id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_2lkxcidxybb4leat5ph4gl3mb4	Justin Sytsma	Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness	2009	16	.pdf	application/pdf	4837	282	54	Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? argue that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious (after all, if Stoljar is arguing that if phenomenal consciousness is in fact phenomenologically obvious, then it should phenomenal consciousness is evident in everyday experience is most often seen in the common claim that everyone colors that contrasts with the qualia view underlying the new science understanding of This statement is representative of the new science understanding of phenomenal consciousness. As such, the claim that phenomenal consciousness is phenomenologically obvious obvious and the concept of phenomenal consciousness in the new science involves the cast much light on the folk understanding of mental states like seeing red and feeling pain. folk share the concept of phenomenal consciousness discussed above, then they should treat folk and philosophers should deny that an entity that lacks phenomenal consciousness can either I began by articulating the new science understanding of phenomenal consciousness and 	./cache/work_2lkxcidxybb4leat5ph4gl3mb4.pdf	./txt/work_2lkxcidxybb4leat5ph4gl3mb4.txt