id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_yrwuw7mrqbcgpm3h3jz7fvol5q	Aron Vallinder	Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia	2017	27	.pdf	application/pdf	12648	806	68	imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. the question of what prior credal state an evidentially motivated imprecise Bayesian Bayesianism, her prior credal state must include all credence functions that satisfy A rational agent updates her degrees of belief over time by conditionalizing her credence function on all the evidence she has received. To unpack this principle, we need a substantive account of what it takes for a credence function to be compatible with a body of evidence. A rational agent's credal state contains all and only those credence functions that are given as the expected value of some probability density the imprecise case, priors are given by the set of credence functions an agent adopts impose on the credence functions in our prior credal state are the principal principle credence functions in the prior credal state to satisfy the principal principle, another	./cache/work_yrwuw7mrqbcgpm3h3jz7fvol5q.pdf	./txt/work_yrwuw7mrqbcgpm3h3jz7fvol5q.txt