Corruption and conflicts as barriers to adaptive governance: Water governance in dryland systems in the Rio del Carmen watershed This is a repository copy of Corruption and conflicts as barriers to adaptive governance: Water governance in dryland systems in the Rio del Carmen watershed. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/141006/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Lopez Porras, G orcid.org/0000-0003-2023-1239, Stringer, LC orcid.org/0000-0003-0017-1654 and Quinn, CH orcid.org/0000-0002-2085-0446 (2019) Corruption and conflicts as barriers to adaptive governance: Water governance in dryland systems in the Rio del Carmen watershed. Science of the Total Environment, 660. pp. 519-530. ISSN 0048-9697 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.01.030 © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 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This leaves it 10 unable to adapt and learn, to reconcile different stakeholder perspectives and to adequately 11 respond to uncertainty. Adaptive water governance regulates water access through flexible, 12 inclusive and innovative institutions, increasing system adaptive capacity in the face of 13 uncertainty. This is necessary for water-scarce systems since they suffer context-specific 14 exposure to land degradation and climate change. This research focuses on how water 15 governance regulates water access in the Rio del Carmen watershed, Mexico, identifying key 16 legal and institutional features that could increase adaptation and secure water resources in 17 the long-term. 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in the 18 watershed, in order to understand the water governance structure and its system dynamics. 19  Corresponding author at: Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK. E-mail address: eegilp@leeds.ac.uk (G. Lopez Porras). mailto:eegilp@leeds.ac.uk 2 It was found that water mismanagement, overexploitation, and conflicts over access to 20 water are due to the lack of application and neglect of formal rules. Results indicate that 21 breaches of the legal framework are commonplace, permitted by corruption of both former 22 and current government officials. Many farmers have institutionalized this corruption in 23 order to access water; increasing social conflicts and hindering any type of planning or water 24 management, which, in turn, continues to affect the ecological conditions of the watershed. 25 By understanding the governance system, its structure and the interactions that weaken 26 and bypass formal institutions to the detriment of water resources, stakeholder 27 engagement has emerged as an entry point for enabling collaboration and acceptance of 28 formal institutions. This process has the potential to create a formal network, as a 29 Watershed Committee, that could be honoured in practice through the efficacy of this 30 engagement. 31 32 Keywords Social-ecological resilience · Water scarcity · Agricultural systems · 33 Stakeholder engagement · Mexico 34 35 1. Introduction 36 Drylands are expanding as a result of environmental change and mismanagement (Huang et 37 al. 2017). Resulting droughts, desertification and degradation accentuate the emergence of 38 often violent conflicts in these regions (IPBES 2018). Adaptive capacity in dryland systems is 39 the ability to develop innovative solutions to face unpredictable changes or disturbances in 40 a water-scarce context (Reed and Stringer 2015; Folke 2016). Adaptive water governance 41 3 (AWG) seeks to foster this adaptive capacity through knowledge generation, flexibility, 42 cross-scale collaboration and subsidiarity, as basic principles that can increase system 43 resilience (Hill Clarvis et al. 2014). A central challenge in increasing drylandsげ ヴWゲｷﾉｷWﾐIW is the 44 conservation of societal benefits obtained from freshwater sources, also known as water 45 ecosystem services (WES), as they are the basis for maintaining multiple ecosystem 46 functions and sustaining and improving human well-being (Davies et al. 2016; Pravalie 47 2016). WES conservation needs proactive management of natural processes, if they are to 48 sustain dryland livelihoods (WWAP 2018). However, in dryland systems like the Rio del 49 Carmen watershed in Mexico, where agriculture is the predominant livelihood activity, the 50 mismanagement of WES has resulted in social conflicts and ecological degradation (Lopez 51 Porras et al. 2018), which generate a loss of resilience and increase vulnerability (Reed and 52 Stringer 2015). 53 Analyses of water governance systems have revealed many failures in the conservation of 54 WES, particularly because governance regimes often do not exhibit a good fit with the 55 societal and environmental context in which they are applied (Smidt et al. 2016; Pahl-Wostl 56 2017). Centralised and top-down governance lack stakeholder collaboration and learning 57 processes, and for these reasons, these approaches have been losing legitimacy (Akhmouch 58 and Clavreul 2016). They are also viewed as unfit to respond to non-linear dynamics 59 (Armitage et al. 2009), such as the continuous and unpredictable variations in climate, water 60 quality or vegetation cover (Capon et al. 2015). Systems like the Rio del Carmen watershed, 61 where informal institutions have considerably greater influence than formal institutions 62 (Lopez Porras et al. 2018), have weak governance structures that fail to conserve WES. They 63 cannot be restructured and improved by simple governance reforms unless the required 64 4 conditions for their operability are considered and analysed (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014), 65 and stakeholder involvement is enacted (Akhmouch and Clavreul 2016). 66 In order to improve human well-being and increase system resilience in drylands, access to 67 WES needs to be regulated within an inclusive and integrated water governance regime 68 (Aylward et al. 2005). This requires a feasible legal and institutional structure with the 69 underlying elements of learning, connectivity, collaboration, flexibility, and subsidiarity 70 (Figure 1), where WES access can be adjusted according to the system needs in the face of 71 uncertainty (Hill Clarvis et al. 2014; DeCaro et al. 2017). Sarker (2013) highlights how 72 collaboration and usersげ autonomy to manage their resources, supported by the financial, 73 technological and legal resources that the state can grant, increases efficiency in water 74 governance. AWG offers one route towards these features (Cosens et al. 2018). However, as 75 aﾗ┌ﾐS ｷﾐ A┌ゲデヴ;ﾉｷ;げゲ Murray Darling Basin, where the excessive use of water resources for 76 agriculture led to environmental degradation and water quality problems, water reforms 77 and their implementation is highly challenging in dryland systems that have institutional 78 problems and conflicted interests (Alexandra 2018). More information is needed regarding 79 the potential for restructuring dryland water governance and the implications for AWG 80 (DeCaro et al. 2017). 81 5 82 Figure 1 Adaptive water governance conceptual framework 83 This paper critically assesses and describes how water governance regulates access to WES, 84 with the aim of identifying key legal and institutional features that could support adaptation 85 and secure WES, using the Rio del Carmen watershed as a case study. To do this, we ask: 1) 86 What is the legal and institutional structure of water governance in the watershed? 2) How 87 has water governance affected water availability and WES in the watershed and for whom? 88 and 3) What kind of conflicts and trade-offs are taking place in the watershed and how are 89 these shaped by institutional aspects? By answering these questions, we describe 1) the 90 main societal and institutional aspects of the system, 2) the social-ecological interplay in 91 relation to water governance and the benefits that stakeholders obtain from WES, and 3) 92 stakeholder interactions and their side effects. Capability for achieving adaptation can be 93 found in system properties, like the legal, social or political potentials, though there are also 94 barriers that hinder AWG (Cosens et al. 2018). Ways in which system adaptive capacity can 95 be enhanced can be revealed through a social-ecological system (SES) assessment. We 96 highlight the main issues that undermine adaptive capacity of water governance in dryland 97 6 systems, and identify entry points within the social and legal structure that could help to 98 restructure the ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげゲ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ ﾗヴSWヴ デﾗ さヴWS┌IW ﾗヴ W┗Wﾐ HヴW;ﾆ ヴWゲｷﾉｷWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW 99 currWﾐデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ デﾗ Wﾐ;HﾉW ゲｴｷaデゲ ;┘;┞ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ふゲぶ ｷﾐデﾗ ﾐW┘ ﾗﾐWゲざ (Folke, 100 2016, p. 4). 101 102 2. Study area and methodology 103 2.1 The Rio del Carmen watershed 104 The Rio del Carmen watershed (Figure 2) is located in the driest area of the Chihuahuan 105 desert, in Chihuahua, Mexico (Quintana 2013). Its vegetation, average rainfall, and climate 106 conditions (Figure 3) are representative of many dryland systems (Safriel et al. 2005). It is 107 composed of 3 main aquifers: Santa Clara (upstream), Flores-Magon に Villa Ahumada and 108 Laguna de Patos (both downstream). More than 90% of water from these aquifers is used 109 for agricultural purposes (CONAGUA 2015a), producing mainly chilli, pecans, cotton, alfalfa, 110 sorghum, and maize (Lopez Porras et al. 2018). However, the three aquifers are considered 111 to be overexploited (DOF 2018). The most important river is the River Carmen, whose 112 waters are retained in the Las Lajas dam with a capacity of 91.01 million m3 (INEGI 2003). 113 7 114 Figure 2 Location and upstream and downstream divisions in the Rio del Carmen watershed. Images obtained from INEGI, 115 (2016). 116 Cultural diversity in the Rio del Carmen watershed is marked by the coexistence of two 117 different agricultural communities: The Mennonite community settled upstream and 118 Mexican farmers settled downstream (Lopez Porras et al. 2018). Each group has its own 119 unique agricultural production model: Mennonite farming techniques are more intensive 120 8 and technology based, while Mexican farmers use more traditional techniques that rely on 121 significant labour inputs (Manzanares Rivera 2016). In the 1950s, downstream areas saw 122 substantial agricultural growth, so a presidential decree was issued in 1957 ordering the 123 creation of the Irrigation District El Carmen 089 along with the necessary hydraulic 124 infrastructure (Las Lajas dam), in order to support and control agriculture in the area, and 125 avoid water overexploitation (DOF 1957). Many of the Mexican farmers downstream are 126 organized through this Irrigation District. The same presidential decree also established an 127 undefined period of restricted-access for new water exploitations in the whole Rio del 128 Carmen watershed, to avoid lowering the watershed´s water cycle and affect the water 129 availability needed for the Irrigation District agriculture (DOF 1957). This means that new 130 applications for water rights in the watershed will only be issued if studies determine that 131 there is water available (LAN 2016). 132 Given the increasing depletion of ground water, numerous conflicts over water access have 133 arisen between the groups (Quintana 2013), a situation that has been reported by the 134 international press (Burnett 2015). To date, this situation has not been resolved, in part due 135 to the cultural differences and differing perceptions over WES between Mennonites and 136 Mexican farmers (Lopez Porras et al. 2018). As a result, the Rio del Carmen watershed 137 social-ecological context presents some interesting challenges from the point of view of 138 water governance in dryland systems. 139 9 140 Figure 3 Precipitation, vegetation cover and climate conditions in the Rio del Carmen watershed. Maps modified from 141 information obtained from INEGI (2016). 142 143 2.2 Research design and methods 144 In order to assess the governance system, which integrates the political, legal, economic and 145 social features of governance (Pahl-Wostl 2017), we first used stakeholder analysis to 146 identify the key types of stakeholder that play a dominant role in the water governance of 147 the Rio del Carmen watershed (see Reed et al. 2009; Lopez Porras et al. 2018). The 148 stakeholder categories, based on the literature and verified in the field, consisted of 149 farmers, government officials, consultants/industry, NGOs and academics. 150 2.2.1 Sampling 151 10 A combination of snowball (Reed et al. 2009) and purposeful sampling (Patton 1999) 152 approaches was then used, asking interviewees to identify and nominate other stakeholders 153 that would provide significant information regarding water governance in the Rio del 154 Carmen watershed. The snowball sample had multiple starting points, beginning with an 155 interview in each stakeholder category in order to avoid a biased sample (Sulaiman-Hill and 156 Thompson 2011; Seale 2012). In qualitative research, sample size and participant selection 157 do not require representativeness or statistical significance to legitimize the findings (Luna-158 Reyes and Andersen 2003; Reed et al. 2009). Instead, to obtain in-depth qualitative data, 159 the purposeful sample allowed us to better understand the governance system in the Rio 160 del Carmen watershed, by obtaining in-depth insights from relevant stakeholders rather 161 than generating generalized data from a population subset (Patton 1999). The stakeholder 162 nominations resulted in a sample of 27 interviews with representatives of the main sectors 163 related to water access and agriculture in the watershed (Table 1), consisting of 14 farmers, 164 7 government officials, 4 consultants, 1 NGO and 1 academic. 165 Table 1 Description of the organisations and sector representation from each stakeholder category. 166 Stakeholder Category Farmers Government officials Consultants NGO Academic Sector representatives Mennonite community National Water Commission Agricultural management World Wide Fund for Nature Faculty of Zootechnics and Ecology of the Autonomous University of Chihuahua Mexican farmers Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources Legal advice 11 Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food Agricultural products and trade State Coordination of Civil Protection 167 2.2.2 Data collection 168 Data was collected with the ethical approval AREA 16-148 granted by the Research Ethics 169 Committee at the University of Leeds. To obtain the qualitative data needed to understand 170 the governance system from all stakeholder perspectives, the semi-structured interview 171 method was selected, given its suitability for producing this in-depth information (Reed et 172 al. 2009)が H┞ ┌ﾐIﾗ┗Wヴｷﾐｪ さデｴW IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ｷデ┞ ﾗa ヴW;ﾉ-world systems through detailed stories and 173 SWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐゲざ (Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003, p. 286). Based on the results obtained from 174 Lopez Porras et al. (2018) ;ﾐS デｴW aｷヴゲデ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ ヮヴｷﾗヴ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ｷﾐ デｴe region, an interview 175 protocol was designed (Appendix). Semi-structured interviews were then conducted in 176 Spanish by the lead author from February to April 2018, in the municipalities of Ahumada, 177 Buenaventura, Chihuahua, Namiquipa and Riva Palacio, in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, 178 since the identified stakeholders were located in these municipalities. Given the conflict 179 context in the watershed, neutrality and non-bias were necessary to conduct the interviews 180 and have access to all stakeholders (Luna-Reyes and Andersen 2003). This non-biased 181 question wording and approach can be found as an Appendix (Bhattacherjee 2012). 182 2.2.3 Analysis 183 12 Interviews were recorded in Spanish. In May 2018 they were transcribed, at which point 184 they were translated into English and anonymised. Prior to the interview, a consent form 185 was signed by each stakeholder indicating that they understood the nature of the research, 186 what the data would be used for, and how anonymity would be maintained. 187 Transcripts were analysed using NVivo 11 for Windows using the content analysis method 188 (Bernard 2011) based on a deductive coding technique (Luna-Reyes and Andersen 2003), 189 where coding categories where determined on the basis of the adaptive governance 190 literature (Cosens et al. 2018). The resulting codes were: agriculture, economic and social 191 drivers, environmental change, institutional and structural features, water management, 192 WES access, trade-offs, conflicts, entry points for adaptation, and legal compliance. During 193 the process, indicative stakeholder quotes were structured in a matrix of codes (Figure 4) in 194 order to test the accuracy of the coding process. Secondary data on aspects including water 195 availability, legal provisions such as the restricted-access decree, and pecan production in 196 the watershed, were ﾗHデ;ｷﾐWS aヴﾗﾏ デｴW FWSWヴ;ﾉ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗa MW┝ｷIﾗげゲ ┘WHゲｷデWゲぎ 197 https://www.gob.mx/conagua; www.dof.gob.mx; 198 http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/; http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/; and 199 https://datos.gob.mx/. Secondary data was analysed using the same coding criteria as the 200 interviews in order to facilitate data validation (Patton 1999). The data obtained from the 201 semi-structured interviews and the secondary data were compared, and triangulated with 202 other sources related to water governance in the Rio del Carmen watershed, such as Athie, 203 (2016); Burnett, (2015); Manzanares Rivera, (2016); and Quintana, (2013). By doing this, we 204 avoided the weakness associated with the use of a single data collection method (Patton 205 1999). This also helped to validate and verify the results, by corroborating the consistencies 206 https://www.gob.mx/conagua http://www.dof.gob.mx/ http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/ https://datos.gob.mx/ 13 of the data and identifying where the differences were (Chi 1997). The explanation of the 207 governance system started from the integration of the coding matrix using the system 208 narrative method (Luna-Reyes and Andersen 2003)く Tｴｷゲ ケ┌;ﾉｷデ;デｷ┗W ﾏWデｴﾗS さ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ゲ aﾗヴ 209 causal analysis and exploration of デｴW ｷﾐデWヴヮﾉ;┞ ﾗa IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデゲざ (Rissman 210 and Gillon, 2017, p. 90). For contradictions during the cross-data validity checks, a 211 complementary approach was used since differences did not necessarily refute each other, 212 so they were analysed in context and were included to demonstrate the perception of each 213 interviewee (May 2010). 214 14 215 Figure 4 Stakeholder analysis process and coding process with three indicative quotes from three coding categories that 216 illustrate the composition of the coding matrix. 217 218 219 15 3. Results 220 3.1 What are the legal, economic, political and social features of the water governance 221 system in the watershed? 222 3.1.1 Legal and institutional structure 223 Article 27 of the Political Constitution of Mexico establishes that the State is the original 224 owner of water resources located within national territory, and the use or exploitation of 225 water can only be made through concessions granted by the federal government. In this 226 sense, the National Water Law establishes a water-rights system to grant concessions for 227 water exploitation, and designates the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) as the 228 ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ;ｪWﾐI┞ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHﾉW aﾗヴ デｴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘;デWヴ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデく CONAGUAげゲ 229 framework of action is regulated by 3 legal instruments: the National Water Law published 230 in the Federal Official Gazette on 1st December 1992, the Regulation of the National Water 231 Law published in the same Gazette on 12nd January 1994, and the Interior Regulation of the 232 National Water Commission published in the Gazette on 30th November 2006. Accordingly, 233 CONAGUAげゲ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW encompasses 3 governance levels: National, Regional Hydrological-234 Administrative, and State level. The administrative units that relate to Rio del Carmen 235 watershed governance are the River Basin Councils, the Chihuahua Local Directorate, and 236 the Irrigation District El Carmen 089. 237 River Basin Councils are mixed and collegiate organizations that hold supportive, 238 consultative and advisory roles between CONAGUA, other government agencies, and 239 society, being the space for public participation in water decision-making (CONAGUA 2016). 240 The Rio del Carmen watershed is located within the Rio Bravo River Basin Council, which 241 16 covers 358,870 km2 distributed across five States, and has thirteen different types of climate 242 according to the Köppen climatic classification (CONAGUA 2013). The Rio Bravo River Basin 243 Council is located in the state of Nuevo Leon, more than 800 kilometres from the Chihuahua 244 Local Directorate (Google 2018)く さIt is a regional participation space formed by civil society 245 and the government. It has representatives from all sectors of the state of Chihuahua, such 246 as agriculture, livestock, and industry, even has a representative of the Governor of 247 Chihuahuaざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Cぶく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ┘ｴWﾐ ;ゲﾆWS ｷa they had participated in council 248 processes, or if the farmers from the Rio del Carmen watershed had representation on that 249 council, CONAGUA officials said no, they had not been invited. Both Mexican farmers and 250 Mennonites did not know what the Rio Bravo River Basin Council was, expressing it with 251 statements such ;ゲ さI do not know it, rather we are organized through an irrigation district, 252 that's where we participateざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Dぶが ﾗヴ さI have never participated or been 253 invited to any CONAGUA meetingざ ふMWﾐﾐﾗﾐｷデW Bぶく None of the farmers nor CONAGUA 254 officials interviewed had been invited to or had participated in a council process. 255 At State level is the Chihuahua Local Directorate. The Directorates are the local 256 organisations representative of CONAGUA´s water management throughout the Mexican 257 states, applying for its policies, strategies, programs, and actions (CONAGUA official C, 258 interview transcript). Regarding water management iﾐ デｴW ┘;デWヴゲｴWSが さCONAGUA has been 259 デヴ┞ｷﾐｪ デﾗ ;SSヴWゲゲ デｴW a;ヴﾏWヴゲげ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ ;ﾐS ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ﾏﾗﾐｷデﾗヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮｷW┣ﾗﾏWデヴｷI ﾉW┗Wﾉ ﾗa デｴW 260 watershedざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Bぶく Nonetheless, interviewees noted that the Local 261 Directorate lacks human and economic resources in ｷデゲ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが さThe 262 technical data for water resources is not obtained according to the procedures that the law 263 dictates. There are only 5 or 6 inspectors in Chihuahua State and they never go to the Rio del 264 17 Carmen watershed to verify and measure water accessざ ふCﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデ Dぶく TｴW N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ W;デWヴ 265 Law establishes that restricted access areas like the Rio del Carmen watershed should have 266 a comprehensive watershed management program and participatory processes for 267 designing and implementing Mexican Official Standards that regulate water access. Also, 268 this law envisages the creation of organizations such as Watershed Committees or Technical 269 Committees of Underground Water, among other formal institutions, for enabling 270 participative water management according to the specific water-system needs. The Local 271 DｷヴWIデﾗヴ;デW ｷゲ デｴW ゲデ;ヴデｷﾐｪ ヮﾗｷﾐデ aﾗヴ デｴWゲW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが さthe Local Directorate has 272 not designed any watershed management programme; its bad reputation has caused it to 273 lose acceptance in the watershed and therefore it has had less presence in the areaざ 274 ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく LｷﾆW┘ｷゲWが さthere are always isolated requests to increase the 275 watershed's regulation: these are people [farmers] worried about their work, but nothing 276 has been doneざ ふCONAGUA official C). 277 The only CONAGUA organizational unit where there is farmer participation is the Irrigation 278 DｷゲデヴｷIデ Eﾉ C;ヴﾏWﾐ ヰΒΓが さwhich is formed by several civil associations that are called 279 irrigation modules, and a water district chief designated by CONAGUAざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Dぶく 280 According to the National Water Law, irrigation districts must have the hydraulic 281 infrastructure, surface water, and groundwater necessary for their activities. Therefore, the 282 Iヴヴｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐ DｷゲデヴｷIデ Eﾉ C;ヴﾏWﾐ ヰΒΓ さis supplied from the Las Lajas dam and the Flores-Magon に 283 Villa Ahumada aquifer, through common water rights granted to the district during its 284 creationざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ デ;ﾆWﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW 285 Irrigation District El Carmen 089 only cover the area under its management, so in this 286 institutional structure, there is no space for collaboration at watershed scale. This means 287 18 that despite the water cycle occurring at the watershed scale, the current water governance 288 system does not have any collaboration or decision-making process that can increase SES 289 adaptation at this scale. 290 291 3.1.2 Societal complexity in the governance system 292 Governance problems in the Rio del Carmen watershed have their roots in the social 293 complexity of the area following the establishment of early Mennonite settlements. The 294 Mennonite community initially arrived in the Laguna de Bustillos watershed around 1930, 295 H┌デ ┘ｴWﾐ デｴW Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ゲデ;ヴデWS デﾗ ｪヴﾗ┘ さa group of consultants in coordination with a 296 credit union of Mennonite farmers, with great lines of credit with many banks, started to buy 297 the upstream grasslands, dividing them into smaller plots, and selling them with irrigation 298 systemsざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく Iﾐ デｴｷゲ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲが さCONAGUA officials at that time were 299 advising this group of developers, selling them some water rights so that they could be 300 divided into different plots, telling them that they could use more water than allowed and 301 nothing would happenざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Dぶく さThis offered an incentive to settle in the 302 watershed, but CONAGUA lied, many of the rights were falseざ ふMWﾐﾐﾗﾐｷデW Aぶく AﾐS ﾐﾗ┘が 303 さformer CONAGUA officials are advising Mennonite farmers with all their acquired 304 knowledge of how to break the lawざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Dぶが H┞ さlodging requests for defence in 305 courts, and delaying the trials so that the Mennonites can continue extracting water without 306 water rightsざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく 307 Around 2010 the Mexican farmers became involved in violent conflicts against the 308 Mennonites, arguing that the upstream illegal water use was affecting their exploitations 309 19 and increasing water depletion (CONAGUA official C, interview transcript). Afterward, due to 310 CONAGUAげゲ ﾏｷゲﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ ｷﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ヴWゲﾗﾉ┗W デｴW Sｷゲヮ┌デWが デｴW MW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴゲ 311 started to work in an inter-institutional way with several government officials to solve the 312 illegality that was taking place in the watershed (Mexican farmer D, interview transcript). 313 Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが デｴW ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ SｷaaｷI┌ﾉデ HWI;┌ゲW さdownstream farmers ask for the removal of all 314 illegal exploitations, with zero openness and flexibility to negotiate, but unfortunately, 315 nothing can be done until Mennonite litigations are solved by the courtsざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ 316 A). By 2015 the violence had receded, because さデｴW ヴ;ｷﾐ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ aｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪ L;ゲ L;ﾃ;ゲ S;ﾏ ;ﾐS 317 that has them [Mexican farmers] calmざ ふMWﾐﾐﾗﾐｷデW Dぶく However, in late 2017 the Mexican 318 a;ヴﾏWヴゲ さreceived proof of 395 apocryphal water rights that the former CONAGUA 319 Chihuahua Director sold to his family and to upstream Mennonitesざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Dぶが 320 which exacerbated tensions, generating new violent clashes, and highlighting the fragility of 321 the social relations in the system (Consultant D, interview transcript). 322 323 3.2 How has water governance affected water availability and WES in the watershed and for 324 whom? 325 3.2.1 Agriculture and WES access 326 BWゲｷSWゲ CONAGUAげゲ ﾏｷゲﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデが デｴWヴW ;ヴW デｴヴWW IﾗヴW ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ 327 agricultural practices in the watershed, and thus WES access: i) environmental change, ii) 328 crop choices and iii) lack of irrigation technﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲく さIn Chihuahua the rainfall is torrential, 329 we have had 100 mm of rain in less than an hour which causes great soil loss and no 330 infiltration for aquifer recharge. However, this helps to maintain the Lajas dam full to its 331 20 maximum capacityざ ふ“デ;デW ｪﾗ┗ernment A). Irregular rainfall has caused some farmers to 332 build retention ditches as an adaptive strategy, while others combine rain-fed irrigation with 333 ┘;デWヴ ┘Wﾉﾉゲく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが S┌W デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴｪヴﾗ┌ﾐS ┘;デWヴ SWヮﾉWデｷﾗﾐが ｷデ ゲWWﾏゲ デｴ;デ さhydraulic 334 infrastructure and irrigation technologies are fundamental for agriculture continuityざ ふ“デ;デW 335 government A). 336 F;ヴﾏWヴゲ ｴ;┗W ゲWﾉWIデWS さhighly water-demanding crops that have a close relationship with 337 water overexploitationざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Bぶく さA big problem is that these crops fight 338 against nature, they are not suitable for the watershed, and the reason is the short-term 339 profitability of the cropsざ ふCﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデ Cぶく Pecan planting has been increasing downstream 340 because its market price is very high, even though the crop needs a huge amount of water. 341 In the agricultural cycle 2013-2014 the Irrigation District El Carmen 089 had 3,156 hectares 342 of pecan (CONAGUA 2015b). According to Sifuentes et al., (2015), in Mexico around 14,000 343 million m3 y-1 of water is used to irrigate one hectare of pecan trees, which is more than 344 double the 7550 million m3 y-1 of water per hectare that maize needs (Collet 2004). Hence, 345 in that single year, the Irrigation District used approximately 44,184,000 million m3 of water 346 only for pecan production. Notwithstanding, the Irrigation District has the infrastructure and 347 the water rights which should sustain that agricultural production, but depletion levels and 348 the decrease in surface water are restricting water access. Furthermore, surface irrigation is 349 commonly used downstream, which is unsuitable for the sustainability of agriculture in the 350 watershed, as it represents a significant source of water loss and leads to soil erosion, as a 351 CONAGUA official stated: 352 21 さCurrently many downstream pecans are young, and even with a glass of water I can 353 go and water them, but when they begin to produce, it will be impossible to water 354 them with these depletion levels and irrigation methodsざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく 355 Upstream is a different situation, as the main crop is maize and Mennonite agriculture uses 356 sprinkler irrigation (Mennonite A, interview transcript). However, optimization of agriculture 357 through irrigation technologies has been an incentive to increase the agricultural frontier 358 and irrigate more, since the Mennonite irrigation technologies are for large-scale 359 agriculture, so they have been changing the upstream grasslands to croplandsく さThey 360 [Mennonites] do not sow in 5 or 10 hectares as Mexicans, they sow in 100 or 200 hectaresざ 361 ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Gぶく RWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷヴヴｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐが さThey [Mennonites] say that if you water little 362 the plant produces little, but if you water the plant a lot it produces a lotざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ 363 F). This increases the pressure on WES. Besides that, the lack of information regarding all 364 the upstream crops that are being irrigated by the Mennonites without water rights, does 365 not allow for any comprehensive agricultural planning (CONAGUA official A, interview 366 transcript). As stated by almost all intervieweesが ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞が ┘ｴWヴW さstrategies 367 for saving water and not oversupplying the market can be implementedざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ 368 D). Moreover, this regulation needs to establish what type of irrigation technology should 369 be used for each type of crop, clearly define the agricultural frontier in order to protect the 370 grasslands, and set crop restrictions (Consultant C, interview transcript). 371 372 3.2.2 Social and ecological impacts 373 22 Water availability is defined by the volume that can be extracted without affecting the 374 water and ecosystem balance (CONAGUA 2015a), so from this perspective, ecological 375 thresholds in water-based SES are crossed through water depletion. Underground water is 376 getting towards that point as it is alarmingly overexploited (Figure 5ぶく さIn the last 4 years the 377 water levels in the aquifer have been decreasing. We have had to deepen the wells which is 378 very expensive, but also we are already drawing very deep waterざ (Mexican farmer G). The 379 watershed has surface water availability (Figure 5), nonetheless, the construction of illegal 380 S;ﾏゲ ┌ヮゲデヴW;ﾏ ｷゲ I;┌ゲｷﾐｪ ゲWヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ;ﾉデWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ デｴW ┘;デWヴ H;ﾉ;ﾐIWく さ30 years ago, we had 381 surface water flow of 100 million m3y-1, and in 2012 we discovered that the surface water 382 flow had dropped to 66 million m3y-1ざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく Gｷ┗Wﾐ ｷﾉﾉWｪ;ﾉ ┘;デWヴ ;IIWゲゲ 383 (Figure 5), there are no reliable data regarding water access and its availability. Again, this is 384 an important barrier to any agricultural planning in the watershed. 385 23 386 Figure 5 Socio-ecological water interactions in the Rio del Carmen watershed. Data obtained from DOF, (2016), DOF, (2018) 387 and CONAGUA official A. 388 389 WES, such as provisioning water for irrigation, regulating and supporting services linked to 390 water infiltration, as well as soil and vegetation conservation, are in decline. さUpstream, 391 there are approximately 50,000 ha that have been transformed to agricultural use in the last 392 15 years, without any authorizationざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく TｴW WIﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Sｷゲデ┌ヴH;ﾐces that 393 24 this generates are largely affecting downstream farmers, particularly HWI;┌ゲW さthe water 394 that fills the Las Lajas dam, from where the Mexican farmers are supplied, is produced 395 upstream where the Mennonites liveざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ ┘ｴ┞ Mexican farmers 396 are the more interested group when it comes to addressing water overexploitation, 397 addressing grassland loss, and arranging inter-institutional working groups. They have 398 submitted proposals, for W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが デﾗ さcreate a trust fund for climate change adaptation 399 through the conservation of grasslands and WES, by taxing 1% of agricultural productionざ 400 (Mexican farmer D); however, to date, they have not achieved any outcome. 401 Crop choice also causes impacts on WES availability. For instance, the ecological conditions 402 ﾗa デｴW ┘;デWヴゲｴWS I;ﾐﾐﾗデ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ﾉ;ヴｪW ヮWI;ﾐ ヮﾉ;ﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐゲく さIf someone sows pecans, it 403 should be mandatory to use a drip irrigation systemざ ふCﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデ Cぶが ;ゲ ;ﾉﾉ ヮWI;ﾐ 404 investments that farmers have made in the watershed can be lost if current agricultural 405 practices continue to increase the depletion levels, さIt is possible that in the future I will 406 have to cut all my pecan trees, because many pecans are being planted and there will be no 407 water to irrigate themざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Aぶく Oﾐ デｴW ┘ｴﾗﾉe, it can be observed that water 408 governance in the Rio del Carmen watershed does not regulate water access in relation to 409 availability as established by CONAGUA; on the contrary, water is accessed according to the 410 number and types of crops that farmers wish to harvest, with individual decisions being 411 made without any planning at watershed scale (Consultant A, interview transcript). 412 413 3.3 What kind of conflicts and trade-offs are taking place in the watershed and how are 414 these shaped by institutional aspects? 415 25 416 3.3.1 Corruption and conflicts as barriers 417 Several statements assert that corruption within CONAGUA is the culprit of illegal water 418 access: 419 さCONAGUA has created a black market for water rights, and the worst thing is that 420 despite being the only way to get them, many are false and they ask for money so 421 they can continue exploiting water illegallyざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Aぶく 422 さWｴWﾐ ┘W ｪﾗ aﾗヴ ｴWﾉヮが デｴW┞ [CONAGUA] tell us that our water right is false, they 423 charge us money to regularize our exploitations and then it turns out that what they 424 sold us is also false, and still, they extort us by asking for money so as not to remove 425 ﾗ┌ヴ W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ;デｷﾗﾐゲざ (Mennonite A). 426 However, CONAGUA officials said that they have been trying to solve the problem of illegal 427 exploitation: 428 さBetween the years 2013-2014 CONAGUA, the federal police, and other agencies 429 tried to destroy the illegal dams that are located upstream, but we could not 430 continue since the Mennonites started to lodge requests for defence in the courtsざ 431 (CONAGUA official A). 432 Some Mennonites recognise this situation stating that, さsome water exploitations are illegal 433 because CONAGUA has been selling fake property rightsざ ふMennonite A), and that is the 434 reason why Mennonites started to lodge requests for defence in the courts. Nonetheless, 435 some Mexican farmers see this situation as untenable, stating that, さthey [Mennonites] do 436 not mind getting into corruption and paying for false water rights whenever necessary; they 437 26 do not care if that is affecting us and our familiesざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ farmer E). The concern is that 438 the exploitation of false water rights are taking place outside CONAGUAげゲ control and 439 ﾃ┌ヴｷゲSｷIデｷﾗﾐが HWI;┌ゲW ┘ｴWﾐ さthe judges grant the requests of the defence, CONAGUA cannot 440 interfere, until years after when the litigations are finished and the watershed depletedざ 441 (Mexican farmer D). 442 Many farmers referred to this corruption, which has conceded the illegal water access, as 443 デｴW ゲﾗ┌ヴIW ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデゲく さThe grounds of the dispute are that the authorities do not 444 enforce the rule of law, CONAGUA does not make farmers respect the law, so Mexican 445 farmers do it their wayざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Cぶく F┌ヴデｴWヴﾏﾗヴWが さwith the recent conflicts caused 446 by corruption of the former director of CONAGUA, the government does not want to get 447 involved, it is very dangerousざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Gぶ. Although these conflicts have resulted in 448 the destruction of some dams that Mennonites used for irrigation (Mennonite D, interview 449 transcriptぶが さthe peaceful way of being of the Mennonites has not fed the animosityざ 450 (CONAGUA official A), rather, it is fuelled by デｴWｷヴ ｷﾉﾉWｪ;ﾉ ┘;デWヴ ;IIWゲゲく Fヴﾗﾏ CONAGUAげゲ 451 ┗ｷW┘ヮﾗｷﾐデが さconflicts between farmers are an economic issue: W┗Wヴ┞HﾗS┞げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｷゲ デﾗ ｴ;┗W 452 enough water to irrigate, but due to the water shortage in the watershed, we cannot 453 generate an agreement with which all the parties agreeざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Cぶく 454 Nevertheless, according to other stakeholders, the problem is more complex than only 455 conflicting interests between the farmers, it is also because, さa system based on corruption 456 has been established over water access in which some CONAGUA officials and many farmers 457 are working, and they will not easily allow this to change because that is what generates 458 them moneyざ ふCﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデ Dぶく 459 460 27 3.3.2 Side effects of social conflicts 461 さThe conflicts in the watershed have caused a distancing between CONAGUA and the 462 farmersざ ふCONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Aぶく CONAGUAげゲ ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW ┘;デWヴゲｴWS ﾐWWSゲ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ 463 ;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ ﾐｷﾉが さthey never give an answer, you cannot communicate with themざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ 464 farmWヴ Cぶが さwhen we ask CONAGUA for help they never come, they do not do anythingざ 465 (Mennonite C). WES loss and fragmentation of the social fabric are not the only outcomes 466 デｴ;デ Iﾗヴヴ┌ヮデｷﾗﾐ ｴ;ゲ ヮヴﾗS┌IWSぎ さThe lack of both agricultural planning and water 467 management, make the farmers compete locally, instead of collaborating to be productively 468 competitive at greater scalesざ ふCﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデ Aぶく Iﾐ ﾗデｴWヴ ;ヴW;ゲ ﾗa デｴW “デ;デW ﾗa Cｴｷｴ┌;ｴ┌; デｴWヴW 469 ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ さseveral commercial alliances between Mexicans farmers and Mennonites, 470 however, the social context in the Rio del Carmen watershed makes collaboration almost 471 impossibleざ ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Fぶく 472 Iﾐ デｴｷゲ ヴWｪ;ヴSが ; MW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ ゲ;ｷS デｴ;デ ﾗﾐW ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ デﾗ ﾏｷデｷｪ;デW Iﾗヴヴ┌ヮデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ さthrough 473 collaboration with the farmers to verify that all the water exploitations comply with the lawざ 474 ふMW┝ｷI;ﾐ a;ヴﾏWヴ Eぶく Tｴｷゲ IﾗｷﾐIｷSWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ; CONAGUA ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉげゲ ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデぎ 475 Farmers must contribute with human resources in order to verify and regularize the 476 rule of law in the watershed. For instance, there is another area in Mexico where a 477 Committee composed of water right holders is the one that authorizes and verifies 478 the exploitations, and the government participates only to support and strengthen 479 that organization (CONAGUA official A). 480 Despite these attempts and proposals from some Mexican farmers to improve the 481 management of the Rio del Carmen watershed, coordination with CONAGUA has not been 482 28 ;IｴｷW┗WSく さThe problem is that the stakeholders with more influence [CONAGUA officials] 483 and more economic resources [Mennonite farmers] are benefited by the status quoざ 484 (Consultant D). This power asymmetry strengthens unsuitable institutional conditions and 485 incentivises corruption, given the niche of impunity that is created, as a Mexican farmer 486 stated: 487 The fear of being sanctioned or imprisoned is the main reason for legal compliance 488 because freedom is a priority for every human being. The high level of corruption in 489 the watershed derives from this lack of fear, since corruption has no consequences 490 either for the farmers or CONAGUA officials (Mexican farmer D). 491 “ﾗﾏW a;ヴﾏWヴゲ ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ さthe solution is to restructure CONAGUAざ ふMWﾐﾐﾗﾐｷデW Aぶく AﾐﾗデｴWヴ 492 proposed solution consisted of さfinding a way to develop the same degree of awareness 493 among all groups [farmers and CONAGUA] (Mexican farmer F). Nonetheless: 494 さThe common long-term objective must be water conservation for future 495 generations, so each one must contribute to achieving a responsible water accessざ 496 (CONAGUA official B). 497 498 4. Discussion 499 4.1 Conceptual framework and current water governance in the Rio del Carmen watershed 500 Knowing the complexities regarding the legal, economic, political and social features of the 501 water governance system, the conflicts that are taking place, and the impacts over WES as 502 highlighted in this study, is requisite for identifying entry points that could be used to 503 restructure the governance regime, such that it better supports AWG in dryland systems. 504 29 According to the legal and institutional design principles of adaptive governance (DeCaro et 505 al. 2017), and the adaptive governance principles for incorporating uncertainty into 506 legislation and policy design (Hill Clarvis et al. 2014), AWG in the Rio del Carmen needs to: 507 - Be iterative and flexible in order to adjust water governance in the face of 508 uncertainty. These uncertainties include precipitation variability and unanticipated 509 changes in land coverage (Sietz et al. 2017). 510 - Give legally binding authority and accountability to stakeholders, to allow locally 511 appropriate decision-making and encourage collaboration. 512 - Have financial, technical and administrative powers to self-govern WES in the 513 watershed. 514 - Embrace connectivity and subsidiarity, so that different centres of activity can 515 concur at the watershed scale, with local standards and policies. 516 In light of this, it is clear that the administrative river basin scale established by the National 517 Water Law does not fit with the required elements for AWG, or with the social and 518 ecological needs in the watershed. River Basin Councils are failed water organizations 519 without representativeness (OECD 2013). The distance to and the lack of participation of the 520 Rio del Carmen stakeholders in the Rio Bravo River Basin Council, is a barrier to the 521 connectivity and subsidiarity that AWG requires. Governance problems are often different 522 between local watershed scale and the wider river basin system (Cosens et al. 2014). This 523 has been found to be the case elsewhere, such as in the Murray Darling Basin in Australia, 524 where the large-basin scale and institutional complexity create bureaucratic obstacles that 525 have undermined water governance and the implementation of water reforms (Alexandra 526 30 2018). Indeed, bureaucracy and institutional inefficiency is a problem that increases 527 CONAGUA's corruption (Athie 2016). In this regard, despite the attempt to decentralize 528 water governance through the creation of these councils, CONAGUA is still a centralised and 529 top-down agency with no political stability, and no control over corruption (Murillo-Licea 530 and Soares-Moraes 2013). Decentralization as an attempt to increase the effectiveness of 531 water governance does not solve corruption, and any governance reform in this sense can 532 be prejudicial to the SES (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014). 533 Inefficient water governance regimes derive from inefficient formal institutions (Pahl-Wostl 534 and Knieper 2014); and corruption is both a driver and an outcome of this situation, leading 535 to negligent, colluded, and incapable water management (Quintana 2013). The main 536 stakeholders, as water rights holders, do not have the legal authority to formally address 537 corruption in water management nor deal with environmental dilemmas, nonetheless, they 538 are those that are affected the most. In this sense, water governance has been reduced to 539 a;ヴﾏWヴゲげ ┘ｷﾉﾉ デﾗ Iﾗﾏヮﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ ;ﾐ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ デｴ;デ ゲ;aWｪ┌;ヴSゲ デｴW ﾉ;┘が ;ﾐS 540 since many lack this will, evidenced by illegal water use, it allows disaffection and 541 disagreements between stakeholders to grow. Dryland adaptive capacity shrinks with social 542 conflicts and WES loss (Mortimore et al. 2009; Middleton et al. 2011), but also lack of 543 coordination is related to low system adaptive capacity (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014). 544 Conflicts over water access and water depletion are not only undermining the watershed 545 adaptive capacity, but also creating unmanaged agricultural development. 546 4.2 Agriculture in a dryland context 547 Crop expansion and unsuitable agriculture are direct drivers of land degradation and water 548 depletion (Marston et al. 2015; IPBES 2018). Improving dryland agriculture is of paramount 549 31 importance, since desertification, an extreme form of drylands degradation (Reed and 550 Stringer 2015), already affects ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ΑヰХ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSげゲ ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ Sヴ┞ﾉ;ﾐSゲ (Winslow et 551 al. 2004). In this regard, desertification is a potential problem in the Rio del Carmen 552 watershed, since the Chihuahuan Desert has been suffering from grassland loss and soil 553 degradation (PMARP 2012; Caracciolo et al. 2016). However, the crops that are being sown 554 in the watershed are unsuitable given its precipitation and climate conditions (Figure 3), and 555 water overexploitation (Quintana 2013). As in the Limarí Basin in Chile, the absence of 556 agricultural planning in dryland watersheds increases water scarcity and thus conflicts over 557 water access, creating the self-produced problem of agricultural drought (Urquiza and Billi 558 2018). In the Rio del Carmen watershed depletion levels are increasing and water flow 559 decreasing. Surface irrigation is not suitable in a water-scarce context (Becerra et al. 2006), 560 and there are better technologies than sprinkler irrigation for maize, like subsurface drip 561 irrigation (Olague et al. 2006). Accordingly, proactive WES-based governance is key to avoid 562 watershed degradation, and to address the global challenges of climate change adaptation 563 and contemporary water management problems (WWAP 2018). A governance system that 564 adjusts agricultural production and crop selection according to the dryland context is 565 needed in order to avoid desertification and support the restoration of degraded soil (IPBES 566 2018). This has been done elsewhere in Mexico, such as in the Nazas watershed in the 567 north. This demonstrates that it is possible to establish water assets for agricultural planning 568 in drylands, as long as there is an organized network at the necessary scale, with reliable 569 data on water access, crop species, and land that is being sown (Sanchez Cohen et al. 2018). 570 However, the Rio del Carmen does not yet have these aspects in place. Current governance 571 problems will not change if current conflicts and corruption continue to permeate the social 572 setting, because collaboration will be not achieved. 573 32 4.3 Entry points and barriers for AWG 574 An entry point for enabling collaboration, and thus addressing corruption, conflicts, and 575 WES loss, is the inception of a process by which the stakeholders in the watershed get 576 engaged and involved in the decision-making and management of water resources 577 (Akhmouch and Clavreul 2016). This stakeholder engagement increases social awareness 578 and acceptability of trade-offs when moving towards adaptation, while reducing conflicts 579 over water access (Akhmouch and Clavreul 2016). Decisions taken within a network that 580 engages a broad range of stakeholders from CONAGUA, the Mennonite community, and the 581 Mexican farmers in the water management, will be more likely to be honoured in practice 582 (Akhmouch and Clavreul 2016). This collaboration and acceptance will also open the door to 583 formally establishing AWG in the Rio del Carmen watershed. Evidence from elsewhere with 584 similarly conflicting stakeholders, such as the Southern Ocean case study, where the 585 formalization of an informal collaborative network enabled the emergence of adaptive 586 governance that addressed the fisheries crisis (Österblom and Folke 2013), indicates this is a 587 potentially feasible proposition. Nonetheless, governance reforms should be based on 588 research that considers societal and institutional features as system drivers, providing 589 suggestions of what needs to be done differently, and with the inclusion of local knowledge 590 (Wiek and Larson 2012; Anthonj et al. 2019). Based on our results, we have identified the 591 creation of the Rio del Carmen Watershed Committee as an entry point that will formally 592 restructure system governance towards AWG. Characteristics of this are as follows: 593 - Watershed Committees are a collegiate organization with government and private 594 participation that will allow the collaboration between farmers, CONAGUA, and 595 other authorities from the agricultural sector that can support sustainable 596 33 agricultural development in line with the watershed conditions. This integrates the 597 connectivity principle of adaptive governance. 598 - The committee is an ideal space for developing a suitable watershed management 599 program, along with the Mexican Official Standard that the National Water Law 600 requires for restricted-access area management. This embodies the subsidiarity 601 principle. 602 - The committees must have rules of integration, organization, and operation, 603 allowing a continuous verification and restructuring of their strategies according to 604 the results. This incorporates the iterativity and flexibility principles. 605 - The committees should establish the attributions and responsibilities that their 606 members have within their hydrological-specific areas, for the execution of their 607 management programs. This includes mechanisms to strengthen verification, legal 608 compliance, and establish conflict resolution processes, giving stakeholders the 609 formal authority and responsibility that AWG requires. 610 - The National Water Law dictates that CONAGUA should provide the support, space, 611 and mechanisms to promote and facilitate participation and collaboration in the 612 public organizations that could help CONAGUA in water management, such as the 613 Watershed Committees or the Technical Committees of Underground Water. This, in 614 conjunction with other financing mechanisms, will give the necessary resources that 615 AWG requires for its operation. 616 For such a committee to be formulated, stakeholder engagement is needed, with the 617 acceptance of the of costs and benefits that this brings with it (Akhmouch and Clavreul 618 34 2016). The identified barriers for the stakeholder engagement include that those who are 619 accessing water illegally do not have incentives to collaborate, since submitting voluntarily 620 to this process will represent large losses in their agricultural investments, similar to a 621 commons problem where individual benefits outweigh collective benefits (Hardin 1968). 622 However, this risks the livelihoods of those who use water legally, so farmers with water 623 rights need to take leadership and drive institutional change (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014). 624 The success of collaboration will depend on the acceptance of trade-offs that arise during 625 the engagement. For farmers, this could consist of voluntarily restricting water access or 626 stopping sowing certain crops; from CONAGUA this might mean giving farmers some 627 licences or authorizations regarding water verification and management. But as 628 demonstrated by the Southern Ocean case, an informal network that effectively engages 629 the stakeholders in resource management, has the potential to evolve and be endowed with 630 legal formality, in order to formally establish AWG (Garmestani and Benson 2013). 631 By assessing and describing the water governance system and how it influences the Rio del 632 Carmen watershed, we have identified the main problems that undermine SES resilience. 633 This is important for locating the potential to increase adaptive capacity in dryland systems. 634 We have highlighted the main barriers to and needs for AWG. However, more research is 635 needed in order to identify barriers and opportunities for enabling the necessary social 636 engagement for AWG, along with improving understanding of the system conditions, 637 institutional arrangements and the possible trade-offs needed to allow the emergence of 638 AWG. This will be particularly challenging given the current conflicts. 639 640 5. Conclusion 641 35 Commonly, water governance does not fit with system requirements for WES conservation, 642 which in turn decreases デｴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげゲ adaptive capacity. This issue has to be addressed, 643 especially in drylands as these areas are commonly exposed to land degradation and climate 644 change. Governance problems grow when vulnerable dryland systems, with depleted 645 underground water and large scale grassland loss, combine with water mismanagement, 646 corruption, lack of coordination, legal breaches and unsustainable agricultural development. 647 This was found in the case of the Rio del Carmen watershed, where these problems have 648 generated ecological deterioration and significant social conflicts. 649 ASSヴWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐW デｴW Rｷﾗ SWﾉ C;ヴﾏWﾐげゲ ;S;ヮデｷ┗W I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWゲ デｴW 650 establishment of an informal network with the engagement of a broader number 651 stakeholders. This will guarantee the acceptance and distribution of the emerging trade-652 offs, in exchange for the continuity of agriculture in the watershed, and greater autonomy 653 and participation in water management. Over the longer term it will be necessary that this 654 stakeholder engagement embedded with local knowledge, be endowed with legal formality, 655 in order to be effective, legitimate and sustainable, and create the required conditions for 656 AWG, like establishing subsidiarity, flexibility, connectivity, and iterativity in the governance 657 regime. Finally, a water governance assessment is required in order to understand the 658 system needs and problems. Comprehending how the governance system shapes ecological 659 and societal interactions enables identification of the barriers and opportunities to increase 660 SES resilience. 661 662 Acknowledgments 663 36 664 We thank the study participants as without their contributions of time and knowledge this 665 research would not have been possible. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their 666 helpful comments that strengthened this paper. The first author acknowledges financial 667 support from CONACYT-SECRETARIA DE ENERGIA-SUSTENTABILIDAD ENERGETICA Grant No. 668 439115. 669 670 Conflict of Interest 671 None 672 673 References 674 Akhmouch A, Clavreul D (2016) Stakeholder Engagement for Inclusive Water Governance: 675 さPヴ;IデｷIｷﾐｪ Wｴ;デ WW PヴW;Iｴざ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW OECD W;デWヴ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW Iﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗Wく W;デWヴ 676 (Switzerland) 8:1に17. doi: 10.3390/w8050204 677 AﾉW┝;ﾐSヴ; J ふヲヰヱΒぶ E┗ﾗﾉ┗ｷﾐｪ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS CﾗﾐデWゲデWS W;デWヴ RWaﾗヴﾏゲ ｷﾐ A┌ゲデヴ;ﾉｷ;げゲ M┌ヴヴ;┞ 678 Darling Basin. 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Environ Dev 851 Sustain 1に23. doi: 10.1007/s10668-018-0271-3 852 Wiek A, Larson KL (2012) Water, People, and Sustainability-A Systems Framework for 853 Analyzing and Assessing Water Governance Regimes. Water Resour Manag 26:3153に854 3171. doi: 10.1007/s11269-012-0065-6 855 45 Winslow M, Shapiro B, Thomas R, Shetty SV. (2004) Desertification, drought, poverty and 856 agriculture: research lessons and opportunities. International Center for Agricultural 857 Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), the International Crops Research Institute for the 858 Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), and the UNCCD Global Mechanism (GM) 859 WWAP (2018) United Nations World Water Assessment Programme/UN-Water. The United 860 Nations World Water Development Report 2018: Nature-Based Solutions for Water. 861 Paris 862 863 Appendix 864 Interview Protocol 865 866 1. Interviewee background 867 868 Are you a farmer, government official, agricultural representative or stakeholder related to 869 the grasslands and the water governance of the Rio del Carmen watershed? 870 If yes, can you explain your activities? 871 872 2. What are the legal, cultural, political and social features of the water governance 873 model in the watershed? 874 875 For the farmers 876 What species do you have been sowing in the last 20 years? 877 Why did you select those crops? 878 Do you think that there is a relation between the crop species and water overexploitation? 879 If yes, do you think that a crop regulation is needed in the Rio del Carmen watershed? 880 46 How would you define the main features of the Mennonite and the Mexican agriculture, 881 and what would be their main differences? 882 Is there another agricultural model that is taking place within the Rio del Carmen 883 watershed? 884 What kind of permits did you need to start farming? (Please answer this from clearing the 885 land to the sale of your products). 886 Have you received any government support? For example money, machinery, subventions 887 or training. 888 Do you think grasslands regulation can support the water governance in the Rio del Carmen 889 watershed? If yes, how? 890 Do you know what policies affect water governance in the Rio del Carmen watershed? 891 Do you know the spaces for participation regarding the water governance in the watershed? 892 If yes, have you been invited to one? 893 Given the lack of CONAGUA´s law enforcement, what do you suggest it will be a good 894 strategy to face the illegal exploitations? 895 For the other stakeholders 896 Do you think that there is a relation between the crop species and water overexploitation? 897 If yes, do you think that a law to set the types of crops to be grown is needed? 898 Do you think that stricter regulations in the use of the grasslands can support the water 899 governance in the Rio del Carmen watershed? If yes, how? 900 How would you define the main features of the Mennonite and the Mexican agriculture, 901 and what would be their main differences? 902 Is there another agricultural model that is taking place within the Rio del Carmen 903 watershed? 904 Do you know what the policy instruments are regarding the water governance in the Rio del 905 Carmen watershed? 906 Do you know that the National Water Law establishes that closed access areas like the Rio 907 del Carmen watershed should have a comprehensive watershed and aquifer management 908 program, as well as participatory processes for designing and implementing a Mexican 909 Official Standard that regulates the water access in the watershed? 910 If yes, do you know if CONAGUA has been taking steps to comply with these legal precepts? 911 Do you consider that some exploitations are breaching the National Water Law in the 912 watershed? If yes, what do you suggest will be a good strategy through which to tackle the 913 illegal exploitation? 914 915 47 3. How has water governance affected water availability and water ecosystem services 916 in the watershed and for whom? 917 For the farmers 918 How and when did you get the land that you are irrigating and your water exploitation? 919 There is something that has impacted your land and your access to water since you got 920 them? 921 What will be a good strategy to address the water deficit between the granted water and 922 the annual recharge volume? 923 Do you think it will be possible to deny an extension of some property rights because of the 924 overexploited status? If yes, what could be the criteria for giving or denying this extension? 925 Do you have noticed an increasing heat or drought during the last 20 years? If yes, what 926 have you done in order to adapt your farming practices? 927 What would be a good strategy to recharge the aquifers of the Rio del Carmen watershed? 928 What agricultural technologies have you incorporated into your land to improve your water 929 access and agricultural production during the last 20 years? 930 What would you do if the watershed were to be depleted this year? 931 How have farmers helped preserve the benefits they get from the watershed for their 932 agriculture? 933 What have been the CONAGUA´s achievements in the Rio del Carmen management and the 934 preservation of the benefits obtained for the agriculture? 935 For the other stakeholders 936 Regarding the data published by CONAGUA, the Rio del Carmen aquifers are overexploited. 937 Do you think it will be possible to deny an extension of the property rights under the 938 overexploited status? If yes, what could be the criteria for giving or denying this extension? 939 What could be another strategy to address the overexploitation? 940 What would be a good strategy to recharge the aquifers of the Rio del Carmen watershed? 941 In what way has the government has been supporting agriculture in the Rio del Carmen 942 watershed? 943 What would need to be adapted to face climate change in the watershed? 944 What would happen if the watershed were to be depleted this year? 945 What positive results have been delivered in the application of water policies in the 946 watershed? 947 48 What have the government been doing to preserve the benefits that the watershed is giving 948 to the agriculture? 949 950 4. What kind of conflicts and trade-offs are taking place in the watershed and how are 951 these shaped by institutional aspects? 952 For the farmers 953 What have CONAGUA been doing to address the conflicts in the Rio del Carmen watershed? 954 How are the conflicts over water access affecting you? 955 Do you know how it has affected other farmers too? 956 What are the main obstacles to collaboration in the watershed? 957 Can you tell me who, why and how would be affected if those obstacles are eliminated? 958 Do you think that Mennonites and Mexican farmers are willing to solve those conflicts? 959 If not, why not? If yes, why are they not solved? 960 Wｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ┞ﾗ┌ SWaｷﾐW ;ゲ ; さIﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSざ ﾗヴ さﾏ┌デ┌;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲざ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴW 961 Mennonites and the Mexican farmers? 962 What would be your contribution as a first step to solve these difficulties? 963 For the other stakeholders 964 What has CONAGUA been doing to address the conflicts in the Rio del Carmen watershed? 965 How are the conflicts over water access affecting 1) the farmers, 2) CONAGUA´s 966 management and 3) the watershed? 967 What are the main obstacles to collaboration in the watershed? 968 Can you tell me who, why and how would be affected if those obstacles are eliminated? 969 Do you think that Mennonites and Mexican farmers are willing to solve those conflicts? 970 If not, why not? If yes, why are they not solved? 971 Wｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ┞ﾗ┌ SWaｷﾐW ;ゲ ; さIﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSざ ﾗヴ さﾏ┌デ┌;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲざ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴW 972 Mennonites and the Mexican farmers? 973 What would be your contribution as a first step to solve these difficulties? 974 975 976 977