id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_joz4l746kngllitfgvlztltnqu	Jan Sprenger	The probabilistic no miracles argument	2015	22	.pdf	application/pdf	6766	798	69	This paper develops a probabilistic reconstruction of the No Miracles Argument (NMA) in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists. As an argument from past and present success of our best scientific theories Figure 1: The structure of the NMA as a two-step argument from the empirical success of T Anti-realists claim that NMA is built on a base rate fallacy: from the high value Second, the anti-realist may argue that empirical adequacy is not required for predictive success. This is basically Laudan's argument from Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI): "I believe that for every highly successful theory in the Figure 4: The Bayesian Network representation of the relation between variables A (the number of alternatives to T), H (empirical adequacy of theory T), S (the success of T) and C (major of the NMA where additional evidence, such as the stability of scientific theories, stability in our currently best theories, or when empirically successful alternatives	./cache/work_joz4l746kngllitfgvlztltnqu.pdf	./txt/work_joz4l746kngllitfgvlztltnqu.txt