – his judgments became more condent and concrete. irdly, Kant’s objections against the possibility of scientic psychology have a fundamental, not instrumental, character. eir core lies in the radical inapplicability of mathematical methods to the study of the soul. Paradoxically enough, Jung agrees with this statement. Despite he was a practicing psychiatrist as well as an experimental psychologist, I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 377 having made his major discoveries on the basis of empirical material, Jung insisted on the impossibility of using mathematical quantitative methods in psychology (especially in studying the unconscious4) and considered that psychology could not replicate the epistemology of physics. ereby he shares Kant’s views on the prospects of scientic psychology. In particular Jung writes with regret that “the tragic thing is that psychology has no self- consistent mathematics at its disposal, but only a calculus of subjective prejudices” (Jung, 1975, p.216). Furthermore, Jung underlines another fundamental obstacle for psychology to become a strict science, i.e., the coincidence of subject and object in psychological studies. He wittily notices: e psyche … observes itself and can only translate the psychic back into the psychic. Were physics in this position, it could do nothing except leave the physical process to its own devices, because in that way it would be most plainly itself. (Jung, 1975, p. 216-217) Below I will predominantly focus on issues, pertaining to the third remark. Kant on the ProsPeCts of sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy Many attempts to explicate Kant’s views on psychology have being undertaken since the 19th century. One of the rst fundamental researches on the topic can be found in J.B.Meyer’s Kants Psychologie (Meyer, 1870) and E.F. Buchner’s Study of Kant’s Psychology with Reference to the Critical Philosophy (Buchner, 1897). Today the interest in Kant’s psychology remains strong. For example, his attitude to rational psychology was thoroughly examined by K.Ameriks (2000) and C.W.Dyck (2014). Kant’s views on empirical and transcendental psychology were considered in various works by G. Hateld (1992), P.Kitcher (1990), and C.M. Schmidt (2008). Unsurprisingly, there are specic works devoted to the issue of the scientic status of psychology in Kant’s writings. In this respect one should mentioned several articles by T. Mischel (1967), T. Sturm (2001, 2008), R.A. Makkreel (2001), A.C. Nayak and E.Sotnak (1995), and V.V. Vasilyev (2010). Relying on these materials and directly on Kant’s works, I will try to summarize the main objections against the possibility of scientic psychology, which subsequently were reected in Jung’s ideas. Before that, two preliminary points should be highlighted. Firstly, when Kant writes about the impossibility of psychology as a ‘proper’ science, he means not rational, but empirical psychology. e dierence is a crucial one. For, according to Kant, rational psychology takes nothing from the experience, but merely the fact that human beings have a soul. Everything else is a metaphysical cognition of the soul (Kant, 1821, p.197). Empirical psychology, in contrast, shows how cognitive faculties are used, not how they should be used (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.337)5. It stands on the foundation of experience, which absolutely cannot give an apodictic reliability, while rational psychology in its ‘natural-scientic’ function sets apodictic principles for empirical psychology (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.336). at is why Hateld underlines that scientic rational psychology is possible (Hateld, 1992, pp.218-219). Here are his arguments: 378 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. Kant admits that there are only a few principles with the required generality, but he is able to name two: “the proposition that ‘substance is permanent’, and that ‘every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws’…. Although Kant does not go on to give examples of these principles as applied to inner sense, presumably the presence of the “I” as the ground of the empirical unity of the self – not as simple, spiritual being, but merely as a permanent substance in time – is an example of the rst principle, and the law … of association of representations is an example of the second principle. In any event, it is evident that Kant is committed to the view that the representations of inner sense, no less than the objects of outer sense, are subjects to universal natural laws. (Hateld, 1992, p.219) Under the term ‘empirical psychology’ Kant, according to Vasil’ev, conceives two dierent disciplines: the doctrine of causal connectivity of inner sense phenomena and the descriptive doctrine of the general forms of inner sense, i.e. the faculties of soul. In this respect, Kant, speaking about the specicity of empirical psychology, usually refers to the rst doctrine, but factually deals with the second one (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.338)6. Such ‘double-entry bookkeeping’ somehow complicates the reconstruction of Kant’s genuine point of view. Secondly, when Kant discusses the impossibility of scientic psychology, he means the proper science or science in the strict sense of the word (eigentliche Wissenschaft) (MAN, 04: 468), i.e. science, whose certainty is apodictic. e last one is provided by the presence of a pure element, which contains a priori principles (MAN, 04: 468-469). On the other hand, Kant notes that “cognition that can contain mere empirical certainty is only knowledge improperly so-called” (MAN, 04: 468). So, maybe we should stop considering this topic, because the mere name of this science, ‘empirical psychology’, brings us to an analytical truth that such science like a proper science is impossible, according to Kant’s denition. But even Kant writes that there are many dierent types of sciences, including empirical sciences. By the way, ten years before the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant maintained in the Foreword to his lectures on psychology that psychology is the ‘physiology of inner sense or reasoning beings’ (Kant, 1821, p.130). However, as we know, physiology is quite a proper science even through the prism of Kant’s strict criteria of scientic knowledge, e.g. criterion of systematicity (MAN, 04: 468). erefore, is it possible that empirical psychology has a chance to be a science in Kant’s system? To answer this question an analysis of Kant’s fundamental objections is required. Kant’s objections against even the possibility of scientic psychology may be reduced to two moments. e rst is the problem of the coincidence between subject and object of cognition in psychology. e second one is the inapplicability of mathematical methods to the inner sense7 phenomena. Regarding the rst objection, Kant unambiguously asserts that all attempts made by any reasoning being to study itself as well as to study other reasoning being, are doomed to failure, for the observation distorts and transforms the state of the observed subject (Kant 1903, p. 471). ere is another one obstacle, closely connected with the nature of the subject itself. Hateld shows that, according to Kant, “although the ‘I’ is the logical subject of all our thoughts, it cannot be regarded as a substance because it cannot be given in intuition, the pure I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 379 category of substance can be properly applied only to objects that can be given in experience, that is, to objects of possible experience (A 349-50)” (Hateld, 1992, p. 203). But if there is no experience, then there is no possible science. With the second of Kant’s objection the situation is more entangled. On reading the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science it seems that, indeed, empirical psychology as a ‘proper’ science is impossible. Furthermore, it is impossible even in a status of a systematic art or empirical doctrine, such as the ‘non-science’ called chemistry (MAN, 04: 470-471). By the way, Kant considers more likely for chemistry to become a ‘proper’ science in the future, than for psychology. So, what are Kant’s arguments? As we already know, the rst is that mathematics is inapplicable to inner sense phenomena and their laws (MAN, 04: 471). Why? Because, as we remember, the form of inner sense is time, which has only one dimension, and time is indivisible, unlike 3D spatial objects, for example, apples, which are obviously separated from each other and easily counted. e second is that “the manifold of inner observation can be separated only by mere division in thought, and cannot then be held separate and recombined at will” (MAN, 04: 471). at is why we cannot use such an operation as systematical analysis in psychology (MAN, 04: 471), primarily because of the indivisibility of time. Summarizing all objections Kant concludes: erefore, the empirical doctrine of the soul can never become anything more than an historical doctrine of nature, and, as such, a natural doctrine of inner sense which is as systematic as possible, that is, a natural description of the soul, but never a science of the soul, nor even, indeed, an experimental psychological doctrine. is is also the reason for our having used, in accordance with common custom, the general title of natural science for this work, which actually contains the principles of the doctrine of body, for only to it does this title belong in the proper sense, and so no ambiguity is thereby produced. (MAN, 04: 471) Analyzing all Kant’s arguments, Buchner underlines8 that “Kant has always stood the great champion of the valuelessness of introspection and nullity of exact methods in their application to the inner sense” (Buchner, 1897, p.49). Makkreel and Sturm agree with him. e rst writes that “in the Friedländer anthropology lectures of 1775-76 we see Kant beginning to note that self-observation is much more dicult than the observation of things outside us: ‘Self-observation is dicult, unnatural, can lead to revision and must not last long’ (25:478)” (Makkreel, 2001, p.186). Sturm, in his turn, notices that Kant “from at least the 1780s … advances a methodological claim against introspection as the primary method of knowing the human mind” (Sturm, 2001, p.174). Instead of introspection Kant oers to focus on human’s behavior, which can be given for outer observation. As A.Brook underlines, “Kant’s rejection of introspection and turn to behavior have a very contemporary feel to them” (Brook, 2014, p. 64). In addition, as Vasil’ev mentions, an analytical empirical psychology, i.e. the descriptive doctrine of the general forms of inner sense, gives the material for all divisions of transcendental 380 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. philosophy and plays the role of a fundamental science in Kant’s system (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.334). Kant, probably, to some extent applies an unjust treatment to empirical psychology and, consequently, defends that for psychology to become a science it must pass through ‘the eye of a needle’. More specically, Kant writes that mathematics is inapplicable to the inner sense, with one single exception, i.e. application of the law of continuity to the ux of inner sense. However, Kant adds that this “would be an extension of cognition standing to that which mathematics provides for the doctrine of body approximately as the doctrine of the properties of the straight line stands to the whole of geometry” (MAN, 04: 471). is notice has an important consequence. Vasil’ev writes that in the Critique of Pure Reason the law of continuity is closely connected with the principles of pure understanding and consequently this law is applicable to the inner sense. It entails that a priori cognition of the soul as a phenomenon is possible (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.336). Otherwise, the categories would have no general validity. Hence, “all a priori concepts of the understanding, with possible exception of Substance and Community, should be applicable to the phenomena of the inner sense” (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.336). It turns out that even empirical psychology may hypothetically have its own pure part, which is based on usage of the law of continuity to phenomena of the inner sense, and thus may possess some mathematical apparatus. However, an application of exact mathematical methods to the inner sense phenomena does not guarantee resolving the problem of inseparability of the manifold of inner observation. Some indications that, in the last analysis, there is no denitive answer to the question of the possibility of scientic psychology can be found in other Kant’s works. us, for instance, in the Preface to his Lectures on Metaphysics Kant writes on the nature of ‘I’9 that “I can be taken in a twofold sense: I as human being, and I as intelligence. I, as a human being, am an object of inner and outer sense. I as intelligence am an object of inner sense only” (Kant, 1821, p.131). Kant repeats this idea almost verbatim a few times in the chapter on Rational psychology (Kant, 1821, pp.200-201). Furthermore, Kant asserts that “the soul is … not merely thinking substance, but rather constitutes a unity insofar as it is connected with the body” (Kant, 1821, p.131). e properties of this connection are dened by principle: “alterations of the body are at the same time alterations of the soul, and alterations of the soul are at the same time alterations of the body” (Kant, 1821, p.189). us a way towards psychology as ‘proper’ science can be paved through the cognition of physiological processes, something that modern neurophysiologists try to undertake. Maybe, there were some other possibilities for empirical psychology to become a ‘proper’ science, upon which Kant meditated in 1780s. As rightly mentions Sturm, “in a letter to Christian Gottfried Schütz, written in September 1785, Kant promises that the Metaphysical Foundations will treat the metaphysical foundations of the ‘doctrine of the soul’ (Seelenlehre) in addition to that of matter (10: 406)…. It is, therefore, clear that Kant changed his mind with regard to the scientic status of empirical psychology and that he did so between September 1785 and the appearance of the Metaphysical Foundations in 1786” (Sturm, 2001, pp.164- 165). Sturm notes that the fact “that Kant changed his mind so late and so suddenly should I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 381 make one cautious with regard to the question of how convinced he was by his own arguments and, moreover, how strong an impossibility claim he really wished to make” (Sturm, 2001, p.165). It should be noted, that later on Kant did not change his views on the connection of the body with the soul. For example, in the letter to S.T.Soemmerring (10 Aug 1975) On the Organ of the Soul he writes that the study of the soul should be undertaken by two faculties: the medical faculty and the philosophical faculty, because, on the one hand, it possesses a sensory receptivity, and, on the other hand, it possesses a faculty of motion (Br, 12: 31). But the agreement between the medical and philosophical faculties on the denition of a seat of the soul is impossible, and it would be better not deal with this issue10, “since the concept of a seat of the soul requires local presence, which would ascribe to the thing that is only an object of the inner sense, and insofar only determinable according to temporal conditions, a spatial relation, thereby generating a contradiction” (Br, 12: pp. 31-32). If so, how can we answer the question of the relationship between body and soul, if we cannot even dene a point for their connection, or an organ where the soul is present, which would be available to be studied through scientic methods? It seems that there is no answer to this question. at is why there will never be any agreement between the medical and philosophical faculties, not only on the location of the soul, but also on the fundamental properties of the interaction between body and soul. erefore, I conclude that in his later works Kant prefers to avoid not only the issue of the ‘organ’ of the soul, but also the issue of psychophysical parallelism in general. Kant’s reections on the organ of the soul are interesting, showing how clearly Kant’s evasiveness emerges over time. In one of his footnotes he strictly distinguishes, what we can explore rationally and systematically, and what we should avoid. To illustrate it Kant allocates two dierent meanings to the concept of ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ (Gemüt)11: “By mind one means only the faculty of combining the given representations and eectuating the unity of empirical apperception (animus), not yet substance (anima) according to its nature, which is entirely distinct from that matter” (Br, 12: 32). us, it turns out that the doctrine of animus was developed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, while the issue of anima never extended beyond the frames of his lectures on psychology. At least it seems to be so. However, concerning the issue of application of the quantitative methods in psychology, we should consider another of Kant’s works, in which about a hundred years before Fechner’s Elemente der Psychophysik he describes such mechanism as the repression of one content of the psyche by another to an unconscious area12. I mean his Versuch den Begri der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763). In this work Kant considers a phenomenon of forgetting through the prism of a conservation law (NG, 02: 194-197) that allows us to conceive not a simple disappearing or coming-away of some contents of consciousness, when they are fading because of the inuence of other more bright and vital contents, but rather a negative emergence or negative coming-to-be by analogy with the concept of negative magnitudes in mathematics (NG, 02: 190). at is why, Kant says, we can remember and recall contents of our psyche, which we are not holding in our consciousness at every moment of our life. 382 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. us, I cannot condently assert that Kant possessed a rm position on the issue concerning the possibility of application of mathematical methods in psychology and, consequently, the possibility of a scientic empirical psychology (unlike rational psychology, which seems to be a ‘proper’ science, based on a priori principles). For example, in the Essay on the maladies of the head (1764) and in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics (1766) Kant appears as an adherent to the physiological determinism of the psychic processes, which is consistent with the scientic worldview. Later, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) he becomes strictly against even a possibility of empirical psychology as a ‘proper’ science. At last, in his reections on the organ of the soul (1795) Kant avoids the issue on the interaction between the body and the soul at least from a physiological or natural-scientic point of view. As surprising as it may be, it is true that many directions, which Kant pointed as ‘dead ends’, led to revolutionary discoveries in dierent realms. is happened with an ‘improper’ science called chemistry, which D.I. Mendeleev provided with a priori principles leading to the construction of the system of chemical elements, his famous periodic table. e same happened with logic, which was ‘condemned’ by Kant to eternal stagnation. So, is it possible that psychology had the same lucky fate? To answer this question, let’s turn to Jung’s ideas. JunG on the ProsPeCts of sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy On the relation between Kant – a champion in the study of conscious processes – and the philosophical and psychological theories on the unconscious two collective monographs have been written in the recent past (Nicholls, A., Liebscher, M., 2010; Giordanetti P., Pozzo R., Sgarbi M., 2012). After reading these monographs, it becomes obvious that “with the possible exception of Leibniz, Immanuel Kant arguably determined the way in which unconscious phenomena were understood in nineteenth-century German thought more than any other philosopher of the eighteenth century” (Nicholls, A., Liebscher, M., 2010 p.9). I should add that Kant and Leibniz in general determined the way in which unconscious phenomena were understood not only in the 19th century in Germany, but also in some respect in the 20th century all over the world. is assertion is based on the fact that Jung was deeply inuenced by Kant’s philosophy13. I note briey that Kant and Jung had in common their apriorism, which gave rise to Jung’s concept of the archetypes of collective unconscious – a priori conditions of any psychic experience. Also both of them shared the methodological presupposition, according to which a clear distinction between constructive and regulative usage of notions and ideas is strongly required. In addition, Kant and Jung inclined to avoid denite assertions, when they dealt with the reective power of judgment. Furthermore, both of them were against innatism. ere were many other features common to Kant and Jung. One of them was the negation of the possibility of scientic psychology. Although Kant’s and Jung’s arguments were somewhat dierent (mostly because of the sharp dierences in their scientic and cultural contexts), the general features of their arguments were quite similar. I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 383 When Jung writes on the impossibility of psychology as a ‘proper’ strict science, he allocates the same fundamental diculties as Kant. e rst one is the coincidence of subject and object, and the second consists in the impossibility of using mathematical quantitative methods to study the psyche. Some of Jung’s arguments were presented above. ey are very characteristic for Jung, and we can nd them in many places of his works. I will show another few examples below. On the rst diculty Jung writes that “there is no medium for psychology to reect itself in: it can only portray itself in itself, and describe itself” (Jung, 1975, p.217). at is why Jung is forced to determine psychology as “the coming to consciousness of the psychic process, but it is not, in the deeper sense, an explanation of this process, for no explanation of the psychic can be anything other than the living process of the psyche itself. Psychology is doomed to cancel itself out as a science and therein precisely it reaches its scientic goal” (Jung, 1975, p.223). In this fragment Jung’s typical position is expressed. According to him, psychology is not an empty abstraction, or a school discipline, or an exact science indierent to its subject, but rather it is the goal, the way and the essence of the psychic process. e last sentence from the citation above, at rst sight, looks like a Buddhist kōan or one of Heidegger’s misty assertions. Actually, Jung discerns the goal of psychology as a science in revelation of the entity of psychic process, but this revelation may be achieved only within the psychic process, to which nothing is external. e nal or ultimate goal of this process is the individuation – a special stage of one’s psyche development, in which a constructive integration of conscious and unconscious contents of the psyche occurs (Jung, 1975, p.223). Following Kant’s anthropological revolution and his concept of inner sense, Jung writes that psychic reality – esse in anima – is “the only form of being we can experience directly. We can distinguish no form of being that is not psychic in the rst place. All other realities are derived from and indirectly revealed by it” (Jung, 1992, p.60). In other work he adds that even “mathematical thinking is also a psychic function” (Jung, 1975, p.217). Developing Kant’s argument that in psyche’s cognition the observation distorts and transforms the state of the observed subject, Jung extends this argument also to the material world. He writes that “the psyche is the world’s pivot: not only is it the one great condition for the existence of a world at all, it is also an intervention in the existing natural order, and no one can say with certainty where this intervention will nally end” (Jung, 1975, p.217). Also, Jung insisted on the necessity of creating a new model of being, which would take into account a great scale and degree of intervention of the psychic factor into the ber of everything that exists. is model should consider “the uncontrollable eects the observer has upon the system observed, the result being that reality forfeits something of its objective character and that a subjective element attaches to the physicist’s picture of the world” (Jung, 1975, p.229). By the way, Jung’s ideas that psyche inuences matter and that there is not only one ‘standard’ causal type of relationships between events, but also an acausal (synchronistic), 384 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. trans-temporal and trans-spatial, type of relationships, provides a convergent horizon between analytical psychology and quantum physics. is fact was examined by W.Pauli’s and P.Jordan’s works (Jung, 1980, p.473). As for the objection that mathematical methods of measurement are inapplicable to the cognition of psychic processes, Jung is not less categorical than Kant. First of all, such bold position is explained by the specicity of the unconscious. Particularly, Jung underlines that a psychological theory cannot “be formulated mathematically, because we have no measuring rod with which to measure psychic quantities. We have to rely solely upon qualities, that is, upon perceptible phenomena. Consequently psychology is incapacitated from making any valid statement about unconscious states, or to put it another way, there is no hope that the validity of any statement about unconscious states or processes will ever be veried scientically” (Jung, 1975, p.214). erein lies the main dierence between physics and psychology, since while “physics determines quantities and their relation to one another; psychology determines qualities without being able to measure quantities” (Jung, 1975, p.232). At the same time, Jung focuses on the fact that regardless this fundamental dierence and other diculties, physicists and psychologists tend to converge in their ideas (Jung, 1975, p.232). If so, has Jung considered somewhat possible for psychology to become a ‘proper’ science, as Kant did? Jung writes that in psychology a precise measuring of the quantities is replaced by an approximate measuring of the degree of intensity of psychic processes. For this, unlike physicists, psychologists use the function of feeling or valuation (Jung, 1975, p.234). In order for psychology to become a ‘proper’ science, Jung maintains, following the Russian philosopher and psychologist N.Grot (1898, p.266), that we should consider the psyche in its dynamics and thereby be able to apply the energy formula to the cognition of psyche (Jung, 1975, p.234). Only then would some quantitative aspect of the psyche become accessible for research. Nevertheless, the main diculty remains: it is impossible to break through the boundaries of the psychic process and convert its content into a form, convenient for exploration. Regarding the possibility of psychology becoming a strict science, it should be noted that years of research and observation led Jung to the awareness that psyche is not chaos, but an objective reality, which can be researched by the means of natural sciences (Jung, 1975, p.233). Moreover, in one of his articles he insists that psychology is not a kind of worldview, but a science (Jung, 1975, p.376). However, it is necessary to clarify that in this context analytical psychology is presented as a science in order to avoid the merely spiritual stance of those who perceived psychology as a way of self-improvement in an excessively dogmatic way. Jung ironically notes that “there are many people today who think they can smell a Weltanschauung in analytical psychology. I wish I were one of them, for then I should be spared the pains of investigation and doubt, and could tell you clearly and simply the way that leads to Paradise” (Jung, 1975, pp.376-377). But there is another moment that explicitly and obviously indicates the possibility of scientic psychology in Jung’s doctrine. It is connected with an idea, according to which spirit I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 385 and matter interact closely between each other. A similar idea can be found in Kant’s lectures on psychology. However, Jung goes much further than Kant. In his late works Jung formulated the concept or doctrine of unus mundus (Jung, 1977, pp.533-543). e general meaning of this concept was borrowed from alchemists and can be reduced to the postulate, according to which physical and psychic processes obeyed one and the same principles, because these processes take place in the initially united Universe, where separation between the physical and psychic is most likely the result of our imperfect perception. e phenomenon of acausal connection between contents of the psyche and events of the objective reality, which Jung calls synchronicity, relies upon the fact that the psychic element can manifest itself as physical and vice versa. Of course, critics may say that the necessity of introducing such a misty principle as synchronicity may harm psychology as a science. But we should remember that the soul is not a material point, moving uniformly in a straight line in vacuum. In this sense, the requirements for psychology to be a science must dier from those presupposed, for instance, by physics. I try to assume that Jung did not see any hard problem in the fact that cognition of the psyche is dierent from cognition of the material world, because psychology can satisfy a crucial methodological principle, such as comprehension or understanding. Here Jung (at least he seems to think so) turns to Kant’s denition of ‘comprehension’, which means “to cognize a thing to the extent which is sucient for our purpose” (Jung, 1982, p.181). But as we already know, psychology is the way of revealing that psyche has one purpose – individuation, and in the process of achieving this purpose we gain enough data for comprehension. So, in this respect analytical psychology can be represented as the practical science of individuation, in which comprehension replaces the characteristic features of knowledge produced by natural sciences. Last but not the least, Jung, much like Kant, thought that the future of psychology as a ‘proper’ precise science would be closely connected with nding the way to make psychic processes and contents intuitive and presentable a priori in space, despite the fact that, according to Kant, they exist only in time. e point here is that Jung was inuenced by representatives of the energy theory, rst of all by Grot14. e energy theory takes an important place among Jung’s ideas. At the rst time it is brightly revealed in the article On the Psychic Energy (1912), and then in On the Nature of the Psyche (1947, republished in 1954). Such devotion to the energy theory may be explained by the assumption that the mature Jung tried to avoid Kant’s restrictions, concerning the possibility of mathematical cognition of the contents of inner sense, which are given only in time. As we remember, according to Jung only the application of the energy formula can allow us to resolve this task, “since mass and energy are of the same nature, mass and velocity would be adequate concepts for characterizing the psyche so far as it has any observable eects in space: in other words, it must have an aspect under which it would appear as mass in motion” (Jung, 1975, p.234). However, it should be noted that if psychologists would be able someday to nd a principle for representing the psychic processes in space, they should decide what to do with 386 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. synchronicity and, consequently, with the trans-temporal and trans-spatial nature of the psyche as it really is, not as it appears to us. On the other hand, this task is not topical, because it goes beyond the transcendental area and refers to the transcendent, given that its decision is closely connected with the psychoid factor15, which delimits the borders of the phenomenal world and the sphere of possible experience. Jung perfectly realized that any direct correspondence between the principles of physics and those of psychology is impossible. However, he believed that the study of analogies between them had a great heuristic potential, and that these analogies “are signicant enough in themselves to warrant the prominence we have given them” (Jung, 1975, p.234). At the same time, according to Jung, there was nothing to discuss seriously in his epoch: he had a very low opinion of the level of modern scientic psychology. Jung compared psychology with medicine in the 16th century, when there was no physiology at all, and with natural sciences in the 13th century, when the rst experiments took place (Jung, 1975, p.356). So, what should new generations of psychologists do? Jung gave only a common principle. He wrote that if at the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th century psychology were focusing predominantly on the physiological determination of psychic processes, the task for future psychology should be to clarify how psychic processes are governed by the spirit, e.g. by archetypes and archetypical plots. ConClusIon Kant’s and Jung’s in their works considered explicitly the issue of possibility of the scientic psychology. After a brief analysis it seems obvious that both thinkers share the position, according to which psychology as a ‘proper’ science is impossible. Moreover, they rely on similar arguments. Firstly, Kant and Jung thought that a serious obstacle for psychology to become a ‘proper’ science lies in the coincidence between subject and object of cognition, which makes almost impossible even such a fundamental scientic procedure as observation, because the observer can distort and transform the state of the observed subject. Secondly, the fundamental impossibility of using strict quantitative mathematical methods to the psyche cognition prevents psychology to become a science. irdly, the still unresolved issue of psychophysical parallelism creates a ‘grim’ background for any eorts aimed at creating a rigorous scientic psychology. e agreement between Kant and Jung in these and many other issues, regarding the science of psyche, despite the dierence between their epochs and their belonging to very dierent intellectual contexts, is very impressive. If Kant focused predominantly on the theoretical aspect of the fundamental impossibility of psychology as a ‘proper’ science, because he could not know for sure what results would be supplied by psychology a century later, Jung, for his part, had the opportunity to make sure de facto that all recent discoveries had failed to put psychology on a solid foundation. I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 387 BIBlIoGraPhy Ameriks, K. Kant’s eory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Balanovskiy, V. ‘Whether Jung Was a Kantian?’ Con-Textos Kantianos, n. 4 (2016), p. 118–126. _____‘Reshenie problemy psikhozicheskogo parallelizma N.Ya. Grotom i K.G. Jungom [Resolving of the issue of psychophysical parallelism by Nicolas Grot and C.G.Jung].’ Filosofskie nauki, vol. 12 (2015), p. 74–91. (In Russian) _____‘N.Ya. Grot i K.G. Jung: O vklade russkoi losoi v razvitie analiticheskoi psikhologii [N. Grot and C.G. Jung: About Russian Philosophy’s Contribution to the Development of Analytical Psychology].’ Voprosy Filosoi, vol. 6 (2016), p. 115-124. Baumeister, F.Ch. Institutiones metaphysicæ complectentes ontologiam, cosmologiam psychologiam theologiam denique naturalem methodo Woli adornatæ. Venice: 1789. Brook, A. ‘Kant and Cognitive Science.’ Estudos Kantianos, v. 2, n. 2 (2014), p. 61-78. Buchner, E.F. A Study of Kant’s Psychology with Reference to the Critical Philosophy. Lancaster: e New Era Print, 1897. Busse, L. (1913) Geist und Körper – Seele und Leib. Paderborn: Sarastro GmbH, 2012. Dyck, C.W. Kant and Rational Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Fechner, G.T. Elemente der Psychophysik. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf und Härtel, 1860. Giordanetti P., Pozzo R., Sgarbi M. (eds.) Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 2012. Grau, K.J. Bewusstsein, Unbewusstes, Unterbewusstes. München: Rösl, 1922. Grot, N. ‚Die Begrie der Seele und der Psychischen Energie in der Psychologie‘. Archiv für systematische Philosophie, IV (1898), S.237-335. Hateld, G. Empirical, rational, and transcendental psychology: Psychology as science and as philosophy. In: Guyer, P. (ed.). e Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.200-227. Jung, C.G. e Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche. In: Adler, G., Hull,R.F.C. (eds., trans.) Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Vol.8. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. _____Mysterium Coniunctionis. In: Adler, G., Hull,R.F.C. (eds., trans.) Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Vol.14. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1977. _____Address on the Occasion of the Founding of the C.G.Jung Institute, Zürich, 24 April 1948. In: Adler, G., Hull,R.F.C. (eds., trans.) Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Vol.18. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1980. _____On Psychological Understanding. In: Adler, G., Hull,R.F.C. (eds., trans.) Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Vol.3. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1982, p.179–196. _____ Letter to Kurt Plachte 10 January 1929. In: Adler, G., Hull,R.F.C. (eds., trans.)Letters, vol.1:1906–1950. London & NY: Routledge, 1992, p. 59-62. Kant, I. Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik: Nebst einer Einleitung, welche eine kurze Übersicht der wichtigsten Veränderungen der Metaphysik seit Kant enthält. Hrsg. von K.H.L.Pölitz. Erfurt: Rechserschen Buchhandlung, 1821. 388 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 BALANOVSKIY, V. _____(1786) e Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Translated and edited by M. Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. _____(1798) Anthropology, History, and Education, eds. Günter Zöller & Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. _____(1821) Lectures on Metaphysics. Translated and edited by K.Ameriks and S.Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. _____(1900- ). Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 Bd., Verlag von G.Reimer. Kitcher, P. Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Makkreel, R.A. Kant on the Scientic Status of Psychology, Anthropology, and History. In: Watkins, E. (ed.). Kant and the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.185-201. Meyer, J.B. Kant’s Psychologie. Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1870. Mischel, T. ‘Kant and the possibility of science of psychology.’ e Monist, vol. 51, no. 4 (1967), p. 599–622. Nayak, A.C., Sotnak, E. ‘Kant on the Impossibility of the “Soft Sciences”.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol.55, n.1(1995), p. 133-151. Nicholls, A., Liebscher, M. Introduction: inking the Unconscious. In: Nicholls, A., Liebscher, M. (eds.) inking the Unconscious: Nineteenth Century German ought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.1–25. Schmidt, C.M. ‘Kant’s transcendental and empirical psychology of cognition.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, n 39 (2008), p. 462-471. Sturm, T. Kant on Empirical Psychology: How Not to Investigate the Human Mind. In: Watkins, E. (ed.) Kant and the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 163-184. _____‘Why did Kant reject physiological explanations in his anthropology?’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, n 39 (2008), p.495-505. Platner, E. Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise. Leipzig: Dyck, 1772. Vasilyev, V.V. Filosofskaya psikhologiya v epokhu Prosveshcheniya [Philosophcal Psychology in an Age of Enlightenment]. Moscow: Kanon, 2010. (In Russian) Wilber, K. Integral Psychology: Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, erapy. Boston: Shambhala, 2000. aBstraCt: is study aims to show a similarity of Kant’s and Jung’s approaches to an issue of the possibility of scientic psychology, hence to explicate what they thought about the future of psychology. erefore, the article contains heuristic material, which can contribute in a resolving of such methodological task as searching of promising directions to improve philosophical and scientic psychology. To achieve the aim the author attempts to clarify an entity of Kant’s and Jung’s objections against even the possibility of scientic psychology and to nd out ways to overcome those objections in Kant’s and Jung’s works. e main methods were explication, reconstruction and comparative analysis of Kant’s and Jung’s views. As a result it was found, that Kant and Jung allocated one and the same obstacles, which, on their opinion, prevent psychology to become a science in the strict sense. ey are: 1) coincidence of subject and object in psychology; 2) impossibility to apply quantitative mathematic methods in psychology; 3) pendency of the issue of psychophysical parallelism. However, Kant and Jung indicated ways to resolve formulated by them fundamental diculties. All those ways lay through the searching a principle of interaction and connection between the psychic and the physical. I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 389 Keywords: I. Kant, C.G. Jung, science, empirical and rational psychology, analytical psychology, mathematic methods in psychology notes 1 Valentin Balanovskiy (PhD) is a researcher, Executive Director of the Academia Kantiana at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Russia) 2 Here and below I use the Cambridge edition of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Kant, 2004). 3 A more rigorous treatment of psychophysical parallelism is oered in Balanovskiy (2015). 4 See, for example, Jung (1975, pp. 9-10:213-215). 5 Schmidt gives a similar denition (2008, p.462). 6 Vasil’ev proposes to call the rst doctrine synthetic empirical psychology, and the second one analytical empirical psychology. 7 e inner sense is a way by which the subject observes itself and its own internal states (KrV, 04: 37). e form of inner sense is time (KrV, 04: 37), which has only one dimension, that is why objects of the inner sense (i.e. contents of the psyche with the possible exception of intuition of outer objects) cannot be intuited and presented a priori in space. But the last condition is necessary in order to establish a ‘proper’ science (MAN, 04: 471). At the same time, the inner sense is closely connected with the transcendental unity of apperception, without which the individual ‘I’, separated from other things, is unthinkable, and, consequently, psyche as such is unthinkable too. us, the diculties in the cognition of inner sense phenomena automatically become diculties in the science of human psyche. 8 Buchner notes that Kant could not keep in mind self-observation or introspection in the modern methodological sense (Buchner, 1897, p.47). 9 Here and below I use the Cambridge edition of Kant’s lectures on Metaphysics L1 (Kant, 1997). 10 Here and below I use the Cambridge edition of Kant’s works (Kant, 2007). 11 According to Makkreel, the distinction between mind (Gemüt) and spirit (Geist) can be found in Friedländer anthropology lectures (1775). He writes that “mind is dened as ‘the mode in which the soul is aected by things’, whereas spirit ‘is the subject that thinks, and is active’” (Makkreel, 2001, p. 193). 12 Sturm maintains that Kant had impact on the formation of the main idea developed by Fechner’s Elemente der Psychophysik, namely that the intensity of subjective perceptions can be measured by mathematical means (Sturm, 2001, pp. 167-168). 13 More information on the topic in Balanovskiy (Con-Textos Kantianos, 2016). 14More information on the topic in Balanovskiy (Voprosy Filosoi, 2016). 15 According to Jung, the ‘psychoid’ or ‘psychoid factor’ is the transcendent psychical, the bridge between the matter and the pure spirit (Jung, 1975, p.216). To be precise, this is the very border itself between matter and spirit, because animate and inanimate nature is available for our direct research, as pure ‘spirit’ or mental constructions (like ideas and notions) do. At the same time, the psychoid factor, like a thing-in-itself, always remains beyond the frames of possible cognition. Recebido / Received: 22.12.16 Aprovado / Approved: 04.02.17 Citations (0) References (21) ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication. Whether jung was a kantian? Article Full-text available Nov 2016 Valentin Balanovskiy Researchers often talk about a powerful heuristic potential of the Kantian heritage, but sometimes they do not show concrete examples in defense of this opinion outside Kantianism and Neo- Kantianism. This article contains an attempt to demonstrate that on the example of how efficiently C.G. Jung used Kant's ideas to construct the theoretical basis of analytical psychology in general and his conception of archetypes in particular, we can see the urgency of Kant's heritage not only for his direct spiritual successors. In addition the question is discussed: why did Jung claim that epistemologically he took his stand on Kant?. View Show abstract Kant and Cognitive Science Chapter May 2019 Andrew Brook View Kant on the Scientific Status of Psychology, Anthropology, and History Chapter Mar 2001 Rudolf A. Makkreel View Introduction: Thinking the unconscious Article Jan 2010 A. Nicholls Martin Liebscher In the entire world one does not speak of the unconscious since, according to its essence, it is unknown; only in Berlin does one speak of and know something about it, and explain to us what actually sets it apart. So wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in 1873, as part of his ironic response to the success of the Philosophy of the Unconscious (Philosophie des Unbewussten, 1869), written by the Berlin philosopher Eduard von Hartmann. If the influence of a concept can be gauged by the way in which it is received by the public at large, if not in academic circles, then Hartmann's volume, which ran to some eleven editions during his lifetime alone and was seen by some as introducing an entirely new Weltanschauung, might be regarded as marking one of the pinnacles of the career of das Unbewusste (the unconscious) during the nineteenth century. Although Hartmann's understanding of the unconscious was, like Freud's, subjected to a scathing critique at the hands of academic philosophy and psychology, it nevertheless took some half a century or so for Freud to supersede Hartmann's public role as the chief theorist and interpreter of the unconscious for the German-speaking public. Today the concept of the unconscious is arguably still first and foremost associated with Freud and with his successors such as Carl Gustav Jung and Jacques Lacan; in short: with psychoanalysis in general. View Show abstract Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious Book Apr 2012 Marco Sgarbi piero emilio Giordanetti R Pozzo The unconscious raises relevant problems in the theory of knowledge as regards non-conceptual contents and obscure representations. In the philosophy of mind, it bears on the topic of the unity of consciousness and the notion of the transcendental Self. It is a key-topic of logic with respect to the distinction between determinate-indeterminate judgments and prejudices, and in aesthetics it appears in connection with the problems of reflective judgments and of the genius. Finally, it is a relevant issue also in moral philosophy in defining the irrational aspects of the human being. The purpose of the present volume is to fill a substantial gap in Kant research while offering a comprehensive survey of the topic in different areas of research, such as history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and anthropology. © 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. All right reserved. View Show abstract Kant on Empirical Psychology Chapter Mar 2001 Thomas Sturm View Empirical, rational, and transcendental psychology: Psychology as science and as philosophy Chapter Jun 1992 Gary Hatfield The chapter places Kant's discussions of empirical and rational psychology in the context of previous discussions in Germany. It also considers the status of what might be called his "transcendental psychology" as an instance of a special kind of knowledge: transcendental philosophy. It is divided into sections that consider four topics: the refutation of traditional rational psychology in the Paralogisms; the contrast between traditional empirical psychology and the transcendental philosophy of the Deduction; Kant's appeal to an implicit psychology in his taxonomy and theory of cognitive faculties throughout the Critique of Pure Reason; and his new definitions of and support for empirical and rational psychology in the Doctrine of Method. View Show abstract Kant on the Impossibility of the "Soft Sciences" Article Mar 1995 Abhaya Nayak Eric Sotnak The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title. View Show abstract Kant and the Possibility of a Science of Psychology Article Jan 1967 Monist Theodore Mischel View Kant's Transcendental Psychology Article Oct 1992 Phil Rev Ralf Meerbote Patricia Kitcher View Show more Advertisement Recommendations Discover more Project Philosophical foundations of C. G. Jung's analytical psychology Valentin Balanovskiy View project Project Russian Philosophical and Psychological Thought of the End of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries and Analytical Psychology of C.G. Jung: Influence, Reception, Criticism Valentin Balanovskiy Ideas, as well as a personality of C.G. Jung are still the subject of great interest among professional community and a wide range of readers in Russia and foreign countries. However, there are not so many fundamental works, which explicate philosophical foundations of analytical psychology. At that the majority of such researches (which are still very rare) deal only with ideas of the narrow range of philosophers, whose influence admits Jung himself. More often in such works are mentioned only two names – I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer. Regarding an influence of Russian philosophical and psychological thought on the analytical psychology, it would be truth to say that in this area was made almost nothing. Hence, a reconstruction of historical-philosophical context and systemic philosophical conceptualization of Jung’s discoveries are strongly far from its finish. This research project is aimed to fulfill designated above lacuna in a studying of the philosophical foundations of analytical psychology. I plan to make a stress on a studying of different links between Russian philosophical and historical-philosophical thought and analytical psychology. These links are not limited to only perceiving and creative development of Jung’s ideas, as we can see by the example B.P. Vysheslavtsev (his ethics of transfigured Eros). These links spread much further and predominantly appear in the influence of monodualism of N. Grot, transcendentalism of E. Medtner, conception of destruction of S. Spielrein, and (according to E.V. Chernosvitov) on the forming of theoretical basis of Jung’s concept and the method of analytical psychology. Implementation of the project will allows integrating Jung’s heritage in more wide historical-philosophical context that will help to increase essentially a scope of the use of analytical psychology, which has a strong, but still insufficient explored, heuristic potential. The project also will give necessary material for an adequate estimation of Russian thinkers’ (Grot, Medtner, Spielrein, Vysheslavtsev) contribution to the development of Russian and foreign philosophy and psychology. To resolve this task it is particularly planned to introduce in scientific discourse the archive sources, which regard the issue of Vysheslavtsev’s and Jung’s mutual influence. ... [more] View project Project Role of the Transcendental Reflection in Implementation of the Power of Judgment by Judges Valentin Balanovskiy Elina Plotnikova According to Kant all activity of the subject - theoretical, practical and aesthetic - is connected with the implementation of the power of judgment. However, at the stage of making a judgment - th eoretical, practical or aesthetic – there is a high probability of an improper blending of the contents of consciousness, which leads to errors. In theoretical activity, flaws of the power of judgment can lead to false conclusions, in practical – to making wrong decisions that can cause damage both to the subject himself and to the subjects or objects with which he interacts. This becomes especially urgent in the context of making adjudications, on which people's lives depend. In "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant gives an example of a judge with flaws of power of judgment, who knows perfectly the laws, but does not know how to apply his knowledge to specific cases. It is therefore extremely important to understand why judges make errors when they implement the power of judgment, what are these errors are and how to avoid them. In particular, a means of minimizing the risk of error due to wrongful blending of dissimilar contents of consciousness in making judgments is transcendental reflection – is a complex differentiation tool that is inherent in our consciousness. It functions at three different levels: meta-level, transcendental level, and the level of formal logic. The study of the features of the functioning of transcendental reflection in judicial practice will allow not only to better understand the cause of the errors, but also to develop recommendations for their elimination. ... [more] View project Project C. G. Jung and N. O. Lossky on the Improving of Personality and Society: Comparative Analysis, Criticism, Modeling of Possible Scenarios of Future Valentin Balanovskiy With the development of new technologies and the automation of production and management processes, with the advent of more free time, the personal qualities of the individual and his ability to co ordinate with others will play an increasingly important role. Artificial assistants, as well as the new system of distribution of economic benefits, will allow many to rid themselves of the need to independently provide basic needs. On the one hand, it is good. On the other hand, the availability of leisure and new opportunities can be a great challenge. An undeveloped, poorly motivated person in the absence of external incentives and constraints, such as the need to independently meet their needs and interact with others, and with the availability of technological means, may pose a threat to themselves and society. On the one hand, such a person without the pressure of external circumstances may simply begin to degrade. On the other hand, progress gives everyone new opportunities. Now, any person becomes a big boss with a staff of artificial assistants. Thus, from how developed and mentally healthy the individual will depend how he will use his free time and technological resource. In turn, Jung and Lossky not only point the way to improving the personality through identifying and overcoming unconscious and egoistic inclinations, but also give an answer to the question of how a transformed personality can contribute to the evolution of society. ... [more] View project Article Full-text available Effect of indirect information on system trust and control allocation ¶ January 2008 · Behaviour and Information Technology Peter W. De Vries Cees Midden In contrast with most other experimental system trust research, this paper examines indirect information as a basis for trust. In experiment 1, the overall valence of an evaluation concerning a route planner was pitted against a consensus cue, i.e. a favourable opinion about the system endorsed by a minority versus a majority. A positive evaluation caused an increase of system trust, whereas a ... [Show full abstract] negative evaluation led to a decrease. Control allocation, i.e. choosing manual or automatic mode, however, remained unaffected. Furthermore, no effect was found of consensus; one explanation holds that, despite the absence of outcome feedback, displaying of routes on-screen provided interfering trust-relevant information. Focusing solely on the consensus effect in the absence of route display, experiment 2 revealed consensus to affect both trust and control allocation.These experiments show that trust-relevant information can be processed heuristically and systematically. Possibly, trust can also be based on direct information despite absence of feedback whether generated solutions are good or bad. View full-text Article Seventy Years in Philosophy of Mind: An Overview, with Emphasis on the Issue of Mental Causation January 2018 · Frontiers of Philosophy in China T. Horgan This paper is an opinionated overview of major developments in philosophy of mind during the past seventy years, with emphasis on the issue of mental causation. Its most prominent positions all embrace a broadly "naturalistic" or "materialistic" conception of human beings, and of mentalityand its place in nature. Included in this paper are discussions of analytical behaviorism, the psychophysical ... [Show full abstract] identity theory, functionalism, multiplerealizability and strong multiple realizability, supervenience, the causal exclusion problem, phenomenal mental states, wide content, contextualist causal compatibilism, agentive phenomenology, and the agent-exclusion problem. Read more Article Full-text available Frequency Discrimination. Assessing Global-Level and Element-Level Units in Memory May 1986 · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition Howard S Hock Lawrence Malcus Lynn Hasher Subjects' knowledge of how often various events occur was used to assess the retention of memory units for word-like strings of letters. A series of strings was presented at one of three exposure durations. Within the series, the frequencies of occurrence of different strings and of the letters composing the strings were varied orthogonally. At relatively long exposure durations, subjects could ... [Show full abstract] discriminate the frequency of occurrence for both strings and their constituent letters. The formation of global-level (string) memory units was indicated by judgments of string frequency being unaffected by either the frequencies of their component letters or experimental conditions (brief exposures) that prohibited accurate judgment of letter frequency. Although judgments of letter frequency were sometimes biased by the frequency of the strings containing the letters, the success with which the judgments discriminated different levels of letter frequency did not depend on the activation of string-level memory units. Furthermore, subjects' frequency judgments for letters were not predictable from their recall of the strings containing the letters. These results, which could not be explained by Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) "availability heuristic," provided evidence for the formation of element-level (letter) memory units. A converging experiment established that element-level frequency information could be abstracted from words as well as nonwords, and further, that this information was stored in long-term memory. View full-text Article Volume Composition and Evaluation Using Eye-Tracking Data January 2010 · ACM Transactions on Applied Perception Aidong Lu Ross Maciejewski David S. Ebert This article presents a method for automating rendering parameter selection to simplify tedious user interaction and improve the usability of visualization systems. Our approach acquires the important/interesting regions of a dataset through simple user interaction with an eye tracker. Based on this importance information, we automatically compute reasonable rendering parameters using a set of ... [Show full abstract] heuristic rules, which are adapted from visualization experience and psychophysical experiments. A user study has been conducted to evaluate these rendering parameters, and while the parameter selections for a specific visualization result are subjective, our approach provides good preliminary results for general users while allowing additional control adjustment. Furthermore, our system improves the interactivity of a visualization system by significantly reducing the required amount of parameter selections and providing good initial rendering parameters for newly acquired datasets of similar types. Read more Last Updated: 26 Sep 2020 Discover the world's research Join ResearchGate to find the people and research you need to help your work. Join for free ResearchGate iOS App Get it from the App Store now. Install Keep up with your stats and more Access scientific knowledge from anywhere or Discover by subject area Recruit researchers Join for free LoginEmail Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login PasswordForgot password? 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