

## COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

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### Non-Governmental Organizations and Palestine: The Politics of Money

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#### **Introduction**

Against the background of the current Palestinian popular uprising, one is compelled to raise some basic and pertinent questions about the nature of financial aid being offered to the Palestinian people under occupation. This will constitute the central preoccupation of this paper. The question which will be assessed deals with three components: the stated goals and objectives of the organizations extending the aid, the in-field mode of implementation, and the degree of indigenous Palestinian involvement in the definition of need, strategy, and objectives.

Furthermore, the scope of this paper will be limited to selected non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Excluded from this discussion will be the aid coming from UN agencies (UNRWA, UNDP, WHO); Arab/Palestinian official/governmental agencies (Jordanian government, the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee); and European governments through the Commission of the European Community. Thus, in terms of sheer volume, the sources that offer the bulk of financial aid will fall outside the scrutiny presented here, but, on the other hand, the three components that constitute the parameters of the present discussion are, by and large, predetermined by the political mandates of the respective member states.

To facilitate the discussion, and out of respect for certain inherent differences among them, the NGOs were grouped into three categories: (1) secular/church-related organizations, (2) USAID-funded organizations, and (3) Islamic/Arab/Palestinian organizations. Since this is a 'spot-check' discussion of main trends, many NGOs which extend assistance to the Palestinian

population under occupation will not be covered here, and this should not be viewed as a judgement of their role.

### **Secular/Church-Related Organizations**

There are many secular and church-related organizations, some large and some small, involved in offering financial aid to the Palestinians under occupation. Many channel their aid through the World Council of Churches; others work directly in Palestine; and still others follow a dual channel. I shall concentrate here on four organizations, namely, Oxfam, Mennonite Central Committee, American Friends Service Committee, and Near East Council of Churches.

#### *Oxfam\**

**Goals and Objectives.** Oxfam views itself as a 'partnership of people who . . . work together for the basic human rights of food, shelter and reasonable conditions of life'. It works for the development of 'poor communities' and those suffering from oppression, since it 'believes in the essential dignity of people'.

Oxfam anchors its support to the Palestinian community under occupation on the grounds that such a community is locked into a 'cycle of deprivation' caused by political circumstances. Thus, in an attempt to reduce this suffering, Oxfam defines the objectives of its programme in Palestine as:

- a) 'partnering true development projects . . .';
- b) 'funding . . . institutions and organizations of various kinds . . .'; and
- c) 'offering moral support for people suffering under oppression'.

Translating these objectives into programmes, Oxfam supports projects in agriculture, health, law, education, general economic development, and the handicapped.

**Mode of Implementation.** Oxfam implements its projects through 'a wide network of connections with people and organizations who are struggling in the same direction: to create awareness, mobilise, motivate and encourage'. It maintains a low visibility in the field; it has no permanent office in Palestine. In some cases it relies on paid advisers and consultants, but the crystallization of the projects it funds, the funding levels, and field follow-up are done by its Middle East Area Co-ordinator, who visits the field about three times annually. Oxfam does not co-ordinate with Israeli authorities regarding its programme of assistance to Palestinian communities under occupation.

**Palestinian Involvement.** There is a varying degree of indigenous Palestinian involvement in the definition of need and objectives, but not the overall strategy. The level and scope of involvement depend to a large extent on the discretion of the Middle East Co-ordinator, and on his understanding and interpretation of the organization's overall goals and strategy. In the present context of Oxfam's work, and due to the limitation of its budgets, the range of indigenous Palestinian involvement seems to be limited to certain popular

organizations whose work and approach fit better within the views of the Middle East Area Co-ordinator and according to his own analysis of the structure of Palestinian society and the desired transformations in it.

It is conceivable that a different Middle East Area Co-ordinator at Oxfam may find a different organizational channel to implement the organization's broad goals and objectives, without a noticeable degree of contradiction. Such a situation allows for the potential of outside meddling into the type of transformations Palestinians themselves ought to seek.

*Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)*

Goals and Objectives. Like Oxfam, MCC defines its target populations in terms of suffering, need, and oppression. But, unlike Oxfam, whose overall orientation is secular, it anchors itself in a specific religious movement and articulates this in the priorities of its programmes. Within a framework representing the Mennonite Brethren in Christ Churches of North America, MCC's overall goal is to 'relieve suffering, to identify with and be signs of hope and reconciliation through the development of communities, the cultivation of peace and friendship, and support for the work of the world wide church'.<sup>2</sup> Committed to 'social justice through non-violence' and 'developmental' work in the sense that it is 'participatory' and concerned with 'self reliance', MCC declares that it rises above 'easy national, racial, cultural or ideological affiliation'. It defines its priorities as:

- a) 'responding to the concerns of partners, especially churches . . . strengthen relationships, empower local structures and leadership';
- b) 'continued and new involvements in areas suffering from conflict, poverty, injustice and ideological enmity';
- c) food for hungry people; and
- d) 'highlighting the peacemaking element of programs'.

MCC translates these priorities and objectives in Palestine into projects in agricultural development, health education, and certain areas of pressing need.

Mode of Implementation. MCC has a permanent office in Jerusalem run by a director, always American or Canadian, and by largely local Palestinian staff. The organization is registered with the Israeli social welfare department within the Civil Administration structure that is responsible to the Defense Ministry. Thus, by registration, MCC is required to clear all projects nominated for funding with military government officials.

Palestinian Involvement. Structurally, indigenous Palestinian involvement in the definition of need, strategy, and objectives is very limited (if non-existent). Indigenous Palestinians here are viewed as mere recipients of MCC funds. Interpreting their 'empowerment' in the context of Israeli occupation depends on the initiative, prerogative, and level of political analysis of whoever happens to be the director of the office and who, in turn, has to match it with the way 'social justice' is perceived by the home office.

Consequently, on the mere level of interpretation of the general goals, there is a long road between aiming to 'empower local structures and leadership' and the type of project that gets implemented locally, and the benchmarks along this road are determined largely by the director.

On the other hand, another layer of isolation between potential indigenous Palestinian involvement and the projects that actually get implemented stems from the clearance process of projects proposed for funding. It has been shown repeatedly that the major criterion used in the clearance process is political, i.e. the type of local organization benefiting from the project, whether or not the project will generate communal solidarity and development, hence, empowerment. Therefore, by submitting projects for clearance, MCC has already participated in removing indigenous Palestinians from being involved in determining the methods of their empowerment, at least by a few notches.

To be fair, MCC may not and, as far as I know, does not submit every proposed project for Israeli clearance, especially if it expects that a certain project will, most likely, be rejected. In such a case, it tends to interpret certain specific approvals as blanket approvals. However, the interpretation process remains at the discretion of the office director and his assessment of the kinds of pressures his operation is under.

#### *American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)*

Goals and Objectives. Unlike Oxfam and MCC, AFSC seems to take a more active role in the politics of the Israeli-Palestinian context in which it offers financial aid. AFSC is guided by values that 'are based on convictions and testimonies of the Religious Society of Friends'.<sup>3</sup> Similar to the two previous organizations, its aim is to help free persons from 'unnecessary suffering', and to help each person realize 'a life of dignity'. 'Through our work,' AFSC's International Division Priorities and Guidelines state, 'we seek to express our deepest belief in the power of love and non-violence to bring positive change in conditions of life and to modify institutions so that they act with genuine concern for individual worth.' Again, it reaffirms that AFSC staff work 'to support non-violent alternatives to militarism and war', and through their social and technical assistance programmes they seek 'to enable people to discover and utilize their own power and resources'.

Mode of Implementation. AFSC was founded in 1917, and since 1948 has had programmes in the Middle East, with both Jews and Arabs, searching for a 'genuinely just and lasting peace'. Although AFSC has no permanent office in Palestine, it has placed, since 1967, a Middle East representative 'to keep in touch with leaders, especially those with moderate views. . . .'

AFSC implements its own projects directly, and, officially, it does not co-ordinate with Israeli military authorities. Follow-up for their projects is effected through periodic field visits by their Middle East representative. Non-co-ordination with military authorities does not preclude, however, co-ordination with acceptable Israeli political authorities.

**Palestinian Involvement.** The general guidelines which inform AFSC's work in support of the Palestinians under occupation carry within them dangerous underpinnings in so far as genuine indigenous Palestinian development and transformation are concerned. AFSC allows for the involvement of Palestinians only in so far as these Palestinians fit within the politico-religious mould of the Friends. Needless to say, goals and objectives are determined largely in Philadelphia; however, AFSC allows some Palestinians to be involved in the definition of needs, subject often to the predetermined political stance of this organization which, if one dare say it, is characterized by righteous overtones.

*Near East Council of Churches (NECC)*

**Goals and Objectives.** The Department on Service to Palestine Refugees (DSPR) has been, since 1974, the administrative body of the NECC. The programme was organized in 1951 for the explicit service of Palestinian refugees, 'as a regional ecumenical ministry' supported by the World Council of Churches and local churches through the NECC.<sup>4</sup> Although DSPR services 'are provided to all people regardless of religious, ethnic or political affiliation', they are offered with an accompanying 'sense of responsibility to maintain continuing Christian presence in Palestine. . . .' Again, their objectives emphasize the need to enable and empower grass-roots groups.

**Mode of Implementation.** Since 1974, NECC's programme in Palestine has been administered by the DSPR regional central office in Cyprus. The local programme, however, is largely designed and wholly implemented by local committees, one for each region (Israel, West Bank, Gaza), composed totally of local Palestinians. The committees are registered with the authorities and have to clear their projects with the Social Welfare Department, especially in Gaza.

The range of projects NECC is involved in varies from one region to the next. In Gaza, by and large, NECC projects are the largest and most permeating. They involve vocational training, health clinics, youth programmes, support for needy families, support for local institutions, and other activities in the camps in co-ordination with UNRWA.

**Palestinian Involvement.** As stated earlier, local committees define the needs and the best way of responding to them. On this level, indigenous Palestinians are fully involved. The crux comes, however, with the review and determination of budgets for the various regions by the 'international executive secretaries'. These are composed of representatives of different churches that fund the programmes who use externally defined strategies to override indigenous definition of need.

**USAID-Funded Organizations**

At present, there are five American private voluntary organizations (PVOs) operating in the West Bank and Gaza who, until 1987, served as the main channels for funnelling USAID money into Palestine. These five are:

ANERA (American Near East Refugee Aid)  
AMIDEAST (America-Mideast Educational and Training Services)  
CDF (Community Development Foundation, or Save the Children)  
CRS (Catholic Relief Service)  
HCM (Holyland Christian Mission)

From 1975 until the end of 1987, the US government disbursed through the PVO channel nearly \$77 million. But with the announcement of the Jordanian Development Plan in 1987, a shift in the disbursement pattern in favour of the Jordanian Plan took place. In 1986, for example, about \$14 million were disbursed through the PVOs compared with \$4.5 million via Jordan, whereas the ratio increased markedly in favour of Jordan in 1987, and continues through 1988. Thus, the total disbursed through Jordan for the years 1986 and 1987 was \$18.5 million. (Specific figures for 1988 not available yet.)

In so far as AID constitutes the primary source of funding for these PVOs, they are governed by the same overall strategy and objectives, determined in Washington and informed by US interests in the area. Consequently, we shall examine first the broad strategic objectives for this type of assistance and then the particular modes of implementation and indigenous Palestinian involvement in the determination of this assistance.

**Goals and Objectives.** The objectives of US-funded projects in the West Bank and Gaza reiterate the same objectives of US government policy in the area, couched, however, in terms of concern for the 'quality of life'. In the words of former Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, the objectives are defined as such:

I cannot speak to you today about the Palestinian problem without mentioning the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Their well-being and desire for a greater voice in determining their own destiny must be another issue of moral concern for us, even as we continue to seek a negotiated solution to the status of the Occupied Territories. If the acceptance by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza of a peaceful future is to be nurtured, they must be given a stake in that future by greater opportunities for economic development, fairer administrative practices and greater concern for the quality of their life.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, the formal definition of the programme, termed 'AID Voluntary Agency Grants', is as follows: '(It is) the desire of Congress to support projects and expand institutions in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza to help build the socio-economic underpinnings necessary to preserve peace.'<sup>6</sup>

Thus, it is amply clear that US assistance is tied to nurturing Palestinian acceptance of a US 'negotiated solution', and that the improvement of the Palestinian quality of life under occupation is nothing more than an acceptable camouflage for the imposition of US-initiated solutions.

In a draft 'Strategy Statement' circulated by the US Department of State and dated, interestingly, at the beginning of the Palestinian uprising, the strategic objectives of US assistance to the Palestinians under occupation are

spelled out much more clearly. The strategy 'is the product of considerable collaboration' among Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, AID, and the Department of State, and the 'programme goals . . . represent a happy congruence of objectives that have as their outcome greater economic and social latitude for the Palestinian people and a higher standard of living.'<sup>7</sup> A four-pronged strategy was developed, and it is summarized as follows:

- 1) 'Promote West Bank/Gaza Strip economic growth';
- 2) 'Creation of a more favorable policy environment for West Bank/Gaza Strip individuals and enterprises, in particular in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors . . .';
- 3) 'Increased capacity of public and non-public institutions to support economic activity . . .';
- 4) 'Improved social services . . .'.<sup>8</sup>

Mode of Implementation. Correctly so, the 'Statement' declares 'how this strategy is implemented is as important as the objectives themselves.' On the one hand, the US government wants to 'visibly demonstrate' its concern for the 'Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories', yet, on the other, the individual PVOs, in implementing this programme, find it imperative to distance themselves from the US government in order to gain local Palestinian credibility. Furthermore, and particularly under the impact of the uprising, the individual American PVOs are taking steps to reassert their independent personality and to back such a reassertion by actively seeking non-official and 'cleaner' sources of funding. In addition to the local credibility factor, the individual American PVOs are pursuing diverse funding avenues because they are worried about their survival in the light of the shift in the disbursement channels in favour of the Jordanian Development Plan.

Since the start of their work, AID-funded organizations have operated on the basis of a certain division of labour among themselves. AMIDEAST focuses on human resource development 'through programmes in education, training, research, and information services' in order 'to promote mutual respect and understanding between peoples of the Arab World and the US'.<sup>9</sup> In 1985, the AID-funded West Bank/Gaza Human Resource Development Project had in it seven participating educational institutions. About 140 faculty members have so far obtained advanced degrees in the US and returned.

The economic development sphere is covered by ANERA, CDF, and CRS, with some areas of overlap. ANERA, for example, 'executes projects that assist Palestinians in the creation of jobs, enhancement of incomes, improvement of the environment, and betterment in their educational and health services'. The projects also seek to strengthen Palestinian institutions such as co-operatives and municipalities (most of whom are appointed by the Israeli military government).<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, CDF claims that its major goals are 'to promote economic growth and Palestinian self-reliance . . . Stimulate and promote a process of community development and local empowerment which consists of broad-based decision-making, inter-institutional cooperation, long-range

planning, and other elements of locally sustained community improvement'.<sup>11</sup> These goals get translated into infrastructural projects, agricultural loans, educational projects, and institutional support.

Various claims notwithstanding, the implementation of the AID-funded programmes is determined largely by the approval process of the Israeli military authorities. In a detailed analysis of 358 AID-funded projects between 1977 and 1983, it was shown that 'Israeli intervention caused a major shift in the allocation of projects and budgets. . . . The share of economic development-related budgets actually implemented is reduced from almost half of the original programme to less than one-third.'<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, as it is actually implemented, the programme shows that Israeli intervention leads to the implementation of 'Israel's own economic policies of allowing only individual prosperity, and curbing communal economic development', annulling, thus, the empowerment and self-reliant growth.<sup>13</sup>

**Palestinian Involvement.** This is the clearest case of the exclusion of indigenous Palestinian involvement in the determination of the overall objectives of the programme. To be more specific, the AID-funded programme is merely a vehicle for rendering US government policies in the area more palatable; it not only excludes Palestinian involvement but also is premised on undermining legitimate Palestinian national aspirations.

All AID-funded American PVOs have American nationals as directors of their offices in the West Bank and Gaza. To be sure, they rely on local Palestinian nationals for the implementation of their local projects. Furthermore, some of the American directors have shown a genuine sensitivity towards Palestinian needs and demands. However, the two layers of US government policy determination and Israeli military authorities' required approval of all projects render Palestinian involvement non-existent, or, if present, totally neutralized.

#### **Islamic/Arab/Palestinian Organizations**

If one excludes the official assistance channelled to Palestine via the Jordanian Government and the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee from Arab sources, one is left with a number of non-governmental organizations whose mandate is to assist in the development of Palestinian society under occupation. These organizations are:

- IDB (Islamic Development Bank)
- AFESD (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development)
- WA (Welfare Association)
- UPA (United Palestinian Appeal)
- JF (Jerusalem Fund)
- SAI (Student Aid International)

Of the above organizations only three, namely WA, UPA, and JF, limit their mandate exclusively to Palestine; the rest work primarily in the Arab world,



with extensions into the Muslim world. Furthermore, only IDB, AFESD, and WA have specific objectives of social and economic development, while the others concentrate primarily on scholarships for post-secondary education (JF and SAI), and on humanitarian and other support (UPA).

**Goals and Objectives.** Unlike the previous two sets of organizations, this group is characterized by similar concerns relating directly to the sustenance of Palestinian society, and emanating from the notion of strengthening Palestinian steadfastness under occupation. The interpretation of this notion, however, varies markedly from one organization to the next. UPA, for example, whose incorporation was in New York and office is in Washington, and which in 1985 was accepted by and registered with the US Agency for International Development, defines its mission as 'purely humanitarian and its aim is to help alleviate the suffering of all Palestinians, especially those living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in refugee camps.'<sup>14</sup> Thus, if UPA is to receive funds from AID, it has then to submit to the broad strategic goals discussed earlier, and thereby negate, by definition, the Palestinian definition of steadfastness under occupation.

The AFESD and IDB allocate a minuscule portion of their annual programme budgets to the assistance of the Palestinian population under occupation. Such assistance falls in the margin of the main current of their activities which, for AFESD for example, is the participation 'in the financing of economic and social development projects in the Arab states and countries . . .'<sup>15</sup> Thus, other than the general notion of assisting the Palestinians under occupation as an expression of Arab and Islamic solidarity, such assistance does not appear to be anchored in well-defined objectives and strategies.

Of the group of organizations discussed here, the Welfare Association is the only organization which was established solely in order to assist in the development of Palestinian society under occupation, on the basis of a clear strategy of development. In its constitution it is stated that the Association was established to 'preserve and promote the aspirations of the Palestinian people'. In a draft Five Year Report 1983-1988, to be published soon, the Association delineated its development strategy with much more clarity than before. The Association's development policy is reflected in its commitment to the empowerment of the Palestinian community, so that the community can define its own development agenda and control its implementation. This approach is anchored in the popular will of the community, and activates the potential of the largest number of participants in the process of social change.

**Mode of Implementation.** To give a clear picture of the mode of implementation, the discussion will focus here primarily on two organizations: the AFESD and the WA.

AFESD has its offices and personnel in Kuwait rather than in Palestine. Consequently, the Fund monitors and follows-up the projects it funds in Palestine largely by remote control. Its Director of Operations makes occasional visits to the West Bank and Gaza, its area of operations in Palestine, and discusses potential projects for support with local contacts. Alternatively,

Palestinian consultants to the Fund from the West Bank and the Gaza travel to Amman or Kuwait in order to assess projects for funding. The Fund has no visibility in Palestine except in selected areas, and with selected institutions.

Having its offices in Geneva, the Welfare Association, in a sense, runs its programme long distance. It has no permanent office in Palestine, nor a permanent representative in the area. Yet, its operational staff provides almost continuous presence in the area. Furthermore, and in congruence with its operational strategy, the Association works through a variety of local institutional partners who serve in the end as multiple anchors for follow-up and monitoring of relevant developments. Thus, the Association only co-ordinates with indigenous Palestinian individuals and groups who work for the fulfilment of Palestinian national aspirations, as defined by Palestinians themselves. Although the primary activity of AFESD is to extend loans to Arab countries in all spheres related to broad economic development, its assistance to Palestine has been primarily in the form of grants (and one loan) in the areas of technical assistance and upgrading of the health sector.

As for the WA, its primary activity occurs in major, well-defined programme areas of development: education, manpower, health, economy, institutions, and culture and the arts. It extends this assistance largely through grants and some loans, especially in the economic development sphere.

Palestinian Involvement. Just as the specific definition and local translation of goals and objectives among these organizations vary, so too, the extent of indigenous Palestinian involvement varies, both in the determination of the overall strategic goals and in the local implementation of these goals. The quasi-official organizations, e.g. IDB and AFESD, tend to work through quasi-official channels, and tend to get influenced in the definition and implementation of their strategic goals by official and quasi-official considerations. Thus, in general, the primary Palestinian input they get from the field comes from well-established individuals and groups who have potential mobility (to travel to Amman or Kuwait), and who represent the Establishment in Palestinian society under occupation.

Moreover, since the internal policies of these quasi-official organizations preclude certain types of support (e.g. operating budgets), and insist on the provision of certain requirements (e.g. formal registration of the potential beneficiary, the land for the proposed project to be Islamic *waqf*, etc.), the indigenous Palestinian input, however constructive and relevant, is truncated by definition.

On the other hand, the Jerusalem Fund and the Welfare Association structurally allow for a broad-based indigenous Palestinian involvement in the determination of their overall goals and objectives, and in the local implementation of those goals.

The Jerusalem Fund, whose office is in Washington, specializes in providing scholarships for post-secondary education for Palestinian students from Israel. As a matter of course it involves organized student bodies in implementing its goals. Potential beneficiaries are also involved, from time to time, in the redefinition of the Fund's goals.

With its much wider developmental scope, the Welfare Association involves indigenous Palestinian input at the early level of formulating its operational strategy, prior to any implementation in the field. It relies on local partners, individuals, and groups in order to reach the widest possible base.

### **Conclusions**

My discussion in this paper on the money relationship between non-governmental organizations and Palestine revolved around one main question: what is the extent of Palestinians' input in the definition of their needs under occupation and the degree of their involvement in implementing that definition? In an attempt to answer this question the paper focused not on the volume of support but on the stated objectives of selected organizations, and the impact these objectives may have on the development of Palestinian society under occupation. Based on this discussion, the following conclusions can be reached:

1) The NGO money relationship with Palestine is characterized by a multiplicity of objectives — often disharmonious — almost always defined from outside, within the sole context of the overall objectives of the organization itself.

2) Money (or support in kind) is the primary means of implementing those objectives.

3) Assessment of the congruence between stated objectives and implementation, with very few exceptions, is done externally.

4) The extent of indigenous Palestinian involvement in the definition of the objectives of assistance ranges from nil in the majority of cases, to active in two specific cases only. As for involvement in the local implementation of those objectives, the range is certainly broader. However, in most cases, this involvement is determined by a number of external factors, such as the political and personal orientation of the foreign director, the need to acquire local credibility and legitimacy, etc., but always within a decision-making structure under the control of foreign personnel.

Based on the present picture, and under the impact of the Palestinian popular uprising, it seems to me that the strategy of NGO assistance to Palestine must be transformed in favour of the centrality of indigenous Palestinian involvement in the determination and implementation of the objectives and goals of assistance.

\*It was pointed out at the Symposium that Oxfam is not a church-related organization. Thus the original heading for this section has been amended to include the word 'secular'.

1. All quotations in this section are taken from a confidential report by Peter Coleridge entitled *Annual Report for the West Bank, Gaza, Israel and Jordan*, 1985.

2. All quotations in this section are taken from MCC, *Program Foundations, Approaches, Priorities*, Draft Report, 1987.

3. All quotations in this section are taken from AFSC International Division, *International Division Priorities and Guidelines*, September 1977.

4. All quotations in this section are taken from the Middle East Council of Churches Department on Service to Palestine Refugees, *Annual Report 1985*.
5. Quoted in Meron Benvenisti, *US Government Funded Projects in the West Bank and Gaza*, Working Paper No. 13, The West Bank Data Base Project, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 1.
6. *Ibid*, p. 3
7. The Agency for International Development, *Strategy Statement: The Direct West Bank/Gaza Program and The Jordan West Bank/Gaza Development Program*, US Department of State, Washington DC, 9 December 1987, pp. 12-16.
8. *Ibid*
9. America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc., *AMIDEAST Annual Report 1985*, Washington DC, 1986, p. 4.
10. American Near East Refugee Aid, Annual Report 1985, Washington DC, 1986.
11. Community Development Foundation, unpublished documents and field trip report, 1988.
12. Meron Benvenisti, *US Government Funded Projects in the West Bank and Gaza*, Working Paper No. 13, The West Bank Data Base Project, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 14.
13. *Ibid*.
14. United Palestinian Appeal, Inc., *1987 Annual Report*, Washington DC, 1988, p. 15.
15. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, *Annual Report 1985*, Kuwait, 1986, p. 5.