key: cord- -peakgsyp authors: walsh, james p title: social media and moral panics: assessing the effects of technological change on societal reaction date: - - journal: nan doi: . / sha: doc_id: cord_uid: peakgsyp answering calls for deeper consideration of the relationship between moral panics and emergent media systems, this exploratory article assesses the effects of social media – web-based venues that enable and encourage the production and exchange of user-generated content. contra claims of their empowering and deflationary consequences, it finds that, on balance, recent technological transformations unleash and intensify collective alarm. whether generating fear about social change, sharpening social distance, or offering new opportunities for vilifying outsiders, distorting communications, manipulating public opinion, and mobilizing embittered individuals, digital platforms and communications constitute significant targets, facilitators, and instruments of panic production. the conceptual implications of these findings are considered. technologies (for example, see flores-yeffal et al., ; hier, ; marwick, ; wright, ) . despite their insight and contributions, knowledge of social media's diverse effects remains scattered and fragmentary. thus, while some of this article's propositions can be gleaned from existing studies, it offers a systematic elaboration that aims to promote analytic balance and encourage productive exchanges that can orient future scholarship. after revisiting the media-moral panic relationship, this article assesses how social media escalate the frequency and intensity of overwrought reactions. while addressing several concrete examples, particularly the role of digital communications in promoting extremist agendas, as recent events concerning trumpism, brexit, the alt-right, and 'fake news' have shattered myths regarding their positive and empowering qualities, the focus of this article is more on general claims than particular findings. accordingly, rather than a final, definitive statement, it presents developmental suggestions and a heuristic that can, and should, be subjected to further scrutiny and debate. in the end, such preliminary efforts are significant as 'before we can pose questions of explanation, we must be aware of the character of the phenomenon we wish to explain' (smelser, : ) . while the identification and policing of deviance are perennial features of human groups, moral panics are 'unthinkable without the media' and are distinctive to modern, mass societies (critcher, : ) . in many respects, cohen and his contemporaries (cohen and young, ; hall et al., ; pearson, ) were the first to articulate the essential role of news-making in constructing social problems. beyond generating surplus visibility and making otherwise marginal behaviours appear pernicious and pervasive, the media represent an independent voice . by delineating moral boundaries and circulating dire predictions about monstrous others, the histrionic tenor of reporting sensitizes audiences, culminating in hardened sentiment and unbridled punitiveness (wright, ) . moreover, coverage translates 'stereotypes into actuality', elevating the actual and perceived severity of deviance (young, : ) . here, identifying affronts to moral order triggers virulent hostility, further marginalizing folk devils and amplifying their deviant attachments and identities. as a control culture is institutionalized, surveillance and intervention intensify, exposing additional deviance, confirming popular stereotypes and justifying further crackdowns (garland, ) . since cohen's research nearly a half-century ago, media systems have undergone sweeping transformation, leading many to question the continued relevance of his work. a particularly influential critique in these regards comes from mcrobbie and thornton ( ) . for them ( : ), cohen's emphasis on mass-broadcasting and its social and institutional correlates -a univocal press, hierarchical information flows, monolithic audiences -is untenable in the context of 'multi-mediated social worlds'. specifically, it is held that the proliferation of media sources encourages exposure to alternative, if not dissenting, claims and reactions, ensuring that 'hard and fast boundaries between 'normal' and 'deviant' are less common' (mcrobbie and thornton, ; - ; cf. tiffen, ) . moreover, expanded access to media technologies -portable camcorders, personal computers, editing software and so one -broadens the remit of expression, giving rise to media sources inflected with the interests of marginalized groups (coleman and ross, ) . able to 'produce their own media' and defended by 'niche and micromedia' (mcrobbie and thornton, : ) , folk devils are no longer powerless victims and can 'fight back' (mcrobbie, ; cf. deyoung, ; thornton, ) . consequently, deviant outsiders and their supporters display greater capacity to contest and short-circuit panicked reactions, outcomes that render the success of moral crusades 'much less certain' (mcrobbie and thornton, : ) . focused on the diversification of conventional media space, mcrobbie and thornton conducted their stock-taking precisely as media systems were being further destabilized. with the onset of the st century, digital platforms not only underpin but also constitute social life in affluent societies, with individuals' identities and relations at least partly cultivated through computing infrastructures (lupton, ) . among the most significant manifestations of 'digital societies' are social media. whether as social networking (facebook), micro-blogging (twitter), or photo -(instagram) and video-sharing (youtube) sites, social media have profoundly reconfigured the production and exchange of information. as 'many-to-many' systems of communication, they promote vernacular discourse and creativity, permitting ordinary users to produce and distribute staggering quantities of 'user-generated content' (keane, ; yar, ) . digital platforms are also displacing the mass media as an information source. finally, as loosely coupled networks of users, their structure not only promotes virality -the rapid and unpredictable diffusion of content -but also fosters an expansive virtual sociality (baym, ; . here, various attributes -'likes', 'retweets', hashtags (#), mentions (@) and so on -index and anchor communications, promoting awareness of others and uniting spatially dispersed users into communities of shared interest and identity (murthy, ) . while mcrobbie and thornton could not have anticipated these momentous shifts, contemporary scholarship assumes, either overtly or implicitly, that their corrective remains as, if not more, relevant today (for example, see carlson, ; carrabine, ; fischel, ; marres, ) . with information control representing a critical axis of power, social media are frequently depicted as an elite-challenging 'microphone for the masses' (murthy, ; cf. gerbaudo, ; jenkins, . here, the accessibility and sophistication of digital platforms is believed to empower ordinary citizens to make their own news, name issues as public concerns, and shape collective sentiment (coleman and ross, ; turner, ) . with knowledge production and image-making increasingly steered by non-experts, many perceive citizen journalism as breeding accounts of reality rooted in public-mindedness rather than sensationalism or commercial considerations (goode, ) . in light of such developments, noted panic scholars claim digital media are shifting 'the locus of definitional power', ensuring 'more voices are heard' (critcher, ) and generating 'new possibilities for resistance' (lindgren, (lindgren, : . thus, the increasingly nodal configuration of media space has attenuated moral guardians' influence, ensuring that panics are 'more likely to be blunted and scattered among competing narratives' (goode and ben-yehuda, : ; cf. le grand, ) . while mcrobbie and thornton's claims remain influential, their ability to convincingly order the evidence is considerably more limited than recent analysis suggests. in accentuating social media's progressive consequences -information pluralism and robust opportunities for citizens to access the public sphere and defuse frenzied reactionsexisting scholarship neglects how digital platforms are 'underdetermined' and doubleedged (monahan, ) . informed by such issues, the following offers a counterpoint, detailing how social media's affordances intensify the proclivity to panic. whether as objects of unease, sources of acrimonious division, or venues for staging moral contests, on balance, contemporary media systems promote febrile anxiety. changing communicative and informational conditions frequently incite moral restiveness. as cohen himself intimates ( cohen himself intimates ( [ : xvii), societies are regularly gripped by fears that, if improperly governed, new media will have deleterious effects on younger generations. the latest iteration of so-called 'media' (drotner, ) or 'techno-panics' (marwick, ) , reactions to social media encapsulate deep-seated anxieties about social change and the types of people it begets. like prior episodes involving 'dangerous' media, including 'penny dreadfuls', pinball machines, comic books and 'video nasties', youth are ambivalently constructed as threatened and threatening (springhall, ) . while anxieties have surfaced around vulnerability stemming from, inter alia, online predators, sexting, cyber-bullying, and exposure to violent and pornographic content (barak, ; gabriel, ; lynch, ; milosevic, ) , youth are also positioned as undisciplined and pathological, with social media branded a leading culprit. alongside being blamed for moral failings -obesity, addiction, disengagement, cultural vacuity, solipsism (baym, ; thurlow, ; szablewicz, ) -multi-media platforms have been linked to violent criminality. whether in relation to video game violence, the possibility of obtaining information about weaponry and prior incidents, or the promise of celebrity immortality offered through documenting their grievances and attacks, digital media have been maligned for encouraging school shootings and associated massacres (ruddock, ; sternheimer, ) . further, during the england riots, journalists and politicians referenced blackberry and twitter 'mobs', claiming teenage gangs employed digital communications to evade authorities, publicize lawlessness and coordinate anti-social behaviour (crump, ; fuchs, ) . such fears have frequently culminated in attempts by adult society to intensify surveillance, censorship, and control over online platforms. for such crusaders, who often utilize the very technologies they condemn to whip up outrage, techno-panics provide an alibi for manning the 'moral barricades' and reasserting the hegemony of their values (sternheimer, ) . thus, while they may empower grassroots actors and disturb social hierarchies, technological changes equally engender moral backlash and nostalgia. social media also reconfigure the external environment wherein panics occur. frequently valorized for encouraging connectedness and encounters with diverse others, upon closer inspection digital platforms exert centripetal force, producing 'filter bubbles' (pariser, ) and 'information silos' (mcintyre, ) which narrow social horizons and increase the likelihood of engaging with affective, and often acerbic, content. as news is increasingly digitally mediated, such dynamics reveal, pace mcrobbie and thornton ( ) , there is no one-to-one correspondence between media and message pluralism. able to curate content at the expense of professional gatekeepers, social media allow users to construct information ecologies that are personalized and restricted (sunstein, ) . such outcomes are exacerbated by social media's 'aggregative functionalities' (gerbaudo, ) : the use of promotional algorithms to deliver tailored content (rogers, ) . for example, by assessing the volume of 'clicks' (likes, shares, mentions, etc.) communications receive, facebook's customized news feed determines what is worthy of users' attention, filtering out stories deviating from extrapolations of their interests and preferences (mcintyre, ) . as this and related examples suggest, by amplifying users' biases and aversions, social media encourage confirmation bias and isomorphic social relations (powers, ) . social media also favour content likely to generate significant emotion and outrage. by promoting communications based on predicted popularity, they prioritize and reward virality and the intensity of reaction rather than veracity or the public interest (van dijck, ; yardi and boyd, ) . the result is the proliferation of 'click-bait', deliberately sensationalized content that captivates through affective arousal (vaidhyanathan, ) . more significantly, new media systems privilege incendiary communications. research suggests that, even for the most staid users, the frisson of disgust is too alluring as content unleashing fear and anger about out-groups is considerably more likely to garner attention and 'trend' (berger and milkman, ; vosoughi et al., ) . these dynamics ultimately appear contagious as messages' emotional valence 'infects' other users, influencing their subsequent interactions and escalating bitterness and antipathy within online environments (kramer et al., ; stark, ) . together such conditions promote anxious alarm. by allowing users to remain cloistered within their preferred tribes and visions of reality, digital platforms encourage misrecognition and distort understanding of social issues, making the acceptance of bloated rhetoric more likely (albright, ) . accordingly, they obstruct heterogeneous interactions and exposure to opposing perspectives, dynamics long identified as precluding the root causes of panics -intolerance and hostility (murthy, ) . finally, by inflating the visibility of inflammatory content, social media mobilize animosity towards common enemies and transform uneasy concern into full-blown panic. alongside breeding fissiparous societies, multi-media platforms can be wielded to engineer crises. historically, panics require the mass media to generate sufficient concern and indignation. social media expand the pathways of panic production. as detailed below, walsh by allowing ordinary netizens to identify and sanction transgression, they unleash participatory, crowd-sourced panics. additionally, as architectures of amplification, their structural features can be commandeered to promote moral contests that are surreptitious, automated, and finely calibrated in their transmission and targeting. conventional wisdom suggests that panics are spearheaded by seasoned and advantageously positioned activists and elites. by expanding capacities of media production and distribution, digital communications permit citizens to directly publicize issues and promote collective action. typically this has been associated with amateur news-making and attempts to document injustice and promote transparency and accountability (coleman and ross, ; walsh, a; yar, ) , but scholars have recently documented opposing trends, where social media are appropriated to define and enforce public morality. as lay actors increasingly participate in the exposure and sanctioning of deviance, distinctions between the media, the public and moral entrepreneurs are blurring, ensuring that panics stem from unorthodox sources and display new discursive and interactional contours. on the one hand, social media enable micro-crusades that, while lacking broad public appeal and support, are sustained by dispersed groups of devoted and technologically equipped citizens. whether employed to advance claims that harry potter promotes satanism and the occult to impressionable youth (sternheimer, ) or discredit public officials and assert a link between vaccinations and autism (erbschloe, ) , digital environments offer optimal arenas for uniting the conspiratorial. given their accessibility and ease-of-use, they obviate the need for elite participation, promoting patterns of mobilization around issues where all citizens potentially emerge as crusaders (hier, ) . moreover, social media's 'mob-ocratic' tendencies can activate collective effervescence (gerbaudo, ) , producing panics driven by mass collaboration. falling into this category are online 'firestorms' (johnen et al., ) , spontaneous and electric outbursts where the documentation and exposure of moral breaches -petty theft, public outbursts, drug use, sexual promiscuity, etc. -are rapidly disseminated, igniting interactive cascades of denigration (trottier, ; wright, ) . such episodes often culminate in digital vigilantism: forms of extra-judicial punitiveness -ostracism, doxing, harassment, job loss, physical attacks, death threats -that emerge from below (powell et al., ; trottier, ) . consequently, alongside increasing the frequency and velocity of panics, online environments appear to promote heightened virulence and excoriation. while underpinned by emergent technologies, forms of digitally mediated opprobrium are inseparable from late-modern social conditions as they offer a palliative for ontological precarity and allow otherwise atomized individuals to police social boundaries (ingraham and reeves, ; cf. bauman, ) . beyond expanding the profile of moral entrepreneurs, the networked and digital configuration of social media can also be marshalled to distort information flows, promote international journal of cultural studies ( ) incendiary content, and channel user experience and engagement. in such instances, digital platforms constitute architectures of amplification that allow interested parties to punch well above their weight. 'attention hacking' and media manipulation. on the one hand, digital platforms permit highly energized and sustained groups to sculpt public sentiment by maximizing the visibility of 'information pollution' and 'fake news' -arresting, sensational and morally tinged content designed to distort and agitate (kalsnes, ) . whether by steering communications, creating fake accounts, or exploiting digital interactions, techniques of 'attention hacking' can strategically influence engagement patterns and produce wildly disproportionate effects (marwick and lewis, ) . ultimately, by allowing users to eliminate ambiguity and delineate moral boundaries in publicly visible ways, sites like twitter and facebook generate new types of agency that can rapidly propel the ideas and identities of various outsiders into prominence (joosse, ). with their cacophonous character making it difficult to vet the integrity of content, digital platforms have been inundated with captivating, tendentious and skewed, if not entirely spurious, communications (news stories, videos, memes, blog posts, hashtags, etc.) to distort online conversations and mobilize receptive users. an exemplary case of digitally mediated crusades appeared during the american election as dedicated members of the 'alt-right', as well as digital mercenaries employed by the internet research agency (ira), a russia-backed 'troll farm', devoted considerable energy and resources to shaping political communication and behaviour. central to their efforts was the creation, sharing, liking and promotion of misinformation and provocative discourse about contentious sociocultural issues, including race relations, gun control, abortion, islamophobia and men's rights (bradshaw and howard, ; nagle, ; singer and brooking, ) . armed with an appreciation of digital platforms' value in shifting the parameters of public discourse, such actors succeeded in generating virality, obtaining mainstream press coverage, and inciting considerable outcry and anxiety (phillips, ) . more recently, the role of digital communication in spreading fake news and inciting panic was on full display in initial reactions to the novel coronavirus (covid- ), an infectious respiratory disease of zoonotic origin. following its emergence in wuhan, china in january , widespread scapegoating and fear-mongering erupted across social media. in relation to the former, the virus was racialized, with numerous messages linking it to the ostensibly exotic dietary practices and unsanitary behaviour of chinese populations, with representations depicting them as folk devils and dangerous, impure others (yang, ) . reflecting a 'politics of substitution' (jenkins, ) , such claims-making diverted attention from considerably more deadly (and preventable) diseases (e.g. malaria), as well as, the structural conditions -media censorship, political corruption, weakly enforced health and safety standards -underlying the emergence and rapid spread of the disease. digital platforms were also used to circulate misinformation and dire, if not apocalyptic, predictions with various rumours -whether false reports of positive cases and contaminated chinese imports, stories of individuals absconding from quarantine zones, or claims that the virus was a bioweapon developed by the chinese or american governments -outpacing official information during the early stages of the outbreak (bogle, ) . by contributing to a broader climate of suspicion, such communications appear to be reactivating fears of a 'yellow peril', as well as producing emergency measures (enhanced surveillance, quarantines, travel bans etc.) and everyday expressions of racism and anti-chinese sentiment (dingwall, ; palmer, ; yang, ) . as this example reveals, like prior epidemics (sars, aids, etc.) where media coverage promoted fear and opprobrium about various outsiders (gay men, drug users, foreigners; see muzzatti, ; ungar, ; watney, ) , digital communications also play a significant role in distorting understanding and encouraging over-reaction. the episode equally suggests, however, that social media's anonymous, horizontal structure ensures that messages travel exponentially faster, lack clear origins and feature palpable vitriol, outcomes that escalate the impetus and excess of alarm (miller, ) . the spread of information pollution frequently hinges on perceptions of social media as the embodiment of the vox populi (gerbaudo, ) . here, fake accounts are utilized to raise awareness and bolster the credibility of favoured content. on the one hand, advances in artificial intelligence allow bots -machine-led communications tools that mimic human users and perform simple, structurally repetitive, tasks -to spread 'computational propaganda' (bradshaw and howard, ; ferrara et al., ) . as social machines and artificial voices, bots automate and accelerate diffusion and engagement, creating, liking, sharing, and following content at rates vastly surpassing human capabilities. thus, they facilitate viral engineering; expanding the momentum of certain messages and, in the process, altering information flows. to exude authority and authenticity, content is also circulated by bogus, 'sockpuppet' accounts posing as those of accredited experts (scientists, journalists, etc.) or ordinary citizens belonging to various groups (women, blue-collar workers, police officers, urban youth, etc.) and appearing to possess folk wisdom (bastos and mercea, ; marwick and lewis, ) . whether manual or automated, techniques of media manipulation also control narratives by reducing the visibility of unwanted and objectionable content. here, keywords and hashtags affiliated with opposing perspectives can be 'hijacked' as platforms are flooded with nonsense or negative messages to disrupt and drown out specific communications, denuding them of their salience and influence (woolley and howard, ) . a recent example of such efforts is found in twitter communications concerning the intensity of the - australian bushfires, an outcome widely linked to the longer fire seasons produced by climate change. the preliminary results of research conducted by graham and keller ( ) suggests that, at the height of the crisis, a coordinated misinformation campaign was waged by a sprawling network of troll and bot accounts to advance broader narratives of climate denial. by flooding social media with hashtags like #arsonemergency (in place of #climateemergency) and co-opting those already trending (e.g. #australiafire, #bushfireaustralia), such actors sought to publicize conspiracies that criminal elements -whether arsonists, radical environmentalists, or isis fighters -were responsible for the blazes and that climate change is an elite-engineered hoax and form of population control (knaus, ) . finally, the propagation of misinformation involves attempts to harness social interaction and collective sense-making. studies suggest that distorted, emotionally charged content is considerably more likely to be shared by ordinary users who unwittingly enlarge its sphere of influence (albright, ; tanz, ) . by bearing the imprimatur international journal of cultural studies ( ) of whomever shared it, whether a relative, colleague, neighbour, or opinion leader, the substance of messages is validated and appears authentic as it spreads laterally across users' networks (van der linden, ) . for instance, on several occasions, accounts linked to the alt-right and russian operatives have successfully 'seeded' content, goading journalists, bloggers, activists, and politicians (including president trump) into endorsing particular communications and providing broader platforms (phillips, ) . since messages distributed through formal channels and hierarchical apparatuses are frequently perceived as self-serving and inauthentic, media manipulation provides a powerful vehicle of promotion. by engineering popularity and relevance, the discursive swarms unleashed by bots and fake accounts can generate an impression of credibility, unanimity and common sense, an outcome essential to normalizing particular modes of thought (chen, ) . ultimately, by concealing the authors and agendas behind communications, such practices facilitate shadow crusades and astroturfing (rubin, ) . while applicable to numerous topics, digitally mediated crusades are distinctly prominent in relation to issues -migration, crime and policing, or terrorism -identified as leading and recurrent sources of panic (hall et al., ; kidd-hewitt and osborne, ; odartey-wellington, ; walsh, walsh, , c welch and schuster, ) , as well as, central topics in online conversations during critical political moments (benkler et al., ; evolvi, ) . for instance, in their recent study of anti-immigrant crusades, flores-yeffal et al. ( ) observed how the indexing of social media communications through hashtags like #illegalsarecriminals and #wakeupamerica fostered networked discourses and connectedness, helping to construct scapegoats, circulate calls for action, and ensure that xenophobic rhetoric echoed throughout cyber-space (see also morgan and shaffer, ) . additionally, preceding the brexit referendum, supporters of the far-right uk independence party utilized digital platforms to trigger and inflate fears about foreigners, circulating contentious claims about workforce competition, cultural displacement, crime and terrorist infiltration (vaidhyanathan, ) . computational crusades. finally, social media unleash crusades that are data-driven, granular, and highly dynamic in their transmission and targeting. here, the digital surveillance and marketing infrastructures that underpin social media's profitability permit computational modelling of user data, promising greater awareness of audiences and encouraging claims-making practices involving extensive narrowcasting; behavioural and psychometric profiling; and the production of predictive knowledge. while empowering users as participants and agents of communication, digital platforms also render them legible as vast tranches of information about their attributes (e.g. gender, race, income), activities (e.g. hobbies, movements, browsing habits), and associations (e.g. relational ties, organizational memberships) are continuously scrutinized for commercial, legal and political purposes (nissenbaum, ) . once harvested, user data undergoes deep profiling, producing digital dossiers which sort individuals based on dozens, and potentially hundreds, of variables. consequently, audiences are less collectivities to be influenced en masse, than individually calculable units, arrangements that permit those possessing the necessary resources and technological literacy to target users with highly customized messages (zuboff, ) . accompanying geodemographic criteria, algorithms can identify and calculate expressive energies and subjective orientations -moods, sensibilities, and emotions. with advances in machine learning and sentiment analysis, digital communications can be analysed to map meaning structures, and discern personality traits on scales previously unimaginable (andrejevic, ; stark, ) . for example, cambridge analytica, a consulting firm hired to assist the trump campaign's online messaging, harvested data concerning online engagement for over million facebook users, pooling it with other information to develop a sprawling collection of psychographic profiles on potential voters and gauge their receptiveness to various messaging strategies (vaidhyanathan, ) . heralding the rise of communications that, while reaching immense audiences, are highly differentiated, it is estimated that, with the assistance of big data analytics, trump's campaign disseminated over million distinct online ads, with variations of individual messages, at times, surpassing , (singer and brooking, ) . big data also yields inferential and predictive knowledge, with computer models unearthing correlations, extrapolating information about users, and forecasting reactions. here, digital enclosures are mined to identify regularities against which users are continuously compared, outcomes that allow claims makers to anticipate content's likely resonance and develop flexible outreach strategies (baym, ) . practices of dataveillance are also recursive, as feedback in the form of engagement patterns is reflexively monitored to elaborate correlations and deepen knowledge of users (neuman et al., ) . accordingly, digital communications double as iterative experiments where multiple messages can be distributed simultaneously to survey reactions and refine techniques of persuasion (andrejevic, ) . in relation to panics, profiling user data liberates crusaders from 'monolithic massappeal, broadcast approach[es]' to issue mobilization (tufekci, ) . rather than attracting support through unifying, 'big tent' issues, dataveillance facilitates agile micro-targeted crusades. able to cleave populations into demographic and affective types, moral guardians can precisely 'hail' subjectivities, allowing them to combine mass transmission with individual connection and overcome what has traditionally been a hobson's choice between maximal exposure and intimate resonance. consequently, moral contests promise to become exponentially more sophisticated, ensuring overwrought discourse reaches, motivates and energizes its intended targets. moreover, given the expressive contours of panics, and the importance of emotions -anxiety, hostility, even hysteria -as levers of action (walby and spencer, ) , the mining, measurement and classification of affective states allows crusaders to viscerally connect with audiences and strengthen their messaging. as a distinct species of collective behaviour, moral panics represent contentious and intensely affective campaigns to police the parameters of public knowledge and morality. as such, they are necessarily dependent upon and constituted by claims-making, with interested parties historically seeking to actuate alarm by influencing the imagery and representations of the mainstream press, arrangements disrupted by recent upheavals in media space. to illuminate the complex relationship between panics and the broader socio-technical context in which they unfold, this article has surveyed the impact of digital communications, presenting a taxonomy of social media's effects on the issues, conditions and practices that incite collective alarm. while displaying elite-challenging potential, social media are ultimately janus-faced and contradictory. alongside providing emergent sources of unease, they cultivate facilitating conditions and offer ideal venues for constructing social problems. specifically, by elevating agitational discourse and promoting homophily, social media generate social friction and hostility. moreover, as instruments of panic production, new technologies reshape the identification and construction of deviance, both permitting lay participation and allowing various parties to manipulate public communications in ways that produce outsized, imperceptible and highly efficient influence. while gauging the precise effects of social media requires more rigorous scrutiny than can be provided here, the available evidence indicates that, all things considered, they inflate the incidence and severity of panics. on the one hand, various studies suggest that, as architectures of amplification, digital platforms reduce transaction costs and transform peripheral (as well as automated and artificial) voices into conspicuous claimants (vaidhyanathan, ) . they also appear to enhance the spread of information pollution, with scholarship revealing that, whether transmitted by algorithms or human agents, 'misinformation, polarizing, and conspiratorial content' (howard et al., : ) not only 'diffuse[s] significantly further, faster, [and] deeper' on social media (vosoughi et al., (vosoughi et al., : albright, ) but also, during the final days of the election, represented the most popular informational content on facebook, leading many to speculate that it played a decisive role in trump's victory (waisbord, ) . finally, evidence surrounding the extent to which gross distortions, extremist views and readily falsifiable conspiracies (such as the views that: climate change is a manufactured crisis, violent crime is at historic highs, undocumented migrants are overwhelmingly violent criminals, etc.) are being normalized as public idiom gives considerable cause for concern (mcintyre, ; scheufele and krause, ). beyond advancing understanding of the media-moral panic relationship, an important task in its own right, by initiating dialogue between theoretical expectations and empirical instances, the preceding analysis promotes conceptual refinement and renewal. specifically, accounting for social media's effects on panic production illuminates significant mutations surrounding the interactants, functions and communicative patterns that define contemporary crusades. first, as many-to-many systems of communication, social media promote novel patterns of participation, offering ordinary persons a greater role, facilitating spontaneous outbursts driven by multitudes and introducing automated, machine-led campaigns. additionally, in enabling new techniques of media manipulation, digital platforms contribute to the weaponization of panics. while conventional wisdom suggests that panics represent domestic affairs, oriented towards mobilizing support, acquiring power and status or manufacturing consent, the case of russia and information warfare suggests that normative conflict may be exogenously engineered to provoke significant social and psychological disruption. finally, in place of uniform messages and mass appeal, the combination of data-mining and behavioural profiling unleashes claims-making techniques that are inhabited and hyper-targeted. drawing attention to these features exposes significant transformations and bolsters the versatility and explanatory capacity of cohen's paradigm. thus, mirroring other recent interventions (falkof, ; joosse, ; wright, ) , by accounting for emergent social conditions, this article advances a nuanced, flexible framework rather than a fixed, uniform model. ultimately, exposing anomalous findings that push the limits of existing perspectives extends the concept's range of applicability, promoting a more robust framework capable of accommodating pivotal shifts in media space and the social relations they engender. alongside laying the foundation for further empirical applications, given the depth and rapidity of social change, such conceptual dexterity is an asset rather than a liability jewkes, ) . as an account of reaction and social problems construction, moral panic theory has traditionally emphasized the mass media's role in sculpting collective knowledge, arbitrating between the real and represented, and generating significant discrepancy between risk and response. this article suggests that, while the legacy press continues to play a significant role, with the ubiquity of digital platforms and technologies, the emergence and spread of panics is being reconstituted. in particular, scholars can further refine and expand the concept's range and impact by engaging with social media's diverse and far-reaching effects on the contours of collective alarm. while it is admittedly premature to predict what new attributes media systems will assume, and there is too much contingency to suggest that future developments will follow an inexorable path, it is hoped that, by taking technological change into account, the idea of moral panic will continue to influence understandings of how fear and transgression are mobilized for varied purposes. the author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. notes . in a striking example of online shaming and digitally mediated outrage, moral entrepreneurs associated with anti-paedophile activism in canada, the uk, and russia have all employed digital platforms to investigate, identify, expose and censure suspected sex offenders (favarel-garrigues, ; trottier, ) . . citing donald trump's rise as a charismatic political maverick, joosse ( ) argues that non-traditional media are ideally suited for producing and reiterating simplistic and highly resonant moral categories, outcomes that can endow otherwise peripheral parties with significant power and influence. . while a full discussion exceeds the scope of this article, the alt-right encompasses an illdefined amalgam of actors (white nationalists, men's rights activists, palaeo-conservatives, nativists, etc.) united by opposition to 'identity politics', multiculturalism, and perceived 'political correctness' (hawley, ; nagle, ) . . for instance, videos of chinese citizens eating bats, rodents, snakes and other 'dirty' or 'exotic' wildlife were quickly posted and widely distributed across various social networking sites (palmer, ) . . surveys from the usa reveal one-quarter of respondents have knowingly shared misinformation on social media (barthel et al., ) . . russian operatives also contributed to such efforts, distributing content and even organizing protests through fake twitter and facebook accounts (singer and brooking, ) . . research reveals, for instance, that various attributes -sexuality, religiosity, education, etc. -can be reliably predicted from patterns involving the single data point, facebook 'likes' (markovikj et al., ) . . for example, during the election, content from just six russian-backed facebook accounts garnered million shares and nearly million interactions on the platform (matsakis, ) . additionally, whether deployed by foreign agents or domestic extremists, bots produced one-third of posts concerning the brexit vote, despite representing just % of active twitter accounts (narayanan et al., ) . . for instance, over two-thirds of americans claim that fake news has left them disoriented and confused about basic facts (barthel et al., ) , while another survey revealed % of americans familiar with a fake news headline thought it was accurate (roozenbeek and van der linden, ). mcrobbie and thornton's ( ) critique continues to be cited as a core 'dimension of dispute facebook's . billion active users leave roughly , comments per minute and share over billion posts per day two-thirds of american adults obtained some of their news from social media (shearer and gottfried, ), while, for british and north american youth, it represents their primary news source an exemplary case is pekka-eric auvinen a finnish shooter deemed the 'youtube gunman' after using the video-sharing site to publicize his actions, espouse 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politics| political communication, computational propaganda, and autonomous agents: introduction moral panics as enacted melodramas making sense of moral panics a new virus stirs up ancient hatred. cnn the cultural imaginary of the internet dynamic debates: an analysis of group polarization over time on twitter the drugtakers. london: macgibbon and kee big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization international journal of cultural studies ( ) james p walsh is an assistant professor of criminology at the university of ontario institute of technology. in addition to moral panics, his research focuses on crime and media; surveillance; and border security and migration policing. key: cord- - mw k yu authors: wang, wei; liang, qiaozhuan; mahto, raj v.; deng, wei; zhang, stephen x. title: entrepreneurial entry: the role of social media date: - - journal: technol forecast soc change doi: . /j.techfore. . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: mw k yu despite the exponential growth of social media use, whether and how social media use may affect entrepreneurial entry remains a key research gap. in this study we examine whether individuals’ social media use influences their entrepreneurial entry. drawing on social network theory, we argue that social media use allows individuals to obtain valuable social capital, as indicated by their offline social network, which increases their entrepreneurial entry. we further posit the relationship between social media use and entrepreneurial entry depends on individuals’ trust propensity based on the nature of social media as weak ties. our model was supported by a nationally representative survey of , adults in china over two years. as the first paper on the role of social media on entrepreneurial entry, we hope our research highlights and puts forward research intersecting social media and entrepreneurship. social media, defined as online social networking platforms for individuals to connect and communicate with others (e.g., facebook), has attracted billions of users. an emerging body of literature suggests that social media enables entrepreneurs to obtain knowledge about customers or opportunities, mobilize resources to progress their ventures, and manage customer relationships after venture launch (cheng & shiu, ; de zubielqui & jones, ; drummond et al., ) . further, social media allows entrepreneurs to efficiently manage their online relationships and reinforce their offline relationships (smith et al., ; thomas et al., ; wang et al., ) . despite much research on the impact of social media on the launch and post-launch stages of the entrepreneurial process (bird & schjoedt, ; gruber, ; ratinho et al., ) , there is little research on the impact of social media on the pre-launch stage, the first of the three stages of the entrepreneurial process (gruber, ) . despite the popularity of social media, it remains unclear whether and how social media affects individuals at the prelaunch stage of the entrepreneurial process, given social media consists of weak ties and substantial noise from false, inaccurate or even fake information, which may or may not benefit its users. in this study, we aim to contribute to the literature by investigating whether individuals' social media use affects their entrepreneurial entry based on social network theory. we argue that a higher social media use will allow an individual to develop a larger online social network and accumulate a greater amount of social capital, which facilitates entrepreneurial entry. a larger social network may facilitate individuals' information and knowledge seeking activities (grossman et al., ; miller et al., ) , which have a significant impact on their ability to generate and implement entrepreneurial ideas in the pre-launch stage (bhimani et al., ; cheng & shiu, ; orlandi et al., ) . social media, unlike offline face-to-face social networks, allows a user to develop a large social network beyond their geographical area without incurring significant effort and monetary cost (pang, ; smith et al., ) . the large social network arising from social media further enables social media users to build larger offline networks beyond their geographical proximity. hence, we argue that individuals' social media use has a positive impact on their offline network, which facilitates their entrepreneurial entry. however, social media is dominated by weak ties, and individuals with low trust propensity may not trust other online users easily so they are cautious about online information and knowledge. thus, we propose that trust propensity, an individual's tendency to believe in others (choi, ; gefen et al., ) , moderates the relationship between social media use and entrepreneurial entry. fig. displays the proposed model. we assessed the proposed model on a publicly available dataset of china family panel studies (cfps), which consists of a sample of nationally representative adults. our findings reveal that social media use https://doi.org/ . /j.techfore. . received august ; accepted september has a positive impact on entrepreneurial entry with individuals' offline network serving as a partial mediator. further, the findings confirm that individuals' trust propensity moderates the relationship between their social media use and entrepreneurial entry, with the relationship becoming weaker for individuals with high trust propensity. our study makes several important contributions to the literature. first, we contribute to the emerging entrepreneurship literature on an individual's transition to entrepreneurship by identifying factors contributing to the actual transition (mahto & mcdowell, ) . the identification of social media use addresses mahto and mcdowell's ( ) call for more research on novel antecedents of individuals' actual transition to starting entrepreneurship. to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the role of social media on individuals' entrepreneurial entry using social network theory. the research on social media in entrepreneurship area has focused on post-launch phases of entrepreneurship (cheng & shiu, ; drummond et al., ; mumi et al., ) , while research on individuals at the pre-launch stage of the entrepreneurial process is lacking. second, our study specified a mechanism for the impact of individuals' social media use on entrepreneurial entry via their offline network and used instrumental variables to help infer the causality. yu et al. ( yu et al. ( , p. noted that "specifying mediation models is essential to the advancement and maturation of particular research domains. as noted, mathieu et al. ( : ) write, 'developing an understanding of the underlying mechanisms or mediators (i.e., m), through which x predicts y, or x → m → y relationships, is what moves organizational research beyond dust-bowl empiricism and toward a true science.'" third, we contribute to the limited stream of research in the entrepreneurship literature on the networking of individuals in the prelaunch phase which has focused on networking offline (dimitratos et al., ; johannisson, ; klyver & foley, ) . instead, we offer a clearer picture of networking for entrepreneurship by connecting the literature on online social media use (fischer & reuber, ; smith et al., ) with offline social networks and entrepreneurial entry. the paper is organized as follows. the next section, section , provides an overview of the social capital theory and associated literature used to construct arguments for hypothesis development. section , data and methods, reports the context, method, and the variables. section reports the results of the statistical analysis, instrumental variable analysis to address endogeneity concerns, and an assessment of robustness checks. section discusses the study findings, outlines key study limitations, and provides guidance for future research and section concludes. social capital theory (rutten & boekema, ) is a popular theoretical framework among management scholars. more recently, the theory has been increasingly used by entrepreneurship scholars to explain behaviors at the levels of both the individual (e.g., entrepreneurs) and firm (e.g., new ventures) (dimitratos et al., ; klyver & foley, ; mcadam et al., ) . according to the theory, the network of an individual has a significant influence on an individual's behavior (e.g., seeking a specific job) and outcomes (e.g., getting the desired job). in the theory, the network represents important capital, referred to as social capital, that produces outcomes valued by individuals (mariotti & delbridge, ) . social capital allows an individual to obtain benefits by virtue of their membership in the social network. the underlying assumption of social capital is, "it's not what you know, it's who you know" (woolcock and narayan ( ) , p. ). for example, people with higher social capital are more likely to find a job (granovetter, ) or progress in their career (gabby & zuckerman, ) . for firms, social capital offers the ability to overcome the liability of newness or resource scarcity (mariotti & delbridge, ) . in entrepreneurship literature, scholars have used social capital to explain resource mobilization and pursuit of an opportunity by both entrepreneurs and small firms (dubini & aldrich, ; stuart & sorenson, ) . at the individual level, entrepreneurs embedded in a network are more likely to overcome challenges of resource scarcity and act promptly to launch a venture to capitalize on an opportunity (klyver & hindle, ) . for example, high social competence entrepreneurs establish strategic networks to obtain information, resources and more strategic business contacts (baron & markman, ) . mahto, ahluwalia and walsh ( ) supported the role of social capital by arguing that entrepreneurs with high social capital are more likely to succeed in obtaining venture capital funding. further, entrepreneurship scholars have argued that social networks influence entrepreneurs' decisions and the probability of executing a plan (davidsson & honig, ; jack & anderson, ; ratinho et al., ) . in women entrepreneurs, the presence of a robust social network is a key determinant of success (mcadam et al., ) . research suggests that the extent of a social network determines which resources entrepreneurs can obtain (jenssen & koenig, ; witt, ) . in the entrepreneurial context, scholars have also examined the influence of social networking at the firm level. for example, new and small firms often use a strong social network to overcome the liability of newness or smallness to pursue growth opportunities (galkina & chetty, ; mariotti & delbridge, ) . entrepreneurial ventures with limited resources often rely on their networks to obtain information and knowledge about consumers, competitors and networks in a foreign market (lu & beamish, ; wright & dana, ; yeung, ) . in the internationalization context, it is almost impossible for entrepreneurial firms to enter a foreign market without a robust social network (galkina & chetty, ) . it is well documented that new firms commonly use strategic networking for resources and capabilities (e.g., research and development) unavailable within the firm. the research on social networks in the entrepreneurship area is robust, but is focused almost exclusively on traditional offline social wang, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) networks with limited attention to the dominant online social media. as offline social networks and online social networks differ significantly in terms of strength of ties (i.e., weak ties vs. strong ties) between network associates (filiposka et al., ; rosen et al., ; subrahmanyam et al., ) , empirical findings from traditional offline social networks may not be applicable to online social networks because offline social networks are dominated by strong ties while online social media are dominated by weak ties (filiposka et al., ) , and strong ties are based on a high degree of trust and reciprocity while weak ties have low trust and reciprocity. this significantly limits our understanding of entrepreneurial phenomena in the context of online social media. further, the research on social networks has also paid limited attention to the pre-launch phase of the entrepreneurial process, focusing mostly on entrepreneurs and established entrepreneurial ventures. finally, as offline social networks, which have strong ties, are the main context of the literature, the role of individual trust propensity remains unexplored as well. this offers a unique opportunity to investigate the role of social media and individuals' trust propensity in the pre-launch phase of the entrepreneurial process. the widespread adoption of the internet has led to an exponential growth in social media around the world. we refer to social media as "online services that support social interactions among users through greatly accessible and scalable web-or mobile-based publishing techniques" (cheng & shiu, , p. ) . social media, using advanced information and communication technologies, offers its users the ability to connect, communicate, and engage with others on the platform (bhimani et al., ; kavota et al., ; orlandi et al., ) . some of the most popular social media companies in the world are facebook, twitter, qq, and wechat. the large number of users coupled with other benefits of social media platforms, such as marketing, engagement, and customer relationship management, have attracted firms and organizations to these platforms. for example, firms have used social media to build an effective business relationship with their customers (steinhoff et al., ) , create brand loyalty (helme-guizon & magnoni, ), and engage in knowledge acquisition activities (muninger et al., ) . firms have also started adopting social media to enhance their internal operations by strengthening communication and collaboration in teams (raghuram et al., ) . thus, social media and its impact on firms and their environment has intrigued business and management scholars driving growth of the literature. recently, entrepreneurship scholars have begun exploring the impact of social media on entrepreneurial phenomena. limited research on social media in entrepreneurship suggests that social media allows entrepreneurial firms to enhance exposure (mumi et al., ) , mobilize resources (drummond et al., ) , and improve innovation performance (de zubielqui & jones, ) . this limited research, while enlightening, is devoted almost entirely to the post-launch stage of the entrepreneurial process, where a start-up is already in existence. the impact of social media on other stages of the entrepreneurial process, especially the launch stage (i.e., entrepreneurial entry), remains unexplored and is worthy of further scholarly exploration. for example, even though we know that social media can offer new effectual pathways for individuals by augmenting their social network, whether social media influences entrepreneurial entry or offline social networks remains unexplored. thus, our goal in this study is to address the gap in our understanding of the impact of social media on entrepreneurial entry. a social network refers to a network of friends and acquaintances tied with formal and informal connections (barnett et al., ) , that can exist both online and offline. social media is useful for creating, expanding and managing networks. research suggests social media can be used to initiate weak ties (e.g., to start a new connection) and manage strong ties (i.e., to reinforce an existing connection) (smith et al., ) . similar to social interactions in a physical setting, people can interact with others and build connections in the virtual world of social media, which eliminates the need for a physical presence in the geographical proximity of the connection target. the lack of requirement for geographical proximity with the in-built relationship management tools in social media allows a user to connect with a significantly larger number of other users regardless of their physical location. the strength of relationships among connected users in social media is reflected by the level of interaction among them; users in a strong connection have a higher level of interaction and vice versa. however, given the probability of a much larger number of connections in social media, dominance of weak ties is accepted. when connected users, either online or offline, in a network reinforce their connection by enhancing their level of interaction in both mediums (i.e., offline and online), they strengthen ties. for example, when two connected users in social media engage in offline activities, they may enhance their offline social tie through the joint experience . research also informs that social media use helps reinforce or maintain the strength of relationships among offline friends (thomas et al., ) . social media allows people to communicate with their offline friends instantly and conveniently without the need to be in geographical proximity (barnett et al., ) . the opportunity to have a higher level of interaction at any time regardless of physical location offers social media users the ability to manage and enlarge their offline social network. further, social media can also be used to initiate offline ties directly. in the digital age, users can connect their friends and acquaintances to other friends and acquaintances on social media. social media platforms also recommend connections to users based on their user profile, preferences, and online activities to generate higher user engagement. for example, in china, when a user intends to connect with a person known to their friends or connections, they can ask their friends for a wechat name card recommendation. once connected online, users can extend their connection to their offline networks as well. as a result, higher social media use may enhance a user's offline social network. thus, we hypothesize: h . social media use of a user is positively associated with their offline social network. entrepreneurship, a context-dependent social process, is the exploitation of a market opportunity through a combination of available resources by entrepreneurs (shane & venkataraman, ) . the multistage process consists of: (a) the pre-launch stage, involving opportunity identification and evaluation, (b) the launch stage, involving business planning, resource acquisition, and entrepreneurial entry, and (c) the post-launch stage, involving venture development and growth (gruber, ) . our focus in this study is on entrepreneurial entry, which is the bridge between the pre-launch and launch stages of the entrepreneurial process, representing the transition from an individual to an entrepreneur (mahto & mcdowell, ; yeganegi et al., ) . entrepreneurial entry requires a viable entrepreneurial idea (i.e., opportunity) and resources (ratinho et al., ; ucbasaran et al., ) . individuals' social networks are important for researching and assessing entrepreneurial ideas (fiet et al., ) and accumulating valuable resources for entrepreneurial entry (grossman et al., ) . research suggests that networks play a crucial role in the success of entrepreneurs and their ventures (galkina & chetty, ; holm et al., ) . social networks allow individuals to access information and resources (chell & baines, ) . a larger social network allows entrepreneurs and smes to overcome resource scarcity for performance enhancement and expansion, especially international expansion (dimitratos et al., ; johannisson, ). although enlightening, the prior research on social networks in entrepreneurship has focused only on the traditional offline networks. in the digital age, social media has emerged as the key networking tool and enhanced individuals' ability to significantly enlarge their network and draw a higher social capital. these platforms allow entrepreneurs to efficiently manage both their online and offline networks and relationships . social media has significantly expanded the ability of individuals to network by removing geographical, cultural and professional boundaries. it allows people, separated by physical distance, to overcome the distance barrier to network and manage relations effectively (alarcóndel-amo et al., ; borst et al., ) . this is especially beneficial for an individual searching for entrepreneurial ideas that may be based on practices, trends, or business models emerging in the geographical locations of their network associates. as an example, jack ma of alibaba did not have to travel to the us to stumble upon the idea of an online commerce platform. social media allowed him to observe and obtain that information through network associates. while social media enlarges the social network of an individual with associates located beyond their geographical location, critics of the platform argue that such networks are mostly made up of weak ties lacking the strong ties of an offline network. however, individuals can still obtain useful and valuable information from abundant weak ties in such social networks (granovetter, ) . when accessing the network, the individuals have access to knowledge and information from various domains to inform their entrepreneurial ideas. further, the efficiency of social media allows for more effective and easy communications with distant individuals (alarcón-del-amo et al., ) . the improved communication with distant network associates allows individuals to strengthen their ties and obtain richer and reliable information. individuals may also obtain valuable access to new resources or new associates, who may support the formation of their new entrepreneurial venture. the distant network associates could also offer individuals additional resources in the form of entrepreneurial connections to new partners, buyers, suppliers, or talent, which all improve the chance of launching new ventures. it is well known that people, especially venture capitalists and investors, tend to minimize their risk by investing in known entrepreneurs rather than unknown entrepreneurs . thus, we believe social media use is beneficial for entrepreneurial entry. h . social media use is positively associated with entrepreneurial entry. social media significantly enhances individuals' capability to expand their networks by removing cultural, geographical, and professional boundaries, to manage and strengthen offline social relationships. according to prior research, offline networks can provide the spatially proximate information and resources relevant to entrepreneurial entry (levinthal & march, ; miller et al., ) . social media enhances the efficiency and reduces the transaction cost of communication with offline network associates, allowing individuals to use them for information, knowledge and resource search. a recombination of information and knowledge is key to generating and then evaluating entrepreneurial ideas for entrepreneurial entry. in an offline social network, an individual has a stronger relationship with network associates because of their face-to-face interactions and collective experience in geographical proximity. further, geographical proximity in an offline social network facilitates relationships in real life by augmenting face-to-face interactions via virtual means (kim et al., ) . the additional channel of communication via virtual social media allows individuals to obtain timely and richer information, which may help them benefit from the collective wisdom and capability of their higher social capital (orlikowski, ) to develop entrepreneurial opportunities. the richer information and better access to knowledge and resources all benefit their entrepreneurial entry. thus, with higher social media use, individuals will have an expanded offline social network, which provides them the resources needed for successful entrepreneurial entry. therefore, we propose: h . the offline social network mediates the relationship between social media use and entrepreneurial entry. trust propensity refers to an individual's tendency to trust others (choi, ; gefen et al., ) . trust propensity is a stable personality trait formed early in life through socialization and life experience (baer et al., ; warren et al., ) . like other ingrained personality traits, it affects an individual's behaviour, especially trust, in many situations (baer et al., ; friend et al., ) . for example, a customer with a high trust propensity is more likely to trust a salesperson without doubting their integrity (friend et al., ) . while trust propensity enables trust, it may leave individuals vulnerable due to reduced monitoring and reduced flow of new ideas (molina-morales et al., ) . furthermore, an individual with a high trust propensity may be inclined to obtain information from others indiscriminately and be locked into relationships. this may influence the individual's information processing capability. in the literature, trust propensity has attracted the attention of scholars seeking to explain not only the offline behavior of individuals, but also online behavior in social media platforms and virtual communities (lu et al., ; warren et al., ) . in social media, network associates are mostly connected through weak ties representing lack of trust and reciprocity. the existence of significant weak ties in social media makes the role of individual trust propensity critical. we believe trust propensity in social media moderates the impact of individuals' social media use on entrepreneurial entry by influencing their ability to network with strangers and known associates. further, prior findings in the literature suggest that trust influences entrepreneurial information searching and processing (keszey, ; molina-morales et al., ; wang et al., ) . this supports the possibility of trust propensity as the moderator of the link between social media use and entrepreneurial entry. in social media, the trust propensity of an individual influences their interaction and behavior (lu et al., ) . accordingly, an individual with a high trust propensity is more inclined to trust others. however, the trust in the relationship may not be mutual as the transacting party may lack the same trust propensity. as a result, the individual may fail to generate identical trust from the other individual thereby limiting the benefits of the relationship. with the aid of social media, an individual has the ability to access a large network of weak ties with remote individuals. this may allow the individual to obtain and validate information crucial to formalizing and finalizing an entrepreneurial idea. however, the advantage of higher social capital from access to a large network on social media may be eroded when individuals have a high trust propensity due to multiple factors. first, the network associates of individuals on social media vary significantly in terms of their trust propensity. the variations in the trust propensity of associates may result in them providing information via social media that may not always be reliable. in particular, network associates with low trust propensity may be reluctant to share valuable information. individuals with high trust propensity will treat a network associate and the information they provide with trust and without suspicion (peralta & saldanha, ; wang et al., ) . as a result, social media users may be exposed to both true and false information from associates. thus, such individuals are more likely to experience greater obstacles in distinguishing reliable information from unreliable noise, thereby incurring significantly higher information and resource search costs. the higher cost may hinder formation and finalization of an entrepreneurial idea and may hamper entrepreneurial entry. alternatively, individuals with low trust propensity are more likely to be more cautious (choi, ) . such individuals, due to their cautious attitude, are less likely to experience noise in their information and resource search, and thus may find it easier to distinguish reliable information from w. wang, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) unreliable information. as a result, the cost (i.e., monetary, labor, and time) of obtaining information and resources for such individuals is lower, which may significantly enhance the probability of entrepreneurial entry. second, in social interactions and transactions trust may trigger a lock-in effect (molina-morales et al., ) . the lock-in effect refers to a scenario where high trust propensity individuals interact only with a few trusted associates on social media. the lock-in effect prevents the individuals from benefiting from a higher social capital on social media. thus, a lock-in effect may significantly limit individuals' information and resource search to a limited number of associates, which may significantly impair development and formation of their entrepreneurial idea, and ultimately entrepreneurial entry. however, individuals with low trust propensity are less likely to suffer from the lock-in effect thereby increasing their probability of entrepreneurial entry. thus, we hypothesize: h . trust propensity moderates the relationship between social media use and entrepreneurial entry. we tested our proposed model on a sample of adults in china, a country with the world's largest population and the second highest total gross domestic product. china provides a rich setting for examining the link between social media and entrepreneurial entry for multiple reasons. first, china has experienced exponential growth in entrepreneurship and private enterprise development unleashed by economic transition (he et al., ) . the resulting entrepreneurial intensity provides a suitable context for investigating entrepreneurial phenomena including entrepreneurial entry. second, in china the adoption and use of social media is widespread with the world's largest number of users of internet (li et al., ) . the major american-based social media platforms, such as facebook, twitter, and instagram, were inaccessible in china at the time of the study (makri & schlegelmilch, ) , and people in china use other social media, such as wechat, qq, and sina weibo, which mirror or are similar to the american social media platforms (li et al., ) . our data is from the surveys of china family panel studies (cfps). cfps is a nationally representative longitudinal survey conducted every two years since by the institute of social science survey at peking university (xie & hu, ) . the cfps covers % of the chinese population in provinces, providing extensive individual-and familylevel economic and social life information. the data from cfps has been validated and used for research in entrepreneurship (barnett et al., ) and other fields (hou et al., ; sun et al., ) . the survey, first conducted in , had three follow-up waves in , , and . our study used data from the and waves, which started including variables on internet activities. the survey contains , observations from , families. we matched the samples in and through a unique identifier of the respondents. as our study focuses on the transition of an individual to an entrepreneur, we excluded respondents who had entrepreneurial entry, and our final study sample had , observations. entrepreneurial entry. the cpfs survey followed existing literature to operationalize entrepreneurial entry, an individual's entry into entrepreneurship, by whether (s)he started a business or became selfemployed (barnett et al., ; eesley & wang, ) . accordingly, in the study, entrepreneurial entry refers to whether the respondents became entrepreneurs within the two years between the and surveys. specifically, the cpfs surveys had a multiple choice question on employment information, where participants chose their current employment status among: (a) agricultural work for your family, (b) agricultural work for other families, (c) employed, (d) individual/private business/other self-employment, and (e) non-agricultural casual workers. we used option d to operationalize entrepreneurial entry, following barnett et al. ( ) . if the respondent did not choose option d in year but chose option d in year , (s)he transitioned to self-employment in those two years, and we dummy coded this individual on entrepreneurial entry. social media use. a primary use of social media on the internet is socializing (bhimani et al., ; hu et al., ) . social media is the main online platform where people connect to each other and share information (bahri et al., ) . the cpfs survey measured social media use by asking, "in general, how frequently do you use the internet to socialize?". the respondents selected an option from the following: ( ) everyday, ( ) - times per week, ( ) - times per week, ( ) - times per month, ( ) once per month, ( ) once per a few months, and ( ) never. as the scale was inverted, we reverse recoded it as minus the selected option to obtain the measure of social media use. offline social network. offline social network refers to an individual's network of associates in the real world. scholars have used a variety of measures to assess the social network of an individual, including the cost of maintaining the relationship (du et al., ; lei et al., ) . in china, the context of our study, a social network is composed primarily of family, friends, and close acquaintances (barnett et al., ) . an important means of maintaining such relationships is through exchanging gifts during important festivals, wedding and funeral ceremonies, and other occasions. thus, scholars have used gift expenses and receipts in the previous year to assess social networks in china (barnett et al., ; lei et al., ) . we focused only on expenses incurred on gifts as the cost of maintaining an offline social network. hence, we operationalized offline social networks by the question on "expenditure on gifts for social relations in the past months" from the cpfs survey. given that the expenditure is an amount, we transformed it using its natural log (ln (expenditure + )) (lei et al., ) . trust propensity. following the guidance of previous studies (chen et al., ; volland, ) , the cpfs survey assessed trust propensity by a single item scale that asked the extent to which a respondent trusts others. the respondents indicated their preference on a - scale. the data for trust propensity is from the survey. controls. in statistical analysis, we controlled for respondent demographics such as gender, age, and education. as age can correlate to people's resource availability, experience, and willingness to assume risk in a nonlinear fashion, we followed prior research to include the squared term of age as a control variable (belda & cabrer-borrás, ) . given the possibility of personal and family income influencing an individual's ability to finance a start-up (cetindamar et al., ; edelman & yli-renko, ) , we included it as a control variable in the analysis. all control variables are from the survey. we report descriptive statistics along with correlations among the study variables in table . table shows there is significant correlation among study variables, with most of the correlation coefficients below . . the negative correlation between age and social media use, at . , is the only exception. given the reported correlation among study variables, we rule out the possibility of multicollinearity in the sample. we further confirmed our inference by calculating variance inflation factors (vif), which were well below the threshold level of with the highest vif being . . w. wang, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) we used stata and spss to test our hypotheses. in the regression models, we used ordinary least squares regression to predict offline social network and logit regression to predict entrepreneurial entry. we report the results of hypothesis testing in table . in the table, model shows the impact of social media use on offline social network. the regression coefficient suggests that social media use has a positive and significant (β= . , p< . ) influence on the offline social network consistent with hypothesis h . thus, it provides support for h . in table , models and provide support for hypotheses h and h . the results of model show the main effect of social media use on entrepreneurial entry is significant (β= . , p< . ), thus providing support for h . in model , when we add offline social network, the coefficient of social media use decreases (β= . , p< . ) and the coefficient of offline social network becomes significant (β= . , p< . ). meanwhile, the chi-squared statistics suggest that the model improved significantly (Δχ = . , p< . ). the results offer preliminary support for hypothesis h (baron & kenny, ) . we further confirm h by using the bootstrapping method due to its inherent advantages (hayes, ; kenny & judd, ; preacher & hayes, ) over the technique of baron and kenny ( ) . we apply bootstrapping with model in spss process (hayes, ) . with bootstrapping samples, the results show that social media use has an indirect effect on entrepreneurial entry (β= . , % confidence interval: . - . ) while the direct effect is also significant (β= . , % confidence interval: . - . ). thus, the results support hypothesis h . the moderating effect of trust propensity is also reported in model of table . in the table, the interaction of social media use and trust propensity is significant and negative (β=- . , p< . ) along with a significant change from model to model (Δχ = . , p< . ). this notes: n refers to the sample size. ⁎ p < . ; ⁎⁎ p < . ; ⁎⁎⁎ p < . . notes: n refers to the sample size. standard errors in parentheses. ⁎ p < . , ⁎⁎ p < . , ⁎⁎⁎ p < . w. wang, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) provides support for hypothesis h . in fig. , we depict the moderating effects, where social media use of high trust propensity individuals has a weaker impact on entrepreneurial entry. additionally, model displays the results for all study variables, suggesting it is robust. we performed additional robustness checks by using alternative measurements for social media use and trust propensity. first, as social media is a communication channel on the internet, we used an item measuring the degree of importance of the internet as a communication channel as an alternative measure of social media use. the results of the analysis with alternative measures are in table and are largely consistent with our original analysis except for the moderating effect of trust propensity. second, because a high trust propensity individual is more likely to trust others, and vice-versa for a low trust propensity individual, we used an alternative dichotomous measure of whether people are mostly trustworthy or cautious when getting along with others for trust propensity. the results of the analysis with the alternative measure of trust propensity are reported in table and offer support for the moderating effect of trust propensity. we assessed endogeneity issues using the two-stage least squares instrumental variables ( sls-iv) approach. there is a possibility that social media use may not be fully exogenous and could be under the influence of certain unobservable characteristics that also influence offline social network. following prior literature (semadeni et al., notes: standard errors in parentheses. the sample size n varies because less missing values on the alternative measurement. social media use is measured with the item "how important is the internet as a communication path?" the answer is scored on a - scale from "very unimportant" to "very important". ⁎ p < . , ⁎⁎ p < . , ⁎⁎⁎ p < . w. wang, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) ), we treated social media use as an endogenous variable and reassessed our results on offline social network. in our model, we identified two instruments to investigate potential endogeneity issues. to investigate endogeneity, we used two instrumental variables (iv): ( ) online work and ( ) online entertainment. we operationalized the two ivs through the frequency of using the internet to work and the frequency of using the internet to entertain, respectively. first, as people can work or entertain on social media, we suggest that these two ivs are correlated with social media use and satisfy the correlation with the endogenous variable. second, the ivs should not be directly correlated with the error terms of estimations on offline social network because learning and entertainment are not the direct social activity but instead the users aim to learn and to entertain. hence, online learning and entertainment should not directly impact offline social network in a strong manner. empirically, in the first stage result in model , the results of the instruments on the potentially endogenous variable are, by and large, significant, suggesting the relevance of the instruments. also, the results of cragg-donald f-statistics show that the instruments are strong (f= . ). moreover, the results of overidentification estimations suggest that the instruments are exogenous (sargan statistics p= . ) (semadeni et al., ) . thus, the results statistically suggest that both ivs satisfy the conditions of qualifications as ivs. last but not least, both durbin (p< . ) and wu-hausman (p< . ) tests confirm the endogeneity. the results of the iv estimation, reported in table , are similar to the previous result. the outcomes of the two-stage estimations are consistent with the regression outcomes in the previous analysis. these outcomes empirically confirm that social media use positively affects offline social network, even after considering the endogeneity issues. despite social media being dominated by weak ties and the substantial noise of false, inaccurate or even fake information, our findings reveal that individuals with higher social media use tend to conduct entrepreneurial entry. it is consistent with the positive benefits of higher social capital or a larger social network (galkina & chetty, ; johanson & vahlne, ). our results suggest that higher social media use indicates a higher probability of a larger social media (online) network, which provides higher social capital that benefits entrepreneurial entry. our findings that the positive influence of offline social network on entrepreneurial entry is also due to the network effect extends the research on the offline social networks of entrepreneurs (chell & baines, ; dubini & aldrich, ; klyver & foley, ) . the literature suggests that social networks influence entrepreneurs' decision making and actions, and entrepreneurs require a strong social network to succeed in the entrepreneurial process (jenssen & koenig, ; witt, ) . our findings, using instrumental variable analysis, suggest that higher social media use enhances individuals' offline social networks. this finding is consistent with past evidence that users often used social networking sites to connect with family and friends (subrahmanyam et al., ) . unlike past studies that simply indicate an overlap between social media and offline network associates (mcmillan and morrison ( ) ), our instrumental variable analysis helps to establish the impact of online networks on offline networks, suggesting social media enhances offline networks and subsequently entrepreneurial entry. specifying mediation models is essential to the advancement of research domains and hence this study helps research on social media in entrepreneurship to further develop beyond its nascent stage (yu et al., ) . finally, our finding that trust propensity moderates the influence of social media use on individuals' entrepreneurial entry suggests that social media, which is dominated by weak ties and substantial noise from false, inaccurate or even fake information, is in fact beneficial to entrepreneurial entry. such benefit may be smaller for people who are notes: standard errors in parentheses. the sample size n varies because less missing values on the alternative measurement. trust propensity is measured with the item "in general, do you think that most people are trustworthy, or it is better to take greater caution when getting along with other people?". we code for the answer "most people are trustworthy" and for "the greater caution, the better". ⁎ p < . , ⁎⁎ p < . , ⁎⁎⁎ p < . table the results of instrumental variable analysis (n = , ). more trusting. specifically, our findings indicate that an individual's trust propensity plays a critical role in their use of social media and the outcome they experience. our results have important implications for practice. first, as social media can help individuals build networks that help with business resources and information both locally and remotely, people can target social media to help refine and validate entrepreneurial ideas and secure much needed resources for entrepreneurial launch. second, as individuals' trust propensity enhances or hinders the positive role of social media on entrepreneurial entry, potential entrepreneurs may specifically aim to apply more caution to their online contacts to obtain higher benefit from social media use for entrepreneurial entry. finally, given the role of social media in entrepreneurship, social media platforms may more specifically promote and facilitate networking of individuals to increase the level of entrepreneurial activity that can be enhanced via social media. our study has limitations and offers opportunity for further inquiry. first, theoretically, we used social network theory, and another theoretical framework may identify other possible mechanisms. for instance, an identification based theory may argue that social media use's influence on entrepreneurial entry could also be attributed to identity change in individuals due to network associates as theorized by mahto and mcdowell ( ) . however, given the lack of information about network associates on social media, identity change may be a remote probability. empirically, we operationalized offline social networks using gift expenses that serve as a proxy for the offline social network. the large nationally representative survey we used contained only expenditure on family relationships, yet individuals also need to expend similarly on gifts, eating out, etc. to maintain relationships with work acquaintances, partners, clients, former school mates, distant relatives, etc. hence, the expenditure on other relationships may mirror the expenditure on family relationships captured by this survey. we acknowledge these limitations and call for future research to search for alternative measures of social networks in other datasets. third, we caution readers in generalizing the findings of our study outside of china due to the study sample. china is different from other countries in terms of its cultural, legal, and social environment, which may affect respondent behavior on social media and entrepreneurial launch. thus, we suggest scholars empirically examine our model in other cultures. our study addresses the effect of social media on the entrepreneurship process, especially the pre-launch phase, by assessing the link between social media use and entrepreneurial entry. we use social capital theory to explain the link between social media use and entrepreneurial entry. we further argue that this relationship is contingent on individuals' trust propensity. thus, individuals with low trust propensity are more likely to benefit from social media use for entrepreneurial entry compared to individuals with high trust propensity. we also find that social media use strengthens individuals' offline social networks, which further aids their entrepreneurial entry. in conclusion, a key message is that social media can help individuals' transition to entrepreneurship. and practice, journal of applied psychology, journal of small business management, and family business review, etc. raj serves on editorial review boards of family business review and international entrepreneurship and management journal. he is also an associate editor of the journal of small business strategy and journal of small business management. wei deng is a phd candidate major in organization management at school of management, xi'an jiaotong university. his research interests include social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial bricolage, and female entrepreneurship. his research has been published in journal of business research, asia pacific journal of management, and others. stephen x. zhang is an associate professor of entrepreneurship and innovation at the university of adelaide. he studies how entrepreneurs and top management teams behave under uncertainties, such as the impact of major uncertainties in the contemporary world (e.g. covid- and ai) on people's lives and work. such research has also given stephen opportunities to raise more than us$ . million of grants in several countries. prior to his academic career, stephen has worked 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introduction to the china family panel studies (cfps). chin individual-level ambidexterity and entrepreneurial entry entrepreneurship in international business: an institutional perspective consequences of downward envy: a model of selfesteem threat, abusive supervision, and supervisory leader self-improvement key: cord- - goxwsx authors: oates, sarah title: the easy weaponization of social media: why profit has trumped security for u.s. companies date: - - journal: digi war doi: . /s - - -z sha: doc_id: cord_uid: goxwsx american-based social media companies have become active players in digital war, both by accident of design and a subsequent failure to address the threat due to concerns over profits. discussions about the negative role of social media in society generally address the myriad problems wrought by social media, including electoral manipulation, foreign disinformation, trolling, and deepfakes, as unfortunate side effects of a democratizing technology. this article argues that the design of social media fosters information warfare. with its current composition and lack of regulation, social media platforms such as facebook and twitter are active agents of disinformation, their destructive force in society outweighing their contributions to democracy. while this is not by deliberate design, the twin forces of capitalism and a lack of regulation of the world’s largest social media platforms have led to a situation in which social media are a key component of information war around the globe. this means that scholarly discussions should shift away from questions of ethics or actions (or lack thereof) on the part of social media companies to a frank focus on the security risk posed to democracy by social media. this article departs from the usual discussion of the role of social media in society by comparing its value to its destructive elements. the problem with trying to "balance" both the benefits of social media such as its challenge to censorship and ability to aggregate social movements against destructive elements such as disinformation and the loss of privacy suggests we can somehow offset one side against the other. but if social media are making a country vulnerable to a key component of modern warfare, that really cannot be "balanced" even by the ability of social media to give voice to those often ignored by the mainstream media or to allow citizens to find affinity groups online. it's like saying that we can find a "balance" for discussing other national security issues, such as the idea that while an enemy might have superior weapons, at least our nation spent more on social welfare over the past decade. it might be true, but it won't help you win the war when the tanks roll over your borders. as executives in silicon valley bristle at these ideas, let us first consider the nature of modern war and why information has become a key element of contemporary conflict. it is not so much that we need to understand the digital aspect of modern warfare; rather we need to see that digital warfare is a new way of understanding war in the digital age. digital war is the central, rather than peripheral, issue. according to the federation of american scientists, digital war is "a subset of what we call information war, involves non-physical attacks on information, information processes, and information infrastructure that compromise, alter, damage, disrupt, or destroy information and/or delay, confuse, deceive, and disrupt information processing and decision making." one of the most useful frames to consider information war is as the "fifth dimension" of warfare, joining land, sea, air, and space as spheres of battle (franz ) . information war is more precise than the notion of "cyber war" (hunker ) . indeed, the two concepts of "digital war" and "cyber war" are often conflated, given that "cyber" capabilities could be much broader than information operations and could embrace such tactics as dedicated denial of service (ddos) attacks to bring down servers, the takeover of critical infrastructure via online or local malware, or even drone attacks that are programmed from afar. that kind of conflation is actually not useful, in that it reduces information to a subset of a broader phenomenon and underplays the critical role of information in conflict. while it is disruptive for a country to lose access to the internet due to an attack on a server, this does not have the same insidious danger as subversive propaganda. cutting off access is an obvious act of war that has a clear solution. infiltrating a media system, especially social media, in order to sow seeds of distrust in a way that undermines political institutions is a far more insidious and corrosive act of aggression against a society. this discussion is focused on information war as it is carried out on social media, the battle for hearts and minds, as the most recent, critical development in modern warfare. social media play a very important part in that war and social media are a critical part of both attack and defense in modern warfare. indeed, information operations not only augment, but they often presage or even essentially replace conventional warfare. while the most publicized attack on democracy has been through attempted russian influence in the u.s. elections, countries in europe also have uncovered sustained anti-democracy campaigns by russians in countries ranging from estonia to the united kingdom. while the u.s. and other countries are aware of the threats and are responding, this article argues that it is difficult to have a robust response when u.s. social media companies are key distribution nodes of foreign disinformation. the ways in which narratives about coronavirus have become part of information warfare should sound a particularly ominous warning to democracies. a combination of fear, a large degree of unknown about the virus, as well as the rapid shifts in the evolution of the epidemic highlight how quickly disinformation can travel through social media at vulnerable moments. while national governments and major media outlets also are struggling with covering and framing the outbreak, social media platforms allow for authoritarian communication campaigns to widen and deepen the gaps between citizens and countries just when those connections are most desperately needed to combat an international health crisis. an example of this has been the attempt by authoritarian states (including china) to hint or even outright claim that the virus originated in a laboratory in the united states. now that it is impossible for social media companies to ignore the rising evidence of the central role of social media in inculcating conflict, they have defaulted to two key arguments in their defense: freedom of speech and the idea that the problem is limited to a fundamental misuse of their platforms. a core point emphasized by social media supporters was that the platforms were also vehicles for positive social change, such as in the arab spring, although the platforms showed very little ability or desire to adapt their programs to a range of national laws or norms. a article called "doing just business or just doing business" highlighted the problem: if internet companies choose to do business in china, for example, they must abide by china's censorship rules. in the case of the yahoo! email service, this meant turning over personal information on hong kong dissidents (dann and haddow ) . dann and haddow argued that the companies had violated their ethical standards, in that it was reasonable to surmise that turning over the information would have adverse consequences for their users. this ethical discussion, which took place before the current global reach of u.s. social media companies, now seems touchingly quaint. dann and haddow describe a world in which the main concerns were about privacy, censorship, and state surveillance, notably whether a country could compel an internet service provider to hand over personal information on its users. there was also disquiet about search engines being compliant with information filtering and collection regimes in non-free states. social media companies still face these challenges, but they pale in the face of the ability of states to weaponize social media for both domestic and international use. in particular, the way that social media companies organize users into affinity groups (for example, by friending on facebook or via hashtags on twitter) makes it remarkably easy to find ways to manipulate these groups. when you add on the way that social media companies sell audiences to advertisers by identifying key markers via user activity (friends, posts, clicks, likes, shares, etc.), you have the ability to manipulate both domestic and foreign audiences as never before. while there has been outrage over cambridge analytica, the same capacity to identify and manipulate social media users still lies at the heart of the social media business model. and there is little sustained outrage over that. social media companies would (and do) argue that it's unfair to blame the nature of social media itself if it winds up as the fifth dimension of warfare. siva vaidhyanathan disagrees: in his book antisocial media, vaidhyanathan asserts that the entire design of social media makes it the perfect carrier for disinformation and that social media companies do little to counter this. indeed, the arguments by mark zuckerberg and other social media officials are at best misinformed and, at worst, disingenuous. given the evidence of the weaponization of social media and the particular lack of foreign citizens to have any right of redress against u.s. companies, it is clear that unregulated and mostly unresponsive dominant media platforms are choosing not to fundamentally change their business model. indeed, shareholders in facebook, twitter, and similar companies would not wish for greater policing of their platforms. the central element of the social media business model is the argument that social media companies are platforms, not providers, of information. this is protected by section of the u.s. communication decency act, which states that "no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." this sounds a little circular but it means that the blame lies with the source of any problematic content, not the platform that provides the content. this has functioned as a get-out-of-jail-free card for facebook and other internet providers if someone, for example, harasses or bullies or even threatens an individual or group. at the same time, section has been hailed by internet advocates as protection of free speech, which is true, but also (inadvertently) creates a great opportunity for proponents of disinformation. section is a very liberal interpretation of u.s. law, which is quite protective of free speech to the point that even hate speech is permissible in the united states. this has created some friction in the united states, but the truly dangerous aspect isn't entirely domestic. it creates opportunities for digital war in two ways. first, it leaves the "digital borders" for disinformation more or less open for foreign states (this is aside from the problems of domestic disinformation). at the same time, as facebook became the dominant social media platform around the world, citizens in other countries find themselves in the same dilemma. while citizens and their leaders discover they need to use the u.s.-based platform in order to communicate and even govern, at the same time social media platforms such as facebook foster disinformation. they have introduced a communications system with a powerful virus of disinformation. this is exacerbated by the fact that facebook also owns whatsapp and instagram, which carry the same problems. a u.s. freedom of speech model has set up a system through which disinformation flourishes and undermines democracy in countries worldwide. it is not that social media companies are unaware or even naive about the way in which their platforms are used for disinformation. rather, there are strong economic incentives for keeping the current laissez-faire 'platform' model. there are three key parts to the model: the needs of the advertisers are primary over those of the users; there is almost no vetting of the identity of who is posting; and content is virtually unmoderated. when content is moderated, it is automated as much as possible and this, so far, has been fairly ineffective. ignoring the role of social media as the fifth dimension of war is lucrative, especially for facebook. according to facebook's annual report, the company had revenue of $ . billion and earned $ . billion. despite all the bad press about facebook in the wake of the russian election interference scandal, daily active users still increased by nine percent to . billion by the end of . the number of employees at facebook surged as well in , with the company reporting , workers at the end of , an increase of percent in a single year. overall, the company estimated that on average about . billion people used facebook at least every month by end of , an increase of eight percent in a single year. the company describes itself in the press release in this way: "founded in , facebook's mission is to give people the power to build community and bring the world closer together. people use facebook's apps and technologies to connect with friends and family, find communities and grow businesses." the self-description highlights the deliberate self-deception: while facebook does provide the services listed, it also furnishes an excellent way to spread malicious disinformation and propaganda to both domestic and foreign audiences. if we want to return to the question of business ethics, one could argue that facebook (and other social media companies) are continuing with a 'hands off' business model to keep costs down and profits up. and it's working. in the five years ended on december , (before the global financial shock from covid- ), facebook stock increased in value by about percent, while the nasdaq index was up about percent over the same period. allowing free access to the platform keeps revenue up and costs down. this raises the question of whether social media could change so that there would be a better balance between the benefits and the drawbacks for society, notably the weaponization of social media to promote foreign disinformation. the real problem is that the users are not the financial priority of facebook or almost any social media site. rather, the advertisers are the key customers being served by the platform. in addition, the investors (in the form of shareholders) also rank far above the users in terms of company priorities. almost any move made to protect the platform and its users from being used in digital war would adversely affect service to the advertisers and the shareholders. as the currency of social media platforms such as facebook is in the number of users, you should keep barriers to entry as low as possible. although facebook is slightly harder to join than twitter, it's still relatively easy to create fake accounts. changing a system in which artificial intelligence is overwhelmingly used to detect fake accounts would be expensive and cumbersome, but still possible (not least by having better ai). but there is a deeper problem. as the value of social media companies is based to a large degree on the number of users, it is not in the interest of the companies (or their shareholders) in either identifying fake accounts or in discouraging them in general. while social media companies may publicly condemn fake accounts and occasionally purge some, in reality fake accounts prop up their business model. content moderation is a more complex issue for social media companies. on the one hand, better content moderation would make a more pleasant experience for a user seeking to avoid extreme speech, pornography, trolling, or what could be considered culturally inappropriate elements of the public sphere (or inappropriate for a particular age or group). social media companies do moderate their content to screen out child pornography, extreme violence, etc., although even this is quite difficult. yet, emotionally charged subject matter drives engagement (celis et al. ). this dovetails with the need to attract consumers to the site so that they can be marketed to advertisers. thus, a quiet, calm public sphere is not the best for their business model. it's true that it would be much more expensive for social media companies to moderate either content or users in a more forceful and efficient way. but as with fake users, outrageous content also helps the bottom line. so it's a lose-lose for social media companies to police their users and their content, as it would be far more costly and actually might reduce engagement. so their reluctance to do so is more than financial or logistical. moderation works directly against their core economic interests as companies. if the economics of social media make it illogical for the platforms to change, how can we inculcate a shift in how social media works? if we stick to a dialogue that compares the benefits of social media to the problems of social media, we are unlikely to drive change. however, if citizens and policymakers alike can be made aware of the critical role of u.s. social media companies in supporting information operations by foreign states, then change is more likely. this means making the central role of information warfare in modern conflict much more visible and compelling. this will take a significant shift in thinking for citizens, democratic leaders, and social media companies alike: in the american laissez-faire freedom of speech model, it is assumed that misinformation and even disinformation are just part of the marketplace of ideas. however, this is a misconception in a world in which information is deployed into highly engaged, yet highly segregated, communities of voters who are essentially walled off from fact-based journalism and information. in the united states, russia and other foreign entities are able to deploy weapons of mass persuasion directly on vulnerable citizens, with both the vulnerabilities and the deployment system provided to a large degree by social media companies. this vulnerability also came into clearer view during the coronavirus epidemic, as propaganda released for financial and political gain added to the global 'infodemic.' in order to fully understand the role of social media companies in warfare, we need to return to the concept of the fifth dimension of war, i.e. information warfare. it is added to the first four dimensions of land, sea, air, and space. information warfare is, of course, not a new phenomenon but it is radically changed and augmented by the digital sphere. in particular, the advent and wide adoption of social media around the globe gave a unique and unprecedented opportunity for countries to carry out information operations on the citizens of other states. the design of social media allows foreign influence operations to identify key groups, infiltrate them, and manipulate them. in , russians were particularly interested in using wedge issues as ways to polarize and manipulate u.s. citizens and could be effective at doing this with trump supporters via social media (jamieson ) . in other words, the design of social media companies is no longer an issue of pros and cons. according to analysts such as vaidhayanathan, facebook's entire design creates the perfect operating theater for information warfare. with social media in its current state, this type of activity cannot be detected or curtailed in a reasonable way because it is embedded in the very nature of social media. it is so easy to pose as another, to gain trust, to polarize, and even convince people to change behavior that american corporations such as facebook create a low-cost weapon for foreign enemies. thus, american corporate ingenuity and business logic created a weapon that is deployed against americans themselves. this again brings up the problem of tradeoffs. americans are now accustomed to the affordances of social media, including the idea that it is "free" to the user. in point of fact, user activity is harvested and sold to advertisers, so users are working for the social media companies in exchange for access. few users, however, either realize or are particularly perturbed by that tradeoff. we could compare this to the rise of the automobile as a mode of transport. initially, cars were seen as independent luxury items and there were few rules to govern their use. the early automobile age was accompanied by chaos and a high rate of accidents. over time, governments took over regulation of the roads and-to a large degree-of car safety through the introduction of seat belts, anti-locking brakes, airbags, and other features. yet, almost , americans die in car accidents every year and tens of thousands more are injured. so americans do accept tradeoffs. but there has never been a national discussion about the security tradeoffs in social media. what is the level of safety that is necessary? how can we start a national conversation about this? why is it a mistake to leave this in the hands of companies? how can we maintain a robust online sphere, but keep it much safer? are citizens willing to pay for this, either directly or through government support? if the nature of the problem is framed as one of national security, can u.s. regulation work? regulating social media is enormously difficult and that's just in the united states, which has the advantage of being the headquarters of large western social media companies. much of this is due to excessive cyber-optimism in the united states, in particular as an echo of the origins of the internet as a research and educational tool outside of the commercial realm. although that aspect of the internet has been long overshadowed by the commercial web, there is no comprehensive set of laws to specifically regulate the internet. nor is there any public consensus on social media regulation, although just over half of americans now believe that major tech companies should be more heavily regulated. but according to the pew research center, republicans feel that tech companies might already interfere with content too much: percent of republicans suspect that tech companies censor political viewpoints. can americans be convinced that social media regulation is a security issue? we can turn to the issue of terrorism as a shift in thinking from civilian to defense issues. prior to / , the idea that u.s. citizens would go through body and luggage searches for all domestic flights would have been laughable. yet, americans and visitors now go through searches not only at airports, but in a wide range of other public spaces. while this is framed as a defense against foreign attacks, americans face significant threats from domestic terrorism. here is a silver lining to how illuminating the capabilities of social media as a tool for foreign actors to wage disinformation war against u.s. citizens is useful. american democracy also faces significant online domestic threats, from anti-vaxxers to hate groups to disinformation attacks on political opponents. politically, though, there is no will to frame social media as a key part of that problem; rather, the general narrative is that disinformation is an unfortunate side effect of the social media we cannot live without. to change this attitude on the part of americans and u.s. social media companies, it will take a radical shift in understanding how social media has opened up a new and (so far) asymmetric battlefield for enemies of the american state. american perception of conflict and security shifted radically with / . the threat of social media is much less visible and woven not only into the generally opaque nature of social media as people pose, pretend, and market themselves. it also comes at a time when the u.s. government is particularly weak as the political sphere is deeply split over the trump administration's actions. that being said, americans do seem to be waking up both to the threat and the lack of protection from social media companies. while russian interference is seen through a strictly partisan lens, chinese interference creates a much more unified response. nor have social media executives won themselves much praise for their disingenuous performance at congressional hearings. as the coronavirus pandemic has led to heightened awareness of both the importance and vulnerability of trustworthy information, this could be a watershed moment in understanding and valuing the communication ecosystem. youtube chief executive susan wojcicki said that the virus had been "an acceleration of our digital lives" and noted that it caused the platform to speed up changes to direct users to authoritative information. it is particularly relevant to consider how youtube addressed health disinformation in the coronavirus pandemic, in that a study by the oxford internet institute found that the platform had emerged as a "major purveyor of health and wellbeing information" (marchal et al. , p. ) . the washington post column that quoted wojcicki speculated that health disinformation was taken more seriously than political disinformation by social media platforms. the relative affordances of social media companies might baffle and confuse many americans, but security threats never baffle or confuse americans for long. all it will take is some relatively unified political leadership that can highlight this threat and americans may indeed be ready for significant changes to the current social media model. just as americans pay a security tax for every airline flight, they may be willing to endorse a model of social media that is forced to take responsibility for its users and content. this will likely mean much more stringent government regulation and a change from section . while this is disappointing for liberal concepts of free speech, free speech cannot work in a system in which it is weaponized by foreign adversaries. controlling polarization in personalization: an algorithmic framework just doing business or doing just business: google, microsoft, yahoo! and the business of censoring china's internet ks: school of advanced military studies, united states army command and general staff college cyber war and cyber power: issues for nato doctrine cyberwar: how russian hackers and trolls helped elect a president: what we don't, can't, and do know coronavirus news and information on youtube: a content analysis of popular search terms antisocial media: how facebook disconnects us and undermines democracy key: cord- -z ianbw authors: celliers, marlie; hattingh, marie title: a systematic review on fake news themes reported in literature date: - - journal: responsible design, implementation and use of information and communication technology doi: . / - - - - _ sha: doc_id: cord_uid: z ianbw in this systematic literature review, a study of the factors involved in the spreading of fake news, have been provided. in this review, the root causes of the spreading of fake news are identified to reduce the encouraging of such false information. to combat the spreading of fake news on social media, the reasons behind the spreading of fake news must first be identified. therefore, this literature review takes an early initiative to identify the possible reasons behind the spreading of fake news. the purpose of this literature review is to identify why individuals tend to share false information and to possibly help in detecting fake news before it spreads. the increase in use of social media exposes users to misleading information, satire and fake advertisements [ ] . fake news or misinformation is defined as fabricated information presented as the truth [ ] . it is the publication of known false information and sharing it amongst individuals [ ] . it is the intentional publishing of misleading information and can be verified as false through fact-checking [ ] . social media platforms allow individuals to fast share information with only a click of a single share button [ ] . in previous studies the effect of the spreading and exposure to misleading information have been investigated [ ] . some studies determined that everyone has problems with identifying fake news, not just users of a certain age, gender or education [ ] . the literacy and education of fake news is essential in the combating of the spreading of false information [ ] . this review identify and discuss the factors involved in the sharing and spreading of fake news. the outcome of this review should be to equip users with the abilities to detect and recognise misinformation and also to cultivate a desire to stop the spreading of false information [ ] . literature background the internet is mainly driven by advertising [ ] . websites with sensational headlines are very popular, which leads to advertising companies capitalising on the high traffic to the site [ ] . it was subsequently discovered that the creators of fake news websites and information could make money through automated advertising that rewards high traffic to their websites [ ] . the question remains how misinformation would then influence the public. the spreading of misinformation can cause confusion and unnecessary stress among the public [ ] . fake news that is purposely created to mislead and to cause harm to the public is referred to as digital disinformation [ ] . disinformation has the potential to cause issues, within minutes, for millions of people [ ] . disinformation has been known to disrupt election processes, create unease, disputes and hostility among the public [ ] . these days, the internet have become a vital part of our daily lives [ ] . traditional methods of acquiring information have nearly vanished to pave the way for social media platforms [ ] . it was reported in that facebook was the largest social media platform, hosting more . million users world-wide [ ] . the role of facebook in the spreading of fake news possibly has the biggest impact from all the social media platforms [ ] . it was reported that % of worldwide users get their news from facebook [ ] . % of facebook users have indicated that they have shared false information, either knowingly or not [ ] . the spreading of fake news is fuelled by social media platforms and it is happening at an alarming pace [ ] . in this systematic literature review, a qualitative methodology was followed. a thematic approach was implemented to determine the factors and sub-factors that contribute to the sharing and spreading of fake news. the study employed the following search terms: ("fake news" (near/ ) "social media") and (defin* or factors or tools) ("misinformation" (near/ ) "social media") and (defin* or factors or tools). in this literature review, only published journal articles between and were considered. this review is not be specific to certain sectors i.e. the health sector or the tourism sector but rather consider on all elements that contribute to individuals sharing false information. studies that are not in english have been excluded in this review. only studies that are related to the research question have been taken into account. this article does not discuss the detection of fake news but rather the reasons behind the spreading of fake news. the analysis consisted of four phases: identification phase; screening phase; eligibility phase and inclusion phase. when conducting this literature review, the selection of articles were based on three main criteria: firstly, to search for and select articles containing the search terms identified above; secondly, selection based on the title and abstract of the article and finally selection based on the content of the article. in the identification phase of this literature review, science direct and emerald insight were selected to perform the literature review. science direct offered a total of journal articles matching the search terms. emerald insight generated journal articles that matched the search terms. continuing with the identification phase, the various articles were then combined and the duplicates were removed. in the screening phase of the source selection, all the article titles were carefully screened and a few articles were excluded as unconvincing. the eligibility of the abstract in the remaining articles were consulted and some articles were excluded based on the possible content of the article. the rest of the articles were further thoroughly examined to determine if they were valuable and valid to this research paper. upon further evaluation, these final remaining articles were further studied to make a final source selection. in this paper, possible reasons for and factors contributing to the sharing and spreading of false information are discussed. the reasons are categorized under various factors highlighted in the journal articles used to answer the research question. these factors include: social factors, cognitive factors, political factors, financial factors and malicious factors. while conducting the literature review, articles highlighted the social factors; articles discussed the role that cognitive factors have in contributing to the sharing and spreading of fake news; articles highlighted the role of political factors; nine articles discussed how financial gain could convince a social media users to spread false information and articles debated malicious factors and the effect that malicious factors have on the sharing and spreading of false information. figure gives a breakdown of all articles containing references to all the subcategories listed above. it was clearly evident that the two single sub-categories of social comparison and hate propaganda were the most debated. with the sub-factor, knowledge and education, closely behind. a high percentage of the articles, . % ( of ), refer to the effects of social comparison on the spreading of false information; followed by . % ( of ) of the articles referencing hate propaganda. knowledge and education was measured at . % ( of ). furthermore, it was concluded that the majority of the articles highlighted a combination of the social factors i.e. conformity and peer influence, social comparison and satire and humorous fakes, which measures at . % ( of ). where the combination of the cognitive factors e.g. knowledge and education and ignorance measured at . % ( of ) . political factors and sub-factors e.g. political clickbaits and political bots/cyborgs, were discussed in . % ( of ) of the articles. in addition, financial factors e.g. advertising and financial clickbaits were referenced in . % ( of ) of the journal articles. and lastly, malicious factors e.g. malicious bots and cyborgs, hate propaganda and malicious clickbaits measured at . % ( of ). fake news stories are being promoted on social media platforms to deceive the public for ideological gain [ ] . in various articles it was stated that social media users are more likely to seek information from people who are more like-minded or congruent with their own opinions and attitudes [ , ] . conformity and peer influence. it is the need of an individual to match his or her behaviour to a specific social group [ ] . the desire that social media users have to enhance themselves on social media platforms could blur the lines between real information and false information [ ] . consequently, social media users will share information to gain social approval and to build their image [ ] . recent studies have shown that certain false information can be strengthened if it belongs to the individuals in the same social environment [ ] . the real power lies with those certain individuals who are more vocal or influential [ ] . the need for social media users to endorse information or a message can be driven by the perception the social media user has about the messenger [ ] . these messengers or "influencers" can be anyone ranging from celebrities to companies [ ] . studies show that messages on social media platforms, like twitter, gain amplification because the message or information is associated with certain users or influencers [ ] . information exchanging depends on the ratings or the influential users associated with the information [ ] . social media users' influence among peers enhance the impact and spreading of all types of information [ ] . these social media influencers have the ability to rapidly spread information to numerous social media users [ ] . the level of influence these influencers have, can amplify the impact of the information [ ] . the lack of related information in online communities could lead to individuals sharing the information based on the opinions and behaviours of others [ ] . some studies show that social media users will seek out or share information that reaffirms their beliefs or attitudes [ ] . social comparison. the whole driving force of the social media sphere is to post and share information [ ] . social comparison can be defined as certain members within the same social environment who share the same beliefs and opinions [ ] . when they are unable to evaluate certain information on their own, they adapt to compare themselves to other members, within the same environment, with the same beliefs and opinions [ ] . the nature of social media allows social media users to spread information in realtime [ ] . social media users generate interactions on social media platforms to gain "followers" and to get "likes" which lead to an increasing amount of fake news websites and accounts [ ] . one of the biggest problems faced in the fake news dilemma, is that social media users' newsfeed on social media platforms, like facebook, will generally be populated with the user's likes and beliefs, providing a breeding ground for users with like-minded beliefs to spread false information among each other [ ] . social media users like to pursue information from other members in their social media environment whose beliefs and opinions are most compatible with their own [ ] . social media algorithms designed to make suggestions or filter information based on the social media users' preferences [ ] . the "like" button on social media platforms, e.g. facebook, becomes a measuring tool for the quality of information, which could make social media users more willing to share the information if the information has received multiple likes [ ] . social media users' belief in certain information depends on the number of postings or "re-tweets" by other social media users who are involved in their social media sphere [ ] . one article mentioned that the false news spreading process can be related to the patterns of the distribution of news among social media users [ ] . the more a certain piece of information is shared and passed along the more power it gains [ ] . this "endorsing" behaviour results in the spreading of misleading information [ ] . it is also known as the "herding" behaviour and is common among social media where individuals review and comment on certain items [ ] . it is also referred to as the "bandwagon effect" where individuals blindly concentrate on certain information based on perceived trends [ ] . the only thing that matters is that the information falls in line with what the social media user wants to hear and believe [ ] . many studies also refer to it as the "filter bubble effect" where social media users use social media platforms to suggest or convince other social media users of their cause [ ] . communities form as a result of these filter bubbles where social media users cut themselves off from any other individual that might not share the same beliefs or opinions [ ] . it was found that social media users tend to read news or information that are ideologically similar to their own ideologies [ ] . satire and humorous fakes. some of the content on social media are designed to amuse users and are made to deceive people into thinking that it is real news [ ] . satire is referred to as criticising or mocking ideas or opinions of people in an entertaining or comical way [ , ] . these satire articles consist of jokes or forms of sarcasm that can be written by everyday social media users [ ] . most satire articles are designed to mislead and instruct certain individuals [ ] . some social media users will be convinced that it is true information and will thus share the information [ ] . the study of cognition is the ability of an individual to make sense of certain topics or information by executing a process of reasoning and understanding [ ] . it is the ability of an individual to understand thought and execute valid reasoning and understanding of concept [ ] . with an increasing amount of information being shared across social media platforms it can be challenging for social media users to determine which of the information is closest to the original source [ ] . the issue of individuals not having the ability to distinguish between real and fake news have been raised in many articles [ ] . users of social media tend to not investigate the information they are reading or sharing [ ] . this can therefore lead to the rapid sharing and spreading of any unchecked information across social media platforms [ ] . [ ] . the trustworthiness of a certain article is based on how successful the exchange of the articles are [ ] . the more successful the exchange, the more likely social media users will share the information [ ] . social media users make supposedly reasonable justifications to determine the authenticity of the information provided [ ] . people creating fake news websites and writing false information exploit the nonintellectual characteristics of some people [ ] . for social media users to determine if the information they received is true or false, expert judgement of content is needed [ ] . in a recent study, it was found that many social media users judge the credibility of certain information based on detail and presentation, rather than the source [ ] . some individuals determine the trustworthiness of information provided to them through social media on how much detail and content it contains [ ] . it is believed that people are unable to construe information when the information given to them, are conflicting with their existing knowledge base [ ] . most social media users lack the related information to make a thorough evaluation of the particular news source [ ] . for many years, companies and people have been creating fake news articles to capitalize on the non-intellectual characteristics of certain individuals [ ] . a driving force of the spreading of false information is that social media users undiscerningly forward false information [ ] a reason for the spreading of false information in many cases are inattentive individuals who do not realise that some websites mimic real websites [ ] . these false websites are designed to look like the real website but in essence only contain false information. social media users tend to share information containing a provocative headline, without investigating the facts and sources [ ] . the absence of fact-checking by social media users on social media platforms, increases the spreading of false information [ ] . social media users tend to share information without verifying the source or the reliability of the content [ ] . information found on social media platforms, like twitter, are sometimes not even read before they are being spread among users, without any investigation into the source of the information [ ] . as mentioned earlier in sect. . , the bandwagon effect causes individuals to share information without making valued judgement [ ] . the spreading of false political information have increased due to the emergence of streamline media environments [ ] . there has been a considerable amount of research done on the influence of fake news on the political environment [ , ] . by creating false political statements, voters can be convinced or persuaded to change their opinions [ ] . critics reported that in the national election in the uk (regarding the nation's withdrawal out of the eu) and the presidential election in the us, a number of false information was shared on social media platforms that have influenced the outcome of the results [ , ] . social media platforms, like facebook, came under fire in the us presidential election, when fake news stories from unchecked sources were spread among many users [ ] . the spreading of such fake news have the sole purpose of changing the public's opinion [ , ] . various techniques can be used to change the public's opinion. these techniques include repeatedly retweeting or sharing messages often with the use of bots or cyborgs [ ] . it also includes misleading hyperlinks that lures the social media user to more false information [ ] . political clickbaits. clickbaits are defined as sources that provide information but use misleading and sensational headiness to attract individuals [ ] . in the us presidential elections it was apparent that clickbaits were used to shape peoples' opinions [ ] . in a recent study it was found that % ( of ) false news stories were shared on social media platforms, like twitter, with links to non-credible news websites [ ] . webpages are purposely created to resemble real webpages for political gain [ ] . news sources with urls similar to the real website url have been known to spread political fake news pieces, which could influence the opinion of the public [ ] . political bots/cyborgs. a social media users' content online is managed by algorithms to reflect his or her prior choices [ ] . algorithms designed to fabricate reports are one of the main causes of the spreading of false information [ ] . in recent years, the rapid growth of fake news have led to the belief that cyborgs and bots are used to increase the spreading of misinformation on social media [ ] . in the us election social bots were used to lead social media users to fake news websites to influence their opinions on the candidates [ ] . hundreds of bots were created in the us presidential elections to lure people to websites with false information [ ] these social bots can spread information through social media platforms and participate in online social communities [ ] . one of the biggest problems with fake news is that it allows the writers to receive monetary incentives [ ] . misleading information and stories are promoted on social media platforms to deceive social media users for financial gain [ , ] . one of the main goals of fake news accounts are to generate traffic to their specific website [ ] . articles with attractive headlines lure social media users to share false information thousands of times [ ] . many companies use social media as a platform to advertise their products or to promote their products [ ] . advertising. people earn money through clicks and views [ ] . the more times the link is clicked the more advertising money is generated [ ] . every click corresponds to advertising revenue for the content creator [ ] . the more traffic companies or social media users get to their fake news page, the more profit through advertising can be earned [ ] . the only way to prevent financial gain for the content creator is inaction [ ] . most advertising companies are more interested in how many social media users will be exposed to their product rather than the possible false information displayed on the page where their advertisement is displayed [ ] . websites today are not restricted on the content displayed to the public, as long as they attract users [ ] . this explains how false information is monetized, providing monetary value for writers to display sensational false information [ ] . financial clickbaits. clickbaits are used to lure individuals to other websites or articles for financial gain [ ] . one of the main reasons for falsifying information is to earn money through clicks and views [ ] . writers focus on sensational headlines rather than truthful information [ ] . appeal rather than truthfulness drives information [ ] . these attractive headlines deceive individuals into sharing certain false information [ ] . clickbaits are purposely implemented to misguide or redirect social media users to increase the views and web traffic of certain websites for online advertising earnings [ ] . social media users end up spending only a short time on these websites [ ] . clickbaits have been indicated as one of the main reasons behind the spreading of false information [ ] . studies debating the trustworthiness of information and veracity analytics of online content have increased recently due to the rise in fake news stories [ ] . social media has become a useful way for individuals to share information and opinions about various topics [ ] . unfortunately, many users share information with malicious intent [ ] . malicious users, also referred to as "trolls", often engage in online communication to manipulate other social media users and to spread rumours [ ] . malicious websites are specifically created for the spreading of fake news [ ] . malicious entities use false information to disrupt daily activities like the health-sector environment, the stock markets or even the opinions people have on certain products [ ] . some online fake news stories are purposely designed to target victims [ ] . websites, like reddit, have been known as platforms where users can get exposed to bullying [ ] . some individuals have been known to use the social media platform to cause confusion and fear among others [ ] . malicious bots/cyborgs. malicious users, with the help of bots, target absent-minded individuals who do not check the article facts or source before sharing it on social media [ ] . these ai powered bots are designed to mimic human behaviour and characteristics, and are used to corrupt online conversations with unwanted and misleading advertisements [ ] . in recent studies it was found that social bots are being created to distribute malware and slander to damage an individual's beliefs and trust [ ] . hate propaganda. many argue that the sharing of false information fuel vindictive behaviour among social media users [ ] . some fake news websites or pages are specifically designed to harm a certain user's reputation [ , ] . social media influencers influence users' emotional and health outcomes [ ] . fake news creators specifically target users with false information [ ] . this false information is specifically designed to deceive and manipulate social media users [ ] . fake news stories like this, intend to mislead the public and generate false beliefs [ ] . in some cases, hackers have been known to send out fake requests to social media users to gain access to their personal information [ ] . the spreading of hoax has also become a problem on social media. the goal of hoaxes is to manipulate the opinion of the public and to maximize public attention [ ] . social spammers have also become more popular over the last few years with the goal to launch different kinds of attacks on social media users, for example spreading viruses or phishing [ ] . fake reviews have also been known to disrupt the online community through writing reviews that typically aim to direct people away from a certain product or person [ ] . another method used by various malicious users, is to purchase fake followers to spread harmful malware more swiftly [ ] . malicious clickbaits. it was reported on in a previous article that employees in a certain company clicked on a link, disguised as important information, where they provide sensitive and important information to perpetrators [ ] . malicious users intending to spread malware and phishing hide behind a fake account to further increase their activities [ ] . clickbaits in some cases are designed to disrupt interactions or to lure individuals into arguing in disturbed online interactions or communications [ ] . these clickbaits have also been known to include malicious code as part of the webpage [ ] . this will cause the social media users to download malware onto their device once they select the link [ ] . various articles were used to identify and study the factors and reasons involved in the sharing and spreading of misinformation on social media. upon retrieving multiple reasons for the spreading of false information, they were categorized into main factors and sub-factors. these factors included social factors, cognitive factors, political factors, financial factors and malicious factors. considering the rapidly expanding social media environment, it was found that especially social factors have a very significant influence in the sharing of fake news on social media platforms. its sub-factors of conformity and peer-influence; social comparison and satire and humorous fakes have great influence when deciding to share false information. secondly, it was concluded that malicious factors like hate propaganda also fuel the sharing of false information with the possibility to financially gain or to do harm. in addition, it was concluded from this review that knowledge and education plays a very important role in the sharing of false information, where social media users sometimes lack the logic, reasoning and understanding of certain information. it was also evident that social media users may sometimes be ignorant and indifferent when sharing and spreading information. fact-checking resources are available but the existence thereof is fairly unknown and therefore often unused. hopefully better knowledge and education will encourage a desire among social media users to be more aware of possible unchecked information and the sources of information and to stop the forwarding of false information. a better understanding of the motives behind the sharing of false information can potentially prepare social media users to be more vigilant when sharing information on social media. the goal of this literature review was only to identify the factors that drive the spreading of fake news on social media platforms and did not fully address the dilemma of combatting the sharing and spreading of false information. while this literature review sheds light on the motivations behind the spreading of false information, it does not highlight the ways in which one can detect false information. this proposes further suggestions for follow-up research or literature studies using these factors in an attempt to detect and limit or possibly eradicate the spreading of false information across social media platforms. despite the limitations of this literature review, it helps to educate and provide insightful knowledge to social media users who share information across social media platforms. algorithmic detection of misinformation and disinformation: gricean perspectives a survey on fake news and rumour detection techniques an overview of online fake news: characterization, detection, and discussion detecting fake news in social media networks why students share misinformation on social media: motivation, gender, and study-level differences the diffusion of misinformation on social media: temporal pattern, message, and source behind the cues: a benchmarking study for fake news detection why do people believe in fake news over the internet? an understanding from the perspective of existence of the habit of eating and drinking this is fake news': investigating the role of conformity to other users' views when commenting on and spreading disinformation in social media the current state of fake news: challenges and opportunities identifying fake news and fake users on twitter why do people share fake news? associations between the dark side of social media use and fake news sharing behavior history of fake news getting acquainted with social networks and apps: combating fake news on social media what the fake? assessing the extent of networked political spamming and bots in the propagation of #fakenews on twitter fake news: belief in post-truth real . keeping it real in digital media. disinformation destroys democracy democracy, information, and libraries in a time of post-truth discourse attention-based convolutional approach for misinformation identification from massive and noisy microblog posts third person effects of fake news: fake news regulation and media literacy interventions good news, bad news, and fake news: going beyond political literacy to democracy and libraries a computational approach for examining the roots and spreading patterns of fake news: evolution tree analysis effects of group arguments on rumor belief and transmission in online communities: an information cascade and group polarization perspective beyond misinformation: understanding and coping with the 'post-truth' era virtual zika transmission after the first u.s. case: who said what and how it spread on twitter distance-based customer detection in fake follower markets exploring users' motivations to participate in viral communication on social media detecting rumors in social media: a survey fake news judgement: the case of undergraduate students at notre dame university-louaize the emergence and effects of fake social information: evidence from crowdfunding fake news and its credibility evaluation by dynamic relational networks: a bottom up approach understanding the majority opinion formation process in online environments: an exploratory approach to facebook social media and the future of open debate: a user-oriented approach to facebook's filter bubble conundrum fake news': incorrect, but hard to correct. the role of cognitive ability on the impact of false information on social impressions social media hoaxes, political ideology, and the role of issue confidence fake news and the willingness to share: a schemer schema and confirmatory bias perspective the dark side of news community forums: opinion manipulation trolls social media? it's serious! understanding the dark side of social media social media security and trustworthiness: overview and new direction key: cord- -ek joi m authors: throuvala, melina a.; griffiths, mark d.; rennoldson, mike; kuss, daria j. title: mind over matter: testing the efficacy of an online randomized controlled trial to reduce distraction from smartphone use date: - - journal: int j environ res public health doi: . /ijerph sha: doc_id: cord_uid: ek joi m evidence suggests a growing call for the prevention of excessive smartphone and social media use and the ensuing distraction that arises affecting academic achievement and productivity. a ten-day online randomized controlled trial with the use of smartphone apps, engaging participants in mindfulness exercises, self-monitoring and mood tracking, was implemented amongst uk university students (n = ). participants were asked to complete online pre- and post-intervention assessments. results indicated high effect sizes in reduction of smartphone distraction and improvement scores on a number of self-reported secondary psychological outcomes. the intervention was not effective in reducing habitual behaviours, nomophobia, or time spent on social media. mediation analyses demonstrated that: (i) emotional self-awareness but not mindful attention mediated the relationship between intervention effects and smartphone distraction, and (ii) online vigilance mediated the relationship between smartphone distraction and problematic social media use. the present study provides preliminary evidence of the efficacy of an intervention for decreased smartphone distraction and highlights psychological processes involved in this emergent phenomenon in the smartphone literature. online interventions may serve as complementary strategies to reduce distraction levels and promote insight into online engagement. more research is required to elucidate the mechanisms of digital distraction and assess its implications in problematic use. attentional focus is one of the most fundamental resources and a key to successful and high-order work [ ] . in the attention economy [ ] , multiple online and offline activities compete for an alternative share of attention [ ] . this trend is expected to grow in the face of increasing communication complexity and information overload [ ] , which is becoming even more prevalent partially due to the vast online accessibility, immediacy and convenience of smartphones, acting as a major motivational pull for engagement [ ] and prompting constant multitasking and frequent attentional loss [ ] . there are currently more than . billion smartphone users [ ] and smartphone use is an emergent area of research [ ] [ ] [ ] . emerging evidence on cognitive function has shown that smartphone availability and daily interruptions compete with higher-level cognitive processes creating a cognitive interference effect [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] , associated with poorer cognitive functioning [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] , performance impairments in daily life [ ] and potential supplanting of analytical thinking skills by "offloading thinking to the device" [ ] (p. ). in spite of such initial evidence, there are cognitive correlates within the digital wellbeing apps or mhapps (apps that track an individual's behaviour, i.e., time spent online, or that aid cognitive, emotional and/or behavioural wellbeing) [ ] have been suggested as supporting self-awareness and self-regulation [ ] and utilized in mental healthcare given their functionality, accessibility, higher adherence rates, real-time assessment, low-cost and for their intervention potential [ , ] . the literature suggests that evidence-based apps may be efficacious in raising self-awareness, mental health literacy and wellbeing, self-efficacy, and ability to cope [ , [ ] [ ] [ ] . online psychological interventions are becoming more prominent in the digital age [ ] , rendering numerous positive health outcomes [ , [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] , complementing service provision and recognized by governmental health institutions (e.g., national institute for health and care excellence (nice) in the uk) [ ] . however, more research is required to determine the comparative effectiveness of these therapies and their components [ ] in improving mental health and wellbeing and rigorous objective evaluation beyond their developers is required. to date, there have been a small number of internet-based interventions associated with device use in university settings. distraction is not considered a dysfunctional construct by itself, but has been implicated in emotion regulation, adhd, and other disorders [ ] [ ] [ ] , and has been minimally examined in the context of the digital environment with no evidence to date as to strategies that could ameliorate its occurrence [ ] . therefore, the aim of the present study was to test the preliminary efficacy of an online intervention based on cognitive behavioural principles (i.e., self-monitoring, mood tracking, and mindfulness) to reduce distraction and related psychological outcomes (i.e., stress) among university students. given: (i) young adults are keen users of smartphone apps, with increased vulnerability to self-regulation and technology use [ ] , (ii) the high stakes for academic achievement, and (iii) the similarity in processes observed between gambling addiction and social media overuse [ ] , the strategies of mindfulness, activity monitoring, and mood tracking utilized in gambling harm-reduction [ , , ] are employed in the present study. these strategies were delivered and facilitated through the use of smartphone mhapps and were tested for their efficacy in reducing levels of distraction and related psychological outcomes and their role in inducing changes in wellbeing [ ] [ ] [ ] . the following hypotheses were formulated: hypothesis (h ). compared to the control condition at follow-up, students receiving the intervention would report: (i) lower rates of smartphone distraction, smartphone and social media use duration, impulsivity, stress, problematic social media use, fomo and nomo and (ii) higher levels of mindful attention, emotional self-awareness, and self-efficacy. hypothesis (h ). at follow-up, high distractors (hds) compared to low distractors (lds) (based on a median-split analysis) would show a greater reduction in distraction and significant improvement in outcomes. hypothesis (h ). the intervention will mediate the relationship between (i) mindful attention and smartphone distraction, and (ii) emotional awareness and smartphone distraction. additionally, online vigilance will mediate the relationship between smartphone distraction and problematic social media use. to the authors' knowledge and given the novelty of the construct of smartphone distraction, this is the first study to examine a preliminary online randomized controlled trial via mhapps for the reduction of smartphone distraction. the present study fills a gap in the smartphone literature by assessing the efficacy of engaging with behaviour change strategies (i.e., mindfulness, self-monitoring, and mood-tracking) used successfully in gambling harm prevention for the reduction of distraction. the present study tested the efficacy of a ten-day online app-delivered randomized controlled trial (rct) based on cognitive-behavioural principles to reduce distraction (primary outcome) and a number of secondary psychological outcomes: self-awareness, mindful attention, fomo, anxiety, and depression among university students. rcts are considered the gold standard in intervention effectiveness despite limitations addressed by scholars [ , ] , primarily for the lack of external validity or methodological choices [ ] . a pragmatic psychosocial intervention with an rct design was chosen [ ] . the duration of the intervention was set given a pragmatic consideration of the free use period of one of the apps (headspace) and, secondly, due to the preliminary nature of this investigation. consolidated standards of reporting trials (consort) guidelines were followed in the protocol and the procedures and reporting of the intervention [ ] . the intervention involved the active engagement for the period of ten consecutive days with three smartphone apps serving three different functions: to assess smartphone and social media use, conduct mindfulness sessions with an emphasis on eliminating distraction, and track mood and assess its impact on distraction, stress, self-regulation, and other measures. interaction with apps was encouraged to: (i) raise emotional awareness of common mood states, such as feeling down, worried, or stressed through mindfulness, (ii) guide basic smartphone monitoring, focusing skills, and awareness, and (iii) provide insight through mood tracking (table ) . to further support active engagement with these intervention components, eligible participants were asked to keep a daily online activity log for the duration of the intervention (i.e., the number of screen-unlocks and the time of day and number of minutes for which the smartphone was used, usefulness of apps, etc.), to aid time perception of daily activities, raise awareness levels, and help increase the accuracy of self-reporting and adherence to the intervention [ , ] . promoting self-awareness of media use and understanding of own behaviour was a key target of the intervention in order to curb distraction. the study was reviewed and approved (no. / ) by the research team's university ethics committee. daily reminders and messages via blogging were sent as a reminder to maintain routine and reflect on levels of activity [ , ] . participants were recruited using convenience and snowball sampling techniques. after gaining institutional ethical approval, the study was advertised to students through the research credit scheme, in university lectures and labs, and to the public through social media as an online intervention to assess the reduction of smartphone distraction. this experimental intervention demanded a significant time involvement and offering incentives increased the chances of participation and completion of the full ten-day intervention. in return for participation, students were offered either research credits or entry in a prize draw (£ gift cards). participants were included in the study based on two screening criteria: regular smartphone and social media usage. only those affirming both and granting consent were able to continue with participation. following the completion of the survey, participants were allocated to one of the two conditions (intervention [ig] or control [cg] ) and further instructions for participation in the intervention were provided depending on the allocation condition. after initially providing age and gender demographics, participants responded to survey items regarding habitual smartphone and social media behaviour (estimates of duration of use), smartphone distraction severity, trait self-regulation, trait mindfulness and other psychological constructs (detailed in "materials"). the survey took approximately min to complete. a total of participants were recruited who participated in the baseline assessment. of these, were undergraduate psychology students in the uk ( . %). the sample comprised males ( %) and females ( %), with an age range of to years (m = . , sd = . ). figure depicts the flow of participants through the study procedures. after the baseline assessment, during the intervention period two individuals of the intervention group withdrew from the study and were not considered in the analysis. from the remaining participants, seven were removed due to providing % incomplete data. the final sample considered at baseline was participants (intention to treat (itt) group) and included participants in the intervention group and in the control group. participants who completed both assessments were considered in the per-protocol analysis (pp) (n = , % of the original sample), with participants comprising the ig and participants the cg. between the two groups, as standardising can easily distort judgements of the magnitude of an effect (due to changes to the sample sd but not the population sd, which may bias the estimate of the effect size measure, such as cohen's d) [ ] . as cohen's d has been reported in other rct and pre-post intervention studies, cohen's d was estimated [ ] . finally, because the sample sizes of the two groups were unequal, type iii sums of squares were used for the ancova. to test the third hypothesis and the hypothesized psychological mechanisms underlying the intervention results, three different mediation analyses were performed across the chosen psychological constructs using spss statistics (version ) and process (model ; [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ), using a non-parametric resampling method bootstrap with bootstrapped samples and bias-corrected % confidence intervals, to probe conditional indirect effects for the variables examined. these analyses were performed on the itt sample in post-intervention results. the survey consisted of sociodemographic and usage data (questions related specifically to smartphone and social media use [hours per day]). the demographic questions and user-related questions had open responses (i.e., "how many hours per day do you use social media?"). the following scales were used for the psychological measures of the study: the smartphone distraction scale [ ] is a newly developed scale comprising of likert-type items. the scale comprises four factors: attention impulsiveness, online vigilance, emotion regulation, and multitasking. scores range from (almost never) to (almost always) with higher scores representing a greater degree of distraction. individual items on the test were summed to give composite scores. sample items included in the scale are the following: "i get distracted by my phone notifications", and "i constantly check my phone to see who liked my recent post while doing important tasks". the scale has demonstrated good psychometric properties [ ] and excellent reliability in the present study with a cronbach's alpha of . for time (t ) and . for time (t ). the mindful attention awareness scale (maas) [ ] is a -item assessment tool that assesses the dispositional tendency of participants to be mindful in everyday life and has been validated among young people, university students and community samples [ , ] . item statements reflect experience of mindfulness, mindlessness in general and specific daily situations and are distributed across a range of cognitive, emotional, physical, interpersonal, and general domains. response options are based on a six-point likert scale from (almost always) to (almost never). scores were averaged across the items to obtain an overall mindfulness score with higher scores reflecting higher levels of dispositional mindfulness. sample items include "i could be experiencing some emotion and not be aware of it until sometime later" and "i find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present" and exhibited a high degree of internal consistency in the present study with a cronbach's alpha of . for t and . for t . the emotional self-awareness scale (esas) [ ] was used to assess esa and comprises five variables: recognition, identification, communication, contextualization, and decision making. the scale consists of items (e.g., "i usually know why i feel the way i do") rated from (strongly disagree) to (strongly agree). the total esa score ranged from to , and sub-scale items are combined to produce a composite score with higher scores indicating higher esa. the esas has presented reasonable internal consistency (cronbach's alpha = . , . , and . for pre-test, post-test and six-week follow-up) [ ] . the scale has demonstrated good validity in prior studies [ , ] and adequate internal consistency in the present study (cronbach's alpha of . for t and . for t ). the perceived stress scale (pss) [ ] is one of the most widely used scales to assess perceived stress and the degree of unpredictability, uncontrollability, and burden in various situations. the scale used was the -item version rated from (never) to (very often) with sample items such as "in the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?", and "in the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things?" scores are obtained by summing the items, with the higher score indicating more perceived stress. the scale possesses good psychometric properties [ ] and its internal consistency in the present study was . for t and . for t . the seven-item generalized anxiety disorder scale (gad- ) [ ] is a brief clinical measure that assesses for the presence and severity of generalized anxiety disorder (gad). the self-report scale asks how often during the last two weeks individuals experienced symptoms of gad. total scores range from - with cut-off scores of , , and being indicative of mild, moderate, and severe anxiety, respectively. increasing scores on the gad- are strongly associated with greater functional impairment in real-world settings. sample items are rated from (not at all) to (nearly every day) and sample items include: "feeling nervous, anxious or on edge" and "trouble relaxing". the scale has been widely used and considered a valid and reliable screening tool in previous research, presenting good reliability, factorial and concurrent validity [ , ] , and demonstrated excellent internal consistency in the present study (α = . t and α = . for t ). the self-report behavioural automaticity index (srbai) [ ] was used to assess habitual strength. the four-item scale was used to assess the degree of automaticity and contained items such as: "using social media on my smartphone is something . . . i do automatically" and "i start doing before i realize i'm doing it". participants indicate their agreement with each item on a likert scale ranging from (does not apply at all) to (fully applies). scores were averaged across items to obtain an overall habit score, with higher scores indicating stronger habitual smartphone use behaviour. the scale has been reported as psychometrically sound in previous studies with good reliability, convergent and predictive validity [ , ] and demonstrated good internal consistency in the present study with a cronbach's alpha of . (t ) and . (t ). the generalized self-efficacy scale (gse) [ ] is a widely used psychometric instrument comprising ten items that assess perceived self-efficacy ("i can always manage to solve difficult problems if i try hard enough."). items are rated on a four-point scale ranging from (not at all true) to (exactly true). the gse has demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency and validity across studies [ , ] . cronbach's alpha in the present study was . (t ) and . (t ). the online vigilance scale (ovs) [ ] is a -item likert scale which assesses a relatively new construct in the internet-related literature, referring to individuals' cognitive orientation towards online content, expressed as cognitive salience, reactivity to online cues and active monitoring of online activity. sample items include "my thoughts often drift to online content" and "i constantly monitor what is happening online". scale items are rated on a four-point likert scale from (does not apply at all) to (fully applies). higher mean scores indicate a higher degree of online vigilance. the scale has evidenced sound construct and nomological validity and high internal consistency [ , , ] . the cronbach's alpha in the present study was . (t ) and . (t ). the eight-item barratt impulsiveness scale-alternative version (bis- ) [ ] is a psychometrically improved abbreviated version of the -item bis scale [ ] presenting good construct and concurrent validity in young populations [ , ] . the scale assesses impulsive behaviour and poor self-inhibition and uses a four-point likert scale from (do not agree) to (agree very much). sample items include: "i do things without thinking" and "i act on the spur of the moment". cronbach's alpha coefficient in the present study was . (t ) and . (t ). the deficient self-regulation measure [ ] is a seven-item scale assessing deficient self-regulation in videogame playing adapted for unregulated internet use [ ] . the scale is rated on a seven-point likert scale from (almost never) to (almost always) and has demonstrated sound psychometric properties [ ] . the scale was adapted for smartphone use with sample items such as "i would go out of my way to satisfy my urges to use social media" and "i have to keep using social media more and more to get my thrill". the original scale and its adaptation has presented satisfactory psychometric properties [ , ] . the cronbach's alpha coefficient in the present study was . (t ) and . (t ). the bergen social media addiction scale (bsmas) [ , [ ] [ ] [ ] ] is a six-item self-report scale for assessing social media addiction severity based on the framework of the components model of addiction (salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, conflict, and relapse) [ ] . each item examines the experience of using social media over the past year and is rated on a five-point likert scale from (very rarely) to (very often), producing a composite score ranging from to . higher bsmas scores indicate greater risk of social media addiction severity. a sample question from the bsmas is "how often during the last year have you used social media so much that it has had a negative impact on your job/studies?" a cut-off score over indicates problematic social media use [ ] . the bsmas has presented sound psychometric properties [ , [ ] [ ] [ ] with high internal consistency (α = . ) [ ] . the cronbach's alpha in the present study was . (t ) and . (t ). the fear of missing out scale (fomos) [ ] includes ten items and asks participants to evaluate the extent to which they experience symptoms of fomo. the scale is rated on a seven-point likert scale from (not at all true) to (extremely true of me). the statements include: "i fear others have more rewarding experiences than me... i get anxious when i don't know what my friends are up to...it bothers me when i miss an opportunity to meet up with friends...". a total score was calculated by averaging the scores, with higher mean scores indicating a greater level of fomo. this instrument has demonstrated good construct validity [ , ] , and good internal consistency with cronbach's alphas of α = . [ ] and . [ ] with α = . in the present study. the nomophobia questionnaire (nmp-q) [ ] comprises items rated using a seven-point likert scale from (strongly disagree) to (strongly agree). total scores are calculated by summing up responses to each item, resulting in a nomophobia score ranging from to , with higher scores corresponding to greater nomophobia severity. nmp-q scores are interpreted in the following way: = absence of nomophobia; - = mild level of nomophobia; - = moderate level of nomophobia; and + = severe nomophobia. the scale has demonstrated good psychometric properties [ , ] with cronbach's alphas of . [ ] and . [ ] . in the present study, internal consistency was: . for (t ) and . for (t ) respectively. the intervention initially involved the search and identification of appropriate mobile apps (in both the apple itunes store and the android google play store) for daily self-monitoring of social media activity for mindfulness practices and mood tracking. the apps needed to be freely available in order to be accessible by the participants. due to time limitations, the development of an app that would encompass all three features (mindfulness of distraction, self-monitoring, and mood-tracking) was deemed adequate for the study given the ample availability of well-designed products offering these services. the following three freely available smartphone lifestyle apps were utilized: (i) antisocial (screen time): to self-monitor screen time/social media use and for voluntary self-exclusion (block app after time limit is reached), (ii) headspace (mindfulness): brief mindfulness sessions, (iii) pacifica (mood tracking): the app encouraged monitoring and tracking an individual's emotional state at various times during the day to enhance awareness. at the outset of the study, participants were directed to an information statement followed by the digital provision of informed consent before responding to the questions. at the end of the survey, they were automatically assigned through the automatic randomization procedure used by the online survey platform qualtrics to either an intervention or a control group. therefore, the intervention was double-blind (to participants and investigators). participants assigned to the ig were asked to download the apps onto their smartphones and to actively engage with all three apps daily for days, which was the maximum free period offered by one of these apps. participants were encouraged to engage with mindfulness/focusing exercises to track their emotional state during the day and monitor patterns in their wellbeing as well as report daily on smartphone usage rates. thereafter, participants received daily notifications via email for the duration of the intervention to remind them to provide online reports about their own social media usage rates, apps accessed, checking frequency, potential self-restriction from use, and satisfaction with the intervention. this process was used to motivate engagement with the apps and accountability. efficacy was evaluated by having a cg condition where participants did not engage in any app use and only completed assessments on the first and tenth day. the target of the intervention was to induce a more mindful state, raise awareness of media and smartphone use, enhance self-regulation and therefore reduce distractions and time spent on smartphones and indirectly on social media by using these apps. the sample size for the rct was determined a priori using g*power v. software for the expected increased effectiveness of the intervention compared to control on the primary outcome distraction at post-assessment (t ). empirical reviews [ ] have suggested a median standardised target effect size of . (interquartile range: . - . ), with the median standardised observed effect size . (iqr . - . ). the present study was a low-threshold intervention for a non-clinical population, so a mean effect of d = . was expected. with a power of -ß = . , and a significance level of α = . , the sample size was calculated to be n = participants per group to find between-and within-group effects. to account for attrition rates in online interventions and control for both type i and ii error rates, n = participants per group were targeted for recruitment [ ] . all data were analysed through spss v. (chicago, il, usa). preliminary data analyses included examining the data for data entry errors, normality testing, outliers, and missing data. seven cases were treated with listwise deletion due to a very high percentage of incomplete data at baseline, resulting in a final sample size of . for the rest of the dataset, little's missing completely at random (mcar) test showed that data were missing completely at random (p = . ). multiple imputation was used to complete the dataset for the baseline analysis and for the non-completers from post-intervention assessment based on patterns of missingness. the data were also checked to ensure that all assumptions for the outlined statistical analyses were satisfied. the kolmogorov-smirnov test was used to evaluate the normal distribution of the variables, and skewness and kurtosis values were examined. for both assessments, all self-report data were normally distributed. assumptions of t-tests included normality, homogeneity of variance, and independence of observations. violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variance were tested using levene's test of equality of variances [ ] . descriptive statistics were conducted to summarize the demographic characteristics of the sample as well as scores for the self-reported and performance-based measures of interest (i.e., stress). pearson's correlations examined bivariate relationships between smartphone distraction and psychological variables, and frequency of smartphone and social media use (presented in table ). while allocation randomisation aimed to reduce any differences between the groups at baseline, a series of independent sample t-tests for the continuous variables and chi-square tests for the categorical variables (gender, ethnicity and education and relationship status) were conducted to analyse group mean differences and compare the baseline and post-intervention outcomes for the control and intervention groups. these were also applied at post-intervention outcomes for both the control and the intervention group. a decrease from the baseline to the post-intervention assessment was hypothesised for the primary outcomes of smartphone distraction, stress, anxiety, deficient self-regulation, fomo and nomo and an increase was hypothesized for mindful attention, self-awareness and self-efficacy. following the descriptive analysis, data from the baseline and post-intervention assessments were analysed to test each of the hypotheses provided to inform the assessment of the intervention efficacy. two approaches to analysis were adopted. first, to isolate any effect of the intervention, a per-protocol (pp) analysis was conducted to maintain the baseline equivalence of the intervention group produced by random allocation [ ] . however, given the limitations to this first analysis approach and to minimise biases resulting from noncompliance, non-adherence, attrition or withdrawal [ , ] , analysis was performed also on an intention-to-treat (itt) basis [ ] . however, these results were not reported in the present study. the effects of the intervention were assessed with an analysis of covariance (ancova), with a minimum significance level at p < . . ancova was chosen given that it is quite robust with regard to violations of normality, with minimal effects on significance or power [ , ] with any differences between the groups at baseline, for the various assessments being used as covariates in the model and considered artefacts of the randomisation [ ] . co-varying for baseline scores supported the analysis in two ways. first, while randomisation aimed to reduce any pre-intervention differences between the groups, residual random differences may have occurred. accounting for such differences isolated the effect of the intervention. partial eta-squared were used as measures of strength of association [ ] . to better understand the effect size of the intervention, it has been recommended to use the differences in adjusted means (standardized mean difference effect sizes) between the two groups, as standardising can easily distort judgements of the magnitude of an effect (due to changes to the sample sd but not the population sd, which may bias the estimate of the effect size measure, such as cohen's d) [ ] . as cohen's d has been reported in other rct and pre-post intervention studies, cohen's d was estimated [ ] . finally, because the sample sizes of the two groups were unequal, type iii sums of squares were used for the ancova. to test the third hypothesis and the hypothesized psychological mechanisms underlying the intervention results, three different mediation analyses were performed across the chosen psychological constructs using spss statistics (version ) and process (model ; [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ), using a non-parametric resampling method bootstrap with bootstrapped samples and bias-corrected % confidence intervals, to probe conditional indirect effects for the variables examined. these analyses were performed on the itt sample in post-intervention results. the t-test results for the pre-test scores found no significant differences between the groups, indicating independence. the post-test scores were significantly lower in the intervention group. for the smartphone distraction scale, the mean pre-test score was . (sd = . ) for the intervention group and . (sd = . ) for the control group. the mean post-test score was . (sd = . ) for the intervention and . (sd = . ) for the control group, respectively. the pre-test score mean was not significantly different between groups (t = − . , ns), but the post-test score mean was significantly lower for the intervention group than for the comparison group (t = − . , p < . ). the pattern was similar in the results for the other variables except for nomo, habitual behaviour, and social media use per day. table provides a summary of the baseline t-test and chi-square outcomes and internal consistency for each scale at each measurement period. all scales demonstrated good internal consistency for the sample considered. a series of bivariate pearson's r correlation analyses was conducted to examine the results obtained amongst sds and the secondary outcomes (table ) . smartphone distraction correlated significantly with problematic social media use (r( ) = . , p < . ), anxiety (r ( ) = . , p < . ), online vigilance (r ( ) = . , p < . ), automaticity (r ( ) = . , p < . ), impulsivity (r( ) = . , p < . ), deficient self-regulation (r( ) = . , p < . ), smartphone use/day (r( ) = . , p < . ), p < . ), fomo (r( ) = . , p < . ) and nomo (r( ) = . , p < . ). however, smartphone distraction correlated negatively with two variables: mindful attention (r( ) = − . , p < . ) and self-awareness (r( ) = − . , p < . ). to test h and assess the effect of the intervention on smartphone distraction, two separate ancovas were conducted. first, to isolate any effect of the intervention, a per-protocol analysis was conducted. as depicted in table online vigilance (r ( ) = . , p < . ), automaticity (r ( ) = . , p < . ), impulsivity (r( ) = . , p < . ), deficient self-regulation (r( ) = . , p < . ), smartphone use/day (r( ) = . , p < . ), p < . ), fomo (r( ) = . , p < . ) and nomo (r( ) = . , p < . ). however, smartphone distraction correlated negatively with two variables: mindful attention (r( ) = − . , p < . ) and self-awareness (r( ) = − . , p < . ). to test h and assess the effect of the intervention on smartphone distraction, two separate ancovas were conducted. first, to isolate any effect of the intervention, a per-protocol analysis was conducted. as depicted in table ancova analyses for the secondary outcomes were also tested across both pp and itt samples. specifically, for the pp sample, main effects of the experimental group on post-intervention outcomes after controlling for baseline scores were found for self-awareness (f( , ) in order to evaluate the effects of the intervention in the intervention group based on level of distraction and to assess whether the effects were consistent in the intervention group independent of degree of distraction, participants were classed into two categories of high distractors vs. low distractors depending on perceived distraction level. a median-split analysis with high vs. low distractor levels was determined by scores above vs. below the median and these were separately analysed inside the intervention group. therefore, a two-way mixed anova with time (pre-test and post-test) as within-factor and distraction severity (high and low distraction) as between-factor was performed to investigate the impact of the intervention (time) and degree of distraction (high vs. low) as assessed at baseline on distraction levels at post-intervention. this analysis was conducted only for the dependent variable for which the interactions were found to be significant. results more specifically for mediation , the intervention group was the proposed independent variable in these analyses, mindfulness was the proposed mediator, and smartphone distraction was the outcome variable. for mediation , stress was the proposed independent variable in these analyses, online vigilance was the proposed mediator, and smartphone distraction was the outcome variable. for mediation , smartphone distraction was the predictor, social media addiction was the outcome and online vigilance was the mediator. analysed variables included the t scores on the constructs examined as covariates to account for pre-intervention performance. for mediation , it was hypothesized that mindful attention would mediate the relationship between the intervention and smartphone distraction ( table ) . no mediation effect was found for mindful attention on the variables. however, a main effect of the intervention on smartphone distraction (path a: b = − . , t = − . , p < . ) was found, but no main effect of mindful attention on smartphone distraction (path b; b = . , t = . , ns). table . mediation effects of mindful attention and emotional self-awareness on intervention effects and smartphone distraction and of online vigilance on smartphone distraction and social media addiction (n = ). for mediation , it was hypothesized that self-awareness would mediate the relationship between the intervention and smartphone distraction (table ). an indirect effect was found on self-awareness on the variables (a × b: b = − . , bca ci = [− . , − . ]), indicating mediation. the intervention significantly predicted self-awareness (path a; b = − . , t = − . , p < . ) and self-awareness significantly predicted lower levels of smartphone distraction (path b; b = . , t = . , p < . ). for mediation , it was hypothesized that online vigilance would mediate the relationship between distraction and social media addiction (table ). an indirect effect was found on self-awareness on the variables (a × b: b = . , bca ci = [ . , . ]), indicating mediation. the intervention significantly predicted self-awareness (path a; b = − . , t = − . , p < . ) and self-awareness significantly predicted lower levels of smartphone distraction (path b; b = . , t = . , p < . ). the present study tested the efficacy of an online intervention employing an integrative set of strategies-consisting of mindfulness, self-monitoring and mood tracking-in assisting young adults to decrease levels of smartphone distraction and improve on a variety of secondary psychological outcomes, such as mindful attention, emotional awareness, stress and anxiety, and perceived self-efficacy, as well as to reduce stress, anxiety, deficient self-regulation, problematic social media use and smartphone-related psychological outcomes (i.e., online vigilance, fomo and nomo). results of the present study provided support for the online intervention effectiveness in impacting these outcomes. findings suggested that students receiving the intervention reported a significant reduction in the primary outcome of smartphone distraction, unlike students in the control group who reported a non-significant reduction in smartphone distraction. in terms of the secondary outcomes, participants in the intervention condition experienced a significant increase in self-awareness, mindful attention, and self-efficacy, and a significant decrease in smartphone use/day, impulsivity, stress, anxiety, deficient self-regulation, fomo, and problematic use. no significant results were found for social media use per day, habitual/automated use and nomo. according to the findings of the present intervention, it appears likely that practising mindfulness and monitoring mood and smartphone activity could lead to a desired behavioural change towards less distraction and less perceived stress with carry-over effects in self-awareness and self-efficacy, similar to interventions for other mental health problems [ , , , , , , ] . these findings are consistent with the growing body of research indicating that mindfulness and self-monitoring are effective strategies to increase self-awareness and reduce stress [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ] . mindful attention could enhance awareness of individual media behaviour by: (i) raising understanding and awareness of disruptive media multitasking activities (i.e., predictors, patterns and effects), and (ii) raising awareness of different strategies for coping with digital distraction and of which strategies are most effective. second, self-monitoring could help in developing an understanding of media habits and time spent on smartphone and social media activities and could curb perceived excess smartphone interaction, consistent with other study findings [ , , , ] . therefore, strategies employing increased mindfulness practice and self-monitoring could aid attentional capacity and self-awareness, which is considered a necessary condition in the behaviour change process of risky behaviours [ , ] . third, mood tracking could enhance awareness of triggers of negative mood and ensuing negative emotional states acting as drivers for distraction. it appears that the same technologies which may impact negatively on young people may be used to leverage smartphone use [ ] and deflect psychological distress if evidence-based behaviour change strategies are applied. intervention strategies such as mindfulness and self-monitoring may encourage increased self-awareness and thus help reduce distraction levels and increase mindful attention. the intervention was also successful in reducing secondary outcomes, such as stress levels and fomo, and it had a positive effect on emotion regulation and loss of control levels. distraction appears to be associated with higher access to social media content and is mediated by online vigilance. salience of smartphone-mediated social interactions (i.e., the salience dimension of online vigilance) has been found to be negatively related to affective wellbeing [ ] . it has been reported that emotional dysregulation mediates the relationship between psychological distress and problematic smartphone use [ ] . higher self-regulation online has been identified as a moderator between need to belong and problematic social media use in young people [ ] and emotion dysregulation as a mediator between insecure attachment and addiction [ ] . although distraction is an emotion regulation strategy with a protective function against emotionally distressing states [ ] and dysphoric mood [ ] , or is used for adaptive coping [ , ] , deficits in attentional control, such as distraction, may also be implicated in stress, anxiety or other affective disorders [ ] and in generalized anxiety disorder with core cognitive symptoms related to excessive thoughts and deficits associated with increased perseverative worry [ ] . therefore, higher mindful attention and monitoring of mood may have influenced the reduction of distraction and the enhancement of emotional control. mediation analyses were also performed to understand the relationships between intervention effects on smartphone distraction via two mediators, mindful attention and self-awareness, and of online vigilance on the relationship between distraction and social media addiction. mediation effects were significant for the relationship among intervention effects and distraction via self-awareness, and for distraction and problematic social media use via online vigilance, indicating that self-awareness could be a potential behaviour strategy to mitigate distraction levels. however, the relationship among intervention effects and distraction was not significant via mindful attention as a mediator. therefore, in the present study it appeared that despite its statistically significant increase, mindful attention was not a mediating factor for distraction in the intervention. mindful attention could potentially be the vehicle to increasing emotional self-awareness [ , , ] , prompting more controlled smartphone interactions. on the contrary, online vigilance was found to be a mechanism associated with smartphone distraction and problematic social media use, given the strong preoccupation with the content prompted even by the mere presence of smartphones, confirming previous findings [ ] . therefore, despite its protective function, distraction may concurrently serve as a gateway to increased smartphone engagement and time spent on devices. time spent alone is not a defining factor and it has been argued instead that the interaction of content, context and time spent, as well as the meaning attached to these interactions, may determine the level of problematic media use [ , ] . within smartphone use, distraction is a salient behaviour with evidence that distraction and mind-wandering are associated with online vigilance, which via reduced mindfulness may be associated with decreased wellbeing [ ] . furthermore, inattention symptoms have been implicated in risk for smartphone addiction and problematic smartphone use [ ] . therefore, handling distraction, which has neural correlates [ ] , may be the means to resisting cue reactivity, implicated in smartphone addiction, in reduced cognitive performance [ ] or in obsessive-compulsive symptoms [ ] . further research is required to assess these cognitive and emotive dimensions of smartphone distraction and its effects on engagement in line with current trends [ ] . however, it has been proposed that the construct of distraction extends beyond the debate on smartphone addiction by considering the role of the smartphone in coping with negative emotions and addressing preference for online vs. offline communications [ ] . research is still conflicted in relation to the cognitive function of distraction. experimental smartphone research has provided initial evidence that social apps compared to non-social apps on smartphones do not capture attention despite their perceived high reward value [ , ] , but other studies support a high interference effect [ ] . therefore, more research is required to elucidate the mechanisms of digital distraction and delineate how digital technologies, individual choices, and contexts affect individuals' attention spans and attentional loss, as well as mental health conditions, such as adhd and anxiety and overall psychological wellbeing [ ] . the present rct assessed the effectiveness of the impact of the use of mindfulness, self-monitoring, and mood tracking delivered through interaction with smartphone apps in reducing distraction arising from recreational smartphone use and social media use. the findings suggest that engaging with the aforementioned practices was effective in reducing distraction levels, stress, anxiety, deficient self-regulation, impulsivity and smartphone-related psychological outcomes, and improving mindful attention and emotional self-awareness and self-efficacy. some limitations need to be taken into consideration. first, a convenience sample of university students was used, which hinders the generalizability of the findings to other groups (i.e., older adults or children). however, this population was considered of primary interest for the study because university students are digital natives liable to experience negative academic consequences due to vulnerability to problematic smartphone use [ ] . the effect sizes found in this rct were medium to large for the variables examined, exceeding the expected range for low-intensity, non-clinical interventions [ ] . however, as a result of the main recruitment protocol, the intervention may have attracted participants who had an interest in the outcomes and a potential self-assessed vulnerability. therefore, the voluntary, self-selected nature of participation could have introduced a significant degree of participant response and confirmation bias [ ] , resulting in the medium to high effect sizes. additionally, the high drop-out rates, consistent with other online rcts [ ] , could have significantly affected the strength of the findings [ ] , and the use of a passive control group might have led to an overestimation of the effects [ ] . due to the use of market-available apps, actual adherence and engagement with the intervention was not accounted for, nor were reasons for dropout [ ] . therefore, the findings should be treated with caution and replicated in future designs. future studies should systematically address response bias and include methods in the rct to improve the accuracy of self-reported data [ , ] . combining self-report with behavioural data [ ] , ecological momentary sampling [ ] , psycho-informatics and digital phenotyping, the provision of a digital footprint for prognostic, diagnostic and intervention purposes [ ] , could enhance the ecological validity of the study. equally, incorporating the measurement of brain activity using magnetic resonance imaging (mri) in interventions could greatly enhance accuracy of assessment of prevention efforts and understanding of the role of neurobiology in behaviour [ , ] . the impact of the intervention on gender was not examined because this university student sample consisted mainly of female participants. considering the gender differences reported in smartphone use [ , ] and in attention processes [ ] , future studies should explore its effect, which could have significant implications for the intervention and prevention of attention failures and poor student outcomes [ ] . additionally, the study design did not manage to provide a longer intervention period due to the lack of freely available apps for participants to use and did not include a second follow-up period to track maintenance of long-term effects, as is customary in rcts, or the use of qualitative process evaluation for a critical understanding of impact of the intervention components [ ] . finally, social, economic and family conditions as well as other issues, which are critical to young people's psycho-emotional states and sense of identity, were not accounted for in the present study [ , ] . despite these limitations, the study provides initial evidence for efficacy of strategies in curbing smartphone distraction and adds to the limited body of knowledge of cognitive-emotive processes in smartphone and social media use [ ] . it also contributed to the still limited knowledge on interventions in smartphone distraction and constitutes a simple, first-step, low key intervention programme, which may be practised by individuals seeking support for attentional difficulties on a self-help basis or within a stepped-care clinical framework for prevention purposes [ ] . experiencing distraction from smartphones and social media content, interferes with high-level cognitive processes and has productivity and emotional implications (i.e., stress) in various contexts and situations [ , [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] , being further compromised by digital triggers and the structural design of smartphones prompting salience and reactivity [ ] . these results have clinical implications as low-intensity interventions may prevent small scale emotional problems from developing into clinical disorders and can reduce incidences of mental health problems [ , ] . practitioners may also find value in using mindfulness and monitoring practices as an adjunct to therapy for problematic use of smartphones. it may be of high value for academic institutions to build specific university-based programmes on maintaining balanced technology use, tackling unregulated and promoting positive smartphone use, or guiding students towards suitable methods to address attention problems more effectively [ , ] . apps may also be utilized by schools for students that are faced with attentional/excessive use difficulties and in assisting young people to become aware of their emotions in preparation for learning more adaptive coping strategies. distraction is an emergent phenomenon in the digital era considering that the boundaries between work and recreation are increasingly blurred with both domains arguably dependent on the use of digital media [ ] . more research on attentional processes within smartphone use could aid the understanding of these processes and impacts experienced across different age groups. psychological low-cost interventions may be effective in addressing precursors of problematic behaviours and enhancing wellbeing dimensions. the aim of the present study was to assess the efficacy of an rct combining evidence-based cognitive-behavioural strategies to reduce distraction from smartphone use, increase mindful attention, emotional self-awareness and self-efficacy and reduce stress, anxiety, deficient self-regulation and smartphone related psychological outcomes (i.e., online vigilance, fomo and nomo). second, it tested the mediating effect of mindful attention and self-awareness of the intervention on distraction, and of online vigilance on the relationship between distraction and social media addiction. findings suggested that students receiving the intervention reported a significant reduction in the primary outcome of smartphone distraction, whereas students in the control group reported a non-significant reduction in smartphone distraction. in terms of the secondary outcomes, participants in the intervention condition experienced a significant increase in self-awareness, mindful attention and self-efficacy and a significant decrease in smartphone use/day, impulsivity, stress and anxiety levels, fomo, deficient self-regulation and problematic social media use. no significant results were found for duration of social media use/day, habitual use and nomo. mediation effects of the intervention were also observed on distraction and problematic social media use via the mediators of emotional self-awareness and online vigilance in mitigating distraction levels. mindful attention was not found to be a mediating process for reducing distraction in the intervention. research on digital distraction is still scarce, yet there is increasing interest in cognitive impacts within digital environments. more evidence is required to assess the nature of attention failures and difficulties occurring both in normative and excessive online use. this evidence would allow an understanding of the prevalence and the nature of these difficulties, as well as their integration in intervention media literacy and risk prevention programmes, enhancing 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addressed the issues about the containment of contagion or the explanation of epidemiological evolution. we propose an interactive dashboard: co.me.t.a.. during crises it is important to shape the best communication strategies in order to respond to critical situations. in this regard, it is important to monitor the information that mass media and social platforms convey. the dashboard allows to explore the mining of contents extracted and study the lexical structure that links the main discussion topics. the dashboard merges together four methods: text mining, sentiment analysis, textual network analysis and latent topic models. results obtained on a subset of documents show not only a health-related semantic dimension, but it also extends to social-economic dimensions. on feb , , who (world health organization) announced an official name for the syndrome coronavirus (sars-cov- ), that is covid- . after a month the covid- has been declared as pandemic. from december to march the covid- has spread throughout china and afterwards through italy, claiming victims and contagions . the focus of this paper is to trace how the mass media, particularly information on newspapers, have addressed the issues about the containment of contagion or the explanation of epidemiological evolution. syilvie briand, who general social media manager, affirms: "we know that every outbreak will be accompanied by a kind of tsunami of information, but also within this information you always have misinformation, rumors, etc. we know that even in the middle ages there was this phenomenon" (zaracostats, ). communication has an important role in the diffusion of behaviour and contagion, especially regarding the spreading of misinformation. during crises it is essential to spot the best communication strategies in order to respond to critical situations. jin, pang and cameron's ( ) studies underline how important it is to understand public's emotional responses to crisis communication, in organizational and brand crisis but also in public and social crisis, such as infectious disease outbreaks (ido) (vijaykumar, jin and nowak, ) . it is not an easy task to understand how communication from public health authorities or social media contents affect public attention and health-related risk evaluation and perception in these situations. it is crucial to constantly monitor public communication activities to find media response during the spread of a disease. to this end, it is important to monitor the information that the mass media and social platforms convey is the proposed shiny dashboard , to represent an alternative way for reading the mass media perspective on tragic events about the viral infection. this contribution was made with the collaboration of cecoms (center for strategic communication iulm university), in order to studies on the planning and design of strategic communication. the contribution at the state of the art is a tool for media monitoring during covid- pandemic and a new media studies prospective for the study of crisis management. this paper is structured as follows: section illustrates the methods and the data visualization tools used, while section explains the corpus buildings procedures. section more specifically discusses the results for a source (the guardian), and section presents future works. methodological features co.me.t.a. is optimized to allow a friendly use even to those users who don't have confidence with data analysis. the intuitive layout of user interface is divided between control panel on the left, plotting space on the right and menu bar with the methods on the upper side. the dashboard mixes four methods: text mining, sentiment analysis, textual network analysis and latent topic models. as concerns the latter model we propose a new visualization approach based on network to represent topics and words. figure shows the dashboard's flowchart: ( ) content extraction and corpus pre-processing; ( ) sentiment analysis and descriptive study of texts: most frequent words and co-occurrence network analysis; ( ) application of a model to extract and identify the latent topics within the contents collected; ( ) plot network to represent each topic and semantic relationships between the extracted topics and terms. in the first step we defined preprocessing procedure for multilingual sources, using as reference the work done within the european project "positive messengers" . after pre-treatment phase, the dashboard generates the final document-term matrix and cut sparse words. dtm allows to describe the corpus through common visualizations, such as barplot of most frequent words and wordcloud. the sentiment analysis is performed using a baseline dictionary. the sentiment polarity is plotted during time lapse of documents publication. in addition, the dtm can be read like an affiliation matrix to analyse the semantic relationships. using a textual network approach, we built a co-occurrence network and proposed the calculation of centrality measure between words. the last method is latent dirichlet allocation model (blei et al., ; griffiths and steyvers, ) . lda method is used to extract latent topics and subsequently construct the terms-topics matrix. the model allows to infer the latent structure of topics from recreating the documents in the corpus. this is possible by considering iteratively the relative weight of the topic in the document and the word in the topic. at the base of the lda we find these assumptions: a) the documents are represented as mixtures of topics, where a topic is a probability distribution over words, as a generative and bayesian inferential model; b) the topics are partially hidden, latent more precisely, within the structure of the document (steyvers and griffiths, ) . extracted the latent topics, the dashboard selects most associated terms for each topic and it constructs a terms-topics two-mode matrix. starting from this matrix, a two-dimensional network is plotted. textual datasets implemented in co.me.t.a. were built with a scraping of the on-line search results (the search key was "coronavirus") of three italian newspapers ("il corriere della sera", "la repubblica", "il sole ore") and two english journals ("the new york times", "the guardian"). we collect articles starting from february, every days there is an update. at the moment number of articles loaded in co.me.t.a. is , in italian language and in english language. this paragraph shows a concise and compact representation of analytical possibilities offered by the dashboard and an idea of the functions put in place for the users. some of the results given by the main tools implemented in co.me.t.a. and related to the guardian (collected from - - to - - ) are presented below, referred to as the first stage of alert, just before the declaration of pandemic status by the who. the wordcloud above shows not only a health-related semantic dimension, but it also extends to social-economic dimensions. a substantial prevalence of a negative sentiment is highlighted by the examination of the trend in a sentiment analysis on the documents. this underlines the high spikes occurred on january th, when the news reported first cases detected in the eu, on february th, when chinese government implemented strict quarantine measures to contain the spreading of the virus from hubei region, and on march th, which is the day of recognition of the disease as pandemic. with use of latent dirichlet allocation topics where extracted: . fifth topic is referred to media and informative context, underling social response to the pandemic. through the words-topic network it is possible to observe how the terms are associated with the referred topic. the network is composed by latent topics, identified through the lda technique and the words associated with the highest probability. this network allows to examine the links between these two dimensions, particularly howthe corpus are distributed among the topics. a node represents a term connected with different topics and indicates that it is not only present in both thematic groups, but it also represents a connection between semantic areas associated with each topic. terms with higher degree centrality (faust, ) are "people, virus, health, outbreak, china, public, uk, government, world, cases, wuhan, masks, staff, home, patients". a high level of centrality in these terms means a strong attention to personal protective equipment and national health preparation to the crisis. terms with high level of closeness centrality (bonacich, ) are "outbreak, virus, china, government, world". in this case the central semantic dimensions detected by the models are the outbreak of the pandemic and the global spreading of the disease. in the topic network it is possible to identify how the term "outbreak" links different topics related to semantic dimensions of economic, health and mediatic spheres. future works may take into consideration several directions, in order to optimize analysis of information and communication about covid- spreading. since the disease has spread globally, the intention of the research is to extend the datasets analysed to other important newspapers in other languages, such as spanish or french. this aims to have a more complete and global representation of the response of mediatic communication to the virus. another purpose of future researches is to identify a connection between sentiment trend extracted from articles and the epidemiological curve to quantify the effect given by death/contagious/healing rates to the communication. an implementation on the dashboard of a sentiment analysis on twitter text from the community could give a description of the public feedback to news, giving indications to media to provide a better communication in crisis situations. one of the most interesting developments for future works is to identify a relation between sentiment given by user tweets and news in future projects intent of the research is to implement the dashboard with two further analytical processes. through correspondence analysis we aim to represent the association structure between a group of extracted keywords and analysed texts, to identify concepts directly unobservable but as results of the measurement of a group of variables. with application of neural networks, it will be possible to better classify texts through textual data measurements in content extraction and corpus pre-processing phases. latent dirichlet allocation probabilistic topic models, in latent semantic analysis: a road to meaning griffths finding scientific topics simultaneous group and individual centralities centrality in affiliation networks integrated crisis mapping: toward a publics-based, emotion-driven conceptualization in crisis communication social media and the virality of risk: the risk amplification through media spread (rams) model coronavirus on social media: analyzing misinformation in twitter conversations a the covid- social media infodemic how to fight an infodemic. the lancet key: cord- -k w h authors: carr, paul r. title: shooting yourself first in the foot, then in the head: normative democracy is suffocating, and then the coronavirus came to light date: - - journal: postdigit sci educ doi: . /s - - - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: k w h this text starts with the premise that ‘normative democracy’ has rendered our societies vulnerable and burdened with unaddressed social inequalities. i highlight three central arguments: ( ) social media, and, consequently, citizen engagement are becoming a significant filter that can potentially re-imagine the political, economic, and social worlds, which increasingly bleed over to how we might develop and engage with ‘democracy’; to this end, i introduce a brief case study on the nefarious interpretation of the killing of jamal khashoggi in to underscore the tension points in normative democracy; ( ) capitalism, or neoliberalism, needs to be more fully exposed, interrogated, and confronted if ‘normative, representative, hegemonic, electoral democracy’ is to be re-considered, re-imagined, and re-invented; the perpetuation of social inequalities lays bare the frailty of normative democratic institutions; ( ) covid- has exposed the fault lines and fissures of normative democracy, illustrating here the ‘common sense’ ways that power imbalances are sustained, which leaves little room for social solidarity; i present herein the case of the economic/labor dynamic in quebec during the coronavirus. ultimately, i believe the quest to re-imagine a more meaningful, critically engaged democracy, especially during a context that is imbued with a political, economic, and public health crisis, cannot be delayed much longer. ; thésée, carr, duclos, and potwora ) , and contextualizes how we think (and act) about the subject. to further clarify this context of how normative democracy manifests itself, i highlight the following examples from my research projects with colleagues over the years, which involved studies in some countries with roughly teacher education and educator participants (carr and thésée ) : & we found that the vast majority did not have a robust, significant democratic experience in their own education; & that this has affected how they consider democracy and education; & that social justice is, for many, a difficult and problematic area to cultivate in and through education owing to a weakly asserted, structured, and supported institutional culture based on normative democracy; & that most considered that the space for inclusive and critical engagement in and through education is constrained, limited, and fraught with obstacles; & that racialized participants had significantly higher levels of experience, conscientization, and engagement with, for example, racism, antiracism, and efforts to address racial inequities, which further underscores how normative democracy closes down fundamental debate, dialog, teaching and learning as well as transformative education while presenting the posture and framework of democracy. when democracy and education are considered to be naturally disconnected while not leaving room for a more critically engaged democracy, it is not difficult to imagine the suffocating nature of normative democracy. normative elections, the ones that have been so effectively presented by the usa as the backbone to any meaningful democracy, have been jettisoned into a cesspit of turmoil and intractable debate that often neglects problematizing some of the most intractable and germane issues (achen and bartels ; howe ; torcal and ramon montero ) . not everyone involved in elections is corrupt or corrupted, or is afflicted with unsightly motivations, and people who go to the polls are not simply sheep being led to the proverbial slaughterhouse. there is a great deal of complexity as to why we vote and why we hope that there will be some hope in participating in mainstream democracy, but the faith in electoral democracy is waning almost everywhere (torcal and ramon montero ; carr and thésée ). yet, these normative elections, which are often ordered to measure with the threat of massive (real and rhetorical) carpet-bombing and worse, if not realized, are replete with all kinds of paradoxical anti-democratic maneuvers, starting with who can be elected, how much money plays into the process, how media can control and shape the message, manipulation, and diversion is a fundamental component, how seeking to win is more a priority than seeking to build a meaningful democracy, and how capitalism is the enormous, indelicate, meandering proverbial pound gorilla in the room (amico ; carr and thésée ) . added to this is the role, the purpose, and place of education in supporting, cultivating, and building a critically engaged democracy as well as critically engaged citizen participation. it is extremely difficult to have one without the other (democracy without education, for example, or, rather, meaningful, critically engaged democracy without meaningful, critically engaged education). (see carr , and carr and thésée , as well as the unesco chair dcmÉt website at uqo.ca/dcmet/ for an archive of publications.). and then, starting in late , the world started to feel the indelible, intractable, and (in)visible perturbations of the coronavirus, which emanated in china, and has quickly disseminated throughout all regions, making it a global pandemic. the number of people affected, contracting the virus, and ultimately succumbing to it, is increasing daily at this time but there is much analysis and data-crunching indicating that, in many areas, after several weeks of self-distancing, hygienic measures, increasing testing, closing down all but 'essential services', and enhancing medical and health care measures, the 'curve' may be flattening. however, few people believe that the virus will disappear, nor that the cost, in terms of human life, will be entirely negligible. so what is the connection to democracy, capitalism (or perhaps more correctly neoliberalism), and covid- ? the vulnerabilities, inequalities, and fault lines that existed prior to the coronavirus have been exacerbated, and the virus has disproportionately impacted racialized, marginalized, and lower income communities. the contraction and death rates are higher, and the economic, labor, living, and social conditions have worsened, notably for already vulnerable communities. this pandemic, sadly, provides a tremendous and significant impetus to re-consider and re-calibrate our thinking around democracy (diamond ; roy ) . this text starts with the premise that 'normative democracy' has put us in a pickle, and that, although there are ways out if it, this will require breaking out of the glass box that has a great many of us believing that there is no alternative. i highlight three points related to democracy in this text, formulating the following central arguments: ) social media and, consequently, citizen engagement are becoming a significant filter that can potentially re-imagine the political, economic, and social worlds (outside of and beyond normative democracy), which increasingly bleed over to how we might develop and engage with 'democracy' (garrett ) ; to this end, the advent of 'fake news' is a worthy subject to explore here because a functioning democracy, to a certain degree, is dependent on media/political literacy, critical engagement/participation, and the capacity to communicate, analyze, and disseminate nuanced perspectives, ideas, and information; i introduce a brief case study on the nefarious interpretation of the killing of jamal khashoggi in (bbc news ) to underscore the tension points in normative democracy; ) capitalism, or neoliberalism, needs to be more fully exposed, interrogated, and confronted if 'normative, representative, hegemonic, electoral democracy' is to be re-considered, re-imagined, and re-invented (lydon ) ; the perpetuation of social inequalities lays bare the frailty of normative democratic institutions; ) covid- has exposed the fault lines and fissures of normative democracy, illustrating here the 'common sense' ways that power imbalances are sustained, which leaves little room for social solidarity (human rights watch ); i present here a small case study of the economic and labor dynamic in quebec during the coronavirus. ultimately, i believe the quest to re-imagine a more meaningful, critically engaged democracy, especially during a context that is imbued with a political, economic, and public health crisis, cannot be delayed much longer. capitalism, in addition to acknowledged and unacknowledged hegemony, is central to this model or framework, and a natural order and superiority flows effortlessly through thinking and believing that this is the only way to be, exist and function. democracy . , which considers more fluidly agency, power crystallizations, social justice, and individual as well as collectivist media and citizen engagement, is much messier than democracy . , which connects more directly with normative, representative, hegemonic, and electoral machinations (carr, hoechsmann, and thésée ) . social media is an exemplary feature of this new environment and can help us draw out the fundamental question if greater media, communication, and online involvement can lead to more robust, critical democratic forms of citizen participation. elsewhere, with colleagues (carr, daros, cuervo, and thésée ) , i describe some of the overlapping components, processes, and concerns that help frame the context for social media, fake news, and citizen participation. it would appear that everyone today is somehow connected to social media, even if one does not have an account for one or many of the social networks that pervade, link and smother the socio-cultural landscape (keating and melis ) . there are networks for an untold array of information sharing and gathering. nouns have become verbs as in 'youtubbing,' 'blogging,' 'vlogging,' 'googling,' 'facebooking,' etc.. the reach is significant, and the digital imprints (and footprints) are equally commensurate (sun, wang, shen and zhang ) . one can do a search for a pair of shoes on amazon.com, and, magically, there will be ads for shoes on the personal facebook feed immediately afterward. algorithms are increasingly programming what we see, and aligning at least some of our attention on 'stuff,' for lack of a better word, where we might not otherwise be interested. this surveillance, usurpation and data-gathering was significantly exposed in , with facebook being highlighted for a particularly negative watershed year (sutton ; wong and morris ) . among the litany of events, problems and phenomena that have plagued facebook, which are clearly not limited to this one, albeit prominent social network, were the following claims, findings and evidence, amongst other issues: algorithms connected to the 'negative effects to referral traffic,' unregulated ads that underscored the mueller investigation that has, as it focus, in large part, the russian involvement in the us presidential election, the cambridge analytica scandal that 'obtained the data of tens of millions of facebook users without their knowledge or consent to help build a powerful political influencing tool,' privacy and security issues, 'special data-sharing arrangements with tech manufactures like amazon, apple and samsung,' hacking of accounts, and regulation problems (sutton ) . (carr et al. : ) fake news has leaped into mainstream consciousness over the past few years as if it is the problem hampering democracy. emphasizing that fake news is rarely neatly packaged within a singular category, the report cited above cautions that deception needs to be interrogated at various times while viewing media messages. with the avalanche of fake accounts, fake (bot) users, and fake (or tampered with) algorithms, the terrain is fertile for fake news. this is especially the case if users, consumers, and citizens are conditioned to not question or verify what comes their way, are reluctant to disbelief 'official' sources, are ignorant, are disinterested, or are enveloped in turbulent news cycles with complex, nuanced, voluminous information, for which they are unable to decipher the diverse and divergent realities emanating from a particular situation, event, or reality (carr, daros, cuervo, and thésée ) . citizen participation requires critical engagement, and constructing media/political literacy, however defined, needs to be considered in order to better underpin meaningful forms of democracy (carr, cuervo, and daros ) . the hailstorm of misinformation, misdirection, and disinformation during the early phases of the coronavirus mirrors the general online landscape, serving as both a tremendous opportunity and a mud-slide concurrently, and highlighting the potential for meaningful solidarity as well as, conversely, marginalization and xenophobia (ali and kurasawa ) . i am also drawn to the nuanced layers that mackenzie and bhatt ( ) add to this debate, suggesting that '[b]ullshit is different from lying and it need not undermine trust, particularly when it is blatant'. (the literature around the notion and proliferation of 'bullshit' is linked to, and builds on, the work of harry g. frankfurt, notably the book aptly entitled on bullshit.) this is extremely relevant in contemporary times, given populist movements, xenophobic manifestations, and the denunciation of human rights, and the quest to diminish 'news' as being 'fake' as a basic principle emanating from some powerful leaders in the western world as well as elsewhere. at the same time, i acknowledge that the traditional media is anchored in biases and hegemonic trappings but am troubled that the 'fake news' caravan seeks to whitewash anything that may bring contrary dimensions to the debate, especially in relation to revealing, exposing, and countering mainstream narratives related to war, conflict, racism, inequalities, and the like. democracy . had a relatively controlled audience, whereas democracy . has let the floodgates open, and this means that there are now opportunities for critique, solidarity, and mobilization that may not have been as readily available previously, including diverse social movements that have taken off through social media (carr, daros, cuervo, and thésée ) . these social movements can be a force of change in society at the local, national, and global levels where governments and international institutions are unwilling, unable, or unmotivated to respond to the needs of the population. for instance, black lives matter (mundt, ross, and burnett ) , #metoo (botti et al. ) , occupy, and idle no more have all had a significant social media influence, and environmental, peace, and other movements have also been influential at diverse levels in mobilizing solidarity that surpasses cultural, linguistic, geographic, and political boundaries carty ) . within the quickly evolving media/social media landscape, i can think of what appear to be several major (media and/or social) events in recent times-noting full-well that by the time this article is published, they may not even be recognizable-including the khashoggi killing, the covington school student debacle, the parkland shooting, the kavanaugh nomination, the thai cave recue, the (british) royal wedding, the manifestations in haiti, the never-ending quest to build a 'wall/barrier/fence' between the usa and mexico, and the political/humanitarian crisis in venezuela, among many others. i apologize for the usa-centric focus here. as a canadian, i am fully cognizant of the depth and reach of usa tentacles, thinking, control, power, and influence in and on my own work, as well as on many others, even though i collaborate widely with colleagues in diverse jurisdictions and contexts, notably in latin america. the usa and its interests bleed over to every region of the world, and, although united statesians (the concept of 'american' is hotly contested and does not cover all of the peoples of the 'americas') may not be talking collectively (in a central way) about the world or may not be collectively immersed in ingratiating the usa into the infinite number of political and economic issues, concerns, and cultural representations of the other countries and peoples, the world is watching, listening, and being consumed by the behemoth of usa empire. the covid- pandemic also squarely places the usa within the core of the action, with daily pronouncements about blaming china, cutting off funding to the world health organization, downplaying the spread of the virus, boasting about how the virus has been beaten back, and spreading the political and economic reach of this country far and wide, in military, diplomatic, commercial, and (potentially) humanitarian ways. it seems as though the reality of this being a (global) pandemic, a far-reaching health crisis, is only partially the story, and the present manifestations in the usa of people demanding that 'isolation' be stopped, while so many are being infected and even dying, is almost incomprehensible, and social media concurrently exposes, denounces, disseminates, and provides an echo chamber for what is taking place. so i question what becomes news, indeed viral, and how does it become more than click-bait, algorithmic entertainment, the bouncing around in limited, like-minded networks, tepid sharing, and a platform for trolls? is it about numbers, the quantity of clicks, views, shares and reads, or something more substantive? at the same time, what are the true dimensions of the issue(s)? who frames it, how, and why, and to what end? what is omitted, downplayed, obfuscated, how and why? in the list of issues in the previous paragraph, we can think of many pitfalls, foibles, and problematic concerns as to what 'issues' look like in democracy . . all issues are not simply a usa problem, but connections to elites, hegemony, power differentials, and media framing are, i believe, worth establishing and interrogating. what is clear is that power differentials are at play in how fake news is constructed, disseminated, understood, and engaged with. the more volatile social media can push up against normative media in further determining how fake news can be projected, masked, embellished, and consumed. concerning the jamal khashoggi killing in october in istanbul (bbc news ), we can follow the usual process of focusing on hegemonic interests and avoiding contextual factors and backdrops. several significant and pivotal factors were down-or under-played in reporting on this tragedy. for example, the relationship to the saudi kingdom, human rights, billions upon billions of dollars in armaments sold to the saudis, the unimaginable assault by saudi arabia against yemen, and the impending famine and genocide in yemen as a result, women's rights, journalistic freedom, and an unending series of beheadings by the quasi-untouchable saudi regime. undoubtedly, information, discussion, debate, reports, and mobilization on all of these fronts can be located and advanced through social media, in spite of the mainstream, hegemonic vision. the point here is that central, controlled, and 'manufactured' debate, at least within a condensed and constrained optic and timeframe, shined a light on the actual killing of khashoggi in turkey, who did it, how, and why. yet, significantly, it was only weakly concerned with the other, what could/should be considered to be, highly pertinent and central issues that are/were intertwined within this quagmire. why such deference was paid to the saudi leadership in this case, when this same deference is not paid in many other instances, especially when the faulty regime is not an ally, is quite pertinent. the lack of historical, political, and economic context, combined with the propensity to avoid latching onto 'research', and a plurality of visions, perspectives, and experiences seem to be a predominant feature of how these stories crystallize. the khashoggi example, like others, contains an evolving set of circumstances and frames, as well as questions, and we are cognizant of how some segments of social media can provide differing narratives that can, consequently, re-shape the 'official' story. yet, the social media dimensions can also counter the formal hegemonic narrative, and this is where alternative forms of 'democracy' can start to take hold (jenkins, shresthova, gamber-thompson, kligler-velenchik, and zimmerman ) . why the more critical dimensions within the khashoggi case (or the venezuela situation or others, for that matter) were/are not more broadly taken up by democracy . relates, i believe, to the hegemonic shaping/framing of the issues. it is also combined with a weakly focused mainstream media, whose reach is now consumed within the 'fake news' bubble, and a still questionable place, at least among many formal political leaders and their business sector supports, of uncontrolled social movements and social media within formal political spheres. however, i do believe that this last factor-social movements and social media being a mobilizing force-is, and will continue to potentially be, central to conceptualizing, developing, cultivating, building, and elaborating a more decent, meaningful, robust, and critically engaged democracy, in spite of the status quo aiming to maintain and sustain its hegemonic place. social media movements can also lead to dictatorship, genocide, and an infringement of rights (sapra ) . for instance, gayo-avello ( ) hypothesizes that social media may contribute but is not the central feature to democratization: in short, social media is not a democratizing catalyzer per se. it is just one of many factors, in addition to great tactical tools, provided the conditions in the nondemocratic country are suitable. moreover, there are many variables which can negatively affect the outcome of any uprising, even without the regime tampering with social media. in other words, social media does not make people free; freedom requires people taking risks and organizing themselves. (gayo-avello : ) social media cannot magically lead to class consciousness, anti-racism, peace, and social solidarity. however, it may be able to provide an outlet and legs to important stories, events, and realities for people who were only previously loosely connected. this could have a dual effect of further questioning and delegitimizing normative democracy, and also providing space and voice for marginalized interests, perspectives, and arguments. social media is now indelibly a part of the citizen participation landscape. what is the point of living in a 'democracy' if you are one of those living in abject poverty, are homeless, and are working tirelessly to make ends meet but never achieve economic justice (ely yamin )? of course, the notion of having the 'freedom' to pursue your dreams, as in 'the american dream', is sufficiently grounded within normative debates to ensure that questioning entrenched, systemic, institutional, deeply grounded social inequalities will be quickly snuffed out. within the usa context, amadeo ( ) highlights the increasing social inequalities as follows: structural inequality seems to be worsening. between and , after-tax income increased % for the wealthiest % of households. it rose % for the top fifth. the bottom fifth only increased by %. that's true even adding all income from social security, welfare, and other government payments. during this time, the wealthiest % increased their share of total income by %. everyone else saw their share shrink by - %. as a result, economic mobility worsened. the financial crisis saw the rich get richer. in , the top % of earners took home % of all income. (amadeo ) powers, fischman, and berliner ( ) have highlighted how research on poverty and social inequalities is poorly understood or operationalized, which further underpins weak policy responses to entrenched and systemic problems. similarly, it is helpful to problematize how wealth has been accrued historically through genocide, slavery, imperialism, war and conflict, colonialism, and a host of racialized, sexist, and other machinations in addition to piketty's ( ) welldocumented treatise capital in the twenty-first century. mclaren (see pruyn and malott ) has highlighted marx's theory on surplus value and the limited mobility between the social classes, and the crushing blow of capital against labor; ultimately, the value of what is produced encounters hyper-inflation in the hands of investors, owners, and speculators without real production, which may seem locked into the days of children being exploited in coal mines over a century ago but there are still many parallels today. giroux ( ) has coined 'casino capitalism' to label the politicoeconomic system that enraptures the vast majority of formal, and to varying degrees, informal activity that underpin mass exploitation. he further elucidates the danger of continuing on the one-way neoliberal path before us: neoliberalism has put an enormous effort into creating a commanding cultural apparatus and public pedagogy in which individuals can only view themselves as consumers, embrace freedom as the right to participate in the market, and supplant issues of social responsibility for an unchecked embrace of individualism and the belief that all social relation be judged according to how they further one's individual needs and self-interests. matters of mutual caring, respect, and compassion for the other have given way to the limiting orbits of privatization and unrestrained self-interest, just as it is has become increasingly difficult to translate private troubles into larger social, economic, and political considerations. one consequence is that it has become more difficult for people to debate and question neoliberal hegemony and the widespread misery it produces for young people, the poor, middle class, workers, and other segments of societynow considered disposable under neoliberal regimes which are governed by a survival-of-the fittest ethos, largely imposed by the ruling economic and political elite. (giroux ) mclaren (see pruyn and malott ) and giroux (see giroux, sandin, and burdick, ) have also made a compelling case to interpret today's reality as a politicoeconomic context that is launching us into hyper-sophisticated forms of fascism. within this backdrop, i believe that there is a great need, as there always has been, to be more fully engaged with (and in) education, in political circles and in public debate, in general, in relation to the philosophy and operationalization of capitalism and, in particular, to the all-encompassing mercantilization of all public and private goods, services, and experiences enveloped within neoliberalism. the covid- context has expedited and underscored the slippery slope toward authoritarianism, stripping away rights while creating socio-economic cleavages that are even more serious than before . democracy . is tethered to democracy . conceptualizations of the world, but the door is (slightly) open to develop a new world, despite the titanic hegemonic vice-grip that maintains a stranglehold on education and public debate. as alluded to in the previous section, the collective 'we' are free to surf the web, consume, create, diffuse, comment, and cajole the other, whether the 'other' knows us, sees us, or cares about us or not. we are not frontally impeded from opening our eyes and ears. on the contrary, many movements have been stimulated from doing so-including the arab springalthough the aftermath re-captured regressive hegemonic features of what preceded it. the dilemma is that the corporate/business politico-economic (hegemonic) world has grown into this concurrently in-your-face and stealth, quickly-evolving, dynamic context seamlessly stamping its imprint in every way possible. the interplay between democracy . and democracy . , thus, offers tremendous potential for citizen participation and engagement while, simultaneously, presenting the quicksand mirage that we may not be as 'free' as we think we are, or we may not be as 'engaged' as we think that we are. neoliberalism has many people around the world gasping for air. now mired in a pandemic that vacillates from signs of encouragement that the 'curve is flattening' to fears that 'community transmission' is rapidly spreading through asymptomatic contact, there is enormous stress about when there will be an effective vaccination, how the health context will play out, and, increasingly, when will the 'economy get back to normal.' at this point in time-although we are aware of massive numbers (the information is not hidden, anyway) of unnecessary deaths in 'developing' countries related to hunger, disease, poverty, and conflict-we can see the extreme concern within local, national, and international governments and institutions to get the economy working. while most of the world has emphasized 'social distancing' as a key measure to diminish the dissemination and transmission of covid- , an eerily bizarre phenomenon has taken hold in the usa (wong, vaughan, quilty-harper, and liverpool ) . disparate, semi-organized protests against 'self-isolation' are taking place in diverse locations, often replete with a range of arms and placards enunciating the right to, among other things, 'haircuts' and to 'play golf.' is it pure insanity, a case of hubris beyond all limits, an anti-science ideology that needs to play out in every sector-including the environment-or complete indifference to human suffering? while the usa situation deeply underscores the anxiety and agitation around the health/economy dichotomy, i present below a brief illustration of the neoliberalization of the political and economic convergence through an example of the coronavirus in québec (canada). québec, a predominantly french-speaking province of . million people in canada, provides an interesting illustration of how a jurisdiction within a federal framework has worked to mobilize, sensitize, and activate a range of health, economic, political, and education measures to confront covid- . there are daily press briefings, information sessions, directives, a vast media campaign, testimonies, and a host of consultations, which all serve to educate the public and to engage the citizenry concurrently. it would be disingenuous to simply criticize where there have been gaps and problems; the reality is that many people have worked diligently and courageously to create a sense of the gravity of the problem and to diminish the extent of the propagation of the virus. having a universal healthcare system has been, i believe, indispensable to understanding how to assess, allocate, distribute, and organize resources. this is not an individual problem but a vast, insidious collective one. it should be acknowledged as well that what we know is shifting and re-calibrating in real time, and decisions made on march were questioned and re-assessed by march and so on. moreover, what we know now cannot always be fully understood until later, and decisions that are taken in that light can lead to nefarious situations and the rampant spread of the virus. hindsight is / as the proverb goes so a fulsome diagnosis of what we are doing today will be more effectively critiqued once we are through to the other side of the pandemic. the situation in québec, one that is surely not unknown elsewhere, underscores the fragility of 'normative' democracy; this is, i believe, a question of normative democracy working the way that it does. one heart-wrenching issue that we are observing at this time is that the vast majority of deaths in québec, like elsewhere, is among those years of age and older, and particularly the + age-group. moreover, what many of us did not know or fully consider, the vast majority of deaths up until now within québec are among those who are in long-term care residences (in french, they are called cshlds), roughly %, which are essentially senior's residences for people with health issues. the transmission within these residences is extensive and rapid, with an increasing number of personnel, nurses, and doctors also being affected. one residence, for example, experienced an overwhelming amount of infection (herron, discussed below), and there are others that have also been deeply affected. one might say that there are two public health crises at this time: one for the general population and another for these particular residences with this specific group. on the one hand, the population is astonished, sickened, and in shock ('how could this happen?,' 'especially to "our elderly"?'). on the other hand, this was a serious politico-economic cocktail being mixed for a couple of decades, massaged through diverse political parties within the normative democracy that adjudicates such matters. (why was there such sustained neglect and under-funding? why was this not flagged as a serious catastrophe in the making?). i would like to underscore that this is not a problem of one person, one political party, one decision, one law, or one particular model: it is the consequence of systemic, institutional failure/negligence as well as the thinnest wedges of normative democracy carrying the day over the broader public interest and good. i briefly present some of the specific underlying conditions that lay the groundwork for what is playing out within this vulnerable population at this time: a lack of monitoring, under-paying workers, and diminished policy importance and planning. media accounts provide information on the tragedy unfolding before our eyes. in one case, at herron, in western montréal, the chsld there, which is privately owned, experienced serious staffing shortages, insufficient equipment, poor oversight, inadequate support from oversight bodies, and unacceptable communications with health authorities. mckenna ( ) provides a sense of the chaos and suffering there: nurses were getting sick, too: six out of the seven registered nurses on staff were experiencing covid symptoms, and of seven licensed practical nurses (lpns), only four were still healthy. (…). about a quarter of the orderlies (préposés aux bénéficiares, or patient attendants) had also stopped workingeither because they were experiencing covid symptoms or because they felt it was no longer safe to work at chsld herron. within weeks, a quarter of those patient attendants would test positive for covid- . (…). bedridden residents were lying in sheets stained brown up to their necks in excrement, so long had it been since their diapers had been changed. some were dehydrated and unfed. (…). the head of professional services at the ciusss, dr. nadine larente, is the doctor who went to help. she told the french-language newspaper la presse the place was in chaos: one lpn and two patient attendants were trying to care for residents. food trays had been placed on the floor, dishes untouched because residents with mobility issues could not reach them. (mckenna ). about double the number, proportionately, of seniors in québec opt for long-term care residences compared with the rest of the country, which could be a function of culture, policy, economics, and options available, and the rapidly aging québécois population is a further aggravating factor preparing the context (dougherty ). one expert (see lowrie ) noted that the spatial configuration 'with long corridors and residents sharing rooms, have a harder time isolating sick residents from uninfected ones, compared to residences with house-style layouts, where residents live in smaller wings' is another factor that helps explain the extreme transmission of the virus in chslds. with staff falling ill or refusing to come to work, there has been a massive campaign to recruit retired nurses and also to bring doctors and specialists into the overburdened long-term care system; the premier of the province has also asked for the military (over a thousand troops) to further provide support within these seniors' residences. social class and political power are fully intertwined in the quickly unraveling situation involving seniors' residences in québec. raising the minimum wage in québec, for example, was vigorously opposed by the present government and others along the way, fearful that employers, especially small businesses, could not afford it. while there is no maximum wage being regulated, those struggling with the minimum wage are often obligated to work two or three jobs, to seek assistance elsewhere, and face other severe challenges, including in relation to housing, childcare, education, and the cost of living. the chsld situation brought everything to a head, with it being clearly obvious that those designated as 'essential services' were often those being paid the least in society. the premier took the almost unprecedented measure of apologizing for underpaying workers when it became difficult and problematic to staff these residences: 'i know a lot of quebecers are asking themselves how we could have got ourselves in this situation,' a sombre legault said at his friday briefing, addressing the catastrophe unfolding in covid- -stricken long-term seniors' residences (chslds). 'i myself have spent several days and nights asking what i should have done differently.' 'if i was able to redo one thing, i would have increased the wages of orderlies faster, even without the accord of the unions. i assume full responsibility. we entered this crisis ill equipped, and clearly the situation deteriorated for all kinds of reasons. the virus got in.' (authier ) . the premier also took a series of steps to increase pay for healthcare workers. as part of its effort to improve working conditions in the health-care system, quebec announced that nearly , employees in both the public and private sector will be getting temporary pay increases. workers who are in direct contact with the diseasesuch emergency-room professionals and nurses in coronavirus testing centreswill receive an % boost in their salaries. those working in long-term care homes, known as chslds, will also be among the , workers to benefit from the % raise…. another , people who work in the health-care system but aren't as directly exposed to the disease, such as the nurses who staff the health line, will get a salary increase of %. and workers in private long-term care homes, many of whom make little more than minimum wage, will get an additional $ per hour. that measure appears designed to discourage these workers from quitting and staying home, to take advantage of federal financial assistance that's worth $ a month. (shingler, stevenson, and montpetit ) . one question that arises here is how these workers could have been underpaid for so long, and what the effect may have been, for them, the people receiving the care, the healthcare institutions and system, and society as a whole. did it dissuade qualified workers from pursuing careers or staying in them? what were the other priorities that negated remunerating fairly such indispensable and 'essential' workers? on the economic side of the ledger, how efficient is it to underpay some employees and over-compensate others who have not actually done the work or who are, ironically, considered to be disproportionately fundamental? is a : ratio for salaries at the top and the bottom reasonable or should it be : or : ? in canada, in general, the wage differentials are less extreme and odious than the usa, but the issue of social (in)equality is also a significant concern there. one study (mishe and wolfe ) focused on usa compensation provides some backdrop to how public services and priorities can be disproportionately affected. ceo compensation is very high relative to typical worker compensation (by a ratio of -to- or -to- ). in contrast, the ceo-to-typical-worker compensation ratio (options realized) was -to- in and -to- in . ceos are even making a lot more-about five times as much-as other earners in the top . %. from to , ceo compensation grew by . % ( . % under the options-realized measure), far outstripping s&p stock market growth ( . %) and the wage growth of very high earners ( . %). in contrast, wages for the typical worker grew by just . %. there is a lot of complexity to how covid- is analyzed, and comparing diverse sites/ jurisdictions/systems and how data are compiled and evaluated may not reveal the true breadth and scope of the reality. similarly, there are many moving parts and lots of people (remunerated and volunteer) involved and engaged, and there are also all kinds of activities aimed at supporting a solidified, vigorous response. my intention in presenting this case study is not to admonish or diminish those serious and important efforts. on the contrary, it is my hope that this pandemic will reveal a silver lining somewhere in that extreme vulnerabilities and shortcomings need to be rectified in order to ensure, as much as possible, that economics will not suffocate political considerations in the future. and i have not emphasized here the race, gender, and other pivotal underlying factors underpinning this pandemic, but they are also a significant piece of the puzzle. this text has underscored what 'democracy' we are trying to achieve, to cultivate, and to ingratiate. the focus and direction of my central arguments about the lack of bone fide democracy within a normative, mainstream political framework that preaches that we live in a developed democracy has, i believe, become accelerated and accentuated as a result of covid- . i have highlighted some of the fundamental issues and problems with 'normative, representative, hegemonic, electoral democracy,' and also emphasized the pivotal contextual shifts and cornerstones embedded in democracy . as well as democracy . . i have also made the case for more robust, critically-engaged citizen participation, which would require or, at the very least, benefit from new forms of education and media/political literacy. the social media equation was brought to light since it serves as an unruly, uncontrolled, and rapidly evolving microcosm of the world, its diversity, its problems, its challenges, and its potential. i was careful to not make a definitive declaration related to achieving democracy through the potentially transformative technologies that now shape how we live and function and relate to the world. despite everything, we are still mired in conflict(s), in inequitable power relations, and in 'democracies' that are not very 'democratic. ' we are still straddling democracy . , in which formal political declarations are fabricated with partisan political interests at the fore, the stock market is seemingly central to everything, and business elites are catered to at every level. similarly, tax cuts-regardless of political stripe-figure into everything, political parties shamelessly line up to receive 'donations' (does anyone believe that they come with no strings attached?), tax breaks for companies must be considered as much as lower tax rates for the rich (does anyone believe that rich people will create more employment based on having more cash? if so, why are there so many off-shore accounts in tax-havens intended to not pay tax?), and (military) might is (still) right for many. the further the coronavirus expands, the more there is discussion about needing an economic balance to 'get back to normal,' and indicators such as the stock market are central to supposedly gaging what is happening (karabell ) . of course, there have been lots of (incremental) changes, and lots of new laws, policies, practices, and shifts in cultural norms that have benefitted, generally speaking, women, racialized minorities, the poor, and the vulnerable. yet, social inequalities, despite massive technological and others changes, not only persist but, in many regards, are increasing. how could this be when there is so much wealth? why do so many people leave their countries in complete desperation, why is there still so much military conflict-most of which goes unreported-why do so many problems of poverty and discrimination persist in the most vulgarly palpable ways, why is there such little global outrage over the state and fate of indigenous peoples (the loss of land, language, culture and autonomy), and why is the 'environment' not the priority? this very partial list of questions is noteworthy because neoliberalism is, definitely, an accelerator to many of the problems we are facing . to be clear here, this is not a binary proposition, and avoiding confronting real problems with real people will not address real suffering, oppression and marginalization (gray and gest ) . we might ask: why are there (recurrent, entrenched) problems when there are so many people, projects, forces, and movements fighting for a more decent, robust, and (even) alternative democracy . , one that could place neoliberalism within a new, different and alternative landscape? how should hegemony be understood today when (many) people so freely believe that they have complete agency over their actions, thoughts and experiences, and when (many) people believe that voting is the (only) key? i would stress here that the binary capitalist-socialist, rich-poor binary is not the most productive lens through which to examine the complexity of such extreme power imbalances around the world. the debate around 'democracy,' i believe, needs to be more all-encompassing, involving all of the tentacles and blockages of neoliberalism into the class, race, gender, cultural, and other pivotal sociological markers of identity, and it also needs to carve out a place for how power works, is distributed and recreated. this debate needs to leave open the door for unknown questions and answers as well as (creative and alternative) processes and deliberations, accepting that the normative elections in place are most likely not very beneficial for most people, and, most definitely, the massive numbers of people who do not participate, willingly or unwillingly (van reybrouck ). it is important to connect the local with the global, as we can through covid- . ely yamin ( ) provides a sense of the need to address global issues globally and to be leery of not considering the complexity of the linkages between complex problems. but that and many other challenges requires weaving human rights praxis-human rights for social change-into broader social movements, as well as working across disciplinary silos. the problems facing the rights movement are too complex for any one set of advocacy tools or any one field's expertise. of course, there is no single monolithic 'human rights community' just as there is no unified 'health and human rights community'. those tropes are used from the 'inside' to police the boundaries of orthodoxy and from the 'outside' to caricaturize sets of actors and strategies. yet, there are dangers of circling the wagons defensively around our professional tribes. the complexity of the challenges posed by rampant inequality, the spread of authoritarianism and illiberalism, distrust in multilateralism, and climate cataclysm call for embracing justified critiques and opening up to new ideas and perspectives-and uniting with labor, environmental and many other social justice movements. (ely yamin ) inspired by paulo freire's transformative work (freire ) , i would advocate for more openness and acceptance of political realities that shape our lived experiences as well as an extremely healthy dose of humility as means to being able to understand, engage with, and be with the 'other.' i explore more fully the interconnections and inspiration of freire's work with my colleague gina thésée (carr and thésée ) . the hard-wired, testosterone-induced, keep-fundraising-at-all-times political systems that have been put in place all over the place need to be re-imagined before they suffocate themselves and everyone else. people will slowly divest themselves from the voting game, leaving it as an empty shell filled with a bunch of white guys in suites. (yes, there are some openings for other identities in this equation but the game was made by and for these guys.) freire wrote of conscientization, and i believe that to get there, we need to focus on peace, not war, social, and cultural development as opposed to economic development, solidarity, and emancipation rather than exclusively on individual rights and liberties, and the recognition that we are (all) human beings. as human beings, we are not required to be racist (no baby is racist but we learn to be so), sexist (a totally learned behavior), classist (exploiting one's neighbor is not an obligation), kill one another (who gets killed anyway? the rich or the poor, and who are they? do we care?), or live with so much misery, hatred, and oppression. ultimately, we are in the same boat (or world) together. one could see the glass half full with lots of progress all over the place, and, yet, the empty side of the glass contains real people living through unimaginable (for the full side of the glass) realities; the wage discrepancies and gaps in the québec example exemplify this reality. the quest for a meaningful democracy aimed at both sides of the glass would be a more conducive option, and re-imagining democracy will require more fully and, even disproportionately, considering the empty side of the glass. taking a stand against democracy . and 'normative, representative, hegemonic, electoral democracy' is a necessary condition to moving forward for this re-imagined democracy. donkervoort ( ) underscores that the pandemic has been exploited by 'autocrats' but that citizens can resist and coalesce around global initiatives to weaken and confront hegemonic forces. this could mean enhanced civil society engagement across all boundaries with an eye to unmasking and dismantling the concentration of wealth and power. covid- has exposed the need for a different universe, not only in terms of public health but also, importantly, in relation to democracy and citizen engagement (roy ) . so while my foot, to return to the title, may be in taters, i'm hopefulindeed, it may be the only way out if this-that my head will not be the ultimate causality as we strive to either sustain or re-imagine a democracy that can not only take us out of a pandemic but, rather, into social solidarity that will remove our bodies and minds (and souls) from imminent disaster. open access this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution . international license, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the creative commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. the images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's creative commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. if material is not included in the article's creative commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. to view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ . /. democracy for realists: why elections do not produce responsive government #covid : social media both a blessing and a curse during coronavirus pandemic. the conversation structural inequality in america: how structural inequality stifles the american dream do democracy and capitalism really need each other? harvard business review the struggle for democracy in education: lessons from social realities covid- analysis: legault offers a mea culpa -but did he really have a choice? montreal gazette jamal khashoggi: all you need to know about saudi journalist's death the #metoo social media effect and its potentials for social change in europe. brussels: feps -foundation for european progressive studies does your vote count? critical pedagogy and 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neoliberalism the new henry giroux reader: the role of the public intellectual in a time of tyranny silent citizenship: the politics of marginality in unequal democracies citizens adrift: the democratic disengagement of young canadians by any means necessary: the new youth activism as covid- spreads, listen to the stock market for now social media and youth political engagement: preaching to the converted or providing a new voice for youth? many factors behind covid- outbreaks hitting quebec's long-term care homes noam chomsky: neoliberalism is destroying our democracy: how elites on both sides of the political spectrum have undermined our social, political, and environmental commons. the nation why are american elections so long? orderlies worked without ppe, covid- patients wandered herron's halls for days after health agency took over lies, bullshit and fake news: some epistemological concerns ceo compensation has grown % since : typical worker compensation has risen only % during that time. economic policy institute scaling social movements through social media: the case of black lives matter capital in the twenty-first century making the visible invisible: willful ignorance of poverty and social inequalities in the research-policy nexus this fist called my heart: the peter mclaren reader (volume i) the pandemic is a portal the last decade showed how social media could topple governments and make social change -and it's only getting crazier from here no one 'is more deserving,' says legault, raising wages of , health-care workers as covid- cases climb location information disclosure in location-based social network services: privacy calculus, benefit structure, and gender differences facebook's terrible, horrible, no good, very bad year: and youthought you had a rough conjuguer démocratie et Éducation : perceptions et expériences de futurs-es enseignants-es du québec. citizenship education research journal/revue de recherche sur l'éducation à la citoyenneté political disaffection in contemporary democracies: social capital, institutions, and politics against elections: the case for democracy it's complicated: facebook's terrible . the guardian covid- latest: cdc director warns us second wave could be even worse key: cord- -gc hdqis authors: chen, peter john; stilinovic, milica title: new media and youth political engagement date: - - journal: jays doi: . /s - - - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: gc hdqis this article critically examines the role new media can play in the political engagement of young people in australia. moving away from “deficit” descriptions, which assert low levels of political engagement among young people, it argues two major points. first, that there is a well-established model of contemporary political mobilisation that employs both new media and large data analysis that can and have been effectively applied to young people in electoral and non-electoral contexts. second, that new media, and particularly social media, are not democratic by nature. their general use and adoption by young and older people do not necessarily cultivate democratic values. this is primarily due to the type of participation afforded in the emerging “surveillance economy”. the article argues that a focus on scale as drivers of influence, the underlying foundation of their affordances based on algorithms, and the centralised editorial control of these platforms make them highly participative, but unequal sites for political socialisation and practice. thus, recent examples of youth mobilisation, such as seen in recent climate justice movements, should be seen through the lens of cycles of contestation, rather than as technologically determined. at the turn of the century, considerable interest was focused on new internet-based technologies and their potential to stimulate democratic improvements around the world. attention was particularly given to their role in revitalising the public due to its diverse meanings, and its applications subject to endless contestation (spicer ) , democracy is an essentially contested concept. active definitions for democracy lie across a spectrum of performances and values, from the "minimalist" versions that captures simple measures such as voter registration and turnout, to "maximalist" definitions that include activities like associational membership, active information seeking and civic dialogue (dahl ) . the discussion of democracy in this article focuses on a maximalist value of equality over other values, such as maximal individual liberty. given the recent prevenance of "collective crises" like the climate and pandemic, prioritising maximal individual liberty contrasts the necessary collective nature of contemporary, complex societies (wildavsky ). prioritising values like maximal individual liberty can be unsustainable and/or create inequalities that structurally undermine participation by others through self-interest (wildavsky ). in contrast, a maximalist view of democracy equally emphasises the production of democratic culture and institutions that promote just outcomes that sustain democratic practice. this sees generalised civic culture as important in developing practices by citizens that are realised through or by institutions that permit democratic modes of expression and collective action. this is important as recent challenges to individual well-being have collective origins (climate, pandemic, economic inequality). as such, it is complementary to a study of youth participation in the political processes of evolved democracies, such as australia, and the internet-based technologies that afford them access. in recent times, youth participation in democratic processes has been subject to controversy. krinsky ( ) notes that it is unremarkable that young people are often the focus of media and moral panics. therefore, it comes as no surprise that this particular demographic has been implicated as the focal point for three politically focused "crises" within the twenty-first century. the first panic is that young people are the source of "democratic decline". this reductionist view is commonly associated with lower formal participation rates, particularly voting, but also membership in key institutions like political parties (milner ) . in the compulsory voting context of australia, print highlights the focus on young people as a state educational project to become "active and informed citizens" ( ) . which, in the context of today's technologically driven political environment, would garner access to political discourse, engagement, and the use of advancing technologies to communicate, coordinate and mobilise. the second and third crises pertain to the increasing levels of structural inequality and the inability of the post- s neoliberal economic model-with a focus on egoistic individualism, and the resultant social and political acceptance of enduring and reproducing inequality (nozick )-to ameliorate the causes of, resultant social conflict over, the environmental crisis. while these last two are empirical facts, the former is more contestable. to unpack this youth-focused concern, a good example is the often-cited lowy institute annual poll (kassam ) , which, at times, has shown a % gap between australians aged to years, and those over , in response to a question that asks if "democracy is preferable to any other kind of government". these types of findings are often reported in the media in rejectionist terms that overreads the data set and does not interrogate its context. for example, this type of finding has led to sensationalist claims in the media that "fewer than half of australian adults under the age of actually believe in democratic government" (hildebrand ) . this type of coverage commonly is predicated on a discourse that young people are expected to perform a high degree of nativity about the political world, which, when displayed by older people, is attributed to pragmatism and experience. at the core of this is an implicit message that the status quo must be observed as a normative good. thus, young people are at the intersection of multiple fast and slow-moving crises, real or phantasmagorical. yet, with higher levels of concern for issues of social and climate justice (sealey and mckenzie ) , it becomes critical for them to have the capacity to engage in political practices and advance these concerns and question the foundations of political practice that have created or contributed to these social problems. therefore, contestable claims about current and potential democratic capacity have to be explored, particularly in the context of claims about technologies that afford or impede on youth participation. emerging information and communication technologies provide new (or remediate) "affordances", or possibilities for human action. affordances are important because of the way they encourage, allow, discourage and prevent particular behaviours. these can be deliberately or accidentally designed into a technology, be visible, or concealed (livingstone and das ) . when thinking about the application of this concept to politics, this is frequently captured in the "cost" hypothesis: the internet reduces the costs of political participation and allows some "natural" human desire to be afforded in greater abundance (negroponte ) . the positive aspects of the "cost" hypothesis become evident when considering the affordances made possible through advancing technologies. from the late s onwards, the very nature of the internet-as a tool to communicate, aggregate and coordinate-has been associated with its democratising potential. therefore, at first instance, it appears logical to assume that contemporary youth, who have grown alongside these evolving technologies, would employ the internet as a communication tool to engage with political discourse, much in the same way that low-cost printing played an important role in youth politics of the s and s. more recently, with the advent of "platform" technologies (technologies that facilitate a range of applications, rather that provide a narrow set of specific functions) and social media channels, it is noted that young people increasingly use social media to engage in political discourse (yang and dehart ) . nonetheless, affordances not only have the ability to promote an engagement in political discourse, the design of certain technologies can also hinder participation. in retrospect, claims that assert the democratising potential of the internet have been predicated on loose understandings of the underlying character of the technology under discussion, that is, an exaggeration of its "true" network characteristics. the internet is not a "mesh" where each node has equal power relative to its peers, but a "powerscape" which virtually mirrors the hierarchical nature of power in the physical space where certain agendas, people and even locations are prioritised. equally, contestable are claims about the impacts of the technology such as deterritorialisation, or the notion that these technologies may separate the individual from the physical context as a primary definer of their social, economic and cultural needs (chen ). importantly, the cost claim, once so important to early arguments about the levelling effect of the internet (a view subject to very early empirical criticism; see small ) , can now be understood as generating compensatory costs: as data abundance increased, scarcity has shifted from the production of content to its consumption, and considerable time (cost) is now spent sorting, filtering and killfiling the vast amount of content generated and pushed at individuals, particularly through online automation (aka "bots"). additionally, free entry to the internet's public spheres is not cost-free for those marginalised subaltern populations-a term coined by postcolonial theorists to describe faction of society excluded from hierarchal structures of power-who also experience exclusion at a personal cost. virtual violence and harassment in online spaces have forcefully attempted to exclude these marginalised groups from the digital public sphere and are well-documented. in this context, youth within established democracies, despite having access to these virtual public spheres, form a part of not only the subaltern identity due to their cultural standing, but also the repression they experience from institutions such as the education system (spivak ) . as such, their participation, much like any other faction of subaltern society, is intensely contested (hartounian ; dhrodia ) . in thinking about social media from the perspective of democratic affordances, it is important to consider the political implications of its underlying technological and intuitional characteristics (howard and parks ) . that is, social media is largely only possible because of its reliance on large database systems that afford horizontal visibility within peer groups. thus, it is unsurprising that social media has been politically useful in the processes of political mobilisation. as evidenced in the work of groups like getup! (an australian-based independent movement for progressive participation in democratic processes), along with others, groups have successfully capitalised off of internet-based technologies to disseminate their message and motivate collective action (vromen ) . equally, xenos et al. ( ) have argued strongly for a positive relationship between young people's time spent on social media and political participation. based on a survey of young people ( - ) in the usa, uk and australia, and drawn from online panels, they argued that social media was positively related to increase political participation and produce a good regression analysis in support of this claim. the deterministic interpretation of this research can be contested, however. this analysis also strongly correlated reported levels of participation with respondents' sense of personal political efficacy. this leaves open the real possibility (as the authors identify) that their observations about technology use and political participation may be an expression of some other unmeasured causal agents, or that tool use is epiphenomenal to the connection between political interest and expression that would occur in any other socio-technical setting. significantly, reflecting our concern about the dominance of individualism, the same volume includes a longitudinal analysis of internet use that concludes that "…facilities on the internet often described as 'social' media offer environments which mainly draw young people's attention away from common concerns" (ekstrom et al. ). thus, the actual relationship remains open for investigation, and youth engagement in political participation on the internet is questionable, opening up the potential to explore how the use of social media and other internet-based technologies could mobilise youths into political engagement. recent attention has particularly been paid to youth mobilisations around climate issues, including the role of young people as leadership figures (i.e. greta thunberg) and peer mobilisation using new media (collin and mccormack ) . these observations are commonly placed into the now-familiar causal narrative of new media as inherently facilitative of collective action. however, until end-to-end case research is conducted, caution needs to be taken in ascribing causation. that is, participants may take a bus to participate in a demonstration. however, the bus itself has little to do with political action, much in the same way that social media might not necessarily be the driver for collective action. more specifically, to argue that social media was the driver behind climate youth protests remains a mostly correlative explanation when dealing with a population so ensconced in a mediated lifeworld, a reality in which all the immediate experiences of an individual are directly impacted and influenced by evolving media technologies. many of these mobilisation case examples are embedded in established social movement industries and, importantly, are not outside the scale of mobilisations seen in pre-internet youthled movements during the cold war. in similar "existential" issues of concern for young people (such as anti-conscription in the s or anti-nuclear movements of the s), mobilisation of youth movements was significant, preinternet. an alternative hypothesis is that we can see this as part of the routine, periodical "cycle of contention" of post-war youth mobilisations in which "good, decent, little people" with an apparent distrust towards establishment rally against the "corrupt and evil forces from above whose policies are responsible for their pain and suffering" (kazin ) . equally, we could argue that established collective action theory might be hierarchically higher than social media-specific theorising in explaining case examples, as it provides a better-substantiated explanation of a greater number of recurrent phenomena. further, the basic premises of the existence of a "deficit" have been challenged. collin ( ) , for example, argues that claims about youth disengagement are exaggerated. she points to volunteering and social movement participation rates as correctives to reliance on "formal" institutional measures of (dis)engagement. while longitudinal data on social media and volunteering in australia is scarce and unreliable (walsh and black ) , internationally, there is evidence that increased volunteering rates pre-date widespread internet adoption and may be associated with motivations like experience-gathering to enhance employability or college entry (jones ) . again, membership and volunteering may now be afforded via online channels, but this does not demonstrate a causal connection between the means and social practice. lastly, flexible definitions of participation serve as a correction of the institutionally oriented "democratic decline" literature by expanding what political participation looks like. they do so by recognising a shift towards informality in terms of participation in the public sphere ("everyday making"; bang and sørensen ) . this draws us to bennett's ( ) analysis of the implications of a social shift towards citizenship as "social movement citizenship" over dutiful/republican models that privilege participation within or through formal institutions. bennett's model emphasises a focus on concern for specific issues as a primary driver for the "hitand-run" participation of everyday making, combined with modes of participation that are more informal and expressive. this not only sits within a post-modern/post-war notion of justice as including recognition as well as other "rightscentric" motivators, but also recognises that the large participation rates in political organisations in the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century might have less to do with their political functions, as much as their provision of social services, recreational opportunities and networking resources. these benefits are now seen outside of these explicitly political groups with postwar consumer culture, hyperpluralism and social diversification. while participation in the activities of formal political institutions is essential in liberal democracies, a decline in interest in more conventional models of government presents problems in realising political wins or accepting political compromises, the importance of linking these types of rights and recognition concerns with just structural outcomes (fraser ) . overall, social movement citizenship, or everyday making, presents challenges to an outcome-focused democratic analysis due to a tendency towards adhocracy, paradoxical disconnection and rapid demobilisation by political participants following their "hit-and-run" engagement. each is discussed in turn. movement politics tend towards fluid structures which more commonly produce flexible adhocracy. while these non-hierarchal power structures are an established advantage of movements, giving them the flexibility, dynamism and resistance to repression, reliance on adhocracy may not produce democratic socialisation. in the context of virtual collective spaces afforded by internet technologies, adhocracy, through decentralised electronic and online methods of collective action, tends to situate issues and problems in the context of "unique" or unusual issues that may require extra-normal methods to address. these types of organisational forms place politics into states of exception where the framing of the problem as exceptional encourages solutions based on the sovereign's ability to transcend the rule of law in the name of the "public good" (schmitt ) . therefore, they are less, not more, likely to consider democratic norms and suffer from low accountability and less-drawing potential. while these forms of governance can ameliorate the crises, the longer-term governance legitimated by invoking sovereign power is problematic under this model (see wallach's ( ) discussion of advocacy and the global financial crisis). while the lack of lesson-drawing limits the "developmental" value of participation in these forms of governance structure, this critique is emerging in response to state responses to the covid- crisis of . second, while rejecting arguments about social media as fundamentally "siloing" its users (the so-called filter bubbles argument), issue-based politics can disconnect participants from other issue groups and meta-narratives seen either as generally necessary for social functioning or as important canvases against which popular debate is framed. bouvier ( ) equates this to reduced personal ownership of claims made online, due to anonymity, and the collapse of the existence of a shared symbolic order (the "big other"). new media, in undermining the cultural dominance of mass political media, has played an essential part in this process. as a type of networked politics, horizontal visibility can be low. one of the difficulties of the study of younger people's political engagement lies in its comparative "invisibility" within social media that is not readily observable to wider publics. as schuster ( ) observed, this invisibility can create a "generational divide" within movements, with older activists unaware of the depth of engagement of younger activists. this reinforces findings that social networks may not create social capital as anticipated (valenzuela et al. ). indeed, there are concerns that high levels of social media consumption may be alienating (hunt et al. ) . finally, and related the factors of velocity and transience associated with "internet time", rapid mobilisation and "flocking" (where attention shifts towards the next exceptional space or incident that garners high visibility, leaving the previous platform or issue empty) can be associated with rapid demobilisation (jackson and chen ) . as uldam and vestergaard ( ) argue, there is a need to refocus on civic participation beyond movement-based and protest-focused analysis. image is not action, and considerable over-attention to visible movement action raises questions about the extent to which the transition from expressive politics to agenda building to policy design, implementation and monitoring occurs. this saw considerable interest from post-war social movement "pracademics" (academics engaged in instrumental and action research), asking questions about "realising wins" and the problem of follow-through post demobilisation (see, for example, the practical work of moyer et al. , see in the map model for social movements). to understand the relationship between social media and democratic practice, we need to determine what type of practice space social media affords. "practice space" is used deliberately here over the more popular "public sphere" due to the authors' view of the tendency to misapply this concept to the new media environment. more specifically, the attraction of online media theorists to habermasian deliberation may not have been the right choice because this particular democratic model emphasises early parts of the policy process over later aspects of it highlighted above. thus, rather than see the commercial social media platforms as public spheres (true sandboxes), we can see them as sites with non-trivial visible and invisible geographies of power that not only provide political affordances, but also shape social expectation of social media citizenship. the monetisation of online spaces, combined with the collapse of the conventional advertising driven internet economy, has increasingly shifted social media into a primary role in what is called "surveillance capitalism". surveillance capitalism produces value through the observation, quantification and commodification of individuals' online behaviours. this data becomes the core product of these services, providing a new market with the potential to capitalise off knowledge about users' preferences (zuboff ) . this has implications for participation in and through these systems due to the role that surveillance plays in creating self-censorship, and the way preference engines generate sameness in the information consumed by individuals. these tendencies-in stark contrast to the view of information in markets as facilitating fair exchange, or the free-speech ethos maintained by the entrepreneurs who run social media enterprises-are problematic for democratic participation. this is due to the reduced capacity for preference formation (attacking performative aspects of speech practice) and preference realisation (via the selective satisfaction of wants at low cost). from the preference formation perspective, the impact of surveillance is demonstrated in stoycheff's ( ) study of the effect of social media users' awareness of surveillance. this experiment found that-even in "strong" free-speech jurisdictionspriming users' awareness of the possibility of surveillance produced more conservative online behaviour and speech. this impact should be concerning to developmental democrats. dahl ( ) , for example, emphasis on the processes of preference formation as a critical aspect of developmental citizenship, something that continues life long, but is vital in the transition into civic life in youth. preference formation is both an individualised practice, in that it is a developmentally acquired skill that individuals exhibit different levels of capacity in, and a collective capacity under conditions of equality. specifically, discourse within groups develops the capacity of the group to undertake political discourse through observation and the presence of relevant information. from a preference realisation perspective, the existence of these so-called preference-knowing machines has implications for human agency. this observation is made because surveillance capitalism, unlike traditional top-down political paternalism exhibited in democratic and authoritarian societies, is fully compatible with high levels of perceived individual efficacy. where "search" once drove the core economy of the internet and provided efficacy through agency, "sharing" and automagical result systems replace agency with expectation. "sharing" allows users to expect that aspects of their "wants" are provided automatically as these systems offer solutions to personal wants and adjust the platform in line with anticipated user desires. thus, efficacy is obtained in these surveillance regimes. significantly, this is achieved not through the type of agency commonly associated with democratic participation, rather a negative agency, surrendering to the panoptic view in recognition of its capacity to service the individual within very narrow and uncontested spheres. this exchange has a psychic cost. hoffmann et al. ( ) identified "privacy cynicism" as the tendency for users to engage in "a cognitive coping mechanism, allowing users to rationalise taking advantage of online services despite serious privacy concerns." this type of preference servicing/channelling is not something we see in corporate media spaces. through the continued valorisation of corporate modes of production in the political sphere, these types of negative agency, passive efficacy systems are proliferating within institutions (public, private and non-profit), and in the new interest in behavioural and persuasive "nudge" economics evidenced in the public sector. these projects-wrapped in the discourse of "big data" analytics-seek to understand their stakeholder groups, be they citizens, clients or employees, but only to the extent to which that knowledge fulfils institutional objectives. this is most obvious in the authoritarian internet of china, where the hard power has most recently been combined with "soft" incentivising through the "social credit system" (ramadan ) but can also be seen, to a seemingly less intrusive extent, in developed democracies through the aforementioned corporatised nature of e-governance and behavioural policy units. the naturalisation of the technologies underpinning these management systems, be they in liberal democracies or authoritarian regimes, further erodes the capacity of users to express consent (with legitimacy implications important in democratic regimes) and participate in process design, eroding the capacity for the transference of democratic capacity into other areas of life. socialisation within these systems of expectations thus displaces developmental citizenship as citizens are increasingly embedded in these systems of affordance. it is essential to learn from the failures of the "electronic democracy" (e-democracy) movement as a development which, at the turn of the century, aimed to streamline bureaucratic processes and motivate higher levels of participative engagement between power elites and their publics. attempts to create and propagate participative platforms advocated at this time significantly failed through a combination of low utilisation and limited state interest in cultivating and connecting with them. even where public management has embraced notions of popular legitimacy, such as the focus on connecting administration to public legitimacy through the reclassification of public sector management as the creation of "public value", this has not led to an embrace of participative media by public managers (bolívar ) . where participative design is undertaken, understanding the constitutive nature of affordances is essential. as mentioned, design choices activate and allow behaviours. thorson ( ) , for example, has argued that there are important differences in the value of new media associated with how the technologies are employed, with "active" use (i.e. search over sociability) correlated with more challenging modes of citizenship, or seeking divergent opinion exposure. matei and britt ( ) provide a useful analysis of wikipedia as an example of a platform that uses advocacy, creates a social hierarchy in production, but sustains openness to new entrants, accountability, and has sustained itself in the face of attacks on its primary function of knowledge production. as indicated, however, this cannot be seen as an engineering problem, and the cultivation of interest and practices to employ, discover and create new democratic affordances is necessary. the contemporary problem is that most civics education is undertaken in bad faith. as bennett ( ) observed, most academic and educational representation of democratic practice bears little resemblance to its actual practice, precisely because this practice in most established democracies falls far short of the underlying idealistic motivations embedded in civics instruction. as "telling people to participate in bad institutions is mere propaganda" (levine ), there has been a tendency to focus on political spaces that are presented as tabula rasa, be this technological spaces over the last two decades, or an emphasis on social movement participation because ever-renewing social movements maintain the appearance of both democratic because they are inherently participative, and new because they tend to be continuously renamed. coleman ( ) has highlighted the importance of skilling for "autonomous ecitizenship" that capacity building and skilling overcome the problem of bad faith by allowing young people to develop their own aspirational spaces. this has been demonstrated in applied research in schools (see black ) . this model presumes, however, that these skills are produced in a context where their democratic application is explicit, and that these self-actualising young e-citizens would employ these skills in a frictionless environment that provides them with an even playing field. if this illusion was able to be sustained by coleman in , a decade later it cannot be. the corporate-dominated internet has proven libertarians wrong: atomised "heroic" individuals cannot find self-actualisation in the face of such overwhelming institutional power. individual liberalism is impossible in an age of such incredible institutional power. the "hidden affordances" of the sub-systems most internet users spend the majority of their time in online (as opposed to the delusion of the internet as a "sandbox") may be malleable to a literate few, but this presents the prospect of meritocracy heavily tilted by neoliberal access to education, not a sustainable democracy of equality. further, social media may provide greater affordances for reactionary and counter-democratic agents (the entrenched, corporations, the state) to limit movement and political agency (cammaerts ; uldam ) . this latter power is contestable. while online activists have attempted to moderate the policies of major internet platform operators, their capacity to act against organisations of this scale and transnational character has been most effective only where similar transnational capacity exists. thus, while there have been a range of statelevel investigations and proposed regulatory interventions in the way platforms operate (in australia primarily focused on ensuring representative democracy), the most significant developments have been seen at the level of the european union. this remains a moving target but provides an example of the need to revisit the politics of accessibility but focused on interventions within the walled gardens online. the internet is no longer a land without a history, and optimistic projections that new affordances have a deterministic correlation with democratisation need to be checked against the visible history of these claims, and the broader background context of societies that are more technologically saturated, and less democratic overall. while new media is undoubtedly at the heart of recent youth mobilisation politics, it is not clear if this is more than correlative or epiphenomenal. younger people are disproportionately institutionally situated in contexts obsessed by the "human capital" developmental school (becker ) in which citizenship rights are primarily held in abeyance, secondary to instrumental aims associated with participation in the private world's production and consumption. thus, recent youth mobilisations can be seen as remarkable contestations in the face of these systems, rather than a result of them to avoid falling into the twin traps of bad faith promotion of weak systems or magical thinking about new spaces and places for participation, systematic democratisation of spaces and places-both online and off-must be the focus of reform. participation without democratisation is the possible panacea that can consume the efforts of reformers. as the internet splits into three distinct jurisdictions-the surveillance capitalism space, authoritarian spaces and the 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and australian research alliance for children and youth equal access, unequal success-major and minor canadian parties on the net what do we mean by democracy? reflections on an essentially contested concept and its relationship to politics and public administration can the subaltern speak? under surveillance: examining facebook's spiral of silence effects in the wake of nsa internet monitoring the networked young citizen: social media political participation and civic engagement civic engagement and social media: political participation beyond protest is there social capital in a social network site? facebook use and college students' life satisfaction, trust, and participation digital citizenship and political engagement: the challenge from online campaigning and advocacy organisations australian research alliance for children and youth wildavsky a ( ) culture and social theory the great equaliser? patterns of social media use and youth political engagement in three advanced democracies social media use and online political participation among college students during the us election the age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power key: cord- - wzf nzz authors: baly, ramy; martino, giovanni da san; glass, james; nakov, preslav title: we can detect your bias: predicting the political ideology of news articles date: - - journal: nan doi: nan sha: doc_id: cord_uid: wzf nzz we explore the task of predicting the leading political ideology or bias of news articles. first, we collect and release a large dataset of , articles that were manually annotated for political ideology -left, center, or right-, which is well-balanced across both topics and media. we further use a challenging experimental setup where the test examples come from media that were not seen during training, which prevents the model from learning to detect the source of the target news article instead of predicting its political ideology. from a modeling perspective, we propose an adversarial media adaptation, as well as a specially adapted triplet loss. we further add background information about the source, and we show that it is quite helpful for improving article-level prediction. our experimental results show very sizable improvements over using state-of-the-art pre-trained transformers in this challenging setup. in any piece of news, there is a chance that the viewpoint of its authors and of the media organization they work for, would be reflected in the way the story is being told. the emergence of the web and of social media has lead to the proliferation of information sources, whose leading political ideology or bias may not be explicit. yet, systematic exposure to such bias may foster intolerance as well as ideological segregation, and ultimately it could affect voting behavior, depending on the degree and the direction of the media bias, and on the voters' reliance on such media (dellavigna and kaplan, ; iyengar and hahn, ; saez-trumper et al., ; graber and dunaway, ) . thus, making the general public aware, e.g., by tracking and exposing bias in the news is important for a healthy public debate given the important role media play in a democratic society. media bias can come in many different forms, e.g., by omission, by over-reporting on a topic, by cherry-picking the facts, or by using propaganda techniques such as appealing to emotions, prejudices, fears, etc. , a bias can occur with respect to a specific topic, e.g., covid- , immigration, climate change, gun control, etc. it could also be more systematic, as part of a political ideology, which in the western political system is typically defined as left vs. center vs. right political leaning. predicting the bias of individual news articles can be useful in a number of scenarios. for news media, it could be an important element of internal quality assurance as well as of internal or external monitoring for regulatory compliance. for news aggregator applications, such as google news, it could enable balanced search, similarly to what is found on allsides. for journalists, it could enable news exploration from a left/center/right angle. it could also be an important building block in a system that detects bias at the level of entire news media (baly et al., (baly et al., , , such as the need to offer explainability, i.e., if a website is classified as left-leaning, the system should be able to pinpoint specific articles that support this decision. in this paper, we focus on predicting the bias of news articles as left-, center-, or right-leaning. previous work has focused on doing so at the level of news media (baly et al., ) or social media users , but rarely at the article level (kulkarni et al., ). the scarce article-level research has typically used distant supervision, assuming that all articles from a given medium should share its overall bias, which is not always the case. here, we revisit this assumption. our contributions can be summarized as follows: • we create a new dataset for predicting the political ideology of news articles. the dataset is annotated at the article level and covers a wide variety of topics, providing balanced left/center/right perspectives for each topic. • we develop a framework that discourages the learning algorithm from modeling the source instead of focusing on detecting bias in the article. we validate this framework in an experimental setup where the test articles come from media that were not seen at training time. we show that adversarial media adaptation is quite helpful in that respect, and we further propose to use a triplet loss, which shows sizable improvements over state-of-the-art pretrained transformers. • we further incorporate media-level representation to provide background information about the source, and we show that this information is quite helpful for improving the article-level prediction even further. the rest of this paper is organized as follows: we discuss related work in section . then, we introduce our dataset in section , we describe our models for predicting the political ideology of a news article in section , and we present our experiments and we discuss the results in section . finally, we conclude with possible directions for future work in section . most existing datasets for predicting the political ideology at the news article level were created by crawling the rss feeds of news websites with known political bias (kulkarni et al., ) , and then projecting the bias label from a website to all articles crawled from it, which is a form of distant supervision. the crawling could be also done using text search apis rather than rss feeds (horne et al., ; gruppi et al., ) . the media-level annotation of political leaning is typically obtained from specialized online platforms, such as news guard, allsides, and media bias/fact check, where highly qualified journalists use carefully designed guidelines to make the judgments. as manual annotation at the article level is very time-consuming, requires domain expertise, and it could be also subjective, such annotations are rarely available at the article level. as a result, automating systems for political bias detection have opted for using distant supervision as an easy way to obtain large datasets, which are needed to train contemporary deep learning models. distant supervision is a popular technique for annotating datasets for related text classification tasks, such as detecting hyper-partisanship (horne et al., ; potthast et al., ) and propaganda/satire/hoaxes (rashkin et al., ) . for example, kiesel et al. ( ) created a large corpus for detecting hyper-partisanship (i.e., articles with extreme left/right bias) consisting of , articles, annotated via distant supervision, and additional , manually annotated articles, part of which was used as a test set for the semeval- task on hyper-partisan news detection. the winning system was an ensemble of character-level cnns (jiang et al., ) . interestingly, all topperforming systems in the task achieved their best results when training on the manually annotated articles only and ignoring the articles that were labeled using distant supervision, which illustrates the dangers of relying on distant supervision. barrón-cedeno et al. ( ) extensively discussed the limitations of distant supervision in a text classification task about article-level propaganda detection, in a setup that is similar to what we deal with in this paper: the learning systems may learn to model the source of the article instead of solving the task they are actually trained for. indeed, they have shown that the error rate may drastically increase if such systems are tested on articles from sources that were never seen during training, and that this effect is positively correlated with the representation power of the learning model. they analyzed a number of representations and machine learning models, showing which ones tend to overfit more, but, unlike our work here, they fell short of recommending a practical solution. budak et al. ( ) measured the bias at the article level using crowd-sourcing. this is risky as public awareness of media bias is limited (elejalde et al., ) . moreover, the annotation setup does not scale. finally, their dataset is not freely available, and their approach of randomly crawling articles does not ensure that topics and events are covered from different political perspectives. lin et al. ( ) built a dataset annotated with the ideology of articles related to the israeli-palestinian conflict published on bitterlemons. org. the articles were written by two editors and guests, which minimizes the risk of modeling the author style. however, the dataset is too small to train modern deep learning approaches. kulkarni et al. ( ) built a dataset using distant supervision and labels from allsides. distant supervision is fine for the purpose of training, but they also used it for testing, which can be problematic. moreover, their training and test sets contain articles from the same media, and thus models could easily learn to predict the article's source rather than its bias. in their models, they used both the text and the url contents of the articles. overall, political bias has been studied at the level of news outlet (dinkov et al., ; baly et al., baly et al., , zhang et al., ) , user , article (potthast et al., ; , and sentence (sim et al., ; saez-trumper et al., ) . in particular, baly et al. ( ) developed a system to predict the political bias and the factuality of news media. in a followup work, showed that bias and factuality of reporting should be predicted jointly. a finer-grained analysis is performed in (horne et al., ) , where a model was trained on k sentences from a dataset of reviews (pang and lee, ) , and used to discriminate objective versus non-objective sentences in news articles. lin et al. ( ) presented a sentence-level classifier, where the labels were projected from the document level. in this section, we describe the dataset that we created and that we used in our experiments. while most of the platforms that analyze the political leaning of news media provide in-depth analysis of particular aspects of the media, allsides stands out as it provides annotations of political ideology for individual articles, which ensures high-quality data for both training and testing, which is in contrast with distant supervision approaches used in most previous research, as we have seen above. in all-sides, these annotations are made as a result of a rigorous process that involves blind bias surveys, editorial reviews, third-party analysis, independent reviews, and community feedback. furthermore, allsides uses the annotated articles to enable its balanced search, which shows news coverage on a given topic from media with different political bias. in other words, for each trending event or topic (e.g., impeachment or coronavirus pandemic), the platform pushes news articles from all sides of the political spectrum, as shown in figure . we took advantage of this and downloaded all articles along with their political ideology annotations (left, center, or right), their assigned topic(s), the media in which they were published, their author(s), and their publication date. thus, our dataset contains articles that were manually selected and annotated, and that are representative of the real political scenery. note that the center class covers articles that are biased towards a centrist political ideology, and not articles that lack political bias (e.g., sports and technology), which commonly exist in news corpora that were built by scraping rss feeds. we collected a total of , articles published by news media and covering topics. in this dataset, a total of , individual articles ( . %) have a political ideology label that is different from their source's. this suggests that, while the distant supervision assumption generally holds, we would still find many articles that defy it. table shows some statistics about the dataset. figure illustrates the distribution of the different political bias labels within each of the most frequent topics. we can see that our dataset is able to represent topics or events from different political perspectives. this is yet another advantage, as it enables a more challenging task for machine learning models to detect the linguistic and the semantic nuances of different political ideologies in news articles, as opposed to cases where certain topics might be coincidentally collocated with certain labels, in which case the models would be actually learning to detect the topics instead of predicting the political ideology of the target news article. it is worth noting that since most article labels are aligned with their source labels, it is likely that machine learning classifiers would end up modeling the source instead of the political ideology of the individual articles. for example, a model would be learning the writing style of each medium, and then it would associate it with a particular ideology. therefore, we pre-processed the articles in a way that eliminates explicit markers such as the name of the authors, or the name of the medium that usually appears as a preamble to the article's content, or in the content itself. furthermore, in order to ensure that we are actually modeling the political ideology as it is expressed in the language of the news, we created evaluation splits in two different ways: (i) randomly, which is what is typically done (for comparison only), and (ii) based on media, where all articles by the same medium appear in either the training, the validation, or the testing dataset. the latter form of splitting would help us indicate what a trained classifier has actually learned. for instance, if it modeled the source, then it would not be able to perform well on the test set, since all its articles would belong to sources that were never seen during training. in order to ensure fair one-toone comparisons between experiments, we created these two different sets of splits, while making sure that they share the same test set, as follows: • media-based split: we sampled , articles from news media ( per medium) and used them as the test set, and we excluded the remaining , articles from these media. then, we used the articles from the remaining media to create the training and the validation sets, where all articles from the same medium would appear in the same set: training, development, or testing. this ensures that the model is fine-tuned and tested on articles whose sources were not seen during training. • random split: here, the test set is the same as in the media-based split. the , articles that we excluded from the media are now added to the articles from the remaining media. then, we split this collection of articles (using stratified random sampling) into training and validation sets. this ensures that the model is fine-tuned and evaluated only on articles whose sources were observed during training. table shows statistics about both splits, including the size of each set and the number of media and topics they cover. we release the dataset, along with the evaluation splits, and the code, which can be used to extend the dataset as more news articles are added to allsides. the task of predicting the political ideology of news articles is typically formulated as a classification problem, where the textual content of the articles is encoded into a vector representation that is used to train a classifier to predict one of c classes (in our case, c = : left, center, and right). in our experiments, we use two deep learning architectures: (i) long short-term memory networks (lstms), which are recurrent neural networks (rnns), which use gating mechanisms to selectively pass information across time and to model long-term dependencies (hochreiter and schmidhuber, ) , and (ii) bidirectional encoder representations from transformers (bert), with a complex architecture yielding high-quality contextualized embeddings, which have been successful in several natural language processing tasks (devlin et al., ). ultimately, our goal is to develop a model that can predict the political ideology of a news article. our dataset, along with some others, has a special property that might stand in the way of achieving this goal. most articles published by a given source have the same ideological leaning. this might confuse the model and cause it to erroneously associate the output classes with features that characterize entire media outlets (such as detecting specific writing patterns, or stylistic markers in text). consequently, the model would fail when applied to articles that were published in media that were unseen during training. the experiments in section confirm this. thus, we apply two techniques to de-bias the models, i.e., to prevent them from learning the style of a specific news medium rather than predicting the political ideology of the target news article. this model was originally proposed by ganin et al. ( ) for unsupervised domain adaptation in image classification. their objective was to adapt a model trained on labelled images from a source domain to a novel target domain, where the images have no labels for the task at hand. this is done by adding an adversarial domain classifier with a gradient reversal layer to predict the examples' domains. the label predictor's is minimized for the labelled examples (from the source domain), and the adversarial domain classifier's loss is maximized for all examples in the dataset. as a result, the encoder can extract representation that is (i) discriminative for the main task and also (ii) invariant across domains (due to the gradient reversal layer). the overall loss is minimized as follows: where n is the number of training examples, l i y (·, ·) is the label predictor's loss, the condition d i = means that only examples from the source domain are used to calculate the label predictor's loss, l i d (·, ·) is the domain classifier's loss, λ controls the trade-off between both losses, and {θ f , θ y , θ d } are the parameters of the encoder, the label predictor, and the domain classifier, respectively. further details about the formulation of this method is available in (ganin et al., ) . we adapt this architecture as follows. instead of a domain classifier, we implement a media classifier, which, given an article, tries to predict the medium it comes from. as a result, the encoder should extract representation that is discriminative for the main task of predicting political ideology, while being invariant for the different media. this approach was originally proposed as an unsupervised domain adaptation, since labelled examples were available for one domain only, whereas in our case, all articles from different media were labelled for their political ideology. therefore, we jointly minimize the losses of both the label predictor and the media classifier over the entire dataset. the new objective function to minimize is as follows: where l i m (·, ·) is the loss of the media classifier, and θ m is its set of parameters. in this approach, we pre-train the encoder using a triplet loss (schroff et al., ) . the model is trained on a set of triplets, each composed of an anchor, a positive, and a negative example. the objective in eq. ensures that the positive example is always closer to the anchor than the negative example is, where a, p and n are the encodings of the anchor, of the positive, and of the negative examples, respectively, and d(·, ·) is the euclidean distance: figure shows an example of such a triplet. the positive example shares the same ideology as the anchor's, but they are published by different media. the negative example has a different ideology than the anchor's, but they are published by the same medium. in this way, the encoder will be clustering examples with similar ideologies close to each other, regardless of their source. once the encoder has been pre-trained, its parameters, along with the softmax classifier's, are fine-tuned on the main task by minimizing the cross-entropy loss when predicting the political ideology of articles. finally, we explore the benefits of incorporating information describing the target medium, which can serve as a complementary representation for the article. while this seems to be counter-intuitive to what we have been proposing in subsection . , we believe that medium-level representation can be valuable when combined with an accurate representation of the article. intuitively, having an accurate understanding of the natural language in the article, together with a glimpse into the medium it is published in, should provide a more complete picture of its underlying political ideology. baly et al. ( ) proposed a comprehensive set of representation to characterize news media from different angles: how a medium portrays itself, who is its audience, and what is written about it. their results indicate that exploring the twitter bios of a medium's followers offers a good insight into its political leaning. to a lesser extent, the content of a wikipedia page describing a medium can also help unravel its political leaning. therefore, we concatenated these representations to the encoded articles, at the output of the encoder and right before the softmax layer, so that both the article encoder and the classification layer that is based on the article and the external media representations are trained jointly and end-to-end. similarly to (baly et al., ) , we retrieved the profiles of up to a , twitter followers for each medium, we encoded their bios using the sentence-bert model (reimers and gurevych, ) , and we then averaged these encodings to obtain a single representation for that medium. as for the wikipedia representation, we automatically retrieved the content of the page describing each medium, whenever applicable. then, we used the pre-trained base bert model to encode this content by averaging the word representations extracted from bert's second-to-last layer, which is common practice, since the last layer may be biased towards the pre-training objectives of bert. we evaluated both the lstm and the bert models, assessing the impact of (i) de-biasing and (ii) incorporating media-level representation. we fine-tuned the hyper-parameters of both models on the validation set using a guided grid search trial while fixing the seeds of the random weights initialization. for lstm, we varied the length of the input ( - , tokens), the number of layers ( - ), the size of the lstm cell ( - ), the dropout rate ( - . ), the learning rate ( e− to e− ), the gradient clipping value ( - ), and the batch size ( - ). the best results were obtained with a -token input, a -layer lstm of size , a dropout rate of . , a learning rate of e− , gradient clipping at . , and a batch size of . this model has around . m trainable parameters, and was trained with -dimensional glove input word embeddings (pennington et al., ) . for bert, we varied the length of the input, the learning rate, and the gradient clipping value. the best results were obtained using a -token input, a learning rate of e− , and gradient clipping at . this model has m trainable parameters. we trained our models on titan x pascal gpus, and the runtime for each epoch was seconds for the lstm-based models and minutes for the bert-based models. for each experiment, the model was trained only once with fixed seeds used to initialize the models' weights. for the adversarial adaptation (aa), we have an additional hyper-parameter λ (see equation ), which we varied from to , where means no adaptation at all. the best results were obtained with λ = . , which means that we need to pay significant attention to the adversarial classifier's loss in order to mitigate the media bias. for the triplet loss pre-training (plt), we sampled , triplets from the training set, such that the examples in each triplet discuss the same topic in order to ensure that the change in topic has minimal impact on the distance between the examples. to evaluate our models, we use accuracy and macro-f score (f averaged across all classes), which we also used as an early stopping criterion, since the classes were slightly imbalanced. moreover, given the ordinal nature of the labels, we report the mean absolute error (mae), shown in equation ( ), where n is the number of instances, and y i andŷ i are the number of correct and of predicted labels, respectively. baseline results the results in table show the performance for lstm and for bert at predicting the political ideology of news articles for both the media-based and the random splits. we observe sizable differences in performance between the two splits. in particular, both models perform much better when they are trained and evaluated on the random split, whereas they both fail on the mediabased split, where they are tested on articles from media that were not seen during training. this observation confirms our initial concerns that the models would tend to learn general characteristics about news media, and then would face difficulties with articles coming from new unseen media. removing the source bias in order to further confirm the bias towards modeling the media, we ran a side experiment of fine-tuning bert on the task of predicting the medium given the article's content, which is a -way classification problem. we used stratified random sampling to create the evaluation splits and to make sure each set contains all labels (media). the results in table confirm that bert is much stronger than the majority class baseline, despite the high number of classes, which means that predicting the medium in which a target news article was published is a fairly easy task. macro f acc. majority . . bert . . in order to remove the bias towards modeling the medium, we evaluated the impact of the adversarial adaptation (aa) and the triplet loss pre-training (tlp) with the media-based split. the results in table show sizeable improvements when either of these approaches is used, compared to the baseline (no de-biasing). in particular, tlp yields an improvement of . points absolute in terms of accuracy, and . points in terms of macro-f . table : impact of adding media-level representations to the article-level representations (with and without debiasing). note that the results in rows and are the same for both lstm and bert because no articles were involved, and the media-level representations were directly used to train the classifier. finally, we evaluated the impact of incorporating the media-level representation (twitter followers' bios and wikipedia content) in addition to teh articlelevel representation. table illustrates these results in an incremental way. first, we evaluated the performance of the media-level representation alone at predicting the political ideology of news articles (see rows and ). we should note that these results are identical for the lstm and the bert columns since no article was encoded in these experiments, and the media representation was used directly to train the logistic regression classifier. then, adding the article representation from either model, without any de-biasing, had no or little impact on the performance (see rows vs. , and vs. ). this is not surprising, since we have shown that, without de-biasing, both models learn more about the source than about the bias in the language used by the article. therefore, the ill-encoded articles do not provide more information than what the medium representation already gives, which is why no or too little improvement was observed. when we use the triplet loss to mitigate the source bias, the resulting article representation is more accurate and meaningful, and the medium representation does offer complementary information, and eventually contributes to sizeable performance gains (see rows and vs. ). the twitter bios representation appears to be much more important than the representation from wikipedia, which shows the importance of inspecting the media followers' background and their point of views, which is also one of the observations in (baly et al., ) . overall, comparing the best results to the baseline (rows vs. ), we can see that (i) using the triplet loss to remove the source bias, and (ii) incorporating media-level representation from twitter followers yields . and . absolute improvement in terms of macro f on the challenging media-based split. we have explored the task of predicting the leading political ideology of news articles. in particular, we created a new large dataset for this task, which features article-level annotations and is well-balanced across topics and media. we further proposed an adversarial media adaptation approach, as well as a special triplet loss in order to prevent modeling the source instead of the political bias in the news article, which is a common pitfall for approaches dealing with data that exhibit high correlation between the source of a news article and its class, as is the case with our task here. finally, our experimental results have shown very sizable improvements over using state-of-the-art pre-trained transformers. in future work, we plan to explore topic-level bias prediction as well as going beyond left-centerright bias. we further want to develop models that would be able to detect specific fragments in an article where the bias occurs, thus enabling explainability. last but not least, we plan to experiment with other languages, and to explore to what extent a model for one language is transferable to another one given that the left-center-right division is not universal and does not align perfectly across countries and cultures, even when staying within the western political world. predicting factuality of reporting and bias of news media sources what was written vs. who read it: news media profiling using text analysis and social media context multi-task ordinal regression for jointly predicting the trustworthiness and the leading political ideology of news media proppy: organizing the news based on their propagandistic content fair and balanced? quantifying media bias through crowdsourced content analysis semeval- task : detection of propaganda techniques in news articles a survey on computational propaganda detection fine-grained analysis of propaganda in news articles unsupervised user stance detection on twitter the fox news effect: media bias and voting bert: pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding predicting the leading political ideology of youtube channels using acoustic, textual, and metadata information on the nature of real and perceived bias in the mainstream media domain-adversarial training of neural networks mass media and american politics nela-gt- : a large multi-labelled news dataset for the study of misinformation in news articles long short-term memory assessing the news landscape: a multi-module toolkit for evaluating the credibility of news different spirals of sameness: a study of content sharing in mainstream and alternative media red media, blue media: evidence of ideological selectivity in media use team bertha von suttner at semeval- task : hyperpartisan news detection using elmo sentence representation convolutional network semeval- task : hyperpartisan news detection multi-view models for political ideology detection of news articles which side are you on? identifying perspectives at the document and sentence levels a sentimental education: sentiment analysis using subjectivity summarization based on minimum cuts glove: global vectors for word representation a stylometric inquiry into hyperpartisan and fake news truth of varying shades: analyzing language in fake news and political fact-checking sentence-bert: sentence embeddings using siamese bertnetworks social media news communities: gatekeeping, coverage, and statement bias team qcri-mit at semeval- task : propaganda analysis meets hyperpartisan news detection facenet: a unified embedding for face recognition and clustering measuring ideological proportions in political speeches predicting the topical stance and political leaning of media using tweets tanbih: get to know what you are reading this research is part of the tanbih project , which aims to limit the effect of "fake news," propaganda and media bias by making users aware of what they are reading. the project is developed in collaboration between the qatar computing research institute, hbku and the mit computer science and artificial intelligence laboratory. key: cord- -d opzb m authors: seo, mihye title: amplifying panic and facilitating prevention: multifaceted effects of traditional and social media use during the mers crisis in south korea date: - - journal: journal mass commun q doi: . / sha: doc_id: cord_uid: d opzb m in the context of the middle east respiratory syndrome (mers) outbreak in south korea, this study examines the multifaceted effects of media use considering the current complex media environment. analysis of a two-wave online panel survey found that traditional media use had a positive influence on mers knowledge while social media use did not. however, knowledge did not facilitate preventive behaviors. in contrast, negative emotional responses due to media use stimulated desirable behaviors. furthermore, social media use directly influenced behavioral responses but traditional media use did not show the same effects. different functions of traditional and social media during an epidemic are discussed. changed that understanding considerably (petersen, hui, & zumla, ) . this unforeseen crisis induced not only morbidity and mortality but also fear and panic in korea. in fact, the panic epidemic caused more widespread damage than the disease itself by slowing the economy and interfering with people's daily routines. in times of crisis, the importance of the media is heightened. government and responsible organizations consider media to be an essential part of crisis management (reynolds & seeger, ) , and the public relies on the media to make sense of confusing or chaotic situations (tai & sun, ; zhang, kong, & chang, ) . given the importance of media in times of crisis, scholarly attention has been largely paid to the following questions: (a) how government and other organizations work (or should work) with media to prepare for and respond to crises and (b) how the media reports (or should report) on crises. relatively less attention, however, has been paid in existing research to examining informational, emotional, and behavioral consequences of individuals' media use in times of crisis. as the importance of social media has risen in general, its importance in the context of crises has also increased. evidence shows that many people turn to social media to seek crisis-related information, such as safety instructions and news updates (veil, buehner, & palenchar, ) , which stands to promote proper behavioral responses to facilitate effective crisis management. however, both researchers and practitioners caution that media-social media in particular-may create misperceptions and amplify public fears by fostering public panic and proliferating unverified information (kasperson, ) . in comparison to traditional media, social media use is particularly susceptible to the aforementioned concerns due to enhanced speed of information transmission and distinctive features of open access platforms (zeng, starbird, & spiro, ) . in the context of the mers outbreak in korea, this study provides an empirical examination of the multifaceted effects of media use in times of crisis in the complex and dynamic media environment of today. using two waves of online panel data collected at two different time points during the mers crisis, i investigate how individuals' traditional and social media use during the crisis produced various consequences, including increased mers knowledge, negative emotions such as fear and anxiety, and direct and indirect facilitation of mers preventive behaviors. i also scrutinize the differences in these effects caused by traditional and social media use. the term crisis is defined as "some breakdown in a system that creates shared stress" (coombs, , p. ) , which includes a very broad range of situations. an infectious disease outbreak is a typical example of crisis in the public health context. prior research has focused on how governments or other responsible organizations can achieve positive relationships with the public in managing a particular crisis. based on the organization-public relationship (opr) approach, scholars have theorized and investigated various (pre)conditions, attributes, and communication strategies of organizations to bring about positive relational outcomes with the public, such as satisfaction, commitment, trust, and mutual understanding (s.-u. yang, ) . with respect to the mers crisis in korea, s.-u. yang ( ) showed that the government's lack of dialogic competency negatively affected government-public relationships. those findings indicate that the korean government's lack of mutuality and openness weakened the credibility of its risk information, which produced negative relational consequences such as distrust and dissatisfaction and the intent to dissolve the relationship. cooperation with the media on the part of government and responsible organizations is a major portion of effective crisis management processes (coombs, ) . from a crisis management perspective, prior research has mainly focused on how to understand and work with the media to accomplish various goals (reynolds & seeger, ) . for instance, researchers have identified the kinds of communication strategies that work best to reduce public-relations damage and generate compliance with desired behaviors in hazardous situations (glik, ) . for instance, seeger, reynolds, and sellnow ( ) emphasized the importance of coordinating specific communication tasks for each crisis phase in the context of hurricane katrina and the h n outbreak. based on the existing literature and case studies, scholars have also attempted to provide guidelines for best practices in crisis communication (veil et al., ) , which could also be used as evaluative criteria in crises (plattala & vos, ) . another line of research focuses on how media channels cover crises by analyzing the content of crisis reporting and discussing its implications. as manifested by terms such as disaster marathon (liebes, ) , the unexpected and impending nature of crises triggers media hype, which produces a prolific amount of reporting. much research has investigated the characteristics of crisis coverage (shih, wijaya, & brossard, ) . shih and colleagues ( ) , for instance, found that the coverage of epidemics showed common patterns across discrete diseases, such as a high eventbase and emphasis on newly identified cases and government actions. with respect to the mers crisis in korea, jin and chung ( ) performed semantic network analysis of korean and foreign media coverage of the crisis. they examined the most frequently used words (e.g., patient, hospital, infection, government, and case) and concluded that korean media focused heavily on the number of cases and the government's responses, consistent with shih and colleagues' findings (see kwon, , for similar findings) . based on content analyses of crisis reporting, past research has also identified persistent problems in crisis reporting, such as excessiveness (rezza, marino, farchi, & taranto, ) , inaccuracy (auter, douai, makady, & west, ) , and sensationalism (moeller, ) . korean media's mers reporting was not exempt from sensational and excessive coverage of the contagious nature of the disease and patient counts (kim, ; kwon, ) . as population mobility and trade in goods and services have increased, newly emerging infectious diseases have become global public health concerns. some emerging infectious diseases have derived from a known infection, such as influenza, and have spread into new populations. the mers outbreak in korea can be understood as one such example. an outbreak of infectious disease causes not only human casualties but also massive economic harm. different from chronic health risks, infectious pandemics trigger spontaneous and intense media attention (posid, bruce, guarnizo, taylor, & garza, ) , which could create cascading effects in various public responses. however, relatively little empirical research has considered the various consequences of media use by individuals during a public health crisis. one of the most desirable public responses to a public health crisis is engaging in preventive behaviors (mitroff, ) . public adoption of precautionary behaviors is critical to preventing large outbreaks of infectious disease, particularly in densely populated countries such as korea. people need to behave in ways that prevent the spread of infectious disease and its consequences, and the media plays an important role in facilitating those behaviors (gammage & klentrou, ; zhang et al., ) . learning from media is one potential pathway to engagement in preventive behaviors (sayavong, chompikul, wongsawass, & rattanapan, ) . besides cognitive responses, another way to galvanize preventive behaviors could be through emotional responses, which could alarm people enough to take proper actions with respect to a given risk. research on risk and health communication has offered various theoretical models and empirical evidence for each approach (boer & seydel, ; griffin, dunwoody, & neuwirth, ). yet, there has been little research testing and comparing the two potential paths to preventive behaviors in the context of a pandemic crisis. first, media use could increase knowledge about a crisis, which could stimulate the public to enact preventive behaviors. the heavy emphasis on knowledge is largely drawn from the traditional knowledge deficit model of communication (rutsaert et al., ) , which claims that a lack of understanding is the major obstacle to reasonable public responses to a risk or crisis. therefore, it accentuates the scientific knowledge transfer from experts to the layperson and media have been regarded as a major conduit of knowledge transfer (hilgartner, ) . thus, when a crisis happens, government and responsible organizations attempt to work with media to disseminate crisis-related information, and the general public turns mainly to the media to acquire the information to deal with the atmosphere of uncertainty. despite that widespread expectation, relatively little empirical attention has been given to whether public crisis knowledge is indeed increased by media use or whether understanding of a crisis indeed facilitates preventive behaviors in times of crisis. media is known to be more suitable for diffusion of knowledge than other channels, such as interpersonal communication (price & oshagan, ) . prior research shows that media use increases health knowledge in the general public, which in turn encourages desirable health behaviors (gammage & klentrou, ; sayavong et al., ) . little empirical evidence, however, has been collected in the context of urgent public health crises such as epidemics. on the contrary, disaster studies have extensively examined individual and group responses to impending threats (e.g., natural disasters or terrorist attacks). according to that body of research, in the face of an impending threat, people become more sensitive to cues about social environments and engage in searches for information as a basis for protective behaviors (lindell & perry, ) . however, despite the known contribution of media channels to these disaster research models, media variables have received insufficient attention in explaining the behavioral responses of individuals to crises. second, media use could stimulate proper behavioral responses via mobilizing information (mi). in the health communication literature, mi is designed to encourage a specific health behavior (friedman & hoffman-goetz, ) . applied to a crisis context, mi offers specific "how to" and "where to" information, such as checklists for preparedness supplies, evacuation information, phone numbers or websites for further information, or specific instructions for precautionary behaviors, meant to encourage people to take specific actions (tanner, friedman, & barr, ) . facing a crisis, the public needs to learn about both the nature of the crisis and how to mitigate its effects and defend themselves (guion, scammon, & borders, ) . a handful of prior studies in the communication discipline have documented the direct and indirect effects of media use on preventive behaviors via knowledge in a crisis situation. ho ( ) , for example, found that attention to newspaper and television news increased public knowledge about the h n pandemic. zhang et al. ( ) also found that media use potentially influenced h n preventive behaviors through fear and perceived knowledge. the results of national surveys in the united kingdom indicate that exposure to media coverage or advertising about swine flu increased the adoption of recommended preventive behaviors (g. rubin, potts, & michie, ) . lin and lagoe ( ) also showed that tv and newspaper use increased h n risk perception and vaccination intent in media users. based on those discussions and findings, it is expected that media use will facilitate public understanding of an emerging infectious disease and encourage appropriate precautionary behaviors. media use in large-scale emergencies, however, still requires empirical scrutiny because of the many unexpected twists that characterize fluid crisis situations. human beings facing a crisis often experience a range of negative emotions. the intense uncertainty inherent to a crisis situation galvanizes fear, worry, and panic (sandman & lanard, ) . in the outbreak of an unfamiliar contagious disease, both the unknown cause and fatal outcome and the interruptions of daily routines and stigma could strengthen negative emotional responses (lee, kim, & kang, ) . prior research indicates that individuals often feel more threatened during crises than is warranted by the actual risk level (coombs & slovic, ) . according to social amplification theory, the risk people feel when facing a crisis could be amplified or weakened by exchanging various forms of information via the news media or informal networks (renn, burns, kasperson et al., ) . once a perceived risk is officially acknowledged, the distortion and exaggeration of information tend follow (song, song, seo, jin, & kim, ) , feeding a range of negative emotional responses. prior research has found that the media tends to overemphasize risk and sensationalize crises. for instance, the media overstresses the horrific symptoms of contagious diseases regardless of facts about the prevalence of those symptoms in a time of outbreak (moeller, ; ungar, ) . the media also tends to focus more on the spread of a disease and the body counts rather than scientific causes (d. rubin & hendy, ) . these types of sensationalism can produce disproportionate public fear and panic responses to infectious diseases. scholars such as muzzatti ( ) have gone a step further and demonstrated that the media can actually manufacture threats to public health. some prior works have examined the effects of media use on emotional reactions toward a crisis. hoffner, fujioka, ibrahim, and ye ( ) , for instance, found that people who learned about the september terrorist attacks through mass media were more likely to report negative emotions than those who heard the news interpersonally. they attributed that difference to the nature of the live pictures and content in mass media crisis reporting. people's negative emotional responses as influenced by media use could lead to inappropriate behaviors, such as avoidance of precautionary behaviors or unnecessary or excessive behavioral reactions (liu, hammitt, wang, & tsou, ) . however, other convincing literature has claimed that emotions can trigger behavioral responses that are benign and adaptive (baumeister, vohs, dewall, & zhang, ) . negative emotional experiences can stimulate people to seek pertinent information (e.g., the risk information seeking and processing (risp) model, griffin et al., ) and encourage them to take preventive actions (e.g., protection motivation theory [pmt], boer & seydel, ) . unlike the cognition-based approach, which emphasizes the role of knowledge, these theoretical models focus on how negative emotions work as motivational drivers to guide people to protect themselves. empirical work has supported those claims by showing that negative emotion can drive positive behavioral responses, including adopting recommended health behaviors (ruiter, abraham, & kok, ) and engaging in information seeking (z. j. yang & kahlor, ) . as discussed, korean media coverage of the mers crisis did not deviate wildly from the patterns reported in the literature (kim, ; kwon, ) . the terms most frequently and centrally mentioned by the major news outlets mainly related to the contagious nature of the disease and patient counting (kwon, ) . sensational reporting and delivering government press releases without critical validation were also characteristic of the mers coverage (kim, ) . in addition, poor government handling of that crisis reduced the credibility of the information it provided (s.-u. yang, ) . against that backdrop, it is worth investigating the potential association between media use related to mers and the negative emotional responses of media users to determine the extent to which they influenced the behavioral responses of those users. along with traditional media channels such as television and newspapers, the importance of social media increases during large-scale events. these trends are particularly salient in the context of crises, which are traditionally marked by high levels of information seeking by the general population. evidence shows that people turn to social media during times of crisis to find information about safety instructions, news updates, and damage reports. increasingly, the public expects even official agents to respond to public requests via social media in times of emergency, concurrent with traditional crisis management (veil et al., ) . these heightened expectations are due in large part to perceptions of the benefits of social media for crisis communication. it is believed that social media can accelerate information dissemination in crisis situations by linking end users directly to critical information sources in real-time (hughes & palen, ) . during the h n virus outbreak, people exchanged information and experiences through social media (chew & eysenbach, ) . social media, such as twitter, has been used to quickly share initial information and updates during various types of crises, as well as to encourage specific actions, such as volunteering and precautionary behaviors (potts, ) . the presence of social media as an information source becomes salient when traditional media provides limited information. for instance, tai and sun ( ) showed that, during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars) epidemic in , chinese people turned to the internet and message services to find information unavailable from the traditional media, which operate under close censorship by the chinese government. likewise, at the beginning of the mers crisis, the korean government withheld the list of hospitals affected by mers, and the mainstream media adhered to the information embargo requested by the government. limited access to needed information fueled fear, so people turned to social media instead of traditional media outlets (kim, ) . social networking service (sns) users are likely to be exposed to messages that affect their perceptions and their use of preventive behaviors related to health risks and the crisis event. vos and buckner ( ) found that sns messages in the outbreak of the h n virus consisted mainly of sense-making messages to educate users about the nature of the risk and efficacy messages to encourage appropriate responses. in a similar line, yoo, choi, and park ( ) found that receiving information about mers through sns directly encouraged mers preventive behavioral intentions. social media is filled not only with information but also emotional expressions (chew & eysenbach, ) . negative emotions are more likely than positive emotions to be floating around social media during an infectious outbreak, which could increase risk perception (choi, yoo, noh, & park, ) . for instance, song et al. ( ) found that negative emotions (e.g., anxiety or fear) prevailed in online boards and social media during the mers crisis. often, information intertwined with emotional markers travels around social media, and emotionally charged messages are more likely than purely informational posts to be shared and diffused (pfeffer, zorbach, & carley, ; stieglitz & dang-xuan, ) . s. choi, lee, pack, chang, and yoon ( ) mined internet media reports about mers in and examined their effects on public emotion expressed online, which they captured using a sentiment analysis. they mined all mers-related news articles from media companies, including the comments about each one. in a time-series analysis, they found a flow from internet media to public fear. according to song et al. ( ) , negative emotion accounted for % of all posts throughout online networks, especially twitter, during the mers crisis. therefore, i have drawn the following four hypotheses. i expected that both traditional and social media use in times of crisis could directly and indirectly facilitate preventive behaviors (via mers knowledge) and negative emotional responses to the mers situation. emerging social media channels have reshaped the crisis information context, which potentially complicates the relationships among media use and informational, emotional, and behavioral responses in the general public. although social media has been considered a powerful tool for disseminating information, both researchers and practitioners have cautioned against the propensity of social media to proliferate inaccurate data, unverified rumors, and even malicious misinformation (zeng et al., ) . because information disseminated through social media is often unverified, identifying accurate data and valid sources can be challenging and could both undermine relevant knowledge and exacerbate the consequences of emotional and behavioral responses. together with the characteristics of open access platforms, this concern is heightened by the dynamic nature of crisis communication and information overload in times of crisis (zeng et al., ) . social media networks are mostly composed of acquaintances and thus share common characteristics with interpersonal channels. prior works have shown that interpersonal channels tend to show stronger effects on behavioral change than traditional media, mainly through normative pressure (price & oshagan, ) . in addition, social media generally deal with a rapid exchange of information, which could be more appropriate for short and clear mi than for scientific knowledge about a crisis. for instance, won, bae, and yoo ( ) conducted an issue word analysis of sns messages during the mers outbreak and reported the six most frequently mentioned words on sns at that time. two of the six words were mask and hand sanitizer, which are clearly related to preventive behaviors. the other four words were hospital, infection, coughing, and checkup, which are also at least indirectly related to preventive behaviors. however, a big data analysis examining online news sites found that posts about symptoms, government reaction, disease treatment, business impacts, and rumors ranked higher than prevention-related information (song et al., ) . therefore, the effects of social media use on crisis knowledge and preventive behaviors might differ from those of traditional media. in terms of emotional responses, social media and traditional media might also show some differences. social media is known for its ability to spread information in a speedy and viral manner, but that information tends to be integrated with emotions. furthermore, emotionally charged messages are more likely to be shared than neutral messages (pfeffer et al., ; stieglitz & dang-xuan, ) . recent works on the mers crisis have shown that about % of the buzzwords on social media during the mers crisis were negatively charged emotional words such as fear and anxiety (s. choi et al., ; song et al., ) . those works suggest that social media might be more likely than traditional media to magnify negative emotional responses. on the contrary, some prior works have found that people use social media for social support in crisis situations (y. choi & lin, ) . that phenomenon could lessen the negative emotional responses in social media users. therefore, it is worth investigating how the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses to social media use differ from those to traditional media use, which raises the following research question: are there any differences between traditional media use and social media use in terms of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses during the mers crisis? the proposed research model is based on the preceding discussion (see figure ) . specifically, i expect that both traditional and social media use related to mers was associated with mers knowledge, and that it directly and indirectly encouraged mers preventive behaviors in media users. i also expect that traditional and social media use about the korean mers crisis stimulated negative emotional responses, which in turn influenced both precautionary and panic behaviors in media users. finally, i examine whether social media use showed informational, emotional, and behavioral consequences similar to those of traditional media use. the data for this study were obtained from a two-wave online panel survey. wave survey was conducted in the first few days of june , when hype about the mers situation was escalating, and wave survey was conducted about month later. the respondents were adult members of an online panel recruited and maintained by a survey company in seoul, korea. about million online users compose the company's panel, and participants were randomly drawn from that list to meet the specified constraints (e.g., areas of residence based on census composition). the selected panel members received a soliciting e-mail from the company and had full liberty to decline participation. the first page of the online survey included an explanation of the study purpose and researcher contact information. study participants gave informed consent by clicking the start survey button. they were free to stop taking the survey at any time, and they received small monetary incentives (e.g., cash-equivalent points) from the company. a total of , members of the online panel participated in wave survey. about month later, the same respondents were recontacted by the survey company to participate in wave survey. the number of participants who completed both waves and online surveys was , which is the final subject sample used for the analyses herein. the final sample was . % male, with a mean age of . years (sd = . ). with regard to level of education, . % of the sample had some level of college education or a bachelor's degree, . % had a -year college degree, and . % of the sample had some level of high school education or were graduates of high school. the median monthly household income was between , , and , , won. of the total sample, . % were married, with an average of . children (sd = . ). traditional news use. traditional news use of mers-related content was measured based on media use frequency questions. specifically, on a -point scale ( = never to = very often), respondents were asked to measure how much they relied on tv news or tv news websites and newspapers and newspaper websites in the context of the korean mers crisis (r = . , m = . , sd = . ). social media use. social media use of mers-related content was measured using three -point scales ( = never to = very often) in wave survey. the specific use behaviors were (a) seeking mers-related news or information using social media, (b) receiving mers-related news or information from others via social media, and (c) talking about mers with others via social media (α = . , m = . , sd = . ). negative emotional reactions to the mers situation. negative emotional reactions to the mers situation were measured in both waves and surveys. on a -point scale ( = not at all to = feel strongly), respondents were asked to report how strongly they felt fear and anxiety about the mers situation (wave , r = . , m = . , sd = . ; wave , r = . , m = . , sd = . ). mers knowledge. mers knowledge was measured using six quiz-type questions in both waves and surveys. knowledge items covered mers symptoms, lethality, maximum latent period, and institutions where a formal diagnosis of mers could be made during the outbreak. for each question, correct answers were coded as , and incorrect answers were coded as . subsequently, the answers to those six questions were combined and used as the mers knowledge measure (wave , with scores ranging from to , m = . , sd = . ; wave , with scores ranging from to , m = . , sd = . ). wave survey using five items. on a -point scale ( = never to = very often), respondents were asked how often they engaged in behaviors to prevent mers: wearing a mask when they were out, washing hands frequently, avoiding contact with people with mers symptoms, avoiding hospitals, and avoiding daily activities such as grocery shopping to avoid crowds (α = . , m = . , sd = . ). before running the path model to test hypotheses, a confirmatory factor analysis (cfa) was conducted to test validity of the measurement model. two knowledge measures were excluded from cfa because measures were composed of all dichotomized items. model modification was not utilized: χ ( ) = . , p = . ; normed fit index (nfi) = . ; incremental fit index (ifi) = . ; comparative fit index (cfi) = . ; root mean square error approximation (rmsea) = . with % confidence interval (ci) = [. , . ]. factor loadings ranged from . to . and two factor loadings were rather low of . (one of mers preventive behaviors) and . (newspaper use item). however all ave (average variance extracted) were higher than . and factor loadings were still within acceptable range (fornell & larcker, ) . therefore, all items remained. path analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses with latent variables and two observed knowledge variables. the tested model included two control variables from wave data. specifically, mers knowledge and negative emotions about the mers situation measured in wave controlled each of the wave variables accordingly. the research model showed a reasonably good fit according to commonly used criteria (hu & bentler, ) : χ ( ) = . , p = . ; nfi = . ; ifi = . ; cfi = . ; rmsea = . with % ci = [. , . ]. figure presents the overall results with path coefficients of the hypothesized model. h predicted that the more individuals use traditional news media (h a) and social media (h b), the more mers knowledge they would acquire. as expected, mers knowledge increased with increasing use of mers-related traditional news media (β = . , p < . ), which supported h a. on the contrary, mers-related social media use was not significantly associated with mers knowledge (β = −. , ns), which did not support h b. therefore, h was only partially supported. h predicted that two types of media use would be positively associated with negative emotional responses to the mers situation. results showed that the more traditional media one used, the more anxious and worried about mers one became (β = . , p < . ), which supported h a. however, mers-related sns use and negative emotions was not significantly associated (β = . , ns), which failed to support h b. therefore, h was also partially supported. the next set of hypotheses predicted that positive effects of mers knowledge (h a) and negative emotional responses (h b) on mers preventive behaviors. as predicted, negative emotional response was positively related to engagement in mers preventive behaviors (β = . , p < . ). on the contrary, mers knowledge was not significantly associated with mers preventive behaviors (β = . , ns). therefore, h was also partially supported. the final set of hypotheses expected that both traditional news media use (h a) and social media use (h b) would have direct positive effects on mers preventive behaviors. results showed that only social media use showed note. dotted arrows denote paths that are not statistically significant or only marginally significant. the numbers presented in figure are the standardized path coefficients. all exogenous variables, including mers knowledge (w ) and negative emotions (w ), were correlated with one another. no error term was correlated. w = wave ; w = wave ; mers = middle east respiratory syndrome. *p < . . **p < . . ***p < . . direct positive effects on mers preventive behaviors (β = . , p < . ) not traditional media use (β = . , ns). finally, rq asked whether traditional media use and social media use show any differences in terms of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. results showed that individuals during the mers crisis showed different responses depending on two types of media use. with respect to cognitive responses, as reported above, only traditional media use was positively associated with mers knowledge. likewise, in terms of emotional responses, traditional news media use showed a positive association with negative emotional reactions. with respect to behavioral responses, only social media use showed significant positive direct effects on mers preventive behaviors. wald tests comparing the path coefficients confirmed that the difference between effects of social media and traditional media on behavioral responses (wald test = − . , p < . ) was statistically meaningful. wald test result also validated that the difference in cognitive response between social and traditional media use was also statistically significant (wald test = − . , p < . ). despite a consensus that the media play an important role in times of crisis, the informational, emotional, and behavioral effects of traditional and social media use by individuals have been understudied in previous research. using two sets of data collected at two different time points during the mers crisis in korea, i investigated how traditional and social media use influenced mers knowledge, fear and anxiety about the mers situation, and adoption of preventive behaviors. to reflect the complexity of today's media environment in times of crisis, i focused on potential differences between the effects of traditional and social media use. first, this study found that traditional media use and social media use have different effects. as expected, traditional media use galvanized public understanding of mers. the more people read newspapers and watched tv news about mers, the more knowledge they acquired about mers symptoms, lethality, and maximum latent period. social media use neither increased nor decreased mers knowledge. the role of social media in times of crisis has received growing attention, at least in part because of its potential for viral information transmission. however, i did not find significant cognitive effects from social media use. compared with traditional media, which mainly report information verified by expert sources (lowrey, ) , social media can not only convey knowledge but also disseminate false or unverified information during a crisis. the null effect of social media use on mers knowledge might thus result from the conflicting content of social media. this speculation, of course, should be verified with a robust empirical examination. second, i found that negative emotions played a prominent role in facilitating preventive behaviors in the mers crisis. experiencing fear and anxiety is a natural reaction when people are faced with a crisis. a lack of familiarity with newly emerging infectious diseases such as mers tends to deepen fear and anxiety (sandman & lanard, ) , and media use could amplify those emotional experiences (kasperson, ) . finding of this study also indicate that traditional media use increased negative emotional responses. the more media respondents consumed, the more fear and anxiety they felt about the mers situation. more importantly, i found that the negative emotional responses people experienced when facing a crisis caused them to protect themselves from mers instead of pushing them into illogical or destructive behaviors. the positive role of negative emotions in promoting adaptive behaviors is consistent with what theoretical frameworks such as pmt and risp suggest. however, most prior studies based on pmt have been developed and tested within the context of public health campaigns. compared with carefully designed campaign messages intended to scare people to act properly with respect to a given risk, media messages could more likely be crude and mixed with various intentions (e.g., sensational reports to secure audience attention). indeed, there is a lack of empirical research examining what kinds of crisis-specific responses could be elicited from the media individuals choose to use in times of crisis. in addition, risp research provides a useful theoretical framework to predict that negative emotions could motivate people to seek information about a risk. however, this framework did not pay attention to media use, which can lead to behavioral consequences such as preventive behaviors beyond information seeking. this study addressed these gaps in the literature by directly testing the roles of negative emotions and media as potential sources of those emotions during a pandemic, which has been rarely examined in previous studies. this finding has clear implications for governmental communication strategies and media reporting. this study's results suggest that it may not be effective crisis management to brush off negative emotions among the public as illogical overreactions. instead, admitting fears and anxiety people may feel and designing messages channeling those emotions into desirable health behaviors needs to be considered even in times of crisis. sympathizing with people's feelings can be an effective means to boost the evaluation of communicators' dialogic competency which was found to be positively related to information credibility and trust in the government during the mers endemic (s.-u. yang, ) , which in turn may promote government and media health message effectiveness. this seemingly positive role of negative emotions, however, does not advocate for sensationalizing crisis situations. instead, both government and media may consider applying knowledge about the potentially positive function of negative emotion to public communication during a crisis. for instance, risk and health communication research has developed guidelines on how to write a good fear appeal message in the public health campaign context. government and news media may consult with these guidelines to compose a message to help people to cope with an epidemic risk. third, the findings of this study indicate that the role of knowledge for preventive behaviors in the mers crisis was rather limited. only traditional media use significantly increased the public's knowledge about mers but the increased understanding did not facilitate precautionary behaviors. disseminating knowledge has been a top priority in times of crisis under the assumption that understanding could lead the public to protective behavioral responses. the results of this study imply that filling the deficit of knowledge may not be the most efficient way to promote behavioral responses. the findings here suggest that an emotional pathway may work more efficiently than cognitive drives in promoting the adoption of preventive behaviors during a public health crisis. however, it is also important to point out that the findings related to knowledge should be interpreted with caution in the context of the mers crisis. s.-u. yang ( ) noted that koreans in general tended to perceive the government's mutuality and openness in communication somewhat unfavorably, which often negatively affected government-public relationships. as s.-u. yang ( ) showed, the korean government's lack of mutuality and openness seems to have deteriorated the credibility of its risk information, which may have worsened the public's trust and satisfaction with the government. this unique situation might have lowered not only the credibility of government information but also the credibility of information from news media that relied heavily on the government for information. accordingly, the low credibility of public information on mers can explain the limited role of knowledge in promoting desirable behavioral responses. prior work examining a different epidemic crisis found that one material factor influencing preventive action was respondent opinion about authorities (quah & hin-peng, ) . my finding thus suggests that simple acquisition of disseminated scientific knowledge might not necessarily produce desirable behavioral responses from the public. it also implies that contextual factors, such as government dialogic competency, should be considered to fully grasp the role of knowledge in times of crisis. fourth, the findings of this study show that, unlike traditional media use, social media use produced strong direct behavioral responses during the mers crisis. traditional media use did not show direct effects on preventive behaviors. this distinction between social media use and traditional media use could be explained in the following two ways. first, compared with traditional media, which is known to be powerful in knowledge diffusion, the interpersonal channel has been considered effective on behavioral responses via the normative route (price & oshagan, ) . the role of normative pressure on behavioral adaptation has been well documented in the health communication literature (e.g., planned behavioral intention model, ajzen, ) . given that social media networks are mainly composed of acquaintances, it is possible that social media might have formed specific behavioral norms related to the mers crisis (e.g., avoidance of hospitals and crowded places). the other explanation is related to potential differences in the content of traditional media and social media. social media might have delivered more mi than traditional media. indeed, a prior work analyzing social media content during the mers crisis reported that preventive behavior-related terms (e.g., masks and hand sanitizers) were the most frequently mentioned words (won et al., ) . furthermore, the most needed information at the beginning of the mers crisis was the list of mers-affected hospitals, which the korean government had withheld. given the government's unwillingness to share the list of hospitals, the public resorted to social media to actively seek, exchange, and share the hospital-related information. that piece of information could single-handedly trigger one preventive behavior (i.e., avoiding specific hospitals to protect themselves). indeed, hospital was one of the terms most frequently used on social media during the mers crisis (won et al., ) . however, a big data analysis of traditional media reported that words such as infection, confirmed cases, and death were centrally located in traditional media content (kwon, ) . in short, compared with traditional media, social media might play an essential role in virally diffusing mi (specific behavioral information, including where not to go and what to do). given the importance of dialogic competency for effective crisis communication (s.-u. yang, ) , some technological features of social media may have enhanced communication mutuality and openness which the korean government and media lacked. communication through social media may allow users to share empathy and social support. at the same time, social media-mediated communication can be perceived as more accessible and open than media-mediated communication. strong mutuality and openness perceived through communication with network members on social media could have increased the credibility of mi which could have enhanced behavioral responses at least during the mers crisis in korea. another notable finding regarding social media is that social media did not generate public anxiety and fear, at least during the mers crisis in korea. this is quite an interesting finding because the korean government strongly criticized media, especially social media, for releasing unverified rumors and fears. the lack of association between social media use and negative emotional responses could be a result of canceling out effects. in other words, social media might induce fear and anxiety, but social media might effectively cancel out the negative emotions by providing wanted social supports or mi, which should be under solid empirical scrutiny in the future study. in the interest of future research, it is important to discuss some of the limitations of this study. the data are not based on a representative sample, which means the study findings must be interpreted with caution. for instance, online panels tended to include the younger and the more educated compared with the general population, which could influence the interpretation of the role of social media and traditional media use during the mers crisis in korea. the measurement of key variables also has limitations. for example, traditional media use was assessed only for newspaper and television. omitting radio and general internet use should be recognized as another major limitation of the study. also, using quiz-type questions to tap mers knowledge without close validation and planning might have contributed to the low correlation between the two mers knowledge measures, which also raises a concern about a test-retest error involved in the panel data. these measurement issues could produce errors, which would be carried into the hypothesized path model this study proposed. in addition, wave data did not include mers preventive behavior measures, which made it impossible to control all the endogenous variables in wave data. therefore, it is hard to argue that an ideal panel data analysis was conducted for testing the proposed hypotheses. with these limitations in mind, this study contributed to the scholarship by testing the predictions drawn from existing theories that have rarely been examined in the context of a real epidemic crisis. major scholarly focus in the communication field has been on how government and responsible organizations manage or should manage crises. shifting away from that focus, this study investigated the associations between individual media use and consequent responses which have been relatively understudied. the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. the author(s) received no 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crisis-related social media messages mihye seo (phd, the ohio state university) is an associate professor in the department of media and communication at sungkyunkwan university, seoul, south korea. her research focuses on media use and its influence on individuals' daily life and on community-building efforts. key: cord- -bxrjftnl authors: androutsopoulos, jannis title: investigating digital language/media practices, awareness, and pedagogy: introduction date: - - journal: nan doi: . /j.linged. . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: bxrjftnl nan this special issue, initiated in july at the th world congress of applied linguistics (aila) in rio de janeiro and completed in the summer of amidst the covid- crisis, brings together researchers based in asia, australia and europe with a background in applied and sociolinguistics and extensive expertise on digital language, communication and literacy. based on original research, the six articles in this special issue examine the relationship between digital language practices and critical awareness of language and digital media, and explore how insights in everyday practices and understandings of digital communication may inform language pedagogy in a digital age. although the research they report is neither carried out in schools nor concerned with institutional learning processes, it remains education-relevant as authors investigate informal, extra-institutional digital language and communication among adolescent and young adult informants, most of whom still participate in institutional education at secondary or tertiary level. table provides an overview of sites, participants, and data sources for the six articles. the following brief introduction outlines three themes that all articles address: (a) the intricate bound of language and media in a digital era, (b) the need for a specifically digital approach to critical language/media awareness, and (c) implications of this research for digital language/media pedagogy. the ongoing digitalisation of society on a global scale ( lundby, ) brings about far-reaching consequences for language and literacy practices. in the first two decades of the st century, digital literacy gained importance in all areas of private and professional practice. in many parts of the world today, a wide range of everyday activities depend on algorithm-based web services, with social interaction by means of networked mobile de-e-mail address: jannis.androutsopoulos@uni-hamburg.de vices being commonplace. new patterns of interpersonal and professional communication are in particular adopted by adolescents and young adults, who lead all age cohorts in the frequency of online communication, as repeatedly attested by media research on an international scale, and whose non-institutional practices of digital writing, composing, remixing and interacting are found to blur boundaries between institutional and vernacular literacies (e.g., herring & androutsopoulos, ; iorio, ; jones, chik & hafner, ) . the six articles in this si investigate these new practices at different levels of granularity. three articles operate at a narrow level of granularity, where analytic attention is paid to surface features of digital interaction and connections are drawn between linguistic resources that are mobilized in digital interaction and the affordances of the underlying technologies. in her article on "modeswitching in video-mediated interaction", maria grazia sindoni examines the practice and process of mode-switching, a recently popular practice of switching between speaking and typing in applications that afford simultaneous use of both language modalities. drawing on a corpus of video-calls by postgraduate students (who also transcribed the data and reflected on their multimodal transcriptions in the context of a university project), sindoni's article documents a range of creative interactional functions of modeswitching between speaking and texting on the same video-call platform. in their article on "digital punctuation as an interactional resource", jannis androutsopoulos and florian busch examine how secondary school students in germany use punctuation in informal messaging. focusing on one rarely used, but highly salient punctuation sign, the message-final period, they examine how this sign undergoes a process of pragmaticalization, i.e. a gain of pragmatic functions at the expense of syntactic ones, and how it thereby comes to contextualize, and become reflexively enregistered with, communicative distance and institutional communication. shaila sultana and sender dovchin, in their article on "relocalization in digital language practices of university students in asian peripheries", present data from a digital ethnography project with university students in bangladesh and mongolia. a close analysis of jid: linedu [m g; september , ; : ] data from facebook profile pages shows how these students engage in multilingual practices and recontextualize ( relocalize , in the authors' own term) linguistic features from various languages and sources, thereby positioning themselves in independent, emancipatory and resistant ways towards power regimes in their respective societies. the other three articles operate at a broader level of granularity. they shift focus away from linguistic/multimodal resources at a surface level and towards the a of narratives and ideologies that shape the experience and awareness of digital media users. even though microlinguistic analysis is also part of this approach (see georgakopoulou's use of corpus-linguistics techniques), the main interest here is on the tension between the power of corporations in designing and preconfiguring media ecologies, on the one hand, and responses by users whose awareness of software constraints and affordances becomes crucial in shaping their own semiotic actions, on the other. in their article on "context design and critical language/media awareness", caroline tagg and philip seargeant draw on interviews with facebook users to investigate how they perceive the contextual constraints that facebook sets up and design the context of their own communication through their decisions on whether, what, and how to post. in her article, "designing stories on social media", alexandra georgakopoulou casts a corpusassisted, critical perspective on media reports about the story feature of instagram and snapchat. she examines how the primordial mode of storytelling is reconfigured ('designed') into an app feature that in turn forms the template of mass-scale digital storytelling among (predominantly younger) users, and identifies tensions that arise between the marketing of these app features and their actual affordances f or semiotic practice. the tension between corporate prefabrication and user awareness and agency is further explored by rodney h. jones in his contribution, "the text is reading you: teaching language in the age of the algorithm", where he draws on interviews and other forms of documentation among university students to examine how they reflect about the ways algorithms influence digital communication, how they themselves conceptualize algorithms (which jones classifies in six metaphors), and how they attempt to trick out their workings to their own personal benefit. together, these six articles move back and forth between broader and narrower levels of structural and contextual granularity in digital communication, i.e., between the multimodal resources people mobilize to do digital text and talk and the knowledge and ideologies that shape their experience and action as digital media users. all of the articles in this si explore the intricate bond between language and media at the levels of practice, product, and crit-ical awareness. they draw on critical language awareness (cla), which emerged in the s as a research field at the interface of applied and sociolinguistics, critical discourse analysis, and new literacy studies. drawing on research and institutional interventions, cla aims to make speakers aware of indexical differences in language, the social stratification of language varieties, the unequal way different registers of communication index social power relations, and the use of discourse as a means for social change ( alim, ; cope & kalantzis, ; fairclough, ) . some articles also draw on critical media awareness, an academic field that started out by developing critical readings of (audiovisua) media content, media representations, and grassroots media production ( kellner & share, ) , and more recently encourages critical understandings of digital communication in a social, political, and economic perspective (e.g., boyd & crawford, ; kellner & kim, ; kitchin, ) . even though scholarship on critical awareness of language and media has developed separately by discipline (linguistics and media studies, respectively), the articles in the special issue support a joint perspective on 'language/media' with regard to exploring communicative practice and awareness. the main reason for this is quite simple. in a digital era, the selection and production of linguistic signs is tightly enmeshed with co-occurring selections of media devices and platforms or applications for the production of utterances and discourses. stylistic choices, in the widest sense of the term, therefore orient not only to individual or imagined audiences, but also to media applications that are enregistered with specific types of addressees and situations ( busch, ) . for example, when it comes to punctuation signs, school students reflect on pragmatic functions of the period (as discussed by androutsopoulos and busch in this issue) specifically with regard to informal communication via messenger. their awareness of period usage is completely different when it comes to writing an email to a teacher, let alone for their handwritten school essays. likewise, the contributions by sindoni as well as sultana and dovchin reveal language practices and awareness that are specifically valid for particular platforms of online interaction (video-conferencing software and social networking, respectively) rather than for written language as such or for private vs. public communication in general. tagg and seargeant show in their article that social networking users build on their understanding of the algorithmic mechanisms of the formation of digital publics in order to design the context of their contributions. in the 'algorithmic pragmatics' approach advocated by jones, social media users conceptualize algorithms in certain ways with regard to their workings in particular software environments, such as an online shopping or music streaming platform. thus, the articles in this special issue suggest we need to think beyond an apparent divide between language and digital media in terms of communicative practice and metapragmatic awareness. jid: linedu [m g; september , ; : ] we need to find ways to research and theorize their convergence and interplay. this language/media approach gains momentum when articles discuss 'folk algorithmics' (jones) , 'critical media-narrative awareness' (georgakopoulou), or a 'critical language/media awareness' (tagg and seargeant) that aims to understand how people make sense of the tension between what is preconfigured (by algorithms and/or corporate design decisions and marketing strategies) and what might be creatively shaped, and how their understandings of this tension shape whether, what, and how they communicate online. one idea that underpins this special issue is that out-of-school practices, skills and understandings of digital language and communication are, in principle, transferable to institutional language education, and that such transfer might be beneficial. the notion that building on students' out-of-school practices can support the teaching of critical language and media awareness has been put forward by scholars such as gee ( ) and knobel and lankshear ( ) . our interest in the implications of our research for language pedagogy is in the spirit of cope and kalantzis ( ) , whose multi-literacies approach is grounded on bringing together "what was happening in the world of communications" with "the teaching of language and literacy in schools" ( : ) . this line of thinking has been part of conversations in linguistics & education ( cekaite & bjork-willen, ; duran, ; fernández-fontecha, o'halloran, wignell, & tan, ; lacasa, martínez & méndez, ; mcginnis, goodstein-stolzenberg & saliani, ; rothoni, ) , and has been taken up in foreign language teaching and learning, for example with regard to expanding the scope of efl writing pedagogy by encompassing vernacular uses of english in various youth cultures (e.g., kim, ; schreiber, ; shepard-carey, ) . this line of scholarship must be distinguished from the thriving research field on computer-supported language learning and teaching (call, e.g., dooly & o' dowd, ; guth & helm, ) . call research examines a wide range of practices and arrangements for language teaching and learning with digital technologies, including provision of digital content, testing and assessing, organizing tandems, and other cross-linguistic learning activities. none of the articles here engage with call research. our interest rather lies in a critical digital language/media pedagogy that brings to the fore out-of-school practices that often go unnoticed and unappreciated by educators. it is worthwhile to set this interest in the context of broader attempts towards a sociolinguistically inclusive language pedagogy, thereby integrating language variation and language varieties into curricular content, overcoming language-ideological binaries and limitations, and legitimizing multiple ways of using language in society. so, while the broader idea of introducing vernacular voices and genres into the curriculum is by no means new, in the digital era it finds new fields of application and new semiotic configurations, notably with regard to multimodality and transmedia. together, the articles in this special issue propose a perspective on digital language and media pedagogy that entails a critical examination of standard language ideology and of the primacy of language as an autonomous system of meaning-making. each article contributes to this approach with a different suggestion. sultana and dovchin align with literature on foreign language teaching and learning, which advocates integrating vernacular uses of english to expand the scope of efl writing pedagogy (e.g., rothoni, ; schreiber, ) , and argue that students' transmodal and translingual practices be considered in efl teaching. sindoni emphasizes the potential of multimodality for student selfexpression, which counterbalances a sole reliance on language for practices of self-expression and interaction (see also duran, ; mcginnis et al., ; schreiber, ; sultana, ) . androutsopoulos and busch cast a critical perspective on the way german language textbooks frame language use online, often reducing it to a special vocabulary or jargon (cf., kiesendahl, ) and eventually sustaining standard language ideologies. on the example of punctuation, they argue that the inclusion of informal digital literacy and metapragmatic awareness into punctuation teaching may promote attention to communicative functions of punctuation signs rather than the now-prevailing normative approach on the linguistic forms themselves. tagg and seargeant advocate a 'social digital literacies education', which aims to build on and enhance people's understanding of the complexities of online interactions. they argue that enhancing language/media literacy requires understanding how people make sense of online interaction, and how this awareness shapes the type and nature of their communication via social media. for jones, an important task for language pedagogy in the age of the algorithm is to raise critical awareness on how algorithmic processes determine aspects of digital communication and interactivity, especially in terms of what is made available to us as an option to consume, i.e. listen, read, watch, purchase. georgakopoulou, too, advocates a critical perspective on social-media stories, uncovering mismatches between the corporate marketing of story-telling apps, these apps' affordances and their users' actual communicative practices. i conclude with an observation from my own teaching experience during the covid- pandemic in the spring term of . the pandemic makes us aware of the far-reaching implications of digital media for education, a point extensively discussed by alice chik and phil benson in their commentary for this si. practically all teaching during the early months of the pandemic has depended on digital platforms and especially video conferencing software (such as zoom), and so did all attempts of educators to network and jointly reflect on their practices and solutions for remote teaching. these solutions depend, on the one hand, on top-down regulations, some taken in haste and without consultations with practitioners themselves. on the other hand, they also crucially depend on digital skills that participants bring along to computer-based, video-mediated teaching in times of crisis. in hamburg, for example, we eventually settled for a combination of synchronous and asynchronous modes for all university courses during the spring term. the asynchronous component is based on various digital blackboard systems that students and staff are already familiar with. the synchronous portion draws on video-conferencing and webinar software, especially zoom, in order to simulate classroom interaction. this was entirely unprecedented in terms of an institution-wide regulation, and its swift implementation in a very short time span caught quite a few members of academic staff by surprise. i soon realized, however, that many of my students somehow seemed to be at ease with video interaction. they operated the platform smoothly, effortlessly switching their cameras and mics on and off, depending on the ongoing activity, and even introduced zoom affordances such as reaction emojis and chatting into the workings of the digital classroom. no one taught them these skills at university. rather, they mobilized non-institutional experiences with video interaction, such as skyping with families and friends, and adapted them to cope a bit more efficiently during the crisis. this is offered as a vivid example for an important point this si aims to make: out-of-school digital skills are transferrable, and research can help identify these skills and understand how they can be transferred into educational institutions. critical language awareness critical questions for big data. information, communication & society digital writing practices and media ideologies of german adolescents. the mouth. critical studies in language enchantment in storytelling: co-operation and participation in children's aesthetic experience. linguistics and education multiliteracies": new literacies, new learning. pedagogies researching online foreign language interaction and exchange. theories, methods and challenges you not die yet": karenni refugee children's language socialization in a video gaming community critical language awareness scaffolding clil in the science classroom via visual thinking: a systemic functional multimodal approach good video games + good learning. collected essays on video games, learning and literacy telecollaboration . : language, literacies, and intercultural learning in the st century computer-mediated discourse . the routledge handbook of language and digital communication discourse and digital practices: doing discourse analysis in the digital age review of education, pedagogy, and cultural studies toward critical media literacy: core concepts, debates, organizations, and policy. discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education sprachreflexion am beispiel neuer medien. eine bestandsaufnahme in aktuellen deutschsprachbüchern it was kind of a given that we were all multilingual thinking critically about and researching algorithms remix: the art and craft of endless hybridization developing new literacies using commercial videogames as educational tools mediatization of communication indnpride": online spaces of transnational youth as sites of creative and sophisticated literacy and identity work the interplay of global forms of pop culture and media in teenagers' 'interest-driven' everyday literacy practices with english in greece i am what i am": multilingual identity and digital translanguaging making sense of comprehension practices and pedagogies in multimodal ways: a second-grade emergent bilingual's sensemaking during small-group reading heteroglossia and identities of young adults in bangladesh. linguistics and education key: cord- - u w r authors: verma, anju; verma, megha; singh, anchal title: animal tissue culture principles and applications date: - - journal: animal biotechnology doi: . /b - - - - . - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: u w r animal cell culture technology in today’s scenario has become indispensable in the field of life sciences, which provides a basis to study regulation, proliferation, and differentiation and to perform genetic manipulation. it requires specific technical skills to carry out successfully. this chapter describes the essential techniques of animal cell culture as well as its applications. cell culture is the process by which human, animal, or insect cells are grown in a favorable artificial environment. the cells may be derived from multicellular eukaryotes, already established cell lines or established cell strains. in the mid- s, animal cell culture became a common laboratory technique, but the concept of maintaining live cell lines separated from their original tissue source was discovered in the th century. animal cell culture is now one of the major tools used in the life sciences in areas of research that have a potential for economic value and commercialization. the development of basic culture media has enabled scientists to work with a wide variety of cells under controlled conditions; this has played an important role in advancing our understanding of cell growth and differentiation, identification of growth factors, and understanding of mechanisms underlying the normal functions of various cell types. new technologies have also been applied to investigate high cell density bioreactor and culture conditions. many products of biotechnology (such as viral vaccines) are fundamentally dependent on mass culturing of animal cell lines. although many simpler proteins are being produced using rdna in bacterial cultures, more complex proteins that are glycosylated (carbohydrate-modified) currently have to be made in animal cells. at present, cell culture research is aimed at investigating the influence of culture conditions on viability, productivity, and the constancy of posttranslational modifications such as glycosylation, which are important for the biological activity of recombinant proteins. biologicals produced by recombinant dna (rdna) technology in animal cell cultures include anticancer agents, enzymes, immunobiologicals [interleukins, lymphokines, monoclonal antibodies (mabs)], and hormones. animal cell culture has found use in diverse areas, from basic to advanced research. it has provided a model system for various research efforts: . the study of basic cell biology, cell cycle mechanisms, specialized cell function, cellÀcell and cellÀmatrix interactions. . toxicity testing to study the effects of new drugs. . gene therapy for replacing nonfunctional genes with functional gene-carrying cells. . the characterization of cancer cells, the role of various chemicals, viruses, and radiation in cancer cells. . production of vaccines, mabs, and pharmaceutical drugs. . production of viruses for use in vaccine production (e.g., chicken pox, polio, rabies, hepatitis b, and measles). today, mammalian cell culture is a prerequisite for manufacturing biological therapeutics such as hormones, antibodies, interferons, clotting factors, and vaccines. the first mammalian cell cultures date back to the early th century. the cultures were originally created to study the development of cell cultures and normal physiological events such as nerve development. ross harrison in showed the first nerve fiber growth in vitro. however, it was in the s that animal cell culture was performed at an industrial scale. it was with major epidemics of polio in the s and s and the accompanying requirement for viral vaccines that the need for cell cultures on a large scale became apparent. the polio vaccine from a de-activated virus became one of the first commercial products developed from cultured animal cells (table . ). tissue culture is in vitro maintenance and propagation of isolated cells tissues or organs in an appropriate artificial environment. many animal cells can be induced to grow outside of their organ or tissue of origin under defined conditions when supplemented with a medium containing nutrients and growth factors. for in vitro growth of cells, the culture conditions may not mimic in vivo conditions with respect to temperature, ph, co , o , osmolality, and nutrition. in addition, the cultured cells require sterile conditions along with a steady supply of nutrients for growth and sophisticated incubation conditions. an important factor influencing the growth of cells in culture medium is the medium itself. at present, animal cells are cultured in natural media or artificial media depending on the needs of the experiment. the culture medium is the most important and essential step in animal tissue culture. this depends on the type of cells that need to be cultured for the purpose of cell growth differentiation or production of designed pharmaceutical products. in addition, serum-containing and serum-free media are now available that offer a varying degree of advantage to the cell culture. sterile conditions are important in the development of cell lines. cells from a wide range of different tissues and organisms are now grown in the lab. earlier, the major purpose of cell culture was to study the growth, the requirements for growth, the cell cycle, and the cell itself. at present, homogenous cultures obtained from primary cell cultures are useful tools to study the origin and biology of the cells. organotypic and histotypic cultures that mimic the respective organs/tissues have been useful for the production of artificial tissues. there are three methods commonly used to initiate a culture from animals. whole organs from embryos or partial adult organs are used to initiate organ culture in vitro. these cells in the organ culture maintain their differentiated character, their functional activity, and also retain their in vivo architecture. they do not grow rapidly, and cell proliferation is limited to the periphery of the explant. as these cultures cannot be propagated for long periods, a fresh explanation is required for every experiment that leads to interexperimental variation in terms of reproducibility and homogeneity. organ culture is useful for studying functional properties of cells (production of hormones) and for examining the effects of external agents (such as drugs and other micro or macro molecules) and products on other organs that are anatomically placed apart in vivo. fragments exercised from animal tissue may be maintained in a number of different ways. the tissue adheres to the surface aided by an extracellular matrix (ecm) constituent, such as collagen or a plasma clot, and it can even happen spontaneously. this gives rise to cells migrating from the periphery of the explant. this culture is known as a primary explant, and migrating cells are known as outgrowth. this has been used to analyze the growth characteristics of cancer cells in comparison to their normal counterparts, especially with reference to altered growth patterns and cell morphology. cell culture this is the most commonly used method of tissue culture and is generated by collecting the cells growing out of explants or dispersed cell suspensions (floating free in culture medium). cells obtained either by enzymatic treatment or by mechanical means are cultured as adherent monolayers on solid substrate. cell culture is of three types: ( ) precursor cell culture, which is undifferentiated cells committed to differentiate; ( ) differentiated cell culture, which is completely differentiated cells that have lost the capacity to further differentiate; and ( ) stem cell culture, which is undifferentiated cells that go on to develop into any type of cell. cells with a defined cell type and characteristics are selected from a culture by cloning or by other methods; this cell line becomes a cell strain. the monolayer culture is an anchorage-dependent culture of usually one cell in thickness with a continuous layer of cells at the bottom of the culture vessel. some of the cells are nonadhesive and can be mechanically kept in suspension, unlike most cells that grow as monolayers (e.g., cells of leukemia). this offers numerous advantages in the propagation of cells. passaging is the process of subculturing cells in order to produce a large number of cells from preexisting ones. subculturing produces a more homogeneous cell line and avoids the senescence associated with prolonged high cell density. splitting cells involves transferring a small number of cells into each new vessel. after subculturing, cells may be propagated, characterized, and stored. adherent cell cultures need to be detached from the surface of the tissue culture flasks or dishes using proteins. proteins secreted by the cells form a tight bridge between the cell and the surface. a mixture of trypsin-edta is used to break proteins at specific places. trypsin is either protein-degrading or proteolytic; it hydrolyzes pepsindigested peptides by hydrolysis of peptide bonds. edta sequesters certain metal ions that can inhibit trypsin activity, and thus enhances the efficacy of trypsin. the trypsinization process and procedure to remove adherent cells is given in flowchart . . quantitation is carried out to characterize cell growth and to establish reproducible culture conditions. cell counts are important for monitoring growth rates as well as for setting up new cultures with known cell numbers. the most widely used type of counting chamber is called a hemocytometer. it is used to estimate cell number. the concentration of cells in suspension is determined by placing the cells in an optically clear chamber under a microscope. the cell number within a defined area of known depth is counted, and the cell concentration is determined from the count. for high-throughput work, electronic cell counters are used to determine the concentration of each sample. in some cases, the dna content or the protein concentration needs to be determined instead of the number of cells. cells propagated as a cell suspension or monolayer offer many advantages but lack the potential for cellto-cell interaction and cellÀmatrix interaction seen in organ cultures. for this reason, many culture methods that start with a dispersed population of cells encourage the arrangement of these cells into organ-like structures. these types of cultures can be divided into two basic types. cellÀcell interactions similar to tissue-like densities can be attained by the use of an appropriate ecm and soluble factors and by growing cell cultures to high cell densities. this can be achieved by (a) growing cells in a relatively large reservoir with adequate medium fitted with a filter where the cells are crowded; (b) growing the cells at high concentrations on agar or agarose or as stirred aggregates (spheroids); and (c) growing cells on the outer surface of hollow fibers where the cells are seeded on the outer surface and medium is pumped through the fibers from a reservoir. to simulate heterotypic cell interactions in addition to homotypic cell interactions, cells of differentiated lineages are re-combined. co-culturing of epithelial and fibroblast cell clones from the mammary gland allows the cells to differentiate functionality under the correct hormonal environment, thus producing milk proteins. primary cell culture these cells are obtained directly from tissues and organs by mechanical or chemical disintegration or by enzymatic digestion. these cells are induced to grow in suitable glass or plastic containers with complex media. these cultures usually have a low growth rate and are heterogeneous; however, they are still preferred over cell lines as these are more representative of the cell types in the tissues from which they are derived. the morphological structure of cells in culture is of various types: ( ) epithelium type, which are polygonal in shape and appear flattened as they are attached to a substrate and form a continuous thin layer (i.e., monolayer on solid surfaces); ( ) epitheloid type, which have a round outline and do not form sheets like epithelial cells and do not attach to the substrate; ( ) fibroblast type, which are angular in shape and elongated and form an open network of cells rather than tightly packed cells, are bipolar or multipolar, and attach to the substrate; and ( ) connective tissue type, which are derived from fibrous tissue, cartilage, and bone, and are characterized by a large amount of fibrous and amorphous extracellular materials. these cultures represent the best experimental models for in vivo studies. they share the same karyotype as the parent and express characteristics that are not seen in cultured cells. however, they are difficult to obtain and have limited lifespans. potential contamination by viruses and bacteria is also a major disadvantage. depending on the kind of cells in culture, the primary cell culture can also be divided into two types. these cells require a stable nontoxic and biologically inert surface for attachment and growth and are difficult to grow as cell suspensions. mouse fibroblast sto cells are anchorage cells. these cells do not require a solid surface for attachment or growth. cells can be grown continuously in liquid media. the source of cells is the governing factor for suspension cells. blood cells are vascular in nature and are suspended in plasma and these cells can be very easily established in suspension cultures. when primary cell cultures are passaged or subcultured and grown for a long period of time in fresh medium, they form secondary cultures and are longlasting (unlike cells of primary cell cultures) due to the availability of fresh nutrients at regular intervals. the passaging or subculturing is carried out by enzymatic digestion of adherent cells. this is followed by washing and re-suspending of the required amount of cells in appropriate volumes of growth media. secondary cell cultures are preferred as these are easy to grow and are readily available; they have been useful in virological, immunological, and toxicological research. this type of culture is useful for obtaining a large population of similar cells and can be transformed to grow indefinitely. these cell cultures maintain their cellular characteristics. the major disadvantage of this system is that the cells have a tendency to differentiate over a period of time in culture and generate aberrant cells. the primary culture, when subcultured, becomes a cell line or cell strain that can be finite or continuous, depending on its lifespan in culture. they are grouped into two types on the basis of the lifespan of the culture. cell lines with a limited number of cell generations and growth are called finite cell lines. the cells are slow growing ( À hours). these cells are characterized by anchorage dependence and density limitation. cell lines obtained from in vitro transformed cell lines or cancerous cells are indefinite cell lines and can be grown in monolayer or suspension form. these cells divide rapidly with a generation time of À hours and have a potential to be subcultured indefinitely. the cell lines may exhibit aneuploidy (bhat, ) or heteroploidy due to an altered chromosome number. immortalized cell lines are transformed cells with altered growth properties. hela cells are an example of an immortal cell line. these are human epithelial cells obtained from fatal cervical carcinoma transformed by human papilloma virus (hpv ). indefinite cell lines are easy to manipulate and maintain. however, these cell lines have a tendency to change over a period of time. nowadays, for the production of biologically active substances on an industrial scale, a mammalian cell culture is a prerequisite. with advancements in animal cell culture technology, a number of cell lines have evolved and are used for vaccine production, therapeutic proteins, pharmaceutical agents, and anticancerous agents. for the production of cell lines, human, animal, or insect cells may be used. cell lines that are able to grow in suspension are preferred as they have a faster growth rate. chinese hamster ovary (cho) is the most commonly used mammalian cell line. when selecting a cell line, a number of general parameters must be considered, such as growth characteristics, population doubling time, saturation density, plating efficiency, growth fraction, and the ability to grow in suspension. advantages of continuous cell lines . continuous cell lines show faster cell growth and achieve higher cell densities in culture. . serum-free and protein-free media for widely used cell lines may be available in the market. . the cell lines have a potential to be cultured in suspension in large-scale bioreactors. the major disadvantages of these cultures are chromosomal instability, phenotypic variation in relation to the donor tissue, and a change in specific and characteristic tissue markers (freshney, ) . the cells in the culture show a characteristic growth pattern, lag phase, exponential or log phase, followed by a plateau phase. the population doubling time of the cells can be calculated during the log phase and plateau phase. this is critical and can be used to quantify the response of the cells to different culture conditions for changes in nutrient concentration and effects of hormonal or toxic components. the population doubling time describes the cell division rates within the culture and is influenced by nongrowing and dying cells. the population doubling time, lag time, and saturation density of a particular cell line can be established and characterized for a particular cell type. a growth curve consists of a normal culture and can be divided into a lag phase, log phase, and plateau phase. this is the initial growth phase of the subculture and re-seeding during which the cell population takes time to recover. the cell number remains relatively constant prior to rapid growth. during this phase, the cell replaces elements of the glycocalyx lost during trypsinization, attaches to the substrate, and spreads out. during the spreading process, the cytoskeleton reappears; its reappearance is probably an integral part of the process. this is a period of exponential increase in cell number and growth of the cell population due to continuous division. the length of the log phase depends on the initial seeding density, the growth rate of the cells, and the density at which cell proliferation is inhibited by density. this phase represents the most reproducible form of the culture as the growth fraction and viability is high (usually %À %), and the population is at its most uniform. however, the cell culture may not be synchronized, and the cells can be randomly distributed in the cell cycle. the culture becomes confluent at the end of the log phase as growth rates during this phase are reduced, and cell proliferation can cease in some cases due to exhaustion. the cells are in contact with surrounding cells, and the growth surface is occupied. at this stage, the culture enters the stationary phase and the growth fraction falls to between % and %. also, the constitution and charge of the cell surface may be changed, and there may be a relative increase in the synthesis of specialized versus structural proteins. the animal cell culture can be grown for a wide variety of cell-based assays to investigate morphology, protein expression, cell growth, differentiation, apoptosis, and toxicity in different environments. product yields can be increased if monitoring of cell growth is managed properly. a number of factors affect the maximum growth of cells in a batch reactor. regular observation of cells in culture helps monitor cell health and the stage of growth; small changes in ph, temperature, humidity, o , co , dissolved nutrients, etc., could have an impact on cell growth. monitoring the rate of growth continuously also provides a record that the cells have reached their maximum density within a given time frame. animal cell cultures show specific characteristics and differ from microbial cultures. the important characteristics of the animal cell are slow growth rate, requirement of solid substrata for anchoragedependent cells, lack of a cell wall (which leads to zf and ab cells embryonic fibroblast cells zebrafish fragility), and sensitivity to physiochemical conditions such as ph, co levels, etc. some of the fundamental bioprocess variables are as follows: temperature is one of the most fundamental variables as it directly interferes with the growth and production processes. on a small scale, thermostatically controlled incubators can be used to control temperature. however, cell cultures grown on a large scale in bioreactors require more sensitive control of temperature. different bioreactors use different methods to maintain the temperature of the cell culture. temperature in a bioreactor is maintained by a heat blanket and water jacket with a temperature sensor. ph ph of the culture medium can be controlled by adding alkali (naoh, koh) or acid (hcl) solution. addition of co gas to the bioreactor, buffering with sodium bicarbonate, or use of naturally buffering solutes help maintain the ph of the culture. a silver chloride electrochemical-type ph electrode is the most commonly used electrode in the bioreactor. dissolved oxygen is the most fundamental variable that needs to be continuously supplied to the cell culture medium. it is consumed with a carbon source in aerobic cultures (moore et al., ) . diffusion through a liquid surface or membranes is one of the methods for providing dissolved oxygen to the medium. the number of viable cells in the culture provides an accurate indication of the health of the cell culture (stacey and davis, ) . trypan blue and erythrosin b determine cell viability through the loss of cellular membrane integrity. both these dyes are unable to penetrate the cell membrane when the membrane is intact, but are taken up and retained by dead cells (which lack an intact membrane). erythrosin b stain is preferred over trypan blue as it generates more accurate results with fewer false negatives and false positives. the toxic chemicals in the culture medium affect the basic functions of cells. the cytotoxicity effect can lead to the death of the cells or alterations in their metabolism. methods to access viable cell number and cell proliferation rapidly and accurately is the important requirement in many experimental situations that involve in vitro and in vivo studies. the cell number determination can be useful for determining the growth factor activity, concentration of toxic compound, drug screening, duration of exposure, change in colony size, carcinogenic effects of chemical compounds, and effects of solvents (such as ethanol, propylene, etc.). the assays to measure viable cells (viability assays) are as follows: bromide] (mtt)/mts/resazurin assay. . protease marker assay. . atp assay. the mtt assay allows simple, accurate, and reliable counting of metabolically active cells based on the conversion of pale yellow tetrazolium mtt. nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide in metabolically active viable cells reduces tetrazolium compounds into brightly colored formazan products or reduces resazurin into fluorescent resorufin (fig. . ). mtt and resazurin assays are widely used, as they are inexpensive and can be used with all cell types. the protease marker assay utilizes the cell-permeant protease substrate glycylphenylalanyl-aminofluorocoumarin (gf-afc). the substrate, which lacks an aminoterminal blocking moiety, is processed by aminopeptidases within the cytoplasm to release afc. the amount of afc released is proportional to the viable cell number. this assay has better sensitivity than resuzurin and the cells remain viable; thus, multiplexing is possible. the atp assay is the most sensitive cell viability assay. it is figure . schematic summary of biochemical events in different viability assays. measured using the beetle luciferase reaction to generate light. the mtt assay and procedure is given in flowchart . . assays to detect dead cells are as follows: the viable cells in culture have intact outer membranes. loss of membrane integrity defines a "dead" cell. the dead cells can be detected by measuring the activity of marker enzymes that leak out of dead cells into the culture medium or by staining the cytoplasmic or nuclear content by vital dyes that can only enter dead cells. ldh is an enzyme that is present in all cell types. it catalyzes the oxidation of lactate to pyruvate in the presence of co-enzyme nad . in the damaged cells, ldh is rapidly released. the amount of released ldh is used to assess cell death (fig. . ). this assay is widely used but has limited sensitivity as half-life of ldh at c is hours. the protease release assay is based on the intracellular release of proteases from the dead/compromised cell into the culture medium. the released proteases cleave the substrate to liberate aminoluciferin, which serves as a substrate for luciferase ( fig. . ) and leads to the production of a "glowtype" signal (cho et al., ). hayflick limit or hayflick's phenomena is defined as the number of times a normal cell population divides before entering the senescence phase. macfarlane burnet coined the term "c limit" in . hayflick and moorhead ( ) demonstrated that a population of normal human fetal cells divide in culture between and times before stopping. there appears to be a correlation between the maximum number of passages and aging. this phenomenon is related to telomere length. repeated mitosis leads to shortening of the telomeres on the dna of the cell. telomere shortening in humans eventually makes cell division impossible, and correlates with aging. this explains the decrease in passaging of cells harvested from older individuals. one of the most important factors in animal cell culture is the medium composition. in vitro growth and maintenance of animal cells require appropriate nutritional, hormonal, and stromal factors that resemble their milieu in vivo as closely as possible. important environmental factors are the medium in which the cells are surrounded, the substratum upon which the cells grow, temperature, oxygen and carbon dioxide concentration, ph, and osmolality. in addition, the cell requires chemical substances that cannot be synthesized by the cells themselves. any successful medium is composed of isotonic, low-molecular-weight compounds known as basal medium and provides inorganic salts, an energy source, amino acids, and various supplements. the basic components that make up most of the animal cell culture media are as follows: inorganic salts (ca , mg , na , k ), nitrogen source (amino acids), energy sources (glucose, fructose), vitamins, fat and fat soluble component (fatty acids, cholesterols), nucleic acid precursors, growth factors and hormones, antibiotics, ph and buffering systems, and oxygen and carbon dioxide concentrations. complete formulation of media that supports growth and maintenance of a mammalian cell culture is very complex. for this reason, the first culture medium used for cell culture was based on biological fluids such as plasma, lymph serum, and embryonic extracts. the nutritional requirements of cells can vary at different stages of the culture cycle. different cell types have highly specific requirements, and the most suitable medium for each cell type must be determined experimentally. media may be classified into two categories: ( ) natural media and ( ) artificial media. natural media consist of naturally occurring biological fluids sufficient for the growth and proliferation of animals cells and tissues. this media useful for promoting cell growth are of the following three types: . coagulant or clots: plasma separated from heparinized blood from chickens or other animals is commercially available in the form of liquid plasma. . biological fluids: this includes body fluids such as plasma, serum lymph, amniotic fluid, pleural fluid, insect hemolymph, and fetal calf serum. these fluids are used as cell culture media after testing for toxicity and sterility. . tissue extract: extracts of liver, spleen, bone marrow, and leucocytes are used as cell culture media. chicken embryo extract is the most common tissue extract used in some culture media. the media contains partly or fully defined components that are prepared artificially by adding several nutrients (organic and inorganic). it contains a balanced salt solution with specific ph and osmotic pressure designed for immediate survival of cells. artificial media supplemented with serum or with suitable formulations of organic compounds supports prolonged survival of the cell culture. the artificial media may be grouped into the following four classes: serum-containing media, serum-free media, chemically defined media, and protein-free media. the clear yellowish fluid obtained after fibrin and cells are removed from blood is known as serum. it is an undefined media supplement of extremely complex mixture of small and large molecules and contains amino acids, growth factors, vitamins, proteins, hormones, lipids, and minerals, among other components (table . ). advantages of serum in cell culture medium . it has basic nutrients present either in soluble or in protein-bound form. transferrin. insulin is essential for the growth of nearly all cells in culture and transferrin acts as an iron binder. . it contains numerous growth factors such as platelet-derived growth factor (pdgf), transforming growth factor beta (tgf-b), epidermal growth factor (egf), and chondronectin. these factors stimulate cell growth and support specialized functions of cells. . it supplies protein, which helps in the attachment of cells to the culture surface (e.g., fibronectin). . it provides binding proteins such as albumin and transferrin, which helps transport molecules in cells. . it provides minerals such as ca , mg , fe , k na , zn , etc., which promote cell attachment. . it increases the viscosity of the medium, which provides protection against mechanical damage during agitation and aeration of suspension cultures. . it provides appropriate osmotic pressure. disadvantages of serum-containing medium . expensive: fetal calf serum is expensive and difficult to obtain in large quantities. and there is no uniformity in composition of serum. this can affect growth and yields and can give inconsistent results. . contamination: serum medium carries a high risk of contamination with virus, fungi, and mycoplasma. the serum itself may be cytotoxic and may contain inhibiting factors, which in turn may inhibit cultured cell growth and proliferation. the enzyme polyamine oxidase in serum reacts with polyamines such as spermine and spermidine to form cytotoxic polyamino-aldehyde. . downstream processing: the presence of serum in culture media may interfere with isolation and purification of culture products. additional steps may be required to isolate cell culture products. the use of serum in culture media presents a safety hazard and source of unwanted contamination for the production of biopharmaceuticals. as a number of cell lines can be grown in serum-free media supplemented with certain components of bovine fetal serum, the development of this type of medium with a defined composition has intensified in the last few decades. eagle ( ) developed a "minimal essential medium" composed of balanced salts, glucose, amino acids, and vitamins. in the last years, considerable work has been carried out to develop more efficient culture media to meet the specific requirements of specific cell lines. advantages of serum-free culture media . serum-free media are simplified, and the composition is better defined. . they can be designed specifically for a cell type. it is possible to create different media and to switch from growth-enhancing media to differentiationinducing media by altering the combination and types of growth factors and inducers. . they decrease variability from batch to batch and improve reproduction between cultures. . downstream processing of products from cell cultures in serum-free media is easier. . they reduce the risk of microbial contamination (mycoplasma, viruses, and prions). . serum-free media are easily available and ready to use. they are also cost-effective when compared with serum-containing media. disadvantages of serum-free media . growth rate and saturation density attained are lower than those compared to serum-containing media. . serum-free media prove to be more expensive as supplementing with hormone and growth factors increases the cost enormously. . different media are required for different cell types as each species has its own characteristic requirements. . critical control of ph and temperature and ultrapurity of reagent and water are required as compared to serum-containing media. these media contain pure inorganic and organic constituents along with protein additions like egfs, insulin, vitamins, amino acids, fatty acids, and cholesterol. these media contain nonprotein constituents necessary for the cell culture. the formulations of dme, mem, rpmi- , procho tm, and cdm-hd are the characterization of cell lines is important to ensure the quality of cell-derived biopharmaceutical products. it helps in determining the cell source with regard to its identity and the presence of other cell lines, molecular contaminants, and endogenous agents. the characterization of mammalian cell lines is species-specific and can vary depending on the history of the cell line and type of media components used for culturing. mammalian cell line characterization can be done in four ways: identity testing can be carried out by isoenzyme analysis. the banding pattern of the intracellular enzyme (which is species-specific) can be determined by using agarose gels. dna fingerprinting and karyotyping, and dna and rna sequencing are alternative methods to identity testing. karyotyping is important as it determines any gross chromosomal changes in the cell line. the growth conditions and subculturing of a cell line may lead to alteration in the karyotype; for example, hela cells were the first human epithelial cancer cell line established in long-term culture, and they have a hypertriploid chromosome number ( n ). bacterial and fungal contamination of cell lines occurs due to impure techniques and source material. the occurrence of contaminants can be tested by a direct inoculation method on two different media. mycoplasma infection is the contamination of cell cultures/cell lines with mycoplasmas, and it represents a serious problem. detection by microscopy is not adequate and requires additional testing by fluorescent staining pcr, elisa assay, autoradiography, immunestaining, or microbiological assay. characterization and testing of cell substrate (cell line derived from human or animal source) is one of the most important components in the control of biological products. it helps to confirm the identity, purity, and suitability of the cell substrate for manufacturing use. the substrate stability should be examined at a minimum of two time points during cultivation for production. in addition, genetic stability can be tested by genomic or transcript sequencing, restriction map analysis, and copy number determination (fda guidelines, ). virus testing of cell substrate should be designed to detect a spectrum of viruses. appropriate screening tests should be carried out based on the cultivation history of cell lines. the development of characteristic cytopathogenic effect (cpe) provides an early indication of viral contamination. some of the viruses of special concern in cell production work are human immunodeficiency virus, human papilloma virus, hepatitis virus, human herpes virus, hantavirus, simian virus, sendai virus, and bovine viral diarrhea virus. for detection of viruses causing immunodeficiency diseases and hepatitis, detection of sequences by pcr testing is adequate. cells exposed to be serum or bovine serum albumin require a bovine virus test. some of the viral testing assays are xc plaque assays, s l-focus assay, reverse transcription assay. xc plaque assay is utilized to detect infectious ecotropic murine retroviruses. s l-focus assay is used to test cells for the presence of infectious xenotropic and amphotropic murine retroviruses that are capable of interacting with both murine and nonmurine cells. real-time (rt) assays such as real-time fluorescent product-enhanced reverse transcriptase (fpert) assay and quantitative real-time for fluorescent productenhanced reverse transcript (qpert) assay detect the conversion of an rna template to cdna due to the presence of the rt template when retrovirus infection is present in the cell line. advantages of animal cell culture . physiochemical and physiological condition: role and effect of ph, temperature, o /co concentration, and osmotic pressure of the culture media can be altered to study their effects on the cell culture (freshney, in addition, this system cannot replace the complex live animal for testing the response of chemicals or the impact of vaccines or toxins. despite considerable progress in the development of cell culture techniques, the potential biohazards of working with animal and human tissues presents a number of ethical problems, including issues of procurement, handling, and ultimate use of material. in most countries, biomedical research is strictly regulated. legislation varies considerably in different countries. research ethics committees, animal ethics committees for animal-based research, and institutional research boards for human subjects have a major role in research governance. some guidelines for the use of experimental or donor animals include assurances of proper conditions for housing animals and minimal pain or discomfort to any animal that is put to death or operated upon. these guidelines apply to higher vertebrates and not to lower vertebrates such as fish or other invertebrates. fetal bovine serum (fbs)-supplemented media are commonly used in animal cell cultures. in recent years, fbs production methods have come under scrutiny because of animal welfare concerns. fbs is harvested from bovine fetuses taken from pregnant cows during slaughter. the common method of harvesting the fetus is by cardiac puncture without any anesthesia. this practice of harvesting fbs is inhumane as it exposes the fetus to pain and/or discomfort. in addition to moral concerns, numerous scientific and technical problems exist with regard to the use of fbs in cell culture. efforts are now being made to reduce the use of fbs and replace it with synthetic alternatives. in the case of human tissues, some considerations that need to be addressed are as follows (freshney, in biomedical research, the use of animal and human cell cultures has become beneficial for diverse applications. it provides indispensable tools for producing a number of products, including biopharmaceuticals, mabs, and products for gene therapy. in addition, animal cell cultures provide adequate test systems for studying biochemical pathways, intra-and intercellular responses, pathological mechanisms, and virus production. some of the applications of animal cell culture are discussed below. animal cell culture technology has played an important role in the development of viral vaccine production. the establishment of cell culture technology in the s and the consequent replacement of live animals for the development of antigens have led to considerable progress in bioprocess technology. with the advent of dna technology, molecular manipulation of viruses has led to the development of a recombinant vaccine against hepatitis b virus (hbv) and several others potential vaccines that are in the final phase of clinical trials. viral particles production by cell culture viral particle production by cell culture differs from the production of molecules such as proteins, enzymes, and toxins by bacteria or animal cells. the product formation may not be related to the development or growth of a cell and may occur through secondary metabolic pathways, unlike virus production, which does not result from secondary metabolic pathway. virus production occurs after the viral infection directs cell machinery to perform viral particle production. two stages are involved in viral production: . cell culture system: this requires the development of an efficient system for conversion of the culture medium substrate in the cell mass. . virus production: this phase differs from the infection phase and has different nutritional and metabolic requirements. a number of immortalized cell lines are used for the industrial production of viral vaccines. table . gives the cell lines used for vaccines. most of the existing classical vaccines for viral disease are either altered or chemically inactive live viruses. however, incomplete inactivation of a virus or reversion of an attenuated strain can risk infection in vaccinated individuals. viruses with segmented genomes with a high degree of genetic exchange can undergo re-assortment or recombination of genetic material with viruses of different serotypes in the vaccinated host, which can result in the production of new variants of the virus. moreover, some live virus vaccines are teratogenic; for example, smithburn neurotropic strain (sns) (smithburn, ) and mp attenuated (caplen et al., ) vaccine strains of the rift valley fever virus. a new type of vaccine that does not present the typical side effects of an attenuated or inactivated viral vaccine has been made possible with the development of rdna technology. virus-like particles (vlps) are highly effective as they mimic the overall structure of the virus; however, these particles lack the infectious genetic material. capsid proteins can aggregate to form core-like particles in the absence of nucleic acids. these spontaneously assembled particles are structurally similar to authenticate viruses and are able to stimulate b-cell-mediated immune responses. in addition, vlps stimulate a cd proliferative response and cytotoxic t-lymphocyte response (jeoung et al., ) . vlps resemble and mimic virus structure and are able to elicit a strong immune response without causing harm. the major advantage of vlps is their simplicity and nonpathogenic nature. they are replicationdeficient as they lack any viral genetic information, thus eliminating the need for inactivation of the virus. this is important as inactivation treatments lead to epitope modifications (cruz et al., ) . as the structural morphology of vlps is similar to the virus, the conformational epitopes presented to the immune system are the same as for the native virus particles. the immune response/antibody reactivity in the case of vlps is significantly improved as vlps present conformation epitopes more similar to the native virus. vlps also induce a strong b-cell response. for broader and more efficient protection, it is possible to adapt one or more antigens to the multimeric protein structure. another advantage offered by vlps is that they significantly reduce vaccine costs as these can elicit a protective response at lower doses of antigen. the fda has approved vlp-based vaccines for hbv and hpv. the hbv vaccine was approved in and the hpv one in (justin et al., ) . to generate immunogenic vlps, the s gene is cloned and expressed in a eukaryotic expression host such as yeast or mammalian cells (e.g., cho cell line). the mammalian cell culture allows easy recovery because the cells are able to secrete the antigen hbsag. the two companies producing cho-based vaccines are the frenchbased pasteur-merieux aventis (gene hevac b) and the israeli-based scigen (sci-b-vac). the gene hevac b vaccine contains the hbsag s protein and m protein, whereas sci-b-vac contains the m and l proteins. viruses of the papillomaviridae family are known to induce lesions and warts and also cause cervical cancer. fifteen strains of papillomaviridae are known to cause cervical cancer. hpv- is considered a high-risk hpv type as the risk of cancer may be higher than for other high-risk hpv types. the two virally encoded proteins of hpv are l and l . l is the main capsid protein that forms the outer shell of the virus. l is found in the interior of the viral particle and is less abundant. the recombinant l vlp is able to induce neutralizing antibodies in animals. gardasil (the first hpv vaccine) was approved by the fda in . this vaccine is manufactured by merck and co., inc. ceravarix, another hpv vaccine (manufactured by glaxo smithkline), was approved by the fda in . it uses the trichoplusia ni (hi- ) insect cell line infected with l recombinant baculovirus (jiang et al., ; wang et al., ) . a number other vlp-based vaccines are in clinical trials. these include the anti-influenza a m -hbcag vlp vaccine (clarke et al., ) , two antimalarial vaccine nicotine-qβ vlps (maurer et al., ) , and an anti-angiiqβ vlp. the vlp production in mammalian cell lines and baculo cell lines of viruses infecting humans and other animals is summarized in table . . proteins play a major role in carrying out biochemical reactions, transporting small molecules within a cell or from one organ to another, formation of receptors and channels in membranes, and providing frameworks for scaffolding. the number of functionally distinct proteins in humans far exceeds the number of genes as a result of post-translational modifications. these modifications include glycosylation, phosphorylation, ubiquitination, nitrosylation, methylation, acetylation, and lipidation. the changes in protein structure as a result of mutation or other abnormalities often lead to a disease condition. protein therapeutics offer tremendous opportunities for alleviating disease. the first therapeutic from recombinant mammalian cells was human tissue plasminogen, which obtained market approval in . at present, %À % of all the recombinant therapeutic proteins are produced in mammalian cells. the main therapeutic proteins can be divided into seven groups (walsh, ): . cytokines . hematopoietic growth factors . growth factors . hormones . blood products . enzymes . antibodies most of the proteins have complex structures and undergo chemical modification to insure full biological activity. protein post-translation modifications (ptm) can happen in several ways. the most widely recognized form of ptm is glycosylation, which involves extensive sequence processing and trimming in the golgi apparatus and endoplasmic reticulum. eukaryotic cells are capable of carrying out this type of modification and are thus preferred in biopharmaceutical processes. hamster, baby hamster kidney (bhk), and cho cells are often the host cells of choice as glycosylation patterns generated from these cells are more similar to human patterns. table . lists various therapeutic proteins produced in animal cell lines. cytokines are proteins of the immune system that play a central role in immune response. cytokines are produced as a result of immune stimulus by various white blood cells. interferons (ifns) were the first family of cytokines to be discovered and used as biopharmaceuticals. ifnα is used for treatment of hepatitis, and more recently has been approved for leukemia and other types of cancers. ifnβ is used for treatment of multiple sclerosis and is marketed under the names avonex, belaseron, and rebif. ifnγ is used for the treatment of chronic granulomatous disease. interleukin is another kind of cytokine that helps regulate cell growth, differentiation, and motility and is used as a biopharmaceutical. the recombinant form of il- is used for the treatment of renal cell carcinoma. growth factors are proteins that bind to receptors on the surface of cells to activate the cells for proliferation and or differentiation. the different types of growth factors are tgf, insulin-like growth factor, and (egf. the primary sources of pdgf are platelets, endothelial cells, and the placenta. two isoforms of this protein are present in the human body and both of these have one glycosylation site and three disulfide bonds. examples of growth factors used as biopharmaceuticals are the following: . osigraft/eptotermin alfa (bone morphogenetic protein) is used for the treatment of tibia fractures, is grown commercially in cho cells, and was first approved in in europe. surgery; it is also commercially grown in cho cells. this product was first approved in europe in . insulin, glucagon, gonadotropins, and growth hormones are the most well-known therapeutic hormones. the first biopharmaceuticals that obtained approval by regulatory agencies were insulin and recombinant human growth hormones. these were produced in microbial cells. the commercial recombinant forms of the gonadotropin family of hormones are gonal-f, luveris, puregon, and ovitrelle. all these are produced using cho cells and are used for treating female infertility. a number of recombinant therapeutic enzymes are expressed in mammalian cells. tissue plasminogen activator (tpa) is a thrombolytic agent involved in dissolving blood clots. recombinant tpa is commercially is known as alteplase and tenectplase, which are used for the treatment of acute myocardial infraction. fabry disease, a genetic metabolic disorder, is characterized by a lack of enzyme α-galactosidase a. α-galactosidase a and is produced by genetically modified cho cells. hemophilia a is caused by the lack of bloodclotting factor viii, hemophilia b is caused by deficiency of factor ix, and hemophilia c by lack of factor xi. factor viii and ix are proteins. the first recombinant factor vii products were recombinate and kogenate, which were expressed in cho and bkh cells, respectively. recombinant factor fix is commercially sold as benefix and is produced in recombinant cho cells. therapeutic antibodies are used in the treatment of cancer, cardiovascular disease, infections, and autoimmune diseases. in , the antibody avasin (bevacizeimab) was approved for the treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer. this antibody acts as an inhibitor of vascular endothelial growth factor. zenapax, another commercially available antibody, is used during prophylaxis for preventing the rejection of transplanted organs. this is commercially grown in the nso cell line and was approved for human use in . gene therapy involves the insertion, removal, or alteration of a therapeutic or working gene copy to cure a disease or defect or to slow the progression of a disease, thereby improving the quality of life. the human genome map was the first major step toward a new way of addressing human health and illness. gene therapy holds great promise, however, the task of transferring genetic material into the cell remains an enormous technical challenge and requires ex vivo cell cultivation and adaptation from the lab to a clinically relevant state. the development of animal cell culture technology is imperative for advances in gene therapy. monogenic diseases caused by single gene defects (such as cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, muscular dystrophy, and sickle cell anemia) are the primary targets of human gene therapy. the first step in gene therapy is to identify the faulty gene. this is followed by gene isolation and generation of a construct for correct expression. integration of the gene followed by delivery of the genetic material in vivo or ex vivo is crucial to the success of gene therapy. in in vivo therapy, the genetic material is introduced directly into the individual at a specific site, and in ex vivo treatment, the target cells are treated outside the patient's body. these cells are then expanded and transferred back to the individual at a specific site. the ex vivo technique involves gene therapy in the cultured cells, which are expanded and subsequently transferred to the targeted tissue. a number of clinical studies and trials for gene therapy have already been approved and are being conducted worldwide. from up to the present, about clinical studies have been reported; % of these studies are intended for cancer treatment. the first product designed for gene therapy was gendicine, a medication produced by shenzhen sibiono genetech, china. gendicine is used for head and neck carcinoma treatment. the tumor suppressing gene p in recombinant adenovirus expresses protein p , which leads to tumor control and elimination. sbn-cel is a cell line that was subcloned from the human embryonic kidney (hek) cell line and has been used for the production of gendicine. in recent years, biopesticides have gained importance due to increased concerns about agrochemicals and their residues in the environment and food. biopesticides provide an effective means for the control of insects and plant disease, and they are environmentally safe. the biological control of insect pests by another living organism (in order to suppress the use of pesticides) is an age-old practice. presently, a number of biological controls are being used as biopesticides. with the high cost of chemical-based pesticides and the development of resistance to multiple chemical pesticides, baculoviruses are one of the most promising biocontrols for insect pests and have been increasingly used effectively against caterpillars worldwide. however, the major impediment in the development of baculoviruses as biopesticides is the high cost and small volumes of in vitro methods. development of an in vitro production process for large quantities of baculoviruses at comparable costs to chemical pesticides will help provide insect control that is safe, efficacious, cost-effective, and environmentally safe. baculovirus production in animal cell culture a number of factors are important for a successful commercial production of bioinsecticides: . large-scale production of viruses at competitive costs. . economic production of viruses (i.e., low cost for the media and running the culture). . effective cell line with high virus per cell productivity. . with passage of the virus into cells, there is a loss of virulence and an increased risk of mutant formation; this should be avoided. . the quality of the polyhedral produced in the cell culture should be comparable to those obtained from caterpillars. the insect baculovirus cell system offers a number of advantages. it produces recombinant proteins that are functional and are immunologically active, as it is able to make post-translational modifications. the recombinant system uses a powerful promoter polyhedron. the most commonly used cell lines in biopesticide production are the sf and sf cell lines, which are derived from ovarian tissues of the fall army worm (spodoptera frugiperda). sf cells show a faster growth rate and higher cell density than sf cells and are preferred. high five cell lines (designated bti-tn- bi- ) established from trichoplusia ni embryonic tissue are also being used. the continuous culturing of cells for virus production leads to virus instability and the so-called passage effect. this can result in a decrease of virulence and polyhedral production and a variety of mutations. all these changes affect commercial production in vitro. two types of mutations are commonly seen in continuous passaging of cell cultures for viral productions: ( ) defective infective particles (dips) and ( ) few polyhedral (fp) mutations. fp mutations are characterized by ( ) reduced polyhedral, ( ) enhanced production of bv, and ( ) lack of occluded virions in polyhedra. all these factors reduce the infectivity of the target pest. spontaneously generated fp mutants have been reported in acmnpv (autographa california nucleopolyhedroviruses) (wood, ) , galleria mellonella nucleopolyhedroviruses (gmmnpv) (fraser and hink, ) , and helicoverpa armigera nucleopolyhedroviruses (hasnpv) (chankraborty and reid, ) . dip mutations are the formation of dips. they occur due to serial passaging for long periods, which results in a decrease in the filtering of infectious virus. dips have been reported in a number of animal virus systems and in baculovirus systems. dip formation can be avoided by low multiplicity of infection. this minimizes the probability of the defective virus entering the cell with an intact helper virion. the majority of antibodies available on the market today are produced in animal cell cultures (van dijk and van de winkle, ) . animal cells are preferred because they are capable of glycosylation and structural conformation, which is essential for a drug to be productive. hybridoma technology has been the most widely used method for small-and large-scale production of mabs. however, these antibodies have limited therapeutic applications since they produce an adverse immune response on repeated use. a number of cell lines are now being used for the production of recombinant antibodies. the cho lines are the most commonly used. other cell lines used are marine myelomas nso, sp / , hek- , and bhk. a number of factors influence the production of mabs. for a high concentration of mab production, the cell line should have high productivity. for high protein productivity, it is important that the selected cell line be productive in order to avoid large reaction volumes and the high cost of protein purification. cell lines with the capacity to grow without anchorage offer an advantage in terms of scaling up the process; it is much simpler than with those designed for the growth culture of anchorage-dependent cells. sp / and nso cell lines can grow naturally in suspension; other cells such as cho and bhk can be easily adapted to this form of cultivation. stem cells are unspecified cells that have the potential to differentiate into other kinds of cells or tissues and become specialized cells. the two characteristics that define stem cells are their ability of self-regenerate and to differentiate into any other cells or tissues. these cells have the capability to renew themselves to form cells of more specialized function. in recent years, stem cell research has been hailed as a major breakthrough in the field of medicine. this property of turning a cell into any other specialized function cell has made researchers believe that stem cells could be utilized to make fully functional, healthy organs to replace damaged or diseased organs. human embryonic stem cells (hescs) are grown on nutrient broth. these cells are traditionally cultured on mouse embryonic fibroblast feeder layers, which allows continuous growth in an undifferentiated stage. the mouse cells at the bottom of the culture dish provide a sticky surface to which the cells can attach. in addition, the feeder cells release nutrients into the culture medium. researchers have now devised animalfree culture systems for hescs and have used human embryonic fibroblasts and adult fallopian tube epithelial cells as feeder layers (in addition to serum-free mediums). more recently, methods to subculture embryonic cells without the feeder layer have been developed. martigel from bd biosciences has been used to coat the culture plate (hassan et al., ) for effective attachment and differentiation of both normal and transformed anchorage-dependent epithelioid and other cell types. this is a gelatinous protein mixture isolated from mouse tumor cells. a major milestone in the biological sciences was the establishment of the tissue culture technique that can both maintain and propagate the growth of living cells under sterile in vitro conditions. traditional cell cultures, which are two-dimensional ( d), are grown as monolayer cultures on a flat and rigid surface. since their development, several advancements have been made to improve cell culture media as well as the biological materials used for culturing. the improvements have proven valuable for cell-based study due to their amalgamation of various modern analytical techniques, such as fluorescence, electrochemistry, and mass spectroscopy. d cell culture does not provide an adequate in vivo environment, where other cells surround the cells in a three-dimensional ( d) ecm (edmondson et al., ) . cells under in vivo conditions both produce and continuously consume oxygen nutrients and other molecules, and such dynamic distributions are not mimicked in conventional d cell cultures. moreover, d cell cultures fail to recapitulate the highly complex d environment, function, and physiology of living tissues, the multitudinous regulatory interactions from surrounding tissue cells, the ecm, and other systemic factors that lead to nonpredictive data of an in vivo response (li et al., ) . the limitations of d cell culture systems have recently become more evident. recent standard protocol advances in the fields of quantitative and system biology and imaging technology have allowed analysis of individual cells and observation of live individual cells growing in a natural physiological d environment. cells cultured in a d model system more closely mimic in vivo conditions. thus, unlike d cell cultures, which can sometimes cause misleading and nonpredictive data of in vivo responses, d systems are realistic for translating study findings. compared to the d cell culture system, the d cell culture system provides a physiologically relevant and closer biomimetic environment, promotes better cell differentiation, and improves cell function (edmondson et al., ) . the d culture system holds great promise for applications in various fields, such as cancer cell biology, stem cell research, drug discovery, and various cell-based analyses and devices. while this culturing model offers state-of-the-art technology for facilitating drug development and numerous other applications, several hurdles remain before a universal, standardized, and validated system can be established (sung et al., ) . recent developments in the transition from d to d cell cultures indicate promising applications for many industries; however, the cost of automation and easyto-use readout systems are still key concerns. the d cell culture system has provided a powerful tool that mimics a highly complex and dynamic in vivo environment, and it has gained greater momentum with the integration of microfluidic technology. microfluidics is a technology characterized by the manipulation of fluids at the micron-scale for the improvement of diagnostics and cell culture research. it uses microfluidic devices to manipulate fluids in the small capillaries or microchannels. microfluidics is a science of manipulating, mixing, monitoring, and analyzing minute volumes of fluids or gases on the surfaces of chips and microfluidic chips. this technology is ideal because it recreates the microenvironment of the vasculature and has become a powerful tool in cell culture research. it encompasses knowledge of the biological sciences, chemistry, physics, and engineering applications (xu and attinger, ) . the microfluidic d cell culture model also allows precise spatial control over the gradients and medium exchange. it not only mimics but also promotes several biologically relevant functions not seen in the d cell culture. furthermore, it has been increasingly used to generate high-throughput cell culture models and has shown considerable promise for improving diagnostics and biological research (el-ali et al., ) . notably, microfluidic cell cultures are potential candidates for next generation cell analysis systems. several d-based cell culture approaches have been created to provide a better biomimetic microenvironment for cells than those of d cultures. in addition, crucial liquid handling steps, including cell loading, nutrient supply, and waste removal-under physiologically relevant conditions-can be performed with real-time microscopy (xu et al., ) . numerous microfluidic devices have been developed to not only provide nutrients and oxygen continuously for cell proliferation but also to investigate several characteristics of a dynamic d cell culture, such as differences in concentration, temperature gradients, and shear force conditions on cell transport and cultivation. numerous microfluidic platforms for d cell culturing have been developed and based on the substrates used for microdevice fabrication, including glass/siliconbased, polymer-based, and paper-based platforms. polydimethylsiloxane (pdms)-based microdevices are the predominant form of microfluidic d cell culture systems because they are economical and allow permeability of o , which is vital in cell proliferation. to provide an in vivo-like environment that resembles living tissues, several natural polymers, such as collagen, fibrin, and agarose, have been used to fabricate microfluidic devices (li et al., ) . microfluidics technology has emerged as a viable and robust platform for tissue engineering-a multidisciplinary field aimed at replacing and repairing damaged and diseased tissues and/or organs and developing in vitro models to mimic physiological conditions. successful clinical applications include the development of organ-on-a-chip technology-a microfluidic perfusion device for regenerative medicineand a chip-based platform for the culture of cells and toxicological studies. scientists currently rely on in vitro cell culture platforms and in vivo animal models to study biological processes and develop therapeutic strategies, although informative have significant shortcomings (zió łkowska et al., ) . in vitro platforms may not simulate the intricate cellÀcell and cellÀmatrix interactions that are vital to regulating cell behavior in vivo (guillouzo & guguen-guillouzo, ) . organ-on-a-chip devices could offer biological relevance and be a requisite for high-throughput applications. an organ-on-a-chip is a microfluidic cell culture device comprising a microchip with continuously perfused chambers that are infused with living cells that are arranged to mimic the d tissue microenvironment and physiology (ghaemmaghami et al., ) . these chips have the potential to significantly impact drug discovery and toxicity testing (ghaemmaghami et al., ) . the simplest functional unit of organ-on-a-chip devices consists of a single, perfused microfluidic chamber that is composed of a single type of cultured cell. these systems are utilized for studying organ-specific responses, chemical responses, such as drugs or toxins, and physical stimuli. in a complex system, two or more independently perfused parallel microchannels are connected by porous membranes to recreate interfaces between different tissues. numerous tissue models have been developed to mimic in vivo biological processes. on-chip tissue models include those for the liver, kidney, lungs, intestines, muscle, fat, and blood vessels as well as models of tumors. various chemicals and drugs, when administered over a long period, result in adverse effects and acute liver toxicity, known as hepatotoxicity (gershell & atkins, ) . in vitro models used for identifying drug-induced liver toxicity have drastically limited utility. therefore, efficient and reliable tools for testing liver toxicity are required. microfluidics devices for liver tissue and cells that can maintain metabolic activity and can be used for drug discovery and toxicity studies have shown great potential for solving this problem. bioreactors with a perfused multiwell plate device were developed by domansky et al. ( ) to recapitulate both the physiological and mechanical microenvironments of hepatocytes that can support both growth and functional integrity for up to week. khetani and bhatia ( ) developed microscale cultures of human liver cells in a multiwell micropatterned co-culture system that can maintain phenotypic functions of liver cells for up to several weeks. a significant challenge for cancer research is the early detection and development of in vitro strategies for studying the role of drug-carrier design in tumor transport and therapies for targeting rapidly dividing cancer cells while leaving normal, healthy cells untouched. the microfluidics tumor-on-a-chip platform can be used for detecting circulating tumor cells (ctcs) in blood flow, which may lead to early diagnosis of cancer (millner et al., ) . a variety of designs for studying the microenvironment of microfluidic devices that culture solid and liquid tumors were reviewed by young ( ) . tatosian and shuler ( ) developed a novel microfluidic system to study the multidrug resistance of cancer cells to chemotherapeutic combinations. jang et al. ( ) fabricated a microfluidic device with an active injection system that produced of combinations of different chemical solutions at various concentrations and stored them in isolated chambers. to optimize system parameters for varied types of cancer cells while requiring minute amounts of reagents and cells, jedrych et al. ( ) generated a microfluidics system for photodynamic therapy-based measurements. this system allows light-induced photosensitizers to be delivered to the carcinoma cells, which-on reaction with oxygenproduce a chemical toxin that is lethal to tumor cells. http://amgenscholars.com/images/uploads/ contentimages/biotechnology-timeline.pdf amgen scholars provides hundreds of undergraduate students with the opportunity to engage in a hands-on summer research experience at some of the world's leading institutions. . http://monographs.iarc.fr http://monographs.iarc.fr/eng/monographs/ vol /mono - .pdf the iarc monographs identify environmental factors that can increase the risk of human cancer. these include chemicals, complex mixtures, occupational exposures, physical agents, biological agents, and lifestyle factors. . www.iptonline.com http://www.iptonline.com/articles/public/ iptfive np.pdf iptonline publishes "the pharmaceutical technology journal," which is designed to provide information on the latest ideas, cutting-edge technologies, and innovations shaping the future of pharmaceutical research, development, and manufacturing. . http://www.aceabio.com http://www.aceabio.com/userfiles/doc/ literature/xcell_appnotes/ rtca_appnote _acea_lores.pdf acea biosciences, inc. (acea) is a privately owned biotechnology company. acea's mission is to transform cell-based assays by providing innovative and cutting-edge products and solutions to the research and drug discovery community. the food and drug administration (fda or usfda) protects and promotes public health through the regulation of all foods (except meats and poultry), the nation's blood supply, and other biologics (such as vaccines and transplant tissues). drugs must be tested, manufactured ?la en promega manufactures enzymes and other products for biotechnology and molecular biology the world health organization (who) is a specialized agency that is concerned with international public health. it is affiliated with the united nations and headquartered in geneva, switzerland. who ensures that more people, especially those living in dire poverty virus-like particle and viral vector production using the baculovirus expression vector system/insect cell system animal cell culture concept and application. alpha science international limited mutagen-directed attenuation of rift valley fever virus as a method for vaccine development serial passage of a helicoverpa armigera nucleopolyhedrovirus in helicoverpa zea cell cultures recombinant hemagglutinin produced from chinese hamster ovary (cho) stable cell clones and a pelc/cpg combination adjuvant for h n subunit vaccine development a bioluminescent cytotoxicity assay for assessment of membrane integrity using a proteolytic biomarker improved immunogenicity of a peptide epitope after fusion to hepatitis b core protein integrated process optimisation: lessons from retrovirus and virus like production perfused multiwell plate for d liver tissue engineering amino acid metabolism in mammalian cell cultures threedimensional cell culture systems and their applications in drug discovery and cell-based biosensors cells on chips the isolation and characterization of the mp and fp plaque variants of galleria mellonella nuclear polyhedrosis virus culture of animal cells: a manual of basic technique culture of animal cells: a manual of basic technique and specialized applications culture of animal cells: a manual of basic technique and specialized applications a brief history of novel drug discovery technologies evolving concepts in liver tissue modeling and implications for in vitro toxicology role of c-jun n-terminal protein kinase / (jnk / ) in macrophage-mediated mmp- production in response to moraxella catarrhalis lipooligosaccharide (los) the serial cultivation of human diploid cell strains assembly of human severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-like particles an integrated microfluidic device for two-dimensional combinatorial dilution evaluation of photodynamic therapy (pdt) procedures using microfluidic system immunogenicity and safety of the virus-like particle of the porcine encephalomyocarditis virus in pig synthesis of rotavirus-like particles in insect cells: comparative and quantitative analysis indian vaccine innovation: the case of shantha biotechnics microscale culture of human liver cells for drug development microfluidic d cell culture: potential application for tissue-based bioassays contribution of ebola virus glycoprotein, nucleoprotein, and vp to budding of vp virus-like particles a therapeutic vaccine for nicotine dependence: preclinical efficacy, and phase i safety and immunogenicity viral vaccines: concepts, principles, and bioprocesses circulating tumor cells: a review of present methods and the need to identify heterogeneous phenotypes apoptosis in cho cell batch cultures: examination by flow cytometry efficient assembly and release of sars coronavirus-like particles by a heterologous expression system the vp protein of rotavirus interacts with a large fraction of human naive b cells via surface immunoglobulins rift valley fever: the neurotropic adaption of virus and experimental use of this modified virus as a vaccine medicines from animal cell culture using physiologically-based pharmacokinetic-guided "body-on-a-chip" systems to predict mammalian response to drug and chemical exposure virus-like particles exhibit potential as a pan-filovirus vaccine for both ebola and marburg viral infections a novel system for evaluation of drug mixtures for potential efficacy in treating multidrug resistant cancers mers-cov virus-like particles produced in insect cells induce specific humoural and cellular imminity in rhesus macaques self-assembly of the infectious bursal disease virus capsid protein, rvp , expressed in insect cells and purification of immunogenic chimeric rvp h particles by immobilized metal-ion affinity chromatography isolation and replication of an occlusion bodydeficient mutant of the autographa californica nuclear polyhedrosis virus drop on demand in a microfluidic chip three-dimensional in vitro tumor models for cancer research and drug evaluation assembly of siv virus-like particles containing envelope proteins using a baculovirus expression system cells, tissues, and organs on chips: challenges and opportunities for the cancer tumor microenvironment microfluidic devices as tools for mimicking the in vivo environment from biopharmaceuticals to gene therapy culture of animal cells: a manual of basic techniques and specialized applications prospects for the use of animal cell cultures in screening of pharmaceutical substances microfluidic single-cell manipulation and analysis: methods and applications membrane protein of human coronavirus nl is responsible for interaction with the adhesion receptor towards single-cell lc-ms phosphoproteomics medicines from animal cell culture animal biotechnology: models in discovery and translation engineering microfluidic organoid-on-a-chip platforms cytotoxicity the degree to which an agent has specific destructive action on certain cells differentiation a change in a cell causing an increase in morphological or chemical heterogeneity immortalized changing a cell type with limited lifespan in vitro into a cell type with unlimited capacity to proliferate; sometimes achieved by animal cells in vitro or by tumor cells in vitro cell growth outside the body, in glass, as in a test tube what is the hayflick effect? . what is the source of cells for primary monolayer cell culture? serum is one of the basic components of cell culture media (true/false)? what was the first recombinant human protein? . what are the different phases of the growth curve? . is the vlp-based hpv vaccine approved by the fda? answers to short answer questions limited replication capacity of cells in culture medium lag phase, log phase, and plateau phase gardasil (the first hpv vaccine) was approved by the fda in yes/no type questions are cells obtained directly from organs and tissues in primary cell culture? is secondary culture used for studying transformed cells? is identity testing a way to determine purity of culture? is ifn-α used for the treatment of multiple sclerosis? is bevacizumab approved for the treatment of colorectal cancer? does passage effect leads to an increase in the virulence of cultured viruses? . do stem cells can not differentiate into other kinds of cells? microfluidic devices provide nutrients and oxygen for cell proliferation living cells are used in organ-on-a-chip microfluidic cell culture can embryonic cells be cultured without any feeder layer? answers to yes/no type questions yes-mechanical, chemical, or enzymatic disintegration of tissues and organs is required in primary cell culture. . yes-secondary cultures are used in the study of transformed cells as these cultures maintain their cellular characteristics no-for testing the purity, one should use fluorescent staining pcr or elisa no-ifn-β is used in the treatment of multiple sclerosis yes-it is an inhibitor of vascular endothelial growth factor no-passage effect leads to viral instability no-stem cells can differentiate into other kind of cell types yes-microfluidic devices also help in investigating characteristics of d cell culture yes-chambers of organ-on-a-chip devices are continuously infused with living cells yes-martigel from bd biosciences can be used to coat the culture plate short answer questions key: cord- - if shva authors: olum, r.; bongomin, f. title: social media platforms for health communication and research in the face of covid- pandemic: a cross sectional survey in uganda. date: - - journal: nan doi: . / . . . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: if shva objectives: ( ) to examine the usage of social media and other forms of media among medical students (ms) and healthcare professionals (hcps) in uganda. ( ) to assess the perceived usefulness of social media and other forms of media for covid- public health campaigns. design: a descriptive whatsapp messenger-based cross-sectional survey in april . setting: makerere university teaching hospitals (muth) and of the medical schools in uganda. participants: hcps at muth and ms in the medical schools in uganda. main outcome measures: we collected data on sociodemographic characteristics, sources of information on covid- , preferences of social media platform and perceived usefulness of the different media platforms for acquisition of knowledge on covid- . results: overall, response rate was . % for both ms and hcps. in total, (hcps [ , . %], ms [ , . %]) were studied. majority (n= , . %) were male with a median age of (range: - ) years. social media was a source of information for ( . %) participants. usage was similar among ms and hcps ( / ( . %) vs. / ( . %), p= . ). among the ms, commonly used social media were: whatsapp (n= , . %) facebook (n= , . %), twitter (n= , . %), instagram (n= , . ) and telegram (n= , . %). except for whatsapp, male ms we more likely to use the other social media platforms (p= < . to . ). mass media (television and radio) and social media were preferred the most useful tools for dissemination of covid- related information. conclusion: more than two-thirds of ms and hcps are routinely using social media in uganda. social media platforms may be used for dissemination of information as well as a research tool among ms and hcps. social media alongside other media platforms can also be used as sources of reliable information on covid- as well as for dissemination of research findings and guidelines. • this is the first study in sub saharan africa on the use of social media for research during the covid- pandemic. • the study also explores perceived usefulness of different media for covid- public health campaigns. • diversity of the participants consisting both healthcare professionals and medical students. • a relatively large sample size was enrolled in the survey despite a low response rate. . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. caused by a novel human coronavirus (sars-cov- ) has rapidly spread to over countries and territories globally [ ] [ ] [ ] . the on-going covid- pandemic has threatened the lives of over million people, claiming over , lives worldwide [ , ] . researchers globally are racing to identify an effective vaccine and treatment for the viral disease, in order to curb the high morbidity and mortality associated with this virus. who has recommended maintaining a social distance universally to reduce human to human transmission of covid- [ ] . as a result, there has been widespread lockdown in most countries in a bid to reduce public gatherings and rapid spread of the disease [ ] . this has affected nearly all sectors, the health sector not spared. except for covid- related studies, other biomedical researches that involve contacts with participants onsite have reduced significantly in many countries [ , ] . researchers have been advised to utilise virtual means including teleconferencing, virtual lab meetings and research seminars to maintain studies that can be conducted remotely [ ] . health campaigns aimed at increasing the awareness of the public on transmission and prevention of the virus are also being employed by various international and local organisations. mass media and social media have been frequently used to disseminate infographics on the pandemic [ ] . in this study, we explored the usage and perceived usefulness of social media and other forms of media among medical students (ms) and healthcare professionals (hcps) in uganda. we conducted an online, descriptive cross-sectional study between wednesday st april and sunday th april as part of a larger study assessing knowledge, . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . . https://doi.org/ . / . . . doi: medrxiv preprint attitude and practices towards covid among healthcare workers [ ] and medical students. a quantitative analysis approached was used. participants were derived from settings: ) medical students from of the universities in uganda offering undergraduate medical degrees with a combined population of about , students. ) health care professionals from makerere university teaching hospitals (muths), with a population size of about , - , . medical students pursuing bachelor of medicine and bachelor of surgery, bachelor of dental surgery, bachelor of nursing and bachelor of pharmacy and healthcare professionals including nurses, midwives, intern doctors, medical officers, residents and specialists at the muth. individuals aged years or older were included in the study after an informed consent was obtained. students and healthcare professionals who were too ill or were offline during the time of the study were excluded. by employing convenience-sampling method, we used whatsapp messenger (facebook inc., california, usa) for enrolling potential participants. we identified all the existing whatsapp groups of medical students in the various universities and those of healthcare professionals in the different muths. a total of about , students and healthcare professionals who were members in the several whatsapp groups were approached to participate in the study. an online data collection tool was designed and executed using google forms (via docs.google.com/forms). the google form link to the questionnaire was sent to the enrolled participants via the identified whatsapp groups. independent variables were demographic characteristics were sex, age, and sources of information on covid- and dependent variables were usage and perceived usefulness of social media. . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . . microsoft excel was used for data cleaning and coding and stata version . (statacorp, college station, tx) for analyses. numerical data was analysed using parametric or non-parametric approaches as appropriate. categorical data was summarized as frequencies and proportions and associations between independent and dependent variables were assessed using chi-square test and logistic regression. a p< . is considered statistically significant. overall, we achieved a response rate of . % ( / : / , (ms) and / (hcps)). majority of the participants were male (n= , %) and medical students (n= , %). the median age of the participants was (range: years mass media (n= , %) and social media (n= , %) were the most used sources of information. female participants were less likely to use journals and websites than male participants. medical students significantly used mass media like tv (aor: . , % ci: . - . , p=. ) but were less likely to use websites (adjusted odds ratio (aor): . , % ci: . - . , p<. ) compared to hcps to access information on covid- , table . . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . about % of medical students frequently used whatsapp followed by facebook ( %) and only % (n= ) did not frequently use any social media platform, figure . excluding whatsapp, male students were more likely to use the other social media platforms than female medical students (p-values between <. and . ). medical students ≥ years were more likely to use facebook (aor: . , % ci: . to . , p<. ) but less likely to use instagram (aor: . , % ci: . - . , p=. ), table . . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . . . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . ≥ ( ) majority of the medical students recognised television, radios and social media as the most useful tools for dissemination of information of covid- , figure . print media (billboards, banners and newspapers) was perceived as the least useful in covid- public health campaigns. is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . the purpose of the study was to assess the usage and perceived usefulness of social media and other forms of media among medical students and healthcare professionals during the covid- pandemic in uganda. the results suggest that mass media and social media were the most used sources of information for covid- among hcps and ms. among medical students, whatsapp and facebook were the most frequently used social media platforms; and they preferred mass media and social media as the most useful tools for dissemination of covid- related information. this is the first study in sub-saharan africa assessing social media usage and perceived usefulness of various media for health campaigns during covid- pandemic. covid- pandemic is currently the greatest public health concern affecting majority of countries globally. social distancing guidelines and lockdowns have also posed a challenge to public health campaigns. this therefore necessitates a shift from popular print media (newspapers, magazines, banners, etc.) to wireless media. our study suggests that common wireless media like televisions, radios and social media can be effective in improving awareness on covid- . over % of the world's population have access to internet to date [ ] . social media are the most used networking sites globally, with facebook being the most used social networking platform [ ] . social media can be used for dissemination of knowledge and clearing myths the public has on covid [ ] . however, misinformation can be equally spread by social media leading to fear, panic and anxiety among the public [ ] . infographics can be therefore be widely distributed via these platforms by verified pages and accounts of public agencies and health officials. who already has dedicated whatsapp numbers and groups in various languages to disseminate info on covid- [ ] . social media can also be used for reporting probable cases, tracing of contacts, making appointments for tests and delivery of test results to the tested clients. ministry of health uganda has dedicated contacts for the public to report any suspected case of covid- to the officials who follow up and perform tests when required [ ] . these contacts can also be accessed through whatsapp. . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. the copyright holder for this preprint this version posted may , . . through whatsapp we were able to reach out to over , medical students and health care professionals within weeks. despite physical social distancing, the society and the world at large are now largely communicating through social media. we were able to achieve a response rate of . % which is in line with a meta-analysis that reported a range of % to % [ ] . it is however lower than the average response rate in the above study ( %) and among physicians ( %) by cunningham and colleagues [ , ] . a few studies conducted using online surveys during the covid- pandemic have also reported promising responses [ , ] in addition to the covid- pandemic, sub-saharan africa has a high burden of other ongoing pandemics, notably hiv/aids and tb [ ] . a vast majority of these patients are on regular follow-ups for routine clinical care and for research purpose. clinicians and researchers can utilise the widely available social media platforms to conduct interviews and follow-ups of these patients. chronic care patients who require uninterrupted supply of medications during this lockdown can also maintain communications with their clinical care and research teams through social media platforms. however, ethical concerns that have been discussed before regarding privacy and confidentiality have to be greatly taken into consideration [ ] . privacy policies and guidelines must be developed by the research teams in conjunction with their respective institutional review boards to safeguard transfer of potentially identifying data. the study has some limitations. the relatively low response rates limit generalizability. follow up reminders were sent to the prospective participants to improve responses. in conclusion, we have been able to show that social media can be robustly used to collect research data among medical students and health care professionals with high response rates. beyond being a research tool, social media alongside other media platforms can be used as sources of reliable information on covid- as well as for dissemination of research findings and guidelines. . cc-by-nc-nd . international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review) a novel coronavirus from patients with pneumonia in china world health organization. who director-general's opening remarks at the media briefing on covid- - worldometers.info; [cited coronavirus covid- global cases by the center for systems science and engineering (csse) [cited world health organisation. coronavirus disease (covid- ) advice for the public covid- : how doctors and healthcare systems are tackling coronavirus worldwide the covid- pandemic and research shutdown: staying safe and productive social media for rapid knowledge dissemination: early experience from the covid- pandemic coronavirus disease- : knowledge, attitude, and practices of health care workers at social media update the pandemic of social media panic travels faster than the covid- outbreak world health organisation. who health alert brings covid- facts to billions via whatsapp international license it is made available under a is the author/funder, who has granted medrxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity ministry of health uganda. coronavirus (pandemic) covid- comparing response rates from web and mail surveys: a meta-analysis. field methods exploring physician specialist response rates to web-based surveys knowledge and behaviors toward covid- among us residents during the early days of the pandemic knowledge, attitudes, and practices towards covid- among chinese residents during the rapid rise period of the covid- outbreak: a quick online cross-sectional survey challenges of tackling non covid- emergencies during the unprecedent pandemic using social key: cord- - sjmf yn authors: cherak, stephana j.; rosgen, brianna k.; amarbayan, mungunzul; plotnikoff, kara; wollny, krista; stelfox, henry t.; fiest, kirsten m. title: impact of social media interventions and tools among informal caregivers of critically ill patients after patient admission to the intensive care unit: a scoping review date: - - journal: plos one doi: . /journal.pone. sha: doc_id: cord_uid: sjmf yn background: the use of social media in healthcare continues to evolve. the purpose of this scoping review was to summarize existing research on the impact of social media interventions and tools among informal caregivers of critically ill patients after patient admission to the intensive care unit (icu). methods: this review followed established scoping review methods, including an extensive a priori-defined search strategy implemented in the medline, embase, psycinfo, cinahl, and the cochrane central register of controlled trials databases to july , . primary research studies reporting on the use of social media by informal caregivers for critically ill patients were included. results: we identified unique citations and thirty-one studies met the inclusion criteria. nine were interventional trials–four randomized controlled trials (rcts)–and a majority (n = ) were conducted (i.e., data collected) between to . communication platforms (e.g., text messaging, web camera) were the most commonly used social media tool (n = ), followed by social networking sites (e.g., facebook, instagram) (n = ), and content communities (e.g., youtube, slideshare) (n = ). nine studies’ primary objective was caregiver satisfaction, followed by self-care (n = ), and health literacy (n = ). nearly every study reported an outcome on usage feasibility (e.g., user attitudes, preferences, demographics) (n = ), and twenty-three studies reported an outcome related to patient and caregiver satisfaction. among the studies that assessed statistical significance (n = ), reported statistically significant positive effects of social media use. overall, of the studies reported positive conclusions (e.g., increased knowledge, satisfaction, involvement) regarding the use of social media among informal caregivers for critically ill patients. conclusions: social media has potential benefits for caregivers of the critically ill. more robust and clinically relevant studies are required to identify effective social media strategies used among caregivers for the critically ill. introduction social media is defined as "websites and applications that enable users to create and share content or to participate in social networking" [ ] . social media tools are platforms and communities, such as facebook or skype, that facilitate quick communication and enable interaction among several users at any given time [ ] . social media participation in older age groups is steadily increasing [ ] , contributing to over . billion active users worldwide [ ] . in considering the various user-generated content and social networking platforms, the role of social media conveys different meanings between users and non-users, age groups (e.g., millennials), and demographic populations. since technological change is associated with linguistic and cultural changes, the role of social media is constantly in flux [ ] . the use of social media in healthcare for increasing speed of communication, distributing accurate information, and promoting knowledge of support, treatments and self-care options is becoming more widespread [ , ] . patient-and family-centered healthcare, which acknowledges that patients and their informal caregivers are central figures in decision-making and delivery of care [ ] , recognizes that patients and caregivers exist within an online social structure and network of relationships [ ] . social media tools, such as real-time communication platforms, educational material, and self-management guides, are now more commonly incorporated in the decision-making process to aid caregivers with making informed decisions regarding their loved one's care [ ] . critically ill patients are often unable to communicate their care preferences (e.g., due to mechanical ventilation, coma, etc.) including those that are in line with their individual values and goals [ ] . in these situations, critically ill patients rely on their informal caregivers to learn about their diagnosis and treatment options, and to make important decisions on their behalf [ ] -these situations can be stressful and distressing for an informal caregiver [ ] . family-centered interventions may improve caregiver's comprehension, satisfaction, and long-term psychological outcomes during and after a family member's critical illness [ , ] . social media tools as family-centered interventions might allow for personalization, presentation, and participation of informal caregivers in their loved one's care, engaging them in the decision-making process and promoting better patient and informal caregiver outcomes [ , ] . despite their potential value, it is unclear whether social media tools can be meaningfully and systematically deployed in critical care medicine [ ] . we therefore asked the question: what is the extent, range, and nature of research evidence on the impact of social media interventions and tools among informal caregivers of critically ill patients? this scoping review was conducted and reported as per the arksey-o'malley -stage scoping review method [ ] . the approach for this review followed the scoping review methods manual by the joanna briggs institute [ ] . the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analysis protocols (prisma-p) guideline was used to develop the protocol [ ] (s table) . we adhered to the prisma-scr extension for scoping reviews [ ] to report findings. inclusion criteria were as follows: ( ) primary quantitative or qualitative research; ( ) reporting on social media use with at least one informal caregiver as an end-user; ( ) conducted with informal caregivers of critically ill patients of any age group; and ( ) in any language or publication year. studies were excluded if they were not primary research (e.g., reviews or editorials), did not report on caregiver use of social media, or were not conducted in a critical care population. for the purposes of this review, we defined: ( ) a caregiver as any informal (i.e., non-clinical) person who regularly provides support to the patient and is in some way directly implicated in the patient's care or directly affected by the patient's health problem (e.g., family, friend); ( ) social media as any form of electronic communication that allow users to share information and other content and create online communities; and ( ) critically ill patients as any persons who are currently admitted to an intensive care unit (icu) or had previously been admitted to an icu. studies were excluded if only abstracts were available. comprehensive literature searches were conducted in medline, embase, psycinfo, cinahl, and the cochrane central register of controlled trials. the search strategies for each database were developed with a medical librarian (dll) and were revised after reviewing preliminary search results. the search strategies combined synonyms and subject headings from three concepts: ) caregivers; ) critical care; and ) social media. a search of the cochrane database of systematic reviews was undertaken to identify review articles related to the research question and their reference lists were screened to identify potential studies missed in the search. all databases were searched from inception to july , . reference lists of included papers were reviewed to identify potential studies missed in the search. no language or date limits were applied. the complete medline search strategy is shown in s table. after a subset of the team (sc, ma) achieved % agreement on a pilot-test of random studies, all titles and abstracts were reviewed independently in duplicate by two reviewers (sc, ma). any study selected by either reviewer at this stage progressed to the next stage. the fulltext of all articles was reviewed independently in duplicate by two reviewers (sc, ma); articles selected by both reviewers at this stage were included in the final review. disagreements were resolved by discussion or the involvement of a third reviewer (br) when necessary. references were managed in endnote x (clarivate analytics, philadelphia, pa, usa). two reviewers (sc, kp) abstracted data independently and in duplicate for each included study using a data collection sheet developed and piloted by the review team. discrepancies were resolved through discussion with a third reviewer (ma). information on document characteristics (e.g., year of publication, geographic location), study characteristics (e.g., setting), caregiver group (e.g., spouses, parents, family caregivers), social media tool used (e.g., communication platform, content community, social networking site, blog or microblog), objectives and outcome measures of social media use, statistical significance, and authors' conclusions were collected. studies that examined social media as one component of a complex intervention were noted as such. findings were synthesized descriptively to map different areas of the literature as outlined in the research question. using a social media framework described in previous research [ ] , we categorized social media tools into five categories: collaborative projects (e.g., endnote, slack), blogs or microblogs (e.g., wordpress, twitter), content communities (e.g., youtube, slide-share), social networking sites (e.g., facebook, instagram), and real-time communication platforms (e.g., text messaging, web camera, facetime) (s table) . study objectives and outcomes were classified according to an adaptation from those outlined in coulter and ellins [ ] proposed framework for strategies to inform, educate and involve patients (s table) . the main objective from each study was categorized into one of five categories: to improve health literacy, clinical decision making, self-care, patient safety or other. outcomes reported in each study were classified as patient and caregiver knowledge, patient and caregiver experience, use of services and cost, health behaviors and health status, and usage feasibility. studies that reported statistically significant outcomes determined by p< . related to the main objective of the study were classified as "statistically significant." studies that reported outcomes that were not statistically significant were classified as "not statistically significant," and if a study did not assess significance through statistical equations that study was classified as "not assessed." descriptive statistics were calculated using stata ic (statacorp. stata statistical software: release . college station, tx: statacorp llc). we screened unique abstracts and reviewed full-text articles; full-text articles were excluded, the most common reasons being that the study did not report original research (n = / ) or that the study did not report on social media use (n = / ) (fig ) . hand searching resulted in the inclusion of seven additional studies. there was % agreement on title and abstract screening and % agreement on full-text screening. the included studies were published between and and primarily conducted in north america (n = , %) or europe (n = , %), and with neonatal or pediatric critical care populations (n = , %) ( table ). fig a depicts the different icu types from the included studies. the median start date was (range: - ) and the median duration was months (range: - months). many studies (n = , %) were interventional studies [ , , , , , , , , ] of which most were conducted in neonatal icus ( / ). we included six qualitative studies and most ( / ) were conducted with neonatal or pediatric critical care populations. caregivers were most commonly parents (n = , %) [ , , , - , - , - , , ] and unspecified family caregivers more broadly-which could include parents, but the term was more broadly defined (n = , %) [ , , , , , , ] . one study was specific to mothers [ ] and one study was specific to fathers [ ] . few studies reported additional perspectives from members of the clinical care team (e.g., nurses, primary care physicians) (n = , %) [ , , ] or critical care patients (n = , %) [ , , ] . more than half of the studies examined real-time communication platforms (e.g., face-time, skype) (n = , %) [ , , , - , , , ] , which accounted for many of the studies conducted with adult populations ( / , %) and most of the studies conducted with neonatal or pediatric populations ( / , %). included studies were categorized by the type of social media tool used (s table) . fig b depicts the different specific social media tools from the included studies. real-time communication platforms, that allowed user communication with messages, voice, and/or video, were the most common social media tool used (n = , %), followed by social networking sites (n = , %) and content communities (n = , %). few studies (n = , %) assessed the use of blog or microblogs and only two studies examined social media use in general. overall, most social media tools included functions that operated like communication platforms, such that they provided the option for users to post and share experiences. many studies (n = , %) included a social media tool as part of a complex intervention, and most of these studies (n = / ) used mobile phones to facilitate the social media component. all of these studies (n = / ) reported that the ubiquitous nature and technical capacity of mobile phones were strong motivating factors. several of these studies (n = / ) addressed potential misuse of information and privacy concerns over text messaging by an established mobile phone dedicated to the study, and provided recommendations to the clinical care team (i.e., nurses, physicians) for text messaging with informal caregivers. the most common intended use of social media was for caregiver satisfaction (n = , %). most studies that examined caregiver satisfaction used communication platforms (n = / ). social networking sites were often used to improve self-care (n = / , %), and content communities were mainly intended to improve patient safety (n = / , %). there were few studies that addressed clinical decision making (n = , %) and half (n = / ) used content communities. five studies ( %) did not fit the framework, and were classified as "other"; three of these studies reported the prevalence of social networking use (n = ) or of internet use more broadly (n = ), and two compared mothers and fathers use of information and communication technology (n = ) or frequency and length of webcam viewing (n = ). usage feasibility and patient and caregiver experience outcomes were most commonly reported (n = and n = , respectively) ( table ). patient and caregiver knowledge outcomes were reported in studies ( %), and use of services and cost outcomes, and health behaviors and health status outcomes were reported in eight studies each. among outcomes related to usage feasibility (n = ), measures of usage and demographics were most common (n = , %) and were often accompanied by measures of users' attitudes and preferences (n = , %). measures of patient or caregiver satisfaction or of clinician-patient/caregiver communication were most commonly reported for outcomes related to patient and caregiver experience (n = and n = , respectively). fig a provides a summary of outcomes as they relate to the study objectives. there were no defining trends between outcomes with regard to objectives for social media use, but measures related to the use of services and cost, or to health behaviors and health status, were generally least reported among any objective. one study reported outcomes related to potential for unintended consequences or harm from social media tools [ ]. reported at least one outcome related to social media use by an informal (i.e., non-clinical) caregiver; adult patient defined as > years. reporting prevalence of internet use among critically ill septic patients and caregivers. comparing mothers' and fathers' use of information and communication technology. comparing mothers' and fathers' frequency and length of viewing their hospitalized neonate via webcam. reporting prevalence of social networking site use among parents of preterm infants. determining parents perception and preferences for information sharing in the neonatal intensive care unit. https://doi.org/ . /journal.pone. .t social media use among caregivers of critically ill patients: a scoping review a). studies that collected data during and/or after reported only positive, negative or indeterminate effects of social media use. majority of studies with a sample size > reported a negative effect, and majority of studies with a sample size - or < reported a positive effect (fig b) . prospective observational studies commonly reported a neutral effect and the majority of prospective intervention studies reported a positive effect (fig c) . among the studies that assessed statistical significance, the majority determined that social media use had a positive effect (fig d) . the most common type of study design was interventional (n = , %)-of which were controlled by randomization (i.e., rcts)-followed by prospective cohort (n = , %) and qualitative (n = , %). of the quantitative studies (n = , %), majority assessed statistical significance (n = / ) and majority determined there was a significantly positive effect of social media use (n = / ). among the randomized interventions (n = ), two found a significantly positive effect, one found a significantly negative effect and one did not assess statistical significance. fig b provides a summary of authors' conclusions of social media use with regard to study objectives. the majority of studies with the objectives of improving health literacy, self-care, patient safety or caregiver satisfaction, reported a statistically significant positive effect. among the four studies that aimed to improve clinical decision making, one study social media use among caregivers of critically ill patients: a scoping review reported a positive effect but did not assess statistical significance, and three studies reported a negative effect but only two assessed significance. we used scoping review methodology to synthesize the literature on the extent, range, and nature of research evidence on the impact of social media interventions and tools among informal caregivers of critically ill patients. there is a growing body of literature, primarily from neonatal or pediatric populations, suggesting that real-time communication platforms are now social media use among caregivers of critically ill patients: a scoping review commonly used social media tools among informal caregivers of critically ill patients. in contrast, there is very little literature regarding caregiver use of social networking sites, blogs, or content communities. the most common intended use for social media was to improve caregiver satisfaction with the experience and role of an informal caregiver of a critically ill patient. outcomes related to usage feasibility, such as measures of user's attitudes, preferences, and demographics, were nearly always reported. few studies assessed cost-effectiveness of using social media tools with informal caregivers, and outcomes related to health behaviors and health status of either the patient or caregiver were reported infrequently. although most studies concluded that the use of social media among informal caregivers is beneficial and meaningful, the potential for unintended consequences or harm specific to informal caregivers were not adequately explored. the low reliability and high variability of content shared on social media highlights the importance of control from medical personnel to avoid the spread of "fake news" [ ] . the emerging utilization of social media tools among informal caregivers for critically ill patients have practical implications for critical care medicine. modern mobile phones are powerful computational devices. the technical capacity of mobile phones to facilitate phone-based health interventions was a motivating factor for several included studies. mobile phones are also omnipresent and nearly always at hand [ ] , which makes it possible to increase the number of points of care to virtually any place and time [ ] . the combination of the technical capacity, personal nature, and convenient proximity of mobile phones has reduced barriers to adoption and increased acceptance of phonebased health interventions in numerous healthcare settings [ ] . the immediacy of access of conclusions on social media use with regard to patient and caregiver focused objectives , , . adapted from coulter and ellins, ; only the main study objective was recorded from a single study; more than one outcome category could be recorded from a single study; only one overall conclusion was recorded from each study. frequency indicated by color: red, very frequent; yellow, moderately frequent; green, infrequent. n, number of studies. https://doi.org/ . /journal.pone. .g mobile phones might also be useful to informal caregivers after patient discharge by providing prompt advice and support, which may reduce healthcare costs by preventing hospital or icu readmission. mobile phones in healthcare settings also have disadvantages. with regard to nursing, disruption of workflow, interruption of practice, and improper usage have been reported [ ] . for example, in the study conducted by piscotty and colleagues [ ] , % of nurses checked their mobile phone more than times per shift and % checked their mobile phone more than times per shift. further, possibility of misuse of information that may violate patient privacy remains an unresolved problem [ ] . nursing organizations have responded with guidelines on professional social media use in the workplace [ ] [ ] [ ] . many included studies addressed potential privacy issues by an established mobile phone dedicated to the study, and recommended to refrain from using patient last names and conditions, to keep communications brief, and to destroy caregiver phone numbers after patient discharge [ ] . that mobile phones may be useful to facilitate social media interventions in critical care medicine is a noteworthy finding of this review, but further research is needed on how social media strategies can be implemented into practice without violating privacy or ethical considerations. support and encouragement can contribute to caregiver confidence, which can promote better understanding of a stressful illness-related situation and enable the caregiver to provide better care [ ] . many included studies found that caregivers reported a more satisfactory critical care experience and increased knowledge of a patient's condition and long-term treatment options when provided with links to online resources with credible information. in the last decade, several members of the united states critical care societies collaborative have started using social media [ ] . the society of critical care medicine is one member, which uses web-based education initiatives to provide accurate and reliable information to educate their members and the public [ ] . as well, the world federation of societies of intensive and critical care medicine also recognized that social media plays a large role in achieving more and better involvement with other member societies, and actively uses social media to liaise with important groups, such as young clinicians [ ] . considering the differences in how critical care societies use diverse approaches to deliver overlapping educational content can provide a rich opportunity to inform development of future web-based education initiatives, targeted specifically at informal caregivers. real-time communication platforms have been studied and implemented in many healthcare settings [ , ] . several included studies found that in neonatal icu populations, parents who were communicating with the clinical care team using videoconferencing instruments (e.g., facetime, skype) felt significantly more satisfied with their infants' care when they were unable to be physically present. no study conducted in adult icu populations used a social media tool dedicated entirely to videoconferencing, although most social media tools included functions which operated similar to communication platforms. further, no included study from any icu reported the use of communication platforms to engage non-local family members or young children who may benefit from remote communication with their loved one. since many communication platforms are free to download on most electronic devices and allow for multiple users at once, an important area for future research is the use of communication platforms by entire support groups of both adult and non-adult critical care patients. this type of research is warranted to determine if positive outcomes of communication platforms depend on whether the caregivers' relationship to the patient is parent-child (i.e., parent providing support to children) versus child-parent (i.e., children providing support to parents). it is important to recognize that social media tools are exactly that-tools-rather than a substitute for personal interaction with healthcare providers. recent studies in other healthcare settings have found that patients' value in-person interaction with healthcare providers more than social media communication, and that healthcare providers are regarded as the most important source of information [ ] . knowledge on the values and preferences of the clinical care team, however, is lacking, and a common concern of many clinicians is that information shared on social media may not always be accurate. more understanding on physician preferences and social media accuracy is important as physicians often rely on patients' informal caregivers to make decisions regarding the patient's care, which frequently contributes to caregiver psychological morbidity [ ] . individualized social media interventions adapted to caregiver preferences may improve caregiver's satisfaction and psychological morbidity [ ] . more research on accurate, proper and potential use of social media in critical care medicine is required before implementation into daily practice. our review indicates there is untapped potential for social media interventions and tools to provide personalized support to informal caregivers of the critically ill. we recommend future inquiry on this topic examine mental health interventions using social media to determine the effect of social media mental health interventions on psychological outcomes of informal caregivers of the critically ill. this information is particularly relevant to challenges related to restricted visitation and social isolation associated with the covid- pandemic [ ] . the large numbers of patients experiencing critical illness and visiting restrictions enacted to prevent the spread of covid- complicate participation of informal caregivers in patient care and recovery [ ] . these factors are likely to make mental health consequences of critical illness on informal caregivers more prevalent and severe [ , ] . social media interventions and tools may be an effective mode of mental health support for informal caregivers of critically ill patients. this scoping review has several strengths. we conducted an extensive literature search and screened reference lists of included studies in order to identify the full breadth of available literature on social media use in critical care populations. the search was executed in five bibliographic databases and was not restricted by language or dates. it was intentionally broad to ensure that social media use across all critical care populations were included. we followed rigorous methodology defined by adherence to recommended protocols and reporting criteria for scoping reviews. further, the interdisciplinary team of a critical care physician, a critical care nurse, and a psychiatric epidemiologist, offered complementary expertise and knowledge. in spite of these strengths, there are limitations to note. we did not search the grey literature nor did we search social media itself, and could have missed studies, though our search strategy was comprehensive and full-text hand searching was completed. as well, the lack of a universal definition for social media, since social media is a relatively new concept that is continually transforming, added complexity to the process of study selection. however, our broad inclusion of study design allowed us to produce a comprehensive summary of the state of the literature on social media use by informal caregivers in critical care medicine. ultimately, the relatively rapid evolution of social media means studies on usage will nearly exclusively reflect social media use of the past. though such studies are valuable, it is important to note that the medium of social media is evolving faster than it is being studied. there is a growing evidence base to support the use of social media among informal caregivers of critically ill patients. there is untapped potential for social media tools to provide personalized support to informal caregivers. social media tools might enable informal caregivers to gain the knowledge that they need in order to feel empowered, involved, and satisfied. social media users should exercise caution on applications and networking sites so as not to compromise patient privacy. in sum, social media represents a flexible medium to deliver health information, and the individualized support that caregivers can obtain through using social media may promote an invaluable collaborative relationship when caring for critically ill patients. supporting information s social media.: oxford dictionary social media in critical care social media-statistics & facts ranked by numbers of active users (in millions). statista social media usage: - . pew research ceter users of the world, unite! the challenges and opportunities of social media neurology and the internet: a review patient and family members' perceptions of family participation in care on acute care wards a new dimension of health care: systematic review of the uses, benefits, and limitations of social media for health communication social media and health care professionals: benefits, risks, and best practices a comparison of the opinions of intensive care unit staff and family members of the treatment intensity received by patients admitted to an intensive care unit: a multicentre survey a randomized trial of a family-support intervention in intensive care units association of surrogate decision-making interventions for critically ill adults with patient, family, and resource use outcomes: a systematic review and meta-analysis translating evidence to patient care through caregivers: a systematic review of caregiver-mediated interventions social media engagement and the critical care medicine community evaluation of mobile apps targeted to parents of infants in the neonatal intensive care unit: systematic app review. jmir mhealth and uhealth scoping the field: services for carers of people with mental health problems the joanna briggs institute best practice information sheet: the effectiveness of pelvic floor muscle exercises on urinary incontinence in women following childbirth preferred reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis protocols (prisma-p) statement prisma extension for scoping reviews (prisma-scr): checklist and explanation effectiveness of strategies for informing, educating, and involving patients reducing pressure ulcers in patients with prolonged acute mechanical ventilation: a quasi-experimental study. diminuicao das ulceras por pressao em pacientes com ventilacao mecanica aguda prolongada: um estudo quasi-experimental a pilot study of audiovisual family meetings in the intensive care unit prioritizing information topics for relatives of critically ill patients: cross-sectional survey among intensive care unit relatives and professionals reanet", the internet utilization among surrogates of critically ill patients with sepsis. plos one a qualitative study of factors that influence active family involvement with patient care in the icu: survey of critical care nurses a family information brochure and dedicated website to improve the icu experience for patients' relatives: an italian multicenter before-and-after study. intensive care medicine american journal of critical care: an official publication, american association of critical-care nurses effects of a social media website on primary care givers' awareness of music therapy services in a neonatal intensive care unit. the arts in psychotherapy testing the feasibility of skype and facetime updates with parents in the neonatal intensive care unit. american journal of critical care: an official publication, american association of critical-care nurses smartphones and text messaging are associated with higher parent quality of life scores and enrollment in early intervention after nicu discharge a randomized controlled study about the use of ehealth in the home health care of premature infants the use of short message services (sms) to provide medical updating to parents in the nicu web camera use in the neonatal intensive care unit: impact on nursing workflow diabetes self-management care via cell phone: a systematic review patient adherence and accuracy using electronic diaries during remote patient monitoring in type and type diabetes can the ubiquitous power of mobile phones be used to improve health outcomes in developing countries? global health to tweet or not to tweet? nurses, social media, and patient care impact of healthcare information technology on nursing practice mobile phone messaging reminders for attendance at healthcare appointments social media guidelines for nurses registered nurses' association of ontario available from: categorization of objectives and outcomes master's programs in advanced nursing practice: new strategies to enhance course design for subspecialty training in neonatology and pediatrics guidelines for using electronic and social media: the regulatory perspective the effectiveness of mi smart: a nurse practitioner led technology intervention for multiple chronic conditions in primary care patient safety and quality: an evidence-based handbook for nurses. advances in patient safety lessons learned from web-and social media-based educational initiatives by pulmonary the world federation of societies of intensive and critical care medicine newsletter online, social media and mobile technologies for psychosis treatment: a systematic review on novel user-led interventions methods of using real-time social media technologies for detection and remote monitoring of hiv outcomes social media use in healthcare: a systematic review of effects on patients and on their relationship with healthcare professionals retiring the term futility in value-laden decisions regarding potentially inappropriate medical treatment ethical dilemmas due to the covid- pandemic bereavement support on the frontline of covid- : recommendations for hospital clinicians rehabilitation after critical illness in people with covid- infection intensive care management of coronavirus disease (covid- ): challenges and recommendations we thank dr. diane lorenzetti (university of calgary) for the development of the search strategies. key: cord- -rzqlmgb authors: marin, lavinia title: three contextual dimensions of information on social media: lessons learned from the covid- infodemic date: - - journal: ethics inf technol doi: . /s - - - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: rzqlmgb the covid- pandemic has been accompanied on social media by an explosion of information disorders such as inaccurate, misleading and irrelevant information. countermeasures adopted thus far to curb these informational disorders have had limited success because these did not account for the diversity of informational contexts on social media, focusing instead almost exclusively on curating the factual content of user’s posts. however, content-focused measures do not address the primary causes of the infodemic itself, namely the user’s need to post content as a way of making sense of the situation and for gathering reactions of consensus from friends. this paper describes three types of informational context—weak epistemic, strong normative and strong emotional—which have not yet been taken into account by current measures to curb down the informational disorders. i show how these contexts are related to the infodemic and i propose measures for dealing with them for future global crisis situations. from the beginning, the pandemic was reflected in the online realm of social media by a flood of redundant information (the so-called infodemic) out of which a significant percentage was made up of misinformation and disinformation (mdi). mdi is used here as one umbrella term for two distinct phenomena: misinformation, which is usually defined as false information shared without knowledge that it is false, while disinformation is fabricated information distributed with the clear intention to mislead (fallis , p. ) . however, on social media, these distinctions are hard to maintain sharply, since we cannot always know who created a piece of misleading information and with what purpose. the infodemic is understood as "an overabundance of information-some accurate and some not-that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it" (world health organization ). this concept is similar with that of information pollution which was defined as "irrelevant, redundant, unsolicited and low-value information" (wardle and derakhshan , p. ) but applied to a crisis situation when an infodemic can become dangerous (tangcharoensathien et al. , p. ) . already since february , the world health organization had singled the infodemic as an emerging problem in the context of the covid- pandemic. one of the most problematic aspects of an infodemic is that it creates information overload which leads to information fatigue for online users: the user's capacity for paying attention to information is limited and tends to exhaust quickly. studies in the psychology of social media have shown that, under conditions of informational overload, users will revert to using mental shortcuts or heuristics for assessing new information. by employing cognitive heuristics, social media users tend to rely on their friends and their endorsements in selecting what information to trust or engage with (koroleva et al. , p. ) . taking these mental shortcuts occurs "in conditions of low motivation and limited ability to process the incoming information" (koroleva et al. , p. ) which is arguably the case when dealing with information overload. trying to save their mental energy, users will tend to delegate their critical engagement to their social network, trusting their peers, or to become disengaged from so many news and revert to apathy. both strategies are dangerous because social media users are also citizens who are instrumental in the efforts to curb down the pandemic. if citizens do not correctly understand what they have to do in a pandemic situation, then governmental measures will be ineffective. online information about the covid- pandemic posted on social media displayed two seemingly distinct problems: the rapid propagation of misinformation and disinformation (mdi) and the so-called infodemic. both problems concerned how information travels in an online social networking medium, but only one of them was tackled with some degree of efficiency. social media platforms rapidly stepped up their pre-existing measures of dealing with mdi and targeted specifically the covid- related misleading information, whereas the infodemic remained untouched (howard ) . the infodemic was seen as a side-effect of the intensification of user interactions on social media, some informational noise that accompanied the humming of online communications. in this article, i will argue that both informational problems are related with and symptomatic of a deeper problem embedded in social media: the contextual design of the user's interactions with information. while we certainly need to pay attention to the quality of informational content (floridi and illari ) distributed on social media, similar attention should be paid to the quality of the user's interaction with the informational context. measures focusing solely on the factual content of information distributed online risk ignoring a significant aspect of social media, its particular context of engaging with information. the paper is structured as follows: first, i briefly review the measures taken by social media platforms to deal with the covid- related mdi, classifying them in view of the content or context focus. secondly, i describe three dimensions of the informational context on social media which made mdi particularly difficult to deal with during the pandemic and, by extension, aggravated the infodemic. finally, drawing from the contextual approach to information, i propose some measures to tackle informational disorders online for future similar global crisis situations. mdi related to covid- was tackled visibly by most mainstream social media platforms. this was possible because there were already some methods in place for dealing with mdi. starting with the elections and the cambridge analytica scandal, social media platforms began paying attention to the mdi shared by their users. in recent years, social media platforms have been testing methods of content curating by using external fact-checking organisations, flagging the misinforming content, and sometimes removing it (howard ) . in the wake of the covid- pandemic, these efforts for fact-checking were accelerated to an impressive extent: "the number of english-language fact-checks rose more than % from january to march" (brennen et al. ). this concentration of effort from disparate organisations was motivated by the emergency of the situation but also by the topic of covid- which rendered itself easier to fact-check: it was more or less clear what was false content and what not-as opposed to previous cases of political mdi (brennen et al. ) . table below summarises the main measures taken by social media platforms for dealing with mdi during the pandemic. most approaches listed in the previous table were primarily content-focused as they were targeting the factual or descriptive content of the information, by checking it against existing evidence and reducing its visibility. however, the context of mdi is just as important as its content (wardle and derakhshan ) . contextual mdi may appear when placing genuine information in a fabricated setting, for example, a private statement cited as if it were a public one, a personal opinion as to represent the views of an organisation, mixing facts with irrelevant comments, or changing the date or place where a photo was taken. a large extent of covid- related mdi shared on social media was contextual or, as some have put it, reconfigured: "most ( %) of the misinformation in our sample involves various forms of reconfiguration, where existing and often true information is spun, twisted, recontextualised, or reworked. less misinformation ( %) was completely fabricated" (brennen et al. ) . even those measures which combined content with context awareness (such as numbers , , and in the table ), the content was the primary focus. these measures relied on someone checking first what information was good enough and then proposing some contextual measures. content-focused approaches are not misguided, but tend to give most of the agency to the social media platform, while the users are left with a passive role, to click and react to what they are shown. meanwhile, when a measure is both content and context focused, the user's agency starts to play a significant role. no matter how many alternative sources of information one is exposed to (as it is the case with measures , , in the table ) , the user has still the final choice to engage with them or not. by contrast, a context-focused approach would presuppose that the user has the freedom to use the social media platform in a way that stimulates and recognises other kinds of engagement with information, regardless whether the information at hand is genuine or mdi. a context-focused approach creates informational environments which accommodate the possibility that the users may engage differently with and interpret differently the same information. this approach would aim to stimulate the users in becoming more sensitive to the modes in which the information is presented to them, educating them in the long run. this notion of context-sensitivity was inspired by similar constructs encountered in human-computer interaction studies such as "contextual design" (wixon et al. ) and "context-aware computing" (schilit et al. (schilit et al. - . context sensitivity in design starts from the idea that the user's perspective is not that predictable, and that there is not one single context of use, accepting that users make sense of an interface in various ways, hence proposing that the designer accommodates for multiple meanings and complex interactions right from the start. in the long run, a contextual approach can educate the users without trying to change their beliefs or attitudes about the informational content as such. the contextual information approach is inspired by value sensitive design (friedman ; van den hoven ) which is complemented by paying attention to three particular dimensions of informational context on social media, described in the next section. the strong emotional context before the pandemic, it was already shown that mdi propagates on social media platforms by playing on the emotional reactions of the online audience (zollo et al. ; khaldarova and pantti ) , aiming to deliberately stir powerful emotions in their readers. some researchers called this feature of mdi a form of "empathic optimisation" (bakir and mcstay , p. ) . emotional manipulation in news items (especially click-bait) is an efficient way of capturing user's attention since emotion-stirring news are usually more interacted with than the neutral ones (bakir and mcstay , p. ) . it may seem that only mdi is emotionally loaded, whereas genuine news sound more sober and neutral. but this would be a misleading view of how information travels on social media platforms. emotional reactions do not belong to misleading information alone, rather these are a normal side-effect of the emotional infrastructure already embedded in most social media platforms. users of social media platforms are allowed a palette of actions and reactions: some are seemingly neutral (commenting, sharing and posting) while others have a clear emotional valence: liking and using other emoticons to endorse or dislike a post. these emotionally charged reactions are easier to perform than the neutral ones: it takes a split second to click like on a post, but some more time to comment on fig. ). the assumption was that now, more than ever, users needed to express emotions online with a richer palette. however the simplistic way of expressing such emotions did not change, it was part of the interaction design from the beginning. the emotional infrastructure of social media was not something requested by users but designed from the start. major social media platforms are oriented towards maximising the user's engagement, i.e. how much time one spends on a specific platform and how much attention is consumed (whiting and williams ) . these kinds of interactions actively promote the user's "attention bulimia" i.e. a behaviour oriented towards "maximizing the number of likes" (del vicario et al. , p. ) and presumably other positive reactions. most buttons for emotional reactions are of positive emotions (like, love, hug, laugh) while in recent years facebook added some more nuanced emotions such as angry, sad or cry. but the overwhelming effect of these emotional reactions is to make other users feel liked by their social network hence, to make the platform a place where one wants to keep returning to for emotional gratification. for many users confined to their homes by the pandemic, social media platforms became a window to the world, as the television set used to be in older days and the easiest way of relating to others. in such times of distress and uncertainty, users posted more frequently than usual (cinelli et al. ) but some of the information posted was not meant to inform others, but rather to express one's concerns and emotions related to the pandemic. posts were also meant to get reactions from one's friends in an attempt to confirm that the others were also feeling the same way as one does. posting about the pandemic became a strategic way of gauging other's emotions on the crisis situation and gathering some feeling of consensus from one's social network. the consensus sought on social media was of an emotional nature which may be at odds with an epistemic consensus about the nature of the facts at hand. during the pandemic, several epistemologists and philosophers of science stepped up and tried to educate the general public on what sources to trust as experts and how to discern facts from fiction about the pandemic-in podcasts, opinion pieces and on their social media accounts (weinberg ) . while this effort is laudable, it needs to be complemented with another approach, taking into account the wider epistemic context in which information travels on social media. this is a particularly weak epistemic context in which information is not always shared to inform. social media platforms are not places where one usually goes to be informed. at least in regular, day to day situations, users turn to social media platforms to relate, to communicate and to be entertained (fuchs ) . the weak epistemic context of social media is ruled by serendipity (reviglio ) , meaning that many users get to be informed by accident. in a crisis situation, users tend to change how they use the platform and shifting towards the communication of vital information such as imminent risks or their location and also seeking to be informed by latest developments from people from the local site of the disaster. the entertainment function tends to become secondary in emergencies (zeng et al. ). in the pandemic situation, the difference was that the crisis was global and that the duration was rather long. this time, the uncertainty that accompanies a crisis situation was extended over months. as epistemic agents, online users tried to make sense of what was going on with them, what they could expect and to assess the personal risks, over a longer period. the pandemic was an extended crisis situation compounded with social alienation on top. this made users feel lost and overwhelmed by problems one could not understand. hence the desire-legitimate to a point-for everyone to be an expert so that they could at least understand what was happening to them. people did not want to be experts in epidemiology, quarantine measures, and home remedies for viruses because of a sudden surge of intellectual curiosity. they needed a way of coping that was also understandable to them. meanwhile, the official discourse of "trust the experts" and "please don't share information you do not understand" incapacitated them as epistemic agents. requiring users to do nothing and just comply went against the general desire to do something, as a way to take control. given the increase in posts on the pandemic by regular users, it may seem that many have tried to become experts overnight in epidemiology, viruses and vaccines. the comic below (fig. ) illustrates the frequent situation emerging during the pandemic of members of the lay public hijacking the role of the expert. a discussion on conditions of trust and expertise makes sense in a regular epistemic context when agents try to acquire knowledge about a domain they know nothing about, having to choose which experts to trust (goldman and o'connor ) . however, acquiring knowledge was probably not the main goal of social media users who started posting scientific information which they did not understand. rather, many users tried to build some understanding of the situation, to make sense of the events. in these cases, shared understanding in a circle or network of friends seemed to be more important for users than gaining access to expertise. the scientific information was posted by lay users to back one's personal opinions, to urge for a certain course of action, or to gather consensus. given these weak epistemic uses of information targeted at emotional fulfilment and networking purposes, the regular content-focused measures would probably be less effective than predicted on such users. related to the previous point and stemming from it, most factual information shared around on social media had some normative implications which often shadowed any knowledge claim. descriptive information was used for prescriptive or evaluative aims. scientific expertise was co-opted strategically to enforce one's own pre-existing evaluative opinions. typical mdi claims are not merely descriptive claims of a state of affairs in the world, but often embedded in a normative context be those prescriptive or evaluative claims, both types are meant to change attitudes of the online users. mdi was shared because it prescribed actions or led to evaluations of the state of affairs which users already agreed with. hence debunking the facts would have solved only half of the puzzle, since the user's motivation to believe these normative claims would have not been dealt with. one example of the strong normative context for mdi, also involving a clear "politicisation" of mdi during the pandemic (howard ) , concerns one of the most popular types of claims analysed by eu vs disinfo ( ) in which the eu was depicted as powerless and scattered in dealing with the pandemic. this claim was traced back to russianbacked agencies which aimed to make users believe that, ultimately, russia was stronger than the eu (howard ). such claims can be debunked by showing that there were fig. everyone is an expert. image source: https ://xkcd.com/ / coordinated measures taken by the eu, however, the implicit claim that other states dealt better with the pandemic than the eu is hard to debunk since it is not explicitly stated. this is just one type of difficulty with mdi which cannot be tackled with a content-focused approach: implicit evaluative claims in which one term of the comparison is not named. some evaluative claims can be checked (if these involve relational predicates which are measurable such as "better than" or "more efficient than") however others, incidentally the politicised evaluative claims, are harder to assess. in russian-backed claims against the eu, the name of "russia" is not mentioned anywhere in the text of the "news", since the aim is to erode the trust in eu from its citizens. if these citizens happen to be in eastern europe, this erosion of trust could lead to an anti-eu generalised feeling, and ultimately bottom-up pressures to exit the eu. these kinds of campaigns cannot be easily fact-checked since the effect is achieved by playing the long game. what looks like news about the pandemic is a dog-whistle about something else. the strong normative context is visible also when using scientific expertise co-opted to back up prescriptive claims otherwise untenable. one example is an unpublished paper by blocken et al. titled "towards aerodynamically equivalent covid . m social distancing for walking and running" ( ) in which an animated image showed a simulation of how joggers coughing will spread particles of droplets when running at a distance of . m from each other. the paper became viral on social media despite not being peerreviewed nor published on a pre-print website. the visual animation showing the spread of droplets was understandable by every lay member of the public, without needing to have specialised knowledge of actual aerodynamics, and presumably made the paper so popular among non-scientists who used it to make prescriptive claims by non-scientists. while the authors hypothesised that it might be unsafe to run close to another-and that even . m distance might not be enough for jogging-the social media audience took this as a reason to shame the runners in their neighbourhoods (koebler ). meanwhile, the first author of the study posted a document on his website answering certain questions about the study and refused to draw any epidemiological conclusions, urging for other's expertise. but social media users did not shy from becoming experts and drawing the conclusions themselves, as the information in the blocken et al. paper was just ammunition in a larger informational battle about what others should do. even if the scientific claims of regular users are checked, their aim remains to prescribe actions for others and to evaluate the world in a way that will be endorsed by one's community of friends. for these purposes, other pieces of news will be co-opted if the first ones were flagged as hoaxes. content-based approaches are then ineffective against this strong desire of social media users to emit evaluative or prescriptive claims about the world and strategically use science-looking sources to back these up. one should address the very desire of regular users to evaluate the world from the little soap-boxes that social media affords. the three dimensions of the informational context on social media previously mentioned (strong emotional, strong normative and weak epistemic) have been analytically distinguished but they function simultaneously to promote certain user behaviours which one could call irresponsible information sharing on social media. the weak epistemic context re-enforces the strong normative claims which are coupled with emotional reactions leading users to become strongly attached to their claims and indifferent to their debunking. while the three dimensions of the informational context work together to produce a perfect storm of low-quality and redundant information-an infodemic-one could still try to design modes of interaction to deal with each of them. future measures dealing with mdi and infodemic in a global pandemic need to also tackle the high emotional load of most mdi items. a practical way of flagging this could be devised by modelling on facebook's "hoax alert" system which warns users that a certain post they are reading has been fact-checked and is probably a hoax. a similar system could be designing an "emotional alert" flag which appears below certain news-looking items which have an unusually high amount of emotional triggering words. this kind of alert would show to users when certain news-like items lead them to feel something quite specific. the readers would be still free to engage with such items, but at least they would be warned about possible emotional manipulation. such alert would also flag click-bait and irrelevant news which are not false in themselves, but which do contribute to the infodemic because of the high virality and potential for polarisation. the weak epistemic context needs to be tackled together with the high normative one. when users engage with newsitems relating to the pandemic (or any other crisis situation), they can be shown alternative news and pages or users to follow which are experts in the field. this has been already implemented, but with little success as it needs to be complemented by more context-aware measures. a new measure could be to try to increase the users' critical engagement with a certain class of news items. this could happen by posting a small survey under the tricky news items asking the users to answer the following questions: "what does this news lead me to believe?", "what does this post ask me to feel?", "please rate how strongly you agreed with these claims before reading this post". and, finally, after answering this mini-survey, the user could be shown a disclaimer stating, "now that you've read posts you agreed with, how about trying something different?"-and the alternative sources with diverse information from experts could be displayed, but after the user has been primed to be more critical and diversify one's information sources. to incentivise users to fill in these surveys, they could receive certain bonus points on the social media platform and, once they accumulate a certain number of points, they could get a badge next to their name of "critical media user" or "critical thinker" which would ensure visibility of their informational skills. these sample measures i have proposed-and presumably other context-sensitive measures-are fit to be implemented only in crisis situations and only targeting the user's posts about the current crisis situation. it is, of course, possible to integrate these measures in the day to day users' interaction. however, social media fulfils certain deep emotional needs of users such as expressing strong normative opinions and seeking emotional consensus. if these contexts are strongly discouraged, the users may find other platforms to do so and they may abandon the too critical platforms. meanwhile, in a crisis situation, these dimensions could be targeted specifically and confined to users that share mdi and redundant information about the crisis at hand. this paper outlined three types of informational context which have not yet been taken into account by the current measures to curb down disinformation and the amount of irrelevant information on social media platforms. mdi countermeasures taken thus far have a limited effect because these did not account for the diversity of information contexts on social media. these measures do not address the primary causes of the infodemic itself, namely the user's need to post content as a way of making sense of the situation and of expressing one's opinion as a way of gathering consensus reactions. in light of these considerations, we need a value-sensitive design re-assessment of how users interact on social media among themselves as well as with the information found online in crisis situations. designing for thoughtful, critical and meaningful user interaction should become an explicit aim for the future of social media platforms in times of pandemics and other global emergencies. fake news and the economy of emotions towards aerodynamically equivalent covid . m social distancing for walking and running. questions and answers. website bert blocken, eindhoven university of technology (the netherlands) and ku leuven (belgium) retrieved from https ://reute rsins titut e.polit ics.ox.ac.uk/ types -sourc es-and-claim s-covid - -misin forma tion the covid- social media infodemic echo chambers: emotional contagion and group polarization on facebook throwing coronavirus disinfo at the wall to see what sticks. eu vs disinfo the varieties of disinformation the philosophy of information quality value-sensitive design social media: a critical introduction social epistemology misinformation and the coronavirus resistance fake news the viral 'study' about runners spreading coronavirus is not actually a study stop spamming me! exploring information overload on facebook the covid- 'infodemic': a new front for information professionals serendipity by design? how to turn from diversity exposure to diversity experience to face filter bubbles in social media context-aware computing applications the next phase in fighting misinformation. facebook newsroom framework for managing the covid- infodemic: methods and results of an online, crowdsourced who technical consultation ict and value sensitive design. the information society: innovation, legitimacy, ethics and democracy in honor of professor jacques berleur sj thinking about 'information disorder': formats of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation the role of philosophy & philosophers in the coronavirus pandemic. daily nous why people use social media: a uses and gratifications approach contextual design: an emergent view of system design novel coronavirus( -ncov): situation report- . who rumors at the speed of light? modeling the rate of rumor transmission during crisis emotional dynamics in the age of misinformation the author would like to thank samantha marie copeland for commenting on an earlier draft of this article and to the two reviewers for their insightful comments on the first version of the article.funding this project has received funding from the european union's horizon research and innovation programme under the marie skłodowska-curie grant agreement number. . the opinions expressed in this document reflect only the author's view. the european commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. open access this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution . international license, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the creative commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. the images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's creative commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. if material is not included in the article's creative commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. to view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/ . /. key: cord- -ib vow authors: li, jianjun; fu, jia; yang, yu; wang, xiaoling; rong, xin title: research on crowd-sensing task assignment based on fuzzy inference pso algorithm date: - - journal: advances in swarm intelligence doi: . / - - - - _ sha: doc_id: cord_uid: ib vow to solve the problem of load unbalance in the case of few users and multi-task, a fuzzy inference pso algorithm (fpso) crowd sensing single objective task assignment method is proposed. with task completion time, user load balancing and perceived cost as the optimization goals, the fuzzy learning algorithm dynamically adjusts the learning factor in the pso algorithm, so that the pso algorithm can perform global search in the scope of the task space, thus obtaining the optimal task assignment solution set. finally, the fpso algorithm is compared with the pso, ga and abc algorithms on the optimization objectives, such as the algorithm convergence, task completion time, perceived cost and load balance. the experimental results show that the fpso algorithm not only has faster convergence rate than the other algorithms, and shorten the task completion time, reduce the platform’s perceived cost, improve the user’s load balance, and have a good application effect in the crowd sensing task assignment. with the widespread use of mobile users, smartphones have become an important bridge between the physical world and the online world. these advances have driven a new paradigm for collecting data and sharing data, namely group intelligence perception [ , ] . at present, the application of group intelligence perception mainly includes: air quality monitoring [ ] , traffic information management [ ] , public information sharing [ ] and so on. as the task assignment of the key problem of the crowd-sensing system, it is necessary to meet the optimization objectives under the constraints while completing the specified tasks, such as the shortest time to complete the task, the least perceived cost required to complete the task, the maximum benefit from completing the task, etc. therefore, the main problem solved by the fuzzy inference pso algorithm crowd sensing task assignment method is: how to perform task assignment for the multi-task of less user participants, which can ensure that the given number of tasks is completed in the shortest time, the perceived cost is the lowest, and user load balancing is optimal. for the problem of poor user load balance in mobile commerce, a fuzzy inference particle swarm crowd sensing task assignment method is proposed to improve the global search ability of the algorithm and avoid falling into local optimum. the main contributions of this paper include: ( ) a single objective task assignment optimization model is constructed, with task completion time, perceived cost and user load balance as the objective function. ( ) based on the task assignment optimization model, a fuzzy inference particle swarm intelligence discernment task assignment method is proposed to solve the task assignment problem in discrete space. ( ) through the simulation experiment, the proposed fuzzy inference particle swarm task assignment method (fpso) is compared with pso, ga and abc algorithms. the experimental results show that fuzzy inference particle swarm optimization algorithm can minimize the task completion time, the lowest perceived cost and the maximum user load balance. the paper mainly reviews the literature on single target assignment and dual objective assignment. for single-objective task assignment: xiao et al. [ ] considered the independent perceptual task scheme to minimize the task average completion time as the optimization goal, proposed the aota algorithm (average time-sensitive online task assignment algorithm); and considered the cooperative perception. in the task assignment scheme, the lota algorithm (the maximum completion time sensitive online task assignment algorithm) is proposed to minimize the maximum completion time of the task, and the important performance of the two algorithms is proved by simulation experiments. yang et al. [ ] considered the biggest problem of budget information in crowd-sensing, modeled by gaussian process and proposed an algorithm bim for quantifying the amount of information based on common standards based on information. the algorithm is suitable for the inability to obtain user cost. xiao et al. [ ] focused on the recruitment of users who are sensitive to deadlines for probabilistic collaboration. mobile users perform crowd-sensing tasks within a certain probability range, and can recruit multiple user systems to perform common tasks to ensure expected the completion time does not exceed the deadline, and ag dur (criteria for time-sensitive greedy user recruitment algorithm) is proposed to maximize utility for recruiting users and to minimize perceived cost expenditures during the deadline. azzam et al. [ ] proposed a user group recruitment model based on genetic algorithm in order to recruit more participants to perform tasks, considering user interest points, related device perception capabilities and user basic information. by comparing with the personal recruitment model, the user group recruitment model based on genetic algorithm can improve the quality of collecting perceived data and ensure the reliability of perceived results. yang et al. [ ] designed the problem of heterogeneous sensor task assignment, and designed the heuristic algorithm to combine the genetic algorithm and the greedy algorithm to achieve the optimization goal of minimizing the total penalty caused by delay. for dual-target assignments: liu et al. [ ] mainly studied the multi-task assignment of dual-objective optimization. for fpmt (less participants multitasking), to maximize the total number of tasks and minimize the moving distance as the optimization goal, use the mcmf (minimum cost maximum flow) theory to convert the fpmt problem, and consider the fpmt problem to build a new mcmf model. xiong et al. [ ] proposed a task assignment search algorithm based on maximizing space-time coverage and minimizing perceived cost in task assignment. considering the perceived time and the quality of task completion. wang et al. [ ] only studied the perceptual task assignment problem to minimize the overall perceived cost and maximize the total utility of group intelligence perception, while meeting various quality of service (qos) requirements, and proposed a new hybrid method combines the greedy algorithm with the bee colony algorithm. messaoud et al. [ ] mainly studied the participatory crowd-sensing user, and under the condition of satisfying information quality and energy constraints, to optimize the data perceptual quality and minimize the perceptual time of all participants, the appropriate task participants designed a crowd-sensing task assignment mechanism based on the tabu search algorithm combined with information quality and energy perception. dindar oz [ ] proposed a solution to the problem of multi-objective task assignment, and designed a neighboring function that successfully solved the quadratic assignment problem for the metaheuristic algorithm, namely the maximum release of greedy allocation. ziwen sun et al. [ ] proposed an attack location assignment (alta) algorithm based on multi-objective binary pso optimization algorithm, which models the task as a multi-objective optimization model. the objective function is total task execution time, total energy consumption and load balancing. the method of nonlinearly adjusting inertia weight overcomes the shortcomings of binary particle swarm optimization (bpso) which is easy to fall into local optimum. in summary, for the crowd-sensing task assignment problem, most researchers only consider one or two optimization goals such as perceived cost, task completion time, and task completion quality, and there are few studies that satisfy both optimization goals. this paper considers the problem of poor user load balance encountered in the process of task problems, combines task completion time and perceived cost, establishes single objective task assignment optimization model, and proposes fuzzy inference particle swarm task assignment method to solve task assignment problem in discrete space. there are two main types of task assignments: multi-participant less tasks and fewer participants multitasking. this topic mainly studies the task assignment of multi-tasks with fewer participants. how to perform reasonable task assignment makes the user load balance more, and the user participation enthusiasm can reduce the task completion time and reduce the perceived cost. in a specific environment, after the cognitive platform publishes the task, the mobile terminal users who are interested in these tasks will confirm the tasks to indicate their intentions, and finally confirm the set of end users u = {u , u , . . . , u n }, and the set of the published task r = {r , r , . . . , r m } (n < m). at the same time, an end user can complete one or more tasks. reasonable task assignment enables each task target to be assigned to the appropriate user or user community to perform. each user is also assigned to a task target that matches its own performance, using each user's maximum energy to complete the task, saving costs, improve task completion rates. in order to satisfy the establishment of the crowd-sensing task assignment model under defined conditions, the following assumptions are made: ( ) the task assignment studied in this paper is in a specific time range, and only the participating users and tasks are allocated during this time. ( ) the matching of the published tasks and the participating users within the coverage of the specified task area is not a task for all coverage areas. this narrows the scope of the task space and improves the quality of the task completion. ( ) for the tasks released by the crowd-sensing platform, users who are suitable for performing the task will be found. there is no case that the appropriate users cannot be found after the task is released. ( ) all users move from the current position to the task position at the same speed, regardless of the user's moving speed. (see table ). ( ) task completion time the total time taken by n users to complete m tasks is t: which t ij represents the time taken by the i user to perform the j task. ( ) load balance load balancing is measured using the ratio of task completion times. the expression is the ratio of each user's completion time to the total task completion time. which t ij represents the completion time of each user on behalf of each user, and t represents the total task completion time. the closer the task completion time to the total task completion time, the more balanced the load is. therefore, the larger the β, the higher the load balance. the perceived cost is related to the distance the user moves to the location of the task and is proportional to the distance traveled by the perceived user to the task location. if the position coordinate of the user is (x u , y u ), and the position coordinate of the task is (x r , y r ), the distance between the user and the task is if the ratio coefficient of the perceived cost and the moving distance is constant α, the perceived cost of the user to the task is c = αd . therefore, the single objective task assignment optimization model is: the constraints are: ( ) m tasks are completely assigned to n users; ( ) each sensing task can only be executed once by a certain perceived user; ( ) the task and the task can only be executed once by a certain user; the number of tasks assigned by each perceptual user is not more than γ ; ≤ a i ≤ γ particle swarm optimization (pso) is proposed to be influenced by bird predation behavior [ , ] . the pso algorithm is modeled as follows: which v i (t) represents the velocity of the particle i at the iteration time t, i represents the number of particles, i ∈ { , , . . . , n }. w is the weight function, and c , c are the weight acceleration coefficient; random is a uniformly distributed random variable in the interval ( , ); x i (t) represents the current position of the particle i at the iteration time t; x in order to improve the overall performance of the swarm intelligence algorithm, fuzzy inference technology is added to the particle swarm optimization algorithm, and the learning factor in the pso algorithm is dynamically adjusted by the fuzzy inference technology, so that the pso algorithm can perform global search in the task space to avoid the algorithm falling into the local optimal area, so as to get the optimal task assignment solution set. in order to verify that the fuzzy inference pso algorithm improves the performance of the original algorithm, several typical algorithms are selected for comparison. as shown in fig. , the fpso algorithm has a faster convergence rate than other algorithms. in this paper, a fuzzy system with two inputs, two outputs and nine rules is designed. the input is the current optimal performance index (vb), the current iteration number iter; the output is c and c ; the mamdani type [ ] is blurred. the system adjusts c and c . ( ) fuzzy set: for the input variables v and iter, three fuzzy sets are defined: low, medium, high. for the output variables c and c , five fuzzy sets are defined: low, medium low, medium, medium high, and high, using a triangular membership function. ( ) variable range. in order to apply to various optimization problems, the input variables need to be converted to a normalized form, that is: where vb is the current optimal estimate of the population; vb min is the optimal estimate of the population; vb max is the worst estimate of the population; iter is the current number of iterations; iter max is the maximum number of iterations of the algorithm. after normalization, the range of nv and niter is [ , ]. ( ) fuzzy rules: the overall idea of fuzzy rule setting is that in the early stage of algorithm iteration, when the evaluation value is poor, it needs strong global search ability, large shrinkage factor value, and the particle is the most excellent learning ability is stronger than the ability of particles to learn from the society, that is c > c ; in the later stage of algorithm iteration, when the evaluation value is good, it needs less global search ability and shrinkage factor value, and the ability of particles to learn from society is stronger. the ability of a particle to learn optimally from itself, that is c < c . therefore, the following nine fuzzy rules are designed: if nb is low and niter is low, then c is medium low and c is low. if nb is low and niter is medium, then c is medium high and c is medium. if nb is low and niter is high, then c is medium high and c is high. if nb is medium and niter is low, then c is medium low and c is low. if nb is medium and niter is medium, then c is medium and c is medium. if nb is medium and niter is high, then c is medium high and c is high. if nb is high and niter is low, then c is medium low and c is low. if nb is high and niter is medium, then c is medium low and c is medium high. if nb is high and niter is high, then c is medium high and c is high. therefore, the fpso algorithm flow chart is shown in fig. : fig. . fpso algorithm flow chart the particle swarm optimization algorithm in the swarm intelligence algorithm is used to map the optimal objective function and constraint conditions of the crowd-sensing task assignment problem to each element of the fuzzy inference particle swarm optimization algorithm to complete the task solving. task assignment process: ( ) analyze the task assignment problem of mobile commerce group in a specific environment; ( ) establishing a crowd-sensing single objective task assignment optimization model, and determining the task assignment constraints and optimization objective function, and transforming into the evaluation index function of the fuzzy inference particle swarm optimization algorithm; ( ) using the fpso algorithm to optimize the search for decision variables; ( ) optimized search of decision variables by fpso algorithm, and evaluate the optimization results according to the objective function; ( ) when the result satisfies the task assignment requirement, the output result ends with the fpso algorithm. in the set environment of mobile commerce crowd-sensing, taking the drip taxi as an example, the time spent by the passenger to release the taxi task to the vehicle owner to start executing the task within the specified time is recorded as the task completion time; the owner of the vehicle arrives at the distance that the passenger user releases the position of the ride, and the fuel cost, the loss fee, etc. consumed during the period are recorded as task-aware costs; the load balance is reflected in the number of tasks received by each vehicle owner. therefore, the number of simulation tasks is , , , , , and the maximum number of iterations of the algorithm is . experiments are performed on the matlab r b simulation platform. the fpso algorithm parameter settings are shown in table . learning factor c learning factor c maximum inertia factor w max . minimum inertia factor w min . maximum particle speed v max the experiment uses three optimization objectives to compare the advantages and disadvantages of several algorithms, namely task completion time, task-aware cost and load balancing. the experimental results and analysis are as follows: ( ) analysis of task completion time the task completion time comparison chart is shown in fig. and fig. . it can be seen from fig. that pso, abc and ga algorithms have good convergence in the early iteration compared with the fpso algorithm. however, with the increase of the number of iterations, pso, abc and ga are easy to fall into local optimum, and fpso algorithm can achieve global optimization and enhance global search ability. therefore, from fig. to complete the task total time and fig. to complete the task average time can be seen the superiority of the fpso algorithm, while the task completion time is minimum. ( ) perceived cost analysis in the task assignment model, task completion time, perceived cost, and load balance are used as task optimization goals. in the experiment, we mainly consider the perceived cost of applying different algorithms to complete the comparison of the same number of tasks. the number of tasks is , , , and respectively in fpso, pso, abc and ga algorithms. it can be seen from fig. , as the number of tasks increases ( , , , respectively), the perceived cost of the fpso algorithm is significantly lower than the pso, abc and ga algorithms. ( ) load balance analysis load balancing is one of the important optimization goals in the paper. the greater the load balancing degree, the more reasonable the task assignment is, it can be seen from fig. that as the number of iterations increases, the curve of the fpso algorithm is always above the pso, abc and ga algorithm curves, and finally tends to . , so the fpso algorithm is better implemented than the pso, abc and ga algorithms. load balancing optimization goals make task assignments more reasonable. through the above experiments, we know that the fpso algorithm can shorten the task completion time, reduce the perceived cost of the task, and balance the user's task load. therefore, in the actual task allocation, it is possible to improve the timeliness of the task, reduce the operating cost of the platform, and improve the task completion amount of the user. this paper proposes a crowd-sensing task assignment method based on fuzzy inference particle swarm optimization to solve the problem of load unbalance in task assignment. in the proposed method, the fuzzy inference technology can dynamically adjust the learning factor in the pso algorithm, so that the pso algorithm can perform global search in the task space to obtain the optimal task assignment solution set. compared with pso, abc and ga algorithms, it has higher precision and better stability in solving performance. at the same time, applying fpso algorithm for task assignment can greatly shorten task completion time, reduce platform perceived cost and improve user load balance. in the future research, not only the load balancing problem of task allocation should be considered, but also the user interest preference problem in the allocation process is also an important factor to determine whether the user performs the task. the user must not only consider the cost of executing the task, but also considering the degree of interest in the task, a combination of various factors motivates the user to perform the task. therefore, in the next study, the user's interest in the task can be listed as an important factor in the user's work, and the task assignment can be further studied. a survey of mobile phone sensing mobile crowd sensing: current state and future challenges u-air: when urban air quality inference meets big data crowd sensing maps of on-street parking spaces flier meet: a mobile crowd sensing system for cross-space public information reposting, tagging and sharing online task assignment for crowd sensing in predictable mobile social networks selecting most informative contributors with unknown costs for budgeted crowd sensing deadline-sensitive user recruitment for probabilistically collaborative mobile crowd sensing grs: a group-based recruitment system for mobile crowd sensing heterogeneous task assignment in participatory sensing task me: multi-task assignment in mobile crowd sensing near-optimal task assignment for piggyback crowd sensing qos-constrained sensing task assignment for mobile crowd sensing fair qoi and energy-aware task assignment in participatory sensing an improvement on the migrating birds optimization with a problem-specific neighboring function for the multi-objective task allocation problem attack localization task allocation in wireless sensor networks based on multi-objective binary particle swarm optimization particle swarm optimization: an overview multi-species cooperative particle swarm optimization algorithm prediction of biochar yield using adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system with particle swarm optimization key: cord- -isnqbetr authors: nakov, preslav title: can we spot the"fake news"before it was even written? date: - - journal: nan doi: nan sha: doc_id: cord_uid: isnqbetr given the recent proliferation of disinformation online, there has been also growing research interest in automatically debunking rumors, false claims, and"fake news."a number of fact-checking initiatives have been launched so far, both manual and automatic, but the whole enterprise remains in a state of crisis: by the time a claim is finally fact-checked, it could have reached millions of users, and the harm caused could hardly be undone. an arguably more promising direction is to focus on fact-checking entire news outlets, which can be done in advance. then, we could fact-check the news before it was even written: by checking how trustworthy the outlets that published it is. we describe how we do this in the tanbih news aggregator, which makes readers aware of what they are reading. in particular, we develop media profiles that show the general factuality of reporting, the degree of propagandistic content, hyper-partisanship, leading political ideology, general frame of reporting, and stance with respect to various claims and topics. recent years have seen the rise of social media, which have enabled people to easily share information with a large number of online users, without quality control. on the bright side, this has given the opportunity to anybody to become a content creator, and it has enabled a much faster information dissemination. on the not-so-bright side, it has also made it easy for malicious actors to spread disinformation much faster, potentially reaching very large audiences. in some cases, this included building sophisticated profiles for individual users based on a combination of psychological characteristics, metadata, demographics, and location, and then micro-targeting them with personalized "fake news" and propaganda campaigns that have been weaponized with the aim of achieving political or financial gains. to be clear, false information in the news has always been around, e.g., think of tabloids. however, social media have changed everything. they have made it possible for malicious actors to micro-target specific demographics, and to spread disinformation much faster and at scale, at the disguise of news. thanks to social media, the news could be weaponized at an unprecedented scale. overall, thanks to social media, people today are much more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. for example, according to a study, % of russians believed that the usa did not put a man on the moon. in contrast, when the event actually occurred, there was absolutely no doubt about it in the ussr, and neil armstrong was even invited to visit moscow, which he did. indeed, disinformation has become a global phenomenon: a number of countries had election-related issues with "fake news". to get an idea of the scale, million users on facebook and instagram saw inflammatory political ads, and cambridge analytica had access to the data of million facebook users in the usa, which it used for targeted political advertisement; for comparison, the us presidential elections in the usa were decided by , voters in three key states. while initially the focus has been on influencing the outcome of political elections, "fake news" has also caused direct life loss. for example, disinformation on whatsapp has resulted in people being killed in india, and disinformation on facebook was responsible for the rohingya genocide, according to a un report. disinformation can also put people's health in danger, e.g., think of the antivaccine websites and the damage they cause to public health worldwide, or of the ongoing covid- pandemic, which has also given rise to the first global infodemic. recently, there has been a lot of research interest in studying disinformation and bias in the news and in social media. this includes challenging the truthiness of claims [ , , ] , of news [ , , , , , , ] , of news sources [ ], of social media users [ , , , , , ] , and of social media [ , , , ] , as well as studying credibility, influence, and bias [ , , , , , ] . the interested reader can also check several recent surveys that offer a general overview on "fake news" [ ] , or focus on topics such as the process of proliferation of true and false news online [ ] , on fact-checking [ ] , on data mining [ ] , or on truth discovery in general [ ] . for some specific topics, research was facilitated by specialized shared tasks such as the semeval- task and the semeval- task on determining rumour veracity and support for rumours (rumoureval) [ , ] , the clef - checkthat! lab on automatic identification and verification of claims [ , , , , , , , , , , , ] , the fever- and fever- tasks on fact extraction and verification [ , ] , and the semeval- task on fact checking in community question answering forums [ , ] , among others. finally, note that the veracity of information is a much bigger problem than just "fake news". it has been suggested that "veracity" should be seen as the fourth "v" of big data, along with volume, variety, and velocity. in order to fact-check a news article, we can analyze its contents, e.g., the language it uses, and the reliability of its source, which can be represented as a number between and , where indicates a very reliable source, and stands for a very unreliable one: f actuality (article) = reliability (language (article)) in order to fact-check a claim (as opposed to an article), we can retrieve articles discussing the claim, then we can detect the stance of each article with respect to the claim, and we can take a weighted sum (here, the stance is a number between - and , where it is - if the article disagrees with the claim, it is if it agrees, and it is if it just discusses the claim or if it is unrelated): note that in formula ( ), the reliability of the website that hosts an article serves as a prior to compute the factuality of an article, while in formula ( ), we use the factuality of the retrieved articles to compute a factuality score for a target claim. the idea is that if a reliable article agrees/disagrees with the claim, this is a good indicator for it being true/false, and it is the other way around for unreliable articles. of course, the formulas above are oversimplifications, e.g., one can fact-check a claim based on the reactions of users in social media [ ] , based on the claim's spread over time in social media [ ] , based on information in a knowledge graph [ ] , extracted from the web [ ] or from wikipedia [ ] , using similarity to previously fact-checked claims [ ] , etc. yet, the formulas give the general idea that the reliability of the source should be an important element of fact-checking articles and claims. yet, it is an understudied problem. characterizing entire news outlets is an important task on its own right. we argue that it is more useful than fact-checking claims or articles, as it is hardly feasible to fact-check every single piece of news. doing so also takes time, both to human users and to automatic programs, as they need to monitor the way reliable media report about a given target claim, how users react to it in social media, etc., and it takes time to get enough such evidence accumulated in order to be able to make a reliable prediction. it is much more feasible to check entire news outlets. note that we can also fact-check a number of sources in advance, and we can then fact-check the news before it was even written! once it is published online, it would be enough to check how trustworthy the outlets that published it are, in order to get an initial (imperfect) idea about how much we should trust this news. this would be similar to the movie minority report, where the authorities could detect a crime before it was even committed. in general, fighting disinformation is not easy; as in the case of spam, this is an adversarial problem, where the malicious actors constantly change and improve their strategies. yet, when they share news in social media, they typically post a link to an article that is hosted on some website. this is what we are exploiting: we try to characterize the news outlet where the article is hosted. this is also what journalists typically do: they first check the source. finally, even though we focus on the source, our work is also compatible with fact-checking a claim or a news article, as we can provide an important prior and thus help both algorithms and human fact-checkers that try to fact-check a particular news article or a claim. how can we profile a news source? note that disinformation typically focuses on emotions, and political propaganda often discusses moral categories [ ] . there are many incentives for news outlets to publish articles that appeal to emotions: (i ) this has a strong propagandistic effect on the target user, (ii ) it makes it more likely to be shared further by the users, and (iii ) it will be favored as a candidate to be shown in other users' newsfeed as this is what algorithms on social media optimize for. and news outlets want to get users to share links to their content in social media as this allows them to reach larger audience. this kind of language also makes them potentially detectable for artificial intelligence (ai) systems; yet, these outlets cannot do much about it as changing the language would make their message less effective and it would also limit its spread. while the analysis of the language used by the target news outlet is the most important information source, we can also consider information in wikipedia and in social media, traffic statistics, and the structure of the target sites url as shown in figure : . the text of a few hundred articles published by the target news outlet, analyzing the style, subjectivity, sentiment, offensiveness [ , , , ] , toxicity [ ] , morality, vocabulary richness, propagandistic content, etc.; . the text of its wikipedia page (if any), including infobox, summary, content, categories, e.g., it might say that the website spreads false information and conspiracy theories; . metadata and statistics about its twitter account (if any): is it an old account, is it verified, is it popular, how is the medium self-describing, is there a link to its website, etc.; . whether people in social media, e.g., on twitter, post links in articles to the target sources in the context of a polarizing topic, and which side of the debate are these users from; . whether there is liberal-vs-moderate-vs-conservative bias of the audience of the target medium in social media, e.g., in facebook; . the language used in videos by the target medium, e.g., in their youtube channels (if any), where the focus is on analysis of the speech signal, i.e., not on what is said but on how it is said, e.g., is it emotional [ ] ; . web traffic information: whether this is a popular website; . the structure of site's url: is it too long, does it contain a sequence of meaningful words, does it have a fishy suffix such as ".com.co", etc. characterizing media in terms of factuality of reporting and bias is part of a larger effort at the qatar computing research institute, hbku: the tanbih mega-project aims to limit the effect of "fake news", disinformation, propaganda and media bias by making users aware what they are reading, thus promoting media literacy and critical thinking. the mega-projects flagship initiative is the tanbih news aggregator [ ] , which shows real-time news from a variety of news sources [ ] . it builds a profile for each news outlet, showing a prediction about the factuality of its reporting[ , , ], its leading political ideology [ ] , degree of propaganda [ , ], hyper-partisanship [ , ] , and general frame of reporting (e.g., political, economic, legal, cultural identity, quality of life, etc.), and stance with respect to various claims and topics [ , , , , ] . for the individual news, it signals when an article is likely to be propagandistic. it further mixes arabic and english news, and allows the user to see them all in english/arabic thanks to qcris machine translation technology. tanbih also offers analytics capabilities, allowing a user to explore the media coverage, the frame of reporting, and the propaganda around topics such as brexit, sri lanka bombings, and covid- . moreover, it performs fine-grained analysis of the propaganda techniques in the news [ , , , , ] . we developed tools such as a web browser plugin, a mechanism to share media profiles and stories in social media, a tool to detect check-worthiness for english and arabic [ , , ] , a twitter fact-checking bot, and an api to the tanbih functionality. the latter is used by aljazeera and other partners. more recently, we have been developing tools for fighting the covid- infodemic by modeling the perspective of journalists, fact-checkers, social media platforms, policy makers, and the society [ , ] . tanbih was developed in close collaboration with mit-csail. we were also partners in a large nsf project on credible open knowledge networks, and we further collaborate with carnegie mellon university in qatar, qatar university, sofia university, the university of bologna, aljazeera, facebook, the united nations, data science society, and a data pro, among others. as part of a larger team, including al jazeera, associated press, rte ireland, tech mahindra, and metaliquid, and v-nova, we won an award at ibc by tm forum and ibc for our media-telecom catalyst project on ai indexing for regulatory practice. in its . years of history, the tanbih mega-project has produced + toptier publications, a best demo award (honorable mention) at acl- , and several patent applications. the project was featured in + keynote talks, and it was highlighted by + media including forbes, boston globe, aljazeera, mit technology review, science daily, popular science, fast company, the register, wired, and engadget. it is widely believed that "fake news" can and has affected major political events. in reality, the true impact is unknown; however, given the buzz that was created, we should expect a large number of state and non-state actors to give it a try. from a technological perspective, we ca expect further advances in "deep fakes", such as machine-generated videos, and images. this is a really scary development, but probably only in the mid-long run; as of present, "deep fakes" are still easy to detect both using ai and also by experienced users. we also expect advances in automatic news generation, thanks to recent developments such as gpt- . this is already a reality and a sizable part of the news we are consuming daily are machine generated, e.g., about the weather, the markets, and sport events. such software can describe a sport event from http://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/tanbih/ igcppjdbignhkiikejdjpjemejoognen http://claimrank.qcri.org/ http://twitter.com/factchecker_bot/ http://app.swaggerhub.com/apis/yifan /tanbih/ . . #/ http://qcri.csail.mit.edu/node/ http://cokn.org/ http://www.tmforum.org/ai-indexing-regulatory-practise/ various perspectives: neutrally or taking the side of the winning or the losing team. it is easy to see how this can be used for disinformation purposes. yet, we hope to see "fake news" gone the way of spam: not entirely eliminated (as this is impossible), but put under control. ai has already helped a lot in the fight against spam, and we expect that it would play a key role in putting "fake news" under control as well. a key element of the solution would be limiting the spread. social media platforms are best positioned to do this on their own platforms. twitter has suspended more than million accounts in may and june , and these efforts continue to date; this can help in the fight against bots and botnets, which are the new link farms: % of the tweets during the us presidential campaign were shared by bots. facebook, from its part, warns users when they try to share a news article that has been fact-checked and identified as fake by at least two trusted fact-checking organizations, and it also downgrades "fake news" in its news feed. we expect the ai tools used for this to get better, just like spam filters have improved over time. yet, the most important element of the fight against disinformation is raising user awareness and develop critical thinking. this would help limit the spread as users would be less likely to share it further. we believe that practical tools such as the ones we develop in the tanbih mega-project would help in that respect. fighting the covid- infodemic in social media: a holistic perspective and a call to arms. arxiv preprint fighting the covid- infodemic: modeling the perspective of journalists, fact-checkers, social media platforms, policy makers, and the society predicting the role of political trolls in social media overview of the clef- checkthat! lab on automatic identification and verification of political claims, task : check-worthiness overview of the clef- checkthat! lab on automatic identification and verification of claims. task : check-worthiness online journalists embrace new marketing function. newspaper research finding credible information sources in social networks based on content and social structure information credibility on twitter battling the internet water army: detection of hidden paid posters semeval- task : detection of propaganda techniques in news articles findings of the nlp if- shared task on fine-grained propaganda detection a survey on computational propaganda detection prta: a system to support the analysis of propaganda techniques in the news fine-grained analysis of propaganda in news articles seminar users in the arabic twitter sphere unsupervised user stance detection on twitter semeval- task : rumoureval: determining rumour veracity and support for rumours predicting the leading political ideology of youtube channels using acoustic, textual and metadata information detecting toxicity in news articles: application to bulgarian checkthat! at clef : automatic identification and verification of claims overview of the clef- checkthat!: automatic identification and verification of claims digital journalism credibility study a context-aware approach for detecting worth-checking claims in political debates semeval- task : rumoureval, determining rumour veracity and support for rumours in search of credible news in search of credible news overview of the clef- check-that! lab on automatic identification and verification of claims in social media: arabic tasks overview of the clef- checkthat! lab on automatic identification and verification of claims. task : evidence and factuality claimrank: detecting check-worthy claims in arabic and english linguistic signals under misinformation and fact-checking: evidence from user comments on social media we built a fake news & click-bait filter: what happened next will blow your mind fully automated fact checking using external sources detecting deception in political debates using acoustic and textual features multi-view models for political ideology detection of news articles the science of fake news a survey on truth discovery detecting rumors from microblogs with recurrent neural networks finding opinion manipulation trolls in news community forums exposing paid opinion manipulation trolls the dark side of news community forums: opinion manipulation trolls hunting for troll comments in news community forums semeval- task : fact checking in community question answering forums fact checking in community forums automatic stance detection using end-to-end memory networks contrastive language adaptation for crosslingual stance detection overview of the clef- checkthat! lab on automatic identification and verification of political claims clef- lab on automatic identification and verification of claims in political debates do not trust the trolls: predicting credibility in community question answering forums fang: leveraging social context for fake news detection using graph representation a stylometric inquiry into hyperpartisan and fake news a largescale semi-supervised dataset for offensive language identification team qcri-mit at semeval- task : propaganda analysis meets hyperpartisan news detection that is a known lie: detecting previously fact-checked claims overview of the clef- checkthat! lab on automatic identification and verification of claims in social media: english tasks team jack ryder at semeval- task : using bert representations for detecting hyperpartisan news fake news detection on social media: a data mining perspective dense vs. sparse representations for news stream clustering predicting the topical stance and political leaning of media using tweets claimskg: a knowledge graph of fact-checked claims automated fact checking: task formulations, methods and future directions fever: a large-scale dataset for fact extraction and verification the second fact extraction and verification (fever . ) shared task it takes nine to smell a rat: neural multi-task learning for check-worthiness prediction the spread of true and false news online experiments in detecting persuasion techniques in the news predicting the type and target of offensive posts in social media semeval- task : identifying and categorizing offensive language in social media (offenseval) semeval- task : multilingual offensive language identification in social media proceedings of the conference on empirical methods in natural language processing fact-checking meets fauxtography: verifying claims about images analysing how people orient to and spread rumours in social media by looking at conversational threads key: cord- -khbzbjuu authors: coşkun, gülçin balamir title: media capture strategies in new authoritarian states: the case of turkey date: - - journal: publizistik doi: . /s - - - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: khbzbjuu this article focuses on the forced transformation of the mass media as an institution in new authoritarian states. it aims to understand the methods used by theses states to control and manipulate the flux of news through the mass media. turkey’s media system has been chosen as a case study because the recent political developments in the country offer worrisome und devastating examples. this article aims to answer to the following question: how can we classify methods and strategies used by the akp government to capture the media in turkey? why and how do the methods used by the akp government differ from those applied by previous governments? to answer to these questions, the article draws on media capture as a framework of analysis. it argues that the akp captured the media by using new strategies which can be divided into three overlapping and interconnected categories: capture by creating its own private media, capture through financial sanctions, and capture by intimidating and criminalizing journalists. the public opinion is influenced by family inherence and personal experience as well as by the public knowledge on political issues framed and transmitted via media (cf. forman , p. ). this public knowledge constitutes an important source for citizens to check governments' policies and to decide among different political actors. the decisions, actions, and reactions by different political actors on socioeconomic issues "are selected and shaped by mass-media professionals" (habermas , p. ) and thus become accessible to the public. for this reason, some scholars describe the news as a main agent in the "construction of public knowledge" (schudson ) . in brief, mass media play an indispensable role in the formation of this public knowledge. having understood the important role of the media in politics, new authoritarian regimes have developed new strategies to influence the formation of public knowledge by the media. instead of establishing direct state control over the media, they tolerate or encourage the private media. however, they prevent them from producing critical content using "diverse measures such as national security prosecutions, punitive tax audits, manipulation of government advertising, and seemingly reasonable content restrictions" (simon , p. ) . to explain the new relation between the media and the new authoritarians, scholars have drawn on economic theories of capture (cf. besley and prat ; corneo ; petrova ) . the "regulatory capture" or "capture theory," associated with the work by economist george stigler, the theory of economic regulation ( ) , draws attention to the fact that regulatory agencies may come to be dominated by the interests they regulate and not by the public interest. stigler's work helps us to understand the main problems not only in the governmental regulations but also in the other sectors that are supposed to fulfill a regulatory or monitoring function in democracies (cf. carrigan and coglianese , p. ) . the usefulness of the broad analytical framework that the term "capture" offers soon became obvious to scholars working on power relations and the media. according to the most common definition, the term media capture points to "a situation in which the media have not succeeded in becoming autonomous in manifesting a will of their own, nor able to exercise their main function, notably of informing people. instead, they have persisted in an intermediate state, with vested interests, and not just the government, using them for other purposes" (mungiu-pippidi , p. ) . based on this definition stiglitz proposes "a taxonomy of media capture based on four broad, and somewhat overlapping, sections: (a) ownership, (b) financial incentives, (c) censorship, and (d) cognitive capture" (stiglitz , p. - ) . while capture through ownership refers to the purchase of mass media institutions by wealthy individuals and corporations and to the creation of interest relations between these owners and the political elites, capture through financial incentives is related to the incentives of advertising and to the relationship between advertisers and media outlets. in the third category of his taxonomy stiglitz talks very briefly about the relationship between censorship and capture and focuses on journalists' self-censorship due to their oppression by the government as well as on the commercial interests of media corporations. lastly, stiglitz discusses cognitive capture, which he defines as "the most interesting aspect of capture-the most subtle, the hardest to prove". this refers to a situation where journalists lose their critical and investigative reflexes and start to transmit the dominant point of view. although stiglitz's taxonomy focuses mainly on media capture by economic elites, recent developments in new authoritarian states, or and perhaps also in socalled democratic countries like the usa, italy or the uk, necessitate a more detailed analysis of the ways of media capture by governments. there are growing numbers of studies of media capture by governments, which aim not merely to censor but to manipulate. mungiu-pippidi ( , p. ) argues that some governments in eastern europe are unable or unwilling to impose direct control over the media, but prefer to capture them by state subsidies, the preferential distribution of state advertising or by handing out financial favors and penalties. in exchange for these favors or penalties, they aim to get media coverage or framing favorable to their political agenda. the concentration of the media and existing clientelist relationships has brought about media capture by economic elites as well as political leaders (cf. márquez-ramírez and guerrero , p. ) and these authors explain to what extent these captured media promote the private interests of media executives and politicians over the public good. a number of recent studies of the turkish media system also use the media capture framework in their analyses of the legal and financial pressures on media organizations and journalists. finkel ( ) surveys the historical background of media concentration and explains how it has facilitated media capture by the akp government. yanatma's research "examines advertising as a tool of government to control the media, particularly print media in a country where politics and journalism have long been intertwined in an often combustible mixture" (yanatma , p. ). yeşil's article ( ) focuses on the disciplinary strategies deployed by the akp and reveals the connection between its capture of the media and the previous authoritarian neoliberal order. yet, the number of studies using capture theory to analyze media system in turkey is still limited. this articles aims to fill this gap as well as to classify capture strategies used by the akp to create the basis for comparative research among new authoritarian states. however, before analyzing these strategies, i offer a brief overview of crucial years that paved the way for the rise of the akp and the transformation of the media system in the s. after the coup d'état a new constitution was designed under the tutelage of turkish military forces and entered into force in . article of the new constitution regulates the freedom of press and starts by saying that "the press is free, and shall not be censored". however, the following lines of the same article define in detail the conditions under which the state can ban and take the measures necessary to stop the distribution of newspapers and periodicals. the main reason for this ban, according to article , is to protect the internal and external security of the state, which can be interpreted very broadly. additionally, different articles of the penal code (such as articles , , and ) bear directly or indirectly upon the press and were vaguely defined so that the judiciary could use them against journalists when the "state interest" was in danger (cf. waldman and Çalışkan , p. ). this illiberal constitutional and legal order was not the only characteristic of the journalistic environment in turkey post coup d'état. neoliberal winds had knocked on turkey's door. one of the reasons for the coup d'état was to facilitate the application of a new economic policy aiming to integrate and adapt turkish economy to the global capitalist system (cf. gürsel ) . the framework of this economic policy was set by decisions made on january , months before the coup d'état. one of these decisions was directly related to the media sector and stipulated the end of the state subventions previously granted to newsprint. this decision slowly made all newspapers financially dependent on advertisement revenue. this neoliberal transformation of economic policies created a completely new environment where media owners with a journalistic family background could not easily find ways to afford the cost of paper and to get sufficient advertisements to finance their newspapers (cf. sözeri and güney , p. ). there were two options for these traditional owners: either to invest in areas outside the media or to sell their family business to new entrepreneurs with backgrounds in banking or construction (cf. kaya , pp. - ) . as a result, the ownership profile of the media slowly changed. by the second half of the s only a limited number of conglomerations, chiefly those owned by dogan, bilgin and doguş holdings, had started to dominate the media market. their main aim was to "obtain political patronage and support for their other business ventures" (kaya and Çakmur , p. ) . the weak coalition governments and economic instability in the s obviously helped these new media conglomerates to pull the strings of political leaders and to steer the game in the direction that they desired. later, when erdogan decided to get rid of these big media holdings, he used this corrupted relationship between media owners and previous political leaders as a card against them. the third characteristic of the media landscape in the s and s was absolute censorship on the kurdish issue and high levels of violence against kurdish journalists or defenders of human rights. this censorship took a form deliberately ignoring the kurds at the beginning of s. while the military rule imposed restrictions on kurdish identity such as changing the names of kurdish cities or prohibiting the use of the kurdish language in public, the media preferred not to cover topics related to these steps. on the very rare occasions when they did treat on topics related to the kurds or kurdish regions, they avoided using use the word "kurd". in fact, it was a reflection of turkish state discourse (cf. yegen ) imposed and controlled by the military rule. the legal framework allowed for lengthy prison sentences to journalists who did not accept to stay within the limits of the state discourse. somer's research, for shows, reveals that "in and , the mainstream turkish daily hürriyet published only articles that were fully or partially related to the country's ethnic kurds. only of these articles used the word kurd in reference to a person, group, concept, or place" (somer , p. ). this intentional ignorance by the mainstream media in the beginning of the s was later transformed into a framework of enmity directed by the military when the armed conflict between the partiya karkeren kurdistane-kurdistan workers' party (pkk) and the turkish army intensified at the beginning of the s. at the same time, various human rights organizations had prepared reports on the murder, torture, depopulation and extrajudicial killings targeting firstly kurds, but also leftist human rights defenders, advocates, and journalists. however, mainstream newspapers, voluntarily or involuntarily, turned a blind eye to all human rights violations (cf. waldman and Çalışkan , p. ) . some journalists working for left-wing or pro-kurdish newspapers were killed by "unknown people" and the turkish government made no serious effort to investigate these killings. when demirel, then prime minister, was asked about the imprisonment or killings of journalists, he answered without shame: "those killed were not real journalists. they were militants in the guise of journalists. they kill each other." (hrw , p. ) labeling journalists who preferred to practice their profession outside the state-drawn framework as "terrorists", which erdogan often did, has its roots in the recent history of journalism in turkey. the fourth characteristic of the media landscape is the weakening of union rights and the increasing oppression on journalists who were members of unions. this deunionization was not specific to the media sector. in fact, it was directly related to the scything of left-wing organizations active in the s as well as to the neoliberal economic policies of turkish governments in the s. the cooperation of the conglomerates dominating the media sector together with the government facilitated this de-unionization (cf. Özsever , p. ) . in practice, union employees started to be dismissed because they were union members and the monopoly structure of the sector did not permit them to find employment in other media enterprises. at this time of the crisis, the failure of the unions to offer support to the dismissed and threatened journalists also played a role in journalists' unwillingness to become union members (cf. sözeri and güney , p. ) . in brief, when the akp came to power in , journalists were working without any constitutionally or legally guaranteed freedom. additionally, some political questions such as the kurdish issue were considered taboo and could only be treated in the way defined by the state bureaucracy and the military. the neoliberal economic transformation in turkey also shaped journalists' working conditions and rights. the clientelistic relationship and the interaction between media patrons and political leaders were accepted as natural. as this brief snapshot of historical media-state relations shows, media freedom has never fully existed in turkey. i argue that when the akp came to power they used the previous laws limiting the freedom of the media, established clientelistic relations between the media patrons and political leaders, and provided weak protection to media professionals as a starting point. consecutive victories in elections fueled their desire and capacity to capture the whole state apparatus. in this process, controlling, using and manipulating information according to their interests played a crucial role. the akp government did not challenge the neoliberal media and did not try to nationalize private media outlets. they captured the media using new strategies. instead of giving a timeline of akp's media policies, this section aims to classify these strategies to allow further comparative research. the classification is based on stiglitz's taxonomy, but calibrates it according to practices in a new authoritarian state, namely turkey. we can classify the akp's methods in three categories: capture by creating its own private media, capture through financial sanctions, and capture by intimidating and criminalizing journalists. at the end of s four major holding companies were dominant in the mainstream media sector in turkey: dogan, bilgin, uzan, and Çukurova. according to the report presented to the media inquiry committee of the turkish grand national assembly in , % of the daily newspapers sold in turkey belonged to the dogan, bilgin or Çukurova group (cf. Özsever , p. ) . the economic crisis brought about a crash, especially in the banking sector, which directly influenced the bilgin and uzan groups. the tasarruf mevduatı sigorta fonu-the savings deposit insurance fund (tmsf) expropriated their media assets, including several newspapers, television and radio outlets. while these two important groups were excluded from the media sector, two new big actors joined the club of media patron, namely doguş and ciner (cf. yeşil , p. ) . although there were important differences and even some conflicting interests among these media patrons (cf. Özsever , p. ) , they had at least two areas in common. firstly, as supporters of neoliberal policies, they were opposed to any kind of journalist organization. secondly, they were not members of the akp's close circle. during its first term the akp government tried to influence the mainstream media dominated by these groups using a carrot and stick strategy, like previous governments. at the same time, some other media groups such as ihlas, albayrak, and gülen 's newspapers and tv channels with islamist backgrounds were becoming richer (cf. Özsever , p. ) . however, the circulation numbers and ratings of these partisan media group outlets were limited. the akp realized soon that they had to develop a new ownership profile to have more direct control over the management of newspapers and tv channels to influence the "construction of public knowledge". businessmen from erdogan's inner circle who had started to prosper under the akp government had to be encouraged and, if necessary, pushed to buy mainstream media outlets. to create a partisan mainstream media, the akp used two main strategies. the first strategy was confiscation followed by a manipulated tender. this scenario first took place over the star (a daily newspaper) and kanal (a news channel), the gülen movement is a transnational islamic order named after the us-based islamic cleric fethullah gülen. established at the beginning of the s inİzmir, turkey, the movement became gradually involved in education, politics and the bureaucracy in turkey (cf.Şık ). the partnership or strategic alliance between the akp and the gülen movement was obvious from to . after a hidden confrontation between them from to , akp leaders, especially erdogan, started to attack the gülenists (cf. taş , pp. - ) . finally, after the failed coup d'état, the akp declared the gülen movement a "fetullahist terrorist organization/parallel state organization". which had belonged to the uzan group before the crisis. in the tmsf confiscated different media outlets belonging to the uzan group, including star and kanal (cf. hürriyet , february ) . in , both outlets were sold to a businessman through a public tender organized by tmsf. however, there was another change of ownership of these outlets and they were sold to the akp-friendly sancak holding group (cf. t , may ) . the second scene was played out in the same year. this time the tmsf confiscated from ciner group atv and the sabah newspaper, two of the biggest mainstream outlets at the time, on the grounds that ciner and its previous owner, the bilgin group, had signed a secret protocol. the timing of this decision was very meaningful because it was less than months before the general elections. neither atv or sabah had a critical position but they were not under the full control of the government and their ratings and circulation were high. so, it was advantageous for the government to silence two important mainstream news outlets for months before the elections. the akp managed to gain the majority in the elections once again. after the elections, tmsf organized a public tender, and the only company to make an offer was Çalık holdings the then chief executive officer of which was beraat albayrak, erdogan's son-in-law (cf. diken b, february ). for the third act of the confiscation method, in , tmsf confiscated different companies belonging to the Çukurova group, including digitürk, show tv, skytürk , and akşam. in the same year, sky türk, akşam, güneş and some other radio channels and magazines were also sold to sancak holding. the akp's second strategy for changing the profile of media ownership is to apply tax mobbing and to force them to avoid the media market. the most obvious example was that of the dogan media, which had controlled more than half of the domestic non-state media market since the mid- s. the problems between the dogan group and the akp started with the trial of deniz feneri launched in germany. the allegations against the islamist deniz feneri charity were that part of the money it collected was used for other purposes. the indictment cited some members of the akp, including the then prime minister erdogan. when the dogan media carried the trial on their first page, erdogan attacked the dogan media and blamed media patrons for acting like prosecutors and the courts (cf. dw , september ). then, suddenly, the ministry of finance decided to audit dogan's financial records for the previous three years ( , , and ) and fined them first $ million and later $ . billion for tax irregularities found during the audit (cf. arsu and tavernise , september ). the first consequence of these fines was that the gözcü newspaper, known to be critical of the akp, had to shut down, and some critical voices in the mainstream papers hürriyet and radikal were dismissed. soon afterwards, two important newspapers owned by the dogan group were sold to karacan and demirören holdings (bloomberg ht , april ) . although the dogan group started to decrease its share in the media sector and reduced the level of anti-government criticism, it faced a tacit threat through a continuing criminal case "on charges of 'establishing an organization for the purpose of criminal activity', forging official documents and violating turkey's anti-smuggling law" (ipi , july ). finally, in , the dogan family decided to leave the media and to sell all its media outlets, including hürriyet, kanal d, and cnn türk, to a conglomerate k whose majority shareholder is erdogan demirören, a businessman with close ties to erdogan (cf. bucak , may ) . in brief, in the last years, using these two strategies the akp government almost completely changed the ownership profile of the mainstream media. today, % of the mainstream media in turkey is under the direct control of the akp government, or more precisely, of president erdogan. the akp government has also used financial sanctions to discipline those media outlets that they cannot completely capture. the first of these methods targets the advertisement revenues of media companies. this kind of sanction does not often immediately attract attention, but it is very effective. since most media outlets depend on the advertising revenue, advertising remains a control tactic for governments, especially in non-democratic regimes. the media outlets in turkey have two sources of advertising revenues: from public announcements and advertisements and from private advertisements. the first group is distributed by the state-run press bulletin authority (basınİlan kurumu; bİk), which is controlled by the government. bİk tends to use official adverts and announcements as carrots or sticks, depending on the position of the newspapers and their owners' relations with the government. according to data compiled by yanatma, in two years the value of official advertisements given to akşam newspaper increased from tl . million (in ) to tl million (in ) after the tmsf took control of this newspaper and sold it to a businessman loyal to president erdogan. in the same period, due to the confrontation between the akp and the gülen movement, official adverts and announcements given to the zaman newspaper (the flagship newspaper of the gülen movement) decreased from tl . million to tl million (cf. yanatma , p. ). a recent example of dropping all official adverts and announcements given to evrensel and birgün, two newspapers known as being leftist and critical of the government, illustrates how bİk can also act as a punitive institution (cf. köylü , february ). given the fact that official adverts constitute important items of revenue, especially for small national newspapers, we can argue that the government aims to silence even miniscule alternative voices using the bİk. the second group, private advertisement revenues, are also not free from governmental pressure. in his very detailed report, yanatma studies data showing advertising space (in square centimeters) and analyzes the distribution of advertising in six major public firms (the state-run banks halkbank, ziraat bankası, and vakıfbank; turkish airlines, turkcell, and turk telekom). after a quantitative analysis of advertisement distribution, the author concludes "that the only criterion for public firms advertising distribution is their coverage of the government and circulation did not play any role in this allocation. while these apparently partisan and unfair practices were apparent before they subsequently turned into a more direct way to punish or support individual newspapers." (yanatma , p. ) during my field research, one of the interviewees who works as a manager at a private tv k channel also referred to an "advertising embargo" by public firms. they argued that once the minister of treasury and finance berat albayrak and some partisan columnist known to have close relations to erdogan directly criticized and targeted them, an embargo followed. they noted that the negative or critical speeches by high-level akp members also spread the message to other firms. they added that private firms wanting to keep up good relations with the government stop adverting in these media and this kind of advertising embargo by public firms and companies has an indirect effect on the total of advertisement revenue acquired. the other method of financial sanctions is more direct and is applied by the radio and television supreme council (rtÜk). rtÜk can impose broadcasting bans or heavy penalties to broadcasters for reasons only vaguely defined by law and this can easily become a powerful stick in government hands. recent experiences show that the government, or more often erdogan himself, did not hesitate to use rtÜk as a stick against any critical voice. in response to a parliamentary question from the main opposition party chp (cumhuriyet halk partisi-republican people's party), rtÜk revealed that it had imposed more than , sanctions on the media and tl million (nearly $ million) in fines over years from to (cf. güneysu , march ). the reasons given for these fines include what was defined by the turkey's top media watchdog as "targeting, insulting, and threatening turkish president erdogan, in addition to calling for a military coup against the constitution" (cf. ipa , december ) or critical reporting on the government's efforts to combat the covid- crisis (hürriyet , april ) . whatever the content, as underlined by erol Önderoglu, the representative of rsf in turkey, it is true that alternative media outlets that reject the official discourse are exposed to broadcasting bans and heavy fines (cf. hacaloglu , april ). additionally, for the first time in the history of rtÜk, media ombudsperson faruk bildirici, selected from the chp quota, was dropped from the council since he criticized almost all the decisions it made and made his criticisms public via social media (cf. bianet ). this exemplifies that the council is reluctant to debate its fines and sanctions and is intolerant to opposition. media patrons or institutions have not been the only target of the akp. at the same time, it developed a three-step strategy of intimidating journalists trying to do their job. during their first term in office, before full control by ownership of the media had not yet been achieved, members of the akp government or their representatives made direct contact with the chief editors of tv channels and newspapers. daily newsroom meetings increasingly took into account their instructions. one of my based on an interview conducted by the author on october , in istanbul. rtÜk is composed of nine members who are elected by the turkish parliament from nominees on the basis of the number of mps of each political party. as the appointment process of its members is not transparent, the council is often criticized for its lack of independence (cf. media ownership monitor ). k interviewees who was working in one of the most important news channels at this period noted that the instructions on which news items to cover started very early. one example was the pamukova train accident in where journalists were permitted to cover the tragedy only from limited perspectives and they could not ask questions about the responsibility of the ministry and high-level bureaucrats. the more the akp reinforced its position within the state bureaucracy over consecutive election victories, the more direct and effective these instructions became. journalists and correspondents who had good relations with the prime minister were appointed to the positions of chief editor and helped to establish a "red phone line" between the newsroom and the office of the prime minister (cf. dagıstanlı , p. ) . for example, nermin yurteri, who had been the correspondent following erdogan, was appointed as the news coordinator of ntv (cf. t , december ) and fatih saraç became a member of the management board of the ciner media group (cf. t , february ). another interviewee said that there were rumors about whatsapp groups among new directors of different newspapers and tv channels set by representatives of the prime ministry or presidency. it is also claimed that government representatives can share a complete news article ready to be "copied and pasted in next day's paper" on these whatsapp groups (Özer ) . the second step for controlling newsrooms was to dismiss journalists who resisted instructions from their chiefs or coming directly from the government. it is difficult to reveal the real number of journalists fired from newsrooms for their critical points of views or refusal to apply instructions dictated by the government. a list of sacked journalists, editors and correspondents prepared by turkey's journalists union during the gezi protests alone includes seventy-two names (cf. muhalefet , july ). the visible part of this iceberg includes famous columnists, chief editors or anchor persons, such as banu güven, hasan cemal, ayşenur arslan, and ruşen Çakır (cf. arsan ), who resigned or were dismissed as they could no longer defend the essence and the ethics of journalism. although the mainstream media have been captured by the government, step by step, "alternative" or "critical" newspapers or tv channels try to survive against legal and financial sanctions. the third step of intimidation by the government has targeted journalists working in these niche newsrooms. the akp's strategy has been based on the illiberal clauses of the press law, the penal code and the anti-terror law, which can be very broadly applied according to the desire of the judiciary. the first large-scale judicial attack on journalists started with the ergenekon case. this began as an investigation into a "deep state" military-led plot to overthrow the akp government, but soon was transformed into a witch-hunt targeting adversarial voices in media and non-governmental organizations (cf. steinvorth , august ). in this period, journalists came up against two categories of charges. firstly, an important group of journalists who were following the ergenekon trials were charged, based on an interview conducted by the author on october , in istanbul. fatih saraç is an islamist businessman who had close relations with erdogan (cf. diken a, february ). based on an interview conducted by the author on october , in istanbul. based on an interview conducted by the author on april , in istanbul. based on the articles and of the penal code, with "the violating of the secrecy of an ongoing trial". a second group of journalists including famous names such as mustafa balbay, tuncay Özkan, soner yalçın, ahmetŞık, and nedimŞener was accused of colluding with the so-called ergenekon ultra-nationalist conspiracy and was jailed pending trial (cf. yeşil , pp. - ) . as underlined by one of the interviewees , this harsh judicial suppression orchestrated by akp's proxies in the judiciary constituted a breaking point and led to the criminalization of all journalists who do not toe the line. after this moment, journalists who speak truth to power realized in concrete terms that not only their job, but also their freedom was at risk. after the ergenekon case, in , journalists working for pro-kurdish media outlets, namely the dicle news agency and the daily Özgür gündem, were arrested and journalists were charged with membership of kck (koma civaken kurdistan-kurdistan democratic communities union) and the pkk, within the framework of police operations that continued for months and targeted administrative staff from the peace and democracy party (bdp), then some academics, and then a large group of lawyers (cf. ergin , december ) . journalists were charged with the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and criminalized on the basis of the vague language of the anti-terror law provisions. the criminalization of journalists gained unprecedented momentum after the failed coup d'état in . a series of judicial suppression targeted journalists with different backgrounds. the first targets were journalists working in media outlets financed by the gülen movement. ten days after the coup, arrest warrants were issued for journalists suspected of links with the gülen movement, some of whom were immediately taken in police custody. more tragically, they found it difficult to get lawyers to defend them (cf. rsf , july ). on july , , all media outlets and print houses close to the gülen movement were closed down and their movable property as well as all real estate belonging to them were transferred to the treasury in terms of decree no. . almost two years afterwards a verdict was handed down and "six former columnists for zaman were sentenced to heavy prison terms for 'membership in a terrorist organization'" (rsf , july ). the second target was the pro-kurdish newspaper Özgür gündem. the suppression of the newspaper's editors and journalists was so high that human rights defenders, academics, and journalists initiated a campaign on may , (the day of the freedom of the press) to protect their colleagues. each of the supporters of the campaign became for one day the substitute editor-in-chief of Özgür gündem until august . however, the judiciary decided to close down the newspaper temporarily on august , for "regularly making pkk terrorist organization propaganda and serving as a broadcasting organ for an armed terrorist organization" (akgül , august ) . next day, some journalists and workers at the daily were detained during a police raid. in addition, the prosecutor charged participants in the solidarity campaign with Özgür gündem with "terror organization propaganda" under the anti-terror act (tmk) article / and "releasing or publishing terror organizations' statements or declarations" under article (akgül a, march ) and their trial started on september , (cf. duran . two different trials related to Özgür gündem lasted for more than years. in brief, the process of jailing and trying defendants in the Özgür gündem trials, as well as the penalties imposed on them, illustrates very well what journalists who do not accept the journalism framework imposed by the government can expect. the third target was cumhuriyet, one of the oldest newspapers from turkey's republican era. on october , turkish police detained board members, executives and some columnists following a series of raids (cf. cumhuriyet , october ) . nine months after their detention the first hearing of the cumhuriyet trials took place on july , . the prosecution claimed that the daily had published news and articles legitimizing the july coup attempt and given their support to three terrorist organizations-"fetÖ, pkk/kck and dhkp/c" (a small far-left group) (cf. akgül b, july ). the indictment presented all the news and articles criticizing the authoritarian policies of the government as support for terrorism and the court sentenced journalists to prison on terrorism charges on april , (cf. gall . as in previous cases against different journalists, the indictment, pretrial detention and trial proceedings of cumhuriyet violated the basic human rights of the defendants. however, the symbolic nature of this trial was even more devastating, as the daily has always had an important place in turkey's journalistic history. in addition, one of my interviewees (see footnote ) noted that the cumhuriyet trials showed that, starting from the ergenekon case, the akp government was able to create a very insecure environment and intimidate an important proportion of journalists as well as human rights defenders by using judicial coercion. they explained that it was relatively easier to organize resistance when ahmetŞık was first arrested during the ergenekon case. however, they said that everybody was more reluctant to participate when they again tried to organize a campaign to support ahmetŞık and other cumhuriyet journalists on trial for the second time. apart from these major trials, there are several legal investigations against individual journalists. since the failed coup d'état, the "famous" article of the turkish penal code has been put into use again against critical intellectuals including academics, lawyers, and journalists. news covering turkey's incursion into afrin in january and military operations in syria were regarded as insults to the turkish state (cf. cengiz , october ). since , the media monitoring database has registered judicial interferences based on the article (cf. medya gözlem veritabanı ). turkey's renewed use of article as a weapon points out the increasing suppression on journalists. the original version of the article accepted in as a part of the new penal code made it a crime to denigrate "turkisshness" and turkish government institutions. prosecutors used the article against novelists, academics and journalists including well-known names such as orhan pamuk, hrant dink (murdered by a turkish nationalist during the period of his trial), taner akçam, and elifŞafak. in , a new amendment changed "turkishness" into "the turkish nation" and made it obligatory to get approval of the minister of justice to file a case. taner akçam brought a case against turkey and the ecthr (european court of human rights) found turkey guilty of violating freedom of expression (cf. akçam v. turkey ). additionally, in their report published at the end of , the committee to protect journalists ranked turkey the second-highest jailer of journalists in the world after china (cf. beiser ). pretrial detention can last for months and sometimes years and has been used as a method of punishment. in , several cases were brought by journalists to the ecthr and in march , the court took an important decision. for the application ofŞahin alpay and mehmet altan, the court held that there had been a violation of article § (right to liberty and security) and a violation of article (freedom of expression) of the european convention on human rights (echr) and ordered to release these journalists from prison. however, almost immediately another warrant was issued for their arrest on charges and they were sent back to jail (cf. ipi ). the last developments show that ecthr rulings are no longer effectively applied by turkish government. the fact that turkey is still a member of the council of europe despite the systematic violations of the echr ruling creates serious doubts on the capacity of european democratic institutions to deal with new authoritarian regimes such as turkey. on the other hand, the huge numbers of prosecutions after the coup attempt in , the use of pretrial detention and the criminalization of any critical views under the state of emergency have increased the number of detainees in prisons and created a very unhygienic and unsafe environment in jail, especially at the time of the global pandemic. although the turkish government passed a new prison release law on april , , the law fails to include many "political" prisoners who are already convicted or in pretrial detention, including journalists, lawyers, and political and human rights activists. the insistence of the turkish government on not releasing them brings to mind the question whether it is a conscious choice to leave all political opponents in jails and at a high-level of risk during the covid- pandemic. the akp government has applied threefold strategies to capture the mass media in turkey. firstly, they have systematically obliged owners of mainstream media outlets to exit the media sector by using the competences of divers public institutions and imposing financial sanctions. in this way, they have changed the ownership profile of the mass media and created their own loyal and partisan media. secondly, using rtÜk they have fined media outlets that they cannot fully control. thirdly, they have targeted and intimidated critical journalists using legal suppression and threats of imprisonment. different factors, such as the transformation of the political economy after the military coup d'état in , the corrupted relationship between journalists and political leaders, and latent censorship on taboo topics, certainly played a role in facilitating the application of these strategies. however, the akp's methods differed on at least three points from previous governments' strategies. first of all, they were able to design their media capture strategy within a political system that they have dominated step by step due to their majority in successive elections. constitutional amendments and important changes in the judicial system have also eroded judicial independence. this erosion k of judicial independence opened the way to the criminalization of journalists as well as to intensifying the effects of criminalization. secondly, instead of continuing with a stick and carrots strategy with existing media tycoons, they transformed pro-akp businessmen into media owners. this process created new media patrons whose existence and future depends largely on erdogan's consent. their blind allegiance to erdogan has become the main characteristic of these new media patrons. the transformation of the ownership profile also influenced workers of media outlets at all level. as underlined by one of my interviewees (see footnote ), an important feature of the journalistic profession is based on a master-apprentice relationship. yet, the coin of the realm is no longer experience in the field, but the capacity to submit. those who were able to offer their experience have voluntarily or involuntarily left the profession. the new generation of reporters, editors or columnists is familiar only with the rule of the akp, which raised important questions about the future. thirdly, ever since his very first years in government erdogan himself has openly attacked journalists and media patrons with whom he does not have a deal. his threats, "you will pay for this," directed to critical journalists and the subsequent judiciary suppression that follows these threats refer also to a systemic transformation of the field. this systemic transformation points out an accreditation of journalism as a whole in turkey. in brief, this captured mass media environment in turkey deeply harms freedom of the press as well as citizens' right to be informed. however, we are at the same time living in an age of digitalization of the media landscape. can social media and online news platforms play a role in solving the media freedom problems in turkey? or will and can turkish government apply a digital censorship through the "new social media law regulation" ? further research focusing on the relevance of social media for the freedom of expression and on the impact of social media regulation will permit us to think about media capture through digital censorship. funding open access funding provided by projekt deal. open access this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution . international license, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the creative commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. the images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's creative commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. if material is not included in the article's creative commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 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Özgür gündem newspaper shut down jail term, fine for Özgür gündem editor-in-chief on watch mate sansürün kaldırılmasının . yılında cumhuriyet davası başlıyor case of altug taner akçam v köşe yazarıyım, kapı dışarıyım turkish media group is fined $ . billion egypt are world's worst jailers of journalists handcuffs for the grabbing hand? media capture and government accountability opposition member faruk bildirici dropped from rtÜk membership milliyet ve vatan demirören-karacan ortaklıgına satıldı dogan media sale to erdogan ally is blow to press freedom illiberal democracy in hungary: authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation? democratization capturing regulatory reality: stigler's the theory of economic regulation. faculty scholarship paper turkey resurrects deadly article against dissent media capture in a democracy: the role of wealth concentration illiberal democracy or electoral autocracy-the case of turkey cumhuriyet gazetesine operasyon ne kim -medyanın mutfagından sansür -otosansür hikayeleri soruda mehmet fatih saraç soruda sabah-atv satışı Özgür gündem'le dayanışma davası başladı deniz feneri kavgası büyüyor journalist arrests from the model of democracy rising competitive authoritarianism in turkey k media capture strategies in new authoritarian states: the case of turkey captured news media: the case of turkey mastering british politics turkish court convicts from cumhuriyet newspaper on terrorism charges. ny times rtÜk sansürünün yıllık bilançosu dış borçlar political communication in media society: does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? the impact of normative theory on empirical research rtÜk'ün televizyon kanallarına verdigi cezalar ne anlama geliyor? the kurds of turkey: killings, disappearances and torture uzan grubuna el konuldu rtÜk'ten fatih portakal'ın sözleri nedeniyle fox tv'ye ceza erdogan lawyer files an appeal to rtÜk demanding tv program suspension ipi troubled by tax case targeting turkey media owner turbulent times: turkey and european court of human rights islamisation of turkey under the akp rule: empowering family, faith and charity İktidar yumagı: medya, sermaye, devlet.İstanbul:İmge yayınevi politics and the mass media in turkey evrensel ve birgün basınİlan kurumu'na karşı elections without democracy: the rise of competitive authoritarianism a third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? democratization political affiliations gazeteciİşten atılır, dövülür how media and politics shape each other in the new europe freedom without impartiality. the vicious circle of media capture in the service of power: media capture and the threat to democracy turkey's judiciary and the drift toward competitive authoritarianism whatsapp groups: another side to censorship in turkey tekelci medyada örgütsüz gazeteci inequality and media capture illiberal democracy and the struggle on the right turkey: in latest escalation, media outlets closed by decree zaman trial: heavy prison sentences for six turkish journalists elections without democracy: the menu of manipulation the politics of uncertainty the power of news İmamın ordusu.İstanbul: kırmızı kedi the new censorship: inside the global battle for media freedom resurgence and remaking of identity: civil beliefs, domestic and external dynamics, and the turkish mainstream discourse on kurds the political economy of the media in turkey: a sectoral analysis turkish journalist seeks german protection the theory of economic regulation in the service of power: media capture and the threat to democracy tamince star gazetesi ve kanal 'e ortak ntv yayın koordinatörü nermin yurteri oldu kart: hükümet eliyle yaratılan 'fatih saraç prototipleri' deşifre edilmeli a history of turkey's akp-gülen conflict public service broadcasting and media systems in troubled european democracies media capture and advertising in turkey: the impact of the state on the news the kurdish question in turkish state discourse media in new turkey: the origins of an authoritarian neoliberal state authoritarian turn or continuity? governance of media through capture and discipline in the akp era the rise of illiberal democracy gülçin balamir coşkun phd, is an einstein fellow at the institut für sozialwissenschaften, humboldt-universität zu berlin. her ongoing project focuses on the role of media control as a symptom of democratic backsliding in the akp era key: cord- -ew lwmsn authors: haddow, george d.; haddow, kim s. title: communicating during a public health crisis date: - - journal: disaster communications in a changing media world doi: . /b - - - - . - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: ew lwmsn “communicating during a public health crisis,” examines how communicating to the public and media during a public health or safety emergency is different. in a serious crisis, all affected people take in information differently, process information differently and act on information differently. this chapter incorporates the centers for disease control and prevention’s (cdc) best advice for communicating during a public health crisis, including infectious disease outbreaks, bioterrorism, chemical emergencies, natural disasters, nuclear accidents and radiation releases and explosions. this chapter also explores the growing role of social media that is now being used for a variety of traditional and new purposes from distress calls to disease surveillance. social media is now a part of the public health communications toolbox. from the cdc down to local departments of health, public health, and safety officials are using social media to push out vital and useful information to the public and to monitor and respond to public comments. but social media is also being used for a broader range of public health purposes-from collecting data to track the spread of diseases to sending calls for help-and the public health system is still figuring out how to adapt. "the use of social media has proven a valuable asset for adaptation and improvisation related to the public health and medical consequences of disasters. these tools are especially valuable for saving lives during a disaster's impact phase and especially during its immediate aftermath, when traditional disaster management capabilities are not available…. the need remains for fusion of social media into existing institutional programs for crisis informatics and disaster-risk management" (keim and noji, ) . the center for disease control and prevention is actively using social media, but social media use by public health agencies is still considered to be in the "early adoption stage" (thackeray et al., ) . even though the majority of state health departments ( %) report using at least one social media application, they are "using social media as a channel to distribute information rather than capitalizing on the interactivity available to create conversations and engage with the audience" (thackeray et al., ) . according to a report on the use of social media by state health departments, . percent of the state health departments reported they had a twitter account, percent a facebook account, and percent a youtube channel; but, "on average, state health departments made one post per day on social media sites, and this was primarily to distribute information; there was very little interaction with audiences. shds have few followers or friends on their social media sites. the most common topics for posts and tweets related to staying healthy and diseases and conditions" (thackeray et al., ) . the report recommends, "because social media use is becoming so pervasive, it seems prudent for state health departments to strategically consider how to use it to their advantage. to maximize social media's potential, public health agencies should communicating during a public health crisis chapter eleven develop a plan for incorporating it within their overall communication strategy. the agency must identify what audience they are trying to reach, how that audience uses social media, what goals and objectives are most appropriate, and which social media applications fit best with the identified goals and objectives" (thackeray et al., ) . there are examples of health departments and associations using social media to augment their communications efforts: • in shelby county, tennessee, the health department is using twitter to increase its media coverage. they tweet out their press releases which are retweeted by reporters-expanding the department's public reach. • in philadelphia, the department of hiv planning uses twitter to increase participation in their community workshops. they tweet out the meeting's content to people in the large nine-county area they serve and use twitter to "extend the conversation beyond the room." • the american public health association (@publichealth) took advantage of the super bowl to promote related health messages using the #superbowl hashtag. they tweeted about healthy snacks, drinking and driving, and flu vaccination. when the half-hour blackout hit, they took advantage of the unexpected opportunity with the tweet in figure . , which was widely retweeted. at the annual meeting for the national association of county and city heath officials (naccho), additional examples of health departments' use of social media were highlighted (new public health, ): • the kansas city health department uses twitter and facebook to push information on extreme heat safety during the summertime. the messages and reports of suspected or confirmed heat-related deaths resulted in coverage of health department activities and partnerships on national news channels including the weather channel and cnn. the boston health commission used social media to promote its youth media campaign on sugary beverages. the campaign received close to , views, and close to , clicks on their facebook ads. • in contra costa, california, a recent campaign included a podcast by the public health director that was promoted on twitter and facebook. parts of the podcast were picked up by local radio which allowed the public health department to most accurately get their message across. the cdc, which has been a pioneer in the integration of social media tools into public health communications, including their multichannel "zombie"-themed emergency preparedness public education campaign (cdc, ) , has developed and is distributing a social media toolkit for health communicators. the cdc's "socialmediaworks" toolkit was designed to help "health communicators integrate social media strategies and technologies into their communication plans." the kit features tools to develop a better social media strategy, learn how social media tools work, plan, implement, and manage all in one place including "calendar and dashboard features that allow you to schedule and manage your social media initiative," and hosts a community forum to enable health professionals to "engage with colleagues on social media strategy, share lessons learned, and learn what works" (cdc, ). in a new england journal of medicine article, "integrating social media into emergency-preparedness efforts," the reason given by the three authors to the pervasiveness of social media is "it makes sense to explicitly consider the best way of leveraging these communication channels before, during, and after disasters…. engaging with and using emerging social media may well place the emergency-management community, including medical and public health professionals, in a better position to respond to disasters" (merchant et al., ) . specifically, they suggest: • actively using networking sites such as facebook to help individuals, communities, and agencies share emergency plans and establish emergency networks. web-based "buddy" systems, for example, might have allowed more at-risk people to receive medical attention and social services during the chicago heat wave, when hundreds of people died of heat-related illness. • linking the public with day-to-day, real-time information about how their community's health care system is functioning. for example, emergency room and clinic waiting times are already available in some areas of the country through mobile-phone applications, billboard really simple syndication (rss) feeds, or hospital tweets. monitoring this important information through the same social channels during an actual disaster may help responders verify whether facilities are overloaded and determine which ones can offer needed medical care. • using location-based service applications (such as foursquare and loopt) and global positioning system (gps) software to allow people to "check in" to a specific location and share information about their immediate surroundings. with an additional click, perhaps off-duty nurses or paramedics who check in at a venue could also broadcast their professional background and willingness to help in the event of a nearby emergency. • increasing the use of social media during recovery. the extensive reach of social networks allows people who are recovering from disasters to rapidly connect with needed resources. tweets and photographs linked to timelines and interactive maps can tell a cohesive story about a recovering community's capabilities and vulnerabilities in real-time. "organizations such as ushahidi have helped with recovery in haiti by matching volunteer health care providers with distressed areas. social media have been used in new ways to connect responders and people directly affected by such disasters as the deepwater horizon oil spill, flash floods in australia, and the earthquake in new zealand with medical and mental health services" (merchant et al., ) . in late , there was a strange increase in emergency room visits in guangdong province in china for acute respiratory illness and a number of local news and internet reports about a respiratory disease affecting healthcare workers. several long weeks later, the government announced the cause was severe acute respiratory syndrome, or sars. according to dr. john brownstein, one of the developers of healthmap, an online platform that mines informal sources for disease outbreak monitoring, "if this data had been harvested properly and promptly, this early epidemic intelligence collected online could have helped contain what became a global pandemic" (brownstein, ) . "we are now in an era where epidemic intelligence flows not only through government hierarchies but also through informal channels, ranging from press reports to blogs to chat rooms to analyses of web searches. collectively, these sources provide a view of global health that is fundamentally different from that yielded by disease reporting in traditional public health infrastructures," dr. brownstein explained. "they also provide a process that dramatically reduces the time required to recognize outbreaks" (brownstein, ) . more recently, the explosion of online news and social media has brought a new era of disease surveillance. today, the websites healthmap.org and outbreaks near me deliver real-time intelligence on a broad range of emerging infectious diseases for a diverse audience, which includes local health departments, governments, clinicians, and international travelers. healthmap.org states they "bring together disparate data sources, including online news aggregators, eyewitness reports, expert-curated discussions and validated official reports, to achieve a unified and comprehensive view of the current global state of infectious diseases and their effect on human and animal health. through an automated process that updates / / , the system monitors, organizes, integrates, filters, visualizes and disseminates online information about emerging diseases in nine languages, early detection of global public health threats" (healthmap.org, ) . healthmap is part of a growing landscape of government and nongovernment organizations mining internet and social data to determine the spread of viruses and the rate of infection. some organizations are also asking the public to self-report how they are feeling, according to kim stephens, the lead blogger of idisaster . , who outlines several tools being used to aggregate data to fight the flu and other diseases. google flu trends is a site that provides geographically based information about the spread of the influenza virus. their data is aggregated from the search terms people are using versus self-reporting. in fact, the graph of the tracked searches (see below) related to the flu compared to the actual reported cases of the virus is so close that they almost overlap. google explains how this works: we have found a close relationship between how many people search for flu-related topics and how many people actually have flu symptoms. of course, not every person who searches for "flu" is actually sick, but a pattern emerges when all the flu-related search queries are added together. we compared our query counts with traditional flu surveillance systems and found that many search queries tend to be popular exactly when flu season is happening. by counting how often we see these search queries, we can estimate how much flu is circulating in different countries and regions around the world. google's results have been published in the journal nature (stephens, ) . mappyhealth is another tool that tracks keywords related to health but instead of using data from searches in google, this system uses the twitter data stream. their stated reason for the site: "it is hypothesized that social data could be a predictor to outbreaks of disease. we track disease terms and associated qualifiers to present these social trends." although this blog post is focused on influenza, the mappyhealth site tracks different categories of illness (stephens, ) . flunearyou is a tool that allows the public to participate in tracking the spread of flu by filling out a survey each week. the survey is quite simple and asks the respondent if they have had any symptoms during the past week and whether or not they have had the flu shot either this year or last year. respondents can include family members and the questions are asked about each person individually. this user-contributed data is then aggregated and displayed on a map with pins that are either green for no symptoms, yellow for some, and red for "at least one person with influenza-like" symptoms. the pins are clickable and display the number of users in that zipcode that have reported their condition, but no personal information whatsoever. the number of participants in the state is displayed ( in massachusetts) as well as locations and addresses where people can get vaccinated. links to local public health agencies are also provided. people can also sign up to receive location-based disease alerts via email. social sharing of the site and its content is encouraged by the addition of prominently placed social media buttons (stephens, ) . consumer-oriented applications also are being developed such as sickweather, which tracks social media posts that reference illnesses and displays trends by location. sickweather also shows illness patterns over time and allows members to report their illness directly and share information with friends through social networks (newcomer, ) . the department of homeland security (dhs) is also mining social media for biosurveillance. dhs is testing whether scanning social media sites to collect and analyze health-related data could help identify infectious disease outbreaks, bioterrorism or other public health and national security risks. the -year biosurveillance pilot involves automatically scanning social media sites, such as facebook and twitter, to collect and analyze health-related data in real-time (sternstein, ) . the social media data analytics technology will "watch for trends," such as whether new or unusual clusters of symptoms in various geographic regions are being reported on social networking sites. the project is the latest in a series of dhs data analysis efforts for biosurveillance. for example, dhs is already analyzing data that is collected by the cdc from public health departments nationwide. also, it is collecting and analyzing air samples in several cities for signs of bioterrorist chemicals, such as anthrax (sternstein, ) . news organizations are providing the public with information about the effects of the influenza virus and some are also using social media to increase public awareness. at the height of the flu season a #fluchat was sponsored by @usatodayhealth. "health based twitter chats offer the public the opportunity to post questions that are addressed by healthcare professionals or researchers. the cdc, for instance, has conducted many chats on a wide variety of topics. watching the questions that are posted in these chats offers local public health organizations an opportunity to "hear" the concerns of the public. knowing this information can help with message formulation and coordination" (stephens, ) . here are a few questions posted to the #fluchat: @usatodayhealth how long after the flu shot are you actually prevented from getting the flu? #fluchat-taylor yarbrough (@sellorelse) january , @usatodayhealth what % of americans have gotten the flu each of the last years?-bob (@sgt ) january , (stephens, ) finally, a trend that will once again change the way public health and safety agencies and organizations operate during disasters-the increased use of facebook and twitter to call for help or rescue. more and more people are turning to social media as their first choice of communications during a crisis. public polling by the red cross in and documents the public's large and growing expectation that disaster officials monitor social media sites and respond quickly to distress calls on facebook, twitter, and other platforms. according to red cross surveys: • percent expect emergency responders to monitor social sites-and to respond promptly for calls for help. • percent would try an online channel to get help if unable to reach emergency medical services (ems). • at least a third of the public expects help to arrive in less than an hour if they posted a request for help on a social media website-and more than three out of four ( %) expect help within hours-up from percent in (american red cross, ). clearly meeting this challenge and responding to these expectations must be a priority for the public health and safety community. communicating to the public and media during a public health or safety emergency is different in several aspects than other disaster communications. in a serious crisis, all affected people take in information differently, process information differently, and act on information differently. in recognition of those differences, the cdc has published its own, highly recommended "crises and emergency risk communications manual." highlights from the edition of the cdc manual follow below. the purpose of an official response to a public health crisis is to efficiently and effectively reduce and prevent illness, injury, and death, and return individuals and communities to normal as quickly as possible. specific hazards under cdc emergency preparedness and response include: • infectious disease outbreaks-the spread of viruses, bacteria, or other microorganisms that causes illness or death. this includes cholera, e. coli infection, pandemic flu, and other infections. • bioterrorism-the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to cause illness or death, including anthrax and the plague. • chemical emergencies-the intentional or unintentional release of a chemical that could harm people's health including chlorine, mercury, nerve agents, ricin, or an oil spill. the cdc also has a role in responding to natural disasters, nuclear accidents, and radiation releases and explosions. so what is the public's response to one of these disasters? • fear, anxiety, confusion, and dread-these are emotions that need acknowledging. • hopelessness and helplessness-part of the job of a crises communicator is to help the community manage its fears and set them on a course. action helps reduce anxiety and restores a sense of control, even if it is symbolic, put up the flag, or preparatory-donate blood, or just as simple, check on an elderly neighbor. • uncertainty-people dislike uncertainty. the not-knowing can seem worse than a bad result. people can manage uncertainty if you share with them the process you are using to get answers. "i can't tell you what's causing so many people in our town to get so sick. but i can tell you what we're doing to find out…." the situation may obviously be uncertain and acting otherwise creates mistrust. • not panic-panic during a crisis is rare. contrary to what we see portrayed in the movies, we seldom act irrationally when faced with a crisis-and we seldom panic. people nearly always behave in a rational way during a crisis. in the face of the / attacks, people in lower manhattan became simultaneously resourceful and responsive. when told what to do by those in authority, people followed instructions. the panic myth is one of the most pervasive misconceptions about crises. many government leaders are concerned about causing public panic. when facing a crisis, they may mistakenly withhold information in an effort to prevent panic and protect the public-at the very time they should be sharing their concerns. conditions that are likely to create heightened anxiety and severe emotional distress are silence or conflicting messages from authorities. people are likely to be very upset when they feel: • they cannot trust what those in authority are telling them. • they have been misled or left without guidance during times of severe threat. • if authorities start hedging or hiding the bad news, they will increase the risk of creating a confused, angry, and an uncooperative public. the faster you give bad news, the better. holding back implies mistrust, guilt, or arrogance. in general, the public wants access to as much information as possible. too little information enhances the psychological stress. if information is incomplete or not present at all during a crisis, this will increase anxiety and increase a sense of powerlessness. it will also lower trust in government agencies. the cdc has found that people may receive, interpret, and act on information differently during an emergency than during a normal period. four factors that change how we process information during a crisis: . we simplify messages-under intense stress and possible information overload, we tend to miss the nuances or importance of health and safety messages by: • not fully hearing information, because of our inability to juggle multiple facts during a crisis. • not remembering as much of the information as we should. • confusing action messages, such as remembering which highway is blocked for safety to cope, many of us may not attempt a logical and reasoned approach to decision making. instead, we may rely on habits and long-held practices. we might also follow bad examples set by others, and engage in irrational behaviors like unfairly blaming leaders or institutions. asking people to do something that seems counterintuitive. examples include the following: • getting out of a safe car and lying in a ditch instead of outrunning a tornado. • evacuating even when the weather looks calm. changing our beliefs during a crisis or emergency may be difficult. beliefs are very strongly held and are not easily altered. see, and tend to believe what we've experienced. during crises, we want messages confirmed before taking action. you may find that you or other individuals are likely to do the following: • change television channels to see if the same warning is being repeated elsewhere. • try to call friends and family to see if others have heard the same messages. • check in on their social media networks to see what their friends and family are doing. • turn to a known and credible local leader for advice. • in cases where evacuation is recommended, we tend to watch to see if our neighbors are evacuating before we make our decision. this confirmation first-before we take action-is very common in a crisis. . we believe the first message-during a crisis, the speed of a response can be an important factor in reducing harm. in the absence of information, we begin to speculate and fill in the blanks. this often results in rumors. the first message to reach us may be the accepted message, even though more accurate information may follow. when new, perhaps more complete information becomes available, we compare it to the first messages we heard. therefore, messages should be simple, credible, and consistent. speed is also very important when communicating in an emergency. an effective message must: • be repeated. • come from multiple credible sources. • be specific to the emergency being experienced. • offer a positive course of action that can be executed. people should also have access to more information, through other channels, such as through websites, and old and new media. good communication can reduce stress, harmful human behavior, and prevent negative public health response outcomes. trained communicators will do the following: • reduce high levels of uncertainty. • use an effective crisis-communication plan. • be the first source for information. • express empathy and show concern. • exhibit competence and expertise. • coordinate with other response officials. • commit and remain dedicated to the response and recovery after the immediate crisis has passed. audiences receive, interpret, and evaluate messages before they take action. expect your audience to immediately judge the content of your message for speed, factual content, and trust and credibility: was the message timely without sacrificing accuracy? one of the primary dilemmas of effective crisis and emergency risk communication is to be speedy in responding but maintain accuracy even when the situation is uncertain. being first to communicate establishes your organization as the primary source of information. the public may judge how prepared your organization was for the emergency based on how fast you responded. speedy responses suggest that there is a system in place and that appropriate actions are being taken. remember that if agencies are not communicating, audiences will turn to other, less credible sources. first impressions are lasting impressions, and it's important to be accurate. responding quickly with the wrong information or poorly developed messages damages credibility. this does not necessarily mean having all the answers; it means having an early presence so the public knows that agencies are engaged and that there is a system in place to respond. research shows there are some basic elements to establishing trust and credibility through communications, and you will notice they repeat the important elements in executing a successful crisis communication plan: empathy and caring-this needs to be expressed in the first seconds. according to research, being perceived as empathetic and caring increases the chances your message will be received and acted on. acknowledge fear, pain, suffering, and uncertainty. competence and expertise-the public will be listening for factually correct information, and some people will expect to hear specific recommendations for action. therefore, you should do the following: • get the facts right. • repeat the facts often, using simple nontechnical terms. • avoid providing sketchy details in the early part of the response. • ensure that all credible sources share the same facts. speak with one voice. inconsistent messages will increase anxiety, quickly undermining expert advice and credibility. honesty and openness-this does not mean releasing information prematurely. it means being transparent-admitting when you do not have all the information, telling the public you do not, and why. the perception of risk is not about numbers alone and communicators should consider the following rules for raising the public's comfort level during a crisis. these are adapted from the environmental protection agency's seven cardinal rules of risk communication. . accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner-two basic tenets of risk communication in a democracy are generally understood and accepted. first, people and communities have a right to participate in decisions that affect their lives, their property, and the things they value. second, the goal should be to produce an informed public that is involved, interested, reasonable, thoughtful, solution-oriented, and collaborative. you should not try to diffuse public concerns and avoid action. guidelines: • show respect for the public by involving the community early, before important decisions are made. • clarify that decisions about risks will be based not only on the magnitude of the risk but on factors of concern to the public. . listen to the audience-people are often more concerned about issues such as trust, credibility, control, benefits, competence, voluntariness, fairness, empathy, caring, courtesy, and compassion. they are not as interested in mortality statistics, and the details of a quantitative risk assessment. if your audience feels or perceives that they are not being heard, they cannot be expected to listen. effective risk communication is a two-way activity. guidelines: • do not make assumptions about what people know, think, or want done about risks. • listen. monitor social media and comments on your website. make an active effort to find out what people are thinking and feeling. • involve all parties who have an interest or a stake in the issue. • identify with your audience and try to put yourself in their place. • recognize people's emotions. • let people know that you understand their concerns and are addressing them. understand that audiences often have hidden agendas, symbolic meanings, and broader social, cultural, economic, or political considerations that complicate the task. accepted, the messenger must be perceived as trustworthy and credible. so the first goal must be to establish trust and credibility. short-term judgments of trust and credibility are based largely on verbal and nonverbal communications. longterm judgments are based largely on actions and performance. once made, trust and credibility judgments are resistant to change. in communicating risk information, these are your most precious assets. once lost, they are difficult to regain. guidelines: • express willingness to follow up with answers if the question cannot be answered at the time you are speaking. • make corrections if errors are made. • disclose risk information as soon as possible, emphasizing appropriate reservations about reliability. • do not minimize or exaggerate the level of risk. • lean toward sharing more information, not less, to prevent people from thinking something significant is being hidden. • discuss data uncertainties, strengths, and weaknesses, including the ones identified by other credible sources. • identify worst-case estimates and cite ranges of risk estimates when appropriate. . coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources-allies can be effective in helping communicate risk information. few things make risk communication more difficult than public conflicts with other credible sources. guidelines: • coordinate all communications among and within organizations. • devote effort and resources to the slow, hard work of building bridges, partnerships, and alliances with other organizations. • use credible and authoritative intermediaries. • consult with others to determine who is best able to answer questions about risk. • try to release communications jointly with other trustworthy sources, such as: -university scientists. -physicians. -local or national opinion leaders. -citizen advisory groups. -local officials. . meet the needs of the media-the media are primary transmitters of risk information. they play a critical role in setting agendas and in determining outcomes. the media generally have an agenda that emphasizes the more sensational aspects of a crisis. they may be interested in political implications of a risk. the media tend to simplify stories rather than reflect the complexity. guidelines: • remain open with, and accessible to, reporters. • respect their need to "feed the beast"-to provide news for an audience that is eager for information / . provide information tailored to the needs of each type of media, such as sound bites, graphics, and other visual aids for television. • agree with the reporter in advance about specific topics and stick to those during the interview. • prepare a limited number of positive key messages in advance and repeat the messages several times during the interview. • provide background material on complex risk issues. • do not speculate. the cdc has produced a series of manuals, toolkits, and trainings that are helping integrate social media into the disaster communications planning and operations of public health officials at every level and are helping speed up the adaption of these tools for saving lives. • keep interviews short and follow up on stories with praise or criticism, as warranted • establish long-term trust relationships with specific editors and reporters speak clearly and with compassion-technical language and jargon are barriers to successful communication with the public. in low-trust, high-concern situations, empathy and caring carry more weight than numbers and technical facts. guidelines: • use plain language • remain sensitive to local norms, such as speech and dress strive for brevity, but respect people's needs and offer to provide more information if needed • use graphics and other pictorial material to clarify messages • personalize risk data by using anecdotes that make technical data come alive. • acknowledge and respond to emotions that people express • promise only what can be delivered • understand and convey that any illness, injury, or death is a tragedy • avoid distant, abstract, unfeeling language about deaths, injuries, and illnesses • do not discuss money-the magnitude of the problem should be in the context of the health and safety of the people-loss of property is secondary give people things to do-in an emergency, simple tasks will: • give people a sense of control • keep people motivated to stay tuned to what is happening • prepare people to take action if and when they need to do so do no harm-the odds of a negative public response increases when poor communication practices are added to a crisis situation • public power struggles, conflicts, and confusion • perception that certain groups are getting preferential treatment more americans using mobile apps in emergencies using social media for disease surveillance. cnn global public square emergent use of social media: a new age of opportunity for disaster resilience integrating social media into emergency-preparedness efforts using social media to extend the reach of local public health departments idisaster . : social media and emergency management. fighting influenza with data nextgov. dhs tries monitoring social media for signs of biological attack adoption and use of social media among public health departments key: cord- -gud dow authors: kalpokas, ignas title: problematising reality: the promises and perils of synthetic media date: - - journal: sn soc sci doi: . /s - - - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: gud dow this commentary article focuses on the emergence of synthetic media—computer-generated content that is created by employing artificial intelligence (ai) technologies. it discusses three of the most notable current forms of this emerging form of content: deepfakes, virtual influencers, and augmented and virtual reality (collectively known as extended reality). their key features are introduced, and the main challenges and opportunities associated with the technologies are analysed. in all cases, a crucial change is underway: reality (or, at least, the perception thereof) is seen as increasingly less stable, and potential for manipulation is on the rise. in fact, it transpires that personalisation of (perceived) reality is the likely outcome, with increasing societal fragmentation as a result. mediatisation is used as a broad-ranging metatheory that explains the permeation by media of everyday affairs to explain the degree of impact that synthetic media have on the society. in this context, it is suggested that we search for new and alternative criteria for reality that would be capable of accounting for the changing nature of agency and impact in today’s world. for assessing the reality of objects and phenomena still hold and whether reality in the general sense must be reconsidered. adopting a perspective tentatively affirmative of such a switch, this article explores ways in which the new, synthetic, media can affect human thinking and behaviour without dealing with anything conventionally real. although the assertion that the media now play an increasingly central role in everyday life has become ubiquitous, the changing nature of the media themselves is commonly overlooked. while discussions would often focus on issues of framing, misrepresentation, or underrepresentation, it is becoming crucial to also focus on the media's generative capacity. the latter refers to the capacity to create synthetic likenesses, personalities, and entire environments solely by way of digital technologies. therefore, the reality we experience and use as a baseline for future decisions and life plans can easily have no physical counterpart and might be even unique to our own personal experience. to provide at least a tentative account of the transformations pertaining to synthetic media, mediatisation theory is briefly overviewed as a metatheory for conceptualising the media's growing influence. the analysis then focuses on synthetic media, first engaging with the capacity to create synthetic likenesses (deepfakes), then moving onto synthetic personalities (virtual influencers) and synthetic worlds (extended reality). this article thereby demonstrates the growing challenges faced by traditional accounts of reality that are biased in favour of physical tangibility. the contention is that the reality of something must, instead, be measured primarily through affective capacity. according to an influential definition, mediatisation refers to the condition whence the media 'have become an integral part of other institutions' operations, while they also have achieved a degree of self-determination and authority that forces other institutions […] to submit to their logic' (hjarvard , p. ) . the matter here is, essentially, one of the media's ever-presence, permeating 'all aspects of private, social, political, cultural, and economic life, from the micro (individual) to the meso (organisational) to the macro (societal) level' (giaxoglou and döveling , p. ). in the same vein, the social world of today is 'changed in its dynamics and structure by the role that media continuously (indeed recursively) play in its construction' (couldry and hepp , p. ). hence, the media no longer mediate between the world and the experience of it but increasingly generate that experience. simultaneously, while previously individuals were confined to their physical location, now one can be immersed in a number of digital worlds and interact with a number of individuals regardless of distance (couldry and hepp , p. ) . likewise, the media must be seen as constituting 'a realm of shared experience' by offering 'a continuous presentation and interpretation of "the way things are"' and thereby contributing to 'the development of a sense of identity and of community' (hjarvard , p. ) , thereby determining the functioning of social relations (nowak-teter , p. ). of course, the media have always played a community-building and community-integrating role. however, the key difference is this: while previously the media used to perform a somewhat supplementary role, building onto the 'real' world and conveying or explaining it, with varying degrees of fidelity, the current condition is characterised by the media hosting and creating the world that they purport to merely represent (kalpokas et al. ) . no less importantly, mediatisation also implies a certain delegation of agency as 'collectivities [are] created by automated calculation based on the "digital traces" that individuals leave online' (couldry and hepp , p. ) . in this sense, as boler and davis ( , pp. - ) assert, algorithms inherent in today's dominant media platforms 'define the spaces of our information encounters, encounters with others, and the status of knowledge'. simultaneously, attention becomes the scarcest of resources-individuals simply no longer have sufficient means to pay enough of it (citton , p. ) . when coupled with algorithmic analysis of trends and user behaviour, attention becomes its own magnet: 'attention attracts attention', i.e. the more people interact with a digital object, the more it rises in the algorithmic pecking order, thereby becoming more visible to others; therefore, even 'looking at an object represents a labour which increases the value of that object', leaving pleasure and labour inextricably entwined (citton , pp. - , ) . it then also becomes obvious that whatever maximises audience attention, becomes an attractive proposition for content providers-audience captivation becomes more important than truthfulness, 'reality' in the conventional sense of the term, or any other considerations (kalpokas ) . that also implies a great degree of malleability and adaptability of the social world, as strict adherence to the tangible no longer is a must: for as long as social occurrences can be created and sustained within media ecosystems, they can and should be seen as sufficiently real, leading towards 'primacy of anticipation over content' (marcinkowski , p. ) . such anticipation refers to both the communicators (anticipation of particular audience expectations to be satisfied) and their audiences (anticipation of being satisfied); in this situation, neither side is likely to give the substance of content priority-whatever satisfies expectations, is good enough. and no less importantly, technology now affords increasingly sophisticated ways of decoupling satisfaction of expectations from conventional considerations of reality by producing high-fidelity synthetic reality. deepfakes are digital content, generated using a deep learning technique known as a generative adversarial network (gan). the production process involves the simultaneous use of two algorithms: one, typically referred to as 'the generator', is tasked with creating artificial content while the second, called 'the discriminator', tries to find fault in the newly-generated content; once such a fault is found, the generator learns from its own mistakes and creates an improved version to be scrutinised by the discriminator, and so on (chesney and citron , p. ; giles et al. , p. )-this is where the adversarial element of gan comes from. the end product is arrived at when the pair of algorithms can no longer make any improvements through mutual learning. one of the main fears pertaining to deepfakes is that they can purport to represent events or insinuate behaviours that never took place in order to destroy the reputations of featured individuals (for both political manipulation and private harassment) or potentially even sway the results of elections (chesney and citron , p. ); alternatively, they can lead to an environment of distrust, whereby even 'hard' evidence of crimes or misdemeanours can be easily dismissed as mere deepfakes (woolley , p. ) . deepfakes can also potentially be used for blackmail and extortion, either for financial gain or to manipulate decisionmakers (hall , p. ) . likewise, whereas the creation of simulated public opinion currently requires armies of trolls, deepfakes can automate the process, generating custom-made content coming from custom-generated profiles etc. (giles et al. , p. ) . crucially, deepfakes are democratic in nature: the only things needed are training material for the algorithms and computing power; in contrast to traditional photo or video editing software, no specialist skill is necessary as the process is automated, meaning that even a relative amateur can produce high-quality synthetic content (chesney and citron , p. ) . currently, the primary use of deepfakes is for synthetic pornography, as in transposing the faces of celebrities or former partners onto the bodies of performers in pornographic videos; however, there are clear threats coming from improvements in the technology itself, such as reducing the quantity of necessary input and increasing the quality of output, and from its pairing with other techniques, including big data-based precision targeting to identify those most susceptible to believing the synthetic content (paul and posard ) . although deepfakes can usually still be identified it is only a matter of time until technology catches up with human perception; moreover, as human response to audio-visual content is often visceral and immediate, people will, nevertheless, believe their eyes and ears 'even if all signs suggest that the video and audio content is fake' (charlet and citron ) . simultaneously, as communication, particularly online, is turning more and more towards the visual, the capacity to manipulate content in this dominant mode of expression can become a notable source of power (vaccari and chadwick , p. ) . nevertheless, due to the aforementioned democratic nature of deepfakes, it is unlikely that this power would be concentrated in the hands of a few actors only. a much more likely outcome is dizzying excess, in which it becomes increasingly difficult for information consumers to make up their minds. the net result might be 'a climate of indeterminacy' whereby people have low levels of trust beyond their bubbles (vaccari and chadwick , p. ) . moreover, this indeterminacy is likely to extend even further, including in domains where objective veracity is prized. one such example would be the legal process, whereby the authenticity of even video evidence will become hard to determine (see e.g. maras and alexandrou ), thereby further contributing to the undermining of trust. in particular, deepfakes may prove to be dangerous in the runup to elections, as parts of e.g. a smear campaign against an opponent. while unlikely to feature in isolation, they are likely to form an integral part of broader cyber operations, perpetrated by domestic or foreign actors (whyte ) . extant research already indicates that if deepfakes are targeted precisely, they can considerably reduce the image of an unfavourably depicted politician in the eyes of the target population (see dobber et al. ) . certainly, the precision-targeting necessary for such an effect necessitates large sets of audience data, which might up the ante for those willing to enter the political manipulation game. nevertheless, for well-resourced political campaigns and, even more so, for hostile nation-states targeted deepfakes will, in all likelihood, become a new addition to their arsenal. still, even for the less-resourced, deepfakes may prove to be a viable tool, for example in trying to harass activists of the opposite camp by placing their images in pornographic videos or other types of content that the victims would likely find unpleasant and disturbing (see e.g. maddocks ). for those reasons, it is extremely likely that deepfakes will feature, in some capacity, in the elections to come. simultaneously, though, the problematisation of reality wrought about by deepfakes extends much further than manipulation or other nefarious uses. for example, as kietzmann et al. ( , p. ) asserts, 'we may soon enjoy injecting ourselves into hollywood movies and becoming the hero(ine) in the games we play' while shopping is going to be transformed by a capacity to create personal deepfake avatars to model different outfits, leading to 'ultimate personalization'. indeed, deep personalisation is likely to be the next big thing in digital consumer-oriented products more broadly, a continuation of the current drive to put as much personal touch into services as possible. there are also further opportunities for businesses: while data-driven targeting and programmatic ad buying are already de rigueur; the next step would be employing gans to deepfake segments in anything from news broadcasts to films in real time to deliver targeted advertising and personalised product placement to every viewer. nevertheless, this ability to place oneself (or be placed) at the centre of the universe and to subject perceived reality to one's interests or tastes (or tasks at hand) clearly points towards an impending future of 'reality' that, instead of being stable and capable of providing a common point of reference, becomes personally tailored and, simultaneously, only personally meaningful, leading to personalised experience cocoons. ultimately, such synthetic media are going to 'challenge public opinion and what we know as reality in basically all sectors of culture and society' (woolley , p. ) . hence, individuals will be faced with a broad variety of largely (or, at least, immediately) indiscernible truth candidates only to default to their pre-existing opinions, partisan bubbles, or influencers. however, the latter are also becoming synthetic. recent developments in today's media also involve the creation of synthetic personalities, primarily as virtual influencers (vis). like their human counterparts, these are personalities geared for maximum audience impact. however, due to their synthetic nature, vis provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility and targeting. hence, it is typical for creators to provide vis with 'a composite personality based on market research', and then use machine learning-based social listening to adapt to target audiences as effectively as possible (bradley a) . in contrast to a human influencer, all of the virtual one's characteristics, including 'age, gender, tone of voice and aesthetics' can be tailored to match audience expectations (bradley a). therefore, as bergendorff ( ) similarly to what has been observed in relation to deepfakes, the synthetic nature of these influencers opens up potential for manipulation, particularly because they can be made so impactful. campaigners already warn of adverse consequences on matters ranging from body image and a sense of inferiority in comparison to virtual personalities' computer-generated accomplishments to virtual influencers taking a political stance (booth ; yocom and acevedo ) . and while in case of most, if not all, of the currently popular virtual influencers such concerns are more of a side effect, it is not too difficult to imagine a virtual influencer intentionally created for manipulative purposes; having been created specifically with appeal to a target audience's preferences in mind and specifically designed to evoke trust from that particular segment of the population, virtual influencers could the conceivably become trusted purveyors of information held in high esteem by their followers (yocom and acevedo ) . while they would be unlikely to develop independent persuasive power in the short or mid-term, virtual influencers could conceivably assist efforts to wrap target audiences within a cocoon of misinformation and this amplify existing campaigns. for brands, vis offer the usual combination of advertising and audience engagement, but with total control of content and behaviour, unlike the often-erratic antics of real-life influencers (bradley a) . moreover, a vi tends to generate around three times more engagement than a human one and acquires followers at a significantly higher rate (leighton ) , possibly as a result of their meticulous tailoring. an additional benefit of vis is their independence from real-world context: for example, while coronavirus lockdowns issued by governments have significantly constrained opportunities (travel, public appearances etc.) for human influencers, virtual ones can continue regardless (deighton ). the preceding can leave brands wondering why hire a human 'when you can create the ideal brand ambassador from sctratch' (hsu ) . from a societal perspective, however, the situation might be somewhat suboptimal because vis are less regulated than their human counterparts, leaving brands more leeway in constructing their campaigns; moreover, vis endorsing products they claim to have tried (which is, of course, impossible) likely contains more than a hint of manipulation (hsu ; cook ) . this problem also extends beyond products and brands as the persuasive power of vis can also be used for promoting political actors and agendas (deighton ). crucially, the synthetic nature of vis might be somewhat liberating: while social media have been used by humans to perform their fake selves, vis are at least authentically fake (hsu ). nevertheless, this authenticity can be easily lost. one reason is the interactive capacity of vis. making vis interact both among themselves and with real-life humans allows for storytelling opportunities and manufactured events that can be carefully orchestrated to generate publicity (sokolov ) and captivate audiences through 'emotional storytelling and empathy' (luthera ) . this captivation might preclude followers from maintaining the necessary distance. the second reason, meanwhile, concerns those followers who do retain that distance: here, the creators of vis may be facing an emotive storytelling gap in talking about specifically human experience while simultaneously being open about not being human (bradley b) . that might drive the creators of some vis to be at best ambiguous about the nature of their creations. after all, around % of millennials and gen z social media users follow or have followed vis without realising their artificial nature (cook ). the next step in dissolving the boundary between the real and the synthetic will be true ai generation of vis without requiring major human input (bergendorff ) . once vis cease being painstakingly human-made and, instead, become interactively and automatically generated, they will not only become ubiquitous but will also become even more irresistible by automatically adapting to their audiences. and as their impact increases, the question of whether they are human or virtual will become increasingly irrelevant. a further step towards the problematisation of reality is the capacity for immersion in a synthetic environment through augmented and virtual reality technologies, typically referred to collectively as extended reality (er). the problematisation of reality is made particularly acute by the fact that er is only effective if it causes an illusion of presence (i.e. the loss of awareness of technological mediation) and an illusion of plausibility, whereby a user's experience responds personally to their actions (pan and de hamilton , pp. - ) . for full immersion, users must also be provided with an 'experiencescape', i.e. a package of 'people, products, and a physical environment' (hudson et al. , p. ) . in that way, er becomes a self-contained world that stands in for 'normal' everyday experience. moreover, the merging of er and social media is likely to offer 'far more immersive experiences and the possibility of sharing more of our lives online', affording an even more effective refuge from the physical world (marr ) . thus far, the primary uses of er are for gaming and educational purposes, but new and emerging uses involve e.g. virtual attendance of real concerts and sporting events (rubin ), potentially even allowing a band to perform in their studio while their sound is put into a completely virtual concert performed by their avatars-particularly attractive in times of distancing and travel restrictions. additionally, there is increasing use of er meeting spaces for both commercial and private use, standing in for travel (rubin ) . in other words, er can literally offer a (synthetic) world of experience within the confines of one's home. however, virtual co-presence also comes with its own dangers, such as virtual abuse, which can have psychological effects as bad as the 'real' thing (rubin ). moreover, there also is a threat of manipulation as er can cause attitude change through experiencing a place, a brand, or a person (tussyadiah ) . in fact, social engineering on er is already a thing, although the applications currently available (at least those open about their aims) are primarily concerned with empathy, social responsibility etc. (marx ) . nevertheless, there is no guarantee that such techniques will not be (or are not already) also employed for nefarious purposes. an important sticking point is that er allows much more extensive data collection (particularly biometric data) than any other type of media (braun ) . these data can also be matched with a record of everything the user sees or hears while the device is on (marr ) . the result is not only potentially detrimental privacy invasion but also unprecedented capacity to tailor the experienced environment by predicting the most visceral of our responses (hall and takahashi ) . that tailoring might tilt users towards prioritising er over the non-user-centric physical environment, thus further contributing to the problematisation of reality. furthermore, the er of the near future 'will be aware, data-rich, contextual, and interactive' courtesy to the development of both g and cloud-based representations of the physical environment, allowing data to be overlaid on the physical world in real time; the net result will be not only a richer experience but also a shift of er from an add-on to the operating system of everyday life (koetsier ) , particularly as haptic technologies mature. as with the other types of synthetic media discussed above, manipulative potential is rather clear. in the case of er, this relates not only to the capacity of generating artificial experiences but also its immersive quality that might have serious ramifications. as audiences experience content much more vividly and are, therefore, less immune to the messages promoted, fake news on er are likely to be more impactful than their broadcast or online forms (pavlik ) . a further issue to be kept in mind is the disappearance of authorship: whereas in traditional content it is easier for the audience to remain conscious of the constructed nature of what they encounter, immersiveness is likely to lead to over-ascribed authenticity (johnson ) . in this way, borders between different versions of reality are likely to blur, thereby completing the slide towards epistemological anarchy. finally, as the adoption of er accelerates, that will further affect the perception of the self, not least through the development of digital avatars into effective standins (marr ) , thereby diminishing the importance of the physical self. concurrently, in line with the development of synthetic persons, it will be increasingly difficult to tell whether one is interacting with an avatar of a human or with an artificial agent (pan and de hamilton , p. ) , thus further stripping reality of its tangible and verifiable character. as shown in this article, the issue of reality has become less straightforward than ever. as we move towards the construction of synthetic likenesses, persons, and entire worlds, that which is real (at least in terms of affecting understanding and causing decisions) might become intangible and personalised. certainly, people have always had divergent interpretations of the world, including many opinions that were false. however, the present condition simultaneously allows the creation of increasingly realistic synthetic objects and environments and is likely to ensure survival even of those who fundamentally misperceive some of the basic physical characteristics of the world. nevertheless, the change goes even deeper as we seem set to lose the awareness of-or, indeed, interest in-the source of lived reality while lacking the time, resources, or motivation to assess the exact nature of what is driving us towards certain beliefs, actions, or decisions. hence, it is advisable that we move towards an affective criterion of reality: an artefact's or an environment's reality to an individual is directly proportionate to the power of affect exerted onto that individual (kalpokas ) . while that might, at first sight, come across as a highly relativist solution, it nevertheless adheres closely to the problematisation of reality discussed above. the net result would be a partly synthetic life that 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reality, presence, and attitude change: empirical evidence from tourism deepfakes and disinformation: exploring the impact of synthetic political video on deception, uncertainty, and trust in news deepfake news: ai-enabled disinformation as a multi-level public policy challenge the reality game: how the next wave of technology will break the truth and what we can do about it this social media influencer is a robot-but how could this influence the future? the globe post conflict of interest the author has reported no conflict of interests. key: cord- -k i gp authors: degeling, chris; kerridge, ian title: hendra in the news: public policy meets public morality in times of zoonotic uncertainty date: - - journal: soc sci med doi: . /j.socscimed. . . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: k i gp public discourses have influence on policymaking for emerging health issues. media representations of unfolding events, scientific uncertainty, and real and perceived risks shape public acceptance of health policy and therefore policy outcomes. to characterize and track views in popular circulation on the causes, consequences and appropriate policy responses to the emergence of hendra virus as a zoonotic risk, this study examines coverage of this issue in australian mass media for the period – . results demonstrate the predominant explanation for the emergence of hendra became the encroachment of flying fox populations on human settlement. depictions of scientific uncertainty as to whom and what was at risk from hendra virus promoted the view that flying foxes were a direct risk to human health. descriptions of the best strategy to address hendra have become polarized between recognized health authorities advocating individualized behaviour changes to limit risk exposure; versus populist calls for flying fox control and eradication. less than a quarter of news reports describe the ecological determinants of emerging infectious disease or upstream policy solutions. because flying foxes rather than horses were increasingly represented as the proximal source of human infection, existing policies of flying fox protection became equated with government inaction; the plight of those affected by flying foxes representative of a moral failure. these findings illustrate the potential for health communications for emerging infectious disease risks to become entangled in other political agendas, with implications for the public's likelihood of supporting public policy and risk management strategies that require behavioural change or seek to address the ecological drivers of incidence. hendra virus is a zoonosis e which means it can be transmitted across species boundaries from its natural host (flying foxes or fruit bats) to cause infection and disease in domestic animals and people. emerging bat-borne infections such as hendra are a pressing global public health concern (wong, lau, woo, & yuen, ) . hendra is highly lethal to humans and endemic in australian flying fox populations. like other new and re-emerging infectious diseases, changes in the incidence and cross-species transmissibility of hendra are likely to hinge on the ecological impacts of natural events and human activities (jones et al., ) . indeed it is clear that hendra has 'spilled' over from flying fox populations into horses, and then people and pet dogs through their increasingly intense interaction in rural and peri-urban areas. importantly, the impacts of these interactions are bi-directional; anything that induces 'stress' in flying foxes is thought to amplify viral shedding into the environment (parrish et al., ) . efforts to disrupt flying-fox encroachment on human settlement, therefore, are likely to increase the risk of human infection. current hopes of prevention rest on the development of a vaccine for horses, the only confirmed intermediate host for hendra transmission to humans. in the interim, public health responses to hendra have focussed on education and behaviour modification amongst high-risk groups such as veterinarians, horse owners and people who work in equine industries, and the institution of disease surveillance and quarantine measures involving both human and animal health sectors (adamson, marich, & roth, ) . since hendra virus first emerged in there have only been four human deaths and seven human infections. however concerns in australia about the risks to human health escalated sharply in when outbreaks in horses occurred over a greater geographic area and at a far higher frequency than past 'hendra seasons' (field, crameri, kung, & wang, ) . concern about the risks posed by the bat-borne virus were further heightened by the subsequent and unexpected discovery of a pet dog with a naturally acquired infection (tapim & withey, ) . many australians, particularly those living in regional areas, already consider flying foxes to be a noisy and unhygienic pest. towns and city suburbs in north-eastern parts of the country can find themselves 'under siege' from large groups of roosting 'fruit bats' e with these 'camps' or colonies sometimes comprised of several thousand individuals. aside from the impacts of noise and faeces, flying fox colonies can 'fly in and feed' on commercial orchards causing significant economic losses for fruit growers. for this reason there has been a longstanding practice of shooting flying foxes and disrupting their colonies with sirens, smoke bombs and helicopters to deter them from congregating in agricultural and residential areas. whereas in the past diseases of wild animals were thought to pose limited risk to humans, the connection between human activity e particularly changes in land use e and changes in patterns of infectious disease is becoming increasingly clear (newell et al., ) . the urbanisation of coastal habitats is thought to have had a number of effects on flying fox populations in eastern australia e restricting access to their normal foods and forcing them to both turn to, and increasingly rely on, commercial orchards and urban gardens for sustenance (plowright et al., ) . and because food is scarce flying foxes are also less inclined to migrate, leading to the formation of permanent camps in agricultural and residential areas. these effects are also exacerbated by natural events that further limit the availability of natural and horticultural food resources, such as cyclones and floods (plowright et al., ) . as large groups of flying foxes congregate in and around human settlements this gives the impression that the population is thriving, whereas this is more a result of reduction in their natural habitat, and several species of flying foxes are, in fact, vulnerable to extinction (welbergen, klose, markus, & eby, ) . for this reason, since in nsw and in queensland, flying foxes camps have been legally protected from human interference to try and rehabilitate the population. in the queensland government took the further step of refusing all applications by farmers for permits to shoot flying foxes to protect their crops, both on ecological grounds and because attempts to break up established camps may be counterproductive. it was argued that any measures that stressed flying foxes would increase the risk of hendra spilling over into horses; and dispersing specific camps would likely be ineffective as there would be nothing to stop the colony re-establishing itself nearby, and once again in conflict with human settlement. thus, what was designed to be legislation to protect a vulnerable species of native animal became a policy instrument with which to try and limit zoonotic risk exposure. this transition from conservation-focussed environmental policy to public health policy has been incremental, such that the policy aim was not to solve either problem but manage areas of emerging concern. yet as people directly affected by flying foxes have struggled to 'live with' the growing throngs of unwelcome neighbours, many have come to believe that by protecting flying fox populations and advocating the adoption of low risk behaviours towards them, governments and health authorities have put the health and welfare of another species above that of human populations. experiences with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (bse) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars) indicate that policymaking for a new zoonotic disease is always difficult and prone to polarising different stakeholders in affected communities (phillips, bridgeman, & ferguson-smith, ; singer et al., ) . a key feature in matters surrounding animal disease control is that radically different policy responses e such as wholesale culling or vaccination e can typically be presented as plausible points of intervention. for this reason decisions surrounding what should be done about new or pressing zoonotic risks are often contested, and finding the right balance between over-caution, laissez-faire approaches, and determining the weight given to different socioeconomic factors can be difficult. for example a lack of due diligence can expose the population to the risk of infection for far longer than necessary, as was the case with bse. conversely, the overzealous application of the precautionary principle can destroy the livelihood of a population, impact its food supply, limit development, and entrench or exacerbate socioeconomic disadvantage (world health organization, ) . furthermore, when the zoonotic risk is new, attempts to explain the choice of policy are likely to be further complicated by uncertainty regarding the precise risk of infection, the drivers of disease emergence, and the measures needed to control the risk of infection. therefore public support for policies that disrupt people's lives and communities or place precautionary limits on the development of natural resources might depend on their understanding of the causes and risks of zoonotic outbreaks, their trust in government agencies, and the likely consequences for them of different public health responses. in this regard news media are an important source of information for the public (brodie, hamel, altman, blendon, & benson, ) , particularly with regard to the complex relationship between the environment and human health and with regards to the risk posed by animals. for not only does the media reflect the issues that concern people, it also impacts upon the issues the public thinks about, and the criteria through which they think about them e influencing people's understanding of what is at stake, of who or what is to blame, of who is at risk, and of what can be done to address the situation (entman, ; scheufele, ) . in this regard, while individual journalists my privilege independence, accuracy and balance, media organisations are rarely neutral and can both influence public opinion themselves, or be used by industry, politicians and interests groups to influence public perception of particular issues and/or promote their own ends (callaghan & schnell, ; terkildsen, schnell, & ling, ) . therefore the effects of how the media chooses to raise to public prominence and then 'frame' events and opinions surrounding a new health issue such as an emerging zoonosis can be recursive. for example because elected officials, politicians and policy advisors are responsive to public opinion, public perceptions about the causes of a disease threat like hendra virus might influence the level of public support for specific health policies, and, thereby, ongoing political debate (gollust, lantz, & ubel, ; harrabin, coote, & allen, ) . in this paper we analyse representations in the australian media of the causes and consequences of the emergence of hendra as a zoonotic risk, focussing on how the unavoidable uncertainty about its causes and likely consequences shaped perceptions of the health policies put in place in the attempt to mitigate the risk of human infection. in short we seek to examine media representations of an infectious threat within a broader policy context. because flying foxes are a highly visible, widespread and relatively novel source of infectious risk for humans, the emergence of hendra virus presents an opportunity to track and compare media representations of disease 'events', health policy goals, political discourses and public opinions in ways that are difficult for noncommunicable diseases. in this our research is consistent with other reports examining media portrayals of the health risk and scientific and policy uncertainty associated with contested environmental exposures (mayer, ) and emerging infectious diseases (eids) (daku, gibbs, & heymann, ; hilton & hunt, ; washer, ) . to identify australian media coverage of issues surrounding the emergence of hendra virus, the database factiva was searched using the following terms as textwords: (hendra virus) or (flying fox*) or (fruit bat*) for the period january through december . a news filter limiting content to the region of australia was then applied identifying more than , items. because we were focussing on representations of hendra and associated public policy, further subject filters were applied to restrict the sample to political and general news, limiting the corpus to just over articles. full-text reports from news media sources from areas affected by hendra virus outbreaks were then downloaded. the sample includes national media organizations . pretesting confirmed that this search strategy would produce a larger and more heterogeneous sample of news reports, while still including coverage that focussed more narrowly on specific zoonotic events. from the resulting corpus of articles we discarded duplicates and reports that were not immediately relevant to hendra virus or flying fox populations (such as those that refer to the zip-line apparatus known as a 'flying-fox' or businesses or products with 'flying fox' in the title), after which unique articles remained to be analysed. the media sample was then read, catalogued manually, and cross-compared by the lead author in order to identify and track prominent concepts, differences, and themes. next, both authors manually cross-coded a pilot sample (n ¼ ) of the media corpus for specific types of content to confirm and to extend the preliminary thematic analysis. articles then were coded for: mention of horses, flying foxes/fruit bats or hendra virus mention of debates about flying fox control report of distal ecological causes (loss of natural habitat) for the emergence of hendra virus or the possibility of viral mutation mention of ignorance about hendra virus amongst scientists, healthcare providers or members of the public reference to government inaction as a factor contributing to the hendra problem reference to people's health and welfare not being high enough on the political agenda. these codes were both emergent and informed by similar media analyses (for example gollust & lantz, ; washer, ) . because hendra events tend to occur seasonally (from winterspring), the calendar year was chosen as the unit of analysis. the results from coding were then tabulated in matrix form, cross referenced and displayed visually as descriptive statistics in charts to aid interpretation. regular discussions among the authors served to generate additional enquires and to validate insights as they emerged. this approach is consistent with ethnographic content analysis, a qualitative research method for interpreting documents within the context of their use, which enables researchers to generate insights about how documents promote particular ways of understanding, interpreting and responding to an issue or event such as the emergence of a new disease from both numerical and narrative data (altheide, ) . with these concepts and types of content in mind, our analysis of the articles proceeded through several cycles of immersion and crystallization of insights e a research process comprised of repeated readings and comparisons across and between newssources, discussions amongst the authors, periods of testing of alternate explanations, and then re-immersion within the research materials (lecompte & schensul, ) . coverage of issues surrounding hendra virus and flying fox populations in the media sample more than doubled in , then plateaued before rising sharply in (table ). this two-phase pattern can be attributed to the tragic deaths from hendra virus of the veterinarians ben cuneen [ ] and alister rodgers [ ] ) report on debate about flying fox control does mention hendra virus ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) report suggests that people's welfare is not high enough on the political agenda ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) report suggests that 'government' inaction is contributing to the problem ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) during the one or two outbreaks that occurred in each of these years; and to the unprecedented number and geographic spread of hendra events in . table shows the results of cross coding for types of content and the frequency with which specific constellations of information appear each year in the media sources sampled. given that flying foxes were first identified as the natural host of hendra virus in (young et al., ) it is surprising to find that until , the media paid little attention to the link between hendra virus and flying fox populations. in previous years reports about flying foxes tended not to mention hendra, but focussed on the impact of flying fox populations on horticultural enterprises and residential areas. in these reports first hand testimony and events on the ground were used to framepublic perceptions of this animal's protected status, and the bureaucratic and 'hands off' approach of the government agencies to this issue. at the same time reports that are primarily about hendra virus during this period typically focus on 'unfolding' zoonotic outbreaks, suspected cases of hendra infection, quarantine orders, human exposure and disease, experimental treatments, and the impacts of these incidents on individuals. it is not until the unprecedented number of hendra outbreaks in that the relationship between hendra virus infection and contact with flying foxes becomes an item of sustained interest in our media sample. in with zoonotic events across two states, dead horses, and upwards of people potentially exposed to the virus through their dealings with sick and dying animals, discussions about the potential role of flying foxes as hendra carriers became firmly established as a central part of the media discourse. although the relative prominence given to different types of nonhuman animal changed across the years sampled. by news about hendra virus and flying foxes suddenly began to be described in reference to each other in the majority of news reports (table ) . the nonhuman species most often linked to hendra virus in the media sample was the horse, both as a victim of zoonotic outbreaks and as the intermediate host for human infection (see fig. ) . as the link between hendra and flying foxes was given greater prominence in the media, representations of the position and status of flying foxes and horses also began to change. an article in the sydney morning herald in provides a typical example of the more cautious approach taken in the earlier years sampled: hendra is not highly contagious but is very often fatal. carried by fruit bats, it infects horses, which can then transmit the disease to humans through bodily fluids. (marriner, , p. ) in this quote flying foxes are identified as the source of the virus and the role of horses as intermediate hosts is well defined, as is the mode of transmission for human infection. at this stage the media are at pains to make it clear that hendra virus is a fatal and devastating disease of horses that can, on occasion, infect and kill people who work in equine industries. flying foxes are not portrayed as an immediate or direct risk to human health but as an environmental factor, they are to be understood as the inadvertent reservoir of equine infection. although horses continue to be a feature of hendra news stories, by it was not uncommon for some subtle distinctions in the natural history of the disease to be dispensed with. rather than intermediate hosts, horses began to be portrayed as victims of a dangerous 'bat-borne' disease; their role as intermediate hosts is implied rather than explicitly stated, as shown by this report in the australian: the outbreak of hendra virus that has killed six horses and exposed people to infection has reached the outskirts of brisbane and is the most virulent in the known history of the fruit bat-borne disease. (barrett, a, p. ) at the same time as the media start to problematize the role of flying foxes in hendra outbreaks column inches begin to be devoted to identifying the source of each equine case. reports begin to note forensically significant details, often with direct quotes from the investigating scientists, much in the same way a crime reporter might ask a detective to profile a likely suspect and then "set the scene" of a murder. "the infected horse was grazing in a small paddock containing flowering and fruiting trees, where flying foxes were active." ("national snapshot: almost waiting for hendra results," , p. ) these descriptions of 'place' resonate closely with public health recommendations given to horse owners to place feeding bins and water troughs under cover and keep their horses out of paddocks with flowering or fruiting trees, if possible. yet translating this advice into practice sometimes only served to increase people's sense of anxiety and powerlessness, and their anger with the government. for example one property owner in gayndah told the courier-mail: "the head vet of queensland is saying, 'keep your horses away from the bats'. well, i'm doing that but the bats aren't keeping away from my horses" mrs robertson said. "fifty thousand infected bats are pooping on my horses, their grass and their water every day." (robertson & hall, , p. ) portrayals of uncertainty, risk, and the drivers of incidence public acknowledgement of scientific uncertainty about hendra virus was also a feature of the media coverage in , heightening the sense that events were out of control (table ). in previous years, statements about expert uncertainty were either general reflections about the lack of knowledge of how horses acquired the virus, or they had a sharp clinical focus e describing how little experience health professions had in dealing with human hendra infections. the former were typically framed as a matter of scientific curiosity, the later a matter of critical urgency that had immediate impact on people's lives. but during the media spotlight on hendra returned to unanswered questions surrounding the health and management of other species. even as scientists and veterinarians were described as being "baffled" by hendra virus, they were required to publically speculate on two issues: the implications of finding a pet dog with a naturally acquired infection, and theorise as to why there were so many equine cases that year. that scientists interviewed by the media appeared to be taken aback by the discovery of the canine case drew this response from the queensland premier, at the time, anna bligh: "the scientists themselves are being very honest with us. they're telling us that science does not fully understand every part of this disease. we, as human beings, have had to cope with that in our past, we've conquered diseases before, i believe we will conquer this one." (miles, macdonald, & helbig, , p. ) throughout the same period members of the public were increasingly portrayed as being forced to deal with the effects and risks of hendra outbreaks with inadequate information about the disease. reflecting the statements of the experts, the concerns of the public expressed in the media were, for the most part, articulated around what people should do to protect themselves and their animals from hendra events, particularly as pet dogs now appeared to catch the disease, and therefore might be a risk to humans. as reports emerged that the infected dog had been destroyed and the media sought to highlight existing scientific literature that showed that dogs, cats and guinea pigs could be infected with the virus under "controlled" laboratory conditions, repeated assurances by health authorities that there was minimal risk of catching hendra from animals other than horses began to wear thin. with this single canine infection, in the words of one reporter: "the bats' presence has become all the more sinister". (macdonald, , p. ) despite increasing attention to the link between hendra virus and flying fox populations, for the most part media reports of the hendra outbreak in infrequently gave any consideration to nonproximal factors for disease emergence. while earlier reports, in and , regularly pointed to land clearing and environmental events such as prolonged drought, floods and cyclones as explanations for flying foxes congregating in residential and agricultural areas, and approximately one in four articles describe habitat loss as inevitably increasing the risk of hendra jumping species, there is a clear and precipitous decline in such reports in . of the reports analysed from , only one in has any mention of these types of ecological drivers for disease emergence or the increasing prevalence of hendra outbreaks (table ) . indeed by the media focus is almost always on events 'as they happen' e the vast majority of reports doing little more than point to the presence of flying foxes and horses in the same locality as the most important characteristic of a causal story of disease or of public health risk. finally cross-coding the media sample revealed that issues surrounding the risk of hendra virus to human health became a dominant feature of reports that specifically address, or at least in some way refer to, the continuing controversy about the control of flying fox populations (fig. ) . while the frequency with which media reports describe the level of dissatisfaction with the government's policy of flying fox protection remains much the same from onwards, in heightened uncertainty about who and what was at risk from hendra virus increasingly became a factor of some importance to assessments of the queensland government's response to the unfolding situation. as the lack of knowledge about hendra virus became an increasingly prominent feature of debates about what should be done about the encroachment of flying fox populations on human settlement and agriculture, so did assertions in the media by members of the public and politicians that concern for the health and welfare of people affected be flying foxes was being ignored in deference to the interests of another species. in key features of the justification for the policy of not moving or culling flying foxes increasingly became contested in the media e particularly the claim that flying fox numbers were in decline and the claim that attempts to disperse flying fox colonies would spread the disease. for those wanting to repeal protective legislation, assertions that flying fox numbers were not falling could be backed up by simple first hand observation. people just had to come to affected areas and look for themselves. what they would find, according to the mayor of charters towers, was: "these bats aren't endangered, they are in plague numbers and more and more communities are feeling the effects of bat infestation." (gilham, , p. ) proponents of policy change to protect the public against batborne diseases also dismissed in the media claims that culling or dispersing flying foxes would spread hendra virus. even as the premier or a government spokespersons re-iterated publically that they would: "respond to the outbreak of hendra virus on the basis of the best-informed science that we can access" (barrett, b, p. ) , what constituted evidence became a point of contention. those seeking to remove protections told the media that current policies were based on a set of (unproven or unsound) assumptions. in support of this, scientists themselves, as is their fashion, acknowledged the limits of scientific certainty e noting that they did not know how horses caught the virus, and that they lacked incontestable proof that disrupting bat colonies would lead to its spread e something admitted by the chief veterinarian of queensland (to the significant discomfort of the previous labor government). in contrast, politicians supporting the 'rights' of land-owners to government protection from flying foxes, such as the independent member of parliament, bob katter, were able to tell press conferences that fruit bats had been removed from towns for years before the current ban without causing an outbreak. and of claims by scientists, health authorities and government spokesperson that these types of interventions could heighten zoonotic risks, katter noted in the townsville bulletin: "if you were looking for a more stupid claim you couldn't find it. we've got empirical evidence on our side, all they've got is conjecture on theirs". (galloway, , p. ) a prominent advocate for bat culling known for his theatrical turn of phrase, one week earlier katter framed the deeper issues in the following terms in the courier-mail: "if it comes to a choice of our children dying or us going out there and killing flying foxes, then i have a very grave moral problem about not going out there and killing the flying foxes," mr katter said. (miles, helbig, & michael, , p. ) pointedly, a number of other politicians even claimed that calls by scientist and the government for more research on hendra was further evidence that current policies put the needs of flying foxes above the health and welfare of 'real' people: "why don't we, as an immediate first response, reduce flying fox numbers? . why is the government throwing money at research, which will not protect families now?" ("hendra virus claims another victim," , p. ) the newsworthiness of the hendra outbreak in and the growing sense of uncertainty expressed by those charged with managing the situation created a media forum in which previously distinct health and environmental issues related to flying foxes became redefined as one and the same problem. consequently, even as a large pool of research funding was announced for projects related to protecting people and communities from hendra virus, this only served to highlight the absence of direct government action. this study employs ethnographic methods to evaluate news coverage of hendra virus and flying foxes in australia. past studies indicate the australian media have a tendency to use alarmist headlines in matters relating to infectious disease (holland, blood, imison, chapman, & fogarty, ) . nonetheless our impression is that the australian news media did not 'over-hype' the risks posed by hendra virus; a finding that echoes uk media coverage of the recent swine flu event (hilton & hunt, ) . what is noteworthy however was the way politicians, interest groups and other 'policy entrepreneurs' used the media to challenge the established policy community surrounding public health, animal disease control and wildlife management to put controlling flying fox populations higher on the public agenda (kingdon, ) . as the number of hendra outbreaks increased in , the values and expertise of public health officials, epidemiologists, wildlife ecologists and environmentalists were questioned, as was their current choice of actions. several features of how hendra outbreaks and debates about flying fox population control were reported in the media permitted opponents of the current policies and practices to reframe the issues, recast debate about what types of actions needed to be taken, and then prime the public as to how these actions could and should be justified in the face of imperfect scientific knowledge. media representation of hendra virus enabled the issue to become not simply a policy or public health issue e but a moral one. by this we mean the discourse surrounding hendra virus and flying fox populations became a debate about what is and should be valued, what is important and worth protecting, and, more broadly, what is the 'right' thing to do. throughout the period sampled media reports increasingly depict the encroachment of flying foxes on human settlement as being the source of the hendra problem. thus while horses remained a risk to human health, rather than being the intermediate host they become fellow victims of the disease. in contrast, the role of flying foxes in hendra transmission and disease ecology becomes increasingly prominent in media coverage, as shown by fig. . as a species they were stigmatized and pathologized. news media increasingly depicted flying foxes as an invasive plague, both reflecting and potentially re-enforcing community sentiment that they are unhygienic disease carrying vermin. and ecological drivers that bring these native wild animals into increasing contact with human settlement, such as land clearing, were increasingly backgrounded. the small number of articles that did identify distal causes for emergent disease neither suggest, nor reflect upon, the relationship between human activities and novel zoonotic events as being a point for plausible preventive interventions. in contrast to the number of reports that advocate some form of control for flying fox populations, only a handful of reports raise the possibility completely removing horses from flying fox habitats as a possible solution. instead by emphasising proximal causes, flying foxes become increasingly blamed for the emergence of poorly understood and increasingly unpredictable emerging zoonotic disease. only a handful of reports offer any attempt to describe the implications of habitat loss for planning policy and disease prevention. this pattern of media reports externalising the origins and threats posed by new infectious diseases is, of course, not unique, but is consistent with media representations of other zoonoses and emerging infectious diseases (eids) (joffe, ) . unlike previous studies of zoonotic events such as sars or swine flu, where the strength of the human-to-human link dominates media representations of risk, in the case of hendra virus the role of nonhuman animals in disease emergence was the most salient feature. rather than being characterised and understood as a consequence of modernity and globalisation e such as is said to be the case for other eids (washer, ) e the threat posed to human interests by another species of animal became the dominant 'frame' in the media. as was also the case in news reporting about issues surrounding other late th century diseases, analysis and critique of the policies, actions and inactions of the government eventually become a central part of the causal story, and, thereby, of increasing moral significance. against this background calls for further research, and for nuanced responses to hendra virus that took account of human, animal, and ecological factors only seemed to reinforce the idea being put forward in the media by opponents of the current policy responses that scientists and environmentalists, rather than the concerns and plight of the very people at risk of disease, were dictating the terms of flying fox and hendra management strategies. questions in the media about the value orientations of those in authority offered an alternative framework through which their actions could be judged, potentially eroding public trust in the government and their stated commitment to evidence-based policymaking. according to this view, the risk of hendra virus was not voluntarily assumed by affected individuals, but forced on them by current government policies. such causal stories, of course, tend to have far greater political potency than discourses reflective of aetiological uncertainty as harmful consequences are viewed as being the product of human intentions, rather than the products of chance (stone, ) . in policy terms, the unprecedented number of outbreaks in seems to have served as a "focussing event" that raised the public visibility of both hendra virus and flying fox management and made them a pressing public health issue (birkland, ; kingdon, ) . the policy rationale of seeking to protect and promote the collective interest was poorly represented in the media; the focus instead was on the immediate impacts on individuals and discrete communities. in these terms the costs of current protections for flying foxes were being borne by an increasingly visible and vocal segment of the population; the benefits were diffuse, unpredictable, unrecognised by the electorate, and therefore difficult to defend politically (oliver, ) . as the amount of coverage of hendra related issues escalated throughout , government spokespersons began to struggle to frame the terms of the debate. those charged with providing information to the public fell into the trap of emphasising the scientific aspects of the health threat, rather than the real world implications. from a public health perspective, the message then became that hendra virus and flying foxes presented a serious but unquantifiable risk to human health, and, as a consequence of the government's cautious and "hands off approach", an imminent threat to communities. at the heart of this transition, media portrayals of scientific uncertainty, moral ambiguity and inconsistencies in descriptions of the government's policy position became linked to a wider political discourse surrounding the control of flying fox populations. opponents of current policies were able to use the media to point to how government legislation was protecting flying foxes, while discounting the implicit policy goals of limiting the environmental drivers of hendra risk exposure. in these terms opponents of the current policies were able to appeal to a set of established norms, tropes and 'rhetorics' for rescue in public health interventions, creating a moral weight for action against flying fox populations in ways that economic arguments and environmental policies had not. as novel zoonotic events such as canine infection remained unexplained, hendra virus and the increasing presence of flying foxes in residential and horticultural areas increasingly became portrayed as a pressing moral issue that required a moral, rather than a scientific solution. against the government's scientific uncertainty and apparent inaction in deference to what they thought was likely to happen in the future, their political opposition offered moral certainty and direct immediate action. people's livelihoods and their 'way of life' were being sacrificed for the good of another species of animal: one that posed a threat to human heath. for the safety and wellbeing of humans, particularly those being forced to live in and around flying foxes, had to be prioritised over the welfare of another species of animal, irrespective of whether interventions intended to resolve their health risks and promote their wellbeing actually did so. this research has several limitations. first given our focus on reactions in selected news media to zoonotic events, health communications and public policy, we were not able to capture the nuance that a broader analysis of press releases, policy documents and the grey literature on hendra virus and flying fox population control would illuminate. second we did not seek to include the political leanings, funding relationships and commercial affiliations of the news organisations examined in the analysis. in this regard australia, and especially queensland, does not have a competitive and diverse media market. ownership of news media is highly concentrated. aside from the news provided by the government funded national broadcaster, the abc, many major towns and cites are served by only one newspaper. this may have coloured how statements by member of the public, politicians, scientists and other experts were framed and presented in the media. finally our focus was on hendra virus in australia. without further research it is doubtful our findings can be generalised to the coverage of other bat-borne emergent zoonotic diseases such as nipah virus in malaysia and bangladesh or sars-like corona virus in south-east asia. what this study reveals is the extent to which the media can be used to construct the risks of hendra virus not as a scientific problem but as a moral question; that is, a problem that requires moral solutions. given that any government measure aimed at protecting public health involves moral judgements that are legitimated through political processes (leichter, ; oliver, ) , the infectious risk posed by wild animals to agricultural production and human populations is undoubtedly both a political and a moral issue. but the moral dimensions of this issue, and the development of policy responses to it, are deeply contested and heavily influenced by media representations of the link between human health, animals and the environment. our findings illustrate the potential for health communications around emerging infectious disease risks to become entangled in other political agendas and conflict with widely held human values, with implications for the public's likelihood of supporting public policy and risk management strategies that require behavioural change or seek to address the ecological drivers of incidence. more broadly, our research illustrates the value of methodologies from the social sciences to expand the relevance of the one world one health public health agenda to reflect lived realities and the needs of communities. one health in nsw: coordination of human an animal sector management of zoonoses of public health significance deadliest hendra closer to capital. the australian. canbera: act news limited row over bat 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connectivity and epidemic dampening: the emergence of hendra virus from flying foxes (pteropus spp to cull or not to cull is the burning question. the courier-mail agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: another look at cognitive effects of political communication policy paradox: the art of political decision making hendra dog case sparks crisis meeting. abc news interest groups, the media, and policy debate formation: an analysis of message structure, rhetoric, and source cues representations of sars in the british newspapers emerging infectious diseases and society climate change and the effects of temperature extremes on australian flying-foxes bats as a continuing source of emerging infections in humans. reviews in medical virology, , e . world health organization serologic evidence for the presence in pteropus bats of a paramyxovirus related to equine morbillivirus funding for this research was provided by the nhmrc centre for research excellence in critical and emerging infectious disease. chris degeling's position at the centre for values, ethics and the law in medicine at sydney university is part funded by a grant from alberta innovates e health solutions awarded to melanie rock. sources of funding had no involvement in design, data collection, analysis or drafting of this article. key: cord- -eylp k authors: ippolito, giuseppe; hui, david s; ntoumi, francine; maeurer, markus; zumla, alimuddin title: toning down the -ncov media hype—and restoring hope date: - - journal: the lancet respiratory medicine doi: . /s - ( ) - sha: doc_id: cord_uid: eylp k nan the proliferation of internet-based health news might encourage selection of media and academic research articles that overstate the strength of causal inference. we investigated the state of causal inference in health research at the end stage of the pathway-ie, the point of social media consumption. did the media hype emanate from ineffective risk communication both to the public and media? proactive case finding and increase in contact tracing and screening led to an exponential rise in the numbers of cases reported by the chinese authorities, with a consequential increase in media reports and ensuing hype. the reproductive rate (r ) predictions, evacuation of european and north american citizens from china, and in some cases the confinement and quarantine of people (eg, in the uk), have gained major visibility in the press and have also contributed to the hype. reporting of the situation in real-time from the public on social media could lead to more accurate collating of information by the media. however, the rapid pace of developments, increasing case detection rates, along with increasing diversity of information mean it has become increasingly difficult for the media to assimilate and make meaningful interpretations from this information source. moreover, the volume of information being reported to and by global public health authorities exceeds the capacity to collate and analyse it, or to cross-reference and verify with other data received. this inability to validate information can fuel speculation, and thereby lead to media and public concern. the balance between providing the information required for appropriate actions in response to risk and providing information that fuels inappropriate actions is delicate. the global media response to -ncov remains unbalanced, largely due to the continuously evolving developments and, as a result, public perception of risk remains exaggerated. the many unknown factors surrounding the virus are likely to lead to further media hype and aberrant public response. for example, the number of people who travelled to and from wuhan before travel restrictions and the lockdown were put in place, how many of these individuals were asymptomatic or were incubating the virus, and whether screening and current control measures will be effective, are all unknowns. a public health emergency among young people as of feb , cases were confirmed, and deaths had been reported to the who. outside of china, cases had been detected in countries. therefore, although several hundreds of patients remain in intensive care, the overall hospital fatality rate remains at %. therefore, it is time to reduce the hype and hysteria surrounding the -ncov epidemic and reduce sens ation alisation of new information, especially on social media, where many outlets aim to grab attention from followers. additionally, the disparity between the strength of language as presented to the media by some researchers and politicians and the inference shared on social media requires more research to determine how content is being relayed on different platforms. an effective way of putting this outbreak into perspective is to compare it with other respiratory tract infections with epidemic potential. -ncov appears to fit the same pattern as influenza, with most people recovering and with a low death rate; the people at risk of increased mortality are older in age (> years), immunosuppressed, or have comorbid illnesses. there is currently no evidence that -ncov spreads more rapidly than influenza or has a higher mortality rate. the media should focus on having altruistic intentions and develop dialogue with the appropriate authorities to protect global health security through effective amiable partnerships. they should highlight vaccine development efforts as well as educational and public health measures that are being put in place to prevent the spread of infection. although there are many things to still learn regarding how best to respond to disease outbreaks of this nature, there are also several positives, such as diagnostics tests being developed within weeks and rolled out globally or the rapid garnering of financial support for vaccine development, which should perhaps be in the headlines, to fuel reassurance rather than fear. while some countries have banned the use of e-cigarettes or vaping products altogether (eg, india), and others have strongly advised against their use (eg, australia), in the uk, public health england (phe) appears to be a lone voice in stating that vaping is % safer than smoking tobacco. here we consider whether vaping can be considered safe; whether vaping is a means of smoking cessation or at least harm reduction; and the correct response to the spiralling epidemic of vaping in young people (< years). the question of whether vaping is safe or safer than smoking can only be answered if the total contents of each of the thousands of available vaping liquids are itemised and subjected to short-term and longterm toxicity testing. to our knowledge, no such database exists; reassurances and extrapolations are no substitute for data. in one expert briefing, it was asserted that "most of the flavours are used in food and, at the relatively low temperatures used in e-cigarettes, they're not going to give rise to hazardous by-products". evidence to support the assertion is scarce and e-liquids contain a multitude of other substances known to be toxic to the lungs, such as ethyl maltol, linalool, methyl emerging infectious diseases and pandemic potential: status quo and reducing risk of global spread history is repeating itself, a probable zoonotic spillover as a cause of an epidemic: the case of novel coronavirus the continuing -ncov epidemic threat of novel coronaviruses to global health-the latest novel coronavirus outbreak in wuhan, china sars to novel coronaviruses-old lessons and new lessons clinical features of patients infected with coronavirus in wuhan, china who. novel coronavirus ( -ncov) situation report . -ncov outbreak-early lessons key: cord- -qmpatq m authors: han, ruixia; cheng, yali title: the influence of norm perception on pro-environmental behavior: a comparison between the moderating roles of traditional media and social media date: - - journal: int j environ res public health doi: . /ijerph sha: doc_id: cord_uid: qmpatq m the activation of norm perception can promote pro-environmental behavior. how does media, as important variables in activating norm perception, affect pro-environmental behavior? through an online survey of randomly selected chinese citizens, this study examines the roles of traditional media and social media in influencing the relationship between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. based on multi-level regression analysis of data, this study found that ( ) compared with traditional media, social media play a more significant role in moderating the relationship between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; ( ) the promotion of the perception of injunctive norms by traditional media has a negative relationship with pro-environmental behaviors; ( ) the activation of subjective norm perception by social media will promote pro-environmental behaviors. according to this research, in the current media environment, we should carefully release pro-environmental information on social media and encourage relevant discussions, and appropriately reduce environment-relevant injunctive normative information on traditional media. the study also discusses the role of media in regulating norm perception and pro-environmental behavior in different cultural contexts. the global spread of the covid- has brought issues of health-related risk prevention back to public attention, of which environmental protection is one. according to the data released by the environmental performance index (epi) in , overall, china ranks th among countries. regarding china's performance in individual indicators it ranks th in health, th in air quality, and th in ecosystem vitality. this indicates the importance of improving environmental quality in china. china proposed the "ecological civilization system reform" in the nineteenth report. however, the launch and implementation of any policy is inseparable from the cooperation and implementation by individual citizens. how to promote environmental protection on a personal level is very important to the success of various environmental protection movements. various studies have explored factors influencing personal pro-environmental behaviors. gifford and nilsson [ ] summarize major personal and social factors affecting pro-environmental behaviors. personal factors include knowledge experience, personality and self-construal, felt responsibility, cognitive biases, etc. social factors include urban-rural differences; religion, cultural and ethnic variations; norms, etc. these variables work together to influence pro-environmental behaviors, and it is important to discover the moderating and mediating mechanisms between these factors. through a meta-analysis of articles, bamberg and möser [ ] demonstrate that eight core psycho-social variables influence pro-environmental behaviors. they are perceived behavior control, feelings of guilt, problem awareness, social norms, internal contribution, attitude, ethics, and intention. they believe that pro-environmental behavioral intention interferences with other variables' effect on pro-environmental behaviors. these researchers prove that there are complex correlations between various influencing factors of pro-environmental behavior. it is very important to understand the relationship between different factors, as some of them play a more important role than others. then, what are these factors, and what are the mechanisms affecting their role in pro-environmental behavior? there are four theoretical paradigms to analyze factors influencing pro-environmental behavior: rational behavior theory [ ] , planned behavior theory [ ] , normative behavior theory [ ] , and value-belief-norm theory (vbn) [ ] , the last of which is based on the theory of normative activation. each theory has a different focus. for example, rational behavior theory emphasizes the importance of self-interest and believes that people conduct pro-environmental behaviors to reduce personal health risks. the theory of planned behavior emphasizes the importance of behavioral intention. it believes that behavioral intention is the key variable in affecting pro-environmental behaviors, while the influencing factors of individual behavioral intention may be multifaceted. the theory of normative activation focuses on activating internal norms, such as expectations, stress, and subjective perception. value-belief-normative theory incorporates the belief in ecological values into the theory of normative activation. generally speaking, rational behavior theory and planned behavior theory are often integrated, and various theoretical frameworks also attach great importance to the importance of norms. for example, in the theory of planned behavior, "norm" is considered to be an important variable affecting individual behavioral intention. in the normative activation theory, different types of "norm" become the core variables of discussion. recent scholarship tends to advocate the integration of these theoretical orientations to form integrated models [ , , ] . "norm" occupies an important position in virtually all of these models. there are various types of norms. according to their source, they can be divided into descriptive norms and injunctive norms [ ] . some scholars have proposed subjective norms. the different influences of each norm on various environmental behaviors have also become an important part of recent research. for example, park and smith [ ] study the effect of subjective norms, personal descriptive norms and injunctive norms, social descriptive norms and injunctive norms on organ donation intentions and behaviors. however, we tend to neglect the fact that the formation of norms is also affected by external information and environment. social media play an increasingly significant role as one source of information that ultimately affects pro-environmental behaviors by influencing the formation of norms. for example, based on a survey of households in hong kong, chan [ ] finds that mass media can influence residents' pro-environmental behavior by affecting their subjective norms. the research by hynes and wilson [ ] indicates that social media can effectively activate people's social comparison psychology and promote people's pro-environmental behavior by improving people's normative cognition. these studies indicate that media environment does affect people's social normative cognition and pro-environmental behaviors. in mainland china, the development of social media in recent years is very rapid. social media have infiltrated into the daily lives of ordinary people. take the most widely used wechat as an example. according to wechat's official report, the number of wechat users has exceeded . billion [ ] . what is the impact of social media on pro-environmental behavior in comparison to traditional media? what is the difference between them in changing people's social norms? what is the specific logic of the use of media to influence social norms and then affect the occurrence of pro-environmental behavior? the theory of social norms derives from perkins and berkowitz's [ ] study of adolescent alcohol abuse behavior. they discover that providing alcoholic adolescents with information about the attitudes of peer groups is far more effective than providing information about the negative consequences of alcoholism itself. therefore, they advocate that intervention should focus more on improving the health awareness and behaviors of the general public. they discover the existence and great influence of social norms and further develop it into an important theoretical path in the study of behavioral and attitude changes [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] . in practice, social normative intervention has also become an important path of behavioral intervention, such as the use of seat belts [ ] , prevention of drunk driving [ ] , prevention of sexual assault [ ] [ ] [ ] and other issues have achieved significant results. pro-environmental behavior is one of these behaviors. pro-environmental behavior refers to environmentally beneficial behaviors that people exhibit in their daily lives, that is, behaviors that tend to be pro-environmental [ ] . in general, pro-environmental behavior is influenced by a variety of self-states and external perceptions, such as individual age, gender, knowledge and education, values, politics and worldview, goals, responsibility, childhood experiences, perceived environmental risk perception, environmental knowledge, etc. normative cognition actually involves the intrinsic specific path of pro-environmental behavior. in this regard, the normative focus theory provides theoretical support. social psychologists cialdini et al. [ ] suggest that people do a lot of good behaviors not because they have a good sense, attitude or purpose, but because they are constrained by social norms, other people's behaviors, and typical practices. taking energy-saving behaviors as an example, they are conducted not so much due to the consideration of environmental protection, social benefit, and money saving than to the influence of the surrounding environment [ ] . that is to say, social norms actually affect people's pro-environmental behavior. different social norms affect pro-environmental behavior differently. social norms are generally divided into two categories, namely descriptive norms and injunctive norms. descriptive norms refer to the popularity of a certain act, whereas injunctive norms refer to social approval of the act [ ] . reno, cialdini, and kallgren [ ] argue that injunctive norms can lead people to perform certain behaviors beyond specific socio-cultural contexts and have stronger behavioral guidance. many scholars have carried out empirical research on different aspects of garbage disposal behavior, energy conservation behavior, conservation and resource conservation behavior, by which they are able to demonstrate the impact of the two norms on various pro-environmental behaviors. however, social norms are not just descriptive norms and injunctive norms. park and smith [ ] indicate that subjective norms, personal descriptive norms, personal injunctive norms, societal descriptive norms and societal injunctive norms all affect organ donation behavior. they pay special attention to the perceptibility of norms and distinguish the individual from the social aspects. the personal level mainly refers to the influence of family and friends who are in daily contact with people, while the social level mainly refers to the social-cultural environment. because this study focuses on groups in the same cultural context, it will focus on perceptual descriptive norms and perceptual injunctive norms at the individual level. in addition, park and smith [ ] also point out that descriptive and injunctive norms are only derived from the division of normative theory. in fact, from the perspective of planned behavior theory, subjective norms should also be included. subjective norms are designed to capture descriptive norms, i.e., whether important others themselves perform the behavior [ ] . we have reason to believe that the norm perception of these three aspects will affect the pro-environmental behavior. thus, we assume that: h : social norm perception has a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior; h - : subjective norm perception has a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior; descriptive norm perception has a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior; h - : injunctive norm perception has a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior. the influence of media on pro-environmental behavior has been confirmed by many research institutes. the impact mechanism can be roughly divided into three categories: first, from the perspective of risk communication, media have an amplifying effect on public environmental risk perception, which affects people's pro-environmental behavior by affecting their attitudes. agha [ ] indicates that the exposure to information about aids on mass media amplifies people's perception of risk and causes them to change behavior. mileti [ ] finds that media communication plays a mediating role between risk perception and pro-environmental behavior. zeng [ ] believes that new media have a greater amplifying effect on environmental risk perception. understanding of the role of media in affecting people's risk perception is multi-dimensional. for example, wahlberg and sjoberg [ ] believe that media do have an impact on risk perception, but the impact is not as heavy as interpersonal communication, and their relationship with behavioral change is not certain. meanwhile, fischhoff [ ] points out that the relationship between media and risk perception has undergone several stages. in sum, these studies all demonstrate the fact that media influence pro-environmental behavior by affecting people's risk perception. the second category is from the perspective of use satisfaction theory which points out that media can raise people's environmental concern, provide environmental-related knowledge, and then affect pro-environmental behavior. for example, huang [ ] discovers that the global warming information obtained by taiwanese residents from television, newspapers, and the internet did influence them to behave in a more pro-environmental manner. the works of holbert et al. [ ] and trivedi, patel and acharya [ ] both examine the impact of media use on pro-environmental behavior from the perspective of promoting environmental concern. the third category is to analyze the role of media according to the framework of planned behavior theory, subjective norm theory, media dependence and other theories. among them, chan [ ] combines the influence of mass media on subjective norms and the analysis model of planned behavior theory to analyze the pro-environmental behavior of hong kong residents. lee [ ] integrates media exposure in an attitude-intention-behavior model of pro-environmental behavior, and ho [ ] combines planned behavior theory and media dependence theory. liao et al. [ ] test the mediating role of perceived media influence between perceived media exposure of others and perceived social norms. in these studies, the most typical and basic research is the ipmi (the influence of presumed media influence) model [ ] . the above research informs us to propose the following hypotheses: h : media usage of environmental information acquisition has a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior. by further analyses, we find that the influence of media on pro-environmental behavior shows different characteristics at different stages in the history of media development. for example, in the early days, people mainly focused on the influence of such traditional media types as television, radio, and newspapers on pro-environmental behaviors. then internet gradually displayed its influence. in recent years, however, social media have become a new force that initiates their influence on pro-environmental behaviors. if the research of holbert [ ] mainly focuses on tv, the research of huang [ ] compare tv, newspapers and the internet, while the research of ho [ ] further refers to other media as traditional media to be compared with the internet. in comparison, the impact of social media on pro-environmental behavior deserves further exploration. in fact, social media have multiple potentials to influence pro-environmental behavior. for example, oakley et al. [ ] , mankoff et al. [ ] have pointed out that the display function of social media reminds the public to follow and promote environmental behavior. at the same time, the recording function of social media also allows the public to have an intuitive feeling about the effects of their pro-environmental behaviors, thereby strengthening their engagement in this aspect of behavior. social media also function to stimulate social comparison, activate normative perception, and improve pro-environmental behavior [ ] . the last advantage of social media is that the information they provide, in comparison to that from official media, attracts more public trust. this helps the construction of online communities and promotes participation in pro-environmental behaviors [ ] . therefore, we argue that social media not only promote pro-environmental behaviors, but also combine the characteristics of media communication with interpersonal communication, and help us perform more than traditional media are capable to do. therefore, we assume the following: h - : traditional media have a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior; h - : social media have a positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior; the degrees of the influence of social media and traditional media on pro-environmental behavior are different. previous studies have indicated that the perception of social norms can significantly affect pro-environmental behavior. normative activation theory provides one theoretical support. it is also supported by the focus theory of normative conduct. relevant behavioral studies have confirmed that regulating people's norm perception does affect people's pro-environmental behavior. for example, if the information of the average household electricity consumption in a community is told to those who consume more, they will reduce electricity consumption [ ] . this discovery is more significant to the promotion of pro-environmental behavior in countries like china, where it is increasingly difficult to improve people's environmental awareness and environmental level [ , ] . under the circumstance when the influencing factors discovered by the planned behavior theory become less influential, it is particularly important to effectively activate public norm perception. the study also finds that perceived descriptive norms and perceptual injunctive norms have different effects on people's pro-environmental behavior. taking "discarding garbage" and "zoo feeding" as examples, descriptive norms describe what most people do, whereas injunctive norms look at behaviors' social consequences in different contexts [ , ] . it is, therefore, particularly important to discover how to arouse people's normative focus. subjective norms which develop from planned behaviors are also affecting people's pro-environmental behavior. our study pays particular attention to how the three social norms are related to pro-environmental behavior in the chinese environment. social norms can only affect individual behavior when they are perceived and activated. researchers have explored the connection between social norms and pro-environmental behaviors by examining the mechanism in which social norms are produced and activated. miller and prentice [ ] conclude that there are three sources of normative beliefs: direct observation of the behavior of others; communication between people or media communication; and speculation of others' behavior based on personal knowledge. media, particularly social media, have become more and more important in our lives. social media combine the functions of traditional mass media with interpersonal communication. while affecting our lives, social media also help adjust our understanding of norms. existing research demonstrates that media composure does affect people's perception of social norms and affect people's pro-environmental behavior. for example, chan [ ] argues that mass media influence pro-environmental behavior by affecting people's subjective norms. hynes [ ] also indicates that social media indirectly enhance people's normative cognition by activating people's social comparative psychology. whether traditional media and social media activate the perception of social norms in the same way, and how the possible difference affects their influence on pro-environmental behavior are the focus of our research. therefore, we propose the following: h : media exposure moderates the relationship between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - : traditional media moderate the relationship between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - : social media moderate the relationship between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. previous studies demonstrate that different norm perceptions have different effects on pro-environmental behavior. for example, injunctive norm perception is more likely to make people jump out of specific situations and make the norm more effective than descriptive norm perception [ ] . this finding is particularly important for the guidance of public behaviors in countries with a low level of pro-environmental behavior. at the same time, we also find that the mechanism of media exposure's impact on pro-environmental behavior is different. for example, ho [ ] finds that traditional media attention and internet media attention have different effects on green buying behavior. chan [ ] indicates that television, newspapers and magazines have different effects on subjective norms. the influence and mechanism of social media on norm perception are more likely to be different. for example, it has been found that social media play a role in pro-environmental behavior through social display, social comparison, and public environmental protection efficacy. because of their own production content, they have a higher influence than the official media. then, the impact of social media on different norm perceptions may also differ and ultimately affect the environmental behavior, so we assume the following: h - - : traditional media moderate the relationship between subjective norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - - : traditional media moderate the relationship between descriptive norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - - : traditional media moderate the relationship between injunctive norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - - : social media moderate the relationship between subjective norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - - : social media moderate the relationship between descriptive norm perception and pro-environmental behavior; h - - : social media moderate the relationship between injunctive norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. summarizing these research hypotheses, this study focuses on the following two levels of research questions: rq . how do social norm perception and media exposure affect pro-environmental behavior? rq . how does media exposure influence the relationship between social norm perception and pro-environmental behavior? if so, how do social media and traditional media moderate the relationship between different type of norm perceptions and pro-environmental behaviors in the chinese social context? this research is mainly based on items of sample data collected through china's online questionnaire platform wenjuanxing (changsha ranxing information technology co., ltd, changsha, hunan province, china). the website's sample database is composed of . million people in provincial units in china (excluding xinjiang). in this survey, by setting ip addresses, user restrictions, logic questions, etc., and by randomly rolling out questionnaire links, the minimum effective sample number set in this survey is . the survey was conducted between august and in . the specific demographic distribution of the survey sample is as follows: . % male and . % female. taking into account the sex ratio . (female ) of china's actual population, in the subsequent data processing, we carry out a weighted processing. the education distribution is . % for universities and colleges, . % for masters and above, and . % for high schools and below. in terms of income distribution, the annual income of cny , to , accounts for . %, cny , to , accounts for . %, less than cny , accounts for . %, more than cny , accounts for . %. the average age of the entire sample is . . the specific demographic distribution can be found in our other study [ ] . in addition, . % of the samples came from cities, . % from counties and towns, and . % from rural areas. public pro-environmental behavior is the core variable of this study. there are many measurement methods, such as those of bratt [ ] , gatersleben et al. [ ] , and dono et al. [ ] . taking into account the specific social and cultural background of china, we adopt the question series used by hong et al. ( ) [ ] in cgss (the china general social survey) of , , and . this group of questions consists of measurement items, including recycling and discussing environmental issues with relatives and friends [ ] . the answers include four items of never, seldom, sometimes and always, to which we assigned , , , respectively. the value range of the entire scale is - , and cronbach's alpha is . . the mean is . , and the standard deviation is . . see table . there are various measurement scales for the perception of social norms. this study uses the measurement of subjective norm perception, perceptual descriptive norm, and perceptual injunctive norm in park and smith [ ] . the research theme has been transformed into specific operations. table . considering the classification of media types in existing studies [ ] and the actual use of media by chinese residents, the use of traditional media in this study mainly includes magazines, newspapers, television, radio, and the internet. in particular, based on the history of the internet, this study separates social media from the internet as a parallel category. the types of social media usage by chinese residents in this study mainly include weibo, wechat, tiktok, kuaishou, zhihu, qq, douban, baidutieba, facebook, twitter, and instagram. the specific measurement content includes whether people obtain the four aspects of information through the above media. the specific measurement items refer to our other research [ ] . one point is scored for each item. the final score-weighted average value range is - points. the means of traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) scale is . , the standard deviation is , and cronbach's alpha is . . the mean of social media usage for the environment information acquisition (sme) scale is . , the standard deviation is , and cronbach's alpha is . . see table . other variables in this study include some demographic variables and important variables related with pro-environmental behavior: age, gender, community participation (cp), environmental knowledge (ek), and environmental risk perception (erp). for operational measurements of gender, age, and community participation, we measured the following: gender: = male, female, and female as control. age: calculated using minus the year of birth. community participation includes: ( ) churches, religious groups, ( ) sports and fitness groups, ( ) cultural and educational groups, ( ) professional associations (such as educational associations, business associations), and ( ) school-related groups (alumni association), ( ) owners' committee, ( ) clan association, family association, association, with point for each participation, ranging from - ; the internal consistency coefficient of the scale is . (cronbach's alpha) [ ] . the environmental knowledge level adopts the cgss version, consisting of measurement items. the internal consistency coefficient is . , and the mean and standard deviation are . and . , respectively. environmental risk perception also uses the cgss version. the internal consistency coefficient of the scale composed of items is . , and the average and standard deviation are . and . , respectively. for the measurement of the above control variables, please refer to our related research [ ] . see table . this study uses spss . to conduct research hypothesis testing by hierarchical regression. pro-environment behavior was specifically set as the dependent variable, and then five types of predictive variables were put into the regression model in turn. these five types of predictive variables include ( ) demographic variables: gender, age, and community participation; ( ) environment-related variables: environmental knowledge and environmental risk perception; ( ) norm perception variables, and three types of secondary indicators include: subjective norm perception, descriptive norm perception, and injunctive norm perception; ( ) traditional media usage for environment information acquisition and social media usage for environment information acquisition; and ( ) interaction variables. we calculated interaction variables by multiplying the relevant variables of norm perception and media exposure. after pearson's test of the relevant variables involved in the study, it can be found that for those general variables that affect pro-environmental behaviors, in addition to age (r = . , p < . ), environmental knowledge (r = − . , p < . ) and environmental risk perception (r = . , p < . ) are significantly correlated with pro-environmental behavior. of particular note is that environmental knowledge and pro-environmental behavior show a significant negative correlation. regarding the correlation between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior, norm perception (r = . , p < . ) and its three constituent variables, subjective norm perception (psn) (r = . , p < . ), descriptive norm perception (pdn) (r = . , p < . ), and injunctive norm perception (pin) (r = . , p < . ), are significantly related to pro-environmental behaviors. in terms of the correlation between media exposure and pro-environmental behaviors, the influence of traditional media exposure (tme) was not significant, while the influence of social media exposure (tme) was significant (r = . , p < . ). these research results provide an understanding basis for our follow-up regression analysis. it should be noted that because social norm perception is a synthetic variable composed of subject norm perception, descriptive norm perception and injunctive norm perception, its correlation coefficient with these three variables exceeds . (r > . ). see table . table shows the results of regression analysis using demographic variables, environment-related variables, norm perception, traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme), and norm perception and their interaction terms to predict pro-environment behavior. we report the coefficients for the final model and the final r-squared value. from the reported results, it can be found that there is no significant correlation between gender and pro-environmental behavior, that is, there is no significant difference in the performance of pro-environmental behavior between men and women. there is a significant influence of age on pro-environmental behavior (b = . , p = . ), with older people engaging in more pro-environmental behavior. there is a significant influence of community participation on pro-environmental behavior (b = . , p = . ), that is, those who are more involved in various types of community organization activities are more engaged in pro-environmental behavior. the model can account for . % of variance in pro-environment behavior. the relationship between environment-related variables and pro-environmental behavior can be found in m - . both of them have a significant relationship with pro-environmental behavior, but the impact of environmental risk perception on pro-environmental behavior is more significant (b = . , p = . ).the impact of environmental knowledge on pro-environmental behavior is relatively insignificant (b = − . , p < . ), and in the current sample, environmental knowledge is negatively correlated with pro-environmental behavior. m - examines the impact of integrating norm perception variables on pro-environmental behaviors. it can be found that norm perception has a significant effect on pro-environmental behaviors, and they are significantly positively correlated (β = . , p = . ). this result supports h . the explanatory power of the entire model has been significantly improved, and the adjusted r-squared value has reached . %. m - examines the impact of traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) on pro-environmental behavior. it can be found that the impact of traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) on pro-environmental behavior is near a significant point (b = − . , p = . ), and the impact of social media on pro-environmental behavior is significant (b = . , p = . ). this partially supports h and h - , and fully supports h - , h - . that is, media composure will positively affect pro-environment behavior; traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) has a near-significant impact on pro-environment behavior, but it is negatively correlated; social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) has a significant positive correlation with pro-environment behavior. the impact of social media on pro-environmental behavior is greater than that of traditional media. m - examines the impact of norm perception and media exposure on pro-environmental behaviors. it is found that the interaction effects of norm perception and traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) have no significant impact on pro-environmental behaviors (b = − . , p = . ), but the interaction effect of norm perception and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) has a close and significant positive correlation to pro-environmental behavior (b = . , p = . ), which partially supports h . h - is not verified, while h - is. table . multiple regression analysis of the influence of norm perception on pro-environmental behavior. gender in order to further test the robustness of the results obtained by the above causal step regression method, we use the bootstrap method to test the main relationship with the help of the process plug-in in spss. the results show that without controlling other variables, the mediating effect of social media on norm perception and pro-environmental behavior is significant (r = . , p = . ), and the llci and ulci are. and. , respectively. this interval does not contain , which suggests that the result is robust. the mediating effect of traditional media on norm perception and pro-environmental behavior is also significant (r = . , p = . ), but the result is not robust, with llci and ulci of − . and. , respectively. with the pearson test results of the pairwise correlation in table , this result suggests the rationality of the strong moderation effect of social media and the possibility of the marginal moderation effect of traditional media without controlling other influencing variables. in order to examine in more detail the moderating effect of media environmental information exposure on the relationship between different types of norm perception and pro-environmental behaviors, we conduct further regression analysis to form table . m - and m - mainly examine the relationship between demographic variables and environment-related variables and pro-environmental behaviors, and the results are consistent with m - and m - . m - examines the relationship between three types of norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. the results show the following: subjective norm perception and pro-environmental behavior are significantly positively correlated (b = . , p = . ); descriptive norm perception and pro-environmental behavior are significantly positively correlated (b = . , p = . ); injunctive norm perception was significantly positive correlation with pro-environmental behavior (b = . , p = . ). this result supports h - , h - , and h - . m - examines traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) and social media environmental information exposure on pro-environmental behaviors. the results show that traditional media have no significant effect on pro-environmental behaviors (b = . , p = . ), and social media have a significant positive impact on pro-environmental behaviors b = . , p = . ), once again negating h - , supporting h - and h - . the results of m - indicate that the interaction between injunctive norm perception and traditional media environmental knowledge acquisition is significantly negatively correlated with pro-environmental behavior (b = − . , p = . ). the interaction effects (b = − . , p = . ) between subjective norm perception and traditional media (tme) and the interaction effects (b = . , p = . ) between descriptive norm perception and traditional media (tme) have no significant correlation with pro-environment behavior. the interaction effect (b = . , p = . ) between subjective norm perception and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) is significantly positively correlated with pro-environmental behavior, and the interaction effect (b = − . , p = . ) between descriptive norm perception and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) and the interaction (b = − . , p = . ) between injunctive norm perception and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) have no significant correlation with pro-environmental behavior. this result supports h - - and h - - . h - - , h - - , h - - , h - - are not verified. this means that traditional media play a moderating role between injunctive norm perception and pro-environment behavior, and social media play a moderating role between subjective norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. in other types of norm perception and pro-environmental behavior, neither traditional media nor social media have significant influence. this result more clearly shows the specific mode of traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) and social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) influencing pro-environmental behavior. table . multiple regression analysis of the influence of different types of norm perception on pro-environmental behavior. gender this article aims to examine how norm perception and media composure influence pro-environmental behavior, and whether media composure plays a mediating role between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. in order to better respond to research questions and report research results more clearly, we have summarized the hypothesis test results, as is shown in table . the table demonstrates that: ( ) norm perception does affect pro-environmental behavior. different types of norm perception have different effects on pro-environmental behavior. ( ) the influence of media exposure on pro-environmental behavior has been confirmed again, although the effect of traditional media deserves further exploration. ( ) the influence of media exposure on the relationship between norm perception and pro-environmental behavior is characterized by differentiation. specifically, traditional media play a negative role in moderating the relationship between injunctive norm perception and pro-environmental behavior, while social media have a positive influence in moderating the relationship between subjective norm perception and pro-environmental behavior. tests on the relationship between media exposure and pro-environmental behavior tests on the moderating effects of different types of information composure on the relationship between different types of norm perception and pro-environmental behavior this study mainly discusses the role of traditional media and social media in activating public norm perception and influencing pro-environmental behavior in the current media society. the research results show that traditional media usage for environment information acquisition (tme) activates norm perception and affects pro-environmental behaviors less than social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme). further detailed research discovers that the deepening of public perception of the injunctive norms through traditional media actually reduces people's pro-environmental behaviors, whereas social media are mainly helpful to activate people's subjective norm perceptions, thereby promoting pro-environmental behaviors. the influence of environmental knowledge acquisition through traditional media on subjective norm perception and descriptive norm perception has no significant correlation with pro-environmental behavior, and the influence of social media usage for environment information acquisition (sme) on descriptive norm perception and injunctive norm perception has no significant correlation with pro-environmental behavior. the results of this study are very instructive for the promotion of pro-environmental behavior in the age of social media. the influence of media on pro-environmental behavior has been confirmed by many studies, and its influence mechanism has also been confirmed by many studies. as mentioned in the literature review, media promote pro-environmental behaviors by amplifying environmental risks [ , ] , by increasing people's environmental concerns and environmental knowledge [ ] [ ] [ ] , and by enhancing people's value orientation or activating their norm perceptions [ ] . in short, media can indirectly affect people's pro-environmental behaviors in various ways. relevant research has also found a basis in risk perception theory, use satisfaction theory, acculturation theory, planned behavior and normative activation theory, and has been centrally presented in media dependency theory. however, existing studies have mainly focused on the impact of traditional media, such as television, radio, newspapers, and the internet on pro-environmental behaviors. research about the impact of social media on pro-environmental behavior also focuses on the mining of influence mechanisms. for example, social media bring normative pressure through their own social comparison function [ ] , while improving self-efficacy to promote pro-environmental behavior [ , ] . however, there is no direct research focus on the influence of social media and traditional media on pro-environmental behavior. our research indicates that social media play a more significant role than traditional media in influencing pro-environmental behavior. in the current era of the media environment, the influence of social media on pro-environmental behavior has become the main way to exert media influence, while the influence of traditional media on pro-environmental behavior is declining. the influence of interpersonal communication on pro-environmental behavior has long been the focus of many studies. ho compares respective roles of traditional media and interpersonal communication in media dependence and green purchasing behavior [ ] . with many other studies, ho proves that interpersonal communication plays a greater role than traditional media. nevertheless, few studies have compared between interpersonal communication and social media. social media blend characteristics of both interpersonal and mass communication. by interpreting interpersonal communication as interpersonal demonstration effect, our research indicates that social media influence pro-environmental behavior by strengthening interpersonal communication's demonstration effect. social media affect pro-environmental behaviors by displaying them publicly. oakley et al. [ ] and mankoff et al. [ ] indicate that social media put small behaviors in daily life under public scrutiny and encourage people's pro-environmental behaviors by improving public understanding of their own behavior and the behavior of others. social media also affect pro-environmental behaviors with the recording function, which helps form public awareness of their deeds and efficiency. social media also affect pro-environmental behaviors by stimulating people's psychology of social comparison and improving their recognition of social norms [ ] . han et al. [ ] points out that user-generated content (ugc) is more likely to gain public trust than official information, by activating pro-environmental norms, creating environmentally friendly online communities, and increasing public pro-environmental participation. compared to studies which focus exclusively on social media, this study makes a comparative analysis of the mechanism by which interpersonal communication and social media influence pro-environmental behaviors. our research shows that in the current era of social media, the influence of traditional media on pro-environmental behavior is weakening, while the influence of social media on pro-environmental behavior is increasing. taking normative perceptual activation as an example, the influence of traditional media on pro-environmental behavior is far less significant than that of social media. at the same time, in the specific types of normative activations, the activation of injunctive norms by traditional media negatively affects pro-environment behavior. excessively diffusing pro-environment information on traditional media may make people stressful and reduce pro-environmental behavior, which is very close to the negative correlation between the increase in environmental knowledge and the pro-environmental behavior found in this sample. in comparison, disseminating pro-environmental information on social media is helpful to improve people's supervisory cognition and promote pro-environmental behaviors. in other words, we should pay attention to the diffusion of pro-environmental information on social media, guide people to form discussions on pro-environmental behaviors in social media, and promote public pro-environment behaviors by stimulating social comparison, norm perception and self-efficacy. we should shift the focus of media information promotion for pro-environmental behavior from traditional media to social media. this study indicates that there is a complex correlation between normative perceptual activation and media usage. understanding this relationship is a prerequisite to effectively promote pro-environmental behavior. the research results show that the dissemination of the prescriptive normative information must be appropriately reduced in traditional media. this result is very similar to the effect of excessive "persuasion" in communication research, especially in countries with a strong collectivist cultural tradition. an overemphasis on prescriptive normative information, or the evaluation of others, is likely to cause people's rebellious psychology and reduce people's pro-environmental behavior. the activation effect of social media on subjective norms proves that people's sense of freedom on social media can stimulate their sense of self-efficacy and subjective norms, thereby promoting pro-environmental behavior. this demonstrates the flexible effects of social media on personal and social integration. in the current situation where the relationship between media and people is more and more interactive, paying attention to the activation of people's subjective norms by social media will be an effective way to improve pro-environmental behavior. the focus of this study is the moderating effect of traditional media and social media on norm perception and pro-environmental behaviors. therefore, we focus on demographic variables and environmental protection related variables that have significant relationships. there are many factors affecting pro-environmental behaviors. gifford and nilsson [ ] have summarized the major personal and social factors of pro-environmental behavior, but in order to study the core themes, we select only the variables that are considered most important to this study. regarding the conceptual configuration of norm perception, we divide it into subjective norm perception, descriptive norm perception, and injunctive norm perception. we mainly draw on the research division proposed by park and smith [ ] . there are other more reliable and better ways of operation, which are worthy of further research. this study examines the relationship between media's activation of norm perception and its impact on pro-environmental behavior. in fact, the type of media contact, whether through traditional media or social media, is composed of multiple specific types of media. what are the differences in the activation of specific media types such as wechat and facebook? this will be very meaningful for studying the influence mechanism of specific social media in different cultural backgrounds, and it is worth further exploration in future research. in terms of research methods, this research uses traditional multi-level regression to compare different models, even though there are many types of media and norm perception. if the structural equation method is adopted, the complexity can be more clearly shown. in addition, this study is based on specific practical considerations, and some assumptions that have a significance level slightly higher than . are marked as significant, which requires special explanation. this study is based on a chinese sample. will the role of media contact between norm activation and pro-environmental behavior be different in different cultural contexts? if we find that the activation of injunctive norms by traditional media reduces pro-environmental behaviors, and the activation of subjective norms by social media is conducive to pro-environmental behaviors, then in non-collectivist cultures, will the activation of injunctive norms by traditional media be positive? the influence on pro-environmental behavior needs to be tested by comparative studies. to conclude, this study indicates that in the current media society, social media play a more important role than traditional media in regulating and promoting pro-environmental behavior. understanding this role of social media is of great significance for regulating people's cognition and behavior in an era of constantly changing media environments. the promotion of pro-environmental behavior must rely on the media environment. the authors declare no conflict of interest. personal and social factors that influence pro-environmental concern and behaviour: a review twenty years after hines, hungerford, and tomera: a new meta-analysis of psycho-social determinants of pro-environmental behaviour ajzen, i. belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: an introduction to theory and research the theory of planned behavior normative influences on altruism a value-belief-norm theory of support for social movements: the case of environmentalism travelers' pro-environmental behavior in a green lodging context: converging value-belief-norm theory and the theory of planned behavior a review of pro-environmental behaviors from the perspective of two decision-making systems a focus theory of normative conduct: recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places distinctiveness and influence of subjective norms, personal descriptive and injunctive norms, and societal descriptive and injunctive norms on behavioral intent: a case of two behaviors critical to organ donation mass communication and pro-environmental behaviour: waste recycling in hong kong i do it, but don't tell anyone! personal values, personal and social norms: can social media play a role in changing pro-environmental behaviours? 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measurement and determinants of environmentally significant consumer behavior the relationship between environmental activism, pro-environmental behaviour and social identity re-examining the measurement quality of the chinese new environmental paradigm (cnep) scale: an analysis based on the cgss data a comparative study of the role of interpersonal communication, traditional media and social media in pro-environmental behavior: a china-based study this article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the creative commons attribution (cc by) license key: cord- -z ta pp authors: shahi, gautam kishore title: amused: an annotation framework of multi-modal social media data date: - - journal: nan doi: nan sha: doc_id: cord_uid: z ta pp in this paper, we present a semi-automated framework called amused for gathering multi-modal annotated data from the multiple social media platforms. the framework is designed to mitigate the issues of collecting and annotating social media data by cohesively combining machine and human in the data collection process. from a given list of the articles from professional news media or blog, amused detects links to the social media posts from news articles and then downloads contents of the same post from the respective social media platform to gather details about that specific post. the framework is capable of fetching the annotated data from multiple platforms like twitter, youtube, reddit. the framework aims to reduce the workload and problems behind the data annotation from the social media platforms. amused can be applied in multiple application domains, as a use case, we have implemented the framework for collecting covid- misinformation data from different social media platforms. with the growth of the number of users on different social media platforms, social media have become part of our lives. they play an essential role in making communication easier and accessible. people and organisations use social media for sharing and browsing the information, especially during the time of the pandemic, social media platforms get massive attention from users talwar et al. ( ) . braun and gillespie conducted a study to analyse the public discourse on social media platforms and news organisation. the design of social media platforms allows getting more attention from the users for sharing news or user-generated content. several statistical or computational study has been conducted using social media data braun and gillespie ( ) . but data gathering and its annotation are time-consuming and financially costly. in this study, we resolve the complications of data annotation from social media platforms for studying the problems of misinformation and hate speech. usually, researchers encounter several problems while conducting research using social media data, like data collection, data sampling, data annotation, quality of the data, copyright © , association for the advancement of artificial intelligence (www.aaai.org). all rights reserved. and the bias in data grant-muller et al. ( ) . data annotation is the process of labelling the data available in various formats like text, video or images. researchers annotate social media data for researches based on hate speech, misinformation, online mental health etc. for supervised machine learning, labelled data sets are required so that machine can quickly and clearly understand the input patterns. to build a supervised or semi-supervised model on social media data, researchers face two challenges-timely data collection and data annotation shu et al. ( ) . one time data collection is essential because some platforms either restrict data collection or often the post itself is deleted by social media platforms or by the user. for instance, twitter allows data crawling of only the past seven days (from the date of data crawling) by using the standard apis stieglitz et al. ( ) . moreso, it is not possible to collect the deleted posts from social media platforms. another problem stands with data annotation; it is conducted either in an in-house fashion (within lab or organisation) or by using a crowd-based tool(like amazon mechanical turk(amt)) aroyo and welty ( ) . both approaches of data annotations require an equitable amount of effort to write the annotation guidelines along with expert annotators. in the end, we are not able to get quality annotated data which makes it challenging to a reliable statistical or artificial intelligence based analysis. there is also always a chance of wrongly labelled data leading to bias in data cook and stevenson ( ) . currently, professional news media or blogs also cover the posts from social media posts in their articles. the inclusion of social media posts in the news and blog articles creates an opportunity to gather labelled social media data. journalists cover humongous topics of social issues such as misinformation, propaganda, rumours during elections, disasters, pandemics, and mob lynching, and other similar events. journalists link social media posts in the content of the news articles or blogs to explain incidents carlson ( ) . to solve the problems of on-time data collection and data annotation, we propose a semi-automatic framework for data annotation from social media platforms. the proposed framework is capable of getting annotated data on social issues like misinformation, hate speech or other critical social scenarios. the key contributions of the paper are listed below-• we present a semi-automatic approach for gathering an-arxiv: . v [cs.si] oct notated data from social media platforms. amused gathers labelled data from different social media platform in multiple formats(text, image, video). • amused reduces the workload, time and cost involved in traditional data annotation technique. • amused resolves the issues of bias in the data (wrong label assigned by annotator) because the data gathered will be labelled by professional news editors or journalists. • the amused can be applied in many domains like fake news or propaganda in the election, mob lynching etc. for which it is hard to gather the data. to present a use case, we apply the proposed framework to gather data on covid- misinformation on multiple social media platforms. in the following sections, we discuss the related work, different types of data circulated and its restrictions on social media platforms, current annotation techniques, proposed methodology and possible application domain; then we discuss the implementation and result. we also highlight some of the findings in the discussion, and finally, we discuss the conclusion and ideas for future works. much research has been published using social media data, but they are limited to a few social media platforms or language in a single work. also, the result is published with a limited amount of data. there are multiple reasons for the limited work; one of the key reason is the availability of the annotated data for the research thorson et al. ( ) ; ahmed, pasquier, and qadah ( ) . chapman et al. highlights the problem of getting labelled data for nlp related problem chapman et al. ( ) . researchers are dependent on in-house or crowd-based data annotation. recently, alam et al. uses a crowd-based annotation technique and asks people to volunteer for data annotation, but there is no significant success in getting a large number of labelled data alam et al. ( ) . the current annotation technique is dependent on the background expertise of the annotators. on the other hand, finding the past data on an incident like mob lynching, disaster is challenging because of data restrictions by social media platforms. it requires looking at massive posts, news articles with an intensive amount of manual work. billions of social media posts are sampled to a few thousand posts for data annotation either by random sample or keyword sampling, which brings a sampling bias in the data. with the in-house data annotation, forbush et al. mentions that it's challenging to hire annotator with background expertise in a domain. another issue is the development of a codebook with a proper explanation forbush et al. ( ) . the entire process is financially costly and time taking duchenne et al. ( ) . the problem with the crowdbased annotation tools like amt is that the low cost may result in wrong labelling of data. many annotators who cheat, not performing the job, but using robots or answering randomly fort, adda, and cohen ( ); sabou et al. ( ) . with the emergence of social media as a news resources caumont ( ), many people or group of people use it for different purpose like news sharing, personal opinion, social crime in the form of hate speech, cyber bullying. nowadays, the journalists cover some of the common issues like misinformation, mob lynching, hate speech, and they also link the social media post in the news articles cui and liu ( ) . in the proposed framework, we used the news articles from profession news website for developing the proposed framework. we only collect the news articles/blog from the credible source which does not compromise with the news quality meyer ( ) . in the next section, we discuss the proposed methodology for the amused framework. social media platform allows users to create and view posts in multiple formats. every day billions of posts containing images, text, videos are shared on social media sites such as facebook, twitter, youtube or instagram aggarwal ( ) . people use a combination of image, text and video for more creative and expressive forms of communication. data are available in different formats and each social media platform apply restriction on data crawling. for instance, facebook allows crawling data only related to only public posts and groups. giglietto, rossi, and bennato discuss the requirement of multi-modal data for the study of social phenomenon giglietto, rossi, and bennato ( ) . in the following paragraph, we highlighted the data format and restriction on several social media platforms. text almost every social media platform allows user to create or respond to the social media post in text. but each social media platform has a different restriction on the size of the text. twitter has a limit of characters, while on youtube, users are allowed to comment up to a limit of characters. reddit allows , characters; facebook has a limit of characters, wikipedia has no limit and so on. the content and the writing style changes with the character limit of different social media platform. image like text, image is also a standard format of data sharing across different social media platforms. these platforms also have some restriction on the size of the image. like twitter has a limit of megabytes, facebook and instagram have a limit of megabytes, reddit has a limit of megabytes. images are commonly used across different platform. it is common in social media platforms like instagram, pinterest. video some platforms are primarily focused on video like youtube. while other platforms are multi-modal which allows video, text and image. for video also there are restrictions in terms of duration like youtube has a capacity of hours, twitter allows seconds, instagram has a limit of seconds, and facebook allows videos up to minutes. the restriction of video's duration on different platforms catches different users. for instance, on twitter and instagram users post video with shorter duration. in contrast, youtube has users from media organisation, vlog writer, educational institution etc where the duration of video is longer. in the current annotation scenario, researchers collect the data from social media platforms for a particular issue with different search criteria. there are several problems with the current annotation approaches; some of them are highlighted below. • first, social media platforms restrict users to fetch old data; for example, twitter allows us to gather data only from the past seven days using the standard apis. we need to start on-time crawling; otherwise, we lose a reasonable amount of data which also contains valuable content. • second, if the volume of data is high, it requires filtering based on several criteria like keyword, date, location etc. these filtering further degrades the data quality by excluding the major portion of data. for example, for hate speech, if we sample the data using hateful keyword, then we might lose many tweets which are hate speech but do not contain any hateful word. • third, getting a good annotator is a difficult task. annotation quality depends on the background expertise of the person. even we hire annotator in our organisation; we have to train them for using the test data. for crowdsourcing, maintaining annotation quality is more complicated. moreover, maintaining a good agreement between multiple annotators is also a tedious job. • fourth problem is the development of annotation guidelines. we have to build descriptive guidelines for data annotation, which handle a different kind of contradiction. writing a good codebook requires domain knowledge and consultant from experts. • fifth, overall, data annotation is a financially costly process and time-consuming. sorokin and forsyth highlighted the issue of cost while using a crowd-based annotation technique sorokin and forsyth ( ) . • sixth, social media is available in multiple languages, but much research is limited to english. data annotation in other languages, especially under-resourced languages is difficult due to the lack of experienced annotators. the difficulty adversely affects the data quality and brings some bias in the data. in this work, we propose a framework to solve the above problems by crawling the embedded social media posts from the news articles and a detailed description is given in the proposed method section. in this section, we discuss the proposed methodology of the annotation framework. our method consists of nine steps, they are discussed below- step : domain identification the first step is the identification of the domain in which we want to gather the data. a domain could focus on a particular public discourse. for example, a domain could be fake news in the us election, hate speech in trending hashtags on twitter like #blacklivesmatter, #riotsinsweden etc. domain selection helps to focus on the relevant data sources. step : data source after domain identification, the next step is the identification of data sources. data sources may consist of either the professional news websites or the blogs that talk about the particular topic, or both. for example, many professional websites have a separate section which discusses the election or other ongoing issues. in the step, we collect the news website or blog which discuss the chosen domain. step : web scraping in the next step, we crawl all news articles from a professional news website or blogs which discuss the domain from each data source. for instances, a data source could be snopes snopes ( ) or poynter institute ( ) . we fetch all the necessary details like the published date, author, location, news content. step : language identification after getting the details from the news articles, we check the language of the news articles. we use iso - codes wikipedia ( ) for naming the language. based on the language, we can further filter the group of news articles based on spoken language from a country and apply a language-specific model for finding meaning insights. step : social media link from the crawled data, we fetch the anchor tag( a ) mentioned in the news content, then we filter the hyperlinks to identify social media platforms like twitter and youtube. from the filtered link, we fetch unique identifiers to the social media posts, for instance, for a hyperlink consisting of tweet id, we fetch the tweet id from the hyperlink. similarly, we fetch the unique id to social media for each platform. we also remove the links which are not fulfilling the filtering criteria. step : social media data crawling in this step, we fetch the data from the respective social media platform. we build a crawler for each social media platform and crawl the details using unique identifiers or uniform resource locator (url) obtained from the previous step. due to the data restriction, we use crowdtangle team ( ) to fetch them from facebook and instagram posts. example-for twitter, we use twitter crawler using tweet id (unique identifier), we crawl details about the tweets. step : data labelling in this step, we assign labels to the social media data based on the label assigned to the news articles by journalists. often news articles describe the social media post to be hate speech, fake news, or propaganda. we assign the class of the social media post mentioned in the news article as a class described by the journalist. for example, if a news article a containing social media post s has been published by a journalist j and journalist j has described the social media post s to be a fake news, we label the social media post s as fake news. usually, the news article is published by a domain expert, and it assures that social media post embedded or linked in the news article is correctly labelled. step : human verification in the next step, to check the correctness, a human verifies the assigned label to the social media post and with label mentioned in the news articles. if the label is wrongly assigned, then data is removed from the corpus. this step assures that the collected social media post contains the relevant post and correctly given label. a human can verify the label of the randomly selected news articles. step : data enrichment in this, we merge the social media data with the details from the news articles. it helps to accumulate extra information which might allow for further analysis. data merging provides analysis from news authors and also explains label assigned to the social media post. in this section, we consider the possible application domains of the proposed framework. nevertheless, the framework is a general one, and it can be tailored to suit varied unmentioned domains as well where the professional news website or blogs covers the incident like election, fake news etc. "fake news is an information that is intentionally, and verifiable false and could mislead readers" allcott and gentzkow ( ) . misinformation is part of fake news which is created deliberately intended to deceive. there is an increasing amount of misinformation in the media, social media, and other web sources. in recent years, much research has been done for fake news detection and debunking of fake news zhou and zafarani ( ) . in the last two decades, there is a significant increase in the spread of misinformation. nowadays more than fact-checking websites are working to tackle the problem misinformation cherubini and graves ( ) . fact-checking websites can help to investigate claims and assist citizens in determining whether the information used in an article is true or not. in a real-world scenario, people spread a vast amount of misinformation during the time of a pandemic, an election or a disaster. gupta et al. ( ) . there is a v problem of fake news -volume -a large number of fake news, velocity -during the peak the speed of propagation also intensifies, variety -different formats of data like images, text, videos are used in fake news. still, fake news detection requires a considerable effort to verify the claims. one of the most effective strategies for tackling this problem is to use computational methods to detect false news. misinformation has attracted significant attention in recent years as evidenced in recent publications li et al. ( ) ; li, meng, and yu ( ); li et al. ( ) ; popat et al. ( ) . additionally, misinformation is adopted across language borders and consequently often spread around the globe. for example-one fake news "russia released lions to implement the lockdown during covid- " was publicised across multiple countries in different languages like italian and tamil poynter ( ). mob lynching is a violent human behaviour where a group of people execute the legal practice without a trial which ends with a significant injury or death of a person apel ( ) . it is a worldwide problem, the first case executed in the th century in ireland, then it was trending in the usa during the - th century. often, mob lynching is initiated by rumours or fake news which gets triggered by the social media by a group of peoplearun ( ). the preventive measures taken by the government to overcome all obstacles and prevent further deaths were not successful in its entirety. getting the data for analysis of mob lynching is difficult because of the unexpected events occurring throughout the year, mainly in remote areas. there is no common search term or keyword that helps to crawl social media. so, if we fetch the specific social media post from the news articles which is covering analysis about the mob lynching arun ( ), we can use it for several studies. it will also help to analyse the cause and pattern from the previous incident griffin ( ) . online abuse is any kind of harassment, racism, personal attacks, and other types of abuse on online social media platforms. the psychological effects of online abuse on individuals can be extreme and lasting mishra, yannakoudakis, and shutova ( ) . online abuse in the form of hate speech, cyberbullying, personal attacks are common issue mishra, yannakoudakis, and shutova ( ) . many research has been done in english and other widely spoken languages, but under-resourced languages like hindi, tamil (and many more) are not well explored. gathering data in these languages is still a big challenge, so our annotation framework can easily be applied to collect the data on online abuse in multiple languages. in this, we discuss the implementation of our proposed framework. as a case study, we apply the amused for data annotation for covid- misinformation in the following way: step : domain identification out of several possible application domains, we consider the spread of misinformation in the context of covid- . we choose this the topic since because, december , the first official report of covid- , misinformation spreading over the web shahi and nandini ( ). the increase of misinformation is one of the big problems during the covid- problems. the director of the world health organization(who), considers that with covid, we are fighting with both pandemic and infodemic the guardian ( ). infodemic is a word coined by world health organization (who) to describe the misinformation of virus, and it makes hard for users to find trustworthy sources for any claim made on the covid- pandemic, either on the news or social media world health organization and others ( ); zarocostas ( ). one of the fundamental problems is the lack of sufficient corpus related to pandemic shahi, dirkson, and majchrzak ( ) . content of the misinformation depends on the domain; for example, during the election, we have a different set of misinformation compared to a pandemic like covid- , so domain identification helps to focus on specif topic. step : data sources for data source, we looked for fact-checking websites(like politifact, boomlive) and decided to use the poynter and snopes. we choose poynter figure : amused: an annotation framework for multi-modal social media data because poynter has a central data hub which collects data from more fact-checking websites while snopes is not integrated with poynter but having more than fact-checked articles on covid- . we describe the two data sources as follow-snopes-snopes snopes ( ) is an independent news house owned by snopes media group. snopes verifies the correctness of misinformation spread across several topics like election, covid- . as for the fact-checking process, they manually verify the authenticity of the news article and performs a contextual analysis. in response to the covid- infodemic, snopes provides a collection of a fact-checked news article in different categories based on the domain of the news article. poynter-poynter is a non-profit making institute of journalists institute ( ). in covid- crisis, poynter came forward to inform and educate to avoid the circulation of the fake news. poynter maintains an international fact-checking network(ifcn), the institute also started a hashtag #coronavirusfacts and #datoscoronavirus to gather the misinformation about covid- . poynter maintains a database which collects fact-checked news from factchecking organisation in languages. step : web scraping in this step, we developed a pythonbased crawler using beautiful soup richardson ( ) to fetch all the news articles from the poynter and snopes. our crawler collects important information like the title of the news articles, name of the fact-checking websites, date of publication, the text of the news articles, and a class of news articles. we have assigned a unique identifier to each of them and its denoted by fcid. a short description of each element given in table . step : language detection we collected data in multiple languages like english, german, hindi etc. to identify the language of the news article, we have used langdetect shuyo ( ) , a python-based library to detect the language of the news articles. we used the textual content of new articles to check the language of the news articles. our dataset is categorise into different languages. step : social media link in the next step, while doing the html crawling, we filter the url from the parsed tree of the dom (document object model). we analysed the url pattern from different social media platforms and applied keyword-based filtering from all hyperlinks in the dom. we store that urls in a separate column as the social media link. an entire process of finding social media is shown in figure . some of the url patterns are discussed below-twitter-for each tweet, twitter follows a pattern twitter.com/user name/status/tweetid. so, in the collection hyperlink, we searched for the keyword, "twitter.com" and "status", it assures that we have collected the hyperlink which referring to the tweet. youtube-for each youtube video, youtube follows a pattern hwww.youtube.com/watch?v=vidoeid. so, in the collection hyperlink, we searched for the keyword, "youtube.com" and "watch", these keyword assures that we have collected the hyperlink which referring to the particular youtube video. reddit-for each subreddit, reddit follows a pattern www.reddit.com/r/subreddit topic/. so, in the collection hy- example news id we provide a unique identifying id to each news articles. we use acronym for news source and the number to identify a news articles. newssource url it is a unique identifier pointing to the news articles. https://factcheck.afp.com/vi deo-actually-shows-anti-gove rnment-protest-belarus news title in this field, we store the title of the news articles. a video shows a rally against coronavirus restrictions in the british capital of london. published date each news articles published the fact check article with a class like false, true, misleading. we store it in the class column. news class we provide a unique identifying id to each news articles. false published-by in this field, we store the name of the professional news websites or blog, for example, afp, quint etc. country each news articles published the fact check article with a class like false, true, misleading. we store it in the class column. we provide a unique identifying id to each news articles. english table : name, definition and an example of elements collected from new articles. perlink, we searched for the keyword, "reddit.com" and a regex code to detect "reddit.com/r/", which confirms that we have collected the hyperlink which referring to the particular subreddit. similarly, we followed the approach for other social media platforms like facebook, instagram, wikipedia, pinterest, gab. in the next step, we used the regex code to filter the unique id for each social media post like tweet id for twitter, video id for youtube. step : social media data crawling after web scraping, we have the unique identifier of each social media post like tweet id for twitter, video id for videos etc. we build a python-based program for crawling the data from the respective social media platform. we describe some of the crawling tool and the details about the collected data. twitter-we used python crawler using tweepy roesslein ( ), which crawls all details about a tweet. we collect text, time, likes, retweet, user details such as name, location, follower count. youtube-for youtube, we built a python-based crawler which collects the textual details about the video, like title, channel name, date of upload, likes, dislikes. we also crawled the comments of the respective. similarly, we build our crawler for other platforms, but for instagram and facebook, we used the crowdtangle for data crawling, data is limited to posts from public pages and group team ( ). step : data labelling for data labelling, we used the label assigned in the news articles then we map the social media post with their respective news article and assign the label to the social media post. for example, a tweet extracted from news article is mapped to the class of the news article. an entire process of data annotating shown in figure . step : human verification in the next step, we manually overlook each social media post to check the correctness of the process. we provided the annotator with all necessary information about the class mapping and asked them to verify it. for example-in figure , human open the news article using the newssource url and verified the label assigned to the tweet. for covid- misinformation, a human checked randomly sampled % social media post from each social media platforms and verified the label assign to the social media post and label mentioned in the news articles. with the random checks, we found that all the assigned labels are correct. this helps make sure the assigned label is correct and reduces the bias or wrongly assigned label. we further normalise the data label into false, partially false, true and others using the definitions mentioned in shahi, dirkson, and majchrzak ( ) . the number of social media post found in four different category is shown in table . step : data enrichment in this step, we enrich the data by providing extra information about the social media post. the first step is merging the social media post with the respective news article, and it includes additional information like textual content, news source, author. the detailed analysis of the collected data is discussed in the result section. based on the results, we also discuss some of the findings in the discussion section. a snapshot of the labelled data from twitter is shown in figure . we will release the data as open-source for further study. for the use case of misinformation on covid- , we identified ifcn as the data source, and we collected data from different social media platforms. we found that around % of news articles contain linked their content to social media websites. overall, we have collected fact-checked news articles from countries in languages. a detailed description of social media data extracted using the amused framework is presented in table . we have cleaned the hyperlinks collected using the amused framework. we filtered the social media posts by removing the duplicates using a unique identifier of social media post. we have presented a timeline plot of data collected from different social media platforms in figure . we plotted the data from those social media platform which has ( ) figure : a timeline distribution of data collected from a number of different social media platform from january to august , we have presented the platform having data count more than . facebook instagram pinterest reddit tiktok twitter wikipedia youtube table : summary of covid- misinformation data collected from different social media platforms, deleted and duplicate posts are excluded in the count. the total number of post more than unique posts in table because it depreciates the plot distribution. we dropped the plot from pinterest ( ), whatsapp( ), tiktok ( ), reddit( ) . the plot shows that most of the social media posts are from facebook and twitter, then followed by youtube, then wikipedia and instagram. we have also presented the class distribution of these social media post in table . the figure shows that the number of post overall social media post was maximum during the mid-march to mid-may, . misinformation also follows the trend of the covid- situation in many countries because the number of social media post also decreased after june . the possible reason could be either the spread of misinformation is reduced, or fact-checking websites are not focusing on this issue as during the early stage. from our study, we highlighted some of the useful points. usually, the fact-checking website links the social media post from multiple social media platforms. we tried to gather data from various social media platforms, but we found the maximum number of links from facebook, twitter, and youtube. there are few unique posts from reddit ( ), tik-tok( ) but they were less than what we were expecting brennen et al. ( ) . surprisingly there are only three unique posts from pinterest, and there are no data available from gab, sharechat, and snapchat. however, gab is well known for harmful content, and people in their regional languages use sharechat. there are only three unique posts from pinterest. many people use wikipedia as a reliable source of information, but there are links from wikipedia. hence, overall fact-checking website is limited to some trending social media platforms like twitter or facebook while social media platforms like gab, tiktok is famously famous for malformation, misinformation brennen et al. ( ) . what-sapp is an instant messaging app, used among friends or group of people. so, we only found some hyperlink which links to the public whatsapp group. to increase the visibility of fact-checked articles, a journalist can also use schema.org vocabulary along with the microdata, rdfa, or json-ld formats to add details about misinformation to the news articles shahi, nandini, and kumari ( ) . another aspect is the diversity of social media post on the different social media platforms. more often, news articles mention facebook, twiter, youtube but less number of post from instagram, pinterest, no post from gab, tiktok. there might be these platforms actively ask or involve the factchecking website for monitoring the content on their platform, or the journalists are more focused on these platforms only. but it would be interesting to study the proposition of fake news on different platforms like tiktok, gab. we have also analysed the multi-modality of the data on the social media platform. in the case of misinformation on covid- , the amount of misinformation on text is more compare to video or image. but, in table we show that apart from text, the fake news is also shared as image, video or mixed-format like image+text. it will also be beneficial to detect fake news on different platforms. it also raises the open question of cross-platform study on a particular topic like misinformation on covid- . someone can also build a classification model shahi et al. ( ) ; nandini et al. ( ) to detect a class of fake news into true, false, partially false or other categories of news articles. while applying amused framework on the misinformation on covid- , we found that misinformation across multiple source platform, but it mainly circulated across facebook, twitter, youtube. our finding raises the concern of mitigating the misinformation on these platforms. in this paper, we presented a semi-automatic framework for social media data annotation. the framework can be applied to several domains like misinformation, mob lynching, and online abuse. as a part of the framework, we also used a python based crawler for different social media websites. after data labelling, the labels are cross-checked by a human which ensures a two-step verification of data annotation for the social media posts. we also enrich the social media post by mapping it to the news article to gather more analysis about it. the data enrichment will be able to provide additional information for the social media post. we have implemented the proposed framework for collecting the misinformation post related to the covid- as future work, the framework can be extended for getting the annotated data on other topics like hate speech, mob lynching etc. amused will decrease the labour cost and time for the data annotation process. amused will also increase the quality of the data annotation because we crawl the data from news articles which are published by an expert journalist. an introduction to social network data analytics key issues in conducting sentiment analysis on arabic social media text fighting the covid- infodemic in social media: a holistic perspective and a call to arms social media and fake news in the election imagery of lynching: black men, white women, and the mob truth is a lie: crowd truth and the seven myths of human annotation on whatsapp, rumours, and lynchings hosting the public discourse, hosting the public: when online news and social media converge types, sources, and claims of covid- misinformation embedded links, embedded meanings: social media commentary and news sharing as mundane media criticism trends shaping digital news overcoming barriers to nlp for clinical text: the role of shared tasks and the need for additional creative solutions the rise of fact-checking sites in europe automatically identifying changes in the semantic orientation of words how does online news curate linked sources? a content analysis of three online news media automatic annotation of human actions in video was coronavirus predicted in a dean koontz novel? what a catch! traits that define good annotators amazon mechanical turk: gold mine or coal mine? the open laboratory: limits and possibilities of using facebook, twitter, and youtube as a research data source enhancing transport data collection through social media sources: methods, challenges and opportunities for textual data narrative, event-structure analysis, and causal interpretation in historical sociology faking sandy: characterizing and identifying fake images on twitter during hurricane sandy a dean koontz novel the international fact-checking network truth finding on the deep web: is the problem solved? a survey on truth discovery t-verifier: verifying truthfulness of fact statements defining and measuring credibility of newspapers: developing an index tackling online abuse: a survey of automated abuse detection methods modelling and analysis of temporal gene expression data using spiking neural networks credibility assessment of textual claims on the web russia released lions beautiful soup documentation corpus annotation through crowdsourcing: towards best practice guidelines fakecovid -a multilingual cross-domain fact check news dataset for covid- analysis, classification and marker discovery of gene expression data with evolving spiking neural networks an exploratory study of covid- misinformation on twitter inducing schema. org markup from natural language context fake news detection on social media: a data mining perspective language-detection library snopes. . collections archive utility data annotation with amazon mechanical turk social media analytics-challenges in topic discovery, data collection, and data preparation why do people share fake news? associations between the dark side of social media use and fake news sharing behavior crowdtangle. facebook, menlo park, california the guardian. . the who v coronavirus: why it can't handle the pandemic youtube, twitter and the occupy movement: connecting content and circulation practices list of iso - codes world health organization and others world report how to fight an infodemic fake news: a survey of research, detection methods, and opportunities key: cord- -azh npc authors: sharma, manoj kumar; anand, nitin; vishwakarma, akash; sahu, maya; thakur, pranjali chakraborty; mondal, ishita; singh, priya; sj, ajith; n, suma; biswas, ankita; r, archana; john, nisha; tapatrikar, ashwini; murthy, keshava d. title: mental health issues mediate social media use in rumors: implication for media based mental health literacy date: - - journal: asian j psychiatr doi: . /j.ajp. . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: azh npc nan research involving human participants and/or animals:.all procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. j o u r n a l p r e -p r o o f social media use has recently become immensely popular not only for its leisure activities through connecting people over the world, but also for keeping updated with the current trends through news and sharing information. it provides a perfect platform to interact with others by offering opportunities to share a user's thoughts, emotions, pictures, videos and creative ideas through posts or blogs (kuss & griffiths, b , a . hence, one important characteristic of social media platforms is rapid spreading of information through its users which is usually impactful. another concern is when it comes to health related information sharing on social media. as open to all, anyone can produce information and publish in the digital forum, share experiences, form their own perspectives which remain unverified by any professional news channel, editors or factcheckers (sommariva, vamos, mantzarlis, uyên-loan Đào, & tyson, ) . thus, social media comes with its own limitations for misinformation in the form of rumours or fake news (zubiaga, liakata, procter, wong sak hoi, & tolmie, ) . moreover, once rumors begin to spread on social media, they are very difficult to control with updates or corrections (jones, thompson, dunkel schetter, & silver, ) . among these, health rumors which are unverified information regarding the practice of medicine and healthcare, often endanger public health (oh & lee, ) . hence, it is important to understand the role and impact of social media in spreading rumours and verify information before sharing it with others. research literature has found that social media has power in influencing people's behavior when there is an outbreak of epidemic or pandemic. over the decades, social media has been flooded with misinformation on diabetes, anorexia as well as anti-vaccination content along with the recent zika virus or ebola epidemic (fernández-luque & bau, ; sommariva et al., ) . the news of the ebola epidemic created a climate of global nervousness with rumours and misinformation quickly spreading through social media platforms. similar trend is being observed with current occurrence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (sars-cov- ) which has been declared as a pandemic. studies have also documented that during crisis events, people often seek out event-related information to stay informed of what is happening. if there is lack of official information, people may be at risk for exposure to rumors that fill the information void (jones et al., ) . additionally, constant assault of information through social media also leads its users to easily consume available information irrespective of its authenticity. in this is the era of "headline stress disorder", a lot of negative feelings like anxiety, hopelessness, despair, and sadness is fueled by being regulated by the (sharma & seshadri, ) . similarly, suicide is another public mental health problem where media and social media play a significant role in either increasing or curtailing the problem within the society. the available literature in bangladesh and india suggests that media reporting about suicide includes information which offers details name of the victim, their occupation, method of suicide, images of suicide victims, suicide notes and citations form suicide notes. this is the information which works to make the news attractive and shares details which increase access to information for harming self and may also work to create misinformation or rumors (arafat, mali & akter, ; armstrong et al., ; jain and kumar, ) . however, the media does not highlight information to educate the general population about what are early signs of suicidal behaviors, prevention plans and expert opinions from mental health professionals, helpline numbers for support and availability of emergency services in hospitals. these findings further suggest that the reports in media on suicide do not follow the guidelines issued by the world health organization (who) and other health regulatory bodies on reporting of suicide in media (arafat, mali & akter, ; armstrong et al., ; cherian, lukose, rappaia et al., ; jain and kumar, ) . there are similar irregularities j o u r n a l p r e -p r o o f which indicate reporting of sensitive information about suicide in a detrimental manner in media in china as well (chu et al., ) . thus, in the light of the existing information, it becomes understandable that media in all its formats have a huge impact and more significantly has a role to report responsibly the information in an educative format which is related to health of the population. in addition, it needs to be more sensitive and responsible in reporting about public health problems like the sars-cov- , and suicide where the focus is on offering information which is helpful for prevention, details the steps to take in times of the health emergency, offers expert opinions from mental health professionals, helpline numbers for support and emergency services in hospitals. this role of media will surely work to minimize the digital content which leads to creation of misinformation or rumors. to summarize, in addition to the responsible role of media in reporting about public health problems, the individual's members of the population, the government, policy makers, health regulatory bodies and health professionals need to collaborate and develop guidelines for responsible dissemination of information over all kinds of media formats with respect to public health problems. such guidelines will also work to improve the media based literacy about health and mental problems among the population and will be extremely helpful for use in times of public health emergencies like the sars-cov- pandemic. the development of such guidelines are crucial as the pattern of epidemics and pandemics changes over time, but the cycle of rumors or fake news or inaccurate media reports continues to revolve around media formats and especially in social media likely due to stress, anxiety and other psychological factors of individuals which requires to be studied in greater detail. is suicide reporting in bangla online news portals sensible? a year-round content analysis against world health organization guidelines assessing the quality of media reporting of suicide news in india against world health organization guidelines: a content analysis study of nine major newspapers in tamil nadu adolescent suicide in india: significance of public health prevention plan assessing the use of media reporting recommendations by the world health organization in suicide news published in the most influential media sources in china health and social media: perfect storm of information is suicide reporting in indian newspapers responsible? a study from rajasthan distress and rumor exposure on social media during a campus lockdown daria j . kuss and mark d . griffiths excessive online social networking : can adolescents become addicted to facebook ? education and health online social networking and addiction -a review of the psychological literature when do people verify and share health rumors on social media? the effects of message importance, health anxiety, and health literacy adolescence: contemporary issues in the clinic and beyond spreading the (fake) news: exploring health messages on social media and the implications for health professionals using a case study analysing how people orient to and spread rumours in social media by looking at conversational threads key: cord- -q blp we authors: bilal; latif, faiza; bashir, muhammad farhan; komal, bushra title: role of electronic media in mitigating the psychological impacts of novel coronavirus (covid- ) date: - - journal: psychiatry res doi: . /j.psychres. . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: q blp we the current research initiative focuses on the role of pakistani media in eliminating panic and depression among health practitioners and the general public due to the outbreak of novel coronavirus (covid- ). in pakistan, electronic media is the most common source of information due to the higher rural population and the lower literacy rate and media's handling of covid- coverage so far creates panic and depression. we suggest that special televised transmissions featuring psychologists and physiatrists should be aired to reduce the panic. media also mitigates the stress of frontline medical staff by paying special attributes to them. abstract: the current research initiative focuses on the role of pakistani media in eliminating panic and depression among health practitioners and the general public due to the outbreak of novel coronavirus . in pakistan, electronic media is the most common source of information due to the higher rural population and the lower literacy rate and media's handling of covid- coverage so far creates panic and depression. we suggest that special televised transmissions featuring psychologists and physiatrists should be aired to reduce the panic. media also mitigates the stress of frontline medical staff by paying special attributes to them. keywords: covid- ; media; mental health. during times of public crises, media must ensure to communicate crisis information efficiently and effectively to the general public, failing to do so will certainly lead to uncertainty, fear, and anxiety. in this era of advancement and technology with the general acceptance for freedom of speech, the role of media becomes indispensable in every respect. as today the world is suffering from ongoing novel coronavirus pandemic, fear of getting infected is sweeping all over the globe. in this context, some sources may be of dire help and play their part in reducing the panic that has been caused due to an increase in the mortality rate all over the globe (wit et al., ) . media is the most powerful tool that can disseminate such campaigns to provide some relief from panic and boost the morale of the general public. there is a general acceptance of the fact that electronic and print media in south asia are politically biased and tend to exploit scenarios like the current situation to win media wars. this is why we should focus on the role media to help reduce anxiety levels in the general public. history shows that there is a direct link between media and society. the basic motive of media is to inform society and to work for social welfare at a massive level as it targets the mass population. this particular study aims to study the role of pakistani media in reducing the mental stress of the public and enhancing the motivation level of the healthcare service providers during the covid- pandemic. (mckibbin & fernando, ) . media campaigns in pakistan need to address the mental health of the public and there is a great need for special transmissions with health professionals and experts to provide advice and instructions for the public to cope with the current situation (ali & gatiti, ) . pakistani media generally enjoys broadcasting freedom and has a strong impact on the day-to-day life of the general public. the current situation demands that they should play a positive role in this critical condition for the well-being of the general public. psychologists, psychiatrists and healthcare professionals should be invited in the programs to guide the people about the covid- with the aim to console and advise the general public on how to avoid stress so that they can cope with this deadly condition without affecting their mental health. special televised campaigns aimed to boost the morale of the public should be given air time (bhatia, ) . another dilemma of the current situation is the absence of schooling of children. children are at home and are moved with the situation. the media is not on-airing any productive program for children which shows that pakistani media is only limited to just one age group in society. what about children who are the future of our society and are already suffering from boredom and depression during the current situation, therefore media should play its role in arranging some special programs aimed at promoting learning activities for children and it will be beneficial for the mental and physical developments of these children who are the future of the covid- (coronavirus) pandemic: reflections on the roles of librarians and information professionals role of media to inform public about depression related diseases covid- risks and response in south asia the global macroeconomic impacts of covid- : seven scenarios are sedentary television watching and computer use behaviors associated with anxiety and depressive disorders? key: cord- - cxv l c authors: islam, a.k.m. najmul; laato, samuli; talukder, shamim; sutinen, erkki title: misinformation sharing and social media fatigue during covid- : an affordance and cognitive load perspective date: - - journal: technol forecast soc change doi: . /j.techfore. . sha: doc_id: cord_uid: cxv l c social media plays a significant role during pandemics such as covid- , as it enables people to share news as well as personal experiences and viewpoints with one another in real-time, globally. building off the affordance lens and cognitive load theory, we investigate how motivational factors and personal attributes influence social media fatigue and the sharing of unverified information during the covid- pandemic. accordingly, we develop a model which we analyse using the structural equation modelling and neural network techniques with data collected from young adults in bangladesh (n = ). the results show that people, who are driven by self-promotion and entertainment, and those suffering from deficient self-regulation, are more likely to share unverified information. exploration and religiosity correlated negatively with the sharing of unverified information. however, exploration also increased social media fatigue. our findings indicate that the different use purposes of social media introduce problematic consequences, in particular, increased misinformation sharing. covid- was not only a global pandemic but according to the director of who, also an "infodemic", highlighting dire issues arising from the abundance of misinformation and fake news circulating about covid- (laato et al., a) . in response to the infodemic, a significant number of resources were directed to curb the spread of misinformation; to ensure the availability of reliable information about covid- to the public (zarocostas, ) . among the adverse effects observed during the infodemic were messages of inefficient government (mahase, ) and individual-level (vaezi, and javanmard, ) responses. another concerning observation was health issues such as cyberchondria or increased anxiety (farooq et al., ) . previous work has highlighted social media to play a crucial role in the spread of misinformation (allcott and gentzkow, ) which calls into question what the platforms could do to prevent the spread of fake news (figueira and oliveira, ) . consequently, the three main research areas concerning fake news are divided into ( ) the (technical) prevention of the spread of fake news; ( ) the impacts of misinformation; and ( ) the relationship between misinformation and population health (laato et al., a) . to support these three areas of concern, human behaviour related to social media use and misinformation sharing needs to be understood. users of social media platforms such as facebook reported to be driven by several motivators such as a wish for entertainment, wish to stay informed and the desire to know the social activities of friends (kietzmann et al., ; quan-haase and young, ) . recent studies have also pointed out that social network sites are often used for selfpromotion and exhibitionism purposes (islam et al., ) . as such, social network sites differ from instant messaging, which is more personal, less self-promoting, more direct and driven by a wish to maintain and develop relationships (quan-haase and young, ) . modern social media platforms such as facebook offer multiple ways in which people can interact, including social activities, instant messaging, photo sharing, video streaming and sharing of news and articles. the social media ecosystems can cause or reinforce the stratification of people into social sub-groups characterised by having a similar mind (guerra et al., ) . this is the result of individuals' own choices due to psychological tendencies as well as ai-based recommendation systems that aim to provide users content they are likely to enjoy (spohr, ) . the lack of critique on thoughts and the amplification of radical ideas by the virtual echo-chambers created by social media have been claimed to contribute to increased dissemination of misinformation (barberá et al., t during covid- , clear communication of the severity of the situation and recommended health measures was needed to ensure people took correct action and did not suffer from unnecessary anxiety (farooq et al., ) . the abundance of unclear, ambiguous and inaccurate information during covid- led to information overload and accelerated health anxiety (cyberchondria) as well as misinformation sharing (laato et al., a) . as social media amplifies the spread of news, and people read news through links shared on social media (allcott and gentzkow, ; thompson et al., ; ku et al., ) , understanding the role that social media plays on the sharing of misinformation is essential. in this setting, social media fatigue (smf) and its connection to misinformation sharing may reveal further insights into human behaviour on social media and the antecedents of the spread of misinformation. thus, our research aims to observe this relationship as well as personal attributes and motivational factors connected to the two constructs via the theoretical frameworks of affordances (norman, ) and cognitive load theory (clt) (sweller, ) . with our paper, we expand the existing literature on misinformation sharing by connecting it to the affordances of social media and smf. the study context of covid- enables us to study our research model at a time when people were faced with a potentially lifethreatening disease that had severe consequences also on the economy. the rest of this study is structured as follows. in the background section, we review the extant literature on misinformation sharing as well as smf. we then present our theoretical foundation before moving on to forming the hypotheses for our research model. the methods and results follow the hypothesis section. in the discussion section, we go through our key findings, theoretical and practical implications of our results, as well as limitations and future work. via the internet and social media, individuals have access to an ever-increasing quantity of information. however, the availability of information has not reportedly correlated with individuals' increased knowledge (pentina and tarafdar, ) . while information is available, it might not be clearly structured, organised or even accessed. previous studies have given four primary reasons for this: ( ) a proportion of the available information is misinformation; ( ) much of the available information is irrelevant; ( ) information entropy: information is poorly organised and presented; and ( ) information overload, there is simply too much information for humans to make sense of (pentina and tarafdar, ; laato et al., a) . the use of a few trusted online sources has been recommended in the literature (farooq et al., ; misra and stokols, ; zarocostas, ) . this becomes especially important in situations such as the covid- pandemic where the novelty, rapid development and unpredictability of the situation can give rise to not only misinformation but poorly structured and presented information as well. resolving these issues is essential to manage and communicate with individuals about the situation and boost their intrinsic motivation to adapt to recommended health measures (farooq et al., ) . social media can be regarded as the amplifier of news articles, both real and fake (allcott and gentzkow, ) . in , the most popular social media platform facebook had over . billion registered users, % of which use the platform for keeping up with news (thompson et al., ) . allcott and gentzkow ( ) observed that during the us elections, roughly one-sixth of the population regarded social media as their primary news source. however, a recent study on adolescents' online behaviour showed a third considered social media as their primary news source, surpassing all other sources (ku et al., ) . besides, studies often separate online websites from social media as a news source (allcott and gentzkow, ; ku et al., ) , however, website news stories are typically disseminated and shared onwards specifically via social media. consequently, social media is particularly susceptible to be used as a platform for fake news dissemination. almost half ( %) of people sharing news reported having, at least at some point, shared misinformation (chadwick and vaccari, ) . there have been reports of bots being used to increase the visibility of fake news (howard et al., ; wang et al., ) , as well as attempts to algorithmically detect fake news (del vicario et al., ) . while bot networks spreading this news can be detected and stopped, algorithms cannot, in many cases, distinguish fake news from real news (del vicario et al., ) . as such, attempts to algorithmically detect and sensor fake news articles from social media would result in a large number of false positives and false negatives, contributing to censorship that would still leave some room open for fake news to be displayed. however, humans can also make mistakes in identifying fake news, on purpose or unintentionally (vicario et al., ) . previous studies have identified various intrinsic predictors for fake news sharing such as ( ) smf; ( ) fomo; ( ) inexperience using the internet; ( ) lack of information verification skills; ( ) laziness; ( ) information overload; and ( ) online trust (laato et al., a; khan and idris, ; talwar et al., ) . also, people are heavily impacted by confirmation bias, meaning they are more likely to believe information when it aligns with their pre-existing views regardless whether the information is reliable or not vicario et al., ) . in the context of pandemics, physical proximity, and perceived severity of the situation have been shown to increase information sharing in general (huang et al., ) . on the other hand, a recent study during covid- found perceived severity not to increase the intention to share unverified information (laato et al., a) . nevertheless, we maintain that rapidly emerging new situations, coupled with a large quantity of ill-structured information may contribute to increased fake news sharing (huang et al., ) . in addition to ensuring the availability of accurate and well-structured information and directing people towards it, there have been several other recent suggestions in the academic literature on how to mitigate the negative impacts of fake news and stop humans from spreading them (nekmat, ) . recent studies have shown users to be more critical towards online news if they have reasons to suspect that the quality of the news is low . nudging people to pay attention to the source(s) of the news they are reading, increases their criticality towards the information and makes them less likely to share fake news onward nekmat, ) . these findings show promise in how social media platforms could influence peoples' news sharing and reading behaviour. another recent article proposed the use of crowdsourcing to fact-checking news as well as confirming their authenticity (pennycook and rand, ) . in a way, crowdsourcing of news articles is already in place. wikipedia, for example, can be regarded as a crowdsourced database of information. however, news articles need to be produced and disseminated rapidly, which means that measures for detecting fake news also need to be quick. the problem in general with currently available suggestions for curbing the spreading of misinformation is that there begins to be a trade-off. while the number of fake news shared can be minimised, other negative consequences can begin to emerge, such as the users' limited freedom (del vicario et al., ) . smf has several, sometimes conflicting definitions (xiao and mou, ) such as "persistent impulses to back away from social media due to information and communication overload" (bright et al., ) and "a subjective and self-evaluated feeling of tiredness from social media usage" . the definition of bright et al. ( ) relates fatigue to cognitive overload. however, it simultaneously reduces the concept of fatigue to the two components of information and communication overload. on the other hand, the definition of lee et al. ( ) is broader, but as a downside provides little theoretical guidance for understanding the factors which lead to smf. one argument for using the definition of lee et al. ( ) is that previous studies have identified several factors contributing to smf besides information and communication overload (bright et al., ) such as depression (cao et al., ) . according to piper et al. ( ) , fatigue can be acute or chronic. acute fatigue is temporary, normal and short while chronic fatigue is more permanent (aaronson et al., ) . in this study, we understand smf based on the above provided definitions (bright et al., ; lee et al., ) to be a temporary, however systematically triggered, state of fatigue caused by social media use. previous studies have shown compulsive social media use to be one of the primary predictors of smf, and have further demonstrated that it can lead to anxiety and depression (dhir et al., ) . another study conceptualised anxiety and depression as the antecedents of fatigue instead, adding a third impacting factor, cyberbullying as a predictor (cao et al., ) . this highlights an issue in the previous literature of smf where there seems to be a lack of a clear theoretical framework explaining what are the antecedents and what are the consequences of smf. furthermore, some studies have provided models studying the relationships between seemingly random factors and smf, resulting in a list of factors predicting it. for example, dhir et al. ( ) showed privacy concerns, self-disclosure, parental encouragement and parental worry to increase smf. furthermore, xiao and mou ( ) reviewed the literature on what causes smf and found relevant quantitative studies, which gave a plethora of reasons that cause smf. these included fear of missing out (fomo), privacy concerns, technology-related factors, social media users' attitudes and personality, social overload, cognitive overload, anxiety, excessive use, cyberbullying, depression, destruction, parental influence, ubiquitous connectivity, shame, social comparison and complexity among many others (xiao and mou, ) . two main theories have been suggested to make sense of what causes smf: the cognitive load theory (clt) (bright et al., ; islam et al., ) and the stressor-strain-outcome model (xiao and mou, ) . both theories share the similarity of modelling smf as the dependant variable and theorising factors influencing it. according to clt, smf can be predicted by information overload, communication overload, system feature overload, social overload, and connection overload (islam et al., ) . there are also moderating factors present, as islam et al. ( ) identified multitasking computer self-efficacy to attenuate the effect of information overload. the presence of attenuating factors, as well as other factors, has also been discussed in studies using the stressor-strain-outcome theory (xiao and mou, ; whelan et al., b) . this theory has been used to look at how social media characteristics give rise to stressors, such as privacy invasion and invasion of life, which then lead to smf (xiao and mou, ) . from this brief look into social media fatigue, we draw three key points. first, the quantity and quality of available information have a significant impact on developing smf (bright et al., ; pentina and tarafdar, ) . second, the social media platform, the user and the interaction between the two all need to be understood to explain smf and its behavioural impacts. finally, clt (sweller, ) and stressorstrain-outcome (xiao and mou, ) offer promising theoretical frameworks for understanding smf (bright et al., ; islam et al., ) . for the current study, we adopt the affordance lens for understanding how social media users interact with the platform during the covid- pandemic. for understanding smf and sharing unverified information, we also draw from clt (sweller, ) . in this section, we present these two theoretical approaches by connecting them to the topic of our study. the term affordance was introduced by the psychologist james gibson ( ) , who conceptualised the term to describe the potential actions that an actor can make in a specific situation. in the context of a door handle, it has the logical affordance of being used to open a door. the door handle may be used in other ways as well, such as rubbing the back or being used as a clothing stand. gibson ( ) stated that affordances are independent of the actors' ability to recognise them. norman ( ) thought this expansion to the concept of affordance was unnecessary, and re-defined affordances to be only those actions, which an individual realises to exist. in doing so, affordances were tied to the objectives, values, thoughts and capabilities of individuals (norman, ) . not all scholars agreed on norman's conceptualisation of the term, and this gave birth to two schools of thought, one supporting norman's definition and the other following that of gibson. in this study, we adopt the definition of norman ( ) and divide affordances into ( ) technical affordances, the opportunities that the technology provides in general, in our case, social media platforms; ( ) individual affordances, the opportunities given to the individual; and ( ) contextual affordances, the opportunities provided by the context, in our case, the covid- pandemic. with technical affordances, our particular focus is on those technical features that afford social media users to read and share news and information. the platforms provide affordances to explore content as well as an opportunity for individuals to promote themselves or their ideologies or simply have fun. therefore, when looking at the individual affordances, we are concerned with personality factors (i.e. capabilities). religious people might, for example, use social media to share religious news and posts. in contrast, people with low levels of self-regulation may bombard their social media network with content they have given little thought to. with regards to contextual affordances, the covid- pandemic gave birth to a new situation with countless news emerging relating to the disease, policies, recommended health measures and various others. accordingly, users were provided contextual affordances to share and comment on this news. the two most significant benefits of using the affordance perspective for social media research: ( ) it can provide new perspectives into how social media shapes its users' interactions; and ( ) it can help understand how the users' inner needs can shape and regulate social media usage . accordingly, social media affordances are concerned with human-computer interaction and can help understand this relationship. as such, affordances can help understand and then minimise the spread of misinformation. on the other hand, one of the primary outcomes that prior literature highlights from social media use is smf (whelan et al., b) . in order to understand how fatigue is developed, we now turn to clt. clt postulates that the human working memory has a limited capacity, which may be overloaded if presented with too much information (sweller, ) . the evolutionary reaction to such situations is to back away and retreat to safer ground (sweller, ) . as an example, imagine our ancestors living in a jungle. there is an obvious benefit from tending to go out and explore, such as finding food and resources. however, exploration also leads to unknown territory and situations where humans can no longer predict what will happen next, thus, making the situation potentially perilous. accordingly, retreating to a familiar environment away from potential peril has been a beneficial thing to do. this evolutionary mechanism still affects human behaviour today and is at play, especially when acquiring new knowledge (panksepp, ; sweller, ) ; also referred to as the human comfort zone. vygotsky theorises that learning happens right outside this zone, the so-called zone of proximal development (shabani et al., ) . using vygotsky's zone of proximal development and clt, information overload can be conceptualised to occur when individuals are overwhelmed with too much novel information or are taken too far away a.k.m.n. islam, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) from their comfort zone. accordingly, information overload leads to impulses to step away from the new knowledge, back to the zone of proximal development (shabani et al., ) . consequently, in the case of information overload due to new knowledge and information coming from social media, smf emerges (bright et al., ) . cognitive load is conceptualised to constitute an intrinsic, extraneous and germane load (sweller, ) . the extraneous load has been investigated more often (mutlu-bayraktar et al., ) , and in the broader concept of human-computer interaction (hci), refers to the environmental stimuli to which the human brain reacts. intrinsic cognitive load, on the other hand, is the load resulting from processing this information and is affected by the individuals' psychological state of mind as well as their prior knowledge (sweller, ) . accordingly, well-structured information and prior expertise of the learner can both reduce intrinsic cognitive load (hollender et al., ) . germane load is a subconscious load that results from the working memory transferring information to long-term memory into so-called schemas. the three types of cognitive loads have been theorised to be linked so that reduced load of one kind releases cognitive capacity for the others (paas et al., ) . originally introduced as a theory for instructional science, clt has recently been integrated with hci (hollender et al., ) , and has been widely successful in explaining human online behaviour such as retention in online courses (mutlu-bayraktar et al., ) and the effects of social media use on learning (lau, ) . as a theory of learning, clt can also be used to understand how humans acquire knowledge through news articles. accordingly, it is relevant in the ongoing research about fake news and misinformation, especially during times when humans need to absorb new information rapidly and change their behaviour, such as the covid- pandemic (laato et al., a) . more specifically, we look at factors, which may affect the intrinsic cognitive load (xiao and mou, ) of social media users. xiao and mou ( ) in their literature review found the following intrinsic cognitive load factors to be meaningful in this context: fear of missing out (fomo), privacy concerns, anxiety, and depression. they also revealed extrinsic cognitive load factors such as parental influence, cyberbullying, complexity, technology-related factors, and social overload to be relevant (xiao and mou, ) . in order to contribute to this body of literature, we propose that five key factors are yet to be taken into account with regards to intrinsic cognitive load factors (which are also aligned with the affordance perspective as discussed earlier) influencing smf. these are: ( ) self-promotion; ( ) entertainment; ( ) religiosity; ( ) deficient self-regulation (ds-r); and ( ) exploration. accordingly, we place these as our independent variables and hypothesise relationships to both smf and sharing unverified information. in the next section, we will hypothesise the relationships in further detail. people have an inherent need to belong by seeking approval and recognition from others (zhou, ) . social media are a place where this need may be fulfiled via obtaining approval for self in forms of favourable comments and likes. studies have found that people tend to follow different strategies to enhance their image on social media (islam et al., ) . for example, people may share information (even private information) on social media to seek relatedness and approval from others (nesi and prinstein, ) . using the affordance lens (norman, ) , social media can be seen to provide social affordances. with these affordances, social media users actively create and maintain their self-image. islam et al. ( ) conceptualised it as self-promotion and showed it to lead to both subjective vitality and addiction. the relationship between self-promotion and addiction indirectly suggests that in the long run, social media use driven by self-promotion increases fatigue (dhir et al., ) . furthermore, when people use social media for self-promotion purposes, they need to actively balance between what to share and what not to in order to maintain a positive image of themselves. this may be increasingly difficult under situations such as the covid- pandemic where it is not easy to conceptualise which piece of information is relevant and trustworthy. this creates additional cognitive load, which in turn can lead to smf (whelan et al., b) . thus, we hypothesise the following. h . self-promotion increases social media fatigue. self-promotion on social media has been linked to narcissism (moon et al., ) , but is most primarily driven by a wish to stay connected (kietzmann et al., ) . perhaps surprisingly, focusing on others on social media has been found to have negative impacts on psychological wellbeing, whereas focusing on self-image has positive outcomes (vogel and rose, ) . the way social comparison on social media decreases wellbeing is that people tend to share only their best aspects online, hiding the negative, thus giving a falsified image to which to compare to (vogel et al., ) . thompson et al. ( ) showed status-seeking, which is closely related to self-promotion, to have a significant positive correlation with the intention to share news and information. similar findings have also been shown in previous studies (lee and ma, ) . in the context of intra-organisational social media platforms, the primary motivation for sharing information is helping people (vuori and okkonen, ) . prior research also suggests that social media users gain social capital through communicating and self-promoting themselves in social media (de zúñiga et al., ) . by drawing on the affordance lens, islam et al. ( ) discussed that social media provides the affordances to self-promote and gain social capital by creating an overly positivistic image of the self that appeals to other people. when the individuals' reputation is on the line, they are no longer under the influence of the online disinhibition effect (suler, ) and are more mindful of what they are sharing. this may lead them to double-check information sources before sharing news articles. during the covid- pandemic, the sharing of reliable information was being emphasised by the media and even social media platforms. thus, we theorise that individuals driven by self-promotion are extra mindful not to share misinformation on covid- , as that may end up ridiculing them in the case the news they shared was fake. thus, we hypothesise the following. h . self-promotion decreases the sharing of unverified information. social media has been characterised as a hedonic information system, meaning social media use is driven at least partially by factors such as enjoyment, fun, and entertainment (quan-haase and young, ; turel and serenko, ; mäntymäki and islam, ) . the wish for fun or entertainment materialises, for example, by enjoying funny stories shared to the user's network and making fun of celebrities and political figures (rieger and klimmt, ) . while people wishing to inform and help others are concerned with the validity and reliability of the information they share (vuori and okkonen, ) , people wishing to have fun may not feel a similar obligation. using the affordance lens (norman, ) , we model social media as a multimodal venue, meaning it can be used for entertainment, but also as a place to share and read information. during the covid- pandemic, a proportion of information sharing and social media activity was driven by a wish to have fun, often caused by humour as a coping mechanism in stressful situations (chiodo et al., ; lee and ma, ) , or because humour can be a way to make sense of new information. a study observing covid- related tweets on twitter found roughly . % to be written in a humorous tone (kouzy et al., ) . while humour itself is a good thing, striving for entertainment as a goal is not concerned with the validity of the shared information as long as the content is funny. accordingly, it is feasible to predict that using social media for entertainment leads to increased sharing of unverified information. thus, we hypothesise the following. h . entertainment increases the sharing of unverified information. a.k.m.n. islam, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) entertainment can be a way for people to blow off steam after a long workday, and as such, it can be characterised by emotional release, escapism and anxiety relief (lee and ma, ) . in particular, emotional release and anxiety relief act as ways to reduce stress and fatigue. by drawing on clt (sweller, ) , we argue that entertaining information may provide less cognitive load, as fun and entertainment may relax our mind, and thereby reduce our cognitive load. while social media use can be characterised by several drivers (thompson et al., ) , the entertainment aspect of it can be regarded to reduce fatigue. during the covid- pandemic, several tweets and social media posts containing humour emerged (kouzy et al., ) . some of the content may be regarded unsuitable and being in bad taste, such as the "covid- is a boomer-remover" meme (brooke and jackson, ) . on the other hand, joking even with such grave topics can be regarded to be a form of coping with the ongoing situation, trying to find humour and lighter sides of it. entertainment or comedy is often political but maybe also otherwise incorrect, possibly even as information. the information that a comedy often provides only serve the goal of provoking and making people think, and as such, is not concerned at all with being accurate. because entertainment can thus be characterised as mindless escapism, anxiety relief and emotional release (lee and ma, ) , we propose the following hypothesis. h . entertainment decreases social media fatigue. exploration has been defined as "appetitive strivings for novelty and challenge" (kashdan et al., ) . in the context of social media use, exploration refers to individuals' desire to go through the information, glance at novel topics and engage with new content. as such, it is linked to curiosity and courage, but also a more precise need to dig into available information (kashdan et al., ) . exploration as a concept is also related to novelty-seeking, which is a personality trait that varies between people. most typically, novelty-seeking is classified from low to high, meaning all people possess novelty-seeking to some degree (bardo et al., ) . the most important brain chemical for regulating exploration and novelty-seeking is dopamine (dulawa et al., ) . exploration may also be understood via clt (sweller, ) in that reduced cognitive load leads to increased exploration, as the primal neurofunctional seeking system activates (panksepp, ) . while exploration itself may lead to seeing increased quantities of information, the seeking of this information is voluntary and under the regulation of the user (panksepp, ) . building off clt (sweller, ) , the trait of exploration functions when people are not overloaded by information and have the cognitive capacity to seek more. while information overload has been found to increase the sharing of unverified information (laato et al., a) , the lack of experiencing information overload, therefore, reduces unverified information sharing. as exploration and tertiary level information overload are regulated by the same primal seeking system (sweller, ; panksepp, ) , we conclude that exploration is associated with the ability to process information. in practice, this manifests in the ability to process new information as well as seek verification for news. exploration should thus have a negative impact on unverified information sharing. therefore, we hypothesise the following. h . exploration decreases the sharing of unverified information. as exploration is connected to a primal desire to seek new content (kashdan et al., ) , it may manifest as increased use of social media. social media, on the other hand, is addictive (islam et al., ) . through addiction, exploration may impact fatigue in two ways: ( ) social media users do not have sufficient time to take care of their duties related to work or family, which may increase their cognitive load. in turn, this may increase fatigue; ( ) social media users are exposed to a large quantity of information, which can cause information overload, which in turn, leads to fatigue (islam et al., ) . during the covid- pandemic, as people were more at home due to government-issued limitations on movement and several workplaces closing down (farooq et al., ) , people had more time on their hands to explore and use social media (laato et al., a) . furthermore, the novelty of the pandemic situation brought a plethora of information to social media, opening new doors for exploration. these circumstances may contribute to increased smf via increased social media use. accordingly, we hypothesise the following. h . exploration increases social media fatigue. the positive effects of faith and religiosity have been controversial topics in academia in the current millennium with famous works having been published arguing against (hitchens, ) and for (mcgrath, ) the usefulness of religion. the complexity of religion can understand the broad spectrum of conceptualisations of religion as a phenomenon. religion has several levels: cognitive, affective, pragmatic and social. religion can serve, at all these levels, an individual, a social group, a broader community -and the community might be a religious community or a profane community using religion as an organising, constitutive or power structure -or a nation. thus, religion can define identity in its diverse forms, for example as a cognitively expressed confession of the vital dogma of one's faith, or one belongs to a group of believers that share the same faith. therefore, also the usefulness of religion has diverse interpretations, depending on the expected function and role of a given religion. should it serve an individual, their psychological integrity, sense of belongingness, meaning of life, or should religiosity support a religious community and the enforcement of the law in society? following khalaf et al. ( ) , we define religiosity as an intrinsic motivation to practise religion. the complexity of religiosity has consequences to the concepts of information, knowledge and truth, and their verifiability, thus, it may be understood through the clt (sweller, ) . religious people might be more sensitive to information that would refer to divine intervention; a thing that is hard to verify. at the same time, religious truth is very often unverified per se. the confirmation bias that may result from having strong religious viewpoints could cause an increase in sharing information that is regarded by the public as misinformation . accordingly, religiosity could be linked to the sharing of unverified information. thus, we hypothesise the following. h . religiosity increases the sharing of unverified information. campbell ( ) emphasises the role of community for the expression of and living out personal faith. instead of broadcasting or streaming religious events, called "online religion", she emphasises the transformation of religion by technology, i.e., "religion online". social media provides affordances for religion online and offers a platform for synchronised and asynchronous communication. it enables religious people to interact even amidst pandemics where meeting in real life is discouraged. religious people can form online communities on social media, where they primarily share the news that is written from the viewpoint of their religion. being able to read the information that is built on a shared core belief system can reduce cognitive load and make reading news less stressful (sweller, ) . this may decrease smf. additionally, religiosity is often associated with discipline and weekly (or daily) routines such as prayers. this may ward against overconsumption of social media, which has been identified as the primary cause for smf (dhir et al., ) . this may have been particularly relevant during covid- where recommended social isolation measures caused people to spend an increasing amount of time at home and gave them more time to overload on social media content (laato et al., a) . taking these two points together, we propose the following hypothesis. h . religiosity decreases social media fatigue. people suffering from ds-r have trouble regulating their actions. as such, they are more susceptible to acting based on impulses or habits a.k.m.n. islam, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) rather than planned behaviour and cognition . because of this, ds-r is connected to ( ) irresponsible, and sub-optimal behaviour; and ( ) decreased psychological wellbeing; ( ) internet addiction (laato et al., a; larose et al., ; lee and perry, ) amongst other harmful things. because ds-r leads to internet addiction (larose et al., ) , it can also contribute to increased social media usage. the covid- pandemic forced people off their routines to adopt health measures such as social isolation (laato et al., b) and in many cases, remote working (barbieri et al., ) . covid- also caused significant unemployment (coibion et al., ) . the lack of routines hit people with poor self-regulation hard, as they have no compulsory or agreed activities guiding their time use. with social media platforms, providing hedonistic instant gratification (mäntymäki and islam, ) , we propose that the covid- pandemic may have amplified the effects of ds-r and even increased experiencing ds-r. the likely increase in social media use during covid- because of ds-r can contribute to smf via two mechanisms: ( ) more time spent on social media leads to higher cognitive load in terms of information and communication overload; ( ) more time spent on social media takes time away from other more meaningful activities. furthermore, the lack of regulation on behaviour will increase the probability of sharing news articles even when one really should not. accordingly, we propose two hypotheses. h . deficient self-regulation increases the sharing of unverified information. h . deficient self-regulation increases social media fatigue. as our last relationship, we investigate the connection between smf and the sharing of unverified information. conceptualising smf to be driven by communication and information overload (bright et al., ) we can use clt to understand this relationship. people experiencing communication and information overload have less cognitive resources at their disposal, which hinders their ability to verify the information they encounter. furthermore, the positive impact of smf on fake news sharing has been empirically demonstrated in previous work (talwar et al., ) . however, on the other hand, smf also leads people away from social media and its active use. these two phenomena may counter each other to an extent. however, talwar et al. ( ) argue that fatigued social media users do not disengage from using social media, but instead change their behaviour. using the clt, we predict this change of behaviour to be in accordance with reducing cognitive load. accordingly, it is highly possible that fatigued users do not go through extra trouble such as verifying the sources of information they encounter, which in turn may lead to an increase in sharing unverified information. thus, we postulate our final hypothesis. the overall proposed research model is displayed in fig. . the five independent variables: ( ) self-promotion; ( ) entertainment; ( ) religiosity; ( ) ds-r; and ( ) exploration are all shown connections to both smf and sharing unverified information. the direct relationship between smf and unverified information sharing is also visible. next, we present our methodology and study context for testing the proposed model. our study concentrates on social media users from bangladesh in april , during which the covid- pandemic was causing severe restrictions and limitations on citizens' lives and mobility . bangladesh is a country in south asia, which has a population of approximately million people. around % of the people have access to the internet, and around % use social media. the most popular social media platforms are facebook and youtube, followed by reddit, instagram, twitter and tiktok. the covid- pandemic arrived in bangladesh officially on march th when the first three cases were reported. this caused governments to take action placing infected areas into quarantine and enforcing it by law. furthermore, the government closed all educational institutes and public services and advised citizens to stay home and avoid social contact, i.e. adopt personal voluntary health measures. we collected data from bangladeshi social media users during april through an online survey drafted using an online survey software called webropol. we adapted validated scales from prior literature for all constructs in our theorised model. after drafting the initial questionnaire, three researchers were asked to carefully look through the survey and the items to ensure they were grammatically correct and made sense in the current study context. according to received suggestions, we made changes to improve the understandability of the items and fixed a few grammar errors. after that, we asked bangladeshi social media users to comment on the overall final questionnaire in terms of how easy or difficult the questions were to understand and respond to. we received a few minor suggestions at this stage, which were taken into account. the final survey items and their source are listed in appendix . before presenting the respondents with the items to measure unverified information sharing, we described the following to clarify the context: "via the following questions, we ask you about your information sharing on social media (e.g. facebook, twitter, linkedin instagram) during the covid- pandemic". similarly, before asking about smf, self-promotion, ds-r, and entertainment, we explained the following: "via the following questions, we ask you about your use of social media (e.g. facebook, twitter, linkedin, instagram) during the last two weeks". we posted the survey link to two major covid- related facebook groups, which both had more than , members. furthermore, we asked students and alumni of a major private university in bangladesh to respond to the survey. the survey was opened times, started responding, and respondents completed the survey in full and submitted their responses. we removed two responses due to missing data. therefore, responses were used to test our research model. out of the respondents, % were male, % were female, and % were other or preferred not to tell. the most popular social media platforms among the respondents were facebook ( %), youtube ( %) and instagram ( %) followed by snapchat, linkedin, twitter, reddit and tiktok. the majority of respondents were young, aged - ( , %), followed by the age groups of - ( , %), - ( , %) and - ( , %). the proposed research model was tested via a two-staged analysis approach. at the first stage, pls-sem technique was utilised to confirm the reliability, the validity of the constructs and test the causal relationships between the constructs. we followed this analysis with a neural network (nn) based approach. pls-sem is an analysis technique for evaluating relations between various independent and dependant internet world stats usage and population statistics, https://www. internetworldstats.com/stats .htm#asia, (accessed on april th ). corona info bd, iedcr. https://corona.gov.bd/ (accessed on april rd, ). a.k.m.n. islam, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) variables and is commonly used for understanding relationships between constructs in cross-sectional data. however, pls-sem cannot examine the non-linear relationships between constructs. to address this issue, we supplemented the pls-sem analysis with the nn approach. to summarise, pls-sem was used to evaluate the hypotheses shown in fig. , while in the second stage, the nn was used to validate the findings of the pls-sem results, and also to prioritise predictors based on their relative importance in influencing smf and unverified information sharing. before moving to use the pls-sem and nn as analysis techniques, we tested multivariate assumptions and the validity and reliability of our data following the guidelines of wong et al. ( ) and fornell and larker ( ) . we first conducted several statistical tests to ensure that our data fulfils the multivariate assumptions for further statistical analysis (wong et al., ) . to ensure normality, at first, we tested our data for skewness and kurtosis in spss. all values were within − . to + . , and therefore, we conclude that the data is normally distributed. next, we tested the linearity of the associations between constructs. the test results (see appendix ) showed that the predictor and target construct have a combination of linear and non-linear relationships. due to the existence of non-linear relationships, the nn approach is necessary to complement the pls-sem results (chong ) . third, the values of variance inflation factor (vif) were calculated (hair et al., ) . all values were less than , which is a widely accepted vif threshold (o'brien, ) . it was, therefore concluded that there was no question of multicollinearity with the data (tan et al., ) . finally, scatter plots were generated to ensure homoscedasticity (white, ; ooi et al., ) . we looked at the regression standardised residuals of all our relationships and found them to be equally distanced from the regression line. it was therefore assumed that the presumption of homoscedasticity was fulfiled. before continuing to test our model results using the sem technique, we checked the validity and reliability of our data. to this end, first, we verified the internal consistencies and convergent validity of the data. the thresholds recommended by fornell and larker ( ) were selected, meaning each item loading was to be above . , construct composite reliability (cr) was to be above . . the average variance extracted (ave) had to be above . . as shown in appendix , all items (except three religiosity items) had loadings higher than . . we removed those three items that did not match the criterion. furthermore, we ensured that crs were above . , and aves were above . (fornell and larker, ) . next, we verified the discriminant validity of our data by using the correlation matrix and square roots of aves. table shows the correlation matrix. from this table, we see that the inter-construct correlations were less than the diagonally presented square roots of the aves. furthermore, we verified the loadings and cross-loadings and observed that the loadings were consistently higher than cross-loadings. these tests ensured that we achieved sufficient discriminant validity. common method bias (cmb) is a problem in studies that use selfreported survey data. it refers to the variance caused by the survey method (podsakoff et al., ) . to address this issue, we conducted harman's single factor test (harman ) . the findings of our analysis islam, et al. technological forecasting & social change ( ) showed that . % of the total variation was due to a single construct, which is well below the required % (podsakoff et al., ) . we revalidated cmb with other methods, owing to increasing disagreements with the validity of harman's single-factor test (lowry and gaskin ) . following the guidelines of liang et al. ( ) , we proceeded to conduct the common method factor test. we did this using the smartpls software by re-using all our items to create a common method factor. we then calculated the variances for each item as explained by the created common method factor and our actual factors in the pls model. the average variance explained by the method factor delivered the average of . and the average variance explained by the assigned factors gave the average of . . as the method variance was minimal ( . ), we concluded that common method bias was not an issue for our operationalisation and data. machine learning methods producing a neural network have been used to support pls-sem analysis (chan and chong, ; chong, ; talukder et al., ) . the main advantage of supplementing sem with a neural network-based analysis is that it is capable of addressing non-linearity in data (chong, ) . some studies have also reported that even with relatively small amounts of data