id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_3k5hzhie3ffczgdisygw2hxxdi	Elizabeth O'Neill	Which Causes of Moral Beliefs Matter?	2015	13	.pdf	application/pdf	5788	454	57	relevant for assessing the epistemic status of moral beliefs in cases where we cannot determine whether the proximal processes producing these beliefs are reliable just by examining the properties of these proximal processes. On the assumption that if sympathy contributes to truth tracking in the moral domain, it does so by picking out entities in pain, and given empirical evidence that sympathy produces false the epistemic status of moral beliefs influenced by proximal causes without Much of the literature on the evolutionary causes of moral beliefs, following Street (2006), has focused on the epistemic property of truth tracking. but, as I show with the cases of disgust and sympathy, it is possible to conclude with confidence that we do not track the truth of moral facts without whether moral beliefs produced by processes involving disgust and sympathy track the truth.	./cache/work_3k5hzhie3ffczgdisygw2hxxdi.pdf	./txt/work_3k5hzhie3ffczgdisygw2hxxdi.txt