id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_lzsbkjlh7fgaxajbdkemurxjwm	Holly K. Andersen	Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities*	2011	12	.pdf	application/pdf	2756	187	46	alternative to laws of nature as a model of explanation in the sciences, and advocates order of priority wrong between mechanisms, regularity, and laws, and then make provide a genuine alternative to laws of nature as a model of explanation in the Mitchell's pragmatic account of laws and mechanisms, he ultimately gets the order of alternative to regularities as a model of explanation; they are an alternative to laws of explanation: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms explain. explanation: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms explain. Leuridan claims that models of mechanisms in science1 depend on regularities, and provide a mechanist response to Leuridan's challenge of stable regularities 1) "… Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on stable regularities. in Mitchell's sense, are causal generalizations based on stable regularities in nature, Mechanism models explain stable regularities because the Leuridan concludes from claims 1 and 2 that mechanisms depend ontologically on 	./cache/work_lzsbkjlh7fgaxajbdkemurxjwm.pdf	./txt/work_lzsbkjlh7fgaxajbdkemurxjwm.txt