id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_uryuq4iuvbajxlglzuca5cwuya	Benjamin Anders Levinstein	A Pragmatist's Guide to Epistemic Utility	2017	26	.pdf	application/pdf	11407	1041	75	will see, Joyce's argument and the arguments of other epistemic utility theorists only work for a certain class of measures called strictly proper scoring A measure of inaccuracy, or scoring rule, is meant to quantify how close a credence in a proposition is to its truth-value at a world. However, from the point of view of the epistemic utility theorist, even some strict scoring rules fail to generate the results she wants. Surprisingly, it is relatively easy to identify exactly what further major restriction on measures of inaccuracy is needed to generate Joyce's results: every probability function must assign itself minimum expected inaccuracy.7 Since scoring rules are loss functions, we will describe Alice as an expected loss minimizer instead of as an In this more general case, we can determine Alice's valuation of a credence x with the merely proper scoring rule G 5 (g1, g0):	./cache/work_uryuq4iuvbajxlglzuca5cwuya.pdf	./txt/work_uryuq4iuvbajxlglzuca5cwuya.txt