id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_2ciunllnsbbwvcpjcqrcb6pdme	J. McKenzie Alexander	Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory	2003	16	.pdf	application/pdf	6030	422	67	A new game representing the new social context would need to be introduced, and it would be an open question whether strategies in equilibrium in the original of attraction for some simple two-strategy games played on social networks using the algorithm of Wuensche and Lesser (1992). A social network model consists of a population of agents, each of whom which a representation of the state space and dynamics of the social network As two of the examples are simple two-strategy versions of the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt, in these cases, this learning rule collapses into: switch strategies if and only if every person receiving the where each node represents one agent in the original social network, and complex strategies in a social network to be represented in a RBN. to every node used to represent a player in the original social network that i's future strategy may depend on.	./cache/work_2ciunllnsbbwvcpjcqrcb6pdme.pdf	./txt/work_2ciunllnsbbwvcpjcqrcb6pdme.txt