Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 12(3), 187-209, 2014 
 

*Corresponding author, : sibila@sibilapetlevski.com; +385 1 4828506; 
*Academy of Dramatic Art (ADU), Trg maršala Tita 5, HR – 10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
* 

BEYOND IDENTITY: THE DYNAMIC SELF 
AT THE INTERSECTION OF PERFORMANCE 

PHILOSOPHY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Sibila Petlevski*

University of Zagreb – Academy of Dramatic Art 
Zagreb, Croatia 

DOI: 10.7906/indecs.12.3.1 
Regular article 

Received: 4 June 2014. 
Accepted: 5 July 2014.

ABSTRACT 

In this article we advocate the methodological feedback loop in the study of the dynamical self at the 
crossroads of performance philosophy, (artistic) performance, and the philosophy of science. We point to 
the importance of the dynamics of methodology transfer between arts and sciences and the “interactive 
continuum” proposed by Newman & Benz in 1998. In the first part of this paper we give a comparative 
review of the research context relevant for our field of study, and we explain our research hubs in 
approaching the concept of “performance”. We suggest the possibility to define our filed of research in 
three equally legitimate ways: as philosophy-of-performance, philosophy-as-performance and 
performance-as-philosophy. In our recent work we are primarily interested in artistic performances that 
incorporate elements of artistic practice in the methodology of research output (Frayling 1993), as well as 
in the potentials of performative aspects of scientific praxis and methodology. However, the conceptual 
background relevant for this paper is in the field of process philosophy and its relation to science 
(Birkhard’s “interactivist model” 2009; Campbell’s “process-based model for an interactive ontology” 
2009). We attribute particular importance to the notion of “autopoietic feedback” (Maturana and Varela 
1974; Luhmann 1990). The second part addresses the issue of transcending identity in the representations 
of the self and the other; the relationship between Theory-Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST), as 
well as some recent attempts at combining different theories of mind (e.g. Barlassina 2013). We also deal 
with the notion of “embodied praxis” (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996); we mention some neuroscientific 
insights into the similar phenomena, and – commenting on the importance of the dialogue between 
neuroscientists and philosophers (Changeux and Ricour) – we give an example of an enactive approach to 
understanding acting (Zarrilli 2007). In the third part of this article, we critique the notion of 
“interpassivity” (Žižek 1997; Pfaller 2000). In the concluding part we mention the importance of exploring 
the concept of “expanded self” (Gallagher 2000; Jeannerod 2003; Kim and Johnson 2013). Being aware of 
the impossibility to reach final conclusions in the scientific approach to the dynamics of the self, instead of 
a formal conclusion, we offer a quote from Yeats’ poem “Balloons of Mind”. 

KEY WORDS 
autopoiesis, dynamic self, embodied cognition, enactive intersubjectivity, performance 

CLASSIFICATION 
JEL: Z11 



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IN FAVOR OF METHODOLOGICAL FEEDBACK LOOPS: A BROAD 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH CONTEXT FOR EXPLORING THE CONCEPT 
OF THE DYNAMIC SELF 

Richard Schechner understands performance as an inclusive term, a node on a continuum [1-5]. 
Not everything is meant to be a performance, but everything, from performing arts to politics 
and economics, can be studied as performance. It is hard to opt for a singular theory and a 
single methodology that would offer an ideal approach to such a broad concept. For 
Schechner [6, 7] what sets performance studies apart, is not necessarily what is defined as 
performance but the framework surrounding the interaction of behavior and the public space 
in which the performance is enacted. For example, performance studies scholars’ inquiry into 
ritual emphasizes its dynamic “behavior”. He distinguishes between various “nodes” of 
performance historically and experientially linked in a web and, as they exist in everyday life, 
as a fan. An example of the recent representation of performance context (for “performance 
art”) is a project, curated by Sinéad O’Donnell in 2012, which investigates an existing map 
created by the German performance artist Boris Nieslony and Gerhard Dirmoser 
(1993-2001). The work titled Mapping’ Performance Art in Context, originally researched 
and finally produced over a period of fifteen years by Nieslony and Dirmoser [8, 9], describes 
the layered categorizations, disciplines, methodologies and locations of Nieslony’s research 
toward the origin and definition of performance art. 

The last 50 years have seen the increased use of the terms and uses of performance and 
performativity in non-theatre/stage associated research fields of linguistics, anthropology, 
ethnography and sociology. “The performative turn” – a paradigmatic shift in the humanities 
and social science to which the concept of performance is central, took performance-inspired 
methods and situations as both the subject of research and methodology – focusing on 
embodied practices as a source for understanding society. The modes of research employed 
stemmed principally from first person and everyday interactions, observations, and analyses, 
thus stepping away from representational and symbolic models to engage with the “real” 
world (see Austin, Conquergood, Goffman, Turner). Performance and performativity – in 
contrast to the representation models of indexing, archiving, and documentation – both as 
theory and practice – have increasingly taken on as placeholders of the modality of the 
knowledge production occurring in the arts and humanities as well as in techno-scientific 
communities and discourse [10]. This shift can be traced to a general concern for “action,” 
which permeated 20th century culture and science, and which has also been echoed in a 
variety of disciplines from linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and gender theory, to 
performance art, music, dance and theatre – marking a turning away from fixed 
representational documents as “knowledge depositories” towards the investigation of event 
and time-based structures as a “knowledge flow”1 The concept of performativity has long 
been discussed within the social sciences and the humanities (in language philosophy, 
performance theory, gender studies, ethnography, anthropology, etc.). Performance is a new 
paradigm, not so much a new art form; it stands less for a new phenomenon than for a new 
observation of familiar phenomena [11] (see also [12]). Performance here becomes not only a 
subject for study but also an interpretive grid laid upon the process of study itself, and indeed 
upon almost any sort of human activity, collective or individual [11]. One salient usage 
focuses on the value of the non-propositional logical mode of understanding gained through a 
bodily involvement and speech in the act of doing. With growing interest in the interface 
between art, science, technology and society, the role of the performative act within scientific 
practice and knowledge production receives more attention these days. Performative acts 
operate in the “context of discovery”, rather than in the “context of justification” [12] (see 



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also [13-15]). In the contemporary European context the idea of “performative science” 
(enriched with new technological approaches and systems science insight into the problem of 
performance complexity) is being propagated by Hans Diebner’s work on Performative 
Science, where research outcomes could be shown in a “serious game” model of 
“installation” [16, 17]. A similar notion, in Croatian context, has its beginnings in Gavella’s 
idea of “freeing new design” in theatre criticism methodology and delivery of its results [18]. 
Recently, typical conceptions from the arts like enactment, embodiment and interplay, to 
name but a few, find applications in different scientific areas – even in the “hard sciences”. 
An artistic performance is a non-replicable event that changes its ontological status with 
every act of being recorded. It is falsifiable in every relational aspect and every phase of its 
development, but it defies the very notion of falsifiability wherever it decides to create a 
modal world (no matter if it was based on the less “engaged” actor-spectator or more 
“engaged” actor-spect-actor type of social agreement between performers and their 
“audience”. An artistic performance is precise in its own way. In a work-in-progress type of 
performance – as well as in a theatrical event or conceptual artistic event with classically 
organized performance time – performers use bodily enacted “operational definitions” in 
order to define in live time the variables they have studied and continue to study in the 
process of preparing the performance. (Here we also include the variables performers 
continue to study within the course of their actual “public” performance, while they perform, 
and sometimes improvise live). The principle of parsimony, so-called Occam’s razor that 
maintains that researches should apply the simplest explanation possible to any set of 
observations, is generally considered not to be applicable to artistic research-in-practice. 
However, since the performers are human beings (and taking into account the historical 
importance of the contested concept of “the natural” in some of the acting techniques based 
on impersonation) we can approach the problem of parsimony in artistic performance with 
some insights taken from the filed of evolutionary biology. We define performance as a 
process of communication in social contexts. Our current research incorporates qualitative 
and quantitative insights into the issue of interaction and its problems (for example, the 
problem of measuring of interaction strength in nature and in society; different parameters in 
measuring interaction strength in nature, society and in social media, and the lack of 
formalization). We are interested in philosophical, scientific, as well as in 
theoretical-performing research of various aspects of interaction (communicative, ritualistic 
and artistic interactions, internal dynamism in relations between memory and representation; 
“constructive memory” and performative use of “relational memory” as a topic dealt with in 
cognitive philosophy and cultural history [19-31]. One of the crucial points in our research is in 
exploring how the discursive field limits and produces identity. Here we point to the interaction 
between identity and the physical world looking into the process of establishing social, 
temporal and discursive relational spaces. The terms “body”, “personae” and “intersubjects” 
have been looked upon within the course of the scenic dynamism of interchange conducted in 
the relational space of culture, for example during the “interplay” [32, 33] which is the topic of 
the theories of acting based in phenomenology. We are also interested in other types of relational 
spaces based on identity that have implication in the performing domain (urban spaces of 
identity, institutional, colonial, postcolonial, national and transnational spaces of identity 
constructed under the influence of popular culture, marginal and liminal spaces including the 
related terms of periphery, border, the Other and the Different.) We are taking into the 
consideration the results of identity theory including the controversy involved in it [34-43], as 
well as of the cognitive science, e.g. [44-47]. In the course of our project dealing with 
discursive identity topics2 we have introduced in an innovative way the following terms into 
the context of the theory of performative arts: mental event, intersubjective identity, 
discursive objectivation, individuation, inter-subject, perception, perceptual synthesis, 



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perception as a form of a corporeal experience, perceptive anticipation, reception, language 
ability, communicational, interactivity, corporeality, autoreferentiality, reflexiveness, 
intentionality, emotional meaning, corporeal as a mind dimension, autopoietical system, 
relational space, dynamism of exchange, interplay, relational memory etc. What we find 
particularly intriguing in the context of the recent situation in the studied area are perfomative 
considerations of art-science relationship. Firstly, we analyze performative artistic practices, 
philosophical and, broadly speaking, theoretical implications of the corresponding “research 
in practice” which incorporates elements of artistic practice in the methodology of research 
output [48]. Secondly, we explore process philosophy and its relation to science [49, 50]; 
R. Campbell’s “process-based model for an interactive ontology” [26], as well as the concept 
of autopoietic feedback in performance [51-58]); particularly in artistic performance, where 
we explore autopoietic and alopoietic behaviors. Thirdly, we explore the intricate relationship 
between philosophy and performance, opening up possibility to define our filed of research in 
three equally legitimate ways: as philosophy-of-performance, philosophy-as-performance and 
performance-as-philosophy. Fourthly, we explore the dynamics of methodology transfer 
between arts and sciences and the “interactive continuum” proposed by Isidore Newman and 
Carolyn R. Benz in 1998 and further developed by C.S. Ridenour and I. Newman in 2008. 
The main purpose of our recent research is in giving new scope to exploring the dynamics of 
exchange connected to the notion of “performance” applied in artistic ”creation”, as well as 
in the study and representation of lives. An important hypothesis, connected to this purpose is 
to prove that the dynamics of methodology transfer between arts and sciences, the 
methodological “interactive continuum” and its “feedback loops” [59, 60] maximizing the 
strength of both methodologies. In order to contribute to clarification of stated theoretical and 
methodological problems, collaborators coming from different fields od research3 will try to 
develop, verify, validate and use in simulations, the formal models for quantification of 
dynamics of exchanges within performances. The type of research conducted in our research, 
to some extent, belongs to the historical context of experiments in art and technology initiated 
at the end of the 60s by artists Robert Rauschenberg and Robert Whitman, and by engineers 
Billy Klüver and Fred Waldhauer. We acknowledge the historical importance of “Intermedia” 
concept employed by Fluxus artist Dick Higgins, particularly in its educational application of 
“Intermedia” which led to university program development based on technology-science-art 
interplay. Here we can mention “Systems art” that emerged in the first wave of the conceptual 
art movement (as in Kenneth Noland and Frank Stella’s work), Roy Ascott’s concept of 
“cybernetic vision”, “generative art” from the 70s that brought artists and scientists together 
promoting the investigation of scientific-technological systems and their relationship to art 
and to life in general. Some of the most innovative aspects of our research are connected to 
the concept of “performative science”. We intend to present our research results in two ways: 
“objectively” (with methodological rigor within quantitative and qualitative frameworks) and 
“subjectively” (using our scientifically obtained models in artistic performance). However, it 
is profoundly erroneous truism – repeated by some cultural psychologists – that the key issue 
that arises with the recognition of subjectivity is “how it affects objectivity” [61]. The 
concept of subjectivity, and the nature of experience standing behind contemporary 
methodological feedback loops, is by far more complex than Ratner would like it to be. 

That peculiar feedback dynamism that makes collaboration between arts and sciences 
methodologically fruitful brings back in focus the issue of the subject and its self-consciousness, 
as in Bickhard’s “social ontology of persons” from 2000, and his “interactivist model” from 
2009 [62-64]. In biological terms, dying is the process whereby an organism no longer 
adequately regulates its material and energetic exchanges with its immediate environment, 
such that its identity eventually disintegrates into the thermodynamic equilibrium [65, 66]. 
The enactive4; self-directed, perception-action based approach to experience elucidates the 



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way mental life relates to bodily activity in terms of bodily self-regulation, sensiomotor 
coupling and intersubjective interaction [55]. As Nicholas Humphrey rightfully claims – 
there can be no hope of scientific progress so long as we continue to write down the identity 
[mental state m = brain state b] in such a way that the mind terms and the brain terms are 
patently incommensurable [67; p.7]. Enaction in the philosophy of mind tries to see how 
perception and action combine to allow humans to perceive, and to have consciousness. It is 
our aim in this article to argue in favor of the concept of the dynamic self. We define that 
concept from the perspective of an inter-enactive approach to agency, at the intersection of 
performance philosophy and the philosophy of science. 

In the context of recent development in the field of systems science applied to performance 
phenomenon, it is important to point to some contemporary attempts to revaluate ontological 
and phenomenological considerations of art and science, particularly the relevance of 
philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, but also M. Heidegger [68], H. Bergson [69]). Merleau-
Ponty’s bio-philosophy is particularly interesting in the view of the philosophy of 
neuroscience that attempts to clarify neuroscientific methods and results using conceptual 
method of philosophy of science. It is important to mention that the importance of some early 
phenomenological insights into the problem of perception, have been recognized both in 
conceptual art practice and in systems theory and cybernetics. Minimalist art acknowledges 
the viewer, whose physical interaction with the work produces ever-shifting viewpoints over 
time, through a kind of feedback loop. This phenomenon bears striking similarities with 
developments in cybernetics at the time, particularly the notion of reflexivity. Here the 
observer, in a kind of synthesis between the organic and the mechanical, becomes part of the 
system observed, without an outside from which to survey the whole [70, 71]. 

In The Autopoiesis of Social Systems [58] Luhmann distinguishes a general theory of self-
referential “autopoietic” systems and a more specific level at which we may distinguish 
living systems (cells, brains, organisms, etc.), psychic systems, and social systems (societies, 
organizations, interactions) as different kinds of autopoietic systems5. In Essays on 
Self-Reference, he makes analogy between conscious systems and social systems pointing to 
the necessity in a system to produce its own decay. He speaks of the “fundamental fact of 
vanishing events, disappearing gestures and words that are dying away” [72; p.9]. Such 
“events” (for example, thoughts and communications) cannot be saved, because their loss is 
at the same time a condition of their “regeneration” (recurring integration of disintegration 
and reintegration). Memory does not preserve events as events, but their 
“structure-generating power”. Luhmann further explains: “A conscious system does not 
consist of a collection of all of its past and present thoughts, nor does a social system pile up 
all of its communications. After a very short time the mass of elements would be intolerably 
large and its complexity would be so high that the system would be unable to select a pattern 
of coordination and would produce chaos. The solution is to renounce all stability at the 
operative level of elements and to use events only. Thereby, the continuing dissolution of the 
system becomes a necessary cause of its autopoietic reproduction. The system becomes 
dynamic in a very basic sense. It becomes inherently restless. The instability of its elements is 
a condition of its duration” [72; p.9]. 

The general theory of autopoietic systems postulates a clear distinction between autopoiesis 
and observation. This condition is fulfilled in the case of social systems as well. Without 
using this distinction, the system could not accomplish the self-simplification necessary for 
self-observation. Autopoiesis and observation, communication and attribution of action are 
not the same and can never fuse. Nevertheless, self-observation in this specific sense of 
describing itself as a chain of clear-cut and responsible actions is a prerequisite of autopoiesis 
as such. Without this technique of using a simplified model of itself, the system could not 



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communicate about communication and could not select its basic elements in view of their 
capacity to adapt themselves to the requirements of autopoiesis in the sense of adaptation to 
the partially resolved dynamics of environment. This particular constellation may not be 
universally valid for all autopoietic systems, claims Luhmann. In view of the special case of 
social systems, however, he thinks that the general theory has to formulate the distinction of 
autopoiesis and observation in a way that does not exclude cases in which self-observation is 
a necessary requirement of autopoiesis as such. Luhmann defines functionalism as a theory of 
a self-referential system applied to “observing systems” as well, where the notion “observing 
system” stands here in the double sense implied by Heinz von Foerster6. Constructivism – 
such as Foerster’s – argues that there are no observations independent of observers. The 
lawfulness and certainty of all natural phenomena are properties of the describer, not of what 
is being described. The logic of the world is the logic of the description of the world. As Paul 
Watzlawick says in the foreword of Lynn Segal’s book on Foerster: “The realization that the 
observer, the observed phenomenon, and the process of observation itself form a totality, 
which can be decomposed into its elements only on pain of absurd reifications, has far-
reaching implications for our understanding of man and his problems – especially of the ways 
in which he literally ‘constructs’ his reality, then reacts to it as if it existed independently of 
him ‘out there,’ and eventually may arrive at the startling awareness that his reactions are 
both the effect and the cause of his reality construction. This ‘curved space’ of human 
experience of the world and of himself, this closure – as Heinz von Foerster calls it – finds its 
symbolic expression in the Ouroboros, the snake that bites its own tail, or its poetic 
expression in the words of T.S. Eliot, for whom ‘The end of all our exploring will be to arrive 
where we started and know the place for the first time’.” [73; pp.xi-xii]. 

What we find particularly useful in our current research is applying systems theory to 
performing arts. Von Bertalanffy’s introduction of systems theory [74-76] changed that 
framework by looking at the system as a whole, with its relationships and interactions with 
other systems, as a mechanism of growth and change. This led to a new language, 
popularizing terms such as open and closed systems, entropy, boundary, homeostasis, inputs, 
outputs, and feedback. What intrigues us most in the context of cultural performance research 
is person-in-environment interaction and the adaptation process analysis. Given the dynamic 
nature of interactions in person-in-environment relationships, adaptation is the central 
(socio)ecological concept. Adaptation relates to the cause-and-effect relationship between the 
person and the environment, with change as the inevitable outcome of the interaction. In 
particular, the additional notion of “complex adaptive systems”, as formulated and developed 
in 1980s by Gell-Mann and the group related to the Santa Fe Institute [77] incorporates 
processes that we focus onto in our current research. The complex systems approach to 
cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to 
this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogeneous, composed of brain, body, 
and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-
linearly coupled brain–body–niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological 
advances [78]. The fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche – according 
to Silberstein & Chemero [78] – makes possible to explain extended cognition without 
invoking representations or computation. They also claim that cognition and conscious 
experience can be understood as a single phenomenon, “eliminating fruitless philosophical 
discussion of qualia and the so-called hard problem of consciousness”. What they call 
“extended phenomenological-cognitive systems” are relational and dynamical entities, with 
interactions among heterogeneous parts at multiple spatial and temporal scales. 



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BEYOND IDENTITY: REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND 
THE OTHERS 

When Heinz von Foerster [79] speaks of “curved space” of human experience of the world 
and of himself, he does that as a cognitive constructivist – a Piaget’s disciple – who illustrates 
the topic of self-reflexivity with the mythic symbol of Ouroboros. The ancient time-serpent 
eating its own tail – the alchemical symbol of the circular nature of the alchemist’s work – is 
depicted in Foerster’s book alongside mathematical formulas. Foerster’s Ouroboros is an 
illustration of the alchemy of human knowledge and at the same time it is an illustration of 
the theory of cognitive development. Foerster’s theory is based on the belief that human 
beings cannot receive a ready-made knowledge given to them in such way that that they can 
understand and use it right away. Humans construct their knowledge; they build it through 
experience, and that experience enables them to create mental models. Heinz von Foerster’s 
concept of eigenform, explained in Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics 
and Cognition (in the chapter on “Objects: Tokens for (Eigen-)Behaviors”) [79, 80] 
illustrates the relationship of an observer and the world around him both mathematically and 
from the phenomenological perspective: “Apparently, only when a subject, S1, stipulates the 
existence of another subject, S2, not unlike himself, who, in turn, stipulates the existence of 
still another subject, not unlike himself, who may well be S1. In this atomical social context 
each subject’ s (observer’ s) experience of his own sensori-motor coordination can now be 
referred to by a token of this experience, the ‘object’, which, at the same time, may be taken 
as a token for the externality of communal space. With this I have returned to the topology of 
closure where equilibrium is obtained when the Eigenbehaviors of one participant generate 
(recursively) those for the other where one snake eats the tail of the other as if it were its own, 
and where cognition computes its own cognitions through those of the other: here is the 
origin of ethics” [80; p.261]. 

Co-creative relationship between the world and the observer, the alchemical illustration of the 
dynamics of “eating the tale of the other as if it was our own”, opens up some space for 
speculation in the field of moral philosophy. At least Foerster wants to make room for ethics 
when he defines the relation between Thou and I as identity. “According to the principle of 
relativity, which rejects a hypothesis when it does not hold for two instances together, 
although it holds for each instance separately (Earthlings and Venusians may be consistent in 
claiming to be in the center of the universe, but their claims fall to pieces if they should ever 
get together), the solipsistic claim falls to pieces when besides me I invent another 
autonomous organism. However, it should be noted that since the principle of relativity is not 
a logical necessity – nor is it a proposition that can be proven to be either true or false – the 
crucial point to be recognized here is that I am free to choose either to adopt this principle or 
to reject. If I reject it, I am the center of the universe, my reality is my dreams and my 
nightmares, my language is monologue, and my logic monologic. If I adopt it, neither I, nor 
the other can be the center of the universe. As in the heliocentric system, there must be a third 
that is the central reference. It is the relation between Thou and I, and this relation is identity: 
reality = community. 

What are the consequences of all this in ethics and aesthetics? 

The ethical imperative: Act always so as to increase the number of choices. 

The aesthetical imperative: If you desire to see, learn how to act” [80; p.227]. 

Thinking about another mind by using one’ own mind as a model – “mindreading” as an 
ability of assigning mental states to others – is an important issue in the theory of mind, but it 
also has potential practical implications for medical science, e.g. in understanding and 



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treating autism. A theory-theorist explains the mechanism of using “folk psychology” in 
order to reason about others’ minds. This is considered to be an innate cognitive capacity 
developed automatically, though instantiated through social interactions: represented and 
exemplified by social relations conducted over centuries of human history. Unlike 
theory-theorist, a theorist of mental simulation does not believe in an innate 
folk-psychological conceptual scheme, but rather in a kind of mental modeling in which the 
simulator uses her own mind as an analog model of the mind of the simulated agent. 
Predicting and anticipating behavior of other living beings is indispensable for survival of 
human species. An effective and fast-acting mindreading system provides us with 
information on other people’s intentions. However, in spite of many differences in 
Theory-Theory versus Simulation-Theory, there are some new attempts at combining TT and 
ST theories of mind as in Barlassina7 [81]. The confrontation between opposing groups of 
TT-supporters and ST-supporters – this prolonged philosophical “quarrel” – waits to be 
settled by an experiment conducted in a laboratory. Neuroscience research has demonstrated 
common neural mechanisms between executed and observed action at the neural level. 
Neuroimaging experiments in humans have showed the activation of a fronto-parietal neural 
network that is involved in the observation and imagination of action. There are also new 
insights into the problem of the self, representing the other, with the new cognitive 
neuroscience view of psychological identification8. Contemporary research in developmental 
science, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience provides cumulative evidence for a view of 
similarities in the construction of representations of the self and others. Trevarthen’s theory 
of coupled rhythms in infant’s coordination with the parent as a partner, and his intersubject 
sympathy – a predisposition to be sensitive and responsive to the subjective states of other 
people [82, 83] – gains in relevance in the light of the newly conducted experiments with 
neonatal imitation. These findings have led Gallagher and Meltzoff to propose that the 
understanding of the other person is primarily a form of embodied practice [84-86]. The 
perception of others’ action, explain Buccino at al. activates the premotor cortex and the 
parietal cortex in a somatotopical manner; watching mouth actions activates the cortical 
representation of the mouth, while watching hand or foot actions activates their respective 
representations [87, 88]. Decety and Chaminade continue the line of the previously made 
research indicating that we are from birth not only acting and thinking selves, but we also 
express an intuitive need to relate ourselves to other people [89-91]. 

An impressive example for an open-minded collaboration across different fields of research is 
a book-length discussion about ethics, human nature and the brain between Jean-Pierre 
Changeux, a French neuroscientist, and Paul Ricoeur, celebrated French philosopher9. In the 
3rd chapter, in the section titled The Human Brain: Complexity, Hierarchy, Spontaneity [92], 
Changeux calls attention to the notion of spontaneous activity arguing that our nervous 
system is not active only when it is stimulated by sensory organs. The brain functions in a 
projective mode. It is the permanent seat of important internal activities – when one thinks, 
when one plans a movement, when one hears, perceives, imagines, or creates. These activities 
occur when we are awake, but also while we are asleep. Changeux explains how these 
activities play a fundamental role in the sense that they serve as the basic material for 
constructing, elaborating, and organizing the representations that will be projected onto the 
world, thereby making it possible to anticipate the future – to anticipate events that will occur 
in both the external and the internal world [92; p.88]. 

Commenting on Changeux’s remarks, Ricoeur points to Husserl’s last writings, highlighting 
his thesis that human agent does not content himself with being informed about his 
environment in order to modify it afterward; from the beginning he interprets it and shapes it, 
or better – to use Husserl’s formulation – he constitutes it as the world that surrounds him by 



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projecting onto it the aims of his action and his demands for meaning. Changeux notices that 
both Ricoeur and himself rejected the input-output model of cerebral function common to 
cybernetics and information theory in favor of the projective schema. He partly agrees with 
Ricouer, saying that we project husserlian “aims of action and demands of meaning” onto a 
world that has neither fate nor meaning, and that it is with our brain that we create categories 
in a world that – according to his opinion – possesses none, apart from those already created 
by human beings. Changeux points to the experiments that have shown that distinct cortical 
(and subcortical) regions are mobilized by the sight of the moving hand, the mental image of 
the movement of one’s own hand, and preparation for executing this movement. He explains 
that when brain interacts with the external world, it develops and functions according to a 
model of variation-selection that is sometimes called Darwinian. According to this 
hypothesis, variation – the generation of diversity of internal forms – precedes the selection 
of the adequate form. Representations are stabilized in our brain not simply by “imprint”, as 
it were a piece of wax, but indirectly via process of selection [92; pp.90-91]. 

One of the rare theatre practitioners keenly interested in embodied acting and cognitive 
foundations of performance is Phillip B. Zarrilli. In Acting (Re)Considered [93] he argued 
that every time an actor performs, he or shy implicitly enacts a “theory” [93; p.3] – a set of 
assumptions and styles that guides an actor through performance, the shape that those actions 
take (as a character, role, or sequence of actions as in some performance art) an the 
relationship to the audience. In an essay on “An Enactive Approach to Understanding 
Acting” [94; pp.635-647], inspired by recent developments in phenomenology, cognitive 
science, and anthropological ecology, he explores an enactive approach to meta-theoretical 
understanding of acting as a phenomenon: “In contrast to representational and/or mimetic 
meta-theories of acting that construct their views of action from a position as a outside 
observer to the process/phenomenon of acting, an enactive view provides an account of 
acting from the perspective of the actor as enactor/ doer from “inside” the processes. Acting 
should not be viewed as embodying a representation of a role or a character, but rather as a 
dynamic, lived experience in which the actor is responsive to the demands of the particular 
moment within a specific (theatrical) environment” [94; p.638]. 

Perceptual, sensiomotor knowledge is vitally important for an enactive view of acting. Zarrilli 
promotes the perspective of the actor-as-(human) doer enactor inside the performance of an 
acting score. Acting is here considered as an extra-daily skilled mode of embodied practice 
requiring the performer to negotiate “interior” and “exterior” via perception-in-action in 
response to an environment. The type of spontaneity Zarrilli advocates (the one that “allows 
one to become an animal, ready “to leap and act”, “embodying the lion’s fury”) is based on 
daily training of actor-as-perceiver. He thinks that in the moment of enactment we are 
utilizing their perceptual and sensory experience and cumulative embodied knowledge as 
skilled exploration in the moment of the specific theatrical “world” or environment created 
during rehearsal proces. [94; p.647]. 

INTERPASSIVITY – A “SHARP-DULL” TERM FOR A MISSING CONCEPT 

In The Plague of Phantasies, Slavoj Žižek draws on Robert Pfaller’s intervention at the 
symposium Die Dirge lachen an unsere Stclle (Linz, Austria, 8-10 October 1996) and 
supplements “the fashionable notion of ‘interactivity’ with its shadowy and much more 
uncanny supplement/double, the notion of ‘interpassivity’” [95; pp.151-152]. The phenomenon 
that provoked Žižek and Pfaller into supplementing the notion of interactivity in arts and 
culture with the notion of interpassivity10, is the situation on the postmodern cultural scene 
where “at the moment when in art an ideology of interactivity appeared predominant, the 
example of canned laughter pointed into an opposite direction: it was an artwork that 



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contained its own observation. Here, the artwork did not leave some creative activity to the 
observers; on the contrary, it kept all for itself, even the “passivity” of the observers” [96; p.47]. 
Žižek criticizes ideological implications of the contemporary “paradox of interpassivity, of 
believing or enjoying through the Other” [95; p.147]. The core of Žižek’s interpretation of 
cultural interpassivity of the (post)modern times is in the psychoanalytical notion of 
“transference”. In the first approach to that notion, Freud defined it as a displacement of 
affect from one idea to another. Later on he described transference as an unconscious 
redirection of feelings from one person in the past to another, e.g. to a therapist during the 
process of psychoanalysis. Lacan described the dialectics of transference in An Intervention 
on the Transference [97] as a pure mechanism that – although it mimics emotional relation 
and manifests itself in the guise of strong affects like love and hate – actually has nothing to 
do with emotions and acquires meaning solely by virtue of the dialectical moment in which it 
is produced. From the repetitive symbolical nature of the transference, which brought this 
notion close to “speech-act” theory, Lacan enriched the concept of transference with the 
concept of “sujet supposé savoir”. Different shades of interpretation in Lacan’s approach to 
the concept of transference consolidated in the sixties around the central problem of 
analysand’s phantasy of the subject that is supposed to know his of her innermost thoughts. 
The analyst as a supposed subject of knowledge is imagined as somebody who knows the 
innermost thoughts of the analysand. The projection of self into the other is a phantasm that 
strips the object of supposedly perfect knowledge from its personality and transfers it into a 
mere function. Lacanian “Objet (petit) a” sets desire in a circular motion around what is 
unattainable. From the theoretical point of view, Žižek’s approach to transference is clearly 
Lacanian: “Transposing my very passive experience on to another is a much more uncanny 
phenomenon than that of being active through another: in interpassivity I am decentred in a 
much more radical way than I am in interactivity, since interpassivity deprives me of the very 
kernel of my substantial identity. Consequently, the basic matrix of interpassivity follows 
from the very notion of subject as the pure activity of (self-)positing, as the fluidity of pure 
Becoming, devoid of any positive, firm Being: if I am to function as pure activity, I have to 
externalize my (passive) Being – in short I have to be passive through another. This inert 
object which ‘is’ my Being, in which my inert Being is externalized, is the Lacanian objet 
petit a. In so far as the elementary, constitutive structure of subjectivity is hysterical – in so 
far, that is, as hysteria is defined by the question ‘What for an object am I (in the eyes of the 
Other, for the Other’s desire)?”, it confronts us with interpassivity at its purest: what the 
hysterical subject is unable to accept, what gives rise to an unbearable anxiety in him, is the 
presentiment that the Other(s) perceive him in the passivity of his Being, as an object to be 
exchanged, enjoyed or otherwise ‘manipulated’. Therein lies the ‘onto-logical axiom’ of 
Lacanian subjectivity: the more I am active, the more I must be passive in another’s place – 
that is to say, the more there must be another object which is passive in my place, on my 
behalf (this axiom is realized in its utmost simplicity in the proverbial senior manager who, 
from time to time, feels compelled to visit prostitutes to be exposed to masochistic rituals and 
‘treated as a mere object’). What psychoanalysis is looking for in an active subject is 
precisely the fundamental fantasy which sustains his disavowed passivity” [95; pp.151-152]. 

The problem with Žižek’s use of the concept of interpassivity is – contrary to what he would 
like to make his readers believe – not in supplementing the fashionable notion of 
‘interactivity’ with its shadowy and much more uncanny supplement/double, the notion of 
‘interpassivity’. The real uncanny, hazardous supplement of interactivity, is transference. 
Žižek’s “interpassivity” – at least the one exemplified in his book with a number of concrete 
examples from everyday life and politics – is based on the pure functionality; on the 
repetitive mechanism of the dialectics of transference. The problem is in the (re)interpretation 
of an old psychoanalytical term, or rather in the lack of any substantially new interpretation. 



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The more one reads Žižek, the more one gets impression that the Greek word ὀξύμωρον – 
“sharp dull” (that makes the etymology of the Latin oxymoron as a figure of speech based on 
juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory elements) lies at the very basis of Slavoj Žižek’s 
“style” of philosophical thinking. Rober Pfaller, a professor from Linz University of Art and 
Industrial Design, masterly defends Žižek’s theory as a philosophy that proceeds through 
examples. In his eulogy of Žižek’s philosophical “toolbox”11, the paper presented at the 
annual conference of the British Society of Phenomenology in 2006, Pfaller explains that a 
typical Žižek’s example is not a concrete illustration of an abstract idea; it fulfills the 
completely different – Pfaller says “paradoxical” function. The idea which Žižek in his 
elaboration points at is far from being there at the beginning. On the contrary, Žižek uses his 
first example in order to dismiss the idea usually connected with the chosen example. He 
suggests an alternative reading and in such a way he “estranges” the common practice of 
approaching the chosen concept. Pfaller – in appraisal of the “strictly logical function” of 
telling jokes in Žižek’s philosophical narrative, claims the following: “Only by ‘estranging’ 
and problematizing our own practice, i.e. by recognizing its strangeness and by transforming 
its previous evidence into a question, we get a key for replacing our astonishment and the 
respective assumptions about foreign phenomena by theoretical concepts” [96; p.37]. 

However, we are not quite sure that Pfaller’s appraisal of the logic of Žižek’s joking – in spite 
of the strictness of the logic that makes Žižek’s points in philosophical narration so 
rhetorically effective – succeeds in convincing the reader of Žižek’s huge body of work that 
every single estrangement-effect this author uses, automatically leads to a deeper insight into 
the chosen philosophical (or broadly speaking cultural) concept. The problem is not in 
Žižek’s philosophical system whose relevance is undisputable, but the real danger lies in the 
possible missuses of his “toolkit”. The term “interpassivity” – since it was established by 
Žižek in the nineties – has assumed a meme-like potency. For example, it is theoretically 
naïve to reduce the problem of “interpassivity” to examples such as the example of the 
internet, “reified as an object, taking on our political values, intentions and goals so that we 
can remain passive, a reversal of the familiar rhetoric that the internet offers greater 
participation and activity”12 [98]. A huge mass of miss-interpretation and theoretical banality 
circles around it. The key concept of “transference” is completely lost in the meantime. There 
is an army of young meta-readers whose chief subject of expertise is reading what said “the 
significant other” about books they are too lazy to read themselves. The interpassivity of 
reading Lacan through Žižek seems to be yet another symptom on the list of symptoms of 
postmodernity. A typical meta-reader of today asks himself: Who cares now about the 
development of the notion of transference in the Lacanian system of thought? Who cares 
about its Freudian legacy? Who cares about the problem of transference connected to the 
relational self in the context of an interpersonal cognitive theory13? 

Dynamical, “situated” approaches to cognition have resulted in the reinterpretation of the 
distinction between so-called external and so-called internal representational formats of 
memory “storage”. Merlin W. Donald suggests in Origins of the Modern Mind [99] and in 
Précis of Origins of the Modern Mind with multiple review and author’s response [100] that 
the increasing reliance on external memory media in “technology-supported culture” (as the 
third stage in the development of “human capacity through culture “) may have deep effects 
on human cognitive development and behavior. The externalization of memory has changed 
the way humans use their cognitive resources, what they can know, where that knowledge is 
stored, and what kinds of codes are needed to decipher what is stored [99; p.362]. The main 
Donald’s thesis is that each translation in human cognitive evolution depends on culturally 
mediated changes to the structure of memory. In Donald’s view, mimesis – as a 
human-specific ability to reenact bodily previously experienced events – is the basis for the 



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translation to the first humanlike culture. What makes mimesis different from imitation, in 
Donald’s account, is that mimesis adds a representational dimension to imitation, so that it 
may be used intentionally to represent both physical and social events such as in the act of 
engaging in certain forms of dance, communicating to others about past events, practicing 
social roles observed in others, coordinating personal behavior in group activities and 
teaching skills14. In the circle of Žižekians, the reification of objects of technology seems to 
be fatally connected to the “interpassive” transference mechanism of “enjoying through the 
other”. However, the process of transferring human memory to external memory disk of 
media and new technology looks entirely different, and certainly ”more natural”, when we 
look upon it from the evolutionary perspective. It seems to us that the dialectical, repetitive 
nature of transference described by Lacan – its pure functionality and its capability to mimic 
emotions in spite of being devoid of them – gets an unexpected supplement in the new 
research of the neurological basis of empathy15.  

A POEM INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION 

The notion of the extended self – the concept that refers to the idea that people incorporate 
self-relevant others or objects into one’s sense of self – has been recently tested. The previous 
experiments by Gallagher [85] showed that the minimal sense of self is grounded in the 
moment-to-moment mapping of intentions to act with the sensory and proprioceptive 
feedback that accompanies the actions. Thus, we have a sense of owning the body and the 
ability to author actions with that body [101]. The recently obtained results provided neural 
evidence for the idea that personally relevant external stimuli may be incorporated into one’s 
sense of self [102]. 

W.B. Yeats wrote a short poem in 1919 titled The Balloon of the Mind. His poetic 
“interpretation” of the problem of the body-mind relationship is the following: 

“Hands, do what you’re bid: // Bring the balloon of the mind // 
That bellies and drags in the wind // Into its narrow shed.” 

The research of the dynamics of the self could not reach a conclusion, but luckily, the poetic 
insight into the mystery of ourselves could provide an objective correlative, a shortcut to the 
reality that we cannot approach by other means – at least not yet. 

REMARKS 
1Lamontagne, a new media artist and curator interested in fashion studies and body-based 
1technologies used by cyborg performer Stelarc, claims in the aforementioned context that a 
1coupling of wearable objects technology and performativity is not only crucial to an 
1understanding of the materiality of the wearable object and its social practice, but also offers 
1new grounds for a repositioning of research within the broader field of performance. 
2Scientific project titled Discursive Identity in Performing Arts; Bodies, Personae, 
3Intersubjects, led by S. Petlevski, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and 
3Sports (2007-2013). 
3The project we started and intend to continue – with or without institutional financial backup 
3– under the title Interactive Continuum: Performative Approaches in Art & Science, includes 
3researchers coming from different fields of art and science. Senior researchers: D. 3Lukić [103], 
3O. Markič [104], Ž. Paić [105], S. Petlevski [32, 33, 106, 107], J. Stepanić [108, 109] and 
3young researchers G. Pavlić and L. Potrović [110]. 
4Evan Thompson [111] traces the development of the concept of enactivity back to 
4phenomenology in the article titled “Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach”. 
4The enactive approach – says Thompson – offers a distinctive view of how mental life 



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4relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and 
4intersubjective interaction. He furthers explains: The name “the enactive approach” and the 
4associated concept of enaction were introduced into cognitive science by Varela, Thompson, 
4and Rosch (1991) in order to describe and unify under one heading several related ideas.1 
4The first idea is that living beings are autonomous agents that actively generate and 
4maintain their identities, and thereby enact or bring forth their own cognitive domains. The 
4second idea is that the nervous system is an autonomous system: it actively generates and 
4maintains its own coherent and meaningful patterns of activity, according to its operation as 
4an organizationally closed or circular and re-entrant sensorimotor network of interacting 
4neurons. The nervous system does not process information in the computationalist sense, but 
4creates meaning. The third idea is that cognition is a form of embodied action. Cognitive 
4structures and processes emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception and 
4action. Sensorimotor coupling between organism and environment modulates, but does not 
4determine, the formation of endogenous, dynamic patterns of neural activity, which in turn 
4inform sensorimotor coupling. The fourth idea is that a cognitive being’s world is not a 
4pre-specified, external realm, represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain 
4enacted or brought forth by that being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the 
4environment. This idea links the enactive approach to phenomenological philosophy, for 
4both maintain that cognition bears a constitutive relation to its objects. Stated in a classical 
4phenomenological way, the idea is that the object, in the precise sense of that which is given 
4to and experienced by the subject, is conditioned by the mental activity of the subject. Stated 
4in a more existential phenomenological way, the idea is that a cognitive being’s world – 
4whatever that being is able to experience, know, and practically handle – is conditioned by 
4that being’s form or structure. Such “constitution” on the part of our subjectivity or 
4being-in-the-world is not subjectively apparent to us in everyday life, but requires systematic 
4analysis – scientific and phenomenological – to disclose [111; p.2]. 
5Autopoiesis is here understood as the capacity of a system to reproduce the components of 
5which it is composed [53, 112]. The evolution of that concept is interesting in itself, 
5especially in the aspect where it is critically evaluated in relation to the complexity of 
5self-reference. On the other hand, there are some recent attempts at revisiting the concept of 
5autopoiesis in relation to cognition and life [113]. They present a mathematical model of a 
53D tessellation automaton, considered as a minimal example of autopoiesis. This leads them 
5to a number of new theses. Thesis T1: “An autopoietic system can be described as a random 
5dynamical system, which is defined only within its organized autopoietic domain”. They 
5propose a modified definition of autopoiesis: “An autopoietic system is a network of 
5processes that produces the components that reproduce the network, and that also regulates 
5the boundary conditions necessary for its ongoing existence as a network.” They also 
5propose a definition of cognition: “A system is cognitive if and only if sensory inputs serve 
5to trigger actions in a specific way, so as to satisfy a viability constraint. They claim that the 
5concepts of autopoiesis and cognition, although deeply related in their connection with the 
5regulation of the boundary conditions of the system, are not immediately identical: a system 
5can be autopoietic without being cognitive, and cognitive without being autopoietic. Finally, 
5they propose a thesis T2: “A system that is both autopoietic and cognitive is a living 
5system.” [113; pp.327-345]. 
6Luhmann refers to Foerster book of essays titled Observing systems [114]. In an article 
6Cybernetics on Cybernetics first published in 1979, Foerester distinguishes the cybernetics 
6of observed systems we may consider to be first-order cybernetics; while second-order 
6cybernetics is the cybernetics of observing systems [80; pp.283-287]. Foerster gives 
6theoretical homage to Maturana’s article “Neurophysiology of cognition” [115]. In 1958 
6Foerster founded the Biological Computer Laboratory (BCL) at the University of Illinois, in 



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6which mathematicians, neurophysiologists, epistemologists, physicists, logicians and 
6computer scientists worked cooperatively on problems of cognition. 
7Barlassina [81] recognizes “mindreading” as the ability to attribute mental states to other 
7individual both to the Theory-Theory (TT) and the Simulation Theory (ST). According to 
7the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one’s possession of a Theory of Mind. On 
7the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a 
7mental state by simulating it in one’s own mind. She defends a two-folded claim: on the one 
7hand, she defends Goldman’s idea that face-based disgust recognition is underpinned by 
7simulation; on the other hand, she maintains that simulation is not enough to account for the 
7attribution of disgust from non-facial visual stimuli, and that this latter capacity should be 
7explained in terms of the possession of theoretical knowledge about disgust. Barsallina 
7proposes a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual 
7stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. Her model is grounded in evidence 
7from individuals suffering from Huntington’s disease. While defending Goldman’s thesis 
7that the ability to attribute disgust based on observing disgusted facial expressions stems 
7from a mirror-based simulation process [116], Barlassina argues that ST is unable to account 
7for the ability to attribute disgust based on non-facial visual stimuli. She proposes that this 
7latter ability is theory-based. 
8Cf. [89, 90]. 
9Ce qui nous fait penser [92] was translated into English under the title What Makes Us Think. 
9A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. 
10The term “interpassivity” coined by Slavoj Žižek, and further developed as a concept by 
10Robert Pfaller and Gijs van Oenen, was originally developed for the discourse of 
10contemporary art. Gijs van Oenen’s “interpassivity” [117] has been developed as a notion in 
10reaction to the so-called Actor-Network Theory (see, e.g. [118, 119]). ANT is an approach 
10to the research in social theory developed in the eighties. It originated in the field of science 
10studies that treats objects as part of social networks. Questions about “what things do” and 
10about “evocative objects” pop up in philosophy and theoretical sociology with increasing 
10frequency. They direct our attention to an important10phenomenon: the agency of objects. 
10Gijs van Oenen [117] contrasts Bruno Latour’s and ANT’s view on the agency, or actancy 
10of objects with his own view of the “interpassive” role of objects. In reaction to traditional 
10interactivity, van Oenen claims, interpassivity indicates that our contribution to the 
10realization of a work of art, or an institution, is now taken over by the artwork or institution 
10itself. He sees it as a consequence of the success of emancipation. Our emancipatory 
10privilege to live only in accordance with norms we have interactively subscribed to, is now 
10starting to turn into a burden – says van Oenen: we feel an obligation to always live up to 
10our emancipatory promise. Interpassivity, the inability to act according to norms we 
10ourselves subscribe to, is a form of resistance to the pressures exerted by successful 
10emancipation. In contrast with Latour’s view that objects can become “actors” but not for 
10particular reasons, van Oenen argues that objects become actors because our interactivity is 
10increasingly being “outsourced” to them. Paradoxically, we need objects to relieve us from 
10our emancipatory burden, in order to sustain our emancipatory ambition. In turn, the 
10condition of interpassivity (see [95]) implies that objects may acquire a more emancipatory 
10status: as carriers of interactive responsibilities, they now interact with us on a more equal 
10footing [117]. 
11Pfaller’s article was later published in International Journal of Zizek Studies. Volume One, 
11Number One – Why Žižek? Under the title “Interpassivity and Misdemeanors: The Analysis 
11of Ideology and the Žižekian Toolbox”. See also other Pfaller’s texts on the aesthetics of 
11interpassivity [120-122]. 



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12From The blog of Philosophical Reflections and Speculations written by Mike Bulajewski 
12who defines himself as “a 34-year old user expertise designer and graduate student at the 
12University of Washington’s Human Centred Design and Engineering program”. 
13For the problem, and each linkage of transference in social cognitive theory see for 
12example: “The authors propose an interpersonal social-cognitive theory of the self and 
12personality, the relational self, in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge 
12about significant others, and each linkage embodies a self-other relationship. Mental 
12representations of significant others are activated and used in interpersonal encounters in 
12the social-cognitive phenomenon of transference (S.M. Andersen & N.S. Glassman, 1996), 
12and this evokes the relational self. Variability in relational selves depends on interpersonal 
12contextual cues, whereas stability derives from the chronic accessibility of significant-other 
12representations. Relational selves function in if-then terms, in which ifs are situations 
12triggering transference, and thens are relational selves. An individual’s repertoire of 
12relational selves is a source of interpersonal patterns involving affect, motivation, 
12self-evaluation, and self-regulation” [123; p.619]. 
14We have already discussed Donald’s mimetic representation elsewhere [106-107]. 
15The evolutionary role of empathy for pain is an interesting topic. In 2005, Tucker, Luu and 
12Derryberry [124] pointed to the role of regulation of pain in the development of empathy. 
12They claimed that the evaluative mechanisms engaged in some complex forms of 
12self-regulation are “extensions of mechanisms that evolved for evaluating and responding to 
12pain”. They also speak of “sympathetic resonance” as an emotional response that ranges 
12from contagion to more complex intersubjective reasoning. In that view, empathy would 
12involve reasoning to integrate visceral emotional contagion and somatic sensiomotor 
12mirroring. Decety and Lamm [91] suggested that empathy involves both emotion sharing 
12(bottom-up information processing) and executive control to regulate and modulate this 
12experience (top-down information processing) aimed at controlling the experience, 
12underpinned by specific neural systems that interact. Dacety and Lamm in “Human 
12Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience” discuss data from recent behavioral 
12and functional neuroimaging studies with an emphasis on the perception of pain in others, 
12and highlight the role of different neural mechanisms that underpin the experience of 
12empathy, including emotion sharing, perspective taking, and emotion regulation. We are 
12interested in the connection between empathy and creativity. Usually, creative persons show 
12greater awareness of the surrounding. It is obvious that the higher quality of incoming 
12information needs a mind that is capable of dealing with it, and in that context it seems that 
12a creative person should have lower level of latent inhibition. Some recent experiments 
12showed that highfunctioning individuals with high IQs (in that particular case, Harvard 
12students) decreased Latent Inhibition associated with increased creative achievement [125]. 
12LI (Lower Inhibition) reflects the brain’s capacity to screen from current attentional focus 
12stimuli previously tagged as irrelevant [126]. Is there any relationship between empathic 
12responses automatically activated by the perception of certain emotional cues and latent 
12inhibition as an automatic protective selection of stimuli? Our hypothesis is that there could 
12be a relationship between latent inhibition and empathy. This is a poorly covered area of 
12research and it needs extensive gathering of material before even getting such a hypothesis 
12an adequate frame for testing. 

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NADILAŽENJE IDENTITETA: DINAMIČKO SEBSTVO NA 
RAZMEĐU FILOZOFIJE IZVEDBE I FILOZOFIJE ZNANOSTI 

S. Petlevski
Sveučilište u Zagrebu – Akademija dramske umjetnosti 
Zagreb, Hrvatska 

SAŽETAK 
U ovom radu zagovaram metodološku petlju povratne veze u istraživanju dinamičkoga sebstva na razmeđu 
filozofije, (umjetničke) izvedbe i filozofije znanosti. U komparativnom pregledu relevantnoga konteksta 
istraživanja objašnjavamo istraživačka čvorišta našega bavljenja konceptom “izvedbenoga”: to je prvenstveno, 
analiza izvedbenih umjetničkih praksi koja inkorporira elemente umjetničke prakse u metodologiju istraživanja 
(Frayling 1993); ali i izvedbene aspekte u znanstvenoj istraživačkoj praksi i metodlogiji. Kao podloga ovoga 
rada bitni su uvidi u procesnu filozofiju i njen odnos prema zanosti (Birkhardov “interaktivistički model”, 
2009), Campbellov “procesno utemeljen model za interaktivnu ontologiju”, 2009) kao i “autopoietički 
feedback” (Maturana i Varela 1974; Luhmann 1990). Naznačujemo tri mogućnosti u složenom odnosu filozofije 
i izvedbe (filozofiju izvedbe, filozofiju-kao-izvedbu i izvedbu-kao-filozofiju); zagovaramo metodologiju 
transfera između umjetnosti i znanosti (“interaktivni kontinuum” Newman i Benz 1998, Ridenour i Newman 
2008). U tekstu je pridana pozornost važnosti koju za naše istraživanje ima razvoj koncepta autopoietičkih 



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sistema. U drugome dijelu teksta bavimo se “nadilaženjem identiteta” u reprezentacijama Ja i Drugoga, 
odnosom Teorije-Teorije (TT) Simulacijske teorije (ST) u teoriji uma (ToM), te najnovijim pokušajima da se 
pristupi objedine (Barlassina 2013). Bavimo se i pojmom “utjelovljene prakse” (Gallagher i Meltzoff 1996), 
bilježimo recentna istraživanja srodnih fenomena u neuroznanosti, komentiramo značaj dijaloga 
neuroananstvenika i filozofa (Changeux i Ricour), a dajemo i primjer osnaživanja izvedbene teoroije i 
“istraživanja-u-praksi” osvješćivanjem enaktivnih procesa u tijeku glumačke izvedbe kod Zarillija (2007). U 
trećem ulomku dajemo kritiku pojma “interpasivnosti” (Žižek 1997; Pfaller 2000), a bavimo se i pojmom 
“transfera” vezanog uz Lacanovo ishodište Žižekova pojma interpasivnosti. U završnome dijelu rada, 
naznačavamo važnost istraživanja pojma “proširenog sebstva” (Gallagher 2000, Jeannerod 2003, Kim & 
Johnson 2013), da bismo, utvrdivši nemogućnost konačnog sumiranja rezultata istraživanja dinamičkog sebstva 
ponudili navod Yeatsove pjesme “Balon Uma”. 

KLJUČNE RIJEČI 
autopoiesis, dinamičko sebstvo, utjelovljena kognicija, enaktivna intersubjektivnost, izvedba