id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_oo2nl7sfezhzzbddaw75j6b3te	Darrell P. Rowbottom	The Instrumentalist's New Clothes	2011	16	.pdf	application/pdf	5952	383	55	unobservable entities discussed by science are generally taken to have observable effects (by of semantic realism in so far as this pertains to talk of unobservable properties, but not unobservable objects provided that these are defined in terms of observable properties and/or unobservable entity instantiates an observable property, namely redness, in so far as some of instance, to extrapolate observable properties into the unobservable realm, and to take talk of evidential grounds for preferring cognitive instrumentalism over semantic realism (although cognitive instrumentalism is not to adopt any peculiar view on the aim of science, although it one can, e.g. attempt to posit only unobservable things possessing observable properties in Where the cognitive instrumentalist differs from Mach is in taking such descriptions literally. Nor does cognitive instrumentalism entail structural realism, especially of an ontological cognitive instrumentalism need not involve acceptance of van Fraassen's view of representation.	./cache/work_oo2nl7sfezhzzbddaw75j6b3te.pdf	./txt/work_oo2nl7sfezhzzbddaw75j6b3te.txt