id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_dp5ph7dqvbfqfp4mjx56iq4wrm	Clark Glymour	When Is a Brain Like the Planet?*	2007	18	.pdf	application/pdf	6795	410	54	argues that such causal time series of macroscopic aggregates of microscopic processes the very possibility that mental properties can be causal factors. properties; aggregates can have causal relations that none of their constituents have, and mental properties do so. We can imagine any mental property to be realized in physically different constituents than brains. be identical with different physical properties in humans and in aliens or identity of mental and physical properties, and for such identifications to of mental properties have no causal role. schemes to frame the structure of what would be required for neuroscientific explanations of mental contents and their causal roles. Further, for identity of mental properties or processes with aggregates of physical properties or processes, the time order and statistical relations of the occurrences of mental properties or processes Nowadays, regional sea surface temperatures and pressures are aggregated into climate indices with resulting distant correlations or teleconnections.	./cache/work_dp5ph7dqvbfqfp4mjx56iq4wrm.pdf	./txt/work_dp5ph7dqvbfqfp4mjx56iq4wrm.txt