id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_pt6axjn2crfyfiq5kasb5aoi5a	Dustin Stokes	Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: a dilemma	2015	56	.pdf	application/pdf	15572	906	46	modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as it is the case and that these cases challenge any strong, encapsulated modular architecture of perception. conceptual or cognitive systems, then, are not modular on Fodor's general architecture. Both encapsulated and unencapsulated modularity theorists take perceptual systems experience from higher-level cognitive and affective states and processes like belief, Second, distinguish the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience from the that in the cases in question, cognitive states of the experimental subjects cause a shift (Klein, Schlesigner, and Meister 1951; Carter and Schooler 1949; Lysak and Gilchrist 1955). cognitive penetrability is one that claims that the perceptual experiences of the subjects the results provide strong evidence for a cognitive effect on perceptual experience. experience entails, at some level, the cognitive penetration of perceptual processing. double dissociation between subjects' performance on two different cognitive tasks does between unencapsulated computational systems and specific cognitive functions.	./cache/work_pt6axjn2crfyfiq5kasb5aoi5a.pdf	./txt/work_pt6axjn2crfyfiq5kasb5aoi5a.txt