id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_2svqu2frzfaijesumt4efpunpq	Franz Huber	On the justification of deduction and induction	2017	38	.pdf	application/pdf	16096	953	61	to one cognitive end, and deduction is justified by an inductively strong argument for accepting the axioms of inductive logic." These reasons take the form of "conditions of adequacy" (Carnap 1963b: 977). Carnap's curious view results because he seems to have thought of these conditions of adequacy as categorical imperatives of explication which justify the analytic truth of the axioms of inductive logic. premises are restricted to some definitions, and whose conclusion says the following: in each possible world w, the principle of universal induction stabilizes on What we do not have is an inductive justification of classical deductive logic relative to the different cognitive end of reasoning in a way that is truth-preserving Consequently we have an inductive justification of the general rules of classical deductive logic relative to the cognitive end of reasoning in an actually truthpreserving way: there is an inductively strong argument which does not presuppose its conclusion, whose premises are restricted to information we have, and	./cache/work_2svqu2frzfaijesumt4efpunpq.pdf	./txt/work_2svqu2frzfaijesumt4efpunpq.txt