id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_xvcjgrz6ifc4zlwc52w6b3hhkq	Ian Hacking	Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability	1967	15	.pdf	application/pdf	8959	648	69	Like each of Professor Savage's difficulties in the theory of personal probability, J. Savage, "Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability," in this issue of Philosof what Savage calls "logical implication." Philosophers know, to their cost, the Classical personalism offers a theory of rational belief and reasonable decision. leads to a well known argument for what I shall call the static assumption of personalism: For any &A, and at least any f c A, Probf(h)is defined and satisfies the the model of learning is that Prob(h/e) represents one's personal probability after the same conditional probability symbol represents my confidence or betting rate for the axioms for personal probability, but in such a way that no practical application betting rates must satisfy the probability axioms or else be open to a Dutch book. In the theory of slightly more realistic personal probability, "possible" is construed realistic personal probability if he assigns a betting rate of 0.4 on each inequality, 	./cache/work_xvcjgrz6ifc4zlwc52w6b3hhkq.pdf	./txt/work_xvcjgrz6ifc4zlwc52w6b3hhkq.txt