1259 

I N T E R S T A T E C0IA3RCF COtfl'lSSirK 
R E P O R T OF THE D I R E C T O R CF THE B U R E A U OF SAFETY I IT RE 
I N V E S T I G A T I O N OF AE" A C C I D E N T 7HICH OCOUFFED ON THE CHICAGO, 
SOUTH SFORE AND SOTjTH E E F D P A I L R O A D N E A R G A R Y , I N D . , ON 
A P R I L 10, 1926. 

May 12, 1926. 
To the Corinission: 

On April 10, 1926, triers was a head-end collicion 
between two passenger trains on the Cmcago, South Snore 
and South Bend Railroad near Gary, Ind., which resulted 
m t_ie death of 1 passenger, and tne injury of 11 passengers 
and 4 employees. 

Location and method of operation 
This railroad is an electric line extending between 

Kensington, 111., and South Bend, Ind., a distance of 75.6 
riles. The Western Division, on iihich tnis accident oc­
curred, covers that portion of the ror.d between Kensington 
and Gary, Ind., ?nd *s a double-track line over wnicii 
trains are operated by tiire-table â id tram oraers. At 
one point where the accident occurred, about 4 > lies west 
of Gary, there is a bridge over the ^^acks of the Elgin, 
Joliet and Eastern Rnilroad, there being a gauntlet trrck 
across this bridge and also on zhe approaches leading to 
the bridge, the length of this gauntlet track is 1,474 feet. 
Thip section of gauntlet track is protected by automatic 
signals oi the color-light type wnich display either red or 
green indications for stop or proceed, respectively. 

The bridge is 110 feet m length. Approaching from 
the east there is a signal governing westbound movements 
located G70 feet fron the beginning cf the gauntlet trade, 
followed by 642 feet of gauntlet track extending to the 
eastern end of the bridge. Approaching from the west 
there is a signcl 688 feet fron the beginning of the 
gauntlet track, followed by 732 feex of gauntlet track ex­
tending to the western end of the bridge. 

The control circait of the westbound signal begins 
at a point 1,316 feet west of the eastbound signal, co that 
when the track between tnis point and tho westbound signal 
is occupied the westbound Fignal displays a stop indication. 
The control of the eastbound signal beginc at the insulated 
joints located at the westbound signal, and a train occupying 



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thc track "between these sign-Is crueec both signrls to cfis-
plcy stop indications In otner v^rls, tiere is s trrck 
circuit extending v'2AT cf the eastboand si ;ual wnieh arfectf 
only the lndicr-nion of the icstbotiid ^igna^1 , umls T_t~rc 
is another trrck circuit betv>ef;n tne two B I ^ T . ^ I T \ uicli 
is common to botn of the signals. 

Tne signpl involved in the accident \,as TI.e one 
governing enc T I O V E N C N ; of westeour.d tic 1 M ove-" the 
gauntlet track, end the point of accident wr? on the ersteri 
p-opropen to Lh^ bridge, 216 fe~;I, iro.. the eastern end of 
cne gauntlc t trrck, ApororcninL_ the point 01 accident 
fro " the east t.II, tr->ck is tongent for distance of ^99.1 
feco; rpprofcrn.y- fron the r,c^ thorp : s ^ 5° curve -co 
che left 1,CC0 j.ect m length, jeyend r.ich uomt t.i1 tr^ck 
is tangent to tht, point of rccment, - distance of 2,247 
icet. The track is level in 3.„c~± direction for a con-
ndcrcble distance except fcr TIK a :>oroacnc Q a» oacn end 
of tne bridge, which are ab^et 1,2C0 feet m lengtn and 
are on ascending grades 01 2.5 ncr cent. 

The weather was clear pt tne ti:IE of the accident, 
wmon occuried at aoout 12.02 ai.r. 

Description 
Eastbound second-class passenger train hTo. 63 con­

sisted of motor car 9, of eteel-^nde^na^e constiuctior., 
end v.rs in enprge of Conductor Landis and rotorrar; Tibbius. 
It left Kensington at 11.30 a.a,, passed Gcluret 2.37 riles 
vest of the -point of accident and tne last open office, at 
11.58 a.m., on ti^e, received a clear indication at the 
sign-1 governing en stbound rrcvê  er.ts over the untiet track 
passed over the bridge and w? 3 descending the ^rade on tne 
eastern side of the bridge vhen it collided witn tram JTo > 
64. 

Westbound seccnd-clpss passenger trnn " 0 . 64 con­
sisted of motor car 6, ^f steal-underfraoe construction, pud 
trailer 111, of v.oodcn construe tion, the tram being m 
charge of Conductor Dcbbert and I otorran KJ.1. It left 
Cary at 11.35 a.i: . , on ti,.e, rjeeived a eloar indication 
at tne wontbeund signal "no waa .ascending the grpde leedmg 
to the bridge '_ic.i it colliaed vitn t m n , So. At the 
tine of the accident the speed of each of tne trains involv­
ed V3F estimated to nave been obout 15 miles an hour. 



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2£:ttor car 9 telescoped tne ne, d e n d of the first 

ce?r in trmn No. 64 for a distance of rbout 5 feet, but 
ncitner of the cars wra derailed. Fne broke o u t in the 
wreckage end ooth of these cors were destroyed. Tne recoiic" 
car m train No. 64 was only slightly damaged, IT; WIG cut 
off iron chc\car ahead of it in time to prevent its 
destruction by fire. 

Summary of evidence 
Motor\an Kull, of tram To. 64, said tnat on reach­

ing the tangeib track approoc.iin; tne point of O c c i d e n t ne 
sri. a green indication displayed by the westbound signal, 
indicating tnat the gauntlet trrck was clear, r n d ne said 
this signal was still displaying a green indication when 
nis n a m nassed it. He L I P do a service application of the 
brakes end estinated thac his tram entered tne gaanxlet 
track at a speed cf about 15 ^iles an hour. T>rhen xne c^r 
w a s about halfway up tne incline ne saw the head end of 
tram No. 63 as it core across the bridge and at once ap~ 
plied the air b re Ice 3 m emergency, and ne said h e felt: so 
sure that tho cars were going to stop tnat he did nox make 
any attempt to get out of the rotorman's vestibalo. 

Conductor Dabbert, of ore in No. 64, said an air­
brake application was made as the :ram approached xne west-
bound signal and thac t n e speed wps about 35 ^iles an nour 
wnen the signal was passed. As tne train was escendmg 
tne grade leading to the bridge ne felt an emergency applica­
tion of tne air brakes nnd he estimated that tne trr*m 
traveled a distance of about twe car-lengths oefore the 
collision occurred. After assisting passengers, he went 
back to a telephone booth to talk with the dispatcher and 
s s he passed the westbound signal ne noted thax it was 
not displaying £?n indication of any kind. Upon leaving 
the booth, nowever, he again looked at the signal and he 
said it was tnen displaying a stop mdication. It farther 
appeared from the statements oi Conductor Dabbcrt that 
he had been over this gauntlet track earlier m tne day on 
trains N O G. 46, 53, ?nd 59, and that on none of tnesc occa­
sions was the tram brought, to a stop nor w a s anytnmg said 
to hira by xhe mctorman to mdicete that chore h a d been 
anything wrong witn the operation of tne signals. 

R. C. Iseminger, collector on tram No. b4, was riding 
in the first car of tne tram at tne tune of Zi.c accident. 
He said he felt a service application of the a n brakes e t 
about tne time the tram was passing tne westbound signal , 
moving at a speed of about 2 0 pales en . l o u r , and tic re wra 
another application just before tne accident occurred. Irr-



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mediately after t r i o occurrence of tho accident he went 
back xo the telephone ^octh to notify the dispatcher of 
the occurrence of t h e accident and at that time noticed 
that no signal indication of any kind was being displayed 
by the v?esAbound signal, later ho observed that the signal 
was displaying a stop indication. 

/Kotorman Tibbits, of train No. 63, said the east­
bound signrl v/aa displaying a proceed indication, that 
his cram passed the signal at a speed of about 25 miles 
an hour and entered on the bridge at a speed of 25 or 30 
miles an hour. he th«-n observed train Wo- 64 entering 
the opposite end of the gauntlet trach ond at once ap­
plied th.? air b""aire3 m emerr3enc3r, craned the sanders and 
reversed the motor, he said the emergency Application was 
made when his tram was at the eastern end cf tne bridge 
and estimated that I D S doeed had b:en reduced to 10 or 12 
miles an hour by tno tine the accident occurred. Motorman 
Tibbits further sT,c ted that he hsd operated trams through 
this gaun+let track on several occasions on the day of the 
accident and that tne signals had been working properly 
at all times. 

Conductor Landis, of tram No. 63, said, his train was 
about halfway between tho eastern end of the bridge and the 
eastern end 01 tho gauntlet track when he felo what he 
thought was a service application of the air brakes fol­
lowed by the reversing of the motor, the collision oc­
curring immediately afterwards, at which time the speed 
of his train res about 15 miles an hour. The statements 
of Colleoior Kroenigj also of train Ko. 63, brougnt out 
nothing additional of importance. 

A consideration of the distances, speeds, and signal 
control circuits indicated clearly that tram No. 63 was 
on the ccntrol circuit of the westbound signal before 
tram ITo. 64 reached that point, but that for some reason 
the signal failed to display a s"cop indication. General 
Superintendent Gray, who reached the scene of the accident 
less than half an hour after its occurrence, expressed the 
opinion that the westbound signal haa displayed the various 
indications testified to by the employees, i.e., proceed 
when it was approached and passed by train Ko. 64, not 
burning when first ooserved shortly after the occurrence 
of tne accident, and stop when observed at a later time. 
This condition, he said, was probably due to a defective 
relay and the tests of the relay witnessed by him since 
that time confirmed this opinion. 



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The signal mstaJ lation at this point was pieced in 

service in 1911, rnd on April 7, 1926, revised line and 
"crack clients ^ere placed ir. s e i v i c e , As at present ar­
ranged tnr rignals operate m t ̂e following manner. An 
eastbound train on re,-chinj tne approach overlap section 
controlling the .vestbound sir nil shunts out the vanes fre­
quency relay, *hich opens fchw control circait of the line 
relay at the westbound signal , causing that signal to dis­
play a stop indication. Tffcnen the tram leaves the ap­
proach section the centrifugal freouency track relay is 
shunted out, noldmg open the control circuit for the line 
_relay at the westbound Lionel ami also changing the 
indication of the eastbound signal from proceed to stop 
A westbound tra^n shants out tne centrifugal freauency re­
lay governing the track between ohe two signals, causing 
both of tnem to display storj indications. 

Ths line relay TTBS removed from the westbound signal 
on the day following the accident and subjected to a seriec 
of tests. It was found tnat wncn energy was first appliec 
to the operating coils tne relay would pick up and drop 
away m the usual manner, but after the relay had been en­
ergized for a -oeriod of five or r»cre minutes it would re­
main m the energized position after the operating ener­
gy had been removed, the front contacts remaining closed 
and causing a proceed indication to be displayed for a 
period of several minutes. TlLien tne operating energy was 
first removed the vane woulu recede slowly from its 
uppermost nositicn until after & considerable period of 
time it would finally return to its normal stop position. 
Tne nore frequently the relay ^ras energized tne longer it 
would remain m tne clear position after the operating 
energy nad been removed, in fact, after one extended series 
of tests this condition remained for more tnan one hour 
and still existed when tne tests for that da/ were con­
cluded. It was elso found tuat tapping the housing or 
jarring the xelay lightly seemed to have no efiect. The 
relay operated properly at tirî e out m all of the tests 
in which it failed to operate properly it was noted that 
it would remain m the proceed position for \ short time 
or until the vane nad dropped iar enough to open cht front 
contacts. Theie would tnen be an interval wnen che vane 
k/ould be m a neutral sone and not permit of the displaying 
of a ny indication, and finally the vane ^oula drop low 
enough to close the back contacts and cause tne display 
of a stop indication. This operation of the relay was 
in entire conformity with the various indications of the 
signal observed by che employees immediately preceding and 
following the occunence of the accident. Tnis relay 
was identiiied as one which had been o/erhanled oy em­
ployees of the company since January of this year, but 
no opinion can be expressed as to its condition whon it 
was again installed, and the reason for its uncertain 



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Director 

perfornance on :h^ da/ w± tne aco^dunt and a3 so during 
the tests Wiiicii bt!i3 ct oer^aids inducted van not aeimite 
ly asccrtaixrd. 

Conclusions 

This accident was caused a frl^e clear signal 
indication, due to a deloc L^ve relay. 

^Tho evidence disclosed thai th° lire relay at the 
irestbound signal vas iii detective ~di nicr, c s a result 
of wrucn the raiay wojld nold tie pigio.1 in rhj proceed 
position for an vid^f xn_te period of ci^e u" i r r one re­
moval ot tic opera tinenergy. Tnere \ , t u tnen be an 
internal dun in; wi iu: it \ou]d be ^n a re_t~al position 
resulting in no signal indention bem^ 01 splayed, and 
finally c bach ceramets wouJd be closed ana cause the 
signal governed Dy tne raluy to assume tho stop position. 

Under tho s p e c D ^ ] matiuccionj contained m tne time 
table the apeed of Grams ovor this g^untior track is 
restrict d ^o nil^s J P nour. Th^ cvid&jco maicated 
that neither of the notoimeu invc-\cd ni this accident 
was obee t ̂ m-. tr__s rule. Hud t ^ rule beo.i observed it 
is bellow a. una tiiiis could have been brought to a stop 
before tne acoidcut occurred. 

Had an adequate system of automatic cram control 
been m use tn~- s accident would not have occurred. 

Tha Gnployees involved -vere exoenerced men; at the 
time of tne accident tnay had been on duty about 7 hours, 
aftei 15 hours or ">ore off dity. 

Respectfully subrcitted, 
W p. BORLAND.