id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cord-004073-k6ad4qgu	Kabir, K. M. Ariful	Modelling and analysing the coexistence of dual dilemmas in the proactive vaccination game and retroactive treatment game in epidemic viral dynamics	2019-12-04		.txt	text/plain	5899	305	42	However, Kabir & Tanimoto [54] claimed that an individual's decision to take a vaccination after social learning (dynamical behaviour) also occurs on local time scales, so this strategy should be updated instantly. To model the social dual-dilemma as a two-stage game, the pre-emptive vaccination and ex post treatment are developed in the framework of SIR epidemic dynamics in a well-mixed population (figure 1). Based on a feedback loop between the resistance evolution and prescription norm, the game approach establishes a social learning dynamical process that somehow controls the optimum use of the antiviral treatment. Consequently, the treatment game is expressed by the following DC dynamics: Considering the defined payoff structure and the portion of individuals presented in table 2, the social average payoff π , expected value of vaccinators π C and expected value of nonvaccinators π D are, respectively, given by	./cache/cord-004073-k6ad4qgu.txt	./txt/cord-004073-k6ad4qgu.txt