key: cord-271536-pscw933i authors: Guo, Zhen-Dong; Wang, Zhong-Yi; Zhang, Shou-Feng; Li, Xiao; Li, Lin; Li, Chao; Cui, Yan; Fu, Rui-Bin; Dong, Yun-Zhu; Chi, Xiang-Yang; Zhang, Meng-Yao; Liu, Kun; Cao, Cheng; Liu, Bin; Zhang, Ke; Gao, Yu-Wei; Lu, Bing; Chen, Wei title: Aerosol and Surface Distribution of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in Hospital Wards, Wuhan, China, 2020 date: 2020-07-17 journal: Emerg Infect Dis DOI: 10.3201/eid2607.200885 sha: doc_id: 271536 cord_uid: pscw933i To determine distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards in Wuhan, China, we tested air and surface samples. Contamination was greater in intensive care units than general wards. Virus was widely distributed on floors, computer mice, trash cans, and sickbed handrails and was detected in air ≈4 m from patients. To determine distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards in Wuhan, China, we tested air and surface samples. Contamination was greater in intensive care units than general wards. Virus was widely distributed on floors, computer mice, trash cans, and sickbed handrails and was detected in air ≈4 m from patients. relatively high for floor swab samples (ICU 7/10, 70%; GW 2/13, 15.4%), perhaps because of gravity and air flow causing most virus droplets to float to the ground. In addition, as medical staff walk around the ward, the virus can be tracked all over the floor, as indicated by the 100% rate of positivity from the floor in the pharmacy, where there were no patients. Furthermore, half of the samples from the soles of the ICU medical staff shoes tested positive. Therefore, the soles of medical staff shoes might function as carriers. The 3 weak positive results from the floor of dressing room 4 might also arise from these carriers. We highly recommend that persons disinfect shoe soles before walking out of wards containing COVID-19 patients. The rate of positivity was also relatively high for the surface of the objects that were frequently touched by medical staff or patients (Tables 1, 2 ). The highest rates were for computer mice (ICU 6/8, 75%; GW 1/5, 20%), followed by trash cans (ICU 3/5, 60%; GW 0/8), sickbed handrails (ICU 6/14, 42.9%; GW 0/12), and doorknobs (GW 1/12, 8.3%). Sporadic positive results were obtained from sleeve cuffs and gloves of medical staff. These results suggest that medical staff should perform hand hygiene practices immediately after patient contact. Because patient masks contained exhaled droplets and oral secretions, the rate of positivity for those masks was also high (Tables 1, 2) . We recommend adequately disinfecting masks before discarding them. For the ICU, the order of dressing is dressing room 1, dressing room 2, and dressing room 3; the order of undressing is dressing room 4, dressing room 5, and dressing room 6. The isolation ward of ICU is a large floor space with 15 cubicles (each with a patient bed) along the 2 opposite perimeters. Each cubicle is open to the central open area without any partition. For the general ward, the order of dressing is dressing room 1, dressing room 2, and dressing room 3; the order of undressing is dressing room 4, dressing room 5, and buffer room 1. The contaminated area of the general ward contains a patient corridor, and the 1-sided cubicles are all enclosed with door access to the corridor. We further assessed the risk for aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2. First, we collected air in the isolation ward of the ICU (12 air supplies and 16 air discharges per hour) and GW (8 air supplies and 12 air discharges per hour) and obtained positive test results for 35% (14 samples positive/40 samples tested) of ICU samples and 12.5% (2/16) of GW samples. Air outlet swab samples also yielded positive test results, with positive rates of 66.7% (8/12) for ICUs and 8.3% (1/12) for GWs. These results confirm that SARS-CoV-2 aerosol exposure poses risks. Furthermore, we found that rates of positivity differed by air sampling site, which reflects the distribution of virus-laden aerosols in the wards ( Figure 2 , panel A). Sampling sites were located near the air outlets (site 1), in patients' rooms (site 2), and (site 3). SARS-CoV-2 aerosol was detected at all 3 sampling sites; rates of positivity were 35.7% (5/14) near air outlets, 44.4% (8/18) in patients' rooms, and 12.5% Figure 2 (1/8) in the doctors' office area. These findings indicate that virus-laden aerosols were mainly concentrated near and downstream from the patients. However, exposure risk was also present in the upstream area; on the basis of the positive detection result from site 3, the maximum transmission distance of SARS-CoV-2 aerosol might be 4 m. According to the aerosol monitoring results, we divided ICU workplaces into high-risk and low-risk areas (Figure 2, panel B) . The high-risk area was the patient care and treatment area, where rate of positivity was 40.6% (13/32). The low-risk area was the doctors' office area, where rate of positivity was 12.5% (1/8). In the GW, site 1 was located near the patients (Figure 2 , panel C). Site 2 was located ≈2.5 m up-stream of the air flow relative to the heads of patients. We also sampled the indoor air of the patient corridor. Only air samples from site 1 tested positive (18.2%, 2/11). The workplaces in the GW were also divided into 2 areas: a high-risk area inside the patient wards (rate of positivity 12.5, 2/16) and a low-risk area outside the wards (rate of positivity 0) (Figure 2, panel D) . This study led to 3 conclusions. First, SARS-CoV-2 was widely distributed in the air and on object surfaces in both the ICU and GW, implying a potentially high infection risk for medical staff and other close contacts. Second, the environmental Figure 2 contamination was greater in the ICU than in the GW; thus, stricter protective measures should be taken by medical staff working in the ICU. Third, the SARS-CoV-2 aerosol distribution characteristics in the ICU indicate that the transmission distance of SARS-CoV-2 might be 4 m. As of March 30, no staff members at Huoshenshan Hospital had been infected with SARS-CoV-2, indicating that appropriate precautions could effectively prevent infection. In addition, our findings suggest that home isolation of persons with suspected COVID-19 might not be a good control strategy. Family members usually do not have personal protective equipment and lack professional training, which easily leads to familial cluster infections (6) . During the outbreak, the government of China strove to the fullest extent possible to isolate all patients with suspected COVID-19 by actions such as constructing mobile cabin hospitals in Wuhan (7), which ensured that all patients with suspected disease were cared for by professional medical staff and that virus transmission was effectively cut off. As of the end of March, the SARS-COV-2 epidemic in China had been well controlled. Figure 2 . Spatial distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 aerosols in isolation wards of the intensive care unit (ICU) and the general ward at Huoshenshan Hospital, Wuhan, China. A) The air sampling sites in the ICU were distributed in different regions: near the air outlet (site 1), near the patients (site 2), and around the doctors' office area (site 3). Orange circles represent sampling sites; blue arrows represent direction of the fresh air flow; and the graded orange arrow and scale bar indicate the horizontal distance from the patient's head. B) In terms of viral aerosol distribution, the space in the ICU was divided into 2 parts: a high-risk area with a 40.6% rate of virus positivity and a low-risk area with a 12.5% rate of virus positivity. C) The air sampling sites in the general ward were distributed in different regions around the patient (site 1), under the air inlet (site 2), and in the patient corridor. D) In terms of the viral aerosol distribution, the space in the general ward was divided into 2 parts: a high-risk area with a 12.5% rate of virus positivity and a low-risk area with a 0% rate of virus positivity. Our study has 2 limitations. First, the results of the nucleic acid test do not indicate the amount of viable virus. Second, for the unknown minimal infectious dose, the aerosol transmission distance cannot be strictly determined. Overall, we found that the air and object surfaces in COVID-19 wards were widely contaminated by SARS-CoV-2. These findings can be used to improve safety practices. World Health Organization. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) situation report-71 COVID-19 and Italy: what next? Lancet Transmission routes of 2019-nCoV and controls in dental practice Air, surface environmental, and personal protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient Rapid deployment of a mobile biosafety level-3 laboratory in Sierra Leone during the 2014 Ebola virus epidemic A family cluster of SARS-CoV-2 infection involving 11 patients in Nanjing, China. Lancet Infect Dis Health protection guideline of mobile cabin hospitals during novel coronavirus pneumonia (NPC) outbreak Address for correspondence: Wei Chen Beijing, China; email: cw0226@foxmail.com, lubing@nic.bmi.ac.cn, and gaoyuwei@gmail.com Emerging Infectious Diseases • www Baylisascaris procyonis, the common intestinal roundworm of raccoons, has increasingly been recognized as a source of severe, often fatal, neurologic disease in humans, particularly children. Although this devastating disease is rare, lack of effective treatment and the widespread distribution of raccoons in close association with humans make baylisascariasis a disease that seriously affects public health. Raccoons infected with B. procyonis roundworms can shed millions of eggs in their feces daily. Given the habit of raccoons to defecate in and around houses, information about optimal methods to inactivate B. procyonis eggs are critical for the control of this disease. However, little information is available about survival of eggs and effective disinfection techniques. Additional data provides infomation on thermal death point and determining the impact of desiccation and freezing on the viability of B. procyonis eggs to provide additional information for risk assessments of contamination and guide attempts at environmental decontamination. Visit our website to listen: https://www2c.cdc.gov/podcasts/ player.asp?f=8620675