id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cord-302937-3yivxfi8	Robertson, Christopher T	Indemnifying precaution: economic insights for regulation of a highly infectious disease	2020-05-30		.txt	text/plain	5935	327	48	For insights, we review health insurance moral hazard, agricultural infectious disease policy, and deterrence theory, but find that classic enforcement strategies of punishing noncompliant people are stymied. Under a strategy of social distancing, lockdown, or quarantine, individuals are directed or suggested to exercise precautions including staying home, closing businesses, wearing masks, and avoiding physical proximity to other persons. 17 For health insurance design, primary moral hazard may have a relatively small effect on risk-taking behavior, because individuals personally suffer many of the other risks associated with illness or injury (including pain, suffering, lost work, chance of death). In this case, although the risk does not approach zero, it is as if relative youth provides partial indemnity insurance against not only the healthcare costs, but also the pain, suffering, lost work, and chance of death that are associated with COVID-19 infection.	./cache/cord-302937-3yivxfi8.txt	./txt/cord-302937-3yivxfi8.txt