id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cord-326740-1fjr9qr4	Perlman, Yael	Reducing Risk of Infection - the COVID-19 Queueing Game	2020-09-03		.txt	text/plain	3189	186	62	We propose a novel approach by which to calculate the risk of a customer being infected while queueing outside the store, while shopping, and while checking out with a cashier. We derive equilibrium strategies for a Stackelberg game in which the authority acts as a leader who first chooses the maximum number of customers allowed inside the store to minimize the risk of infection. In the second model, we analyze reducing waiting time in the payment queue (and ensuring the safety of cashiers and customers) by allowing store management to set aside a separate waiting space with limited capacity adjacent to the cashiers. In the game, the authority chooses a maximum number of customers allowed inside the store at a time to minimize the risk of transmission. Thus, in this setting, the store is divided into two separate areas: (i) the payment area with c ≥ 1 parallel cashiers and waiting space of size N customers and (ii) the shopping area, in which the maximum number of customers allowed, K.	./cache/cord-326740-1fjr9qr4.txt	./txt/cord-326740-1fjr9qr4.txt