INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON 

REPORT NO. 3455 
CHICAGO, SOUTH SPORE AND SOUTH BEND RAILROAD 

IN RE ACCIDENT 
AT GARY, IND., ON 

MARCH 4, 1952 



- 2 - Report Mo. 3455 

Date: 
Railroad: 
Location: 
Kind of accident: 
Equipment involved: 

Train numbers: 

Consists: 

Estimated speeds: 
Operation: 

Track: 

Weather: 
Time: 

March 4 , 1952 
Chicago, South Shore and South Bend 
Gary, Ind. 
Collision 
Passenger 
train 

203 

Passenger- : Passenge: 
equipment train 
train 

Equipment 
of No. 
150 

6 multiple-: 2 multiple-
unit cars unit cars 
Standing Standing 

29 

4 multiple-
unit cars 

12 m. p. h. 
Timetable, train orders and 
automatic block-signal system 
Station track; tangent; 0.06 percent 
descending grade eastward 
Clear 
6: 04 p. m. 
189 injured 
Failure to operate following train 
in accordance with signal 
ind ications 

SUMMARY 

Casualties: 
Cause: 



- 3 -

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 

REPORT NO. 3455 
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS 

UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910. 
CHICAGO, SOUTH SHORE AND SOUTH BEND RAILROAD 

May 5, 1952 

Accident at Gary, Ind., on March 4, 1952, caused 
failure to operate the following train in 
accordance with signal indications. 

1 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 

PATTERSON, Commissioner: 
On March 4, 1952y there was a collision between a 

passenger train and a passenger-equipment train, which in 
turn collided with another passenger train on the Chicago, 
South Shore and South Bend Railroad, This accident resulted 
in the injury of 180 passengers, 3 employees not on duty, 
1 assistant trainmaster and 5 train-service employees. It 
was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the 
Indiana Public Service Commission, 

Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com­
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the 
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and 
disposition. 



- h -

S t a t i o n t r a c k s Nos. 

Switch 

To v e s t y a r d -
l i m i t s i g n 

2 . 8 7 mi. 

C r o s s o v e r A - 169 f t . f 

Switch 
S p r i n g switch 

xi 
NJ 
O 
u 

M s*> 
( < , O » LT\ 

CO 
d H 

X Gary, I n d , 
( P o i n t o f a c c i d e n t ) 

6 a 0 mi. 
0 Shearson Tower, I n d , 1 
1 1 0 o 6 m i , 
o Kensington, 1 1 1 . 

VJestv;ard main t r a c k 
Eastward main t r a c k 

O 

u 
O 

FT) «\ - 4 " 
!>» 

V U Si 
_ JH O 
0-* O CJ3 H 
« c/j ^ 

A 

O 
CO 

o to 
ci o 

•RH 

o 



3455 

Location of Accident and Method of Operation 
This accident occurred on that part of the railroad, 

extending between Kensington, 111., and Gary, Ind*, 15.6 
miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is 
a double-track line, over which trains moving with the 
current of traffic are operated by timetable, train orders 
and an automatic block-signal systf-m. A catenary system 
is provided for the electric propulsion of trains. The 
main tracks from north to south are designated as westward 
main track and eastward main track. The station at Gary is 
located between the two main tracks. A trailing-point cross­
over, 490 feet in length, connects the txro main tracks and 
also serves as the lead track for station tracks. The west 
switch of this crossover is a spring switch located in the 
westward main track 940 feet west of the station. The normal 
position of this switch is for movement on the westward main 
track. Two station tracks, designated from north to south 
as track Mo. 1 and track No. 2, extend westward from the 
station and are located between the two main tracks. Tracks 
Nos. 1 and 2 connect with the lead track at switches, 
respectively, 712 feet and 631 fcjet west of the station. 
Crossover A, 169 feet in length, connects the eastward 
main track with the lead track. The west switch of 
crossover A is located in the eastward main track 905 feet 
west of the station and is facing-point for east-bound move­
ments. The east switch of crossover A is located 22 feet 
west of the switch at the west end of track No. 1. It is 
a spring switch and is normally lined for movements on the 
lead track. The accident occurred within yard limits on 
the lead track, at a point 201.5 feet east of the west switch 
of crossover A and 701.5 feet west of the station, and 2.87 
miles east of the west yard-limit sign. From the west on the 
eastward main track there are, in succession, a tangent 2,961 
feet in length, a 3° curve to the right 614 feet to the west 
switch of crossover A and 70 feet eastward. The grade far 
east-bound trains varies between 0 . 1 2 percent ascending 
and. 0.54 percent descending throughout a distance of 5 , 4 0 0 
feet immediately west of the point of accident, and is 0 . 0 6 
percent descending eastward at that point. 

The switch stand of the main-track switch of crossover 
A is of the low-stand, ground-throw type. It is located 
6 feet 11-1/4 inches north of th<= center-line of the east­
ward main track. It is eauipped with both a red and a white 
rectangular target and an electric switch lamp. 'Alien the 
switch is lined for entry to the crossover a red liaht and. 
the red. target are displayed in the direction of an approach­
ing train. The centers of the targets and the lenses of 
the switch lamp are, respectively, 1 foot 1 inch, and 1 foot 
10 inches above the level of the tops of the rails. 



Automatic signals 593 and 591 are located, respectively, 
1.0? miles and 842 feet west of the point of accident. 
Signal 593 is of the 1-unit color-light type and displays 
three aspects. Signal 591 is of the 2-unit color-light 
type and displays four aspects. These signals are continuously 
lighted. The aspects applicable to this investigation and 
the corresponding indications are as follox^s: 
Signal 
593 

Aspect 
GREEN 

Indication 
PROCEED 

YELLOW RESTRICTED SPEED, but 
not more than one-
half the maximum 
speed for the 
territory. 

591 P.ED-over 
YELLOW 

Facing point svitck 
entering Gary Yard 
op en-proceed at 
restricted speed, 
orcpax°ed to stop 
shoi't of obstruction 

The controlling circuits of these signals are so arranged 
that when the west switch of crossover A is lined for entry 
to the station tracks and the eastward main track between 
signal 591 and the switch is unoccupied, signal 591 indicates 
that the switch Is lined for entry to Gary Yard—Proceed at 
Restricted Speed, and signal 593 indicates RESTRICTED SPEED. 

This carrier's operating rules read in part as follows: 
104. * * * Switches must b>~ properly lined af t ng 

having been used, 
* ** 

104(a). All main track switches and those 
required by rule and special instructions to be 
locked must be left in that condition. 

# 



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Timetable special Instructions read in part as follows 
7, Train Movements: 
# # * 

(l) All trains, regardless of class, will approach 
all schedule meeting or passing points under control 
prepared to stop. 

i't # tit 

(c) RESTRICTED SPEED—Proceed prepared to stop shor 
of train, obstruction, or anything that may require 
the speed of a train to be reduced, not to exceed (20) 
twenty mil.es per hour. 

2_2 * * * 

(c) Indications of Signal 501 located * * * 
Monroe St., Gary, arc as follox-irs: 

Tlie top unit indications are— 
GREEK Clear—Proceed 
YELLOW Caution or order board display at stop 

indIcation 
RED Stop, then proceed at restricted speed, 

looking out for track to be occupied, 
broken rail, or open switch. 

The lower unit indications are— 
YELLOW indicates facing point switch entering 

GARY YARD open—proceed at restricted 
speed, prepared to stop short of 
obstruction 

RED indicates facing point switch to Gary 
Yard lined for main track movement— 
be governed by top unit. 

20. YARD LIMITS. 
* * <it 

http://mil.es


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(c) All trains will approach Gary * # under 
control, expecting to find the track occupied by 
yard motors. 
In the vicinity of Gary the soeed of passenger trains 

is restricted tc 45 miles per hour 
Description of Accident 

No. 203, an east-bound first-class passenger train, 
consisted of six multiple-unit passenger-train cars. All cars 
were of all-steel construction, and all ware power units 
except the third car. This train was being operated from 
the front control compartment of MU coach 26, the first 
unit of the train. It passed Shearson Tower, the last open 
office, 6 miles west of the point of accident, at 5:55 p. m., 
2 minutes late, passed signal 593, which indicated Proceed, 
and stopeed at signal 591, which indicated Proceed at 
Restricted. Speed to station tracks. After a proceed signal 
was given by a member of the mechanical force in the vicinity 
of the switch to track No. 2, it proceeded, entered crossover 
A and was routed to track No. 2. It stopped with the front 
end about 8 feet west of the east end of track No. 2, a.nd 
tne rear end about 530 feet west of the station. 

A passenger-equipment train consisting of two multiple-
unit passenger-train cars had been placed on the westward 
main track at the station by members of the mechanical force. 
The samo employees later moved this equipment from the 
westward main track to the lead track to permit a west-bound 
freight train to proceed. The passenger-equipment train was 
move! to the lead track Immediately ,nfter No. 203 arrived, 
and first was stopped about 3 feet from the roar end oi that 
train. About 1 minute later it was moved against the rear 
end of No, 203 and immediately afterward the west end was 
struck by No. 29. 

No, 29, an cast-bound, first-class passenger train, 
consisted of four multiple-unit passenger-train cars. All 
cais were of all-stocl construction. This train was being 
operated fiom the front control compartment of MU coach 11, 
the first unit of the train. It passed Sheerson Tower at 
5:57 p. m., 1 minute late, passed signal 593, which indicated 
RESTRICTED SPEED, passed signal 591, which indicated Proceed 
at Restricted Speed to station traces, entered crossover A, 
and while moving at en estimated speed of 12 miles per hour 
it struck the west end of the passenger-equipment train. 



- 9 - 3455 

Uo. 203 was moved eastward about 11 feet. The draft 
gear of each car in this train was damaged or broken and. all 
the caî s were somewhat damaged. The east truck of the east 
car of the passenger-equipment train was slightly displaced.. 
This car was considerably damaged and the west car was 
somewhat damaged. No. 29 stopped Trith the front end of the 
first car about 11 feet east of the point of collision and 
against the west end of the west car of the psssenger-equipiaent 
train. A separation occurred between the first and the second, 
cars. The rear end-sill of the first car overrode the front 
end-sill of the second car, and the vestibules between those 
cars were crushed inward. Tne rear truck of the first car 
was displaced slightly. The first and the second cars \ r e r e 
considerably damaged and the third and the fourth cars -cse 
somewhat damaged. 

The motorman and the flagman of No. 203, and the 'notor-
man, the conductor and the flagman of No. 29 were injured. 

The weather was clear and it was dusk a"c the time of 
the accident, which occurred about 6:04 p. m. ' 

Txie multiple-unit cars involved are equipped with 
automatic air brakes with U-4 universal valves, and an 11-23 
engineer's brake valve at each control station of each power 
unit. A safety-control feature which operates in conjunction 
with the controller and a foot pedal is provided. If 
downward, pressure against spring-tension on the controller 
handle is released while the controller is in running position, 
the brakes will be applied in emergency and power to the 
trr.ction motors will be cut off. Also, if downward pressure 
on the controller handle and the foot pedal are rcleasod 
simultaneously while the controller handle is in off-position 
and the reverser key ie in, the brakes will be applied in 
emer ;ency. 

Di scussicn 
At Gary, east-bound passenger trains which terminate 

at thai station and east-bound passenger trains en route to 
other points which are scheduled to be passed by another 
train at Gary are routed to the station tracks through 
crossover A. The switches used for such movements to and 
from the station tracks and the main tr.' cks are operated 
when nccossa.ry by members of the mechanical force. These 
employees also inspect equipment and perform switching 
service with the passenger equipment of trains either arriving 
or originating at Gary. No. 203 is scheduled to be narsed 
by No. 29 at Gary. Timetable special instructions provide • 
that trains must approach schedule pressing points and Gary 
Yard under control. 



- 10 - 3455 

On the day of the accident, as No. 203 was approaching 
Gary the motorman was in the control compartment at the front 
end of the first car and the members of the train crew were 
in various locations in the cars of the train. The motorman 
said that sig'nal 593 indicated Proceed for his train and. 
signal 591 also indicated Proceed when it first became 
visible to him. His attention was momentarily diverted by 
highway traffic at a grade crossing about 1 mile west of 
signal 591 and when he again observed the signal it was 
displaying a red-over-yellow aspect. He said that after 
his train had stopped at signal 591 he received a proceed, 
signal given with a white light from the vicinity of the 
switch to track No. 2. No. 203 then proceeded and the 
motorman observed that the xrest switch of crossover A was 
lined for entry to the station tracks. The train entered 
crossover A and was routed to track No. 2. It was stopped, 
about 6:02 p, m,, with the front end of the first car about 
8 feet west of the east end of track No. 2. The accident 
occurred about 2 minutes later. 

Before No, 203 arrived at Gary the passenger equipment 
of No. 130, a west-bound first-class passenger train, 
scheduled to leave Gary at 6:25 p. m., was placed on the west­
ward main track at the station by two car inspectors regularly 
assigned, at this point to inspect equipment and perform 
switching service. Soon after the equipment of No. 130 had 
been placed on the westward main track, a west-bound, freight 
train arrived at Gary. The car inspectors mo^ed the eriuiament 
of No. 130 to the station tracks to permit the freight train 
to proceed. With a car inspector at each end of the passenger-
equipment train, it was moved westward over the switch at the 
west end of the crossover and lead track, A car-insocctor 
helper, who a] so was regularly assigned at this point, had. 
lined the west switch of crossover A for entry to the 
station tracks, in accordance with previous instructions, 
and was awaiting the arrival of No. 205. 1,rhen he observed 
that the passenger equipment of No. 130 had been moved 
westward he proceeded to the west switch of the crossover 
and lead, track and lined it for movement to the station 
tracks. After No. 203 had entered track No. 2, the 
po-sccnger-equipment train was moved eastward and stopped 
on the lea.d. track with the east end of the east car about 
3 feet west of the rear end of No. 203. The car inspector 
at the east end of the passenger-equipment train said that 
as the train was moved eastward he called to the helper 
and instructed him to close the west switch of crossover A. 
He said that he did not know if the helper heard or understood 
the Instruction. The car inspector at the west end of the 
passenger-equipment train said that after his train stopped 
on the lead track he observed that No. 29 was closely 



- 1 1 - 3455 

approaching and then he became aware that it had entered 
crossover A. He inserted the reverser key and opened the 
controller and the passenger-equipment train moved eastward 
and against the rear end of No. 203 immediately before the 
collision occurred. The helper said that he had lined the 
west switch of crossover A for entry to the station tracks 
before the arrival of No, 203 and he was in the vicinity 
of the switch of track No, 2 when that train arrived. When 
he observed that the passenger-equipment train was moving 
westward he proceeded to the west switch of the crossover 
and. lead track to line it for the movement of the equipment 
to the station tracks. He said that the switch lock was 
frozen and it took longer than usual to open It. He restored 
the switch to normal position when the passenger-equipment 
train cleared the westward main track and then proceeded 
to the south side of the eastward main track and passed the 
west switch of crossover A.without restoring it to normal 
position. The helper said that the arrival of the west-bound 
extra freight train and the return movement of the passenger 
equipment of No. 130 to the station tracks had not been 
anticipated and required a variation from the normal routine 
of movements. Because he became concerned with the movement 
of a baggage car which was to be added to No. 29 when it 
arrived, he overlooked tho position of the main-track switch 
of crossover A. He was in the vicinity of the yard tracks 
south of the eastward main track when No. 29 entered 
crossover A and struck the passenger-oauipment train. 

As No. 29 was approaching the point where the accident 
occurred the speed was about 19 miles per hour. The motorman 
was maintaining a lookout ahead from the control compartment 
at the front end of the first car. The members of the train 
crew and an assistant trainmaster wore at Various locations 
in the cars of the train. The headlight was lighted brightly. 
The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned 
properly when used en route. The motorman said that signal 
593 indicated Proceed. When the train was closely approaching 
signal 591 his attention was diverted to an automobile 
closoly approaching the rail-highway grade-crossing in the 
vicinity of the signal. He said he observed that a yellox* 
asp>oct was displayed by signal 591 and he thought that it 
was the top unit of the signal and expected to proceed on the 
eastward main track. After he had passed the signal he 
observed the red light of the switch lamp and that the west 
switch of crossover A was lined for movement to the station 
tracks. He immediately made an emergency application of the 
brakes and attempted to reverse the power to the traction 
motors, he t.iought that the speed was reduced to about 12 
miles per hour when the collision occurred. 



- 12 - 3455 

After the accident occurred tne signal system was 
tested and it functioned as intended. Examination of the 
signals involved disclosed no defective condition of the 
signal apparatus. Under the 'circumstances present, the 
aspect displayed by signal 5Q1 indicated that the switch 
was lined, for the train to enter Gary Yard, that the speed, 
of lo. 29 should be reduced to 20 miles per hour or less, 
and that the speed should be so controlled that the train 
could, be stopped short of an obstruction. 

Cause-
It is found that this accident w<"s caused by failure 

to operate tne following train in accordance with signal 
indications. 

Dated at Washinpton, D. 0., this fifth 
day of Kay, 1952. 
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson. 

( SEAL) W t P. BARTEL, 
Secretary.