Promotion of Cultural Content Knowledge Through
the Use of the History and Philosophy of Science

Igal Galili

Published online: 22 July 2011
� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Historical excurse was suggested as a beneficial form of using the history and
philosophy of science in the modules of learning materials developed within the History

and Philosophy in Science Teaching project. The paper briefly describes the theoretical

framework of the produced modules, addressing ontological and epistemological aspects of

historical changes in physics knowledge with regard to several particular concepts relevant

to school course of physics. It is argued that such excurses create Cultural Content

Knowledge which improves the Pedagogical Content Knowledge in teachers and are

appropriate to facilitate the meaningful learning by students. The modules illustrate the

new aspect of the scientific knowledge not sufficiently addressed in the current science

educational discourse—the constructive diachronic discourse that took place in the history.

Historical excurse makes explicit the paradigmatic conceptual changes in physics

knowledge and thus creates the space of learning in which the ‘‘correct’’ knowledge (type
I) emerges in a discourse with the alternates (type II knowledge). Some of the previous

conceptions show certain similarity to students’ misconceptions which further motivates

essential use of both types of scientific knowledge to support the meaningful learning of

physics curriculum. The epistemological aspects of the developed materials illuminate the

nature of scientific knowledge and its major features: objectiveness and cumulative nature.

Teachers found the developed modules interesting, important but challenging their back-

ground and requiring special preparation.

1 Introduction

Using the history and philosophy of science (HPS) in science teaching has a long record

and many researchers argued for its benefits to students and teachers of science (e.g., Brush

1969; Duschl 1990; Matthews 1994; Kipnis 1996). Importantly, the argumentation for

using the HPS evolves with time, reflecting the cultural changes and research discourse

taking place (Matthews 2000; Galili 2008). However, despite the intensive support for

I. Galili (&)
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: igal@vms.huji.ac.il

123

Sci & Educ (2012) 21:1283–1316
DOI 10.1007/s11191-011-9376-x



using the HPS in science teaching and articulation of its advantages (e.g., Matthews 1994,

p. 38), the issue continues to be complex and controversial (Galili and Hazan 2001a), as it

emerges from research reports (e.g., Monk and Osborne 1997):

… even materials produced for teachers, for example, those produced in the UK … are not used.
Attempts to produce restructured courses that put history at the center of the enterprise … have
enjoyed only marginal success, as have those that have sought to introduce a more rigorous and
current view of the philosophy of science … (emphasis added)

Physics teachers and physics researchers who lecture physics often refuse to signifi-

cantly include the HPS materials beyond references, sporadic points and anecdotes, which

are interesting, may remove the tension of formal instruction but are not essentially helpful

to comprehend the complex subject matter. Serious opponents of using history state:

indeed, why should we confuse students with obsolete views, surpassed problems, and

premature epistemology of science?

Professional historians, in their turn, also criticize the historical presentations and

materials for teaching produced by science educators, pointing to their voluntary selection,

Whiggish and ‘‘bad’’ history. Indeed, the historical materials vary in a huge span of

contents and aspects, all important for the history of science in variety of perspectives.

Historical discourse is intensive and rich. Naturally, history consumers could be easily

criticized for incompleteness and being not sufficiently informed of historical background

and current research.

Concerning the philosophy of science, there is a widespread myth among teachers that

science teaching can be neutral, ‘‘free of any philosophy’’ (Tseitlin and Galili 2006). The

philosophers of science, in their turn, express their dissatisfaction with the philosophically

superficial—and sometimes simply wrong—ideas on the nature of science, suspecting

educators in insufficient competence in philosophy (Alters 1997; Matthews 2009).

However, even substantial and relevant critique cannot nullify argumentation of the vast

potential of the HPS for science education, despite the numerous difficulties of actual

application (Gauld 1991; Monk and Osborne 1997; Grimellini-Tomasini & Levrini 2004;

Galili 2008; Höttecke 2009; Höttecke et al. 2010). Researchers point to the complexity of

the subject which when ignored may cause troubles (Höttecke and Silva 2010). Intensive

research, theoretical and empirical, is required to investigate what and how to employ

regarding the HPS in science teaching, the conditions for their effective use.

The aim of this article is to illustrate several aspects of understanding this subject within

a new perspective, named cultural. Within the HIPST (History and Philosophy of Science
in Teaching) European project,

1
we tried not only to produce new teaching materials, but

also elaborate on their relevance and even necessity in attaining better understanding of the

subject matter, the scientific method (epistemology), and the beneficial impact of such

materials for remedy of students’ misconceptions in both realms. The modules provided

concrete pedagogical suggestions. In doing this, we intended to match the features of the

contemporary culture (its plurality, dialectic and dialogic nature) while presenting science

as a human activity of construction of tentative but objective knowledge, the rational
account of Nature.

It appears that a special framework of scientific theories, termed discipline-culture
(Tseitlin and Galili 2005), legitimizes the use of the HPS based materials in education.

1
HIPST project comprised the effort of ten groups from seven European countries and Israel. They tried to

promote using the HPS based materials in science education. The project was mainly concerned with the
development and implementation of historical case studies for teaching and learning science. The official
Internet cite of the project is at: http://hipstwiki.wetpaint.com.

1284 I. Galili

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http://hipstwiki.wetpaint.com


The essential role of philosophy and history of science obtains semantic explicitness and
thus contributes to the meaningful understanding of fundamental statements of physical

theories (physics ontology) and of the scientific method (physics epistemology). Impor-

tantly, the developed materials address ontology and epistemology with regard to physical

knowledge of the curriculum. This specific setting of application ontology and episte-

mology caused Schwab (1978) to introduce special terms—substantive and syntactic

knowledge in correspondence.

Dealing with physics knowledge from the past one may distinguish between two types

of the scientific contents, correct and incorrect, in view of the contemporary curriculum,

and consider their importance for science learning.
2

We argue for the essential role of the

incorrect conceptions from the history in the process of knowledge construction by stu-

dents and the advantages of such use in a special form of presentation—historical excurse.
In our choice of contents of physics curriculum to be addressed, we followed the strategy

of addressing ‘‘critical details’’ of physics knowledge (Viennot 2004). The paper will

briefly illustrate the produced materials and the specific rationale of each of the developed

modules. Finally, we will briefly describe the feedback of practicing teachers of physics to

whom we presented the modules in a series of meetings.

2 Theoretical Background

Those school teachers and university lecturers who resist to adoption of historical materials

often explain that such materials address obsolete and simply incorrect contents in light of

the curriculum that they have to keep with. Indeed, the scientific knowledge from the past

often includes obsolete conceptions, views, values, language and terminology foreign to

the modern learner (e.g., heavy religious load). Therefore, in science education, unlike

humanities, we do not use the original treatises but their modern descriptions further

selected and adopted to be presented in textbooks. For instance, in teaching and learning

the fundamental laws of motion, required in physics class, nobody uses the original—

Newton’s Principia (1687/1999)—but the contemporary presentation of these laws,
modified for the particular audience. Such are physics textbooks by Resnick and Halliday

(1988)—for university students, Hewitt (2002)—for high schools, Reif (1995)—for teacher

training, etc. All of them present essentially the same contents although very different from

the original and to each other. If, however, a novice learner decides to read the Principia,
he/she immediately faces essential difficulties. The concepts in use may confuse also an

expert. For example, one may find that the First Law of Motion—the law of inertia—was

not a special case of the Second Law as usually stated in physics textbooks today (Galili

and Tseitlin 2003).

If so, why do we need to use the historical materials beyond mere curiosity and

intellectual interest? It is a challenge indeed to answer this question. Although many

practitioners ignore history of physics, many researchers advocate another view (e.g.,

Duschl 1990; Kipnis 1996; Seroglou and Koumaras 2001;
3

Galili and Hazan 2000b, 2001b;

Grimellini-Tomasini and Levrini 2004; Galili and Hazan 2004; Mikelskis 2009). They

claim that the HPS materials are more than historical documents and try to demonstrate

their relevance for the modern teaching of science.

2
This, unlike the common perspective of historians, who use the terms right/wrong relatively to the time

period considered.
3

Review of the developments in using the History of Physics in Physics Education.

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1285

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One perspective was seemingly simple to agree with: the HPS materials inform the

learner about the features and nature of science as a human activity in which scientists seek

the objective truth about the nature—the laws that govern its organization and explain

natural phenomena. Conant (1957) collected the stories about bright individuals in science,

who by their activities and discoveries facilitated the progress of our civilization. The

materials were left to the student and teacher to be interpreted and related to the curric-

ulum. This open nature of this and many other presentations of the history of science

allowed the opponents to argue that the historical materials are more appropriate for

extracurricular enrichment, not for regular teaching. Numerous historical materials were

produced since then; yet, a great distance remained to the agreement of the need to include

such materials into the regular teaching of science. Educators usually saw the HPS contents

as being more appropriate for those who are interested and therefore being merely optional.

Quite in accordance with the often prevailing pragmatic approach, the questions of ‘‘why

this knowledge and not another?’’ and ‘‘was there another account for the same phe-

nomena’’, which could provide the pleasure of understanding Nature, were seen as inferior

to mastering the scientific formalism and training standard problem solving—‘‘this is

physics’’, they say. Indeed it is, we answer, but it is not the whole physics, as we all know.

In this regard, teachers point to missing by students the big picture in their learning

physics which causes poor conceptual knowledge and inability to face and solve non-

standard qualitative and quantitative problems requiring more than a known algorithm (e.g.

Galili and Bar 1992; Galili and Hazan 2000a; Mahajan and MacKay 2000).
4

The HPS

based materials enable learning of just this aspect of scientific knowledge—getting its big

picture, familiarizing with the veracity and flexibility of the scientific method, its many

faceted potential in the account of nature, revealing its laws and using the power of this

knowledge for numerous purposes.

The constructivist paradigm of science education considers conceptual change, that is,
construction instead of passive adoption of knowledge, to be the way of learning science

(e.g., Duit and Treadust 1998). The goal of teachers became to encourage such a process to

take place. Posner et al. (1982) elaborated the conditions for conceptual change in learning

science: dissatisfaction with the knowledge currently held, combined with plausibility,

intelligibility and fruitfulness of the scientific knowledge presented. To facilitate the

transition, much research effort was and continues to be invested in revealing students’

conceptions prior, during and after formal instruction. While reporting about the findings

of this activity, researchers often mentioned the resemblance they found between students’

naı̈ve and novice conceptions, on the one hand, and those held by scientists in the past, on

the other (e.g., Piaget 1968; McCloskey 1983a, b; Halloun and Hestenes 1985; Galili and

Hazan 2000b).

These reports revived the already old thesis of similarity (recapitulation) between philo-

and onto-genesis of knowledge (Piaget and Garcia 1989). At least, one may see that the

disequilibrium taking place when an individual fails to answer questions and manipulate
reality, which Piaget considered to be the driving mechanism of the individual develop-
ment, could be compared to the tension growth leading to the scientific revolutions when

the collective knowledge accumulates discrepancies causing crisis and eventually a
‘‘breakdown of the normal technical puzzle-solving activity’’ (Kuhn 1970, p. 69). The

similarity does not presume identity, of course.

4
For the recent conversation on poor understanding of physics by students for their lacking of a ‘‘big

picture’’ (June 2010) see in PHYSLRN forum (PHYSLRNR@LISTSERV.BOISESTATE.EDU) the dis-
cussion ‘‘Discrete Skills vs. Big Picture’’.

1286 I. Galili

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Two these perspectives—educational constructivism and genetic epistemology relate

between individuals to the history of science (Tsou 2006) and create the important per-

spective of relevancy of the HPS based learning materials. Such perspective essentially

draws on the similarity of conceptual difficulties. This pragmatic view suggests consid-

ering specific historical ideas relevant to the contents presented in a regular science class. It

is within this perspective that Monk and Osborne (1997) elaborated how those ideas may

promote the required conceptual progression through a sort of cognitive resonance in the
learners of science.

Duit et al. (2005) within the program of educational reconstruction stated the need to
reveal relevant historical background for providing scientific clarification of the concept to

be taught. Other authors suggested that acquaintance with historical examples could pro-

mote understanding the nature of science by making it concrete and meaningful (e.g.,

Kipnis 1998; McComas 1998, 2008; Matthews 2000).

Less numerous are reports of actual application of the HPS based learning materials

(e.g., Kipnis 1992). Galili and Hazan performed a year long experiment of teaching optics

course to 10th grade students using their textbook (2004) in which the subject matter of

optics was interwoven with the pertinent history of science from the first accounts by

Greek philosophers to the contemporary physics. Students demonstrated a significantly

better knowledge both in the subject matter and views of the nature of science (Galili and

Hazan 2000b, 2001b).

2.1 Science as a Culture

To identify our approach in using the HPS materials and the suggested concept of cultural
content knowledge (CCK) we should address the issue of culture with regard to science.
Much has been said regarding science as a culture (e.g., Bevilacqua et al. 2001). Latour

(1987), among other social constructivists, distinguished between ‘‘Ready Made Science’’

and ‘‘Science in Making’’ and deliberately described the latter. Similarly, Ziman (2000, p.

24) defined:

In effect, academic science is a culture. It is a complex way of life that has evolved in a ‘group of
people with shared traditions, which are transmitted and reinforced by members of the group’.

Close, albeit somewhat different view was stated by Aikenhead (1997) who suggested

seeing science as a subculture of the Western culture and described:

Scientists share a well defined system of norms, values, believes, expectations and conventional
actions of a group.

This definition is extremely broad and may include behaviorist, spiritual as well as

subject matter subjects. In practice, however, the ‘‘cultural’’ educational discourse

addressed numerous attributes and features of science as a social activity, ‘‘way of life’’.

This realm is investigated by anthropologists (e.g., Marx 2009), but it is relevant to science

education researchers who address such issues as students’ and teachers’ worldviews, the

influence of social milieu, the impact of science on the society and the classroom culture—

a well defined list of research questions (Cobern 1993).

Although in our products we mentioned these aspects too but they were not our major

target. The focus of our approach was different and laid in the scientific knowledge itself—

the subject matter. Our approach was close to description of the historical consolidation of

certain scientific theory (Kipnis 2001) as well as displaying conceptual plurality in

understanding of basic scientific concepts (Levrini 2002). Within this approach, the

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scientific contents are under close examination of the disciplinary discourse. It is this

plurality
5

and the discursive nature of scientific knowledge that makes science a culture of

a special kind (not necessary identified with the Western culture), different from great

many other systems of knowledge seeking the truth about the world.

Lotman and Uspensky (1978) within their semiotic approach to culture considered it to

be ‘‘a mechanism for organizing and preserving information in the consciousness of the

community.’’ They identified two types of culture, those arranged around contents or

expression, rules or texts, in correspondence. Within this perspective, Tseitlin and Galili

(2005) interpreted science (physics) knowledge—the culture of rules—as organized in the

form of several fundamental theories. The cultural perspective on the totality of the sci-

entific knowledge allows representation fundamental theories as discipline-cultures instead
of regular disciplines commonly presented in teaching science. Scientific discipline usually
focuses on certain theory and ignores alternatives both historical and contemporary. For

example, the standard course on classical mechanics ignores its historical predecessors

(say, Aristotelian mechanics) as well as successors (say, relativistic or quantum mechanics)

and parallel disciplines (say, thermodynamics or electromagnetism). This presents the

background of introduction of CCK into the discourse of science education.

2.2 Discipline-Culture Approach

The suggested in the previous study (ibid.) construct—discipline-culture—can represent
certain physical theory in the form appropriate for providing the learners with the big

picture of the discipline in educational context. Discipline-culture displays the structure of
the disciplinary knowledge to be learned and thus fulfills the fundamental requirement of

science education (Bruner 1966).

When the cultural framework is applied to certain theory, the learner is provided with

explicit identification of three types of knowledge elements (Fig. 1). The first—nucleus—
includes the paradigm of the considered theory, its central concepts and principles, onto-

logical (such as the paradigmatic model of the theory) and epistemological (such as the

adopted rules of knowledge production and validation). One may see this structure as a

clarification making explicit those subject matter presuppositions which comprise the basis
of any scientific theory. Seemingly, those were mentioned in general terms by Cobern

(2000). In the course of regular teaching, they, however, are often skipped or passed

without required attention and discussion. Not that they are not respected. Just the opposite

is true, but lacking any controversy or tension of possible alternative, they are often swiftly

left in favor of the ‘‘real stuff’’ to deal with—the application (the second type of theory

elements).

The second type—body knowledge—includes constructs which result various applica-
tions of the central paradigm: solved problems, working models, explained phenomena,

Nucleus Body 

Periphery 
Fig. 1 Discipline-culture
structure

5
In fact, plurality and culture share the same root in Hebrew, the language of the author.

1288 I. Galili

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experiments and instruments. Lakatos (1970) called the solved by certain theory problems

‘‘protection belts’’ with respect to the hard core of the theory (its nucleus, in our terms).

Together, these two areas (nucleus and body) represent what is normally considered to be

the disciplinary knowledge, corresponding to the certain part of a regular curriculum of
physics course. Body knowledge often prevails even in school education, let alone the

universities departments of physics, practically reducing learning to application of the

correct knowledge in the form of solving standard problems by means of accumulated

algorithms. This activity (hard and complex by itself) is currently emblematic for science

education.

The third type of knowledge elements, often missed in educational context, represents

the conceptions that contradict the nucleus, alternative accounts, ideas and concepts,

alternative epistemology, either from the past or from the more advanced theories, as well

as the problems and phenomena that the considered theory failed to resolve or explain. The

elements of the third type comprise periphery. These knowledge elements locate the theory
in the knowledge medium, display its limits of validity. However, even a question about

such knowledge may surprise the teacher or curriculum designer.

All three areas together constitute the cultural representation of certain theory in
physics.

Educational context and constructivist requirement suggest addressing students’ mis-

conceptions of the particular subject matter in the process of instruction. Misconceptions,

apparently contradict the nucleus of the theory and hence they could be also placed in the

periphery, together with the ‘‘logico-structural categories of students’ worldview’’ (Cobern

1993), also in odds with the nucleus. One may still distinguish students’ misconceptions

from the alternative conceptions, ontological and epistemological, practiced in science

(e.g., caloric in thermodynamics).

The reference to culture in the identification of this triadic structure is justified by the
fact that cultural presentation includes alternative accounts for the same subject, those

which argue with the nucleus and placed in the periphery. It is this feature that authenti-

cally represents the nature of scientific knowledge as well as matches the modern per-

spective on culture legitimizing several perspectives on the same subject—a pluralistic

picture. The latter feature allows demonstration (visualization) of the dynamics of the

scientific knowledge, both evolutionary and revolutionary changes taking place in science.

Those manifest themselves in status exchange between certain elements of nucleus and

periphery, the growing number of elements in certain area and so on. Within such

framework of teaching the student may grasp the meaning of the paradigmatic changes that

took place in the scientific knowledge and genuinely understand the contents of curricu-

lum, realize to themselves the area of validity and limits of reliability of certain theory.

For example, culturally represented Classical Mechanics will be explicit in identifying

its nucleus: Newtonian paradigmatic model (absolute space and time, void and point

masses interacting through central forces), postulated laws, principles and definitions of the

fundamental concepts. Besides displaying the body knowledge, such instruction exposes

the periphery—the conceptual rivals of the Classical Mechanics: the principles of Aris-

totelian mechanics, as well as those of the relativistic and quantum mechanics. The teacher

will find there the relevant misconceptions of the learners.

It is clear that the history of science serves as major resource of periphery elements.

Furthermore, the considered triadic structure displays the relationship between the fun-

damental theories. Such representation includes separated nuclei and overlaid areas of

body knowledge all together immersed in the periphery (Fig. 2). This account visualizes

the principle of correspondence between physical theories, for example, between Classical

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1289

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and Relativistic Mechanics. Their nuclei are, in a sense, contradicting each other—

incommensurable; each is located in the periphery of the other.
6

At the same time, the two

theories may produce non contradictive results (such as the theory of relativity in the low

velocities limit), which is represented by the area shared by the two bodies of knowledge.

Yet, being different, in the characteristic fundamentals, the scientific theories possess

family resemblance, a powerful concept introduced by Wittgenstein (1953), though not
regarding scientific theories. With regard to theories in science, it manifests itself in the

shared or similar concepts, methodology, principles, mathematical formalism, etc. (also

Irzik and Nola 2010). We thus may have arrived at the ‘‘big’’ picture of physics in cultural

perspective—a family of a few fundamental physical theories.

2.3 The Role of the Philosophy of Science

The role of the philosophy for science in science education can be represented by semiotic

tools (Tseitlin and Galili 2006). Within this perspective, the philosophy of science provides

the conceptual meaning (the concept vertex) to the scientific contents—the object vertex in
the semiotic triangle (Fig. 3). Science curriculum which represents the object (science)

occupies the vertex of sign in the same triangle. This way, it is shown that the philosophy
of science determines the contents of the sign—science curriculum. Indeed, we know that

each philosophical paradigm—empiricist, rationalist, positivist or constructivist—origi-

nates the correspondent to it curriculum in science teaching, determines its contents and

provides specific scientific worldview.

The discipline-culture approach further refines the role of philosophy. Indeed, it is the

philosophy of science that determines the elements of nucleus for certain theory, elaborate

its ontological and epistemological foundation. Thus, the nucleus of Newtonian theory

differs from the nucleus of the theory of electromagnetism by the contents that essentially

distinguish between the two theories. For instance, the ontological statements regarding the

‘‘interaction at a distance’’ oppose to the ‘‘interaction by contact’’, the time–space inde-

pendence oppose to the time–space dependence, etc. These contents of the disciplinary

nuclei are philosophical in nature, and they changed in the course of history. It is these

characteristics of the nucleus that provide the physical meaning of the theory rather than

particular problems solved by it. Once the statements of the nucleus are determined their

alternatives are sent to the periphery, but never disappear. Thus, the scientific revolution of

the seventeenth century introduced forced interaction at a distance (gravitation), through

vacuum and sent the alternative—the interaction at a contact (Descartes)—to the periph-

ery, for a while. Tension between these two ontological claims eventually brought to the

radical conceptual change in which the concept of field was introduced in the electro-
magnetism, in the nineteenth century. This development can be represented as an exchange

Nucleus1 
Body1

Periphery 

Nucleus2
Body2

Fig. 2 Discipline-culture structure of two fundamental theories

6
This perspective can be related to incommensurability of the essentially different physical theories as

introduced by Kuhn (1970).

1290 I. Galili

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of elements between the nucleus and periphery. The discourse between the two proceeded;

action at a distance did not disappear and remained in the periphery in the form of

alternative theories, old and new.

In epistemology, two philosophical framework, rationalism and empiricism, suggested

different approaches to concept definitions in physics, nominal and empirical. In different

periods each took place in the nucleus or periphery of physics theory. In the twentieth

century the empiricism (positivism) placed the operational definitions in the fore, moving

them from the periphery, where they were after Hellenistic physics, to the nucleus of the

modern theories. This change can be illustrated by the changes of concept definitions of

inertial mass (Mach 1893), simultaneity by Einstein (1905), and weight (Reichenbach

1927).

The ontological and epistemological elements of the nucleus represent the core state-

ments (genus) of the considered physical theory. Although these contents are often missed
in instruction, they are important for establishing the big picture of physics knowledge in

the learner. In the modules that we developed, we addressed the relevant epistemological

and ontological contents and described their changes in the course of history. This account

matches the need of wider representation of the nature of science often limited to one

approach (Duschl 1985; Alters 1997; Matthews 2009; Höttecke and Silva 2010).

2.4 Implication to Physics Education: Cultural Content Knowledge

Historical materials are used in education in the variety of forms (Seroglou and Koumaras

2001). The collection of case studies by Conant (1957) described in details the activity of

prominent scientists and their major discoveries independent of any particular curriculum

or interpretation. In the great scale of the Harvard Project Physics (Rutherford et al. 1971)
and its predecessor, Physics by Taylor (1941), the whole physics course was immersed into
historical narrative. This tradition continued in the impressive courses of Rogers (1960)

and Glashow (1994), who emphasized historical roots of the fundamental concepts and

conceptions. The courses, as mentioned by the authors, addressed the audience of non-

physics and even non-science majors. Hecht (1994) elegantly infuses historical details in

the narrative of the main text. Some university physics textbooks contain special boxes,

which present historical information about the scientists whose names appear in physics

laws and units: Newton, Faraday, Maxwell, Ampere, Volta (e.g., Serway and Jewett 2004).

The boxes appeared on the margins and were independent in content from the main text.

The European project HIPST, small in scale, looked for the appropriate format of

products that could contribute to science teaching in physics classes. Historical cases were
chosen as a feasible and appropriate form to incorporate history and philosophy of science

into teaching (Höttecke et al. 2010). However, the obvious limitations of a case—its focus
on event, person, experiment, or instrument—posed a serious challenge to those committed

Object Concept 

Representation

(a) 

Science Curriculum

Science The Philosophy 
of Science (b) 

Fig. 3 a Generic semiotic triangle; b the semiotic relationship of science, the philosophy of science and
science curriculum

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1291

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to the cultural approach. Indeed, dealing with a particular case one may miss its rela-
tionship to the whole web of physics knowledge, its discourse—the cultural perspective.

The latter suggests addressing conceptual dialogue: debate of scientists. Such dialogue may

be diachronic and the scholar may differ in their conceptions, worldviews, methods and
technology, as well as immersed in different social environments. To reach the cultural

perspective, our group suggested historical excurse as an appropriate format of the mod-
ules to be developed. The excurses had to address conceptual points of the physics cur-

riculum, especially important for understanding, teaching and learning certain subject

matter (Fig. 4). This way several constraints of the project could be fulfilled: (1) com-
pactness: focus on the relevant selected topics and materials; (2) flexibility: the modules
allow application in different extent and purposes (teacher training course, extracurricular

or regular teaching); (3) conservatism: the modules do not replace the adopted curriculum
but facilitate and strengthen its understanding and meaningful learning.

Our historical excurses included comprehensive accounts of several subjects in content

knowledge each expanded along a historical period. Special in its features, this genre may

serve as an effective pedagogical tool of conceptual clarification. Excurse may include

narrative parts in presenting history of the concept, limited quotations of the originals easy

for reading. Furthermore, after presenting the historical narrative, the excurse separately

addressed its ontological and epistemological aspects with regard to the considered concept

and elaborated its curricular relevance. Questions, mostly qualitative, together with sug-

gested activities enabled discussion and strengthened each excurse pedagogically.

As mentioned above, the criteria for choosing materials were based on the relevancy

and content importance as established by researchers of physics education and matching

our goal—promoting cultural content knowledge of the subject matter. In realizing this

program we observed that the historical contents, usually used in education, elaborate and

discuss the knowledge which is considered today as ‘‘correct’’. Such is addressing the

history of lever and other simple machines used in various technologies. Similar respect is

given to Archimedes’ law of buoyancy, Eratosthenes’ measurement of Earth radius, history

of microscope and telescope, Cavendish’s ‘‘weighing the Earth’’; the discovery of elec-

tromagnetism by Oersted, and so on. The heroes of such stories are Archimedes,

Eratosthenes, Galileo, Kepler, Copernicus and Newton, but never Aristotle, Ptolemy, Ibn

al-Haytham, Descartes, Buridan, Oresme, and Grimaldi. The common in the former group

is that they produced the knowledge proven later to be ‘‘correct’’ (‘‘got it right’’). Those of

the latter group, however, if mentioned at all by educators, are solely criticized. We may

label the first type—Type-I history, and the second—Type-II history.
Type-II history is indeed about the knowledge refuted in the following development of

science. However, those scholars had important and sometimes pivotal contributions

Excurse 2 Excurse 1 Excurse 3 

Curriculum 
flow 

Conceptually important concepts 

Fig. 4 Schematic presentation of incorporation of historical excurses into the existing curriculum

1292 I. Galili

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providing their ‘‘shoulders’’ for the others to stand on.
7

They participated in the conceptual

discourse of physics through time. For example, the cultural approach to teaching physics

should adopt such items as the ideas of Aristotelian mechanics, Pythagorean theory of

vision, impetus theory of the medieval physics, Ibn al-Haytham’s theory of vision, and

caloric theory of heat. Each of these topics belongs to the periphery of certain contem-

porary physical theory and challenges contents in the correspondent nucleus and body

(Fig. 5). All together, they may establish constructive conceptual dialogue in the course of

regular teaching.

It might seem that using Type-I materials is natural and that of Type-II—problematic

and confusing. However, in closer view, the Type-I history, although interesting and

enriching, seems to be not of unique importance. The historical materials of this type could

be, in fact, replaced with equivalent modern addressing the same subject matter. Thus,

many physics textbooks present simple machines (lever, screw, edge, pulley) without any

history. It is frequent to present lever or buoyancy conditions without reference to

Archimedes and the Geometrical Optics—without reference to Kepler. Teacher demon-

strates the experiments and refers to the everyday experience. This policy might make the

materials less interesting but preserves their validity. In effect, Type-I history is not
essential in learning disciplinary contents.

The role of Type-II history of science is different and important to figure out. Some

science educators decisively deny it for using in class, claiming its misleading and con-

fusing influence on the students whose knowledge is not sufficiently mature to handle the

obsolete contents (Galili and Hazan 2001a). Indeed, such ideas, refuted, often with great

efforts in science itself, may confuse. Why mount ‘‘artificial obstacles’’, why to revive the

old barriers already surpassed in science itself? There are several answers to this concern:

1. Controversy of the scientific knowledge (represented by the ‘‘wrong’’ knowledge) is an

essential feature of the scientific activity in which the knowledge is produced.

Controversy distinguishes the scientific knowledge from many others. Introduction of

the historical debate into teaching converts teaching from transmission of dogma to the

making an appreciated and justified choice. Controversy creates an adequate and

authentic image of science. Therefore, revealing controversy in science grants maturity

to the knowledge of the learner.

2. It is the debate of ideas that makes science attractive to many learners. Certain part of

youth is interested in science as a living knowledge engaged in self-correction,

comparative analysis, a fair competition of ideas, in which they, the novice, can

participate, not only as consumers (e.g., de Hosson and Kaminski 2007). For this type

of learners, the periphery knowledge drives their major interest in science.
By excluding controversy of knowledge and debate of conceptual refutation, we

often lose such students, repelled by dogma and algorithmic applications.

Nucleus Body 

Periphery 
Knowledge 

Type II Knowledge 
Type I 

Fig. 5 Two types of historical
knowledge and the areas of their
affiliation within the discipline-
culture structure of physical
theory

7
This powerful metaphor represented the framework of scholarship adopted in Chartres (Bernard of

Chartres) in the twelfth century (e.g. Hannam 2009).

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1293

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3. The similarity between some obsolete conceptions in science and naı̈ve conceptions of

students, as reported by numerous studies, may be used in a remedial discussion

(utilizing rich, often unique in quality argumentation developed by the bright minds of

the past) leading to refutation of the alternative conceptions and ultimately, to the

required conceptual change and/or cognitive resonance in the learner. In the following,

we will illustrate such materials.

4. Certain elements of obsolete scientific knowledge are especially important. Those

often present paradigmatic conceptions of the old theories. Such are, for example, the

conceptions of motion by Aristotle (the need for the external mover for the body to

maintain its motion) and that of Buridan (the internal mover—impetus—to cause

motion of the body that possesses it). These conceptions from the periphery of

classical mechanics establish conceptual variation of the central conception of

mechanics and create the appropriate and required space of learning for the learner
(Marton et al. 2004). The process of learning is different from loading computer with

information; it presumes cognitive construction and reconstruction through compar-
ison between the possibilities. This way people provide knowledge with meaning.

All together these answers claim that addressing periphery facilitates meaningful

teaching and is essential. Periphery knowledge upgrades content knowledge of the disci-
pline to the CCK, which is valuable for both: science learners (whether or not they intend

to become physicists) and science teachers. Although in humanities the pertinent CCK is

traditionally encouraged in students and presents a norm, in science education, CCK is

often underestimated, neglected and ignored. Thus, it normally escapes teacher training

programs and many learning materials. Such knowledge may be observed in old age

scholars after their long enculturation via living in science. Our study argues for this

knowledge already at the stage of learning science. This change is required by the young

generation of students and teachers of science.

One can visualize (Fig. 6) the benefit of the CCK to the Pedagogical Content Knowl-

edge (PCK, Shulman 1986)—the central concept of science education. The latter is usually

represented by the overlaying of pedagogical and content disciplinary knowledge. In this

representation, the impact of the CCK becomes obvious.

We will now briefly represent the implementation of the presented above considerations

in five historical excurses that have been developed within the HIPST project.

3 Developed Materials

3.1 Structure of the Modules

All the developed in the project modules shared the common structure which included the

following principal sections:

Cultural Content 
Knowledge - CCK 

Pedagogical  
Knowledge 

Disciplinary 
PCK Increase of the PCK  

due to the CCK 

Content Disciplinary 
Knowledge 

Fig. 6 Symbolic representation of the impact of the CCK on the PCK

1294 I. Galili

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• Abstract
• Introduction
• Conceptual history of the considered subject
• Historical and philosophical background including nature of science
• Target group, curricular relevance and didactical benefit
• Activities, methods and media for learning
• Obstacles to teaching and learning
• Pedagogical skills
• Additional reading

The average length of five developed by our group modules was 50 pages of text

including pictures, drawings and tables. The constituents of the modules reflected the fact

that they addressed practicing and prospective teachers of physics, although high school

students may benefit too from reading the materials. Historical originals were quoted and

questions (usually qualitative) were provided to facilitate discussions. We related to the

results of pertinent research in physics education (students’ conceptions on the subject)

published in international journals. In the following, we will briefly describe the developed

modules.

3.2 Module 1. Understanding Classical Mechanics: A Dialogue with Cartesian Theory

of Motion

This excurse displayed a particular segment of the history of mechanics closely preceded to

Newtonian era of the classical mechanics. We considered Descartes’ laws of motion

followed by seven rules of collisions between two hard bodies. Descartes suggested these

laws in his Principles of Philosophy (1644/1983), and they were thoroughly studied by
Newton as a young student in Cambridge, who later replaced them with his own three laws,

those we learn today at school. This was done by Newton in the famous Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687/1999) which appeared to be a sort of conceptual
debate with the Principles of Descartes. In this excurse, we displayed the laws of motion,
rules of collisions together with their explanations from the original text of Descartes and

analyzed all of them. The qualitative analysis was illustrated by numerical examples.

We demonstrated the failure of the third law of motion (the law of collision) and six (out

of seven) rules of elastic collisions which refined that law. The major failures of Descartes

were that he considered the quantity of motion to be scalar value (instead of vector) and
distinguished between the state of rest and motion as essentially different states of matter.
Thus, he ignored Galileo’s principle of relativity and the symmetry of interaction between

the colliding bodies in the sense of the third Newton’s Law (action–reaction equality). The

only exception of correctness was his first rule of collision, which possessed so high

symmetry (two identical balls with equal velocities in frontal collision) that it preserved the

rule correct even if the explanation given was wrong. Descartes knew that most of his

claims provided incorrect results, but he did not know why (this was known to Huygens

and Newton), and so he attributed the failure to the non-ideal conditions in reality.

The excurse proceeded to the history of refutation of Descartes’ rules of collision, first

empirically: by Jan Marci, John Wallis and Christopher Wren, and then—theoretically, by

Christian Huygens (Dugas 1988; Losee 1993; Taylor 1941; Westfall 1989). We elaborated

on the pioneer work of Huygens who, in his famous thought experiment, addressed the

account of collision by two observers, one at rest, and the other in motion, applying

Galileo’s principle of relativity. Drawing on the previous empirical results (the coefficient

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1295

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of restitution), Huygens succeeded to deduce the law of conservation of the quantity mv
2

(labeled vis viva by Leibniz in 1695), later—kinetic energy, in the elastic collisions.
Huygens’ results regarding description of physical reality by different observers, as he

introduced in his work, and his method of application of the relativity principle in

mechanics, were ahead of his time to be interpreted in their full meaning. Only much later,

they were appreciated as masterpieces of the classical mechanics (Mach 1893/1989).

As a rationalist philosopher rather than a modern physicist Descartes kept with his

principles no matter what the reality showed to him. This strategy may serve as an example

of great educational value. The excurse allowed high school students and physics teachers

to follow the arguments of Descartes, who consistently applied rational reasoning keeping

with the stated by him principles. It appeared that this feature by itself, although very

important in science, is not sufficient to produce valuable knowledge. The need of con-

tinuous inductive-deductive cycle including experiment with controlled parameters was

revealed. In it, theoretical reasoning and experimentation are interwoven, and this was

missed in Descartes’ method.

Reflecting the central ideas of Descartes regarding motion and collisions, we distin-

guished between the ontological and epistemological claims, analyzed them and showed

which of their features passed the test of time and which of them—did not, what exactly

was wrong and for what reason. The idea was to show that some claims of Descartes were

refuted (moved to the periphery), yet there were important accomplishments which con-

tributed and promoted the classical mechanics (its nucleus and body). Table 1 juxtaposes

both. This separation encourages students’ active comparison between the knowledge

claims—our pedagogical strategy in using HPS. This analysis matched high school cur-

riculum at conceptual and formal levels.

Furthermore, through considering the diachronic dialogue regarding collisions the

teacher may demonstrate the important feature of the scientific enterprise. In fact, the

Table 1 Elements of knowledge introduced by Descartes and considered in the module

Remained adopted Later rejected

Ontology Ontology

The law of inertia (Descartes’ first and second laws,
combined and modified)

Motion and rest are natural states (do not require
causal explanation for preservation)

Uniform motion is a state not a process (rejection of
Aristotelian and impetus based understanding)

The idea of motion [momentum] conservation
(upgraded to be vector quantity)

The idea of the centrifugal force (tendency, conatus)
(Developed by Huygens, reconsidered by Newton)

The first rule of collision: Two identical hard bodies
colliding with equal speeds separate with the same
speeds after collision (understood as velocity
reverse)

The law of interaction (Descartes third law)
Rest—motion opposition. Rest and motion as

absolute concepts. Addressing motion without
reference frame (body) (Violation of Galileo’s
relativity)

Motion as a scalar independent of direction, inability
of decomposition

Holistic description of projectile motion (without
decomposition on vertical and horizontal)

Non-symmetrical interaction (unequal forces)
between bodies; ‘‘overcoming’’ of one body over
the other (Violation of Newton’s third law)

Rules of collisions (6 out of 7, except the first)

Epistemology Epistemology

Physical theory as a hierarchical, reductionist system
(basic laws and definitions following by their
applications)

Validity of mechanism in the conceptual explanation
(for applications of fundamentals of the theory)

Neglecting empirical verification of theoretical
statements, rejecting control experiment

Neglecting hypothetico-deductive cycle in scientific
research

Metaphysical reasoning in physics arguments

1296 I. Galili

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researchers (Wren, Wallis, Huygens and Newton) did not simply start their studies ‘‘from

the question’’ (as sometimes stated in presenting scientific method) but rather with learning

the subject matter, the results and ideas of others whose work preceded to their own

inquiry. In a sense, each new researcher joined the debate in the community discourse of

scholars.

All together, the excurse provides students with a chance to familiarize the great debate

from the foundation of the classical mechanics and grasp the principles of this great

physical theory. Grimellini-Tomasini et al. (1993), who investigated pertinent students’

conceptions of collisions, provided education relevancy to the considered materials—the

treatment of collisions—by describing students’ ideas and their difficulties (also, Sason

2005).

Furthermore, by displaying the historical introduction of the kinetic-energy conserva-

tion drawing on the inversion of relative velocities between the elastically colliding bodies

the excurse, in fact, suggested a new approach to teaching energy in physics class. This

idea also touches on the curricular question whether momentum or energy to teach first.
8

This module may support addressing a very passionate historical discourse on the account

for motion in the context of collisions (e.g., Smith 2006). Momentum and kinetic energy

both were involved in the same discourse.

3.3 Module 2. The Pre-Newtonian Theory of Motion

This module also addressed the high school students and physics teachers. It deals with the

account of motion—the major content of mechanics. Seeking the ‘‘big’’ picture of the

subject, the excurse addresses the ontological discourse regarding the nature of motion

(Clagett 1959; Crombie 1959; Gliozzi 1965; Koyre 1968; Pedersen and Phil 1974; Grant

1996; Drake 1999).

The text identifies three major steps in the conceptual understanding of motion during

which the correspondent contents of the nucleus changed. Table 2 presents them as they

were in the theory of Aristotle (Hellenic period), the theory of impetus (Hellenistic and

medieval periods), and the classical mechanics (in the seventeenth century). The module

illustrated these contents by quoting from the originals by Descartes (1644/1983), Galilei

(1638/1914), Newton (1687/1999) and other scholars.

Table 2 Ontological development in the nucleus of the theory of motion (summary)

(Galileo, Descartes, 
Newton) 

Buridan, Oresme) 

Rest is a state; motion is a process 

Natural motion – 
spontaneous, without 
agent 

Violent motion – due to 
the force exerted by the 
external mover

Violent motion – due to the 
internal mover – impetus 
("force of motion") 

Natural motion – due to 
the gravity producing 
impetus

Motion (rectilinear and 
uniform) is a state

Motion (rectilinear and 
uniform) is equivalent to 
the rest (relativity 
principle) 

Hellenic science 

(Hipparchus, Philoponus, (Aristotle)

Classical mechanics 

Change of motion is due 
to the external force 

Medieval science

8
See, for example, the debate in PHYSLRNR electronic forum—Physics Learning Research List, on May

2011.

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1297

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In parallel to the ontological claims regarding motion, we addressed the epistemological

development in the science of motion from Aristotle to Newton. Table 3 presents these

changes in the nucleus of the theory of mechanics. These epistemological aspects facili-

tated the adequate understanding of the status of the ontological views at the correspondent

times. The validity of epistemology often remained in shade when the consumer is focused

on applications and remains unfamiliar with the fundamental presuppositions that allowed

such application.

By making explicit the changes of both types, the excurse makes possible to illustrate

and discuss the nature of the progress in the scientific knowledge, continuous, yet, not a

simple accretion. The community of scholars kept a constructive diachronic dialogue,

discussing the same subject, introducing new concepts and modifying the old ones, often in

the same contexts. This process was illustrated in presenting the contributions of Galileo,

Descartes and Newton.

The excurse dismisses the frequent neglect of the mediaeval science (the ‘‘Dark Ages’’)

by demonstrating significant accomplishments in the theory of motion which essentially

facilitated the achievements of the later scholars.
9

Many of such achievements are relevant

to school curriculum: invention of pendulum, method of virtual displacements, kinematic

relativity (the precursor of the dynamic relativity of Galileo), the precise characteristics of

motion—velocity and acceleration (instant and averaged), classification of motion (uni-

form and uniformly accelerated types) and its accounts: graphical representation of motion,

mean speed theorem, calculation of distances, thought experiment of falling bodies, and

others. Many of them are traditionally attributed by physics teachers and textbooks to

Galileo who in fact adopted them from the previous scholars such as Buridan, Oresme,

Bradwardine, Swineshead, Heytesbury, Benedetti (e.g., Pedersen and Phil 1974; Hannam

2009). These contents, besides contributing to the disciplinary learning, may surprise and

cause cultural enrichment. However, the major impact of the applied excurse is expected in

the improving of understanding of the basic concepts of the theory of classical mechanics

(Tables 2, 3), easily missed in a strictly disciplinary instruction applying these concepts.

Table 3 Epistemological development in the nucleus of the theory of motion (summary)

Hypotetico-deductive 
cycle  

Reasoning by principles, 
logic and authority 

Nominal and operational 
concept definitions  

Introduction of 
controlled variable 
experiment  

Invention of formal tools for 
conceptual and mathematical 
accounts of motion  

Logical analysis 
seeking for the causes 
of natural phenomena 

Classical mechanicsMedieval scienceHellenic science 

Establishing basic 
principles 
(experience based)  

Contemplation of nature 
seeking law like 
regularities

Theological metaphysics 
(creator and designer of 
the world)

Combining rational and 
empirical approaches in a 
research cycle 

Hierarchical reductionist 
theory for a certain 
domain of reality  

Logical analysis based 
on the principles and 
rules (resolution and 
composition)  

9
Lacking background in the history of science, science teachers are often ignorant regarding the cultural

legacy of the medieval scholars. Pejorative attitude to the medieval science is often behind the claims
‘‘Galileo was the first scientist’’ and ‘‘the church impeded science’’.

1298 I. Galili

123



The relevancy of the pre-Newtonian views of motion (Type II knowledge of the

periphery) for teaching mechanics was demonstrated in numerous researches which

revealed high school students’ misconceptions similarity to the historical conceptions:

force-motion relationship (‘‘motion implies force’’), impetus like views, etc. (e.g., Viennot

1979; Whitaker 1983; McCloskey 1983a, b; Halloun and Hestenes 1985; Galili and Bar

1992). Science educators may take an advantage of this similarity of onto- and phylogenies

even without stating exact recapitulation. In particular, the excurse displayed the argu-

ments by which the erroneous views of motion were refuted in the later progress. They

could be used again, this time to overcome students’ erroneous conceptions.

Furthermore, seeking the empirical refutation of impetus the excurse suggested an

original activity, which by modern means (electrical or magnetic field that counterbalance

the gravitational force at the highest point of an object thrown upwards) can distinguish

between the predictions drawn on the impetus theory and those made by using Newtonian

views. This activity, either as a real or thought experiment, is especially important since

many situations in the regular experience could be reasonably well explained by means of

impetus which thus prevails in the naive knowledge.

3.4 Module 3. The Story of Optical Image

This excurse elaborated the genesis of physics knowledge regarding optical image and

vision. The subject is usually studied at the beginning of high school. The history of optical

image started with the period when several theories tried to account for optical image—

classical Greece. Some of the conceptions introduced then coexisted for years, remaining a

subject of a continuous conceptual discourse (Conford 1937; Ronchi 1970, 1991; Pedersen

and Phil 1974; Lindberg 1976; Russo 1996; Park 1997). The excurse followed the evo-

lution of understanding from the Hellenic theories (Pythagorean active vision, Atomists’

eidola, Plato’s hybrid understanding, and Aristotle’s transmission by means of the med-

ium), to the Hellenistic theory of Euclidean rays of vision, and the medieval ray theory by

Ibn al-Haytham (11th c). These theories of Type II history preceded to the theory of Kepler

(17th c), currently taught at schools as Geometrical Optics. In parallel, the history of light

ray—the central optical concept employed to account for vision and light—was traced. In

its course, the status of ray changed from the effective cause of vision, in the Hellenistic

and Medieval physics, to a mere descriptive tool, in the Keplerian geometrical and Huy-

gens’ wave theories of light.

The important conceptual debate took place between the intromission and extramission

theories of vision, during more than 1,500 years, until the extramission theory was refuted

by Ibn al-Haytham in the eleventh century. His own theory served, however, as an

intermediate stage before Kepler’s account within the theory termed—Geometrical optics,

for the intensive geometrical procedures used to represent image formation (Table 4;

Fig. 7).

Table 4 Ontological changes in the intromission theory of optical image

Holistic eidolon (Atomists) or 
medium perturbation (Aristotle) 
transfers from the object into the 
eye of the observer  

Points of an object are 
mapped to the points of 
the image by single rays
of light (Ibn al-Haytham) 

Points of an object are 
mapped to the pints of 
the image by light fluxes
(Kepler)

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1299

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Addressing optical image in the module utilized art representations of image transfer

and its transformation in a plane mirror. This approach was discussed previously (Galili

and Zinn 2007).

The relevance of these contents for physics education was demonstrated by several

researches that reported and analyzed misconceptions students held regarding vision and

optical image (e.g. Guesne 1985; Rice and Feher 1987; Bendall et al. 1993; Langley et al.

1997; Galili and Hazan 2000a, b). The schemes of knowledge that students hold regarding

optical image show certain similarity to the conceptions of scientists in the past. Thus, prior

to instruction, students often show holistic understanding of optical image creation and

transfer through space (similar to Atomists), whereas novice learners of optics often show

misconception which corresponds to the image transfer by means of a single ray per image

point (similar Ibn al-Haytham’s account for vision). It was checked that addressing the old

theories of vision in instruction (Type II knowledge of the periphery), that is to say,

applying cultural curriculum, had significant remedial effect on students’ misconceptions

(Galili and Hazan 2000b).

This excurse possesses an important additional potential. Exposure of the conceptual

development of the scientific knowledge regarding optical image touches on the nature of

science with respect to its usual identification as a ‘‘sub-culture of the Western culture’’

(e.g., Aikenhead 1997; Aikenhead and Jegede 1999). The excurse shows that after the first

steps in Hellenic and Hellenistic societies, scientists of non Western societies of Muslim

countries significantly contributed to the optical knowledge and even led the scientific

research in the early Middle Ages (Al-Kindi and Ibn al-Haytham). This educational

innovation was possible due to the cultural appeal to the periphery and presents a special

modification of school curriculum. The latter is prevailed by images of the Western culture

(no scientists from any other place), as if only they contributed to the contemporary science

that changed through time. At schools we continue to promote the old image of science.

 
O I

(Atomists)

(Ibn al-Haytham)

(Kepler)

Fig. 7 Transformation of the conception of optical image transfer (corresponds to Table 4). The
mechanism of image transfer of Aristotle’s—a perturbation of the medium transferring the impression of the
object into the eye—was skipped here although it belongs to the intromission conceptions too. It was
different from Atomists’ conception: moving through space eidolon enters the eye. In the big debate
between intro-mission and extra-mission conceptions of vision (Lindberg 1976) Atomists and Aristotle
stood, however, on the same side

1300 I. Galili

123



In this regard, this excurse may suggest another option—to identify the special status of

science as a culture close to Popper’s concept of the third world (Popper 1972, 1978).
Within this view, science presents a universal type of culture which belongs and charac-

terizes all people regardless their cultural identification. Being a universal culture it is

easier to be adopted, appreciated and genuinely supported by the great variety of learners

across the world.

3.5 Module 4. The Story of Weight and the Gravitational Force: Marriage and Divorce

The excurse to the history of weight concept was prepared for high school students and

physics teachers. It goes across the whole history of physics from its dawn to the modern

period. In this big span, one may identify three periods of weight conceptualization

(Fig. 8):
10

1. Weight is the faculty causing the body to be heavy and fall;

2. Weight is the gravitational force acting on the body and different from its mass, and;

3. Weight is the result of (standard) weighing of the body, that is, the force that the body

exerts on the measuring apparatus. Weight is distinguished from the gravitational

force.

One observes here that the definition of weight changed through the history showing

complexity of the concept and the subtleness of the subject matter involved. It is these

historical changes that create the required space of learning (Marton et al. 2004) to be used
in the instruction. Comparison between different interpretations of the same concept—

weight—presents educational advantage of this historical excurse. While following the

genesis of this concept and the parallel changes of the related epistemology the learner

reveals the full picture of physics knowledge which makes his/her knowledge meaningful.

The excurse follows the history from the pre-Newtonian holistic understanding

addressing a whole cluster of features related to an object, which one may express today as

mass-gravity-matter (the medieval notion of ‘‘pondus’’ could be also informative), to the

Newtonian invention of the gravitation—the attraction force between each two material

bodies and his identification of this force with weight (the gravitational definition of
weight). Newton stripped weight from other qualities previously affiliated to weight, and

first of all, from the inertial mass as he defined it. The story ultimately arrives to the

modern physics and the new split, this time it was between the gravitational force and

weight (by the new operational definition of weight). This step drew on the recently
adopted in physics principle of equivalence of Einstein (Reichenbach 1927/1958).

Newton 
1687  

Gravity, 
weight, 
mass  

Gravitation force, 
Weight force

Inertial Mass 

Einstein 1916 
Reichenbach 1927 

Gravitation force

Weight force

Inertial Mass 

Fig. 8 Conceptual evolution of
the weight in physics history

10
We skip here on the important development of weight concept during the Middle Ages.

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1301

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All together the conceptual evolution presented in Fig. 8, looks as sequential removing the

conceptual degeneracy that took place along the progress in physics knowledge.

The excurse refines this evolution and informs the learner about the ontological and

epistemological changes that caused variation of weight definition. Weight in modern

physics was reinterpreted due to the cardinal change in the epistemology of physics at the

end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries—the introduction of the

positivistic philosophy. Within this vision, Mach performed revision of the classical

mechanics and operationally defined mass (Mach 1893/1989). He, however, ignored the
concept of weight (the subject which required the principle of equivalence that he did not

possess).

Weight was treated later, after introduction of the Theory of General Relativity by

Albert Einstein. Hans Reichenbach (1927) did that while applying the new approach

consolidated in the philosophy of science. Starting from positivism of Mach it arrived to

operationalism defined by Percy Bridgman (1927)—a distinguished physicist who entered
the epistemological discourse of science. His claim was that the operational definition (and

only such) determines the meaning of any physical concept by means of a unique mea-

surement. The contemporary philosophy of science established later a more balanced

requirement: to be well defined any physical concept should be provided with two defi-

nitions: theoretical (nominal) and operational (epistemic) (Margenau 1950). This per-

spective establishes a special value of the excurse to the history of weight: it demonstrates

the norm of concept definition in physics and also discharges the myth of teaching physics

‘‘without philosophy’’ (Tseitlin and Galili 2006). The historical account of weight displays

and protrudes the ubiquitous importance of epistemology in science.

As seen, the issue is not new, neither for physics, nor for philosophy. However, in

science education, a system with huge inertia, the transition to the operational definition of

weight proceeds very slowly and has not yet accomplished despite of the wide spread

confusion of students/teachers and the importance of conceptual clarification by means of

concept definitions in physics instruction (Galili 2001; Galili and Lehavi 2006; Leong and

Chin 2009). In light of this situation, the excurse to the history of weight may not only well

illustrate the role of the philosophy of science in education, as depicted by the semiotic

triangle (Fig. 3b), but also lead to a conceptual change in many physics curricula. A special

educational feature of this discourse is that it is still continuing. One may observe a split

between the textbooks, that is to say, between those authors who keep with the Newtonian

definition (e.g., Young and Freedman 2004)—the majority in the US, for instance, versus

those, also in the same country, who define weight operationally (e.g., Orear 1961; Marion

and Hornyack 1982; Keller et al. 1993; Halliday et al. 2000). The beneficial way to clarify

the concept seems to present it in a cultural way: in its historical genesis. Such presen-

tation, together with analysis and discussion may lead to the conceptual learning and

necessary change in physics education.

The relevancy of the subject to physics pedagogy was reported in several studies. The

common confusion of students regarding weight and gravitational force (beyond the

confusion of weight and mass) can be traced to the instruction in accordance with the

Newtonian definition of weight (e.g., Galili and Kaplan 1996). In a way, education reca-

pitulates the history of physics following the same path of development: from the pre-

Newtonian all-inclusive concept of mass-gravity-weight at students of earlier ages (Galili

and Bar 1997) to the Newtonian gravitational understanding of weight as the gravitational

force exerted on the body, but not its mass (Galili and Kaplan 1996), and finally to the

distinguishing among weight, mass and the gravitational force as three different concepts

(Stein et al. 2009). Teaching the operationally defined weight is simple enough to be taught

1302 I. Galili

123



already at the level of junior high school and its incorporation provides remedy to prevent

the weight misconceptions (ibid.). Also, teaching by means of a historical excurse to the

history of weight will further enhance the impact by providing wider perspective on the

method of physics and worldview of science making students’ knowledge more mature,

valid and reliable.

3.6 Module 5. The Story of Inertial Force

This excurse is special by the fact that its subject matter deals with the topic which is

traditionally problematic even to mention in physics curriculum at schools—inertia and
inertial forces. The module addresses mainly the population of physics teachers of high
schools who usually face these concepts in their naı̈ve form in students’ ideas. School

curriculum usually ignores this subject and address close, but not the same: inertial mass.
Inertia is reduced solely to inertial mass, making the rest of students’ ideas—miscon-
ceptions. High school students are expected to administer physics descriptions without

inertial forces. While in physics class at school inertial force is a misconception, it is
widely used in the everyday life and practically by all textbooks in engineering—the

situation that is hardly acceptable by any reasonable educator.

Although the notion of inertia was introduced by Kepler only in the seventeenth century
its roots go back to the medieval science. The seeds of inertia could be recognized in the

concepts of impetus and gravity. Mach (1893), who by the end of the nineteenth century

revised mechanics trying to purify its concepts by putting them on the empirical bases,

ignored inertial forces. This was not occasional, of course, and perhaps shared the reason

with the contemporary curriculum designers who ignore those forces too—these forces are

considered ‘‘fictitious’’, not real, actually not required by an inertial observer—the only

legitimate observer in the classical physics of the nineteenth century. Much changed in

physics since then.

The required clarification of the subject may come through examination of the rich

history of inertia concept that we made using the originals (Kepler 1618; Galilei 1613,

1632, 1638; Descartes 1644, 1976; Huygens 1659; Newton 1687; Euler 1736; D’Alembert

1758; Einstein and Infeld 1938) and the secondary resources by scientists and historians

(Lagrange 1783; Sommerfeld 1952; Drabkin and Drake 1960; Drake 1964; Jammer 1961;

Cohen 1971). The excurse reconstructs the diachronic discourse of scholars regarding

inertia and inertial forces which could be visualized by the representation which keeps with

the idea of nucleus-periphery structure of a physical theory (Fig. 9).

The unfolding story starts from Kepler’s breaking with separation between the heavens

and sub-lunar world. Inertia for him was the faculty of resistance to motion of the
weightless planets (celestial objects), much like weight for Aristotle in the violent motion

of terrestrial objects. From there, the excurse proceeded through the indifference to motion
of Galileo and rejection of any force related to motion by Descartes to vis inertia of
Newton who radically modified Keplerian inertia to the force acting on the body during

any change of its motion, in proportion to the rate of that change (Cohen 1971; Galili and

Tseitlin 2003).

The excurse discusses the outstanding contribution of Christian Huygens who prior to

Newton introduced his vis centrifuga. The special status of the latter was too novel at his

time—the account of reality from the point of view of the person on a spinning wheel. This

perspective was not understood until Einstein’s epistemological revolution which legiti-

mized the account of reality by any observer. Why this great delay in recognition? Was it

because the approach of several observers applied by Huygens was not elaborated by him

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within any new philosophical framework (Huygens did not distinguish between inertial and
non-inertial observers) and therefore was abandoned for about 200 years by his fellow

scholars who shared the Newtonian worldview. Such question emerged in this excurse

emphasized the fundamental importance of philosophical framework in physics.

Following this history, one reveals that the notion of ‘‘fictitious force’’ appeared with

regard to the d’Alembert force in the eighteenth century. The force was considered to be no
more than a mathematical trick, ‘‘not really a force’’ quite in agreement with the New-

tonian paradigm of interactive nature of forces. The situation changed only in the twentieth
century, when the idea of description of reality by various observes, or in other words, in

different frames of reference, entered to the modern physics. The epistemological progress

was articulated by Bridgman (1927), and it legitimized inertial forces within the opera-
tional framework of physical concepts. However, as often happens, the name fictitious
remained causing great confusion regarding the ‘‘reality’’ of such forces.

The diachronic conceptual discourse (Fig. 9) on the inertial force was suggested as a

mediating concept for meaningful learning about inertia. It illustrated the non-linear nature

of knowledge accumulation regarding certain concept in scientific progress, far from being

simple or ‘‘Wiggish’’—a sequential replacement. Instead, the presented debate revealed

complementary contributions within various worldviews and epistemologies that con-

structed the present understanding of inertial forces.

The high relevance of inertial forces for physics course was established in several

studies on high school students’ conceptions (e.g., Gardner 1981, 1984; Galili and Kaplan

2002). The finding that weak and strong students equally often employ inertial forces

regardless the instruction was indicative. Students frequently use them to account for

various physical situations. In accordance with the dictum of educational constructivism,

It is a resistant 
pull of medium 

It is a fictitious force of reaction 

Inertial force is the 
internal force 

preserving the state 
of motion or res

Gravity and inertia 
are indistinguishable  

It is a feature of a 
material body 

Inertia is laziness 
of material bodies 

It is an illusion of force 
due to the conservation 

of motion 

It is impetus that 
keeps the body in 

motion

It is a force similar 
to gravity

Fig. 9 Representation of conceptual evolution of the inertial force in a diachronic discourse on the subject
of inertial motion and inertia

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this extreme popularity obliges teachers to address inertial forces in their instruction, not

merely dismiss them as erroneous. In fact, the legitimacy of inertial forces is warranted by

the operational definition of force adopted in modern physics as well as in modern ped-

agogy of physics (Arons 1990; Reif 1995).

The major complexity of the subject is, however, due to the strong linkage existing

between inertial forces and the issue of multiple observers as adopted by modern physics

for more than a 100 years but remains outside of regular school curriculum. The frame-

work of multiple observers, by transgressing the description of the world soley by inertial

observers, matches the modern cultural perspective.

4 Teachers’ Perception of the Developed Materials

As already mentioned, the developed materials mainly addressed physics teachers and

hence, their perception of the developed modules was of central importance for us,

especially in light of the novel character of the cultural approach. Within the activities of

our group in the project, teachers participated in three national meetings and several

workshops. Several findings in this regard were especially important to determine the final

form of the developed materials.

Firstly, we were reminded that the major difficulty of using the HPS-based materials in

actual teaching is due to the fact that teacher training programs, as well as disciplinary

programs at physics departments of universities, do not require courses in the history and/

or philosophy of science. Therefore, practicing teachers normally lack background

knowledge and hold strong naı̈ve views of the subject of HPS. This implied that the

meaningful cooperation with teachers had to start after the first version of the materials was

constructed and teachers were invited to react, comment and ask questions facing concrete

products. This interaction took place at the national meetings and workshops. The collected

by us reflections were used in the subsequent revision of the modules.

Teachers wrote to us:
11

There is no tradition of teaching physics with such materials…. They require deep understanding… I
will have to learn much first by myself before to bring them to the class to ignite my students. I am
still not there.

Yet, at the same time:

But they [the materials] are very much relevant, interesting, provides meaning. They are interesting
to hear, they bring ‘‘taste’’ to the class instruction. They are refreshing and opening your mind,
provide a big picture of how people arrived to the theories, how it happened from the thoughts of
more than one person. We want our students to think in big [wide perspective], not only solve
problems. This is also more interesting and in fact there is no other way to produce future scientists.

Secondly, many teachers expressed concern about the lack of time for ‘‘extra materials’’

in the already dense and crowded physics curriculum. Indeed, high school instruction in

our country is currently oriented to the matriculate examination requiring solving standard

problems rather than expressing theoretical disciplinary knowledge and knowledge of the

history or philosophy of physics. This fact brought the question of whether the knowledge

of the HPS is relevant for the success at the final test students have to pass. Teachers said:

The major problem is lacking time. In the framework of high school physics course there is no place
to stop and spend more time for discussion on any topic. We need to run and mainly focus on the

11
All the quotations were translated by us from Hebrew.

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material that will be tested. It is a pity, but perhaps one can infuse some drops of these materials at
relevant points…

In accordance to this view, our decision was to focus on the concepts of central

importance in the curriculum and, in a sense, adopt our materials to such pragmatic

consideration.

A special concern was mentioned with regard to presenting historical materials:

Presenting these materials may increase the direct teaching [lecturing] and reduce the time reserved
for individual solving problems and personal creativity. There is a need to find a balance in teaching
between listening the story and student activity, otherwise the most interesting stories may again
become boring after some time.

Regarding the cultural structure and addressing several theories in their account of the

same subject, we received the following reflection:

I liked very much the structure and the idea that different theories have different nuclei, and they
‘‘maintain’’ cultural discourse. Indeed, culture comes [in Hebrew] from ‘‘numerous’’. … I liked to see
how different theories were connected. For instance, it was about reproduction of light ray by
superposition of light waves [Fresnel zones treatment of light expansion].

Some teachers were skeptical and suspicious when they found materials not familiar to

them in the subject matter, those addressing wrong theories and conceptions from the past

(Type-II knowledge). The concern was that such alternative ideas often look rather rea-

sonable and not obvious for refutation. Therefore, teachers thought, such theories could

confuse students, and the teachers may face the problems that they created for themselves.

In response to this concern, we displayed the results of physics education research that

demonstrated students’ misconceptions similar to the historical conceptions and outlined

the idea of knowledge recapitulation in the evolution of scientific knowledge (e.g., Piaget

1968; Galili and Hazan 2000b). It was understood, then, that whether or not the teacher

addressed certain ‘‘wrong knowledge’’, the mind of students was already ‘‘contaminated’’

with many wrong ideas, some very similar to those in the history of science, spontaneously

produced by the learner in his/her account of reality. This information softened the

resistance and replaced it with pragmatic interest and curiosity regarding the ways by

which scientists refuted those plausible but incorrect conceptions. Thus, with regard to the

mentioned problem of optical image one teacher stated:

The image in Camera Obscura can be very useful in explanation of optical image, using the paradox
[mentioned by Aristotle and solved by Ibn al-Haytham] of transfiguration of the observed image
depending on the size of the opening [of the camera].

Despite of the lack of background, teachers showed a special interest to the philosophy

of science. One teacher wrote:

Philosophy displays the reasons for all [materials] we teach, the way people thought and produced
claims, made inferences. … Without learning philosophy physics [knowledge] is similar to the
revelation of commandments given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai. [There were immediate
problems of acceptance and lack of understanding among the people of Israel who had to adopt the
codex without any reasoning]

Similar appreciation of the philosophy of science was observed in teachers reflecting to

the argumentation in favor of the operational definition of weight and its separation from

the gravitational force. Dealing with the philosophical requirement of operationalism

teachers raised the question why Newton did not see the problem. In a vivid discussion the

teachers revealed to themselves the epistemological differences between Newtonian and

contemporary physics: the unique observer of Newton versus multiple observers in

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contemporary physics. The standard declaration that physics knowledge changes with time

was refined drawing on this concrete example.

All together, the teachers sympathized to the cultural approach. One teacher

summarized:

I liked to know how different were solutions suggested by philosophers [to the same problem or
question] until scientists arrived to the present understanding.

Another teacher wrote:

Much thanks for the great intellectual pleasure this special workshop caused to me.

5 Discussion

In presenting the modules we have already addressed various content specific aspects

which are on discussion in physics education research. Here we add few points of sum-

marizing character related to the historical excurse, the product of our activity in the
project. One may realize that these points are very much interwoven. Yet, they deserve

mentioning as separate points.

5.1 Making Science

We may start with mentioning that the genre of historical excurse revealed special

advantage in demonstrating the nature of science as a product of intellectual activity, a

special culture and a way of knowledge construction. Familiarizing with historical excurses

one may, for example, refine a rather misleading claim that scientific inquiry ‘‘begins with

a question’’. Our excurses testify that scientific inquiry of scientists rather starts from

learning by an individual the previous discourse, the accumulated scientific knowledge on

the subject considered. As it is very well known to the practitioners, people do not

spontaneously produce research questions. Similarly, scientists did not spontaneously

possess skills of scientific inquiry when they face a problem to solve. In a way, making

science is not straightforward common sense applications (Cromer 1993; Wolpert 1994).

In order to pose a scientifically meaningful question and further explore it in a scientific
research—confirm and refine, or refute and replace—one needs to be introduced into

specific discourse (related views and ideas) regarding the considered subject. Research

questions are usually inherited and/or constructed in the course of inquiry. The National
Science Education Standards (NRC 1996) put this important claim of the complex nature
of science in the following form:

Inquiry is a multifaceted activity that involves making observations; posing questions; examining
books and other sources of information to see what is already known; planning investigations;
reviewing what is already known in light of experimental evidence; using tools to gather, analyze,
and interpret data; proposing answers, explanations, and predictions; and communicating the results.
(emphasis added)

Historical excurse presents a sequence of events and studies, and reveals to the learner

the narrative of a certain inquiry. Familiarity with the big picture is essential, for it enables

the learner, as well as the researcher, to ask relevant questions. Historical excurse displays
a diachronic discourse on the particular topic performed by different people in different

times and by means of various methods. In a way, excurse may unfold several scientific
research programs (Lakatos 1970) applied to the same question. Thus, for instance, Ibn al-
Haytham thoroughly learned the heritage of Greek and Hellenistic scientists before he

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could question and investigate light, vision and image creation (Module 3). He answered

the same questions which bothered other scholars and addressed their claims to be scru-
tinized and debated. The progress in science is, thus, a continuing ascending construction
of spiral nature: returning back to the same subject at different levels, rather than localized
independent projects of questions–answers as often presented in introductory physics

courses and studies.

Considering history of physics in a sufficiently wide scope, one may learn to appreciate

the features of cyclicity and continuity, combined and preserved in science development,

hermeneutic in nature. The complexity of this process manifests itself in the continuous

back and force interaction between theory and experimentation: the repeating inductive-

deductive cycle, introduced by Aristotle in its initial form: observation-explanation,

replaced in more modern science by the repeating hypothesis-experiment framework (e.g.,

Losee 1993). The best way to show the importance of this aspect of scientific activity is to

show what happens when one neglects it. We showed that in Module 1, discussing Des-

cartes’ theory of motion and collisions.

5.2 Cumulative Nature

Closely related another benefit of historical excurses is their demonstration of the cumu-
lative nature of physics knowledge and continuity of the scientific progress. The contro-
versy of this view may be traced to Kuhn’s (1970) thesis of science history as comprised of

periods of incommensurable paradigms (or the parallel claim in humanities by Foucault

(1970) of periods of different cultural epistemes). Indeed, replacement of one theory with

another (an incommensurable nucleus, new concepts and frames of thought) may be

interpreted as a break in continuity of science. This view is, however, partial and ignores

the whole picture. Cultural approach demonstrates the idea of continuity by leaving no

nucleus isolated. The rival ideas and conceptions are not deleted in the physics history

(collective mind) as well as in physics teaching (in the suggested pedagogy), but placed in

the periphery representing as if preserving dialogue with the nucleus. Despite of the

different epistemologies and worldviews, a virtual diachronic discourse on various aspects

of the subject matter continued. This image of scientific knowledge creates a big picture

showing knowledge accumulation, which yet does not imply simple addition, but inte-
gration of ideas and data on the subject of concern.

Such was the way of knowledge about motion, developed through the whole history of

physics. Modules 1 and 2 together described this process across the time segment of

2,000 years. In it, Philoponus and Buridan, in a way, debated with Aristotle; Descartes—

with medieval scholars and Galileo, and Newton—with Aristotle, Buridan, Galileo,

Kepler, Descartes and Huygens. Similar discourse took place over the concept of optical

image (Module 3), the concept of weight (Module 4) and the concept of inertial force

(Module 5). They all demonstrate the possibility of scientists to proceed with the same

research subject, adopt the knowledge from the past and tackle it again and again, arguing

by alternative interpretations, methods and tools.

In fact, scientists never forgot their dependence on the previous accomplishments and

warned the novices against simplification of the new achievements as discoveries ex

nihilio, in isolation from the previous scientific products. For instance, in the interview

with the New York Times, in April 1921, Einstein said (Jammer 1999):

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There has been a false opinion widely spread among the general public that the theory of relativity is
taken as differing radically from the previous developments in physics from the time of Galileo and
Newton, that it is violently opposed to their deductions. The contrary is true. Without the discoveries
of every one of the great men of physics, those who laid down preceding laws, relativity would have
been impossible to conceive, and there would have been no basis for it. Psychologically it is
impossible to come to such a theory at once, without the work which must be done before.

This and other confessions of scientists may place to the correct context certain inter-

pretations of science progress which might create an impression of discontinuity of

‘‘science in action’’ (e.g. Latour 1987). Other scholars may describe debate over scientific

issues and/or in a particular period and setting—a historical case (e.g., Shapin and Schaffer

1985). Such descriptions of the scientific enterprise may be locally valid and sociologically

informative, but they cannot be but secondary for one who reconstructs what happened in

the particular scientific content discourse in a wider scope and longer run (thus, scholars

debated plenum versus vacuum not only in Britain of the seventeenth century). This order

of things was illuminated in our excurses with regard to several physical concepts. Their

goal was to elaborate the perspective of continuing progress for the purpose of learning and

teaching physics at schools.
12

Exposed solely to the disciplinary formalism and lacking CCK of the subject, students

may remain unaware of the conceptual scientific tradition. Therefore, they cannot but
become the teachers who keep strictly with the ‘‘correct’’ disciplinary curriculum and

neglect any background of its claims. Regardless their opposite and sincere intentions—

this is indoctrination of knowledge. Naturally, their students, in mass, will do the same.

This reality presents a vicious circle of cultural ignorance.
13

Providing teachers with CCK

regarding central issues of physics may break the circle and change this unfortunate reality

in science education.

5.3 Objectiveness of Science

The next to mention benefit of historical excurse is promotion of understanding science as

a human construction of objective knowledge about Nature (AAAS 1993). On our days, it
became common, in science education in particular, to emphasize the opposite—the

‘‘subjective nature of science’’. The adherents of this view argue by the fact that individuals
are biased and reflect in their knowledge specific social environments, personal back-

ground, worldviews, imagination, etc., which thus introduce subjectivity into the their

scientific products. Others might mean by ‘‘subject’’ the whole community of researchers.

Therefore, subjective actually means for them human made. The latter is, however, not the
original meaning of subjective in the philosophy of science, representing individual, idi-

osyncratic knowledge, depending on personal perceptions and conceptions.

It may appear as a claim: ‘‘Science has a subjective element’’, which seemingly
addresses certain features of the form of scientific articles. Indeed, considering our mod-
ules, one may point to the fact that Descartes’ theory of motion reflected his strong

personal religious beliefs (Module 1) and similarly, Newton’s worldview, also deeply

religious and individual, penetrated into his concept of inertial force (Module 5). If, then,

one remains silent about the objectiveness of the science content on the first place,

12
In the history of science, the assertion of continuity of the scientific knowledge was stated not once by

Sarton (1947), Grant (1996), Bala (2006), Hannam (2009) and others.
13

For the marvellous visualized image of such see M.C. Esher’s Ascending and Descending (1960).

Promotion of the Cultural Content Knowledge 1309

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the claim of subjective elements easily becomes: ‘‘Scientific knowledge is subjective’’.14

This claim places science in the same category with magic, astrology, religion (miracles),

politics and personal interpretations, which presents a serious drawback in science edu-

cation. To prevent this distortion of replacement of the essential with accompanying, the

HPS based materials should take a wider scope that reveals, for example, that the men-

tioned subjective features of form did not remain in the scientific theories. The subjective

features were abandoned in the following discourse of the scientific community and in no

way appear in our wide use of the classical mechanics.

The presented excurses, by their comparative and wide temporal perspective on the

scientific discourse, allow the learner to argue for the objectivity of scientific knowledge.

The learners observe consolidation of the collective knowledge of the science community
that goes through purification and modification in a long run, through debate of individuals

holding different ideas and frameworks of thought, becoming more and more adequate to

the features of the world outside. Thus, the resultant knowledge of classical mechanics
enabled great technological achievements—a reliable test of objectivity: people walked on

the Moon regardless various individual details in the knowledge of the people who created

the knowledge required for such enterprise.

At the same time, different scientific theories vary in their areas of validity. For

example, Classical mechanics is essentially different from Quantum mechanics. Related by
the principle of correspondence (Fig. 2) and family resemblance, both mechanics present

human made pictures of the reality. Possessing nuclei valid in different areas of physical

parameters, they produce dissimilar statements, which are considered in science both

objective and correct in a well defined sense.

Furthermore, in science education, it is important not to confuse various aspects of
scientific knowledge with its genus (NRC 1996; Bunge 1996). Confusion of objectivity
with universal and unconditional correctness of knowledge seemingly leads to miscon-
ceptions about the nature of science. The prominent contemporary physicist addressed this

issue (Weinberg 2001):

We [scientists] believe in the objective truth that can be known, and at the same time we are always
willing to reconsider, as we may be forced to, what we have previously accepted.

As shown in our excurses, the scientific claims (principles and laws of physics) are

independent of race, nationality, religion, personality, state of mood and worldview of

those who apply them: reproduction of the conditions is followed by reproduction of the
same results—verification. This is the objectiveness of the scientific knowledge. Popper

(1972) depicted consolidation of the collective scientific knowledge as the process in

which the objects of the second world15—the knowledge of individuals possibly sub-
jective—create the objects of the third one shared by the community of scientists—the
world of objective scientific theories:

For scientific knowledge simply is not knowledge in the sense of the ordinary usage of the words ‘I
know’. While knowledge in the sense ‘I know’ belongs to what I call the ‘second world’, the world of
‘subject’, scientific knowledge belongs to the third world, to the world of objective theories, objective
problems, and objective arguments.

14
To make my claim objective I avoid personal citing in this matter. My intention is solely to call for

attention and the need to correct the deformed in education.
15

The first world is the world of real objects.

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In no contradiction to objectiveness, the scientific knowledge remains dynamic,

unfinished, and tentative—a special type of culture which reflects Nature, not replaces it.

Finally, it is not enough to declare that the scientific knowledge is discussable and

allows corrections and refutations; the teacher should be equipped with concrete examples

presented in an intelligible, visually appealing and plausible form. The historical excurse

allows illustrate the dialogue among several theories, expressed in terms of nucleus-

periphery interaction and exchange of knowledge elements in case of scientific revolutions.

Historical excurses demonstrate the dynamics in which theories were corrected, refuted

and replaced. This feature distinguishes scientific knowledge from other types of knowl-

edge: religious, mystic, and traditional.

6 Conclusion

In the development of the HPS based materials within the HIPST project, we have arrived

at a new format of using the HPS contents in teaching physics—a historical excurse.

Science educators may apply it aiming at construction by the learners of the conceptually

meaningful knowledge regarding important topics of physics curriculum. Developed

within this format modules were discussed with school teachers at workshops and meet-

ings. The accumulated responses provided basis for belief that application of the modules

may promote Cultural Content Knowledge of physics in students and teachers. Historical

excurses, rich in physical contents, can facilitate meaningful learning of ontological and

epistemological aspects of physics. The excurses provide the learners with a big picture

and possess advantages over isolated episodes from the history of science by being

inclusive regarding the construction of the knowledge to be learned.

We argued that addressing deliberately chosen scientific articles, albeit refuted in sci-

ence history (Type II knowledge), could reveal the meaning of the knowledge to be

mastered today—Type I knowledge. It is the combination of both types that makes the

knowledge cultural. Both types together better represent the genesis and meaning of
conceptions in science. Inclusion of the alternative conceptions in science for improving
teaching and learning physics is a step similar to the constructivist reform of science
education that suggested revealing and addressing the alternative conceptions of students
as a tool for their remedy. This holds equally with regard to the content knowledge as well

as syntactic one (the scientific methodology).

By presenting a big picture of scientific discourse on certain subject, which goes

through different periods of history and different personalities of scholars who contributed

to the scientific progress, historical excurse might serve as an effective tool to demonstrate
the objective nature of science (physics in particular) in its contents, and thus to facilitate
understanding of its essential difference in this aspect from other types of knowledge

which are subjective.

Addressing the CCK in teaching not necessarily implies significant increase of
instruction time but rather the change in the nature of curriculum and pedagogy—the

teaching style. The expected impact of our products—to be further checked—seeks

restructuring students’ knowledge from the spontaneously created structure of the

knowledge in pieces (diSessa 1993), or scheme-facets (Galili and Hazan 2000a, b), to the
cultural knowledge of science organized in scientific theories each possessing triadic

structure of discipline-culture.

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Acknowledgments This study and development were supported by the European Commission (7th FWP)
as part of the Project HIPST—History and Philosophy in Science Teaching. We appreciate that support and
express our gratitude to Professor Dietmar Hottecke from the University of Hamburg and Professor Falk
Riess from the University of Oldenburg, for their permanent interest, help and concern that they kindly
granted to our work throughout the project.

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	Promotion of Cultural Content Knowledge Through the Use of the History and Philosophy of Science
	Abstract
	Introduction
	Theoretical Background
	Science as a Culture
	Discipline-Culture Approach
	The Role of the Philosophy of Science
	Implication to Physics Education: Cultural Content Knowledge

	Developed Materials
	Structure of the Modules
	Module 1. Understanding Classical Mechanics: A Dialogue with Cartesian Theory of Motion
	Module 2. The Pre-Newtonian Theory of Motion
	Module 3. The Story of Optical Image
	Module 4. The Story of Weight and the Gravitational Force: Marriage and Divorce
	Module 5. The Story of Inertial Force

	Teachers’ Perception of the Developed Materials
	Discussion
	Making Science
	Cumulative Nature
	Objectiveness of Science

	Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References