id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_leumwm4wsfbcdfm424ckeqwe7m	Yann Benétreau-Dupin	Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles	2015	20	.pdf	application/pdf	5553	467	63	The Doomsday paradox and the appeal to anthropic bounds to solve the cosmological constant problem are two examples of puzzles of probabilistic confirmation. assume that the prior probability distribution is constant within the anthropically allowed dealing with events we are completely ignorant about, one can use an imprecise, Bayesianfriendly framework that better handles ignorance, and avoids the paradoxical, uncomfortable consequences of the Doomsday argument, and better models the limited role anthropic One could hope that a more adequate prior probability distribution—one that better reflects our ignorance and is normalizable—may prevent the conclusion of these cosmic puzzles (especially Gott's Doomsday argument). an imprecise prior credal set with probability distributions that each favors a different Let us see how we can reframe Gott's Doomsday argument with an imprecise prior credence Let us see how such a prior credal set avoids the conclusion of Gott's Doomsday paradox.	./cache/work_leumwm4wsfbcdfm424ckeqwe7m.pdf	./txt/work_leumwm4wsfbcdfm424ckeqwe7m.txt