[illustration: sir frederick roberts] * * * * * the afghan wars - and - by archibald forbes with portraits and plans * * * * * contents part i.--the first afghan war chap. i.--preliminary ii.--the march to cabul iii.--the first year of occupation iv.--the second year of occupation v.--the beginning of the end vi.--the road to ruin vii.--the catastrophe viii.--the siege and defence of jellalabad ix.--retribution and rescue part ii.--the second afghan war i.--the first campaign ii.--the opening of the second campaign iii.--the lull before the storm iv.--the december storm v.--on the defensive in sherpur vi.--ahmed khel vii.--the ameer abdurrahman viii.--maiwand and the great march ix.--the battle of candahar * * * * * list of illustrations and plans portrait of sir frederick roberts _frontispiece_ plan of cabul, the cantonment portrait of sir george pollock portrait of sir louis cavagnari and sirdars plan of cabul showing the actions, dec. - plan of action, ahmed khel portrait of the ameer abdurrahman plan of the action of maiwand plan of the action of candahar _the portraits of sir g. pollock and sir f. roberts are engraved by permission of messrs henry graves & co._ * * * * * the afghan wars part i: _the first afghan war_ chapter i: preliminary since it was the british complications with persia which mainly furnished what pretext there was for the invasion of afghanistan by an anglo-indian army in , some brief recital is necessary of the relations between great britain and persia prior to that aggression. by a treaty, concluded between england and persia in , the former state bound itself, in case of the invasion of persia by any european nation, to aid the shah either with troops from india or by the payment of an annual subsidy in support of his war expenses. it was a dangerous engagement, even with the _caveat_ rendering the undertaking inoperative if such invasion should be provoked by persia. during the fierce struggle of - , between abbas meerza and the russian general paskevitch, england refrained from supporting persia either with men or with money, and when prostrate persia was in financial extremities because of the war indemnity which the treaty of turkmanchai imposed upon her, england took advantage of her needs by purchasing the cancellation of the inconvenient obligation at the cheap cost of about £ , . it was the natural result of this transaction that english influence with the persian court should sensibly decline, and it was not less natural that in conscious weakness persia should fall under the domination of russian influence. futteh ali, the old shah of persia, died in , and was succeeded by his grandson prince mahomed meerza, a young man who inherited much of the ambition of his gallant father abbas meerza. his especial aspiration, industriously stimulated by his russian advisers, urged him to the enterprise of conquering the independent principality of herat, on the western border of afghanistan. herat was the only remnant of afghan territory that still remained to a member of the legitimate royal house. its ruler was shah kamran, son of that mahmoud shah who, after ousting his brother shah soojah from the throne of cabul, had himself been driven from that elevation, and had retired to the minor principality of herat. the young shah of persia was not destitute of justification for his designs on herat. that this was so was frankly admitted by mr ellis, the british envoy to his court, who wrote to his government that the shah had fair claim to the sovereignty of afghanistan as far as ghuznee, and that kamran's conduct in occupying part of the persian province of seistan had given the shah 'a full justification for commencing hostilities against herat.' the serious phase of the situation for england and india was that russian influence was behind persia in this hostile action against herat. mr ellis pointed out that in the then existing state of relations between persia and russia, the progress of the former in afghanistan was tantamount to the advancement of the latter. but unfortunately there remained valid an article in the treaty of to the effect that, in case of war between the afghans and the persians, the english government should not interfere with either party unless when called on by both to mediate. in vain did ellis and his successor m'neill remonstrate with the persian monarch against the herat expedition. an appeal to st petersburg, on the part of great britain, produced merely an evasive reply. how diplomatic disquietude had become intensified may be inferred from this, that whereas in april ellis wrote of persia as a russian first parallel of attack against india, lord auckland, then governor-general of india, directed m'neill, in the early part of , to urge the shah to abandon his enterprise, on the ground that he (the governor-general) 'must view with umbrage and displeasure schemes of interference and conquest on our western frontier.' the shah, unmoved by the representations of the british envoy, marched on herat, and the siege was opened on november d, . durand, a capable critic, declares that the strength of the place, the resolution of the besiegers, the skill of their russian military advisers, and the gallantry of the besieged, were alike objects of much exaggeration. 'the siege was from first to last thoroughly ill-conducted, and the defence, in reality not better managed, owed its _éclat_ to persian ignorance, timidity and supineness. the advice of pottinger, the gallant english officer who assisted the defence, was seldom asked, and still more seldom taken; and no one spoke more plainly of the conduct of both besieged and besiegers than did pottinger himself.' m'neill effected nothing definite during a long stay in the persian camp before herat, the counteracting influence of the russian envoy being too strong with the shah; and the british representative, weary of continual slights, at length quitted the persian camp completely foiled. after six days' bombardment, the persians and their russian auxiliaries delivered an assault in force on june d, . it failed, with heavy loss, and the dispirited shah determined on raising the siege. his resolution was quickened by the arrival of colonel stoddart in his camp, with the information that a military force from bombay, supported by ships of war, had landed on the island of karrack in the persian gulf, and with the peremptory ultimatum to the shah that he must retire from herat at once. lord palmerston, in ordering this diversion in the gulf, had thought himself justified by circumstances in overriding the clear and precise terms of an article in a treaty to which england had on several occasions engaged to adhere. as for the shah, he appears to have been relieved by the ultimatum. on the th september he mounted his horse and rode away from herat. the siege had lasted nine and a half months. to-day, half a century after simonich the russian envoy followed mahomed shah from battered but unconquered herat, that city is still an afghan place of arms. shah soojah-ool moolk, a grandson of the illustrious ahmed shah, reigned in afghanistan from till . his youth had been full of trouble and vicissitude. he had been a wanderer, on the verge of starvation, a pedlar and a bandit, who raised money by plundering caravans. his courage was lightly reputed, and it was as a mere creature of circumstance that he reached the throne. his reign was perturbed, and in he was a fugitive and an exile. runjeet singh, the sikh ruler of the punjaub, defrauded him of the famous koh-i-noor, which is now the most precious of the crown jewels of england, and plundered and imprisoned the fallen man. shah soojah at length escaped from lahore. after further misfortunes he at length reached the british frontier station of loodianah, and in became a pensioner of the east india company. after the downfall of shah soojah, afghanistan for many years was a prey to anarchy. at length in , dost mahomed succeeded in making himself supreme at cabul, and this masterful man thenceforward held sway until his death in , uninterruptedly save during the three years of the british occupation. dost mahomed was neither kith nor kin to the legitimate dynasty which he displaced. his father poyndah khan was an able statesman and gallant soldier. he left twenty-one sons, of whom futteh khan was the eldest, and dost mahomed one of the youngest. futteh khan was the warwick of afghanistan, but the afghan 'kingmaker' had no barnet as the closing scene of his chequered life. falling into hostile hands, he was blinded and scalped. refusing to betray his brothers, he was leisurely cut to pieces by the order and in the presence of the monarch whom he had made. his young brother dost mahomed undertook to avenge his death. after years of varied fortunes the dost had worsted all his enemies, and in he became the ruler of cabul. throughout his long reign dost mahomed was a strong and wise ruler. his youth had been neglected and dissolute. his education was defective, and he had been addicted to wine. once seated on the throne, the reformation of our henry fifth was not more thorough than was that of dost mahomed. he taught himself to read and write, studied the koran, became scrupulously abstemious, assiduous in affairs, no longer truculent but courteous. he is said to have made a public acknowledgment of the errors of his previous life, and a firm profession of reformation; nor did his after life belie the pledges to which he committed himself. there was a fine rugged honesty in his nature, and a streak of genuine chivalry; notwithstanding the despite he suffered at our hands, he had a real regard for the english, and his loyalty to us was broken only by his armed support of the sikhs in the second punjaub war. the fallen shah soojah, from his asylum in loodianah, was continually intriguing for his restoration. his schemes were long inoperative, and it was not until that certain arrangements were entered into between him and the maharaja runjeet singh. to an application on shah soojah's part for countenance and pecuniary aid, the anglo-indian government replied that to afford him assistance would be inconsistent with the policy of neutrality which the government had imposed on itself; but it unwisely contributed financially toward his undertaking by granting him four months' pension in advance. sixteen thousand rupees formed a scant war fund with which to attempt the recovery of a throne, but the shah started on his errand in february . after a successful contest with the ameers of scinde, he marched on candahar, and besieged that fortress. candahar was in extremity when dost mahomed, hurrying from cabul, relieved it, and joining forces with its defenders, he defeated and routed shah soojah, who fled precipitately, leaving behind him his artillery and camp equipage, during the dost's absence in the south, runjeet singh's troops crossed the attock, occupied the afghan province of peshawur, and drove the afghans into the khyber pass. no subsequent efforts on dost mahomed's part availed to expel the sikhs from peshawur, and suspicious of british connivance with runjeet singh's successful aggression, he took into consideration the policy of fortifying himself by a counter alliance with persia. as for shah soojah, he had crept back to his refuge at loodianah. lord auckland succeeded lord william bentinck as governor-general of india in march . in reply to dost mahomed's letter of congratulation, his lordship wrote: 'you are aware that it is not the practice of the british government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states;' an abstention which lord auckland was soon to violate. he had brought from england the feeling of disquietude in regard to the designs of persia and russia which the communications of our envoy in persia had fostered in the home government, but it would appear that he was wholly undecided what line of action to pursue. 'swayed,' says durand, 'by the vague apprehensions of a remote danger entertained by others rather than himself,' he despatched to afghanistan captain burnes on a nominally commercial mission, which, in fact, was one of political discovery, but without definite instructions. burnes, an able but rash and ambitious man, reached cabul in september , two months before the persian army began the siege of herat. he had a strong prepossession in favour of the dost, whose guest he had already been in , and the policy he favoured was not the revival of the legitimate dynasty in the person of shah soojah, but the attachment of dost mahomed to british interests by strengthening his throne and affording him british countenance. burnes sanguinely believed that he had arrived at cabul in the nick of time, for an envoy from the shah of persia was already at candahar, bearing presents and assurances of support. the dost made no concealment to burnes of his approaches to persia and russia, in despair of british good offices, and being hungry for assistance from any source to meet the encroachments of the sikhs, he professed himself ready to abandon his negotiations with the western powers if he were given reason to expect countenance and assistance at the hands of the anglo-indian government. burnes communicated to his government those friendly proposals, supporting them by his own strong representations, and meanwhile, carried away by enthusiasm, he exceeded his powers by making efforts to dissuade the candahar chiefs from the persian alliance, and by offering to support them with money to enable them to make head against the offensive, by which persia would probably seek to revenge the rejection of her overtures. for this unauthorised excess of zeal burnes was severely reprimanded by his government, and was directed to retract his offers to the candahar chiefs. the situation of burnes in relation to the dost was presently complicated by the arrival at cabul of a russian officer claiming to be an envoy from the czar, whose credentials, however, were regarded as dubious, and who, if that circumstance has the least weight, was on his return to russia utterly repudiated by count nesselrode. the dost took small account of this emissary, continuing to assure burnes that he cared for no connection except with the english, and burnes professed to his government his fullest confidences in the sincerity of those declarations. but the tone of lord auckland's reply, addressed to the dost, was so dictatorial and supercilious as to indicate the writer's intention that it should give offence. it had that effect, and burnes' mission at once became hopeless. yet, as a last resort, dost mahomed lowered his pride so far as to write to the governor-general imploring him 'to remedy the grievances of the afghans, and afford them some little encouragement and power.' the pathetic representation had no effect. the russian envoy, who was profuse in his promises of everything which the dost was most anxious to obtain, was received into favour and treated with distinction, and on his return journey he effected a treaty with the candahar chiefs, which was presently ratified by the russian minister at the persian court. burnes, fallen into discredit at cabul, quitted that place in august . he had not been discreet, but it was not his indiscretion that brought about the failure of his mission. a nefarious transaction, which kaye denounces with the passion of a just indignation, connects itself with burnes' negotiations with the dost; his official correspondence was unscrupulously mutilated and garbled in the published blue book with deliberate purpose to deceive the british public. burnes had failed because, since he had quitted india for cabul, lord auckland's policy had gradually altered. lord auckland had landed in india in the character of a man of peace. that, so late as april , he had no design of obstructing the existing situation in afghanistan is proved by his written statement of that date, that 'the british government had resolved decidedly to discourage the prosecution by the ex-king shah soojah-ool-moolk, so long as he may remain under our protection, of further schemes of hostility against the chiefs now in power in cabul and candahar.' yet, in the following june, he concluded a treaty which sent shah soojah to cabul, escorted by british bayonets. of this inconsistency no explanation presents itself. it was a far cry from our frontier on the sutlej to herat in the confines of central asia--a distance of more than miles, over some of the most arduous marching ground in the known world. no doubt the anglo-indian government was justified in being somewhat concerned by the facts that a persian army, backed by russian volunteers and russian roubles, was besieging herat, and that persian and russian emissaries were at work in afghanistan. both phenomena were rather of the 'bogey' character; how much so to-day shows when the afghan frontier is still beyond herat, and when a descendant of dost mahomed still sits in the cabul _musnid_. but neither england nor india scrupled to make the karrack counter-threat which arrested the siege of herat; and the obvious policy as regarded afghanistan was to watch the results of the intrigues which were on foot, to ignore them should they come to nothing, as was probable, to counteract them by familiar methods if serious consequences should seem impending. our alliance with runjeet singh was solid, and the quarrel between dost mahomed and him concerning the peshawur province was notoriously easy of arrangement. on whose memory rests the dark shadow of responsibility for the first afghan war? the late lord broughton, who, when sir john cam hobhouse, was president of the board of control from to , declared before a house of commons committee, in , 'the afghan war was done by myself; entirely without the privity of the board of directors.' the meaning of that declaration, of course, was that it was the british government of the day which was responsible, acting through its member charged with the control of indian affairs; and further, that the directorate of the east india company was accorded no voice in the matter. but this utterance was materially qualified by sir j. c. hobhouse's statement in the house of commons in , that his despatch indicating the policy to be adopted, and that written by lord auckland, informing him that the expedition had already been undertaken, had crossed each other on the way. it would be tedious to detail how lord auckland, under evil counsel, gradually boxed the compass from peace to war. the scheme of action embodied in the treaty which, in the early summer of , was concluded between the anglo-indian government, runjeet singh, and shah soojah, was that shah soojah, with a force officered from an indian army, and paid by british money, possessing also the goodwill and support of the maharaja of the punjaub, should attempt the recovery of his throne without any stiffening of british bayonets at his back. then it was urged, and the representation was indeed accepted, that the shah would need the buttress afforded by english troops, and that a couple of regiments only would suffice to afford this prestige. but sir harry fane, the commander-in-chief, judiciously interposed his veto on the despatch of a handful of british soldiers on so distant and hazardous an expedition. finally, the governor-general, committed already to a mistaken line of policy, and urged forward by those about him, took the unfortunate resolution to gather together an anglo-indian army, and to send it, with the ill-omened shah soojah on its shoulders, into the unknown and distant wilds of afghanistan. this action determined on, it was in accordance with the anglo-indian fitness of things that the governor-general should promulgate a justificatory manifesto. of this composition it is unnecessary to say more than to quote durand's observation that in it 'the words "justice and necessity" were applied in a manner for which there is fortunately no precedent in the english language,' and sir henry edwardes' not less trenchant comment that 'the views and conduct of dost mahomed were misrepresented with a hardihood which a russian statesman might have envied.' all men whose experience gave weight to their words opposed this 'preposterous enterprise.' mr elphinstone, who had been the head of a mission to cabul thirty years earlier, held that 'if an army was sent up the passes, and if we could feed it, no doubt we might take cabul and set up shah soojah; but it was hopeless to maintain him in a poor, cold, strong and remote country, among so turbulent a people.' lord william bentinck, lord auckland's predecessor, denounced the project as an act of incredible folly. marquis wellesley regarded 'this wild expedition into a distant region of rocks and deserts, of sands and ice and snow,' as an act of infatuation. the duke of wellington pronounced with prophetic sagacity, that the consequence of once crossing the indus to settle a government in afghanistan would be a perennial march into that country. chapter ii: the march to cabul the two main objects of the venturesome offensive movement to which lord auckland had committed himself were, first, the raising of the persian siege of herat if the place should hold out until reached--the recapture of it if it should have fallen; and, secondly, the establishment of shah soojah on the afghan throne. the former object was the more pressing, and time was very precious; but the distances in india are great, the means of communication in did not admit of celerity, and the seasons control the safe prosecution of military operations. nevertheless, the concentration of the army at the frontier station of ferozepore was fully accomplished toward the end of november. sir harry fane was to be the military head of the expedition, and he had just right to be proud of the , carefully selected and well-seasoned troops who constituted his bengal contingent. the force consisted of two infantry divisions, of which the first, commanded by major-general sir willoughby cotton, contained three brigades, commanded respectively by colonels sale, nott, and dennis, of whom the two former were to attain high distinction within the borders of afghanistan. major-general duncan commanded the second infantry division of the two brigades, of which one was commanded by colonel roberts, the gallant father of a gallant son, the other by colonel worsley. the troops raised for shah soojah, who were under fane's orders, and were officered from our army in india, had been recently and hurriedly recruited, and although rapidly improving, were not yet in a state of high efficiency. the contingent which the bombay presidency was to furnish to the 'army of the indus,' and which landed about the close of the year near the mouth of the indus, was under the command of general sir john keane, the commander-in-chief of the bombay army. the bombay force was about strong. before the concentration at ferozepore had been completed, lord auckland received official intimation of the retreat of the persians from before herat. with their departure had gone, also, the sole legitimate object of the expedition; there remained but a project of wanton aggression and usurpation. the russo-persian failure at herat was scarcely calculated to maintain in the astute and practical afghans any hope of fulfilment of the promises which the western powers had thrown about so lavishly, while it made clear that, for some time at least to come, the persians would not be found dancing again to russian fiddling. the abandonment of the siege of herat rendered the invasion of afghanistan an aggression destitute even of pretext. the governor-general endeavoured to justify his resolution to persevere in it by putting forth the argument that its prosecution was required, 'alike in observation of the treaties entered into with runjeet singh and shah soojah as by paramount considerations of defensive policy.' a remarkable illustration of 'defensive policy' to take the offensive against a remote country from whose further confines had faded away foiled aggression, leaving behind nothing but a bitter consciousness of broken promises! as for the other plea, the tripartite treaty contained no covenant that we should send a corporal's guard across our frontier. if shah soojah had a powerful following in afghanistan, he could regain his throne without our assistance; if he had no holding there, it was for us a truly discreditable enterprise to foist him on a recalcitrant people at the point of the bayonet. one result of the tidings from herat was to reduce by a division the strength of the expeditionary force. fane, who had never taken kindly to the project, declined to associate himself with the diminished array that remained. the command of the bengal column fell to sir willoughby cotton, with whom as his aide-de-camp rode that henry havelock whose name twenty years later was to ring through india and england. duncan's division was to stand fast at ferozepore as a support, by which disposition the strength of the bengal marching force was cut down to about fighting men. after its junction with the bombay column, the army would be , strong, without reckoning the shah's contingent. there was an interlude at ferozepore of reviews and high jinks with the shrewd, debauched old runjeet singh; of which proceedings havelock in his narrative of the expedition gives a detailed account, dwelling with extreme disapprobation on runjeet's addiction to a 'pet tipple' strong enough to lay out the hardest drinker in the british camp, but which the old reprobate quaffed freely without turning a hair. at length, on december th, , cotton began the long march which was not to terminate at cabul until august th of the following year. the most direct route was across the punjaub, and up the passes from peshawur, but the governor-general had shrunk from proposing to runjeet singh that the force should march through his territories, thinking it enough that the maharaja had permitted shah soojah's heir, prince timour, to go by peshawur to cabul, had engaged to support him with a sikh force, and had agreed to maintain an army of reserve at peshawur. the chosen route was by the left bank of the sutlej to its junction with the indus, down the left bank of the indus to the crossing point at roree, and from sukkur across the scinde and northern belooch provinces by the bolan and kojuk passes to candahar, thence by khelat-i-ghilzai and ghuznee to cabul. this was a line excessively circuitous, immensely long, full of difficulties, and equally disadvantageous as to supplies and communications. on the way the column would have to effect a junction with the bombay force, which at vikkur was distant miles from ferozepore. of the distance of miles from the latter post to candahar the first half to the crossing of the indus presented no serious difficulties, but from sukkur beyond the country was inhospitable and cruelly rugged. it needed little military knowledge to realise how more and yet more precarious would become the communications as the chain lengthened, to discern that from ferozepore to the indus they would be at the mercy of the sikhs, and to comprehend this also, that a single serious check, in or beyond the passes, would involve all but inevitable ruin. shah soojah and his levies moved independently some marches in advance of cotton. the dooranee monarch-elect had already crossed the indus, and was encamped at shikarpore, when he was joined by mr william hay macnaghten, of the company's civil service, the high functionary who had been gazetted as 'envoy and minister on the part of the government of india at the court of shah soojah-ool-moolk.' durand pronounces the selection an unhappy one, 'for macnaghten, long accustomed to irresponsible office, inexperienced in men, and ignorant of the country and people of afghanistan, was, though an erudite arabic scholar, neither practised in the field of asiatic intrigue nor a man of action. his ambition was, however, great, and the expedition, holding out the promise of distinction and honours, had met with his strenuous advocacy.' macnaghten was one of the three men who chiefly inspired lord auckland with the policy to which he had committed himself. he was the negotiator of the tripartite treaty. he was now on his way toward a region wherein he was to concern himself in strange adventures, the outcome of which was to darken his reputation, consign him to a sudden cruel death, bring awful ruin on the enterprise he had fostered, and inflict incalculable damage on british prestige in india. marching through bhawulpore and northern scinde, without noteworthy incident save heavy losses of draught cattle, cotton's army reached roree, the point at which the indus was to be crossed, in the third week of january . here a delay was encountered. the scinde ameers were, with reason, angered by the unjust and exacting terms which pottinger had been instructed to enforce on them. they had been virtually independent of afghanistan for nearly half a century; there was now masterfully demanded of them quarter of a million sterling in name of back tribute, and this in the face of the fact that they held a solemn release by shah soojah of all past and future claims. when they demurred to this, and to other exactions, they were peremptorily told that 'neither the ready power to crush and annihilate them, nor the will to call it into action, was wanting if it appeared requisite, however remotely, for the safety and integrity of the anglo-indian empire and frontier.' it was little wonder that the ameers were reluctant to fall in with terms advanced so arrogantly. keane marched up the right bank of the indus to within a couple of marches of hyderabad, and having heard of the rejection by the ameers of pottinger's terms, and of the gathering of some , armed belooches about the capital, he called for the co-operation of part of the bengal column in a movement on hyderabad. cotton started on his march down the left bank, on january jeth, with men. under menaces so ominous the unfortunate ameers succumbed. cotton returned to roree; the bengal column crossed the indus, and on february th its headquarters reached shikarpore. ten days later, cotton, leading the advance, was in dadur, at the foot of the bolan pass, having suffered heavily in transport animals almost from the start. supplies were scarce in a region so barren, but with a month's partial food on his beasts of burden he quitted dadur march th, got safely, if toilsomely, through the bolan, and on th reached quetta, where he was to halt for orders. shah soojah and keane followed, their troops suffering not a little from scarcity of supplies and loss of animals. keane's error in detaining cotton at quetta until he should arrive proved itself in the semi-starvation to which the troops of the bengal column were reduced. the khan of khelat, whether from disaffection or inability, left unfulfilled his promise to supply grain, and the result of the quarrel which burnes picked with him was that he shunned coming in and paying homage to shah soojah, for which default he was to suffer cruel and unjustifiable ruin. the sepoys were put on half, the camp followers on quarter rations, and the force for eleven days had been idly consuming the waning supplies, when at length, on april th, keane came into camp, having already formally assumed the command of the whole army, and made certain alterations in its organisation and subsidiary commands. there still remained to be traversed miles before candahar should be reached, and the dreaded kojuk pass had still to be penetrated. keane was a soldier who had gained a reputation for courage in egypt and the peninsula. he was indebted to the acuteness of his engineer and the valour of his troops, for the peerage conferred on him for ghuznee, and it cannot be said that during his command in afghanistan he disclosed any marked military aptitude. but he had sufficient perception to recognise that he had brought the bengal column to the verge of starvation in quetta, and sufficient common sense to discern that, since if it remained there it would soon starve outright, the best thing to be done was to push it forward with all possible speed into a region where food should be procurable. acting on this reasoning, he marched the day after his arrival. cotton, while lying in quetta, had not taken the trouble to reconnoitre the passes in advance, far less to make a practicable road through the kojuk defile if that should prove the best route. the resolution taken to march through it, two days were spent in making the pass possible for wheels; and from the th to the st the column was engaged in overcoming the obstacles it presented, losing in the task, besides, much baggage, supplies, transport and ordnance stores. further back in the bolan willshire with the bombay column was faring worse; he was plundered severely by tribal marauders. by may th the main body of the army was encamped in the plain of candahar. from the kojuk, shah soojah and his contingent had led the advance toward the southern capital of the dominions from the throne of which he had been cast down thirty years before. the candahar chiefs had meditated a night attack on his raw troops, but macnaghten's intrigues and bribes had wrought defection in their camp; and while kohun-dil-khan and his brothers were in flight to girishk on the helmund, the infamous hadji khan kakur led the venal herd of turncoat sycophants to the feet of the claimant who came backed by the british gold, which macnaghten was scattering abroad with lavish hand. shah soojah recovered from his trepidation, hurried forward in advance of his troops, and entered candahar on april th. his reception was cold. the influential chiefs stood aloof, abiding the signs of the times; the populace of candahar stood silent and lowering. nor did the sullenness abate when the presence of a large army with its followers promptly raised the price of grain, to the great distress of the poor. the ceremony of the solemn recognition of the shah, held close to the scene of his defeat in , havelock describes as an imposing pageant, with homagings and royal salutes, parade of troops and presentation of _nuzzurs_; but the arena set apart for the inhabitants was empty, spite of eastern love for a _tamasha_, and the display of enthusiasm was confined to the immediate retainers of his majesty. the shah was eager for the pursuit of the fugitive chiefs; but the troops were jaded and sickly, the cavalry were partially dismounted, and what horses remained were feeble skeletons. the transport animals needed grazing and rest, and their loss of numbers to be made good. the crops were not yet ripe, and provisions were scant and dear. when, on may th, sale marched toward girishk, his detachment carried half rations, and his handful of regular cavalry was all that two regiments could furnish. reaching girishk, he found that the chiefs had fled toward seistan, and leaving a regiment of the shah's contingent in occupation, he returned to candahar. macnaghten professed the belief, and perhaps may have deluded himself into it, that candahar had received the shah with enthusiasm. he was sanguine that the march to cabul would be unopposed, and he urged on keane, who was wholly dependent on the envoy for political information, to move forward at once, lightening the difficulties of the march by leaving the bombay troops at candahar. but keane declined, on the advice of thomson, his chief engineer, who asked significantly whether he had found the information given him by the political department in any single instance correct. food prospects, however, did not improve at candahar, and leaving a strong garrison there as well, curious to say, as the siege train which with arduous labour had been brought up the passes, keane began the march to cabul on june th. he had supplies only sufficient to carry his army thither on half rations. macnaghten had lavished money so freely that the treasury chest was all but empty. how the afghans regarded the invasion was evinced by condign slaughter of our stragglers. as the army advanced up the valley of the turnuk, the climate became more temperate, the harvest was later, and the troops improved in health and spirit. concentrating his forces, keane reached ghuznee on july st. the reconnaissance he made proved that fortress occupied in force. the outposts driven in, and a close inspection made, the works were found stronger than had been represented, and its regular reduction was out of the question without the battering train which keane had allowed himself to be persuaded into leaving behind. a wall some feet high and a wet ditch in its front made mining and escalade alike impracticable. thomson, however, noticed that the road and bridge to the cabul gate were intact. he obtained trustworthy information that up to a recent date, while all the other gates had been built up, the cabul gate had not been so dealt with. as he watched, a horseman was seen to enter by it. this was conclusive. the ground within yards of the gate offered good artillery positions. thomson therefore reported that although the operation was full of risk, and success if attained must cost dear, yet in the absence of a less hazardous method of reduction there offered a fair chance of success in an attempt to blow open the cabul gate, and then carry the place by a _coup de main_. keane was precluded from the alternative of masking the place and continuing his advance by the all but total exhaustion of his supplies, which the capture of ghuznee would replenish, and he therefore resolved on an assault by the cabul gate. during the st july the army circled round the place, and camped to the north of it on the cabul road. the following day was spent in preparations, and in defeating an attack made on the shah's contingent by several thousand ghilzai tribesmen of the adjacent hill country. in the gusty darkness of the early morning of the d the field artillery was placed in battery on the heights opposite the northern face of the fortress. the th regiment was extended in skirmishing order in the gardens under the wall of this face, and a detachment of sepoys was detailed to make a false attack on the eastern face. near the centre of the northern face was the cabul gate, in front of which lay waiting for the signal, a storming party consisting of the light companies of the four european regiments, under command of colonel dennie of the th. the main column consisted of two european regiments and the support of a third, the whole commanded by brigadier sale; the native regiments constituted the reserve. all those dispositions were completed by three a.m., and, favoured by the noise of the wind and the darkness, without alarming the garrison. punctually at this hour the little party of engineers charged with the task of blowing in the gate started forward on the hazardous errand. captain peat of the bombay engineers was in command. durand, a young lieutenant of bengal engineers, who was later to attain high distinction, was entrusted with the service of heading the explosion party. the latter, leading the party, had advanced unmolested to within yards of the works, when a challenge, a shot and a shout gave intimation of his detection. a musketry fire was promptly opened by the garrison from the battlements, and blue lights illuminated the approach to the gate, but in the fortunate absence of fire from the lower works the bridge was safely crossed, and peat with his handful of linesmen halted in a sallyport to cover the explosion operation. durand advanced to the gate, his sappers piled their powder bags against it and withdrew; durand and his sergeant uncoiled the hose, ignited the quick-match under a rain from the battlements of bullets and miscellaneous missiles, and then retired to cover out of reach of the explosion. at the sound of the first shot from the battlements, keane's cannon had opened their fire. the skirmishers in the gardens engaged in a brisk fusillade. the rattle of hay's musketry was heard from the east. the garrison was alert in its reply. the northern ramparts became a sheet of flame, and everywhere the cannonade and musketry fire waxed in noise and volume. suddenly, as the day was beginning to dawn, a dull, heavy sound was heard by the head of the waiting column, scarce audible elsewhere because of the boisterous wind and the din of the firing. a pillar of black smoke shot up from where had been the afghan gate, now shattered by the pounds of gunpowder which durand had exploded against it. the signal to the storming party was to be the 'advance' sounded by the bugler who accompanied peat. but the bugler had been shot through the head. durand could not find peat. going back through the bullets to the nearest party of infantry, he experienced some delay, but at last the column was apprised that all was right, the 'advance' was sounded, dennie and his stormers sped forward, and sale followed at the head of the main column. after a temporary check to the latter, because of a misconception, it pushed on in close support of dennie. that gallant soldier and his gallant followers had rushed into the smoking and gloomy archway to find themselves met hand to hand by the afghan defenders, who had recovered from their surprise. nothing could be distinctly seen in the narrow gorge, but the clash of sword blade against bayonet was heard on every side. the stormers had to grope their way between the yet standing walls in a dusk which the glimmer of the blue light only made more perplexing. but some elbow room was gradually gained, and then, since there was neither time nor space for methodic street fighting, each loaded section gave its volley and then made way for the next, which, crowding to the front, poured a deadly discharge at half pistol-shot into the densely crowded defenders. thus the storming party won steadily its way, till at length dennie and his leading files discerned over the heads of their opponents a patch of blue sky and a twinkling star or two, and with a final charge found themselves within the place. a body of fierce afghan swordsmen projected themselves into the interval between the storming party and the main column. sale, at the head of the latter, was cut down by a tulwar stroke in the face; in the effort of his blow the assailant fell with the assailed, and they rolled together among the shattered timbers of the gate. sale, wounded again on the ground, and faint with loss of blood, called to one of his officers for assistance. kershaw ran the afghan through the body with his sword; but he still struggled with the brigadier. at length in the grapple sale got uppermost, and then he dealt his adversary a sabre cut which cleft him from crown to eyebrows. there was much confused fighting within the place, for the afghan garrison made furious rallies again and again; but the citadel was found open and undefended, and by sunrise british banners were waving above its battlements hyder khan, the governor of ghuznee, one of the sons of dost mahomed, was found concealed in a house in the town and taken prisoner. the british loss amounted to about killed and wounded, that of the garrison, which was estimated at from to strong, was over killed. the number of wounded was not ascertained; of prisoners taken in arms there were about . the booty consisted of numerous horses, camels and mules, ordnance and military weapons of various descriptions, and a vast quantity of supplies of all kinds. keane, having garrisoned ghuznee, and left there his sick and wounded, resumed on july th his march on cabul. within twenty-four hours after the event dost mahomed heard of the fall of ghuznee. possessed of the adverse intelligence, the dost gathered his chiefs, received their facile assurances of fidelity, sent his brother the nawaub jubbar khan to ask what terms shah soojah and his british allies were prepared to offer him, and recalled from jellalabad his son akbar khan, with all the force he could muster there. the dost's emissary to the allied camp was informed that 'an honourable asylum' in british india was at the service of his brother; an offer which jubbar khan declined in his name without thanks. before he left to share the fortunes of the dost, the sirdar is reported to have asked macnaghten, 'if shah soojah is really our king, what need has he of your army and name? you have brought him here,' he continued, 'with your money and arms. well, leave him now with us afghans, and let him rule us if he can.' when jubbar khan returned to cabul with his sombre message, the dost, having been joined by akbar khan, concentrated his army, and found himself at the head of , men, with thirty guns; but he mournfully realised that he could lean no reliance on the constancy and courage of his adherents. nevertheless, he marched out along the ghuznee road, and drew up his force at urgundeh, where he commanded the most direct line of retreat toward the western hill country of bamian, in case his people would not fight, or should they fight, if they were beaten. there was no fight in his following; scarcely, indeed, was there a loyal supporter among all those who had eaten his salt for years. there was true manhood in this chief whom we were replacing by an effete puppet. the dost, koran in hand, rode among his perfidious troops, and conjured them in the name of god and the prophet not to dishonour themselves by transferring their allegiance to one who had filled afghanistan with infidels and blasphemers. 'if,' he continued, 'you are resolved to be traitors to me, at least enable me to die with honour. support the brother of futteh khan in one last charge against these feringhee dogs. in that charge he will fall; then go and make your own terms with shah soojah.' the high-souled appeal inspired no worthy response; but one is loth to credit the testimony of the soldier-of-fortune harlan that his guards forsook the dost, and that the rabble of troops plundered his pavilion, snatched from under him the pillows of his divan, seized his prayer carpet, and finally hacked into pieces the tent and its appurtenances. on the evening of august d the hapless man shook the dust of the camp of traitors from his feet, and rode away toward bamian, his son akbar khan, with a handful of resolute men, covering the retreat of his father and his family. tidings of the flight of dost mahomed reached keane on the d, at sheikabad, where he had halted to concentrate; and outram volunteered to head a pursuing party, to consist of some british officers as volunteers, some cavalry and some afghan horse. hadji khan kakur, the earliest traitor of his race, undertook to act as guide. this man's devices of delay defeated outram's fiery energy, perhaps in deceit, perhaps because he regarded it as lacking discretion. for akbar khan made a long halt on the crown of the pass, waiting to check any endeavour to press closely on his fugitive father, and it would have gone hard with outram, with a few fagged horsemen at his back, if hadji khan had allowed him to overtake the resolute young afghan chief. as keane moved forward, there fell to him the guns which the dost had left in the urgundeh position. on august th he encamped close to cabul; and on the following day shah soojah made his public entry into the capital which he had last seen thirty years previously. after so many years of vicissitude, adventure and intrigue, he was again on the throne of his ancestors, but placed there by the bayonets of the government whose creature he was, an insult to the nation whom he had the insolence to call his people. the entry, nevertheless, was a goodly spectacle enough. shah soojah, dazzling in coronet, jewelled girdle and bracelets, but with no koh-i-noor now glittering on his forehead, bestrode a white charger, whose equipments gleamed with gold. by his side rode macnaghten and burnes; in the pageant were the principal officers of the british army. sabres flashed in front of the procession, bayonets sparkled in its rear, as it wended its way through the great bazaar which pollock was to destroy three years later, and along the tortuous street to the gate of the balla hissar. but neither the monarch nor his pageant kindled the enthusiasm in the cabulees. there was no voice of welcome; the citizens did not care to trouble themselves so much as to make him a salaam, and they stared at the european strangers harder than at his restored majesty. there was a touch of pathos in the burst of eagerness to which the old man gave way as he reached the palace, ran through the gardens, visited the apartments, and commented on the neglect everywhere apparent. shah soojah was rather a poor creature, but he was by no means altogether destitute of good points, and far worse men than he were actors in the strange historical episode of which he was the figurehead. he was humane for an afghan; he never was proved to have been untrue to us; he must have had some courage of a kind else he would never have remained in cabul when our people left it, in the all but full assurance of the fate which presently overtook him as a matter of course. havelock thus portrays him: 'a stout person of the middle height, his chin covered with a long thick and neatly trimmed beard, dyed black to conceal the encroachments of time. his manner toward the english is gentle, calm and dignified, without haughtiness, but his own subjects have invariably complained of his reception of them as cold and repulsive, even to rudeness. his complexion is darker than that of the generality of afghans, and his features, if not decidedly handsome, are not the reverse of pleasing; but the expression of his countenance would betray to a skilful physiognomist that mixture of timidity and duplicity so often observable in the character of the higher order of men in southern asia.' chapter iii: the first year of occupation sir john kaye, in his picturesque if diffuse history of the first afghan war, lays it down that, in seating shah soojah on the cabul throne, 'the british government had done all that it had undertaken to do,' and durand argues that, having accomplished this, 'the british army could have then been withdrawn with the honour and fame of entire success.' the facts apparently do not justify the reasoning of either writer. in the simla manifesto, in which lord auckland embodied the rationale of his policy, he expressed the confident hope 'that the shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents, and when once he shall be received in power, and the independence and integrity of afghanistan established, the british army will be withdrawn.' the shah had been indeed restored to his throne, but by british bayonets, not by 'his own subjects and adherents.' it could not seriously be maintained that he was secure in power, or that the independence and integrity of afghanistan were established when british troops were holding candahar, ghuznee and cabul, the only three positions where the shah was nominally paramount, when the fugitive dost was still within its borders, when intrigue and disaffection were seething in every valley and on every hill-side, and when the principality of herat maintained a contemptuous independence. macnaghten might avow himself convinced of the popularity of the shah, and believe or strive to believe that the afghans had received the puppet king `with feelings nearly amounting to adoration,' but he did not venture to support the conviction he avowed by advocating that the shah should be abandoned to his adoring subjects. lord auckland's policy was gravely and radically erroneous, but it had a definite object, and that object certainly was not a futile march to cabul and back, dropping incidentally by the wayside the aspirant to a throne whom he had himself put forward, and leaving him to take his chance among a truculent and adverse population. thus early, in all probability, lord auckland was disillusioned of the expectation that the effective restoration of shah soojah would be of light and easy accomplishment, but at least he could not afford to have the enterprise a _coup manqué_ when as yet it was little beyond its inception. the cost of the expedition was already, however, a strain, and the troops engaged in it were needed in india. lord auckland intimated to macnaghten his expectation that a strong brigade would suffice to hold afghanistan in conjunction with the shah's contingent, and his desire that the rest of the army of the indus should at once return to india. macnaghten, on the other hand, in spite of his avowal of the shah's popularity, was anxious to retain in afghanistan a large body of troops. he meditated strange enterprises, and proposed that keane should support his project of sending a force toward bokhara to give check to a russian column which pottinger at herat had heard was assembling at orenburg, with khiva for its objective. keane derided the proposal, and macnaghten reluctantly abandoned it, but he demanded of lord auckland with success, the retention in afghanistan of the bengal division of the army. in the middle of september general willshire marched with the bombay column, with orders, on his way to the indus to pay a hostile visit to khelat, and punish its khan for the 'disloyalty' with which he had been charged, a commission which the british officer fulfilled with a skill and thoroughness that could be admired with less reservation had the aggression on the gallant mehrab been less wanton. a month later keane started for india by the khyber route, which wade had opened without serious resistance when in august and september he escorted through the passes prince timour, shah soojah's heir-apparent. during the temporary absence of cotton, who accompanied keane, nott had the command at candahar, sale at and about cabul, and the troops were quartered in those capitals, and in jellalabad, ghuznee, charikar and bamian. the shah and the envoy wintered in the milder climate of jellalabad, and burnes was in political charge of the capital and its vicinity. it was a prophetic utterance that the accomplishment of our military succession would mark but the commencement of our real difficulties in afghanistan. in theory and in name shah soojah was an independent monarch; it was, indeed, only in virtue of his proving himself able to rule independently that he could justify his claim to rule at all. but that he was independent was a contradiction in terms while british troops studded the country, and while the real powers of sovereignty were exercised by macnaghten. certain functions, it is true, the latter did permit the nominal monarch to exercise. while debarred from a voice in measures of external policy, and not allowed to sway the lines of conduct to be adopted toward independent or revolting tribes, the shah was allowed to concern himself with the administration of justice, and in his hands were the settlement, collection and appropriation of the revenue of those portions of the kingdom from which any revenue could be exacted. he was allowed to appoint as his minister of state, the companion of his exile, old moolla shikore, who had lost both his memory and his ears, but who had sufficient faculty left to hate the english, to oppress the people, to be corrupt and venal beyond all conception, and to appoint subordinates as flagitious as himself. 'bad ministers,' wrote burnes, 'are in every government solid ground for unpopularity; and i doubt if ever a king had a worse set than has shah soojah.' the oppressed people appealed to the british functionaries, who remonstrated with the minister, and the minister punished the people for appealing to the british functionaries. the shah was free to confer grants of land on his creatures, but when the holders resisted, he was unable to enforce his will since he was not allowed to employ soldiers; and the odium of the forcible confiscation ultimately fell on macnaghten, who alone had the ordering of expeditions, and who could not see the shah belittled by non-fulfilment of his requisitions. justice sold by venal judges, oppression and corruption rampant in every department of internal administration, it was no wonder that nobles and people alike resented the inflictions under whose sting they writhed. they were accustomed to a certain amount of oppression; dost mahomed had chastised them with whips, but shah soojah, whom the english had brought, was chastising them with scorpions. and they felt his yoke the more bitterly because, with the shrewd acuteness of the race, they recognised the really servile condition of this new king. they fretted, too, under the sharp bit of the british political agents who were strewn about the country, in the execution of a miserable and futile policy, and whose lives, in a few instances, did not maintain the good name of their country. dost mahomed had maintained his sway by politic management of the chiefs, and through them of the tribes. macnaghten would have done well to impress on shah soojah the wisdom of pursuing the same tactics. there was, it is true, the alternative of destroying the power of the barons, but that policy involved a stubborn and doubtful struggle, and prolonged occupation of the country by british troops in great strength. macnaghten professed our occupation of afghanistan to be temporary; yet he was clearly adventuring on the rash experiment of weakening the nobles when he set about the enlistment of local tribal levies, who, paid from the royal treasury and commanded by british officers, were expected to be staunch to the shah, and useful in curbing the powers of the chiefs. the latter, of course, were alienated and resentful, and the levies, imbued with the afghan attribute of fickleness, proved for the most part undisciplined and faithless. the winter of - passed without much noteworthy incident. the winter climate of afghanistan is severe, and the afghan, in ordinary circumstances, is among the hibernating animals. but down in the khyber, in october, the tribes gave some trouble. they were dissatisfied with the amount of annual black-mail paid them for the right of way through their passes. when the shah was a fugitive thirty years previously, they had concealed and protected him; and mindful of their kindly services, he had promised them, unknown to macnaghten, the augmentation of their subsidy to the old scale from which it had gradually dwindled. wade, returning from cabul, did not bring them the assurances they expected, whereupon they rose and concentrated and invested ali musjid, a fort which they regarded as the key of their gloomy defile. mackeson, the peshawur political officer, threw provisions and ammunition into ali musjid, but the force, on its return march, was attacked by the hillmen, the sikhs being routed, and the sepoys incurring loss of men and transport. the emboldened khyberees now turned on ali musjid in earnest; but the garrison was strengthened, and the place was held until a couple of regiments marched down from jellalabad, and were preparing to attack the hillmen, when it was announced that mackeson had made a compact with the chiefs for the payment of an annual subsidy which they considered adequate. afghanistan fifty years ago, and the same is in a measure true of it to-day, was rather a bundle of provinces, some of which owned scarcely a nominal allegiance to the ruler in cabul, than a concrete state. herat and candahar were wholly independent, the ghilzai tribes inhabiting the wide tracts from the suliman ranges westward beyond the road through ghuznee, between candahar and cabul, and northward into the rugged country between cabul and jellalabad, acknowledged no other authority than that of their own chiefs. the ghilzais are agriculturists, shepherds, and robbers; they are constantly engaged in internal feuds; they are jealous of their wild independence, and through the centuries have abated little of their untamed ferocity. they had rejected macnaghten's advances, and had attacked shah soojah's camp on the day before the fall of ghuznee. outram, in reprisal, had promptly raided part of their country. later, the winter had restrained them from activity, but they broke out again in the spring. in may captain anderson, marching from candahar with a mixed force about strong, was offered battle near jazee, in the turnuk, by some ghilzai horse and foot. andersen's guns told heavily among the ghilzai horsemen, who, impatient of the fire, made a spirited dash on his left flank. grape and musketry checked them; but they rallied, and twice charged home on the bayonets before they withdrew, leaving of their number dead on the ground. nott sent a detachment to occupy the fortress of khelat-i-ghilzai, between candahar and ghuznee, thus rendering the communications more secure; and later, macnaghten bribed the chiefs by an annual subsidy of £ to abstain from infesting the highways. the terms were cheap, for the ghilzai tribes mustered some , fighting men. shah soojah and the envoy returned from jellalabad to cabul in april . a couple of regiments had wintered not uncomfortably in the balla hissar. that fortress was then the key of cabul, and while our troops remained in afghanistan it should not have been left ungarrisoned a single hour. the soldiers did their best to impress on macnaghten the all-importance of the position. but the shah objected to its continued occupation, and macnaghten weakly yielded. cotton, who had returned to the chief military command in afghanistan, made no remonstrance; the balla hissar was evacuated, and the troops were quartered in cantonments built in an utterly defenceless position on the plain north of cabul, a position whose environs were cumbered with walled gardens, and commanded by adjacent high ground, and by native forts which were neither demolished nor occupied. the troops, now in permanent and regularly constructed quarters, ceased to be an expeditionary force, and became substantially an army of occupation. the officers sent for their wives to inhabit with them the bungalows in which they had settled down. lady macnaghten, in the spacious mission residence which stood apart in its own grounds, presided over the society of the cantonments, which had all the cheery surroundings of the half-settled, half-nomadic life of our military people in the east. there were the 'coffee house' after the morning ride, the gathering round the bandstand in the evening, the impromptu dance, and the _burra khana_ occasionally in the larger houses. a racecourse had been laid out, and there were 'sky' races and more formal meetings. and so 'as in the days that were before the flood, they were eating and drinking, and marrying and giving in marriage, and knew not until the flood came, and took them all away.' macnaghten engaged himself in a welter of internal and external intrigue, his mood swinging from singular complacency to a disquietude that sometimes approached despondency. it had come to be forced on him, in spite of his intermittent optimism, that the government was a government of sentry-boxes, and that afghanistan was not governed so much as garrisoned. the utter failure of the winter march attempted by peroffski's russian column across the frozen steppes on khiva was a relief to him; but the state of affairs in herat was a constant trouble and anxiety. major todd had been sent there as political agent, to make a treaty with shah kamran, and to superintend the repair and improvement of the fortifications of the city. kamran was plenteously subsidised; he took macnaghten's lakhs, but furtively maintained close relations with persia. detecting the double-dealing, macnaghten urged on lord auckland the annexation of herat to shah soojah's dominions, but was instructed to condone kamran's duplicity, and try to bribe him higher. kamran by no means objected to this policy, and, while continuing his intrigues with persia, cheerfully accepted the money, arms and ammunition which macnaghten supplied him with so profusely as to cause remonstrance on the part of the financial authorities in calcutta. the commander-in-chief was strong enough to counteract the pressure which macnaghten brought to bear on lord auckland in favour of an expedition against herat, which his lordship at length finally negatived, to the great disgust of the envoy, who wrote of the conduct of his chief as 'drivelling beyond contempt,' and 'sighed for a wellesley or a hastings.' the ultimate result of macnaghten's negotiations with shah kamran was major todd's withdrawal from herat. todd had suspended the monthly subsidy, to the great wrath of kamran's rapacious and treacherous minister yar mahomed, who made a peremptory demand for increased advances, and refused todd's stipulation that a british force should be admitted into herat. todd's action in quitting herat was severely censured by his superiors, and he was relegated to regimental duty. perhaps he acted somewhat rashly, but he had not been kept well informed; for instance, he had been unaware that persia had become our friend, and had engaged to cease relations with shah kamran--an important arrangement of which he certainly should have been cognisant. macnaghten had squandered more gold on herat than the fee-simple of the principality was worth, and to no purpose; he left that state just as he found it, treacherous, insolent, greedy and independent. the precariousness of the long lines of communications between british india and the army in afghanistan--a source of danger which from the first had disquieted cautious soldiers--was making itself seriously felt, and constituted for macnaghten another cause of solicitude. old runjeet singh, a faithful if not disinterested ally, had died on june th, , the day on which keane marched out from candahar. the breath was scarcely out of the old reprobate when the punjaub began to drift into anarchy. so far as the sikh share in it was concerned, the tripartite treaty threatened to become a dead letter. the lahore durbar had not adequately fulfilled the undertaking to support prince timour's advance by the khyber, nor was it duly regarding the obligation to maintain a force on the peshawur frontier of the punjaub. but those things were trivial in comparison with the growing reluctance manifested freely, to accord to our troops and convoys permission to traverse the punjaub on the march to and from cabul. the anglo-indian government sent mr clerk to lahore to settle the question as to the thoroughfare. he had instructions to be firm, and the sikhs did not challenge mr clerk's stipulation that the anglo-indian government must have unmolested right of way through the punjaub, while he undertook to restrict the use of it as much as possible. this arrangement by no means satisfied the exacting macnaghten, and he continued to worry himself by foreseeing all sorts of troublous contingencies unless measures were adopted for 'macadamising' the road through the punjaub. the summer of did not pass without serious interruptions to the british communications between candahar and the indus; nor without unexpected and ominous disasters before they were restored. general willshire, with the returning bombay column, had in the previous november stormed mehrab khan's ill-manned and worse armed fort of khelat, and the khan, disdaining to yield, had fallen in the hopeless struggle. his son nusseer khan had been put aside in favour of a collateral pretender, and became an active and dangerous malcontent. all northern beloochistan fell into a state of anarchy. a detachment of sepoys escorting supplies was cut to pieces in one of the passes. quetta was attacked with great resolution by nusseer khan, but was opportunely relieved by a force sent from another post. nusseer made himself master of khelat, and there fell into his cruel hands lieutenant loveday, the british political officer stationed there, whom he treated with great barbarity, and finally murdered. a british detachment under colonel clibborn, was defeated by the beloochees with heavy loss, and compelled to retreat. nusseer khan, descending into the low country of cutch, assaulted the important post of dadur, but was repulsed, and taking refuge in the hills, was routed by colonel marshall with a force from kotree, whereupon he became a skulking fugitive. nott marched down from candahar with a strong force, occupied khelat, and fully re-established communications with the line of the indus, while fresh troops moved forward into upper scinde, and thence gradually advancing to quetta and candahar, materially strengthened the british position in southern afghanistan. dost mahomed, after his flight from cabul in , had soon left the hospitable refuge afforded him in khooloom, a territory west of the hindoo koosh beyond bamian, and had gone to bokhara on the treacherous invitation of its ameer, who threw him into captivity. the dost's family remained at khooloom, in the charge of his brother jubbar khan. the advance of british forces beyond bamian to syghan and bajgah, induced that sirdar to commit himself and the ladies to british protection. dr lord, macnaghten's political officer in the bamian district, was a rash although well-meaning man. the errors he had committed since the opening of spring had occasioned disasters to the troops whose dispositions he controlled, and had incited the neighbouring hill tribes to active disaffection. in july dost mahomed made his escape from bokhara, hurried to khooloom, found its ruler and the tribes full of zeal for his cause, and rapidly grew in strength. lord found it was time to call in his advance posts and concentrate at bamian, losing in the operation an afghan regiment which deserted to the dost. macnaghten reinforced bamian, and sent colonel dennie to command there. on september th dennie moved out with two guns and men against the dost's advance parties raiding in an adjacent valley. those detachments driven back, dennie suddenly found himself opposed to the irregular mass of oosbeg horse and foot which constituted the army of the dost. mackenzie's cannon fire shook the undisciplined horde, the infantry pressed in to close quarters, and soon the nondescript host of the dost was in panic flight, with dennie's cavalry in eager pursuit. the dost escaped with difficulty, with the loss of his entire personal equipment. he was once more a fugitive, and the wali of khooloom promptly submitted himself to the victors, and pledged himself to aid and harbour the broken chief no more. macnaghten had been a prey to apprehension while the dost's attitude was threatening; he was now in a glow of joy and hope. but the envoy's elation was short-lived. dost mahomed was yet to cause him much solicitude. defeated in bamian, he was ready for another attempt in the kohistan country to the north of cabul. disaffection was rife everywhere throughout the kingdom, but it was perhaps most rife in the kohistan, which was seething with intrigues in favour of dost mahomed, while the local chiefs were intensely exasperated by the exactions of the shah's revenue collectors. macnaghten summoned the chiefs to cabul. they came, they did homage to the shah and swore allegiance to him; they went away from the capital pledging each other to his overthrow, and jeering at the scantiness of the force they had seen at cabul. intercepted letters disclosed their schemes, and in the end of september sale, with a considerable force, marched out to chastise the disaffected kohistanees. the fort of tootundurrah fell without resistance. julgah, however, the next fort assailed, stubbornly held out, and officers and men fell in the unsuccessful attempt to storm it. in three weeks sale marched to and fro through the kohistan, pursuing will-o'-the-wisp rumours as to the whereabouts of the dost, destroying forts on the course of his weary pilgrimage, and subjected occasionally to night attacks. meanwhile, in the belief that dost mahomed was close to cabul, and mournfully conscious that the capital and surrounding country were ripe for a rising, macnaghten had relapsed into nervousness, and was a prey to gloomy forebodings. the troops at bamian were urgently recalled. cannon were mounted on the balla hissar to overawe the city, the concentration of the troops in the fortress was under consideration, and men were talking of preparing for a siege. how macnaghten's english nature was undergoing deterioration under the strain of events is shown by his writing of the dost: 'would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head?' how his perceptions were warped was further evinced by his talking of 'showing no mercy to the man who has been the author of all the evil now distracting the country,' and by his complaining of sale and burnes that, 'with good infantry, they are sitting down before a fortified place, and are afraid to attack it.' learning that for certain the dost had crossed the hindoo koosh from nijrao into the kohistan, sale, who had been reinforced, sent out reconnaissances which ascertained that he was in the purwan durrah valley, stretching down from the hindoo koosh to the gorebund river; and the british force marched thither on d november. as the village was neared, the dost's people were seen evacuating it and the adjacent forts, and making for the hills. sale's cavalry was some distance in advance of the infantry of the advance guard, but time was precious. anderson's horse went to the left, to cut off retreat down the gorebund valley. fraser took his two squadrons of bengal cavalry to the right, advanced along the foothills, and gained the head of the valley. he was too late to intercept a small body of afghan horsemen, who were already climbing the upland; but badly mounted as the latter were, he could pursue them with effect. but it seemed that the afghans preferred to fight rather than be pursued. the dost himself was in command of the little party, and the dost was a man whose nature was to fight, not to run. he wheeled his handful so that his horsemen faced fraser's troop down there below them. then the dost pointed to his banner, bared his head, called on his supporters in the name of god and the prophet to follow him against the unbelievers, and led them down the slope. fraser had formed up his troopers when recall orders reached him. joyous that the situation entitled him to disobey them, he gave instead the word to charge. as the afghans came down at no great pace, they fired occasionally; either because of the bullets, or because of an access of pusillanimity, fraser's troopers broke and fled ignominiously. the british gentlemen charged home unsupported. broadfoot, crispin and lord were slain; ponsonby, severely wounded and his reins cut, was carried out of the _mêlée_ by his charger; fraser, covered with blood and wounds, broke through his assailants, and brought to sale his report of the disgrace of his troopers. after a sharp pursuit of the poltroons, the dost and his followers leisurely quitted the field. burnes wrote to the envoy--he was a soldier, but he was also a 'political,' and political employ seemed often in afghanistan to deteriorate the attribute of soldierhood--that there was no alternative for the force but to fall back on cabul, and entreated macnaghten to order immediate concentration of all the troops. this letter macnaghten received the day after the disaster in the kohistan, when he was taking his afternoon ride in the cabul plain. his heart must have been very heavy as he rode, when suddenly a horseman galloped up to him and announced that the ameer was approaching. 'what ameer?' asked macnaghten. 'dost mahomed khan,' was the reply, and sure enough there was the dost close at hand. dismounting, this afghan prince and gentleman saluted the envoy, and offered him his sword, which macnaghten declined to take. dost and envoy rode into cabul together, and such was the impression the former made on the latter that macnaghten, who a month before had permitted himself to think of putting a price on 'the fellow's' head, begged now of the governor-general 'that the dost be treated more handsomely than was shah soojah, who had no claim on us.' and then followed a strange confession for the man to make who made the tripartite treaty, and approved the simla manifesto: 'we had no hand in depriving the shah of his kingdom, _whereas we ejected the dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim_.' durand regards dost mahomed's surrender as 'evincing a strange pusillanimity.' this opprobrious judgment appears unjustified. no doubt he was weary of the fugitive life he had been leading, but to pronounce him afraid that the kohistanees or any other afghans would betray him is to ignore the fact that he had been for months among people who might, any hour of any day, have betrayed him if they had chosen. nobler motives than those ascribed to him by durand may be supposed to have actuated a man of his simple and lofty nature. he had given the arbitrament of war a trial, and had realised that in that way he could make no head against us. he might, indeed, have continued the futile struggle, but he was the sort of man to recognise the selfishness of that persistency which would involve ruin and death to the devoted people who would not desert his cause while he claimed to have a cause. when historians write of afghan treachery and guile, it seems to have escaped their perception that afghan treachery was but a phase of afghan patriotism, of an unscrupulous character, doubtless, according to our notions, but nevertheless practical in its methods, and not wholly unsuccessful in its results. it may have been a higher and purer patriotism that moved dost mahomed to cease, by his surrender, from being an obstacle to the tranquillisation of the country of which he had been the ruler. chapter iv: the second year of occupation dost mahomed remained for a few days in the british cantonments on the cabul plain, an honoured guest rather than a prisoner. his soldierly frankness, his bearing at once manly and courteous, his honest liking for and trust in our race, notwithstanding the experiences which he had undergone, won universal respect and cordiality. officers who stood aloof from shah soojah vied with each other in evincing to dost mahomed their sympathy with him in his fallen fortunes. shah soojah would not see the man whom he had ingloriously supplanted, on the pretext that he 'could not bring himself to show common civility to such a villain.' how macnaghten's feeling in regard to the two men had altered is disclosed by his comment on this refusal. 'it is well,' he wrote, 'as the dost must have suffered much humiliation in being subjected to such an ordeal.' in the middle of november the dost began his journey toward british india, accompanied by sir willoughby cotton, who was finally quitting afghanistan, and under the escort of a considerable british force which had completed its tour of duty in afghanistan. sale succeeded cotton in temporary divisional command pending the arrival of the latter's successor. about the middle of december shah soojah and his court, accompanied by the british envoy, arrived at jellalabad for the winter, burnes remaining at cabul in political charge. macnaghten was mentally so constituted as to be continually alternating between high elation and the depths of despondency; discerning to-day ominous indications of ruin in an incident of no account, and to-morrow scorning imperiously to recognise danger in the fierce rising of a province. it may almost be said that each letter of his to lord auckland was of a different tone from the one which had preceded it. burnes, who was nominally macnaghten's chief lieutenant, with more self-restraint, had much the same temperament. kaye writes of him: 'sometimes sanguine, sometimes despondent, sometimes confident, sometimes credulous, burnes gave to fleeting impressions all the importance and seeming permanency of settled convictions, and imbued surrounding objects with the colours of his own varying mind.' but if burnes had been a discreet and steadfast man, he could have exercised no influence on the autocratic macnaghten, since between the two men there was neither sympathy nor confidence. burnes had, indeed, no specific duties of any kind; in his own words, he was in 'the most nondescript situation.' macnaghten gave him no responsibility, and while burnes waited for the promised reversion of the office of envoy, he chiefly employed himself in writing long memorials on the situation and prospects of affairs, on which macnaghten's marginal comments were brusque, and occasionally contemptuous. the resolute and clear-headed pottinger, who, if the opportunity had been given him, might have buttressed and steadied macnaghten, was relegated to provincial service. throughout his career in afghanistan the envoy could not look for much advice from the successive commanders of the cabul force, even if he had cared to commune with them. keane, indeed, did save him from the perpetration of one folly. but cotton appears to have been a respectable nonentity. sale was a stout, honest soldier, who was not fortunate on the only occasion which called him outside of his restricted _métier_. poor elphinstone was an object for pity rather than for censure. it happened fortunately, in the impending misfortunes, that two men of stable temperament and lucid perception were in authority at candahar. general nott was a grand old indian officer, in whom there was no guile, but a good deal of temper. he was not supple, and he had the habit of speaking his mind with great directness, a propensity which accounted, perhaps, for the repeated supersessions he had undergone. a clearheaded, shrewd man, he was disgusted with very many things which he recognised as unworthy in the conduct of the affairs of afghanistan, and he was not the man to choose mild phrases in giving vent to his convictions. he had in full measure that chronic dislike which the indian commander in the field nourishes to the political officer who is imposed on him by the authorities, and who controls his measures and trammels his actions. nott's 'political,' who, the sole survivor of the men who were prominent during this unhappy period, still lives among us esteemed and revered, was certainly the ablest officer of the unpopular department to which he belonged; and how cool was henry rawlinson's temper is evinced in his ability to live in amity with the rugged and outspoken chief who addressed him in such a philippic as the following--words all the more trenchant because he to whom they were addressed must have realised how intrinsically true they were:-- 'i have no right to interfere with the affairs of this country, and i never do so. but in reference to that part of your note where you speak of political influence, i will candidly tell you that these are not times for mere ceremony, and that under present circumstances, and at a distance of miles from the seat of the supreme government, i throw responsibility to the wind, and tell you that in my opinion you have not had for some time past, nor have you at present, one particle of political influence in this country.' nott steadily laboured to maintain the _morale_ and discipline of his troops, and thus watching the flowing tide of misrule and embroilment, he calmly made the best preparations in his power to meet the storm the sure and early outbreak of which his clear discernment prognosticated. shah soojah's viceroy at candahar was his heir-apparent prince timour. the dooranee chiefs of western afghanistan had not unnaturally expected favours and influence under the rule of the dooranee monarch; and while in candahar before proceeding to cabul, and still uncertain of what might occur there, shah soojah had been lavish of his promises. the chiefs had anticipated that they would be called around the vice-throne of prince timour; but shah soojah made the same error as that into which louis xviii. fell on his restoration. he constituted his court of the men who had shared his loodianah exile. the counsellors who went to candahar with timour were returned _émigrés_, in whom fitness for duty counted less than the qualification of companionship in exile. those people had come back to afghanistan poor; now they made haste to be rich by acts of oppressive injustice, in the exaction of revenue from the people, and by intercepting from the dooranee chiefs the flow of royal bounty to which they had looked forward. uktar khan was prominent among the dooranee noblemen, and he had the double grievance of having been disappointed of the headship of the zemindawar province on the western bank of the helmund, and having been evilly entreated by the minions of prince timour. he had raised his clan and routed a force under a royalist follower, when nott sent a detachment against him. uktar khan had crossed the helmund into zemindawar, when farrington attacked him, and, after a brisk fight, routed and pursued him. the action was fought on january , , in the very dead of winter; the intensity of the cold dispersed uktar's levies, and farrington returned to candahar. in reply to macnaghten's demand for information regarding the origin of this outbreak, rawlinson wrote him some home truths which were very distasteful. rawlinson warned his chief earnestly of the danger which threatened the false position of the british in afghanistan. he pointed out how cruel must be the revenue exactions which enabled prince timour's courtiers to absorb great sums. he expressed his suspicion that shah soojah had countenanced uktar khan's rising, and spoke of intrigues of dark and dangerous character. macnaghten scouted rawlinson's warning, and instructed him that 'it will make the consideration of all questions more simple if you will hereafter take for granted that as regards us "the king can do no wrong."' however, he and the shah did remove from candahar the vakeel and his clique of obnoxious persons, who had been grinding the faces of the people; and the envoy allowed himself to hope that this measure would restore order to the province of candahar. the hope was vain, the evil lay deeper; disaffection to the shah and hatred to the british power were becoming intensified from day to day, and the aspiration for relief was swelling into a passion. in the days before our advent there had been venality and corruption in public places--occasionally, likely enough, as macnaghten asserted, to an extent all but incredible. but exaction so sweeping could have occurred only in regions under complete domination; and in afghanistan, even to this day, there are few regions wholly in this condition. when the yoke became over-weighty, a people of a nature so intractable knew how to resent oppression and oppose exaction. but now the tax gatherer swaggered over the land, and the people had to endure him, for at his back were the soldiers of the feringhees and the levies of the shah. the latter were paid by assignments on the revenues of specified districts; as the levies constituted a standing army of some size, the contributions demanded were heavier and more permanent than in bygone times. macnaghten, aware of the discontent engendered by the system of assignments, desired to alter it. but the shah's needs were pressing; the anglo-indian treasury was strained already by the expenditure in afghanistan; and it was not easy in a period of turmoil and rebellion to carry out the amendment of a fiscal system. that, since the surrender of the dost, there had been no serious rising in northern or eastern afghanistan, sufficed to make macnaghten an optimist of the moment. he had come by this time to a reluctant admission of the fact against which he had set his face so long, that shah soojah was unpopular. 'he has incurred,' he wrote, 'the odium that attaches to him from his alliance with us'; but the envoy would not admit that our position in afghanistan was a false one, in that we were maintaining by our bayonets, against the will of the afghans, a sovereign whom they detested. 'it would,' he pleaded, 'be an act of downright dishonesty to desert his majesty before he has found the means of taking root in the soil to which we have transplanted him.' while he wrote, macnaghten must have experienced a sudden thrill of optimism or of self-delusion, for he continued: 'all things considered, the present tranquillity of this country is to my mind perfectly miraculous. already our presence has been infinitely beneficial in allaying animosities and in pointing out abuses.' if it had been the case that the country was tranquil, his adjective would have been singularly appropriate, but not precisely in the sense he meant to convey. but there was no tranquillity, miraculous or otherwise. while macnaghten was writing the letter which has just been quoted, brigadier shelton, who, about the new year, had reached jellalabad with a brigade from british india in relief of the force which was withdrawing with cotton, was contending with an outbreak of the wild and lawless clans of the khyber. when macnaghten wrote, he had already received intelligence of the collapse of his projects in herat, and that major todd, who had been his representative there, judging it imperative to break up the mission of which he was the head, had abruptly quitted that city, and was on his way to candahar. mischief was simmering in the zemindawar country. the ghilzai tribes of the region between candahar and ghuznee had accepted a subsidy to remain quiet, but the indomitable independence of this wild and fierce race was not to be tamed by bribes, and the spirit of hostility was manifesting itself so truculently that a british garrison had been placed in khelat-i-ghilzai, right in the heart of the disturbed territory. this warning and defensive measure the tribes had regarded with angry jealousy; but it was not until a rash 'political' had directed the unprovoked assault and capture of a ghilzai fort that the tribes passionately flew to arms, bent on contesting the occupation of their rugged country. colonel wymer was sent from candahar with a force, escorting a convoy of stores intended for the equipment of khelat-i-ghilzai. the tribes who had been loosely beleaguering that place marched down the turnuk upon wymer, and on may th attacked him with great impetuosity, under the command of a principal chief who was known as the 'gooroo.' wymer, in the protection of his convoy, had to stand on the defensive. the ghilzais, regardless of the grape which tore through their masses, fell on sword in hand, and with an intuitive tactical perception struck wymer simultaneously in front and flank. his sepoys had to change their dispositions, and the ghilzais took the opportunity of their momentary dislocation to charge right home. they were met firmly by the bayonet, but again and again the hillmen renewed their attacks; and it was not till after five hours of hard fighting which cost them heavy loss, that at length, in the darkness, they suddenly drew off. had they been swiss peasants defending their mountains, or poles struggling against the ferocious tyranny of russia, their gallant effort might have excited praise and sympathy. had they been soudanese, a statesman might have spoken of them as a people 'rightly struggling to be free'; as it was, the envoy vituperated them as 'a parcel of ragamuffins,' and wymer's sepoys were held to have 'covered themselves with glory.' macnaghten proceeded to encourage a sense of honour among the tribes by proposing the transfer to another chief, on condition of his seizing and delivering over the inconvenient 'gooroo,' of the share of subsidy of which the latter had been in receipt. while this creditable transaction was under consideration, uktar khan was again making himself very unpleasant; so much so that macnaghten was authorising rawlinson to offer a reward of , rupees for his capture, which accomplished, rawlinson was instructed to 'hang the villain as high as haman.' the gallows was not built, however, on which uktar was to hang, although that chief sustained two severe defeats at the hands of troops sent from candahar, and had to become a fugitive. the ghilzais, who had gathered again after their defeat under the 'gooroo,' had made little stand against the detachment which colonel chambers led out from candahar, and they were again temporarily dispersed. the 'gooroo' himself was in our hands. if the disaffection was in no degree diminished, the active ebullitions of it were assuredly quelled for the time. it was true, to be sure, that akbar khan, the fierce and resolute son of dost mahomed, had refused the envoy's overtures to come in, and was wandering and plotting in khooloom, quite ready to fulfil macnaghten's prophetic apprehension that 'the fellow will be after some mischief should the opportunity present itself'; that the dooranees were still defiant; that an insurgent force was out in the dehrawat; and that the tameless chief akram khan was being blown from a gun by the cruel and feeble timour. but unquestionably there was a comparative although short-lived lull in the overt hostility of the afghan peoples against shah soojah and his foreign supporters; and macnaghten characteristically announced that 'the country was quiet from dan to beersheba.' to one of his correspondents he wrote: 'from mookoor to the khyber pass, all is content and tranquillity; and wherever we europeans go, we are received with respect, attention and welcome. i think our prospects are most cheering; and with the materials we have there ought to be little or no difficulty in the management of the country. the people are perfect children, and they should be treated as such. if we put one naughty boy in the corner, the rest will be terrified.' general nott at candahar, who 'never interfered in the government of the country,' but regarded the situation with shrewd, clear-headed common sense, differed utterly from the envoy's view. the stout old soldier did not squander his fire; it was a close volley he discharged in the following words: 'the conduct of the thousand and one politicals has ruined our cause, and bared the throat of every european in this country to the sword and knife of the revengeful afghan and bloody belooch; and unless several regiments be quickly sent, not a man will be left to describe the fate of his comrades. nothing will ever make the afghans submit to the hated shah soojah, who is most certainly as great a scoundrel as ever lived.' nott's conclusions were in the main justified by after events, but the correctness of his premiss may be questioned. that the conduct of some of the political officers intensified the rancour of the afghans is unhappily true, but the hate of our domination, and of the puppet thrust upon them by us, seems to have found its origin in a deeper feeling. the patriotism of a savage race is marked by features repulsive to civilised communities, but through the ruthless cruelty of the indiscriminate massacre, the treachery of the stealthy stab, and the lightly broken pledges, there may shine out the noblest virtue that a virile people can possess. a semi-barbarian nation whose manhood pours out its blood like water in stubborn resistance against an alien yoke, may be pardoned for many acts shocking to civilised communities which have not known the bitterness of stern and masterful subjugation. chapter v: the beginning of the end the deceptive quietude of afghanistan which followed the sharp lessons administered to the dooranees and the ghilzais was not seriously disturbed during the month of september , and macnaghten was in a full glow of cheerfulness. his services had been recognised by his appointment to the dignified and lucrative post of governor of the bombay presidency, and he was looking forward to an early departure for a less harassing and tumultuous sphere of action than that in which he had been labouring for two troubled years. the belief that he would leave behind him a quiescent afghanistan, and shah soojah firmly established on its throne, was the complement, to a proud and zealous man, of the satisfaction which his promotion afforded. one distasteful task he had to perform before he should go. the home government had become seriously disquieted by the condition of affairs in afghanistan. the secret committee of the court of directors, the channel through which the ministry communicated with the governor-general, had expressed great concern at the heavy burden imposed on the indian finances by the cost of the maintenance of the british force in afghanistan, and by the lavish expenditure of the administration which macnaghten directed. the anglo-indian government was urgently required to review with great earnestness the question of its future policy in regard to afghanistan, and to consider gravely whether an enterprise at once so costly and so unsatisfactory in results should not be frankly abandoned. lord auckland was alive to the difficulties and embarrassments which encompassed the position beyond the indus, but he was loth to admit that the policy of which he had been the author, and in which the home government had abetted him so eagerly, was an utter failure. he and his advisers finally decided in favour of the continued occupation of afghanistan; and since the indian treasury was empty, and the annual charge of that occupation was not less than a million and a quarter sterling, recourse was had to a loan, macnaghten was pressed to effect economies in the administration, and he was specially enjoined to cut down the subsidies which were paid to afghan chiefs as bribes to keep them quiet. macnaghten had objected to this retrenchment, pointing out that the stipends to the chiefs were simply compensation for the abandonment by them of their immemorial practice of highway robbery, but he yielded to pressure, called to cabul the chiefs in its vicinity, and informed them that thenceforth their subsidies would be reduced. the chiefs strongly remonstrated, but without effect, and they then formed a confederacy of rebellion. the ghilzai chiefs were the first to act. quitting cabul, they occupied the passes between the capital and jellalabad, and entirely intercepted the communications with india by the khyber route. macnaghten did not take alarm at this significant demonstration, regarding the outbreak merely as 'provoking,' and writing to rawlinson that 'the rascals would be well trounced for their pains.' yet warnings of gathering danger were rife, which but for his mood of optimism should have struck home to his apprehension. pottinger had come down from the kohistan, where he was acting as political officer, bent on impressing on him that a general rising of that region was certain unless strong measures of prevention were resorted to. for some time before the actual outbreak of the ghilzais, the afghan hatred to our people had been showing itself with exceptional openness and bitterness. europeans and camp followers had been murdered, but the sinister evidences of growing danger had been regarded merely as ebullitions of private rancour. akbar khan, dost mahomed's son, had moved forward from khooloom into the bamian country, and there was little doubt that he was fomenting the disaffection of the ghilzai chiefs, with some of whom this indomitable man, who in his intense hatred of the english intruders had resolutely rejected all offers of accommodation, and preferred the life of a homeless exile to the forfeiture of his independence, was closely connected by marriage. the time was approaching when sale's brigade was to quit cabul on its return journey to india. macnaghten seems to have originally intended to accompany this force, for he wrote that he 'hoped to settle the hash of the ghilzais on the way down, if not before.' the rising, however, spread so widely and so rapidly that immediate action was judged necessary, and on october th colonel monteath marched towards the passes with his own regiment, the th native infantry, some artillery and cavalry details, and a detachment of broadfoot's sappers. how able, resolute, and high-souled a man was george broadfoot, the course of this narrative will later disclose. he was one of three gallant brothers, all of whom died sword in hand. the corps of sappers which he commanded was a remarkable body--a strange medley of hindustanees, goorkhas, and afghan tribesmen of divers regions. many were desperate and intractable characters, but broadfoot, with mingled strength and kindness, moulded his heterogeneous recruits into skilful, obedient and disciplined soldiers. broadfoot's description of his endeavours to learn something of the nature of the duties expected of him in the expedition for which he had been detailed, and to obtain such equipment as those duties might require, throws a melancholy light on the deteriorated state of affairs among our people at this period, and on the relations between the military and civilian authorities. broadfoot went for information, in the first instance, to colonel monteath, who could give him no orders, having received none himself. monteath declined to apply for details as to the expedition, as he knew 'these people' (the authorities) too well; he was quite aware of the danger of going on service in the dark, but explained that it was not the custom of the military authorities at cabul to consult or even instruct the commanders of expeditions. broadfoot then went to the general. cotton's successor in the chief military command in afghanistan was poor general elphinstone, a most gallant soldier, but with no experience of indian warfare, and utterly ignorant of the afghans and of afghanistan. wrecked in body and impaired in mind by physical ailments and infirmities, he had lost all faculty of energy, and such mind as remained to him was swayed by the opinion of the person with whom he had last spoken. the poor gentleman was so exhausted by the exertion of getting out of bed, and being helped into his visiting-room, that it was not for half-an-hour, and after several ineffectual efforts, that he could attend to business. he knew nothing of the nature of the service on which monteath was ordered, could give broadfoot no orders, and was unwilling to refer to the envoy on a matter which should have been left to him to arrange. he complained bitterly of the way in which he was reduced to a cypher--'degraded from a general to the "lord-lieutenant's head constable."' broadfoot went from the general to the envoy, who 'was peevish,' and denounced the general as fidgety. he declared the enemy to be contemptible, and that as for broadfoot and his sappers, twenty men with pickaxes were enough; all they were wanted for was to pick stones from under the gun wheels. when broadfoot represented the inconvenience with which imperfect information as to the objects of the expedition was fraught, macnaghten lost his temper, and told broadfoot that, if he thought monteath's movement likely to bring on an attack, 'he need not go, he was not wanted'; whereupon broadfoot declined to listen to such language, and made his bow. returning to the general, whom he found 'lost and perplexed,' he was told to follow his own judgment as to what quantity of tools he should take. the adjutant-general came in, and 'this officer, after abusing the envoy, spoke to the general with an imperiousness and disrespect, and to me, a stranger, with an insolence it was painful to see the influence of on the general. his advice to his chief was to have nothing to say to macnaghten, to me, or to the sappers, saying monteath had men enough, and needed neither sappers nor tools.' at parting the poor old man said to broadfoot: 'if you go out, for god's sake clear the passes quickly, that i may get away; for if anything were to turn up, i am unfit for it, done up in body and mind.' this was the man whom lord auckland had appointed to the most responsible and arduous command at his disposal, and this not in ignorance of general elphinstone's disqualifications for active service, but in the fullest knowledge of them! monteath's camp at bootkhak, the first halting-place on the jellalabad road, was sharply attacked on the night of the th, and the assailants, many of whom were the armed retainers of chiefs living in cabul sent out specially to take part in the attack, although unsuccessful, inflicted on monteath considerable loss. next day sale, with h.m.'s th, joined monteath, and on the th he forced the long and dangerous ravine of the khoord cabul with sharp fighting, but no very serious loss, although sale himself was wounded, and had to relinquish the active command to colonel dennie. monteath encamped in the valley beyond the pass, and sale, with the th, returned without opposition to bootkhak, there to await reinforcements and transports. in his isolated position monteath remained unmolested until the night of the th, when he repulsed a ghilzai attack made in considerable strength, and aided by the treachery of 'friendly' afghans who had been admitted into his camp; but he had many casualties, and lost a number of camels. on the th sale, reinforced by troops returned from the zurmut expedition, moved forward on monteath, and on the d pushed on to the tezeen valley, meeting with no opposition either on the steep summit of the huft kotul or in the deep narrow ravine opening into the valley. the ghilzais were in force around the mouth of the defile, but a few cannon-shots broke them up. the advance guard pursued with over-rashness; the ghilzais rallied, in the skirmish which ensued an officer and several men were killed, and the retirement of our people unfortunately degenerated into precipitate flight, with the ghilzais in hot pursuit. the th, to which the fugitive detachment mainly belonged, now consisted mainly of young soldiers, whose constancy was impaired by this untoward occurrence. macnaghten had furnished sale with a force which, in good heart and vigorously commanded, was strong enough to have effected great things. the ghilzai chief of tezeen possessed a strong fort full of supplies, which dennie was about to attack, when the wily afghan sent to major macgregor, the political officer accompanying sale, a tender of submission. macgregor fell into the snare, desired sale to countermand the attack, and entered into negotiations. in doing so he committed a fatal error, and he exceeded his instructions in the concessions which he made. macnaghten, it was true, had left matters greatly to macgregor's discretion; and if 'the rebels were very humble,' the envoy was not disposed to be too hard upon them. but one of his firm stipulations was that the defences of khoda buxsh's fort must be demolished, and that gool mahomed khan 'should have nothing but war.' both injunctions were disregarded by macgregor, who, with unimportant exceptions, surrendered all along the line. the ghilzais claimed and obtained the restoration of their original subsidies; a sum was handed to them to enable them to raise the tribes in order to keep clear the passes; khoda buxsh held his fort, and sold the supplies it contained to sale's commissary at a fine price. every item of the arrangement was dead in favour of the ghilzais, and contributory to their devices. sale, continuing his march, would be separated further and further from the now diminished force in cabul, and by the feigned submission the chiefs had made they had escaped the permanent establishment of a strong detachment in their midst at tezeen. macnaghten, discontented though he was with the sweeping concessions which macgregor had granted to the ghilzais, put the best face he could on the completed transaction, and allowed himself to believe that a stable settlement had been effected. on the th sale continued his march, having made up his baggage animals at the expense of the th native infantry, which, with half of the sappers and three guns of the mountain train, he sent back to kubbar-i-jubbar, there to halt in a dangerously helpless situation until transport should be sent down from cabul. his march as far as kutti sung was unmolested. mistrusting the good faith of his new-made allies, he shunned the usual route through the purwan durrah by taking the mountain road to the south of that defile, and thus reached the jugdulluk valley with little opposition, baulking the dispositions of the ghilzais, who, expecting him to traverse the purwan durrah, were massed about the southern end of the defile, ready to fall on the column when committed to the tortuous gorge. from the jugdulluk camping ground there is a steep and winding ascent of three miles, commanded until near the summit by heights on either side. sale's main body had attained the crest with trivial loss, having detached parties by the way to ascend to suitable flanking positions, and hold those until the long train of slow-moving baggage should have passed, when they were to fall in and come on with the rear-guard. the dispositions would have been successful but that on reaching the crest the main body, instead of halting there for the rear to close up, hurried down the reverse slope, leaving baggage, detachments, and rear-guard to endure the attacks which the ghilzais promptly delivered, pressing fiercely on the rear, and firing down from either side on the confused mass in the trough below. the flanking detachments had relinquished their posts in panic, and hurried forward in confusion to get out of the pass. the rear-guard was in disorder, when broadfoot, with a few officers and some of his sappers, valiantly checked the onslaught, but the crest was not crossed until upwards of men had fallen, the wounded among whom had to be abandoned with the dead. on october th sale's force reached gundamuk without further molestation, and halted there temporarily to await orders. during the halt melancholy rumours filtered down the passes from the capital, and later came confirmation of the evil tidings from the envoy, and orders from elphinstone directing the immediate return of the brigade to cabul, if the safety of its sick and wounded could be assured. sale called a council of war, which pronounced, although not unanimously, against a return to cabul; and it was resolved instead to march on to jellalabad, which was regarded as an eligible _point d'appui_ on which a relieving force might move up and a retiring force might move down. accordingly on november th the brigade quitted gundamuk, and hurried down rather precipitately, and with some fighting by the way, to jellalabad, which was occupied on the th. some members of the gundamuk council of war, foremost among whom was broadfoot, argued vigorously in favour of the return march to cabul. havelock, who was with sale as a staff-officer, strongly urged the further retreat into jellalabad. others, again, advocated the middle course of continuing to hold gundamuk. it may be said that a daring general would have fought his way back to cabul, that a prudent general would have remained at gundamuk, and that the occupation of jellalabad was the expedient of a weak general. that a well-led march on cabul was feasible, although it might have been difficult and bloody, cannot be questioned, and the advent of such men as broadfoot and havelock would have done much toward rekindling confidence and stimulating the restoration of soldierly virtue, alike in the military authorities and in the rank and file of the cabul force. at gundamuk, again, the brigade, well able to maintain its position there, would have made its influence felt all through the ghilzai country and as far as cabul. the evacuation of that capital decided on, it would have been in a position to give the hand to the retiring army, and so to avert at least the worst disasters of the retreat. the retirement on jellalabad, in the terse language of durand, 'served no conceivable purpose except to betray weakness, and still further to encourage revolt.' while sale was struggling through the passes on his way to gundamuk, our people at cabul were enjoying unwonted quietude. casual entries in lady sale's journal, during the later days of october, afford clear evidence how utterly unconscious were they of the close gathering of the storm that so soon was to break upon them. her husband had written to her from tezeen that his wound was fast healing, and that the chiefs were extremely polite. she complains of the interruption of the mails owing to the ghilzai outbreak, but comforts herself with the anticipation of their arrival in a day or two. she was to leave cabul for india in a few days, along with the macnaghtens and general elphinstone, and her diary expresses an undernote of regret at having to leave the snug house in the cantonments which sale had built on his own plan, the excellent kitchen garden in which her warrior husband, in the intervals of his soldiering duties, grew fine crops of peas, potatoes, cauliflowers and artichokes, and the parterres of flowers which she herself cultivated, and which were the admiration of the afghan gentlemen who came to pay their morning calls. [illustration: cabul the cantonment _and the_ surrounding country.] the defencelessness of the position at cabul had long engaged the solicitude of men who were no alarmists. engineer officer after engineer officer had unavailingly and a half from the cantonments, with the cabul river intervening. with shelton's troops and those in the cantonments general elphinstone had at his disposition, apart from the shah's contingent, four infantry regiments, two batteries of artillery, three companies of sappers, a regiment of cavalry, and some irregular horse--a force fully equipped and in good order. in the balla hissar shah soojah had a considerable, if rather mixed, body of military and several guns. the rising of the d november may not have been the result of a fully organised plan. there are indications that it was premature, and that the revolt in force would have been postponed until after the expected departure of the envoy and the general with all the troops except shelton's brigade, but for an irrepressible burst of personal rancour against burnes. durand holds, however, that the malcontents acted on the belief that to kill burnes and sack the treasury was to inaugurate the insurrection with an imposing success. be this as it may, a truculent mob early in the morning of november d assailed burnes' house. he at first regarded the outbreak as a casual riot, and wrote to macnaghten to that effect. having harangued the throng without effect, he and his brother, along with william broadfoot his secretary, prepared for defence. broadfoot was soon killed, and a little later burnes and his brother were hacked to pieces in the garden behind the house. the treasury was sacked; the sepoys who had guarded it and burnes' house were massacred, and both buildings were fired; the armed mob swelled in numbers, and soon the whole city was in a roar of tumult. prompt and vigorous military action would no doubt have crushed the insurrection, at least for the time. but the indifference, vacillation and delay of the british authorities greatly encouraged its rapid development. macnaghten at first 'did not think much of it.' shelton was ordered into the balla hissar, countermanded, a second time ordered, and again instructed to halt for orders. at last the envoy himself despatched him, with the loose order to act on his own judgment in communication with the shah. shelton marched into the balla hissar with part of his force, and the rest of it was moved into the cantonments. when the brigadier went to the shah, that potentate demanded to know who sent him, and what he had come for. but the shah, to do him justice, had himself taken action. informed that burnes was attacked and the city in revolt, he had ordered campbell's regiment of his own levies and a couple of guns to march to his assistance. campbell recklessly attempted to push his way through the heart of the city, instead of reaching burnes' house by a circuitous but opener route, and after some sharp street fighting in which he lost heavily, he was driven back, unable to penetrate to the scene of plunder and butchery. shelton remained inactive in the balla hissar until campbell was reported beaten and retreating, when he took some feeble measures to cover the retreat of the fugitives, who, however, abandoned their guns outside the fortress. the day was allowed to pass without anything further being done, except the despatch of an urgent recall to major griffiths, whom sale had left at kubbar-i-jubbar, and that good soldier, having fought every step of the way through the passes, brought in his detachment in unbroken order and without loss of baggage, notwithstanding his weakness in transport. shelton, reinforced in the balla hissar, maintained an intermittent and ineffectual fire on the city. urgent orders were despatched to sale, recalling him and his brigade--orders with which, as has been mentioned, sale did not comply--and also to nott, at candahar, begging him to send a brigade to cabul. in compliance with this requisition, maclaren's brigade immediately started from candahar, but soon returned owing to the inclemency of the weather. captain mackenzie was in charge of a fort containing the shah's commissariat stores; this fort was on the outskirts of a suburb of cabul, and was fiercely attacked on the d. for two days mackenzie maintained his post with unwearying constancy. his garrison was short of water and of ammunition, and the fort was crowded with women and children, but he held on resolutely until the night of the d. no assistance was sent, no notice, indeed, of any kind was taken of him; his garrison was discouraged by heavy loss, and by the mines which the enemy were pushing forward. at length, when the gate of the fort had been fired, and his wounded were dying for lack of medical aid, he evacuated the fort, and fought his way gallantly into cantonments, bringing in his wounded and the women and children. with this solitary exception the afghans had nowhere encountered resistance, and the strange passiveness of our people encouraged them to act with vigour. from the enclosed space of the shah bagh, and the adjacent forts of mahmood khan and mahomed shereef, they were threatening the commissariat fort, hindering access to it, and besetting the south-western flank of the cantonments. a young officer commanded the hundred sepoys garrisoning the commissariat fort; he reported himself in danger of being cut off, and elphinstone gave orders that he and his garrison should be brought off, and the fort and its contents abandoned. several efforts to accomplish the withdrawal were thwarted by the afghan flanking fire, with the loss of several officers and many men. the commissary officer urged on the general the disastrous consequences which the abandonment of the fort would entail, containing as it did all the stores, adding that in cantonments there were only two days' supplies, without prospect of procuring any more. orders were then sent to warren to hold out to the last extremity; which instructions he denied having received. early in the morning of the th troops were preparing to attack the afghan fort and reinforce the commissariat fort, when warren and his garrison reached the cantonments. the gate of the commissariat fort had been fired, but the enemy had not effected an entrance, yet warren and his people had evacuated the fort through a hole cut in its wall. thus, with scarcely a struggle to save it, was this vital fort allowed to fall into the enemy's hands, and thenceforward our unfortunate people were to be reduced to precarious and scanty sources for their food. from the th to the th november there was a good deal of desultory fighting, in the course of which, after one failure, mahomed shereef's fort was stormed by a detachment of our people, under the command of major griffiths; but this success had little influence on the threatening attitude maintained by the afghans. on the th, owing to the mental and physical weakness of poor general elphinstone, brigadier shelton was summoned into cantonments from the balla hissar, bringing with him part of the garrison with which he had been holding the latter post. the hopes entertained that shelton would display vigour, and restore the confidence of the troops, were not realised. he from the first had no belief in the ability of the occupants of the cantonment to maintain their position, and he never ceased to urge prompt retreat on jellalabad. from the purely military point of view he was probably right; the duke of wellington shared his opinion when he said in the house of lords: 'after the first few days, particularly after the negotiations at cabul had commenced, it became hopeless for general elphinstone to maintain his position.' shelton's situation was unquestionably a very uncomfortable one, for elphinstone, broken as he was, yet allowed his second in command no freedom of action, and was testily pertinacious of his prerogative of command. if in shelton, who after his manner was a strong man, there had been combined with his resolution some tact and temper, he might have exercised a beneficial influence. as it was he became sullen and despondent, and retired behind an 'uncommunicative and disheartening reserve.' brave as he was, he seems to have lacked the inspiration which alone could reinvigorate the drooping spirit of the troops. in a word, though he probably was, in army language, a 'good duty soldier,' he certainly was nothing more. and something more was needed then. action on shelton's part became necessary the day after he came into cantonments. the afghans occupied all the forts on the plain between the seah sung heights and the cantonments, and from the nearest of them, the rikabashee fort, poured in a heavy fire at close range, which the return artillery fire could not quell. on macnaghten's urgent requisition the general ordered out a strong force, under shelton, to storm the obnoxious fort. captain bellew missed the gate, and blew open merely a narrow wicket, but the storming party obeyed the signal to advance. through a heavy fire the leaders reached the wicket, and forced their way in, followed by a few soldiers. the garrison of the fort hastily evacuated it, and all seemed well, when a sudden stampede ensued--the handful which, led by colonel mackrell of the th and lieutenant bird of the shah's force, had already entered the fort, remaining inside it. the runaway troops were rallied with difficulty by shelton and the subordinate officers, but a call for volunteers from the european regiment was responded to but by one solitary scottish private. after a second advance, and a second retreat--a retreat made notwithstanding strong artillery and musketry support--shelton's efforts brought his people forward yet again, and this time the fort was occupied in force. of those who had previously entered it but two survivors were found. the afghans, re-entering the fort, had hacked mackrell to pieces and slaughtered the men who tried to escape by the wicket. lieutenant bird and a sepoy, from a stable the door of which they had barricaded with logs of wood, had fended off their assailants by a steady and deadly fire, and when they were rescued by the entrance of the troops they had to clamber out over a pile of thirty dead afghans whom the bullets of the two men had struck down. it had come to our people in those gloomy days, to regard as a 'triumph' a combat in which they were not actually worsted; and even of such dubious successes the last occurred on november , when the afghans, after having pressed our infantry down the slopes of the behmaroo ridge, were driven back by artillery fire, and forced by a cavalry charge to retreat further, leaving behind them a couple of guns from which they had been sending missiles into the cantonments. one of those guns was brought in without difficulty, but the other the afghans covered with their jezail fire. the envoy had sent a message of entreaty that 'the triumph of the day' should be completed by its capture. major scott of the th made appeal on appeal, ineffectually, to the soldierly feelings of his men, and while they would not move the sepoys could not be induced to advance. at length eyre spiked the piece as a precautionary measure, and finally some men of the shah's infantry succeeded in bringing in the prize. the return march of the troops into cantonments in the dark, was rendered disorderly by the close pressure of the afghans, who, firing incessantly, pursued the broken soldiery up to the entrance gate. on the depressed garrison of the cabul cantonments tidings of disaster further afield had been pouring in apace. soon after the outbreak of the rising, it was known that lieutenant maule, commanding the kohistanee regiment at kurdurrah, had been cut to pieces, with his adjutant and sergeant-major, by the men of his own corps; and on november th intelligence had come in that the goorkha regiment stationed at charikar in the kohistan, where major pottinger was resident, was in dangerous case, and that codrington, its commandant, and some of his officers had already fallen. and now, on the th, there rode wearily into cantonments two wounded men, who believed themselves the only british survivors of the charikar force. pottinger was wounded in the leg, haughton, the adjutant of the goorkha corps, had lost his right hand, and his head hung forward on his breast, half severed from his body by a great tulwar slash. of the miserable story which it fell to pottinger to tell only the briefest summary can be given. his residence was at lughmanee, a few miles from the charikar cantonments, when early in the month a number of chiefs of the kohistan and the nijrao country assembled to discuss with him the terms on which they would reopen the communications with cabul. those chiefs proved treacherous, slew rattray, pottinger's assistant, and besieged pottinger in lughmanee. finding his position untenable, he withdrew to charikar under cover of night. on the morning of the th the afghans assailed the cantonments. pottinger was wounded, codrington was killed, and the goorkhas were driven into the barracks. haughton, who succeeded to the command of the regiment, made sortie on sortie, but was finally driven in, and the enemy renewed their assaults in augmented strength. thenceforward the position was all but hopeless. on the th the last scant remains of water was distributed. efforts to procure water by sorties on the nights of the th and th were not successful, and the corps fell into disorganisation because of losses, hardships, exhaustion, hunger and thirst. pottinger and haughton agreed that there was no prospect of saving even a remnant of the regiment unless by a retreat to cabul, which, however, was clearly possible only in the case of the stronger men, unencumbered with women and children, of whom, unfortunately, there was a great number in the garrison. on the afternoon of the th haughton was cut down by a treacherous native officer of the artillery, who then rushed out of the gate, followed by all the gunners and most of the mahommedans of the garrison. in the midst of the chaos of disorganisation, dr grant amputated haughton's hand, dressed his other wounds, and then spiked all the guns. when it was dark, the garrison moved out, pottinger leading the advance, dr grant the main body, and ensign rose the rear-guard. from the beginning of the march, discipline was all but entirely in abeyance; on reaching the first stream, the last remains of control were lost, and the force was rapidly disintegrating. pottinger and haughton, the latter only just able to keep the saddle, pushed on toward cabul, rested in a ravine during the day, evaded the partisan detachment sent out from cabul to intercept them, rode through sleeping cabul in the small hours of the morning, and after being pursued and fired upon in the outskirts of the city, finally attained the cantonments. it was afterwards learned that a portion of the regiment had struggled on to within twenty miles from cabul, gallantly headed by young rose and dr grant. then the remnant was destroyed. rose was killed, after despatching four afghans with his own hand. dr grant, escaping the massacre, held on until within three miles of the cantonments, when he too was killed. macnaghten was naturally much depressed by the news communicated by pottinger, and realised that the afghan masses already encompassing the position on the cabul plain would certainly be increased by bands from the kohistan and nijrao, flushed already with their charikar success. he sided strongly with the large party among the officers who were advocating the measure of abandoning the cantonments altogether, and moving the force now quartered there to the safer and more commanding position in the balla hissar. the military chiefs opposed the project, and propounded a variety of objections to it, none of which were without weight, yet all of which might have been overcome by energy and proper dispositions. shelton, however, was opposed to the scheme, since if carried out it would avert or postpone the accomplishment of his policy of retreat on jellalabad; elphinstone was against it in the inertia of debility, and the project gradually came to be regarded as abandoned. another project, that of driving the afghans from mahmood khan's fort, commanding the direct road between the cantonments and the balla hissar, and of occupying it with a british force, was so far advanced that the time for the attempt was fixed, and the storming party actually warned, when some petty objection intervened and the enterprise was abandoned, never to be revived. the rising was not three days old when already elphinstone had lost heart. on the th he had written to macnaghten suggesting that the latter should 'consider what chance there is of making terms,' and since then he had been repeatedly pressing on the envoy the 'hopelessness of further resistance.' macnaghten, vacillating as he was, yet had more pith in his nature than was left in the debilitated old general. he wrote to elphinstone on the th recommending, not very strenuously, the policy of holding out where they were as long as possible, and indeed throughout the winter, if subsistence could be obtained. he pointed out that in the cantonments, which he believed to be impregnable, there were at least the essentials of wood and water. arguing that a retreat on jellalabad must be most disastrous, and was to be avoided except in the last extremity, he nevertheless ended somewhat inconsistently by leaving to the military authorities, if in eight or ten days there should appear no prospect of an improvement of the situation, the decision whether it would be wiser to attempt a retreat or to withdraw from the cantonments into the balla hissar. far from improving, the situation was speedily to become all but hopeless. the village of behmaroo, built on the north-eastern slope of the ridge of the same name bounding the plain on the north-west, lay about half a mile due north of the cantonments, part of which some of the houses on the upper slope commanded. from this village, after the loss of the commissariat fort, our people had been drawing supplies. on the morning of the d the afghans were seen moving in force from cabul toward behmaroo, obviously with intent to occupy the village, and so deprive the occupants of the cantonments of the resource it had been affording them. a detachment under major swayne, sent out to forestall this occupation, found behmaroo already in the possession of a body of kohistanees, who had so blocked the approaches that swayne did not consider himself justified in attempting the fulfilment of his orders to storm the place; and he contented himself with maintaining all day an ineffectual musketry fire on it. a diversion in his favour by a gun supported by cavalry had no result save that of casualties to the gunners and troopers; reinforcements brought out by shelton effected nothing, and in the evening the troops were recalled. on this ill-fated day akbar khan, dost mahomed's fierce and implacable son, arrived in cabul, and the evil influence on the british fortunes which he exerted immediately made itself felt, for the events of the following day were to bring about a crisis in the fate of our ill-starred people. recognising the mischief wrought by the hostile occupation of our only source of supplies, the envoy strongly urged the immediate despatch of a strong force to occupy the behmaroo ridge, and dislodge from the village its kohistanee garrison. shelton opposed the measure, urging the dispirited state of the troops, their fatigue from constant defensive duty, and their weakened physique because of poor and scanty rations. he was overruled, and before daybreak of the d a force under his command, consisting of five companies of the th, twelve companies of native infantry, some cavalry, and one horse-artillery gun, was in position on the north-eastern extremity of the ridge overhanging the village. the gun opened fire on the village with grape, and after a short resistance the greater part of its garrison quitted it. the storming party intrusted to major swayne did not, however, act, and was withdrawn. leaving a detachment on the knoll above the village, shelton moved his force along the upland to a position near the gorge intersecting the ridge, forming his infantry into two squares, with the cavalry in rear. the further hill beyond the gorge was crowded with hostile afghans from cabul, and the long-range fire of their jezails across the dividing depression, carried execution into the squares which shelton had inexplicably formed as if to furnish his foes with a target which they could not miss. the muskets of his men could not retaliate, and the skirmishers he threw forward to the brow of his hill could not endure the afghan fire. shelton's single gun maintained a hot and telling fire on the afghan masses on the opposite hill, and baulked an attempt against his right flank made by the afghan cavalry swarming in the outer plain; but when its vent became too hot for the gunners to serve it, the dullest comprehension became alive to the folly of sending a single gun into the field. shelton's men, falling fast though they were, and faint with fatigue and thirst, yet had endured for hours a fusillade to which they could not reply, when a body of afghan fanatics suddenly sprang up out of the gorge, swept back with their fire the few skirmishers who had been still holding the brow of the hill, and planted their flag within thirty yards of the front of the nearer of the squares. shelton offered a large reward to the man who should bring it in, but there was no response. in a passion of soldierly wrath, the veteran commanded a bayonet charge; not a man sprang forward at the summons which british soldiers are wont to welcome with cheers. the cowed infantry remained supine, when their officers darted forward and threw stones into the faces of the enemy; the troopers heard but obeyed not that trumpet-call to 'charge!' which so rarely fails to thrill the cavalryman with the rapture of the fray. the gunners only, men of that noble force the company's horse-artillery, quitted themselves valiantly. they stood to their piece to the bitter end. two of them were killed beside it, another was severely wounded, a fourth, refusing to run, took refuge under the gun, and miraculously escaped death. but the gallant example of the artillerymen in their front did not hearten the infantrymen of the leading square. the panic spread among them, and they broke and fled. fortunately they were not pursued. the rear square stood fast, and the officers by great exertion succeeded in rallying the fugitives under the cover it afforded. the news that a principal chief, abdoolah khan, had been severely wounded in the plain gave pause to the offensive vigour of the afghans, and the assailants fell back, abandoning the gun, but carrying off the limber and gun-team. our people reoccupied the position, the gun recommenced its fire, and if the cavalry and infantry could have been persuaded to take the offensive the battle might have been retrieved. but they remained passive. the reinforced afghans renewed their long-range fire with terrible effect; most of the gunners had fallen, and the brigadier, recognising the growing unsteadiness of his command and the imminent danger of capture to which the solitary gun was again exposed, ordered a retirement on the detachment left near behmaroo and the limbering up of the gun, to which a second limber had been sent out from the cantonments. the movement was scarcely begun when a rush of fanatic afghans completely broke the square, and all order and discipline then disappeared. a regular rout set in down the hill toward cantonments, the fugitives disregarding the efforts of the officers to rally them, and the enemy in full pursuit, the afghan cavalry making ghastly slaughter among the panic-stricken runaways. the detachment near behmaroo attempted to fall back in orderly fashion, but the reinforced garrison of the village swept out upon it, surrounded it, broke it up, and threw it into utter rout with the loss of a large proportion of its strength, one whole company being all but annihilated. it seemed as if pursued and pursuers would enter the cantonments together so closely were they commingled; but the fire from the ramparts and an opportune charge of horse arrested the pursuit. yet eyre reckons as the chief reason why all the british force that had gone out to battle was not destroyed, the fact that a leading afghan chief forced his men to spare the fugitives, and ultimately halted and withdrew his people when the opportunity for wholesale slaughter lay open to them. most of the wounded were left on the field, where they were miserably cut to pieces; and the gun, which had been overturned in the attempt of the drivers to gallop down the face of the hill, finally passed into the possession of the afghans. shelton's dispositions as a commander could not well have been worse; his bearing as a soldier, although undaunted, imparted to his hapless troops nothing of inspiration. the obstinacy with which he held the hill after the impossibility of even partial success must have been patent to him, was universally condemned. it need scarcely be added that his loss was very severe. no more fighting was possible. what, then, was to be done? elphinstone and shelton were at one in opposing removal into the balla hissar. macnaghten, to whom shah soojah had communicated his urgent recommendation of that measure as the only expedient which could secure the safety of the british troops, fell in with the views of the military authorities. there came to him a letter from osman khan, the chief who had called off his adherents on the previous day from pursuing the fugitives fleeing into cantonments. osman wrote that, if his troops had followed up their successes, the loss of the cantonments and the destruction of the british force were inevitable; but, he continued, that it was not the wish of the chiefs to proceed to such extremities, their sole desire being that our people should quietly evacuate the country, leaving the afghan sirdars to govern it according to their own customs, and with a king of their own choosing. in communicating this letter to general elphinstone, sir william asked for the latter's opinion on the military possibility, or the reverse, of the retention of the british position in afghanistan. elphinstone, in reply, enumerated sundry reasons which led him to the conclusion which he stated, that 'it is not feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country, and that you ought to avail yourself of the offer to negotiate which has been made to you.' chapter vi: the road to ruin as the result of the military disaster of november d, and of the representations of the general, recorded in the last chapter, macnaghten, with whatever reluctance, permitted himself to entertain proposals for an arrangement made by the afghan leaders. from the beginning of the outbreak, while urging on the military authorities to exert themselves in putting down the revolt, he had been engaged in tortuous and dangerous intrigues, with the object of sowing discord among the afghan chiefs, and thus weakening the league of hostility against shah soojah and his british supporters. in the conduct of these intrigues he used the services of mohun lal, who had been one of burnes' assistants, and who, having escaped the fate of his chief, had found refuge in the city residence of a kuzzilbash chief. mohun lal was a fitting agent for the sort of work prescribed to him, and he burrowed and suborned with assiduity, and not altogether without success. but it is unhappily true that he was commissioned to carry out a darker enterprise, the removal by assassination of certain of the more virulently hostile among the afghan leaders. the incident is the blackest of the many discreditable transactions which chequer the inner political history of this melancholy chapter of our annals. it is unfortunately certain that lieutenant john conolly, macnaghten's kinsman and his confidential representative with shah soojah, authorised mohun lal, in writing, to compass the taking off of prominent afghan leaders. in a letter to mohun lal, of th november, conolly wrote: 'i promise , rupees for the head of each rebel chief.' again, on the th, he wrote: 'there is a man called hadji ali, who might be induced by a bribe to try and bring in the heads of one or two of the mufsids. endeavour to let him know that , rupees will be given for each head, or even , rupees.' two chiefs certainly did die under suspicious circumstances, and in each case the blood-money was claimed. it was refused by mohun lal on the plea that the stipulation that the heads of the dead afghans should be brought in was not fulfilled. whether macnaghten inspired those nefarious machinations, whether indeed he was actively aware of them, are questions which, in the absence of conclusive evidence, may judiciously be left unanswered. there is extant a letter from him to mohun lal, written december st, which has the following passage: 'i am sorry to find from your letter of last night that you should have supposed it was ever my object to encourage assassination. the rebels are very wicked men, but we must not take unlawful means to destroy them.' and later he is reported to have informed an afghan deputation that, 'as a british functionary, nothing would induce him to pay a price for blood.' durand holds that it was the belief on the part of the afghan chiefs that the british envoy had set a price on their heads which destroyed all confidence in macnaghten's good faith, and which was akbar khan's chief incentive to his murder. the terms proffered on november th by an afghan deputation were so humiliating that macnaghten peremptorily rejected them; and the threat of immediate hostilities unless our people promptly surrendered their arms and withdrew was not carried out. a period of inaction strangely ensued, which on the afghan side was a treacherous lull, but which macnaghten, hoping against hope that some turn in our favour might yet occur, regarded with complacency. the chiefs, aware that winter was approaching with added hardship to the forlorn garrison, temporarily desisted from urging negotiations. but the british military authorities, with troops living from hand to mouth on precarious half rations, and with transport cattle dying fast of starvation, kept urging the envoy to activity in making terms, if absolute starvation was to be averted. futile projects were discussed between envoy and general, only to be put aside. as the dreary days of inaction and depletion passed, the deterioration of military spirit among our people manifested itself more and more plainly. british soldiers stolidly watched the afghans destroying our bridge across the cabul river, within a quarter of a mile from cantonments. scared by the threat of an assault, which, in the scornful words of brave lady sale, a child with a stick might have repulsed, the garrison of the mahomed shereef fort abandoned it in a panic, the white soldiers of the th showing the example of pusillanimity to the sepoys whom their cowardice demoralised. next day the detachment of the th which had guarded an exposed position had to be withdrawn, ceding the post of honour to the stauncher sepoys. the camp followers were living on carrion; the commissaries reported but four days' provisions in store, and their inability to procure any more supplies. at length on december th the four senior military officers informed the envoy that it was imperatively necessary he should negotiate a retreat, on the best terms he could obtain. macnaghten had to bring himself to recognise that the alternatives were negotiation or starvation, and on the th december, with a draft treaty in his hand, he met the principal afghan chiefs on the river side between the cantonments and the city. after the introductory palavers, macnaghten read the proposed treaty, whose purport was as follows: that the british should evacuate afghanistan forthwith unmolested, furnished with supplies and accompanied by hostages, on their march to india; that the dost, his family, and other afghan political exiles, should be allowed to return to their country; that shah soojah should have the option of remaining at cabul or going down to india; that amnesty should be accorded to all adherents of shah soojah and his british allies; that all prisoners should be released; and that perpetual friendship and mutual good offices should thenceforth endure between the british and the afghans. akbar khan made demur to some of the provisions, but was overruled, and the main stipulations of the treaty were agreed to by the chiefs. the conference broke up with the understanding that the british troops should evacuate cantonments within three days, and that meanwhile provisions should be sent in for their use. the treaty was simply a virtual capitulation all along the line; but the inherent falseness of our position, the incapacity of the military chiefs, and the debased spirit of the troops, consequent partly on low rations but mainly because of the utter absence of competent and vigorous leadership such as a broadfoot or a havelock would have supplied, enforced on the reluctant envoy conditions humiliating beyond previous parallel in the history of our nation. from the outset the afghan chiefs defaulted from their promise of sending in supplies, but some grain was brought into cantonments by the troops, whose evacuation of the balla hissar on the th was effected under humiliating circumstances. the afghans demanded the surrender of the forts in british occupation in the vicinity of the cantonments. the requisition was complied with, and the magazine fort furnished the enemy with both arms and ammunition. the three stipulated days passed away, and still the british force remained motionless in the cantonments. macnaghten was bent on procrastination, and circumstances seemed to favour a policy which to all but himself was inexplicable. by the treaty, shah soojah was in effect committed to withdraw to india, but soon after its acceptance the chiefs had invited him to remain in cabul as king, on the stipulation that he should give his daughters in marriage to leaders of the malcontents. after considerable deliberation, the shah had consented to remain on the condition named, but a few days later he withdrew his acceptance. his vacillation increased the suspicions of the chiefs, and they demanded the immediate evacuation of the cantonments, refusing to furnish provisions until that was done. meanwhile they sent in no transport animals, although large sums had been handed over for their purchase. our people were still immobile, and already, on the th, there had occurred a fall of snow several inches deep. the envoy was engaged in strange and dubious intrigues, and since the afghans were not fulfilling their share of the treaty obligations, he appears to have regarded himself as no longer bound by its conditions, and free to try to obtain better terms from other sources, in pursuit of which purpose he was expending money in a variety of directions. the dark and unscrupulous mohun lal was his confidant and instrument. akbar khan and the chiefs of his party had become aware of macnaghten's machinations, and they laid a snare for him into which he fell with open eyes. emissaries were sent to him with the sinister proposals that the british should remain in afghanistan until the spring, when they were to withdraw as of their own accord; that the head of ameenoolla khan, one of the most powerful and obnoxious of the rebel leaders, should be presented to the envoy in return for a stipulated sum of money; and that for all those services the british government should requite akbar khan with a present of thirty lakhs of rupees, and an annual pension of four lakhs. macnaghten refused peremptorily the proffer of ameenoolla's head, but did not reject co-operation in that chiefs capture by a dubious device in which british troops were to participate; he did not hesitate to accept the general terms of the proposals; and he consented to hold a conference with akbar khan on the following day to carry into effect the projected measures. on the morning of the d the deceived and doomed man, accompanied by his staff-officers, lawrence, trevor and mackenzie, rode out from cantonments to keep the fateful tryst on the bank of the cabul river. his manner was 'distracted and hurried.' when he told lawrence of the nature of the affair on which he was going, that shrewd officer immediately warned him that it was a plot against him. 'a plot!' he replied hastily, 'let me alone for that; trust me for that!' and lawrence desisted from useless expostulation. poor old elphinstone had scented treachery; but the envoy had closed his mouth with the impatient words: 'i understand these things better than you!' as he rode out, he admitted the danger of the enterprise, but argued that if it succeeded it was worth all risks. 'at all events,' he ended, 'let the loss be what it may, i would rather die a hundred deaths than live the last six weeks over again.' the escort halted, and the four british gentlemen advanced to the place of rendezvous, whither came presently akbar khan and his party. akbar began the conference by asking the envoy if he was ready to carry out the proposals presented to him overnight. 'why not?' was sir william's short reply. a number of afghans, armed to the teeth, had gradually formed a circle around the informal durbar. lawrence and mackenzie pointed out this environment to some of the chiefs, who affected to drive off the intruders with their whips; but akbar observed that it did not matter, as they 'were all in the secret.' 'suddenly,' wrote mackenzie, 'i heard akbar call out, "begeer! begeer!" ("seize! seize!") and turning round i saw him grasp the envoy's left hand with an expression on his face of the most diabolical ferocity. i think it was sultan jan who laid hold of the envoy's right hand. they dragged him in a stooping posture down the hillock, the only words i heard poor sir william utter being, "az barae khooda" ("for god's sake"). i saw his face, however, and it was full of horror and astonishment.' neither mackenzie nor lawrence, the surviving companions of the envoy, witnessed the actual end. 'whether,' writes kaye, 'he died on the spot, or whether he was slain by the infuriated ghazees, is not very clearly known; but the fanatics threw themselves on the prostrate body and hacked it with their knives.' there is no doubt that the head of the unfortunate macnaghten was paraded in triumph through the streets of cabul, and that the mangled trunk, after being dragged about the city, was hung up in the great bazaar. of the three officers who accompanied the envoy to the conference, trevor was massacred, lawrence and mackenzie were saved with difficulty by friendly chiefs, and brought into the city, where they and captain skinner joined the hostages, captains connolly and airey, under the safe roof of the venerable mahomed zemaun khan. that akbar and the confederate chiefs spread a snare for the envoy is plain, and that they regarded his acceptance of their deceitful proposals as a proof of his faithlessness to the treaty obligations to which he had bound himself. it was no element in their reasoning that since they had not regarded the treaty the british functionary might without breach of faith hold that it did not bind him. but it is improbable that the murder of macnaghten was actually included in their scheme of action. their intention seems to have been to seize him as a hostage, with intent thus to secure the evacuation of afghanistan and the restoration of dost mahomed. the ill-fated envoy's expressions on his way to the rendezvous indicate his unhinged state of mind. he went forth to sure treachery; akbar's gust of sudden fury converted the planned abduction into savage murder, and his abrupt pistol bullet baulked the more wily and less ruthless project which had probably been devised in cold blood. the escort brought back into cantonments tidings that the envoy had been seized. the garrison got under arms, and remained passive throughout the day. the defences were manned at night, in the apprehension that the noise and disturbance in the city portended an assault; but that clamour was caused by the mustering of the afghans in expectation that the british would attack the city, bent on vengeance on the murderers of the envoy. action of that nature was, however, wholly absent from the prostrate minds of the military chiefs. on the following afternoon captain lawrence transmitted certain overtures from the chiefs, as the result of a conference held by them, when, notwithstanding severe comments on the conduct of the envoy, professions were made of sincere regret for his death. with certain alterations and additions, the treaty drawn up by macnaghten was taken by the chiefs as the basis for the negotiations which they desired to renew. major pottinger, as now the senior 'political' with the force, was called on by general elphinstone to undertake the task of conducting negotiations with the afghan leaders. the high-souled pottinger rose at the summons from the sickbed to which he had been confined ever since his wonderful escape from charikar, and accepted the thankless and distasteful duty. it is not necessary to recount the details of negotiations, every article and every stage of which display the arrogance of the men who knew themselves masters of the situation, and reveal not less the degrading humiliation to which was submitting itself a strong brigade of british troops, whose arms were still in the soldiers' hands, and over whose ranks hung banners blazoned with victories that shall be memorable down the ages. on the sombre and cheerless christmas day pottinger rose in the council of men who wore swords, and remonstrated with soldierly vigour and powerful argument against the degrading terms which the chiefs had contumeliously thrown to them. he produced letters from jellalabad and peshawur giving information of reinforcements on the way from india, and urging the maintenance of resistance. he argued that to conclude a treaty with the afghans would be a fatal error, and suggested two alternative courses which offered a prospect of saving their honour and part of the army--the occupation of the balla hissar, which was the preferable measure, or the abandonment of camp, baggage, and encumbrances, and forcing a retreat down the passes. the council--pottinger must have written sarcastically when he termed it a 'council of war'--unanimously decided that to remain in cabul and to force a retreat were alike impracticable, and that nothing remained but the endeavour to release the army by agreeing to the conditions offered by the enemy. 'under these circumstances,' in the words of pottinger, 'as the major-general coincided with the officers of the council, and refused to attempt occupying the balla hissar, and as his second in command declared that impracticable, i considered it my duty, notwithstanding my repugnance to and disapproval of the measure, to yield, and attempt to carry on a negotiation.' this pottinger accordingly did. the first demand with which he had to comply was to give bills for the great sums promised by the envoy to the chiefs for their services in furthering and supporting his treaty. this imposition had to be submitted to, since the afghans stopped the supplies until the extortion was complied with. the next concession required was the surrender of the artillery of the force, with the exception of six field and three mule guns; and the military chiefs endured this humiliation, against which even the demoralised soldiery chafed. then the demand for hostages had to be complied with, and four officers were sent on to join the two hostages already in afghan hands. the chiefs had demanded four married hostages, with their wives and children, and a circular was sent round offering to volunteers the inducement of a large stipend; but the sentiment of repulsion was too strong to be overcome by the bribe. the sick and wounded who could not bear the march were sent into the city in accordance with an article of the treaty, two surgeons accompanying their patients. the treaty, ratified by the leading chiefs and sent into cantonments on new year's day , provided that the british troops, within twenty-four hours after receiving transport, and under the protection of certain chiefs and an adequate escort, should begin their march of evacuation, the jellalabad garrison moving down to peshawur in advance; that the six hostages left in cabul should be well treated, and liberated on the arrival at peshawur of dost mahomed; the sick and wounded left behind to be at liberty to return to india on their recovery; all small arms and ordnance stores in the cantonment magazine to be made over to the afghans 'as a token of friendship,' on which account also, they were to have all the british cannon except as above mentioned; the afghans to escort the ghuznee garrison in safety to peshawur; and a further stipulation was that the british troops in candahar and western afghanistan were to resign the territories occupied by them and start quickly for india, provisioned and protected from molestation by the way. severe and humiliating as were those terms, they were not obtained without difficulty. the terms put forward in the earlier drafts of the treaty were yet more exacting, and the tone of the demands was abrupt, contemptuous, and insulting. pottinger had to plead, to entreat, to be abject; to beg the masterful afghans 'not to overpower the weak with sufferings'; 'to be good enough to excuse the women from the suffering' of remaining as hostages; and to entreat them 'not to forget kindness' shown by us in former days. one blushes not for but with the gallant pottinger, loyally carrying out the miserable duty put upon him. the shame was not his; it lay on the council of superior officers, who overruled his remonstrances, and ground his face into the dust. our people were made to pass under the yoke every hour of their wretched lives during those last winter days in the cabul cantonments. the fanatics and the common folk of the city and its environs swarmed around our petty ramparts, with their foul sneers and their blackguard taunts, hurled with impunity from where they stood at the muzzles of the loaded guns which the gunners were forbidden to fire. officers and rank and file were in a condition of smouldering fury, but no act of reprisal or retribution was permitted. if the present was one continuous misery, the future lowered yet more gloomily. it was of common knowledge as well in the cantonments as in the city, that the engagements made by the chiefs were not worth the paper on which they had been written, and that treachery was being concerted against the force on its impending travail through the passes. it was told by a chief to one of the officers who was his friend, that akbar khan had sworn to have in his possession the british ladies as security for the safe restoration of his own family and relatives, and, strange forecast to be fulfilled almost to the very letter, had vowed to annihilate every soldier of the british army with the exception of one man, who should reach jellalabad to tell the story of the massacre of all his comrades. pottinger was well aware how desperate was the situation of the hapless people on whose behalf he had bent so low his proud soul. mohun lal warned him of the treachery the chiefs were plotting, and assured him that unless their sons should accompany the army as hostages, it would be attacked on the march. day after day the departure was delayed, on the pretext that the chiefs had not completed their preparations for the safe conduct of the force and its encumbrances. day after day the snow was falling with a quiet, ruthless persistency. the bitter night frosts were destroying the sepoys and the camp followers, their vitality weakened by semi-starvation and by the lack of firewood which had long distressed them. at length on january th, sturt the engineer officer got his instructions to throw down into the ditch a section of the eastern rampart, and so furnish a freer exit than the gates could afford. the supply of transport was inadequate, provisions were scant, and the escort promised by the chiefs was not forthcoming. pottinger advised waiting yet a little longer, until supplies and escort should arrive; but for once the military chiefs were set against the policy of delay, and firm orders were issued that the cantonments should be evacuated on the following day. shah soojah remained in cabul. the resolution became him better than anything else we know of the unfortunate man. it may be he reasoned that he had a chance for life by remaining in the balla hissar, and that from what he knew, there was no chance of life for anyone participating in the fateful march. he behaved fairly by the british authorities, sending more than one solemn warning pressing on them the occupation of the balla hissar. and there was some dignity in his appeal to brigadier anquetil, who commanded his own contingent, 'if it were well to forsake him in the hour of need, and to deprive him of the aid of that force which he had hitherto been taught to regard as his own?' chapter vii: the catastrophe the ill-omened evacuation by our doomed people of the cantonments wherein for two months they had undergone every extremity of humiliation and contumely, was begun on the dreary winter morning of january th, . snow lay deep on plain and hill-side; the cruel cold, penetrating through the warmest clothing, bit fiercely into the debilitated and thinly clad frames of the sepoys and the great horde of camp followers. the military force which marched out of cantonments consisted of about armed men, of whom about were europeans, native soldiers on foot, and native cavalrymen. the gallant troop of company's horse-artillery marched out with its full complement of six guns, to which, with three pieces of the mountain train, the artillery arm of the departing force was restricted by the degrading terms imposed by the afghan chiefs. in good heart and resolutely commanded, a body of disciplined troops thus constituted, and of a fighting strength so respectable, might have been trusted not only to hold its own against afghan onslaught, but if necessary to take the offensive with success. but alas, the heart of the hapless force had gone to water, its discipline was a wreck, its chiefs were feeble and apathetic; its steps were dogged by the incubus of some , camp followers, with a great company of women and children. the awful fate brooded over its forlorn banners of expiating by its utter annihilation, the wretched folly and sinister prosecution of the enterprise whose deserved failure was to be branded yet deeper on the gloomiest page of our national history, by the impending catastrophe of which the dark shadow already lay upon the blighted column. the advance began to move out from cantonments at nine a.m. the march was delayed at the river by the non-completion of the temporary bridge, and the whole of the advance was not across until after noon. the main body under shelton, which was accompanied by the ladies, invalids, and sick, slowly followed. it as well as the advance was disorganised from the first by the throngs of camp followers with the baggage, who could not be prevented from mixing themselves up with the troops. the afghans occupied the cantonments as portion after portion was evacuated by our people, rending the air with their exulting cries, and committing every kind of atrocity. it was late in the afternoon before the long train of camels following the main body had cleared the cantonments; and meanwhile the rear-guard was massed outside, in the space between the rampart and the canal, among the chaos of already abandoned baggage. it was exposed there to a vicious jezail fire poured into it by the afghans, who abandoned the pleasures of plunder and arson for the yet greater joy of slaughtering the feringhees. when the rear-guard moved away in the twilight, an officer and fifty men were left dead in the snow, the victims of the afghan fire from the rampart of the cantonment; and owing to casualties in the gun teams it had been found necessary to spike and abandon two of the horse-artillery guns. the rear-guard, cut into from behind by the pestilent ghazees, found its route encumbered with heaps of abandoned baggage around which swarmed afghan plunderers. other afghans, greedier for blood than for booty, were hacking and slaying among the numberless sepoys and camp followers who had dropped out of the column, and were lying or sitting on the wayside in apathetic despair, waiting for death and careless whether it came to them by knife or by cold. babes lay on the snow abandoned by their mothers, themselves prostrate and dying a few hundred yards further on. it was not until two o'clock of the following morning that the rear-guard reached the straggling and chaotic bivouac in which its comrades lay in the snow at the end of the first short march of six miles. its weary progress had been illuminated by the conflagration raging in the cantonments, which had been fired by the afghan fanatics, rabid to erase every relic of the detested unbelievers. it was a night of bitter cold. out in the open among the snow, soldiers and camp followers, foodless, fireless, and shelterless, froze to death in numbers, and numbers more were frost-bitten. the cheery morning noise of ordinary camp life was unheard in the mournful bivouac. captain lawrence outlines a melancholy picture. 'the silence of the men betrayed their despair and torpor. in the morning i found lying close to me, stiff, cold, and quite dead, in full regimentals, with his sword drawn in his hand, an old grey-haired conductor named macgregor, who, utterly exhausted, had lain down there silently to die.' already defection had set in. one of the shah's infantry regiments and his detachment of sappers and miners had deserted bodily, partly during the march of the previous day, partly in the course of the night. no orders were given out, no bugle sounded the march, on the morning of the th. the column heaved itself forward sluggishly, a mere mob of soldiers, camp followers and cattle, destitute of any semblance of order or discipline. quite half the sepoys were already unfit for duty; in hundreds they drifted in among the non-combatants and increased the confusion. the advance of the previous day was now the rear-guard. after plundering the abandoned baggage, the afghans set to harassing the rear-guard, whose progress was delayed by the disorderly multitude blocking the road in front. the three mountain guns, temporarily separated from the infantry, were captured by a sudden afghan rush. in vain anquetil strove to rouse the th to make an effort for their recapture. green was more successful with his handful of artillerymen, who followed him and the brigadier and spiked the pieces, but being unsupported were compelled a second time to abandon them. on this march it became necessary also, from the exhaustion of their teams, to spike and abandon two more of the horse-artillery guns; so that there now remained with the force only a couple of six-pounders. while the rear-guard was in action, a body of afghan horse charged on the flank, right into the heart of the baggage column, swept away much plunder, and spread confusion and dismay far and wide. the rear of the column would probably have been entirely cut off, but that reinforcements from the advance under shelton pushed back the enemy, and by crowning the lateral heights kept open the thoroughfare. at bootkhak was found akbar khan, who professed to have been commissioned to escort the force to jellalabad, and who blamed our people for having marched out prematurely from the cantonments. he insisted on the halt of the column at bootkhak until the following morning, when he would provide supplies, but he demanded an immediate subsidy of , rupees, and that pottinger, lawrence and mackenzie should be given up to him as hostages that the force would not march beyond tezeen until tidings should arrive that sale had evacuated jellalabad. those officers by the general's instructions joined the afghan chief on the following morning, and akbar's financial requisition was obsequiously fulfilled. after two days' marching our people, who had brought out with them provisions for but five and a half days, expecting within that time to reach jellalabad, were only ten miles forward on their march. another night passed, with its train of horrors--starvation, cold, exhaustion, death. lady sale relates that scarcely any of the baggage now remained; that there was no food for man or beast; that snow lay a foot deep on the ground; that even water from the adjacent stream was difficult to obtain, as the carriers were fired on in fetching it; and that she thought herself fortunate in being sheltered in a small tent in which 'we slept nine, all touching each other.' daylight brought merely a more bitter realisation of utter misery. eyre expresses his wonderment at the effect of two nights' exposure to the frost in disorganising the force. 'it had so nipped even the strongest men as to completely prostrate their powers and incapacitate them for service; even the cavalry, who suffered less than the rest, were obliged to be lifted on their horses.' in fact, only a few hundred serviceable men remained. at the sound of hostile fire the living struggled to their feet from their lairs in the snow, stiffened with cold, all but unable to move or hold a weapon, leaving many of their more fortunate comrades stark in death. a turmoil of confusion reigned. the afghans were firing into the rear of the mass, and there was a wild rush of camp followers to the front, who stripped the baggage cattle of their loads and carried the animals off, leaving the ground strewn with ammunition, treasure, plate, and other property. the ladies were no longer carried in litters and palanquins, for their bearers were mostly dead; they sat in the bullet fire packed into panniers slung on camels, invalids as some of them were--one poor lady with her baby only five days old. mess stores were being recklessly distributed, and lady sale honestly acknowledges that, as she sat on her horse in the cold, she felt very grateful for a tumbler of sherry, which at any other time would have made her 'very unladylike,' but which now merely warmed her. cups full of sherry were drunk by young children without in the least affecting their heads, so strong on them was the hold of the cold. it was not until noon that the living mass of men and animals was once more in motion. the troops were in utter disorganisation; the baggage was mixed up with the advance guard; the camp followers were pushing ahead in precipitate panic. the task before the wretched congeries of people was to thread the stupendous gorge of the khoord cabul pass--a defile about five miles long, hemmed in on either hand by steeply scarped hills. down the bottom of the ravine dashed a mountain torrent, whose edges were lined with thick layers of ice, on which had formed glacier-like masses of snow. the 'jaws of death' were barely entered when the slaughter began. with the advance rode several afghan chiefs, whose followers, by their command, shouted to the ghilzais lining the heights to hold their fire, but the tribesmen gave no heed to the mandate. lady sale rode with the chiefs. the ghilzai fire at fifty yards was close and deadly. the men of the advance fell fast. lady sale had a bullet in her arm, and three more through her dress. but the weight of the hostile fire fell on the main column, the baggage escort, and the rear-guard. some of the ladies, who mostly were on camels which were led with the column, had strange adventures. on one camel was quite a group. in one of its panniers were mrs boyd and her little son, in the other mrs mainwaring, with her own infant and mrs anderson's eldest child. the camel fell, shot. a hindustanee trooper took up mrs boyd _en croupe_, and carried her through in safety; another horseman behind whom her son rode, was killed, and the boy fell into afghan hands. the anderson girl shared the same fate. mrs mainwaring, with her baby in her arms, attempted to mount a baggage pony, but the load upset, and she pursued her way on foot. an afghan horseman rode at her, threatened her with his sword, and tried to drag away the shawl in which she carried her child. she was rescued by a sepoy grenadier, who shot the afghan dead, and then conducted the poor lady along the pass through the dead and dying, through, also, the close fire which struck down people near to her, almost to the exit of the pass, when a bullet killed the chivalrous sepoy, and mrs mainwaring had to continue her tramp to the bivouac alone. a very fierce attack was made on the rear-guard, consisting of the th. in the narrow throat of the pass the regiment was compelled to halt by a block in front, and in this stationary position suffered severely. a flanking fire told heavily on the handful of european infantry. the belated stragglers masked their fire, and at length the soldiers fell back, firing volleys indiscriminately into the stragglers and the afghans. near the exit of the pass a commanding position was maintained by some detachments which still held together, strengthened by the only gun now remaining, the last but one having been abandoned in the gorge. under cover of this stand the rear of the mass gradually drifted forward while the afghan pursuit was checked, and at length all the surviving force reached the camping ground. there had been left dead in the pass about soldiers and over camp followers. akbar and the chiefs, taking the hostages with them, rode forward on the track of the retreating force. akbar professed that his object was to stop the firing, but mackenzie writes that pottinger said to him: 'mackenzie, remember if i am killed that i heard akbar khan shout "slay them!" in pushtoo, although in persian he called out to stop the firing.' the hostages had to be hidden away from the ferocious ghazees among rocks in the ravine until near evening, when in passing through the region of the heaviest slaughter they 'came upon one sight of horror after another. all the bodies were stripped. there were children cut in two. hindustanee women as well as men--some frozen to death, some literally chopped to pieces, many with their throats cut from ear to ear.' snow fell all night on the unfortunates gathered tentless on the khoord cabul camping ground. on the morning of the th the confused and disorderly march was resumed, but after a mile had been traversed a halt for the day was ordered at the instance of akbar khan, who sent into camp by captain skinner a proposal that the ladies and children, with whose deplorable condition he professed with apparent sincerity to sympathise, should be made over to his protection, and that the married officers should accompany their wives; he pledging himself to preserve the party from further hardships and dangers, and afford its members safe escort through the passes in rear of the force. the general had little faith in the sirdar, but he was fain to give his consent to an arrangement which promised alleviation to the wretchedness of the ladies, scarce any of whom had tasted a meal since leaving cabul. some, still weak from childbirth, were nursing infants only a few days old; other poor creatures were momentarily apprehending the pangs of motherhood. there were invalids whose only attire, as they rode in the camel panniers or shivered on the snow, was the nightdresses they wore when leaving the cantonments in their palanquins, and none possessed anything save the clothes on their backs. it is not surprising, then, that dark and doubtful as was the future to which they were consigning themselves, the ladies preferred its risks and chances to the awful certainties which lay before the doomed column. the afghan chief had cunningly made it a condition of his proffer that the husbands should accompany their wives, and if there was a struggle in the breasts of the former between public and private duties, the general humanely decided the issue by ordering them to share the fortunes of their families. akbar khan sent in no supplies, and the march was resumed on the morning of the both by a force attenuated by starvation, cold, and despair, diminished further by extensive desertion. after much exertion the advance, consisting of all that remained of the th, the solitary gun, and a detachment of cavalry, forced a passage to the front through the rabble of camp followers, and marched unmolested for about two miles until the tunghee tariki was reached, a deep gorge not more than ten feet wide. men fell fast in the horrid defile, struck down by the afghan fire from the heights; but the pass, if narrow, was short, and the advance having struggled through it moved on to the halting-place at kubbar-i-jubbar, and waited there for the arrival of the main body. but that body was never to emerge from out the shambles in the narrow throat of the tunghee tariki. the advance was to learn from the few stragglers who reached it the ghastly truth that it now was all that remained of the strong brigade which four days before had marched out from the cabul cantonments. the slaughter from the afghan fire had blocked the gorge with dead and dying. the ghilzai tribesmen, at the turn into the pen at the other end of which was the blocked gorge, had closed up fiercely. then the steep slopes suddenly swarmed with afghans rushing sword in hand down to the work of butchery, and the massacre stinted not while living victims remained. the rear-guard regiment of sepoys was exterminated, save for two or three desperately wounded officers who contrived to reach the advance. the remnant of the army consisted now of about seventy files of the th, about troopers, and a detachment of horse-artillery with a single gun. the general sent to akbar khan to remonstrate with him on the attack he had allowed to be made after having guaranteed that the force should meet with no further molestation. akbar protested his regret, and pleaded his inability to control the wild ghilzai hillmen, over whom, in their lust for blood and plunder, their own chiefs had lost all control; but he was willing to guarantee the safe conduct to jellalabad of the european officers and men if they would lay down their arms and commit themselves wholly into his hands. this sinister proposal the general refused, and the march was continued, led in disorder by the remnant of the camp followers. in the steep descent from the huft kotul into the tezeen ravine, the soldiers following the rabble at some distance, came suddenly on a fresh butchery. the afghans had suddenly fallen on the confused throng, and the descent was covered with dead and dying. during the march from kubbar-i-jubbar to the tezeen valley shelton's dogged valour had mainly saved the force from destruction. with a few staunch soldiers of his own regiment, the one-armed veteran, restored now to his proper _métier_ of stubborn fighting man, had covered the rear and repelled the ghilzai assaults with persevering energy and dauntless fortitude. and he it was who now suggested, since akbar khan still held to his stipulation that the force should lay down its arms, that a resolute effort should be made to press on to jugdulluk by a rapid night march of four-and-twenty miles, in the hope of clearing the passes in that vicinity before the enemy should have time to occupy them. that the attempt would prove successful was doubtful, since the force was already exhausted; but it was the last chance, and shelton's suggestion was adopted. in the early moonlight the march silently began, an ill omen marking the start in the shape of the forced abandonment of the last gun. fatal delay occurred between seh baba and kutti sung because of a panic among the camp followers, who, scared by a few shots, drifted backwards and forwards in a mass, retarding the progress of the column and for the time entirely arresting the advance of shelton's and his rear-guard. the force could not close up until the morning, ten miles short of jugdulluk, and already the afghans were swarming on every adjacent height. all the way down the broken slope to jugdulluk the little column trudged through the gauntlet of jezail fire which lined the road with dead and wounded. shelton and his rear-guard handful performed wonders, again and again fending off with close fire and levelled bayonets the fierce rushes of ghilzais charging sword in hand. the harassed advance reached jugdulluk in the afternoon of the th, and took post behind some ruins on a height by the roadside, the surviving officers forming line in support of the gallant rear-guard struggling forward through its environment of assailants. as shelton and his brave fellows burst through the cordon they were greeted by cheers from the knoll. but there was no rest for the exhausted people, for the afghans promptly occupied commanding positions whence they maintained a fire from which the ruins afforded but scant protection. to men parched with thirst the stream at the foot of their knoll was but a tantalising aggravation, for to attempt to reach it was certain death. the snow they devoured only increased their sufferings, and but little stay was afforded by the raw flesh of a few gun bullocks. throughout the day volley after volley was poured down upon the weary band by the inexorable enemy. frequent sallies were made, and the heights were cleared, but the positions were soon reoccupied and the ruthless fire was renewed. captain skinner, summoned by akbar, brought back a message that general elphinstone should visit him to take part in a conference, and that brigadier shelton and captain johnson should be given over as hostages for the evacuation of jellalabad. compliance was held to be imperative, and the temporary command was entrusted to brigadier anquetil. akbar was extremely hospitable to his compulsory guests; but he insisted on including the general among his hostages, and was not moved by elphinstone's representations that he would prefer death to the disgrace of being separated from his command in its time of peril. the ghilzai chiefs came into conference burning with hatred against the british, and revelling in the anticipated delights of slaughtering them. akbar seemed sincere in his effort to conciliate them, but was long unsuccessful. their hatred seemed indeed stronger than their greed; but at length toward nightfall akbar announced that pacific arrangements had been accepted by the tribes, and that what remained of the force should be allowed to march unmolested to jellalabad. how futile was the compact, if indeed there was any compact, was soon revealed. the day among the ruins on the knoll had passed in dark and cruel suspense--in hunger, thirst, and exhaustion, in the presence of frequent death; and as the evening fell, in anguish and all but utter despair. as darkness set in the conviction enforced itself that to remain longer in the accursed place was madness; and the little band, leaving behind perforce the sick and wounded, marched out, resolute to push through or die fighting. in the valley the only molestation at first was a desultory fire from the camping ghilzais, who were rather taken by surprise, but soon became wide awake to their opportunities. some hurried forward to occupy the pass rising from the valley to the jugdulluk crest; others, hanging on the rear and flanks of the column encumbered with its fatal incubus of camp followers, mixed among the unarmed throng with their deadly knives, and killed and plundered with the dexterity of long practice. throughout the tedious march up the steeply rising defile a spattering fire came from the rocks and ridges flanking the track, all but blocked by the surging concourse of miserable followers. the advance had to employ cruel measures to force its way through the chaos toward the crest. as it is approached from the jugdulluk direction the flanking elevations recede and merge in the transverse ridge, which is crowned by a low-cut abrupt rocky upheaval, worn down somewhat where the road passes over the crest by the friction of traffic. just here the tribesmen had constructed a formidable abattis of prickly brushwood, which stretched athwart the road, and dammed back the fugitives in the shallow oval basin between the termination of the ravine and the summit of the ridge. in this trap were caught our hapless people and the swarm of their native followers, and now the end was very near. from behind the barrier, and around the lip of the great trap, the hillmen fired their hardest into the seething mass of soldiers and followers writhing in the awful gehenna on which the calm moon shone down. on the edges of this whirlpool of death the fell ghilzais were stabbing and hacking with the ferocious industry inspired by thirst for blood and lust for plunder. it is among the characteristics of our diverse-natured race to die game, and even to thrill with a strange fierce joy when hope of escape from death has all but passed away and there remains only to sell life at the highest possible premium of exchange. among our people, face to face with death on the rocky jugdulluk, officers and soldiers alike fought with cool deadly rancour. the brigadier and the private engaged in the same fierce _mêlée_, fought side by side, and fell side by side. stalwart captain dodgin of the th slew five afghans before he fell. captain nicholl of the horse-artillery, gunless now, rallied to him the few staunch gunners who were all that remained to him of his noble and historic troop, and led them on to share with him a heroic death. all did not perish on the rugged summit of the jugdulluk. the barrier was finally broken through, and a scant remnant of the force wrought out its escape from the slaughter-pit. small detachments, harassed by sudden onslaughts, and delayed by reluctance to desert wounded comrades, were trudging in the darkness down the long slope to the soorkhab. the morning of the th dawned near gundamuk on the straggling group of some twenty officers and forty-five european soldiers. its march arrested by sharp attacks, the little band moved aside to occupy a defensive position on an adjacent hillock. a local sirdar invited the senior officer to consult with him as to a pacific arrangement, and while major griffiths was absent on this errand there was a temporary suspension of hostilities. the afghans meanwhile swarmed around the detachment with a pretence of friendship, but presently attempts were made to snatch from the soldiers their arms. this conduct was sternly resented, and the afghans were forced back. they ascended an adjacent elevation and set themselves to the work of deliberately picking off officer after officer, man after man. the few rounds remaining in the pouches of the soldiers were soon exhausted, but the detachment stood fast, and calmly awaited the inevitable end. rush after rush was driven back from its steadfast front, but at last, nearly all being killed or wounded, a final onset of the enemy, sword in hand, terminated the struggle, and completed the dismal tragedy. captain souter of the th, with three or four privates all of whom as well as himself were wounded, was spared and carried into captivity; he saved the colours of his regiment, which he had tied round his waist before leaving jugdulluk. a group of mounted officers had pushed forward as soon as they had cleared the barrier on the crest. six only reached futtehabad in safety. there they were treacherously offered food, and while they halted a few moments to eat two were cut down. of the four who rode away three were overtaken and killed within four miles of jellalabad; one officer alone survived to reach that haven of refuge. the ladies, the married officers, and the original hostages, followed akbar khan down the passes toward jugdulluk, pursuing the line of retreat strewn with its ghastly tokens of slaughter, and recognising almost at every step the bodies of friends and comrades. at jugdulluk they found general elphinstone, brigadier shelton, and captain johnson, and learned the fate which had overtaken the marching force. on the following day akbar quitted jugdulluk with his hostages and the ladies, all of whom were virtually prisoners, and rode away through the mountains in a northerly direction. on the fourth day the fort of budiabad in the lughman valley was reached, where akbar left the prisoners while he went to attempt the reduction of jellalabad. chapter viii: the siege and defence of jellalabad sale's brigade, retreating from gundamuk, reached jellalabad on the th november . an investigation into the state of the fortifications of that place showed them, in their existing condition, to be incapable of resisting a vigorous assault. but it was resolved to occupy the place, and to captain george broadfoot, as garrison engineer, was committed the duty of making it defensible. this assuredly was no light task. the enciente was far too extensive for the slender garrison, and its tracing was radically bad. the ramparts were so dilapidated that in places they were scarcely discernible, and the ruins strewn over what should have been the glacis afforded near cover to assailants, whose attitude was already so threatening as to hinder the beginning of repairing operations. their fire swept the defences, and their braves capered derisively to the strains of a bagpipe on the adjacent rocky elevation, which thenceforth went by the name of 'piper's hill.' a sortie on the th cleared the environs of the troublesome afghans, supplies began to come in, and broad-foot was free to set his sappers to the task of repairing the fortifications, in which work the entrenching tools he had wrenched from the cabul stores proved invaluable. how greatly sale had erred in shutting up his force in jellalabad was promptly demonstrated. the connecting posts of gundamuk and peshbolak had to be evacuated; and thus, from jumrood at the foot of the khyber up to cabul, there remained no intermediate post in british possession with the solitary exception of jellalabad, and communications were entirely interrupted except through the medium of furtive messengers. the jellalabad garrison was left unmolested for nearly a fortnight, and the repairs were well advanced when on the th the afghans came down, invested the place, and pushed their skirmishers close up to the walls. on december st colonel dennie headed a sortie, which worsted the besiegers with considerable slaughter and drove them from the vicinity. bad news came at intervals from cabul, and at the new year arrived a melancholy letter from pottinger, confirming the rumours already rife of the murder of the envoy, and of the virtual capitulation to which the cabul force had submitted. a week later an official communication was received from cabul, signed by general elphinstone and major pottinger, formally announcing the convention which the cabul force had entered into with the chiefs, and ordering the garrison of jellalabad forthwith to evacuate that post and retire to peshawur, leaving behind with 'the new governor,' an afghan chief who was the bearer of the humiliating missive, the fortress guns and such stores and baggage as there lacked transport to remove. the council of war summoned by sale was unanimous in favour of non-compliance with this mandate. broadfoot urged with vigour that an order by a superior who was no longer a free agent and who issued it under duress, could impose no obligation of obedience. sale pronounced himself untrammelled by a convention forced from people 'with knives at their throats,' and was resolute in the expression of his determination to hold jellalabad unless ordered by the government to withdraw. more and more ominous tidings poured in from cabul. a letter received on january both reported the cabul force to be still in the cantonments, living utterly at the mercy of the afghans; another arriving on the th told of the abandonment of the cantonments and the beginning of the march, but that the forlorn wayfarers were lingering in detention at bootkhak, halted in their misery by the orders of akbar khan. those communications in a measure prepared the people in jellalabad for disaster, but not for the awful catastrophe of which dr brydon had to tell, when in the afternoon of the th the lone man, whose approach to the fortress lady butler's painting so pathetically depicts, rode through the cabul gate of jellalabad. dr brydon was covered with cuts and contusions, and was utterly exhausted. his first few hasty sentences extinguished all hope in the hearts of the listeners regarding their cabul comrades and friends. there was naturally great excitement in jellalabad, but no panic. the working parties were called in, the assembly was sounded, the gates were closed, the walls were lined, and the batteries were manned; for it was believed for the moment that the enemy were in full pursuit of fugitives following in brydon's track. the situation impressed broadfoot with the conviction that a crisis had come in the fortunes of the jellalabad garrison. he thought it his duty to lay before the general the conditions of the critical moment which he believed to have arrived, pointing out to him that the imperative alternatives were that he should either firmly resolve on the defence of jellalabad to the last extremity, or that he should make up his mind to a retreat that very night, while as yet retreat was practicable. sale decided on holding on to the place, and immediately announced to the commander-in-chief his resolve to persevere in a determined defence, relying on the promise of the earliest possible relief. because of the defection of his sikh auxiliaries and the faint-heartedness of his sepoys, wild's efforts to cross the threshold of the khyber had failed, and with the tidings of his failure there came to sale the information that the effort for his relief must be indefinitely postponed. it may be assumed that this intimation weakened in some degree the general's expressed resolution to hold jellalabad with determination, and it is not to be denied that this resolution was in a measure conditional on the not unwarranted expectation of early relief. neither he nor his adviser macgregor appears to have realised how incumbent on the garrison of jellalabad it was to hold out to the last extremity, irrespective of consequences to itself, unless it should receive a peremptory recall from higher authority; or to have recognised the glorious opportunity presented of inspiriting by its staunch constancy and high-souled self-abnegation a weak government staggering under a burden of calamity. than sale no braver soldier ever wore sword, but a man may delight to head a forlorn hope and yet lack nerve to carry with high heart a load of responsibility; nor was macgregor so constituted as to animate his chief to noble emprise. fast on the heels of the gloomy tidings from the khyber mouth there came to them from shah soojah, who was still the nominal sovereign at cabul, a curt peremptory letter obviously written under compulsion, of which the following were the terms: 'your people have concluded a treaty with us; you are still in jellalabad; what are your intentions? tell us quickly.' sale summoned a council of war, which assembled at his quarters on january th. its proceedings were recorded, and the documents laid before it were preserved by captain henry havelock in his capacity as sale's staff-officer. record and papers were reclaimed from havelock's custody by general sale before the evacuation of afghanistan, and had been long lost to sight. they have recently been deposited among the records of the india office, but not before their latest non-official possessor had published some extracts from them. it is to be hoped that the more important documents may be given to the public in full, since passages from documents, whether intentionally or not, may be so extracted as to be misleading. broadfoot, who had been a member of the council of war, and who was apparently aware of the suppression of the official records, wrote in a detailed narrative of its proceedings while his recollection of them was still fresh, and this narrative he sent to havelock, desiring him to note 'any points erroneously stated, distinguishing between what you may merely not remember and what you know i am mistaken in.' havelock, who was a loyal and ardent admirer of general sale, having sparsely annotated broadfoot's narrative, returned it with the statement that he had compared it with memoranda still in his possession, and that he considered that it 'contributes a fair and correct statement of that which occurred.' the officers comprising the council to whom sale and macgregor addressed themselves were colonel dennie of the th, colonel monteath of the th n.i., captains backhouse and abbott of the artillery, captain oldfield commanding the cavalry, and captain broadfoot the garrison engineer. the following is a summary of the proceedings, as recorded by broadfoot and authenticated by havelock. after a few formal words from general sale, he called on macgregor to submit a matter on which that political officer and himself were agreed. macgregor then described the situation from the point of view of sale and himself, and expressed their united conviction that nothing was to be hoped for from the government. reserving his own liberty of action, he sought the opinion of the officers on offers received from akbar khan to treat for the evacuation of afghanistan, and he laid before them a draft answer to shah soojah's curt letter, professing the readiness of the garrison to evacuate jellalabad on his requisition, since it was held only for him, but naming certain conditions: the exchange of hostages, the restoration of british prisoners and hostages in exchange for the afghan hostages on arrival of the force at peshawur, escort thither 'in safety and honour,' with arms, colours, and guns, and adequate assistance of supplies and transport. both sale and macgregor frankly owned that they were resolved to yield, and negotiate for safe retreat. great excitement from the first had pervaded the assemblage, and when macgregor had finished his statement broadfoot arose in his wrath. he declined to believe that the government had abandoned the jellalabad garrison to its fate, and there was a general outburst of indignation when sale produced a letter carrying that significance. broadfoot waxed so warm in his remonstrances against the proposed action that an adjournment was agreed to. next day sale and macgregor urged that it was impossible to hold out much longer, that later retreat would be impracticable, and that the scheme they proposed was safe and honourable. broadfoot denounced it as disgraceful, contended that they could hold jellalabad indefinitely--'could colonise if they liked'--and retreat at discretion. he denied that the place was held for shah soojah, and challenged their right to surrender the post unless by government order. hostages he proclaimed worthless while the afghans held heavier pledges of ours in the shape of prisoners and hostages. he denounced as disgraceful the giving of hostages on our part. monteath's remark that nobody would go as a hostage roused oldfield to express himself tersely but pointedly on the subject. 'i for one,' he exclaimed in great agitation, 'will fight here to the last drop of my blood, but i plainly declare that i will never be a hostage, and i am surprised that anyone should propose such a thing, or regard an afghan's word as worth anything.' the resolution to treat for the abandonment of jellalabad was carried, oldfield only voting with broadfoot against it, but the stipulations: regarding hostages were omitted. broadfoot continued to press modifications of the conditions set out in the proposed reply, pleading, but in vain, that the restoration of the prisoners in afghan hands before departure of the garrison should be insisted on; and that since evacuation was resolved on, it should at least be conducted as a military operation, and not degradingly under escort. then, and little wonder, he objected to expressions in the draft letter as too abject, and he was successful in procuring the alteration of them. the letter was written out, signed by macgregor, and despatched to cabul. it was agreed that those members of the council who chose to do should record in writing the reasons for their votes, and this was done by dennie, monteath, abbott, and broadfoot. broadfoot, pending an answer from cabul, set the garrison to work in digging a ditch round the fortifications. the reply from the shah, to the effect 'if you are sincere in offers, let all the chief gentlemen affix their seals,' was laid before the reassembled council on february th. the implied imputation on the good faith of british officers might well have stung to indignation the meekest; but the council's opinion was taken as to the expediency of complying with the derogatory request made by the shah, as well as of a stipulation--a modification of what broadfoot had originally urged in vain--for the surrender of all prisoners, hostages, sick, and wounded under detention in afghanistan, on the arrival at peshawur of the jellalabad brigade. the members of council, who in the long interval since the previous meeting had been gradually regaining their self-respect and mental equipoise, unanimously declined to accept the proposals tendered them by their commanding officer and his political ally; and a letter written by monteath was accepted, which 'was not a continuation of the negotiation.' thus ended the deliberations of the memorable council of war, whose eleventh hour resolve to 'hold the fort' mainly averted the ruin of british prestige in india and throughout the regions bordering on our eastern empire; and the credit of its final decision to repudiate the humiliating proposals of sale and macgregor belongs to george broadfoot, who was firmly though silently backed by havelock. the day after that decision was formulated a letter came from peshawur informing the garrison that every effort would be made for its relief; and thenceforth there was no more talk of surrender, nor was the courage of the little brigade impaired even when the earthquake of february th shook the newly repaired fortifications into wreck. broadfoot's vehement energy infected the troops, and by the end of the month the parapets were entirely restored, the bastions repaired, and every battery re-established. after the council of war had rejected the proposals laid before it, a decision which in effect involved the maintenance of the defence to the last extremity, nearly two months passed without the occurrence of any important event, except the speedily retrieved misfortune of the earthquake of february th. the close investment of the place by akbar khan thwarted the efforts of the foraging parties to obtain much needed supplies. those efforts were not vigorous, for sale, aware of his garrison's poverty of ammunition, was bent on a passive defence, and steadily refused his consent to vigorous sorties. the policy may have had its abstract merits, but it was certainly unsatisfactory in this respect, that perseverance in it involved the unpleasantness of apparently inevitable starvation. general pollock had arrived in peshawur, and was making energetic efforts to get his force in order for the accomplishment of the relief of jellalabad. but he foresaw serious delays, and so late as the middle of march was still unable to specify with any definiteness the probable date of his arrival at that place. the european troops in jellalabad would be out of meat rations early in april, and havelock's calculation was that the grain, on which mainly subsisted the native soldiers, who had been on half rations since the new year, would be exhausted before the middle of that month. sale modified his policy of inactivity when he learned that the blockading afghans were attempting to drive a mine under a salient of the defences, and dennie on march th led out a sally, destroyed the works, and thrust back akbar's encroachments. the general lack of vigour, however, on the garrison's part emboldened the afghans so much that they actually grazed their flocks of sheep within yards of the walls. this was too impudent, and the general consented to a raid, which resulted in the acquisition of some sheep, an invaluable addition to the commissariat resources. it is worth recording that the native regiment gave up its share of the sheep to the soldiers of the th, on the ground that europeans needed animal food more than did natives of india. on april th the afghan leader fired a salute in triumph for a supposititious repulse of pollock in the khyber. in regard to what then happened there is a strange conflict of testimony. general sale, in a private letter written six weeks later, states: 'i made my arrangements with macgregor to sally the next day, provided we did not hear that pollock had forced the pass.' akbar's salutes, and the information of spies that pollock had fallen back, 'made us look very grave--our case desperate, our provisions nearly out, and no relief at hand. i therefore decided to play a bold stroke to relieve ourselves, and give courage to pollock's force in case of success. if we failed in thrashing akbar, we would have left our bones on the field.' abbott's diary of april th and th records that spies reported that pollock had been repulsed at ali musjid, and that the heads of three of his officers had been sent in to akbar, whereupon 'all the commanding officers waited on the general, beseeching him to attack akbar instantly. the th and the battery got all ready for work, but the old general was obstinate, and refused to act.' backhouse's diary (april th) mentions that pollock having been reported repulsed, and akbar having fired a salute, the officers commanding corps and detachments went in a body and proposed to the general to attack akbar instantly, but without success. 'immediately the matter was broached, the general set his face against anything of the kind, and disagreed about every point--insisted that the enemy had or men in camp, and were too strong for us; and then, the next minute, that it was no use going out as we couldn't punish them, as they _wouldn't stand_; and concluding with usual excuse for inactivity, "it isn't our game." words ran precious high....' whether spontaneously or under pressure, general sale must have ordered a sortie in force; for at dawn of the th three infantry columns marched out by the cabul gate, the right commanded by havelock, the centre by dennie, the left by monteath, general sale being in command of the whole force. akbar, reputed about strong, was in formation in front of his camp about three miles west of jellalabad, his left flank resting on the river, with an advanced post of men in the 'patched up' fort about midway between his camp and jellalabad. the prescribed tactics were to march straight on the enemy, with which monteath and havelock complied; but dennie, whether with or without orders is a matter in dispute, diverged to assail the 'patched up' fort. the outer defences were carried, gallant old dennie riding at the head of his men to receive his death wound. in vain did the guns for which sale had sent batter at the inner keep, and the general abandoning the attempt to reduce it, led on in person the centre column. meanwhile havelock and monteath had been moving steadily forward, until halted by orders when considerably advanced. havelock had to form square once and again against the afghan horsemen, who, however, did not dare to charge home. the artillery came to the front at the gallop, and poured shot and shell into akbar's mass. the three columns, now abreast of each other, deployed into line, and moving forward at the double in the teeth of the afghan musketry fire, swept the enemy clean out of his position, capturing his artillery, firing his camp, and putting him to utter rout. akbar, by seven o'clock in the april morning, had been signally beaten in the open field by the troops he had boasted of blockading in the fortress. the garrison of jellalabad had thus wrought out its own relief. thenceforth it experienced neither annoyance nor scarcity. pollock arrived a fortnight after the dashing sally which had given the garrison deliverance, and the head of his column was played into its camp on the jellalabad plain by the band of the th, to the significant tune 'oh, but ye've been lang o'coming.' the magniloquent ellenborough dubbed sale's brigade 'the illustrious garrison,' and if the expression is overstrained, its conduct was without question eminently creditable. chapter ix: retribution and rescue it was little wonder that the unexpected tidings of the cabul outbreak, and the later shock of the catastrophe in the passes, should have temporarily unnerved the governor-general. but lord auckland rallied his energies with creditable promptitude. his successor was on the voyage out, and in the remnant of his term that remained he could not do more than make dispositions which his successor might find of service. every soldier of the 'army of retribution' was despatched to the frontier during lord auckland's rule. lord auckland appointed to the command of the troops which he was sending forward a quiet, steadfast, experienced officer of the artillery arm, who had fought under lake at deig and bhurtpore, and during his forty years of honest service had soldiered steadily from the precipices of nepaul to the rice-swamps of the irrawaddy. pollock was essentially the fitting man for the service that lay before him, characterised as he was by strong sense, shrewd sagacity, calm firmness, and self-command. when his superior devolved on him an undue onus of responsibility he was to prove himself thoroughly equal to the occasion, and the sedate, balanced man murmured not, but probably was rather amused when he saw a maker of phrases essaying to deck himself in his laurels. there were many things in lord auckland's indian career of which it behoved him to repent, but it must go to his credit that he gave pollock high command, and that he could honestly proclaim, as he made his preparations to quit the great possession whose future his policy had endangered, that he had contributed toward the retrieval of the crisis by promptly furthering 'such operations as might be required for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the british government.' brigadier wild reached peshawur with a brigade of four sepoy regiments just before the new year. he was destitute of artillery, his sepoys were in poor heart, and the sikh contingent was utterly untrustworthy. to force the khyber seemed hopeless. wild, however, made the attempt energetically enough. but the sikhs mutinied, expelled their officers, and marched back to peshawur; wild's sepoys, behaving badly, were driven back with loss from the mouth of the pass, and wild himself was wounded. when pollock reached peshawur on february th, , he found half of wild's brigade sick in hospital, and the whole of it in a state of utter demoralisation. a second brigade commanded by brigadier-general mccaskill, had accompanied pollock, the sepoys of which promptly fell under the evil influence of wild's dispirited and disaffected regiments. pollock had to resist the pressing appeals for speedy relief made to him from jellalabad, and patiently to devote weeks and months to the restoration of the morale and discipline of the disheartened sepoys of his command, and to the reinvigoration of their physique. by kindness combined with firmness he was able gradually to inspire them with perfect trust and faith in him, and when in the end of march there reached him a third brigade, comprising british cavalry and horse-artillery, ordered forward by lord auckland on receipt of tidings of the destruction of the cabul force, he felt himself at length justified in advancing with confidence. [illustration: sir george pollock] before daylight on the morning of april th pollock's army about strong, consisting of eight infantry regiments, three cavalry corps, a troop and two batteries of artillery, and a mountain train, marched from the jumrood camping ground into the portals of the khyber. pollock's scheme of operations was perfect in conception and complete in detail. his main column, with strong advance and rear-guards, was to pursue the usual road through the pass. it was flanked on each side by a chain of infantry detachments, whose assigned duty was to crown the heights and sweep them clear of assailants in advance of the head of the central column. the afreedi hill men had blocked the throat of the pass by a formidable barrier, behind which they were gathered in force, waiting for the opportunity which was never to come to them. for the main body of pollock's force serenely halted, while the flanking columns, breaking into skirmishing order, hurried in the grey dawn along the slopes and heights, dislodging the afreedi pickets as they advanced, driving them before them with resolute impetuosity, and pushing forward so far as to take in reverse with their concentrated fire the great barrier and its defenders. the clansmen, recognising the frustration of their devices, deserted the position in its rear, and rushed tumultuously away to crags and sungahs where knife and jezail might still be plied. the centre column then advanced unmolested to the deserted barricade, through which the sappers soon cleared a thoroughfare. the guns swept with shrapnel the hill-sides in front, the flanking detachments pushed steadily further and yet further forward, chasing and slaying the fugitive hillmen; and the duke of wellington's observation was that morning fully made good, that he had never heard that our troops were not equal, as well in their personal activity as in their arms, to contend with and overcome any natives of hills whatever.' the whole british force, in its order of three columns, the centre in the bed of the hollow, the wings on the flanking ridges, steadily if slowly moved on in the assured consciousness of victory. it was sunset before the rear-guard was in camp under the reoccupied ali musjid. the sikh troops who were to keep open pollock's communications with peshawur moved simultaneously on ali musjid by a more circuitous route. while pollock was halted opposite the throat of the khyber waiting for the demolition of the afreedi barricade, the ill-starred shah soojah was being murdered, on his way from the balla hissar of cabul to review on the siah sung slopes the reinforcements which akbar khan was clamouring that he should lead down to aid that sirdar in reducing jellalabad before relief should arrive. ever since the outbreak of november shah soojah had led a dog's life. he had reigned in cabul, but he had not ruled. the sirdars dunned him for money, and jeered at his protestations of poverty. it is not so much a matter of surprise that he should have been murdered as that, feeble, rich, and loathed, he should have been let live so long. it does not seem worth while to discuss the vexed question whether or not he was faithful to his british allies. he was certainly entitled to argue that he owed us nothing, since what we did in regard to him was nakedly for our own purposes. shah soojah's second son futteh jung had himself proclaimed his father's successor. the vicissitudes of his short reign need not be narrated. while pollock was gathering his brigades at gundamuk in the beginning of the following september, a forlorn afghan, in dirty and tattered rags, rode into his camp. this scarecrow was futteh jung, who, unable to endure longer his sham kingship and the ominous tyranny of akbar khan, had fled from cabul in disguise to beg a refuge in the british camp. pollock's march from ali musjid to jellalabad was slow, but almost unmolested. he found, in his own words, 'the fortress strong, the garrison healthy; and except for wine and beer, better off than we are.' one principal object of his commission had been accomplished; he had relieved the garrison of jellalabad, and was in a position to ensure its safe withdrawal. but his commission gave him a considerable discretion, and a great company of his countrymen and countrywomen were still in afghan durance. the calm pulsed, resolute commander had views of his own as to his duty, and he determined in his patient, steadfast way to tarry a while on the jellalabad plain, in the hope that the course of events might play into his hands. maclaren's brigade, which in the beginning of november general elphinstone had instructed general nott to despatch with all speed to cabul, returned to candahar early in december. nott in despatching it had deferred reluctantly to superior authority, and probably maclaren not sorry to have in the snowfall a pretext for retracing his steps. atta mahomed khan, sent from cabul to foment mischief in the candahar regions, had gathered to his banner a considerable force. general nott quietly waited until the sirdar, at the head of some , men, came within five miles of candahar, and then he crushed him after twenty minutes' fighting. the fugitives found refuge in the camp of the disaffected dooranee chiefs, whose leader meerza ahmed was sedulously trying to tamper with nott's native troops, severe weather hindering the general from attacking him. near the end of february there reached nott a letter two months old from elphinstone and pottinger, ordering him to evacuate candahar and retire to india, in pursuance of the convention into which they had entered. the dooranee chiefs astutely urged that shah soojah, no longer supported by british bayonets, was now ruling in cabul, as an argument in favour of nott's withdrawal. nott's answer was brief: 'i will not treat with any person whatever for the retirement of the british troops from afghanistan, until i have received instructions from the supreme government'--a blunt sentence in curious contrast to the missive which sale and macgregor laid before the jellalabad council of war. when presently there came a communication from government intimating that the continued occupation of candahar was regarded as conducive to the interest of the state, nott and rawlinson were in a position to congratulate themselves on having anticipated the wishes of their superiors. the situation, however, became so menacing that early in march its afghan inhabitants were expelled from the city of candahar to the last soul; and then nott, leaving a garrison in the place, took the field in force. the old soldier, wary as he was, became the victim of meerza's wily strategy. as he advanced, the afghans retired, skirmishing assiduously. leaving nott in the turnuk valley, they doubled back on candahar, and in the early darkness of the night of the th march they furiously assailed the city gates. they fired one of the gates, and the swarming ghazees tore down with fury its blazing planks and the red-hot ironwork. the garrison behaved valiantly. inside the burning gate they piled up a rampart of grain bags, on which they trained a couple of guns loaded with case. for three hours after the gate fell did the fanatics hurl assault after assault on the interior barricade. they were terribly critical hours, but the garrison prevailed, and at midnight, with a loss of many hundreds, the obstinate assailants sullenly drew off. nott, although urgently summoned, was unable to reach candahar until the th. candahar was fortunately preserved, but at the end of march the unpleasant tidings came that ghuznee, which british valour had carried by storm three years before, had now reverted into afghan possession. the siege had lasted for nearly three and a half months. in mid-december the besiegers occupied the city in force, introduced by the citizens through a subterranean way; and the garrison, consisting chiefly of a regiment of sepoys, withdrew into the citadel. the bitter winter and the scant rations took the heart out of the natives of the warm and fertile indian plains; but nevertheless it was not until march th that the garrison, under pledge of being escorted to peshawur with colours, arms, and baggage, marched out. the unfortunates would have done better to have died a soldierly death, with arms in their hands and the glow of fighting in their hearts. as the event was, faith with them was broken, and save for a few officers who were made prisoners, most were slaughtered, or perished in a vain attempt to escape. during his long isolation nott's resources had been seriously depleted, and he had ordered up from scinde a brigade, escorting much needed treasure, ammunition, and medicines. brigadier england was entrusted with the command of this force, whose assemblage at quetta was expected about the end of march. pending its gathering england had moved out toward the entrance of the kojuk pass, where he met with a sharp and far from creditable repulse, and fell back on quetta miserably disheartened, suggesting in his abjectness that nott should abandon candahar and retire on him. the stout old soldier at candahar waxed wroth at the limpness of his subordinate, and addressed to england a biting letter, ordering peremptorily the latter's prompt advance to candahar, engaging to dry-nurse him through the kojuk by a brigade sent down from candahar for the purpose, and remarking sarcastically, 'i am well aware that war cannot be made without loss; but yet perhaps british troops can oppose asiatic armies without defeat.' thus exhorted england moved, to find his march through the kojuk protected by wymer's sepoys from candahar, who had crowned the lateral heights before he ventured into the pass; and he reached candahar without maltreatment on the th may, bringing to nott the much needed supplies which rendered that resolute man equal to any enterprise. it remained, however, to be seen whether any enterprise was to be permitted to him and to his brother commander lying in camp on the jellalabad plain. lord ellenborough, the successor of lord auckland, had struck a firm if somewhat inexplicit note in his earliest manifesto, dated march th. a single sentence will indicate its tenor: 'whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely on military considerations, and hence in the first instance regard to the safety of our detached garrisons in afghanistan; to the security of our troops now in the field from unnecessary risks; and finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction upon the afghans of some signal and decisive blow.' those were brave words, if only they had been adhered to. but six weeks later his lordship was ordering nott to evacuate candahar and fall back on quetta, until the season should permit further retirement to the indus; and instructing pollock, through the commander-in-chief, to withdraw without delay every british soldier from jellalabad to peshawur, except under certain specified eventualities, none of which were in course of occurrence. pollock temporised, holding on to his advanced position by the plea of inability to retire for want of transport, claiming mildly to find discretionary powers in the government instructions, and cautiously arguing in favour of an advance by a few marches to a region where better climate was to be found, and whence he might bring to bear stronger pressure for the liberation of the prisoners. nott was a narrower man than pollock. when he got his orders he regarded them as strictly binding, no matter how unpalatable the injunctions. 'i shall not lose a moment,' he wrote, 'in making arrangements to carry out my orders, without turning to the right or the left, and without inquiring into the reasons for the measures enjoined, whatever our own opinions or wishes may be.' he reluctantly began preparations for withdrawal. carriage was ordered up from quetta, and a brigade was despatched to withdraw the garrison of khelat-i-ghilzai, and to destroy the fort which craigie had so long and valiantly defended. it would be tedious to detail the vacillations, the obscurities, and the tortuosities of lord ellenborough's successive communications to his two generals in afghanistan. pollock had been permitted to remain about jellalabad until the autumn should bring cooler marching weather. nott had been detained at candahar by the necessity for crushing menacing bodies of tribal levies, but as july waned his preparations for withdrawal were all but complete. on the th of that month lord ellenborough wrote to him, reiterating injunctions for his withdrawal from afghanistan, but permitting him the alternatives of retiring by the direct route along his line of communications over quetta and sukkur, or of boxing the compass by the curiously circuitous 'retirement' _via_ ghuznee, cabul, and jellalabad. pollock, for his part, was permitted, if he thought proper, to advance on cabul in order to facilitate nott's withdrawal, if the latter should elect to 'retreat' by the circuitous route which has just been described. one does not care to characterise the 'heads i win, tails you lose' policy of a governor-general who thus shuffled off his responsibility upon two soldiers who previously had been sedulously restricted within narrow if varying limits. their relief from those trammels set them free, and it was their joy to accept the devolved responsibility, and to act with soldierly initiative and vigour. the chief credit of the qualified yet substantial triumph over official hesitation certainly belongs to pollock, who gently yet firmly forced the hand of the governor-general, while nott's merit was limited to a ready acceptance of the responsibility of a proffered option. a letter from nott intimating his determination to retire by way of cabul and jellalabad reached pollock in the middle of august, who immediately advanced from jellalabad; and his troops having concentrated at gundamuk, he marched from that position on th september, his second division, commanded by m'caskill, following next day. pollock was woefully short of transport, and therefore was compelled to leave some troops behind at gundamuk, and even then could carry only half the complement of tentage. but his soldiers, who carried in their haversacks seven days' provisions, would gladly have marched without any baggage at all, and the chief himself was eager to hurry forward, for nott had written that he expected to reach cabul on th september, and pollock was burning to be there first. in the jugdulluk pass, on the th, he found the ghilzais in considerable force on the heights. regardless of a heavy artillery fire they stood their ground, and so galled pollock's troops with sharp discharges from their jezails that it became necessary to send infantry against them. they were dislodged from the mountain they had occupied by a portion of the jellalabad brigade, led by gallant old general sale, who had his usual luck in the shape of a wound. this jugdulluk fighting was, however, little more than a skirmish, and pollock's people were to experience more severe opposition before they should emerge from the passes on to the cabul plain. on the morning of the th the concentrated force had quitted its camp in the tezeen valley, and had committed itself without due precaution to the passage of the ravine beyond, when the afghan levies with which akbar khan had manned the flanking heights, opened their fire. the sirdar had been dissuaded by captain troup, one of his prisoners, from attempting futile negotiations, and advised not to squander lives in useless opposition. akbar had replied that he was too deeply committed to recede, and that his people were bent on fighting. they were not baulked in the aspiration, which assuredly their opponents shared with at least equal zeal. pollock's advance-guard was about the middle of the defile, when the enemy were suddenly discovered blocking the pass in front, and holding the heights which pollock's light troops should have crowned in advance of the column. akbar's force was calculated to be about , strong, and the afghans fought resolutely against the british regiments which forced their way up the heights on the right and left. the ghazees dashed down to meet the red soldiers halfway, and up among the precipices there were many hand-to-hand encounters, in which the sword and the bayonet fought out the issue. the afghans made their last stand on the rocky summit of the huft kotul; but from this commanding position they were finally driven by broadfoot's bloodthirsty little goorkhas, who, hillmen themselves from their birth, chased the afghans from crag to crag, using their fell kookeries as they pursued. it was akbar khan's last effort, and the quelling of it cost pollock the trivial loss of thirty-two killed and wounded. there was no more opposition, and it was well for the afghans, for the awful spectacles presented in the khoord cabul pass traversed on the following day, kindled in pollock's soldiers a white heat of fury. 'the bodies,' wrote backhouse in his unpublished diary, 'lay in heaps of fifties and hundreds, our gun wheels crushing the bones of our late comrades at every yard for four or five miles; indeed, the whole march from gundamuk to cabul may be said to have been over the bodies of the massacred army.' pollock marched unmolested to cabul on the th, and camped on the old racecourse to the east of the city. nott, in evacuating candahar, divided his force into two portions, the weaker of which general england took back to india by quetta and sukkur, while on august th nott himself, with two european battalions, the 'beautiful sepoy regiments' of which he had a right to be proud, and his field guns, marched away from candahar, his face set towards cabul. his march was uneventful until about midway between khelat-i-ghilzai and ghuznee, when on the th the cavalry, unsupported and badly handled in a stupid and unauthorised foray, lost severely in officers and men, took to flight in panic, and so gave no little encouragement to the enemy hanging on nott's flank. two days later shumshoodeen, the afghan leader, drew up some , men in order of battle on high ground left of the british camp. nott attacked with vigour, advancing to turn the afghan left. in reprisal the enemy threw their strength on his left, supporting their jezail fire with artillery, whereupon nott changed front to the left, deployed, and then charged. the afghans did not wait for close quarters, and nott was no more seriously molested. reaching the vicinity of ghuznee on september th, he cleared away the hordes hanging on the heights which encircle the place. during the night the afghans evacuated ghuznee. soon after daylight the british flag was waving from the citadel. having fulfilled lord ellenborough's ridiculous order to carry away from the tomb of sultan mahmoud in the environs of ghuznee, the supposititious gates of somnath, a once famous hindoo shrine in the bombay province of kattiawar, nott marched onward unmolested till within a couple of marches of cabul, when near maidan he had some stubborn fighting with an afghan force which tried ineffectually to block his way. on the th he marched into camp four miles west of cabul, whence he could discern, not with entire complacency, the british ensign already flying from the balla hissar, for pollock had won the race to cabul by a couple of days. for months there had been negotiations for the release of the british prisoners whom akbar khan had kept in durance ever since they came into his hands in the course of the disastrous retreat from cabul in january, but they had been unsuccessful, and now it was known that the unfortunate company of officers, women, and children, had been carried off westward into the hill country of bamian. nott's officers, as the candahar column was nearing cabul, had more than once urged him to detach a brigade in the direction of bamian in the hope of effecting a rescue of the prisoners, but he had steadily refused, leaning obstinately on the absence from the instructions sent him by government of any permission to engage in the enterprise of attempting their release. he was not less brusque in the intimation of his declinature when pollock gave him the opportunity to send a force in support of sir richmond shakespear, whom, with a detachment of kuzzilbash horse, pollock had already despatched on the mission of attempting the liberation of the prisoners. the narrow old soldier argued doggedly that government 'had thrown the prisoners overboard.' why, then, should he concern himself with their rescue? if his superior officer should give him a firm order, of course he would obey, but he would obey under protest. pollock disdained to impose so enviable a duty on a recalcitrant man, and committed to sale the honourable and welcome service--all the more welcome to that officer because his wife and daughter were among the captives. at the head of his jellalabad brigade, he was to push forward by forced marches on the track of shakespear and his horsemen. the strange and bitter experiences of the captives, from that miserable january sabbath day on which they passed under the 'protection' of akbar khan until the mid-september noon when shakespear galloped into their midst, are recorded in full and interesting detail in lady sale's journal, in vincent eyre's _captivity_, and in colin mackenzie's biography published under the title of _storms and sunshine of a soldier's life_. here it is possible only briefly to summarise the chief incidents of the captivity. the unanimous testimony of the released prisoners was to the effect that akbar khan, violent, bloody, and passionate man though he was, behaved toward them with kindness and a certain rude chivalry. they remained for nearly three months at budiabad, living in great squalor and discomfort. for the whole party there were but five rooms, each of which was occupied by from five to ten officers and ladies, the few soldiers and non-commissioned officers, who were mostly wounded, being quartered in sheds and cellars. mackenzie drily remarks that the hardships of the common lot, and the close intimacy of prison life, brought into full relief good and evil qualities; 'conventional polish was a good deal rubbed off and replaced by a plainness of speech quite unheard of in good society.' ladies and gentlemen were necessitated to occupy the same room during the night, but the men 'cleared out' early in the morning, leaving the ladies to themselves. the dirt and vermin of their habitation were abominably offensive to people to whom scrupulous cleanliness was a second nature. but the captives were allowed to take exercise within a limited range; they had among them a few books, and an old newspaper occasionally came on to them from jellalabad, with which place a fitful correspondence in cypher was surreptitiously maintained. they had a few packs of playing cards; they made for themselves backgammon and draught-boards, and when in good spirits they sometimes played hopscotch and blindman's-buff with the children of the party. the sundays were always kept scrupulously, lawrence and mackenzie conducting the service in turn. the earthquake which shook down the fortifications of jellalabad brought their rickety fort about the ears of the captives. several escaped narrowly with their lives when walls and roofs yawned and crumbled, and all had to turn out and sleep in the courtyard, where they suffered from cold and saturating dews. after the defeat of akbar by the jellalabad garrison on april th, there was keen expectation that sale would march to their rescue, but he came not, and there were rumours among the guards of their impending massacre in revenge for the crushing reverse akbar had experienced. presently, however, mahomed shah khan, akbar's lieutenant, arrived full of courtesy and reassurance, but with the unwelcome intimation that the prisoners must prepare themselves to leave budiabad at once, and move to a greater distance from jellalabad and their friends. for some preparation was not a difficult task. 'all my worldly goods,' wrote captain johnson, 'might be stowed away in a towel.' others who possessed heavier impedimenta, were lightened of the encumbrance by the ghilzai sirdar, who plundered indiscriminately. the european soldiers were left behind at budiabad, and the band of ladies and gentlemen started on the afternoon of april th, in utter ignorance of their destination, under the escort of a strong band of afghans. at the ford across the cabul river the cavalcade found akbar khan wounded, haggard, and dejected, seated in a palanquin, which, weak as he was, he gave up to ladies macnaghten and sale, who were ill. a couple of days were spent at tezeen among the melancholy relics of the january slaughter, whence most of the party were carried several miles further into the southern mountains to the village of zandeh, while general elphinstone, whose end was fast approaching, remained in the tezeen valley with pottinger, mackenzie, eyre, and one or two others. on the evening of april d the poor general was finally released from suffering of mind and body. akbar, who when too late had offered to free him, sent the body down to jellalabad under a guard, and accompanied by moore the general's soldier servant; and elphinstone lies with colonel dennie and the dead of the defence of jellalabad in their nameless graves in a waste place within the walls of that place. toward the end of may the captives were moved up the passes to the vicinity of cabul, where akbar khan was now gradually attaining the ascendant. prince futteh jung, however, still held out in the balla hissar, and intermittent firing was heard as the weary _cortège_ of prisoners reached a fort about three miles short of cabul, which the ladies of the proprietor's zenana had evacuated in their favour. here they lived if not in contentment at least in considerable comfort and amenity. they had the privacy of a delightful garden, and enjoyed the freedom of bathing in the adjacent river. after the strife between akbar khan and futteh jung ceased they were even permitted to exchange visits with their countrymen, the hostages quartered on the balla hissar. they were able to obtain money from the cabul usurers, and thus to supply themselves with suitable clothing and additions to their rations, and their mails from india and jellalabad were forwarded to them without hindrance. the summer months were passed in captivity, but it was no longer for them a captivity of squalor and wretchedness. life was a good deal better worth living in the pleasant garden house on the bank of the logur than it had been in the noisome squalor of budiabad and the vermin-infested huddlement of zandeh. but they still-lived under the long strain of anxiety and apprehension, for none of them knew what the morrow might bring forth. while residing in the pleasant quarters in the logur valley the captives of the passes were joined by nine officers, who were the captives of ghuznee. after the capitulation the latter had been treated with cruel harshness, shut up in one small room, and debarred from fresh air and exercise. colonel palmer, indeed, had undergone the barbarity of torture in the endeavour to force him to disclose the whereabouts of treasure which he was suspected of having buried. akbar had full and timely intimation of the mutual intention of the british generals at jellalabad and candahar to march on cabul, and did not fail to recognise of what value to him in extremity might be his continued possession of the prisoners. they had been warned of their probable deportation to the remote and rugged bamian; and the toilsome journey thither was begun on the evening of august th. a couple of ailing families alone, with a surgeon in charge of them, were allowed to remain behind; all the others, hale and sick, had to travel, the former on horseback, the latter carried in camel panniers. the escort consisted of an irregular regiment of afghan infantry commanded by one saleh mahomed khan, who when a subadar serving in one of the shah's afghan regiments had deserted to dost mahomed. the wayfarers, female as well as male, wore the afghan costume, in order that they might attract as little notice as possible. bamian was reached on september d, where the wretchedness of the quarters contrasted vividly with the amenity of those left behind on the cabul plain. but the wretchedness of bamian was not to be long endured. an intimacy had been struck up between captain johnson and saleh mahomed, and the latter cautiously hinted that a reward and a pension might induce him to carry his charges into the british camp. on september th there was a private meeting between the afghan commandant and three british officers, pottinger, johnson, and lawrence. saleh mahomed intimated the receipt of instructions from the sirdar to carry the prisoners over the hindoo koosh into khooloom, and leave them there to seeming hopeless captivity. but on the other hand a messenger had reached saleh from mohun lal with the assurance that general pollock, if he restored the prisoners, would ensure him a reward of , rupees, and a life pension of , rupees a year. saleh mahomed demanded and received a guarantee from the british officers; and the captives bound themselves to make good from their own resources their redemption money. the afghan ex-subadar proved himself honest; the captives were captives no longer, and they proceeded to assert themselves in the masterful british manner. they hoisted the national flag; pottinger became once again the high-handed 'political,' and ordered the local chiefs to come to his durbar and receive dresses of honour. their fort was put into a state of defence, and a store of provisions was gathered in case of a siege. but in mid-september came the tidings that akbar had been defeated at tezeen, and had fled no one knew whither, whereupon the self-emancipated party set out on the march to cabul. at noon of the th they passed into the safe guardianship of shakespear and his horsemen. three days later, within a march of cabul, there was reached the column which sale had taken out, and on september st pollock greeted the company of men and women whose rescue had been wrought out by his cool, strong steadfastness. little more remains to be told. there was an afghan force still in arms at istalif, a beautiful village of the inveterately hostile kohistanees; a division marched to attack it, carried the place by assault, burnt part of it, and severely smote the garrison. utter destruction was the fate of charikar, the capital of the kohistan, where codrington's goorkha regiment had been destroyed. pollock determined to 'set a mark' on cabul to commemorate the retribution which the british had exacted. he spared the balla hissar, and abstained from laying the city in ruins, contenting himself with the destruction of the principal bazaar, through which the heads of macnaghten and burnes had been paraded, and in which their mangled bodies had been exposed. prince futteh jung, tired of his vicissitudes in the character of an afghan monarch, ceded what of a throne he possessed to another puppet of his race, and gladly accompanied the british armies to india. other waifs of the wreck of a nefarious and disastrous enterprise, among them old zemaun khan, who had been our friend throughout, and the family of the ill-fated shah soojah, were well content to return to the exile which afforded safety and quietude. there also accompanied the march of the humane pollock a great number of the mutilated and crippled camp followers of elphinstone's army who had escaped with their lives from its destruction. on the th of october the forces of pollock and of nott turned their backs on cabul, which no british army was again to see for nearly forty years, and set out on their march down the passes. jellalabad and ali musjid were partially destroyed in passing. pollock's division reached peshawur without loss, thanks to the precautions of its chief; but with m'caskill and nott the indomitable afghans had the last word, cutting off their stragglers, capturing their baggage, and in the final skirmish killing and wounding some sixty men of nott's command. of the bombastic and grotesque paeans of triumph emitted by lord ellenborough, whose head had been turned by a success to which he had but scantly contributed, nothing need now be said, nor of the garish pageant with which he received the armies as they re-entered british territory at ferozepore. as they passed down through the punjaub, dost mahomed passed up on his way to reoccupy the position from which he had been driven. and so ended the first afghan war, a period of history in which no redeeming features are perceptible except the defence of jellalabad, the dogged firmness of nott, and pollock's noble and successful constancy of purpose. beyond this effulgence there spreads a sombre welter of misrepresentation and unscrupulousness, intrigue, moral deterioration, and dishonour unspeakable. part ii: the second afghan war chapter i: the first campaign a brief period of peace intervened between the ratification of the treaty of gundamuk on may th, , and the renewal of hostilities consequent on the massacre at cabul of sir louis cavagnari and the whole _entourage_ of the mission of which he was the head. there was nothing identical or even similar in the motives of the two campaigns, and regarded purely on principle they might be regarded as two distinct wars, rather than as successive campaigns of one and the same war. but the interval between them was so short that the ink of the signatures to the treaty of gundamuk may be said to have been scarcely dry when the murder of the british envoy tore that document into bloody shreds; and it seems the simplest and most convenient method to designate the two years of hostilities from november to september , as the 'second afghan war,' notwithstanding the three months' interval of peace in the summer of . dost mahomed died in , and after a long struggle his son shere ali possessed himself of the throne bequeathed to him by his father. the relations between shere ali and the successive viceroys of india were friendly, although not close. the consistent aim of the british policy was to maintain afghanistan in the position of a strong, friendly, and independent state, prepared in certain contingencies to co-operate in keeping at a distance foreign intrigue or aggression; and while this object was promoted by donations of money and arms, to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of the country, while according a friendly recognition to the successive occupants of its throne, without undertaking indefinite liabilities in their interest. the aim, in a word, was to utilise afghanistan as a 'buffer' state between the northwestern frontier of british india and russian advances from the direction of central asia. shere ali was never a very comfortable ally; he was of a saturnine and suspicious nature, and he seems also to have had an overweening sense of the value of the position of afghanistan, interposed between two great powers profoundly jealous one of the other. he did not succeed with lord northbrook in an attempt to work on that viceroy by playing off the bogey of russian aggression; and as the consequence of this failure he allowed himself to display marked evidences of disaffected feeling. cognisance was taken of this 'attitude of extreme reserve,' and early in lord lytton arrived in india charged with instructions to break away from the policy designated as that of 'masterly inactivity,' and to initiate a new basis of relations with afghanistan and its ameer. lord lytton's instructions directed him to despatch without delay a mission to cabul, whose errand would be to require of the ameer the acceptance of a permanent resident and free access to the frontier positions of afghanistan on the part of british officers, who should have opportunity of conferring with the ameer on matters of common interest with 'becoming attention to their friendly councils.' those were demands notoriously obnoxious to the afghan monarch and the afghan people. compliance with them involved sacrifice of independence, and the afghan loathing of feringhee officials in their midst had been fiercely evinced in the long bloody struggle and awful catastrophe recorded in earlier pages of this volume. probably the ameer, had he desired, would not have dared to concede such demands on any terms, no matter how full of advantage. but the terms which lord lytton was instructed to tender as an equivalent were strangely meagre. the ameer was to receive a money gift, and a precarious stipend regarding which the new viceroy was to 'deem it inconvenient to commit his government to any permanent pecuniary obligation.' the desiderated recognition of abdoolah jan as shere ali's successor was promised with the qualifying reservation that the promise 'did not imply or necessitate any intervention in the internal affairs of the state.' the guarantee against foreign aggression was vague and indefinite, and the government of india reserved to itself entire 'freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material support.' the ameer replied to the notice that a mission was about to proceed to cabul by a courteous declinature to receive an envoy, assigning several specious reasons. he was quite satisfied with the existing friendly relations, and desired no change in them; he could not guarantee the safety of the envoy and his people; if he admitted a british mission, he would have no excuse for refusing to receive a russian one. an intimation was conveyed to the ameer that if he should persist in his refusal to receive the mission, the viceroy would have no other alternative than to regard afghanistan as a state which had 'voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the british government.' the ameer arranged that the vakeel of the indian government should visit simla, carrying with him full explanations, and charged to lay before the viceroy sundry grievances which were distressing shere ali. that functionary took back to cabul certain minor concessions, but conveyed the message also that those concessions were contingent on the ameer's acceptance of british officers about his frontiers, and that it would be of no avail to send an envoy to the conference at peshawur for which sanction was given, unless he were commissioned to agree to this condition as the fundamental basis of a treaty. before the vakeel quitted simla he had to listen to a truculent address from lord lytton, in the course of which shere ali's position was genially likened to that of 'an earthen pipkin between two iron pots.' before sir lewis pelly and the ameer's representative met at peshawur in january , shere ali had not unnaturally been perturbed by the permanent occupation of quetta, on the southern verge of his dominions, as indicating, along with other military dispositions, an intended invasion. the peshawur conference, which from the first had little promise, dragged on unsatisfactorily until terminated by the death of the ameer's representative, whereupon sir lewis pelly was recalled by lord lytton, notwithstanding the latter's cognisance that shere ali was despatching to peshawur a fresh envoy authorised to assent to all the british demands. the justification advanced by lord lytton for this procedure was the discovery purported to have been made by sir lewis pelly that the ameer was intriguing with general kaufmann at tashkend. since shere ali was an independent monarch, it was no crime on his part to enter into negotiations with another power than great britain, although if the worried and distracted man did so the charge of folly may be laid to him, since the russians were pretty certain to betray him after having made a cat's-paw of him, and since in applying to them he involved himself in the risk of hostile action on the part of the british. the wisdom of lord lytton's conduct is not apparent. the truculent policy of which he was the instrument was admittedly on the point of triumphing; and events curiously falsified his short-sighted anticipation of the unlikelihood, because of the russo-turkish war then impending, of any _rapprochement_ between the ameer and the russian authorities in central asia. the viceroy withdrew his vakeel from cabul, and in the recognition of the ameer's attitude of 'isolation and scarcely veiled hostility' lord salisbury authorised lord lytton to protect the british frontier by such measures as circumstances should render expedient, 'without regard to the wishes of the ameer or the interests of his dynasty.' lord lytton took no measures, expedient or otherwise, in the direction indicated by lord salisbury; the ameer, as if he had been a petted boy consigned to the corner, was abandoned to his sullen 'isolation,' and the russians adroitly used him to involve us in a war which lasted two years, cost us the lives of many valiant men, caused us to incur an expenditure of many millions, and left our relations with afghanistan in all essential respects in the same condition as lord lytton found them when he reached india with the 'new policy' in his pocket. if the russians could execute as thoroughly as they can plan skilfully, there would be hardly any limit to their conquests. when england was mobilising her forces after the treaty of san stefano, and ordering into the mediterranean a division of sepoys drawn from the three presidencies of her indian empire, russia for her part was concerting an important diversion in the direction of the north-western frontier of that great possession. but for the opportune conclusion of the treaty of berlin, the question as to the ability of sepoy troops stiffened by british regiments to cope with the mixed levies of the tzar might have been tried out on stricken fields between the oxus and the indus. when gortschakoff returned from berlin to st petersburg with his version of 'peace with honour'--bessarabia and batoum thrown in--kaufmann had to countermand the concentration of troops that had been in progress on the northern frontier of afghanistan. but the indian division was still much in evidence in the mediterranean, its tents now gleaming on the brown slopes of malta, now crowning the upland of larnaca and nestling among the foliage of kyrenea. kaufmann astutely retorted on this demonstration by despatching, not indeed an expedition, but an embassy to cabul; and when stolietoff, the gallant defender of the schipka pass, rode into the balla hissar on august th, , shere ali received him with every token of cordiality and regard. no other course was now open to her majesty's government than to insist on the reception at cabul of a british mission. the gallant veteran officer sir neville chamberlain, known to be held in regard by the ameer, was named as envoy, and an emissary was sent to cabul in advance with information of the date fixed for the setting out of the mission. shere ali was greatly perplexed, and begged for more time. 'it is not proper,' he protested, 'to use pressure in this way; it will tend to a complete rupture.' but sir neville chamberlain was satisfied that the ameer was trifling with the indian government; and he had certain information that the ameer, his ministers, and the afghan outpost officers, had stated plainly that, if necessary, the advance of the mission would be arrested by force. this was what in effect happened when on september st major cavagnari rode forward to the afghan post in the khyber pass. the officer who courteously stopped him assured him that he had orders to oppose by force the progress of sir neville and his mission, so cavagnari shook hands with the afghan major and rode back to peshawur. the viceroy sought permission to declare war immediately, notwithstanding his condition of unpreparedness; but the home government directed him instead to require in temperate language an apology and the acceptance of a permanent mission, presenting at the same time the ultimatum that if a satisfactory reply should not be received on or before the th november hostilities would immediately commence. meanwhile military preparations were actively pushed forward. the scheme of operations was as follows: three columns of invasion were to move simultaneously, one through the khyber pass to dakka, another through the kuram valley, south of the khyber, with the peiwar pass as its objective, and a third from quetta into the pisheen valley, to march forward to candahar after reinforcement by a division from mooltan. to general sir sam browne was assigned the command of the khyber column, consisting of about , men, with thirty guns; to general roberts the command of the kuram valley column, of about , men, with twenty-four guns; and to general biddulph the command of the quetta force, numbering some men, with eighteen guns. when general donald stewart should bring up from mooltan the division which was being concentrated there, he was to command the whole southern force moving on candahar. the reserve division gathering at hassan abdul and commanded by general maude, would support the khyber force; another reserve division massing at sukkur under general primrose, would act in support of the candahar force; and a contingent contributed by the sikh feudatory states and commanded by colonel watson, was to do duty on the kurum line of communication. the generals commanding columns were to act independently of each other, taking instructions direct from army and government headquarters. no answer to the ultimatum was received from the ameer, and on the morning of november st sir sam browne crossed the afghan frontier and moved up the khyber on ali musjid with his third and fourth brigades and the guns. overnight he had detached macpherson's and tytler's brigades with the commission to turn the ali musjid position by a circuitous march, the former charged to descend into the khyber pass in rear of the fortress, and block the escape of its garrison; the latter instructed to find, if possible, a position on the rhotas heights on the proper left of the fortress from which a flank attack might be delivered. about noon sir sam reached the shagai ridge and came under a brisk fire from the guns of ali musjid, to which his heavy cannon and manderson's horse-battery replied with good results. the afghan position, which was very strong, stretched right athwart the valley from an entrenched line on the right to the rhotas summit on the extreme left. the artillery duel lasted about two hours, and then sir sam determined to advance, on the expectation that the turning brigades had reached their respective objectives. he himself moved forward on the right upland; on the opposite side of the khyber stream appleyard led the advance of his brigade against the afghan right. no co-operation on the part of the turning brigades had made itself manifest up till dusk; the right brigade had been brought to a halt in face of a precipitous cliff crowned by the enemy, and it was wisely judged that to press the frontal attack further in the meantime would involve a useless loss of life. sir sam therefore halted, and sent word to appleyard to stay for the night his further advance, merely holding the ridge which he had already carried. but before this order reached him appleyard was sharply engaged with the enemy in their entrenched position, and in the fighting which occurred before the retirement was effected two officers were killed, a third wounded, and a good many casualties occurred among the rank and file of the native detachments gallantly assailing the afghan entrenchments. early next morning offensive operations were about to be resumed, when a young officer of the th lancers brought intelligence that the afghan garrison had fled under cover of night, whereupon the fort was promptly occupied. the turning brigades had been delayed by the difficult country encountered, but detachments from both had reached kata kustia in time to capture several hundred fugitives of the ali musjid garrison. the mass of it, however--its total strength was about men--effected a retreat by the peshbolak track from the right of the entrenched position. sir sam browne's advance to dakka was made without molestation, and on th december he encamped on the plain of jellalabad, where he remained throughout the winter, maude's reserve division keeping open his communications through the khyber pass. the hill tribes, true to their nature, gave great annoyance by their continual raids, and several punitive expeditions were sent against them from time to time, but seldom with decisive results. the tribesmen for the most part carried off into the hills their moveable effects, and the destruction of their petty forts apparently gave them little concern. for the most part they maintained their irreconcilable attitude, hanging on the flanks of our detachments on their return march through the lateral passes to their camps, and inflicting irritating if not very severe losses. occasionally they thought proper to make nominal submission with tongue in cheek, breaking out again when opportunity or temptation presented itself. detailed description of those raids and counter-raids would be very tedious reading. it was when starting to co-operate in one of those necessary but tantalising expeditions that a number of troopers of the th hussars were drowned in a treacherous ford of the cabul river near jellalabad. general roberts, to whom the conduct of operations in the kuram district had been entrusted, crossed the frontier on november st, and marched up the valley with great expedition. the inhabitants evinced friendliness, bringing in live stock and provisions for sale. reaching habib killa on the morning of the th, he received a report that the afghan force which he knew to be opposed to him had abandoned its guns on the hither side of the peiwar kotul, and was retreating in confusion over that summit. roberts promptly pushed forward in two columns. building on the erroneous information that the enemy were in a hollow trying to withdraw their guns--in reality they were already in their entrenched position on the summit of the kotul--he ordered cobbe's (the left) column to turn the right of the supposed afghan position, and debar the enemy from the kotul, while the other column (thelwall's) was ordered to attack in front, the object being to have the enemy between two fires. cobbe's leading regiment near the village of turrai found its advance blocked by precipices, and a withdrawal was ordered, the advantage having been attained of forcing the enemy to disclose the position which he was holding. further reconnaissances proved that the afghan line of defence extended along the crest of a lofty and broken mountainous range from the spingawai summit on the left to the peiwar kotul on the right centre, the right itself resting on commanding elevations a mile further south. the position had a front in all of about four miles. it was afterwards ascertained to have been held by about regulars and a large number of tribal irregulars. general roberts' force numbered about men. his scheme of operations he explained to his commanding officers on the evening of december st. with the bulk of the force he himself was to make a circuitous night march by his right on the spingawai kotul, with the object of turning that position and taking the main afghan position on the peiwar kotul in reverse; while brigadier cobbe, with whom were to remain the th (queen's) and th punjaub infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment and six guns, was instructed to assail the enemy's centre when the result of the flank attack on his left should have made itself apparent. the turning column, whose advance the general led in person, consisted of the th n. i. (leading), th goorkhas, and a mountain battery, all under colonel gordon's command; followed by a wing of the d highlanders, d punjaub infantry, and d pioneers, with four guns on elephants, under brigadier thelwall. the arduous march began at ten p.m. trending at first rearward to the peiwar village, the course followed was then to the proper right, up the rugged and steep spingawai ravine. in the darkness part of thelwall's force lost its way, and disappeared from ken. further on a couple of shots were fired by disaffected pathans in the ranks of the th n. i. that regiment was promptly deprived of the lead, which was taken by the goorkha regiment, and the column toiled on by a track described by general roberts as 'nothing but a mass of stones, heaped into ridges and furrowed into deep hollows by the action of the water.' day had not broken when the head of the column reached the foot of the steep ascent to the spingawai kotul. the goorkhas and the d rushed forward on the first stockade. it was carried without a pause save to bayonet the defenders, and stockade after stockade was swept over in rapid and brilliant succession. in half-an-hour general roberts was in full possession of the spingawai defences, and the afghan left flank was not only turned but driven in. cobbe was ordered by signal to co-operate by pressing on his frontal attack; and roberts himself hurried forward on his enterprise of rolling up the afghan left and shaking its centre. but this proved no easy task. the afghans made a good defence, and gave ground reluctantly. they made a resolute stand on the further side of a narrow deep-cut ravine, to dislodge them from which effort after effort was ineffectually made. the general then determined to desist from pressing this line of attack, and to make a second turning movement by which he hoped to reach the rear of the afghan centre. he led the d wing, three native regiments, and ten guns, in a direction which should enable him to threaten the line of the afghan retreat. brigadier cobbe since morning had been steadily although slowly climbing toward the front of the peiwar kotul position. after an artillery duel which lasted for three hours the afghan fire was partially quelled; cobbe's infantry pushed on and up from ridge to ridge, and at length they reached a crest within yards of the guns on the kotul, whence their rifle fire compelled the afghan gunners to abandon their batteries. meanwhile roberts' second turning movement was developing, and the defenders of the kotul placed between two fires and their line of retreat compromised, began to waver. brigadier cobbe had been wounded, but colonel drew led forward his gallant youngsters of the th, and after toilsome climbing they entered the afghan position, which its defenders had just abandoned, leaving many dead, eighteen guns, and a vast accumulation of stores and ammunition. colonel h. gough pursued with his cavalry, and possessed himself of several more guns which the afghans had relinquished in their precipitate flight. the decisive success of the peiwar kotul combat had not cost heavily; the british losses were twenty-one killed and seventy-two wounded. his sick and wounded sent back to fort kuram, general roberts advanced to ali khel, and thence made a reconnaissance forward to the shutargurdan pass, whose summit is distant from cabul little more than fifty miles. its height is great--upwards of , feet--but it was regarded as not presenting serious obstacles to the advance by this route of a force from the kuram valley moving on cabul. a misfortune befell the baggage guard on one of the marches in the trans-peiwar region when captains goad and powell lost their lives in a tribal onslaught. the somewhat chequered experiences of general roberts in the khost valley need not be told in detail. after some fighting and more marching he withdrew from that turbulent region altogether, abjuring its pestilent tribesmen and all their works. the kuram force wintered in excellent health spite of the rigorous climate, and toward the end of march its forward concentration about ali kheyl was ordered, which was virtually accomplished before the snow had melted from the passes in the later weeks of april. adequate transport had been got together and supplies accumulated; colonel watson's contingent was occupying the posts along the valley; and general roberts was in full readiness promptly to obey the orders to advance which he had been led to expect, and on which his brother-general sir sam browne had already acted to some extent. the march on candahar of the two divisions under the command of general stewart had the character, for the most part, of a military promenade. the tramp across the deserts of northern beloochistan was arduous; the bolan, the gwaga, and the kojuk passes had to be surmounted, and the distances which both biddulph and stewart had to traverse were immensely in excess of those covered by either of the forces operating from the north-western frontier line. but uneventful marches, however long and toilsome, do not call for detailed description. stewart rode into candahar on january th, , and the troops as they arrived encamped on the adjacent plain. the governor and most of his officials, together with the afghan cavalry, had fled toward herat; the deputy-governor remained to hand over the city to general stewart. for commissariat reasons one division under stewart presently moved by the cabul road on khelat-i-ghilzai, which was found empty, the afghan garrison having evacuated it. simultaneously with stewart's departure from candahar biddulph marched out a column westward toward the helmund, remaining in that region until the third week in february. on its return march to candahar the rear-guard had a sharp skirmish at khushk-i-nakhud with alizai tribesmen, of whom were left dead on the field. soon after the return of stewart and biddulph to candahar, orders arrived that the former should retain in candahar, quetta, and pishin a strong division of all arms, sending back to india the remainder of his command under biddulph--the march to be made by the previously unexplored thal-chotiali route to the eastward of the pisheen valley. before sir sam browne moved forward from jellalabad to gundamuk he had been able to report to the viceroy the death of shere ali. that unfortunate man had seen with despair the departure on december th of the last russian from cabul--sure token that he need hope for nothing from kaufmann or the tzar. his chiefs unanimous that further resistance by him was hopeless, he released his son yakoub khan from his long harsh imprisonment, constituted him regent, and then followed the russian mission in the direction of tashkend. kaufmann would not so much as allow him to cross the frontier, and after a painful illness shere ali died on february st, , near balkh in northern afghanistan. he was a man who deserved a better fate than that which befell him. his aspiration was to maintain the independence of the kingdom which he ruled with justice if also with masterfulness, and he could not brook the degradation of subjection. but, unfortunately for him, he was the 'earthen pipkin' which the 'iron pot' found inconvenient. there had been plenty of manhood originally in his son and successor yakoub khan, but much of that attribute had withered in him during the long cruel imprisonment to which he had been subjected by his father. shere ali's death made him nominal master of afghanistan, but the vigour of his youth-time no longer characterised him. he reigned but did not rule, and how precarious was his position was evidenced by the defection of many leading chiefs who came into the english camps and were ready to make terms. after the flight of shere ali some correspondence had passed between yakoub khan and major cavagnari, but the former had not expressed any willingness for the re-establishment of friendly relations. in february of his own accord he made overtures for a reconciliation, and soon after intimated the death of his father and his own accession to the afghan throne. major cavagnari, acting on the viceroy's authorisation, wrote to the new sovereign stating the terms on which the anglo-indian government was prepared to engage in negotiations for peace. yakoub temporised for some time, but influenced by the growing defection of the sirdars from his cause, as well as by the forward movements of the forces commanded by browne and roberts, he intimated his intention of visiting gundamuk in order to discuss matters in personal conference with major cavagnari. a fortnight later he was on his way down the passes. instructions had been given by the viceroy that yakoub khan should be received in the british camp with all honour and distinction. when his approach was announced on may th, cavagnari and a number of british officers rode out to meet him; when he reached the camp, a royal salute greeted him, a guard of honour presented arms, and sir sam browne and his staff gave him a ceremonious welcome. cavagnari had full powers to represent his government in the pending negotiations, as to the terms of which he had received from the viceroy detailed instructions. the ameer and his general-in-chief, daoud shah, came to the conference attired in russian uniforms. the negotiations were tedious, for the ameer, his minister, and his general made difficulties with a somewhat elaborate stupidity, but cavagnari as a diplomatist possessed the gift of being at once patient and firm; and at length on may th the treaty of peace was signed, and formally ratified by the viceroy four days later. by the treaty of gundamuk afghanistan was deprived for the time of its traditional character of a 'buffer state,' and its ameer became virtually a feudatory of the british crown. he was no longer an independent prince; although his titular rank and a nominal sovereignty remained to him, his position under its articles was to be analogous to that of the mediatised princes of the german empire. the treaty vested in the british government the control of the external relations of afghanistan. the ameer consented to the residence of british agents within his dominions, guaranteeing their safety and honourable treatment, while the british government undertook that its representatives should not interfere with the internal administration of the country. the districts of pisheen, kuram, and sibi were ceded to the british government along with the permanent control of the khyber and michnai passes, and of the mountain tribes inhabiting the vicinity of those passes; all other afghan territory in british occupation was to be restored. the obligations to which the treaty committed the british government were that it should support the ameer against foreign aggression with arms, money, or troops at its discretion, and that it should pay to him and his successor an annual subsidy of £ , . commercial relations between india and afghanistan were to be protected and encouraged; a telegraph line between cabul and the kuram was forthwith to be constructed; and the ameer was to proclaim an amnesty relieving all and sundry of his subjects from punishment for services rendered to the british during the war. that the treaty of gundamuk involved our indian empire in serious responsibilities is obvious, and those responsibilities were the more serious that they were vague and indefinite, yet none the less binding on this account. it is probable that its provisions, if they had remained in force, would have been found in the long run injurious to the interests of british india. for that realm afghanistan has the value that its ruggedness presents exceptional obstacles to the march through it of hostile armies having the indian frontier for their objective, and this further and yet more important value that the afghans by nature are frank and impartial ishmaelites, their hands against all foreigners alike, no matter of what nationality. if this character be impaired, what virtue the afghan has in our eyes is lost. in his implacable passion for independence, in his fierce intolerance of the feringhee intruder, he fulfils in relation to our indian frontier a kindred office to that served by abattis, _cheveux de frise,_ and wire entanglements in front of a military position. the short-lived treaty, for which the sanguine mr stanhope claimed that it had gained for england 'a friendly, an independent, and a strong afghanistan,' may now be chiefly remembered because of the circumstance that it gave effect for the moment to lord beaconsfield's 'scientific frontier.' the withdrawal of the two northern forces to positions within the new frontier began immediately on the ratification of the treaty of gundamuk, the evacuation of candahar being postponed for sanitary reasons until autumn. the march of sir sam browne's force from the breezy upland of gundamuk down the passes to peshawur, made as it was in the fierce heat of midsummer through a region of bad name for insalubrity, and pervaded also by virulent cholera, was a ghastly journey. that melancholy pilgrimage, every halting-place in whose course was marked by graves, and from which the living emerged 'gaunt and haggard, marching with a listless air, their clothing stiff with dried perspiration, their faces thick with a mud of dust and sweat through which their red bloodshot eyes looked forth, many suffering from heat prostration,' dwells in the memory of british india as the 'death march,' and its horrors have been recounted in vivid and pathetic words by surgeon-major evatt, one of the few medical officers whom, participating in it, it did not kill. chapter ii: the opening of the second campaign there were many who mistrusted the stability of the treaty of gundamuk. perhaps in his heart sir louis cavagnari may have had his misgivings, for he was gifted with shrewd insight, and no man knew the afghan nature better; but outwardly, in his quiet, resolute manner, he professed the fullest confidence. cavagnari was a remarkable man. italian and irish blood commingled in his veins. both strains carry the attributes of vivacity and restlessness, but cavagnari to the superficial observer appeared as phlegmatic as he was habitually taciturn. this sententious imperturbability was only on the surface; whether it was a natural characteristic or an acquired manner is not easy to decide. below the surface of measured reticent composure there lay a temperament of ardent enthusiasm, and not less ardent ambition. in subtlety he was a match for the wiliest oriental, whom face to face he dominated with a placid dauntless masterfulness that was all his own. the wild hill tribes among whom he went about escortless, carrying his life continually in his hand, recognised the complex strength of his personal sway, and feared at once and loved the quiet, firm man, the flash of whose eye was sometimes ominous, but who could cow the fiercest hillman without losing a tittle of his cool composure. [illustration: _from a photograph by bourne & shepherd: sir louis cavagnari and sirdars_] cavagnari had negotiated the treaty of gundamuk, the real importance of which consisted in the afghan acceptance of a british resident at cabul. the honour, the duty, and the danger naturally fell to him of being the first occupant of a post created mainly by his own mingled tact and strength. many of his friends regarded him in the light of the leader of a forlorn hope, and probably cavagnari recognised with perfect clearness the risks which encompassed his embassy; but apart from mayhap a little added gravity in his leave-takings when he quitted simla, he gave no sign. it was not a very imposing mission at whose head he rode into the balla hissar of cabul on july th, . his companions were his secretary, mr william jenkins, a young scotsman of the punjaub civil service, dr ambrose kelly, the medical officer of the embassy, and the gallant, stalwart young lieutenant w. r. p. hamilton, v.c., commanding the modest escort of seventy-five soldiers of the guides. it was held that an escort so scanty was sufficient, since the ameer had pledged himself personally for the safety and protection of the mission. the envoy was received with high honour, and conducted to the roomy quarters in the balla hissar which had been prepared as the residency, within easy distance of the ameer's palace. unquestionably the mission was welcome neither to the afghan ruler nor to the people, but cavagnari, writing to the viceroy, made the best of things. the arrival at the adjacent sherpur cantonments of the herat regiments in the beginning of august was extremely unfortunate for the mission. those troops had been inspired by their commander ayoub khan with intense hatred to the english, and they marched through the cabul streets shouting objurgations against the british envoy, and picking quarrels with the soldiers of his escort. a pensioned sepoy who had learned that the afghan troops had been ordered to abuse the eltchi, warned cavagnari of the danger signals. cavagnari's calm remark was, 'dogs that bark don't bite.' the old soldier earnestly urged, 'but these dogs do bite, and there is danger.' 'well,' said cavagnari, 'they can only kill the handful of us here, and our death will be avenged.' the days passed, and it seemed that cavagnari's diagnosis of the situation was the accurate one. the last words of his last message to the viceroy, despatched on september d, were 'all well.' the writer of those words was a dead man, and his mission had perished with him, almost as soon as the cheerful message borne along the telegraph wires reached its destination. in the morning of september d some afghan regiments paraded without arms in the balla hissar to receive their pay. an instalment was paid, but the soldiers clamoured for arrears due. the demand was refused, a riot began, and the shout rose that the british eltchi might prove a free-handed paymaster. there was a rush toward the residency, and while some of the afghan soldiers resorted to stone-throwing, others ran for arms to their quarters, and looted the arsenal in the upper balla hissar. the residency gates had been closed on the first alarm, and fire was promptly opened on the rabble. the place was never intended for defence, commanded as it was at close range from the higher level of the arsenal, whence a heavy continuous fire was from the first poured down. the mob of the city in their thousands hurried to co-operate with the mutinied soldiers and share in the spoils of the sack, so that the residency was soon besieged. as soon as the outbreak manifested itself cavagnari had sent a message to the ameer, and the communication admittedly reached the latter's hands. he had more than troops in the balla hissar, still at least nominally loyal; he had guaranteed the protection of the mission, and it behoved him to do what in him lay to fulfil his pledge. but the ameer sat supine in his palace, doing no more than send his general-in-chief daoud shah to remonstrate with the insurgents. daoud shah went on the errand, but it is questionable whether he showed any energy, or indeed desired that the besiegers should desist. it was claimed by and for him that he was maltreated and indeed wounded by the mob, and it appears that he did ride into the throng and was forcibly dismounted. he might perhaps have exerted himself with greater determination if he had received more specific orders from his master the ameer. that feeble or treacherous prince never stirred. to the frequent urgent messages sent him by lieutenant hamilton, he replied vaguely: 'as god wills; i am making preparations.' meanwhile the little garrison maintained with gallant staunchness hour after hour the all but hopeless defence.' while the fighting was going on,' reported the pensioner who had previously warned cavagnari, 'i myself saw the four european officers charge out at the head of some twenty-five of the garrison; they drove away a party holding some broken ground. when chased, the afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf. later, another sally was made by a detachment, with but three officers at their head. cavagnari was not with them this time. a third sally was made with only two officers leading, hamilton and jenkins; and the last of the sallies was made by a sikh jemadar bravely leading. no more sallies were made after this.' about noon the gates were forced, and the residency building was fired; but the defenders long maintained their position on the roof and in a detached building. at length the fire did its work, the walls and roof fell in, and soon the fell deed was consummated by the slaughter of the last survivors of the ill-fated garrison. hamilton was said to have died sword in hand in a final desperate charge. tidings of the massacre were carried with great speed to massy's outposts in the kuram valley. the news reached simla by telegraph early on the morning of the th. the authorities there rallied from the shock with fine purposeful promptitude, and within a few hours a telegram was on its way to general massy's headquarters at ali khel instructing him to occupy the crest of the shutargurdan pass with two infantry regiments and a mountain battery, which force was to entrench itself there and await orders. the policy of which lord lytton was the figurehead had come down with a bloody crash, and the 'masterly inactivity' of wise john lawrence stood vindicated in the eyes of europe and of asia. but if his policy had gone to water, the viceroy, although he was soon to default from the constancy of his purpose, saw for the present clear before him the duty that now in its stead lay upon him of inflicting summary punishment on a people who had ruthlessly violated the sacred immunity from harm that shields alike among civilised and barbarous communities the person and suite of an ambassador accepted under the provisions of a deliberate treaty. burnes and macnaghten had met their fate because they had gone to cabul the supporters of a detested intruder and the unwelcome representatives of a hated power. but cavagnari had been slaughtered notwithstanding that he dwelt in the balla hissar residency in virtue of a solemn treaty between the empress of india and the ameer of afghanistan, notwithstanding that the latter had guaranteed him safety and protection, notwithstanding that britain and afghanistan had ratified a pledge of mutual friendship and reciprocal good offices. lord lytton recognised, at least for the moment, that no consideration of present expediency or of ulterior policy could intervene to deter him from the urgent imperative duty which now suddenly confronted him. the task, it was true, was beset with difficulties and dangers. the forces on the north-western frontier had been reduced to a peace footing, and the transport for economical reasons had been severely cut down. the bitter afghan winter season was approaching, during which military operations could be conducted only under extremely arduous conditions, and when the line of communications would be liable to serious interruptions, the available troops for a prompt offensive did not amount to more than men all told, and it was apparent that many circumstances might postpone their reinforcement. when men are in earnest, difficulties and dangers are recognised only to be coped with and overcome. when the simla council of war broke up on the afternoon of september th the plan of campaign had been settled, and the leader of the enterprise had been chosen. sir frederick roberts was already deservedly esteemed one of the most brilliant soldiers of the british army. he had fought with distinction all through the great mutiny, earning the victoria cross and rapid promotion; he had served in the abyssinian campaign of , and been chosen by napier to carry home his final despatches; and he had worthily shared in the toil, fighting, and honours of the umbeyla and looshai expeditions. in his command of the kuram field force during the winter of - he had proved himself a skilful, resolute, and vigorous leader. the officers and men who served under him believed in him enthusiastically, and, what with soldiers is the convincing assurance of whole-souled confidence, they had bestowed on him an affectionate nickname--they knew him among themselves as 'little bobs.' his administrative capacity he had proved in the post of quartermaster-general in india. ripe in experience of war, roberts at the age of forty-seven was in the full vigour of manhood, alert in mind, and of tough and enduring physique. he was a very junior major-general, but even among his seniors the conviction was general that lord lytton the viceroy, and sir f. haines the commander-in-chief, acted wisely in entrusting to him the most active command in the impending campaign. our retention of the kuram valley was to prove very useful in the emergency which had suddenly occurred. its occupation enabled massy to seize and hold the shutargurdan, and the force in the valley was to constitute the nucleus of the little army of invasion and retribution to the command of which sir frederick roberts was appointed. the apex at the shutargurdan of the salient angle into afghanistan which our possession of the kuram valley furnished was within little more than fifty miles of cabul, whereas the distance of that city from lundi kotul, our advanced position at the head of the khyber pass, was about miles, and the route exceptionally difficult. roberts' column of invasion was to consist of a cavalry brigade commanded by brigadier-general dunham-massy, and of two infantry brigades, the first commanded by brigadier-general macpherson, the second by brigadier-general baker, three batteries of artillery, a company of sappers and miners, and two gatling guns. the kuram valley between the shutargurdan and the base was to be garrisoned adequately by a force about strong, in protection of roberts' communications by that line until snow should close it, by which time it was anticipated that communication by the khyber-jellalabad-gundamuk line would be opened up, for gaining and maintaining which a force of about men was to be detailed under the command of major-general bright, which was to furnish a movable column to establish communications onward to cabul. a strong reserve force was to be gathered between peshawur and rawal pindi under the command of major-general ross, to move forward as occasion might require, in the south-west sir donald stewart was to recall to candahar his troops, which, having begun their march toward india, were now mainly echeloned along the route to quetta, when that general would have about men at his disposition to dominate the candahar province, reoccupy khelat-i-ghilzai, and threaten ghuznee, his communications with the indus being kept open by a brigade of bombay troops commanded by brigadier-general phayre. sir frederick roberts left simla on et september along with colonel charles macgregor, c.b., the brilliant and daring soldier whom he had chosen as chief of staff, and travelling night and day they reached ali khel on the th. the transport and supply difficulty had to be promptly met, and this was effected only by making a clean sweep of all the resources of the peshawur district, greatly but unavoidably to the hindrance of the advance of the khyber column, and by procuring carriage and supplies from the friendly tribes of the kuram. notwithstanding the most strenuous exertions it was not until the st october that roberts' little army, having crossed the shutargurdan by detachments, was rendezvoused at and about the village of kushi in the logur plain, within forty-eight miles of cabul. some sharp skirmishes had been fought as the troops traversed the rugged ground between ali khel and the shutargurdan, but the losses were trivial, although the general himself had a narrow escape. a couple of regiments and four guns under the command of colonel money were left in an entrenched camp to hold the shutargurdan. the massacre of the british mission had no sooner been perpetrated than yakoub khan found himself in a very bad way. the cabul sirdars sided with the disaffected soldiery, and urged the ameer to raise his banner for a _jehad_ or religious war, a measure for which he had no nerve. nor had he the nerve to remain in cabul until roberts should camp under the balla hissar and demand of him an account of the stewardship he had undertaken on behalf of the ill-fated cavagnari. what reasons actuated the anxious and bewildered man cannot precisely be known; whether he was simply solicitous for his own wretched skin, whether he acted from a wish to save cabul from destruction, or whether he hoped that his entreaties for delay might stay the british advance until the tribesmen should gather to bar the road to the capital. he resolved to fly from cabul, and commit himself to the protection of general roberts and his army. the day before general roberts arrived at kushi the ameer presented himself in baker's camp, accompanied by his eldest son and some of his sirdars, among whom was daoud shah the commander-in-chief of his army. sir frederick on his arrival at kushi paid a formal visit to the ameer, which the latter returned the same afternoon and took occasion to plead that the general should delay his advance. the reply was that not even for a single day would sir frederick defer his march on cabul. the ameer remained in camp, his personal safety carefully protected, but under a species of honourable surveillance, until it should be ascertained judicially whether or not he was implicated in the massacre of the mission. yakoub had intimated his intention of presenting himself in the british camp some days in advance of his arrival, and as telegraphic communication with headquarters was open, his acceptance in the character of an honoured guest was presumably in accordance with instructions from simla. the man who had made himself personally responsible for the safety of cavagnari's mission was a strange guest with an army whose avowed errand was to exact retribution for the crime of its destruction. it might seem not unreasonable to expect that, as an indispensable preliminary to his entertainment, he should have at least afforded some _prima facie_ evidence that he had been zealous to avert the fate which had befallen the mission, and stern in the punishment of an atrocity which touched him so nearly. but instead, he was taken on trust so fully that afghans resisting the british advance were not so much regarded as enemies resisting an invasion and as constructive vindicators of the massacre, as they were held traitors to their sovereign harbouring in the british camp. on the morning of october d the whole force marched from kushi toward cabul, temporarily cutting loose from communication with the shutargurdan, to avoid diminishing the strength of the column by leaving detachments to keep the road open. all told, roberts' army was the reverse of a mighty host. its strength was little greater than that of a prussian brigade on a war footing. its fate was in its own hands, for befall it what might it could hope for no timely reinforcement. it was a mere detachment marching against a nation of fighting men plentifully supplied with artillery, no longer shooting laboriously with jezails, but carrying arms of precision equal or little inferior to those in the hands of our own soldiery. but the men, europeans and easterns, hillmen of scotland and hillmen of nepaul, plainmen of hampshire and plainmen of the punjaub, strode along buoyant with confidence and with health, believing in their leader, in their discipline, in themselves. of varied race, no soldier who followed roberts but came of fighting stock; ever blithely rejoicing in the combat, one and all burned for the strife now before them with more than wonted ardour, because of the opportunity it promised to exact vengeance for a deed of foul treachery. the soldiers had not long to wait for the first fight of the campaign. on the afternoon of the th baker's brigade, with most of the cavalry and artillery, and with the d highlanders belonging to macpherson's brigade, camped on the plain to the south of the village of charasiah, macpherson remaining one march in rear to escort the convoy of ammunition and stores. north of charasiah rises a semicircular curtain of hills ascending in three successive tiers, the most distant and loftiest range closing in the horizon and shutting out the view of cabul, distant only about eleven miles. the leftward projection of the curtain, as one looks northward, comes down into the plain almost as far as and somewhat to the left of charasiah, dividing the valley of charasiah from the outer plain of chardeh. to the right front of charasiah, distant from it about three miles, the range is cleft by the rugged and narrow sung-i-nawishta pass, through which run the logur river and the direct road to cabul by beni hissar. information had been received that the afghans were determined on a resolute attempt to prevent the british force from reaching cabul, and the position beyond charasiah seemed so tempting that it was regarded as surprising that cavalry reconnaissances sent forward on three distinct roads detected no evidences of any large hostile gathering. but next morning 'showed another sight.' at dawn on the th general roberts, anxious to secure the sung-i-nawishta pass and to render the track through it passable for guns, sent forward his pioneer battalion with a wing of the d and two mountain guns. that detachment had gone out no great distance when the spectacle before it gave it pause. from the sung-i-nawishta defile, both sides of which were held, the semicircular sweep of the hill-crests was crowned by an afghan host in great strength and regular formation. according to subsequent information no fewer than thirteen regiments of the afghan regular army took part in the combat, as well as large contingents of irregular fighting men from cabul and the adjoining villages, while the british camp was threatened from the heights on either side by formidable bodies of tribesmen, to thwart whose obviously intended attack on it a considerable force had to be retained. the dispositions of the afghan commander nek mahomed khan were made with some tactical skill. the sung-i-nawishta pass itself, the heights on either side, and a low detached eminence further forward, were strongly held by afghan infantry; in the mouth of the pass were four armstrong guns, and on the flanking height twelve mountain guns were in position. the projecting spur toward charasiah which was the extreme right of the afghan position, was held in force, whence an effective fire would bear on the left flank of a force advancing to a direct attack on the pass. but roberts was not the man to play into the hands of the afghan tactician. he humoured his conception so far as to send forward on his right toward the pass, a small detachment of all arms under major white of the d, with instructions to maintain a threatening attitude in that direction, and to seize the opportunity to co-operate with the flanking movement entrusted to general baker as soon as its development should have shaken the constancy of the enemy. to baker with about infantry and four guns, was assigned the task of attacking the afghan right on the projecting spur and ridge, forcing back and dispersing that flank; and then, having reached the right of the afghan main position on the farthest and loftiest range, he was to wheel to his right and sweep its defenders from the chain of summits. baker moved out toward his left front against the eminences held by the afghan right wing, which nek mahomed, having discerned the character of roberts' tactics, was now reinforcing with great activity. the d highlanders led the attack, supported vigorously by the th goorkhas and the th punjaub infantry. the resistance of the afghans was stubborn, especially opposite our extreme left, whence from behind their sungahs on a steep hill they poured a heavy fire on the assailants. a yet heavier fire came from a detached knoll on baker's right, which the artillery fire gradually beat down. the afghans continued to hold the advanced ridge constituting their first position until two o'clock, when a direct attack, accompanied by a double flanking fire, compelled their withdrawal. they, however, fell back only to an intermediate loftier position about yards in rear of the ridge from which they had been driven. approached by successive rushes under cover-of artillery fire, they were then attacked vigorously and fell back in confusion. no rally was permitted them, and by three o'clock the whole afghan right was shattered and in full flight along the edge of the chardeh valley. baker unfortunately had no cavalry, else the fugitives would have suffered severely. but the rout of the afghan right had decided the fortune of the day. its defenders were already dribbling away from the main position when baker, wheeling to his right, marched along the lofty crest, rolling up and sweeping away the afghan defence as he moved toward the sung-i-nawishta gorge. that defile had already been entered by the cavalry of white's detachment, supported by some infantry. while baker had been turning the afghan right, white and his little force had been distinguishing themselves not a little. after an artillery preparation the detached hill had been won as the result of a hand-to-hand struggle. later had fallen into the hands of white's people all the afghan guns, and the heights to the immediate right and left of the gorge had been carried, the defenders driven away, and the pass opened up. but the progress through it of the cavalry was arrested by a strongly garrisoned fort completely commanding the road. on this fort baker directed his artillery fire, at the same time sending down two infantry regiments to clear away the remnants of the afghan army still lingering in the pass. this accomplished, the fighting ceased. it had been a satisfactory day. less than half of roberts' force had been engaged, and this mere brigade had routed the army of cabul and captured the whole of the artillery it had brought into the field. the afghan loss was estimated at about killed. the british loss was twenty killed and sixty-seven wounded. on the night of the combat part of baker's troops bivouacked beyond the sung-i-nawishta, and on the following day the whole division passed the defile and camped at beni hissar, within sight of the balla hissar and the lofty ridge overhanging cabul. on the afternoon of the th a violent explosion was heard in the beni hissar camp from the direction of the sherpur cantonment north of cabul, near the site of the british cantonments of - . next morning information came in that the sherpur magazine had been blown up, and that the cantonment had been abandoned by the afghan regiments which had garrisoned that vast unfinished structure. general massy led out part of his brigade on a reconnaissance, and took possession of the deserted sherpur cantonment, and of the seventy-five pieces of ordnance parked within the walls. massy had observed from the siah sung heights that the asmai heights, overhanging the cabul suburb of deh afghan, were held by a large body of afghan soldiery, a force, it was afterwards learned, composed of the remnants of the regiments defeated at charasiah, three fresh regiments from the kohistan, and the rabble of the city and adjacent villages, having a total strength of nearly men, with twelve guns, under the leadership of mahomed jan, who later was to figure prominently as the ablest of our afghan enemies. massy heliographed his information to general roberts, who sent baker with a force to drive the enemy from the heights; and massy was instructed to pass through a gap in the ridge and gain the chardeh valley, where he might find opportunity to intercept the afghan retreat toward the west. massy pierced the ridge at the village of aushar, and disposed his troops on the roads crossing the chardeh valley. meanwhile baker found the ascent of the sher derwaza heights so steep that the afternoon was far spent before his guns came into action, and it was still later before part of his infantry effected their descent into the chardeh valley. reinforcements necessary to enable him to act did not reach him until dusk, when it would have been folly to commit himself to an attack. a night patrol ascertained that the afghans had evacuated the position under cover of darkness, leaving behind their guns and camp equipage. on the th the divisional camp moved forward to the siah sung heights, a mile eastward from the balla hissar, and there it was joined by baker, and by massy, who on his way to camp led his wearied troopers through the city of cabul without mishap or insult. the goorkha regiment was detached to hold the ridge commanding the balla hissar, and a cavalry regiment was quartered in the sherpur cantonment to protect it from the ravages of the villagers. a melancholy interest attaches to the visit paid by sir frederick roberts to the balla hissar on the th. through the dirt and squalor of the lower portion he ascended the narrow lane leading to the ruin which a few weeks earlier had been the british residency. the commander of the avenging army looked with sorrowful eyes on the scene of heroism and slaughter, on the smoke-blackened walls, the blood splashes on the whitewashed walls, the still smouldering debris, the half-burned skulls and bones in the blood-dabbled chamber where apparently the final struggle had been fought out. he stood in the great breach in the quarters of the guides where the gate had been blown in after the last of the sorties made by the gallant hamilton, and lingered in the tattered wreck of poor cavagnari's drawing-room, its walls dinted with bullet-pits, its floor and walls brutally defiled. next day he made a formal entry into the balla hissar, his road lined with his staunch troops, a royal salute greeting the banner of britain as it rose on the tall flagstaff above the gateway. he held a durbar in the 'audience chamber' in the garden of the ameer's palace; in front and in flank of him the pushing throng of obsequious sirdars of cabul arrayed in all the colours of the rainbow; behind them, standing immobile at attention, the guard of british infantry with fixed bayonets which the soldiers longed to use. the general read the mild proclamation announcing the disarmament of the cabulese and the punishment of fine which was laid upon the city, but which never was exacted. and then he summarily dismissed the sirdars, three only, the mustaphi, yahuja khan the ameer's father-in-law, and zakariah khan his brother, being desired to remain. their smug complacency was suddenly changed into dismay when they were abruptly told that they were prisoners. another ceremonial progress the general had to perform. on the th he marched through the streets of cabul at the head of his little army, the bazaars and dead walls echoing to the music of the bands and the wild scream of the bagpipes. in the afghan quarter no salaams greeted the conquering feringhees, and scowling faces frowned on the spectacle from windows and side-streets. three days later occurred an event which might have been a great catastrophe. captain shafto of the ordnance was conducting an examination into the contents of the arsenal in the upper balla hissar, and had already discovered millions of cartridges, and about , lbs. of gunpowder. daoud shah, however, expressed his belief that at least a million pounds were in store. captain shafto, a very cautious man, was pursuing his researches; the goorkhas were quartered in the upper balla hissar near the magazine shed, and the th occupied the ameer's garden lower down. on the th a dull report was heard in the siah sung camp, followed immediately by the rising above the balla hissar of a huge column of grey smoke, which as it drifted away disclosed flashes of flame and sudden jets of smoke telling of repeated gunpowder explosions. the th, powdered with dust, escaped all but scathless; but the goorkha regiment had been heavily smitten. twelve poor fellows were killed, and seven wounded; among the former were five principal goorkha officers. the balla hissar was promptly evacuated. occasional explosions occurred for several days, the heaviest of those on the afternoon of the th, which threw on the city a great shower of stones, beams, and bullets. by a jet of stones blown out through the balla hissar gate four afghans were killed, and two sowars and an afghan badly hurt. captain shafto's body and the remains of the goorkhas were found later, and buried; and the determination was formed to have no more to do with the balla hissar, but to occupy the sherpur cantonment. meanwhile general hugh gough was despatched with a small force of all arms to escort to cabul money's gallant garrison of the shutargurdan, and to close for the winter the line of communication _via_ the kuram valley. colonel money had undergone with fine soldierly spirit and action not a few turbulent experiences since roberts had left him and his sikhs on the lofty crest of the shutargurdan. the truculent ghilzais gave him no peace; his method of dealing with them was for the most part with the bayonet point. the last attempt on him was made by a horde of ghilzais some , strong, who completely invested his camp, and after the civility of requesting him to surrender, a compliment which he answered by bullets, made a close and determined attack on his position. this was on the th october; on the following day gough heliographed his arrival at kushi, whereupon money took the offensive with vigour and scattered to the winds his ghilzai assailants. on th october the shutargurdan position was evacuated, and on the d november the cabul force received the welcome accession of headquarters and two squadrons th lancers, money's d sikhs, and four mountain guns. chapter iii: the lull before the storm sir frederick roberts had been hurried forward on cabul charged with the duty of avenging the perpetration of a foul and treacherous crime, 'which had brought indelible disgrace upon the afghan nation.' the scriptural injunction to turn the other cheek to the smiter has not yet become a canon of international law or practice; and the anti-climax to an expedition engaged in with so stern a purpose, of a nominal disarmament and a petty fine never exacted, is self-evident. our nation is given to walk in the path of precedent; and in this juncture the authorities had to their hand the most apposite of precedents. pollock, by destroying the char bazaar in which had been exposed the mangled remains of burnes and macnaghten, set a 'mark' on cabul the memory of which had lasted for decades. cavagnari and his people had been slaughtered in the balla hissar, and their bones were still mingled with the smouldering ruins of the residency. wise men discerned that the destruction of the fortress followed by a homeward march as swift yet as measured as had been the march of invasion, could not but have made a deep and lasting impression on the afghans; while the complications, humiliations, and expense of the long futile occupation would have been obviated. other counsels prevailed. to discover, in a nation virtually accessory as a whole after the fact to the slaughter of the mission, the men on whom lay the suspicion of having been the instigators and the perpetrators of the cruel deed, to accord them a fair trial, and to send to the gallows those on whose hands was found the blood of the massacred mission, was held a more befitting and not less telling course of retributive action than to raze the balla hissar and sow its site with salt. skilfully and patiently evidence was gathered, and submitted to the military commission which general roberts had appointed. this tribunal took cognisance of crimes nominally of two classes. it tried men who were accused of having been concerned in the destruction of the british mission, and those charged with treason in having offered armed resistance to the british troops acting in support of the ameer, who had put himself under their protection. of the five prisoners first tried, condemned, and duly hanged, two were signal criminals. one of them, the kotwal or mayor of cabul, was proved to have superintended the contumelious throwing of the bodies of the slaughtered guides of the mission escort into the ditch of the balla hissar. another was proved to have carried away from the wrecked residency a head believed to have been cavagnari's, and to have exhibited it on the ridge above the city. the other three and many of those who were subsequently executed, suffered for the crime of 'treason' against yakoub khan. probably there was no afghan who did not approve of the slaughter of the envoy, and who would not in his heart have rejoiced at the annihilation of the british force; but it seems strange law and stranger justice to hang men for 'treason' against a sovereign who had gone over to the enemy. on the curious expedient of temporarily governing in the name of an ameer who had deserted his post to save his skin, comment would be superfluous. executions continued; few, however, of the mutinous sepoys who actually took part in the wanton attack on the british residency had been secured, and it was judged expedient that efforts should be made to capture and punish those against whom there was evidence of that crime, in the shape of the muster-rolls of the regiments now in the possession of the military authorities. it was known that many of the disbanded and fugitive soldiers had returned to their homes in the villages around cabul, and early in november general baker took out a force and suddenly encircled the village of indikee, on the edge of the chardeh valley--a village reported full of afghan sepoys. a number of men were brought out by the scared headmen and handed over, answering to their names called over from a list carried by baker; and other villages in the vicinity yielded a considerable harvest of disbanded soldiers. before the commission the prisoners made no attempt to conceal their names, or deny the regiments to which they had belonged; and forty-nine of them were found guilty and hanged, nearly all of whom belonged to the regiments that had assailed the residency. on th november sir frederick roberts proclaimed an amnesty in favour of all who had fought against the british troops, on condition that they should surrender their arms and return to their homes; but exempted from the benefit were all concerned in the attack on the residency. the amnesty was well timed, although most people would have preferred that fewer sepoys and more sirdars should have been hanged. our relations with the ameer during the earlier part of his residence in the british camp were not a little peculiar. nominally he was our guest, and a certain freedom was accorded to him and his retinue. there was no doubt that the sirdars of the ameer's suite grossly abused their privileges. whether with yakoub khan's cognisance or not, they authorised the use of his name by the insurgent leaders. nek mahomed, the insurgent commander at charasiah, was actually in the tents of the ameer on the evening before the fight. to all appearance our operations continued to have for their ultimate object the restoration of yakoub khan to his throne. our administrative measures were carried on in his name. the hostile afghans we designated as rebels against his rule; and his authority was proclaimed as the justification of much of our conduct. but the situation gradually became intolerable to yakoub khan. he was a guest in the british camp, but he was also in a species of custody. should our arms reinstate him, he could not hope to hold his throne. his harassed perplexity came to a crisis on the morning of the th october, the day of general roberts' durbar in the balla hissar, which he had been desired to attend. what he specifically apprehended is unknown; what he did was to tell general roberts, with great excitement, that he would not go to the durbar, that his life was too miserable for long endurance, that he would rather be a grass-cutter in the british camp than remain ameer of afghanistan. he was firmly resolved to resign the throne, and begged that he might be allowed to do so at once. general roberts explained that the acceptance of his resignation rested not with him but with the viceroy, pending whose decision matters, the general desired, should remain as they were, affairs continuing to be conducted in the ameer's name as before. to this the ameer consented; his tents were moved to the vicinity of general roberts' headquarters, and a somewhat closer surveillance over him was maintained. secrecy meanwhile was preserved until the viceroy's reply should arrive. the nature of that reply was intimated by the proclamation which general roberts issued on the th october. it announced that the ameer had of his own free will abdicated his throne and left afghanistan without a government. 'the british government,' the proclamation continued, 'now commands that all afghan authorities, chiefs, and sirdars, do continue their functions in maintaining order ... the british government, after consultation with the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people.' this _ad interim_ assumption of the rulership of afghanistan may have been adopted as the only policy which afforded even a remote possibility of tranquillity. but it was essentially a policy of speculative makeshift. the retributive and punitive object of the swift march on cabul can scarcely be regarded as having been fulfilled by the execution of a number of subordinate participants and accessories in the destruction of the mission and by the voluntary abdication of yakoub khan. that the afghan 'authorities, chiefs, and sirdars,' would obey the command to 'maintain order' issued by the leader of a few thousand hostile troops, masters of little more than the ground on which they were encamped, experience and common sense seemed alike to render improbable. the afghans subordinated their internal quarrels to their common hatred of the masterful foreigners, and the desperate fighting of december proved how fiercely they were in earnest. yakoub khan had been regarded as merely a weak and unfortunate man, but the shadows gradually darkened around him until at length he came to be a man under grave suspicion. general roberts became satisfied from the results of the proceedings of the court of inquiry, that the attack on the residency, if not actually instigated by him, might at least have been checked by active exertion on his part. information was obtained which convinced the general that the ex-ameer was contemplating a flight toward turkestan, and it was considered necessary to place him in close confinement. he remained a close prisoner until december st. on the early morning of that day he was brought out from his tent, and after taking farewell of the general and his staff, started on his journey to peshawur, surrounded by a strong escort. if the hill tribes along his route had cared enough about him to attempt his rescue, the speed with which he travelled afforded them no time to gather for that purpose. during those uneventful october and november days, when the little army commanded by general roberts lay in its breezy camp on the siah sung heights, there was no little temptation for the unprofessional reader of the telegraphic information in the newspapers to hold cheap those reputedly formidable afghans, whose resistance a single sharp skirmish had seemingly scattered to the winds, and who were now apparently accepting without active remonstrance the dominance of the few thousand british bayonets glittering there serenely over against the once turbulent but now tamed hill capital. one may be certain that the shrewd and careful soldier who commanded that scant array did not permit himself to share in the facile optimism whether on the part of a government or of the casual reader of complacent telegrams. it was true that the government of india had put or was putting some , soldiers into the field on the apparent errand of prosecuting an afghan war. but what availed roberts this host of fighting men when he had to realise that, befall him what might in the immediate or near future, not a man of it was available to strengthen or to succour him? the quietude of those cool october days was very pleasant, but the chief knew well how precarious and deceitful was the calm. for the present the afghan unanimity of hostility was affected in a measure by the fact that the ameer, who had still a party, was voluntarily in the british camp. but when yakoub's abdication should be announced, he knew the afghan nature too well to doubt that the tribal blood-feuds would be soldered for the time, that dooranee and barakzai would strike hands, that afghan regulars and afghan irregulars would rally under the same standards, and that the fierce shouts of 'deen! deen!' would resound on hill-top and in plain. cut loose from any base, with slowly dwindling strength, with waning stock of ammunition, it was his part to hold his ground here for the winter, he and his staunch soldiers, a firm rock in the midst of those surging afghan billows that were certain to rise around him. not only would he withstand them, but he would meet them, for this bold man knew the value in dealing with afghans of a resolute and vigorous offensive. but it behoved him above all things to make timely choice of his winter quarters where he should collect his supplies and house his troops and the followers. after careful deliberation the sherpur cantonment was selected. it was overlarge for easy defence, but hard work, careful engineering, and steadfast courage would redeem that evil. and sherpur had the great advantage that besides being in a measure a ready-made defensive position, it had shelter for all the european troops and most of the native soldiery, and that it would accommodate also the horses of the cavalry, the transport animals, and all the needful supplies and stores. an afghan of the afghans, shere ali nevertheless had curiously failed to discern that the warlike strength of the nation which he ruled lay in its intuitive aptitude for irregular fighting; and he had industriously set himself to the effort of warping the combative genius of his people and of constituting afghanistan a military power of the regular and disciplined type. he had created a large standing army the soldiery of which wore uniforms, underwent regular drill, obeyed words of command, and carried arms of precision. he had devoted great pains to the manufacture of a formidable artillery, and what with presents from the british government and the imitative skill of native artificers he was possessed at the outbreak of hostilities of several hundred cannon. his artisans were skillful enough to turn out in large numbers very fair rifled small-arms, which they copied from british models; and in the balla hissar magazine were found by our people vast quantities of gunpowder and of admirable cartridges of local manufacture. there were many reasons why the cabul division of shere ali's army should be quartered apart from his turbulent and refractory capital, and why its cantonment should take the form of a permanent fortified camp, in which his soldiers might be isolated from cabul intrigues, while its proximity to the capital should constitute a standing menace to the conspirators of the city. his original design apparently was to enclose the behmaroo heights within the walls of his cantonment, and thus form a great fortified square upon the heights in the centre of which should rise a strong citadel dominating the plain in every direction. the sherpur cantonment as found by roberts consisted of a fortified enciente, enclosing on two sides a great open space in the shape of a parallelogram lying along the southern base of the behmaroo heights. when the british troops took possession, only the west and south faces of the enciente were completed; although not long built those were already in bad repair, and the explosion of the great magazine when the afghan troops abandoned the cantonment had wrecked a section of the western face. the eastern face had been little more than traced, and the northern side had no artificial protection, but was closed in by the behmaroo heights, whose centre was cleft by a broad and deep gorge. the design of the enciente was peculiar. there was a thick and high exterior wall of mud, with a banquette for infantry protected by a parapet. inside this wall was a dry ditch forty feet wide, on the inner brink of which was the long range of barrack-rooms. along the interior front of the barrack-rooms was a verandah faced with arches supported by pillars, its continuity broken occasionally by broad staircases conducting to the roof of the barracks, which afforded a second line of defence. the closing in of the verandah would of course give additional barrack accommodation, but there were quarters in the barrack-rooms for at least all the european troops. in the southern face of the enciente were three gateways, and in the centre of the western face there was a fourth, each gate covered adequately by a curtain. between each gate were semicircular bastions for guns. in the interior there was space to manoeuvre a division of all arms. there was a copious supply of water, and if the aspect of the great cantonment was grim because of the absence of trees and the utter barrenness of the enclosed space, this aesthetic consideration went for little against its manifest advantages as snug and defensible winter quarters. shere ali had indeed been all unconsciously a friend in need to the british force wintering in the heart of that unfortunate potentate's dominions. human nature is perverse and exacting, and there were those who objurgated his memory because he had constructed his cantonment a few sizes too large to be comfortably defended by sir frederick roberts' little force. but this was manifestly unreasonable; and in serious truth the sherpur cantonment was a real godsend to our people. supplies of all kinds were steadily being accumulated there, and the woodwork of the houses in the balla hissar was being carried to sherpur for use as firewood. on the last day of october the force quitted the siah sung position and took possession of sherpur, which had undergone a rigorous process of fumigation and cleansing. the change was distinctly for the better. the force was compacted, and the routine military duties were appreciably lightened since there were needed merely piquets on the behmaroo heights and sentries on the gates; the little army was healthy, temperate, and in excellent case in all respects. the dispositions for field service made at the outset of the campaign by the military authorities have already been detailed. regarded simply as dispositions they left nothing to be desired, and certainly sir frederick roberts' force had been organised and equipped with a fair amount of expedition. but it was apparent that the equipment of that body of men--and that equipment by no means of an adequate character, had exhausted for the time the resources of the government as regarded transport and supplies. promptitude of advance on the part of the force to which had been assigned the line of invasion by the khyber-jellalabad route, was of scarcely less moment than the rapidity of the stroke which roberts was commissioned to deliver. the former's was a treble duty. one of its tasks was to open up and maintain roberts' communications with india, so that the closing of the shutargurdan should not leave him isolated. another duty resting on the khyber force was to constitute for roberts a ready and convenient reserve, on which he might draw when his occasions demanded. no man could tell how soon after the commencement of his invasion that necessity might arise; it was a prime _raison d'être_ of the khyber force to be in a position to give him the hand when he should intimate a need for support. yet again, its presence in the passes dominantly thrusting forward, would have the effect of retaining the eastern tribes within their own borders, and hindering them from joining an offensive combination against the little force with which roberts was to strike at cabul. but delay on delay marked the mobilisation and advance of the troops operating in the khyber line. there was no lack of earnestness anywhere; the eagerness to push on was universal from the commander to the corporal. but the barren hills and rugged passes could furnish no supplies; the base had to furnish everything, and there was nothing at the base, neither any accumulation of supplies nor means to transport supplies if they had been accumulated. weeks elapsed before the organisation of the force approached completion, and it was only by a desperate struggle that general charles gough's little brigade received by the end of september equipment sufficient to enable that officer to advance by short marches. roberts was holding his durbar in the balla hissar of cabul on the day that the head of gough's advance reached jellalabad. no man can associate the idea of dawdling with jenkins and his guides, yet the guides reaching jellalabad on october th were not at gundamuk until the d, and gundamuk is but thirty miles beyond jellalabad. the anti-climax for the time of general bright's exertions occurred on november th. on that day he with gough's brigade reached so far cabulward as kutti sung, two marches beyond gundamuk. there he met general macpherson of roberts' force, who had marched down from cabul with his brigade on the errand of opening communications with the head of the khyber column. the two brigades had touch of each other for the period of an interview between the generals, and then they fell apart and the momentary union of communication was disrupted. general bright had to fall back toward gundamuk for lack of supplies. the breach continued open only for a few days, and then it was closed, not from down country but from up country. roberts, surveying the rugged country to the east of cabul, had discerned that the hill road toward jugdulluk by luttabund, was at once opener and shorter than the customary tortuous and overhung route through the khoord cabul pass and by tezeen. the pioneers were set to work to improve the former. the luttabund road became the habitual route along which, from cabul downwards, were posted detachments maintaining the communications of the cabul force with the khyber column and india. nearly simultaneous with this accomplishment was the accordance to sir frederick roberts of the local rank of lieutenant-general, a promotion which placed him in command of all the troops in eastern afghanistan down to jumrood, and enabled him to order up reinforcements from the khyber column at his discretion, a power he refrained from exercising until the moment of urgent need was impending. after his interview at kutti sung with general bright, macpherson, before returning to cabul, made a short reconnaissance north of the cabul river toward the lughman valley and into the tagao country inhabited by the fanatic tribe of the safis. from his camp at naghloo a foraging party, consisting of a company of the th escorting a number of camels and mules, moved westward toward a village near the junction of the panjshir and cabul rivers, there to obtain supplies of grain and forage. the little detachment on its march was suddenly met by the fire of about sari tribesmen. captain poole, observing that the tribesmen were moving to cut him off, withdrew his party through a defile in his rear, and taking cover under the river bank maintained a steady fire while the camels were being retired. the safis were extremely bold and they too shot very straight. captain poole was severely wounded and of his handful of fifty-six men eight were either killed or wounded, but their comrades resolutely held their position until reinforcements came out from the camp. the safis, who retired with dogged reluctance, were not finally routed until attacked by british infantry in front and flank. after they broke the cavalry pursued them for six miles, doing severe execution; the dead of the th were recovered, but the poor fellows had been mutilated almost past recognition. general macpherson returned to sherpur on the th november, having left a strong garrison temporarily at luttabund to strengthen communications and open out effectually the new route eastward. general roberts, with all his exertions, had been unable to accumulate sufficient winter of grain for his native troops and forage for his cavalry and baggage animals. agents had been purchasing supplies in the fertile district of maidan, distant from cabul about twenty-five miles in the ghuznee direction, but the local people lacked carriage to convey their stocks into camp, and it was necessary that the supplies should be brought in by the transport of the force. the country toward ghuznee was reported to be in a state of disquiet, and a strong body of troops was detailed under the command of general baker for the protection of the transport. this force marched out from sherpur on november st, and next day camped on the edge of the pleasant maidan plain. baker encountered great difficulties in collecting supplies. the villages readily gave in their tribute of grain and forage, but evinced extreme reluctance to furnish the additional quantities which our necessities forced us to requisition. with the villagers it was not a question of money; the supplies for which baker's commissaries demanded money in hand constituted their provision for the winter season. but the stern maxim of war is that soldiers must live although villagers starve, and this much may be said in our favour that we are the only nation in the world which, when compelled to resort to forced requisitions, invariably pays in hard cash and not in promissory notes. baker's ready-money tariff was far higher than the current rates, but nevertheless he had to resort to strong measures. in one instance he was defied outright. a certain bahadur khan inhabiting a remote valley in the bamian direction, refused to sell any portion of his great store of grain and forage, and declined to comply with a summons to present himself in baker's camp. it was known that he was under the influence of the aged fanatic moulla the mushk-i-alum, who was engaged in fomenting a tribal rising, and it was reported that he was affording protection to a number of the fugitive sepoys of the ex-ameer's army. a political officer with two squadrons of cavalry was sent to bring into camp the recalcitrant bahadur khan. his fort and village were found prepared for a stubborn defence. received with a heavy fire from a large body of men while swarms of hostile tribesmen showed themselves on the adjacent hills, the horsemen had to withdraw. it was judged necessary to punish the contumacious chief and to disperse the tribal gathering before it should make more head, and baker led out a strong detachment in light marching order. there was no fighting, and the only enemies seen were a few tribesmen, who drew off into the hills as the head of baker's column approached. fort, villages, and valley were found utterly deserted. there were no means to carry away the forage and grain found in the houses, so the villages belonging to bahadur khan were destroyed by fire. their inhabitants found refuge in the surrounding villages, and there was absolutely no foundation for the statements which appeared in english papers to the effect that old men, women, and children were turned out to die in the snow. in the words of mr hensman, a correspondent who accompanied the column: 'there were no old men, women, and children, and there was no snow.' british officers cannot be supposed to have found pleasure, on the verge of the bitter afghan winter, in the destruction of the hovels and the winter stores of food belonging to a number of miserable villagers; but experience has proved that only by such stern measures is there any possibility of cowing the rancour of afghan tribesmen. no elation can accompany an operation so pitiless, and the plea of stern necessity must be advanced alike and accepted with a shudder. of the necessity of some such form of reprisals an example is afforded in an experience which befell general baker a few days later in this same maidan region. he visited the village of beni-badam with a small cavalry escort. the villagers with every demonstration of friendliness entertained the officers and men with milk and fruit, and provided corn and forage for their horses. there were only old men in the village with the women and children, but no treachery was suspected until suddenly two large bodies of armed men were seen hurrying to cut off the retreat, and it was only by hard fighting that the general with his escort succeeded in escaping from the snare. next day he destroyed the village. baker probably acted on general principles, but had he cared for precedents he would have found them in the conduct of the germans in the franco-prussian war. he remained in the maidan district until the transport of the army had brought into sherpur all the supplies which he had succeeded in obtaining in that region, and then returned to the cantonment. by the terms of the proclamation which he issued on the th october sir frederick roberts was announced as the dominant authority for the time being in eastern and northern afghanistan. he occupied this position just as far as and no further than he could make it good. and he could make it good only over a very circumscribed area. even more than had been true of shah soojah's government forty years previously was it true of roberts' government now that it was a government of sentry-boxes. he was firm master of the sherpur cantonment. general hills, his nominee, held a somewhat precarious sway in cabul in the capacity of its governor, maintaining his position there in virtue of the bayonets of his military guard, the support of the adjacent sherpur, and the waiting attitude of the populace of the capital. east of cabul the domination of britain was represented by a series of fortified posts studding the road to gundamuk, whence to jumrood the occupation was closer, although not wholly undisturbed. when a column marched out from sherpur the british power was dominant only within the area of its fire zone. the stretch of road it vacated as it moved on ceased to be territory over which the british held dominion. this narrowly restricted nature of his actual sway sir frederick roberts could not but recognise, but how with a force of men all told was it possible for him to enlarge its borders? one expedient suggested itself which could not indeed extend the area of his real power, but which might have the effect, to use a now familiar expression, of widening the sphere of his influence. from among the sirdars who had regarded it as their interest to cast in their lot with the british, he selected four to represent him in the capacity of governors of provinces which his bayonets were not long enough to reach. the experiment made it disagreeably plain that the people of the provinces to which he had deputed governors were utterly indisposed to have anything to do either with them or with him. the governors went in no state, they had no great sums to disburse, they were protected by no armed escorts, and they were regarded by the natives much as the southern states of the american union after the civil war regarded the 'carpet bag' governors whom the north imposed upon them. the logur governor was treated with utter contempt. the kohistanees despitefully used shahbaz khan, and when a brother of yakoub khan was sent to use his influence in favour of the worried and threatened governor, he was reviled as a 'kafir' and a 'feringhee,' and ordered peremptorily back to sherpur if he had any regard for his life. sirdar wali mahomed, the governor-nominate to the remote turkestan, found pretext after pretext for delaying to proceed to take up his functions, and had never quitted the british camp. when baker returned from maidan he reported that he had left the district peaceful in charge of the governor whom he had installed, the venerable and amiable hassan khan. baker's rear-guard was scarcely clear of the valley when a mob of tribesmen and sepoys attacked the fort in which the old sirdar was residing, shot him through the head, and then hacked his body to pieces. it was too clear that governors unsupported by bayonets, and whose only weapons were tact and persuasiveness, were at an extreme discount in the condition which afghanistan presented in the end of november and the beginning of december. chapter iv: the december storm the invader of afghanistan may count as inevitable a national rising against him, but the afghans are a people so immersed in tribal quarrels and domestic blood feuds that the period of the outbreak is curiously uncertain. the british force which placed shah soojah on the throne and supported him there, was in afghanistan for more than two years before the waves of the national tempest rose around it. the national combination against roberts' occupation was breaking its strength against the sherpur defences while as yet the cabul field force had not been within sight of the capital for more than two months. there seems no relation between opportunity and the period of the inevitable outburst. if in november the cabul sirdars had restrained themselves for a few days longer two more regiments would have been following on sale's track, and the british force in the cantonments would have been proportionately attenuated. roberts might have been assailed with better chance of success when his force was dispersed between the siah sung camp, the balla hissar, and sherpur, than when concentrated in the strong defensive position against which the afghans beat in vain. perhaps the rising ripened faster in than in because in the former period no macnaghten fomented intrigues and scattered gold. perhaps shere ali's military innovations may have instilled into the masses of his time some rough lessons in the art and practice of speedy mobilisation. the crowning disgrace of was that a trained army of regular soldiers should have been annihilated by a few thousand hillmen, among whom there was no symptom either of real valour or of good leadership. to roberts and his force attaches the credit of having defeated the persistent and desperate efforts of levies at least ten times superior in numbers, well armed, far from undisciplined, courageous beyond all experience of afghan nature, and under the guidance of a leader who had some conception of strategy, and who certainly was no mean tactician. in the afghan idiosyncrasy there is a considerable strain of practical philosophy. the blood of the massacred mission was not dry when it was recognised in cabul that stern retribution would inevitably follow. well, said the afghans among themselves, what must be must be, for they are all fatalists. the seniors recalled the memory of the retribution pollock exacted--how he came, destroyed istalif, set a 'mark' on cabul by sending the great bazaar in fragments into the air, and then departed. this time istalif was not compromised; if roberts sahib should be determined to blow up the char chowk again, why, that infliction must be endured. it had been rebuilt after pollock sahib's engineers had worked their will on it; it could be rebuilt a second time when roberts sahib should have turned his back on the city, as pray god and the prophet he might do with no more delay than pollock sahib had made out yonder on the logur plain. so after a trial of roberts' mettle at charasiah, and finding the testing sample not quite to their taste, the afghans fell into an attitude of expectancy, and were mightily relieved by his proclamation read at the balla hissar durbar of october th. after a reasonable amount of hanging and the exaction of the fine laid on the city, it was assumed that he would no doubt depart so as to get home to india before the winter snows should block the passes. but the expected did not happen. the british general established a british governor in cabul who had a heavy hand, and policed the place in a fashion that stirred a lurid fury in the bosoms of haughty sirdars who had been wont to do what seemed good in their own eyes. he engaged in the sacrilegious work of dismantling the balla hissar, the historic fortress of the nation, within whose walls were the royal palace and the residences of the principal nobles. those were bitter things, but they could be borne if they were mere temporary inflictions, and if the hated feringhees would but take themselves away soon. but that hope was shattered by the proclamation of october th, when the abdication of the ameer was intimated and the british _raj_ in afghanistan was announced. yes, that pestilent _zabardasti_ little general, who would not follow the example of good old pollock sahib, and who held yakoub khan and sundry of his sirdars in close imprisonment in his camp, had now the insolence to proclaim himself virtually the ameer of afghanistan! far from showing symptom of budging, he was sending out his governors into the provinces, he was gathering tribute in kind, and he had taken possession of shere ali's monumental cantonment, under the shadow of the behmaroo heights on which afghan warriors of a past generation had slaughtered the feringhee soldiers as if they had been sheep; and it was the feringhee general's cantonment now, which he was cunningly strengthening as if he meant to make it his permanent fortress. yakoub khan had gained little personal popularity during his brief and troubled reign, but he was an afghan and a mahomedan; and his deportation to india, followed shortly afterwards by that of his three ministers, intensified the rancour of his countrymen and co-religionists against the handful of presumptuous foreigners who arrogantly claimed to sway the destinies of afghanistan. _cherchez la femme_ is the keynote among western peoples of an investigation into the origin of most troubles and strifes; the watchword of the student of the springs of great popular outbursts among eastern nations must be _cherchez les prêtres_. the peter the hermit of afghanistan was the old mushk-i-alum, the fanatic chief moulla of ghuznee. this aged enthusiast went to and fro among the tribes proclaiming the sacred duty of a _jehad_ or religious war against the unbelieving invaders, stimulating the pious passions of the followers of the prophet by fervent appeals, enjoining the chiefs to merge their intestine strifes in the common universal effort to crush the foreign invaders of the afghan soil. the female relatives of the abdicated ameer fomented the rising by appeals to popular sympathy, and by the more practical argument of lavish distribution of treasure. the flame spread, tribesmen and disbanded soldiers sprang to arms, the banner of the prophet was unfurled, and the nation heaved with the impulse of fanaticism. musa khan, the boy heir of yakoub, was in the hands of the mushk-i-alum, and the combination of fighting tribes found a competent leader in mahomed jan, a warduk general of proved courage and capacity. the plan of campaign was comprehensive and well devised. the contingent from the country to the south of the capital, from logur, zurmat, and the mangal and jadran districts, was to seize that section of the cabul ridge extending from charasiah northward to the cleft through which flows the cabul river. the northern contingent from the kohistan and kohdaman was to occupy the asmai heights and the hills further to the north-west; while the troops from the maidan and warduk territories, led by mahomed jan in person, were to come in from the westward across the chardeh valley, take possession of cabul, and rally to their banners the disaffected population of the capital and the surrounding villages. the concentration of the three bodies effected, the capital and the ridge against which it leans occupied, the next step would be the investment of the sherpur cantonment, preparatory to an assault upon it in force. the british general through his spies had information of those projects. to allow the projected concentration to be effected would involve serious disadvantages, and both experience and temperament enjoined on roberts the offensive. the logur contingent was regarded as not of much account, and might be headed back by a threat. mahomed jan's force, which was reckoned some strong, needed to be handled with greater vigour. meer butcha and his kohistanees were less formidable, and might be dealt with incidentally. roberts took a measure of wise precaution in telegraphing to colonel jenkins on the th december to march his guides (cavalry and infantry) from jugdulluk to sherpur. on the th general macpherson was sent out toward the west with a column consisting of bayonets, three squadrons, and eight guns. following the ghuznee road across the chardeh valley, he was to march to urgundeh, in the vicinity of which place it was expected that he would find mahomed jan's levies, which he was to attack and drive backward on maidan, taking care to prevent their retreat to the westward in the direction of bamian. on the following day general baker marched out with a force made up of infantrymen, two and a half squadrons, and four guns, with instructions to march southward toward the logur valley, deal with the tribal gathering there, then bend sharply in a south-westerly direction and take up a position across the ghuznee road in the maidan valley on the line of retreat which it was hoped that macpherson would succeed in enforcing on mahomed jan. in that case the afghan leader would find himself between two fires, and would be punished so severely as to render it unlikely that he would give further trouble. to afford time for baker to reach the position assigned to him macpherson remained halted during the th at aushar, a village just beyond the debouche of the nanuchee pass, at the north-western extremity of the asmai heights. on that day a cavalry reconnaissance discovered that the kohistanee levies in considerable strength had already gathered about karez meer, some ten miles north-west of cabul, and that masses of afghans presumably belonging to the force of mahomed jan were moving northward in the kohistan direction, apparently with the object of joining meer butcha's gathering at karez. it was imperative that the latter should be dispersed before the junction could be effected, and sir frederick roberts had no option but to order macpherson to alter his line of advance and move against the kohistanees. necessary as was this divergence from the original plan of operation, it had the effect of sending to wreck the combined movement from which so much was hoped, and of bringing about a very critical situation. if lockhart's reconnaissance had been made a day earlier, macpherson might probably have utilised to good purpose by dispersing the kohistanees, the day which as it was he spent halted at aushar. he might have accomplished that object equally well if, instead of the cavalry reconnaissance made by lockhart, macpherson himself had been instructed to devote the th to a reconnaissance in force in the direction of karez meer. [illustration: map of cabul and surroundings.] the country being held unsuited for the action of wheeled artillery and cavalry, macpherson left his details of those arms at aushar, and marched on the morning of the th on karez with his infantry and mountain guns. as his troops crowned the surkh kotul they saw before them an imposing spectacle. the whole terrain around karez swarmed with masses of armed tribesmen, whose banners were flying on every hillock. down in the pughman valley to the left rear, were discerned bodies of the hostile contingent from the west, between which and the kohistanees no junction had fortunately as yet been made. macpherson's dispositions were simple. his mountain guns shelled with effect the kohistanee tribesmen, and then he moved forward from the surkh kotul in three columns. his skirmishers drove back the forward stragglers, and then the main columns advancing at the double swept the disordered masses before them, and forced them rearward into their intrenched position in front of the karez village. there the resistance was half-hearted. after a brief artillery preparation the columns carried the position with a rush, and the kohistanees were routed with heavy loss. meer butcha and his kohistanees well beaten, macpherson camped for the night near karez. baker had reached his assigned position in the maidan valley, and there seemed a fair prospect that the operation against mahomed jan as originally designed might be carried out notwithstanding the interruption to its prosecution which had been found necessary. for there was good reason to believe that the afghan commander and his force, whose strength was estimated at about men, were in the vicinity of urgundeh, about midway between macpherson at karez and baker in the maidan valley. if mahomed jan would be so complaisant as to remain where he was until macpherson could reach him, then roberts' strategy would have a triumphant issue, and the warduk general and his followers might be relegated to the category of negligable quantities. orders were sent to macpherson to march as early as possible on the morning of the th, follow up the enemy who had been observed retiring toward the west and south, and endeavour to drive them down toward general baker. he was further informed that the cavalry and horse-artillery which he had left at aushar would leave that village at nine a.m. under the command of brigadier-general massy, and would cross the chardeh valley by the urgundeh road, on which he was directed to join them on his march. the specific instructions given to general massy were as follows: 'to advance from aushar by the road leading directly from the city of cabul toward urgundeh and ghuznee' (the main ghuznee road), 'to proceed cautiously and quietly feeling for the enemy, to communicate with general macpherson, and to act in conformity with that officer's movements, but on no account to commit himself to an action until general macpherson had engaged the enemy.' macpherson marched at eight a.m., moving in a south-westerly direction toward urgundeh by a direct track in rear of the range of hills bounding the western edge of the chardeh valley. to the point at which it was probable that he and massy should meet he had considerably further to travel than had the latter from the aushar camp, and macpherson's force consisted of infantry while that of massy was cavalry and horse-artillery. massy left aushar at nine a.m. in consideration of the shorter distance he had to traverse, and he headed for killa kazee, a village near the foothills of the western ridge about four miles from aushar as the crow flies. he did not comply with the letter of his instructions to follow the ghuznee road because of the wide detour marching by it would have involved, but instead made his way straight across country. that he should have done this was unfortunate, since the time he thus gained threw him forward into a position involving danger in advance of any possible co-operation on the part of macpherson, who was still far away from the point of intended junction while massy was comparatively near it. massy's force consisted of two squadrons th lancers and a troop of th bengal lancers, escorting four horse-artillery guns. he had detached a troop of th lancers to endeavour to open communication with macpherson, in compliance with his instructions. as he approached killa kazee, captain gough commanding the troop of th lancers forming the advance guard, sent back word that the hills on either side of the ghuznee road some distance beyond the village were occupied by the enemy in considerable force. massy, in his unsupported condition and destitute of any information as to macpherson's whereabouts, would have shown discretion by halting on receipt of this intelligence pending further developments. but he probably believed that the afghans flanking the road were casual tribesmen from the adjacent villages who were unlikely to make any stand, and he determined to move on. what he presently saw gave him pause. a great mass of afghans some strong were forming across the ghuznee road. from the hills to right and left broad streams of armed men were pouring down the hillslopes and forming on the plain. the surprise was complete, the situation full of perplexity. that gathering host in massy's front could be none other than mahomed jan's entire force. so far from being in retreat southward and westward, so far from waiting supinely about urgundeh until macpherson as per programme should drive it on to the muzzles of baker's martinis, here it was inside our guard, in possession of the interior line, its front facing toward turbulent cabul and depleted sherpur, with no obstruction in its path save this handful of lancers and these four guns! massy's orders, it was true, were to act in conformity with macpherson's movements, and on no account to commit himself to an action until that officer had engaged the enemy. yes, but could the framer of those orders have anticipated the possibility of such a position as that in which massy now found himself? there was no macpherson within ken of the perplexed cavalryman, nor the vaguest indication of his movements. the enemy had doubled on that stout and shrewd soldier; it was clear that for the moment he was not within striking distance of his foe, whether on flank or on rear. no course of action presented itself to massy that was not fraught with grave contingencies. if he should keep to the letter of his orders, the afghan host might be in cabul in a couple of hours. should he retire slowly, striving to retard the afghan advance by his cannon fire and by the threatening demonstrations of his cavalry, the enemy might follow him up so vigorously as to be beyond macpherson's reach when that officer should make good his point in the direction of urgundeh. if on the other hand he should show a bold front, and departing from his orders in the urgent crisis face to face with which he found himself should strain every nerve to 'hold' the afghan masses in their present position, there was the possibility that, at whatever sacrifice to himself and his little force, he might save the situation and gain time for macpherson to come up and strike mahomed jan on flank and in rear. for better or for worse massy committed himself to the rasher enterprise, and opened fire on the swiftly growing afghan masses. the first range was held not sufficiently effective, and in the hope by closer fire of deterring the enemy from effecting the formation they were attempting, the guns were advanced to the shorter ranges of and yards. the shells did execution, but contrary to precedent did not daunt the afghans. they made good their formation under the shell fire. mahomed jan's force had been estimated of about strong; according to massy's estimate it proved to be double that number. the array was well led; it never wavered, but came steadily on with waving banners and loud shouts. the guns had to be retired; they came into action again, but owing to the rapidity of the afghan advance at shorter range than before. the carbine fire of thirty dismounted lancers 'had no appreciable effect.' the outlook was already ominous when at this moment sir frederick roberts came on the scene. as was his wont, he acted with decision. the action, it was clear to him, could not be maintained against odds so overwhelming and in ground so unfavourable. he immediately ordered massy to retire slowly, to search for a road by which the guns could be withdrawn, and to watch for an opportunity to execute a charge under cover of which the guns might be extricated. he despatched an aide-de-camp in quest of macpherson, with an order directing that officer to wheel to his left into the chardeh valley and hurry to massy's assistance; and he ordered general hills to gallop to sherpur and warn general hugh gough, who had charge in the cantonment, to be on the alert, and also to send out at speed a wing of the d to the village of deh mazung, in the throat of the gorge of the cabul river, which the highlanders were to hold to extremity. the enemy were coming on, the guns were in imminent danger, and the moment had come for the action of the cavalry. the gallant cleland gave the word to his lancers and led them straight for the centre of the afghan line, the troop of bengal lancers following in support. gough, away on the afghan left, saw his chief charging and he eagerly 'conformed,' crushing in on the enemy's flank at the head of his troop. 'self-sacrifice' the germans hold the duty of cavalry; and there have been few forlorner hopes than the errand on which on this ill-starred day our troopers rode into the heart of , afghans flushed with unwonted good fortune. through the dust-cloud of the charge were visible the flashes of the afghan volleys and the sheen of the british lance heads as they came down to the 'engage.' there was a short interval of suspense, the stour and bicker of the _mêlée_ faintly heard, but invisible behind the bank of smoke and dust. then from out the cloud of battle riderless horses came galloping back, followed by broken groups of troopers. gallantly led home, the charge had failed--what other result could have been expected? its career had been blocked by sheer weight of opposing numbers. sixteen troopers had been killed, seven were wounded, two officers had been slain in the hand-to-hand strife. cleland came out with a sword cut and a bullet wound. captain stewart mackenzie had been crushed under his fallen horse, but distinguished himself greatly, and brought the regiment out of action. as the dust settled it was apparent that the charge had merely encouraged the enemy, who as they steadily pressed on in good order, were waving their banners in triumph and brandishing their tulwars and knives. the fire from the sniders and enfields of their marksmen was well directed and deliberate. while cleland's broken troopers were being rallied two guns were brought into action, protected in a measure by gough's troop and the detachment of bengal lancers, which had not suffered much in the charge. but the afghans came on so ardently that there was no alternative but prompt retreat. one gun had to be spiked and abandoned, lieutenant hardy of the horse artillery remaining by it until surrounded and killed. some yards further back, near the village of baghwana, the three remaining guns stuck fast in a deep watercourse. at general roberts' instance a second charge was attempted, to give time for their extrication; but it made no head, so that the guns had to be abandoned, and the gunners and drivers with their teams accompanied the retirement of the cavalry. some fugitives both of cavalry and artillery hurried to the shelter of the cantonment somewhat precipitately; but the great majority of massy's people behaved well, rallying without hesitation and constituting the steady and soldierly little body with which roberts, retiring on deh mazung as slowly as possible to give time for the highlanders from sherpur to reach that all-important point, strove to delay the afghan advance. this in a measure was accomplished by the dismounted fire of the troopers, and the retirement was distinguished by the steady coolness displayed by cough's men and neville's bengal lancers. deh mazung was reached, but no highlanders had as yet reached that place. the carbines of the cavalrymen were promptly utilised from the cover the village afforded; but they could not have availed to stay the afghan rush. there was a short interval of extreme anxiety until the men of the d, brownlow leading them, became visible advancing at the double through the gorge. 'it was literally touch and go who should reach the village first, the highlanders or the afghans,' who were streaming toward it 'like ants on a hill,' but the men of the d swept in, and swarming to the house tops soon checked with their breechloaders the advancing tide. after half-an-hour of futile effort the afghans saw fit to abandon the attempt to force the gorge, and inclining to their right they occupied the takht-i-shah summit, the slopes of the sher derwaza heights, and the villages in the south-eastern section of the chardeh valley. macpherson, marching from the surkh kotul toward urgundeh, had observed parties of afghans crossing his front in the direction of the chardeh valley, and when the sound reached him of massy's artillery fire he wheeled to his left through a break in the hills opening into the chardeh valley, and approached the scene of the discomfiture of massy's force. this he did at . p.m., four and a half hours after leaving the surkh kotul. as the length of his march was about ten miles, it may be assumed that he encountered difficulties in the rugged track by which he moved, for macpherson was not the man to linger by the way when there was the prospect of a fight. had it been possible for him to have marched two hours earlier than he did--and his orders were to march as early as possible--his doing so would have made all the difference in the world to massy, and could scarcely have failed to change the face of the day. he did not discover the lost guns, but he struck the afghan rear, which was speedily broken and dispersed by the th and d sikhs. macpherson's intention to spend the night at killa kazee was changed by the receipt of an order from general roberts calling him in to deh mazung, where he arrived about nightfall. sir frederick roberts then returned to sherpur, for the defence of which general hugh gough had made the best dispositions in his power, and the slender garrison of which was to receive in the course of the night an invaluable accession in the shape of the guides, strong, whom jenkins had brought up by forced marches from jugdulluk. the misfortunes of the day were in a measure retrieved by a well-timed, ready-witted, and gallant action on the part of that brilliant and lamented soldier colonel macgregor. a wing of the d had been called out to hold the gorge of the cabul river, but the nanuchee pass, through which led the direct road from the scene of the combat to sherpur, remained open; and there was a time when the afghan army was heading in its direction. macgregor had hurried to the open pass in time to rally about him a number of massy's people, who had lost their officers and were making their way confusedly toward the refuge of sherpur. remaining in possession of this important point until all danger was over, he noticed that the ground about bagwana, where the guns had been abandoned, was not held by the enemy, and there seemed to him that the opportunity to recover them presented itself. taking with him a detachment of lancers and artillerymen, he rode out and met with no molestation beyond a few shots from villagers. from macpherson's baggage guard, met as it crossed the valley toward sherpur, he requisitioned sixty infantrymen who entered and held bagwana, and covered him and the gunners during the long and arduous struggle to extricate the guns from their lair in the deep and rugged watercourse. this was at length accomplished, scratch teams were improvised, and the guns, which were uninjured although the ammunition boxes had been emptied, were brought into the cantonment to the general joy. the result of the day's operations left general baker momentarily belated. but on the morning of the th that officer, finding that no afghans were being driven down upon him in accordance with the programme, quitted the maidan country and marched northward toward urgundeh. an attack on his baggage and rearguard was foiled; but as he reached his camping ground for the night at urgundeh the afghans were found in possession of the gorge opening into the chardeh valley, through which ran his road to cabul. they were dislodged by a dashing attack of part of the g d highlanders led by lieutenant scott napier. it was not until the morning of the th that baker was informed by heliograph from sherpur of the occurrences of the previous day, and received directions to return to the cantonment without delay. in the course of a few hours he was inside sherpur, notwithstanding that his march had been constantly molested by attacks on his rear-guard. the casualties of the th had been after all not very serious. all told they amounted to thirty men killed and forty-four wounded; fifty-one horses killed and sixteen wounded. but the afghans were naturally elated by the success they had unquestionably achieved; the national rising had been inaugurated by a distinct triumph, the news of which would bring into the field incalculable swarms of fierce and fanatical partisans. it was clear that mahomed jan had a quick eye for opportunities, and some skill in handling men. that he could recognise the keypoint of a position and act boldly and promptly on that recognition, his tactics of the th made abundantly obvious, and his commanding position on the morning of the th still further demonstrated his tactical ability. _l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace_ is the game to be played by the commander of disciplined troops against asiatic levies, and no man was more sensible of this than the gallant soldier who now from the bastion of sherpur could see the afghan standards waving on the summit of the takht-i-shah. indeed he was impressed so thoroughly by the force of the maxim as to allow himself to hope that some soldiers, of whom about one-third were europeans, backed by a couple of mountain guns, would be able to carry by assault the lofty peak, strongly held by resolute afghans in protected positions, supported by several thousands of their fellows lying out of sight until an attack should develop itself, to meet which they were at hand to reinforce the garrison of the takht-i-shah. from the gorge of the cabul river there runs due south to near charasiah a lofty and rugged range, the highest point of which, the takht-i-shah, is about midway from either extremity. from this main ridge there project eastward at right angles two lateral spurs. the shorter and more northerly of those runs down to the balla hissar, the longer and more southerly obtruding itself into the plain as far as the village of beni hissar. this latter spur quits the main ridge no great distance south of the takht-i-shah peak, and on the th the afghan reserves were massed in rear of the peak, both on the main ridge and on this spur. the steep faces of the mountain were strewn with great smooth boulders and jagged masses of rock; the ascent, everywhere laborious, was complicated in places by sheer scarps, and those formidable impediments were made still more difficult by frequent sungahs, strong stone curtains behind which the defenders lay safe or fired with a minimum of exposure. on the summit was a great natural cavity which had been made bomb proof by art, and further cover was afforded by caves and lines of rock. the most northerly portion of the ridge described is known as the sher derwaza heights, which macpherson had occupied on the morning of the th, and his brigade it was which furnished the little force already mentioned as charged to attempt the task of storming the takht-i-shah. for several hours morgan's two mountain guns industriously shelled that peak, and then the infantry made their effort. the afghans fought stubbornly in defence of a lower hill they held in advance of the takht-i-shah, but after a hard struggle they had to abandon it to macpherson's resolute men. but the exertions of the latter to ascend the peak were baulked by its rugged steepness and the fire of the afghans holding the sungahs on its face. sir frederick roberts had to recognise that the direct attack by so weak a force unaided by a diversion, could not succeed, and he ordered further efforts to be deferred. the casualties of the abortive attempt included three officers, one of whom, major cook, v.c. of the goorkhas, than whom the british army contained no better soldier, died of his wound. macpherson was directed to hold the ground he had won, including the lower advanced hill, and was informed that on the following morning he was to expect the co-operation of general baker from the direction of beni hissar. the lesson of the result of attempting impossibilities had been taken to heart, and the force which baker led out on the morning of the th was exceptionally strong, consisting as it did of the d highlanders and guides infantry, a wing of the d sikhs, a cavalry regiment, and eight guns. marching in the direction of the lateral spur extending from the main ridge eastward to beni hissar, baker observed that large masses of the enemy were quitting the plain villages about beni hissar in which they had taken shelter for the night, and were hurrying to gain the summit of the spur which constituted the defensive position of the afghan reserve. baker's _coup d'oeil_ was quick and true. by gaining the centre of the spur he would cut in two the afghan line along its summit, and so isolate and neutralise the section of it from the centre to the beni hissar extremity, toward which section the reinforcements from the plain villages were climbing. but to accomplish this shrewd stroke it was necessary that he should act with promptitude and energy. his guns opened fire on the summit. the sikhs, extended athwart the plain, protected his right flank. his cavalry on the left cut into the bodies of afghans hurrying to ascend the eastern extremity of the spur. with noble emulation the highlanders and the guides sprang up the rugged slope, their faces set towards the centre of the summit line. major white, who already had earned many laurels in the campaign, led on his highlanders; the guides, burning to make the most of their first opportunity to distinguish themselves, followed eagerly the gallant chief who had so often led them to victory on other fields. lieutenant forbes, a young officer of the d heading the advance of his regiment, reached the summit accompanied only by his colour-sergeant. a band of ghazees rushed on the pair and the sergeant fell. as forbes stood covering his body he was overpowered and slain. the sudden catastrophe staggered for a moment the soldiers following their officer, but lieutenant dick cunyngham rallied them immediately and led them forward at speed. for his conduct on this occasion cunyngham received the victoria cross. with rolling volleys highlanders and guides reached and won the summit. the afghans momentarily clung to the position, but the british fire swept them away and the bayonets disposed of the ghazees, who fought and died in defence of their standards. the severance of the afghan line was complete. a detachment was left to maintain the isolation of some of the enemy who had been cut off; and then swinging to their right baker's regiments swept along the summit of the spur toward the main ridge and the takht-i-shah, the highlanders leading. as they advanced they rolled up the afghan line and a panic set in among the enemy, who sought safety in flight. assailed from both sides, for macpherson's men from the conical hill were passing up the north side of the peak, and shaken by the steady fire of the mountain guns, the garrison of the takht-i-shah evacuated the position. baker's soldiers toiled vigorously upward toward the peak, keen for the honour of winning it; but the credit of that achievement justly fell to their comrades of macpherson's command, who had striven so valiantly to earn it the day before, and who had gained possession of the peak and the afghan standards flying on its summit, a few minutes before the arrival of white's highlanders and jenkins' guides. as the midday gun was fired in the cantonment the flash of the heliograph from the peak told that the takht-i-shah was won. while baker was sweeping the spur and climbing the lofty peak of the main ridge, his reserve, which remained in the plain, was in sharp action against masses of assailants from the city and other bodies from the villages about beni hissar. those were beaten off by the d sikhs and baker's flanks were thus cleared, but the resolute afghans, bent on interfering with his return march, surged away in the direction of the siah sung ridge and gathered thereon in considerable strength. the guns of sherpur shelled them smartly, but they held their ground; and massy went out to disperse them with the cavalry. the afghans showed unwonted resolution, confronting the cavalry with extraordinary steadiness in regular formation and withholding their fire until the troopers were close upon them. but the horsemen were not to be denied. captains butson and chisholme led their squadrons against the afghan flanks, and the troopers of the th avenged the mishap which had befallen that gallant regiment two days before, riding through and through the hostile masses and scattering them over the plain. but in the charge butson was killed, chisholme and trower were wounded; the sergeant-major and three men were killed and seven were wounded. brilliant charges were delivered by the other cavalry detachments, and the siah sung heights were ultimately cleared. the guides' cavalry attacked, defeated, and pursued for a long distance a body of kohistanees marching from the north-east apparently with intent to join mahomed jan. the casualties of the day were sixteen killed and forty-five wounded; not a heavy loss considering the amount of hard fighting. the afghans were estimated to have lost in killed alone from to men. the operations of the day were unquestionably successful so far as they went, but the actual results attained scarcely warranted the anticipation that the afghans would acknowledge themselves defeated by breaking up their combination and dispersing to their homes. it was true that they had been defeated, but they had fought with unprecedented stubbornness and gave little evidence of being cowed. throughout the day the villages around cabul had evinced a rancorous hostility which had a marked significance. not less significant was the participation in the fighting of the day on the part of the population of cabul. as baker was returning to sherpur in the evening he had been fired upon from the balla hissar, and his flanking parties had found ambushes of armed afghans among the willows between the city and the cantonment. but for the skill and courage of the non-commissioned officer in charge a convoy of wounded on its way to sherpur would certainly have been destroyed. but there was a stronger argument than any of those indications, significant as they were of the unbroken spirit of the afghans, telling against the probability that the operations of the day would have the effect of putting down the national rising. the hordes which had gathered to the banners of the mushk-i-alum and mahomed jan combined with the fanaticism of the _jehad_ a fine secular greed for plunder. was it likely that they would scatter resignedly, leaving untouched the rich booty of the city that had been almost within arm's-length as they looked down on it from the peak of the takht-i-shah, and whose minarets they were within sight of on the spur and in the villages of beni-hissar? was that ever likely? and was it not made more and yet more unlikely when on the afternoon of the th macpherson, acting on orders, moved his camp to the balla hissar heights, evacuating deh mazung and leaving open to the enemy the road into the city through the cabul gorge? the following morning was to show how promptly and how freely the afghans had taken advantage of the access to the capital thus afforded them. it must never be forgotten that at this time our people in afghanistan held no more territory than the actual ground they stood upon and the terrain swept by their fire. no trustworthy intelligence from outside that region was procurable; and of this there can be no clearer evidence than that the general was under the belief that the enemy had been 'foiled in their western and southern operations.' the morning of the th effectually dispelled the optimistic anticipations indulged in overnight. at daybreak a large body of afghans, with many standards, were discerned on a hill about a mile northward of the asmai ridge, from which and from the kohistan road they were moving on to the crest of that ridge. they were joined there by several thousands coming up the slopes from out the village of deh afghan, the northern suburb of cabul. it was estimated that there were about men in position along the summit of the ridge, and occupying also a low conical hill beyond its north-western termination. the array of afghans displayed itself within a mile of the west face of the sherpur cantonment, and formed a menace which could not be brooked. to general baker was entrusted the task of dislodging the enemy from the threatening position, and there was assigned to him for this purpose a force consisting of about bayonets, eight guns, and a regiment of native cavalry. his first object was to gain possession of the conical hill already mentioned, and thus debar the afghan force on the asmai heights from receiving accessions either from the masses on the hill further north or by the kohistan road. under cover of the artillery fire the highlanders and guides occupied this conical hill after a short conflict. a detachment was left to hold it and then colonel jenkins, who commanded the attack, set about the arduous task of storming from the northward the formidable position of the asmai heights. the assault was led by brownlow's staunch highlanders, supported on the right by the guides operating on the enemy's flank; and the afghan position was heavily shelled by four of baker's guns, and by four more in action near the south-western corner of the sherpur cantonment. macpherson from his position on the balla hissar hill aided the attack by the fire of his guns, and also by despatching two companies of the th to cross the cabul gorge and operate against the enemy's left rear. in the face of a heavy fire the highlanders and guides climbed with great speed and steadiness the rugged hillside leading upward to the afghan breastwork on the northern edge of the summit. their approach and the crushing shrapnel fire from the guns near sherpur had caused numerous afghans to move downward from the position toward deh afghan, heavily smitten as they went; but the ghazees in the breastworks made a strenuous resistance and died under their banners as the highlanders carried the defences with a rush. the crest, about a quarter of a mile long, was traversed under heavy fire and the southern breastwork on the peak was approached. it was strong and strongly held, but a cross fire was brought to bear on its garrison, and then the frontal attack led by a lance-corporal of the d was delivered. after a hand-to-hand grapple in which highlanders and guides were freely cut and slashed by the knives of the ghazees, the position, which was found full of dead, was carried, but with considerable loss. the whole summit of the asmai heights was now in british possession, and everything seemed auspicious. the afghans streaming down from the heights toward the city were being lacerated by shell fire and musketry fire as they descended. when they took refuge in deh afghan that suburb was heavily shelled, and it was gradually evacuated. scarcely had jenkins won the summit of the asmai ridge when the fortune of the day was suddenly overcast; indeed while he was still engaged in the attainment of that object premonitory indications of serious mischief were unexpectedly presenting themselves. a vast host of afghans described as numbering from , to , , debouched into the chardeh valley from the direction of indikee, and were moving northwards, apparently with the object of forming a junction with the masses occupying the hills to the north-west of the asmai heights. about the same time cavalry scouting in the chardeh valley brought in the information that large parties of hostile infantry and cavalry were hurrying across the valley in the direction of the conical hill the defence of which had been entrusted to lieutenant-colonel clark with highlanders and guides. recognising clark's weakness, general baker had judiciously reinforced that officer with four mountain guns and bayonets. the guns opened fire on the afghan bodies marching from the killa kazee direction, and drove them out of range. but they coalesced with the host advancing from indikee, and the vast mass of afghans, facing to the right, struck the whole range of the british position from near the cabul gorge on the south to and beyond the conical hill on the north. the most vulnerable point was the section at and about that eminence, and the necessity for supplying clark with further reinforcements became urgently manifest. baker sent up a second detachment, and sikhs came out from sherpur at the double. but the afghans, creeping stealthily in great numbers up the slope from out the chardeh valley, had the shorter distance to travel, and were beforehand with the reinforcements. their tactics were on a par with their resolution. the left of their attack grasped and held a knoll north of the conical hill, and from this position of vantage brought a cross fire to bear on clark's detachment. as their direct attack developed itself it encountered from the conical hill a heavy rifle fire, and shells at short range tore through the loose rush of ghazees, but the fanatics sped on and up without wavering. as they gathered behind a mound for the final onslaught, captain spens of the d with a handful of his highlanders went out on the forlorn hope of dislodging them. a rush was made on him; he was overpowered and slaughtered after a desperate resistance, and the afghan charge swept up the hill-side. in momentary panic the defenders gave ground, carrying downhill with them the reinforcement of punjaubees which captain hall was bringing up. two of the mountain guns were lost, but there was a rally at the foot of the hill under cover of which the other two were extricated. the afghans refrained from descending into the plain, and directed their efforts toward cutting off the occupants of the position on the asmai summit. they ascended by two distinct directions. one body from the conical hill followed the route taken by jenkins in the morning; another scaled a spur trending downward to the chardeh valley from the southern extremity of the asmai ridge. it was estimated that the afghan strength disclosed this day did not fall short of , men; and general roberts was reluctantly compelled to abandon for the time any further offensive efforts. his reasons, stated with perfect frankness, may best be given in his own words. 'up to this time,' he wrote, 'i had no reason to apprehend that the afghans were in sufficient force to cope successfully with disciplined troops, but the resolute and determined manner in which the conical hill had been recaptured, and the information sent to me by brigadier-general macpherson that large masses of the enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and west, made it evident that the numbers combined against us were too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively small force meeting them. i therefore determined to withdraw from all isolated positions, and to concentrate the whole force at sherpur, thus securing the safety of our large cantonment, and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of life.' the orders issued to generals baker and macpherson to retire into the cantonment were executed with skill and steadiness. jenkins' evacuation of the asmai position was conspicuously adroit. when the order to quit reached that able officer, major stockwell of the d was out with a small detachment, maintaining a hot fire on the afghan bodies ascending by the southern spur from the chardeh valley. he fell back with great deliberation, and when he rejoined the retirement down the hill face looking toward sherpur was leisurely proceeded with, the hostile advance from, the northern side being held in check by the fire of covering parties from jenkins' left flank. general macpherson's retirement was masterly. flanking his march through the cabul gorge with two companies of the th who stalled off a rush of ghazees from the asmai crest, he continued his march through the suburb of deh afghan, his baggage in front under a strong guard. some few shots were exchanged before the suburb was cleared, but the casualties were few and presently the brigade entered the cantonment. general baker continued to hold a covering position with part of his force, until the troops from the heights and macpherson's command had made good their retirement, and he was the last to withdraw. by dusk the whole force was safely concentrated within the cantonment, and the period of the defensive had begun. the casualties of the day were serious; thirty-five killed, and wounded. during the week of fighting the little force had lost somewhat heavily; the killed numbered eighty-three, the wounded . eight officers were killed, twelve were wounded. chapter v: on the defensive in sherpur although overlarge for its garrison, the sherpur cantonment had many of the features of a strong defensive position. on the southern and western faces the massive and continuous enciente made it impregnable against any force unprovided with siege artillery. but on the eastern face the wall had been built to the elevation only of seven feet, and at either end of the behmaroo heights, which constituted the northern line of defence, there were open gaps which had to be made good. the space between the north-western bastion and the heights was closed by an entrenchment supported by a 'laager' of afghan gun-carriages and limbers, the ground in front strengthened by abattis and wire entanglements, beyond which a village flanking the northern and western faces was occupied as a detached post. the open space on the north-eastern angle was similarly fortified; the village of behmaroo was loopholed, and outlying buildings to the front were placed in a state of defence. the unfinished eastern wall was heightened by logs built up in tiers, and its front was covered with abattis, a tower and garden outside being occupied by a detachment. a series of block houses had been built along the crest of the behmaroo heights supporting a continuous entrenchment, gun emplacements made in the line of defence, and the gorge dividing the heights strongly fortified against an attack from the northern plain. the enciente was divided into sections to each of which was assigned a commanding officer with a specified detail of troops; and a strong reserve of european infantry was under the command of brigadier-general baker, ready at short notice to reinforce any threatened point. it was presumably owing to the absorption of the troops in fighting, collecting supplies, and providing winter shelter, that when the concentration within sherpur became suddenly necessary the defences of the position were still seriously defective; and throughout the period of investment the force was unremittingly engaged in the task of strengthening them. nor had the military precaution been taken of razing the villages and enclosures within the fire zone of the enciente, and they remained to afford cover to the enemy during the period of investment. before the enemy cut the telegraph wire in the early morning of the th sir frederick roberts had informed the authorities in india of his situation and of his need for reinforcements; and he had also ordered up general charles gough's brigade without loss of time. gough was already at jugdulluk when he received the order calling him to cabul, but he had to wait for reinforcements and supplies, and the tribesmen were threatening his position and the line of communication in rear of it. he did not move forward until the st. on the following day he reached luttabund, whence he took on with him the garrison of that post, but although his march was unmolested it was not until the th that he reached sherpur, a day too late to participate in repelling the assault on the cantonment. while general roberts' force was busily engaged in making good the defences of sherpur, the afghans refrained from attempting to back their success on the asmai heights by an assault on the defensive position which seemed to invite an attack. during the first two days of their possession of the city they were enjoying the fruits of their occupation in their own turbulent manner. roberts' spies reported them busily engaged in sacking the hindoo and kuzzilbash quarters, in looting and wrecking the houses of chiefs and townsfolk who had shown friendliness to the british, and in quarrelling among themselves over the spoils. requisitioning was in full force. the old moulla mushk-i-alum was the temporary successor of general hills in the office of governor of cabul; and spite of his ninety years he threw extraordinary energy into the work of arousing fanaticism and rallying to cabul the fighting men of the surrounding country. the _jehad_ of which he had been the chief instigator had certainly attained unexampled dimensions, and although it was not in the nature of things that every afghan who carried arms should be inspired with religious fanaticism to such a pitch as to be utterly reckless of his life, swarms of fierce ghazees made formidable the levies which mahomed jan commanded. on the th and th the afghans made ostentatious demonstrations against sherpur, but those were never formidable, although they made themselves troublesome with some perseverance during the daytime, consistently refraining from night attacks, which was remarkable since ordinarily they are much addicted to the _chapao_. there never was any investment of sherpur, or indeed any approximation to investment. cavalry reconnaissances constantly went out, and piquets and videttes were habitually on external duty; infantry detachments sallied forth whenever occasion demanded to dislodge the assailants from points occupied by them in inconvenient proximity to the defences. the afghan offensive was not dangerous, but annoying and wearying. it was indeed pushed with some resolution on the th, when several thousand men poured out of the city, and skirmished forward under cover of the gardens and enclosures on the plain between cabul and sherpur, in the direction of the southern front and the south-western bastions. the afghans are admirable skirmishers, and from their close cover kept up for hours a brisk fire on the soldiers lining the sherpur defences, but with singularly little effect. the return rifle fire was for the most part restricted to volleys directed on those of the enemy who offered a sure mark by exposing themselves; and shell fire was chiefly used to drive the afghan skirmishers from their cover in the gardens and enclosures. some of those, notwithstanding, were able to get within yards of the enciente, but could make no further headway. on the morning of the th it was found that in the night the enemy had occupied the meer akhor fort, a few hundred yards beyond the eastern face, and close to the residency compound of the old cantonments of - . the fire from this fort was annoying, and general baker went out on the errand of destroying it, with bayonets, two mountain guns, and a party of sappers. as the fort was being approached through the dense mist a sudden volley from it struck down several men, and lieutenant montenaro of the mountain battery was mortally wounded. the fort was heavily shelled from the south-eastern bastion; its garrison evacuated it, and it was blown up. mahomed jan and his coadjutors could hardly flatter themselves that as yet they had made any impression on the steadfast defence which the british force was maintaining in the sherpur cantonment. the afghan leader had tried force in vain; he knew the history of that strange period in the winter of during which afghan truculence and audacity had withered the spirit of a british force not much less numerically strong than the little army now calmly withstanding him. things had not gone very well with that little army of late, possibly its constancy might have been impaired, and its chief might be willing, as had been elphinstone and the eltchi, to listen to terms. anyhow there could be no harm in making a proffer based on the old lines. so the afghan leader proposed to general roberts, apparently in all seriousness, that the british army should forthwith evacuate afghanistan, encountering no molestation in its march; that the british general before departing should engage that yakoub khan should return to afghanistan as its ameer; and that there should be left behind two officers of distinction as hostages for the faithful fulfilment of the contract. 'we have a lakh of men; they are like wolves eager to rush on their prey! we cannot much longer control them!'--such were said to have been the terms of a message intended to disturb the equanimity of the british commander. meer butcha and his kohistanees, again, were not to all appearance anxious for the restoration of yakoub. they professed themselves content to accept our staunch friend wali mahomed as ameer, if only the british army would be good enough to march home promptly and leave to afghans the administration of afghan affairs. it was not likely that a man of roberts' nature would demean himself to take any notice of such overtures. for the moment circumstances had enforced on him the wisdom of accepting the defensive attitude, but he knew himself, nevertheless, the virtual master of the situation. he had but one serious anxiety--the apprehension lest the afghans should not harden their hearts to deliver an assault on his position. that apprehension was not long to give him concern. on the th, as a menace against the southern face of sherpur, the enemy took strong possession of the mahomed shereef fort, stormed so gallantly by colonel griffiths on th november ; and they maintained themselves there during the two following days in face of the fire of siege guns mounted on the bastions of the enciente. on the st and d large numbers of afghans quitted the city, and passing eastward behind the siah sung heights, took possession in great force of the forts and villages outside the eastern face of sherpur. on the d a spy brought in the intelligence that mahomed jan and his brother-chiefs had resolved to assault the cantonment early on the following morning, and the spy was able to communicate the plan of attack. the men holding the king's garden and the mahomed shereef fort had been equipped with scaling ladders, and were to make a false attack which might become a real one, against the western section of the southern front. the principal assault, however, was to be made against the eastern face of the behmaroo village--unquestionably the weakest part of the defensive position. the d was the last day of the mohurrum--the great mahomedan religious festival, when fanaticism would be at its height; and further to stimulate that incentive to valour, the mushk-i-alum would himself kindle the beacon fire on the asmai height which was to be the signal to the faithful to rush to the assault. the information proved perfectly accurate. all night long the shouts and chants of the afghans filled the air. purposeful silence reigned throughout the cantonment. in the darkness the soldiers mustered and quietly fell into their places; the officers commanding sections of the defence made their dispositions; the reserves were silently standing to their arms. every eye was toward the asmai heights, shrouded still in the gloom of the night. a long tongue of flame shot up into the air, blazed brilliantly for a few moments, and then waned. at the signal a fierce fire opened from the broken ground before one of the gateways of the southern face, the flashes indicating that the marksmen were plying their rifles within yards of the enciente. the bullets sped harmlessly over the defenders sheltered behind the parapet, and in the dusk of the dawn reprisals were not attempted. but this outburst of powder-burning against the southern face was a mere incident; what men listened and watched for was the development of the true assault on the eastern end of the great parallelogram. the section commanders there were general hugh gough in charge of the eastern end of the behmaroo heights, and colonel jenkins from the village down to the native hospital and beyond to the bastion at the south-eastern corner. the troops engaged were the guides from the ridge down to behmaroo village and beyond to the native hospital, in which were men of the th punjaub infantry, and between the hospital and the corner bastion the th, reinforced by two companies of d highlanders from the reserve, which later sent to the defence of the eastern face additional contributions of men and guns. 'from beyond behmaroo and the eastern trenches and walls,' writes mr hensman, 'came a roar of voices so loud and menacing that it seemed as if an army fifty thousand strong was charging down on our thin line of men. led by their ghazees, the main body of afghans hidden in the villages and orchards on the east side of sherpur had rushed out in one dense mob, and were filling the air with their shouts of "allah-il-allah." the roar surged forward as their line advanced, but it was answered by such a roll of musketry that it was drowned for the moment, and then merged into the general din which told us that our men with martinis and sniders were holding their own against the attacking force.' when the first attack thus graphically described was made the morning was still so dark and misty that the outlook from the trenches was restricted, and the order to the troops was to hold their fire till the assailants should be distinctly visible. the detachment of the th opened fire somewhat prematurely, and presently the guides holding behmaroo and the trenches on the slopes followed the example, and sweeping with their fire the terrain in front of them broke the force of the attack while its leaders were still several hundred yards away. between the hospital and the corner bastion the men of the th and d awaited with impassive discipline the word of permission to begin firing. from out the mist at length emerged dense masses of men, some of whom were brandishing swords and knives, while others loaded and fired while hurrying forward. the order to fire was not given until the leading ghazees were within eighty yards, and the mass of assailants not more distant than yards. heavily struck then by volley on volley, they recoiled but soon gathered courage to come on again; and for several hours there was sharp fighting, repeated efforts being made to carry the low eastern wall. so resolute were the afghans that more than once they reached the abattis, but each time were driven back with heavy loss. about ten o'clock there was a lull and it seemed that the attacking force was owning the frustration of its attempts, but an hour later there was a partial recrudescence of the fighting and the assailants once more came on. the attack, however, was not pushed with much vigour and was soon beaten down, but the afghans still maintained a threatening attitude and the fire from the defences was ineffectual to dislodge them. the general resolved to take their positions in flank, and with this intent sent out into the open through the gorge in the behmaroo heights, four field guns escorted by a cavalry regiment. bending to the right, the guns came into action on the right flank of the afghans, and the counter-stroke had immediate effect. the enemy wavered and soon were in full retreat. the kohistanee contingent, some strong, cut loose and marched away northward, with obvious recognition that the game was up. the fugitives were scourged with artillery and rifle fire, and massy led out the cavalry, swept the plain, and drove the lingering afghans from the slopes of siah sung. the false attack on the southern face from the king's garden and the mahomed shereef fort never made any head. those positions were steadily shelled until late in the afternoon, when they were finally evacuated, and by nightfall all the villages and enclosures between sherpur and cabul were entirely deserted. some of those had been destroyed by sappers from the garrison during the afternoon, in the course of which operation two gallant engineer officers, captain dundas and lieutenant nugent, were unfortunately killed by the premature explosion of a mine. mahomed jan had been as good as his word; he had delivered his stroke against sherpur, and that stroke had utterly failed. with its failure came promptly the collapse of the national rising. before daybreak of the th the formidable combination which had included all the fighting elements of north-eastern afghanistan, and under whose banners it was believed that more than , armed men had mustered, was no more. not only had it broken up; it had disappeared. neither in the city, nor in the adjacent villages, nor on the surrounding heights, was a man to be seen. so hurried had been the afghan dispersal that the dead lay unburied where they had fallen. his nine days on the defensive had cost general roberts singularly little in casualties; his losses were eighteen killed and sixty-eight wounded. the enemy's loss from first to last of the rising was reckoned to be not under . on the th the cavalry rode far and fast in pursuit of the fugitives, but they overtook none, such haste had the fleeing afghans made. on the same day cabul and the balla hissar were reoccupied, and general hills resumed his functions as military governor of the city. cabul had the aspect of having undergone a sack at the hands of the enemy; the bazaars were broken up and deserted and the hindoo and kuzzilbash quarters had been relentlessly wrecked. sir frederick roberts lost no time in despatching a column to, the kohistan to punish meer butcha by destroying that chief's forts and villages, and to ascertain whether the tribesmen of the district had dispersed to their homes. this was found to be the case, and the column returned after having been out five days. after making a few examples the general issued a proclamation of amnesty, excluding therefrom only five of the principal leaders and fomentors of the recent rising, and stipulating that the tribesmen should send representatives to sherpur to receive explanations regarding the dispositions contemplated for the government of the country. this policy of conciliation bore good fruit; and a durbar was held on january th, , at which were present about sirdars, chiefs, and headmen from the kohistan, logur, and the ghilzai country. rewards were presented to those chiefs who had remained friendly; the general received the salaams of the assembled sirdars and then addressed them in a firm but conciliatory speech. the country remained still in a disturbed state, but there was little likelihood of a second general rising. general roberts was resolved, however, to be thoroughly prepared to cope with that contingency should it occur. sherpur was encircled by a military road, and all cover and obstructions for the space of yards outside the enciente were swept away. another road was constructed from behmaroo village to the siah sung heights and yet another from the south-eastern gateway direct to the balla hissar, on both of which there were bridges across the cabul river. along the northern face of cabul from deh afghan to the balla hissar, a road broad enough for guns was made, and another broad road cut through the lower balla hissar. another military road was built through the cabul gorge to the main ghuznee and bamian road in the chardeh valley. strong forts were built on the asmai and sher derwaza heights and on the spur above the balla hissar, which, well garrisoned and supplied adequately with provisions, water, and ammunition, would enable cabul as well as sherpur to be held. the latter was greatly strengthened, the eastern point of the behmaroo heights being converted into something like a regular fortress. later, in march, when the cabul force had increased to a strength of about , men and twenty-six guns, the command was formed into two divisions, of which the first remained under the lieutenant-general, the second being commanded by major-general john ross. the line of communications was in charge of major-general bright, and brigadier-general hugh gough was the cavalry commander in succession to brigadier-general massy. on the d of may, sir donald stewart arriving at cabul from candahar, took over the chief command in north-eastern afghanistan from sir frederick roberts. sir donald's march from candahar, which was an eventful one, is dealt with in the next chapter. chapter vi: ahmed khel while sir frederick roberts had been fighting hard in north-eastern afghanistan, sir donald stewart had been experiencing comparative tranquillity in his candahar command. as soon as the news reached him of the destruction of cavagnari's mission he had promptly concentrated his troops, and so early as the third week of september ( ) he was in a position to carry out his orders to create a diversion in aid of roberts' advance on cabul by making a demonstration in the direction of ghuznee and placing a garrison in khelat-i-ghilzai. no subsequent movements of importance were undertaken in southern afghanistan during the winter, and the province enjoyed almost unbroken quietude. in herat, however, disturbance was rife. ayoub khan, the brother of yakoub khan, had returned from exile and made good his footing in herat, of which formerly he had been conjoint governor with yakoub. in december he began a hostile advance on candahar, but a conflict broke out between the cabul and herat troops under his command, and he abandoned for the time his projected expedition. [illustration: action at ahmed khel. miles from ghuznee. th. april .] in the end of march sir donald stewart began the march toward cabul which orders from india had prescribed. he left behind him in candahar the bombay division of his force under the command of major-general primrose, whose line of communication with the indus valley was to be kept open by phayre's brigade, and took with him on the northward march the bengal division, consisting of two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade. the first infantry brigade was commanded by brigadier-general barter, the second by brigadier-general hughes, and the cavalry brigade, which divisional headquarters accompanied, by brigadier-general palliser. khelat-i-ghilzai was reached on th april; the bengal portion of its garrison joined the division and the advance was resumed on the following day. until shahjui, the limit of the candahar province, the march was uneventful; but beyond that place extreme difficulties were experienced in procuring supplies, for the villages were found deserted and the inhabitants had carried off, destroyed, or hidden their stores of grain. the force was embarrassed by a horde of hazaras, who swarmed in wild irregularity on its flanks, plundering and burning with great vindictiveness, eager to wreak vengeance on their afghan foes. and it had another although more distant companionship, in the shape of several thousand hostile tribesmen and ghazees, whose fanaticism their moullas had been assiduously inciting, and who marched day by day parallel with the british right flank along the foothills at a distance of about eight miles. their attitude was threatening but it was not thought wise to meddle with them, since their retreat over the hills could not well be cut off, and since the policy of non-interference would tend to encourage them to venture on a battle. the soundness of this reasoning was soon to be made manifest. on the night of april th the division was encamped at mushaki, about thirty miles south of ghuznee. the spies that evening brought in the information that the enemy had resolved on fighting on the following morning, and that the position they intended to take up was the summit of a low spur of the gul koh mountain ridge, bounding on the west the valley followed by the road. this spur was said to project in a north-easterly direction toward the ghuznee river, gradually sinking into the plain. during a great part of its length it flanked and overhung the road, but near where it merged into the plain the road passed over it by a low saddle at a point about six miles beyond mushaki. at dawn of the th the column moved off, palliser leading the advance, which sir donald stewart accompanied, hughes commanding the centre, barter bringing up the rear and protecting the baggage. an hour later the enemy were visible in great strength about three miles in advance, presenting the aspect of a vast body formed up on the spur and on the saddle crossed by the road, and thus threatening stewart at once in front and on both flanks. the british general at once made his dispositions. his guns were on the road in column of route. the three infantry regiments of hughes' brigade came up to the left of and in line with the leading battery, the cavalry took ground on the plain on its right, and a reserve was formed consisting of an infantry regiment, two companies sappers and miners, and the general's escort of a troop and two companies. orders were sent back to barter to send forward without delay half the infantry of his brigade. in the formation described the force resumed its advance until within striking distance. then the two batteries came into action on either side of the road; the horse-battery on the right, the flat ground to its right being covered by the d punjaub cavalry; the field-battery on the left. sir donald stewart's proper front thus consisted of the field and horse-batteries with their supports, but since it was apparent that the greatest strength of the enemy was on the higher ground flanking his left, it behoved him to show a front in that direction also, and for this purpose he utilised hughes' three infantry regiments, of which the th was on the right, the d sikhs in the centre, and the d goorkhas on the left. part of the reserve infantry was sent to make good the interval between the left of the artillery and the right of the infantry. the guns had no sooner come into action than the enemy in great masses showed themselves on spur and saddle and plain, bent seemingly on an attempt to envelop the position held by the british. 'suddenly,' writes hensmen, 'a commotion was observed in the most advanced lines of the opposing army; the moullas could be seen haranguing the irregular host with frantic energy, the beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then as if by magic waves on waves of men--ghazees of the most desperate type--poured down upon the plain, and rushed upon general stewart's force. the main body of the afghan army remained upon the hill to watch the ghazees in their reckless onslaught, and take advantage of any success they might gain. the fanaticism of the or men who made this desperate charge has perhaps never been equalled; they had or yards to cover before they could come to close quarters, and yet they made nothing of the distance. nearly all were well armed with tulwars, knives, and pistols. some carried rifles and matchlocks, while a few--and those must have been resolute fanatics indeed--had simply pikes made of bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened on long shafts. their attack broke with greatest violence on our flanks. on our left flank the th bengal lancers were still moving into position when the ghazees rushed in among them. in an instant they were hidden in the cloud of dust and smoke, and then they galloped toward the right rear, and struck into the reserve in rear of the lieutenant-general and his staff. all was confusion for a moment; the ammunition mules were stampeded, and with the riderless horses of the lancers killed or wounded in the _mêlée_, dashed into the headquarter staff. the ghazees had continued their onward rush, and were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. some of them penetrated to within twenty yards of the knoll on which the staff were watching the action, and so critical was the moment that sir donald stewart and every man of his staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence.' the hurried retirement of the lancers had left the left flank bare. it was turned by the fierce rush of the fanatics, who were actually in rear of the leftward infantry regiment and in the heart of the british position. the goorkhas had been thrown into momentary confusion, but their colonel promptly formed them into rallying squares, whose fire mowed down the ghazees and arrested the headlong vehemence of their turning movement. but it was not the british left only which was temporarily compromised by the furious onslaught of the fanatics. their enveloping charge broke down the defence of the weakly-manned interval between the left of the artillery and the right of the infantry. the detachments holding that interval were forced back, righting hand-to-hand as the sheer weight of the assault compelled them to give ground; the th, in its effort to throw back its right to cover the interval and protect the guns, was thrown into confusion and gave ground; and the guns, their case shot exhausted and the afghans within a few yards of their muzzles, had to be retired. the onslaught on the right front of the horse-battery was delivered with great determination, but was held at bay and finally crushed by the repeated charges of the d punjaub cavalry. every man of the reserves was hurried into the fighting line; the soldiers were steadied by the energetic efforts of their officers and settled down to a steady and continuous fire from their breechloaders; the guns poured their shells into the hostile masses; and the fire of the forty-pounders on the left effectually arrested the attempt of the afghan horse to move round that flank. the hard-fought combat lasted for an hour; at ten o'clock the 'cease fire' sounded, and the british victory was signal. the enemy was dispersing in full flight, and the cavalry was chasing the fugitives across the plain on the right. how reckless had been the whirlwind charges of the ghazees was evidenced by the extraordinary number of their dead whose corpses strewed the battlefield. in no previous conflict between our troops and the afghans had the latter suffered nearly so heavily. more than dead were counted on the field, and many bodies were carried away; on a moderate computation their total loss must have been between and , and that in an estimated strength of from , to , . the casualties of the british force were seventeen killed and wounded, of whom four died of their wounds. the injuries consisted almost wholly of sword slashes and knife stabs received in hand-to-hand encounters. the pursuit was soon recalled, but the hazaras took up the chase with ardour and in the rancour of vengeance slew and spared not. sir donald stewart tarried on the field only long enough to bury his dead and have his wounded attended to; and soon after noon his force resumed its march. ghuznee was reached on the st, where there was a halt of three days. it had been reported that the indomitable mushk-i-alum was raising the tribesmen of zurmut and shilgur to avenge the defeat of ahmed khel, and a cavalry reconnaissance made on the d had found a gathering of or men about the villages of urzoo and shalez, six miles south-east of ghuznee. on the morning of the d a strong column commanded by brigadier-general palliser moved on the villages, which were found occupied in considerable force. they were too solidly built to be much injured by artillery fire, and the afghans lay close in the shelter they afforded. palliser hesitated to commit his infantry to an attack. sir donald stewart having arrived, ordered the infantry to carry the villages without delay, and the affair was soon over, the tribesmen suffering severely from the rifle fire as they evacuated the villages, and later in the pursuit made by the cavalry and horse-artillery. on the following day the march toward cabul was resumed. on the th april major-general ross had been despatched from cabul by sir frederick roberts on the mission of joining hands with stewart's division. on the th ross opened heliographic communication with sir donald, and was informed of the latter's victory at ahmed khel. but the junction of the two forces was not accomplished until the th; and in the interval the force commanded by general ross had received considerable annoyance at the hands of tribal levies gathered by local chiefs. the tribesmen interfered with the roadmaking operations of his sappers in the vicinity of sheikabad, and some fighting occurred in very rugged country on the d. trivial loss was experienced by his command, but the demonstrations of the tribesmen evinced with what inveterate determination, notwithstanding so many severe lessons, the afghans persisted in their refusal to admit themselves conquered. driven away with severe loss on the th, those indomitable hillmen and villagers were back again on the following morning on the overhanging ridges; nor were they dispersed by the 'resources of civilised warfare' until more of them had paid with their lives the penalty of their obstinate hostility. on the th, at sheikabad, sir donald stewart took leave of the division which he had led from candahar, and proceeded to cabul with general ross' force to assume the chief command in north-eastern afghanistan. his division turned aside into the logur valley, where it remained at until the final concentration about cabul in anticipation of the evacuation. by the reinforcement brought by stewart the cabul field force was increased to a strength of about , men. chapter vii: the ameer abdurrahman the occupation of afghanistan by the british troops had been prolonged far beyond the period originally intended by the authorities. but the strain of that occupation was great, and although it had to be maintained until there should be found a ruler strong enough to hold his own after the evacuation, the decision was definitely arrived at to withdraw from the country before the setting in of another winter. mr lepel griffin, a distinguished member of the political department of the indian civil service, reached cabul on th march, his mission being to further the selection and acceptance of a capable ruler to be left in possession. the task was no easy one. there was little promise in any of the barakzai pretenders who were in afghanistan, and in the address which mr griffin addressed in durbar to a number of sirdars and chiefs in the middle of april, he preserved a tone at once haughty and enigmatical. one thing he definitely announced, the viceroy's decision that yakoub khan was not to return to afghanistan. the state was to be dismembered. as to the future of herat the speaker made no allusion; but the province of candahar was to be separated from cabul and placed under an independent barakzai prince. no decision could for the present be given in regard to the choice of an ameer to rule over cabul. the government desired to nominate an ameer strong enough to govern his people and steadfast in his friendship to the british; if those qualifications could be secured the government was willing and anxious to recognise the wish of the afghan people, and nominate an ameer of their choice. but in effect the choice, so far as the english were concerned, had been already virtually made. on the th of march lord lytton had telegraphed to the secretary of state advocating the 'early public recognition of abdurrahman as legitimate heir of dost mahomed, and the despatch of a deputation of sirdars, with british concurrence, to offer him the throne, as sole means of saving the country from anarchy'; and the minister had promptly replied authorising the nomination of abdurrahman, should he be found 'acceptable to the country and would be contented with northern afghanistan.' abdurrahman had known strange vicissitudes. he was the eldest grandson of the old dost; his father was afzul khan, the elder brother of shere ali. after the death of the dost he had been an exile in bokhara, but he returned to balkh, of which province his father had been governor until removed by shere ali, made good his footing there, and having done so advanced on cabul, taking advantage of shere ali's absence at candahar. the capital opened its gates to him in march ; he fought a successful battle with shere ali at sheikabad, occupied ghuznee, and proclaimed his father ameer. those were triumphs, but soon the wheel came round full circle. afzul had but a short life as ameer, and abdurrahman had to retire to afghan turkestan. yakoub, then full of vigour and enterprise, defeated him at bamian and restored his father shere ali to the throne in the winter of . abdurrahman then once more found himself an exile. in , after much wandering, he reached tashkend, where general kaufmann gave him permission to reside, and obtained for him from the czar a pension of , roubles per annum. petrosvky, a russian writer who professed to be intimate with him during his period of exile, wrote of him that, 'to get square some day with the english and shere ali was abdurrahman's most cherished thought, his dominant, never-failing passion.' his hatred of shere ali, his family, and supporters, was intelligible and natural enough, but why he should have entertained a bitter grudge against the english is not very apparent; and there has been no overt manifestation of its existence since he became ameer. to mr eugene schuyler, who had an interview with him at tashkend, he expressed his conviction that with £ , wherewith to raise and equip an army he could attain his legitimate position as ameer of afghanistan. resolutely bent on an effort to accomplish this purpose, he was living penuriously and saving the greater part of his pension, and he hinted that he might have russian assistance in the prosecution of his endeavour. the selection of a man of such antecedents and associations as the ruler of a 'buffer' state in friendly relations with british india was perhaps the greatest leap in the dark on record. abdurrahman came straight from the position of a russian pensionary; in moving on afghanistan he obeyed russian instructions; his tashkend patrons had furnished him with a modest equipment of arms and money, the value of which he undertook to repay if successful. it is of course possible that those functionaries of a notoriously simple and ingenuous government started and equipped him in pure friendly good nature, although they had previously consistently deterred him. but there was not a circumstance in connection with abdurrahman that was not suspicious. three distinct hypotheses seem to present themselves in relation to this selection as our nominee; that lord lytton had extraordinary, almost indeed preternatural foresight and sagacity; that he was extremely fortunate in his leap in the dark; that he desired to bring to the naked _reductio ad absurdum_ the 'buffer state' policy. when abdurrahman began his movement is uncertain. so early as the middle of january it was reported at sherpur that he had left tashkend, and was probably already on the afghan side of the oxus. in a letter of february th mr hensman speaks of him as being in badakshan, where his wife's kinsmen were in power, and describes him as having a following of or turcoman horsemen and possessed according to native report of twelve lakhs of rupees. on the th of march lord lytton telegraphed to the secretary of state that he was in possession of 'authentic intelligence that the sirdar was in afghan turkestan, having lately arrived there from badakshan.' [illustration: the ameer abdurrahman.] it was regarded of urgent importance to ascertain definitely the disposition of abdurrahman, and whether he was disposed to throw in his lot with the british government, and accept the position of its nominee in northern afghanistan. the agent selected by mr griffin to open preliminary negotiations was a certain mohamed surwar, ghilzai, who had been all his life in the confidential service of the sirdar's family. surwar was the bearer of a formal and colourless letter by way simply of authentication; but he also carried full and explicit verbal instructions. he was directed to inform the sirdar that since he had entered afghan turkestan and occupied places there by force of arms, it was essential for him to declare with what object he had come, and whether actuated by friendly or hostile feelings toward the british government, which for its part had no ill-feeling toward him because of his long residence within the russian empire and his notoriously close relations with that power. that the british government was able to benefit him very largely in comparison with that of russia; and that wisdom and self interest alike suggested that he should at once open a friendly correspondence with the british officers in cabul. that his opportunity was now come, and that the british government was disposed to treat him with every consideration and to consider most favourably any representations he might make. it had no intention of annexing the country, and only desired to see a strong and friendly chief established at cabul; and that consequently the present communication was made solely in abdurrahman's own interest, and not in that of the british government. he was desired to send a reply by surwar, and later to repair to cabul, where he should be honourably received. surwar returned to cabul on st april, bringing a reply from abdurrahman to mr griffin's letter. the tone of the reply was friendly enough, but somewhat indefinite. in conversation with surwar as reported by the latter, abdurrahman was perfectly frank as to his relations with the russians, and his sentiments in regard to them. it had been reported that he had made his escape clandestinely from tashkend. had he cared to stand well with us at the expense of truth, it would have been his cue to disclaim all authority or assistance from the russian government, to confirm the current story of his escape, and to profess his anxiety to cultivate friendly relations with the british in a spirit of opposition to the power in whose territory he had lived so long virtually as a prisoner. but neither in writing nor in conversation did he make any concealment of his friendliness toward the russians, a feeling which he clearly regarded as nowise incompatible with friendly relations with the british government. 'if,' said he to surwar, 'the english will in sincerity befriend me, i have no wish to hide anything from them'; and he went on to tell how the russians had forbidden him for years to make any effort to interfere in afghan affairs. this prohibition stood until information reached tashkend of the deportation of yakoub khan to india. then it was that general kaufmann's representative said to him: 'you have always been anxious to return to your country; the english have removed yakoub khan; the opportunity is favourable; if you wish you are at liberty to go.' the russians, continued abdurrahman, pressed him most strongly to set out on the enterprise which lay before him. they lent him , rupees, and arms, ammunition, and supplies; he was bound to the russians by no path or promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude. 'i should never like,' said he, 'to be obliged to fight them. i have eaten their salt, and was for twelve years dependent on their hospitality.' surwar reported abdurrahman as in fine health and possessed of great energy. he had with him a force of about men, consisting of four infantry and two cavalry regiments, with twelve guns and some irregulars. he professed his readiness, in preference to conducting negotiations through agents, to go himself to charikar in the kohistan with an escort, and there discuss matters with the english officers in person. surwar testified that the sirdar had with him in turkestan no russian or russian agent, and this was confirmed through other sources. he had sent forward to ascertain which was the easiest pass across the hindoo koosh, but meanwhile he was to remain at kondooz until he should hear again from mr griffin. while the wary sirdar waited on events beyond the hindoo koosh he was sending letters to the leading chiefs of the kohistan and the cabul province, desiring them to be ready to support his cause. that he had an influential party was made clear at a durbar held by mr griffin on april st, when a considerable gathering of important chiefs united in the request that abdurrahman's claim to the ameership should be favourably regarded by the british authorities. in pursuance of the negotiations a mission consisting of three afghan gentlemen, two of whom belonged to mr griffin's political staff, left cabul on may nd carrying to abdurrahman a letter from mr griffin intimating that it had been decided to withdraw the british army from afghanistan in the course of a few months, and that the british authorities desired to leave the rulership in capable and friendly hands; that they were therefore willing to transfer the government to him, recognise him as the head of the state, and afford him facilities and even support in reorganising the government and establishing himself in the sovereignty. the mission found the attitude of abdurrahman scarcely so satisfactory as had been reported by surwar, and its members were virtual prisoners, their tents surrounded by sentries. abdurrahman's explanation of this rigour of isolation was that he could not otherwise ensure the safety of the envoys; but another construction conveyed to them was that they were kept prisoners that they might not, by mixing with the people, learn of the presence on the right bank of the oxus of a russian officer with whom abdurrahman was said to be in constant communication and on whose advice he acted. their belief was that abdurrahman was entirely under russian influence; that mr griffin's letter after it had been read in durbar in the camp was immediately despatched across the oxus by means of mounted relays; and that russian instructions as to a reply had not been received when they left turkestan to return to cabul. they expressed their belief that the sirdar would not accept from british hands cabul shorn of candahar. they had urged him to repeat in the letter they were to carry back to cabul the expression of his willingness to meet the british representative at charikar which had been contained in his letter sent by surwar; but he demurred to committing himself even to this slight extent. the letter which he sent by way of reply to the weighty communication mr griffin had addressed to him on the part of the government of india that official characterised as 'frivolous and empty, and only saved by its special courtesy of tone from being an impertinence.' an afghan who had sat at kaufmann's feet, abdurrahman was not wholly a guileless man; and the truth probably was that he mistrusted the greeks of simla and the gifts they tendered him with so lavish protestation that they were entirely for his own interest. there was very little finesse about the importunity of the british that he should constitute himself their bridge of extrication, so that they might get out of afghanistan without the dangers and discredit of leaving chaos behind them. but abdurrahman had come to know himself strong enough to reduce to order that legacy of chaos if it should be left; and in view of his future relations with his fellow afghans he was not solicitous to be beholden to the foreigners to any embarrassing extent. he knew, too, the wisdom of 'masterly inactivity' in delicate conditions. and, again, he had no confidence in our pledges. on the th of august, the day after the meeting between him and mr griffin at zimma, the latter wrote: 'they (abdurrahman and his advisers) feared greatly our intention was to rid ourselves of a formidable opponent, and dreaded that if he had come straight into cabul he would have been arrested, and deported to india.' a liberal government was now in office in england, and was urgent for the speedy evacuation of afghanistan. lord lytton had resigned and had been succeeded as viceroy by the marquis of ripon. lieutenant-general sir donald stewart was in chief command at cabul. a great number of letters from abdurrahman to chiefs and influential persons throughout afghanistan were being intercepted, the tone of which was considered objectionable. he was reported to be in close correspondence with mahomed jan, who had never ceased to be our bitter enemy. the fact that negotiations were in progress between the british government and abdurrahman had become matter of general knowledge throughout the country, and was occasioning disquietude and excitement. so clear were held the evidences of what was termed abdurrahman's bad faith, but was probably a combination of genuine mistrust, astute passivity, and shrewd playing for his own hand, that it became a serious question with the indian government on the arrival of the new viceroy, whether it was good policy to have anything more to do with him. it was resolved that before breaking off intercourse the suggestion of sir donald stewart and mr griffin should be adopted, that a peremptory although still friendly letter, demanding a definite acceptance or refusal of the proffers made, within four days after the receipt, should be sent to abdurrahman, with a detailed explanation of the arrangements into which we were prepared to enter with regard to him and the future of afghanistan. a letter was forwarded from cabul on th june, in which mr griffin informed the sirdar that since the british government admitted no right of interference by foreign powers in afghanistan, it was plain that the cabul ruler could have no political relations with any foreign power except the english; and if any foreign power should attempt to interfere in afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the cabul ruler, then the british government would be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it. as regarded limits of the territory, the latter stated that the whole province of candahar had been placed under a separate ruler, except sibi and pisheen, which were retained in british possession. consequently the british government was unable to enter into any negotiations on those points, or in respect to arrangements in regard to the north-western frontier which were settled by the treaty of gundamuk. subject to those reservations, the british government was willing that abdurrahman should establish over afghanistan--including herat when he should have conquered it--as complete and extensive authority as was swayed by any previous ameer. the british government would exercise no interference in the internal government of those territories nor would it demand the acceptance of an english resident anywhere within afghanistan, although for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse it might be agreed upon that a mahommedan agent of the british government should be stationed at cabul. abdurrahman's reply to this communication was vague and evasive, and was regarded by sir donald stewart and mr griffin as so unsatisfactory that they represented to the government of india, not for the first time, their conviction of the danger of trusting abdurrahman, the imprudence of delaying immediate action, and the necessity of breaking off with him and adopting other means of establishing a government in cabul before the impending evacuation. lord ripon, however, considered that 'as matters stood an arrangement with abdurrahman offered the most advisable solution, while he doubted whether it would not be found very difficult to enter into any alternative arrangement.' his excellency's decision was justified by the event. meanwhile, indeed, abdurrahman had started on june th for the kohistan. he crossed the hindoo koosh and arrived on july th at charikar, where he was welcomed by a deputation of leading chiefs, while the old mushk-i-alum, who for some time, thanks to mr griffin's influence, had been working in the interests of peace, intimated on behalf of a number of chiefs assembled in maidan that they were ready to accept as ameer the nominee of the british government. so propitious seemed the situation that it was considered the time had come for formally acknowledging abdurrahman as the new ameer, and also for fixing approximately the date of the evacuation of cabul by the british troops. the ceremony of recognition was enacted in a great durbar tent within the sherpur cantonment on the afternoon of july d. the absence of abdurrahman, and the notorious cause of that absence, detracted from the intrinsic dignity of the occasion so far as concerned the british participation in it; nor was the balance restored by the presence of three members of his suite whom he had delegated to represent him. a large number of sirdars, chiefs, and maliks were present, some of whom had fought stoutly against us in december. sir donald stewart, who presided, explained to the assembled afghans that their presence and that of the officers of the british force had been called for in order that the public recognition by the british government of the sirdar abdurrahman khan as ameer of cabul should be made known with as much honour as possible. then mr griffin addressed in persian a short speech to the 'sirdars, chiefs, and gentlemen' who constituted his audience. having announced the recognition of abdurrahman by 'the viceroy of india and the government of her most gracious majesty the queen empress,' he proceeded: 'it is to the government a source of satisfaction that the tribes and chiefs have preferred as ameer a distinguished member of the barakzai family, who is a renowned soldier, wise, and experienced. his sentiments towards the british government are most friendly; and so long as his rule shows that he is animated by these sentiments, he cannot fail to receive the support of the british government.' mr griffin then intimated that the british armies would shortly withdraw from afghanistan; and in his formal farewell there was a certain appropriate dignity, and a well-earned tribute to the conduct of our soldiers during their service within the afghan borders. 'we trust and firmly believe,' said mr griffin, 'that your remembrance of the english will not be unkindly. we have fought you in the field whenever you have opposed us; but your religion has in no way been interfered with; the honour of your women has been respected, and every one has been secure in possession of his property. whatever has been necessary for the support of the army has been liberally paid for. since i came to cabul i have been in daily intercourse with you, but i have never heard an afghan make a complaint of the conduct of any soldier, english or native, belonging to her majesty's army.' the durbar was closed by an earnest appeal by sir donald stewart to all the sirdars and chiefs that they should put aside their private feuds and unite to support the new ameer. on august d abdurrahman and mr griffin at length met, about sixteen miles north of cabul. his adherents were still full of excitement and suspicion; but the ameer himself was calm, cheerful, and dignified. the conference between him and mr griffin lasted for three hours and was renewed on the following day. 'he appeared,' wrote mr griffin, 'animated by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the british government, and although his expectations were larger than the government was prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous insistence, and the result of the interview may be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.' the tidings of the maiwand disaster had reached sherpur by telegraph, and the ameer was informed that a necessity might occur for marching a force from cabul to candahar. his reply was that the tribes might be hostile, but that if no long halts were made by the way he would have no objections to such a march. in this he showed his astuteness, since the defeat of ayoub khan by a british army would obviously save him a contest. so willing to be of service on this matter was he that when the march was decided on he sent influential persons of his party in advance to arrange with the local maliks to have supplies collected for the column. the arrangements made with him were that he was to fall heir to the thirty guns of shere ali's manufacture which the out-marching army was to leave in sherpur, and was to receive - / lakhs of rupees (£ , ); ten lakhs of which were given as an earnest of british friendship, and the balance was money belonging to the afghan state, which had gone into the commissariat chest and was now restored. at the ameer's earnest and repeated request the forts which had been built around cabul by the british army, were not destroyed as had been intended, but were handed over intact to the new ameer. it seemed that sir donald stewart, who was to evacuate sherpur on the th august, would leave cabul without seeing abdurrahman. but at the last moment mr griffin succeeded in arranging an interview. it was held early in the morning of the evacuation, in a tent just outside the sherpur cantonment, was quite public, and lasted only for quarter of an hour. abdurrahman was frank and cordial. he said that his heart was full of gratitude to the british, and desired that his best thanks should be communicated to the viceroy. at the close of the interview he shook hands with all 'who cared to wish him good-bye and good luck,' and sent his principal officer to accompany the general on his first day's march, which began immediately after the parting with abdurrahman. sir donald stewart's march down the passes was accomplished without incident, quite unmolested by the tribes. small garrisons were temporarily left in the khyber posts, and the war-worn regiments were dispersed through the stations of north-western india. chapter viii: maiwand and the great march when in the early spring of sir donald stewart quitted candahar with the bengal division of his force, he left there the bombay division, to the command of which general primrose acceded, general phayre assuming charge of the communications. the province during the early summer was fairly quiet, but it was known that ayoub khan was making hostile preparations at herat, although the reports as to his intentions and movements were long uncertain and conflicting. shere ali khan, who had been governor of candahar during stewart's residence there, had been nominated hereditary ruler of the province with the title of 'wali,' when it was determined to separate candahar from north-eastern afghanistan. on june st the wali, who had some days earlier crossed the helmund and occupied girishk with his troops, reported that ayoub was actually on the march toward the candahar frontier, and asked for the support of a british brigade to enable him to cope with the hostile advance. there was reason to believe that the wali's troops were disaffected, and that he was in no condition to meet ayoub's army with any likelihood of success. after stewart's departure the strength of the british forces at candahar was dangerously low--only of all ranks; but it was important to thwart ayoub's offensive movement, and a brigade consisting of a troop of horse-artillery, six companies of the th, two bombay native infantry regiments, and native troopers, in all about strong, under the command of brigadier-general burrows, reached the left bank of the helmund on july th. on the th the wali's infantry, strong, mutinied _en masse_ and marched away up the right bank of the river, taking with them a battery of smooth bore guns, a present to shere ali khan from the british government. his cavalry did not behave quite so badly, but, not to go into detail, his army no longer existed, and burrows' brigade was the only force in the field to resist the advance of ayoub khan, whose regular troops were reported to number cavalry, and from to infantry exclusive of the deserters from the wali, with thirty guns and an irregular force of uncertain strength. [illustration: action at maiwand. th. july .] burrows promptly recaptured from the wali's infantry the battery they were carrying off, and punished them severely. the mutineers had removed or destroyed the supplies which the wali had accumulated for the use of the brigade, and general burrows therefore could no longer remain in the vicinity of girishk. the helmund owing to the dry season was passable everywhere, so that nothing was to be gained by watching the fords. it was determined to fall back to khushk-i-nakhud, a point distant thirty miles from girishk and forty-five from candahar, where several roads from the helmund converged and where supplies were plentiful. at and near khushk-i-nakhud the brigade remained from the th until the morning of the th july. while waiting and watching there a despatch from army headquarters at simla was communicated to general burrows from candahar, authorising him to attack ayoub if he thought himself strong enough to beat him, and informing him that it was considered of the greatest political importance that the force from herat should be dispersed and prevented from moving on toward ghuznee. spies brought in news that ayoub had reached girishk, and was distributing his force along the right bank between that place and hydrabad. cavalry patrols failed to find the enemy until the st, when a detachment was encountered in the village of sangbur on the northern road about midway between the helmund and khushk-i-nakhud. next day that village was found more strongly occupied, and on the d a reconnaissance in force came upon a body of ayoub's horsemen in the plain below the garmao hills, about midway between sangbur and maiwand. those discoveries were tolerably clear indications of ayoub's intention to turn burrows' position by moving along the northern road to maiwand and thence pressing on through the maiwand pass, until at singiri ayoub's army should have interposed itself between the brigade and candahar. there was certainly nothing impossible in such an endeavour, since maiwand is nearer candahar than is khushk-i-nakhud. why, in the face of the information at his disposal and of the precautions enjoined on him to hinder ayoub from slipping by him toward ghuznee through maiwand and up the khakrez valley, general burrows should have remained so long at khushk-i-nakhud, is not intelligible. he was stirred at length on the afternoon of the th, by the report that of yakoub's cavalry and a large body of his ghazees were in possession of garmao and maiwand, and were to be promptly followed by ayoub himself with the main body of his army, his reported intention being to push on through the maiwand pass and reach the urgundab valley in rear of the british brigade. later in the day colonel st john, the political officer, reported to general burrows the intelligence which had reached him that the whole of ayoub's army was at sangbur; but credence was not given to the information. the somewhat tardy resolution was taken to march to maiwand on the morning of the th. there was the expectation that the brigade would arrive at that place before the enemy should have occupied it in force, and this point made good there might be the opportunity to drive out of garmao the body of yakoub's cavalry reported in possession there. there was a further reason why maiwand should be promptly occupied; the brigade had been obtaining its supplies from that village, and there was still a quantity of grain in its vicinity to lose which would be unfortunate. the brigade, now strong, struck camp on the morning of the th. the march to maiwand was twelve miles long, and an earlier start than . would have been judicious. the soldiers marched fast, but halts from time to time were necessary to allow the baggage to come up; the hostile state of the country did not admit of anything being left behind and the column was encumbered by a great quantity of stores and baggage. at karezah, eight miles from khushk-i-nakhud and four miles south-west of maiwand, information was brought in that the whole of yakoub's army was close by on the left front of the brigade, and marching toward maiwand. the spies had previously proved themselves so untrustworthy that small heed was taken of this report; but a little later a cavalry reconnaissance found large bodies of cavalry moving in the direction indicated and inclining away toward garmao as the brigade advanced. a thick haze made it impossible to discern what force, if any, was being covered by the cavalry. about ten a.m. the advance guard occupied the village of mundabad, about three miles south-west of maiwand. west of mundabad, close to the village, was a broad and deep ravine running north and south. beyond this ravine was a wide expanse of level and partially cultivated plain across which, almost entirely concealed by the haze, ayoub's army was marching eastward toward maiwand village, which covers the western entrance to the pass of the same name. if general burrows' eye could have penetrated that haze, probably he would have considered it prudent to take up a defensive position, for which mundabad presented many advantages. but he was firm in the conviction that the enemy's guns were not up, notwithstanding the reports of spies to the contrary; he believed that a favourable opportunity presented itself for taking the initiative, and he resolved to attack with all possible speed. lieutenant maclaine of the horse-artillery, a gallant young officer who was soon to meet a melancholy fate, precipitated events in a somewhat reckless fashion. with the two guns he commanded he crossed the ravine, galloped across the plain, and opened fire on a body of afghan cavalry which had just come within view. general nuttall, commanding the cavalry and horse-artillery, failing to recall maclaine, sent forward in support of him the four remaining guns of the battery. those approached to within yards of the two advanced pieces, and maclaine was directed to fall back upon the battery pending the arrival of the brigade, which general burrows was now sending forward. it crossed the ravine near mundabad, advanced on the plain about a mile in a north-westerly direction, and then formed up. there were several changes in the dispositions; when the engagement became warm about noon the formation was as follows:--the th foot was on the right, its right flank thrown back to check an attempt made to turn it by a rush of ghazees springing out of the ravine in the british front; on the left of the th were four companies of jacob's rifles ( th native infantry) and a company of sappers, the centre was occupied by the horse-artillery and smooth bore guns, of which latter, however, two had been moved to the right flank; on the left of the guns were the its grenadiers somewhat refused, and on the extreme left two companies of jacob's rifles. the cavalry was in the rear, engaged in efforts to prevent the afghans from taking the british infantry in reverse. the position was radically faulty, and indeed invited disaster. both flanks were _en l'air_ in face of an enemy of greatly superior strength; almost from the first every rifle was in the fighting line, and the sole reserve consisted of the two cavalry regiments. the baggage had followed the brigade across the ravine and was halted about yards in rear of the right, inadequately guarded by cavalry detachments. for half-an-hour no reply was made to the british shell fire, and an offensive movement at this time might have resulted in success. but presently battery after battery was brought into action by the afghans, until half-an-hour after noon the fire of thirty guns was concentrated on the brigade. under cover of this artillery fire the ghazees from the ravine charged forward to within yards of the th, but the rifle fire of the british regiment drove them back with heavy loss, and they recoiled as far as the ravine, whence they maintained a desultory fire. the enemy's artillery fire was well sustained and effective; the infantry found some protection from it in lying down, but the artillery and cavalry remained exposed and suffered severely. an artillery duel was maintained for two hours, greatly to the disadvantage of the brigade, which had but twelve guns in action against thirty well-served afghan pieces. the prostrate infantry had escaped serious punishment, but by two p.m. the cavalry had lost fourteen per cent, of the men in the front line, and horses; the afghan horsemen had turned both flanks and the brigade was all but surrounded, while a separate attack was being made on the baggage. heat and want of water were telling heavily on the sepoys, who were further demoralised by the afghan artillery fire. a little later the smooth bore guns had to be withdrawn for want of ammunition. this was the signal for a general advance of the afghans. their guns were pushed forward with great boldness; their cavalry streamed round the british left; in the right rear were masses of mounted and dismounted irregulars who had seized the villages on the british line of retreat. swarms of ghazees soon showed themselves threatening the centre and left; those in front of the th were still held in check by the steady volleys fired by that regiment. at sight of the ghazees, and cowed by the heavy artillery fire and the loss of their officers, the two companies of jacob's rifles on the left suddenly fell into confusion, and broke into the ranks of the grenadiers. that regiment had behaved well but it caught the infection of demoralisation, the whole left collapsed, and the sepoys in utter panic, surrounded by and intermingled with the ghazees, rolled in a great wave upon the right. the artillerymen and sappers made a gallant stand, fighting the ghazees hand-to-hand with handspikes and rammers, while the guns poured canister into the advancing masses. slade reluctantly limbered up and took his four guns out of action; maclaine remained in action until the ghazees were at the muzzles of his two guns, which fell into the enemy's hands. the torrent of mingled sepoys and ghazees broke in upon the th, and overwhelmed that regiment. the slaughter of the sepoys was appalling--so utterly cowed were they that they scarcely attempted to defend themselves, and allowed themselves without resistance to be dragged out of the ranks and killed. a cavalry charge was ordered in the direction of the captured guns, but it failed and the troopers retired in disorder. the infantry, assailed by hordes of fierce and triumphant ghazees, staggered away to the right, the th alone maintaining any show of formation, until the ravine was crossed, when the broken remnants of the sepoy regiments took to flight toward the east and the general's efforts to rally them were wholly unavailing. the th with some of the sappers and grenadiers, made a gallant stand round its colours in an enclosure near the village of khig. there colonel galbraith and several of his officers were killed, and the little body of brave men becoming outflanked, continued its retreat, making stand after stand until most were slain. the afghans pursued for about four miles, but were checked by a detachment of rallied cavalry, and desisted. the fugitives, forming with wounded and baggage a straggling column upwards of six miles long, crossed the waterless desert sixteen miles wide, to hanz-i-madat, which was reached about midnight and where water was found. from asu khan, where cultivation began, to kokoran near candahar, the retreat was harassed by armed villagers and the troops had to fight more or less all the way. officers and men were killed, lieutenant maclaine was taken prisoner, and five of the smooth bore guns had to be abandoned because of the exhaustion of the teams. about midday of the th the broken remnants of the brigade reached candahar. when the casualties were ascertained it became evident how disastrous to the british arms had been the combat of maiwand. out of a total of engaged no fewer than were killed. the wounded numbered ; followers and horses were killed and seven followers and sixty-eight horses wounded. since chillianwallah the british arms in asia had not suffered loss so severe. the spirit of the candahar force suffered materially from the maiwand disaster, and it was held that there was no alternative but to accept the humiliation of a siege within the fortified city. the cantonments were abandoned, the whole force was withdrawn into candahar, and was detailed for duty on the city walls. the effective garrison on the night of the th numbered , including the survivors of the maiwand brigade. so alert were the afghans that a cavalry reconnaissance made on the morning of the th, found the cantonments plundered and partly burned and the vicinity of candahar swarming with armed men. the whole afghan population amounting to about , persons, were compelled to leave the city, and then the work of placing it in a state of defence was energetically undertaken. buildings and enclosures affording cover too close to the enciente were razed, communication along the walls was opened up, and gun platforms were constructed in the more commanding positions. the walls were both high and thick, but they were considerably dilapidated and there were gaps and breaks in the bastions and parapet. the weak places as well as the gates were fronted with abattis, the defects were made good with sandbags, and wire entanglements and other obstructions were laid down outside the walls. while this work was in progress the covering parties were in daily collision with the enemy, and occasional sharp skirmishes occurred. on the th august ayoub opened fire on the citadel from picquet hill, an elevation north-westward of the city, and a few days later he brought guns into action from the villages of deh khoja and deh khati on the east and south. this fire, steadily maintained though it was day after day, had little effect, and the return fire gave good results. it was not easy to invest the city since on the west and north there was no cover for the besiegers, but in deh khoja on the east there was ample protection for batteries, and the ground on the south-west was very favourable. its advantages were improved so skilfully that it was at one time believed there was a european engineer in ayoub's camp. deh khoja was inconveniently near the cabul gate, and was always full of men. so menacing was the attitude of the afghans that a sortie was resolved on against the village, which was conducted with resolution but resulted in utter failure. the attempt was made on the morning of the th. the cavalry went out to hinder reinforcements from entering the village from the eastward. an infantry force strong commanded by brigadier-general brooke and divided into three parties, moved out later covered by a heavy artillery fire from the city walls. the village was reached, but was so full of enemies in occupation of the fortress-like houses that it was found untenable, and the three detachments extricated themselves separately. in the course of the retirement general brooke and captain cruickshank were killed. the casualties were very heavy; were killed and were wounded. the tidings of the maiwand disaster reached cabul on the th july by telegram from simla. the intention of the military authorities had already been intimated that the cabul force should evacuate afghanistan in two separate bodies and by two distinct routes. sir donald stewart was to march one portion by the khyber route; the other under sir frederick roberts was to retire by the kuram valley, which watson's division had been garrisoning since roberts had crossed the shutargurdan in september . but the maiwand news interfered with those arrangements. stewart and roberts concurred in the necessity of retrieving the maiwand disaster by the despatch of a division from cabul. roberts promptly offered to lead that division, and as promptly the offer was accepted by stewart. by arrangement with the latter roberts telegraphed to simla urging that a force should be despatched from cabul without delay; and recognising that the authorities might hesitate to send on this errand troops already under orders to return to india, he took it on himself to guarantee that none of the soldiers would demur, providing he was authorised to give the assurance that after the work in the field was over they would not be detained in garrison at candahar. the viceroy's sanction came on the d august. the constitution and equipment of the force were entrusted to the two generals; and in reply to questions his excellency was informed that roberts would march on the th and expected to reach candahar on d september. sir donald stewart gave his junior full freedom to select the troops to accompany him, and placed at his disposal the entire resources of the army in transport and equipment. it cannot truly be said that it was the _elite_ of the cabul field force which constituted the column led by roberts in his famous march to candahar. of the native infantry regiments of his own original force which he had mustered eleven months previously in the kuram only two followed him to candahar, the th goorkhas and d pioneers, and the second mountain battery adhered to him staunchly, of his original white troops the th lancers, as ever, were ready for the march. his senior infantry regiment, the th, would fain have gone, but the good old corps was weak from casualties and sickness, and the gallant knowles denied himself in the interests of his men. the two highland regiments, the d and d, had done an infinity of fighting and marching, but both had received strong drafts, were in fine condition, and were not to be hindered from following the chief whom, though not of their northern blood, the stalwart sons of the mist swore by as one man. sir frederick roberts had already represented that it would be impolitic to require the native regiments to remain absent from india and their homes for a longer period than two years. in the case of many of the regiments that term was closely approached, and the men after prolonged absence and arduous toil needed rest and were longing to rejoin their families. 'it was not,' in the words of general chapman, 'with eager desire that the honour of marching to candahar was sought for, and some commanding officers of experience judged rightly the tempers of their men when they represented for the general's consideration the claims of the regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from field service.... the enthusiasm which carried sir frederick roberts' force with exceptional rapidity to candahar was an after-growth evolved by the enterprise itself, and came as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the leader himself.' the constitution of the force was made known by the general orders published on d august. it consisted of three batteries of artillery commanded by colonel alured johnson; of a cavalry brigade of four regiments commanded by brigadier-general hugh gough; and of an infantry division of three brigades commanded by major-general john ross. the first brigade was commanded by brigadier-general herbert macpherson, the second by brigadier-general t. d. baker, and the third by brigadier-general charles macgregor. colonel chapman, r.a., who had served in the same capacity with sir donald stewart, was now roberts' chief of staff. the marching out strength of the column was about , men, of whom were europeans. speed being an object and since the column might have to traverse rough ground, no wheeled artillery or transport accompanied it; the guns were carried on mules, the baggage was severely cut down, the supplies carried were reduced to a minimum, and the transport animals, numbering , consisted of mules, ponies, and donkeys. it was known that the country could supply flour, sheep, and forage. the time specified for the departure of the force from sherpur was kept to the day. on the th the brigades moved out a short distance into camp, and on the following morning the march begun in earnest. the distance from cabul to candahar is about miles, and the march naturally divides itself into three parts; from cabul to ghuznee, ninety-eight miles; from ghuznee to khelat-i-ghilzai, one hundred and thirty-four miles; and from khelat-i-ghilzai to candahar, eighty-eight miles, ghuznee was reached on the seventh day, the daily average being fourteen miles--excellent work for troops unseasoned to long continuous travel, tramping steadily in a temperature of from ° to ° in the shade. when possible the force moved on a broad front, the brigades and regiments leading by rotation, and halts were made at specified intervals. the 'rouse' sounded at . a.m. and the march began at four; the troops were generally in camp by two p.m. and the baggage was usually reported all in by five; but the rearguard had both hard work and long hours. there was no sign of opposition anywhere, not a single load of baggage was left behind, comparatively few men fell out foot-sore, and the troops were steadily increasing in endurance and capacity of rapid and continuous marching. at ghuznee there was no rest day, and the steadfast dogged march was resumed on the morning of the th. the strain of this day's long tramp of twenty miles to yergati was severe, but the men rallied gamely, and the general by dint of care and expedient was able to keep up the high pressure. 'the method,' writes general chapman, 'of such marching as was now put in practice is not easy to describe; it combined the extreme of freedom in movement with carefully regulated halts, and the closest control in every portion of the column; it employed the individual intelligence of each man composing the masses in motion, and called on all for exertion in overcoming the difficulties of the march, in bearing its extraordinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishment of the object in view.' on the th a distance of twenty-one miles was covered--the longest day's march made; the effort was distressing owing to the heat and the lack of shade, but it was enforced by the absence of water. there was no relaxation in the rate of marching, and khelat-i-ghilzai was reached on the eighth day from ghuznee, showing a daily average of nearly seventeen miles. the th was a halt day at khelat-i-ghilzai, where sir frederick roberts received a letter from general primrose in candahar, describing the sortie made on the village of deh khoja and giving details of his situation. it was resolved to evacuate khelat-i-ghilzai and take on its garrison with the column, which on the th resumed its march to candahar. on his arrival at tir andaz on the following day the general found a letter from candahar, informing him that at the news of the approach of the cabul force ayoub khan had withdrawn from his investment of candahar, and had shifted his camp to the village of mazra in the urgundab valley, nearly due north of candahar. on the morning of the th general hugh gough was sent forward with two cavalry regiments a distance of thirty-four miles to robat, the main column moving on to khel akhund, half way to the former place. gough was accompanied by captain straton the principal signalling officer of the force, who was successful in communicating with candahar, and in the afternoon colonel st john, major leach, and major adam rode out to robat, bringing the information that ayoub khan was engaged in strengthening his position in the urgundab valley, and apparently had the intention to risk the issue of a battle. on the th the whole force was concentrated at robat; and as it was desirable that the troops should reach candahar fresh and ready for prompt action, the general decided to make the th a rest day and divide the nineteen miles from robat to candahar into two short marches. the long forced march from cabul may be regarded as having ended at robat. the distance between those two places, miles, had been covered in twenty days. it is customary in a long march to allow two rest days in each week, but roberts had granted his force but a single rest day in the twenty days of its strenuous march. including this rest day, the average daily march was a fraction over fifteen miles. as a feat of marching by a regular force of , men encumbered with baggage and followers, this achievement is unique, and it could have been accomplished only by thorough organisation and steady vigorous energy. sir frederick roberts was so fortunate as to encounter no opposition. for this immunity he was indebted mainly to the stern lessons given to the tribesmen by sir donald stewart at ahmed khel and urzoo while that resolute soldier was marching from candahar to cabul, and in a measure also to the good offices of the new ameer. but it must be remembered that roberts had no assurance of exemption from hostile efforts to block his path, and that he marched ever ready to fight. it will long be remembered how when roberts had started on the long swift march, the suspense as to its issue grew and swelled until the strain became intense. the safety of the garrison of candahar was in grave hazard; the british prestige, impaired by the disaster of maiwand, was trembling in the balance. the days passed, and there came no news of roberts and of the , men with whom the wise, daring little chief had cut loose from any base and struck for his goal through a region of ill repute for fanaticism and bitter hostility. the pessimists among us held him to be rushing on his ruin. but roberts marched light; he lived on what the country supplied; he gave the tribesmen no time to concentrate against him; and two days in advance of the time he had set himself he reached candahar at the head of a force in full freshness of vigour and burning with zeal for immediate battle. while halted at robat on the th sir frederick heard from general phayre that his division had been retarded in its march by lack of transport, but that he hoped to have it assembled at killa abdoolla on the th, and would be able to move toward candahar on the th. but as killa abdoolla is distant some eight marches from candahar, it was obvious that general phayre could not arrive in time to share in the impending battle. on the morning of the st the cabul force reached candahar. sir frederick roberts, who had been suffering from fever for some days, was able to leave his dhooly and mount his horse in time to meet general primrose and his officers to the east of deh khoja. the troops halted and breakfasted outside the shikapore gate, while general roberts entered the city and paid a visit to the wali shere ali khan. on his arrival he assumed command of the troops in southern afghanistan; and he remained resting in the city while the cabul force marched to its selected camping ground near the destroyed cantonments on the north-west of candahar. a few shots were fired, but the ground was occupied without opposition. baker's brigade was on the right, camped in rear of picquet hill, in the centre was macpherson's brigade sheltered in its front by karez hill, and on the left among orchards and enclosures was macgregor's brigade, in rear of which was the cavalry. chapter ix: the battle of candahar although yakoub khan had ceased to beleaguer candahar, he had withdrawn from that fortress but a very short distance, and the position he had taken up was of considerable strength. the urgundab valley is separated on the north-west from the candahar plain by a long precipitous spur trending south-west from the mountainous mass forming the eastern boundary of the valley further north. where the spur quits the main range, due north of the city, the murcha pass affords communication between the candahar plain and the urgundab valley. the spur, its summit serrated by alternate heights and depressions, is again crossed lower down by an easy pass known as the babawali kotul. it is continued beyond this saddle for about a mile, still maintaining its south-westerly trend, never losing its precipitous character, and steeply scarped on its eastern face; and it finally ends in the plain in a steep descent of several hundred feet. the section of it from the babawali kotul to its south-western termination is known as the pir paimal hill, from a village of that name in the valley near its extremity. ayoub khan had made his camp near the village of mazra, behind the curtain formed by the spur described, and about a mile higher up in the valley than the point at which the spur is crossed by the road over the babawali kotul. he was thus, with that point artificially strengthened and defended by artillery, well protected against a direct attack from the direction of candahar, and was exposed only to the risk of a turning movement round the extremity of the pir paimal hill. such a movement might be made the reverse of easy. a force advancing to attempt it must do so exposed to fire from the commanding summit of the pir paimal; around the base of that elevation there were several plain villages, and an expanse of enclosed orchards and gardens which strongly held were capable of stubborn defence. in the valley behind the pir paimal hill there was the lofty detached kharoti hill, the fire from which would meet in the teeth a force essaying the turning movement; and the interval between the two hills, through which was the access to the mazra camps, was obstructed by deep irrigation channels whose banks afforded cover for defensive fire, and could be swept by a cross fire from the hills on either flank. [illustration: kandahar.] sir frederick roberts at a glance had perceived that a direct attack by the babawali kotul must involve very heavy loss, and he resolved on the alternative of turning the afghan position. a reconnaissance was made on the afternoon of the st by general gough, accompanied by colonel chapman. he penetrated to within a short distance of the village of pir paimal, where it was ascertained that the enemy were strongly entrenched, and where several guns were unmasked. a great deal of valuable information was obtained before the enemy began to interfere with the leisurely withdrawal. the cavalry suffered little, but the sikh infantry covering the retirement of the reconnaissance were hard pressed by great masses of afghan regulars and irregulars. so boldly did the enemy come on that the third and part of the first brigade came into action, and the firing did not cease until the evening. the enemy were clearly in the belief that the reconnaissance was an advance in force which they had been able to check and indeed drive in, and they were opportunely audacious in the misapprehension that they had gained a success. the information brought in decided the general to attack on the following morning; and having matured his dispositions, he explained them personally to the commanding officers in the early morning of september st. the plan of attack was perfectly simple. the babawali kotul was to be plied with a brisk cannonade and threatened by demonstrations both of cavalry and infantry; while the first and second brigades, with the third in reserve, were to turn the extremity of the pir paimal hill, force the enemy's right in the interval between that hill and the kharoti eminence, take in reverse the babawali kotul, and pressing on up the urgundab valley, carry ayoub khan's principal camp at mazra. the bombay cavalry brigade was to watch the roads over the murcha and babawali kotuls, supported by infantry and artillery belonging to general primrose's command, part of which was also detailed for the protection of the city; and to hold the ground from which the cabul brigades were to advance. general gough was to take the cavalry of the cabul column across the urgundab, so as to reach by a wide circuit the anticipated line of the afghan retreat. soon after nine a.m. the forty-pounders on the right of picquet hill began a vigorous cannonade of the babawali kotul, which was sturdily replied to by the three field-guns the enemy had in battery on that elevation. it had been early apparent that the ayoub's army was in great heart, and apparently meditating an offensive movement had moved out so far into the plain as to occupy the villages of mulla sahibdad opposite the british right, and gundigan on the left front of the british left. both villages were right in the fair way of roberts' intended line of advance; they, the adjacent enclosures, and the interval between the villages were strongly held, and manifestly the first thing to be done was to force the enemy back from those advanced positions. two batteries opened a heavy shell fire on the sahibdad village, under cover of which macpherson advanced his brigade against it, the d goorkhas and d highlanders in his first line. simultaneously baker moved out to the assault of gundigan, clearing the gardens and orchards between him and that village, and keeping touch as he advanced with the first brigade. the shell fire compelled the afghan occupants of sahibdad to lie close, and it was not until they were near the village that macpherson's two leading regiments encountered much opposition. it was carried at the bayonet point after a very stubborn resistance; the place was full of ghazees who threw their lives away recklessly, and continued to fire on the british soldiers from houses and cellars after the streets had been cleared. the d lost several men, but the afghans were severely punished; it was reported that were killed in this village alone. while a detachment remained to clear out the village, the brigade under a heavy fire from the slopes and crest of the fir paimal hill moved on in the direction of that hill's south-western extremity, the progress of the troops impeded by obstacles in the shape of dry water-cuts, orchards, and walled enclosures, every yard of which was infested by enemies and had to be made good by steady fighting. while macpherson was advancing on sahibdad, baker's brigade had been pushing on through complicated lanes and walled enclosures toward the village of gundigan. the opposition experienced was very resolute. the afghans held their ground behind loopholed walls which had to be carried by storm, and they did not hesitate to take the offensive by making vigorous counter-rushes. baker's two leading regiments were the d and the d sikhs. the left wing of the former supported by the th goorkhas, the old and tried comrades of the d, assailed and took the village. its right wing fought its way through the orchards between it and sahibdad, in the course of which work it came under a severe enfilading fire from a loopholed wall which the sikhs on the right were attempting to turn. captain frome and several men had been struck down and the hot fire had staggered the highlanders, when their chief, colonel brownlow, came up on foot. that gallant soldier gave the word for a rush, but immediately fell mortally wounded. after much hard fighting baker's brigade got forward into opener country, but was then exposed to the fire of an afghan battery near the extremity of the pir paimal spur, and to the attacks of great bodies of ghazees, which were withstood stoutly by the sikhs and driven off by a bayonet attack delivered by the highlanders. the two brigades had accomplished the first part of their task. they were now in alignment with each other; and the work before them was to accomplish the turning movement round the steep extremity of the pir paimal ridge. macpherson's brigade, hugging the face of the elevation, brought up the left shoulder and having accomplished the turning movement, swept up the valley and carried the village of pir paimal by a series of rushes. here, however, major white commanding the advance of the d, found himself confronted by great masses of the enemy, who appeared determined to make a resolute stand about their guns which were in position south-west of the babawali kotul. reinforcements were observed hurrying up from ayoub's standing camp at mazra, and the afghan guns on the kotul had been reversed so that their fire should enfilade the british advance. discerning that in such circumstances prompt action was imperative, macpherson determined to storm the position without waiting for reinforcements. the d under major white led the way, covered by the fire of a field battery and supported by the th goorkhas and the d pioneers. springing out of a watercourse at the challenge of their leader, the highlanders rushed across the open ground. the afghans, sheltered by high banks, fired steadily and well; their riflemen from the pir paimal slopes poured in a sharp cross fire; their guns were well served. but the scottish soldiers were not to be denied. their losses were severe, but they took the guns at the point of the bayonet, and valiantly supported by the goorkhas and pioneers, shattered and dispersed the mass of afghans, which was reckoned to have numbered some men. no chance was given the enemy to rally. they were headed off from the pir paimal slopes by macpherson. baker hustled them out of cover in the watercourses in the basin on the left, and while one stream of fugitives poured away across the river, another rolled backward into and through ayoub's camp at mazra. while macpherson had effected his turning movement close under the ridge, baker's troops on the left had to make a wider sweep before bringing up the left shoulder and wheeling into the hollow between the pir paimal and the kharoti hill. they swept out of their path what opposition they encountered, and moved up the centre of the hollow, where their commander halted them until macpherson's brigade on the right, having accomplished its more arduous work, should come up and restore the alignment. baker had sent colonel money with a half battalion away to the left to take possession of the kharoti hill, where he found and captured three afghan guns. pressing toward the northern end of the hill, money to his surprise found himself in full view of ayoub's camp, which was then full of men and in rear of which a line of cavalry was drawn up. money was too weak to attack alone and sent to general baker for reinforcements which, however, could not be spared him, and the gallant money had perforce to remain looking on while the advance of macpherson and baker caused the evacuation of ayoub's camp and the flight of his cavalry and infantry toward the urgundab. but the discovery and capture of five more afghan cannon near babawali village was some consolation for the enforced inaction. considerable numbers of ayoub's troops had earlier pushed through the babawali pass, and moved down toward the right front of general burrows' bombay brigade in position about picquet hill. having assured himself that burrows was able to hold his own, sir frederick roberts ordered macgregor to move the third brigade forward toward pir paimal village, whither he himself rode. on his arrival there he found that the first and second brigades were already quite a mile in advance. the battle really had already been won but there being no open view to the front general ross, who commanded the whole infantry division, had no means of discerning this result; and anticipating the likelihood that ayoub's camp at mazra would have to be taken by storm, he halted the brigades to replenish ammunition. this delay gave opportunity for the entire evacuation of the afghan camp, which when reached without any further opposition and entered at one p.m. was found to be deserted. the tents had been left standing; 'all the rude equipage of a half barbarous army had been abandoned--the meat in the cooking pots, the bread half kneaded in the earthen vessels, the bazaar with its _ghee_ pots, dried fruits, flour, and corn.' ayoub's great marquee had been precipitately abandoned, and the fine carpets covering its floor were left. but in the hurry of their flight the afghans had found time to illustrate their barbarity by murdering their prisoner lieutenant maclaine, whose body was found near ayoub's tent with the throat cut. to this deed ayoub does not seem to have been privy. the sepoys who were prisoners with maclaine testified that ayoub fled about eleven o'clock, leaving the prisoners in charge of the guard with no instructions beyond a verbal order that they were not to be killed. it was more than an hour later when the guard ordered the unfortunate officer out of his tent and took his life. the victory was complete and ayoub's army was in full rout. unfortunately no cavalry were in hand for a pursuit from the mazra camp. the scheme for intercepting the fugitive afghans by sending the cavalry brigade on a wide movement across the urgundab, and striking the line of their probable retreat toward the khakrez valley, may have been ingenious in conception, but in practice did not have the desired effect. but ayoub had been decisively beaten. he had lost the whole of his artillery numbering thirty-two pieces, his camp, an immense quantity of ammunition, about men killed; his army was dispersed, and he himself was a fugitive with a mere handful along with him of the army of , men whom he had commanded in the morning. the battle of candahar was an effective finale to the latest of our afghan wars, and it is in this sense that it is chiefly memorable. the gallant men who participated in the winning of it must have been the first to smile at the epithets of 'glorious' and 'brilliant' which were lavished on the victory. in truth, if it had not been a victory our arms would have sustained a grave discredit. the soldiers of roberts and stewart had been accustomed to fight and to conquer against heavy numerical odds, which were fairly balanced by their discipline and the superiority of their armament. but in the battle of candahar the numerical disparity was non-existent, and ayoub had immensely the disadvantage as regarded trained strength. his force according to the reckoning ascertained by the british general, amounted all told to , men. the strength of the british force, not including the detail of bombay troops garrisoning candahar, was over , . but this army , strong, consisted entirely of disciplined soldiers of whom over one-fifth were europeans. the accepted analysis of ayoub's army shows it to have consisted of regular infantry, regular cavalry, tribal irregular infantry of whom an indefinite proportion was no doubt ghazees, and irregular horsemen. in artillery strength the two forces were nearly equal. when it is remembered that charasiah was won by some soldiers of whom only about were europeans, contending against , afghans in an exceptionally strong position and well provided with artillery, sir frederick roberts' wise decision to make assurance doubly sure in dealing with ayoub at candahar stands out very strikingly. perforce in his battles around cabul he had taken risks, but because those adventures had for the most part been successful he was not the man to weaken the certainty of an all-important issue by refraining from putting into the field every soldier at his disposal. and he was wisely cautious in his tactics. that he was strong enough to make a direct attack by storming the babawali kotul and the pir paimal hill was clear in the light of previous experience. but if there was more 'brilliancy' in a direct attack, there was certain to be heavier loss than would be incurred in the less dashing turning movement, and sir frederick with the true spirit of a commander chose the more artistic and less bloody method of earning his victory. it did not cost him dear. his casualties of the day were thirty-six killed including three officers, and wounded among whom were nine officers. the battle of candahar brought to a close the latest of our afghan wars. sir frederick roberts quitted candahar on the th september, and marched to quetta with part of his division. on the th october, at sibi, he resigned his command, and taking sick leave to england sailed from bombay on the th october. his year of hard and successful service in afghanistan greatly enhanced his reputation as a prompt, skilful, and enterprising soldier. * * * * * the pisheen and sibi valleys are the sole tangible results remaining to us of the two campaigns in afghanistan sketched in the second part of this volume--campaigns which cost the lives of many gallant men slain in action or dead of disease, and involved the expenditure of about twenty millions sterling. lord beaconsfield's vaunted 'scientific frontier,' condemned by a consensus of the best military opinions, was rejected by the liberal government which had recently acceded to power, whose decision was that both the khyber pass and the kuram valley should be abandoned. on this subject sir frederick roberts wrote with great shrewdness: 'we have nothing to fear from afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. it may not be very flattering to our _amour propre_, but i feel sure i am right when i say that the less the afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. should russia in future years attempt to conquer afghanistan, or invade india through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime.' during the winter of - the khyber and the kuram were evacuated by the british troops, the charge of keeping open and quiet the former being entrusted to tribal levies paid by the indian government. so far, then, as regarded the north-western frontier, the _status quo ante_ had been fallen back upon. but there was a keen difference of opinion in regard to the disposition of the salient angle furnished by candahar. throughout the british occupation and the negotiations with abdurrahman, the annexation of candahar had been consistently repudiated. the intention on our part announced was to separate it from cabul, and to place it under the independent rule of a barakzai prince. such a prince had actually been appointed in shere ali khan, and although that incompetent sirdar was wise enough to abdicate a position for which he was not strong enough, this action did not relieve us from our pledges against annexation. nevertheless many distinguished men whose opinions were abstractly entitled to weight, were strongly in favour of our retention of candahar. among those were the late lord napier of magdala, sir henry rawlinson, sir edward hamley, sir donald stewart, and sir frederick roberts. among the authorities opposed to the occupation of candahar were such men as the late lord lawrence and general charles gordon, sir robert montgomery, lord wolseley, sir henry norman, sir john adye, and sir archibald alison. while the professional experts differed and while the 'candahar debates' in parliament were vehement and prolonged, the issue, assuming that fidelity to pledges was still regarded as a national virtue, was perfectly clear and simple. in the frank words of sir lepel griffin: 'we could not have remained in candahar without a breach of faith.' and he added with unanswerable force: 'our withdrawal was in direct accordance with the reiterated and solemn professions which i had been instructed to make, and the assurances of the government of india to the chiefs and people of cabul.... the wisdom of the policy of retiring from candahar may be a fair matter for argument, but it was one on which both governments were agreed. i am convinced that withdrawal, after our public assurances, was the only practicable policy.' lord ripon acted on his instructions 'to keep in view the paramount importance of effecting a withdrawal from candahar on the earliest suitable occasion.' the abdication of the wali shere ali khan cleared the air to some extent. a british garrison under the command of general hume wintered in candahar. ayoub khan was a competitor for the rulership of the southern province, but he received no encouragement, and after some negotiation the ameer abdurrahman was informed that candahar was reincorporated with the kingdom of afghanistan, and it was intimated to him that the capital would be given over to the governor, accompanied by a suitable military force, whom he should send. on the st of april an afghan force entered candahar, followed presently by mahomed hassan khan, the governor nominated by the ameer. general hume soon after marched out, and after halting for a time in the pisheen valley to watch the course of events in candahar, he continued his march toward india. the restless ayoub did not tamely submit to the arrangement which gave candahar to abdurrahman. spite of many arduous difficulties, spite of lack of money and of mutinous troops, he set out toward candahar in july . mahomed hassan marched against him from candahar, and a battle was fought at maiwand on the anniversary of the defeat of general burrows on the same field. ayoub was the conqueror, and he straightway took possession of the capital and was for the time ruler of the province. but abdurrahman, subsidised with english money and english arms, hurried from cabul, encountered ayoub outside the walls of candahar, and inflicted on him a decisive defeat. his flight to herat was followed up, he sustained a second reverse there, and took refuge in persia. abdurrahman's tenure of the cabul sovereignty had been at first extremely precarious; but he proved a man at once strong, resolute, and politic. in little more than a year after his accession he was ruler of shere ali's afghanistan; candahar and herat had both come to him, and that without very serious exertion. he continues to reign quietly, steadfastly, and firmly; and there never has been any serious friction between him and the government of india, whose wise policy is a studied abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of the afghan kingdom. * * * * * index a. abdoolah jan, to be shere ali's successor. abdurrahman, the ameer, son of afzul khan, the eldest son of dost mahomed, his early career; his connection with russia; sounded by the british government; sir lepel griffin's mission to; enters afghanistan; recognised as ameer; defeats ayoub khan; his subsequent reign. adam, major. adve, sir john, against keeping candahar. afghanistan, events in, previous to the first afghan war; 'a bundle of provinces;' its condition under abdurrahman. afghan war, first, the responsibility for; objects of and preparations for. afghan war, second, the policy of england leading to; the force employed in; tangible results to england. afreedi hillmen oppose pollock. afzul khan, the ameer, eldest son of dost mahomed, and father of abdurrahman. armed khel, battle of. airey, captain, a hostage. akbar khan, son of dost mahomed, joins his father with a force; covers his father's retreat; in khooloom; among the ghilzais; in cabul; negotiations with macnaghten; interview with and murder of macnaghten; forecast of his intentions; meets the retreating british army at bootkhak, his demands; conduct to the fugitives; offers to treat; invests jellalabad; resistance to pollock; treatment of his captives; sends the body of elphinstone to jellalabad. akram khan put to death by timour. ali khel. ali musjid fort, the, key of the khyber pass; partially destroyed; sir sam browne's attack upon. alison, sir archibald, against keeping candahar. ameenoolla khan, an afghan chief. ameer. see shere ali, yakoub khan, abdurrahman, afzul khan. anderson, captain, skirmish with the ghilzais. anderson, mrs, her child. anquetil, brigadier, in command of shah soojah's contingent; exertions during the retreat; replaces shelton in command. appleyard, at sir s. browne's attack upon ali musjid. asmai heights, the, afghans driven from; reoccupied; beacon on; fortified by sir f. roberts. asu khan. atta mahomed khan, overcome by general nott. attock river, the. auckland, lord; becomes governor-general of india , his undecided policy; treatment of dost mahomed's appeal; his policy becomes warlike; treaty with runjeet singh and shah soojah; determines to support shah soojah with an army; objects of the expedition; the simla manifesto; disagreement with macnaghten; forbids an expedition against herat; the home government presses the reconsideration of the afghan questions; after the disasters; has the credit of pollock's appointment. aushar; massy at. ayoub khan, brother of yakoub, in command of herat regiments; in possession of herat; his victory at maiwand; besieges cabul; shifts to mazra; defeated by sir f. roberts; drives mahomed hassan out of candahar, defeated by abdurrahman. b. baba wali kotul, pass of the; cannonaded; village of. backhouse, captain, on the council of war at jellalabad; his diary. badakshan. badiabad, the fort of, the captives at the. baghwana, guns abandoned at; recovered. bahadur khan refuses to furnish forage. bajgah. baker, brigadier-general; battle of charasiah; pursues the mutinous sepoys; in the maidan valley; marches to sherpur; takes the takht-i-shah; in the attack on the cantonments; takes the meer akhor fort; in the great march; his position at candahar, the battle. balkh. balla hissar, the; evacuated; cavagnari at; sir f. roberts at; explosions in, evacuated; road cut through. bamian, hill country of; abdurrahman defeated by yakoub khan at. barakzai tribe, the. barter, brigadier-general, commands the infantry at ahmed khel. beaconsfield, lord, 'scientific frontier'. behmaroo ridge; village of. bellew, captain, at the storming of the rikabashee fort. belooch provinces, the. beni badam, baker treacherously attacked at. beni hissar. bentinck, lord william; his opinion of the first afghan expedition. berlin, treaty of. bhawulpore. bhurtpore. biddulph, general, in command of the quetta force. bird, lieutenant, at the storming of the rikabashee fort. bokhara. bolan pass, the. bootkhak. boyd, mrs, in the retreat. broadfoot, captain george, his sappers; in the gundamuk council of war; garrison engineer at jellalabad; urges sale to hold the place; his account of the council of war. broadfoot, with fraser's bengal cavalry, killed at purwan durrah. broadfoot, william, secretary to sir a. burnes, murdered with him. brooke, brigadier-general, killed in attack on deh khoja. browne, sir sam, in command of the khyber column; attack on the ali musjid; reports the death of shere ali; receives yakoub khan; commands in 'the death march'. brownlow, colonel, of the d highlanders, in the attack on the cantonments; killed in the battle of candahar. broughton, lord. _see_ sir john cam hobhouse. brydon, dr, sole survivor of the khyber disaster. burnes, sir alexander, sent by lord auckland to cabul; favourable to dost mahomed, reprimanded by his superiors, leaves cabul; re-enters with shah soojah; his opinion of shah soojah's ministers; advice to macnaghten; his character; murdered; revenged. burrows, brigadier-general, in the maiwand disaster; in the battle of candahar. butler's, lady, picture. butson, captain, killed at sherpur. c. cabul, pass of khoord; description of, slaughter in; pollock's army marches up. cabul, shah soojah ousted from the throne of; shah soojah re-enters; british troops in; dost mahomed surrenders at; murder of burnes at; shah soojah murdered at; nott arrives at; punished; cavagnari at; the sherpur cantonments, north of; roberts near; mahomed jan plans to take; hostility of villages round; mushk-i-alum governor of; re-occupied by roberts; fortifications and communications improved; sir lepel griffin arrives at; holds a durbar at. campbell, sent by shah soojah to assist burnes, fails. candahar, siege of, by shah soojah, relieved by dost mahomed; entered by shah soojah and keane; occupied by british troops; independent province of; timour, shah soojah's viceroy at; british troops to leave; nott in; afghans beaten off; general stuart's march on; evacuated; to be separated from cabul; shere ali khan governor of; burrow's army withdrawn into; sir f. roberts marches on; arrives at; battle of; question of retention of; battle between abdurrahman and ayoub khan at. cavagnari, sir louis; ineffectual attempt to enter cabul; correspondence with yakoub khan; at cabul, his character; the massacre. chamberlain, sir neville, abortive attempt to enter afghanistan as envoy. chambers, colonel, defeats the ghilzais. chapman, colonel (now major-general) e. f., chief of the staff; in the great march; reconnaissance before the battle of candahar. charasiah, battle of. chardeh valley, the. charikar, capital of the kohistan, troops quartered in; disaster of; punishment of; abdurrahman arrives at. chisholm, captain, wounded at the seah sung ridge. clark, lieutenant-colonel. cleland, gallant conduct of. clerk, mr, demands right of way through the punjaub. clibborn, colonel, defeated by beloochees. cobbe, leads the attack of the peiwar kotul. codrington, commandant of charikar; killed; revenged. commissariat fort, the. conolly, lieutenant john; a hostage. cook, major, v.c., of the goorkha regiment, killed at the takht-i-shah. cotton, sir willoughby, commands first infantry division; on the march to cabul; in chief command in afghanistan; a respectable nonentity.'. craigie, defence of khelat-i-ghilzai. crispin, with eraser's bengal cavalry, killed at purwan durrah. cruickshank, captain, killed at the attack on deh khoja. cunyngham, lieutenant dick, v.c., gallant conduct at the takht-i-shah. cutch. d. dadur, in. dakka. daoud shah, yakoub khan's general; accompanies the ameer to roberts' camp. deh-i-afghan, a suburb of cabul. deh khati. deh khoja. deh mazung. dehrawat. deig. dennie, colonel, of the th, at the taking of ghuznee; in command at bamian; replaces sale in command; heads a sortie from jellalabad; in the council of war; commands the centre at the great sortie and is killed. dennis, colonel. dodgin, captain, valour in the retreat. dooranees, the. dost mahomed, origin; early career; asks for terms; forsaken by his troops; a fugitive; in bokhara and khooloom; at bamian and kohistan; surrenders to macnaghten; sent into british india; to be allowed to return to afghanistan; his return to his sovereignty; dies. drew, colonel, enters the peiwar kotul. duncan, general. dundas, captain, killed at sherpur. dunham-massy, brigadier-general. durand, on the siege of herat; on lord auckland's manifesto; on macnaghten's appointment; at siege of ghuznee; on the restoration of shah soojah; on dost mahomed's surrender; on the retreat on jellalabad; on macnaghten's ill-faith. e. edwardes, sir henry, on lord auckland's manifesto. ellenborough, lord, on sale's brigade; first manifesto; vacillations; orders the removal of the gates of somnath from sultan mahmoud's tomb; reception of the returning armies. ellis, mr, british envoy to persia. elphinstone, general; succeeds cotton in chief command; his character and infirmities; orders sale to return to cabul; about to leave india; orders the abandonment of the commissariat fort; the duke of wellington's verdict on his position; hopeless; 'scents treachery'; calls upon pottinger to open negotiations; in the retreat; consents to hand over the ladies; and their husbands; refuses akbar's proposal that the europeans should lay down their arms; conference; made a hostage; at jugdulluk; death. elphinstone, mr, on the afghan expedition. england, brigadier, defeated at the kojuk pass. evatt, surgeon-major, on the 'death march.' eyre, vincent, opinion on shelton's defeat at behmaroo; description of the sufferings of the retreat; his 'captivity.'. f. fane, sir harry, commander-in-chief; heads the expedition to cabul. farrington, routs uktar khan at zemindawar. ferozepore. forbes, lieutenant, of the d highlanders, killed at the takht-i-shah. fraser's bengal cavalry at purwan durrah. frome, captain, killed in the battle of candahar. futtehabad. futteh ali, shah of persia. futteh jung, second son and successor of shah soojah; abdicates. futteh khan, eldest brother of dost mahomed, his fate. g. galbraith, colonel, killed at maiwand. garmao hills, the. ghazees. ghilzais, the; description of; brave conduct of under the 'gooroo,'; gain terms from macgregor; attack sale's force; slaughter by, in the khoord cabul; hang on the rear of the retreat; slaughter by, at jugdulluk; attack pollock; harass money. ghirishk. ghuznee. siege of; occupied by british troops; surrendered to the afghans; retaken by nott. goad, captain, killed. gool mahomed khan. goorkha regiments. gooroo, the ghilzai leader. gordon, colonel, his command in the attack on the spingawai and peiwar kotuls. gordon, general charles, against keeping candahar. gorebund river, the. gortschakoff. gough, captain, with the th lancers; in the charge of december th. gough, general charles. gough, general hugh. grant, dr, gallant conduct at charikar. green, in the retreat. grenadiers, its, the. griffin, sir lepel, his mission to arrange for the succession to yakoub khan; on the retention of candahar. griffiths, major, gallant march from kubbar-i-jubbar; storms mahomed shereef's fort. guides, the; in the attack on the beni-hissar. gul koh ridge, the. gundamuk, sale's council of war at; final tragedy of the retreat near; evacuated; pollock's troops concentrate at; treaty of ; conclusion of. gundigan. gwaga pass, the. h. habib killa. hadji khan khakur. haines, sir f., commander-in-chief. hall, captain. hamilton, lieutenant w. r. p., v.c., with cavagnari at cabul; killed. hamley, sir edward, in favour of keeping candahar. hanz-i-madat. hardy, lieutenant, killed. hassan abdul. hassan khan, governor of maidan, killed. haughton, desperately wounded in the charikar disaster. havelock, captain henry, aide-de-camp to sir w. cotton; on shah soojah's reception in candahar; description of shah soojah; staff officer to sale; authenticates broadfoot's account of sale's council of war at jellalabad; in the great sortie from jellalabad. hay, at the siege of ghuznee. hazaras, horde of. helmund river, the. hensman, mr; on the defence of sherpur; on the battle of ahmed khel; on abdurrahman. herat, persia and; siege of, by the persians; independent; macnaghten presses for an expedition against; ayoub khan in; ayoub driven from, by abdurrahman. highlanders, the d and d. hills, major-general, governor of cabul. hindoo koosh, the. hobhouse, sir john cam, lord broughton, president of the board of control, claims the responsibility of the first afghan war in , contradictory statement in . huft kotul, the; last stand of the afghans at. hughes, brigadier-general, at ahmed khel. hume, general. hyderabad. hyder khan, son of dost mahomed, and governor of ghuznee, taken prisoner. hydrabad. i. indian contingent in the mediterranean, the. indikee, mutinous sepoys captured in. indus, the. irrawady, the. istalif, a kohistan village destroyed. jacob's rifles ( th native infantry) at the maiwand disaster. jadran. jazee, anderson encounters ghilzais at. jellalabad; british troops quartered in; march on resolved upon; durand's opinion of; akbar's conditions for the evacuation of; defence of; pollock at; elphinstone buried at; partially destroyed; sir s. browne's camp near; disaster to the th hussars near. jenkins, colonel, of the guides; storms the asmai heights; adroit evacuation of asmai heights. jenkins, william, secretary to cavagnari. johnson, captain, in charge of the treasury at cabul; hostage; arranges the redemption of the captives. johnson, colonel alured, commands the artillery in the great march. jubbur khan, brother to dost mahomed, ; in charge of dost mahomed's family at khooloom. jugdulluk valley, the; retreating column harassed at; slaughter at; captives arrive at; pollock engaged with ghilzais at. julgah fort, the, sale fails to take. jumrood. k. kamran, shah of herat. karezah. karez hill, the. karez meer. karrack. kata kustia. kattiawar. kaufmann, general. kaye, sir john; history of the afghan war; opinion of burnes; account of macnaghten's murder. keane, sir john, commander-in-chief of the bombay army; marches towards hyderabad; his character; marches on cabul; siege of ghuznee; camp near cabul. kelly, dr ambrose, with cavagnari. kershaw, at siege of ghuznee. khakrez valley, the. kharoti hill, the. khel akhund. khelat; occupied by nott. khelat, khans of. see meerab, nusseer. khelat-i-ghilzai; occupied by nott; garrisoned; garrison withdrawn; one of the stages on the great march. khig. khiva. khoda buxsh. khooloom; akbar at. khooloom, wali of. khost valley, the. khushk-i-nakhud, skirmish at. khyber-jellalabad-gundamuk route, the. khyber pass, the; the clans of; ghilzais intercept the communication by; wild fails to force; pollock marches through; cavagnari turned back from; question of the retention of; evacuated. killa abdoolla. killa kazee; massy at. king's garden, the, at cabul. knowles. kohdaman. koh-i-noor, the, taken by runjeet singh from shah soojah. kohistan, dost mahomed in. kojuk pass, the; brigadier england repulsed at. kokoran. kolum-dil-khan. kotwal of cabul, the, tried for the massacre of cavagnari, etc. kondooz. kottree. kubbar-i-jubbar. kuram valley, the. kurdurrah. kushi; general roberts meets yakoub khan at. kutti sung. l. lahore, mr clerk at. lake. lancers, the th. lancers, bengal, the. lawrence, captain, warns macnaghten; made prisoner; sends messages from the chiefs to elphinstone; description of the retreat; made hostage; in captivity. lawrence, lord, his 'masterly inactivity;' against keeping candahar. leach, major. lockhart. logur valley, the; plain; river. loodianah, shah soojah's refuge in. lord, dr, political officer in the bamian district; killed at purwan durrah. loveday, lieutenant, political officer at khelat, barbarously murdered. lughman valley, the. lughmanee, pottinger besieged in. lundi kotul. luttabund. lytton, lord, viceroy, ; his instructions; ratifies the treaty of gunda-gundamuk; prepares to revenge cavagnari; decides that yakoub khan does not return to afghanistan; recommends abdurrahman. m. macgregor, brigadier-general charles, c. b., chief of sir f. roberts' staff; recovers the guns at baghwana; in the great march; in the battle of candahar. macgregor, major, deceived by the ghilzai chief of tezeen; sale's adviser. mackenzie, captain colin, at the defeat of dost mahomed near bamian; gallant conduct of; with macnaghten; a hostage; story of the retreat. mackenzie, captain stuart, gallant conduct of. mackeson, political officer at peshawur. mackrell, colonel, killed at the storming of the rikabashee fort. maclaine, lieutenant, of the horse artillery, in the maiwand disaster; taken prisoner; murdered. maclaren. macnaghten, lady; in the retreat. macnaghten, sir william hay, envoy to shah soojah, influence with lord auckland; his use of bribery; on the reception of the shah at candahar; enters cabul with shah soojah; convinced of the shah's popularity; real sovereign of afghanistan; his mistakes; relations with the ghilzais; consents to the abandonment of the balla hissar; relations with herat; nervous about the communication; relation with dost mahomed; proposes to put a price on his head; receives his surrender; his peculiar temperament; his finance; discovers the unpopularity of the shah; his conduct to the 'gooroo' and ghilzais; appointed governor of bombay; called upon to retrench; his conduct to elphinstone; despatches sale; his quarters at cabul; demands the reduction of the rikabashee fort; depression; negotiation about the retreat; murdered. macpherson, brigadier-general; in the december operations round cabul; in the great march; in the battle of candahar. mahmood khan, fort of. mahmoud shah, brother of shah soojah. mahomed hassan khan, abdurrahman's governor of candahar, defeated by ayoub. mahomed jan, a warduk general, defends the asmai heights; attacked by massy and macpherson; attack on the sherpur cantonments. mahomed meerza, shah of persia, his ambition, designs on herat. mahomed shah khan, akbar's lieutenant. mahomed shereef, fort of. mahomed surwar, agent of sir lepel griffin. mahomed zemaun khan. maidan plain, the. mainwaring, mrs, in the retreat. maiwand; disaster at; battle at, between mahomed hassan and ayoub. manderson. mangal. marshall, colonel, routs nusseer khan. massy, brigadier-general; occupies the shutargurdan pass; takes possession of the sherpur cantonments; in the attack on mahomed jan; in the defence of the sherpur cantonments. maude, general. maule, lieutenant. mazra; ayoub's camp at, during battle of candahar. m'caskill, brigadier-general, with pollock; in the last skirmishes. meer akhor fort, the, blown up. meer butcha, a chief of kohistan. meerza ahmed, a dooranee chief. mehrab, khan of khelat. michnai pass, the. m'neill, british envoy to persia. mohun lal, agent for macnaghten's 'blood money.' money, colonel, left to hold the shutargurdan pass; brought out by gough; in the battle of candahar. monteath, colonel, sent against the ghilzais; in the council of war at jellalabad; at the great sortie. montenaro, captain, killed at the meer akhor fort. montgomery, sir robert, against keeping candahar. mookoor. moolla shikore, shah soojah's minister. mooltan. moore, elphinstone's servant. morgan. mulla sahibdad. mundabad. murcha pass. musa khan, heir of yakoub khan. mushaki. mushk-i-alum, a moulla of ghuznee; his influence; governor of cabul, fires the beacon on the asmai heights. mustaphi, the, punished for the cavagnari massacre. n. naghloo. nanuchee pass, the. napier, lieutenant scott, of the d highlanders. napier, lord, of magdala, in favour of keeping candahar. nek mahomed khan, afghan commander at the battle of charasiah. nepaul. neville, of the bengal lancers. nicholl, captain, his heroism in the retreat. nijrao. norman, sir henry, against keeping candahar. northbrook, lord, relations with shere ali. nott, general; in command at candahar; occupies khelat; his character; discipline; disagrees with macnaghten; receives orders from elphinstone to evacuate candahar, refuses to obey; fighting with meerza ahmed; his letter to brigadier england; lord ellenborough repeats orders to evacuate candahar, obeys; marches towards cabul; drives afghans out of ghuznee; refuses to aid in the rescue of the prisoners. nugent, lieutenant, killed. nusseer, khan of khelat. nuttall, general. o. oldfield, captain, in the council of war at jellalabad. orenburg. osman khan. outram pursues dost mahomed; raid on the ghilzais. p. palliser, brigadier-general. palmer, colonel, tortured. palmerston's, lord, ultimatum to persia. panjshir river, the. paskevitch, general. pathans. peat, captain, at siege of ghuznee. peiwar pass, the. pelly, sir lewis, at the conference of peshawur. peroffsky. persia, relations between great britain and. peshawur. peshbolak. petroffsky, a russian writer. phayre, brigadier-general. picquet hill, the, attacked by ayoub khan. pioneers, the. pisheen valley, the; retained by us. pollock, general; arrives in peshawur; at jellalabad; his qualifications; his work; the rescue and retribution; contrast between nott and; arrives at cabul; punishment of cabul. ponsonby, with fraser's bengal cavalry in purwan durrah. poole, captain, wounded. pottinger, major, defends herat against the persians; warns macnaghten of the danger in kohistan; in the disaster at charikar; conducts negotiations for the retreat; a hostage. powell, captain, killed. poyndah khan, father to dost mahomed. primrose, general; in the battle of candahar. punjaub regiments. punjaub, the. purwan durrah valley, the. q. quetta; occupied. r. rattray. rawlinson, sir henry; his warnings to macnaghten; macnaghten's orders to, respecting uktar khan; in favour of retaining candahar. rawul pindi. rhotas heights, the. rikabashee fort, the. ripon, marquis of, viceroy; in favour of the settlement with abdurrahman; sanctions general roberts' march on candahar. robat, great march ends at. roberts, colonel. roberts, sir frederick, in command of the kuram column; his scheme of operations; battle of the peiwar kotul; his previous career; with the army of invasion; battle of charasiah; at cabul; revenge for cavagnari; intercourse with yakoub khan; in the sherpur cantonment; active operations round cabul; on the defensive in sherpur; the great march on candahar; battle of candahar; in favour of keeping candahar. roree. rose, ensign, in the retreat from charikar. ross, major-general john; in the great march; in the battle of candahar. runjeet singh sikh ruler of the punjaub, treatment of shah soojah; occupies peshawur; death. russia, relations with persia; policy towards dost mahomed; afghanistan to be used as a 'buffer state' between british india and; russo-turkish war; relations with abdurrahman; opinion of roberts on afghanistan and. s. safi tribe, the, engage macpherson. sale, lady, her journal; account of the retreat; akbar's kindness to. sale, sir robert; at siege of ghuznee; in command at cabul; chastises the kohistanees; his character; fighting in the khoord cabul at bootkhak; at gundamuk; occupies jellalabad; defence of jellalabad; fighting with the ghilzais at jugdulluk; ordered to rescue captives. saleh mahomed khan, arranges the escape of the captives. salisbury, lord. sangbur. scinde. scott, major. schuyler, mr eugene, interviews abdurrahman. seah sung heights, the. seh baba. seistan, province of. shafto, captain, killed at the balla hissar. shagai ridge, the. shah bagh, the. shahbaz khan. shahjui. shahlez. shakespear, sir richmond. sheikabad. shelton. brigadier, arrives at jellalabad; character; at cabul; receives contradictory orders from macnaghten; in the balla hissar; takes the rikabashee fort; opposes the removal of the troops into the balla hissar; attacks bemaroo; commands the main body in the retreat; his dogged valour; a hostage. sher-derwaza heights, the. shere ali, the ameer, son of dost mahomed, accession and character; refuses to receive a resident; negotiations with lord lytton; cordial reception of the russians, refuses to receive sir neville chamberlain; death at balkh; his mistakes. shere ali khan, wali of candahar; abdicates. sherpur cantonments, the; description of; operations round; defence of; durbar at; interview between sir donald stewart and abdurrahman at. shikarpore. shilgur. shumshoodeen, an afghan leader. shutargurdan pass, the. sibi; retained by us. sikhs. sikh feudatory states contingent. sikh regiments. singiri. skinner, captain, a hostage. slade, at the maiwand disaster. somnath, gates of. soojah-ool-moolk, shah; early career; intrigues; lord auckland determines to restore him; his share in the expedition; replaced on the throne, entry into cabul; his position; with macnaghten at cabul; refuses to see dost mahomed; goes to jellalabad; his errors; disaffection towards him; recommends the occupation of the balla hissar; stipulations with regard to; remains in cabul; letter to sale at jellalabad; murdered. soorkhab. souter, captain, escapes from the slaughter at gundamuk. spens, captain of the d highlanders, killed. spingawai kotul, the, attack on, by roberts. stanhope, mr, on the treaty of gundamuk. stewart, sir donald; marches into candahar; begins his march to cabul; battle of ahmed khel and urzoo; continues his march to cabul; relations with abdurrahman; in favour of keeping candahar. st john, colonel. stoddart, colonel. stolietoff, defender of the schipka pass, received by shere ali. 'storms and sunshine of a soldier's life,' by colin mackenzie. straton, captain. sukkur. suliman mountains, the. sultan jan. sultan mahmoud, tomb of. sung-i-nawishta pass, the. surkh kotul, the. sutlej river, the. swayne, major. syghan. t. tagao. takht-i-shah peak, the. tashkend, russians at; shere ali at; abdurrahman at. tezeen. thal-chotiali. thelwall, brigadier. thomson, engineer to keane. timour, prince, son of shah soojah, supported by runjeet singh; soojah's viceroy at candahar; cruelty. tir-andaz. todd, major, political agent in herat. tootundurrah fort, sale takes. trevor, with macnaghten at his death; murdered. troup, captain. tunghee tariki, gorge of, scene of slaughter. turnuk. turrai. tytler. u. uktar khan, a discontented dooranee chief; macnaghten offers reward for his head. urgundab. urgundeh. urzoo, affair of. v. vakeel, the, obnoxious minister of shah soojah. viceroys, _see_ lords w. bentinck, auckland, ellenborough, northbrook, lytton, and the marquis of ripon. vikkur. w. wade, escorts prince timour by the khyber route. wali mahomed, governor designate of turkestan. warren, evacuates the commissariat fort. watson, colonel, in command of the sikh feudatory contingent. wellesley, the marquis, criticism on lord auckland's decision. wellington, duke of, criticism on lord auckland's decision; on elphinstone's position at cabul; on english troops v. hillmen. white, major, of the d highlanders, at the attack on beni hissar; in the battle of candahar. wild, brigadier, attempts to force the khyber pass. willshire, general, harassed in the bolan pass; punishes khelat. wolseley, lord, against keeping candahar. worsley, colonel. wymer, colonel, hard fighting with the ghilzais. y. yahuja khan. yakoub khan, son of shere ali, released and made regent; intercourse with sir sam browne; question of his complicity in the cavagnari massacre; takes refuge in the english camp; a prisoner; the viceroy's decision against his return to power. yar mahomed, shah kamran's minister. yergati. z. zakariah khan, yakoub's brother. zandeh, captives carried to. zemindawar, country of. zimma, abdurrahman and sir lepel griffin at. zurmut. * * * * * the end. * * * * * http://www.archive.org/details/scenesadventures taylrich transcriber's note: variations in spelling and hyphenation have been retained as in the original. some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. a complete list follows the text. text italicized in the original are surrounded by underscores (_italics_). the 'oe' ligature is represented as oe. pound symbol (lb with a bar) represented as lb. scenes and adventures in affghanistan, by william taylor, late troop serjeant-major of the fourth light dragoons. london: t. c. newby, , mortimer st., cavendish sq. and t. & w. boone, , new bond street. . t. c. newby, printer, , mortimer street, cavendish square. to florentine lady sale, the following pages are inscribed as a tribute of respect and admiration for the heroism by her displayed during the late campaign in affghanistan. contents. preface. chapter i. proclamation of lord auckland. the ghauts. fatal practical joke. embarkation at bombay. mishap at sea. landing at bominacote. review of the troops by sir john keane. suicide of lieutenant fyers. advance upon scinde. tattah. the moslems and hindoos. tombs of tattah. hindoo superstition. adventure of a dak, or native postman. death of a smuggler. jurruk. belochee thefts. feat of a native trooper. chapter ii. singular fate of three officers of the queen's royals. evacuation of jurruk by the inhabitants. desertion of camel drivers. preparations for the attack and defence of hyderabad. submission of the ameers. consternation of the natives at the arrival of a steamer in the indus. baida. accident to a dragoon. the lukkee pass. kotiah. loss of two soldiers of the th foot. sehwan. arrival of sir henry fane. asiatic jugglers. conversion of a european soldier to the mahommedan faith. chapter iii. larkhana. departure of the commander-in-chief for candahar. capture of belochee thieves. ludicrous scene in the bazaar. tremendous hurricane. an irish colonel's appeal to his men. murder of cooks belonging to the army. a native funeral. the bholun pass. massacre of camp followers. ill-timed merriment. animal instinct. chapter iv. skirmish with the enemy. belochee waggery. cleverly planned capture of a bruhee. sufferings from want of water. valley of shawle. quettah. belochee cruelties. adventures in a stone quarry. treachery of the khan of khelat. murder of another cook. poisoning of the wells. fortunate discovery. chapter v. the khojuck pass. descent of the troops. shocking death of a camel driver. detection and escape of an affghan thief. loss of cavalry horses. candahar. arrival of shah soojah. condition of the troops. attempt of the natives to cut off a convoy of provisions. asiatic mendicants. the mosque at candahar. arrival of affghan auxiliaries. chapter vi. installation of shah soojah. attack on the camel guards. heroism of an affghan youth. murder of cornet inverarity of the th lancers. departure from candahar. the ghiljie hills. locusts. arrival of new auxiliaries. camel batteries. hyder khail. arrival at ghuznee. tomb of mahommed. remains of the old town of ghuznee. chapter vii. reconnaisance of the fortress. skirmish with the enemy. rejoicing of the garrison at our supposed defeat. preparation for a coup de main. engineer operations. storming and taking of the fortress. chapter viii. an affghan heroine. capture of hyder khan the commandant of ghuznee. escape of ghool mahommed khan. singular discovery of a map on the person of an affghan chief. description of the affghan women. the ruling passion. treasuretrove. the golden shield. chase of the enemy. just retribution. chapter ix. attempt to assassinate the shah. court martial on an affghan chief. visit to the hospital at ghuznee. hatred of the affghans towards the native troops. departure from ghuznee. capture of a battery. fatal accident. summary punishment. arrival at cabul. pursuit of dost mahommed and treachery of a native chief. description of cabul. the balar hissar. mosque of the emperor baber. the bazaar. chapter x. triumphant entry of shah soojah into cabul. the cabul races. death of brigadier general arnold. sale of the general's effects. arrival of prince timour. the sikhs. murder of colonel herring. arrival of money and supplies from the upper provinces. chapter xi. institution of the order of the doorannee empire. murder of a private of the th light infantry. departure from cabul. return to ghuznee. accident to the revd. mr. pigot. discovery of the skeletons of british soldiers. horse-steaks. treachery of some ghiljie chiefs and destruction of their fort. adventure of a dragoon. loss of a cook. chapter xii. arrival at quettah. storming of the fortress of khelat. suicide of a trooper belonging to the horse artillery. departure from quettah. the bholun pass. dadur. bagh. breaking out of the cholera. death of doctor forbes. shikarpoor. death of captain ogle. sukkur-bukkur. death of lieutenant janvrin. wedding ceremonies of the natives. breaking up of the bombay column. departure of brigadier scott. boar hunt. larkhana. sehwan. kurrachee. feast of the mohurrum. embarkation and arrival at bombay. preface. the following narrative is put forth with all the diffidence and apprehension that a mind unaccustomed to literary pursuits, and limited in its opportunities of improvement, naturally feels on presenting itself for the first time to the notice of the public. the doubts i entertain, regarding the prudence of the step i have taken, are in no small degree increased by the circumstances under which the work has been executed, the details having been entirely furnished from memory, and without the aid of any sort of data or memoranda. i should never have dreamt of undertaking such a task, had not the partiality of good natured, though perhaps misjudging friends, overcame the scruples which a consciousness of my own deficiencies excited, and induced me to commit to paper the scenes with which they professed themselves to have been amused. having candidly admitted the demerits of the work, i may now be allowed to say a few words in its favour. should it be taken up in the expectation of supplying materials for the defence of an erroneous policy, or the gratification of party spleen, it will fall short of the hopes of the reader, for i have endeavoured to steer clear of every thing like political allusion in the fear of adding to difficulties, which already appeared sufficiently formidable, and of wrecking my little bark on a stormy and troubled sea. mine is the simple, straightforward narrative of a soldier, more accustomed to wield the sword than the pen, and caring little for the conflicting interests or animosities of party. with such a small amount of profession, it is not unreasonable to hope that the public will extend towards it some portion of that generous indulgence with which it is ever wont to regard the literary efforts of the humbler classes. _london, december th, ._ affghanistan. chapter i. proclamation of lord auckland.--the ghauts.--fatal practical joke.--embarkation at bombay.--mishap at sea.--landing at bominacote.--review of the troops by sir john keane.--suicide of lieutenant fyers.--advance upon scinde.--tattah.--the moslems and hindoos.--tombs of tattah.--hindoo superstition.--adventure of a dak, or native postman.--death of a smuggler.--jurruk--belochee thefts.--feat of a native trooper. towards the latter end of august , rumours reached bombay and the various military stations in the deccan, that the troops were about to be called into active service, and that the scene of operations was to be at a distance from our indian territories. the extensive preparations soon after set on foot, and the unusual activity observable in the various arsenals of the presidency, left no doubt as to the truth of these reports, and the only subject of speculation that remained was, the precise destination of the forces. public curiosity was at length set at rest, by the arrival of a proclamation from the governor general, directing the assemblage of an army for service across the indus, and explaining at length the intentions of government. it will not be necessary for the purposes of this narrative that i should canvass the merits of this remarkable document, or enter upon a discussion of the policy on which it was founded. sufficient is it for me to say that the objects which it professed, were the protection of our commerce, and the safety of our indian frontiers, both of which were menaced by the intrigues and aggressions of persia. having detailed the steps taken by dost mahommed in furtherance of the views of that power, and expressed its conviction, that as long as cabul remained under his government there was no hope that the interests of our indian empire would be preserved inviolate, the proclamation proceeded to state, that pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, justified us in replacing on the throne of afghanistan, shah sooja-ool-moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of joint resistance to external aggression which were at that time judged necessary by the british government; and who on his empire being usurped by its present rulers had found an honorable asylum in the british dominions. such in a few words were the objects set forth in lord auckland's proclamation and never has unfortunate state paper been assailed with such hostility and bitterness. whether the censures with which it has been visited are deserved or not i will leave to others to decide, contenting myself with the observation, that failure and success are but too apt to sway men's judgments and to give a character to the circumstances that have led to them. the bombay troops ordered to form part of the army of the indus consisted of her majesty's nd, or queen's royals, the th regiment of foot, of her majesty's th light dragoons, the st regiment of bombay light cavalry, two troops of the honorable company's horse artillery, one company of foot artillery, the th regiment of native infantry, the poona irregular horse, with the sappers and miners, the whole constituting an effective force of about , men, under the command of lieutenant-general sir john keane. the th light dragoons were stationed at kirkee, about miles from bombay, when orders arrived that the detachment should proceed to the presidency, for the purpose of embarking for its destination. we left our cantonments early in november, and overtook the artillery, which had preceded us from poona, at the ghauts. we halted here two days, and were joined by her majesty's th regiment of foot, shortly after our arrival. short as was our stay, it was signalised by one of those practical jokes which so often terminate in fatal results, but which, unfortunately, seem to have no effect in rendering people cautious. some artillerymen having been out shooting game, one of them brought home a loaded gun and carelessly left it in his tent. several of his comrades came in, in the afternoon, and in the course of a carousal one of them took the loaded piece, and presenting it at the nearest soldier, jestingly threatened to shoot him. he had scarcely uttered the word when the gun went off and stretched his unfortunate comrade dead at his feet. nothing could equal the distress and remorse of the homicide at the thoughtless act by which he had deprived a fellow creature of life, and it had a marked effect on his future character and conduct. the passage through the ghauts is romantic and picturesque in the extreme, the road lying over stupendous mountains and through deep ravines for the length of about seven or eight miles. some beautiful country houses have been lately erected here by a wealthy parsee of bombay, on sites which command the finest and most extensive views in the neighbourhood. these delightful summer retreats are surrounded by every luxurious accessory that wealth and taste can supply, and the governor is occasionally glad to fly to them for a short respite from the cares of office. we arrived at bombay on the th of november, and found it a scene of busy excitement. the streets were filled with troops and artillery proceeding to the place of embarkation, and the inhabitants flocked in thousands to the bunder head, to witness their departure. the harbour was literally alive with the numerous small craft employed in conveying the troops to the different transports, while the blue peter flying at the mast head of the latter announced that we had very little time for delay. we accordingly hurried down to the beach, and were immediately put on board the cambridge. we found it so crowded that major daly, our commanding officer, was compelled to remonstrate with the authorities on the subject, and after some trouble, he succeeded in getting from seventy to eighty men removed to the other vessels. this did not sufficiently lessen the inconvenience to prevent sickness breaking out amongst us, and we lost one of the horse artillery before we were many days at sea. the passage was short, but not unattended with danger. the cambridge struck on a sand bank, off the gulf of cutch, and it was with considerable difficulty that she was relieved from her perilous position. we were kept on the bank about four hours, and it may easily be conceived that no small degree of alarm and uneasiness prevailed amongst the landsmen, who were unaccustomed to dangers of this description. the night was pitch dark, and the breakers sounded unpleasantly near us. captain douglass the commander of the vessel, appeared however all confidence, and after trying a variety of experiments to get her off, he hit upon one which luckily proved successful. the whole of the troops on board having been ordered upon deck, the captain directed them to jump three times simultaneously. this was done by our fellows with a hearty good will, and had the instant effect of loosening the vessel from the bank, and enabling her to float again into deep water. we arrived off the mouth of the indus in about fourteen days after our departure from bombay. the troops were immediately disembarked in _pattemars_, small and clumsy coasting vessels peculiar to the country. we reached bominacote the next evening without any other accident than the sinking of three boats, two containing artillery horses, and the other officers' supplies, to the value it was said of £ , which had been sent on speculation with the army by an eminent parsee firm at bombay. bominacote forms a sort of harbour of refuge for the vessels which carry on a trade along this line of coast. the village itself consists of a few filthy huts, and its inhabitants spend their lives in hunting and fishing. both males and females are in a state of almost savage nature little covering being used by them beyond the loin _goity_ or covering for the loins common to the natives of these parts. the proverbial vanity of the weaker sex was, however, displayed in the eagerness with which they bartered their most precious articles for a few handkerchiefs of manchester make that we happened to have with us. as soon as the horses belonging to the cavalry, and the military stores had been landed, it was decided that we should advance upon scinde in two divisions; the infantry under the command of brigadier sir thomas wiltshire, and the cavalry under brigadier scott. previous to our departure the troops were reviewed by lieutenant-general sir john keane, who had followed us from bombay in the victoria steamer. sir john expressed himself in terms of warm satisfaction at the high state of discipline and ardour of the men, who were eager to be led against the enemy. the usual precautions on entering hostile territories were now taken, the cavalry being ordered to sharpen their sabres, and the infantry served with sixty rounds of ball cartridge. before we took our departure from bominacote, a melancholy circumstance occurred, which threw a temporary gloom over us. as the men were sitting down to dinner the report of a pistol was heard in the officers' lines. suspecting some accident i ran to the spot, accompanied by two of my comrades, and discovered lieutenant fyers, one of the officers of my own regiment, lying dead in his tent, with a freshly discharged pistol in his right hand. the unfortunate gentleman had placed the muzzle of it to his mouth, and the ball, taking a slanting direction, had passed out over the left ear. for several days previous he had been observed to labour under great depression of spirits, but no immediate cause could be assigned for the fatal act. his loss was generally lamented, for he was both a good officer and an estimable member of society. our route lay through a country barren in the extreme, scarcely a vestige of vegetation being any where to be met with. of the natives we saw or heard nothing, for as we advanced they fell back, deserting the villages and betaking themselves to their mountain fastnesses. it being now near christmas the men suffered some inconvenience from the sudden transitions of temperature, the days being sultry and the nights extremely cold. the consequence was that the dysentery broke out amongst us, and several fatal cases occurred. at the close of the third days' march reports became current through the camp that we should soon see the enemy. it was said that a force of ten thousand horse and foot was about to take the field against us, and captain outram was despatched towards hyderabad, to ascertain the truth of the story. he brought back information that the enemy were ensconced within the walls of that town, and appeared to have little disposition to leave them. we now began to find the difference between quarters and camp, for the general thought it necessary to send out frequent reconnoitering parties and pickets, in order to guard against surprise. early on the morning of the fifth day, we arrived at tattah, a place of considerable antiquity, and, i believe, mentioned in holy writ. the indus formerly washed the walls of this town, but owing to some natural or artificial ingredient the course of the river has been completely changed, and it now runs at about four miles distance. emerging from one of the most barren and desolate tracts of country that it is possible to imagine, even the tombs of tattah, or city of the dead, as it is called in the language of the natives, proved an agreeable distraction to us. tattah itself is a small, wretchedly built town, containing little more than a thousand inhabitants, who are for the most part of the moslem religion. the few hindoos who reside here constitute the wealthier part of the trading community, but influential as this fact would pre-suppose them, they are a persecuted and oppressed race, the privilege of erecting places of worship within the precincts of the town being not only denied them, but even the free exercise of their religious rites. aggressions of the most wanton and tyrannical nature, and murders committed under circumstances of the most shocking barbarity, and having their origin solely in religious jealousy, are matters of no unfrequent occurrence here. the hindoos are consequently obliged to resort to the caves of the neighbouring mountains, to practise their religious ceremonies, but the relentless intolerance of their persecutors pursues them even there. during our short stay we saw the bodies of two of the proscribed race, who had been found murdered in one of their concealed temples. the tombs of tattah stand on a gentle eminence, at a short distance from the town: they are of circular construction, and are, as nearly as i could judge, from seventy to eighty feet in circumference, and from thirty to forty feet in height. they are capped with domes, but their external appearance presents nothing graceful or ornamental to the eye. the interior is gained by a staircase, which ascends to an aperture forming the entrance, about midway in the building, and a rudely constructed ladder conducts the visitor downward to the basement, where the bodies lie. the interior of the dome is lined with blue tiles richly ornamented with arabesques and inscriptions from the koran. there are about a dozen of these remarkable monuments and they are clustered together, without arrangement or regard for effect. of the many sketches taken at the time i have not seen one which conveys a correct idea of their details. although visited by nearly the whole of the troops, it is a fact highly creditable to their good taste and feeling that no mischief or desecration of any sort was committed. sir john keane, in a general order issued before our departure, took occasion expressly to allude to this circumstance, in terms alike honourable to himself and to us. a curious, and i must say revolting, instance of the gross superstition of the hindoos fell under my observation whilst at tattah. at the northern extremity of the bazaar i was shown some of the most miserable specimens of humanity that can well be imagined. in a filthy mud hut, the very aspect of which threatened contagion, sat two living skeletons rocking themselves to and fro. they were without covering of any sort, except the old blanket on which they sat, and their deep sunk eyes and contracted features told a tale of long but patiently endured privation. i was informed that these poor wretches were undergoing a self-inflicted penance, for the non-performance of some religious rite. they had condemned themselves for a period of seven years to a daily allowance of rice and water, barely sufficient to prevent the extinction of the vital powers. we offered them food, but they sternly rejected it. this lamentable fanaticism on the part of a simple and inoffensive people is, after all, but another and more harmless phase of the fierce bigotry, which still continues to exist amongst european nations. a _dâk_, or native postman, who had crossed the river from bhooj with letters for the camp, was waylaid by two belochees as he was descending towards it, by the left bank, and the letter bag taken from him. his captors, having brought him to their retreat in the hills, secured his hands behind his back, and lay down to sleep, one of them using the letter bag as a pillow. the _dâk_ remained quiet, until their snoring satisfied him they were sound asleep, and then slipping his hands out of the ligatures, he stole over to the fellow who had the post-bag under him, and placing his knee on his breast, cut his throat from ear to ear with a knife, which he took from the mountaineer's person, and made off with the bag. in about ten minutes after, he heard the belochee close upon his heels, and, redoubling his speed, a chase of nearly ten miles ensued, in the course of which, the poor fellow had two or three times nearly yielded from fatigue. the dreadful fate which awaited him, should he fall into his pursuer's hands, flashed however across his mind, and plucking up fresh strength and courage, he at length succeeded in reaching the camp, but in so weak and exhausted a state that nature was near sinking under the effort. on the eve of our departure, a circumstance occurred which created a very angry feeling between the inhabitants and the troops, and occasioned much regret to the commander-in-chief, who was desirous that our advance should not be marked by any thing which savoured of cruelty. in consequence of the great increase of drunkenness amongst the european troops, owing to the cheapness and abundance of liquor, strict orders were issued against its being allowed into camp. one of the inhabitants of tattah, who was engaged in smuggling the prohibited article, was stopped about dusk by a serjeant, who happened to be going his rounds. the fellow took to his heels, and a sepoy, who was stationed as sentry in the staff lines, mistaking him for a thief, and seeing him pass at a speed which rendered capture out of the question, levelled his musket, and shot him dead on the spot. he was a fine muscular fellow, about two or three and twenty, and belonged to a respectable family in the town. his friends immediately repaired to the scene in a numerous body, and carried him off amidst the wailing and lamentation of the women. after this it was considered dangerous for any of us to venture into the town when nightfall had set in. the army was now ordered to advance upon jurruk, a town situated on the banks of the indus, at about a day's march from tattah. it is better built and cleaner than the latter place, and some of the streets are covered over with thatched roofs, forming a series of rude arcades, illuminated by oil lamps. opthalmia is a common disease amongst the natives, and several of the troops were attacked by it. some of us also suffered severely from the guinea worm, a malady, common in some parts of hindostan, and which, although not considered dangerous, is attended with great pain. it generally attacks the feet, and has the effect of effectually crippling the patient for the time. i have had one drawn out of my right foot, which measured nearly half a yard in length, and i have known others to have had no less than from seven to eight of them at once. it being impossible for persons thus affected to march on foot or even to mount on horseback, they were usually carried along with the army in kajarvees, a sort of double-chair strung across the back of a camel, and swinging with a see-saw movement that occasioned no small additional suffering to the unfortunate occupant. the spot selected for the encampment was extremely lovely, being encircled by hills, and having the river indus running on its right. as the different regiments wound their way round the heights, and descended into the plain where the tents were to be pitched, the scene would have made a beautiful subject for a sketch. how often during a progress through this wild and romantic country have i regretted the want of a sufficient acquaintance with the art of design, to enable me to convey to paper some of its more striking and characteristic features. in consequence of the numerous thefts committed by the belochees, who daily carried off numbers of our camels, it became necessary to provide them with guards whilst at pasturage. this, however, did not prevent the plunderers from continuing their descents, and they became so hardy that they sometimes even ventured to attack or carry off the guards themselves. one day, whilst a party of the poona auxiliary horse were in charge of some camels about two miles from camp, the belochees came suddenly upon them. there were only six of our men, whilst the enemy numbered twelve or fifteen. nothing daunted, however, a gallant fellow dashed out from amongst our men, and cut down three or four of the marauders. being quickly seconded by the others, the belochees took to flight, and the black hero dismounted, and cutting off the head of one of his dead antagonists, strung it by the hair to his crupper, and triumphantly rode into camp with it, amidst the acclamations of his comrades. a more substantial reward was conferred upon him for this daring exploit a few days afterwards by his promotion to the rank of havildar or serjeant. this may be said to have been the first occasion on which any of our troops came into actual collision with the enemy, but the example which was made had little or no effect in restraining the thefts of the belochees who appeared to have an incorrigible taste for this sort of adventure. chapter ii. singular fate of three officers of the queen's royals.--evacuation of jurruk by the inhabitants.--desertions of camel drivers.--preparations for the attack and defence of hyderabad.--submission of the ameers.--consternation of the natives at the arrival of a steamer in the indus.--baida.--accident to a dragoon.--the lukkee pass.--kotiah.--loss of two soldiers of the th foot.--sehwan.--arrival of sir henry fane.--asiatic jugglers.--conversion of a european soldier to the mahommedan faith. a melancholy incident occurred at jurruk, but whether it was occasioned by accident or treachery we never could satisfactorily trace. some officers belonging to the queen's royals applied for leave to go hunting in the preserves of the ameers of scinde, and having obtained it, lieutenant sparkes lieutenant nixon and dr. hibbert, who constituted the party, left the camp on foot at an early hour of the morning. their leave of absence expired at six o'clock the same evening, but none of them had made their appearance at that hour. about half past eight a dog belonging to dr. hibbert was observed returning into camp without his master, which gave rise to gloomy apprehensions amongst his brother officers, and the non return of any of the party by next morning, confirmed their worst fears. it was immediately determined to send out a troop of native cavalry to scour the country in search of them, and the preserves were of course the first spot to which they directed their horses. part of the force dismounted at the shirkagh or royal preserves, and proceeded on foot for a considerable distance. observing smoke ascending in dense volumes to the right they made their way towards it, and on gaining the spot a shocking sight presented itself. a large area had been cleared by the flames, and not a blade of grass or brushwood had been left. the body of lieutenant sparkes lay, dreadfully scorched and mutilated, upon the ground, while that of dr. hibbert was found in a tree, into which he had evidently climbed to escape the devouring element. a little further on lay lieutenant nixon whose features were so withered and defaced, that it was almost impossible to recognize him, and from the contracted and distorted position in which his limbs were found it was evident that he had suffered a more agonizing death than the others. the remains of the three unfortunate officers were borne back to the camp and interred with military honours. they were all talented and spirited young men and their untimely fate was a source of universal regret and discussion. by some it was contended that the natives had observed them entering the preserves, and inspired by hate had fired the woods in different places, so as effectually to surround them and cut off all chance of escape. to such a degree did this supposition obtain credence, that the soldiers of the queen's royals loudly demanded to be allowed to take revenge on the inhabitants of the district. this of course could not be permitted, and the clamour that had been raised about the matter soon died away. shortly after our arrival an order came down from the ameers of scinde, that the inhabitants of jurruk should vacate the town and retreat to hyderabad. it was obeyed with great reluctance, the love of home being stronger with these poor people than their fear of the british. their removal was one of the most distressing and painful scenes i have ever witnessed, both men and women giving way to wild bursts of passionate grief, and casting back long and lingering regards at the habitations they had abandoned. they left in bodies of between two and three hundred, carrying with them all their portable effects, and at night the town was completely deserted. we neither interfered with, nor molested them during their preparations for departure, but immediately on their quitting, a strong picket was posted in some of the empty houses. provisions became extremely scarce in the camp, and owing to the remissness of the commissariat in forwarding the stores from tattah, our grog was reduced from two drams daily, to one dram on halting days. this was attended with the worst possible effects, for it encouraged the troops to search after the liquor of the country; which proved not only injurious to the constitution of the soldier, but to the discipline of the service. desertion became of frequent occurrence, and from one hundred to one hundred and fifty camel drivers from india, together with some ghorra wallars, or native horsekeepers, succeeded in making their way across the river to cutch bhooj. a few were caught, and from six to twelve dozen lashes each were inflicted on the delinquents. captain outram was again sent forward to hyderabad on a mission to the ameers of scinde, but they received him in the haughtiest manner and refused to come to any sort of terms. the captain found them fortifying the hills round the city, under the superintendence of an european officer, and he observed a battery of twenty pieces of cannon, posted on the banks of the river. twenty thousand belochees armed with talwar, shield, and matchlock, and two thirds of whom were dismounted, occupied a position on the right bank, so as to protect the battery. half of this force subsequently moved across the river and took up a strong position on the western bank, where we lay. the city was reported to be full of armed men, and the idea of attacking it previous to our junction with the bengal army was regarded as worse than folly, the river being eighteen hundred feet wide and our pontoons of insufficient length to traverse it. the enemy, triumphing in our seeming inaction, sent vaunting and threatening messages to us. the commander-in-chief took no notice of their bravadoes, but silently made all the necessary preparations for attacking the city as soon as he was joined by the bengal army. strong cavalry pickets were thrown out on the hills to the right, which commanded an extensive view of the surrounding country, and the sound of drums and other military instruments was strictly prohibited in camp. on the th, sir henry pottinger came into camp from hyderabad, the ameers not only refusing to pay the arrears of tribute that were due, but treating the envoy with every sort of indignity. the bengal army having come through the punjaub, and crossed the indus at roree was now ready to act in conjunction with us on the right bank of the river, and the commander-in-chief resolved to lose no further time in investing the city. he accordingly commenced operations by planting a battery on some heights which commanded its walls, but which were at too great a distance for the guns to do much damage. to the great disappointment of both officers and men, who already revelled in the anticipation of prize money, the ameers became alarmed at these demonstrations and came to terms. an envoy, whose appearance created no small amusement in the camp, was despatched from hyderabad to adjust the necessary preliminaries. he was a short, thick set old fellow, with a merry twinkling eye, and as little as possible of what is called official dignity about him. he brought with him from twenty to thirty lacs of rupees, but the reception which he met with from sir john keane was not calculated to elevate the worthy functionary in his own estimation. positive orders having been issued that neither officers nor men should be allowed to enter hyderabad on any pretence whatsoever, i am unable to give my readers a description of the town. it appeared to be of considerable extent, but of such little strength, that had the ameers driven matters to extremities, i have no doubt we should have carried the place in an hour. we were exceedingly amused at the surprise and consternation displayed by the inhabitants of hyderabad at the arrival of one of the iron steamers in the indus, with supplies for the troops from bombay. nearly the whole of the population flocked down to the banks of the river to behold this surprising phenomenon; they threw their arms in the air, and flung themselves prostrate on the earth in perfect ecstacies of wonder at every movement of the mysterious power which propelled the vessel. the scene was nearly as ridiculous as that which greeted columbus when the first notions of european power and civilisation burst upon the astonished minds of the simple aborigines of america. after remaining a few days at hyderabad the army resumed its march, and arrived next evening at baida. an accident occurred here, by which a trooper of the th light dragoons lost his life. the banks of the river were extremely steep, and as we were watering our horses the pressure from behind forced a man named helm into the river. he was instantly carried away by the current, and was soon lost to view, although we strained every effort to save him. his body floated down to hyderabad, and was recovered by the natives, who restored it to his commanding officer, together with a belt full of rupees, which was found round his waist. continuing our route we arrived at the lukkee pass, where we found some thermal springs, from which the sick derived considerable benefit. a noble lake at the further extremity of the defile afforded our officers several days shooting and fishing, while the beautiful scenery, by which it was surrounded on every side, furnished such of them as were artists with fine subjects for the exercise of their pencil. precipitous heights, assuming every variety of fantastic form, stretched downward to the water's edge, some in graceful sweeps, and others in bold and threatening attitudes, whilst their bases were hid in rich woods or washed by the waters of the lake. leaving this romantic spot with regret, we proceeded to kotiah, where we lost two soldiers belonging to her majesty's th regiment of foot. they went out in search of some camels which were at pasturage and were never afterwards seen or heard of. a party which was sent in search of them found the marks of footsteps and some traces of blood on the spot where the camels had been grazing, and from the torn up appearance which the ground presented there was little doubt that they had made a desperate struggle for their lives. not satisfied with carrying off our camels, the belochees frequently ventured within the lines after nightfall, and made off with any thing they could lay their hands upon. sir keith jackson, the captain of my own troop, detected a fellow with a bridle in his hand, which he was watching an opportunity to slip off with unperceived, and taking his hand whip he inflicted a most unmerciful castigation upon him. the rascal whined and moaned like a corrected child during the progress of the punishment, but as soon as he was let loose he stuck his tongue in his cheek, and went laughing out of camp. our next destination was sehwan, a thickly populated village, about seventy english miles from hyderabad. here we were joined by the ever to be lamented sir henry fane, who was to have assumed the command of the combined forces at their junction at candahar, but who declined it in disgust at the wretchedly organised state of the commissariat, and the neglect which had been shown in providing for the contingencies of the route. sir henry foresaw, and subsequent events justified his views, that although supplies might be regularly forwarded from time to time, it was extremely doubtful, nay almost next to impossible, that they could reach an army always on the advance, through distant and mountainous regions, and having enemies hanging on its rear who were but too deeply interested in preventing their safe arrival. before sir henry left us he inspected the troops, and appeared satisfied with the condition of the men, who had not as yet encountered hardships sufficient to affect their appearance. there have been few men in command whose personal qualities have more endeared him to those who served under him than sir henry fane. he was between sixty and seventy years of age, at the time i speak of, and his venerable countenance, beaming with the kindliest and most benevolent feelings, and manners that had a parental touch about them, combined to render him one of the most respected and popular officers in the army. we viewed his departure from amongst us with the deepest regret, for though we felt the fullest confidence in our then leader, this gallant veteran had so won upon our affections that a comparison with him must have proved invidious to any one. the ingenuity of the asiatic jugglers is well known, and i believe our european exhibitors derive their proficiency, in a great measure, from them, our soldiery carrying back with them the rudiments of this respectable branch of knowledge, and turning their swords, if not into ploughshares, at least into as peaceable and innocent a mode of gaining a livelihood. an exhibition which took place during our short stay at sehwan made many of the "greenhorns" amongst us gape, and impressed them with a very high notion of the favour in which the professors of the art are held by his satanic majesty. returning one day from the bazaar, i observed a crowd of soldiers and natives assembled near the lines of the artillery. elbowing my way through them i found a conjuror at his tricks, and from the expensive and elaborate nature of the paraphernalia by which he was surrounded, at once perceived that his pretensions were of the highest order. he was attired in loose flowing robes, covered with mystic characters; and a long white beard descended to his waist, contrasting oddly with his jet black locks and piercing hazel eyes. surrounded by the various emblems and accessories of his art, he looked a very imposing figure, and every movement which he made was regarded with as much interest as if destiny really rested on his fiat. his only assistants were a man who beat a _tom-tom_, or drum, to collect an audience, and a beautifully formed girl about five or six years of age, whose supple and graceful movements excited general admiration. having made a clear space of about thirty feet in diameter, the conjuror took an oblong basket, about two feet in length, and one in breadth, the interior of which he exhibited to the spectators, in order to convince them that nothing was concealed in it. after performing a variety of common-place tricks, such as balancing a sword upon a pipe and then swallowing the blade, he suddenly turned towards the child and addressed her in an angry tone of voice. she made some reply which appeared to make him still more choleric, for his features became swollen with rage, and his eyes shot glances of fire. the discussion continuing in the same violent strain he appeared no longer able to control his fury, and suddenly seizing the child by the waist, he opened the basket and crammed her into it. the half stifled cries of the girl were distinctly heard, but they only appeared to enrage him the more. snatching a sword, which lay near him, he plunged it to the hilt in the basket, twice or thrice, and every time he drew it out it was reeking with gore. the half smothered groans and sobs of the dying child at length convinced several of the spectators that a murder had been committed, and two or three soldiers rushed into the circle for the purpose of seizing the criminal. triumphantly smiling at the success of the cheat, he held them at bay with the sword for a few minutes, when, to our great surprise, the child bounded into the circle, unscathed, from amidst the crowd, though we had kept our eyes attentively fixed on the basket all the time. suspecting that two children had been employed, i examined the basket, but found no trace of an occupant, and saw nothing in its construction which could have aided the deception. this clever trick was loudly applauded, and brought its author a plentiful harvest of pice and cowries, while many there were who went away with the firm conviction that it could only have been effected through the agency of the devil himself. we had left a number of sick behind us at tattah, with instructions that they should be conveyed in pattemars up the river indus, and rejoin us at sehwan. a boat containing a corporal and five men was stranded on the banks of the river, and was with some difficulty got off. the soldiers were so prostrated with fever that they could scarcely move, and in this state they arrived at sehwan. to their great distress they found that the army had proceeded on its route, and one of their companions expired immediately after their arrival. the heat of the sun was intolerable, and the corpse began to putrify. in vain they implored the native boatmen to inter it or cast it in the river, but they preferred running the risk of infection to touching the dead body of an infidel. the corporal, who was well acquainted with the language of the country, entreated some of the natives who crowded to the banks to remove the body, but they remained deaf to his prayers. resorting to a stratagem which he thought would have the effect of removing their religious scruples, he asserted that the deceased had died in the mahommedan faith, and commanded them on pain of the displeasure of the prophet, to give him decent interment. at first they looked incredulous, but the corporal swore loud and fast, and they were at length convinced. they removed the body, and placing it on a sort of bier, somewhat similar to a sailor's hammock, carried it on shore. having swathed it in cotton cloths, and laid it with the feet towards the setting sun, they decked the head and breast with flowers, and bore it in procession to the place of interment, which was situated in a romantic spot on the banks of the indus. the companions of the deceased proceeded on their route, rejoicing in the success of the corporal's trick, and rejoined the main body without further accident. chapter iii. larkhana.--departure of the commander-in-chief for candahar.--capture of belochee thieves.--ludicrous scene in the bazaar.--tremendous hurricane.--an irish colonel's appeal to his men.--murder of cooks belonging to the army.--a native funeral.--the bholun pass.--massacre of camp followers.--ill-timed merriment.--animal instinct. leaving sehwan we crossed the indus in pontoons, and entered a fertile tract of country. our route lay through rich pasturage and waving fields of corn, occasionally diversified by rivers and lakes, the latter of which we found well stocked with fish and game. the natives did not exhibit any symptoms of fear at our approach, but continued peaceably tilling and cultivating their lands. proceeding by rapid marches we at length reached larkhana, the boundary which divides upper and lower scinde. it is a place of considerable importance, and contains from seven to eight thousand inhabitants. long cloths are manufactured here in considerable quantities, and a brisk trade is carried on, in various other articles with the mountain tribes. sir john keane now quitted us to proceed to candahar, where he was to assume the command of the grand army of the indus. he was accompanied by two squadrons of native cavalry, one resselah of local horse, a regiment of native infantry, and two pieces of artillery. the command of this division consequently devolved upon major general wiltshire. the belochees again favoured us with a visit and carried away about a dozen camels from the encampment. a troop of cavalry was ordered out in pursuit, and after a hot chase succeeded in coming up with the marauders. they immediately abandoned their prey and made off to the hills, but not before they had left three or four of their party in our hands. resolved to make an example which would deter them from repeating the offence, general wiltshire ordered the cat to be liberally administered to them in the bazaar. the senior of the party was first tied up, and it was evident, from the trepidation he was in, that he expected no less than the punishment of death. he begged and implored for mercy, and finding that no attention was paid to his supplications, he took leave of one of the other culprits, who turned out to be his son, and resigned himself to die. tied up, as he was, and unable to observe the expression of our countenances, which were convulsed with laughter, in anticipation of the scene that was about to follow, he every moment expected to hear the report of the musket, or feel the blow of the sabre that was to deal out his doom. the moment, however, the cat descended on his shoulders, the terrified expression of his face changed into that of the most extravagant joy. he smiled and nodded at his son, and bore his four dozen lashes with the joyful patience of a martyr, suffering in the vindication of some holy cause. on being set loose the culprits were informed that if they were ever again detected in the commission of similar offences they would be shot, without mercy, and they were ordered to disseminate this useful piece of information amongst their comrades of the hills. pursuing our route from larkhana we encamped the same evening at dooson, and were visited during the night by a terrific hurricane. arising without any previous indication, the tempest came suddenly upon us in our sleep, sweeping the tents before it, and enveloping us in whirlwinds of white sand. the night being pitch dark we were soon in the greatest distress and confusion, and to add to our embarrassments the horses broke loose and ran wild amongst us. they killed two of the camp followers, and injured several others by treading them under foot, and the alarm which they created was as great as if the enemy had made a sudden irruption amongst us. to this succeeded a scene of rioting and squabbling, one having lost a shaco, another a jacket, and another his shoes. accusations and denials, oaths, vociferations, and complaints of injuries received, formed altogether a pleasant medley; and glad enough we were when the first streak of dawn threw some light on this scene of horrible confusion. after lasting about two hours, heavy drops of rain announced the approaching cessation of the tempest, but we only exchanged one discomfort for another, being soon drenched to the skin. after two days further march we arrived at a wretched village, which separates upper scinde from belochistan, and which is only entitled to notice as forming the boundary of a desert plain, about fifty miles in extent, and completely divested of vegetation, the white soil lying exposed to, and reflecting back with intensity, the scorching rays of the sun. there were only two wells at the village, and there was a fierce contest for precedence at them, it being known that there was neither spring nor stream of any kind in the desert which we were about to traverse. the infantry entered on this cheerless waste about three in the afternoon and the cavalry followed about five. the former were fully accoutred, and carried sixty rounds of ball cartridge each. at two o'clock the following morning the cavalry overtook them and the general halt sounded. so great was the fatigue of the infantry that numbers threw themselves upon the ground in despair, declaring, it was impossible for human nature to sustain more, and they could proceed no further. it must be borne in mind that our rations had, for two months previous, consisted of only half a pound of flour and an equal quantity of red rice, with about four ounces of meat, and the latter was in some instances of no use to us, from the difficulty of procuring fuel to cook it. the order of march having been again given, several refused to move from sheer exhaustion, and their situation became one of great embarrassment to their colonel, who was aware that if he left them behind, they would be instantly sabred by the enemy, who were always hovering on our rear. recollecting it was st. patrick's day, and that most of the recusants were irishmen, he ordered, as a last resource, that the band of the regiment should strike up their national anthem. the effect was electrical, the poor devils, whose limbs, a short time previous, had refused to perform their accustomed office, and whose countenances wore the aspect of the most abject despondency, seemed at once to have new life and energy infused into them. they felt that this was an appeal to their proverbial bravery and powers of endurance, and gratified vanity did that which threats and remonstrances had failed to effect. a faint smile lit up their features, and slowly rising from the ground they tottered on their way. had they adhered to their first determination they would have fallen victims to the most savage cruelties, as the following circumstance will soon convince the reader:-- three of the cooks belonging to our division, who followed with the camp kettles at a short distance in its wake, lost their way in the darkness of the night, and as chance would have it, stumbled upon a party of the enemy. they were immediately seized, and each man was bound by the wrist to the saddle of a belochee horseman. the cries of the unfortunate men having reached the rear-guard, which consisted of the native auxiliary horse, they turned in pursuit, and soon came in sight of the enemy, whose figures were dimly visible in the obscurity which prevailed. as soon as they heard them galloping up the belochees spurred their horses to their utmost speed, dragging their prisoners along with them at a terrific pace. finding their pursuers gained upon them they stooped down, and with their broad knives ripped up two of their victims from the abdomen to the throat, and then cast them loose. the third, more fortunate, escaped with life, the belochee to whose saddle he was attached having freed him by cutting off his left arm with a blow of his sabre: then wheeling round on our horse, who were now almost up with them, the enemy took deliberate aim at the advancing troopers, and having killed two, and severely wounded another, they plunged into the darkness and succeeded in baffling pursuit. we reached the extremity of this barren waste by seven o'clock next morning, and encamped at the bottom of a steep hill where there was abundance of excellent water. the cupidity of the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, having got the better of their apprehensions, several of them ventured into the camp with supplies of flour, which was eagerly purchased from them by the soldiery, at the rate of about half a crown the lb. the risk which they ran was great, for if the fact had been discovered, they would, in all probability, have been massacred by the mountain chief. the profits which they realised by the adventure, must however, have well repaid them for the hazard. descending the hills to our right, we one day observed a funeral procession; and curious to witness the ceremonies performed on those occasions i followed at a little distance. the corpse was swathed in cotton bandages like a mummy, the head only being left exposed, and it was borne on a bamboo bier, or stretcher, on the shoulders of four men. the relations and friends of the deceased gave vent to their grief in the bitterest lamentations, and there appeared a depth and sincerity in their woe which is but too often wanting at our european rites. the procession was headed by a faquir or priest, whose rolling eyes, and long dishevelled locks, gave him a wild and unearthly appearance. his costume was no less singular than his looks, for it consisted of a motley sort of garment, composed of patches of almost every colored cloth, with a cap or rather a crown of peacock's feathers. arrived at the place of interment, which was situated in the valley, the procession halted at a freshly dug grave, and the bier was laid beside it. the crowd formed themselves into a circle round it, and the faquir holding up a small idol, commenced an oration in which he expatiated on the merits of the deceased. the crowd having prostrated themselves, the faquir took a reddish sort of powder, and made a large mark with it on the forehead of the dead man; then taking a basket of freshly pulled flowers and herbs he scattered them over the body and into the grave. the mourners rising from the ground, and walking in single files round the bier made a respectful salaam towards it, after which the corpse was lowered perpendicularly into the earth, and the grave filled up. at the conclusion, the faquir sat himself on a stone at a short distance from the grave, and remained there quietly smoking his hookah, and philosophising, as all good faquirs should do, on the uncertainty of mundane things. our next destination was dadur, where we were to form a junction with a portion of the bengal forces. the distance is only a day's march, and nothing of interest occurred on the route. on approaching the encampment of the bengal troops, i could not help being struck with their superior appearance. it was evident that their commissariat was better organized than ours, for their camp equipage and other appointments were in all respects complete, and they were abundantly supplied with necessaries of every kind. this disparity was, in some degree, removed before we left dadur, by the arrival of additional supplies from bombay. a few days having been passed in recruiting our strength after these fatiguing marches, we at length received orders to advance on the celebrated bholun pass. nothing could be more calculated to awaken us to the difficulties of our position, or to impress us with the uncertainty of the fate that awaited us, than the imposing grandeur of the scenery on which we now entered. let the reader picture to himself a gloomy looking gorge winding through two ranges of stupendous hills, whose rugged masses of rock and hanging declivities impend over the narrow route as if about to choke it up, or recede a short distance to some fortress-like looking freak of nature from whose imaginary bastions and parapets it seemed easy to hurl down destruction and death on the passenger, and he may easily imagine that our feelings were not of the liveliest or most comfortable nature. a handful of men could have effectually stopped our progress had there been but another leonidas amongst the wild inhabitants of this magnificent defile, whose military skill and resolution would have enabled him to seize upon, and maintain its many points of defence. we could not conceal from ourselves difficulties so apparent, and a general and undefined feeling of uneasiness pervaded us all. we felt that if the enemy had any intention of resisting us they would not lose opportunities which nature herself appeared to indicate; and it was but too obvious that if they only knew how to avail themselves of the formidable barriers which she had placed against invasion, our situation would become critical in the extreme. once involved in the intricacies of the pass, the superior knowledge of the country possessed by the natives, and their familiarity with mountain warfare would enable them to harrass us at every step, and a well planned and daring attack might at once overwhelm us. such were the reflections that suggested themselves to almost every man's mind, and many there were, i dare say, who just then thought of home, and speculated whether it would ever be his lot to revisit its peaceful fireside, and recount the dangers of which he had been the hero. the bengal troops who preceded us through the pass left behind them sad proofs of the justice of some of these conclusions. we found from five and twenty to thirty camp followers lying dead upon their track, the throats of several having been cut, and the others bearing on their mutilated persons the unequivocal evidence of a desperate hand to hand struggle. as we advanced through the gorge we could observe the belochees peering at us over the jutting points of the precipices, and the sharp report of their gingalls and matchlocks, which, luckily for us, were not very sure in their aim, usually followed the brief inspection by which we were favoured. observing a camp follower leading a camel at some distance in the rear, three of the mountaineers suddenly darted from a fissure in the rock in which they had lain concealed, and having cut the poor fellow down, led the animal up the ascent by one of those diverging tracks like sheep walks, with which these hills abound. a serjeant belonging to the horse artillery, who happened to witness the circumstance, instantly galloped back, and gallantly dashing his horse up the mountain succeeded in sabreing the nearest of the thieves, and brought back the camel amidst a shower of balls from the neighbouring heights. within a few miles of the affghanistan boundary the gorge is traversed by a stream which winds like a snake through the sinuosities of the pass, and crosses it no less than sixteen times. although it presents for the most part, the appearance of an insignificant mountain rivulet, it is, in many places studded with deep and dangerous holes, into which the cavalry often plunged, and got a good sousing before they were aware of it. shouts of laughter usually escaped the comrades of the luckless wight who became thus involved, and on one occasion a tragedy had nearly resulted from their ill-timed merriment. an irish trooper, named dwyer, a brave, but hot-blooded fellow, like most of his countrymen was feeling his way cautiously through the stream, when both horse and rider stumbled, and became instantly lost to view. some alarm was at first experienced for their safety, but it gave way to a roar of laughter when we beheld them again emerging from the water. after several successive attempts to disengage himself, the horse at length obtained a secure footing, and dwyer, wheeling him suddenly round upon us with a countenance furious with rage, drew a pistol from his holster and fired at a group of seven or eight men, who stood close to the spot, but fortunately without effect. the madman was immediately placed under arrest, but was released after a few days' confinement. on approaching beebenaunce towards the close of the fourth day's march, we found another stream where the cavalry dismounted, for the purpose of filling their canteens with water, while the infantry were distributed so as to protect them. we had been marching for several hours under a scorching sun, and over a stony and rugged road, which rendered constant watchfulness and exertion necessary to prevent the horses from falling on their knees. tormented by an insatiable thirst, we were about to slake it, when it was discovered that the stream was polluted by the putrifying bodies of several of dead affghans, and followers of the bengal army; the spot having been the scene of a deadly contest which had occurred some days previous. the struggle between the loathing which this circumstance created and the pressing calls of nature was however of short duration. not a man of us hesitated to drink from the contaminated liquid, but the horse which i rode, being imbued with keener senses than his master, positively refused to partake of it, though almost dropping with fatigue and thirst. i took him lower down the stream, where his fastidiousness being no longer offended he indulged in a long and copious draught. chapter iv. skirmish with the enemy.--belochee waggery.--cleverly planned capture of a bruhee.--sufferings from want of water.--valley of shawle.--quettah.--belochee cruelties.--adventure in a stone quarry.--treachery of the khan of khelat.--murder of another cook.--poisoning of the wells.--fortunate discovery. we were about to quit the pass at the close of the eighth day's march, when the enemy made another and more successful attempt at plunder. emboldened by the absence of the infantry, which was at a considerable distance in the rear, they descended the heights in greater numbers than usual, and attacked the camp followers in charge of the officers' baggage. the latter took to flight, and the belochees commenced pillaging the trunks and cases. amongst the property carried off was a camel belonging to brigadier scott, which was laden with the whole of the general's kit. a party of the th dragoons, under the command of lieutenant gillespie, at length galloped up and put the enemy to flight. there were only three men wounded and three horses killed on our side, whilst the belochees left great numbers of dead on the ground. during the heat of the firing a mistake occurred, which at first occasioned some alarm, but was soon converted into a burst of uncontrollable merriment. our men had driven the last of the enemy up the hill, the latter peppering away at them from every rock or crevice where they could find shelter, when our attention was arrested by the appearance of a general officer on the heights to our left, who appeared to be making signs to us. it was at first supposed that one of our leaders had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and universal consternation prevailed. the general at length took off his shaco, and advancing to the very edge of the precipice, waved it in the air as if to cheer us on to his rescue, when to our infinite amusement we discovered it was the fellow who had made off with the brigadier's kit, and who, after examining the contents of it, had rigged himself out in full uniform. the rocks echoed with laughter, and the _pseudo_ general appeared to enjoy the fun as much as any of us, for he capered about in a perfect ecstacy of delight, and gave expression to his contentment in the most delectable yells. a shower of balls was at length directed against him, and the brigadier's swarthy representative came tumbling down the precipice to render himself and his briefly enjoyed honours into our hands. amongst the booty carried off upon this occasion were the wind instruments belonging to the st bombay cavalry, and a bullock, carrying two packages of ball ammunition, which contained rounds each. some amusement was created amongst us by speculations as to the probable use that would be made of the former, the humour displayed in the appropriation of general scott's kit having given us a high idea of the waggish propensities of the enemy. our fun was however turned into mortification when we beheld them cutting our ball ammunition into slugs to fit the bore of their gingalls, and sending it back to us from the heights in as wholesale quantities as they had taken it. in the course of the skirmish a feat was performed by two of the native troops, which was watched with the most intense interest. a bruhee (a fierce and warlike tribe, distinguished by their inveterate hostility towards the black troops in our service,) had taken shelter behind a rock, about midway up the mountain, and kept up a constant fire on some native cavalry beneath. two of the sepoys belonging to the bombay native infantry observing the circumstance, determined on effecting his capture, and laying down their muskets at the foot of the hill, they crept stealthily up. whenever the fellow's flashing eyes were observed on a line with the rock, searching for an object for his aim, they crouched under cover until the discharge of his gingall satisfied them he was about to reload. they then rapidly advanced to his lurking place, and pouncing suddenly upon him conveyed him down the hill. the prisoner had such a horror of falling into our hands that he several times implored his captors to put an end to him on the spot. they took no notice of his entreaties until they had reached the bottom of the hill, where they had laid their arms, when a havildar meeting them inquired if they had not heard of the orders, that no prisoners should be brought into camp. "i knew nothing about it," replied one of the soldiers; "but this i do know that he is a stout-hearted fellow, and deserves a better fate." "_i_ understand you," exclaimed the other sepoy, and taking his musket he placed the muzzle of it to the prisoner's head, and literally covered the serjeant with his brains. the quantity of carrion which we every where left upon our route attracted numbers of the ravening beasts of prey with which these hills abound, and we could not rest at night from the dismal howling which surrounded us. even the new made graves of our comrades did not escape the keen and hungering scent of the jackall, their remains being scarcely interred before we found them again torn up, their whitening bones alone attesting the nature of the visitation. amongst the greatest of our annoyances, however, was the intolerable stench which proceeded from the putrefying bodies of the camels, that lay scattered every where upon our track, and which was enough to breed a mortality. as we emerged from the pass into the open country, the heights became literally alive with belochees, who gave expression to their rage and disappointment in the most absurd and violent gesticulations. we bivouacked late at night in the open plain, after a fatiguing and harassing march of twelve hours, during which we had been unable to procure a drop of water. the same privation awaited us in the place where we passed the night, and the sufferings of both men and cattle were dreadful. it was not until six o'clock next day that we fell in with a stream that traversed the road to quettah, and were able to satisfy the thirst which consumed us. we were now in the valley of shawle, which presented a most agreeable contrast to the barren hills through which we had just passed: here we found a succession of vast orchards, whose fruit trees bursting into blossom and gladdening the wearied eye with a variety of the most beautiful tints recalled to most of us the pleasant scenery of dear old england. on our arrival at quettah the troops underwent a medical inspection, and it was determined that the sick should be left behind. a depôt was accordingly established here, consisting of one regiment of bengal infantry, one company of european foot artillery, some heavy ordnance, and some gikwar, or native horsemen, the whole under the command of brigadier-general nott. this arrangement was reported to have given rise to some angry altercation between the latter officer and sir john keane previous to the departure of the commander-in-chief for candahar, general nott being indignant at being thus invalided and debarred his share in the danger and glories of the campaign. we remained at quettah about a week, the condition of both men and horses being such as to render rest necessary. the supplies which we obtained from the bengal column and the rich pasturage of the surrounding country soon refreshed and re-invigorated us, and we pursued our route in renewed health and spirits. leaving quettah, we again entered a barren and mountainous district which presented few traces of cultivation, and which afforded little or no pasturage for our cattle. in order to embarrass us the more the belochees lay on the watch for the parties who were sent out to cut grass, and maimed and mutilated them in the most shocking manner. one poor fellow had his ears slit, and another received injuries which rendered the amputation of an arm necessary. the thefts of cattle, however, became less numerous, the cutting off the supplies of forage being deemed a less hazardous and equally effectual mode of impeding our progress. so serious became this change in the tactics of the enemy that it was resolved to increase the number of men sent out on the foraging expeditions. this did not, however, deter the belochees from repeating their attacks, and on one occasion they drove in a party consisting of a considerable number of native soldiers, and succeeded in making three or four of the grass-cutters prisoners. a squadron of her majesty's th light dragoons was immediately ordered out in pursuit under the command of major daly. we proceeded towards the hills at full gallop, and at length came in sight of the enemy who were in a close body of from three to four hundred. they suddenly disappeared from view, although the country was still a perfect level, and presented no apparent means of concealment. on reaching the spot we found they had ensconced themselves in a large stone pit or quarry, into which it was impossible for cavalry to penetrate, and a sharp and well directed fire from all the salient points of the rocks affording the least shelter, indicated to us their different lurking places. patiently watching our opportunities we sent a volley into every recess or cavity where a rag was to be seen fluttering, and major daly observing a party of about ten or twelve clustered in some bushes which lay almost within a bound of his horse gallantly dashed the animal down the descent, followed by lieutenant janvrin, the quarter-master of the regiment, and with a couple of hog spears, which they happened to have with them they dispatched several of the party. the others made their escape by plunging deeper into the recesses of the quarry. the night now setting in, the belochees took advantage of the obscurity to steal out of their lair and creep through our lines one by one. they did not get off, however, without further loss. hearing a rustling noise within a few feet of me, whilst on the watch, i listened attentively and felt convinced that some of them were endeavouring to effect their escape by crawling along the ground on their hands and knees. i plunged my spurs in my horse and clearing the distance at a bound, just as i observed two men rising from the ground, i cut them both down, notwithstanding a most determined resistance, in the course of which they fired twice at me. several others were disposed of in like manner, but no prisoners were made. we returned to camp about nine o'clock, well satisfied with the issue of our adventure. the grass cutters who had been made prisoners, and who were abandoned when it was found that our pursuit was likely to prove successful, had received no other injury at the hands of the enemy, than a severe thrashing with a bamboo. the poor fellows were terribly frightened, and felt most grateful for their deliverance. major daly and two privates were severely wounded in this affair. beside a thrust of a sabre in the chest the major received a musket ball in the left foot, which disabled him for some time from active service. we also found that several of the horses had been injured, it being a favourite trick of the enemy to hamstring them, or rip their bellies open, whenever they could get within reach of the animals. a treacherous trick played us by one of the neighbouring chiefs, the khan of khelat, added in no small degree to the difficulties we had to encounter. the khan had promised allegiance to shah soojah, and undertook to facilitate the progress of the british troops through his territories. instead of fulfilling the friendly professions he had made towards us, he interdicted the villagers from bringing supplies to the camp, and cut off almost all the mountain streams. several of the camp followers who ventured out in search of water, were either carried off or murdered, and our situation became distressing in the extreme. in one day's march of fifteen miles, we left upon our track the bodies of nearly one hundred men, who died from sheer physical exhaustion. continuing our progress towards the khojuck heights, where we expected to meet with determined opposition, we lost a number of men on the route from their own imprudence in venturing at a distance from the camp after dusk. one of them, a portuguese cook, belonging to my own regiment, lost his way in proceeding to the bazaar for necessaries, and fell into the hands of the belochees, who were always hanging on our rear. his cries being heard by some soldiers returning from the bazaar, they ran towards the spot from whence the noise proceeded, and were received with a volley of bullets. they did not of course venture farther, being ignorant of the number of the enemy, but on procuring assistance from the camp, they discovered the cook with his throat cut, the head being nearly severed from the shoulders. sickness now increased alarmingly amongst us, owing to the bad quality of the attar or flour, as well as the reduction in our usual quantity of rations. the cattle were little better off, and the difficulties of the route increased at almost every step. water continued as scarce as ever, for the natives filled up or concealed part of the wells and poisoned the remainder. of the latter fact, we received intimation in time to prevent accidents, and chance befriended us as regarded the former. after a harassing day's march some soldiers of the th infantry, who had set out in search of water, were unsuccessful and were bewailing their hard fate, when the unusual moistness of the place where they had pitched their tent attracted their notice. they sounded the ground and finding it hollow, immediately arrived at the conclusion that it was a well that had been freshly covered over. further examination confirmed this supposition, and about half an hour's work revealed a deep hole to their sight, in which they found a spring of excellent water. this discovery created such joy and frantic eagerness in the camp that the authorities were obliged to place a strong guard with loaded muskets over it in order to keep back the pressure of the crowds who flocked to it. in the course of the next day's march we came upon a part of the road which was literally strewn with human skeletons and broken matchlocks. of the various surmises current amongst us as to the occasion of this wholesale butchery, the most probable was, that one of the caravans travelling to candahar had been attacked and overpowered by one of the marauding tribes of the district. chapter v. the khojuck pass.--descent of the troops.--shocking death of a camel driver.--detection and escape of an affghan thief.--loss of cavalry horses.--candahar.--arrival of shah soojah.--condition of the troops.--attempt of the natives to cut off a convoy of provisions.--asiatic mendicants.--the mosque at candahar.--arrival of affghan auxiliaries. we reached the khojuck pass in the expectation of finding it occupied by the forces of dost mahommed, but contrary to general anticipation it was abandoned. we learned that the dost had visited the place a few days before, in company with several of his chiefs, when the prudence of disputing our passage was discussed. owing to some violent differences of opinion amongst the subordinate chiefs, the idea was abandoned, and the enemy fell back towards candahar. how different might have been the fate of the expedition but for this impolitic and cowardly step. to enable the reader to judge of its importance a brief description of the pass will be necessary. ascending an eminence of no great height a platform of rock is gained, from which a glorious view bursts upon the sight. immediately beneath is a steep declivity, along whose rugged sides winds the narrow road, while a chasm of immense depth yawns beneath, and threatens to engulph the luckless passenger should he chance to slip as he treads his way down the difficult and dangerous descent. receding into the far distance lie long ranges of blue mountains broken at intervals into open plains and valleys, whose calm and smiling aspect contrasts well with the frowning majesty of the neighbouring heights. nothing could be finer than the view which presented itself as our troops wound round the brow of this tremendous precipice, their arms glittering in the sun, and their uniforms imparting a gay and dazzling variety to the sober hues of the stunted herbage with which its sides were clad. the infantry, consisting of several companies of the queen's royals and a party of the th regiment were ordered to line the heights in order to protect the descent of the artillery and cavalry, together with the heavy baggage. so steep was the road (if road it could be called) that the cavalry were obliged to dismount and lead their horses, bridle in hand, and the artillery to unlimber their guns and drag them down the precipice, a task, as the reader may conceive, of no small labour and difficulty. about half way down, a camel, laden with camp equipage, missed its footing and was precipitated into the abyss with its conductor, and both were of course, immediately dashed to pieces. we reached the plain without any further mishap about six o'clock the same evening, and had every reason to congratulate ourselves that the cowardice or negligence of the enemy had prevented them from disputing our passage. having halted at the bottom of the pass two days so as to enable the remainder of the heavy ordnance and baggage to descend we proceeded towards candahar. the enemy occasionally made their appearance, and though not caring to face us in the field, continued to harass us severely by hanging on our rear, and cutting off the stragglers. nor did they abate in the least in their love of thieving, robberies being just as frequent, and characterised by as much ingenuity and daring as ever. late one night i was on sentry before the tent of lieutenant kemp when a rustling noise attracted my notice; on looking attentively towards the spot from whence it proceeded, i perceived an affghan crawling towards the tent on his hands and knees, and suffering him to enter, in order the more easily to secure him, i surprised him as he was in the act of plundering it. the fellow was completely naked, and on my attempting to lay hold of him he slipped through my fingers like an eel, owing to the quantity of grease with which his person was smeared, and succeeded in clearing the lines in safety. i did not shoot him because positive orders had been issued against shots being fired in camp, which had before given rise to many groundless alarms. the weather now became excessively hot, the thermometer being degrees in the shade, which rendered it necessary that we should prosecute our way either in the cool of the morning or at night. the nights were so beautiful that the latter could not be deemed a hardship, and had the scenery been but equal to that through which we had just passed, it could not have been seen to greater advantage than under these clear delicious moonlights. nothing, however, can be more flat or uninteresting than the country between the khojuck pass and candahar. the only thing that might be said to have broken the monotony of the route was an occasional shot which told the fate of some poor horse, who, having been broken down by fatigue and privation, and rendered incapable of further exertion, was mercifully put out of pain by its rider. there were nearly fifty head of cattle disposed of in this way between the pass and candahar, a pretty item in the expenses of the campaign, when it is borne in mind that each of them had cost from fifty to sixty pounds in india. had we come in contact with the enemy at candahar as we expected, i have no doubt the cavalry would have been found wholly ineffective from the jaded and worn-out condition of their horses. we arrived at candahar on the th. of may, and effected a junction with the remainder of the bengal forces under sir willoughby cotton. here we were also joined by shah soojah in company with sir william mcnaghten and sir alexander burnes. the dethroned monarch immediately took possession of his ancestral palace, which had just been evacuated by the enemy. the reverses of fortune to which these asiatic sovereigns are subject have so steeled them against adversity, that i doubt if his majesty was agitated, even by a passing emotion, at this important event. if he felt at all, it was perhaps more a sensation of fear than joy, for he could not conceal from himself the fact, that the opinions of his subjects were arraigned to a man against him, and that under such circumstances his tenure of sovereignty would in all probability be terminated by a bloody death. tired as we were of the harassing mountain warfare in which we had been engaged, and anxious to strike a blow which would decide the fate of the campaign, we were yet agreeably disappointed at the evacuation of candahar by the enemy. we were greatly in need of rest after the long and fatiguing marches, which we had made; and the deplorable condition in which we found ourselves, as regarded supplies, rendered it highly impolitic to bring us just then in face of the enemy. sickness had increased alarmingly amongst us, but in this respect we did not find our position improved, for the excessive heat which prevailed during our stay here carried off great numbers of the men. although the bazaar was plentifully supplied with meat and fruit, flour was difficult to be obtained, the stock on hand having been eagerly bought up by the troops on their arrival. the traders turned the scarcity of this necessary article to profitable account, for they only gave lb. to the rupee instead of lb., the usual proportion. we had been living on half rations, and these not of the best quality, for nearly a month previous, and had looked forward to our arrival at candahar for some addition to the quantity, but so far was this from being the case, that it was found necessary to put the camp followers on the same allowance, and it was not until three weeks after our arrival that an increase and that not the full one, was served out to us. we were in daily expectation of the arrival of a convoy of six hundred camels laden with provisions and grain, but intelligence having been brought us that the affghans lay in way to intercept it, it was thought advisable to send out a force consisting of two squadrons of native cavalry, a party of her majesty's th light infantry and two field pieces for its protection. the enemy being informed by their spies of this movement, fell back to the hills, and the supplies were brought in safety to the camp. the native contractor who furnished them, was offered a bribe of , rupees by dost mahommed to direct his camels another way, but much to his credit refused it. candahar is a place of considerable importance in a commercial point of view, but its military advantages are scarcely deserving of notice. it is surrounded by an old wall and ditch, some efforts to strengthen which had been made by throwing up a few parapets, but they were abandoned at the first news of our approach. the principal entrance faces the south and leads directly into the bazaar, which presents rather an animated scene to the eyes of the stranger, in consequence of the varied and picturesque costumes of the multitudes who resort to it, and who are composed of asiatics of almost every race. the merchandize exposed for sale is no less heterogeneous in its character than its vendors, and much to our surprise and gratification it included good broad-cloths and whitechapel needles, articles which, in the dilapidated and transparent state of our clothing, proved of no small service to us. common and disgusting as mendicancy has become through all parts of asia, i have never seen it carried to such an annoying extent as here. our ears were assailed on all sides by whining petitions, and our eyes offended by the exhibition of festering sores or simulated deformities. the ingenuity displayed in twisting a straight and well made limb into some hideous distortion, or in painting up an ugly case of cancer, would have excited the admiration and envy of the importunate cripples who beset the chapels of catholic countries. at the further extremity of the bazaar stands a noble mosque, in which are interred the remains of shah soojah's father and grandfather. a lofty gilt dome and graceful minarets distinguish it above the other buildings of the town, and the effect, as it is approached from the distance, is extremely imposing. on entering this beautiful temple the visitor is conducted up a flight of marble steps to a platform within the dome, where the remains of the deceased princes lie. the tombs are covered with palls of blue velvet, fringed with gold, and illuminated by about two hundred lamps, which are kept burning night and day, while forty faquirs, or priests, watch perpetually over them. two magnificent folio editions of the koran, bound in velvet and ornamented with characters of gold, were also shown to us with a degree of reverence that proved the estimation in which they were held. a few pigeons which were flying round the interior of the building appeared to divide with these costly exemplars of the book of life the regard and veneration of the votaries of the temple, this bird being held sacred, and any invasion of its privileges visited by the punishment of death. several of the affghan chiefs who were known to be devoted to the interests of dost mahommed becoming alarmed at the turn affairs were taking, or, as some said, being dissatisfied with that prince for refusing to guarantee the safety of their women, now came into camp and tendered their allegiance to shah soojah. these reluctant auxiliaries were warmly received by the politicals, who hailed their adhesion as an omen of the success of the expedition; and i observed sir alexander burnes carry his joy so far as cordially to embrace one of them. the chief smiled grimly, but said but little. i had an opportunity however of ascertaining his real feelings, on getting amongst his followers a few days afterwards. they openly expressed their regret at being compelled to join the invaders of their country, and stated, that they could not have a braver leader, or a better prince, than dost mahommed. they described him as being of a just and generous nature, whilst they represented the shah as being cruel and unprincipled. these affghan horsemen were a fine athletic set of men, and capitally mounted, their breed of cattle being much superior to ours, and exhibiting proofs of the most careful grooming. the riders wore coats of mail with steel gauntlets, and their arms consisted of a sabre, heavier and longer than ours, a dagger, and in some instances shields and matchlocks. i have no hesitation in saying that the affghan cavalry, if these were a fair sample of them, are a most effective body of men. they may not be equal to ours in the field, but for a harassing system of mountain warfare where they are required to make sudden descents upon infantry, hemmed in between defiles, and embarrassed by ignorance of the country, no body of troops can be better adapted. their horses are light limbed, but strong and wiry, and capable of undergoing incredible fatigue while the trooper himself, practised from infancy in the management of the animal, can ride him over places where no european horseman would venture. had these wild mountaineers but the advantages of discipline and proper organization their country would be inaccessible to any troops in the world. chapter vi. installation of shah soojah.--attack on the camel guards.--heroism of an affghan youth.--murder of cornet inverarity of the th lancers.--departure from candahar.--the ghiljie hills.--locusts.--arrival of new auxiliaries.--camel batteries.--hyder khail.--arrival at ghuznee.--tomb of mahommed.--remains of the old town of ghuznee. in order to give a sort of political eclat to the steps taken to reinstate shah soojah on the throne of his ancestors, it was resolved that he should be solemnly inaugurated at candahar, and nothing was omitted that could possibly tend to render the ceremony imposing. on the morning fixed for its celebration, the whole of the british forces were paraded in review order on a large plain to the north of the city, whilst the shah's troops were drawn up at a little distance. in the centre of the field stood a platform canopied with crimson silk, and ornamented with numerous banners and devices, the seat reserved for the shah being ascended by a broad flight of tapestried steps, and covered with cushions of crimson and gold. the other accessories of the pageant were got up in similar costly style, but the effect, on the whole, conveyed to the mind rather the unsatisfied feeling which attends the hollow show and glitter of the theatre, than the idea of substantial power. the weather was beautiful, the sun shedding its gorgeous rays full upon us, and finding innumerable reflections in the military panoply beneath. the heat was however excessive, and the majority of us would have willingly exchanged our places in the ceremonial for the shade and repose of our tents. as early as six o'clock the commander-in-chief took up his position in front of the line, and was received with a general salute. the shah was soon after observed leaving the gates of the city on an elephant, the howdah of which was of solid silver. his majesty appeared to me to be between fifty and sixty years of age; of middle stature, and somewhat inclined to corpulency. his features were large, but regular, and the expression which played about them was not calculated to leave a favourable impression on the physiognomist. it had a mingled character of vaccillation and cruelty about it, which impressed one with the notion that the possessor could sink with ease from the extreme of tyrannical self-will to the abject and fawning humility of the slave. his majesty was accompanied by his vizier, a tall, spare looking man of a thoughtful and rather melancholy cast of features, and somewhat older than his master. immediately behind the shah rode sir william mcnaghten, in full court dress, such as is usually worn by officials at her majesty's levees in england, and he was followed by sir alexander burnes, in a plain suit, and surrounded by the affghan chiefs, with whom he appeared to be in close and friendly converse. the winning smile and frank and courteous manner of the latter gentleman appeared to have gained for him a degree of consideration amongst the natives, which no other european could boast of, and which was principally attributable to the talismanic influence of qualities that have a never failing effect in softening down and subduing even the most rugged and intractable natures. nothing could exceed the splendour of the costumes in which these chiefs were clad, their turbans and weapons being studded with diamonds and other precious stones; whilst the horses on which they were mounted were perfect models of animal beauty. as soon as the shah arrived on the ground the bands of the different regiments struck up "god save the king," and his majesty was conducted to his throne by the politicals. the troops then marched past the platform in slow and quick time each regiment lowering its colors as it arrived before it. a proclamation was afterwards read, declaring and confirming the shah's title to the throne, and all persons subject to his authority having been required to yield him fealty, the affghan chiefs present tendered their homage. the troops were marched back to their lines immediately after, and a durbar concluded the ceremonies of the day. it must not be imagined that during all this time our ever watchful enemies had abated their vigilance or lost any opportunity of annoying us. they did not dare to attack the camp, itself, precautionary measures having been adopted to prevent their near approach, by stationing inlying and outlying pickets round it. we were compelled, however, to send our camels to graze at some distance from the encampment, and the soldiers in charge of them were frequently surprised and driven in. on one occasion a party of the th light infantry, consisting of a serjeant and six privates, who had been entrusted with the care of from fifteen to eighteen camels, fell asleep on their posts, being overcome by the excessive heat, and the affghans, stealing upon them whilst in this state, put one man to death, and severely wounded two others, the whole of the camels of course falling into their hands. the serjeant escaped but was broken for neglect of duty. shortly after this occurrence, two of the marauders fell into our hands. in order to put an end to, or diminish these vexatious losses it was determined to make a terrible example of the prisoners, in the hope that it would have some effect upon their companions. they were accordingly tried by a court martial, composed of native officers, and sentenced to be blown from the mouth of a gun. having been led into the market-place at candahar, they were ordered to draw lots as to who should first undergo this dreadful doom. the younger of the prisoners, a stripling of about nineteen years of age, whose firm and gallant bearing excited universal sympathy and admiration, responded to this command by at once embracing the mouth of the gun from which he was instantly blown to atoms. his companion, a grey-headed man, upwards of sixty years of age, sat looking on, unmoved at this terrible scene, and coolly smoking his hookah. on being ordered to take his place at the gun he did not exhibit the least appearance of fear, and just as the match was about being applied, the officer in command arrested it and directed the prisoner to be taken away, the shah influenced, it is said, by the entreaties of sir alexander burnes, having granted his pardon. this unexpected release from the very jaws of death produced as little emotion on the part of this stout old man, as its near approach or the fate of his youthful companion had elicited. the mysterious and premature death of cornet inverarity, of the th lancers, formed, whilst here, the universal topic of discussion in the military circles. the circumstances, as far as i could collect them, were these:--a pic-nic party had been given by the officers of the regiment at a pleasant rural retreat, within a few miles of candahar, and the cornet, being fond of fishing, took his rod and strayed a short distance from his companions in search of sport. his prolonged absence having given rise to remark, some of the party went in search of him, and found the unfortunate gentleman lying dead on the banks of a neighbouring stream. the wounds he had received were of such a nature as to preclude the idea that they were self-inflicted, and there can be but little doubt that he was murdered by the affghans. the deceased was an officer of considerable acquirements, and was regretted by all who had the honour of his acquaintance. he was only in his th year, and had been about five in the service. i gladly avail myself of the opportunity which presents itself of paying a tribute to the good conduct and friendly feeling of the native troops, who testified on all occasions the utmost willingness, and indeed the most anxious desire to render all the aid and service in their power to their european comrades. their knowledge of the language of the country, and their acquaintance with the value of its produce, proved of no small advantage to us in our daily traffic with the cunning and thievish traders of the bazaar. let me add that the general feeling amongst us was that, in privation or danger, we might always count with certainty on the generosity and bravery of the sepoy. having passed nearly seven weeks at candahar, it was determined that we should next proceed to ghuznee, where it was reported that dost mahommed and his followers had resolved on making a stand. the army quitted the encampment on the th of june, preceded by a squadron of european cavalry, two squadrons of the native troops, and two field pieces loaded with canister and grape shot. the route from candahar to ghuznee lies through a wild and mountainous country, and over roads extremely difficult, and at times almost impassable. the ghiljies fled on our approach to the numerous mud forts with which these hills abound, and seldom ventured on our track. in the dwellings they had abandoned we found only a few old crones and hungry dogs, both of whom received us with a sort of howling welcome. the ghiljie huts are constructed somewhat like a bee hive, being of circular and conical form, with interior accommodations of the most wretched description. the few males whom we caught a glimpse of were clad in the same substitute for broad cloth that served the famous bryan o'lynn, who having-- "no breeches to wear, cut up a sheepskin to make him a pair." we were lucky enough to discover the stores of corn and _bussorah_ (a sort of provender for cattle) which the natives had buried at the first news of our approach. we were also well supplied with water the country being traversed in all directions by rivers and streams. to counterbalance these advantages we were annoyed with shoals of locusts, which literally darkened the atmosphere and kept up a perpetual buzzing and humming in our ears. the locust appears to be a favorite article of food with the natives, who roast it on a slow fire and devour it with eagerness. we could not bring ourselves to relish this equivocal dainty, although our rations were not of the best or most varied description. as we advanced on khelat-i-ghiljie scarcely a day passed without some chief coming into camp from cabul, with a retinue of from one to two hundred men, in order to tender his allegiance to the shah. they were immediately sent to the rear and incorporated with his majesty's levies. many of these new auxiliaries brought camel batteries, which created a good deal of curiosity and amusement amongst the european troops, to whom they were a novelty. each camel carried a sort of rampart on his back, which mounted from four to six swivel guns of small calibre, the conductor both driving the animal and serving the guns. we were surprised at the rapidity and accuracy with which these portable batteries were served and brought to bear, the animal dropping on its knees wherever it became necessary to bring the guns within range, and rising the moment they were discharged. at hyder khail we were plundered of several camels laden with bedding, belonging to her majesty's nd, or queen's royals, and the party in charge of them disappeared and was not again heard of before we left. as we passed khelat-i-ghiljie the country began to improve in its character, and large tracts, covered with corn and beans, betokened the presence of a more civilized tribe than that through whose inhospitable territories we had just passed. the villagers came daily into camp with fruit and vegetables, which they parted with at reasonable prices, and their conduct to us on the whole was civil and peaceable. on the st. of july we arrived in sight of ghuznee, the strength of which we found underrated rather than exaggerated. ghuznee may be said to form the key to cabul since it commands the only direct route to that place. the citadel is of great extent, and includes within its precincts three or four bazaars and several streets. it is surrounded on every side by strong bastions and substantial walls, the whole of which had been recently put in repair, and it mounted nine guns (one a pounder) besides innumerable wall pieces, gingals, and matchlocks. the principal entrance is at the north side, on the road to cabul, and is approached by a bridge of slight construction, thrown across a deep ditch or moat. to the right and left stretch long chains of lofty hills, which approach the walls so closely on the north side, as to command a view of the interior of the citadel. the enemy, sensible of the importance of these heights, had lined them with troops in order to prevent our planting batteries on them. at the distance of about three quarters of a mile from the fort, and situated in an amphitheatre of hills, lies the town of ghuznee, which consists of only a few narrow, straggling streets. a narrow, but deep and rapid river, whose banks are studded with rich corn fields, winds its devious route through the pleasant valley in which the town is situate, and half encircles its walls. nearly equidistant from the town and the fort, and surrounded by luxuriant orchards and vineyards, stands the famous tomb of mahommed of ghuznee. it consists of an oblong building ft. by , and about feet in height, and is crowned by a mud cupola. the gates are said to be of sandal-wood, and were taken from the temple of somnath by the conqueror, whose remains lie entombed here. the grave stone in the interior is made of the finest white marble, but its once rich sculpture is now nearly defaced, and it presents but few traces of the arabic characters with which it was formerly inscribed. over the last resting place of the hero, and in a sadly decayed state, are suspended the banner of green silk, and the enormous mace which he had so often borne in battle. in the plain to the south of the hills stand two pillars, or obelisks, of brickwork, about one hundred feet in height, and twelve in diameter at the base, which are said to have marked the limits of the bazaar of ancient ghuznee, and which at present form serve only as conspicuous landmarks for the traveller. chapter vii. reconnaisance of the fortress.--skirmish with the enemy.--rejoicings of the garrison at our supposed defeat.--preparation for a coup de main.--engineer operations.--storming and taking of the fortress. we debouched on the plain in front of the fort about eight o'clock in the morning, and advanced upon it in three columns--the cavalry on the right, the artillery in the centre, and the infantry on the left. the commander-in-chief determined to reconnoitre the place in force, and make the enemy show their strength. on approaching the orchards and walled gardens before described, we found them occupied by the enemy, and the st brigade having been immediately thrown into them, drove the affghans out of the enclosures in capital style, and forced them to take shelter behind the defences, with a comparatively trifling loss on our side. our guns were now brought to bear upon the fortress, which had kept up a sharp fire on us from the moment of our appearance, but owing to our having left our heavy battering train behind us at candahar we did but little or no damage. about eleven o'clock we drew off, and pitched our camp out of range of the fire of the foot. on our skirmishers retiring from the gardens they were immediately occupied by the enemy, who commenced cheering our retreating parties, in the conviction that they had obtained a victory. under this impression they instantly sent off expresses to cabul, to announce the fact, and state that if the whole of the surrounding country could be raised, they had little doubt of being able to cut us off to a man. the garrison spent the night in rejoicings, and blue lights were constantly sent up as signals to their friends on the neighbouring hills. next morning the shah's camp was threatened on the left by large bodies of horse and foot who were driven off by the cavalry and some of his highness's troops; whilst another force, consisting chiefly of horse, under the command of one of dost mahommed's sons; and at a short distance from him a ghiljie chief, with about fifteen hundred cavalry, who had hung upon our flank all the way from khelat-i-ghiljie, menaced us to the right. this determined the commander-in-chief to expedite matters, and the engineers having made a careful inspection of the fortress, he resolved on carrying it by storm. the whole of the nd was consumed in making the necessary preparations, the field hospital being got ready while strong detachments of cavalry scoured the country around, in order to keep the enemy from our lines. in order to give my readers a correct idea of the strength of the fortifications, and the difficulties overcome by the intelligence and courage of the officers and men of the british army, i cannot do better than to copy the official reports made by the principal engineer officers on the subject. they contain a full detail of the operations up to the moment when the citadel fell into our possession. _memorandum of the engineers' operations before ghuznee, in july, , by captain george thompson, bengal engineers, chief engineer army of the indus._ the accounts of the fortress of ghuznee, received from those who had seen it, were such as to induce his excellency the commander-in-chief to leave in candahar the very small battering train then with the army, there being a scarcity of transport cattle. the place was described as very weak, and completely commanded from a range of hills to the north. when we came before it on the morning of the st of july we were very much surprised to find a rampart, in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a faussebraye and wet ditch. the irregular figure of the "enceinte" gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. in addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had been enlarged, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it. the garrison was variously stated from three to four thousand strong, including five hundred cavalry, and from subsequent information we found that it had not been overrated. on the approach of the army, a fire of artillery was opened from the body of the place, and of musketry from the neighbouring gardens. a detachment of infantry cleared the latter, and the former was silenced for a short time by shrapnells from the horse artillery, but the fire from the new outwork on the bank of the river was in no way checked. a nearer view of the works was, however, obtained from the gardens which had been cleared. this was not at all satisfactory. the works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. we had no battering train, and to besiege ghuznee in form, a much larger one would be required than the army ever possessed. the great command of the parapets from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading. it therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole _contour_ of the place, to discover if any other mode of attack could be adopted. the engineers, with an escort, went round the works, approaching as near as they could find cover. the garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire upon the officers whenever they were obliged to show themselves. however, by keeping the infantry beyond musket range, and the cavalry at a still greater distance, only one man was killed, and another wounded; the former being hit by men sent out of the place to drive off the reconnoitring party. the fortifications were found equally strong, all round, the only tangible point observed being the cabul gateway, which offered the following advantages for a _coup-de-main_. the road to the gate was clear, the bridge over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions for the artillery within three hundred yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from cabul being expected. the result of this reconnaisance was a report to his excellency the commander-in-chief, that if he decided upon the immediate attack on ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success was a dash at the cabul gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder. his excellency decided upon the attempt, the camp was moved that evening to the cabul road, and the next morning, the nd, sir john keane in person reconnoitred the proposed point of attack, approved of the plan, and gave orders for its execution. preparations were made accordingly, positions for the artillery were carefully examined, which excited the jealousy of the garrison, who opened a smart fire upon the party. it was arranged that an explosion party, consisting of three officers of engineers, captain peat, lieutenants durand and mcleod, three serjeants, and eighteen men of the sappers in working dresses, carrying lbs. of powder in twelve sand bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long, should be ready to move down to the gateway at daybreak. at midnight the first battery left camp, followed by the other four, at intervals of half an hour. those to the right of the road were conducted to their positions by lieutenant stuart, those to the left by lieutenant anderson. the ground for the guns was prepared by the sappers and pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground to the right, and of some old garden walls to the left. the artillery was all in position, and ready by a. m. of the rd, and shortly after, at the first dawn, the party under captain peat moved down to the gateway, accompanied by six men of her majesty's th light infantry, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same regiment, which extended to the right and left of the road; when they arrived at the ditch, taking advantage of what cover they could find, and endeavouring to keep down the fire from the ramparts, which became heavy on the approach of the party, though it had been remarkably slack during the previous operations; blue lights were shown, which rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible, but luckily they were buried on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below. the explosion party marched steadily on, headed by lieutenant durand; the powder was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover in less than two minutes. the artillery opened when the blue lights appeared, and the musketry from the covering party at the same time. so quickly was the operation performed, and so little was the enemy aware of the nature of it, that not a man of the party was hurt. as soon as the explosion took place, captain peat, although hurt by the concussion, his anxiety preventing him from keeping sufficiently under cover, ran up to the gate, accompanied by a small party of her majesty's th light infantry, and ascertained that it was completely destroyed. there was some delay in getting a bugler to sound at the advance, the signal agreed on for the assaulting column to push on, and this was the only mistake in the operation. the assaulting column, consisting of four european regiments (her majesty's nd regiment, bengal european regiment, her majesty's th light infantry, and her majesty's th regiment) commanded by brigadier sale, the advance under lieutenant colonel dennie, accompanied by lieutenant sturt, engineers, moved steadily through the gateway, through a passage inside the gateway, in a domed building, in which the opening on one side rendered everything very obscure, and making it difficult to find the outlet into the town. they met with little opposition; but the party of the enemy seeing a peak in the column, owing to the difficulty in scrambling over the rubbish in the gateway, made a rush, sword in hand, and cut down a good many men, wounding the brigadier and several other officers. these swordsmen were repulsed, and there was no more regular opposition; the surprise and alarm of the governor and sirdars being so great when they saw the column occupying the open space inside the gate, and firing upon them, that they fled, accompanied by their men, even the garrison of the citadel following their example. parties of the affghans took refuge in the houses, firing on the column as it made its way through the streets, and a good deal of desultory fighting took place in consequence, by which some loss was sustained. the citadel was occupied as soon as daylight showed that it had been abandoned by the enemy, and the whole of the works were in our possession before a. m. we lost seventeen men, six european and eleven natives killed--eighteen officers, and one hundred and seventeen europeans, and thirty natives wounded--total one hundred and eighty-two. of the affghans more than five hundred and fourteen were killed in the town, that number of bodies having been buried, and about one thousand outside by the cavalry, one thousand six hundred prisoners were taken, but i have no means of estimating the number of wounded. there were nine guns of different calibres found in the place, a large quantity of good powder, considerable stores of shot, lead, &c., &c., and a large supply of attar and other provisions. geo. thomson, capt. engrs. _chief engineer army of the indus._ the following report by captain peat, of the bombay civil engineers, gives a more detailed account of the operations for blowing up the gate, which, it will be seen, were attended with difficulties of no ordinary nature. "during the reconnaissance the wall pieces were particularly troublesome. this weapon is almost unknown in our service, but it is a very efficient one, especially in the defence of works, and its use should not be neglected. every fortified post should be supplied with a proportion of them, and a certain number of men in every regiment practised in firing them. the charge recommended by colonel pasley, for blowing open gates is from sixty to one hundred and twenty pounds, and this is, doubtless, sufficient in ordinary cases; but in this instance we were apprehensive that the enemy might have taken alarm at our being so much on that side of the place, and in consequence, partially or wholly, built up the gateway. it was afterwards found that some attempts of the kind had been made by propping up the gate with beams. the charge was so heavy, that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the roof of the square building in which it was placed, which proved a very considerable obstacle to the assaulting column, and the concussion acted as far as the tower, under which an officer's party of her majesty's th regiment were standing at the time, but without occasioning any casualties. in cases of this nature it is of course the first object to guard against any chance of failure; and it is impossible, even now, to say how much the charge might have been reduced with safety. the enemy appeared so much on the alert, and the faussebraye was so much in advance of the gate that we never contemplated being able to effect our object by surprise. the only question was, whether it ought to be done by day or night. it was argued in favor of the former, that the artillery would be able to make so much more correct practice that the defences would be in a considerable degree destroyed, and the fire so completely kept under as to enable the explosion party to advance with but little loss, and with the advantage of being able to see exactly what they were about. captain thompson, however, adhered to the latter, and we were afterwards convinced it was the most judicious plan; for although the fire of the artillery was necessarily more general than it would have been in daylight, still it was so well directed as to take up a good deal of the attention of the besieged, and draw upon their batteries a portion of the fire, which in daylight would have been thrown down upon the explosion party and assaulting columns. it would also, even in daylight, have been difficult, with our light artillery, to have kept down the fire so completely but that a few matchlock men might have kept their position near the gateway; and in that narrow space a smart fire from a few pieces might have obliged the party to retire. the obscurity of the night, to say nothing of the confusion which it must occasion among undisciplined troops, is certainly the best protection to a body of men engaged in an enterprise of this nature. blue lights certainly render objects distinctly visible, but their light is glaring and uncertain, especially to men firing through loopholes. the party consisted of eighteen officers, twenty-eight sergeants, seven buglers, and two hundred and seventy-six rank and file. it was made of this strength, not only to keep up a heavy fire upon the parapets, and thereby divert attention from the party at the gateway, but also because we were not aware whether the faussebraye was occupied or not, and as it extends so much in advance as to take the gate completely in reverse, it would have been necessary, had a fire opened from it, to have carried it by assault before the party with the bags could have advanced. the party with lieutenant durand was accompanied by six men of the th, without their belts, the better to secure them from observation, to protect them from any sortie that might be made from the postern of the faussebraye on the right, or even from the gate itself, while another party under an officer, lieutenant jennings, accompanied me as far as the tower so as to check any attempts that might have been made from the faussebraye on the left, and at the same time keeping up a fire on such of the enemy as showed their heads above the parapet; of this party one man was killed and a few wounded. nothing could have been more gallant than the conduct of lieutenants durand and mcleod, and the men under their command; or more efficient than the manner in which they executed their duty. the powder being in sand bags of a very coarse open texture, a long hose and port fire was thought to be the safest method of firing it. the end of the hose fortunately just reached the small postern. the casualties, however, during this operation were much fewer than was expected, being in all one private killed, two sergeants, and twenty-three rank and file wounded. the heaviest fire was certainly outside the bridge, for the enemy near the gateway being marked, whenever they attempted to shew their heads above the parapet, were obliged to confine themselves to the loop-holes, the range from which is very uncertain and limited against men moving about. a high loop-holed wall, although imposing in appearance, is a profile but ill adapted to resist attacks of this nature. the enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to have no idea of the nature of our operations. had they been so they might easily have rendered it impossible to place the powder bags, by throwing over blue lights, of which they had a large quantity in store. the powder pots and other fire works so much used by the natives of hindoostan would certainly have rendered the confined space leading to the gate much too hot for such an operation; but the ignorance of the besieged was known and calculated upon, the result shows how justly. their attempts at resistance were confined to the fire from the loopholes and throwing over large pieces of earth, some of which appeared to be intended to knock off the port fire. i on this occasion received an excellent lesson on the necessity of not allowing preconceived opinions to lead to any carelessness, in accurately ascertaining the result of any operation of this nature. the gateway appeared, from what i had seen from the hills to the north, to lead straight into the town, and on running in to examine it after the explosion i was so much impressed with this idea and so much convinced of the probability of the gateway having been blocked up during the day, that i was led to believe that it had actually been done, from seeing, in front of the gate that had been destroyed, the outline of an arch filled up with brick masonry. the true entrance turned to the right and would have been discovered by advancing a few paces, and that in perfect safety, for the interior was secure from all fire. lieutenant durand on first going up saw from through the chinks of the gate that there was a light and a guard immediately behind it, and from that circumstance was convinced that no interior obstacles of importance existed. my mistake therefore was luckily immediately corrected without any bad consequence resulting. a party of sappers with felling axes, and commanded by lieutenant wemyss, and two scaling ladders in charge of lieutenant pigan, accompanied the assaulting column. of ten engineer officers engaged in this attack, only one, lieutenant marriot, was slightly wounded. captain thompson however had a very narrow escape, having been thrown down by a rush of some swordsmen into the gateway, and nearly sabred while upon the ground." chapter viii. an affghan heroine.--capture of hyder khan the commandant of ghuznee.--escape of ghool mahommed khan.--discovery of a map on the person of an affghan chief.--description of the affghan women.--the ruling passion.--treasuretrove.--the golden shield.--chase of the enemy.--just retribution. the cavalry taking no part in these operations i was an idle, but not the less an anxious spectator of the scene. i had never before witnessed effects so awfully grand, or so intensely exciting in their nature as those which immediately preceded and followed the explosion at the gates. the atmosphere was illuminated by sudden and powerful flashes of various coloured light which exposed the walls and bastions of the fortress to view, and revealed the dusky figures of the garrison, in the act of pointing their guns, or endeavouring to penetrate the denseness of the obscurity beneath, in order to assure themselves of the position of their assailants. then followed the din and roar of artillery--the terrific explosion of the gates--the crash of woodwork and masonry--the hollow rumbling of the old towers as they came in huge masses to the ground--the rush of the storming party through the breach, and the deafening cheers and shouts of besiegers and besieged. it seemed as if all the elements of destruction had been let loose at once, and yet i panted to be in the midst of them. i hardly dared to breathe from the very intenseness of my anxiety, and it was not till i saw the british flag floating from the citadel, that i could respire freely. to the soldier there is nothing more trying or chafing than to be condemned to a state of inaction during the progress of such spirit-stirring events as these. while the affghans were disputing our entrance into the citadel an incident occurred, which for a moment diverted the attention of the combatants and turned their fury into pity. amongst the foremost of the party who signalised themselves by their desperate gallantry was an aged chieftain, the richness of whose costume excited general attention, his turban and weapons being resplendent with jewels. the hope of plunder immediately marked him out as an object of attack, and numbers at once assailed him. he defended himself like a man who knew there was no chance of life, but who was resolved to sell it as dearly as he could. he had killed several of the queen's royals and severely wounded captain robinson, when a grenadier of the company to which the latter belonged, seeing his officer in danger, rushed to his assistance, and with a thrust of his bayonet brought the gallant old chieftain to the ground. the grenadier was about to despatch him, when a beautiful girl, about seventeen, threw herself into the _mêlée_ and plunged a dagger in his breast. she then cast herself on the body of the chieftain, for the purpose of protecting it, and the affghans, forming a sort of rampart before them, maintained their ground until the heroic girl succeeded in getting it conveyed into the interior of the citadel. shortly after the place was taken she was found weeping over the remains of the brave old man, who, on enquiry, we learned was her father. she was treated with the utmost respect and tenderness by our men, who neither obtruded themselves on her grief nor offered any interruption to the preparations which she made for his interment. amongst the prisoners who fell into our hands was hyder khan, a son of dost mahommed, and late commandant of the fortress. this chief was discovered hiding in a privy by a soldier of the queen's royals, who would have bayonetted him but for the timely interference of one of his officers, who chanced to be near the spot. the affghan leader was immediately brought before sir john keane, and the shah being present rated him soundly for his treachery. he replied only by a haughty look of defiance, and was consigned to a tent closely guarded by sepoys. the sword found upon this chief, and which is at present in the possession of sir john keane, was valued at , rupees. of the many prisoners we had taken, the capture of none afforded such gratification as that of ghool mahommed khan, to whose bad faith some of our past privations had been owing. this chief had entered into a contract with sir alexander burnes, to establish magazines of provisions and corn at quettah, for the use of the british troops, and five thousand rupees were paid over to him for the purpose. he purchased up all the corn of the surrounding districts, but instead of fulfilling his agreement he forwarded it to ghuznee for the use of the garrison, and was amongst the most conspicuous defenders of the fortress. on being brought before the shah his majesty ordered him to be bowstringed, but before the sentence could be carried into effect he managed to escape. his treachery failed in its object, for the greater portion of the flour and grain which he had supplied now fell into our hands. we also found from five to six hundred horses in the stables of the fortress, all of which were in excellent condition, and ranging in value from seventy to a hundred pounds each. i entered the fort shortly after it surrendered and at every step spectacles of the most shocking and revolting nature met the eye. round a long twenty pounder, which was planted to the right of the entrance, lay heaps of dead affghans, who appeared to have attached the greatest importance to the service of this piece from the numbers who crowded to perform the duty whenever our fire killed those engaged in it. the agonising cries and groans of the wounded wretches who lay stretched at every side, and who craved drink to sate their burning thirst, struck those who had not been engaged in the fearful excitement of the scene with horror and pity, whilst at every turning a horse, wild with the injuries he had received, was to be met galloping furiously along the narrow streets, and treading the bodies of the dying and dead under foot. advancing through the bazaar, my attention was drawn towards a venerable looking affghan, who was seated on the ground with his back propped against a wall, and whose richly ornamented muslin robes were stained with blood, which flowed profusely from a wound in his breast. a fine looking youth of about fourteen years of age was attempting to stanch it, and i hastened to proffer my assistance. the old man, however, pushed me back, and would not let me approach him, plainly indicating by his gestures that he held me and my countrymen in abhorrence. whilst standing at a short distance from him, a straggling ball came whizzing past me, whether intentionally or accidentally i cannot say, and put an end to his sufferings. some soldiers, who afterwards examined the person of this old chief, for such from his attire i took him to be, discovered amongst other things an extremely well executed map, on which the whole of the route of our troops from the point at which we had disembarked to our arrival at ghuznee was plainly indicated. some of the affghan women were occasionally to be met turning over the bodies of the dead, in the hope of being able to discover their relations or friends, and giving way to their grief in the most heart-rending lamentations. they were the most superior class of women i had as yet seen amongst the asiatics, their features being regular, and finely formed, and their eyes piercing, but at the same time soft in their expression. although nothing like violence was used towards them, they did not escape some incivilities at the hands of our men, owing to the fact that a number of affghan soldiers had attempted to escape in female disguise. various were the adventures related amongst us, as having occurred on the first entrance of our troops into the fortress. a scotchman, belonging to my own regiment, named james hamilton, who was known to be an inveterate snuff-taker was discovered in a tobacconist's shop in the bazaar literally covered from head to foot with the contents of the _chatties_ or jars with which it was filled, and testing the qualities of each with an air of the most exquisite relish, his nose having been long a stranger to its favourite aliment. the ruling passion was exemplified in different ways in others. some sought for drink, of which there was little to be obtained and others for gold, which we had every reason to believe was plentiful, if we knew but where to find it. a soldier of the th light infantry, more fortunate than his fellows, lit unexpectedly on a jar which was filled to the brim with gold pieces to the value it is said of £ sterling, and conveyed it secretly to the camp. becoming apprehensive that this large sum would be discovered on him, and that he would be obliged to give it up to the prize agent, he distributed it amongst several of his comrades in order that they might take care of it. the possession of so much wealth turning the heads of his trustees they thought they might allow themselves a few indulgences at his expence, but their excesses ultimately betrayed the secret and they were compelled to hand over the money to the common fund. as the soldiers severally left the fortress to return to the camp they were stripped of the plunder which they had obtained, and a goodly heap of armour and weapons of every kind was soon piled before the entrance. amongst the number of curious articles obtained in this way was an old shield, which had belonged to one of the affghan chiefs and which, though remarkable for the oddness of its construction, presented little else to attract the eye. its material appeared to be a compound of copper and some white metal, and it was thrown aside by the prize agent amongst the most valueless of the objects which fell under his care. a soldier of the bengal european regiment, who had been a jeweller by trade, happened to observe the circumstance, and carelessly taking up the shield, as if to examine the devices with which it was ornamented, scrutinized it for some time, and went away without making the slightest observation. he immediately repaired to the captain of his company, and told him to bid for the shield at the prize sale which was to take place a few days afterwards, advising him not to stop at any reasonable price for it. the officer acted on the hint, and obtained the article for about thirty or forty rupees. the shield turned out to be of the purest and finest gold, and the fortunate possessor felt so grateful to his informant that he made him a present sufficient to purchase his discharge, and carry him home to england. amongst the different ensigns captured from the enemy on this occasion were two banners of green and crimson silk, trimmed with gold lace and inscribed with precepts from the koran. they were desperately defended, the affghans appearing to attach great importance to their safety. they are, i believe, at present in the possession of her majesty's th light infantry, and the bengal european regiment. shortly after the breach had been effected intelligence was brought to the commander-in-chief, that numbers of the enemy were making their escape through one of the back gates. he immediately dispatched the st bombay light cavalry in pursuit. the affghans being daring horsemen, and better mounted than our men, made at once for the hills, where they knew our cavalry could not follow. aware of this our men put their horses to their utmost speed, in order to intercept them before they got entangled in the defiles. the chase soon assumed a character of lively interest. an affghan, worse mounted, or less skilled in horsemanship than his fellows, was overtaken and cut down, and the pursuers pressed hard on the heels of another. the cheers of his enemies, and the clatter of their horses' hoofs sounding fearfully near in the ears of the pursued he put the noble animal on which he was mounted to its utmost speed, and cleared the space between him and his companions at a bound rather than a gallop. again he was almost within reach of the sabres of our men, and again did the fleetness of his horse place him for a time in safety. as he was about to plunge into a deep ravine after the other fugitives a shot brought his horse upon its knees, and the rider was flung upon his head. all now seemed over with him. starting, however, to his feet, he turned upon his pursuers, and single handed opposed a host of them. warding off the blows which rained on him from every side, he kept rapidly retreating until he gained the brow of a steep declivity over which he flung himself and was instantly lost to view. disappointed in their pursuit, our men took an unmanly revenge on some peasants who were peaceably engaged in agricultural occupations near the spot. one of these wanton acts of cruelty met with a just retribution. a havildar or serjeant, seeing a young affghan following the plough at a little distance, galloped up, and made several cuts at him with his sabre. the young man ran to the other side of the plough, and placed the serjeant at bay. the latter drew a pistol from his holster, and was about to shoot him, when his horse stumbled over the plough and fell on his side, breaking the leg of the havildar and pinning him at the same time firmly to the ground. the affghan seized the sword which had fallen from his grasp, and dealt him a blow on the head which instantly killed him. the comrades of the dead man riding up surrounded and captured the peasant, and he was brought into camp to abide the decision of the commander-in-chief. a representation having been made to sir john keane of the wanton and unprovoked attack which had been made upon the prisoner, he immediately ordered him to be liberated. the havildar was interred on the spot where he fell and there were few in the army who pitied or regretted him. chapter ix. attempt to assassinate the shah.--court martial on an affghan chief.--visit to the hospital at ghuznee.--hatred of the affghans towards the native troops.--departure from ghuznee.--capture of a battery and fatal accident.--summary punishment.--arrival at cabul.--pursuit of dost mahommed and treachery of a native chief.--description of cabul.--the balar hissar.--mosque of the emperor baber.--the bazaar. a few days after the taking of ghuznee a tragical scene occurred, which pretty clearly indicated how the tide of popular feeling ran with regard to the restored monarch. there is a poetical superstition that approaching events are often foreshadowed, and the circumstance to which i allude seemed to impress every man's mind at the time with the result that has since happened. the majority of the prisoners who fell into our hands were released on condition of their serving in the shah's army, but there remained about thirty who refused to accept of their liberty on such terms. they consisted for the most part of the immediate followers of dost mahommed's father-in-law, and were devotedly attached to that prince. the shah, on learning the circumstance ordered them to be brought before him, and expostulated with them on the folly of their conduct. a chief of haughty bearing stepped from amongst the prisoners, and after overwhelming his majesty with reproaches, told him that nothing should induce him to enter the service of a man who had brought the horrors of foreign invasion on his country. then suddenly snatching a dagger from one of the attendants, he rushed with uplifted arm towards the shah, and would have pierced him to the heart had not one of his majesty's servants interposed his person, and received the blow intended for his master. the faithful domestic fell dead at the feet of the shah, and the officers and attendants instantly rushed towards the assassin with drawn swords; but he had already anticipated their intention by plunging the poniard in his breast. the shah, alarmed and exasperated, ordered the whole of the prisoners to be immediately executed, and in a few minutes their heads were rolling in the dust. this terrible scene created great alarm in the camp, it being at first reported that his majesty had been assassinated, but the apprehensions to which it gave rise were soon dispelled, by his publicly making his appearance amongst us. a chief, named walla mahommed, who had persisted in firing on the troops several hours after the taking of the fort, and in spite of repeated summonses to surrender, was brought to a court martial by order of the commander-in-chief, and sentenced to be shot within the walls of the fortress. he had killed three or four of our men, and wounded one of the native officers by his obstinate folly. he met his fate with the most perfect indifference, for the fear of death cannot be said to be one of the weaknesses of the affghan character. i one day paid a visit, with some of my comrades, to the hospital where the wounded affghans had been carried by their friends. it was situated in the old town, and consisted of a mud hut, whose thatched roof was broken in several places, and afforded little or no shelter against the heat of the sun. the interior was as filthy and disgusting as it is possible to conceive. into a space of about thirty feet by twelve, were crowded from seventy to a hundred patients, who were disabled by wounds of every description, their sufferings being aggravated tenfold, by the intolerable heat and stench of the place. they were attended by two elderly men and a youth about fifteen years of age, who were busily engaged dressing their wounds, whilst a faquir was performing certain charms, by which he pretended he could restore them to health. pitiable and disgusting as the scene was i could not help laughing at the mummeries of the fellow. he first placed some cow dung in the hand of the sufferer, and holding it in his, saturated it with water and compelled the patient to smell it. he then wound up the ceremony by repeating some prayers over the fumes of a charcoal pan, the patient repeating after him certain responses which he directed him to make. this done, he covered him up with an old blanket, and ordered him to lay quiet for several hours, when the cure would be complete. having of course received a consideration for all this trouble, he left his patients to the progress of the charm, and the discovery, when too late, that they had been grossly duped. happening to have a quantity of apples with me which i had just plucked from one of the orchards in the vicinity, i offered them to the sufferers in the hope that they would in some degree refresh them. they accepted them with eagerness which induced some sepoys who were with me to follow my example. the affghans indignantly refused to receive anything at their hands, and so great was their hatred of the native troops, that they actually spat upon the men who showed them this kindness. early in august we resumed our march towards cabul, leaving the whole of our sick and wounded in garrison at ghuznee. it was reported that dost mahommed intended to dispute every inch of ground to the capital, but these valiant resolutions were abandoned as soon as formed. the only indication of a preconcerted plan of defence which we met with on the route, was a battery of sixteen field pieces which we found planted on an eminence commanding the entrance to a formidable pass about midway between ghuznee and cabul, but which had been deserted by the enemy as soon as our advanced columns made their appearance. a party of the horse artillery having been sent to secure the guns and ammunition, an accident took place which was attended with fatal consequences. one of the men having approached a tumbrel with a lighted pipe a spark fell into it and the whole blew up with a tremendous explosion, killing two of the party and severely injuring another. the conduct of the inhabitants of the different villages along this route, whether influenced by good will or fear, i cannot take upon myself to say, was friendly and well disposed towards us. this did not however prevent some excesses on the part of the native troops, which sir john keane sought to repress by issuing an order forbidding the men from robbing the villagers on pain of death. at chesgow, about two days march from ghuznee, a soldier belonging to the nd bengal light cavalry was observed thieving in the immediate vicinity of the staff lines, and one of sir john's aides de camps who watched his proceedings took a gun from his tent and deliberately lodged its contents in his side. the unfortunate man died of the wound, after lingering a few days. the extreme severity of the punishment and its informal nature, were bitterly canvassed amongst the native troops, but it nevertheless had the effect of preventing a repetition of the offence. early on the morning of the th of august, we encamped without opposition under the walls of cabul, dost mahommed and his forces having fled to the hills at the first news of our approach. the commander-in-chief being desirous of securing the person of the usurper, immediately despatched captain outram, and hadji khan, a chief supposed to be well affected towards shah soojah, with a thousand affghans and a hundred native cavalry in pursuit. they had not proceeded far from the camp when it became evident to captain outram that treachery was secretly at work, the affghans deserting daily, until their number was diminished to about five hundred. hadji khan, to whose guidance the force was entrusted, led it by long and circuitous routes, under pretence that they would thereby more easily intercept the fugitives, and turned a deaf ear to the captain's entreaties that they should proceed directly across the hills. wherever a rapid movement became necessary, the affghan managed so that his followers should be delayed on the route, and there was no sort of impediment that craft or ingenuity could suggest that he did not employ to retard the progress of the troops. captain outram having no authority to act without the aid of the khan was obliged to shut his eyes to these manoeuvres, and succeeded after the most urgent persuasion in inducing the affghan chief to proceed at once to the hills, with a small detachment. after traversing the highest parts of the hindoo kosh, a chain of mountains, fifteen thousand feet above the level of the sea, and extending as far as bamean, captain outram found that dost mahommed had taken refuge in the territories of an independent uzbeck chieftain then at enmity with the shah. whilst crossing the heights several blue lights were thrown up by the orders of hadji khan, which the british had reason to believe were intended to give warning to the enemy. further pursuit through a difficult and hostile territory became of course out of the question, and the horses being worn out from want of forage and rest, orders were given for the return of the party to cabul. during the march homeward hadji khan contrived to give the british the slip, and made off to the hills, rightly calculating that his equivocal conduct would be severely punished by the shah. he was, however, captured before the british left cabul, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. it was said that the commander-in-chief was dissatisfied with the conduct of captain outram in this affair, and that he pointedly passed over his name in the official despatches to mark his displeasure. as several descriptions of cabul have been published it will only be necessary for me to give such of its leading features as are essential to the completeness of my narrative. the city lies almost in the centre of a semicircular chain of hills, the valley in which it is situated being watered by a noble river which pursues a serpentine and picturesque route through it, and divides the town in nearly equal parts. the bazaar stands at the base of a lofty mountain, up whose rugged sides straggle rude and irregular fortifications of no great strength or importance. the town itself covers a considerable extent of ground, and the streets are in general regular and well built as compared with the other cities of asia. towering high above the other buildings may be observed the mosque and balar hissar or palace of the sovereign. the latter is surrounded by beautiful gardens and is entered by a large flagged court-way leading to the principal portal of the edifice. the proportions of the building are on a scale commensurate with royalty, the centre being surmounted by a lofty dome, and the wings of vast extent. the right wing contains the stabling of the shah and chambers of the household, and the left is appropriated to the sovereign's own use. the general effect of this building is heavy, and it conveys the idea of a prison rather than a palace. about half a mile to the right of the palace stands the mosque which contains the remains of the emperor baber. this temple is one of the finest i have seen in this part of asia, being of great architectural beauty and noble proportions. it is entirely composed of richly carved stone-work, and is crowned by a number of graceful spires and minarets. the interior is magnificently ornamented with gilding and sculpture, and the pavement is composed of rich mosaics of various coloured marbles. the tomb containing the remains of the emperor occupies the centre of the mosque, and is less elaborately ornamented than any other part of it, being composed of plain slabs of white marble on which some extracts from the koran are inscribed. the bazaar is of circular form, the streets composing it radiating from an open space in its centre, and presenting a thronged and busy aspect. the principal articles of merchandize which attracted our notice were cashmere shawls of the richest and most expensive patterns, and costly silks of every description. a considerable trade is also carried on in preserved fruits, which find their way from here to the most distant parts of hindostan. in the fruit market we observed grapes which measured nearly two inches in circumference; peaches, whose rich bloom and luscious quality gratified at once the eye and the palate; and strawberries, such as the hot houses of europe, and all the inventions of horticultural science could not force into existence. as to apples and pears, fruits prized in the western hemisphere, they were in such abundance and of such low price, that they were only deemed worthy of furnishing food for cattle. almost all the necessaries of life were in equal profusion, beef fetching only a penny, and mutton twopence the pound. it may be readily imagined that to the tired and half-starved soldier, cabul appeared almost a second land of promise. chapter x. triumphant entry of shah soojah into cabul.--the cabul races.--death of brigadier general arnold.--sale of the general's effects.--arrival of prince timour.--the sikhs.--murder of colonel herring.--arrival of money and supplies from the upper provinces. it having been announced that early on the morning of the th of august the shah would take formal possession of the balar hissar, the troops were under arms and in review order at ten o'clock. the commander-in-chief, the politicals, and the whole of the general officers and staff rode up, shortly after, to the tent of his majesty, at which i happened that morning to be stationed as orderly, and were kept waiting some time. sir william mcnaghten and sir alexander burnes were at length summoned to the shah's presence, and having remained with him a few minutes, they came out and informed the commander-in-chief, it was his majesty's pleasure that the ceremony should be postponed until three o'clock the same afternoon. the reason assigned for this alteration was understood to be an augury pronounced by his majesty's priests or soothsayers, that the hour was unpropitious, an opinion in which the troops devoutly concurred, the prospect of broiling for several hours under a meridian sun not being extremely agreeable. at the appointed hour the troops were again under arms, and salvoes of artillery announced the shah's departure from his tent. his majesty was, as usual, borne on an elephant, the howdah of which was of silver, and the caparisons crimson and gold. on each side of him sat sir william mc naghten and sir alexander burnes, the former attired in the same court dress which he had worn at candahar. his majesty appeared in excellent health and spirits, and addressed much of his conversation to sir alexander burnes, who seemed to be high in his favour. the shah's costume was, as usual, magnificent, his turban being ornamented with a single diamond, whose value was estimated at £ , . immediately after came six elephants, containing the ministers and household of the shah, and then followed the commander-in-chief, with the whole of the general officers and staff in brilliant uniforms, and decorated with their various orders. the next feature in the procession, and a ludicrous one it was, was the appearance of two burly-looking fellows, dressed in red and yellow, and wearing conical caps, out of which shot two large horns. we at first supposed they were his highness's jesters, but instead of that they turned out to be his executioners, functionaries far more essential to the comfort of an asiatic prince. the shah's troops, consisting of two thousand infantry, brought up the rear, our own lining the route along which the procession passed. on approaching the city his highness was received with loud acclamations by the populace, who gave expression to their satisfaction in barbarous music and salvoes of small fire arms. many of the houses were decorated with flowers, and the windows were crowded with spectators. at the entrance, and in the courts of the palace, was stationed a body of about horsemen, whose steel armour and splendid horses gave them a martial and imposing appearance. they received us with stern and scowling looks, which plainly indicated that their hearts were not in the ceremony which they were compelled to sanction by their presence. on the shah's entrance into the palace he held a durbar, at which all the british officers were presented to him, and his majesty took the opportunity of expressing to them individually and collectively his thanks for the exertions which they had made to replace him on his throne. we had several reviews of the troops during our stay at cabul, and on each occasion we were honoured by the shah's presence. in order to give his highness some notion of an english horse race, it was agreed that the officers should get up sweepstakes amongst themselves, which the shah no sooner heard of, than he added a splendid gold hilted sword with damascus blade. this increased the spirit of competition, and the derby or oaks was never looked forward to with more eager interest. the place selected for the course was a level plain immediately beyond our lines, and about a mile and a half from the city. from sixteen to twenty horses belonging to the officers of the different regiments were entered for the sword, and it was resolved that three heats should be run for it, the first six horses of the first heat being privileged to run the second, and the third heat being limited to the first and second horses of the second heat. it was agreed that the sweepstakes, which amounted to a considerable sum, should be divided into three parts, for the different breeds and ages of cattle so as to prolong the sport for three or four days. six o'clock in the evening being the time fixed for the commencement of the races, the course became crowded, long before that hour, with anxious spectators, the natives not being amongst the least eager lookers on at this, to them, novel scene. the shah took up his position near the winning post, attended by the politicals, and the commander-in-chief, but his majesty did not appear to take much interest in the sport, and he left the course before it was half over. the officers rode their own horses and turned out in gay striped jackets and jockey caps; so that but for the dark faces and turbaned heads which every where encountered the eye it would not have been difficult to imagine ourselves suddenly transported to ascot or epsom. the word having been given, away started the competitors in high blood and spirits; and as the rider belonging to some particular regiment passed the others in his career, the men composing it enthusiastically cheered and hurraed him, others taking up their shouts as their favourite passed him in turn, this military favouritism imparting to the contest a degree of wild excitement such as i have never witnessed on any similar occasion. the second heat was still more warmly contested, as, according to the regulations above mentioned only the two foremost horses could be entered for the third. major daly of the th light dragoons, and an officer of the th lancers, whose name i now forget, obtained the precedence, after a hard struggle, the race being a neck and neck one the entire way. as the two successful officers belonged to different divisions, one to the bengal and the other to the bombay army, the partizanship which before had been only regimental now extended to the two armies, and "bravo bengal," "bravo bombay," burst at every moment from the eager multitudes assembled, as the riders alternately passed or repassed each other in the final heat. after a contest in which the competitors themselves almost appeared to feel the influence which pervaded the crowd, and to think that the honor of their respective divisions depended upon their success, major daly gained the race by about a neck, and was handed the sword amid the delighted cheers of the bombay troops and the congratulations of his brother officers. the races continued two days longer, and afforded a pleasant recreation to the men after the fatiguing and harassing duties of the last few months. brigadier general arnold of the army of the indus, having been long suffering under a liver complaint, breathed his last at cabul shortly after our arrival there. this officer was distinguished for his qualities as a _bon vivant_, and having laid in a good store of necessaries for the campaign, was the only one almost who fared well amidst the general privations. he kept an excellent table along the route, and an invitation to it, was always regarded as amongst the lucky chances by which fortune signified her favour. good living could not however protect the general against disease, and he fell ill at candahar of a malady which is often said to be the result of it. he was carried from candahar to cabul in a palankeen, and took no part whatever in the events which occurred between those places. his remains were interred in the armenian burial ground, outside the walls of the city, and his effects were publicly sold by auction a few days after. the general had left bengal with about eighty camels laden with baggage and necessaries, of which about five and twenty remained at the time of the sale. his trunks were filled with quantities of plate, a goodly provision of snuff and cigars, and such an immense stock of linen that it occupied two days of the sale. his cooking apparatus was most elaborate and ingenious, and we could not help wondering at the uses to which the infinite varieties of small and curious articles of which it was composed were devoted. the prices at which these effects were sold will appear incredible to the european reader, but it must be remembered that it was the scarcity, in fact the almost total impossibility of getting them, that enhanced their value. the cigars sold at the rate of about two shillings and six pence each, the snuff at ten shillings an ounce, a few bottles of beer, a liquor of which no other officer in the army possessed a drop, at thirty shillings each, and some choice wines at from three to four pounds the bottle. the other things brought proportionate prices, the shirts fetching from thirty to forty shillings each. the amount realised at this sale must have been enormous. prince timour, the eldest son of shah soojah, arrived at cabul early in september, escorted by the troops of runjeet singh. we expected to find the sikhs an undisciplined horde of barbarians, but they turned out on the contrary to be nearly as well organized as ourselves, being disciplined by french officers, and marching with the same order and regularity as a european regiment. each division was headed by an excellent military band and officered by the same number of grades as ourselves. the men were in general about the middle height, and not so muscular or well formed as the affghans. they are made, however, of the right material for the soldier, being brave, orderly, and tractable, and though they may be considered in some respects inferior to the european troops, they are in my opinion, equal if not superior, to the sepoys. a detachment consisting of the th light dragoons, the th lancers, and her majesty's queen's royals, under the command of major-general sir thomas wiltshire, was despatched to receive the prince with fitting honors. he was met at a short distance from the town by the british escort, and conducted to the palace amid salvoes of artillery. the prince was a fine youth about one or two and twenty, with a frank expression of countenance and affable manners. the meeting between him and his royal father was said to be extremely affecting, and the prince was unceasing in his expressions of gratitude to the british for bringing about this happy reunion. large supplies of arrack, biscuits, and rice, together with money to pay the troops, having been promised from the upper provinces, their arrival was looked forward to with some anxiety in the camp, as we could not leave cabul without them. information was at length received that colonel herring was on his way through the punjaub, and after a tedious and harassing journey, in which he had to encounter frequent opposition to his progress from the mountain tribes, he at length reached hyder khail within one day's march of cabul. riding out alone next morning, for the purpose of inspecting the country, the colonel was set upon by a body of affghans and barbarously murdered, his body being plundered of every article of value he had about him, and his horse carried off. his mutilated remains were found in the course of the day by some troopers, who had been sent out in search of him, and brought to cabul along with the stores, which reached that place in safety the same night. he was interred with military honours in the armenian burial-ground, on the following day. the deceased had been long in the service, and was a gallant and experienced officer. we heard that his murderers were captured shortly after we left cabul, and put to a dreadful death, by order of the shah. chapter xi. institution of the order of the doorannee empire.--murder of a private of the th light infantry.--departure from cabul.--return to ghuznee.--accident to the revd. mr. pigot.--discovery of the skeletons of british soldiers.--horse-steaks.--treachery of some ghiljie chiefs and destruction of their fort.--adventure of a dragoon.--loss of a cook. in order to testify his gratitude towards the british, the shah resolved to institute an order of merit, to be called the order of the doorannee empire, and to confer its respective grades upon three classes of officers, namely, generals, brigadier generals, and field officers. a durbar having been summoned, at which the ministers of state, the politicals, and a number of british officers were present, a chapter of the order was held, and his majesty, as sovereign, invested the commander-in-chief, several general and field officers, and the politicals with the decoration, which consisted of a sort of maltese cross with a jewel in the centre. his majesty was also pleased to express his desire that every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private soldier in the army should receive a silver medal, commemorative of the campaign, and for this purpose placed a large sum of money at the disposal of sir john keane. the queen's sanction has been obtained to the measure, but the medal has not as yet been issued. leave had been given by the officers in command of the different regiments to men entering the town to carry their side arms, as a protection in case of chance collision with the inhabitants. the facility of obtaining intoxicating liquors rendered this a contingency of not unlikely occurrence, and our men soon got themselves into unpleasant and in some instances dangerous scrapes. on one occasion, a private of the th light infantry having been drinking rather freely, forced himself into the apartments of the wife of a respectable inhabitant. proceeding to offer her some violence, her screams alarmed the neighbourhood, and the soldier was soon surrounded by a host of angry husbands and fathers, armed with every description of weapon. he defended himself with his bayonet for some time, contenting himself with merely parrying their blows, and had fought his way into the street, when he was met by several others of the townspeople, who set upon the unfortunate fellow and instantly despatched him. they secreted the body until night-fall, and then threw it outside the walls of the town, where it was discovered next morning. it having been determined that early in september part of the forces should set out on their return homeward, the choice fell upon her majesty's th foot, the nd or queen's royals, one company of foot artillery, a detachment of the th light dragoons, the st regiment of bombay light cavalry, and two troops of bombay horse artillery, the whole under the command of major general sir thomas wiltshire. it would naturally be supposed that after so long an absence from quarters, we hailed this intimation with something like pleasure, but such was far from being the fact. we had rioted in profusion and luxury, and did not relish the idea of again encountering the privations of the long and dreary route which lay between us and india. added to this we had seen but little of actual fighting, and the promotions had been consequently few. promotion and prize money are the all engrossing subjects of a soldier's ambition, and this speedy return put an end at once to our long cherished hopes. we well knew that the restless and turbulent spirit of the affghan chiefs would not permit them to remain long in subjection to shah soojah, and that there would consequently be more work for the british troops. regret and envy of our more fortunate comrades were therefore the predominant feelings which pervaded nearly the whole of the departing troops. we left cabul on the th of september, and arrived at ghuznee, the scene of our former exploits, after eight days' march, during which nothing worthy of mention occurred. it is astonishing how soon the traces of war disappear, and the living gaps caused by its ravages are filled up. the fortress appeared as perfect in its outline as if the hand of the destroyer had not recently passed over it, new gates having been substituted for those which had been damaged, and the breach immediately above them re-filled with masonry. the inhabitants of the bazaar had resumed their accustomed occupations, and scolded, and chaffered, and jested, and laughed, as if they had neither lost relatives nor friends, nor dabbled through mire freshly reeking with their blood. familiarity, they say, breeds contempt and blunts the feelings, and the asiatic, before whose eyes such scenes pass almost daily, thinks of them only as the immutable decrees of fate, which cannot be shunned, and ought not to be repined at. the sick and wounded, of whom we had left numbers at ghuznee, had almost all died, and were interred in an open space selected for the purpose outside the walls of the fortress. the last resting-place of our brave fellows is situated at the foot of one of the adjacent mountains, but neither stone nor inscription indicates the spot. the bengal regiment of native infantry, whom we found in garrison at ghuznee on our return, and whom we left after us, appeared to be quite as well reconciled to their quarters as we were at cabul, although the two places appeared to me vastly different in point of health and comfort. the majority of the inhabitants regarded the troops with a sort of sullen indifference, but the trading classes seemed civil enough. the quantities of fish and game with which the neighbourhood abounded, afforded the officers a ready means of dissipating their time, and we would have been well content to have remained here. orders were however given that we should pursue our route, and we left ghuznee on the th of september, after a stay of only two or three days. instead of diverging to the right towards candahar, we took the direct route to quettah, over the ghiljie hills. the weather had become intensely cold, and the rivers and streams were covered with ice, several inches in thickness. the rev. mr. pigot, our chaplain, happened to be crossing one of them on a pony, when the ice gave way with his weight, and the worthy clergyman was immersed in the water. the stream was not, however, so deep as to occasion any alarm for his safety, and he was speedily rescued from his embarrasment, with no other inconvenience than being kept shivering several hours in his wet clothes, his baggage being at a considerable distance in advance. the rascally native who preceded us as guide grinned maliciously, and told him that if he had not forgotten to say his prayers setting out the accident would not have happened. on encamping, at the close of the first day's march, from ghuznee, some soldiers belonging to the th infantry and queen's royals, went out in search of water, and met with a draw well, which proved to be dry. one of them descended in order to examine it more closely, and an exclamation of horror escaped him as he reached the bottom. on his companions enquiring the occasion of it, they learned that he had fallen upon several skeletons, the identity of which with some soldiers we had lost on the route upwards was placed beyond doubt by fragments of military clothing and regimental buttons which lay scattered about. singular to relate, a lark had built its nest in one of the skulls, and was found innocently reposing with its young in this curious receptacle. the annoyances to which we had been subjected during our route upwards, from the thieving system of warfare pursued by the affghans, seemed now at an end. our road lay through bleak and desolate hills, where only a solitary, and timid mountaineer was occasionally to be seen. numerous rivers and streams traversed this wild country in every direction, and relieved us from all apprehensions on the score of water. provisions were also plentiful, as the commissariat had taken care to lay in sufficient supplies, and the only inconvenience which we might be said to have experienced was the severe cold of the nights. the barren nature of the country rendered fuel difficult of obtainment, and the consequence was that numbers of the troops were carried off by dysentery. the march from ghuznee to quettah occupied about five weeks, and we thought we should never reach the end of these long chains of hills. always ascending and descending heights of no inconsiderable elevation, the horses became regularly knocked up with fatigue, and we were obliged to shoot numbers of them on the way. in a recess in one of these hills, i one day came upon a singular scene. about nine or ten of the natives were assembled around a dead horse and while part of them were cutting steaks from his haunches, the others were engaged cooking them. revolting as such a sight is to european stomachs, i have seen the time when, on our march upwards, i could have partaken of these same horse steaks with infinite relish. a few days before our arrival at quettah, we requited an atrocious act of treachery, which had been committed towards us by some ghiljie chiefs, with the punishment it richly merited. about one hundred camel drivers, who had left us at candahar, on our way to cabul, for the purpose of returning homewards, took their route over the hills we were now crossing in order to shorten the journey. they were met by the ghiljies with professions of friendship, and seduced into a mountain fort under the pretence of hospitality. they had no sooner entered its walls than their throats were all cut, and their bodies flung into deep wells for the purpose of concealing the massacre from the eyes of the british. information of the fact having been received, sir thomas wiltshire despatched a squadron of her majesty's th light dragoons, two companies of native infantry, and two pieces of artillery to raze the fortress to the ground. the cavalry started at two o'clock in the morning, and after a hard gallop of eighteen miles we arrived in front of the ghiljie strong-hold. it was a small but strongly constructed fortress, situated on the brow of a steep declivity and defended by strong wooden gates. the entrance was commanded by an old iron carronade, and a number of loopholes for the discharge of musketry. not a living soul was to be seen on the walls, and fearing some artifice, major daly, our commanding officer, resolved to suspend operations until the artillery came up. as soon as the latter made its appearance, and the guns were placed in a position to command the fort, major daly ordered part of the cavalry to dismount and proceed with loaded carbines to the gate, under cover of their fire. no opposition was, however, offered to us, the enemy having fled to the mountains, and the gates were forced open in a few minutes. the only inhabitants we found in the place were a few women and children, but we discovered quantities of the richest silks and carpets, beside arms and money (consisting principally of silver coins) the fortress being a sort of depot for the booty obtained by these highland marauders. one of the cavalry having entered a dwelling in search of plunder, was suddenly seized by two or three ghiljies, who unexpectedly made their appearance through a sort of trap, with which almost every house in the fort was furnished. they placed a bandage over his eyes, and were in the act of passing a rope round his arms, when the timely approach of some of his comrades saved him from being carried off as a prisoner, the enemy disappearing through the trap the moment they heard the noise of their footsteps at the entrance. the troopers would have willingly pursued them, but the depth and darkness of the subterraneous passage convinced them it was something more than a mere cellar, and they knew that if they once got involved in its windings they would be completely at the mercy of the enemy. it is probable that these passages had outlets without the walls, and that it was through them the enemy made their escape at the first news of our approach, the suddenness and quickness of our movements preventing them from taking their valuables with them. there was also abundance of cattle and grain, of which we brought off large supplies to the camp. orders having been given to the artillery to blow up the fortress, the women and children were sent out of it, and at five o'clock the same day the walls were breached, so as to render them completely useless, and the houses fired in all directions. after remaining to see that the work of destruction was complete, we quitted the place at three o'clock in the morning, and arrived the same day at the encampment. the enemy were not entirely without their revenge, for, following on our footsteps, and watching us closely, they contrived to carry off the cook, and three camels laden with the cooking utensils of the squadron, a loss which was severely felt, and by some thought ill compensated by the booty we had obtained. chapter xii. arrival at quettah.--storming of the fortress of khelat.--suicide of a trooper belonging to the horse artillery.--departure from quettah.--the bholun pass.--dadur.--bagh.--breaking out of the cholera.--death of doctor forbes.--shikarpoor.--death of captain ogle.--sukkur-bukkur.--death of lieutenant janvrin.--wedding ceremonies of the natives.--breaking up of the bombay column.--departure of brigadier scott.--boar hunt.--larkhana.--sehwan.--kurrachee.--feast of the mohurrum.--embarkation and arrival at bombay. we reached quettah on the th of october, and the army separated into two divisions there, one to proceed by the fortress of khelat, to punish the khan for the treacherous trick which he had played us on our way up, and the other to return homeward through the bholun pass. the force destined for military operations against khelat consisted of her majesty's nd or queen's royals, her majesty's th regiment of foot, the th bengal native infantry, one company of foot artillery, one troop of horse artillery, with the poona irregular horse, the whole under the command of major-general sir thomas wiltshire. as my detachment was not included in this expedition, owing to the fatigued condition of the horses, and the difficulty of procuring forage on the route, i can only describe the storming of khelat from the reports of those who were present at it. the fortress of khelat was very little inferior to ghuznee in point of strength, being defended by strong breastworks and mounted with large cannon. the garrison consisted of from twelve to fourteen hundred men, and there was abundance of provisions and ammunition in the place. after reconnoitring its position sir thomas wiltshire resolved on carrying it by storm, and the affair was a short but brilliant one. a battery was erected on one of the neighbouring heights, and a well directed fire soon brought the gates down. the stormers then rushed up the causeway under cover of our guns; but before they had reached the gateway, a heavy fire from the loopholes of the fortress killed from twenty to thirty of our troops, amongst whom was lieutenant gravatt, who was gallantly leading them on. a desperate hand to hand fight then ensued, the enemy resisting in dense masses, and disputing every inch of ground; but our men carried all before them, at the point of the bayonet, and drove the enemy into the interior of the fortress, where they were headed by the khan himself. the old chieftain fought with desperation and though frequently offered quarter, indignantly refused to accept it. he and the followers by whom he was surrounded were all bayonetted on the spot, and in about four hours the whole of the fortress was in the possession of our troops. in the immediate vicinity of the place where the khan was killed, a shocking spectacle presented itself. his favorite women, about twelve or fourteen in number, lay heaped together in a pool of blood, their throats having been cut by order of the khan, to prevent their falling into our hands. a large quantity of treasure, consisting of specie and jewels, was found in the citadel, and had the cavalry been present more would have fallen into the hands of our troops, as the enemy were observed despatching it to the hills, on camels, through one of the back gates, during the heat of the assault. amongst the various effects which were captured on this occasion were several boxes of arms and accoutrements, which had been plundered from us on our way to cabul, and a telescope and some books, which had belonged to one of our officers. cattle and grain were also found in great abundance, and proved of no small service to the division, on its route homeward, through the gundava pass. the fortress was completely dismantled before the departure of the troops, and the chiefs and other prisoners liberated on promising allegiance to the shah. amongst the residents whom we found at quettah on our arrival was a bombay parsee, who had ventured up to that place with supplies, consisting of tea, sugar, hams, brandy, beer, wines, and other necessaries. to the soldier as well as the officer these articles were a welcome treat, and having plenty of money to purchase them we soon exhausted the stores of the enterprising trader who had reason to congratulate himself on the successful issue of his trip. the morning previous to our departure a suicide occurred under circumstances which gave rise to the suspicion that the wretched perpetrator of it intended to have preluded it by the crime of murder. a trooper belonging to the horse artillery was placed under arrest for some trifling neglect of duty, and as soon as he was liberated he took a loaded pistol and went directly to the tent of the adjutant of his corps who had fortunately quitted it a few minutes before. the disappointed trooper returned to his lines and immediately blew his own brains out. we left quettah on the st of november, about nine o'clock at night, taking with us the sick who had been left behind on our way to cabul, and who were now sufficiently restored to proceed homeward. in consequence of the scarcity of water on the route we were obliged to make a forced march of eight and twenty miles, and reached the entrance to the bholun pass at six o'clock the next morning. we entertained a lively recollection of the reception we had met with on our former passage through this defile, and now felt some misgivings that we should not be allowed to retrace our steps without a repetition of the favours which were then so liberally showered upon us. to our great gratification and contentment, however, the belochees offered us no sort of obstruction, and could they have facilitated our progress through their country, would, i have little doubt, been well inclined to do so. we occasionally caught glimpses of them watching our movements at a respectful distance, but they never ventured within musket shot during the whole of our passage. we lost two or three men from sickness before we cleared the defile, and found it almost impossible to inter them from the stony nature of the strata with which the whole of this district is covered. quitting the bholun we proceeded to dadur, and thence to bagh, through a jungle abounding with every sort of game, but more particularly deer and wild boar. the troops made their way with considerable difficulty through the intricacies of this entangled route, the pioneers being in constant requisition to clear a passage for them. on the th of november we arrived at bagh, a village situated at the cabul side of the desert, elsewhere described. the place consists of a few miserable huts, surrounded by fields of joharra, and containing only one tank of stagnant water. doctor forbes, of the st light cavalry, an officer universally esteemed for his benevolence, hearing that the natives were dying in numbers of the cholera, immediately hastened to the village to tender his services. he was seized by the epidemic and returned to his quarters in a dying state. the unfortunate gentleman expired in a few hours afterwards, and was interred the same day. five or six of the european troops were attacked in like manner, and were immediately hurried to the hospital tents, where two of them died, but the others struggled successfully against the disease. brigadier scott, taking alarm at these unequivocal evidences of malaria, gave orders that we should proceed across the desert without a moment's delay, and we accordingly struck our tents at four o'clock the same day, carrying our sick along with us. on reaching the extremity of the desert we found the st regiment of bombay grenadiers, with a large convoy of provisions and stores for the use of the army. these supplies should have reached us at the other side of the bholun, but the escort had been attacked by the cholera on the route, and were obliged to remain stationary until the disease had abated. we found them nearly all convalescent and about to continue their route. we took from them a stock of provisions, and pursued our march. we arrived at shikarpoor with a great number of sick who had fallen ill of the epidemic on the way, and it was resolved that we should remain here a few days. shikarpoor is a large well built town, and contains two fine mosques, several roofed bazaars, and two or three large manufactories. the british resident has a fine house here, the gardens of which are tastefully laid out in the european style. notwithstanding the clean looking appearance of the town it is far from being healthy, and from ten to twelve of our troops were daily carried off by the cholera during our stay. amongst the number was captain ogle of the th light dragoons, who fell a victim to his humanity in visiting the sick of his troop. this lamented gentleman was only in his thirtieth year, and was a great favourite with his corps. he was unfortunately a married man, and had been looking forward with feelings of eager anticipation to his reunion with his family. being of a buoyant and joyous temperament, his loss was felt severely in the circle of his brother officers; his ready jest and imperturbable good humour rendering him the life and soul of the mess table. captain ogle looked upon the private soldier as something more than a mere automaton placed at his disposal, and whilst he had always a due regard for the discipline of the service, he exercised the power entrusted to him with humanity and judgment, the act in which he lost his life being but the last of a countless series of generous and disinterested offices which he was in the habit of performing for those under his command. few men have left behind them a memory so associated with every thing that is valuable and estimable in social and military life. leaving shikarpoor, on the th of november, we arrived on the following day at sukkur bukkur, a town situated on the banks of the indus, and having its citadel on a rock in the centre of the river. the cholera rapidly disappeared here; but we sustained another loss in the person of lieutenant janvrin, the acting quarter-master of our detachment, who was carried off by the small-pox. on the opposite bank of the river lies roree, a village remarkable only for its manufactures, which consist principally of silks. several of us having obtained leave to visit the place, we were strolling through the bazaar, when we observed preparations for a wedding in progress. taking up a position which enabled us to see what was passing, without obtruding on the parties concerned, we waited patiently until the ceremonies commenced. at the expiration of about a quarter of an hour the bridegroom made his appearance in front of the house which contained his betrothed, and both in person and attire he was all that a native belle could have desired. he was a fine, muscular looking fellow of about seven or eight and twenty, with handsome features and bold and jaunty air. he was dressed in a loose robe, of spotless white, and without any ornaments or weapons whatsoever. proceeding directly to the door of the house which contained his dulcinea he knocked at it three times with the knuckles of his right hand and once with his left. he then threw himself prostrate on a mat which had been made for the purpose, by the lady's own hands, and there waited her coming forth. the door presently opened, and a number of musicians immediately struck up a wild and discordant air. a timid and pretty looking maiden, about fourteen years of age, showily dressed in different coloured silks, and ornamented with a nose ring and bangles of pure gold, at length stepped forth, followed by her relatives and friends, who formed themselves into a circle around her. the bridegroom starting to his feet made a formal claim to the hand of his affianced and presented her with a garland of flowers, which she gracefully threw across her shoulders, in token that she accepted him, and then suffered him to embrace her. lifting her in his arms he placed her on the back of a donkey, and they went in procession to pay visits of ceremony through the town, the bride distributing sweetmeats to the crowd, as she passed along. the bridegroom showered his favours about in the form of some red powder, which he flung in the faces of all near him, and especially in those of the europeans, of whom there were a good many present. he half blinded some of us, and conferred as dark a hue as his own upon others--freaks that appeared to give infinite delight and amusement to the natives, but which were not taken in quite as good part by some testy fellows amongst us. having arrived at the house of the bridegroom's father, the old gentleman graciously descended, and taking the bride in his arms, bore her into his dwelling. the bridegroom remained a few minutes after them, and flinging some cowries to the musicians and crowd, he made a salaam and darted in after his _inamorata_. we remained at sukkur about six weeks, in consequence of an order forwarded after us by sir william mc naghten, under the apprehension that our services would be again wanted at cabul. the indus being navigable up to the town, we had plentiful supplies of provisions and other necessaries at moderate prices, and felt tolerably satisfied with our quarters. as to the probability of our having to return to cabul, the cavalry felt at ease regarding the rumours which prevailed, for they well knew that the condition of their horses put such a thing completely out of the question. an order at length arrived that the various brigades of the bombay column should be broken up, and that the troops composing them should return to their respective quarters. brigadier general scott, and his aides de camp, accordingly left us by one of the first boats which sailed down the indus for bombay, and we remained under the command of the officers of our respective regiments. we passed our time hunting in the jungles, in the vicinity of the camp, or in fishing in the river, both of which proved prolific sources of amusement. i went out several times to chase the wild boar, and on one of these occasions the sport nearly proved fatal to me. proceeding with two of my comrades, and a native for guide, through a dense and almost impenetrable part of the jungle, we suddenly roused a huge boar, which turned fiercely upon us, and made directly at the nearest of its pursuers, which, as chance would have it, happened to be me. he had me down on the earth in a twinkling, and would have made short work of me had not a well-directed shot from one of my companions struck him right between the eyes, and tumbled him lifeless on the ground. the man to whom i owed my safety exhibited admirable coolness, and self-possession, for the slightest deviation in his aim would have sent the bullet through me instead of the object for which it was intended. it was with the greatest difficulty we contrived to drag our prize into camp, for he weighed no less than from twenty-five to thirty stone, and supplied the troop with pork chops until we were tired of them. the importance of sukkur as a military position cannot be exaggerated. it forms the key to scinde, and the indus being navigable up to the fortress, its supplies do not depend on season or circumstance. these advantages have not been overlooked, for it has since been retained in the possession of our troops, and will always serve as a _point d'appui_ in any future operations we may undertake at that side of the indus. after passing nearly six weeks at sukkur, we took the route to larkhana along the right bank of the indus. the road lay, as before, through a jungle, and the occasional glimpses which we caught of the river through the clearances gave a picturesque effect to the scenery. we arrived at larkhana on the th of january, and remained there only one day. proceeding thence to sehwan we reached the latter place in about four days, and found a gun boat belonging to the hon. company lying at moorings in the river. we left sehwan on the following day, and taking a farewell of the river indus we proceeded towards the coast through a wild and deserted district, in which we found neither villages nor inhabitants. within one day's march of kurrachee we found a number of tombs richly sculptured and covered with inscriptions from the koran, which were said to contain the remains of some of the native princes. there being abundance of excellent water here, and kurrachee having the reputation of not being extremely healthy, it was determined that we should remained encamped here until the khelat division formed a junction with us. it was not till the end of february, however, that the khelat forces made their appearance, having kept us waiting about five weeks, and on the day after their arrival we marched into kurrachee where we found her majesty's th regiment. kurrachee is situated on the coast of belochistan, and its natural advantages entitle it to the rank of a first rate sea-port town. it possesses a fine harbour, in which a seventy-four gun ship may ride in safety, and which is protected by the batteries of the town, and the guns of a fortress occupying an island about midway between the mainland and the promontory which forms the harbour. on our arrival at scinde, instructions had been forwarded to commodore pepper, by the commander-in-chief, to invest the place, and we accordingly found it in possession of our troops on our return. the town is large but irregularly built, and is surrounded by walls and bastions, on which we saw some pieces of cannon, but they were of small calibre, and of the worst possible construction. to the north of the town we observed a superb banyan tree, which extended its foliage to such a distance, that it formed a pavilion capable of containing a small stone mosque for the accommodation of a number of faquirs or priests. of the many curious specimens of this class that i have met with in asia, i have seen none so utterly degraded and isolated from every thing like humanity. their bodies were thickly coated over with ashes and red paint, and their hair clotted with filthy moisture. they were surrounded by every sort of abomination, and howled and whined like a set of wild beasts. that they had not reduced themselves to this savage state merely from fanaticism we had abundant opportunities of discovering, for we saw the inhabitants of kurrachee daily pouring into the temple with rich presents and offerings, and propitiating their good will by sacrifices of their most precious and valuable effects. to the left of the mosque lies a tank, or reservoir, about fifty feet long by thirty broad, in which we saw a number of live alligators, which are carefully fed by the priests, and held in the greatest possible veneration and awe by the deluded votaries who repair there. the feast of the mohurrum had commenced a few hours before our arrival, but we were in time to witness the greater part of it. a short description of these singular rites may not be uninteresting to the reader. a hole being dug in the ground to the depth of about six or eight feet, fire is placed in it, and the devotees dance round it, with the most extravagant exclamations and gestures, some dashing square pieces of iron or brass together, to add to the effect. according as one set of dancers becomes fatigued they are replaced by another, and thus the ceremonies are kept up without intermission from sunset to daybreak. when the moon is at its full they march in procession to the water's side, preceded by their taboots, a sort of fantastical temple, constructed of bamboo and gilt paper. i have seen one of these temples, at poona, of such large dimensions that it required an elephant to draw it, and cost no less a sum than a thousand rupees. on reaching the water's side the taboots are thrown in and allowed to float away with the tide. this concludes the ceremonies and the wearied performers are glad to return to their homes. on returning towards the lines, from the mohurrum, we saw a miserable looking wretch squatted at the side of the road, who appeared to be in deep affliction, for he was weeping bitterly and lamenting his hard fate. i addressed him and inquired into the cause of his grief. he told me that he had been induced to become a convert to christianity by one of the missionaries, and had been thrust out of the pale of social intercourse from the moment the fact became known. he deplored his having yielded to the arguments of the missionary, since they had debarred him from participating in the religious ceremony which had just terminated, its pomp and circumstance having evidently made a deeper impression on his imagination than his conviction. we gave him some relief and passed on, when our attention was again directed to him by one of our companions, who had lingered behind. several of the natives had surrounded the poor convert, and were spitting upon him, and loading him with the vilest reproaches. we returned to the spot and compelled them to leave him in peace. amongst the british whom we found on our arrival at kurrachee was mr. masson, the author of an interesting work on affghanistan, which has been lately published. this gentleman had been originally a private soldier in the honourable company's service, and had risen through various grades to the profitable civil employ which he at present holds. he rendered some important services to the company, for which they awarded him a pension of £ a-year, and much to his credit he settled the whole of it on his aged mother. after remaining at kurrachee about ten days, the order was at length issued for the embarkation of the cavalry, which was now limited to my own detachment. upwards of thirty _pattemars_ were hired for the voyage, and from twelve to fourteen men, and an equal number of horses, were stowed in each. we had a quick and favourable passage, and arrived at bombay on the th of march, after an absence of nearly eighteen months. the end. appendix. appendix. from the delhi gazette extraordinary, october , . "the right hon. the govenor-general of india having with the concurrence of the supreme council, directed the assemblage of a british force for service across the indus, his lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of reasons which have led to this important measure. "it is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the british government in the year with the ameers of scinde, the nawab of bahawulpore, and maharaja runjeet singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the british nation in central asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce. "with a view to invite the aid of the _de facto_ rulers of afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, captain burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year , on a mission to dost mahomed khan, chief of cabul: the original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. "whilst captain burnes, however, was on his journey to cabul, information was received by the governor-general that the troops of dost mahomed khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally, maharaja runjeet singh. it was naturally to be apprehended that his highness the maharaja would not be slow to avenge this aggression, and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the british government would be altogether frustrated. in order to avert a result so calamitous, the governor-general resolved on authorising captain burnes to intimate to dost mahomed khan, that if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the maharaja, his lordship would exert his good offices with his highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. the maharaja, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the british nation, at once assented to the proposition of the governor-general, to the effect that in the mean time hostilities on his part should be suspended. "it subsequently came to the knowledge of the govenor-general that a persian army was besieging herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout affghanistan, for the purpose of extending persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the indus; and that the court of persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her majesty's mission in the persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with great britain. "after much time spent by captain burnes in fruitless negotiation at cabul, it appeared that dost mahomed khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the governor-general could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of maharajah runjeet singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of india; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of these schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. ultimately, he gave his undisguised support to the persian designs in affghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the british power in india, he was well apprised; and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the british government compelled captain burnes to leave cabul without having effected any of the objects of his mission. "it was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the british government to bring about a good understanding between the sikh ruler and dost mahomed khan; and the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that so long as cabul remained under his government we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our indian empire would be preserved inviolate. "the governor-general deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of herat and the conduct of the persian nation. the siege of that city had now been carried on by the persian army for many months. the attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the british envoy at the court of persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. the besieged have behaved with gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause, and the govenor-general would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach them from british india. in the mean time the ulterior designs of persia, affecting the interests of the british government, have been by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. the governor-general has recently ascertained, by an official despatch from mr. m'neil, her majesty's envoy, that his excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the persian government, to quit the court of the schah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two governments. the necessity under which great britain is placed of regarding the present advance of the persian arms into affghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the schah, under the express order of her majesty's government. "the chiefs of candahar (brothers of dost mahomed khan, of cabul) have avowed their adherence to the persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the british nation in india, and to have been openly assisting in the operations against herat. "in the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our envoy from cabul, the governor-general felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories. "his attention was naturally drawn, at this conjuncture, to the position and claims of schah sooja-ool-moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity which were, at that time judged necessary by the british government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the british dominions. "it had clearly been ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who have visited afghanistan, that the barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the british government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interests and security, the british government acknowledged and respected their authority. but a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. the welfare of our possessions in the east requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandisement. "after a serious and mature deliberation, the governor-general was satisfied that pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of schah sooja-ool-moolk, whose popularity throughout affghanistan had been proved to his lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. having arrived at this determination, the governor-general was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less from the position of maharaja runjeet singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the british government, that his highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations. mr. macnaghten was accordingly deputed in june last to the court of his highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a tripartite treaty by the british government, the maharaja, and schah sooja-ool-moolk, whereby his highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the schah to the throne of his ancestors. the friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all. various points have been adjusted which had been the subject of discussion between the british government and his highness the maharaja, the identity of whose interests with those of the hon. company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding states. a guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the ameers of scinde; and the integrity of herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; whilst, by the measures completed or in progress it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the british government will gain their proper footing among the nations of central asia; that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier in india, and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment. "his majesty schah sooja-ool-moolk will enter affghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a british army. the governor-general confidently hopes that the schah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of affghanistan established, the british army will be withdrawn. "the governor-general has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the british crown; but he rejoices that in the discharge of his duty he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the affghan people. throughout the approaching operations british influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the affghans have been impaired. "even to the chiefs whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the british government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country. "by order of the right hon. the governor-general of india, "w. h. macnaghten, "secretary to the government of india, "with the governor-general. * * * * * "notification "with reference to the preceding declaration, the following appointments are made;-- "mr. w. h. macnaghten, secretary to government, will assume the functions of envoy and minister, on the part of the government of india, at the court of schah sooja-ool-moolk; mr. macnaghten will be assisted by the following officers:-- "captain alexander burnes, of the bombay establishment, who will be employed under mr. macnaghten's direction, as envoy to the chief of khelat, or other states. "lieutenant e. d'arcy todd, of the bengal artillery, to be political assistant and military secretary to the envoy and minister. "lieutenant eldred pottinger, of the bombay artillery; lieutenant r. leech, of the bombay engineers; mr. p. b. lord, of the bombay medical establishment, to be political assistants to ditto ditto. "lieutenant e. r. conolly, of the th regiment bengal cavalry, to command the escort of the envoy and minister, and to be military assistant to ditto ditto. "mr. g. j. berwick, of the bengal medical establishment, to be surgeon to ditto ditto. "w. h. macnaghten, "secretary to the governor of india, with the governor-general." * * * * * transcriber's note: the following modifications have been made to the text. contents, chapter iii: 'candahah' replaced with candahar. contents, chapter iv: 'khelet' replaced with khelat. contents, chapter viii: comma after 'commandant of ghuznee' replaced with a period. contents, chapter xii: 'cott' replaced with scott. page : missing emdashes added to the chapter description. page : 'soojah-ool-moolk' replaced with sooja-ool-moolk. page : period removed from between 'lieutenant' and 'nixon'. page : 'schwan' replaced with sehwan. page : 'und' replaced with and. page : 'candahah' replaced with candahar. page : 'couutrymen' replaced with countrymen. page : 'khelat-i-giljie' replaced with khelat-i-ghiljie. page : 'precints' replaced with precincts. page : 'and and' replaced with and. page : 'immedialely' replaced with immediately. page : comma after 'commandant of ghuznee' replaced with period. page : 'mélée' replaced with mêlée. page : missing hyphen added in commander-in-chief. page : 'then' replaced with than. page : 'circumstanee' replaced with circumstance. page : missing hyphen added in commander-in-chief. page : 'pretented' replaced with pretended. page : 'strong hold' replaced with strong-hold. page : comma inserted after 'however'. page : 'ccott' replaced with scott. page : 'epedemic replaced with epidemic. page : 'extraorinary' replaced with extraordinary. page : 'nawah' replaced with nawab. page : 'inteference' replaced with interference. team. produced from images provided by the million book project campaign of the indus. campaign of the indus: in a series of letters from an officer of the bombay division. with an introduction, by a.h. holdsworth, esq. . introduction. * * * * * the circumstance of an english army penetrating into central asia, through countries which had not been traversed by european troops since alexander the great led his victorious army from the hellespont to the jaxartes and indus, is so strong a feature in our military history, that i have determined, at the suggestion of my friends, to print those letters received from my son which detail any of the events of the campaign. as he was actively engaged with the bombay division, his narrative may be relied upon so far as he had an opportunity of witnessing its operations; and it being my intention to have only a few copies printed, to give to those friends who may take an interest in his letters, i need not apologize for the familiar manner in which they are written, as they were intended by him only for his own family, without an idea of their being printed. a history, however, may be collected from them most honourable to the british soldiers, both europeans and natives of india. they shew the patience with which, for more than twelve months, the soldiers bore all their deprivations and fatiguing marches through countries until then unknown to them, whether moving through arid sands or rocky passes, under a burning sun; or over desolate mountains, amidst the most severe frosts, with scarcely an interval of repose. neither was their gallantry less conspicuous than their patience, when they had the good fortune to find an enemy who ventured to face them. although the circumstances which his letters detail might well deserve a better historian than my son, yet are they of that high and honourable character, that they cannot lose any part of their value by his familiar manner of narrating them. when i decided upon printing these letters, it became a matter of interest to place before the reader a short account of the countries in which the operations of the army were conducted, as well as of the native rulers who took part in, or were the cause of them; in order that the letters might be more clearly understood by those friends who have not felt sufficiently interested in the history of those countries to make any inquiries about them. but, before i do so, i shall draw the attention of the reader to the army of alexander, to which i have before alluded. without entering into the causes which led to his extraordinary conquests, predicted by daniel as the means ordained of god to overthrow the persian empire, then under the government of darius, certain it is that he conquered the whole of those countries which extend from the hellespont to the indus, when his career was arrested by his own soldiers. having overrun syria, egypt, media, and parthia, keeping his course to the north-east, he not only passed the oxus, and forced his way to the jaxartes, but, pressed by the scythians from its opposite shore, he crossed that river, and beat them in a decisive battle. from the jaxartes he returned in a southern direction towards the indus, and having suffered the greatest privations, and struggled with the most alarming difficulties during the time that he was engaged in the conquest of those mountainous districts, he at length reached cabool, making himself master of afghanistan. here he appears to have halted for a considerable time, to refresh and re-equip his army, which, with the addition of , recruits, amounted to , men. at this place, alexander first came upon the scene of the campaign referred to in the following letters. here he meditated the invasion of india, intending to march to the mouth of the ganges; but the conquest of that country was destined for a nation almost unknown in the days of alexander, and lying far more remote from it than greece; and, until the campaign of drew our armies to the western side of the indus, the sutlej was alike the boundary of alexander's conquests to the east, as of those of england towards the west. alexander having prepared his army for this expedition, moved towards the indus, taking many strong places on his march. having crossed that river, the king of the country offered no resistance, but became the ally of alexander, who expected to have found porus, whose kingdom was on the other side of the hydaspes, equally ready to submit. but it required the utmost skill of alexander to cross the river, which he effected, and conquered porus, after a most severe struggle, with the loss of his renowned charger, bucephalus, and he was so pleased at the magnanimity of porus that he not only gave him back his kingdom, but added several small states to it, making him a sincere ally. alexander then continued his march towards the east, conquering all who opposed him, until he reached the banks of the hyphasis (sutlej), which he was about to cross, when his progress was arrested by murmurs and tumults in his camp. his soldiers declared their determination not to extend his conquests, and entreated him to return. he then marched back to the acesines, gave the whole country as far as the hyphasis to porus, and thus made him ruler of the punjab. alexander encamped near the acesines until the month of october, when the fleet which he built, consisting of galleys and boats, being ready, he embarked his army and proceeded towards the indus; but before he reached that river he came to two countries possessed by warriors who united their armies to oppose his progress. after beating them in many engagements, alexander attacked the city of the oxydracæ, into which the greater part of those armies had retired. here his rash valour had nearly terminated his career: he was severely wounded in the side by an arrow, from the effects of which he was with difficulty restored to health. he then descended the river, a portion of his army marching on its banks, conquering every nation that opposed him. about the month of july he reached patala (tatta), where he built a citadel and formed a port for his shipping. he then proceeded, with part of his fleet, by the western branch of the river, to discover the ocean. this he accomplished at great hazard, when he sacrificed to the gods (particularly to neptune), and besought them not to suffer any mortal after him to exceed the bounds of his expedition. he then returned to join the rest of his fleet and army at patala, and to make arrangements for his march to babylon. he appointed nearchus admiral of his fleet, and having given him orders to ascend the persian gulf to the euphrates, he commenced his march through beloochistan, leaving nearchus to follow him as soon as the season would permit. alexander was more than sixty days in reaching the frontiers of persia, during which time his army sufficed such dreadful privations from want of food, that the soldiers were obliged to eat their own war-horses, and from the sickness consequent upon such a state of distress, his army was reduced to less than one-half of the number which left patala. it is not necessary to follow him to babylon, or to describe the voyage of nearchus, who, having sailed up the persian gulf, united his forces to those of his royal master in the river pasi-tigris, near susa. enough, however, may be learned from this history to convince us that if such an army could be conducted years ago from the hellespont to the jaxartes and indus, the march from the southern shores of the caspian sea to cabool would require comparatively but very slight exertion, if those who have the means should have the desire also to accomplish it. i can say little of my own knowledge of the political causes which gave rise to the war, as i am unacquainted with the affairs of india and the motives which actuated its governors; but a brief outline may be collected from a book lately published by the hon. capt. osborne, military secretary to the governor-general, to which i shall refer, after making some observations upon the countries through which the operations of the army were conducted, and particularly on the situation of afghanistan, in reference to those persons who had before been, is well as those who were, its rulers, when shah shooja was restored by the british government to its throne. these observations i have chiefly collected from the valuable work of that enterprising officer lieut. burnes, which he published after visiting those countries in , , and . the chief portion of the bombay division of the army engaged in the operations to which these letters refer, landed at the hujamree mouth of the indus, and marching through lower sinde, by tatta, ascended the indus by its western bank. on arriving in upper sinde, it was found that shah shooja with his contingent, as well as the bengal division of the army, had crossed the indus _en route_ from that presidency, and had advanced towards afghanistan, and that the bombay division was to follow them. to effect this, the division marched through cutch gundava, and the bolan pass, which is situated in the mountains which divide the province of sarawar, in beloochistan, as well as cutch gundava, from afghanistan. having made their way through the bolan pass, the army entered the shawl district of afghanistan, and thence proceeded through the ghwozhe pass to candahar, ghuzni, and cabool; at which last-mentioned place shah shooja's eldest son joined his father with some troops of runjet sing's, which had crossed the indus from the punjab, marching by peshawur and the kyber pass. the division of the bombay troops under general willshire having remained at cabool about a month, returned to ghuzni, and thence in a straight direction to quettah, leaving candahar some distance on the right; capt. outram, who commanded a body of native horse, preceding the main body of the division for the purpose of capturing the forts, or castles, belonging to those chiefs who had not submitted to shah shooja. from quettah, general willshire moved with a part of his division upon kelat, and thence through the gundava pass and cutch gundava to the indus, where these troops were met by the rest of the division, which came from quettah by the bolan pass. hence they descended to curachee to embark for their respective quarters in india. the fate of one of the regiments of the division, the th, as it is recorded in a bombay paper, is most distressing. they embarked at curachee for bombay, and sailed in the morning with a fair wind and a fine breeze, but before the night closed in upon them the ship was fast aground upon a sandbank, off the hujamree branch of the indus, scarcely within sight of land. everything was thrown overboard to lighten the ship, but in vain; she became a total wreck, and settled down to her main deck in the water. she fortunately, however, held together long enough to allow all the men to be taken on shore, which occupied three days, but with the loss of everything they had taken on board with them. the other regiments, we may hope, have been more fortunate, as they were not mentioned in the paper which gave this melancholy account of the th regiment. sinde, the country through which the army first passed, is divided into three districts, each governed by an ameer, the chief of whom resides at hydrabad, the second at khyrpoor, and the other at meerpoor; and when lieut. burnes ascended the indus, in , the reigning ameers were branches of the beloochistan tribe of talpoor. with these the chief of kelat and gundava, mehrab khan (who was related by marriage to the ameer of hydrabad), was more closely allied than any other prince. like them, he had been formerly tributary to cabool, and had shaken off the yoke, and, possessing a very strong country between afghanistan and sinde, he became as useful as he had at all times proved himself a faithful ally to the sindeans. shikarpoor, with the fertile country around it, as well as bukker, had formerly belonged to the barukzye family of afghanistan, and, although they still possessed candahar, cabool, and peshawar, they had in vain endeavoured to withdraw mehrab khan from his alliance with the sindeans, or to recover those lost possessions. to understand the political state of afghanistan, into which the army marched for the purpose of restoring shah shooja to its throne, it will be necessary to go back to the early part of the last century, when nadir shah had raised himself to the throne of persia. his name having become formidable as a conqueror, he turned his thoughts to the conquest of india, and, assuming sufficient pretexts for breaking the relations of amity which he professed for the monarch of that country, he determined to invade it, and for that purpose began his march in . taking with him some of the chiefs of afghanistan, he crossed the punjab and entered delhi. he there raised enormous contributions, and seized upon everything worth taking away; amongst other things the far-famed peacock throne, in which was the renowned diamond called "the mountain of light." the spoils with which he returned to persia were valued at nearly seventy millions of pounds sterling. it is not necessary to follow the history of nadir; it will be enough to say that, amidst the confusion which followed his death, ahmed khan obtained possession of part of his treasure, amongst which was the great diamond. he escaped with it into khorassan, where he made himself master also of a large sum of money which was coming to nadir from india. ahmed was a brave and intelligent man, had been an officer of rank under the shah, and, being in possession of the treasure necessary for his purpose, he proclaimed himself king, and was crowned at candahar "king of the afghans." ahmed was of the suddoozye family, which were but a small tribe; but he was greatly assisted by the powerful barukzye family, whose friendship he justly valued and made use of to his advantage: of this latter family hajee jamel was then the chief. ahmed knew how to conciliate the independent spirit of his afghan subjects, and by making frequent incursions on his neighbours, kept alive that spirit of enterprise which was congenial to their feelings; but from the time of his death the royal authority began to decline, as timour, his son and successor, had neither the sense nor enterprise necessary to uphold it. affairs became still worse under the sons of timour. shah zumaun was of a cruel disposition, and wanted the education necessary to the situation he was called upon to fill; his brothers, mahmood and shah shooja, were not better disposed; and towards the barukzye family, who had been so instrumental in placing their grandfather, ahmed, on the throne, they conducted themselves not only most imprudently, but with dreadful cruelty. shah zumaun was succeeded by shah shooja, of whom, although the chief person in the present drama, little more need be said of this part of his history than that, ignorant of the mode of governing such independent tribes as the afghans, his power was never great, and, after the fall of his vizier, and the murder of his comrade, meer waeez, it gradually declined, until he lost his throne at neemla, in . he had taken the field with a well-appointed army of , men; but was attacked by futteh khan, an experienced general, at the head of men, before the royal army was formed for battle; akram khan, his vizier, was slain, and he fled to the kyber country, leaving the greater part of his treasure in the hands of his conquerors. shah shooja had failed to conciliate the barukzye family; futteh khan, their chief, had therefore espoused the cause of the king's brother, mahmood, and having driven shah shooja from his throne, he placed mahmood upon it, and accepted for himself the situation of vizier. under his vigorous administration, the whole of the afghan country, with the exception of cashmere, submitted to the dominion of the new sovereign. the shah of persia, anxious to possess himself of herat, sent an army against it, but was defeated in his object, and herat was preserved to mahmood by the successful exertions of futteh khan. no sooner, however, was mahmood thus firmly established in his dominions, than his son kamran became jealous of the man who had raised him to the situation, and had secured to him the kingdom; he therefore determined to effect the ruin of the vizier. the prince was not long in gaining over his father to his views; and futteh khan being at herat, kamran seized on his person and put out his eyes. in this state he kept him prisoner for about six months, during which time the brothers of the vizier, irritated at the conduct of kamran, began to show signs of disaffection. mahmood ordered futteh khan to be brought before him in the court of his palace, and accusing the brothers of the vizier of rebellion, directed him to bring them back to a state of allegiance. the vizier, in the dreadful condition in which he had been reduced, replied to the demand of mahmood, "what can an old and blind man do?" when, by the order of the king, the courtiers cut the vizier to pieces, limb after limb: his nose and ears were hacked off; neither did he receive his death blow until not a member of his person was left upon which they could inflict torture. with the fall of his vizier the king's power rapidly declined, and he fled to herat, virtually yielding up the rest of his kingdom. he died in , his son, kamran, succeeding to the limited government of that portion only of his former dominions. upon the flight of mahmood to herat, the horrid murder of their brother threw the whole of the barukzye family into open revolt, the eldest of whom, azeem khan, recalled shah shooja from his exile. from the time shah shooja lost his throne, he had been first a captive in the hands of the son of his former vizier, and then a pensioner on the bounty of the maharajah, at lahore, who in return extorted from him the famous diamond, "the mountain of light," and other jewels, which he had brought away with him when he fled at neemla. he then made his escape from the maharajah, and found protection and support from the british government of india. upon the summons from azeem khan, shah shooja immediately hastened to peshawur; where, before his benefactor had time to meet him, he practically displayed his ideas of royalty so unwisely, and so insulted some of the friends of the barukzye family, that the whole party took offence, and they at once rejected him, and placed his brother eyoob on the throne. eyoob was but a puppet king, the tool of the family who raised him to the government; azeem khan, who was appointed his vizier, being in truth the ruler. several of the young princes who aspired to the throne were delivered over to eyoob, who put them to death. shooja, driven from peshawur, retired to shikarpoor, which the ameers of sinde ceded to him; where, in place of conducting himself with prudence, he was so addicted to low intrigue with those about him, that his enemies availed themselves of this propensity to effect his ruin, and drove him from shikarpoor, when, crossing the indus, he fled through the desert by juydalmeer, and returned to loodiana. "the fitness," says lieut. burnes, "of shah shooja-ool-moolk for the station of a sovereign seems ever to have been doubtful. his manners and address are highly polished, but his judgment does not rise above mediocrity; had the case been otherwise, we should not now see him an exile from his country and his throne, without a hope of regaining them, after an absence of twenty years, and before he has attained the fiftieth year of his age." the civil wars which had thus so frequently occurred in afghanistan weakened the resources of the country and its means of defence. runjet sing availed himself of the advantage which this state of affairs presented to him, and obtained possession of cashmere; when, continuing his conquests, he crossed the indus, and made himself master of peshawur, burning its palace, and laying the country under tribute. azeem khan made a precipitate retreat before the army of the sikhs towards cabool, without attempting to arrest their progress, and was so stung with remorse at the weakness of his conduct that he died on reaching that city. with the death of azeem the royal authority was extinguished. the king fled to lahore, and lived under the protection of his conqueror. herat alone remained in the possession of one of the suddoozye family. the brothers of the late vizier seized his son, and deprived him of his treasure and his power. the kingdom was then divided between them. cabool fell into the hands of dost mahomed; peshawur and candahar were held by two of his brothers; the sindeans threw off their yoke, and refused to pay tribute; balk was annexed to the dominions of the king of bokhara; the richest portion of the provinces having fallen into the possession of the sikhs. in seventy-six years from the time that ahmed shah was crowned at candahar, the dooranee monarchy again ceased to exist. as i have given the character of shah shooja, it will be interesting to quote that of dost mahomed, from the same author. "he is unremitting in his attention to business, and attends daily at the courthouse, with the cazee and moollahs, to decide every cause according to law. trade has received the greatest encouragement from him, and he has derived his own reward, since the receipts of the customhouse of the city have increased fifty thousand rupees, and furnished him with a net revenue of two lacs of rupees per annum. the merchant may travel without a guard or protection from one frontier to another, an unheard-of circumstance in the time of the kings. the justice of this chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes. the peasant rejoices at the absence of tyranny, the citizen at the safety of his home, the merchant at the equity of his decisions and the protection of his property, and the soldier at the regular manner in which his arrears are discharged." "one is struck with the intelligence, knowledge, and curiosity which he displays, as well as at his accomplished manners and address." to this short sketch of afghanistan, and of the persons connected with its political history, i will add some extracts from the work of the hon. capt. osborne, because they explain the circumstances which led to the campaign of the indus, and to the restoration of shah shooja to the throne of cabool. he says, "in may, , a complimentary deputation was sent by runjet sing to the governor-general at simla, consisting of some of the most distinguished sikh chiefs, who were received with all the honours prescribed by oriental etiquette. shortly afterwards, lord auckland resolved to send a mission to the court of lahore, not merely to reciprocate the compliments of the maharajah, but to treat upon all the important interests which were involved in the existing state of political affairs in that quarter of the world. the recent attempts of the persians on herat, the ambiguous conduct of dost mahomed, and the suspicions which had been excited with respect to the proceedings and ulterior designs of russia, rendered it of the greatest importance to cement the alliance with runjet sing, and engage him to a firm and effective co-operation with us in the establishment of general tranquillity, the resistance of foreign encroachment, and the extension of the benefits of commerce and the blessings of civilization. accordingly, w.h. macnaghten, esq., was deputed on the mission to the maharajah, accompanied by dr. drummond, capt. macgregor, and the hon. w. osborne, military secretary to the governor-general. "the object of the governor-general's mission to lahore having been accomplished, and the concurrence, and, if necessary, the co-operation of runjet sing, in the restoration of shah shooja, secured, mr. macnaghten repaired to loodiana, for the purpose of submitting to the shah the treaties that had been concluded, and announcing to him the approaching change in his fortunes. the envoys seem to have been much struck with the majestic appearance of the old pretender, especially with the flowing honours of a black beard descending to his waist, always the most cherished appendage of oriental dignity. he had lived for twenty years in undisturbed seclusion, if not 'the world forgetting,' certainly 'by the world forgot,' consoling himself for the loss of his kingdom in a domestic circle of six hundred wives, but always 'sighing his soul' towards the mountains and valleys of afghanistan, and patiently awaiting the _kismet_, or fate, which was to restore him to his throne. the preparations thenceforward went rapidly on. the contingent raised by the shah was united (more for form than use) to the british force, and in three months the expedition began its operations." but before i conclude this introduction to the letters, which detail the results of these treaties with the maharajah, and the march of shah shooja to cabool, as i have spoken of the leading characters of afghanistan, i may be permitted to say a few words about the persons through whose exertions the shah has been restored to the throne of that country--the officers of the british army; and i do so the more anxiously, because the naval and military glory of our country, which in my early days was the theme of every song, is now seldom heard of in society, and those gallant services appear to be nearly forgotten, which during a long protracted state of warfare, within our own recollection, placed england in a position to dictate her own terms of peace to the world:--a state of society which encourages a certain class of persons the more effectually to abuse the military profession, and to mislead their deluded followers, by clamouring about the expense of the army, and the aristocratic bearing of its members, that they may the more readily carry out their own schemes of personal vanity and demoralizing political economy. it is the peculiar feature of the british army, to which we are indebted for its high and honourable bearing, that the sons of the first families in the land are ever anxious to bear arms under its standards, looking not to pecuniary emolument, but to those honours which military rank and professional attainments can procure for them; whilst the first commands and the highest stations in the service are filled without distinction from every grade in society. it is this happy mixture which induces that high sense of honour, so peculiarly characteristic of our service; that acknowledged distinction between the officers and the privates; that true discipline which, tempered with justice and kindly feeling, wins the respect of the soldier, and induces him to place that reliance upon his commander everywhere so conspicuous, whether in the camp or field of battle. but this high feeling in the army causes no additional expense to the country; the charge is altogether a deception. let the following sketch of a young soldier's life of the present day, as applicable to others as to himself, answer the charge of these politicians. he was educated for the highest walk of the legal profession, and had nearly prepared himself for the university, when he decided to change his course and go into the army. the commander-in-chief placed his name amongst the candidates for commissions, and he went to hanover, where, after he had made himself master of the german language, his royal highness the duke of cambridge kindly gave him a commission in the yagers of the guard, better known in england, in the peninsula, and at waterloo, as the rifles of the german legion. being only a volunteer in the regiment, he could not receive pay from the government; he was, therefore, at very considerable personal expense to keep his proper standing with his brother officers; and as soon as he had acquired all the military knowledge that he was likely to get in the regiment in time of peace, he obtained leave to return to england; and, as he had not any immediate expectation of a commission, he visited france, to make himself more perfect in the french language. after this, he was allowed to purchase a commission in the nd regiment, or queen's royals; and he embarked to join that corps in india. his letters will shew what that regiment, in common with others, have endured during a campaign of fifteen months in central asia, their privations and expenses; and when his second commission was paid for, during that campaign, he found himself at its close, at the age of twenty-five, a lieutenant on full pay, the amount of which, if he was in england, would be far short of the interest of the money which has been expended in his commissions and education, and with fifteen lieutenants still above him on the roll of his regiment. it will be seen by his letters, and it is confirmed by the official despatches of the commander-in-chief, that the company to which he was attached (the light company of the queen's) led the storming party at ghuzni. he was shot through the arm and through the body, and left for dead at the foot of the citadel at kelat, whilst endeavouring to save the lives of some beloochees who were crying for mercy. and for these services he is to be rewarded with a medal, by shah shooja; for ghuzni, and for the capture of both places he has the full enjoyment of the highest gratification that a soldier can feel--the consciousness that he has done his duty to his country, and, let me hope, in the act of mercy in which he suffered, his duty to his god as a christian. but he is not a solitary example of such good fortune. no one who was wounded and survived may have been nearer death than himself, yet are there others who have done more, and suffered more, as the history of the army of the indus would bear ample testimony. let me then ask, in behalf of the british officer, when he is lightly spoken of as a man, or when the expenses of the army are cavilled at, on which side is the debt--on his, or on that of his country? a.h. holdsworth. _brookhill,--may, ._ [illustration] it may be right to draw the attention of the reader to a circumstance which, at first sight, may appear singular--that the same letters frequently contain reports quite contradictory to each other. it should therefore be borne in mind that such letters were probably written at different times, as the writer found opportunity; who, being anxious that his family should know all that passed as well in the camp as in the field, preferred leaving each report in the way in which it was circulated at the time of his writing it, rather than correct it afterwards, as the truth, might turn out. such letters shew the situation in which an army is placed on its landing in a new country, where no account of the movements of the inhabitants can be relied upon, and the heavy responsibility which attaches to the officers who are entrusted with its command. campaign of the indus. * * * * * letter i on board the ship syden, off the mouth of the indus, nov. th, . my dear father,--we left belgaum on the nd of last month, and arrived at bombay on the first of this; and we started from bombay on the th, for this place. i had intended to write from bombay, but everything was in such a state of confusion and bustle whilst we were there, that i literally could find no time or place for doing so. we are now at anchor off one of the mouths of the indus, and have had a delightful voyage. our ship is a very nice one, of tons, belonging to a swede, who is an excessively good fellow, and has treated us very well. sir john keane is already arrived in the steamer semiramis and also one of the native regiments. our bombay force consists of men, of which are europeans--viz., of the queen's, and of h.m. th regiment, one squadron of the th light dragoons, with foot and horse artillery. the rest of the force is composed of native regiments, horse and foot. we shall not land, i think, until to-morrow evening, as we are almost the only ship that has yet arrived. the infantry are divided into two brigades, and the cavalry form another by themselves. our brigade (the first) consists of the queen's, and the th and th regiments of native infantry, commanded by our worthy colonel, now general willshire, c.b.; the other brigade is commanded by a company's officer. we have to go in boats about thirty miles, it is said, up the river, before we finally march. where it is i am perfectly ignorant; however, some place between this and hydrabad, whence we shall march as far north as shikarpoor, where we are to form a junction with the bengal troops, , in number, under sir h. fane. what our destination will be after that i know not; whether we shall advance with the bengalees upon herat, or form a corps of reserve on the indus. the country between this and shikarpoor belongs to the ameers of sinde. they were very restive at first, when they heard of our intention to march through their country, and threatened to oppose our progress; but i believe they have since thought better of it; however, i do not think that they can do anything against us: time will soon shew. we have been excessively crowded on board: twenty-six officers. i have been obliged to sleep on the poop every night, which, when the dew was heavy, was by no means pleasant. i hope we shall go further than shikarpoor, as i should like very much to see cabool, candahar, and all that part of the world, which so few europeans have visited. what is the cause of all this bustle and war i hardly know myself, and, at all events, it is too long to make the subject of a letter; i must therefore refer you to the papers for it; but i have heard from old officers that for the last twenty years the company have been anxious to establish themselves west and north of the indus. it is not likely, therefore, now that they have such an opportunity, that they will let it slip, so that perhaps we may be quartered there for the next two or three years. how it will turn out i know no more than the man in the moon: a soldier is a mere machine, and is moved by his superiors just as a chessman by a chess-player. should there be any skrimmaging, our men are in high spirits, and will, i think, soon make the ameers put their pipes in their pockets. ours is the first european army that has been on the indus since the time of alexander. i was obliged to sell my horses and other things on leaving belgaum, at a dead loss. i intend buying another horse when we land in sinde, as i am told we can get good ones very cheap there. this is a regular case of here to-day and there to-morrow: perhaps my next letter may be dated from cashmere--who knows? i felt rather sorry at leaving belgaum; we were all of us excessively rejoiced to get out of bombay. the report at first was, that we were to garrison it for the next two or three years, and we were therefore very glad when we found that was not to be the case. now, it is said, there is a chance of our going into persia; but i do not think that we shall. the man waits to lay the cloth on the cuddy table, where i am writing, so i must conclude for the present. _nov. th_.--the regiment is beginning to disembark right in front. the grenadiers are now going into the boats of the natives that are to take them up the river. since i wrote yesterday, i have heard all the news relative to our disembarkation. we are to go fifteen miles up the river in native boats to a place called vicur, where we form our first camp ground. we are to remain there for a week or ten days, in order to collect camels, bullocks, &c., for the transportation of our baggage. we have to pass a very dangerous bar in getting to this place, where several boats have been wrecked; but we have fine large ones. from all accounts, the ameers are now peaceably disposed, except one fellow, who, we hear, is inclined to be rather obstreperous; but i think the sight of our force will soon bring him to his senses. there are, however, a set of men who live on the mountain borders of sinde, called beloochees, the eastern inhabitants of beloochistan, who are a robber, free-and-easy kind of people, who may give us some trouble in endeavouring to walk off with part of our baggage, &c. i intend to keep a journal of what occurs, and will write by every opportunity. i think i have now mentioned everything that i have heard relative to this grand expedition; except, by-the-bye, that sir henry fane has denominated the force as "the army of the indus," and ours, the bombay branch of it, as "the corps d'armée of sinde." there is a grand title for you! i have nothing more to say; and as i must be looking after my traps previous to disembarking, i must conclude with best love to you, and all at home. your most affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. p.s.--i must trust this to the captain of the vessel, giving him instructions to put it into the bombay post when he returns, so that it is equally doubtful when you may receive it. he is an excessively good fellow, the captain; and we are going to make him a present of a silver goblet, worth l., for his attentions to us whilst on board his ship. letter ii. perminacote, five miles from vicur, right bank of the hujamree, one of the branches of the indus, december th, . my dear kitty,--i wrote to my father, about ten days ago, from the ship in which we came here, stating what i then knew about this expedition; but having since received your letter, and my father's, dated sept. th, i cannot think of going on this bloody campaign without first answering yours. things look now a little more warlike. the ameers have endeavoured to cut off everything like a supply from this part of the country, and we have to depend in a great measure, at present, on the supplies brought by the shipping. we have nothing in the shape of conveyance for our baggage. we expected two thousand camels and five hundred horses here for sale; but they are not to be seen at present, and where they are, or when they will arrive, no one knows. news has been received, it is said, from pottinger, the company's political agent at hydrabad, the principal town of the ameers, that they have called in their army, consisting of , beloochees, as they tell pottinger, "for the purpose of paying them off;" but he says it looks very suspicious, and that they are also fortifying the various towns on the indus. he has been expected here for the last two or three days, but has not yet arrived. report also says that he has been fired at in his way down. we are kept in the most strict discipline, and have a great deal to do. out-lying and in-lying pickets every night, the same as if we were in the presence of an enemy. this is a very pleasant climate at present, though excessively cold at night-time, as we feel to our cost when on picket, sleeping in the open air, with nothing but our cloaks to cover us; and some nights the dew is excessively heavy, which is very unhealthy, and has laid me up for the last few days with an attack of rheumatism. however, i hope to be out of the sick list to-day. there is such a sharp, cutting, easterly wind, that i can hardly hold my pen. it averages from to in the shade during the hottest part of the day, but that is only for about two hours. however, in the hot season it is worse than india; and we have proof here, even at this time, of the power of the sun occasionally; so i hope that we shall push on for shikarpoor, and join the bengal army, under sir h. fane, as quickly as possible, as we shall then have some chance of getting to cabool, which is said to be a delightful climate. we are still totally ignorant of our future proceedings, except what i have stated above. we are in great hopes that we have not been brought here for nothing, and that we may have a chance of seeing a few hard blows given and taken ere long. hydrabad and _lootè_ is what is most talked about at present. it will, however, be a most harassing kind of warfare, i expect, as the force of the ameers consists of arabs and beloochees; a regular predatory sort of boys, capital horsemen, but not able, i should think, to engage in a regular stand-up fight. i think their warfare will consist in trying to cut off a picket at night, breaking through the chain of sentries, and endeavouring to put the camp in confusion, &c. &c.; so that the poor subalterns on picket will have anything but a sinecure there; however, it will be a capital way of learning one's duty in the field. by-the-bye, i forgot to tell you, amongst other rumours of war, that an ameer was down here a few days ago to obtain an interview with sir j. keane, who refused to see the ameer, or to have anything to do with him, and told him that he would soon talk to him at hydrabad. our force is now nearly all arrived, all except the bombay grenadier regiment, which is to form part of ours, (i.e., the first brigade,) and not the th regiment, as i told my father. we have now here two squadrons of h.m. th light dragoons, the queen's, and the th regiment. the native regiments are, the grenadiers, the th, the th, and the th; there is also a due proportion of horse and foot artillery, together with some native cavalry, making in all fighting men. we are now about fifteen miles from the sea, and we got up quite safe, although there is a very dangerous bar to cross, and all the boats were not so lucky as ours, as the horse artillery lost fifteen horses; and a boat belonging to a merchant of bombay went down, in which goods to the amount of one thousand rupees ( l.) were lost. our camp presents a very gay appearance--so many regiments collected together; and altogether i like this sort of campaigning work very well, although i expect that we shall be very hard put to it when we march, if we do not get more means of conveyance. the wind is blowing such intolerable dust into the tent that i can hardly write. the captain of the vessel which brought us from bombay came up here last night, and returns to-day about eleven o'clock, and sails this evening for bombay; i shall give him this letter to take, so that you and my father will receive my letters at the same time. as long as i keep my health i do not care where we go or what we do. the doctor has just come in and put me off the sick list. it is getting very near eleven o'clock, and the captain will be off directly, so that i must conclude my letter, hoping you will, for this reason, excuse its shortness; and with best love, &c., to all at home, believe me ever your most affectionate brother, t.w.e. holdsworth. p.s. i have not any horse at present, which i find a great inconvenience. i sold what i had at belgaum, before i left it, at a dead loss, as i expected to get plenty here on my arrival, but have been wofully disappointed. there were some splendid creatures for sale at bombay, which was very tempting, but they asked enormous sums for them. i wonder where i shall eat my christmas dinner! this is the first european army that has been on the indus since the time of alexander the great. letter iii. camp near tatta, four miles from the indus, january st, . my dear father,--i write to wish you a happy new year on this the first day of , which, if it turns out as its opening prognosticates, is likely to be a very eventful one for me, if i do not get knocked on the head or otherwise disposed of. i wrote to you from the ship syden, about the th of november, and to kate from our last station at bominacote, on the right bank of the hujamree, about the th of last month, both which letters will, i expect, leave bombay to-day by the overland mail for england; but as another mail will leave on the th, and i thought you would be anxious to learn as much of our movements &c. as possible, i dare say the present letter will not be amiss. we remained at our old encampment, bominacote, until the th of last month, and i picked up my health very fast there, and was able to enjoy myself shooting a great deal, particularly the black partridge, which is an uncommonly handsome bird, and much bigger than the english. the nd brigade of infantry, consisting of h.m. th regiment, the th and rd regiments native infantry, under the command of general gordon, a company's officer, together with the th light dragoons, a regiment of native cavalry, and one troop of horse artillery, left the aforesaid place on the th, with sir john keane and his escort; and the first brigade, consisting of ourselves, the st grenadiers, and th regiment native infantry, under the command of our chief, general willshire, left on the th. i was on out-lying picket the night before, (christmas night,) and a very curious way it was of passing it. the first part of the night, till twelve o'clock, was exceedingly fine and beautiful, and, as i lay on the cold ground, my thoughts travelled towards poor old devonshire, and i could not help fancying in what a much more comfortable way you must be spending it at home, all snug, &c. at brookhill. after twelve, the strong northerly wind, which blows with great force at intervals this time of the year in this country, sprung up, and it soon got intensely cold. towards two i forgot myself for about half an hour, and nodded on my post, and on awakening i was taken with what i am sure must have been a slight attack of cholera. i was stone cold, particularly my arms, hands, legs, and feet, and suffered excruciating pains in my stomach, till nature relieved me, which she was kind enough to do uncommonly frequent. i had luckily some brandy with me, of which i drank, i should think, half a bottle down without tasting it; but it did me a great deal of good at the time, although i have not been well since, and am still very far from being so. our camels, of which i had two, were furnished us by the commissariat, and we ought to have had them at four o'clock on the day before; but, like everything else, we did not get them till four o'clock the morning we marched, about an hour before we turned out. i had to trust entirely to providence with regard to mine, as to whether i should get them or not, as i was on outlying picket, and could not attend to them, and i had just two minutes, after coming from picket in the morning, to get a mouthful of villanous coffee, when i was obliged to fall in with my company, which formed the advanced guard of the brigade, and march off in double quick time, leaving all to chance. my poor stomach wanted something most awfully to stop its proceedings, but it was totally out of the question, as general willshire hurried us off at a slapping pace; luckily, the march was only eight miles, so it did not fatigue me much: i marched on foot the whole of it, as i could not get my pony in the hurry of starting. we got nothing to eat till two o'clock, when part of our mess things arrived, and we pitched into whatever we could get. this march; though, was by far the most pleasant, as we had a good firm tract of country to pass over, and no sand. the "rouse" sounded at five, and we marched again at half-past six. this night i was on in-lying picket, and was obliged to pass it in harness, and ready to turn out at a moment's notice, although awfully tired. we had a very unpleasant march, as the north winds got up soon after we started, and blew the dust and sand right into our eyes; we had, however, being on the advance guard, comparatively easy work, as there were only two sections with each officer: the poor column suffered severely. this day, however, was paradise compared to the next, which was eighteen miles, through an uninhabited sandy desert, with a few tamarisk shrubs and no water, except a few stagnant pools, which was the cause of the march being so long, there being no place for encampment. general willshire, however, made the best of a bad matter, and sent on the night before to a place about half way, and the least unchristian-like spot he could find, half the men's rations for the next day, together with the bheesties (or water carriers) and the men's grog, &c., with orders for the cooks to have these rations cooked and ready for the men as soon as they marched in; so that on arriving at the ground we piled arms and formed a curious sort of pic-nic in the middle of the desert. we halted here about an hour, and lucky it was that the men got the means of recruiting their strength in this manner, as the latter part of the march was a terrible teaser. we marched off from this place about twelve. although we had found the morning pleasant enough, with a fine bracing breeze, yet in the afternoon, about half an hour after starting, the wind went down, and the sun shone out terribly; the sand in some parts was half knee deep, and although there was no breeze to blow it in our faces, yet it rose from the trampling of so many feet in successive dense columns, and completely enveloped the whole brigade, almost blinding the men, so that they could hardly see the man before them, and getting into their noses and mouths so as nearly to suffocate them; however, they bore it manfully, and marched straight through it like britons. our encampment that night was at a place called golam shah, on the buggaur, one of the branch streams of the indus. we found that the second brigade had only left it the same morning, having been obliged to halt there the preceding day; and general willshire found a letter from sir john keane, advising a halt there for the following day, which we accordingly did, and a precious comfortable day we had. i got off my pony at the close of this day's march with a dreadful headache, and had to wait for an hour till halket's tent and kit, with whom i am doubling up, arrived. his servants brought me the delightful intelligence that my camel man had bolted with his camels at our last encampment, and that my things were all left there on the ground, with my servant, and that it was quite uncertain when they would be up; in fact, it seemed exceedingly doubtful whether they would arrive at all. however, they did come in at last, but very late, on three ponies, two bullocks, and one donkey, which were the only things my boy could get, and for which i had to pay considerably. i turned in as soon as i could; and the next day, which was a most wretched one, i was very unwell. this place, golam shah, must, i think, be one of the most wretched places in the whole world, situated as it is in the heart of a desert, with only one recommendation,--viz., the river buggaur, the water of which is excessively sweet and wholesome. the day we passed at it was the coldest i remember since leaving england. a strong northerly wind blew the whole day, and the clouds of dust and sand that rose in consequence were so thick as perfectly to obscure the sun, and all we could do we could not keep ourselves warm. here we had the misfortune also to lose the only man that has as yet fallen on the march, an old soldier. he was taken with cholera at eight in the morning and died at twelve at night: he was buried about six hours afterwards, just as the regiment marched. the hospital men had no time to stretch him, and he was laid in the earth in the same posture in which he died, with his arms stuck a kimbo, pressing upon his stomach, which shews that he must have suffered intense agony. poor fellow! they had not time to dig his grave very deep, and i am afraid the jackals will be the only benefiters by his death. we left this place the next morning, the th, and arrived here (tatta) about eleven o'clock, a twelve-mile march. a great number of the nd brigade rode out to meet us, and the th light dragoons very kindly asked us to breakfast immediately on our arrival. you may be sure they had not to ask us twice! tatta is a very ancient town, said to have been built by either alexander, on his march down the indus, or by one of his generals; the ancient name was patala. at that time the country was in possession of hindoos, or, at least, of the followers of brahma, who were most probably the original possessors of the greater portion of the east. afterwards, on the rise of mahomet, it was soon in possession of his followers, who seem to have held it for a long period, as they have left magnificent proofs of their grandeur, both in the city and all round the neighbourhood, which is studded with splendid cupolas, domes, temples, and tombs; there is one in particular in the town itself an old tomb, now used as a caravanserai, which is excessively handsome. when i talk of a tomb being turned into a caravanserai, you will of course understand that a tomb in this part of the world is very different from one in the western part of the globe. this tomb itself would cover as much ground as exeter cathedral. the inside of the domes are very beautifully enamelled in the chastest colours, and with most excellent taste, and would put to shame the most handsome drawing-room in london, i should think. i have never repented not being able to draw so much as i have since i have been in the east, but particularly since i have been at this place, where there is so much that would look well in a sketch; but i would not give twopence to be able to draw and not draw well, particularly when i see the daubs that some men, who fancy they are hands at it, produce, after fagging at the simplest thing possible, and i believe that if nature does not give you a turn for it, all the trying possible would never make a painter, and that what the old roman proverb said of the poet, "non fit sed nascitur poeta," is equally applicable to the painter. i tried it for a short time, at hanover, but my master told me i was the most awkward and stupid pupil he ever had, and advised me to cut the concern, and i followed his advice; nor am i sorry that i did so, as i should never have been able to draw well, and should have only been discontented, and given it up in disgust. we have, however, two officers in our regiment who both draw and sketch exceedingly well; and i will try to get duplicates from them if possible, so that, if god spares my life, and i ever return home, i shall be able to shew you some specimens of the country we have passed through. _jan. nd._--well, we are to have no fighting, at least at present, it appears. this will be cheering news for kitty, i expect. we were most egregiously disappointed in the town or city of tatta itself. we saw it at a great distance on our march, and on arriving on our encamping ground, it looked excessively well, and gave us the idea of a very handsome place. we saw what we imagined to be high houses, built of stone, towers and pillars; but lo! when we rode in to examine it, these splendid buildings turned out to be a most miserable collection of white mud houses, which had the appearance of stone at a distance. some of them were tolerably high, certainly; but the most wretched-looking things possible. this is the case with most towns in the east. like dartmouth, they all look best à la distance. i am sorry to say that we have a great many men in the hospital now, and four officers on the sick list; two of them very unwell. all the cases are bowel complaints, and most of them dysentery. this is the case generally. while on the march, soldiers seldom feel it; but when the halt afterwards comes, then they get touched up awfully. however, it is not to be wondered at, when one considers the quantity of duty which they have to perform at present. out-lying and in-lying pickets, and guards, &c.; add to which, the being suddenly transported from the climate of india, to which most of them have become inured by a residence, on the average, of twelve years, to this comparatively cold and changeful climate, is enough of itself to shake them a little. they have also done what no indian troops have done before: in marching in india, almost everything is carried for the soldier; he merely carries what he does on parade--viz., his firelock and accoutrements. our regiment though, by-the-bye, has always carried a blanket, with a clean shirt and stockings and flannel waistcoat wrapped up in it, that they may be enabled to change as soon as they have marched in. on this march, each man has carried his knapsack, with his kit in it, twenty rounds of ammunition, a havresack with his day's rations, and a small round keg containing water, the weight of all which is no joke. while at bominacote, we fully expected to have a little fighting after passing tatta, and on our arrival here we heard a report which induced us to believe that we should have a brush with the ameers very shortly; but it appears now that the ameers have seen the folly of such proceedings, and have determined to receive us amicably, and to assist our passage through their country, and that it was only one of the ameers that was inclined to be restive. he endeavoured to stop our camels, &c., and managed to do so for some time, and collected as much of what they call an army as he could--about of these beloochees, but with no guns, or anything of that sort. however, on collecting them, they represented to him that the british troops were behaving so well, and the inhabitants of the country were getting so much more money for their articles of sale than they ever got before, that they considered it was more for their profit and advantage that the english should march through their country than that they should oppose them, and get licked into the bargain, as they were sure they would be. all eastern nations have an awful dread of european artillery. it also happened that the poor ameer had unfortunately not the wherewithal to carry on the war, and his army made excessively high demands on him, you may be sure. the consequence of all which was, that the army dissolved itself as quietly as possible, and the poor ameer found himself solus. the result is, that a deputation is now here, with a small force from the head ameer, at hydrabad, under the command of nûr mahomed, another ameer, and that he has made most ample apologies for the conduct of his brother ameer, and offered not only to let us pass through his country, but to assist us in so doing to the utmost of his power. it was indeed well for the ameers that they came to this decision, as had they acted contrary we should have taken possession of their country to a moral certainty. now they have a chance of keeping half the loaf. we have here certainly the flower of the bombay army, and a very respectable force in every respect: two of the best european regiments, four of the best native, the th dragoons, two regiments of light cavalry, two troops of horse artillery in prime order, and a battalion of foot artillery, together with a splendid band of auxiliary horse from cutch, the finest looking fellows i ever saw: they arrived here on the same day as ourselves. i was standing on one of the hills as they wound their way round it; i was never struck with anything so much, nor have i ever seen anything so orientally military before. they are dressed in green garments, edged with gold, and red turbans, tied under the chin, like the old mahratta soldiers; their arms are match-lock, lance, scimitar, and pistols, and they appear to be excellent and practical riders. they are quite an independent corps, each man finding his own horse, arms, accoutrements, &c., and they take good care to be excellently mounted. they have a few european officers attached to them from the bombay establishment. their dress is also uncommonly handsome; a green hussar dress, with gold braiding. in addition to all this force, we have a subsidiary one nearly as large, coming on directly to follow our steps, and occupy sinde, while we march on with the bengalees for cabool. this force, they say, is to consist of h.m. th regiment from deesa, the th, th, nd, and th regiments, rd n.i., together with h.m. th and st regiments, and ceylon rifle corps (malays) from ceylon, so that i expect the government at home will have to send more regiments to india as quickly as possible. sir j. keane is very likely to have the command of the whole force, both bombay and bengal, as they say sir h. fane is gone back to bengal with half the bengal force, in consequence of the burmese declaring war; which, as might have been expected, they did directly when so many regiments were marched from their neighbourhood. this report is, however, contradicted, and they say now that sir h. fane is going home, and will meet us at shikarpoor or hydrabad, give up the command to sir j. keane, and go down the indus, and thence to england overland. which is the true version i know not; but i am afraid that i have little chance of meeting colonel fane, and giving him arthur's letter, which i expected to do when i wrote last. i am delighted at the prospect of our going to cabool: there we may have some fighting, and have a chance of being permanently quartered till we return to europe, whenever that may be. what the original cause of all this was, as i told you before, i hardly know; and you are more likely to get at the true version from some of the indian newspapers, or from any friends you may have connected with this part of the world, than from me. but, as far as i can learn, this appears to be it: shah shooja is the rightful heir to the throne of cabool, and dost mahomed is what mr. c. dickens calls the "wrongful one," alias the usurper. dost mahomed had possession of the country, and the indian government, from what motives i know not, determined to unseat him and replace shah shooja. in this matter they are assisted by old runjet sing, king of lahore, or, as his oriental title goes, "the blind lion of the punjab." the persians, on the contrary, took part with dost mahomed, insulted our resident at their court, and besieged shah shooja's party in herat; from which, however, after a siege of long duration, they were finally obliged to retire. there was a report at first that russia was concerned in this affair, and that russian troops were present with the persians at the siege, but these turned out to be a regiment or two of russian renegadoes whom the king of persia has in his pay. there was another report of a letter having been discovered from the government of russia to the king of persia, which induced the belief that the emperor of russia was playing a deep game, the object of which was to lessen our influence in the east; and many people, i believe, are very much of this opinion. how far all this may be true i know not; but i have been told by old indians that for a long time the indian government have been anxious to have a strong footing in sinde, and to command the navigation of the indus; and that now they have the opportunity they are not likely to let it slip. the afghans are a very hardy race of men, and we may have some sharp work with them; but i think a gun or two of our horse artillery would have sent the beloochees scampering. they are miserably equipped; but being nearly all robbers, they might have annoyed us by a night attack, which would have been anything but pleasant, particularly for the poor sub. on out-lying picket. some bombay native merchants are at present at tatta; they have been here for ten years, and have been afraid to stir for fear of being robbed. i have no doubt but that the inhabitants of the country would prefer our government considerably to that of the ameers, as they are exceedingly tyrannical, and grind their subjects to the last degree, demanding half of everything that is offered for sale. when burnes travelled first in this country, some few years ago, and was received by the ameer in divan, at hydrabad, an old priest who was present is said to have reproved the ameer for receiving burnes so civilly, and to have told him "that since one englishman had seen the indus, it would not be long before they would be in possession of it;" and so it seems likely to turn out. well; as long as i keep my health i care little where we go or what we do; but marching in ill health is a great damper to the spirits. the stay-at-home soldiers in england little know what service in this climate really is. i should like to see ---- of the ---- on out-lying picket here; he would not find it quite so pleasant as almack's. i have very little time to add more, as the post goes to bombay to-day, but to wish you all at home a very happy new year, and love to all relations and friends, as you may not hear from me again for some time. i will endeavour to pick up as many curiosities and things of that description as possible for you, if i do not get knocked on the head. i keep a journal, and will write by every opportunity. your next letter to me may find me in cabool. once more, good bye. ever your affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. letter iv. camp, near jarruk, on the banks of the indus, twenty miles from hydrabad, january, st, . my dear father,--i had fully intended this letter for kitty, but such a dreadful event happened in our regiment yesterday, that i was afraid, if she was at all unwell when she received the letter, connecting it, as she would, with me, it might throw her into some dreadful fever, or something of that sort. i have very little time to write, as the post leaves this, by steamer, at three o'clock to-day; and i have a great deal to do during the day. i think it my duty, however, to write, as the report of the circumstance might get into the papers without mentioning names, or giving wrong ones, and you might be needlessly alarmed. to strike at once _in medias res_, this event is no less than the horrible death of three of our officers in a burning shikargur, or large thicket, enclosed by the ameers for the preservation of game. the names of the poor, unfortunate fellows are sparky (whom, by-the-bye, you might have seen at chatham,) nixon, and hibbert. the two first, lieut. sparke, in the grenadiers, and nixon, in the light company. hibbert was assistant-surgeon. they were three of the finest hearted fellows: nixon, a long time one of my fellow subs in the light company. (i can hardly write, my hand shakes so.) poor hibbert was an exceedingly clever fellow, and a great traveller, and one of the most beautiful draughtsmen you could meet with any where. they are all three a terrible loss to our corps. i will tell you the mournful tale as it happened. we arrived here on the th. i breakfasted on tuesday with them at mess, which was the last time i ever saw them alive: they were in exceedingly high spirits. the success of an enterprise the day before appears to have determined them to go upon another expedition on this day, which at first sight did not appear half so hazardous as it unfortunately proved to be; this was no less than going into a shikargur (of which i have explained the meaning above) about four or five miles in the rear of our camp, and which was supposed to be well stocked with game. it happened that this jungle had been set on fire about two days previously, most likely by some of our camel drivers, or other native followers: some said it was done by the beloochees; but this i think very unlikely, as it is dead to leeward of our camp. well, they did not appear in the evening, and we began to be rather alarmed on their account: however, we thought they would turn up by some chance or other. next morning (yesterday), when the regiment fell in, an hour before daylight, which the whole camp does here every morning, as we are supposed to have a hostile force not very far from us, they were reported absent. breakfast came; no tidings of them: ten; eleven o'clock; and they began to be the talk of the whole camp. however, we speculated that the worst that could have happened to them was being taken prisoners by a party of beloochees, and kept as hostages, or something of that sort. at twelve, general willshire became so alarmed and anxious about them that he sent out a troop of the st light cavalry to scour the jungles, and discover what they could of them; another officer sent out a party of six natives, with the promise of a reward of two hundred rupees if they could find any tidings of them. well; the day went on; and at mess, at six o'clock, nothing had been heard relative to their fate, except that a little dog belonging to poor nixon returned to camp about four o'clock. about eight o'clock i was in dickinson's tent, smoking a cheroot, &c., previous to turning in, when one of our servants rushed in with the dreadful intelligence that the bodies had been found in the jungle by the light cavalry. it struck us at first so unexpectedly, and as being a thing so dreadful, that we would hardly believe it; however, all doubt was soon changed into horrible reality by the arrival of the bodies within our lines. i was determined not to see them; but there was a horrible fascination which drew one along with the rest to the hospital tent, where they were lying. * * * * * twelve o'clock.--well; i am just returned from seeing the last honours paid to their remains; it is a melancholy business a military funeral; every officer in camp attended; and, after all, they have had the satisfaction of a christian burial, which may not be our luck in a short time. i do not know why, but this sad event has made me an old woman almost! they lie side by side on a hill just in the rear of our camp; "no useless coffin enclosed their corse;" but there they lie together, wrapped in their cloaks. peace to their manes! we intend erecting a monument to them, if possible. i learned that some of the staff had been to the jungle to investigate it thoroughly to-day, and from various circumstances, have come to the conclusion that they had climbed up some high trees, which surrounded the place where they fell, in order to shoot the game as they came out, and that before they had time to make their escape, a breeze came, which brought the smoke, and which most likely stifled, or at least rendered them senseless. let us hope that this was the case, as i should think that so their death would not have been very painful: the position in which their bodies were lying when found seems to warrant this supposition. a porcupine was found close to their trees, burnt to a cinder. it blew very hard last night, and i passed an almost sleepless night in thinking of these poor fellows. it gives a man an awful shake in going through life, seeing the very fellows you have lived with for the last two years, in whose proceedings you have borne a part, brought suddenly before you in such a state: a man in these situations thinks more in two hours than he does in the whole course of his natural life under ordinary circumstances. it proves what helpless beings we are; how little we can control our own actions: truly, "in the midst of life we are in death." i wrote to you on the new year's day everything that had happened up to that time; the letter was to have gone by the overland mail of the th. i hope you will receive it safe, as i should be sorry you should lose anything from me now, as it may be the last you may ever have, so precarious are the chances of a soldier's life on actual service. shortly after writing to you, i got ill again, and it ended in a slight fever, which cleared me out altogether, since which i have been in perfectly good health, thank god. i came off the sick list on the nd january, the day before we marched from tatta. i will give you my journal from that time to the sad event which has just happened. _wednesday, jan._ , .--on this day, at a.m., the corps d'armé of sinde marched out of the encampment near tatta _en route_ for hydrabad, the cutch auxiliary horse in advance, detaching flankers, &c., then the main body in the following order:--the th light dragoons in front; next, one squadron of horse artillery, followed by two squadrons of the st regiment of bombay light cavalry, one company of foot artillery, then the first brigade of infantry, under general willshire, consisting of the queen's royals, th and st, or grenadier regiment, native infantry, a second squadron of horse artillery, a second company of foot artillery; the nd infantry brigade, consisting of h.m. th regiment, the th and rd regiments native infantry; the whole closed by two other squadrons of st light cavalry. we (i.e., the st brigade) left our ground a quarter before six, and halted on a rising ground close to the walls of tatta, whence we had a very fair view of the cavalry, artillery, &c., that were in the advance of us, winding their way through a pretty avenue of trees: the whole presented a very animated and martial appearance, the different corps marching off with colours uncased, band playing, &c. cunningham's, or the poonah auxiliary horse, having only arrived the night before, did not join the main body, but came up somewhat later in the day, i believe. the march of the main body this day was not more than ten miles; but our brigade was posted two miles in advance of the rest of the force, and the queen's were nearly a mile in advance of the other two regiments of the brigade; so that we marched about thirteen miles. we encamped in a rather pretty valley surrounded by barren rocks, with our right resting on a shikargur (or hunting thicket); we had a fine pebbly bottom, which was a great relief to our feet after the hot dust of tatta. my baggage did not make its appearance till about five o'clock, my unfortunate young camel having proved restive, and flung its load two or three times, thereby considerably damaging my cot and table: mess at six,--nothing particular. _thursday, jan_. .--in consequence of our being so much in advance, our "rouse" did not sound till six o'clock this morning, and we did not march off our ground till seven. after we had marched about two miles; we halted and piled arms, to enable the cavalry, &c., in our rear to pass on, and thus we had a very good review of them: they marched in the same order as yesterday, except that in addition, and near to the light cavalry, came cunningham's horse from poonah: this was the first time we had seen them; they made a very splendid appearance, about strong, and well equipped in every respect; their dress and accoutrements the same as the cutch horse, (of which i gave you a description in my last,) with the difference of wearing yellow and red instead of green and red. we had a very pleasant march this day, except the latter part, which was exceedingly dusty; some very pretty and romantic scenery, consisting of ruined forts, abrupt hills, large rocks, interspersed with some beautiful lakes here and there. we reached our encamping ground rather late--half-past eleven o'clock--lost my breakfast, owing to my native groom, who carried some stock for me, and to whom i had given directions to wait by the regiment till they had piled arms and were dismissed, having disobeyed my orders, and cut off with my tatter to the river, about three miles off: gave chase directly the parade was dismissed, and walked through a shikargur to the river, but could not find the rascal. i had, however, a good view of the indus, which does not here appear to be very broad: a cruel hot day; and, in addition to my other misfortunes, was nearly stifled by the clouds of dust raised by cavalry of every description leading their horses to water. on my return to camp i luckily found my baggage arrived, and had a good snoose till six o'clock, mess time; heard at mess that the ameers had agreed to all our terms, and would do everything to assist our passage through their country; that we were to march straight to shikarpoor, without halting at hydrabad; after remaining at which place for some time, we should advance upon candahar,--all fudge. our position this halt was about the centre of the army,--bad encamping ground,--very dusty. _friday, th_.--left our encampment at six, in the same order as before; our out-lying picket, under stisted, joined us near our first halt, about three miles. warlike news,--the ameers had rejected our treaty, and that a force of , beloochees had crossed the river; and would probably give us some trouble. stisted had received orders to keep a very sharp look-out with his picket, as there was a chance of its being attacked: jephson joined, with news from sir j. keane, that there was every chance of our being attacked on the line of march; however, we were not, although we passed over some very pretty ground for a battle. marched into our encamping ground about half-past ten, near a half-ruined village called jarruk, on the banks of the river; the army here took up a rather strong position, on a chain of heights; our brigade being, however, pushed on again in advance, on some low and jungly ground near the river; the queen's again on the extreme front. news still warlike; the beloochees, under meer mahomet, one of the ameers, and the most restive of them, being supposed to be near us in great force, though nobody seemed to know where. all the oot-wallas, or camel-drivers, put under charge of sentries, as there was reason to suspect they meditated deserting in the night with our camels. bad encamping ground again,--a dusty, half-cultivated field. _saturday, th_.--turned out of bed between two and three, a.m., with orders to fall in, at a moment's notice, in "light marching order," as an attack was strongly expected. spies had reported that , beloochees were in a shikargur not seven miles from us, and that they intended a night attack; everybody in the highest state of excitement, pistols loading, &c. fell in an hour before daylight; cavalry sent out in all directions; staff and field-officers galloping about like mad fellows; remained under arms till day had fully broke, when we were dismissed, but commanded not to stray far from camp: great excitement all day; cunningham's horse sent out to reconnoitre; returned late at night, reporting that they had patrolled sixteen miles in advance, had closely examined the shikargur in question, and could find no traces of the beloochees,--a strong suspicion, however, remained that there were beloochees in our neighbourhood. _sunday, th_.--under arms an hour before daylight; no further news; camp quiet. as i was to be on out-lying picket this evening, rode out after breakfast to look at my ground, which appeared rather strong, intersected with ravines, brushwood; &c., and a good place to hold against cavalry. mounted picket at five o'clock, p.m., fifty-seven rank and file, two serjeants, four corporals, and one bugler, a chain of nine double sentries, the right resting on the river and the hydrabad road, and the chain running along a dry nullah, till it communicated with the sentries of the th regiment's picket; a corporal's party of three men detached in advance to an old ruin on the left front; a picket of cavalry about two miles in advance, with videttes on some high ground. a beautiful moonlight night, and not very cold till about one o'clock in the morning; lay on the ground and thought of what was going on at brookhill and fancy ball at torquay; visited my sentries continually; the men in high spirits, and very much on the alert; nothing extraordinary occurred. letter v. camp kotree, four miles from hydrabad, february th, . my dear father,--i wrote to you a few days ago from jarruk, informing you of the melancholy fate of three of my brother officers; but having received your letter since, dated nov. th, containing the bill for rupees (or l.), and informing me of the news of kate's intended marriage, i could not let slip an opportunity which has just occurred, by our having got possession of curachee, of writing to kitty, and also, at the same time, of informing you of what has occurred since. you will receive this at the same time as you do the other, since it will arrive at bombay in time to go by the same overland mail. i wrote to you on the st; and on sunday, the rd of february, we marched out of jarruk for this place; we made a two days' march of it, both very disgusting; horrible, or rather no roads at all; nothing but dust and sand under our feet, which the wind blew into our eyes every minute; add to which, small halts every five minutes, on account of the artillery in our front, who could not get on through the badness of the way: this perpetual halting is the most wearisome thing possible to a soldier when once fairly under weigh. well; we arrived here on the day before yes-day; our front is now completely changed, being towards the river, and not turned from it, or with our right resting on it, as it has been before; our brigade is on the extreme right. of course, you know that we are on the western bank, and that hydrabad is on the eastern, and therefore the opposite one. since we have been here, we have a little relaxed in our discipline, being no longer under arms before daylight; but reports are still very various as to whether we are to have peace or war with the ameers, and whether we shall eventually have to sack hydrabad or not. a deputation from thence came over yesterday to sir j. keane. it appears that the ameers will agree to our treaty, but demur about the money which that treaty obliges them to pay. as far as i can learn, though i do not advise you to put much reliance on it, as i may very likely be wrong, this seems to be the case. it appears that the ameers have long owed our ally, whom we are going to place on the throne of cabool, shah shooja, twenty lacs of rupees; that on our declaring war they agreed to pay this sum, with shah shooja's consent, to our government to meet the expenses of the war, and to give us a passage through their country to shikarpoor. however, from our first landing in their country they have played a most underhand game, and endeavoured to throw every indirect obstacle in our way, behaving friendly to our faces, but behind our backs giving very different directions to their satellites: this was found out by means of intercepted letters, particularly at our last halt at jarruk. the conduct of our party may not be considered of quite the fairest nature, as we are establishing posts in their country by way of communication, and reserves at three or four different places. this was, no doubt, part of the original plan that sent us here, as these posts are to be strongly fortified, consisting, it is supposed, of shikarpoor, schwun, tatta, and curachee, and are to be the posts of defence on our north-west frontiers against any incursions from our northern neighbours, particularly russia. the ameers are particularly indignant at this, as i am told it did not form part of the original treaty, and they see in it, no doubt with justice, a prelude to our final possession of their country. pottinger, the political agent, had collected, before he left hydrabad, grain for the army to the value of three lacs of rupees; this, it is now found out, has either been taken away or destroyed, and sir j. keane immediately added it to the other twenty lacs contained in the treaty. the ameers say they will pay half the whole sum demanded here, and the remaining half on our arrival at shikarpoor. this sir j. keane has refused, and told them he will not leave this or hydrabad till he gets every fraction. we yesterday received news which must, i should think, have an effect on the ameers one way or the other. the admiral on this station, sir f. maitland, brought up in his (i think the wellesley) h.m. th regiment, from mandivie, in cutch, to curachee, a fort on the westernmost branch of the indus. on approaching the fort, the beloochees who garrisoned it, taking it for a common free-trader, had the foolish presumption to fire into her; the admiral wore his vessel round, just gave one broadside, down came their fort in one second about their ears,--you may guess how it astonished them: they sent word to say that the english fire a lac of shot in one second. they say the ameers were one year in taking this place, which cost the english one second. i think myself that we shall not have any fighting here, and that hydrabad will still remain in the hands of the ameers. the report to-day is, that we cross the river to-morrow; if so, i suppose with hostile intentions, or at least for intimidation; but this i hardly believe. sir j. keane, they say, refused to receive the deputation from the ameers yesterday. should the thing be settled peaceably, we shall immediately march for shikarpoor, and thence most likely on candahar, a new climate. it has been getting gradually hotter here; and in the hot season sinde is dreadful. at shikarpoor we meet a part, if not the whole, of the bengal force, and shah shooja, with his and runjet sing's contingent, is also there. runjet himself is very ill: part of the agreement between him and us was, that we should preserve the throne to his son on his demise. he was excessively civil to lord auckland, and all the english who have been at lahore. sir h. fane, they say, still proceeds with the bengal army. the drummer is here waiting for my letter, as it is very late for the post, so, in haste, good bye. love, &c., and believe me ever, your most affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. p.s. jephson is post-master to the force. letter vi. camp, near larkhanu, wednesday, th march, . my dear father,--i last wrote to you from kotree, opposite hydrabad. we are now, as you will see by the date, at larkhanu, a pretty considerable distance from the former place. i see, by my journal, that it was the th of february when i last wrote, exactly one month ago. we were then, i believe, rather ignorant of what the ameers intended; but the fate of curachee, of which i gave you an account; brought them to their senses, and the day after i wrote things were settled, and officers had permission to visit hydrabad, merely reporting their names to their respective majors of brigade before they did so. in consequence of which i went over to that place on the th, with dickenson and piercy; but there was not much to repay us for our ride, under a cruelly hot sun, as the fort, the only place worth seeing, was shut up, and no one could get a view of the inside except a few of the staff. it did not appear to be very strong, although it had a pretty appearance. i think the ameers acted very wisely, as it could easily be taken by escalade. the rest of the town consisted of a great straggling bazaar, just the same as is to be seen everywhere in india; and it did not appear a bit better than that at belgaum. there were some fine elephants belonging to the ameers, and some pretty ruins on the outskirts of the town. the beloochees had all left, and were nowhere to be seen. sunday, the th, we marched off our ground at kotree, and reached lukkee on saturday, the th, after a six days' march, most of them fifteen miles. here we halted four days to allow the pioneers, &c., to make a road over the lukkee pass for the artillery. we found here some excellent sulphur springs and baths, about a mile from our encampment, among the lukkee hills, which, if they could be transported to dartmouth, would make a second bath of it. the whole of our force were bidetizing here all day long. being so directly under the hills, we found it rather warmer than we liked. there were some large lakes here, full of wild duck, and capital partridge-shooting, and we were cracking away all the time. on the march to this place i had the misfortune to lose a very nice little bull-terrier bitch, about a year old, which i had from a pup, at belgaum, and which had followed my fortunes so far. it was all her own fault, as she broke from my tent one night, and though i used every endeavour i could hear nothing more of her. the st we marched over the pass to schwun, the largest place in sinde next to tatta. the pass was not half so bad as we expected, so we filed over it very easily. on our arrival at schwun we heard that sir h. fane had just passed down the river, with his staff, _en route_ for bombay, and was laying at anchor about five miles down the river, where sir j. keane went to meet him; so that here ended my last chance of meeting col. fane, and giving him arthur's letter. sir h. fane will remain at bombay, which is to be the head quarters of the indian army while this business lasts. we only halted one day at schwun; i rode in to look at the town, which was nearly desolate, as the inhabitants of every place invariably remove with their families on our arrival. there was, however, a fine old castle in ruins, which was well worth seeing, and must have been a place of some importance in former days; and a very superb mosque in the centre of the town, in which was a tame tiger. we left schwun on saturday, the rd, crossing the arrul river, which flows round the town into the indus, on pontoons, and commenced our first march in upper sinde. this day's march was delightful, and the only tolerable one we have had, all the rest being through a dismal, dusty desert, with sometimes no path at all, and the dust generally so thick in marching that you cannot see an inch before you. this was, however, a grand exception. we marched by the side of a magnificent lake, full of wild fowl, the banks of which were carpeted with rich wild clover, and over-shadowed with fine trees, the only ones of any size that we have yet seen in sinde; so that you might almost fancy you were going through a nobleman's park in england (kitly, par example.) in fact, this place put me more in mind of old england than, any i have seen in the east. from schwun we marched direct to this place, which we reached on the th, the day before yesterday, without halting once: most of the marches fifteen miles, and all terrible teasers, on account of the badness of the roads, and the stupidity or wilful ignorance of our guides. one of our marches was to have been a short one of ten miles; but for some unaccountable reasons our route and encamping ground were changed three times. we lost our way in the jungle, and marched fifteen, instead of ten, miles before we found ourselves in our proper places; on arrival at which we found that half the officers' and men's baggage was gone on to our next encamping ground, fifteen miles further, which, owing to the variety of places named in orders, our servants supposed to be the right one. my baggage was one of the unlucky; but my servant came back with my things about five o'clock in the evening; so that my poor camels must have gone nearly forty miles that day, with a prospect of another fifteen the next morning at five. general willshire, and, i hear, sir j. keane also, were among the sufferers. our poor sick were all lost in the jungles for this day, and we saw nothing of half of them till we arrived on our next encamping ground. some of them were upwards of twenty-four hours without getting anything to eat, or attendance of any sort. well, we marched to this place on the day before yesterday, after ten days' regular hard work. a great number in hospital; though they are coming out again now pretty fast. it is believed we shall halt here about a week; but what we shall do then nobody seems to know. the greater part of the force will, it is believed, follow the bengalees to candahar, who marched from shikarpoor for that purpose, under sir willoughby cotton, on the nd, but have since been detained, owing to the impracticability of the country. one regiment of our brigade (the grenadier regiment, native infantry) is under orders for bukkur, an island fort on the indus, about twenty-five miles from shikarpoor, which (i.e., bukkur) is to be our depôt for stores, &c., and where all the present unfits, in the shape of sick men, are to be sent. no doubt some other troops will be left in upper sinde, at different places, and i have some fears that the "queen's" may be among the number. heaven defend us from being quartered in any part of this wretched country, particularly from shikarpoor, which is said to be one of the hottest places in existence. in fact, the persians say, "while there is a shikarpoor, there ought to be no johannum," or hell. what a pity it would be to lose such a capital chance of seeing candahar, and perhaps cabool, which is said to be a splendid place and a delightful climate. the bolan pass, a most magnificent and difficult one, the key to afghanistan from sinde, is said to be now totally impassable, from the number of dead cattle, horses, and camels, which shah shooja's force lost there. this i believe, however, to be mere report. we heard, the other day, that dost mahomed had occupied it, and that we should have to take it at the point of the bayonet. so much do reports vary, one knows not what to believe. this pass, said to be thirty miles long, and at some places almost impassable, runs through and over the large chain of mountains that separates the mountainous country of candahar and cabool, or, as it is generally called, afghanistan, from the lowland of sinde; it is not easy to cross it, at least before april, as till then the snows are not melted. i hope and trust my next letter will be dated from candahar, which is, however, a good six weeks' march from this place. we have found the weather dreadfully hot for the last few days, averaging generally in our tents in the day time, though the nights are cool, and the mornings generally very cold. i have not yet been in larkhanu, though we marched through a part of it on our arrival. our men have been now for three days without any dram at all, and their rations are getting worse and worse every day; in fact, things are so bad that they have been obliged to send to shikarpoor for part of what was left there by the bengal commissariat, which is said to be excellent, and which has fed their army very well, although they have come a much greater distance than we have. i spoke to our paymaster about my bill, and he has shewn it to the paymaster-general, who says he will cash it whenever i like, but that i must take it in a lump; he will not give it me by instalments. this is a great nuisance, as it is very hazardous taking so much money about with one; the money, too, takes up a great deal of room and is very heavy; it was, however, quite a god-send, as i had no idea how very expensive this march would turn out; grain for cattle being exceedingly dear, the natives raising the price to about per cent. everywhere, thanks to bad management somewhere. at tatta each officer received a month's pay in advance, that he might purchase cattle for his baggage. this is to be deducted by three instalments, one from each of the next three issues of pay. an ensign's pay for one month will hardly purchase sufficient conveyances. the only mode in this country is by camels, and a camel is of all animals the most treacherous, or rather precarious lived; they get ill suddenly and go off in three hours: a great number have died with us. now an officer losing his camels loses one month's pay, and must leave his kit on the ground, as he has nothing wherewith to replace his loss. you can, therefore, imagine what a great relief your bill proved to me, as i shall always have it to fall back upon. i bought a very nice little cabool horse at kotree, from one of the ameers' disbanded beloochees. he is very hardy, and accustomed to this country, and not particular as to his food, which is a capital thing, as most of the arab horses that have been brought from india have fallen off terribly. he is a very pretty figure, goes well, and leaps capitally, which few of the arabs can. i gave rupees for him, or l. in india, i am confident he would fetch or rupees ( l. or l.) i am very doubtful as to the time when this letter may reach you; i hope it may catch the overland mail on the th; but jephson says it is very doubtful, and will depend entirely on the chance of there being a ship at curachee, or off the hujamree. the heat now, while i am writing, is dreadful, and there is a beastly hot wind blowing which i never felt before. heaven send us soon out of sinde! we are expecting the overland mail from england every day; it generally manages to come two days after i write home. you will by this time have received the letter i wrote from the syden, and the one i wrote to kate about the th of december from bominacote. reports vary much as to whether we shall have any fighting if we advance into candahar. i should think dost mahomed would like to try a brush with us, at least with shah shooja. with love to all at home, believe me your affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. letter vii. camp, candahar, june th, . my dear father,--i begin this letter to you on the th of june, , though when it will reach you, or whether it ever will, is very doubtful. i have not written, i see, since the beginning of march, from larkhanu; there was, however, very little use in so doing, as there was very little chance of your ever getting it, our friends the beloochees, kaukers, &c., having made free with nearly every mail, and destroyed them. i am very much afraid that i also have been a sufferer by them, and that you must have written to me long ere this, but that our friends of the bolan pass have made use of the letter to wrap their cabobs in. i have not heard from you or from home at all since the nd of february, when i got your letter, dated november th, enclosing the bill on government, and informing me of kate's intended marriage. i have, however, long since this heard of my lieutenancy, and seen my name in the "gazette," but have not yet received the confirmation of it from sir h. fane in this country, so that i have been fighting my way, and am likely to continue so, on the rank and pay of a full ensign; however, there will be so much the more back pay to receive when it does come; it is a great nuisance, however, not having it, as i require it so much in this country. you can form no conception of the hopeless expense which we have inevitably been obliged to incur. we have had a tolerable share of hardships, &c., and the poor marching soldiers have suffered terribly. what do you think of our having made a forced march of thirty to forty miles, for six hours of it under the hottest sun i can recollect, and i have felt a few of them in india? since we left larkhanu we have met with little but a series of robberies, murders, alarms, and skirmishes; in short, everything but an actual stand-up fight, which we were all anxious for, as it would settle matters at once, and free us from the predatory attacks and cold-blooded murders of these barbarous tribes. to begin from where i left off: we marched from larkhanu on the th march, and reached dadur, about four miles from the entrance to the bolan pass, the nest of the robber hordes of kaukers, tuckers, and beloochees, on the th of april, having halted several times at intermediate places, and made some terrible marches, fifteen miles being the average distance. we often lost our way, and marched thereby a great deal further than was necessary, through bad guidance. i must tell you, however, that before leaving larkhanu, sir j. keane assumed the command of the whole army, both bengal and bombay, by which general willshire got command of the bombay division. the two bombay brigades were broken up, the grenadiers and th regiment of native infantry were sent to garrison bukkur, a tolerably strong fort on the indus, and the rd native infantry was sent to lukkur, a town on the opposite side. there also the different regiments that were to go on sent their sick, and bukkur was made a depot for supplies, medical stores, &c. the greater part of the foot and some of the horse artillery were sent there also. our regiment and the th were then made into one brigade, and marched from larkhanu, as i said before, on the th. the cavalry and horse artillery, &c., did not march for two days after, with the commander-in-chief, who took with him his pet corps; the th native infantry. they marched by a different route from ourselves on account of the scarcity of supplies in that desert country; we halted for them at kochee, which place we reached on the th about p.m., after the thirty to forty miles' march i before told you of, across the marshy desert which seems to divide sinde from cutch gundava. this march ought only to have been twenty-six miles; but owing to the stupidity of our guide we went a longer and more circuitous route, and also had the pleasure of losing our way during the night; in addition to which, on arriving at the village where it was intended to halt, our staff found out, all of a sudden, that there was not a sufficiency of water for the whole force, in consequence of which we were moved to another village (kichee) five miles further on. it was during this march that i first witnessed the effects of extreme thirst on men, however well disciplined. it was, as i have said before, the hottest day i ever felt; not a breath of air, and the sun enough to knock you down. the men were suffering dreadfully, and falling out by sections, when about eleven or twelve o'clock they caught sight of some water carriers with their mussacks full, so that they knew water could not be far off. all discipline was pitched to the devil in an instant, and the men rushed from the ranks for the water more like mad devils than anything else--nothing could stop them; the mounted officers galloped in amongst them, and threatened, but to no purpose; nothing short of cutting them down would have stopped any of them. in the midst of this, general willshire, at the head of the brigade, hearing a row and looking round, saw the greater part of the th (they being in front on this day) scampering across the country like a pack of hounds; not knowing what was the matter, he galloped up to the colonel and demanded an explanation, when, seeing what was the cause, he made the best of it, called a halt, and every one immediately rushed to the wells, the scenes at which were most ridiculous, fighting, pushing, knocking down &c. i saw one man actually lie down and wallow in a filthy ditch full of every description of dirt imaginable. we halted here about two hours, and then marched to our ground, about six or seven miles further on, the men performing this latter part of the march with great cheerfulness. we halted here two days to rest the men, and were joined by the rest of the bombay force, with the commander-in-chief. we marched again on the th, another night march about twenty miles. here we made another halt for three days, while some of the staff went on to get information of the country a-head, about which they were ignorant. all the villages we had passed through were deserted, and in some places the water was stinking. we looked back upon sinde as a paradise compared to the country we were now in. all the little grain that was supplied to the bazaars by the commissariat was sold at the most exorbitant price, yet we were obliged to buy it, and as much as we could get of it too, and lucky we thought ourselves to get any of it, even at this rate, at times, in order to feed our horses and camels, which were beginning to knock up terribly. we could not now, as we used to do in sinde, send the latter into the jungle to feed on the small brushwood, of which they were so fond, except at the risk of being robbed of them, and having the servants who looked after them murdered by the bands of beloochees who hovered about us in every direction. still, notwithstanding these annoyances, the humbugging system of conciliation was kept up, and although there was not an inhabitant to be seen, we were robbed to our faces very nearly; yet if a poor sub.'s horse or camel happened to break his ropes and strayed into a field he was immediately pounced upon by a provost-marshal and put into a sort of pound, from which he was not released except on the payment of a certain sum to be given to the owners of the field! where were they to be found? the loss of camels now was irreparable; even if there were any to be sold, the prices asked were so exorbitant that few of us youngsters, hampered as we were, could afford to purchase; loss of camels produced loss of kit, loss of kit produced loss of health, &c. yet during the whole of this march we were losing camels through robberies and fatigue, and no measures taken that we ever heard of to put a stop to it. we marched from this place on the nd, and came to a halt again at a place called kotrie, close under the hala mountains, about five miles from the gundava pass. here we (i.e., our brigade and the th light dragoons) halted for a week. sir j. keane pushed on a-head with two troops of light cavalry and the left wing of the th native infantry, in order to catch up sir willoughby cotton, who was marching in command of the main body of the bengal division. general willshire, with the staff, artillery, and cavalry, was at gundava, about eight miles from us. at this place, kotrie, which the inhabitants luckily had not deserted, we were better off in point of supplies than we had been since we left larkhanu, and there was plenty of shooting and fishing; but it was without exception the hottest place i ever was in. being close under a high range of mountains, we were perfectly screened from any cool breezes that might take it into their heads to blow from that quarter; add to this, the hills themselves, being composed of granite, or some stone of that description, attracted the sun, and reflected the heat back again on us, so that we were attacked from two sides at once. by this time we had no stronger liquor with us than tea, so that we were perfectly eligible to become members of the tea-total temperance society; our supplies in the liquor line, which we had sent on from hydrabad to larkhanu by water, not having reached the latter place in time for us to get them. in this respect the men were better off than ourselves, they having their dram or two every day. here the robbers began to be more bold, and we did not lose sight of them until we reached candahar. five mails (one of them an "overland," bringing, perhaps, letters from you or some one at home) out of six were robbed between this and shikarpoor; and news was received from sir j. keane in advance that at the entrance of the bolan pass several bodies of sepoys of shah shooja's army were lying, there having been a grand skrimmage there between the sepoys and beloochees, in which the former, being caught napping, were worsted. we stayed at this place, as i said before, a week, and started again on the st. on the morning of the nd of april, during a severe march of twenty-two miles, one of our men, a straggler, who had fallen to the rear with dysentery, was murdered by these robbers, and another man of the th cruelly wounded, but he has since recovered. they were sitting together by the side of the road, when of a sudden a party of beloochees rushed out from some low bushes, and, before either had time to rise, fired into them. adams, of the queen's, received a ball on the outside of his right thigh, passing down, and coming out at his knee on the other side, and cutting some particular vein or artery, which occasioned his death through loss of blood. the th man was hit on the right side, the ball coasting round his body, and coming out at the other side, without touching his tripes or any vital part. adams had not his firelock with him, but the th man had his, but unloaded, and, in his struggles to keep possession of it, received some desperate sabre cuts; but he has since recovered. of course he was soon overpowered, as adams could give no assistance. the beloochees then stripped them of everything, except their shirt and trowsers, and left them to their fate, till another man of the th came up, in charge of some of his company's camels, who brought in the news to camp; but the apothecary who went out was too late to save poor adams. it was gratifying to know that cunningham, with a party of his horse, having received intelligence that a party of these blackguards were encamped in a jungle, beat through it, and followed their tracks for fourteen miles, when he came upon them, and killed six and took four prisoners; cunningham having outstripped his party, killed two men himself and took another prisoner. these rascals were brought into camp, and strictly guarded, or i believe they would have been torn to pieces by the european soldiers. one of them was sworn to by the wounded th man as being one of the murderers, and we were all in great hopes of seeing the blackguards dancing the tight rope; but, instead of that, they were all brought on (except one, who being badly wounded, died on the road) to dadur, where they were given up to one of the political diplomatic gentlemen, who, it is said, actually let them go with five rupees to carry them home. fancy a beloochee's _home!_ this was carrying the conciliation principle far with a vengeance! we started again at half-past twelve, on the night of the rd--another night-march of nineteen miles. both the nights we were at this place we were alarmed by a supposed attack of beloochees; but they turned out to be nothing more than a loose horse or two of the dragoons, for which one of their camp-followers suffered, being taken for a beloochee, while running after one of the horses, and therefore cut down by a dragoon on sentry. the night we left this place was one of the most fearful i ever remember; it had been threatening all the afternoon, and about eight the simoom came on with dreadful violence, blowing for five minutes at a time, at intervals of twenty minutes or so, until we got under weigh, at half-past twelve. the wind, hot and scorching, like a blast from a furnace, rushed over the country with the violence of a hurricane, bringing with it perfect clouds of dust and sand, so that it was totally impossible to face it, except at the risk of being actually blinded or stifled. the baggage was to have gone on before us at nine o'clock, as the moon was expected to be up, but the clouds of dust, &c., completely hid her from us, and she did not shew her nose the whole night. during the blasts it was the most perfect "darkness visible" that you can imagine, and at the intervals when it ceased, the sensation of the atmosphere was more like standing before a hot fire than anything else. i had read of these things before in novels, travels, &c; i now, for the first time, experienced the reality. add to all these little annoyances, we were every moment expecting a rush of beloochees; and if they had had the pluck of a hare, they might have considerably crippled our proceedings, by rushing in and ham-stringing our camels. the darkness, the unavoidable confusion, the awkwardness of the camels themselves, all favoured them, and i expected nothing less; if they had been cossacks instead, they would have played the very devil with us altogether. at length, at half-past eleven, the baggage got off, and now for the first time with a baggage guard, consisting of a troop, or company, from each of the three regiments, together with all the irregular horse we possessed, with strict orders that any beloochees shewing themselves at all near the baggage were instantly to be cut down or bayoneted. the main body followed in another hour, with a strong rear-guard, to pick up stragglers, &c. these precautions ought to have been taken before, and poor adams would have been saved. i know very little of this march, as i remember i slept through the whole of it, until morning, on horseback, being terribly fatigued and worn out. the morning was delightfully cool, with a fresh bracing breeze from the north. you may well imagine how we enjoyed it, after the terrible relaxation of the night before. we reached our ground about seven, at a place called nonsherah. here we heard some bloody-minded reports of the beloochees, who had been plundering the artillery and left wing of the th, which were here the day before. they seemed, however, to have made a pretty good retaliation, and four beloochees' heads were stuck upon the walls of the town, in proof of the soldiers' vengeance. in consequence of there being a good baggage-guard, the beloochees made themselves tolerably scarce during this march, although the ground was very favourable for them. however, they now and then took long shots from the nullahs, &c., that were near the road, but without doing any damage. at last, a soldier, from the baggage-guard company of the th, having occasion to fall out, and going into a nullah for his purpose, unexpectedly found himself cheek by jowl with thirty of these rascals. he was knocked down, but bellowing out most lustily, his section came up, and being joined by another section of the queen's, they shot about six of them dead, and put the rest to flight, having rescued the th man. the robbers at this place were _rather_ forward, and actually walked off with some camels that were out feeding close to the rear of our encampment, in the middle of the day. they were, however, all recovered very soon by the irregulars, and those of the robbers who could not manage to escape, managed to get their heads broken by these surwars; and intelligence having been received that a whole gang, with their families, were encamped near us, a party of fourteen, and one jemadar, of the st light cavalry, were sent out, who coming unexpectedly upon them, the robbers advanced to shew fight, when the jemadar gave the word to fire, and each trooper brought down his bird. the rest immediately took to their heels, and owing to the nature of the ground (it was among the hills) effected their escape. the troopers returned to camp with the swords and shields, &c., of the fallen. from this place we marched again the next morning, and a short and easy march brought us to dadur. _june th_.--i have not been able to write much lately, as it was literally too hot to do so. we have had it from to in our tents during the day; for the last week, however, it has been getting cooler, and to-day is pleasant enough. i wished also to keep the letter open as long as i could; but now, since we march on sunday next, the th, i have not much time left, though i have a great deal more to say. i received by the mail the confirmation of my lieutenancy, by sir h. fane, from bombay. an "overland" arrived again here last night, but no letters or anything for me. i see, by the english papers, that there was a report at home that we had lost men already--the greatest lie possible. if we had lost that, we should have lost more than half the bombay army. we have not lost more than we generally do in quarters, though the men have been, terribly knocked up, and well they may be, with the horrible marches they have made. i was very much amused by the debates in parliament, with regard to our "military promenade," as some of the papers call it. i wish i could see some of their writers on an out-lying picket, with a prospect of a twenty miles' march, i rather think they would not talk so much of "promenading." the bengal army, with our cavalry, and most of the artillery, marched this morning for cabool. shah shooja goes to-morrow or next day, and we bring up the rear, as i said before, on sunday. however, we will talk of that anon, or i shall forget where i left off. on looking back, i find that i have brought the force up as far as dadur. well; we halted there till the th. the th, artillery and irregular horse, however, marched before us, on the th. while there, the rascally beloochees and kaukers kept hovering about us, and walked off with some camels and a horse or two. they generally, however, paid very dearly for them, as the cavalry that were sent after them on these occasions made a terrible example of them. while here we heard of a shocking murder at curachee. a captain hand, of the st bombay grenadier regiment, was taking his morning's ride, when, on turning a corner on the top of a hill, he unexpectedly found himself in the midst of about thirty beloochees. they talked to him very civilly, and he allowed them to get round his horse, not suspecting anything, when one rascal behind him gave him a terrible wipe on the back of his head with his sword, which knocked him off his horse, and the others rushed in, and cut him to pieces. a lieut. clarke, of the same corps, happened to be riding this way, and seeing these beloochees, asked them if they had seen a latich pass that way, meaning hand; to which they replied by a volley from their matchlocks, a ball from one of which struck clarke on the leg, and he galloped for camp as fast as he could, and fell off his horse exhausted before the quarter-guard of h.m. th regiment. a party was immediately sent out, and they found the body of poor hand horribly mutilated. a good number of these rascals have been since taken, and, i suppose, hanged; unless the conciliation principle lets these rascals off also. they belong to different bands, under different robber-chiefs, among the hills. these robber khans have strongholds on the almost inaccessible mountains that run up the whole west frontier of sinde, and divide it from beloochistan. all merchandize and travellers passing through sinde to the west of the indus are obliged to pay a sort of black mail to these khans to be allowed to pass through; but so bad is their name for treachery, ferocity, &c., that few, if any, of the traders between india and central asia go this route. they do not care a farthing for the ameers, who also secretly connive at their proceedings, in order to draw recruits from them on any emergency. well; we got the steam up again on the th, and, together with the th light dragoons, and about sixty irregulars, started for the celebrated bolan pass, with a great quantity of commissariat stores from bukkur, for the army in advance, under our charge. this celebrated pass would be the best line of communication between the countries of central asia and sinde; and as far as the pass is concerned itself, it is quite guiltless of the bad character it holds. it is merely the bed of a winter torrent, and is an easy ascent the whole way through; and during the greater part of the year quite passable for any description, of conveyance; but in consequence of the great number of robbers, from all parts of beloochistan and sinde, who infest it, no one thinks of travelling this route, unless with a very strong escort. a great number, therefore, of native merchants, &c., took advantage of the opportunities offered by the passage of it by the different divisions of our army. we had with us a native horse-dealer, who had travelled the same way down the year before, with horses for the bombay market, and, as he considered, with a sufficient escort; but they were suddenly attacked, his brother killed, and he only saved himself by the swiftness of his horse. these robbers are several degrees more savage than even their brother beloochees in the south of sinde. there are two clans of them. the kaukers and tuckers; of these, the kaukers are by far the worst. they are represented as being regular barbarians, and are even said to be cannibals, though perhaps that is a little too melodramatic. they possess few fire-arms, but roll down large pieces of rock in the narrow passes, and rush out from the small recesses of the rocks, leading god knows where, which abound in every part. they never spare any one, and cut and hack about the bodies of their victims in the most frightful manner. with all this they are the greatest cowards possible; a few determined men would be a match for the greatest odds; but the very name of kauker seems to convey terror in it to a traveller. i saw the head of one of these rascals lying about at dadur, and it was the most frightful face i ever beheld, more like a wild beast's than a human being's. on entering the pass, which we did as if expecting an enemy, with skirmishers, flanking parties, &c., we were nearly stifled by the horrible smell arising from the number of dead camels which were lying on the ground, in every degree of putrefaction. we soon, however, came to bodies of a different sort; for on the banks of a small rivulet, and in the water, most in the long reeds, some in the middle of the road, were about twenty or thirty dead sepoys and followers. they were in every kind of shape and contortion that could indicate a violent death. some were in a tolerable state of preservation, but others, again, had been sadly mauled; tripes torn out by jackals, and one or two were perfect skeletons. we kept on coming also upon an arm or a leg, or an ugly-looking skull; but the most disgusting sight was an arm and leg, protruding out of the centre of the stream, washed to the consistency of a washer-woman's hand after a hard day's washing. if you can fancy all this on a dark, sluggish-looking stream, surrounded by high and barren rocks, you may, perhaps, guess what feelings of disgust it excited in us. however, before reaching candahar we were pretty well accustomed to these sights, and got rather callous on the subject, as there was a fair sprinkling of them to be met with all the way to that town. well; we made five marches through this delightful pass, and debouched on a fine wide plain on the th. not a stick, not a particle of forage, except some high rank grass, was to be got in all this time, and we had been obliged to take on supplies for our camels and horses from dadur; so there was a new expense, and new carriage to be provided. the robbers did not attempt any attack upon us at all (though, if they had had the slightest pluck, they might have crippled us pretty considerably) except in the last march, but then we fired on them first. my company was on baggage-guard this day, which was sent on in advance of the column; and halket, seeing some of the rascals on the hills, had a crack at them with his double-barrel, which produced a reply of three shots from them; but a soldier of the company taking a beautiful aim at one of them, at a distance i am afraid to mention, and nearly knocking a fellow's head off, the rest took to their heels, and we saw no more of them. our grenadiers, however, who were bringing up the rear, had a slight skrimmage with them, and killed five or six, without any of their shots taking effect, although one man's firelock and another man's belt were cut in half by a bullet. they fired on the column which came on afterwards, and wounded one trooper of the light dragoons, and a few native followers, and killed three horses. most of us lost a deal of kit in this pass, owing to the camels' feet knocking up, from the sharpness of the stones; and the very moment the column was off the ground the rascals would be down and fighting for what was left behind. i was on rear-guard the second day's march, and the very moment we cleared the ground it was most amusing to see the rascals popping out of the holes in the rocks in every direction. on the th, we reached siriab, where we halted for one day. this was a rather pretty valley, with some fruit gardens, but the fruit not ripe. here i was taken unwell, and obliged to go on the sick-list; i had been ailing some time; the doctor, however, put me off the list again on the th; but owing to the fatigue &c. i underwent on th, in going through the ghwozhe pass, i caught a violent fever, and the next day was laid on my beam ends, and did not get round again till the middle of last month. in the ghwozhe pass our company was on baggage guard. we left our last encamping ground at a.m. on the th; we had only four miles to the pass, and the pass was five more, when we reached our new ground, so it was not more than nine miles altogether, yet it was o'clock at night before the rear-guard, bringing up the fag end of the baggage, came in. for nearly the whole of this day i was exposed to an infernally hot sun, and the stench arising from the dead cattle was really frightful. i was also literally twenty-six hours without getting a morsel to eat or a drop to drink, and but the day before on the sick-list. no wonder i was laid up! this ghwozhe pass was a great deal worse than any part of the bolan. it was nothing but a succession of the most difficult ascents and precipitous descents; the most trying kind of ground for the poor camels, who fell down in great numbers, and in some parts the path lay between two high rocks, and was only four feet wide; how the artillery got over it i cannot imagine. a handful of determined men could, i should think, defend it against an army. we were on the _qui vive_ the whole time, expecting an attack on the baggage, but we only lost a few camels. here we caught up the th and artillery, which left dadur before us. if our toils had been great, those of the th and artillery were twice as much, as it took them two days and two nights to get the guns through, and they were obliged to bivouack in the pass, and were attacked once or twice by the ghiljees; whom, however, one section or so easily drove off. i must now tell you that on leaving the bolan pass the kaukers &c. made their bows to us, but handed us at the same time over to the care of their intimate friends the ghiljees. these are a kind of half-civilized robbers, a large clan, and abound throughout the whole of afghanistan. their chief is a friend of dost mahomed. they gave us a little annoyance on the road, but whenever they did so they managed to get the worst of it. they murdered a few poor camp followers. at one place they fired on some grass-cutters belonging to the th light dragoons, after coming among them and talking with them in a friendly manner, as is their usual custom, in order to ascertain what might be the chance of an attack. a troop of that corps was immediately sent out, with nearly all the officers. some villagers who had been bringing things to our camp joined the robbers, but the th played the d--l with them, killing or wounding about forty, and only one horse belonging to the th was wounded. major daly, who commands the corps, killed four men himself with a simple bamboo hunting spear, used for killing boars. sir j. keane had fourteen of them shot that had been caught stealing camels at quittah, one march from siriab, where we left our sick: a brigade of the bengal army is quartered there. well; in spite of ghiljees, kaukers, passes, &c., we reached candahar on the th of may, having only halted two days since we left dadur,--pretty good work! we were very much disappointed in the country, which is little better than a desert, and the weather cruelly hot. i remember very little of what occurred after i was on the sick-list, except that on arriving at our ground at one place, after a march of eighteen miles, we found that the natives had destroyed the well which was to have supplied us with water,--pleasant news for a man laid up with fever; in consequence of which they made a good profit by bringing it in for sale. about as much as would fill two moderate-sized pitchers was sold for half a rupee, about d. my european servant came and begged to be allowed to drink the water in my basin with which i had just washed myself, and before i could say anything, drank down the whole of it with a zest as if it had been champagne. we reached candahar on the th, and on the th his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk was crowned, after which there was a review of all the troops that were here by his majesty, a grand "tomasha;" but such, i am told, was the unpopularity of the shah that out of the whole population of candahar very few persons were looking on, though the easterns are devoted sight-hunters. on the -- he held a levee, where every officer had the honour of making his leg to his majesty. i was not present at either of these grand occasions, being at the time still on the sick-list. i, however, had a glimpse of his majesty the other morning as he was taking his airing. he is a fine-looking man, with a splendid black beard. i am told that he is a very accomplished man, but an exceedingly bad ruler. he has written his own life, which is said to be very interesting: i should think it must be so, as few men have experienced so many changes of fortune as he has. you will find a very good description of him, as well as of cabool and sinde, in "burnes' travels in bokhara," the present sir alexander burnes, who is second in command to macnaghten, and a great deal with the shah. i read also an excellent article on this country &c. in the last december or january number of "blackwood's magazine." another horrible murder, somewhat similar to that of capt. hand, occurred here about the middle of last month. two officers of the th lancers, inverarity and wilmer, went one day on a fishing excursion to a small river about seven miles from this; several parties had been there before on pic-nic excursions, as it was much cooler, and there were some beautiful gardens, with lots of fruit, on the banks of the stream. there is a slight hill to be crossed in getting to it, at the top of which is a cut-throat narrow pass, formed out of the rock; you must pass through it in single file, and the bottom being of rock is so slippery and rough that it is with difficulty a horse can keep his footing on it. they were returning home about half-past eight o'clock, when wilmer, being rather wrong in his stomach, got off his horse for a short time, and inverarity said he would walk to the top of the hill to look at the view by moonlight; wilmer followed in a few minutes on foot, his ghorewalla following with his horse. on coming near the top of the hill before mentioned, he was somewhat astonished at a large stone whizzing by his head, and immediately afterwards about six or seven men jumped on him out of the rocks. he had time to draw back, and received two different cuts on his walking stick, which cut it through, and slightly wounded him on the forehead. he managed to draw back from another, which was made at him with such strength that the fellow fell with the force of his own blow. wilmer then thought it as time to cut and run, and bolted as fast as he could with these chaps after him. they luckily, however, stopped to rob his and inverarity's bangies, containing their kit, which they met his servant carrying, &c. wilmer did not stop till he reached a detachment of the shah's force which is stationed there, he returned with a party from them, and on reaching the other side of the hill found poor inverarity lying on the ground dreadfully mutilated; he was not quite dead when they came up, and wilmer says he can never forget the convulsive shudder he gave on their arrival, taking them for the murderers returning to finish him. he died, however, almost immediately, merely saying, "for god's sake, look at my hands! i am afraid i am very badly wounded." thus fell another victim, as we all feel, to the conciliation principle! neither inverarity's horse nor anything of then kit has been since seen, though wilmer has recovered his horse. this will give you a pretty idea of the country we are living in. the next day there was an order out from sir j. keane, in which, after giving an account of the murder, he begged all officers never to go out into the country on sporting expeditions unless in large parties and well armed. the shah and sir john were also on the point of burning down the village near which the murder occurred, but the political department would not allow it. seven or eight men were, however, taken up, though nothing certain has been proved. they are still in chains in the town; what will be done with them i don't know. i always have my holster pipes, and pistols loaded, whenever i ride out, as there is nothing like being prepared. i have little to say of candahar, which appears to me to be just the same as every other town i have seen in the east, very dirty, &c. it stands in a tolerably fertile plain, with hills scattered all round it. it is a perfect square, each side of which is nearly a mile in length; two streets, one from north to south, the other from east to west, run through it, and bisect each other in the centre: in these are the different bazaars. the rest of the town, as it appeared to me as i rode round the walls the other day, is perfectly deserted. there are double walls to the town, entire all the way round, but i should think it could be easily taken. a great number of the inhabitants have left it on account of the dearness of provisions, occasioned by the hungry mouths of so large a force as ours, and also because, on his first arrival, the shah wished to play some of his old arbitrary acts over again. the ghiljees have been at their old tricks lately, robbing some supplies for the army, which came up by the bolan pass about a week ago, and which they followed nearly into our camp. the caravan, however, was under the charge of a right sort of fellow, the rajah of buhawulpoor, who was bringing up a contingent to the shah's force, and if any of his camels were taken away he took two for one from the first village he arrived at. the ghiljees got more bold afterwards, and actually endeavoured to walk off with the camels of the bengal army, and five or six were taken prisoners by some sepoys, and one blown from a gun in the town. they, however, killed one, and severely wounded two other unarmed soldiers of h.m. th light infantry, who were out with the camels of their regiment, the guard for the camels having very quietly gone to sleep in a house. the poor fellows made a desperate fight, defending themselves with their shoes; and one of them pulled a mounted ghiljee off his horse, but had his arm cut through before he could get the fellow's sword from him: they lost a great many camels. _june th_.--well, to-morrow we are off for cabool; i hope the country may improve as we advance. everybody speaks very highly of cabool itself--a fine climate, feet above the sea. it has been very hot the whole time we have been here. they say there is plenty of grain to be had on the road; i hope this may be true, and that we shall not have a repetition of what took place before in regard to expense. i was congratulating myself, a day or two since, on the prospect of getting my back pay, but now i hear that i shall not only be minus that, but that we are not to get any more pay for three months, owing to some mismanagement or other; consequently, we shall be obliged to get into debt, with a nice little interest to pay off. i wish, therefore, that next year you would give me credit for another l. i do not wish you to send it out to me, but that you would let me draw upon you as far as that sum, in case i should find it necessary, as this campaign has sadly crippled me. your last l. is nearly gone, and yet i have not spent a farthing that i could help: this irregular way of paying troops is very disgusting to them. the report is now that we are not likely to have any regular fighting, as it is pretty generally believed that dost mahomed has agreed to our terms; the "on dit" is, that he is at peshawur, and awaits our arrival in cabool, to give himself up to the british government. colonel wade, one of the political diplomatic line, is near peshawur with a part of runjet's army, but dost mahomed will not surrender himself to him, nor will colonel wade cross the punjab frontiers, on account of the great enmity which exists between the afghans and sikhs: however, all this is to be proved. i wish we could have one good brush with them, as we should then have plain sailing; as it is, i suppose we shall be annoyed by these rascally ghiljees all the way up: out-lying pickets to take care of camels, &c. with regard to the climate of this country i can say little, as we have only been here during the hot weather, and hot we have found it with a vengeance; but then we have been living in tents. one man of ours has died by a coup de soleil; he was one of the camel guard. i do not consider the climate an unhealthy one. it is a very lucky thing for us that we were not left in sinde: the troops left there have suffered terribly. sinde is one of the hottest places in the world, and very unhealthy; in fact, i consider it to be about one of the most disgusting countries in the world. the th regiment lost an officer there under very melancholy circumstances. he was coming up to join his regiment, having been only lately appointed to it, and lost his way in that dreadful desert i told you of, where he wandered in a wretched state for two days, during which time the simoom came on, and he died from its effects a short time after reaching his tent; the simoom was still so violent that his servants were obliged to dig his grave inside his tent: his body turned black immediately after death. we have had excellent european fruit here, and the gardens about the place are very large and beautiful--peaches, apricots, cherries, apples, grapes, and mulberries. i never tasted anything more delicious than the melons here. you cannot imagine, in your temperate climate, how refreshing they are on a hot day; but, then, they are said to be very dangerous. the vegetables, too, are good, particularly to those who had been without them so long as we had. there are peas, beans, salad, cucumber, but, unfortunately, no potatoes; what would we not give for a nice mealy murphy! we have not tasted one for four months; however, in all these respects cabool is much superior. what we shall do when we reach that place i cannot imagine,--one thing, the hindoo koosh, prevents our marching further. the report is, that if everything goes smooth we shall go back again this year; but this i do not believe, as i hardly think it probable that the government would be at such expense in marching us such a distance just to keep us at cabool for a month, and if we overstay that it will be too late, and the snow and severity of the climate will hinder our returning. moreover, runjet sing is very ill, and, they say, is likely to kick, in which case there will, i take it, be a regular shindy in the punjab; and john company, when he has once put his foot into a country, does not withdraw it very soon. besides, there is herat and persia to be looked to. for my part, i have no objection to a winter in cabool; and if we can only get up our supplies in the liquor line, we shall, i have no doubt, make ourselves very comfortable. the th lancers have an excellent pack of foxhounds with them, and horses are very cheap. there are to be races &c. on a grand scale also when we get there; and if we can get our supplies up by that time, we may look forward to spending a merry christmas even in such a distant country. how curious all this must sound to you in your quiet, lovely home of brookhill. i have often thought of you all during this campaign, particularly the other day, when i had the fever; and i hope and trust my life maybe spared that i may see you all once more, particularly as i have never seen you at brookhill. with regard to myself, my health, with the exception of the fever, has been much better than i could have expected, considering what we have gone through. i have, however, been sadly bothered the whole time i have been in the country with rheumatism; at times, during the march, i was so bad with it that i could not walk ten minutes at a time. i have also had terrible pains in the joints of my arms, and have them still, and it is with difficulty i can get a gun to my shoulder. i can walk pretty well now, but running is totally out of the question; so that i am afraid i should come off poorly in a hand-to-hand encounter with these rascals. i applied to the doctor for some medicine, but he said "he could give me none;" in fact, they will not give an officer any medicine now unless he is very seriously ill, as they are very short of medical stores. i hope you may be able to get through this letter; the blue paper i have been writing on is russian, and bought in candahar. i do not think i have anything more to say. i will write again when i reach cabool. tell kate i will write to her too: i hope she got my letter which i wrote in january last under cover to you. with best love to all at home, believe me your very affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. p.s.--by-the-bye, there is an officer here in h.m. th light infantry, with the bengal force, who knows arthur very well, in fact, i think a great deal better than i do myself. his name is wood; he is a canterbury man, and seems to know mr. baylay and everybody else there. he was in the th when arthur was at canterbury with the th drag. guards. he desired to be kindly remembered to arthur when i wrote. i hope eliza's hooping-cough is well. i was very sorry to hear of poor sluman's death: as far back as i can recollect he is always associated in my mind with home. i hope ghiljee, kauker, beloochee, and co., will let this pass. letter viii. camp, near ghuzni, july th, . my dear father,--you must put down yesterday, the rd of july, in your memorandum book as a memorable day for your son tom, and, i may say, for the british army. ghuzni, the strongest fortress in afghanistan, was taken by assault in three-quarters of an hour, by the four european regiments of the army--viz., the queen's, th light infantry, th regiment, and bengal european regiment. the storming party, or forlorn hope, consisted of the light companies of the four regiments. the whole right in front--ergo, our company (the light company of the queen's) was the first in. i may well remember it, as it was the first time i smelt gunpowder and saw blows given in real earnest. it is the most splendid thing for us that could have happened: if we had failed, we should have had the whole country down upon us in a few days; now, they say, the country is ours. it is reported that sir j. keane was so very anxious about it, that when he heard our first cheers, after entering the gate of the town, he actually cried, it was such a relief to his mind; and that he told brigadier sale, lieutenant-colonel of the th light infantry, who commanded on the occasion, that it was very likely that the fate of india depended on our taking this place. ghuzni was considered dost mahomed's principal fortress; his son commanded in it, and it was garrisoned by afghans. young dost expected to hold it out for a fortnight; and his father was to have come to his relief in a day or two, when we should have had a difficult part to perform, as we should have been surrounded in this valley by armed parties on all sides; so that it would have been really a ticklish job. they had collected provisions in the town for three months, and arms and ammunition; in fact, it was the regular depôt for their army. they had also about four or five lacs of rupees; but that will not give us much prize money. our loss was very trifling, owing to the daring and sudden nature of the attack, as they were taken totally by surprise. our regiment suffered the most, and we have thirty-seven killed and wounded, including officers, of whom six out of eighteen were wounded--one-third of the whole,--however, none of the latter dangerously, thank god, though two of them are returned severely wounded. five men of our regiment were killed outright on the spot, and i am afraid we shall lose some more in a few days from the effects of their wounds. of the enemy, about were killed, and more than made prisoners; and of the remainder, who made their escape over the walls, the greater part were cut down by the dragoons, or spifflicated by the lancers. among the prisoners is young dost himself, the greatest prize of all. more than a thousand magnificent horses have also been taken, besides pack-horses, camels, and grain in abundance. however, i never can tell a story without going back to the very commencement. i finished my last letter to you the day before we left candahar. well; we started on sunday, the th of june, and made seven marches to belanti ghiljee, where we caught up the shah's army, with a bengal division. here sir john keane had first come in sight of young dost's army, who, however, retired very quickly, though there was some talk of their holding out at this place, and we were pushed on rapidly in consequence. they shewed their sense in not holding out there, as it would not have taken us long to dislodge them. we halted here a day, and then marched on by very short and easy marches, halting every third or fourth day, and taking things very easy, although we were constantly annoyed by the ghiljees, who murdered several of our camp followers, and tried to rob us whenever they could find an opportunity, until we were within five good marches of ghuzni, when general willshire received an order to push on by forced marches, and to make these five into three. after making two out of these three, (and precious long ones they were,) we found out that we were still upwards of twenty miles from ghuzni, with the men so fatigued that it was nearly impossible for them to do it, and that we should therefore be obliged to make two of it. the event, however, proved the contrary; for, about seven o'clock in the evening, a dispatch came from general willshire, and about eight, just as we were preparing to turn in, the orders were out to strike our tents, and march in an hour's time, and catch up sir john keane and the shah, who were halted about nine miles in advance of us. sir john was anxious to have the whole force concentrated before marching on ghuzni. nothing, however, was certain; and we were all in a high state of excitement, not knowing what to expect: this was the evening of the th. we made quick work of this march, and reached sir john keane about half-past twelve. here we heard that sir john keane was in expectation of a night attack. he had fallen in that morning with the advance of the enemy, who had, however, upon the appearance of the british force, retired upon ghuzni. we bivouacked on our ground, after throwing out strong pickets, and marched again at a.m., sir john keane, the bengalees, and cavalry in advance, then the shah, and then our small party. we, however, sent our artillery to join sir john. about eight o'clock, when within about three miles of ghuzni, we heard the first symptoms that the game of war was beginning: our batteries were firing on the place, and the garrison were returning it with good effect; it served as a sort of overture to the opera in which we knew we must soon be actors. in consequence of the great quantity of baggage, now the whole army was joined, we were halted for a couple of hours to protect it, and the whole of the cavalry was sent back for that purpose; and well it was that they were, as a part of the enemy's cavalry made a demonstration for attacking it, but withdrew on seeing ours. we were at length marched on, and took up our ground a little to the s.w. of the fort, but out of harm's way, when we heard a more definite account of what had been done. the advance of the bengal column, h.m. th light infantry and the th native infantry, had some little work in driving the enemy out of the gardens and old buildings that surround the town. this, however, they accomplished with a trifling loss; our guns then opened on the place, but as they were light ones (the heaviest being still in the rear), with little effect. this desultory fire on both sides was, however, kept up for about three hours: little execution being done, and a few casualties having occurred among the artillery, sir john keane ordered the guns to be withdrawn. we had not been on our ground more than three hours when we were ordered once more on the march, and to march by a circuitous route across the mountains, in order to avoid the fire of the town, and take up our ground on the other side of it. we reached our new ground about nine, after a fatiguing march of seven miles, crossing the river, and, by an infernal path, through the hills. here we bivouacked again for the night, as little of our baggage had arrived. the enemy took this move of ours as a defeat, and concluded that we had marched on to cabool, despairing of taking their fort: the event proved how wofully they were mistaken! they wasted a good deal of powder in firing for joy, and young dost sent a dispatch from the place to his father, apprizing him of the fact, and begging him to come down upon us immediately, while he would follow upon our rear. he also sent to a ghiljee chieftain near us, telling him to collect as many followers and country people as he could to make an attack upon our baggage, as he had only to come down and take it. we sold this fellow a bargain, however, the next day. well; the first thing we heard the next morning was from young keane, and to this effect, that we were to rest for that day, and that the four european corps were to storm the place the next morning before daylight, as the state of the country was such that sir john could not waste time in breaching it; and, moreover, it was doubtful whether, from the nature of the walls, it could be breached at all. we did not, however, learn the final dispositions till the evening. that day, the nd, i shall never forget; it was a very dismal one; much more so than the next. there was a nervous irritability and excitement about us the whole day; constantly looking at the place through spy-glasses, &c.; and then fellows began to make their wills, and tell each other what they wished to have done in case they fell; altogether it was not at all pleasant, and every one longed most heartily for the morrow, and to have it over. i felt as i used to do when i was a child, and knew i must take a black dose or have a tooth drawn the next morning. about twelve o'clock a great deal of firing took place on our left; this we soon ascertained to be the ghiljee chief i have before mentioned, coming down with the amiable purpose of lootzing our camp. a part of the shah's afghan cavalry, a few guns of the horse artillery, and a squadron of lancers, were ordered out, who soon sent them to the right-about. the chief, when he saw that it was not such an easy job as he expected, cut his stick the first, with his horsemen, about , leaving the poor footpads, about , to shift for themselves. they were terribly mauled, and a great number of prisoners taken, whose heads the shah struck off immediately. well; evening came at last! and then we heard the morning's news confirmed; that the light companies of the four corps were to form the storming party, that an engineer officer, with some sappers, each carrying a bag of gunpowder (in all lbs.), was to advance to the cabool gate, and place it there, in order to blow it down; that immediately upon the gates falling we were to rush in and take possession of the town, &c. at the same time a false attack was to be made by the th bengal native infantry on the candahar gate, in order to divert the enemy's attention. brigadier sale, lieut.-colonel of the th, was to command the whole, and col. dennie, of the same corps, the storming party. three regiments of native infantry were to be in reserve, under sir willoughby cotton; and the cavalry were to be stationed so as best to intercept the flight of those who might manage to make their escape from the place. we were to be formed ready for the attack at two o'clock in the morning, close to a high pillar, about half a mile from the fort; we were to advance under cover of the artillery, who were to fire over and clear the walls for us. i laid down in my cloak directly after mess, and, being dreadfully tired, never slept more soundly than i did the night before the storming of ghuzni. at one o'clock we turned out; i took a cup of tea and a couple of ginger biscuits, and joined my company: in a quarter of an hour we were on our march to the pillar, where we were to be formed. here we found col. sale and the engineer officers, &c. col. sale called out the officers, and told them the plan of the attack, which was to be the same as mentioned before, except that the th light infantry were to line the ditch outside the town, and fire on the ramparts, while we advanced. the storming party, queen's and bengal european regiments, were, after entering the gate, to move along a street to the left, clearing the houses, &c., and on arriving at the end to mount the ramparts, and to return by them. our object in doing this was to drive as many men as possible into the citadel, and having obtained this object, a signal was to be given, and the artillery were to fire shells into the citadel, which, particularly as their powder magazine was there, it was expected would soon make them cut and run. the th and th regiments being nearest, were then to rush up and take possession of the citadel, and the native regiments, being in reserve, were to assist them. col. sale then said a few words of encouragement, and concluded by hoping "we should all have luck"--on the whole a very neat and appropriate speech. we then piled arms, and officers fell out. i never saw fellows more merry than most of us were while we were waiting there; in fact, if we had been going to the most delightful place in the world, we could not have appeared in better spirits; and this put me strongly in mind of a scene i had read in a book called "the subaltern," where the feelings of the officers, waiting for an attack, are described as being just the same. at length, "bang" went a gun from our batteries. col. sale said, "ah, there goes the signal; we had better be starting:" just as if one was to get ready to take a ride to brixham or elsewhere. well; we fell in, and in about a quarter of an hour off we went. the enemy returned the fire from our batteries in good style, and there was a regular row. they pointed their "long tom," a fifty-two pounder, towards us, and sent the shot over our heads and a little to our left. the ball made a terrific row rushing over us. whilst we were marching down to the attack the fire on both sides was at its height. the noise was fearful, and the whole scene the grandest and, at the same time, the most awful i ever witnessed. i caught myself, once or twice, trying to make myself as small as i could. as we got nearer the gate it grew worse, and the enemy, from their loop-holes, began to pepper us with matchlocks and arrows. the scene now was splendid. the enemy, at the commencement of the firing, threw out blue lights in several places, which looked beautiful, and the flames of their and our artillery, together with the smaller flashes from the matchlock men, added to the roar of their big guns, the sharp cracking of the matchlocks, the whizzing of their cannon balls and ours, (the latter of which, by-the-bye, went much nearer our heads than the enemy's, as our artillery fired beautifully, and sent their shot close over our heads, on the ramparts,) the singing of the bullets, and the whizzing of their arrows, all combined, made up as pretty a little row as one would wish to hear. add to this, that it was as dark as pitch, and you may judge of the effect. we made a rush over the bridge, which the enemy had not destroyed, and continuing it up a slight ascent, we found ourselves of a sudden close to the gate. here there was a check. although the gate was blown down, still the remains of it, and the barricade on the inside, rendered it a difficult place to get over, particularly as it wanted at least half an hour of daylight, and was perfectly dark. the two first sections were therefore a long time getting through, during which the two last, to which i belonged, were standing still outside, exposed to a cross fire from two round towers, which flanked the entrance. our men, however, kept up such a smart fire upon every hole and opening that no man dared shew his nose, and their fire was therefore rendered harmless. at length we moved in, and found that, besides what i have mentioned above, there was a large hole in the roof of the portico over the gate, through which the enemy were pitching earth, beams of wood, stones, &c.; one of these beams knocked over my european servant, who was next to me, and dislocated his arm, and, taking me in the flank, made me bite the dust also; however, i had no further hurt than a slight bruise, and was up again immediately, as i heard one of the soldiers say, "oh! there is poor mr. holdsworth: he's down!" on getting within the gate a few volleys cleared the opening of the street. robinson, (our captain,) col. sale, with kershaw and wood of the th, sale's staff, (the latter the man who knew arthur at canterbury,) were the first in. poor col. sale got a cut in the mouth, and fell upon kershaw, who went down with him; on rising, an afghan was lifting his sword to cut down sale when kershaw seized the hilt of his sword, and ran his own into him. robinson also got a terrible cut on the side of his head, which would have done his business for him if he had not had on a cap padded with cotton, which deadened the weight of the blow. all the companies of the storming party, however, got in well, except the last, the light company of the bengal european regiment, and they had a desperate fight, the enemy having returned to the gate in great numbers, and twenty-seven men of the company were laid low in no time. after this every company that came in had a shindy at the gate; the fact was, that the enemy took every company for the last, and therefore made a desperate attempt to escape through it. our company, with the advance, pushed through the town, clearing the tops of the houses. we only lost one man of our company; we thought he was done for at first, but he is still alive, and, i am glad to say, likely lo do well; he was shot right through the breastplate, and the ball went round his body and was taken out of his back; he is to wear the same breastplate in future. on coming to the end of the town we halted, and were agreeably surprised, shortly after, to see the british flag waving on the top of the citadel: the fact of the matter was, that the enemy never thought of retiring to the citadel at all, but endeavoured to make their escape directly they found we were inside the gates; the th and th, therefore, quietly marched up and took possession of it. we now returned by the ramparts, taking a great number of prisoners, and on reaching the large street where the horses were, the scene was perfectly ridiculous; the horses were loose, and running and charging about in all directions, kicking, fighting, &c. on getting near the gate we entered by, the effects of our fight became more apparent, as dying and dead afghans testified. there were eight lying at one particular spot, where a tumbril had blown up, and their bodies were still burning from the effects. i never saw finer men than some of these afghans--they were perfect models. the plunder now began, though to little purpose, as prize agents were at the gates and made most of us refund. i managed, however, to get through a rather handsome spear, which i took from before the tent of one of the chiefs. if the carelessness of my servants will allow it i mean to keep it till we get back whenever that may be, and send it home by some trusty person, when perhaps you may think it worthy of a place among your curiosities at brookhill. the th and th, however, had the best of it in the citadel, which was also the palace, and where all young dost's women were. i hear that the soldiers have possession of some very handsome articles which they boned there i believe. after this, young dost, or, to give him his right name, hyder khan, was found in a large hole near the citadel, with about twenty followers; they had some work, however, in securing him. about this time i saw the shah, with the diplomatic people, sir j. keane, and sir w. cotton, enter the fort and proceed to the citadel. the old shah was mightily delighted, as well he might be, and expressed himself in raptures with the european soldiery. i was back again to breakfast at mess by eight o'clock. several of our men were wounded by arrows. one soldier swore "that a fellow had shot his ramrod into him." stisted had an arrow through the calf of his leg, but his wound is not considered of any importance. _july th_.--sir j. keane, with the greater part of the army, marched this morning for cabool; ours (the bombay division) march to-morrow. although the greater part of the town was taken in the way i have described, still a party of about men, under dost mahomed's standard-bearer, (a great man, of course,) held out till the next day, when they were all taken, and soon afterwards shot. they certainly must have been assisted by some europeans, as their powder was made up in a very scientific manner, and their grape was exceedingly well put together. young dost cannot imagine how the gate was blown down; he thinks, i hear, that we shot two men inside the fort from a big gun, who opened the door for us. he was sleeping over it at the time; the explosion must have "astonished him a few, i guess." he says some of his father's best soldiers have fallen there; and one man in particular, a great chief, said to be the best swordsman between cabool and candahar. i have been in the fort since, and i am glad we took it in the dark, as it is not at all a nice looking place by daylight. the rooms in the citadel are very fine, particularly where the women were, the ceilings of which are inlaid with gold work. all our sick and wounded are to be left here: we only leave one officer behind, poor young, who was shot through the thigh very near the groin. reports have been very various since the fall of ghuzni whether dost himself will fight or not. it seems to be generally expected that we shall have another shindy before we get to cabool, though a great number of chiefs have lately come in to the shah, among the principal of whom is hadjee khan kauker, the governor of bamian, a man of great influence in the country, and a great intriguer, formerly a great friend of dost mahomed's. he came in to us about three hours after the place had fallen: he had been waiting on the top of a hill to see the result, and was prepared to join whichever side was victorious. i must tell you, also, that on the st, the day we marched upon ghuzni, another son of dost was waiting outside the town to attack us with about three thousand men; but on seeing the size of our army he thought better of it, and cut for cabool as fast as he could; he was deserted on the way by most of his army, and reached cabool with scarcely a follower: his father was exceedingly enraged, and is said to have put him in prison. _sunday, th_.--the day before yesterday, dost mahomed's brother, a man who has always favoured the english, and advised dost to have nothing to do with the persians, &c., but who lives quite retired, and has very little to do with politics, came into our camp to endeavour to make terms for his brother; but, it is said, neither party was satisfied: they say that he was disgusted at our proposals, and replied, "that dost would rather lose his life than accept them." dost wants to be made the shah's vizier; but that, of course, could not be allowed. how it will end no one knows: however, a few days will shew. we have had several deserters from dost's army; they say he is encamped, and has thrown up strong entrenchments about three miles in front of cabool. i should hardly, however, think that the people of cabool will allow his doing so, as there are several rich people in it who would not like to see ghuzni reacted at their own door. there would be lots of prize money for us. talking of prize money, i am afraid there will not be very much, though the things that were taken sold remarkably well, as did also the horses, &c. i managed to buy, though for much beyond its value, a rather pretty coverlet for a bed, which was taken in the fort, which perhaps belonged to some of the young ladies of the harem; it is of shawl velvet, and said to be made in cashmere. i intend to send it home with the spear, and give it to kate; though what use she can put it to i hardly know, as i am sure it will not be large enough for her bed; still, when one considers whence it was taken, it may possess some little interest. young dost is left behind in the fort, which is to be strongly garrisoned, and where we leave all our sick and wounded. the climate of this place is delightful; it is about feet above the level of the sea; and although this is the hottest month in the year, still we do not find it at all unpleasant, living in tents: a delightful change from candahar. there is the most beautiful clover here i ever saw, and lots of fruit. we have just received intelligence of runjet sing's death; he has been reported dead several times before; but they say this time it is really the case; if so, we are still only at the beginning of our work, as we shall most likely have something to do in the punjab. the government, it is said, have guaranteed the succession of runjet's son, who is little better than a natural idiot. the chiefs of the sikhs, who are very warlike people, and have often licked the afghans, say they will not consent to be ruled by such a person,--thereon hangs the matter. a large force has been gradually concentrating at delhi, meerut, loodiana, and all the north-west stations in bengal, ready to march into the punjab in case of runjet's death, which has been long expected; and we very likely shall make an advance by the line of the cabool river to peshawur, and attock, on the indus. it is rather late to begin a campaign after marching more than a thousand miles, and not meeting an enemy except robbers. if i ever do get home safe and sound after all this work, i shall consider myself very lucky. _july st_.--here we are, our first day's march to cabool. reports still flying about as to whether dost means to fight. i wore the pistols you gave me in london at the storming,--they are a capital pair! the post goes directly, so i must conclude, with best love to all, your very affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. p.s.--they say shah shooja will give us all medals when everything is settled; those for the officers to be a small gold one, with an impression of the fort of ghuzni; those for the soldiers to be silver, and the same pattern. if you look into the military papers when this reaches you, i dare say you will find further accounts of the business. note.--"it was arranged that an explosion party, consisting of three officers of engineers (capt. peat, lieuts. durand and m'leod), three serjeants and eighteen men of the sappers in working dresses, carrying three hundred pounds of powder in twelve sand bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long, should be ready to move down to the gateway at break of day. "so quickly was the operation performed, and so little was the enemy aware of the nature of it, that not a man of the party was hurt."--_from memoranda of capt. thompson, r.e., chief engineer, army of indus_. letter ix. memorandum.--i have lost this letter, which i regret the more, because it gave a very full account both, of cabool and its environs, as well as of many interesting circumstances which took place during the time the bombay division of the army remained there. as far as i remember its contents, it began with the march of the army from ghuzni to cabool, the desertion of the troops of dost mahomed, and his flight from the capital. it described his pursuit by a party of officers and cavalry, volunteers from the british army, commanded by captain outram, who accompanied hadjee khan kauker, the principal chief of the country, with a body of afghans, who had joined shah shooja at ghuzni. it stated, that after a few days had expired, the party had nearly reached the fugitive, when hadjee khan refused to proceed, stating, amongst other excuses, that his men had dispersed to plunder, and that he had not any means of preventing it; and captain outram was obliged to proceed without him. it had been supposed by shah shooja, that hadjee khan had been so committed with dost mahomed that he might be safely trusted upon this occasion; but there is not the least doubt but that he was engaged in correspondence with him during the whole time, and that dost mahomed was thus enabled to effect his escape with his family, although captain outram with his party pursued him as far as bamian. if hadjee khan had not acted in this most treacherous way, there could not be a doubt but that dost mahomed must have fallen into the hands of captain outram. thus hadjee khan proved his double treachery; for which, on his return to cabool, it was understood the shah would have put him to death, but for the presence of the english, upon whose interference his sentence was changed to perpetual confinement in one of the state prisons. it described, also, the arrival of the eldest son of shah shooja, with the contingent from runjet sing; his meeting with his youngest brother on the road, near the city, who went out for that purpose upon an elephant, richly caparisoned, attended by a suitable cortège; his reception by the british army, and afterwards by his father, at the bala hissar, where my son mixed with the troops of the shah, who filled the palace yard, and was thus enabled to witness the first interview, which was anything but that which might have been expected when the eldest son arrived at the palace to congratulate his father on his restoration to his throne. the king was seated alone in an open balcony, slightly raised above the court, where his officers of state were ranged on either side, on the ground. the prince advanced through a line of troops and public officers, but did not raise his eyes from the ground. when he came near his father, he prostrated himself in submission to the king, who called to him "that he was welcome;" after which the son ascended to the balcony, where he again made a prostration, when his father raised him up, and seated him near him. the peculiarly careful conduct of the son on his approach appears to have arisen from a consciousness of his father's jealous and suspicious temper, and a fear lest even a smile interchanged with a friend at the court might be construed into hidden treachery. soon after this, the chief persons of the court made their salutations to the king, to each of whom he said a few words, and the ceremony was ended. my son added, that he little expected when he was at the levee of his late majesty king william, before he left england, that the next ceremony of the sort at which he should be present would be that of the king of afghanistan, in central asia, a person with whose name and country he had not then the slightest acquaintance. the youngest son of shah shooja, whom i have mentioned, is described as a beautiful boy, under twelve years of age, ruddy and fair as an english child. he is a great favourite with his father at present, and usually accompanies the shah wherever he goes. his childhood probably protects him from suspicion of treachery or intrigue. my son appeared to have mixed occasionally with the inhabitants of cabool, and, through the introduction of the persian interpreter, to have become personally acquainted with some of the leading persons of the city. they are described by him as being particularly affable and civil to the officers of our army, with, some of whom he paid a visit to a man of rank, at his country-house, and with whom they dined. nothing could exceed the attention of their host. he shewed them his stud consisting of more than fifty horses, and every other thing that he possessed, (except his women,) and the hospitality and good fare was unbounded. neither was the curiosity of these persons less in inquiring minutely into everything they saw when they visited the officers in the camp, than their desire to please in their own houses; and he appeared to have left the place with a most favourable impression of the upper ranks of the city. of the city itself, its magnificent bazaar, filled with the richest manufactures of the east, its gardens abounding with the finest fruits in the world, and the fertile country that surrounds it, his description is the same as that which will be found much more at length in the travels of lieut. burnes, in . cricket and horse-racing appeared to be the chief recreation of the army during the time it remained inactive; and the two divisions having fortunately come from different presidencies, the same spirit of rivalry amongst the officers, in the sports of the camp, was as naturally excited at cabool as in any of the counties or garrisons of their native land. the evening before they left their ground, two miles from cabool, he was sent with a subaltern's party to search through all the worst parts of the city for men who were missing from the camp, but after spending many hours, he returned without finding any. they had been paid the day before, and had got away to the liquor-shops; but all turned up in the morning except one, whose body was found murdered, near the camp. a.h. holdsworth. letter x. camp at kotree, in cutch gundava, december th, . my dear father--as i am now tolerably recovered and my wounds nearly healed, i take the first opportunity (as my arm is losing its stiffness) of writing to you, as i have no doubt you will be very anxious to hear how i am going on. i desired stisted, the day after the taking of kelat, to write, as i was myself then unable. i have no doubt but that he did so; yet i know you must have been anxious before you heard the final result; and i am now happy to inform you that i am getting rapidly well, and expect in a short time to be out of the "sick list." my wound was esteemed a rather ugly one at first; and i must consider it one of the most fortunate cases of providence that the bullet took the direction it did, as had it swerved in the least degree it must have gone through my lungs, or downward through my liver; and in either case would most likely have done my business completely. as the man who fired at me was so very close, the ball went clear through, and so saved me from the unpleasant process of having it extracted by the doctor, &c. i had my right flank exposed to the man who pinked me, and so the ball passed through my right arm into my right side, and passing downwards to the rear, came out at my back, about an inch from the back-bone. had it passed to the front instead of to the rear, i should have most assuredly left my bones at kelat: as it was, from my coughing up a tolerable quantity of blood when i was first hit, the doctor imagined that my lungs had been affected, and for a couple of days, as i have since heard, was very doubtful as to my eventual recovery. however i may now, i believe, consider myself completely out of the wood. i find i have not written since the last day i was at cabool; and i have had few opportunities of doing so, as we have been on the move ever since, and until we reached kelat there was very little to write about. we broke ground and marched to the other side of cabool on monday, the th of september, and halted on the th for a grand tomasha at the bala hissar, or shah's palace, being no less than the investiture of the order of the doorannee pearl, which was conferred by shah shooja on the big-wigs of the army. sir john keane, sir willoughby cotton, and mr. macnaghten get the first order; generals of divisions and brigadiers, the second; and all field officers engaged at ghuzni and heads of departments, the third; for the rest, all officers engaged at ghuzni get a gold medal, and the soldiers a silver one: however, all this depends on the will and sanction of queen victoria. on wednesday, the th, we took our final leave of cabool and its beautiful environs, and reached ghuzni on the th, where we halted two days, and then struck off in a new direction, straight across country to quettah, by a new road, and very little known, leaving candahar to our right, and thereby cutting off a considerable angle. our object in doing this was, besides saving distance, to afford assistance, if required, to captain outram, who had preceded us by about a week, and was gone with some of the shah's force into the ghiljee country, and was employed in destroying the forts, &c., of some of the refractory ghiljee chiefs. he captured one fort in which were found forty or fifty fellows who were identified as being the same men who had murdered so many camp followers and some of our officers during our march through the country. i saw them at ghuzni, where they were under confinement, and about to be executed in a few days, as i was told. about eight marches from ghuzni, outram sent to general willshire for assistance, as his force was not sufficient; he was then before the largest of these hill forts, belonging to one of the most influential and refractory of the chiefs, and who had given us a great deal of annoyance in our way up. a wing of the th native infantry, some artillery, and the light companies were therefore sent to his assistance; but they made a miserable failure as the chief, putting himself at the head of about a hundred faithful followers, dashed through their pickets at night, and made his escape with all his valuables, and without losing a man. we marched at an easy pace, detaching a force now and then to take a fort, which was invariably found, deserted on our approach. nevertheless, we had hard work of it, as our route lay through and over high and barren mountains with scarcely an inhabitant or village to be seen, and nothing to be got for our cattle. for three days my horse, and those of most of us, lived on bushes and rank grass that we found occasionally. we had to depend on our commissariat for everything; and they found it difficult to supply grain for the staff and field officers' horses, so, of course, ours were quite left out of the question. guns, powder, and shot were in great requisition; and, luckily, hares and khorassan partridges were tolerably abundant. at times, even our guides confessed themselves at fault, so difficult was it to make our way through such a country. however, one thing was greatly in our favour--we had a splendid, bracing climate the whole way, the nights and mornings being "_rayther_" too cold, the thermometer ranging at that time between and degrees. the poor sepoys and camp-followers, however, suffered severely. we experienced scarcely the slightest annoyance from the inhabitants although we passed through the most disaffected part of the country--viz., the ghiljee country, and latterly through the heart of the kauker country, whose chief, hadjee khan kauker, is a prisoner at cabool, as i told you in my former letter. at length, on the st of october, we reached quettah, where we were delighted to find a few parsee merchants, who had come up from bombay, and from whom we were enabled to get a few european comforts, in the shape of brandy, gin, wine, tea, pickles, &c., which we had long been without; even milk and butter were luxuries to us. general willshire now ordered the st bengal native infantry, which had been left here in our march up, together with h.m. th, and a small detail of artillery, to proceed to kelat, under colonel baumgardt, our brigadier. the st were to garrison it; and the th were sent because mehrab khan, the kelat chief, had declared that "he would not surrender to any but european troops, and see the sepoys d--d first, if they came alone." however, no resistance was expected, as mehrab had been offered very liberal terms, which he had apparently accepted. the rest of the force was to go down by the bolan pass, and wait at bukkur, or somewhere in upper sinde, till joined by the th. however, the next day a new order came out, and the queen's, together with a stronger detail of artillery, were ordered to reinforce the detachment to kelat. well; we marched on the th of november; and the next day, after we had readied our ground, when we had just sat down to breakfast, great was our surprise to see general willshire himself ride into camp with a few of his staff. all we could learn on the subject was, that on that morning, which was the day fixed for the rest of the division to begin their march down the bolan pass, and just as they were about to start, the general sent for his adjutant and quarter-master-general, and, taking them and his aides with him, started for our camp. things now looked a little more warlike; still we experienced no annoyance during the whole march; few of us but thought that on our approach mehrab khan would give in. we halted a day at mostrong, which was about half way, and here general willshire and the political agent communicated with the khan, who replied, that "as to the terms, he was willing to meet general willshire half way, with a small escort, and there talk them over; but that if we advanced against him with an army, he should shut his gates, and we should find him at the door of his citadel with his drawn sword." there was "no mistake about that 'ere," as sam weller would say. however, most of us thought it was merely bravado, as our progress was not molested at all; this, however, was afterwards accounted for by the khan's having called in all his fighting-men to his standard. the last three days before arriving at kelat we marched in order of battle, and had strong pickets at night, the whole force sleeping on their arms, and ready to fall in at a moment's notice. on the th we were within eight miles of the fort; and on our arriving on our ground a few horsemen were observed reconnoitring us, who fired on our advance, but retired leisurely on the approach of the column. by that hour the next day "kelat was prize money." we strongly expected to be attacked that night, and were all ready for a shindy; the artillery loaded with grape, and port-fires lighted, &c. however, it passed over very quietly; but we had hardly marched a mile from our encampment the next morning, when, in an opening through the hill to our right, we observed a large cloud of dust, which we soon discovered to be raised by a strong body of horsemen. they were about a mile and a half from our flank, and kept moving on in a parallel line with our column. however, at a point where the road took a turn towards the hills they halted, at about yards from the advance guard, and deliberately fired into them with their matchlocks, but at too great a distance to do much harm. one company from the advance was sent to dislodge them; upon which they moved quickly down towards the main body, and taking up a position at about the same distance from us as before from the advance, gave us the same salute as they had before treated those in front to. their balls came whistling in upon us on all sides, and knocked up the dust like drops of rain, but no damage was done; they then galloped off. it was a great pity we had no more cavalry with us; only fifty bengal, or irregular horse, and their cattle were so done up that they were perfectly useless. the enemy laughed at the advance companies that were now sent out to skirmish with them. the ground consisted of undulating hills, and rather rough, over which our skirmishers, encumbered as they were with knapsacks and other absurdities, "selon les regles," found it very difficult to move quickly, and the enemy, riding their sure-footed horses to the top of one of those hills, would fire down, and wheel round, and be under cover of the other side of the hill before our men could return the compliment effectually. if we had had a squadron of dragoons with us, lightly equipped, the result would have been very different. but, unfortunately, the only time during nearly the whole campaign when cavalry would have been of important service to us we were without them. however, very little blood is ever shed in desultory affairs of this sort, and they only wounded about three or four of our men; and at one place, a party of them coming unexpectedly upon the reserve of the skirmishers, two sections opened a fire upon them, emptied a few saddles, and sent the rest flying. we with the main body had a very good view of the whole affair, and a very animating scene it was. our road had hitherto lain through a valley, about four miles broad; but when within about three miles and a half from kelat, it takes a sudden turn to the right, and leads, for the next mile and a half, through a narrow and straight pass, after penetrating which, and arriving at the debouche, the fortress of kelat appeared before us, frowning defiance. the first sight of it had certainly a very pretty effect: the sun had just burst out, and was lighting the half-cultivated valley beneath us, interspersed with fields, gardens, ruinous mosques, houses, &c.; while kelat, being under the lee of some high hills, was still in the shade; so that, while all around presented a smiling and inviting appearance, as if hailing our approach with gladness, the fortress above seemed to maintain a dark and gloomy reserve, in high contrast with the rest of the picture; nor was the effect diminished when a thin cloud of smoke was seen spouting forth and curling over its battlements, followed, in a short interval, by the report of a large gun, which came booming over the hills towards us. "hurrah! they have fired the first shot," was the exclamation of some of us, "and kelat is prize-money!" on looking more minutely at it, however, it had rather an ugly appearance, and seemed, at that distance, much more formidable than ghuzni did at the first view. we could only see the citadel, which was much more commanding and difficult of access than that of ghuzni. the outworks, however, as we afterwards found, were not half so strong; these were, however, hidden from our view by two hills, rather formidable in appearance, covering the approach to the fortress, on each of which a redoubt was erected, and which we could perceive covered with men. beneath us in the valley the advance companies were seen pushing on to occupy the gardens and other inclosures, while nearer the fort we could observe the body of cavalry we had been before engaged with drawn up, as if waiting our approach, under cover of the redoubts on the hills. half way down the road leading into the valley was our artillery, consisting of four six-pounders, field-pieces belonging to the shah, and two nine-inch howitzers, with our horse artillery. here, also, was general willshire and staff, who now ordered one of the guns to open on the horsemen, in order to cover the movements of the advance companies, who were driving the enemy's matchlock men before them out of the inclosures in good style. the first shot struck wide of them, the second kicked up a dust rather too close to be pleasant, and the third went slap in among them, knocking over a horse or two, when these gallant cavaliers cut their sticks, and we saw no more of them. we soon moved into the valley, and halted for a considerable time at the foot of the hill. we were here within three-quarters of a mile of the nearest redoubt, and about a mile and half from kelat itself. general willshire now made a reconnaissance, and the men from the different baggage guards came in and joined their respective regiments. after halting here about an hour, (the guns from the nearest redoubt every now and then pitching a shot rather close to us,) the brigade-major made his appearance with orders for the three regiments to form in quarter distance column of companies, to attack the two redoubts, each leaving one company with the colours to form the reserve. the th were to attack the nearest redoubt, and the st bengal native infantry to turn its right, while we were to push on and carry the other, which was the nearest to the fort. at the same time, our artillery were brought into position, and covered our advance. the plot now began to thicken, and altogether the whole affair was the most exciting thing i ever experienced, and beat ghuzni out of the pit. we moved steadily on, the guns from the redoubts blazing at us as fast as they could load them; but they were very inferior workmen, and only two shots struck near us, one knocking up the dust close to us, and bounding over our heads, and the other whizzing close over our leading company; however, they kept their ground till we arrived at the foot of the hills, when our artillery having unshipped one of their guns, and otherwise deranged their redoubts, they exploded their powder, and retired, some leisurely, but most in the greatest disorder. here, again, we had occasion to regret having no cavalry, as a troop or two would have effectually cut off or dispersed them. on reaching the top of the hill which they had abandoned, we found ourselves within a quarter of a mile of the lower end of the town, with the beloochees making the best of their way towards the gate, which was open to admit them. captain outram here rode up to us, and cried out, "on men, and take the gate before they can all get in." this acted like magic on the men. all order was lost, and we rushed madly down the hill on the flying enemy, more like hounds with the chase in view than disciplined soldiers. the consequence was, we were exposed to a most galling fire from the ramparts, by which several of our best men were put _hors de combat_; the fugitives were too quick for us, and suddenly the cry was raised by our leading men, "the gate is shut." all was now the greatest confusion, and shelter was sought for wherever it could be found. unluckily a rush was made by the greatest part of the regiment to an old shell of a house, which could scarcely afford cover to twenty men, much less to the numbers who thronged into it, and who were so closely jammed that they could not move; and so the outside portion were exposed to the fire from the left bastion of the town, which completely out-flanked them, and from which the matchlock-men kept pouring in a cool and most destructive fire upon this dense mass with the utmost impunity; while a wide, broken-down doorway in the centre exposed them to a fire from another bastion in their front, if ever they shewed their nose for an instant to see how matters were going on, or to return their fire. poor fellows! you may guess their situation was anything but pleasant. the consequences soon began to shew themselves--eight men and one officer (poor gravatt) were shot dead, and several more were severely wounded, and had the artillery been less expeditious in knocking down the gate, the greatest part of them would have been annihilated. the other part of the regiment (myself among the rest) were more fortunate. seeing so many rushing to one place, i made for another shelter, about twenty paces to the rear, which consisted of a long wall, about five feet high, and which afforded ample cover to us all. it was within seventy yards of the bastion that proved so fatal to the other party, and from which they kept up a pretty good fire upon us whenever we exposed ourselves. however, i was so excited that nothing would do but i must see the whole affair; this, however, was rather foolish, as every now and then they would direct their attention to us, and send in a volley, which would sing over us and knock up the dust and the old wall about us in good style. simmons's horse (the adjutant's) was foolishly brought down, and had not been a second there when it was shot slap through the hind-leg. the ground behind us was raised a little, so that the horse's leg was in a line with and nearly touching my head as i stood looking over the wall; on reaching the cover we found four or five poor fellows who had been wounded in the rush down the hill, and who had crawled in here as well as they could. i had an excellent view of the further proceedings from this place. right above us on the redoubt, from which we had driven the enemy, our artillery had now established themselves, and were slapping away as hard as they could at the gate. i could see every shot as it struck: they made some very clever shots, sending the balls all about the gate, and sometimes knocking down a portion of the bastion over it, considerably deranging the operations of the matchlock-men who were in it; but still the old gate would not fall. in the mean time, the advance companies, which had been in quiet possession of the gardens, inclosures, &c., since the beginning of the affair, were now ordered up to a wall about thirty yards in front of the doorway. they had to run over about three hundred yards of open country before they could get to it, exposed to a fire from the bastion over the door. i saw them make a splendid rush, but three poor fellows and a native water-bearer fell, whom i saw crawl under cover afterwards. all this time the artillery were banging away, but as they made so slight an impression on the gate, two guns of the shah's were moved down the hill a little to our left, and within about one hundred and fifty yards of the gate. they fired two shots; the first made the old gate shake; the second was more fortunate, and took it about the middle, and brought it completely down. our men gave a general hurrah; and outram galloping down the hill at full speed, gave the word, "forward;" and general willshire came up to us at his best pace, waving his hat, "forward, queen's," he sung out, "or the th will be in before you." on we rushed again for the gate as hard as we could; the enemy treated us to one more volley, by which they did some execution, and dickenson was wounded in his leg, and then abandoning the lower defences of the town, retreated to the citadel. however, on entering the gate, we found matters not so easy as we expected. the streets were very narrow and so intricate that they formed a perfect labyrinth, and it was very difficult to make any progress through them. the men, therefore, soon got scattered about and broken into small parties; and some, i am afraid, thought of loot, or plunder, more than of endeavouring to find their way to the citadel. i forgot to mention that during the time we were under cover, the th and st native infantry had moved round the hill and taken up a position on our right. these two regiments were ordered forward and into the town and at the same time and the same gate as we were. the whole force, therefore, entered the town nearly together. i followed with a party of our men, and we pushed along as well as we could through streets, by-ways, &c. this was rather nervous work, as we never could tell what we had to expect before us; there was no open enemy to be seen, but whenever we came to an opening exposed to the citadel, a few bullets invariably came whizzing in about us, and knocked over a man or two; moreover, having the recollection of ghuzni fresh in our minds, we expected every moment a rush of some desperate fellows from the narrow holes we passed through. after groping my way through narrow passages and all sorts of agreeable places, i found myself in the exact spot i had started from--viz., the gate by which we had entered. here a man of our light company came and told me that he had discovered a way to the citadel, and begged me to put myself at the head of a few men there collected. of course i did so, and in a short time we found ourselves in a large courtyard, with stables, &c., full of horses and beloochees; right under the windows of the citadel. these men cried out for "aman," or "mercy;" but the soldiers recollecting the treachery that had been practised at ghuzni in a similar case were going to shoot the whole kit of them. not liking to see this done, i stopped their fire, and endeavoured to make the beloochees come out of their holes and give themselves up. i was standing at this time in the centre of the court, and had heard a few shots whizzing rather close over my head, when i suddenly received a shock, which made me think at the moment i was smashed to bits, by a ball from a ginjall, or native wall piece. i was knocked senseless to the ground, in which state i suppose i lay for a few minutes, and when i came to myself i found myself kicking away, and coughing up globules of clotted blood at a great pace. i thought at first i was as good as done for; however, on regaining a little strength, i looked around, and seeing none of our men in the place, and thinking it more than probable, from what i knew of their character, that the very men whom i had been endeavouring to save might take it into their heads to give me the "_coup de grace_" now i was left alone, i made a desperate effort, got on my legs, and managed to hobble out, when i soon found some of our men, who supported me until a dooly could be brought, into which i was placed, and was soon on my way to the doctor. you may imagine my feelings all this time to be anything but pleasant. i still continued coughing up blood, which was flowing also pretty freely from my side. the idea that you may probably have only a few hours longer to exist, with the many recollections that crowd into your mind at such a time, is anything but a delightful one; and the being so suddenly reduced from a state of vigorous activity to the sick, faintish feeling that came over me, by no means added to the _agremens_ of my situation. i well recollect being carried through the gate, where general willshire with his staff and the officers who had been left with the reserve companies were, and who all pressed forward to see who the unfortunate fellow in the dooly was, when the low exclamation of "poor holdsworth!" and the mysterious and mournful shaking of heads which passed among them, by no means tended to enliven my spirits. i soon reached the place where the doctors, with their understrappers, were busily employed among the wounded, dying, and dead. i was immediately stripped and examined, and then, for the first time, heard that the ball had passed through and out of my body. i also now discovered that it had struck and gone through my arm as well. being very anxious, i begged hunter, the doctor, to let me know the worst. he shook his head, and told me "he thought it a rather dangerous case, principally from my having spit so much blood." he had not time, however, to waste many words with me, as he had plenty of others to attend. dickenson, also, i found here; having been wounded, as i before told you. he did all he could to keep my spirits up, but, as you may suppose, i felt still very far from being comfortable. nor were the various objects that met my eye of a consolatory nature: men lying, some dead, others at their last gasp, while the agonizing groans of those who were undergoing operations at the hands of the hospital assistants, added to the horror of the scene. i may now say that i have seen, on a small scale, every different feature of a fight. in the meantime, there had been sharp fighting in the citadel. our men, after forcing their way through numerous dark passages, in sonic places so narrow and low that they were forced to crawl singly on their hands and knees, at length arrived there; but as there were a great number of approaches to this their last place of refuge, our men got broken up into small detached parties, and entered it at different places. one party reached the place where mehrab khan, at the head of the chiefs who had joined his standard, was sitting with his sword drawn, &c. the others seemed inclined to surrender themselves, and raised the cry of "aman!" but the khan, springing on his feel, cried, "aman, nag!" equivalent to "mercy be d--d," and blew his match; but all in vain, as he immediately received about three shots, which completely did his business; the one that gave him the "_coup de grace_," and which went through his breast, being fired by a man of our regiment, named maxwell. so fell mehrab khan, having fulfilled his promise to general willshire, and died game, with his sword in his hand, in his own citadel. other parties, however, were not so fortunate, as each being too weak, the enemy generally offered a determined resistance, and several, after giving themselves up, finding the numbers to whom they had surrendered smaller than they had at first appeared, turned upon them suddenly; for which, however, they suffered in the long-run, as the soldiers, at last, maddened by this conduct, refused quarter, and fired at once into whatever party they met, without asking any questions. at length the few survivors, being driven to their last stronghold at the very top of the citadel, surrendered on condition of their lives being granted to them; when one loud and general "hurrah!" proclaimed around that kelat was ours. the greatest part of the garrison had, however, before this managed to make their escape over the hills. dickenson, while he was lying wounded by my side, saw quantities of them letting themselves down the walls of the citadel by means of ropes, shawls, &c. dooly, the most faithful of his chiefs and followers, remained by mehrab khan to the last. these were all either taken prisoners or killed. besides the khan himself, the dadur chief, who had been the cause of great annoyance to us in our way up, and the governor of the shawl district, were among the slain. the only two men of his council of any note among the survivors are at present prisoners in our camp, on their way to bengal. thus ended this short, but decisive affair, which i consider to be a much more gallant one than that of ghuzni, both in regard to the numbers engaged on each side and the manner in which it was taken. we merely halted for an hour, and then went slap at it, as if it was merely a continuation of our morning's march. general willshire was exceedingly pleased with the result, as well he might be, and issued a very complimentary address to the force engaged, the next day. i hope and conclude his fortune will be made by it. the loss on our side at kelat was, in proportion, a great deal greater than at ghuzni. we had altogether about bayonets engaged, and the loss was , being about one in seven; of this loss, the queen's bear a proportion equal to that of the other two regiments together, having returned about seventy in the butcher's bill out of , which was the number we brought into the field, being about one in four. out of thirteen officers, we had one killed, four severely, and one slightly, wounded; twenty-three men were killed, and forty-one wounded, of whom some have died since, and most will feel the effect of their wounds till their dying day, as the greatest portion are body wounds. with regard to prize-money, i have no doubt that had things been even tolerably well managed, there would have been plenty of it, but we did not stay there long enough to search the place thoroughly. i hear also that the other part of the force that went down by the bolan pass claim to share with us, which we do not allow; so that, perhaps, it may get into the lawyers' hands, and then good-bye to it altogether, i do not expect, under any circumstances, more than l. some of the rooms of the citadel were very handsomely fitted up, particularly one in the old fellow's harem, which was one entire mirror, both sides and ceiling. we remained at kelat till the st of november, and then marched by the gundava pass on this place. during the week that we remained there, my wounds continued doing very well, and i had very little fever; and on the third and fourth days after i was hit, the doctor considered me "all right." on the two first days of our march, however, i caught a low fever, which left me on the third, and i have continued to grow gradually better ever since. we found the gundava a much longer and more difficult pass than that of the bolan, and could get very little grain or supplies either for ourselves or our cattle. our march was perfectly unmolested, as by that time the new khan had arrived at kelat, and most of the principal chiefs had acknowledged him. i do not know, however, what has become of mehrab khan's eldest son, a lad of fifteen years old, who was bringing up a reinforcement to his father in our rear, while we were marching on kelat, but did not arrive in the neighbourhood until after the place was taken. he, however, threatened us with a night attack while we were lying in front of it, so that we were on the alert, every one sleeping on his arms during the whole time we were there. "we laid not by our harness bright, neither by day nor yet by night." during the whole of this time the weather set in dreadfully cold, colder than i ever experienced it anywhere in my life; sharp frosts, &c. well; to cut the matter short, yesterday, the th of december, we arrived at this place, which is the same that we halted at for a week in our march up. here, at length, we are in the land of plenty, and enjoy such luxuries as fresh eggs, butter, milk, vegetables, &c., with a goût that those only can feel who have been so long without them as we have. we find the climate, however, very hot, and i am sorry to say that we are losing many fine fellows from the effect of the change. it is very painful to witness these poor fellows going off in this miserable manner, after surviving the chances of fire and steel, and all the harassing duties they have had to perform during the campaign, now when they have arrived at nearly the very end of it. _larkhanu, dec. th_.--i have delayed sending this till our arrival here, as the communication between this and bombay is perfectly open, which might not have been the case at kotra. we have been here about a week, and report says that we are to finish our marching here, and drop down the river to curachee in boats. i hope this may prove the case, as i am sure we have had marching enough for one campaign. another report, however, says, that there is a kick-up in the punjab, and that we shall be detained in this country in consequence; but i do not think it likely. that part of our force which was not employed at kelat went down by the bolan pass, and have suffered considerably from cholera, which luckily we have as yet escaped. the men that we have lost since our arrival in this low country have all died from complaints of the lungs, from which they were perfectly free in the cold country above the hills. since writing the former part of this letter, i have received a letter from kate, dated september th, which i will answer as soon i have finished this letter to you. _december th, christmas day_.--i hope to spend this evening more comfortably than i did last year, when i was on out-lying picket, the night before we commenced our first march. now, i trust, we have finished our last. we have luckily met all our mess supplies here, which have been waiting for us about six months, having never managed to get further than bukkur. so now it is a regular case of-- "who so merry as we in camp? danger over, live in clover," &c. i have just heard that the order is out for our marching the day after to-morrow to the banks of the river, there to remain till the boats are ready. now the campaign is so near its close, i feel very glad that i have been on it, as it is a thing that a man does not see every day of his life in these times; and i consider it to be more lucky than otherwise that i have four holes in my body as a remembrance of it; but i cannot say that i relish a longer sojourn in india, unless we have the luck to be sent to china, which i should like very much, (fancy sacking pekin, and kicking the celestial emperor from his throne,) as i do not think the climate has done me any good, but on the contrary. i do not know whether these wounds of mine will give me any claim;--and, talking about that, i would wish you to inquire whether or not i am entitled to any gratuity for them. i hear that officers returned "wounded" on the list in the peninsular campaign, no matter how slight the wound might have been, received a gratuity of one year's pay as a compensation; and this, i think, was called "blood-money." i do not know how far this may be the case at present, but i do not think that l. ought to be lost sight of for want of a little inquiry. by-the-bye, i had nearly forgotten to say that i have received two letters from eliza, which i will answer as soon as possible; but i do not think it safe to keep this open any longer, as i may lose the mail to bombay; so must conclude, with best love to all at home, your very affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. letter xi. camp larkanu, dec. th, . my dear eliza,--i finished and sent off a letter to my father yesterday, giving an account of the storming of kelat, and the wounds i received in the skrimmage, and telling him of everything that had happened since i wrote before, which was the day we left cabool. you can see his letter, which gives a pretty full account of all our proceedings up to the present time. i have now to make many apologies for not having answered your two letters, one dated may th, giving an account of kate's wedding, and the other, dated the th of july, from bristol, and likewise for having forgotten to thank you for the money you were kind enough to send out with my father's, last year. i can assure you never came money more acceptable, as no one can imagine what expenses we have unavoidably been obliged to incur in this campaign, which i suppose has cost officers more than any other campaign that ever was undertaken. i think there are few of us who have come off under l. besides our pay; and yet this was merely for the common necessaries of life,--just sufficient to keep body and soul together. i can assure you i feel very much obliged for your present, as also for the two letters which i received while on the march. i have often thought of brookhill during the many dreary marches that we have made, and on the solitary out-lying pickets, with no one to speak to, and deplored my unlucky fate, in being obliged to leave home just as you seem to be comfortably settled there. still i have hope that i may yet return, some day or other. i can now give you more definite intelligence with regard to our movements than i did in my father's letter; since sending off which orders have come out, and the campaign, as far as our regiment is concerned, is decidedly brought to a close. h.m. th, with gen. willshire, baumgardt, and head-quarter staff, marched this morning for bukkur, where they are to remain for four or five months, so report says, and longer than that i suppose, if their services are required. the queen's, and the th light dragoons, are to return to bombay as soon as the necessary arrangements for their transportation thither &c. are completed. we march from this to-morrow for the banks of the river, about twelve miles, and shall probably remain there for three weeks or so, until the shipping is got ready in bombay, when we shall drop down the indus in boats, and embark from curachee for the presidencies: would it were for england. most of our married officers have obtained leave to precede the regiment, and are off in a day or two. i hope to see lieutenant-colonel fane when we arrive at bombay. his father, sir h. fane, has publicly and officially resigned the commander-in-chief-ship in favour of sir jasper nicolls. sir henry has been dangerously unwell at bombay; but report says he is now getting better. he intends sailing as soon as possible, i believe, and so will most likely be gone before we arrive there. sir j. keane has also resigned, and is to be succeded by sir thomas m'mahon. it is not quite certain that we shall go to bombay, as some say that we shall land at cambay, and go up to deesa, and others that we shall return to belgaum. last night we received bombay papers, giving an account of the taking of kelat. they have buttered us up pretty well, and seem to think it a much more gallant affair than that of ghuzni--in this last particular they are only doing us justice. _dec. th, camp, taggur bundur; banks of the indus_.--we arrived here the day before yesterday, and are likely to remain, i believe, a fortnight or so. we muster rather small, as most of the married officers are off to-day and yesterday. as to my wounds, i have only one hole still open--namely, the one through which the bullet took its final departure, and that, i think, will be closed in a day or two. i am sorry to say that since arriving here i have caught a "cruel cold," from which i am suffering severely at present. by-the-bye, there are a few incidents connected with the taking of kelat which i forgot to mention in my letter to my father. mehrab khan, the chief of kelat, managed to send away all his harem and family on the morning of the fight, directly we were seen approaching, but his other chiefs were not so fortunate, and the greater part of them deliberately cut the throats of all the females belonging to their establishments, including wives, mothers, and daughters, as soon as we established ourselves within the town, rather than suffer them to fall into the hands of us infidels. i forgot, i think, also, to mention that i managed to procure rather a handsome koran, which was found in the citadel, and also an excellent damascus blade, both of which i intend giving to my father, and a few articles of native costume, which would go far to make up a neat fancy dress, but it is not quite complete. a great number of handsome articles were stolen by the camp followers and other rascals, worse luck for us poor wounded officers, who could not help ourselves. we were rather surprised at finding some excellent european articles in the shape of double-barrelled guns, pistols, beautiful french musical boxes, prints, looking-glasses, and pier-glasses, &c., in the rooms of the citadel. where mehrab khan could have picked them up i cannot think, unless they were the result of some successful foray on some unfortunate caravan. the day after the fight, captain outram, of whom i have so often spoken in my letters to my father, volunteered to take the dispatches to bombay, and started for that purpose straight across country to someanee bay, on the sea-coast, a distance of miles, and across the barren mountains that compose the greatest part of beloochistan. this route had up to that time never been traversed by any european, except pottinger, who passed through all these countries twenty years ago, disguised as a native. it was attempted last year by captain harris, of the bombay engineers, author of the "african excursions," a very enterprising officer, and who landed at someanee bay for that purpose; but after getting about twenty miles into the interior, reported the route as impracticable. when this is taken into consideration, with the great chance there was of captain outram's falling into the hands of the many straggling fugitives from kelat, and the well-known character of these _gentlemen_, now smarting under the painful feeling of being driven from their homes, &c., it must be confessed that it required no little pluck to undertake it. the plan proved, however, perfectly successful. he travelled in the disguise of an afghan peer or holy man, under the guidance of two afghan seyds, a race of men much looked up to and respected in all mahomedan countries, on account of their obtaining, [whether true or not, i know not] a pure descent from the prophet. outram and his party fell in with several bands of fugitives, and actually came up and were obliged to travel a day or two with the harem and escort of mehrab khan's brother. as there was a chance of outram's being discovered by this party, the seyd introduced him in the character of a peer, which holy disguise he had to support during the whole journey; and after some extraordinary escapes he arrived at someanee bay in seven or eight days. our sick and wounded have been left behind at kelat, under the charge of an officer of the th, since which things have gone on very smoothly there. the new khan has been very accommodating, and has given fêtes, &c., to the officers left behind, in honour of our gallantry. he has also written to general willshire to say that he intends giving us all a medal each, whether we are allowed to wear it or not, as he does not see why, if the shah did it for ghuzni, he might not do it also for kelat. lord auckland has published an order that all regiments belonging to the company that went beyond the bolan pass shall wear afghanistan on their colours and appointments, and all engaged at ghuzni that name also; and has written to the queen for permission for queen's regiments employed in like manner to bear the same. i suppose we shall get kelat in addition. there is one other point which, in my hurry to get my letter off in time for the january mail, i totally forgot to mention--viz., about drawing some money on my father. i have before mentioned the great expense we have been put to in this campaign; in addition to this, when we were ordered from quettah to take kelat, we were also under orders to return to quettah after having taken the place. a sergeant was therefore left behind at quettah to take charge of whatever effects any person might leave, and officers were strongly advised to leave the greater part of their kit at this place. i, as well as most of my brother officers, was foolish enough to follow this advice, and brought only a bundle of linen; consequently now i am almost minus everything; dress-coat, appointments, are all left behind, as general willshire, after the taking of kelat, instead of returning to quettah, proceeded into cutch gundava by the gundava pass. nothing has been since heard of what we have left behind, except that the sergeant could not get camels or carriage sufficient to bring them down. moreover, it is unsafe to go through the bolan pass without a tolerably strong escort; so, taking all things into consideration, i do not think there is much chance of our ever seeing anything of them again. the consequences will be, that, on our arrival at bombay, i shall be obliged to get an entire new fit out, and as the campaign has drained me dry, i shall be obliged to draw upon my father for it; however, i will repay him by the end of the year, as by that time the company will have given us half a year's full batta, which they intend doing as a sort of indemnification for the losses we have sustained on the campaign; my batta will be about l. i do not think i have any more to say, and as the january overland sails on the th, i hope this letter will reach bombay in time to go by it, as well as my father's. by-the-bye, how is old nelly? if she has any good pups, i wish you would manage to keep one for me, as i expect the old girl will be either dead or very old by the time i return. i am longing to get out of the "sick-list," as the thickets here near the river are full of partridges and hares, and the climate, at this time of the year, is very cool and pleasant. my rheumatism is much better since i was wounded; but i still have it in my left arm. well, no more; but wishing you, and all, a happy new year. believe me ever your very affectionate brother, t.w.e. holdsworth. letter xii. camp, curachee, feb. th, . my dear father,--you will see, by my date, that our share of the campaign is ended; in fact, we are only waiting here for shipping, which is on its way from bombay, to take us from this place to mandavie, in cutch, where we land, and then march immediately to deesa, in guzerat; so that, after all our toilsome marches, &c., we have yet another, still more toilsome, before us of miles. the climate of cutch and guzerat during the period of year that we shall be occupied in marching is so hot that no changes of station are ever made even by native corps, and europeans are never allowed to march in guzerat except during the cold months. it is sharp work on our poor men; many of whom appear very unfit for it; but they are now so accustomed to hard work, that they will get well through it i have little doubt. we left tuggur bandur, from which place i wrote to eliza and kate, on the th of january, and drifted quietly down the river in boats, pulling up and coming to an anchor every evening at sunset. we reached tatta bundur, about five miles from the town, on the st, and after staying there a few days, started again for this place, which we reached in five marches, on the st. we were immediately most hospitably entertained by the officers of h.m. th, which is an excellent regiment. here we have been ever since, living on the fat of the land, and enjoying ourselves very much, after all our toils. this is now a rather considerable station: one queen's and one company's regiment, and detail of foot artillery, and plenty of european supplies brought by the bombay merchants. it is a very decent climate; and would make a very good station. i wish they would leave us here in place of sending us to deesa, at this time of the year. sir john keane, general willshire, and the bombay staff are expected here in a day or two. sir john is bringing down with him hyder khan, dost mahomed's son, who commanded at ghuzni when it was taken. he is to be brought to bombay, and as he is of a very quiet, amiable disposition, will, so report says, be eventually allowed to join his father. poor dost, they say, is in a very bad way, deserted by nearly all his followers; but there still seems to be mischief brewing in the north-west. all accounts say that bokhara is very much inclined to the russian interest, and shah kamran's vizier at herat has been carrying on a correspondence with the persians, the object of which is said to be the delivery of herat into their hands. the punjab is also in a very unsettled state; so there are plenty of materials for getting up another row in these countries before long. war is most positively said to be decided on with china, and seven regiments, to be followed by a reserve of equal number, together with a considerable naval force, are to be sent there as soon as possible. lord auckland, we are told, has had _carte blanche_ from the home government to act as he thinks fit with regard to china, and that he has determined upon a hostile movement as soon as this campaign is regularly finished, which it may be said to be; so there will be glorious fun there. it is not yet known here what regiments will go. i am afraid there is little chance for the queen's. the th light dragoons have arrived here, having come down by land; they are to return to their old quarters at kickee, near poonah. the th may also be expected in a few days; they are to occupy our old quarters at belgaum. the th (royal irish) have come on from ceylon, and are to go to poonah; and the th go home (to england) as soon as possible. this is understood to be the destination of each regiment, but this affair with china may cause an alteration. i am very sorry to mention the unfortunate death of poor little halkett, one of my best friends, and the son of general halkett, of hanover, who was so very civil to me while i was there, and nephew of sir colin halkett. since we have been here, i have received your letter, dated november nd, by which it appears that you had just then heard of the taking of ghuzni. you mentioned, also, in it that you had received my letter from candahar, which i am very glad to hear, as i was very much afraid, from the state of the country, that it would never reach its destination. as you mention nothing about it, i suppose you had not received the letter i wrote from ghuzni almost immediately after the capture. i know many letters were lost about that time, and mine, i am afraid, among the number. there is a report here (but i think, too good to be true) that all officers with the advance, or storming, party at ghuzni, consisting of the light companies of the european regiments, were to get brevet rank. in that case, as the company to which i belong--viz, the light--was one of the number, and, in fact, headed the assault, capt holdsworth would be my future rank. tell eliza that i got her letter which was enclosed in yours, and was very much surprised at its contents. i do not know what to say about deesa as station, reports are so various on the subject. the heat, i believe is awful in the hot weather the thermometer rising to in the houses; and the worst part of the business is, that this heat, which is occasioned by the hot winds, lasts all night through; so that the night is nearly as hot as the day. at other times of the year, i believe, the climate is very pleasant. the th give a very good account of it. there is a great quantity of game there, and some of the best hog-hunting in india. mount aboo, called the parnassus of india, is within fifty miles of it, and is a great place of resort during the hot weather. should this expedition to china take place, which seems decided upon at present, what an immense power the english will eventually have in the east. in a few years, i have no doubt it may extend from herat to the most eastern parts of china, including all the islands in the adjacent seas. like the romans, england seems to be extending her dominion everywhere--"super et garamantes et indos, proferet imperium," and yet what a row she kicks up about russia. the french papers seem to be rather jealous about ghuzni. how the english papers butter it up! and yet it was not half so brilliant an affair as kelat, nor so hardly contested; but very little is said about the latter. enclosed, i send you a view of the north front of kelat, shewing the gate by which we entered. it gives you a pretty good idea of the place, and was drawn by lieutenant creed, of the engineers. i went yesterday to see a tank, about seven miles from this place, in which are a great quantity of alligators, half tame. the tank in which they are belongs to a mahomedan temple, which is considered a very holy one, and much resorted to, and these animals are kept there by the priests of the establishment, in order to induce a greater number of visitors. a calf was killed and thrown in among the scaly gentlemen, who very soon demolished it. i never saw anything so loathesome and repulsive as these monsters. this letter goes by the "hannah" packet, which sails this evening for bombay, and will, i hope, reach that place in time to go by the "overland packet." i suppose you know that this is classic ground, and the place from which nearchus, alexander's admiral, started on his return to the euphrates. i have no time for more. so, with love to all at home, believe me your affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. letter xiii. deesa, april st, . my dear father,--i received your letter, dated january th, about the beginning of this month, while on our march from mandavie to this place. i see by the papers that the news of the taking of kelat had readied england, as i find my name mentioned in the "western luminary," which came out in this overland. i wrote you last from curachee, about the beginning or middle of february. we stayed there till the th. a few days before we left, lord keane and suite arrived, bringing with him hyder khan, the captured chief of ghuzni. while there, lord keane presented new colours to the th regiment, which we had an opportunity of witnessing. he and all his party have since gone home. on the th, i, with my company under my command, embarked for mandavie, in cutch, where we arrived in two days, in patamars, and waited till the whole regiment came down, which they did by companies, so that it was the th of march before we were able to start for this place. we arrived here on the th of this month, pushing on as fast as we could, as the commanding officer was anxious to get the men under cover, on account of the great heat. there was excellent shooting the whole way up; and if it had been the cold season, i should have enjoyed the march amazingly; but it was too hot to venture out. on arrival here we found about three hundred recruits, who had arrived since we went on service, and about fifty of the men we left behind us; also seven new officers. as i have a company under my command i have scarcely had a moment to myself since i have been here; what with fitting and getting the recruits in order, and new clothing the old hands, you have no conception what tedious work it is getting into quarters. i have bought a very comfortable little bungalo for four hundred rupees. we were promised our full batta on our arrival here; but, although the bengalees, it is said, received theirs some time ago, yet there is a screw loose, i fear, somewhere in the bombay, and that it may be some time before we get ours, and that it will not be as much as the bengalees: so much for being in an inferior presidency. this is a great disappointment, after our losses on the campaign. with regard to this place, i have not been long enough in it to form an opinion. its appearance is decidedly against it, the soil being nothing but a barren sandy desert, with the low hills of the aravulles to the eastward, running north to the mountain aboo, the parnassus of hindostan. the last week has been oppressive, and hot in the extreme; and this is but the commencement of the hot weather, which i am told will last about six weeks longer, when a very slight monsoon comes on, and lasts at intervals till the end of october, when the cold season commences, which is said to be very pleasant. there is a lot of game here of every description, including lions; and it is one of the best hog-hunting stations in india. our men, to the surprise of everybody, were very healthy in the march up; and since they have been here, and not having their knapsacks to carry, knocked off their work in grand style. the men we have brought back with us are well-seasoned, hardy fellows, and i would back them to march against any soldiers in the world. i suppose you have long ere this received stisted's letter and mine about kelat. colonel arnold[a] died at cabool whilst we were there, and was buried with a magnificent military funeral in the armenian burial-ground. [footnote a: colonel arnold was in the th hussars at waterloo, and shot through the body in the charge in which major howard, of that regiment, was killed.] i am sorry to say that, as i predicted, the spear which i took at the storming of ghuzni has been broken to pieces through the carelessness of my servants. i have, however, the koran and sword from kelat; and i think i shall be able to get a matchlock taken at that place,--a very good specimen of the sort of thing i was wounded by; perhaps it may be the identical one. the sword i left in cutch, in my way up from mandavie, to be put to rights, as the workmen of that country are the best in india, i will try if i can get another weapon, as a remembrance of ghuzni. i brought down from cabool as far as quettah a very good specimen of the kyber knife, a very cut-throat sort of instrument, with which every afghan is armed. i sent it down with my other things through the bolan pass, when we turned off to kelat, and i am sorry to say it was stolen. you write about old ----: did i never mention him to you? he is here; but was not with us on the campaign, being too unwell when we started. though not an old man, he is a very old soldier for an indian, and is nearly worn out: he is anxious to get his discharge at the end of the year, when he will have served his twenty-one years, and be entitled to a decent pension. he is a very straight-forward, blunt, honest old fellow, and when he first joined was a very powerful man, and the best wrestler in the regiment, thereby proving his south devon blood. he was ----'s servant when i joined, and i was delighted at hearing the south devon dialect again, which he speaks with so much truth and native elegance that you would imagine he had but just left his native village. there were a great many devonshire men in the regiment; we lost one, a very fine young man in the grenadiers, in coming down from kelat to cutch gundava, by the same chest complaint that carried off so many: he was a native of tiverton. well; it is twelve o'clock, and i am afraid i shall be too late for the post; so good bye. your affectionate son, t.w.e. holdsworth. * * * * * appendix. fall of ghuzni, & entrance of the british army into cabool. _(from the bombay government gazette extraordinary of august th, .)_ secret department. bombay castle, aug th, . the honourable the governor in council has the highest satisfaction in republishing the following notification issued by the right honourable the governor-general, announcing the capture by storm of the town and fortress of ghuzni, as also the general order issued on the occasion by his excellency lieutenant-general sir john keane, k.c.b. and g.c.h., commander-in-chief of the army of the indus. by order of the honourable the governor in council, l.r. reid, acting chief secretary. * * * * * notification.--secret department. simla, august th, . the right hon. the governor-general of india has great gratification in publishing, for general information, a copy of a report this day received from his excellency lieutenant-general sir john keane, k.c.b, commander-in-chief of the army of the indus, announcing the capture, by storm, on the d ult., of the important fortress of ghuzni. a salute of twenty-one guns will be fired on the receipt of this intelligence at all the principal stations of the army in the three presidencies. by order of the right hon. the governor-general of india, (signed) t.h. maddock, officiating secretary to the government of india, with the governor-general. * * * * * to the right hon. lord auckland, g.c.b., etc. my lord,--i have the satisfaction to acquaint your lordship that the army under my command have succeeded in performing one of the most brilliant acts it has ever been my lot to witness during my service of forty-five years in the four quarters of the globe, in the capture, by storm, of the strong and important fortress and citadel of ghuzni yesterday. it is not only that the afghan nation, and, i understand, asia generally have looked upon it as impregnable; but it is in reality a place of great strength, both by nature and art, far more so than i had reason to suppose from any description that i had received of it, although some are from others in our own service who had seen it in their travels. i was surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a fausse brayze and a wet ditch, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills from the north, rendering it nugatory. in addition to this, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch was filled with water, and unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it. it is therefore the more honourable to the troops, and must appear to the enemy out of all calculation extraordinary, that a fortress and citadel to the strength of which, for the last thirty years, they had been adding something each year, and which had a garrison of afghan soldiers, commanded by prince mahomed hyder, the son of dost mahomed khan, the ruler of the country, with a commanding number of guns, and abundance of ammunition, and other stores, provisions, &c., for regular siege, should have been taken by british science and british valour in less than two hours from the time the attack was made, and the whole, including the governor and garrison, should fall into our hands. my dispatch of the th instant, from nanee, will have made known to your lordship that the camps of his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk, and of major-general willshire, with the bombay troops, had there joined me in accordance with my desire, and the following morning we made our march of twelve miles to ghuzni, the line of march being over a fine plain. the troops were disposed in a manner that would have enabled me at any moment, had we been attacked, as was probable, from the large bodies of troops moving on each side of us, to have placed them in position to receive the enemy. they did not, however, appear; but on our coming within range of the guns of the citadel and fortress of ghuzni, a sharp cannonade was opened on our leading column, together with a heavy fire of musketry from behind garden walls, and temporary field-works thrown up, as well as the strong outwork i have already alluded to, which commanded the bed of the river from all but the outwork. the enemy were driven in under the walls of the fort in a spirited manner by parties thrown forward by major-general sir willoughby cotton, of the th and th bengal native infantry, and her majesty's th light infantry, under brigadier sale. i ordered forward three troops of horse artillery, the camel battery, and one foot battery, to open upon the citadel and fortress, by throwing shrapnel shells, which was done in a masterly style under the direction of brigadier stephenson. my object in this was to make the enemy shew their strength in guns, and in other respects, which completely succeeded, and our shells must have done great execution, and occasioned great consternation. being perfectly satisfied on the point of their strength in the course of half an hour, i ordered the fire to cease, and placed the troops in bivouac. a close reconnoissance of the place all around was then undertaken by captain thomson, the chief engineer, and captain peat, of the bombay engineers, accompanied by major garden, the deputy quartermaster-general of the bombay army, supported by a strong party of her majesty's th lancers, and one from her majesty's th light infantry. on this party a steady fire was kept up, and some casualties occurred. captain thomson's report was very clear, he found the fortifications equally strong all round; and, as my own opinion coincided with him, i did not hesitate a moment as to the manner in which our approach and attack upon the place should be made. notwithstanding the march the troops had performed in the morning, and then having been a considerable time engaged with the enemy, i ordered the whole to move across the river (which runs close under the fort wall) in columns, to the right and left of the town, and they were placed in opposition on the north side on more commanding ground, and securing the cabool road. i had information that a night attack upon the camp was intended from without. mahomed ubzul khan, the eldest son of dost mahomed khan, had been sent by his father with a strong body of troops from cabool to the brother's assistance at ghuzni, and was encamped outside the walls, but abandoned his position on our approach, keeping, however, at the distance of a few miles from us. the two rebel chiefs of the ghiljee tribe, men of great influence--viz., abdool rhuman and gool mahomed khan, had joined him with horse, and also a body of about ghazees from zeimat, under a mixture of chiefs and mollahs, carrying banners, and who had been assembled on the cry of a religious war. in short, we were in all directions surrounded by enemies. these last actually came down the hills on the nd, and attacked the part of the camp occupied by his majesty shah shooja and his own troops, but were driven back with considerable loss, and banners taken. at daylight on the nd i reconnoitered ghuzni, in company with the chief engineer and the brigadier commanding the artillery, with the adjutant and quartermaster-general of the bengal army, for the purpose of making all arrangements for carrying the place by storm, and these were completed in the course of the day. instead of the tedious process of breaching, (for which we were ill prepared,) captain thomson undertook, with the assistance of captain peat, of the bombay engineers, lieutenants durand and macleod, of the bengal engineers, and other officers under him, (captain thomson,) to blow in the cabool gate, the weakest point, with gunpowder; and so much faith did i place on the success of this operation that my plans for the assault were immediately laid down and the orders given. the different troops of horse artillery, the camel and foot batteries, moved off their ground at twelve o'clock that night, without the slightest noise, as had been directed, and in the most correct manner took up the position assigned them, about yards from the walls. in like manner, and with the same silence, the infantry soon after moved from their ground, and all were at their post at the proper time. a few minutes before three o'clock in the morning the explosion took place, and proved completely successful. captain peat, of the bombay engineers, was thrown down and stunned by it, but shortly after recovered his senses and feeling. on hearing the advance sounded by the bugle, (being the signal for the gate having been blown in,) the artillery, under the able directions of brigadier stevenson, consisting of captain grant's troop of bengal horse artillery, the camel battery, under captain abbott, both superintended by major pew, captains martin and cotgrave's troops of bombay horse artillery, and captain lloyd's battery of bombay foot artillery, all opened a terrific fire upon the citadel and ramparts of the fort, and, in a certain degree, paralysed the enemy. under the guidance of captain thomson, of the bengal engineers, the chief of the department, colonel dennie of her majesty's th light infantry, commanding the advance, consisting of the light companies of her majesty's nd and th regiments of foot, and of the bengal european regiment, with one company, of her majesty's th light infantry, proceeded to the gate, and with great difficulty, from the rubbish thrown down, and determined opposition offered by the enemy, effected an entrance, and established themselves within the gateway closely followed by the main column, led in a spirit of great gallantry by brigadier sale, to whom i had entrusted the important post of commanding the storming party, consisting (with the advance above-mentioned) of her majesty's nd foot, under major carruthers; the bengal european regiment, under lieutenant-colonel orchard, followed by her majesty's th light infantry, under major thomson; and her majesty's th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel croker. the struggle within the fort was desperate for a considerable time. in addition to the heavy file kept up, our troops were assailed by the enemy sword in hand, and with daggers, pistols, &c.; but british courage, perseverance, and fortitude, overcame all opposition, and the fire of the enemy in the lower area of the fort being nearly silenced, brigadier sale turned towards the citadel, from which could now be seen men abandoning the guns, running in all directions, throwing themselves down from immense heights, endeavouring to make their escape; and on reaching the gate with her majesty's th, under lieutenant-colonel croker, followed by the th, forced it open at five o'clock in the morning. the colours of her majesty's th and th were planted on the citadel of ghuzni amidst the cheers of all ranks. instant protection was granted to the women found in the citadel, (among whom were those of mahomed hyder, the governor) and sentries placed over the magazine for its security. brigadier sale reports having received much assistance from captain kershaw, of her majesty's th light infantry, throughout the whole of the service of the storming. major general sir willoughby cotton executed in a manner much to my satisfaction the orders he had received. the major general followed closely the assaulting party into the fort with the reserve--namely, brigadier roberts, with the only available regiment of his brigade; the th native infantry, under lieutenant-colonel monteath; part of brigadier sale's brigade, the th native infantry, under major maclaren; and th native infantry, under lieutenant-colonel wheeler; and they immediately occupied the ramparts, putting down opposition whenever they met any, and making prisoners, until the place was completely in our possession a desultory fire was kept up in the town long after the citadel was in our hands, from those who had taken shelter in houses, and in desperation kept firing on all that approached them. in this way several of our men were wounded, and some killed, but the aggressors paid dearly for their bad conduct in not surrendering when the place was completely ours. i must not omit to mention that three companies of the th native infantry, under captain hay, ordered to the south side of the fort to begin with a false attack, to attract attention on that side, performed that service at the proper time, and greatly to my satisfaction. as we were threatened with an attack for the relief of the garrison, i ordered the th bombay native infantry, under the command of lieutenant colonel stalker, to guard the cabool road, and to be in support of the cavalry division. this might have proved an important position to occupy, but as it was, no enemy appeared. the cavalry division, under major-general thackwell, in addition to watching the approach of an enemy, had directions to surround ghuzni, and to sweep the plain, preventing the escape of runaways from the garrison. brigadier arnold's brigade--the brigadier himself, i deeply regret to say, was labouring under very severe illness, having shortly before burst a blood-vessel internally, which rendered it wholly impossible for him to mount a horse that day--consisting of her majesty's th lancers, under lieutenant-colonel persse, temporarily commanding the brigade, and major mac dowell, the junior major of the regiment, (the senior major of the th lancers major cureton, an officer of great merit, being actively engaged in the execution of his duties as assistant adjutant-general to the cavalry division,) the nd cavalry, under major salter, and the rd, under lieutenant-colonel smith, were ordered to watch the south and west sides. brigadier scott's brigade were placed on the cabool road, consisting of her majesty's th light dragoons, under major daly, and of the st bombay cavalry under lieutenant-colonel sandwith, to watch the north and east sides: this duty was performed in a manner greatly to my satisfaction. after the storming, and that quiet was in some degree restored within, i conducted his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk, and the british envoy and minister, mr. macnaghten, round the citadel and a great part of the fortress. the king was perfectly astonished at our having made ourselves masters of a place conceited to be impregnable, when defended, in the short space of two hours, and in less than forty-eight hours after we came before it. his majesty was, of course, greatly delighted at the result. when i afterwards, in the course of the day, took mahomed hyder khan, the governor, first to the british minister, and then to the king, to make his submission, i informed his majesty that i had made a promise that his life should not be touched, and the king, in very handsome terms, assented, and informed mahomed hyder, in my presence, that although he and his family had been rebels, yet he was willing to forget and forgive all. prince mahomed hyder, the governor of ghuzni, is a prisoner of war in my camp, and under the surveillance of sir alexander burnes, an arrangement very agreeable to the former. from major general sir w. cotton, commanding the st infantry division, (of the bengal army,) i have invariably received the strongest support; and on this occasion his exertions were manifest in support of the honour of the profession and of our country. i have likewise, at all times, received able assistance from major-general willshire, commanding the nd infantry division, (of the bombay army,) which it was found expedient on that day to break up, some for the storming party, and some for other duties. the major-general, as directed, was in attendance upon myself. to brigadier sale i feel deeply indebted for the gallant and soldierlike manner in which he conducted the responsible and arduous duty entrusted to him in command of the storming party, and for the arrangements he made in the citadel immediately after taking possession of it. the sabre wound which he received in the face did not prevent his continuing to direct his column until everything was secure; and i am happy in the opportunity of bringing to your lordship's notice the excellent conduct of brigadier sale on this occasion. brigadier stevenson, in command of the artillery, was all i could wish; and he reports that brigade-majors backhouse and coghlan ably assisted him. his arrangements were good; and the execution done by the arm he commands, was such as cannot be forgotten by those of the enemy who have witnessed and survived it. to brigadier roberts, to colonel dennie, who commanded the advance, and to the different officers commanding regiments already mentioned, as well is to the other officers, and gallant soldiers under them, who so nobly maintained the honour and reputation of our country, my best acknowledgments are due. to captain thomson, of the bengal engineers, the chief of the department with me, much of the credit of the success of this brilliant _coup-de-main_ is due. a place of the same strength, and by such simple means as this highly-talented and scientific officer recommended to be tried, has, perhaps, never before been taken; and i feel i cannot do sufficient justice to captain thomson's merits for his conduct throughout. in the execution he was ably supported by the officers already mentioned; and so eager were the other officers of the engineers of both presidencies for the honour of carrying the powder bags, that the point could only be decided by seniority, which shews the fine feeling by which they were animated. i must now inform your lordship, that since i joined the bengal column in the valley of shawl, i have continued my march with it in the advance; and it has been my good fortune to have had the assistance of two most efficient staff-officers in major craigie, deputy adjutant-general, and major garden, deputy quartermaster-general. it is but justice to those officers that i should state to your lordship the high satisfaction i have derived from the manner in which all then duties have been performed up to this day, and that i look upon them as promising officers to fill the higher ranks. to the other officers of both departments i am also much indebted for the correct performance of all duties appertaining to their situations. to major keith, the deputy adjutant-general, and major campbell, the deputy quartermaster-general of the bombay army, and to all the other officers of both departments under them, my acknowledgments are also due, for the manner in which their duties have been performed during this campaign. captain alexander, commanding the th bengal local horse, and major cunningham, commanding the poona auxiliary horse, with the men under their orders, have been of essential service to the army in this campaign. the arrangements made by superintending-surgeons kennedy and atkinson previous to the storming, for affording assistance and comfort to the wounded, met with my approval. major parsons, the deputy commissary-general, in charge of the department in the field, has been unremitting in his attention to keep the troops supplied, although much difficulty is experienced, and he is occasionally thwarted by the nature of the country and its inhabitants. i have throughout this service received the utmost assistance i could derive from lieutenant-colonel macdonald, my officiating military secretary, and deputy adjutant-general of her majesty's forces, bombay; from captain powell, my persian interpreter, and the other officers of my personal staff. the nature of the country in which we are serving, prevents the possibility of my sending a single staff-officer to deliver this to your lordship, otherwise i should have asked my aide-de-camp, lieutenant keane, to proceed to simla, to deliver this despatch into your hands, and to have afforded any further information that your lordship could have desired. the brilliant triumph we have obtained, the cool courage displayed, and the gallant bearing of the troops i have the honour to command, will have taught such a lesson to our enemies in the afghan nation as will make them hereafter respect the name of a british soldier. our loss is wonderfully small considering the occasion, the casualties in killed and wounded amount to about . the loss of the enemy is immense; we have already buried of their dead nearly , together with an immense number of horses. i enclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing. i am happy to say that, although the wounds of some of the officers are severe, they are all doing well. it is my intention, after selecting a garrison for this place, and establishing a general hospital, to continue my march to cabool forthwith--i have, &c., (signed) john keane, lieut.-general. no. . _list of killed, wounded, and missing, in the army under the command of lieutenant-general sir john keane, before ghuzni, on the st of july_, :-- nd troop bengal horse artillery-- horses wounded. rd troop bombay-- rank and file, horses, wounded. th troop bombay-- horse killed. nd regiment bengal cavalry-- horse killed, rank and file wounded. th bengal local horse-- rank and file and horse missing. her majesty's th light infantry-- rank and file killed. th bengal native infantry-- captain wounded. th bengal native infantry-- lieutenant, and rank and file wounded. total killed-- rank and file, and two horses. total wounded-- captain, lieutenant, rank and file, and horses. total missing-- rank and file, and horse. _names of officers wounded._ captain graves, th bengal native infantry, severely. lieutenant vanhomrigh, th bengal native infantry, slightly. (signed) r. macdonald, lieut.-colonel, military secretary, and deputy adjutant-gen. to her majesty's forces, bombay. no. . _list of killed, wounded, and missing, in the army under the command of lieutenant-general sir john keane, k.c.b. and g.c.h., in the assault and capture of the fortress and citadel of ghuzni, on the rd of july, _:-- general staff-- colonel, major, wounded. rd troop bombay horse artillery-- rank and file wounded. th troop bombay horse artillery-- rank and file and horse wounded. bengal engineers-- rank and file killed, rank and file wounded, rank and file missing. bombay engineers-- lieutenant, rank and file, wounded. nd bengal light cavalry-- rank and file wounded. st bombay light cavalry-- havildar killed, rank and file and horses wounded. her majesty's nd foot (or queen's royals)-- rank and file killed; captains, lieutenants, sergeant, and rank and file wounded. her majesty's th light infantry-- rank and file killed; sergeants and rank and file wounded. her majesty's th foot-- rank and file wounded. bengal european regiment-- rank and file killed; lieutenant-colonel, major, captains, lieutenants, ensign, sergeant, rank and file wounded. th bengal n.i.-- havildar, rank and file, wounded. th bengal n.i.-- rank and file killed; i havildar and rank and file wounded. th bengal n.i.-- havildars killed, rank and file wounded. total killed-- sergeants or havildars, rank and file. total wounded-- colonel, lieutenant-colonel, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants or havildars, rank and file, horses. total missing-- rank and file. grand total on the st and rd of july, killed, wounded, and missing-- officers and men, and horses. _names of officers killed wounded, and missing._ general staff--brigadier sale, her majesty's th light infantry, slightly; major parsons, deputy commissary-general, slightly. bombay engineers--second lieutenant marriott, slightly. her majesty's nd (or queen's royals)--captain raitt, slightly; captain robinson, severely; lieutenant yonge, severely; lieut. stisted, slightly; adjutant simmons, slightly; quartermaster hadley, slightly. bengal european regiment--lieutenant-colonel orchard, slightly; major warren, severely; captains hay and taylor, slightly; lieutenant broadfoot, slightly; lieutenant haslewood, severely; lieutenants fagan and magnay, slightly; ensign jacob, slightly. (signed) r. macdonald, lieut.-colonel, military secretary, and deputy adjutant-gen. to her majesty's forces, bombay. general order, _by his excellency lieutenant-gen. sir john keane, commander-in-chief of the army of the indus._ head-quarters, camp, ghuzni, july rd, lieutenant-general sir john keane most heartily congratulates the army he has the honour to command, on the signal triumph they have this day obtained in the capture by storm of the strong and important fortress of ghuzni. his excellency feels that he can hardly do justice to the gallantry of the troops. the scientific and successful manner in which the cabool gate (of great strength) was blown up by captain thomson, of the bengal engineers, the chief of that department with this army, in which he reports having been most ably assisted by captain peat, of the bombay engineers, and lieutenants durand and macleod, of the bengal engineers, in the daring and dangerous enterprise of laying down powder in the face of the enemy, and the strong fire kept up on them, reflects the highest credit on their skill and cool courage, and his excellency begs captain thomson and officers named will accept his cordial thanks. his acknowledgments are also due to the other officers of the engineers of both presidencies, and to the valuable corps of sappers and miners under them. this opening having been made, although it was a difficult one to enter by, from the rubbish in the way, the leading column, in a spirit of true gallantry, directed and led by brigadier sale, gained a footing inside the fortress, although opposed by the afghan soldiers in very great strength, and in the most desperate manner, with every kind of weapon. the advance, under lieutenant-colonel dennie, of her majesty's th, consisting of the light companies of her majesty's nd and th, and of the bengal european regiment, with one company of her majesty's th; and the leading column, consisting of her majesty's nd queen's, under major carruthers, and the bengal european regiment, under lieutenant-colonel orchard, followed by her majesty's th light infantry, as they collected from the duty of skirmishing, which they were directed to begin with, and by her majesty's th, under lieutenant-colonel croker. to all these officers, and to the other officers and gallant soldiers under their orders, his excellency's best thanks are tendered; but, in particular, he feels deeptly indebted to brigadier sale, for the manner in which he conducted the arduous duty entrusted to him in the command of the storming party. his excellency will not fail to bring it to the notice of his lordship the governor-general, and he trusts the wound which brigadier sale has received is not of that severe nature long to deprive this army of his services. brigadier sale reports that captain kershaw, of her majesty's th light infantry, rendered important assistance to him and to the service in the storming. sir john keane was happy, on this proud occasion, to have the assistance of his old comrade, major-general sir willoughby cotton, who, in command of the reserve, ably executed the instructions he had received, and was at the gate ready to enter after the storming party had established themselves inside, when he moved through it to sweep the ramparts, and to complete the subjugation of the place with the th bengal native infantry, under major m'laren; brigadier roberts, with the th native infantry, under lieutenant-colonel monteath; and the th native infantry, under lieutenant-colonel wheeler. his arrangements afterwards, in continuation of those brigadier sale had made for the security of the magazine and other public stores, were such as meet his excellency's high approval. the commander-in-chief acknowledges the services rendered by captain hay, of the th native infantry, in command of three companies of that regiment sent to the south side of the fortress to begin with a false attack, and which was executed at the proper time, and in a manner highly satisfactory to his excellency. nothing could be more judicious than the manner in which brigadier stevenson placed the artillery in position. captain grant's troop of bengal artillery, and the camel battery, under captain abbott, both superintended by major pew; the two troops of bombay horse artillery, commanded by captains martin and cotgrave; and captain lloyd's battery of bombay foot artillery, all opened upon the citadel and fortress in a manner which shook the enemy, and did such execution as completely to paralyse and to strike terror into them; and his excellency begs brigadier stevenson, the officers, and men of that arm, will accept his thanks for their good service. the th regiment bombay native infantry, under the command of lieutenant-colonel stalker, having been placed in position to watch any enemy that might appear on the cabool road, or approach to attack the camp, had an important post assigned to them, although, as it happened, no enemy made an attack upon them. in sieges and stormings it does not fall to the lot of cavalry to bear the same conspicuous part as to the other two arms of the profession. on this occasion, sir john keane is happy to have an opportunity of thanking major-general thackwell, and the officers and men of the cavalry divisions under his orders, for having successfully executed the directions given, to sweep the plain, and to intercept fugitives of the enemy attempting to escape from the fort in any direction around it; and had an enemy appeared for the relief of the place during the storming, his excellency is fully satisfied that the different regiments of this fine arm would have distinguished themselves, and that the opportunity alone was wanting. major-general willshire's division having been broken up for the day, to be distributed as it was, the major-general was desired to be in attendance upon the commander-in-chief. to him and to the officers of the assistant quartermaster-general's department of the bengal and bombay army, his excellency returns his warmest thanks for the assistance they have afforded him. the commander-in-chief feels--and in which feeling he is sure he will be joined by the troops composing the army of the indus--that, after the long and harassing marches they have had, and the privations they have endured, this glorious achievement, and the brilliant manner in which the troops have met and conquered the enemy, reward them for it all. his excellency will only add, that no army that has ever been engaged in a campaign deserves more credit than this which he has the honour to command, for patient, orderly, and correct conduct, under all circumstances, and sir john keane is proud to have the opportunity of thus publicly acknowledging it. by order of his excellency lieutenant-general sir john keane, commander-in-chief of the army of the indus. (signed) r. macdonald, lieut.-colonel, military secretary, and deputy adjutant-gen. of her majesty's forces, bombay. * * * * * entrance into cabool. (_from the delhi gazette extraordinary, of thursday, aug. _.) notification.--secret department. simla, august th, . the governor-general of india publishes for general information, the subjoined copy and extracts of despatches from his excellency the commander-in-chief of the army of the indus, and from the envoy and minister at the court of his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk, announcing the triumphant entry of the shah into cabool, on the th instant. in issuing this notification, the governor-general cannot omit the opportunity of offering to the officers and men composing the army of the indus, and to the distinguished leader by whom they have been commanded, the cordial congratulations of the government upon the happy result of a campaign, which, on the sole occasion when resistance was opposed to them, has been gloriously marked by victory, and in all the many difficulties of which the character of a british army for gallantry, good conduct, and discipline has been nobly maintained. a salute of twenty-one guns will be fired on the receipt of this intelligence at all the principal stations of the army in the three presidencies. by order of the right hon. the governor-general of india, t.h. maddock, officiating secretary to the government of india, with the governor-general. * * * * * (copy.) to the right hon. lord auckland, g.c.b., etc. my lord,--we have the honour to acquaint your lordship that the army marched from ghuzni, _en route_ to cabool, in two columns, on the th and st ult., his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk, with his own troops, forming part of the second column. on the arrival of the commander-in-chief with the first column, at hyde khail, on the st inst., information reached him, and the same reached the envoy and minister at huft assaya, that dost mahomed, with his army and artillery, were advancing from cabool, and would probably take up a position at urghundee or midan, (the former twenty-four, the latter thirty-six miles from cabool.) upon this it was arranged that his majesty, with the second column, under major general willshire, should join the first column here, and advance together to attack dost mahomed, whose son, mahomed akhbar, had been recalled from jellahabad, with the troops guarding the khyber pass, and had formed a junction with his father; their joint forces, according to our information, amounting to about , men. every arrangement was made for the king and the army marching in a body from here to-morrow; but in the course of the night, messengers arrived, and since (this morning) a great many chiefs and their followers, announcing the dissolution of dost mahomed's army, by the refusal of a great part to advance against us with him, and that he had in consequence fled, with a party of horsemen, in the direction of bamian, leaving his guns behind him, in position, as they were placed at urghundee. his majesty shah shooja has sent forward a confidential officer, with whom has been associated major cureton, of her majesty's th lancers, taking with him a party of men and an officer of artillery, to proceed direct to take possession of those guns, and afterwards such other guns and public stores as may be found in cabool and the balla hissar, in the name of, and for his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk, and the king's order will be carried by his own officer with this party, for preserving the tranquillity of the city of cabool. a strong party has been detached in pursuit of dost mahomed, under some of our most active officers. we continue our march upon cabool to-morrow, and will reach it on the third day. we have, &c., (signed) john keane, lieut.-general, commander-in-chief. (signed) w.h. macnaghten, envoy and minister. * * * * * _extract from a letter from his excellency lieutenant-general sir john keane, k.c.b. and g.c.h., dated head-quarters, camp, cabool, august th, _:-- "it gives me infinite pleasure to be able to address my despatch to your lordship from this capital, the vicinity of which his majesty shah shooja-ool-moolk and the army under my command reached the day before yesterday. the king entered his capital yesterday afternoon, accompanied by the british envoy and minister and the gentlemen of the mission, and by myself, the general and staff officers of this army, and escorted by a squadron of her majesty's th light dragoons, and one of her majesty's th lancers, with captain martin's troop of horse artillery. his majesty had expressed a wish that british troops should be present on the occasion, and a very small party only of his own hindostanee and afghan troops. after the animating scene of traversing the streets, and reaching the palace in the bala hissar, a royal salute was fired, and an additional salvo in the afghan style, from small guns, resembling wall-pieces, named gingalls, and carried on camels. we heartily congratulated his majesty on being in possession of the throne and kingdom of his ancestors, and upon the overthrow of his enemies; and after taking leave of his majesty, we returned to our camp. "i trust we have thus accomplished all the objects which your lordship had in contemplation when you planned and formed the army of the indus, and the expedition into afghanistan. "the conduct of the army both european and native, which your lordship did me the honour to place under my orders, has been admirable throughout, and, notwithstanding the severe marching and privations they have gone through, their appearance and discipline have suffered nothing, and the opportunity afforded them at ghuzni of meeting and conquering their enemy has added greatly to their good spirits. "the joint despatch addressed by mr macnaghten and myself to your lordship, on the rd instant, from shikarbad, will have informed you that at the moment we had made every preparation to attack (on the following day) dost mahomed khan, in his position at urghundee, where, after his son, mahomed akhbar, had joined him from jellahabad, he had an army amounting to , men, well armed and appointed, and thirty pieces of artillery, we suddenly learned that he abandoned them all, and fled, with a party of horsemen, on the road to bamian, leaving his guns in position, as he had placed them to receive our attack. "it appears that a great part of his army, which was hourly becoming disorganized, refused to stand by him in the position to receive our attack, and that it soon became in a state of dissolution. the great bulk immediately came over to shah shooja, tendering their allegiance, and i believe his majesty will take most of them into his pay. "it seems that the news of the quick and determined manner in which we took their stronghold, ghuzni, had such an effect upon the population of cabool, and perhaps also upon the enemy's army, that dost mahomed from that moment began to lose hope of retaining his rule, for even a short time longer, and sent off his family and valuable property towards bamian; but marched out of cabool, with his army and artillery, keeping a bold front towards us until the evening of the nd, when all his hopes were at an end by a division in his own camp, and one part of his army abandoning him. so precipitate was his flight, that be left in position his guns, with their ammunition and wagons, and the greater part of the cattle by which they were drawn. major cureton, of her majesty's th lancers, with his party of men, pushed forward, of the rd, and took possession of those guns, &c. there were twenty-three brass guns in position, and loaded; two more at a little distance, which they attempted to take away; and since then, three more abandoned, still further off on the bamian road; thus leaving in our possession twenty-eight pieces of cannon, with all the materiel belonging to them, which are now handed over to shah shooja-ool-moolk." * * * * * _extract from a letter from w.h. macnaghten, esq., envoy and minister to the court of shah shooja-ool-moolk, dated cabool, th of august, _:-- "by a letter signed jointly by his excellency lieutenant-general sir john keane and myself, dated the rd inst., the right hon. the governor-general was apprised of the flight of dost mahomed khan. "the ex-chief was not accompanied by any person of consequence, and his followers are said to have been reduced to below the number of on the day of his departure. in the progress of shah shooja-ool-moolk towards cabool, his majesty was joined by every person of rank and influence in the country, and he made his triumphal entry into the city on the evening of the th instant. his majesty has taken up his residence in the bala hissar, where he has required the british mission to remain for the present." * * * * * (_from the bombay government gazette extraordinary of august th._) simla, august th, . a letter from shikarbad, of august rd, states-- "the chiefs with their military followers are flocking in by thousands. no better commentary on the feeling regarding dost mahomed khan could be given than the fact of his having been able to induce only out of , men to accompany him; capt. outram and seven other officers accompany the pursuing party." the dates from the army at cabool are to august the th. the letters from thence give the following intelligence:-- "the shah's reception at this place was equally gratifying as at candahar, though the enthusiasm was not so boisterous. "we arrived here yesterday, and, i am happy to say, with a sufficient stock of supplies in our godown to render us quite independent of any foreign purchases for the next ten days, which will keep down prices, and save us from the extravagant rates which we were obliged to purchase at when we reached candahar. i have not been to the city yet, but am told it is far superior to candahar. our people are now very well off; for the increased rations, and abundance and cheapness of grain as we came along, have left them nothing to want or wish for." extract of a further letter from shikarbad, august rd:-- "the afghans have not yet recovered from their astonishment at the rapidity with which ghuzni fell into our hands, nor up to this moment will they believe how it was effected. "this morning we received intelligence of dost mahomed's flight towards bamian; for several days past many of his former adherents had been joining the king. since this morning, thousands of afghans have been coming in to tender their allegiance to his majesty, who is in the greatest spirits at this pacific termination to the campaign, and says that god has now granted all his wishes, --cabool is at hand! "we are all delighted at it. few armies have made so long a march in the same time that the army of the indus has done. the country is every day improving. the road to candahar from where we are now encamped lies in a continued valley seldom stretching in width above two miles; cultivation on each side of the road, and numberless villages nestling under the hills. since we left ghuzni, the fruits have assumed a very fine appearance; the grapes, plums, and apples have become very large, like their brethren of europe. the climate now is very fine. the rapid loghurd river is flowing close to our encampments, and the european soldiers and officers are amusing themselves with fishing in it. we are beginning to get vegetables again. i passed this morning through fields of beans, but only in flower. our attention must be turned to the cultivation of potatoes; they grow in quantities in persia, and this seems to be just the country for them. to revert from small things to great: a party has just been detached towards bamian with a view of cutting off dost mahomed. it would be a great thing to catch him. the party consists chiefly of afghans, headed by hajee khan kaukur, and about eight or ten british officers have been sent with it, to prevent the afghans from committing excesses." from the london gazette extraordinary, _thursday, feb. th._ india board, feb. th. a despatch has been this day received at the east india house, addressed by the governor-general of india to the select committee of the east india company, of which the following is a copy:-- "camp at bhurtpore, dec. th, . "i do myself the honour to forward copies of the despatches noted in the margin, relative to the assault and capture of the fort of kelat. " . the decision, the great military skill, and excellent dispositions, of major-general willshire, in conducting the operations against kelat, appear to me deserving the highest commendation. the gallantry, steadiness, and soldier-like bearing of the troops under his command rendered his plans of action completely successful, thereby again crowning our arms across the indus with signal victory. " . i need not expatiate on the importance of this achievement, from which the best effects must be derived, not only in the vindication of our national honour, but also in confirming the security of intercourse between sinde and afghanistan, and in promoting the safety and tranquillity of the restored monarchy; but i would not omit to point out that the conduct on this occasion of major-general willshire, and of the officers and men under his command, (including the st regiment of bengal native infantry, which had not been employed in the previous active operations of the campaign,) have entitled them to more prominent notice that i was able to give them in my general order of november th; and in recommending these valuable services to the applause of the committee, i trust that i shall not be considered as going beyond my proper province in stating an earnest hope that the conduct of major-general willshire in the direction of the operations will not fail to elicit the approbation of her majesty's government.--i have, &c. "auckland." * * * * * general orders, _by the governor-general of india._ camp doothanee, december th, . the many outrages and murders committed, in attacks on the followers of the army of the indus, by the plundering tribes in the neighbourhood of the bolan pass, at the instigation of their chief, meer mehrab khan, of kelat, at a time when he was professing friendship for the british government, and negotiating a treaty with its representatives, having compelled the government to direct a detachment of the army to proceed to kelat for the exaction of retribution from that chieftain, and for the execution of such arrangements as would establish future security in that quarter, a force, under the orders of major-general willshire, c.b., was employed on this service; and the right hon. the governor-general of india having this day received that officer's report of the successful accomplishment of the objects entrusted to him, has been pleased to direct that the following copy of his despatch, dated the th ultimo, be published for general information. the governor-general is happy to avail himself of this opportunity to record his high admiration of the signal gallantry and spirit of the troops engaged on this occasion, and offers, on the part of the government, his best thanks to major-general willshire, and to the officers and men who served under him. by command of the governor-general, t.h. maddock, officiating secretary to the government of india, with the governor-general. from major-general sir thomas willshire, k.c.b., to the governor-general of india. camp, near kelat, nov. th. . my lord,--in obedience to the joint instructions furnished to me by his excellency the commander-in-chief of the army of the indus, and the envoy and minister to his majesty shah shooja, under date cabool, the th of september, , deputing to me the duty of deposing mehrab khan of kelat, in consequence of the avowed hostility of that chief to the british nation during the present campaign, i have the honour to report, that on my arrival at quettah, on the st ultimo, i communicated with captain bean, the political agent in shawl, and arranged with him the best means of giving effect to the orders i had received. in consequence of the want of public carriage, and the limited quantity of commissariat supplies at quettah, as well as the reported want of forage on the route to kelat, i was obliged to despatch to cutch gundava the whole of the cavalry and the greater portion of the artillery, taking with me only the troops noted in the margin,[b] and leaving quettah on the rd instant. [footnote b: two guns bombay horse artillery; four guns shah's ditto; two ressalaghs local horse; queen's royals; her majesty's th regiment; st regiment bengal native infantry; bombay engineers.] during the march, the communications received from mehrab khan were, so far from acceding to the terms offered, that he threatened resistance if the troops approached his capital. i therefore proceeded, and arrived at the village of giranee, within eight miles of kelat, on the th instant. marching thence the following morning, a body of horse were perceived on the right of the road, which commenced firing on the advanced guard, commanded by major pennycuick, her majesty's th regiment, as the column advanced, and the skirmishing between them continued until we came in sight of kelat, rather less than a mile distant. i now discovered that three heights on the north-west face of the fort, and parallel to the north, were covered with infantry, with five guns in position, protected by small parapet walls. captain peat, chief engineer, immediately reconnoitered; and having reported that nothing could be done until those heights were in our possession, i decided upon at once storming them simultaneously, and, if practicable, entering the fort with the fugitives, as the gate in the northern face was occasionally opened to keep up the communication between the fort and the heights. to effect this object i detached a company from each of the european regiments from the advanced guard with major pennycuick, her majesty's th regiment, for the purpose of occupying the gardens and enclosures to the north-east of the town, and two more companies in the plain, midway between them and the column; at the same time i ordered three columns of attack to be formed, composed of four companies from each corps, under their respective commanding officers, major carruthers, of the queen's, lieutenant-colonel croker, her majesty's th regiment, and major western, st bengal native infantry, the whole under the command of brigadier baumgardt, the remainder of the regiments forming three columns of reserve, under my own direction, to move in support. a hill being allotted to each column, brigadier stevenson, commanding the artillery, moved quickly forward in front towards the base of the heights, and when within the required range opened fire upon the infantry and guns, under cover of which the columns moved steadily on, and commenced the ascent for the purpose of carrying the heights, exposed to the fire of the enemy's guns, which had commenced while the columns of attack were forming. before the columns reached their respective summits of the hills, the enemy, overpowered by the superior and well-directed fire of our artillery, had abandoned them, attempting to carry off their guns, but which they were unable to do. at this moment, it appearing to me the opportunity offered for the troops to get in with the fugitives, and if possible gain possession of the gate of the fortress, i despatched orders to the queen's royal and th regiments to make a rush from the heights for that purpose, following myself to the summit of the nearest, to observe the result. at this moment, the four companies on my left, which had been detached to the gardens and plain, seeing the chance that offered of entering the fort, moved rapidly forward from their respective points towards the gateway, under a heavy and well-directed fire from the walls of the fort and citadel, which were thronged by the enemy. the gate having been closed before the troops moving towards it could effect the desired object, and the garrison strengthened by the enemy driven from the heights, they were compelled to cover themselves, as far as practicable, behind some walls and ruined buildings to the right and left of it, while brigadier stevenson, having ascended the heights with the artillery, opened two guns, under the command of lieutenant foster, bombay horse artillery, upon the defences above the gate and its vicinity, while the fire of two others, commanded by, lieutenant cowper, shah's artillery, was directed against the gate itself; the remaining two, with lieutenant creed, being sent round to the road on the left hand, leading directly up to the gate, and when within two hundred yards, commenced fire, for the purpose of completing in blowing it open, and after a few rounds, they succeeded in knocking in one half of it. on observing this, i rode down the hill towards the gate, pointing to it, thereby announcing to the troops it was open. they instantly rose from their cover and rushed in. those under the command of major pennycuick, being the nearest, were the first to gain the gate, headed by that officer, the whole of the storming columns from the three regiments rapidly following and gaining an entrance, as quick as it was possible to do so, under a heavy fire from the works and from the interior, the enemy making a most gallant and determined resistance, disputing every inch of ground up to the walls of the inner citadel. at this time i directed the reserve column to be brought near the gate, and detached one company of the th regiment, under captain darley, to the western side of the fort, followed by a portion of the st bengal native infantry, commanded by major western, conducted by captain outram, acting as my extra aide-de-camp, for the purpose of securing the heights, under which the southern angle is situated, and intercepting any of the garrison escaping from that side; having driven off the enemy from the heights above, the united detachments then descended to the gate of the fort below, and forced it open before the garrison (who closed it as they saw the troops approach) had time to secure it. when the party was detached by the western face, i also sent two companies from the reserve of the th, under major deshon, and two guns of the shah's artillery, under the command of lieutenant creed, bombay artillery, by the eastern to the southern face, for the purpose of blowing open the gate above alluded to, had it been necessary, as well as the gate of the inner citadel; the infantry joining the other detachments, making their way through the town in the direction of the citadel. after some delay, the troops that held possession of the town at length succeeded in forcing an entrance into the citadel, where a desperate resistance was made by mehrab khan, at the head of his people; he himself, with many of his principal chiefs, being killed sword in hand. several others, however, kept up a fire upon our troops from detached buildings difficult of access, and it was not until late in the afternoon, that those that survived were induced to give themselves up on a promise of their lives being spared. from every account, i have reason to believe the garrison consisted of upwards of fighting men, and that the son of mehrab khan had been expected to join him from nerosky, with a further reinforcement; the enclosed return will shew the strength of the force under my command present at the capture. the defences of the fort, as in the case of ghuzni, far exceeded in strength what i had been led to suppose from previous report, and the towering height of the inner citadel was most formidable, both in appearance and reality. i lament to say that the loss of killed and wounded on our side has been severe, as will be seen by the accompanying return; that on the part of the enemy must have been great, but the exact number i have not been able to ascertain. several hundreds of prisoners were taken, from whom the political agent has selected those he considers it necessary for the present to retain in confinement; the remainder have been liberated. it is quite impossible for me sufficiently to express my admiration of the gallant and steady conduct of the officers and men upon this occasion; but the fact of less than an hour having elapsed from the formation of the columns for the attack to the period of the troops being within the fort, and this performed in the open day, and in the face of an enemy so very superior in numbers, and so perfectly prepared for resistance, will, i trust, convince your lordship how deserving the officers and troops are of my warmest thanks, and of the highest praise that can be bestowed. to brigadier baumgardt, commanding the storming column, my best thanks are due, and he reports that captain willie, acting assistant adjutant-general, and captain gilland, his aide-de-camp, ably assisted him, and zealously performed their duties; also to brigadier stevenson, commanding the artillery, and lieutenants forster and cowper, respectively in charge of the bombay and shah's, artillery. i feel greatly indebted for the steady and scientific manner in which the service of dislodging the enemy from the heights, and afterwards effecting an entrance into the fort, was performed. the brigadier has brought to my notice the assistance he received from captain coghlan, his brigade major, lieutenant woosnam, his aide-de-camp, and lieutenant creed, when in battery yesterday. to lieutenant-colonel croker, commanding her majesty's th regiment; major carruthers, commanding the queen's royals; major western, commanding the bengal st native infantry, i feel highly indebted for the manner in which they conducted their respective columns to the attack of the heights, and afterwards to the assault of the town, as well as to major pennycuick, of the th, who led the advance-guard companies to the same point. to captain peat, chief engineer, and to the officers and men of the engineer corps, my acknowledgments are due; to major neil campbell, acting quartermaster-general of the bombay army; to captain hagart, acting deputy adjutant-general; and to lieutenant ramsay, acting assistant quartermaster-general, my best thanks are due for the able assistance afforded me by their services. from my aides-de-camp, captain robinson and lieutenant halket, as well as from captain outram, who volunteered his services on my personal staff, i received the utmost assistance; and to the latter officer i fell greatly indebted for the zeal and ability with which he has performed various duties that i have required of him, upon other occasions, as well as the present. it is with much pleasure that i state the great assistance i have received from captain bean in obtaining supplies. t. willshire, major-gen., commanding bombay column, army of the indus. * * * * * _return of casualties in the army under the command of major-general willshire, c.b., employed at the storming of kelat, on the th of november, _:-- st troop of cabool artillery-- rank and file, horses, wounded. gun lancers attached to ditto-- rank and file, horse, wounded; corporal, since dead. her majesty's nd, or queen's royal regiment-- lieutenant, rank and file, killed; captains, lieutenants, adjutant, sergeants, rank and file, horse, wounded. her majesty's th regiment-- rank and file, killed; captain, sergeants, rank and file, wounded. st regiment of bengal native infantry-- subadar, rank and file, killed; captain, ensign, jemadars, sergeants, drummer, rank and file, bheestie, wounded. sappers and miners and pioneers-- sergeant wounded. th bengal local horse-- rank and file wounded. total-- lieutenant, subadar, rank and file, killed; captains, lieutenants, ensign, adjutant, jemadars, sergeants, drummer, rank and file, bheestie, horses, wounded. total killed and wounded-- . _names of officers killed and wounded._ killed--her majesty's nd or queen's royal regiment--lieutenant t. gravatt. wounded--her majesty's nd, or queen's royal regiment--captain w.m. lyster, captain t. sealy, lieutenant t.w.e. holdsworth, severely; lieutenant d.j. dickenson, slightly; adjutant j.e. simmons, severely. her majesty's th regiment--captain l.c. bourchier, severely. st regiment of bengal native infantry--captain saurin, slightly; ensign hopper, severely. c. hagart, captain, acting deputy adjutant-gen bombay column, army of the indus. * * * * * _state of the corps engaged at the storming of kelat, on the th of november, , under the command of major-general willshire, c.b._ camp at kelat, november th, . staff-- major-general, brigadiers, aides-de-camp, acting deputy-adjutant general, acting quartermaster-general, deputy assistant-quartermaster-general, brigade-majors, sub-assistant commissary general. detachment rd troop horse artillery-- lieutenants, sergeants, rank and file. st troop cabool artillery-- lieutenant, sergeants, drummer, farier, rank and file. her majesty's nd, or queen's royal regiment-- major, captains, lieutenants, ensign, adjutant, sergeants, drummers, rank and file. her majesty's th regiment-- lieutenant-colonel, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, quartermaster, surgeon, sergeants, drummers, rank and file. st regiment bengal native infantry-- major, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon, native officers, sergeants, drummers, rank and file. sappers and miners and pioneers-- captain, lieutenant, assistant surgeon, native officers, sub-conductor, sergeants, drummers, rank and file. total-- major-general, brigadiers, aides-de-camp, acting deputy adjutant-general, acting quartermaster-general, deputy assistant-quartermaster-general, brigade-majors, sub-assistant-commissary-general, lieutenant-colonel, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, adjutants, quartermasters, surgeons, assistant-surgeon, native officers, sub-conductor, sergeants, drummers, farrier, , rank and file. the sappers and miners and pioneers were not engaged until the gate was taken. c. hagart, captain, acting deputy adjutant-gen., bombay column, army of the indus. note--two russalas of the bengal local horse remained in charge of the baggage during the attack. * * * * * _list of beloochee sirdars killed in the assault of kelat, on the th of november, _:-- meer mehrab khan, chief of kelat. meer wullee mahomed, the muengul sirdar of wudd. abdool kurreem, ruhsanee sirdar. dad kurreen, shahwanee sirdar. mahomed ruzza, nephew of the vizier mahomed hoosein. khysur khan, ahsehrie sirdar. dewan bucha mull, financial minister. noor mahomed and taj mahomed, shagassa sirdars. _prisoners._ mahomed hoossein, vizier. moola ruheem dad, ex-naib of shawl; with several others of inferior rank. j.d.d. dean, political agent. * * * * * capture of the fort and citadel of kelat. political department fort william, dec. , . the hon. the president in council has much satisfaction in publishing the following despatch from major-general willshire, c.b., with the returns annexed to it, reporting the capture of the fort and citadel of kelat, by storm, on the th of november, which brilliant achievement was effected by a force consisting of only men, with the loss, his honour in council grieves to say, of killed and wounded, including amongst the former one officer, lieutenant gravatt, of her majesty's nd, or queen's regiment, and amongst the latter, eight officers. meer mehrab khan himself, and eight other sirdars, were amongst the slain of the enemy. the general order issued by the right hon. the governor-general, on the receipt of this intelligence, is republished, and his honour in council unites with his lordship in recording his high admiration of the signal gallantry and spirit of the troops engaged, and in offering his thanks to major-general willshire, and to the officers and men who served under him on this occasion. a royal salute will be fired from the ramparts of fort william, at noon this day, in honour of the event. by order of the hon. the president in council, h.t. prinsep, secretary to the government of india. the first afghan war. by mowbray morris. london: sampson low, marston, searle, & rivington, crown buildings, , fleet street. . [_all rights reserved._] preface. the following pages pretend to give nothing more than a short summary of events already recorded by recognised authorities. the first afghan war. it was in the year , when the power of napoleon was at its height, that diplomatic relations were first opened between the courts of calcutta and cabul. napoleon, when in egypt, had meditated on the chances of striking a fatal blow at england through her indian dependencies; some correspondence had actually passed between him and tippoo saib on the subject, and subsequently, in , he had concluded a treaty with the russian emperor paul for an invasion of india by a force of , men, to be composed of equal parts of french and russian troops. the proposed line of march was to lie through astrakhan and afghanistan to the indus, and was to be heralded by zemaun shah, who then ruled at cabul, at the head of , afghans. there was but little danger indeed to be apprehended from afghanistan alone, but afghanistan with russia and france in the background was capable of proving a very troublesome enemy. in such circumstances the attitude of persia was of the last importance, and marquess wellesley, then viceroy of india, at once proceeded to convert a possible enemy into a certain and valuable ally. a young officer who had distinguished himself under harris at seringapatam was selected for this delicate service. how the young captain, whom englishmen remember as sir john malcolm, fulfilled his mission is matter of history. a thorough master of all oriental languages, and as skilful in council as he was brave in the field, malcolm soon pledged the court of persia to the interests of england, and not only was it agreed that the two contracting parties should unite to expel any french force that might seek to gain a footing on any of the islands or shores of persia, but the latter government bound itself to "slay and disgrace" any frenchman found in the country. this treaty, which may be thought to have somewhat dangerously stretched the bounds of diplomatic hostility, was, however, never formally ratified, and internal dissensions, culminating in the deposition of zemaun shah by his brother mahmoud, removed all danger from our frontier for a time. but the idea still lived in napoleon's restless heart. the original treaty with paul was discussed with his successor alexander, and in a french mission, with the avowed design of organizing the proposed invasion, was despatched, not to cabul, but to teheran. the magic of napoleon's name was stronger even than british eloquence and british gold, and malcolm, once all-powerful in iran, when he sought to renew the former pledges of amity, was turned back with insult from the persian capital. a second mission, however, despatched direct from london under the guidance of sir harford jones, was more fortunate. napoleon had been defeated in spain, and the news of his defeat had spread. russia was something less eager for the french alliance than she had been in , while between the muscovites and the persians there had long existed a hereditary feud, which the proposed league had by no means served to extinguish. the english envoy, skilfully piecing together these broken threads to his own ends, was enabled with little loss of time to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance between great britain and persia, the earliest result of which was the immediate dismissal of the french mission. by this treaty the persian king bound himself not to permit the passage through his dominions of any force hostile to india, and, in the event of war arising between england and afghanistan, to invade the latter at the cost of the former; furthermore, he declared null all treaties previously concluded by him with any other european power. the english, in their turn, pledged themselves to assist him, should his kingdom be invaded, either with men or money and arms, but should the war be one only with afghanistan, they were not to interfere unless their interference was sought by both parties. though this treaty was concluded in - , it was not formally ratified till november , . not on persia alone, however, was the english government content to rely. in a friendly afghanistan was a second most serviceable string which it had been the height of imprudence to let another fit to his bow. the two countries stood in almost precisely similar relations to english india; each as an enemy contemptible single-handed, but a dangerous item in an invading force; each a useful ally, and each a salutary check upon the other. at the same time, then, as sir harford jones was neutralizing the french influence at teheran, the honourable mountstuart elphinstone was despatched by lord minto, who had succeeded lord wellesley at calcutta, to the court of cabul. previous to the year afghanistan was practically a _terra incognita_ to englishmen. zemaun shah, the once terrible ameer whose threatened invasion had disturbed even the strong mind of lord wellesley, was, indeed, in their hands, living, dethroned and blinded, a pensioner on their bounty at loodhianah, but of the country he had once ruled over and of the subjects who had driven him into exile but little was known in calcutta and still less in london. before the close of the eighteenth century but one englishman had ever penetrated into that unknown land. forster, a member of the bengal civil service, in - had crossed the punjab to cashmere, and thence had descended through the great khyber and koord-cabul passes to the afghan stronghold, whence journeying on by ghuznee, candahar, and herat he had won his way to the borders of the caspian sea. his book was not published till some fifteen years after, and shows chiefly, to use kaye's words, "how much during the last seventy years the afghan empire and how little the afghan character is changed." but the labour and intelligence of one man, however much they may profit himself, have rarely by themselves added much to the knowledge of a nation. many well-read englishmen could still own to little more than a vague idea of afghanistan; that it was a bare and rocky country, which the heat of summer and the cold of winter alike rendered impervious to travellers, happily shut out from more civilised regions by a mighty barrier of mountains, topped with eternal snow, through which, by passes inaccessible to all save the mountaineers themselves, hordes of savage warriors had in earlier days poured down in irresistible flood on the fertile valleys of the indus. elphinstone let in more light on the gloomy and mysterious scene. though with his own eyes he saw but little of the country and the people, as his journey was stayed at peshawur, he acquired from various sources a vast amount of information, which he reproduced with extraordinary distinctness. his book rapidly became the acknowledged text-book of the history and geography of the country, and may still be read with pleasure and studied with profit. it would have been well if one of the lessons he taught had been better laid to heart; and thirty years later his unfortunate namesake must have recalled with peculiar bitterness all he had once read of the ingrained treachery of the afghan character. the mission was in itself entirely successful, though the rapid march of events soon neutralised, and eventually wholly destroyed its work. shah soojah, a name to be before many years but too familiar to english ears, received the envoys at peshawur, then one of the chief cities of his kingdom. he appeared to them in royal state, seated on a golden throne, and blazing with jewels, chief among which shone forth in a gorgeous bracelet the mighty koh-i-noor. nor were the english outdone in magnificence. the entire mission was on a scale of profuse splendour, and the presents they brought with them so numerous and so costly that when, thirty years later, burnes arrived in cabul the courtiers turned in disgust from what kaye contemptuously calls "his pins and needles, and little articles of hardware, such as would have disgraced the wallet of a pedlar of low repute." the envoys were most hospitably received, and elphinstone formed a very favourable opinion of the character of soojah, whom he described as both affable and dignified and bearing the "manners of a gentleman." he listened attentively to the envoys' proposals, and declared that "england and cabul were designed by the creator to be united by bonds of everlasting friendship," but at the same time he confessed his country to be in such an unsettled condition, and his own throne so insecure, that, for the present, the best advice he could give the english gentlemen was that they should retire beyond the frontier. on june th, , therefore, the mission set out on its homeward journey, having, however, arranged a treaty, which was shortly after formally ratified by lord minto at calcutta, by which soojah bound himself to treat the french, if allied with the persians, much as the persian monarch had pledged himself to behave to them if allied with the afghans. but even at the very time of ratification this treaty had been practically rendered null by the success of sir harford jones's mission to teheran, and within a year soojah had been deposed by his brother mahmoud, from whom he had himself wrested the crown, and was a captive in the hands of runjeet singh. the final overthrow of napoleon in removed all fears of a french advance on india, but in its stead arose the still more imminent shadow of russia. for many years past that shadow had been looming larger and larger to the eyes of the kings of teheran, till the annexation of georgia brought the eagles of the czar over the caucasus up to the very frontier of their northern provinces. the english alliance, and an army drilled under the supervision of english officers, had, however, turned the head of the persian king, and his heir, abbas mirza, at the head of , troops, of whom half were drilled and equipped after the english fashion, dared, in , to throw down the gauntlet to the czar. he paid dearly for his daring. english drill and english arms availed him little without english officers. his son, mahomed mirza, was utterly routed with the division under his command, and soon after he himself was defeated in open battle by the russian paskewitch with a loss of men. the english help, promised by the treaty of in the event of persia becoming involved in war with any european power, was not forthcoming. mediation took the place of armed men, and with the help of great britain a peace was concluded in between the two powers, humiliating to persia, and ultimately disastrous to england. by this treaty persia lost the khanates of erivan and nakhichevan, and practically her whole defensive frontier to the north. in sir harford jones's words, "persia was delivered, bound hand and foot, to the court of st. petersburg." the territory acquired by russia was nearly equal in extent to the whole of england, and her outposts were brought within a few days' march of the persian capital. from that time, up to lord auckland's arrival at calcutta in , persia was little more than a minion of the czar, used by him to cover the steady advance of his battalions eastward. the death of futteh ali shah, at ispahan in , snapped the last link that bound persia to our interests. futteh ali, as far as lay in his power, had ever striven to remain faithful to his english allies, and to resist, as far as he dared, russian intrigue and russian influence within his kingdom. but his son and grandson had welcomed the muscovite alliance with open arms, and when the latter ascended the throne on his grandfather's death, it was evident that the czar would be paramount at the persian court. mahomed mirza shah, the new king, had long dreamed of the conquest of herat and the extension of his eastern frontier, and had more than once, in his grandfather's lifetime, striven to turn his dreams to facts. nothing could have been more favourable to the russian plans, and no sooner was mahomed secure upon the throne than he was urged to the immediate execution of his long-cherished designs. such was the state of affairs when lord auckland was despatched by lord melbourne in to take the reins of indian government from the hands of sir charles metcalfe. meanwhile many changes had taken place at cabul. the weak and dissolute mahmoud, the deposer of soojah, proved no more than a puppet in the hands of his vizier, futteh khan, the head of the great barukzye tribe. the youngest of the twenty brothers of this able and powerful chief was the celebrated dost mahomed. born of a woman of an inferior tribe, he had entered life as a sweeper of the sacred tomb of lamech. from thence he was promoted to hold a menial office about the person of his great brother, into whose favour he at length rose by the murder, when only a boy of fourteen, of one of the vizier's enemies. from that time his rise was steady, and as he rose so did he discard the follies and excesses of his youth, displaying a daring and heroic spirit, great military address, and a power of self-discipline and self-control unparalleled among the chiefs of central asia. to his hands was entrusted the execution of the vizier's project for establishing the barukzyes in herat, then held by a brother of the reigning king. the design was completely successful for the moment, owing to the daring and also to the treachery of dost mahomed, but the blow recoiled with fearful force on the person of the vizier. returning from his raid against the persians, which had been the ostensible pretext for his march to herat, futteh khan was seized by prince kamran, son of mahmoud; his eyes were put out, and persisting in his refusal to give up his brother to the prince's vengeance, he was hacked to pieces before the whole court. this brutal act finally overthrew the long tottering dynasty of the suddozyes, who had been kings in cabul since ahmed shah founded the afghan empire in . dost mahomed's vengeance was sudden and no less brutal. but it is impossible in this limited space to enter into all the details of his rise to the chief seat of power. it must suffice to say that when lord auckland entered on his government dost mahomed was firmly seated on the throne of cabul, and the whole of the country in the hands of the barukzye sirdars, with the exception of herat, where kamran still reigned, the last remnant, save the exiled soojah, of the legitimate line. shortly after lord auckland's arrival at calcutta dost mahomed addressed to him a letter of congratulation on his assumption of office. adverting to his quarrel with the sikhs, who, under runjeet singh, the old one-eyed "lion of the punjab," had wrested the rich valley of peshawur from the afghan empire, he said, "the late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of the reckless and misguided sikhs, and their breach of treaty, are well known to your lordship. communicate to me whatever may suggest itself to your wisdom for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance." and he concluded with a hope that "your lordship will consider me and my country as your own." to this complimentary effusion the viceroy returned a suitable reply, assuring the ameer of his wish that the afghans should become a "flourishing and united nation," but declining to interfere in the sikh quarrel, on the plea that it was not "the practice of the british government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states." it was hinted, too, that "some gentleman" would probably be deputed to the ameer's court to discuss certain "commercial topics." this plan, which had originally commended itself to lord william bentinck, shortly after took effect in the despatch of captain alexander burnes to cabul. but by this time affairs in persia had reached a crisis. though mahomed shah, breathing fire and sword against herat, had ascended the throne in , it was not till that his threats took practical shape. despite the ceaseless promptings of the russian minister at teheran (who, it is perhaps needless to say, had, according to his own government, done his best to dissuade mahomed from any advance on the afghan frontier), the shah still hung back. if kamran would send hostages and a large present, would own the persian king as sovereign, coin money, and have prayers read in his name, all should be well. the hostages and the present kamran was content to allow, but the rest he could not stomach. the barukzye chief who ruled at candahar viewed the proposed invasion with complaisance, hoping to secure herat for himself, and being perfectly willing to hold it as a fief of persia. he even went so far as to propose to send one of his sons to the persian camp as hostage for his fidelity, and to secure the best terms for himself and his brothers. dost mahomed warned him that if he did so he would be made "to bite the finger of repentance," but the warning was disregarded. egged on by the flattering assurances of the inestimable advantages to be derived from a persian alliance, that the russian agent did not cease to lay before him, kohun dil khan disobeyed the commands of his chief; the boy was to be sent, and the alliance was to be completed. mahomed shah then commenced his march against herat, and at the same time burnes appeared at cabul. "thus," says kaye, "the seeds of the afghan war were sown." burnes had been at cabul before. he had gone there in , with the sanction of lord william bentinck, and had been courteously received by dost mahomed, of whom he had formed a very favourable opinion, in contrast with that which he entertained of the weak and vacillating soojah. his opinion of the ameer was, probably, in the main a correct one, but he scarcely seems to have exercised his usual judgment when he declared the afghans to be "a simple-minded, sober people, of frank and open manners." returning in the following year, burnes was sent to england to impart to the authorities at home the results of his travels and observations. in london he was received with the greatest enthusiasm. his book was published, and read by every one. he became the "lion" of the season, and the name of "bokhara burnes" was to be seen in every list of fashionable entertainments. returning to india in , he was soon removed from cutch, where he had acted as assistant to the resident, on a mission to the ameers of sindh. while still engaged in that duty he received notice to hold himself in readiness to proceed to cabul, and on november , , he sailed from bombay "to work out the policy of opening the river indus to commerce." that lord auckland had at that time any idea, much less any definite plan, of interfering in afghan politics is most unlikely, as it is certain lord william bentinck had not when he first thought of this "commercial" mission. it is worthy of note, however, that when burnes first broached the plan to the court of directors at home they refused to countenance it, feeling, in the words of the chairman, mr. tucker, "perfectly assured that it must soon degenerate into a political agency, and that we should, as a necessary consequence, be involved in all the entanglements of afghan politics." mr. grant, of the board of control, held similar views, and sir charles metcalfe in an emphatic minute pointed out the evils of this "commercial agency." the die, however, was cast, and on september , , burnes for the second time entered cabul. as before, dost mahomed received him with all courtesy, and with "great pomp and splendour." the navigation of the indus soon disappeared into the background. from burnes's own letters to macnaghten, the political secretary at calcutta, it may be seen how much of importance he himself attached to his commercial character. nevertheless, at a private interview, "which lasted till midnight," with the ameer, he talked a good deal about the indus, and about trade, and other such harmless topics. the ameer listened with the greatest attention, but when it came to his turn to speak, he substituted for the indus the word peshawur, and for commerce, the ability and resources of runjeet singh. if only he could regain peshawur it was very evident that whoso would might hold the trade of the indus. on this head burnes was cautious. he suggested that possibly some arrangement might be concluded with runjeet singh by which peshawur might be restored to the ameer's brother mahomed, from whose government the sikhs had originally won it. but the ameer wanted it for himself, and by no manner of means for his brother. further than this, however, burnes would not commit himself. he distinctly stated, moreover, that neither dost mahomed nor his brothers (should they decline the persian alliance, of which the ameer, and probably with sincerity, declared himself in no way desirous) must found any hopes on british aid. sympathy he promised largely, should they behave themselves well, but not a single rupee nor a single musket. still, even after this, the ameer persisted in his professions of friendship to the english, nor is there any reason to doubt that he, at that time, meant what he said. nay, he even offered himself to compel his brothers at candahar to break once and for all with the shah; but this burnes declined, exhorting him, however, to use all pacific means to influence them, and himself writing to kohun dil to threaten him with the displeasure of england if he continued his intrigues with the persian and russian courts. at that particular time the candahar chiefs had rather cooled in their desire for the persian alliance, and began to have suspicions that instead of obtaining herat they were not unlikely to lose candahar. burnes thereupon despatched lieutenant leech, an officer of his mission, to them, promising them that should the persian army after the fall of herat advance on candahar, he would himself march with dost mahomed to their defence, which he would further with all the means in his power. it was a bold step, but as many thought at the time, and as nearly all were agreed afterwards, it was by far the best that could have been taken. lord auckland, however, thought, or was advised to think otherwise. burnes was severely censured for having so far exceeded his instructions--though he might well have pleaded in excuse that he knew not what were the instructions he had exceeded--and ordered at once to "set himself right with the chiefs." there was nothing left for him but to obey, and the result of his obedience was a treaty concluded between the chiefs and the shah under a russian guarantee. such a risk was not to be run again, nor was burnes for the future to be able to plead any want of definite instructions. from this time forward his instructions were, indeed, explicit enough. briefly they may be defined as to ask for everything and to give nothing. in vain did dost mahomed point out that in desiring to regain peshawur from the sikhs, he was doing practically no more than england was avowedly bent on doing, on guarding his frontier from danger, and that to exchange runjeet singh for his brother mahomed was but to make his last state worse than his first. burnes himself fully recognized the justice of his arguments, but burnes's masters remained obstinately deaf. all they would promise was to restrain runjeet singh from attacking dost mahomed, provided dost mahomed in return bound himself to abstain from an alliance with any other state. at this, says burnes, the sirdars only laughed. "such a promise," said jubbar khan, the ameer's brother, and a staunch champion of the english cause, "such a promise amounts to nothing, for we are not under the apprehension of any aggressions from lahore; they have hitherto been on the side of the ameer, not of runjeet singh, and yet for such a promise you expect us to desist from all intercourse with russia, with persia, with toorkistan, with every nation but england." to make matters still worse, at this crisis a new actor appeared on the scene, the russian vickovitch, bearing letters from count simonich and from the czar himself, though the latter was unsigned, so as to be repudiated or acknowledged as events might require. the ameer, still willing to please the british, offered to turn the russian back from his gates, but that, burnes pointed out, would be contrary to the rule of civilised nations, and vickovitch was therefore allowed to enter cabul and to present his letters, which were ostensibly, as those of burnes had been, of a purely commercial bearing. what burnes, however, thought of the arrival, he showed plainly enough in a letter written a few days after to a private friend. "we are in a mess here," he writes. "the emperor of russia has sent an envoy to cabul with a blazing letter three feet long, offering dost mahomed money to fight runjeet singh.... it is now a neck-and-neck race between russia and ourselves, and if his lordship would hear reason he would forthwith send agents to bokhara, herat, candahar, and koondooz, not forgetting sindh." his lordship, however, would not hear such reason as burnes had to offer, and when on march th, , certain specific demands were presented by the ameer, that the english should protect cabul and candahar from persia, that runjeet singh should be compelled to restore peshawur, and various others of the same tendency, burnes could only, in the name of the british government, refuse his assent to any and all of them, and then sit down to write a formal request for his dismissal. one more attempt was made by dost mahomed to come to terms, but it was of no use. the old ground was traversed again, and only with the old result. as a last resource the ameer wrote to lord auckland in terms almost of humility, imploring him "to remedy the grievances of the afghans," and to "give them a little encouragement and power." this was the last effort, and it failed. then the game was up indeed. vickovitch was sent for and received with every mark of honour; one of the candahar chiefs came up in haste to cabul, and on april th, , burnes turned his back on the afghan capital. as the russian here disappears from our story a a few words as to his subsequent career and end may not be out of place. after the departure of the english envoy he flung himself heart and soul into his business; promising men, promising money, promising everything that the ameer asked. he even proposed to visit lahore and use his good offices with runjeet singh, but that plea failed, owing chiefly to the address of mackeson, our agent at lahore. for a time the russian was all-powerful throughout afghanistan, but after the repulse of the persians from herat and the entry of the english into cabul his star paled. he proceeded to teheran to give a full report of his doings to the russian minister there, and by him was ordered to proceed direct to st. petersburg. arrived there, flattered with hope, for he felt he had done all man could do, he reported himself to count nesselrode. the minister refused to see him. "i know no captain vickovitch," was the answer, "except an adventurer of that name who is reported to have been lately engaged in some unauthorised intrigues at cabul and candahar." vickovitch understood the answer thoroughly. he knew that severe remonstrance had been sent from london to st. petersburg; he knew his own government only too well. he went home, burnt his papers, wrote a few lines of reproach, and blew his brains out. to return to cabul. notwithstanding the russian promises, and the exultation of his brothers at candahar, the ameer felt that he had acted unwisely. very soon he saw that russia could do little more than promise, and that england had made up her mind to perform. despite russian money and russian men, the shah could not force his way into herat while eldred pottinger stood behind the crumbling walls, and a vast army was assembling on the banks of the indus to drive dost mahomed and the whole barukzye clan from power. to keep friends with the afghan ruler and to preserve the independence of his empire was the obvious policy of the british government. but the authorities at simlah, lord auckland, mr. macnaghten, mr. henry torrens and mr. john colvin, had determined that that ruler should be, not the barukzye dost mahomed, a man of proved energy and ability, who had shown himself anxious to cultivate the friendship of england, and who possessed the confidence and the favour of his subjects, but the suddozye shah soojah, who, though born of the legitimate line, was no less a usurper than dost mahomed himself, who was regarded by the majority of his countrymen with indifference and contempt, and who more than once had proved alike his inability to administer and to maintain dominion. by what process of reasoning the viceroy arrived at this remarkable conclusion has never been made perfectly clear, but though he alone, notwithstanding sir john hobhouse's generous declaration from the board of control, will be, rightly or wrongly, held by posterity responsible for the disastrous events which followed, it is at least to his credit that he left no stone unturned to arrive at the opinions of all competent advisers before deciding on his own. prominent among these was mr. mcneill, then our envoy at the court of teheran, a man of keen powers of observation and undoubted ability, who may be said to share with pottinger the glory of the persian repulse from herat. his plan, as he impressed more than once on burnes, was to consolidate the afghan empire under dost mahomed. placing no reliance on the sincerity of the candahar chiefs, he yet entertained a high opinion of the ameer himself, whom he would have been well pleased to see established in herat and candahar as well as in cabul. mcneill's correspondence, however, had to pass through the hands of captain, afterwards sir claudius, wade, himself also well versed in the politics of central asia, and at that time holding the responsible post of governor-general's agent on the north-western frontier. wade forwarded a copy of mcneill's letter to the governor, and forwarded with it one from himself in which he strongly deprecated the policy of consolidation. to him it seemed better that the afghan empire should remain, as it then was, sub-divided into practically independent states, each of whom, as he conceived, would be more likely in their own interests to court our friendship and to meet our views, than if brought under the yoke of one ruler, to whom they could never be expected to yield a passive obedience. "supposing," he continued, "we were to aid dost mahomed to overthrow in the first place his brother at candahar, and then his suddozye rival at herat, what would be the consequence? as the system of which it is intended to be a part would go to gratify the longing wish of mahomed shah for the annexation of herat to his dominions, the first results would be that the shah-zadah kamran would apply to persia, and offer, on the condition of her assistance to save him from the fate which impended over his head, to submit to all the demands of that general, which kamran has hitherto so resolutely and successfully resisted, and between his fears and the attempts of dost mahomed to take it, herat, which is regarded by everyone who has studied its situation as the key to afghanistan, would inevitably fall prostrate before the arms of persia, by the effect of the very measures which we had designed for its security from persian thraldom." that it was our interest to maintain the independence of herat was obvious, so long as herat was able to remain in the position it was then assuming, that of a barrier against russo-persian invasion. prince kamran was, in fact, then playing our game as well as we could have played it ourselves. but the question was, how long would herat be able to retain its independence? the fall of herat meant the fall of candahar, and the absorption of all southern and western afghanistan into a persian province, and a persian province was then but another name for a russian province. could it have been possible, and that mcneill thought it possible was a strong argument in its favour, to consolidate the various states under one ruler strong enough to retain the reins when once placed in his hands, herat and candahar would have been secured for ever, and there would have arisen in a united afghanistan a perpetual barrier to russian ambition. had we come to terms with dost mahomed, in all human probability we should not have had to chastise the insolence of his son. burnes for his part still championed the cause of the ameer, urging that it was not yet too late to secure his friendship, that, despite all that had taken place, he still wanted only the smallest encouragement to range himself on our side, and that as whatever action was taken could not be taken save at some cost, the money could not be better spent than on dost mahomed. but when burnes's opinion was asked, the government had already decided on their policy, and as dost mahomed was to go, he was only asked to pronounce on the expediency of choosing soojah as his successor. it seemed to him that mcneill's plan, of which he was a staunch advocate, would be better served by restoring soojah to his crown than by giving it to sultan mahomed or any other of the chiefs, who would probably be but a tool in the hands of the sikhs, themselves objects of bitter hatred to the afghans. as the government, then, were committed to one of two evils, burnes gave his vote in favour of that which seemed to him the least, and which he, in common with the rest of the council, believed could be accomplished with little danger and at comparatively little expense. lord auckland's first idea was that the deposition of dost mahomed should be effected by the combined forces of runjeet singh and soojah, raised and drilled under british supervision, and assisted by british gold--in kaye's words, "england was to remain in the background, jingling the money-bag." such were the first instructions issued to the mission sent in may, , to sound runjeet singh on the design, but scarcely had they been written when the thought of employing british troops seems first to have dawned in, or been introduced into lord auckland's mind. he would have preferred that the two princes should undertake the work on their own account, while he contributed merely his countenance and perhaps some money, but he was very doubtful whether the princes would see the matter in the same light. macnaghten, the leader of the mission, was instructed therefore to suggest the first course to runjeet singh, and should he view that with disfavour, to hold out the possibility of some sort of "demonstration" being undertaken by british troops from some convenient point. the event proved that lord auckland's doubts were just. the sikh prince heard the proposal for restoring soojah with pleasure, and at once gave his consent to the plan; but when macnaghten, cautiously feeling his way, hinted that an army of sikhs, together with such a force as soojah could raise with british help, would be amply sufficient, the crafty old man stopped him with an emphatic refusal. that england should become a third party to the treaty already existing between him and soojah was, in his own phrase "adding sugar to milk;" he was willing, moreover, himself to play such a part as england might deem necessary; but with the independent expedition he would have nothing to do. macnaghten therefore at once returned to his original proposal, and after a good deal of fencing and delay on bunjeet singh's part, the treaty was concluded. from soojah, of course, little difficulty was to be anticipated, but he, unlike runjeet singh, though willing to employ british gold and british skill in equipping and disciplining the forces he declared his ability at once to bring to his standard, was by no means anxious to see a british force in the field with him. he was doubtful what effect such an apparition in their strongholds might have upon his countrymen, nor was he at all desirous to appear as owing his throne to british bayonets. he proposed that his own force should proceed by way of the bolan pass on candahar and ghuznee, while the sikhs, with whom should go his son timour, should march on the capital through the khyber and koord-cabul defiles. already, he said, had he received offers of allegiance from numerous chiefs discontented with the barukzye rule, and offended at dost mahomed's alliance with the persians, prominent among whom appeared, strangely enough, the name of abdoolah khan, destined to become the prime mover in the insurrection which ultimately cost soojah his life, and restored the barukzye dynasty. "the faggots," they wrote, "are ready; it only requires the lighted torch to be applied." soojah therefore was urgent with macnaghten that he should be allowed to accomplish his restoration with his own troops, as he expressed himself confident of doing; a feat which would greatly tend to raise his character among his countrymen, while the fact of his being "upheld by foreign force alone could not fail to detract in a great measure from his dignity and consequence." soojah's wishes, in fact, tallied precisely with lord auckland's original design, but every day brought fresh complications, with fresh confirmation of the impracticability of that design. first soojah and runjeet singh alone were to be the agents; then a british force was to "demonstrate" in reserve at shikarpoor; next a few british regiments were to be added to soojah's levies. finally, all these plans were dismissed, and one wholly different to any lord auckland had hitherto dreamed of was substituted in their stead. sir henry fane, commander-in-chief of the british army in india, was then at simlah, with lord auckland. that he had from the first disapproved of english interference with afghan politics the following passage from his correspondence with sir charles metcalfe, written in , sufficiently proves. "every advance you might make beyond the sutlej to the westward, in my opinion, adds to your military weakness ... if you want your empire to expand, expand it over oude or over gwalior and the remains of the mahratta empire. make yourselves complete sovereigns of all within your bounds, _but let alone the far west_." but as it had been decided that the work was to be done, he was vehement in his opinion that it should be done as thoroughly as possible. with a "fine old tory" contempt of anything approaching to economy, he advised the employment of a regular british force, horse, foot, and artillery, with which there could be no possibility of a reverse, a contingency in the peculiar circumstances of the case to be guarded against with more than common care. there were, still nearer to the viceroy's person, other and even warmer advocates of the same policy; so after some weeks of suspense and oscillation lord auckland yielded, and the fiat for the "army of the indus" went forth. in august the regiments selected were warned for field service, and in september a general order published the constitution of the force. it was to be divided into two columns, the bengal column and the bombay column. the former was to consist of a brigade of artillery under colonel graham; a brigade of cavalry under colonel arnold; and five brigades of infantry under colonels sale and bennie, of her majesty's, and colonels nott, roberts, and worseley, of the company's service. the latter were told off into two divisions under sir willoughby cotton, an officer of her majesty's army, who had seen service in the burmese war, and major-general duncan, of the company's army. the whole was to be under the personal command of sir henry fane himself. the bombay column was to consist of a brigade of artillery under colonel stevenson; a brigade of cavalry under major-general thackwell; a brigade of infantry under major-general wiltshire; the whole to be under the command of sir john keane, commander-in-chief of the bombay army. the english regiments selected were, besides the artillery, in the bengal column, the th lancers and the rd and th regiments of the line; in the bombay column, the th dragoons and the nd and th regiments of the line. besides these troops, soojah's own levies were being actively raised on the other side of the indus, under the supervision of captain wade, who found it no easy matter to quiet the afghan's not unfounded fears lest he should come to be no more than a puppet in the hands of the english officers, and his restoration finally effected, not by his own arms, but by the english bayonets. though the sympathies of the majority of our army were rather with dost mahomed than with soojah, and it was far from clear to them on what pretext they were to invade the former's kingdom, the prospect of active employment after so many years of repose was popular with all classes of military men, and from every quarter of india officers, leaving without a murmur the luxurious ease of well-paid staff appointments, made haste to rejoin their regiments. scarcely less important than the selection of the military commands was the selection of the envoys who were to accompany the different columns in a political capacity. wade of course was to march with the sikh force destined to escort prince timour through the khyber pass to his father's capital, but it was not so easy to determine on whom should devolve the delicate duty of directing the mind of soojah himself, and shaping the political course of his operations. sir henry fane not unreasonably wished that the entire control, political as well as military, should be vested in his own hands, and proposed to take burnes with him as his confidential adviser. but lord auckland had other views, and, contrary to general expectation, his choice fell on macnaghten, under whom burnes, after a momentary, and not unnatural, fit of disgust, agreed to serve in a subordinate capacity, believing, in common with others, that soojah once firmly seated on the throne, macnaghten would return, and the chief control of affairs would then devolve upon him. on october st the declaration of war was issued. if our officers were doubtful before as to the right of their cause this document certainly tended but little to solve their doubts. hardly, moreover, had the simlah manifesto had time to penetrate through india when news arrived of the raising of the siege of herat. as the deliverance of herat, and western afghanistan generally, from persian rule had formed, according to the proclamation, the principal object of the expedition, it was supposed that the english army would now be disbanded, and soojah and runjeet singh left to their own devices. even those of the authorities at home who had allowed that, while a persian force was still at the gates of herat, lord auckland could not do otherwise than prepare for its defence, were unanimously of opinion that the motive for the expedition had now ceased to exist. among such authorities conspicuously appear the names of the duke of wellington, lord wellesley, sir charles metcalfe, mountstuart elphinstone, and others of scarce less weight and experience. lord auckland and his advisers were not, however, of this number. the army was to be reduced in strength, it is true, since there was no longer any prospect of an encounter with persia, or possibly with russia, but the expedition was in no way to be abandoned. instead of two divisions the bengal column was to consist only of one; two brigades of infantry were to be left behind; and the cavalry and artillery were to be proportionately reduced. nor was sir henry fane inclined to retain the command of a force whose numbers were so diminished, and whose probabilities of action were so limited. the bengal column was therefore placed in the hands of sir willoughby cotton, and on its junction with the column from bombay the chief command was to fall to sir john keane, who led the latter force. all things were now ready, but before the army broke ground a grand ceremony was to take place, a ceremony which had indeed been arranged before any note of war had been sounded. on november th lord auckland and runjeet singh met at ferozepore. it was a magnificent pageant. the viceroy's camp was pitched about four miles from the river gharra. the english army lay on the plain, a noble force, in perfect order and condition, and brought together, according to havelock, in a manner that had never before been equalled. escorted by the principal military and political english officers, runjeet singh rode up on his elephant through a splendid guard of honour, amid the thunder of artillery and the clash of innumerable bands, to the durbar tent. lord auckland and sir henry fane rode out to meet him, and as the two cavalcades joined such was the crush and uproar that many of the sikh chiefs, thinking there was some design afoot on their prince, began "to blow their matches and grasp their weapons with a mingled air of distrust and ferocity." with some difficulty a passage was cleared, and the little decrepit old man, supported by the viceroy and the commander-in-chief, entered the tent where the costly presents prepared for him were laid out. ordnance of british make, horses and elephants magnificently caparisoned, were all inspected and admired, and, while a royal salute thundered without, the prince bowed low before a picture of queen victoria, borne into his presence by sir willoughby cotton. as the infirm old chief was being conducted round the tent he stumbled and fell to the ground at the very muzzle of one of the british guns. a murmur of horror arose from his sirdars at so dire an omen, but as the viceroy and sir henry fane hastened to raise him to his feet, their hearts were comforted by the reflection that though their chief had fallen before the british guns, the highest representatives of the british queen had raised him again to his feet. on the following day the visit was returned amid a scene of still greater splendour and variety. according to an eye-witness "the sikhs shone down the english." all the great sirdars were present in their most gorgeous trappings and mounted on their finest steeds, while from a sikh band the strains of our own national anthem rose upon the air, and from the sikh guns pealed forth the salute ordained for royalty alone. it must be confessed, however, that runjeet singh's ideas of ceremony were not all of the same exalted nature. at a later period of the day, after all the due formalities were over, the viceroy was required to be present at "an unseemly display of dancing girls, and the antics of some male buffoons." the two following days were devoted to military exercises. on the first sir henry fane manoeuvred the british force with elaborate skill and display; and on the second the sikh cavalry executed some less intricate movements with the unqualified approval of their experienced critics. with this the ceremony was at an end. runjeet singh returned to lahore, and the viceroy followed him on his first visit to the sikh principality. the final dispositions and selections were made by the commander-in-chief. a few weeks previously soojah's levies, about strong, horse, foot, and artillery, under the command of major-general simpson, had left loodhianah on their way to the front, and on december th, , the british troops marched out from ferozepore on their first stage to the afghan capital. a glance at the map will suffice to show that a more direct route might have been found from ferozepore to cabul than down the bank of the indus to bukkur, thence, across the river, by shikarpoor and dadur, through the bolan pass, to quettah, and from quettah, through the kojuck, by candahar and ghuznee to cabul. in short, as kaye points out, the army was about to traverse two sides of a triangle, instead of shaping its course along a third. but there were two important reasons for the choice of the longer route. in the first place, runjeet singh had strong objections to opening the punjab to our troops; and in the second place the ameers of sindh were to be "coerced." shikarpoor, on the northern bank of the indus, had originally formed a part of the great douranee empire, handed down by timour to zemaun shah and his brothers, intact as it had been received from the founder, ahmed. but piece by piece the kingdom had been dismembered through the quarrels and weaknesses of its rulers. cashmere, and mooltan, and peshawur had been won by the sikhs; herat had risen to independence; while shikarpoor with a fair slice of the southern frontier had passed to the ameers of sindh. but though shikarpoor was theirs, they held, or had held it, in consideration only of a yearly tribute, which tribute, unpaid through many years, had now swelled, as soojah maintained, to no less a sum than twenty lakhs of rupees, a sum gratuitously increased by the english government to twenty-five lakhs, that the terms of runjeet singh (who was to have received half, but had lately increased his wants) might be granted without soojah being the sufferer. the ameers themselves, however, told a different tale. independently of their not unreasonable objections to the validity of a claim that had been suffered to slumber for upwards of thirty years, they were enabled triumphantly, as they supposed, to point to two releases of the debt, written in korans, and signed and sealed by soojah. thus fortified, they declared to colonel pottinger, our agent at hyderabad, that "they were sure the governor-general did not intend to make them pay again for what they had already bought and obtained, in the most binding way, a receipt in full"--a mark of confidence which pottinger was instructed to demolish without delay. nor was this the only difficulty that the passage through sindh promised to present. in the treaty which had opened the indus to navigation, it had been expressly stipulated that the river should be free to commerce only, and it became therefore necessary, for the transport of our army, that this treaty should be broken. pottinger, sorely against his will, was ordered to point out to the ameers that if they placed any obstacles in the way of the "first and necessary" undertaking on which their english friends had embarked, it would be the painful duty of those friends to take steps to ensure a more ready and hearty co-operation. in other words, the ameers were told that if they did not do what was wanted of them, they would be turned out to make room for those who would. they must pay the twenty-five lakhs of rupees, the greater part of which would go into the pockets of a man to whom they were indebted not one single anna; they must consent to the violation of the treaty of the indus, and they must further the advance of our army through their territory in every possible way. if they did not agree to these demands, they would find the consequences disagreeable. it did not at first appear that they were likely to agree. burnes had, indeed, managed to settle the difficulty of the indus, and the ameers of khyrpore, more tractable than the hyderabad princes, had agreed temporarily to cede to the british the fortress of bukkur, the point selected for the passage. soojah with his levies, who were some days' march in advance of the bengal column, had already crossed, and was waiting our arrival at shikarpoor, but for a while it seemed extremely doubtful when we should be able to join him. the ameers were waxing turbulent. they had grossly insulted pottinger, and were openly collecting forces for the defence of their capital. it was feared that the "painful duty" would be found necessary, and orders were despatched to keane (who had landed with the bombay army at vikkur in the end of november, but had been temporarily delayed at tattah for want of carriage) to prepare to co-operate with cotton against hyderabad. as the bombay column moved up the right bank of the river, the bengal column, against the urgent remonstrances of macnaghten, moved down the left bank to meet it. both forces were in the highest spirits. the defences of hyderabad were known to be weak; its treasures were believed to be immense, and a prospect of unbounded loot danced before the eyes of a soldiery who had almost forgotten what the word meant. at the eleventh hour, however, the enchanting prospect faded. the ameers consented to our demands; a part of the tribute was paid, and hyderabad was saved for a time; while, what was then of still more importance, a collision between the military and political authorities was avoided. on february th, , cotton was at shikarpoor, and again differences between him and macnaghten seemed imminent. soojah had found himself short of carriage, and macnaghten had asked cotton to supply him with camels from his own train. but the general expressed himself strongly to the effect that if soojah was unable to advance his men, it were far better that soojah and his men should be left behind than that their wants should be relieved at the expense of the english troops. it was but too apparent, even at that early stage, that the english military officers were inclined to look upon soojah and his soldiers as altogether superfluous. he was, indeed, a king who was to be restored to his throne, but until the throne was ready for him it would be better for all parties that he should remain in the background. macnaghten, keenly alive to the danger of such sentiments, and feeling himself especially bound, both in honour and interest, to uphold the cause of our ally, combated the military policy resolutely. a collision was happily averted by the timely arrival of despatches from the viceroy, strongly tending to confirm macnaghten's views; nevertheless, when the english force advanced, three days afterwards, the carriage difficulty had not been solved, and soojah with his levies remained at shikarpoor. keane, who came up with the bombay army some days later, though little less willing, was more able to help; but the king, who had fondly hoped to head the advance into his own kingdom, was, for the time, compelled to content himself with a second place. cotton's march through the bolan pass to quettah, though arduous and painful, was unopposed. many of the camels and other beasts of burden dropped dead on the route from want of water; there was considerable desertion among the camp followers, and some plundering on the part of the beloochees, but progress was steadily made, and on march th the column reached quettah, "a most miserable mud town, with a small castle on a mound, on which there was a small gun on a ricketty carriage." here there seemed a fair prospect of sheer starvation. stores, as well as baggage, had been abandoned among the rugged defiles of the bolan pass, and mehrab khan, the beloochee prince of khelat, with whom burnes had concluded a treaty in our favour, either could not, or would not, help. he declared that there was very little grain in his country, and burnes could not prove that he did not speak truth, while he was bound to allow the khan's plea that much of the alleged scarcity was owing, though unavoidably owing, to our own presence. he could not, therefore, conscientiously recommend macnaghten to sanction cotton's proposal for a movement on khelat, though convinced in his own mind of our ally's treachery, and when keane, arriving at quettah on april th, assumed the chief command, it was decided to push on for candahar with all possible speed. save for the heat, and the scarcity of water, the advance proceeded uneventfully enough. our soldiers behaved admirably under circumstances peculiarly trying to europeans, and experienced by many of them for the first time. george lawrence (one of the three owners of a name which is a household word throughout india, at that time a captain of the nd bengal light cavalry) relates how he saw a trooper of the th lancers pour the contents of a soda-water bottle half full of water, a treasure then worth its weight in gold, down the throat of a native child on the point of perishing from thirst. as the army neared candahar, soojah was moved up again to the front, and many of the chiefs and people of western afghanistan hastened to his standard. it was known that kohun dil khan had fled, that there was open dissension among the barukzye brotherhood, and it soon became clear that if a stand was to be made it would be made at a point nearer cabul. on april th, shah soojah-ool-moolk, after more than thirty years of exile, re-entered in bloodless triumph the southern capital of his kingdom. till june th the army lay at candahar, waiting the ripening of the crops. so long a period of forced inactivity was distasteful to the troops, while daily the conviction forced itself on the more observant of the officers that the popularity which soojah had claimed for himself existed only in his own imagination. the douranee tribes had, indeed, long yearned to shake off the hateful yoke of the barukzye sirdars, by whom they had been systematically plundered and oppressed; but they lacked both spirit and strength to make common cause with their promised deliverer, while both their national and religious feelings were alike stirred by the appearance within their gates of the accursed infidels. when the first cravings of curiosity had been gratified, their attitude to their king was one rather of indifference than devotion, and to us one of undisguised if not active enmity. it needed not the warning of soojah to remind the english that they were no longer in hindostan. two young officers, inverarity, of the th lancers, and wilmer, were attacked at a short distance from camp; inverarity was murdered, and his companion escaped with difficulty. the ghilzyes, a fierce and lawless tribe, the original lords of the soil, alike rejecting british gold and british promises, began, too, to give early promise of the stern opposition that was hereafter to be experienced from them. when, a fortnight after his arrival, soojah held a grand state reception, scarcely one of his subjects appeared to do homage to their king. a royal salute of guns was fired in his honour; the british troops marched past his throne in imposing array, and soojah, highly elated, declared that the moral influence of the ceremony would be felt "from pekin to constantinople." but in reality, the whole affair, so far as what should have been its most important features were concerned, was a miserable failure. lawrence relates a significant speech made to him by an afghan of distinction, whom he fell in with while on reconnoitering service to the front. "what could induce you," said the man, "to squander crores of rupees in coming to a poor rocky country like ours, without wood or water, in order to force upon us an unlucky person as a king, who, the moment you turn your backs, will be upset by dost mahomed, our own king?" the order to advance given on june th was heard therefore with pleasure by all; and on july st the army was encamped before the famous citadel of ghuznee. it became soon evident that a serious mistake had been committed. ghuznee was deservedly considered the strongest fortress in the country, and its defences were the boast of all afghanistan. keane had, indeed, been advised to the contrary, but he knew at least that it was garrisoned by about of the enemy under hyder khan, one of the ameer's sons, while another was reported to be in the neighbourhood with a strong body of horse. nevertheless, discarding the battering train, which had been tugged up to candahar with immense labour and expense, he resumed his march with light field-pieces only, and found himself accordingly before a place subsequently described by himself as one "of great strength, both by nature and art," without the means of effecting a breach in its walls. our light companies soon cleared the villages and gardens surrounding the fort, not, however, without some loss, and at daybreak on the nd keane and cotton, with a party of engineers, reconnoitred the place from the heights commanding the eastern face. it was perfectly evident that the field-pieces might for all practical purposes have been left behind with the siege train at candahar, but treachery was to show us a way in, which we could have found for ourselves only at immense loss. one of the garrison, a barukzye of rank, nephew to the ameer himself, had deserted to our camp; the gates, he assured us, had all been built up with the exception of the cabul gate, and by the cabul gate therefore it was decided that the entrance should be made. that very night was chosen for the attack. four english regiments were detailed for service; the nd, th, and th of the line, and the company's european regiment. colonel dennie, of the th, was to lead the advance, consisting of the light companies of the four regiments, and the main column was placed under brigadier sale. captain thomson, of the bengal engineers, was to superintend the explosion party, with his two subalterns, durand (afterwards sir henry durand) and macleod, and captain peat, of the bombay corps. the night was dark and stormy. the light guns were ordered to open fire, to distract the attention of the garrison, while the powder-bags were piled at the gate. the work was done quickly, quietly and well. durand, according to one account, finding the first application of the port-fire of no effect, was obliged to scrape the hose with his finger-nails; then the powder exploded, and with a mighty crash, heard above the roaring of the guns and the noise of the storm, down, amid a column of black smoke, came huge masses of timber and masonry in dire confusion. in rushed dennie at the head of the stormers, and after him pressed sale with the main column. the resistance, though short, was stubborn. the breach was still so narrow that entrance was difficult and slow. dennie had won his way inside, but between him and sale a strong party of the garrison had made their way to the gate. the brigadier himself was cut down, but after a desperate struggle regained his feet, cleaving his opponent to the chin. the supports, under colonel croker, pushed forward manfully, and as the day broke the colours of the th and th regiments were flung out to the morning breeze on the ramparts of the afghans' strongest fort. ghuznee was ours, with a loss of killed and wounded, of whom were officers. the loss of the garrison was never accurately known. upwards of were buried by our men, and many more were supposed to have fallen beyond the walls under the sabres of our cavalry; prisoners were taken, and large stores of grain and flour proved a welcome addition to the value of the prize. with the fall of ghuznee fell the hopes of dost mahomed. within little more than twenty-four hours the news had reached him, and his brother, jubbar khan, was forthwith despatched to the english camp, proffering submission to soojah, but claiming for his brother the office of vizier, which had come to be considered a sort of hereditary appanage of the barukzye clan. the offer was declined, and what kaye calls the "mockery" of an honourable asylum in the british dominions suggested in its stead. with an indignant refusal the envoy returned to his brother, and dost mahomed then resolved on one last attempt. he moved out from the capital, designing to take up his ground at maidan, a well-chosen spot on the cabul river. but when he had reached urgundeh, he saw too clearly that the game was up. hadji khan, a man in whom he had placed peculiar reliance, had gone over to the enemy; the kuzzilbashes were leaving him fast. with the koran in his hand, he rode among his troops. "you have eaten my salt," he said, "these thirteen years. if, as is too plain, you are resolved to seek a new master, grant me but one favour in requital for that long period of maintenance and kindness--enable me to die with honour. stand by the brother of futteh khan while he executes one last charge against the cavalry of these feringhee dogs; in that onset he will fall; then go and make your own terms with shah soojah." the appeal was in vain. dismissing all of his followers who were minded to purchase safety by bowing to the new allegiance, he turned his horse's head, and rode towards the hindoo-koosh. a party of horse under the gallant outram was despatched in hot pursuit. twelve english officers rode with him, lawrence among the number, and about of our own men. had the party been no larger it is probable that it would not have been left to dost mahomed to surrender at his own discretion. but in an evil hour it was decided that hadji khan with afghans should be added, and the dilatoriness of our "allies" wholly neutralised the energies of our own men. hadji, a traitor once, remained a traitor still, and though quick to leave his master in the hour of his misfortunes, he had no intention, with an eye to future contingencies, to commit himself beyond hope of recall. the harder, then, outram and his troops rode, the slower rode the khan and his following; every pretext that the ingenious eastern mind could devise for delay was turned to account, and as the country was wholly unknown to the english leader he could not leave hadji to his devices and push on alone after the fugitive. his orders were not to continue the chase beyond the afghan frontier. on august th he reached bamean, to find that his game was but a day's march before him; but that one day's march had sounded the recall. dost mahomed was over the frontier, and there was nothing left for outram but to return, to be laughed at for his "wild-goose chase," and to hear from the commander-in-chief that "he had not supposed there were thirteen such asses in his whole force!" it is satisfactory, however, to know that the traitor hadji had this time over-reached himself. outram reported his conduct on his return; other proofs of his treason were forthcoming; he was arrested by order of the king, and spent the remainder of his life a state prisoner in hindostan. so soojah was once more seated on the throne of cabul. he had entered the city on august th in royal pomp, resplendent with jewels (among which the mighty koh-i-noor was this time conspicuous by its absence), mounted on a white charger, half smothered in golden trappings; macnaghten and burnes, in diplomatic costume, rode with him, and all the chief officers of the english army swelled his train. but there was no popular enthusiasm; there were no loyal cries of welcome. the people flocked to stare at the show, but it was at the white-faced strangers they stared, not at their restored king. still, the work had been done. the english flag had waved over candahar and ghuznee; an english army was encamped before cabul. the usurpers were in flight, and the "rightful" king had returned again to his own. according to the original terms of the proclamation, the british troops, their mission accomplished, were at once to withdraw from the country. soojah himself was anxious to be rid of allies in whose hands he was conscious he was and could be no more than a puppet, and whose presence in the kingdom was a standing testimony to the absence of that loyalty which he had so loudly vaunted. nothing would have better pleased the english themselves than to have acquiesced in the king's wishes; nothing would have pleased lord auckland better than that they should do so. but it could not be. unprotected by british bayonets the throne of the new king would not have stood for a day, and with it would have fallen the feeble fabric on which the "justice" of the expedition rested. the simlah manifesto had declared that soojah's "popularity throughout afghanistan had been proved to his lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities;" how then could his lordship leave soojah alone to give the lie to his own manifesto? but though it was expedient that an english force should still, at least for a time, continue at the king's right hand, it was neither expedient, nor, as it was thought, necessary that the entire army should remain. a garrison at cabul and candahar, and others at the principal posts on the main roads to hindostan, ghuznee and quettah on the west, and jellalabad and ali-musjid on the east, would be amply sufficient. these could be furnished by a portion of the bengal army, and the remainder could be withdrawn by way of jellalabad and the khyber pass, while the bombay column could return _en masse_ through the bolan pass. such was the advice of the commander-in-chief, and such, as it soon appeared, was the opinion of the viceroy himself. before, however, the homeward march began, wade had brought prince timour to his father's court. wade's share in the expedition, though dwarfed by the more brilliant exploits of keane, had, notwithstanding the disaffection of the sikhs (who, after runjeet singh's death, had not cared to conceal their dislike of their english allies), been performed with complete success, and had moreover materially assisted the march of the larger force. for a long time dost mahomed had regarded the advance through the khyber with far greater anxiety than that along the western route, and though his troops had never actually encountered wade in the field, a considerable detachment had been withdrawn for that purpose from the main army at a very critical moment. the official order for the departure of the troops appeared on october nd. it was at once seen that the first plan had been considerably altered. nearly the whole of the bengal division was to remain behind under cotton, and only a comparatively small detachment was to return home with keane and the bombay army. though dost mahomed had fled the kingdom, he was known to be still near at hand, a guest among the fiery and hostile oosbegs, with whom he might at any rate seriously harass the frontier, if not, indeed, find himself strong enough to hazard an advance upon the capital. a detachment had therefore been sent up in september to the hindoo-koosh, and it became necessary to supply their place at cabul. the th, th, and st were the english regiments that remained. of these, the first named, with the th bengal native infantry and three light field guns, was stationed at cabul, under dennie. jellalabad was garrisoned by the th bengal native infantry, the rd bengal light cavalry, some sappers and miners, three light guns, and a detachment of skinner's horse. at candahar, under nott, were the th and st regiments of the line, the nd and rd regiments of bengal native infantry, a company of the european bengal artillery, two regiments of soojah's irregular infantry, one of his cavalry, and a troop of his horse artillery. maclaren held ghuznee with the th bengal native infantry, some of skinner's horse, and certain details of soojah's levies. at quettah was a small force composed of soojah's troops only, while the kojuck pass was watched by a body of afghan horse, under bosanquet, of the bengal infantry. at each of these posts was also stationed a political officer. shortly after the departure of keane with the homeward-bound column, soojah left the cold of the capital for the milder air of jellalabad, and with him went macnaghten, leaving burnes in charge at cabul. the winter months were passed in comparative quiet. macnaghten busied himself with an attempt to win the favour of the turbulent khyber tribes, and by lavish payments did succeed in lulling them to temporary quiet. there, too, was received news of the fall of khelat, which had been determined on during the upward march as punishment for mehrab khan's treachery, and still more important news from the bamean of the further flight of dost mahomed to the court of the ameer of bokhara, where our own envoy stoddart was then a close prisoner in imminent danger of death. but as a set-off against so much that was good to hear there came from burnes the disquieting intelligence of the advance of a large russian force from orenberg on khiva, ostensibly to release certain russian merchants from captivity, and to punish the khan, not too severely, for general misconduct--a pretext which, it will probably be remembered, was used with great effect on a subsequent occasion. macnaghten was inclined at first to make light of the news, on which burnes had, on the contrary, laid the greatest stress; but as rumour grew he consented at last to despatch a mission to the russian camp. conolly and rawlinson were selected--burnes, when the post was offered to him, having only replied "that he would willingly go if he was ordered"--when, on the eve of their departure, the welcome news arrived that there was no longer a russian camp for them to visit. snow, pestilence and famine had done the work that neither tartar sabres nor english diplomacy would have probably availed to do then, any more than they have availed since, and of peroffski's men scarcely a man found his way back to orenberg. towards the end of april the court returned to cabul. affairs were far from satisfactory. the unpopularity of the english, and even of soojah himself, became daily more and more obvious to all observant people. the dual government was a failure. the english, pledged not to interfere with soojah, were obliged to permit much of which they strongly disapproved to pass unchallenged, and were only called upon to intervene to pass measures which soojah himself was not strong enough to enforce. whenever therefore their presence did make itself conspicuously felt it had the natural result of only increasing their unpopularity. the expense had already been enormous, and showed no signs of decreasing. the wealth and liberality of the english had been a tradition in afghanistan since the days of elphinstone, and the afghans, though they hated the infidel soldiers much, loved the infidel gold still more. unfortunately, too, the dislike borne to the english by the afghan men was not shared by the afghan women, and the passion of jealousy, with but too good cause, was thus added to the passions of distrust and hate. evil news, too, came from every quarter; from the bamean frontier on the north, from herat on the west, from candahar on the south, from peshawur on the east. macnaghten had never ceased importuning the viceroy to sanction the restoration of herat and peshawur to the afghan dominions. the sikhs were now open in their declarations of enmity to the english, though they had refrained as yet from any actual hostilities, and macnaghten, with considerable reason, declared there could be no safety in afghanistan till, to use his own words, "the road through the punjab was macadamised." at herat, too, yar mahomed, the vizier, a man of boundless avarice and treachery, though living on british bounty, was openly intriguing with persia, and had behaved with such gross and repeated insolence to our envoy that the latter had at last left his court in disgust. but lord auckland, though not insensible to macnaghten's arguments, did not dare at that time to increase either his responsibilities or his expenses, both of which were already sufficiently heavy. grave complaints were heard from candahar, where the old system of taxation that had made the barukzye rule so irksome was still in force, and still in the hands of the same hated collectors. the ghilzyes, who had already received severe punishment from outram, were again in the field, and further still to the south the whole country was in revolt. khelat had been won back from us by mehrab khan's son, and loveday, the english officer in charge, barbarously murdered. in the far north our outposts had pushed on over the bamean range, and were in frequent collision with the oosbegs, and other supporters of the barukzye cause. it is true that wherever our troops met the enemy in the open field the victory remained with the former, but that such meetings were as frequent as they were showed the angry temper of the country but too plainly to all who had eyes to see and ears to hear. still the sanguine temperament of macnaghten refused to recognise the impracticability of the game. still he persisted in believing in the popularity of soojal, and in the ultimate settlement of his kingdom, and as a proof of his confidence he about this time sent down to bengal for his wife, an example which was followed by most of the other married officers. the news from the north soon became still more alarming. jubbar khan was at khooloom with the ameer's family, living on the bounty of the wullee, or chief of that place, who still upheld with fidelity rare for an afghan the cause of the fugitive king. other once staunch supporters, however, had "come in," as the phrase went, among them azim khan, one of the ameer's sons, and it was reported that jubbar himself was vacillating. a forward movement of our troops would, it was believed, soon bring him to his senses. a forward movement was accordingly made and the khan did "come in." on july rd he arrived at bamean with his brother's family, and a large party of retainers. but now the ameer himself was once more in the field. at first a guest in the court of bokhara, he had afterwards become the prisoner of that treacherous chief, who, had he dared, would have murdered his captive, and his sons with him, as he would have murdered the english envoy. but dost mahomed, who as he said of himself, "was a wooden spoon, to be thrown hither and thither without hurt," contrived in some way to effect his escape, and, after infinite hardships, to make his way to his old ally of khooloom, who welcomed him with open arms. the oosbegs gathered to the popular standard. the ameer was reminded that his wives and children were in our power; "i have no family," was his answer, "i have buried my wives and children," and at the head of men he advanced on bamean early in september. our troops had been compelled to abandon the outposts they had established beyond the frontier. they had never failed indeed to repel the frequent attacks that had been made on them, but it had become at last painfully evident that such isolated posts were no longer tenable. they fell back therefore to bamean, losing everything on the retreat, and to make matters still worse a regiment of afghan infantry that had been lately raised went over in a body to the enemy. meanwhile, however, dennie had come up with strong reinforcements, and on september th a decisive battle was fought. the enemy were immeasurably the stronger both in numbers and position, but the victory was ours, and for the second time dost mahomed only escaped death by the speed of his horse. but though he saved his life, he lost a valuable friend. dennie's guns had a salutary effect on the wullee, and within a few days of the battle the old man prudently came to terms with the english, pledging himself no longer to harbour or assist dost mahomed or any of his family. great was the delight in the camp at cabul, where affairs had begun to look very black indeed, and serious apprehensions at one time entertained of an insurrection;--but they had not yet done with the ameer. driven out of the hindoo koosh, our gallant enemy next re-appeared in kohistan, a district only too ripe for revolt. sale was ordered out to meet him and burnes went with him, while wade was despatched from jellalabad to act against the refractory wuzzeerees. after a series of small successes, in one of which edward conolly, a young cavalry officer of great bravery and promise, was killed, and one repulse at joolgah, sale, on november nd, met the ameer at purwandurrah, in the nijrow country, a name disastrous among many other disastrous names in the annals of the afghan war. the latter had no original intention of giving battle, but a chance movement of our horse changed his mind. lord, one of our political agents, had proposed that our cavalry, the nd bengal light cavalry, should take up new ground on the afghan flank. the order had been given, and the two squadrons, numbering something over two hundred sabres, had already gone "threes about," when dost mahomed, seeing, as he supposed, the british in retreat, rode straight down on them at the head of about horsemen. fraser, who was in command, at once facing his men about, gave the order to charge, and dashed, with his officers behind him, full at the advancing squadrons. not a trooper followed. at an irresolute walk they met the onset, and scarcely even waiting to cross swords, fled in every direction, leaving their officers to their fate. of these, two, crispin and broadfoot, were instantly cut down; lord managed to win his way through the sabres, only to fall immediately afterwards by a shot from one of the forts; fraser, severely wounded, was saved only by the strength and speed of his horse; how the others escaped no man could say. our infantry managed in a measure to retrieve the fortunes of the day. the afghans were driven from their position, but their leader once again escaped from out our very grasp. lawrence has generously tried to find excuses for the conduct of his men (he was not himself with them, for at that time he was acting as assistant agent to macnaghten), but the fact remains that a native regiment, hitherto famous for its bravery and fidelity, refused to follow its english officers on the field of battle, and fled like sheep before a horde of irregular horsemen not twice their number. burnes wrote off to cabul forthwith to announce, perhaps somewhat to magnify, the disaster, and implored macnaghten to concentrate all our troops at once on the capital, in anticipation, which all then believed to be certain, of the ameer's instant advance. far other, however, were at that time the plans of dost mahomed. he did, indeed, advance on the capital, but attended only by a single attendant, and within twenty-four hours after his victory he had placed his sword in macnaghten's hands. force would never have driven him to such a step, but he was weary of fighting in a cause which, so far as he then could foresee, could but be hopeless, and he felt that after his brilliant triumph of the previous day he could lay down his arms without disgrace. macnaghten and the other english officers received him with the utmost courtesy. nicholson, an officer of great bravery and intelligence, was appointed to take charge of him, but the indignity of a guard was spared him. soojah refused to see him, on the ground that he should be "unable to show common civility to such a villain." many, however, who had held persistently aloof from soojah, came to pay their respects to one whom they still regarded as their lawful ruler; one of them, shere mahomed, known as the swiftest mounted messenger in all afghanistan, exclaiming, as he grasped his chief cordially by the hand, "ah, ameer, you have done right at last; why did you delay so long putting an end to all your miseries?" within a few days the ameer's son, afzul khan, followed his father's example, and on november th the two illustrious prisoners set out for india, under the charge of nicholson and a strong escort of british troops. as in the previous year the court passed the winter months at jellalabad. cotton was already there on his way down to india, "anxious to get away," and only waiting the arrival of his successor, general elphinstone. elphinstone was a brave, kindly, and courteous old gentleman; he had seen service in the peninsular, and bore the waterloo medal, but he was entirely without experience of indian warfare; was, moreover, sadly crippled in health, and unfortunately destitute of the very qualities of energy and foresight which were peculiarly necessary to his position. his appointment was made against his own personal inclinations, nor was it precisely clear on what grounds it had been made, save on the grounds that he was a relation of lord elphinstone, at that time governor of bombay. but he was ordered to assume the command, and, as a soldier, he obeyed his orders. cotton handed over his charge, and took his leave with these words, "you will have nothing to do here; all is peace." never was there made a more unfortunate remark. the winter passed in tolerable quiet, but with the return of spring came back the old troubles. the first symptoms of disquiet appeared again in the neighbourhood of candahar. two admirable officers were in charge there, nott and rawlinson, the former holding the military, the latter the political command. the irrepressible ghilzyes were again in revolt, and the douranees had risen to join them. soojah was particularly eager to conciliate the latter tribe, and had, when at candahar, remitted many of the impositions which had rendered the barukzye rule so odious; but he had also, as has been already said, retained in office the equally odious tax-collectors who had been employed under the latter dynasty, and the douranees, anticipating complete redress, and probably substantial rewards, were irritated past endurance to find their state no better under their own king than it had been under the usurper. long ripe for revolt, their disaffection had been secretly fomented by that indefatigable traitor the herat vizier, yar mahomed, whose intrigues found a willing tool in aktur khan, a chief of the zemindawer country. rawlinson, anxious to try the effect of conciliatory measures, and believing with burnes that afghanistan was not to be settled at the point of the bayonet, despatched his assistant elliot to confer with the insurgents. the mission was successful for the time; aktur khan "came in;" certain concessions were made, and certain honours conferred upon him, in return for which he promised to disband his followers. but the peace, as rawlinson anticipated, was short-lived. the gallant but imprudent conduct of lynch, our political agent among the ghilzye tribes, in storming a small fort near khelat-i-ghilzye, to avenge an insult offered him by the garrison, had set that turbulent country in a flame. wymer was sent out by nott to settle matters, which he did effectively enough. the ghilzyes, under a famous leader known as the "gooroo," fought like madmen, holding our troops in check for five fierce hours; but they gave way at last, and fled, leaving the greater part of their number dead or dying on the field. aktur khan, fired by the example, scattered his promises to the winds, and instead of disbanding, collected anew his forces for another struggle. woodburn, a dashing officer, met him on the banks of the helmund, and defeated him after a smart engagement, but the british forces were insufficient to follow up the victory, and on reaching ghiresk woodburn was compelled to await the arrival of more troops from candahar. thence, strongly reinforced, he moved out on august th, and after a short but sharp struggle, in which the janbaz, or afghan horse, for once in a way behaved with great gallantry, aktur khan fled, completely routed, and for a time again there was peace among the douranees. the ghilzyes, too, at the same time had received so severe a repulse from chambers, that even they were forced to abstain from action for a while, and the dreaded "gooroo" was at last prevailed on to "come in" to the english camp. on the north-western frontier our troops had been equally successful under nott and wymer. akrum khan, a close ally of aktur khan, was in arms in the dehrawut country, and would submit neither to promises, threats, nor force. treachery, however, did its work at last. one of his own countrymen offered to betray him, and by a rapid night march the rebel was seized, and carried down a close prisoner to candahar. macnaghten, at times humane almost to a fault, had at length resolved to give a terrible example to these continued disturbers of the public peace. orders were sent down to prince timour, who governed for his father at candahar, and who would have obeyed any orders emanating from his english allies, and akrum khan was blown from a gun. by the end of october, , there at last seemed really a prospect of peace in western afghanistan. despite the warnings of rawlinson, who could see farther below the surface than most of his comrades, and who knew well that there was something more than mere discontent at an obnoxious tax lurking in the hearts of the western tribes--despite, too, the shadow of akbar khan, dost mahomed's favourite son, who was still hovering about our northern frontier--macnaghten's spirits rose higher than they had ever risen before. of a temperament peculiarly susceptible to the influence of the hour, he was alternately depressed and exalted beyond reason, as the varying fortunes of our arms favoured or threatened the ultimate success of his plans. after the disaster of purwandurrah he was convinced that the game was lost; after the discomfiture of the ghilzyes and the death of akrum khan he was equally convinced that the game was won, and in one of his letters, written about this time to a private friend, he boasted that the country was quiet "from dan to beersheba." the well-earned reward of his labours had come at last in the shape of the government of bombay; within a few weeks he hoped to turn his back on the scene of so many anxieties and so many disappointments, leaving to his successor the legacy of an accomplished task. that successor would of course be burnes; burnes, who had a clearer eye for the future than his chief, and who felt in his inmost heart that the end of such a system as had been established in afghanistan could not be far off, yet who, impatient for macnaghten's departure, was willing to dare all risks, so that he might at last touch the goal of his ambition. and at this very time, in that serene sky, the cloud was gathering that was to break when least expected, and overwhelm macnaghten and burnes and the whole english cause in utter ruin. elphinstone, as has been said, was now in command of the british forces. next in rank to him were sir robert sale, of the th light infantry, and brigadier shelton, who had come up in the spring of the year with his regiment, the th of the line. soojah's own troops were under brigadier anquetil, who had superseded roberts, much to macnaghten's satisfaction, for roberts was too much of an "alarmist" to please the sanguine envoy. the main body of the garrison lay in the new cantonments. these remarkable works had been erected in the previous year. situated in low, swampy ground about two miles from the citadel, they were defended only by a low mud rampart and ditch, over which a pony had been ridden for a wager by one of our own officers; they were commanded on every side by hills and villages, while, to make matters still worse, the commissariat supplies were stored in a small fort without the wall. the authority for this unfortunate arrangement has been the subject of much discussion, into which it would be neither profitable nor pleasant to enter here; but it should not, at least, be forgotten that our engineer officers had always urged most strongly the expediency of posting the troops in the bala hissar, or citadel, a strong position on a hill commanding the entire city and suburbs. at first, indeed, this had been done, but the soldiers were soon required to give way to the ladies of soojah's harem, and it was then deemed necessary, by some person or persons, to build what kaye aptly calls "the sheep-folds on the plain." elphinstone, at any rate, was not to blame, whoever was, for the folly had been committed before elphinstone had assumed the command. but familiarity, as usual, soon begot security, and in this dangerous position our officers and men soon learned to live as tranquilly and easily as in the strongest fortress in the world, or as in the luxurious quarters they had left in peaceful hindostan. the time passed pleasantly enough. lady macnaghten and lady sale had joined their husbands, and nearly all the married officers had followed the example of their chiefs. the climate was fine and bracing, nor was there any lack either of amusement or society. englishmen carry their sports with them into every quarter of the globe, and the stolid afghans looked in amazement and admiration on the races, the cricket, and the skating with which the white-faced infidels beguiled the idle days. but there were unfortunately other habits in which some of the english chose to indulge which stirred up in the native heart feelings of a very different nature, habits which have already been briefly touched upon, and which were growing fast into an open and notorious scandal. "there are many," wrote kaye in , "who can fill in with vivid personality all the melancholy details of this chapter of human weakness, and supply a catalogue of the wrongs which were soon to be so fearfully redressed." macnaghten proposed to set his face towards home in november. his last days, as ill-fortune would have it, had been again embittered with revolt, arising from an unpopular measure which he had felt himself obliged to sanction. our sojourn in afghanistan had been a fearful drain on the resources of the indian government, and the need for economy had been urgently pressed upon lord auckland by the authorities at home. macnaghten, casting about for the means of obeying his chief's instructions, unluckily hit upon the most unfortunate means he could have chosen. he determined to inaugurate a general system of retrenchment in the stipends, or subsidies, paid to the chiefs, and as a beginning, the sum of £ , which had been yearly paid to the eastern ghilzyes to secure our communications with hindostan, was forthwith stopped. as a natural result they at once flew to arms, occupied the passes on the road to jellalabad, commenced an organised system of plundering, and entirely cut off the communications it was our greatest interest to keep open. but the envoy was not very seriously disturbed. sale's brigade, which was under orders for india, could "thresh the rascals" on its homeward journey, and clear the passes easily enough. monteith was accordingly sent out with the th native infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and some guns, and sale followed with his own regiment, the th light infantry. the task was not so easy as the envoy had anticipated. sale himself was wounded and wyndham, of the th, killed. it was found necessary to despatch more troops before the work could be done. it was done, however, partly by force and partly by diplomacy; the khoord-cabul defile was once more cleared; detachments of troops were posted at intervals along the pass, while sale himself, halting at gundamuck, put away his ideas of home for a time. november st was the day fixed for macnaghten's departure. he was not without warnings that for some days past there had existed strong symptoms of disaffection in the city, where the shopkeepers were closing their shutters, and refusing to sell their wares to the english. john conolly, a relative of the envoy's, had got an inkling of what was meditated, while mohun lal, an interpreter, who had served us faithfully from the time of our first entry into the country, had directly warned burnes of a conspiracy of which abdoolah khan, one of our most uncompromising opponents, was the prime instigator, and in which the chiefs of all the tribes then assembled in cabul were alike implicated. but burnes was still under the orders of macnaghten, and macnaghten still refused to listen to the "croakers." on that very evening the conspirators met for the last time, and on the morning of the nd the city rose in insurrection. burnes himself was the first victim. his house was within the city walls, next to that of captain johnson, the paymaster of soojah's troops. on the previous night johnson had slept in the cantonments, but burnes was at home, and with him his brother charles, and william broadfoot, an able officer, who had been selected by the expectant envoy for the post of military secretary. before daybreak he had again been warned of his danger by a friendly native, and at a later hour came osman khan, the vizier himself, with the same tale, imploring him to seek safety either in the citadel or the cantonments. burnes could no longer disbelieve, for already an angry crowd was gathering under his windows, and angry voices were raised in clamour for the lives of the englishmen. he consented to write to the envoy for aid, and to send messengers to abdoolah khan, promising him that if he would restrain the citizens his grievances should receive prompt redress. why no immediate answer was returned to the first of these messages has never been made perfectly clear; the latter resulted only in the death of the messenger. meanwhile burnes himself was haranguing the mob from an upper gallery, while his brother and the guard were firing on them from below. in vain he appealed to their avarice; the only answer was that he should "come down into the garden." a cashmerian, who had found his way into the house, swore to pass him and his brother out in safety to the cantonments, if the latter would bid the firing cease. hastily disguising themselves, the brothers followed the man to the door, but scarcely had they set foot beyond it, when the traitor shouted with a loud voice, "this is sekunder burnes!" in a moment the mob were on them, and, hacked to pieces by the cruel afghan knives, then fell the first, but not the last victims of a long series of mistakes. the paymaster's house was next sacked; upwards of £ , of the public money and £ of johnson's private fortune fell to the share of the murderers. no force came from the cantonments to check them, and the only effort made in the early part of the day was made by soojah himself, who sent one of his own regiments down from the bala hissar into the city. entangled in a network of narrow lanes and bazaars, they could do no good, and shelton, coming up later with a small body of infantry and artillery, was in time only to cover a disorderly flight. it is difficult to decide on the true cause of the lateness of shelton's arrival, but it is certain that had burnes's message received prompt attention, the insurrection, for that time at least, would have been nipped in the bud. that such was the opinion of the afghans themselves many of our officers were subsequently assured, and the fact that none of the chief conspirators took any part in the first outbreak seems to give colour to the supposition that it was not the original design to proceed to such extremities as followed, but rather to convey to the british such a warning as might convince them of the hopelessness of their cause, and induce them at last to take measures to leave the country to its own devices. be this, however, as it may, nothing was done till the time had passed for anything to be of use, and a riot which resolute men could have quelled with ease in the morning, would in the afternoon have taxed, if not defied, the best energies of . the history of the days which followed between the first rising and the opening of negotiations is as difficult to write as it is painful to read. so many and so conflicting are the accounts that have been received, that it is impossible within a limited space to present a distinct and coherent narrative of events, or, without the risk of a hasty conclusion, to apportion, even were it desirable to do so, the precise share of responsibility to each actor in that dismal tragedy of errors. it is certain, at least, that from the nd to the th november the utmost confusion and dismay prevailed within the british cantonments. no two of the authorities seem ever to have counselled alike; there was disunion between elphinstone and macnaghten, and disunion even between elphinstone and shelton. orders were issued one hour to be countermanded the next, and then re-issued. there was no lack of individual boldness in council, and, among the officers, no lack of individual bravery in action, but want of co-operation rendered both alike useless. our strength was frittered away in a series of petty sorties, conducted by insufficient numbers, and generally ordered when the time for immediate action was past. our soldiers, even our own english soldiers, disheartened and demoralized by repeated defeats, for which they felt that they themselves were not to blame, lost confidence alike in their commanders and in themselves. it is said that it was actually found necessary to employ a sepoy guard to prevent the soldiers of an english regiment leaving their post, and it is certain that on one, if not on more than one occasion, our men fairly turned their backs and ran before the afghan hordes. at an early day, as might well have been foreseen, the forts containing the commissariat supplies and stores fell into the enemy's hands, and though this disaster was for a time remedied by the energies of our commissariat officers, who had fortunately not been lost with the stores, and who managed to collect supplies from some of the neighbouring villages, there soon arose a new danger in the doubt whether the the siege would not outlast the ammunition. urgent and frequent messages had been sent to bring up sale's brigade, which was supposed to be still among the khoord-cabul hills, and to eldred pottinger to join the garrison with his detachment from charekur, a place about miles north of cabul. but sale's brigade was already on its march to jellalabad, and of pottinger's detachment only he and another officer reached cabul alive. to crown all, it was known that akbar khan was moving down from bamean. on the rd a strong force of cavalry and infantry, but accompanied, through what strange process of reasoning it is impossible to say, by only one gun, moved out under shelton to occupy a hill commanding the sources of our supplies, which had been recently threatened by the enemy. the expedition was a total failure. shelton himself behaved with conspicuous gallantry, and his officers nobly followed his example; but the men, discouraged by frequent defeat, and finding their muskets no match for the afghan jezails, were mown down like grass, till, having lost their solitary piece of artillery, they fled in disgraceful panic back to the cantonments. with this disastrous attempt concluded all exterior operations, and on the same day macnaghten received instructions from elphinstone to open negotiations for surrender. at the first meeting the terms offered were so insulting that macnaghten refused to continue the conference. his hopes, too, had somewhat revived of late by a communication from mohun lal, whom he had secretly employed to sow, with offers of large bribes, dissensions among the hostile chiefs, and by the news of the death of two of our bitterest foes, abdoolah khan and meer musjedee. whether these men died from wounds received in battle, or by assassins set on by mohun lal, is not certain, but it seems tolerably clear that the interpreter was instigated by some one in the british camp to offer large sums of money for the heads of the principal insurgents. as a set-off to this, however, came grave reports from the commissariat department, and the news that there was little prospect of maclaren's brigade, which had set out from candahar to their relief, being able to win its way to cabul. on december th, therefore, negotiations were renewed. akbar khan, who had by this time joined his countrymen amid uproarious expressions of delight, with the chiefs of all the principal tribes, met the envoy on the banks of the cabul river, about a mile from the cantonments. macnaghten read in persian the draft treaty he had prepared, of which the main stipulations were to the following effect:--that the british troops in afghanistan should be withdrawn to india as speedily as possible, accompanied by two sirdars of rank as guarantees of safe conduct; that on their arrival at peshawur arrangements should at once be made for the return of dost mahomed and all others of his countrymen at that time detained in india; that soojah should be allowed to depart with the troops, or to remain where he was on a suitable provision, as he might prefer; and that four "respectable" british officers were to be left at cabul as hostages for the due fulfilment of the treaty until the return of dost mahomed and his family. after a discussion of two hours the terms were accepted, and it was agreed that the evacuation of our position should commence in three days' time. such a treaty is not to be read with pleasure, but it was possibly the best that could have been concluded under the circumstances that had arisen; for which macnaghten himself appears, at least, to have been less responsible than his military colleagues, at whose urgent and repeated instigations he had undertaken the work. it became soon apparent how little dependence was to be placed on the afghan word. on the th, according to the stipulation, the british troops stationed in the citadel left their quarters, about six o'clock on a winter's evening. scarcely had they cleared the gates, when an ugly rush was made for them by the crowd outside. the gates were immediately closed, and the guns of the citadel opened an indiscriminate fire on friends and foes alike. akbar khan declared that at that late hour he could not undertake their safe conduct to the cantonments, and the men were therefore obliged to pass the night on the frosty ground, without tents, without food, and without fuel. on the following morning they reached the cantonments in safety, but half-dead with hunger and exposure. it had been agreed that the afghans should supply the necessary provisions and carriage for the march; but it had also been agreed that the british forts in the neighbourhood of their position should be given up. the afghans refused to play their part till we had played ours, and the forts were accordingly placed in their hands. still, provisions came in but slowly, and carriage not at all. a horde of robbers and fanatics swarmed between the city and the cantonments, plundering under our very eyes the few supplies that were sent in, but as they were now to be considered "as our allies" not a shot was permitted to be fired. yet even then macnaghten continued to hope against hope, that "something might turn up" to spare the humiliation of an enforced retreat, and on the evening of the nd it seemed to him that such a chance had arrived. it came in the shape of a proposal from akbar khan that he and the ghilzyes should, in the face of the concluded treaty, unite with the english to re-occupy the citadel and the abandoned forts; that our forces should be allowed to remain in afghanistan till the spring, and then withdraw as though of their own free-will; that the head of the formidable ameen-oolah khan should be sent to the envoy, and that in consideration of all these good offices akbar khan himself should receive an annuity of four lakhs of rupees from the british government, together with a bonus of thirty lakhs. the offer of murder was indignantly rejected, but with the others macnaghten closed at once, and on the following morning, having requested that two regiments with some guns might be held ready for instant service, he rode out to the proposed place of conference, accompanied by lawrence, trevor and mackenzie. the latter, indeed, learning the new design, ventured to expostulate with his chief on the risk he was about to run, while elphinstone earnestly implored him to pause before he committed himself to so perilous and so crooked a course; but despising warnings and advice alike, macnaghten rode hopefully out to his death. among some small hillocks about yards from the cantonments the meeting was appointed; salutations were exchanged, the party dismounted, and the envoy and the khan seated themselves on the ground. scarcely had the conversation been opened, when the chiefs began to close in on the little group. it was pointed out to akbar that as the conference was a secret one, they should be advised to withdraw; he answered that it was of no matter, as they were all in the plot with him. the words had not left his lips when the englishmen were seized. trevor, lawrence and mackenzie were flung each behind a mounted afghan and galloped off to one of the forts, through a crowd of armed fanatics, who cut and struck at them as they passed. on the way trevor slipped from his seat and was instantly hacked to pieces, but the others got safely through. as they were hurried away, lawrence turned his head and saw the envoy struggling in the grasp of akbar khan, "with an awful look of horror and consternation on his face;" a pistol shot was heard soon after, and no english eye ever saw macnaghten alive or dead again. such was the end of the attempt of an honest englishman to outwit the most treacherous people in the world. on the following day new terms were sent to elphinstone to be added to the existing treaty--that first treaty which macnaghten had lost his life in attempting to evade. these required that the guns with the exception of six, and all the muskets, save those in actual use, should be given up, and that the numbers of hostages should be increased. eldred pottinger, who had succeeded to the envoy's place, strongly combated this additional insult, giving his undaunted voice for the immediate seizure of the citadel, or at least for one last attempt to fight their way sword in hand down to jellalabad. his brave counsel was overruled; the guns and muskets were given up, a few at a time, in the vain hope that in some way the treaty might yet be averted, or perhaps to alleviate, if possible, the humiliation of the surrender; captains walsh and drummond, with lieutenants warburton and webb were sent to join lieutenants conolly and airy, who were already in the hands of the chiefs, and such of the sick and wounded as were unable to bear the fatigues of the march were conveyed into the city under doctors berwick and campbell. on the th of january, , before the promised escorts had arrived, the british army, contrary again to pottinger's advice, moved out from the cantonments, and the fatal march began. the british troops that marched out on that th january numbered fighting men, of whom were europeans, and about , camp followers. of this force two men reached jellalabad alive, one of whom died on the following day. the married officers and their wives, with all the women and children, and a few of the wounded, were on the third day of the retreat placed in the care of akbar khan, who, to give him such credit as is his due, for once kept his word when he promised to treat them honourably and well; six more officers, including the general himself and shelton, at a later period fell or were surrendered as hostages, into the same hands, and were carried back up country, though elphinstone, sick in body as in heart, prayed hard to be allowed to die with his men; captain souter, of the th, who had wrapped the regimental colours round his waist, was taken prisoner with a few private soldiers at gundamuck, where the last stand was made by the gallant handful who had survived the horrors of the pass. the rest of the europeans perished to a man beneath the knives and bullets of their "allies." among the native troops and camp followers the loss was probably less than was at the time, and has been generally since, supposed. some of the former deserted in sheer terror to the afghans, and some of the latter it is possible found hiding-places among the mountains, whence, when the noise of battle had passed on, they contrived to make good their escape; yet thousands fell beneath the murderous rain that poured down night and day upon the defenceless rabble, and thousands, untouched by shot or steel, from utter weariness sank down into the snow to rise no more. had the march been pushed on from the first with more expedition, it is probable that at least a far larger number would have been saved; but that, owing to the general demoralisation that had set in, inspired by the irresolution of the commander, and aggravated by the disorderly crowd of camp-followers, whose terror quenched all notions of discipline, was precisely what could not be done. from dawn vast hordes of ghazee fanatics had hung on the rear, cutting off stragglers, plundering the baggage, and from every coign of vantage firing indiscriminately into the struggling line. the roads were slippery with ice, and on the evening of the first day the snow began to fall; on the second day the march became but "a rabble in chaotic rout." the european troops indeed, set a glorious example. the officers did all that mortals could do to preserve discipline, and the men, obeying so far as it was possible to obey, nobly redeemed their former errors; but hampered by a helpless crowd whose one thought of safety was not to fight but to fly, it was but little that they could do. here and there a stand was made by gallant handfuls of our men, and where the english stood, there the afghans fled, but these momentary triumphs served rather to increase than to check the fury of our foes. enough of a melancholy and shameful tale--let it be sufficient to say that when brydon reached jellalabad on the th the army of cabul had for all practical purposes disappeared from off the face of the earth. the news came upon the government like a thunder-stroke. the last days of lord auckland's administration were drawing near, and as he read macnaghten's sanguine despatches he fondly hoped that it would be his fortune to return to england, not only the conqueror, but the tranquilizer of afghanistan. towards the close of the year, indeed, rumours of a disquieting nature had found their way down to calcutta, and when all rumours ceased it became evident that our communications were interrupted, and that something serious had happened; but not even the gloomiest dared to anticipate the worst: on january th the worst was known. though there was anything but unanimity in the calcutta council, some preparations, chiefly through the energetic representations of george clerk, our agent on the north-western frontier, had been made before the full tidings of the disaster came down. it had appeared to some, of whom was sir jasper nicolls, then commander-in-chief in india, that it was better to accept the blow, and withdraw altogether behind the indus, than by attempting to retrieve still further to deepen our disgrace. sale still held jellalabad in the teeth of overwhelming numbers; nott was still master of candahar;--let them yield up the charge they had so nobly kept, and if too weak to find their own way down to india, let troops sufficient for their help advance, but for no other purpose. lord auckland, unwilling to commit his successor to a task which had already proved too strong for his own energies, was inclined to listen to the advocates of retreat, and though the news of the annihilation of the army of cabul roused him for the moment into a proclamation that the awful calamity was but "a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the british power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the british-indian army," he quickly followed it by an intimation that when sale and nott had been relieved, it were better that the british troops should withdraw to peshawur. still, fresh forces were to be raised, and a fine soldier was to head them. the offer had been first made to major-general lumley, adjutant-general in india, but lumley's health forbade him to accept so important a post, and lord auckland's choice--a choice as popular as it was judicious--finally fell upon pollock, a distinguished officer of the company's service, who had seen fighting under lake and wellington, and wherever, indeed, it was to be seen since the year , when he had first landed in india, a young lieutenant of artillery. pollock hastened up to his command without a moment's delay, but before he could reach peshawur our troops had suffered yet another repulse. mr. robertson, lieutenant-governor of the north western frontier, and george clerk, already mentioned, had counselled from the first prompt measures, not of retreat, but reprisal. at their earnest request colonel wild had been moved up to peshawur with four native infantry regiments, the th, rd, th and th, but without guns. it was supposed he could procure them from the sikhs, and with a great deal of trouble he did manage to procure four ricketty guns, which seemed likely to do as much harm to his own men as to the enemy, and one of which broke down the next day on trial. reinforcements were coming up, which it was probable would contain artillery, but wild did not dare to wait. his sepoys were anxious to advance; the loyalty of the sikhs was doubtful, and he feared the contamination might spread. on january th he commenced operations. the key of the khyber pass, as we have all heard more than once within the last few weeks, is the fortress of ali musjid, occupying a strong position some five miles down the pass, and about twenty-five from peshawur. it had been recently garrisoned by some loyal natives under an english officer, mackeson; but, straitened for provisions, and hard pressed by the khyberees, it was doubtful whether the brave little garrison could hold out much longer, and on the night of the th the rd and th regiments, under colonel moseley, were despatched with a goodly supply of bullocks to its relief. the fort was occupied without loss, but the bullocks, save some or , had meanwhile disappeared, and there were now more mouths to feed in ali musjid and less wherewith to feed them. wild was to have followed with the other two regiments, his sikh guns and sikh allies, on the th, but when the time came the latter turned their backs on the khyber and marched to a man back to peshawur. the sepoys met the enemy at the mouth of the pass, but the spirit of disaffection seemed to have spread. after an irresolute and aimless volley they halted in confusion: in vain wild and his officers called on them to advance; not a man moved; the guns broke down, and one of them, despite the gallant efforts of henry lawrence, had to be abandoned. one of our officers was killed, and wild himself, with several more, was wounded; the retreat was sounded, and the column fell back on jumrood. the two regiments which held the fort had soon to follow their example. they could have held the post for any time indeed, so far as mere fighting went, but they had no provisions, and the water was poisonous. on the rd, then, they evacuated their position, and after a sharp struggle, in which two english officers fell, and some sick and baggage had to be abandoned, made good their way back to their comrades. such was the state of affairs pollock found on his arrival at peshawur. despite urgent letters received from jellalabad the general saw that an immediate advance was impossible. the morale of the defeated sepoys had fallen very low; the hospitals were crowded with sick and wounded, and there was still an insufficiency of guns. reinforcements of british dragoons and british artillery were pressing up from the punjab, and pollock decided to wait till he could make certain of success. he decided well; nor was the time of waiting lost. he visited the hospitals daily, cheering the sick, and reanimating by his kindness and decision the wavering and disheartened sepoys. on march th the long-desired reinforcements arrived, and orders were at once issued for the advance. at three o'clock on the morning of april th the army moved off from jumrood to the mouth of the pass. it was divided into three columns; two of these were to crown the heights on either side, while the third, when the hills had been sufficiently cleared, was to advance through the gorge; each column was composed of a mixed force of europeans and sepoys; four squadrons of the rd dragoons and eleven pieces of artillery accompanied the centre column. the attack was as successful as it was ingenious. a huge barricade of mud and stones and trunks of trees had been thrown across the mouth of the pass, while the heights on either side swarmed with the wild hill-tribes. so quietly, however, did our flanking columns advance, that they were half-way up the heights before the enemy became aware of the movement. from peak to peak our men, english as well as sepoys, clambered as agile as the mountaineers themselves, pouring from every spot of vantage a steady and well-directed fire on the disconcerted khyberees, who had never dreamed that the white-faced infidels could prove more than a match for them in their own fastnesses. then pollock with the main column advanced. the afghans, finding themselves out-flanked on either side, gradually withdrew; the barricade was removed without loss; and the huge line of soldiers, camp-followers, and baggage-waggons passed unopposed on its victorious way to jellalabad. the dreaded khyber pass had been forced with the slightest possible loss of life, and the boastful afghans beaten at their own tactics. on the th jellalabad was reached. with what intense delight sale's noble brigade saw once more from their walls the colours of a friendly force may well be imagined. for five weary months the little band had resisted every offer of surrender, and beaten back every assault. in february the fortifications that had been raised and strengthened by broadfoot with infinite labour were destroyed by an earthquake; and at that very time they learnt that akbar khan was advancing on them. the works, however, were restored, and in a dashing sortie, commanded by dennie, the afghan chief, with the flower of the barukzye horse, was driven from his position without the loss of a single man to the garrison. a few days before pollock arrived a still more daring enterprise had been attempted. on april th another sortie in force was sent out under dennie, monteith, and havelock, which bore down on the afghan camp, and sent akbar khan flying with his men far away in the direction of lughman--a dashing exploit, and a complete victory, but dearly won, for it was won at the cost of the gallant dennie. the meeting between the two armies was, wrote pollock to a friend, "a sight worth seeing;" according to mr. gleig the band of the th went out to play the relieving force in, and the entry was performed to the tune of "oh, but ye've been lang o' coming." still there was plenty yet to be done, if only the english soldiers might be allowed to do it. at first it seemed doubtful whether lord ellenborough, who had succeeded lord auckland in february, would be more willing to sanction a forward movement than was his predecessor. on his first landing, no one could have been more eager than he to avenge the humiliation of cabul, but as he went up the country his opinions began to suffer a change. soojah had been murdered about the very time that the khyber pass was forced, by the treachery of a son of zemaun khan (a faithful friend to the english, by whose good offices the english captives were still living in safety, if not in comfort); his son futteh jung had been nominally appointed to succeed him, but his government was no more than a farce. jealous of each other, and jealous particularly of the rising power of akbar khan, it was plain that the afghan sirdars would never rest till the strength and popularity of dost mahomed was once more among them to restore and maintain order. was it not better to accept the inevitable, to withdraw our troops, now that it could be done with comparative honour, and to leave the country to its own king and its own devices? it was doubtful how much longer the brave nott could maintain himself in candahar, and the force that had been sent out from sindh under england to relieve him had been beaten back at the kojuck pass; ghuznee, after a stubborn resistance, had fallen, and the british officers sent prisoners to cabul. lord ellenborough cannot be blamed for hesitating at such a crisis; but the urgent prayers of pollock, nott, and outram at last prevailed, and orders were given that the military commanders might use their own discretion, while they were at the same time warned that failure meant the inevitable fall of the british empire in the east. the responsibility was gladly taken, and the advance commenced which was to retrieve, as far as it was possible to retrieve, the shame of all former failure. the advance was an unbroken series of victories. england, reinforced with some british troops, had moved out again from quettah, cleared the kojuck pass, and joined nott at candahar. with a force now raised to a strength equal to that which lay at jellalabad, nott, resolute to "retire to india" by way of ghuznee and cabul, lost no time in setting to work. dividing his troops, he took with him the th and st regiments of the line, and the "beautiful sepoy" regiments that had stood by him so well, and despatched the rest back to india in charge of england, in whose hands also he placed prince timour, whom, after his father's death it was alike dangerous to take to cabul or to leave at candahar. about the same time pollock, with men of all arms, including the st regiment of the line and the rd dragoons, moved out from jellalabad on the khoord-cabul pass, that blood-stained theatre of an awful tragedy. the enemy were in force at jugdulluck, but pollock, employing the same tactics that had been so efficacious among the khyber hills, sent out flanking parties to clear the heights, while from below his guns kept up a hot fire of shells on their position. the ghilzyes fought bravely, but they could not stand against the english troops in open fight, and with as little loss as in his first engagement pollock led his men into the pass. seven miles within, in the little valley of tezeen, akbar khan, with , of his best troops, resolved to make one last throw for victory. he threw and lost. while the english dragoons met and broke the charge of the afghan horse, the english infantry, gallantly seconded by the sepoys and ghoorkahs, pressed up the heights under a heavy fire. sale himself led the advanced column; monteith and broadfoot and mccaskill followed. not a shot was fired by the stormers; thick and fast flew the bullets among them from the long afghan jazails, but not an english musket answered. the work was done with the bayonet, and driven from crag to crag by that "beautiful weapon" alone, the enemy fled in confusion, till amid the ringing cheers of the whole british force the british flag waved on the highest pinnacle of the pass. this was akbar khan's last attempt; leaving his troops to shift for themselves, he fled northward to the ghoreebund valley; pollock, over the crumbling skeletons of the comrades whom he had so worthily avenged, led his men in triumph to cabul, and the british ensign once more flew from the heights of the bala hissar. on september th pollock reached cabul, and on the th he was joined by nott. after a slight check to the cavalry of his advanced guard, at an early period of his march, the latter's success had been as complete as pollock's. at ghoaine he had utterly routed a superior force of the enemy under shumshoodeen khan. ghuznee had been evacuated before even our preparations for the assault were completed; the works were dismantled and blown up, the town and citadel fired, and the famous sandal-wood "gates of somnauth," which, according to afghan tradition, had adorned their famous sultan's tomb for upwards of eight centuries, carried off in accordance with lord ellenborough's expressed desire. at syderabad, where in the previous november woodburn and his men had been treacherously massacred, shumshoodeen turned again; the stand was stubborn and for a while the issue seemed doubtful; but the news of the defeat at tezeen had spread, the afghans lost heart, and abandoning their position left the way for nott clear into cabul. the honour of the british arms was at last complete; , british troops were encamped in the afghan capital, and from every quarter round submission was pouring in. ameen-oollah khan, who held out to the last, had been utterly routed in the kohistan by a force under mccaskill, and akbar khan had also intimated his wish to treat for terms. the miserable futteh jung, who had already once been forced to fly for his life, was formally installed on his throne, but as formally warned that he was to expect no further aid or protection. the prospect before him was too much for his weak and timorous mind, and, in truth, it was far from a pleasant one; after a few days' nominal rule, he voluntarily resigned a crown which he would never have been able to keep, and shahpoor, a high-spirited young boy of the suddozye house, was seated in his stead. two things had yet to be done. the captives were to be recovered, and some unmistakeable mark of british retribution was to be stamped on cabul. before akbar khan took the field for the last time he had despatched all the english hostages, together with the prisoners from ghuznee, towards the bamean frontier, under saleh mohamed. pollock immediately on reaching cabul had sent sir richmond shakespeare, with a party of horse in hot haste after them, and subsequently a stronger force under sale. before, however, the rescue arrived the prisoners had effected their own deliverance through the medium of saleh mohamed's cupidity. on a promise, duly drawn up and signed by pottinger, lawrence and three others, of a heavy bribe, the afghan had consented to escort them not to turkestan and slavery, as had been intended, but back to the english camp, and it was at kaloo, on their way down to cabul, that, after more than eight months' daily expectation of death, they once more found themselves among english friends and safe under the english flag. despite the many hardships and anxieties they had undergone, their health, even of the women and children, had been marvellously preserved, and their condition had, on the whole, been far better than any they could have hoped for when they exchanged the certain dangers of the retreat for the uncertain security of akbar khan's word. two only of the little band that had turned their backs on the miseries of the khoord-cabul pass were missing when they rode into sale's camp, amid the cheers of the men and a salute of welcome from the guns. john conolly, mourned by all who knew him, had died at cabul a few days before the march for bamean began, and in the previous april, after pollock's victory had heralded the triumph which was to atone for the disasters that the british arms had experienced under his command, poor elphinstone, after days of intense suffering in body and mind, and bewailing to the last that he had not been permitted to die with his men, passed away amid the affectionate sympathy of all his fellow-prisoners. his body was sent down to jellalabad, and there interred with military honours in the presence of his victorious successor. to set the seal of our triumph on cabul it was determined to destroy the great bazaar, where the mutilated body of macnaghten had been exposed to the insults of his murderers. it had been first intended to demolish the citadel, but the suddozye chiefs pleaded so earnestly for this last remnant of their royalty, that pollock consented to spare it. during two days, october th and th, the work of destruction went on, and though every precaution was taken to prevent any farther loss beyond that ordered, and particularly any excess on the part of our soldiers, many suffered, and there was much excess. on the th the homeward march began. futteh jung had implored the safe conduct of the british from a kingdom where he was no king, and from subjects with whom his life was not worth an hour's purchase, and with him went for the second time into exile his blind old grandfather zemaun shah. by the khoord-cabul and khyber passes, the scenes of so much misery and such grievous humiliation, the victorious army returned in triumph to hindostan, and ere ferozepore was reached they heard that the last of the suddozye line had fled, that akbar khan had seized the throne in trust for his father, and that dost mahomed himself was even then on his way through the punjab to resume his old dominion. and so the english army left secure on the throne of afghanistan the dynasty they had spent so many millions of treasure and so many thousands of lives to overthrow. london: gilbert and rivington, printers, st. john's square, e.c. transcriber's notes obvious punctuation errors repaired. inconsistent hyphenation fixed. p. : he proceded to teheran -> he proceeded to teheran. pp. (twice), : dost mohamed -> dost mahomed. p. : to be be applied -> to be applied. p. : five brigades of of infantry -> five brigades of infantry. p. : burnes with with him -> burnes with him. p. : you own terms -> your own terms. p. : salutatations were exchanged -> salutations were exchanged. note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) for name and fame or through afghan passes by g. a. henty. contents preface. chapter : the lost child. chapter : the foundling. chapter : life on a smack. chapter : run down. chapter : the castaways. chapter : the attack on the village. chapter : the fight with the prahus. chapter : the torpedo. chapter : the advance into afghanistan. chapter : the peiwar-khotal. chapter : a prisoner. chapter : the advance up the khyber. chapter : the massacre at cabul. chapter : the advance upon cabul. chapter : the fighting round cabul. chapter : the fight in the pass. chapter : at candahar. chapter : on the helmund. chapter : the battle of maiwand. chapter : candahar. chapter : the battle of candahar. chapter : at home at last. illustrations sam dickson finds little willie gale. will and hans in search of a shelter. captain herbert saved. william gale in the hands of the afghans. one of the gunpowder magazines had exploded. letters from the general. will saves colonel ripon. gundi carried by the bayonet. preface. in following the hero of this story through the last afghan war, you will be improving your acquaintance with a country which is of supreme importance to the british empire and, at the same time, be able to trace the operations by which lord roberts made his great reputation as a general, and a leader of men. afghanistan stands as a line between the two great empires of england and russia; and is likely, sooner or later, to become the scene of a tremendous struggle between these nations. happily, at the present time the afghans are on our side. it is true that we have warred with, and beaten them; but our retirement, after victory, has at least shown them that we have no desire to take their country while, on the other hand, they know that for those races upon whom russia has once laid her hand there is no escape. in these pages you will see the strength and the weakness of these wild people of the mountains; their strength lying in their personal bravery, their determination to preserve their freedom at all costs, and the nature of their country. their weakness consists in their want of organization, their tribal jealousies, and their impatience of regular habits and of the restraint necessary to render them good soldiers. but, when led and organized by english officers, there are no better soldiers in the world; as is proved by the splendid services which have been rendered by the frontier force, which is composed almost entirely of afghan tribesmen. their history shows that defeat has little moral effect upon them. crushed one day, they will rise again the next; scattered--it would seem hopelessly--they are ready to reassemble, and renew the conflict, at the first summons of their chiefs. guided by british advice, led by british officers and, it may be, paid by british gold, afghanistan is likely to prove an invaluable ally to us, when the day comes that russia believes herself strong enough to move forward towards the goal of all her hopes and efforts, for the last fifty years--the conquest of india. g. a. henty. chapter : the lost child. "my poor pets!" a lady exclaimed, sorrowfully; "it is too bad. they all knew me so well; and ran to meet me, when they saw me coming; and seemed really pleased to see me, even when i had no food to give them." "which was not often, my dear," captain ripon--her husband--said. "however it is, as you say, too bad; and i will bring the fellow to justice, if i can. there are twelve prize fowls--worth a couple of guineas apiece, not to mention the fact of their being pets of yours--stolen, probably by tramps; who will eat them, and for whom the commonest barn-door chickens would have done as well. there are marks of blood in two or three places, so they have evidently been killed for food. the house was locked up last night, all right; for you see they got in by breaking in a panel of the door. "robson, run down to the village, at once, and tell the policeman to come up here; and ask if any gypsies, or tramps, have been seen in the neighborhood." the village lay at the gate of captain ripon's park, and the gardener soon returned with the policeman. "i've heard say there are some gypsies camped on netherwood common, four miles away," that functionary said, in answer to captain ripon. "put the gray mare in the dog cart, sam. we will drive over at once. they will hardly expect us so soon. we will pick up another policeman, at netherwood. they may show fight, if we are not in strength." five minutes later, captain ripon was traveling along the road at the rate of twelve miles an hour; with sam by his side, and the policeman sitting behind. at netherwood they took up another policeman and, a few minutes later, drove up to the gypsy encampment. there was a slight stir when they were seen approaching; and then the gypsies went on with their usual work, the women weaving baskets from osiers, the men cutting up gorse into skewers. there were four low tents, and a wagon stood near; a bony horse grazing on the common. "now," captain ripon said, "i am a magistrate, and i daresay you know what i have come for. my fowl house has been broken open, and some valuable fowls stolen. "now, policeman, look about, and see if you can find any traces of them." the gypsies rose to their feet, with angry gestures. "why do you come to us?" one of the men said. "when a fowl is stolen you always suspect us, as if there were no other thieves in the world." "there are plenty of other thieves, my friend; and we shall not interfere with you, if we find nothing suspicious." "there have been some fowls plucked, here," one of the policemen said. "here is a little feather--" and he showed one, of only half an inch in length "--and there is another, on that woman's hair. they have cleaned them up nicely enough, but it ain't easy to pick up every feather. i'll be bound we find a fowl, in the pot." two of the gypsies leaped forward, stick in hand; but the oldest man present said a word or two to them, in their own dialect. "you may look in the pot," he said, turning to captain ripon, "and maybe you will find a fowl there, with other things. we bought 'em at the market at hunston, yesterday." the policeman lifted the lid off the great pot, which was hanging over the fire, and stirred up the contents with a stick. "there's rabbits here--two or three of them, i should say--and a fowl, perhaps two, but they are cut up." "i cannot swear to that," captain ripon said, examining the portions of fowl, "though the plumpness of the breasts, and the size, show that they are not ordinary fowls." he looked round again at the tents. "but i can pretty well swear to this," he said, as he stooped and picked up a feather which lay, half concealed, between the edge of one of the tents and the grass. "this is a breast feather of a spangled dorking. these are not birds which would be sold for eating in hunston market, and it will be for these men to show where they got it from." a smothered oath broke from one or two of the men. the elder signed to them to be quiet. "that's not proof," he said, insolently. "you can't convict five men, because the feather of a fowl which you cannot swear to is found in their camp." "no," captain ripon said, quietly. "i do not want to convict anyone but the thief; but the proof is sufficient for taking you in custody, and we shall find out which was the guilty man, afterwards. "now, lads, it will be worse for you, if you make trouble. "constables, take them up to mr. bailey. he lives half a mile away. fortunately, we have means of proving which is the fellow concerned. "now, sam, you and i will go up with the netherwood constable to mr. bailey. "and do you," he said, to the other policeman, "keep a sharp watch over these women. you say you can find nothing in the tents; but it is likely the other fowls are hid, not far off, and i will put all the boys of the village to search, when i come back." the gypsies, with sullen faces, accompanied captain ripon and the policeman to the magistrate's. "is that feather the only proof you have, ripon?" mr. bailey asked, when he had given his evidence. "i do not think that it will be enough to convict, if unsupported; besides, you cannot bring it home to any one of them. but it is sufficient for me to have them locked up for twenty-four hours and, in the meantime, you may find the other fowls." "but i have means of identification," captain ripon said. "there is a footmark in some earth, at the fowl house door. it is made by a boot which has got hobnails and a horseshoe heel, and a piece of that heel has been broken off. "now, which of these men has got such a boot on? whichever has, he is the man." there was a sudden movement among the accused. "it's of no use," one of them said, when the policeman approached to examine their boots. "i'm the man, i'll admit it. i can't get over the boot," and he held up his right foot. "that is the boot, sir," the constable exclaimed. "i can swear that it will fit the impression, exactly." "very well," the magistrate said. "constable, take that man to the lockup; and bring him before the bench, tomorrow, for final committal for trial. there is no evidence against the other four. they can go." with surly, threatening faces the men left the room; while the constable placed handcuffs on the prisoner. "constable," mr. bailey said, "you had better not put this man in the village lockup. the place is of no great strength, and his comrades would as likely as not get him out, tonight. put him in my dog cart. my groom shall drive you over to hunston." captain ripon returned with his groom to netherwood, and set all the children searching the gorse, copses, and hedges near the common, by the promise of ten shillings reward, if they found the missing fowls. half an hour later, the gypsies struck their tents, loaded the van, and went off. late that afternoon, the ten missing fowls were discovered in a small copse by the wayside, half a mile from the common, on the road to captain ripon's park. "i cannot bring your fowls back to life, emma," that gentleman said, when he returned home, "but i have got the thief. it was one of the gypsies on netherwood common. we found two of the fowls in their pot. no doubt they thought that they would have plenty of time to get their dinner before anyone came, even if suspicion fell on them; and they have hidden the rest away somewhere, but i expect that we shall find them. "they had burnt all the feathers, as they thought; but i found a breast feather of a spangled dorking, and that was enough for me to give them in custody. then, when it came to the question of boots, the thief found it no good to deny it, any longer." that evening, captain ripen was told that a woman wished to speak to him and, on going out into the hall, he saw a gypsy of some thirty years of age. "i have come, sir, to beg you not to appear against my husband." "but, my good woman, i see no reason why i should not do so. if he had only stolen a couple of common fowls, for a sick wife or child, i might have been inclined to overlook it--for i am not fond of sending men to prison--but to steal a dozen valuable fowls, for the pot, is a little too much. besides, the matter has gone too far, now, for me to retract, even if i wished to--which i certainly do not." "he is a good husband, sir." "he may be," captain ripon said, "though that black eye you have got does not speak in his favor but that has nothing to do with it. matters must take their course." the woman changed her tone. "i have asked you fairly, sir; and it will be better for you if you don't prosecute reuben." "oh, nonsense, my good woman! don't let me have any threats, or it will be worse for you." "i tell you," the woman exclaimed, fiercely, "it will be the worse for you, if you appear against my reuben." "there, go out," captain ripon said, opening the front door of the hall. "as if i cared for your ridiculous threats! your husband will get what he deserves--five years, if i am not mistaken." "you will repent this," the gypsy said, as she passed out. captain ripon closed the door after her, without a word. "well, who was it?" his wife inquired, when he returned to the drawing room. "an insolent gypsy woman, wife of the man who stole the fowls. she had the impudence to threaten me, if i appeared against him." "oh, robert!" the young wife exclaimed, apprehensively, "what could she do? perhaps you had better not appear." "nonsense, my dear!" her husband laughed. "not appear, because an impudent gypsy woman has threatened me? a nice magistrate i should be! why, half the fellows who are committed swear that they will pay off the magistrate, some day; but nothing ever comes of it. here, we have been married six months, and you are wanting me to neglect my duty; especially when it is your pet fowls which have been stolen. "why, at the worst, my dear," he went on, seeing that his wife still looked pale, "they could burn down a tick or two, on a windy night in winter and, to satisfy you, i will have an extra sharp lookout kept in that direction, and have a watchdog chained up near them. "come, my love, it is not worth giving a second thought about; and i shall not tell you about my work on the bench, if you are going to take matters to heart like this." the winter came and went, and the ricks were untouched, and captain ripon forgot all about the gypsy's threats. at the assizes a previous conviction was proved against her husband, and he got five years penal servitude and, after the trial was over, the matter passed out of the minds of both husband and wife. they had, indeed, other matters to think about for, soon after christmas, a baby boy was born, and monopolized the greater portion of his mother's thoughts. when, in due time, he was taken out for walks, the old women of the village--perhaps with an eye to presents from the park--were unanimous in declaring that he was the finest boy ever seen, and the image both of his father and mother. he certainly was a fine baby; and his mother lamented sorely over the fact that he had a dark blood mark, about the size of a three-penny piece, upon his shoulder. her husband, however, consoled her by pointing out that--as it was a boy--the mark did not matter in the slightest; whereas--had it been a girl--the mark would have been a disfigurement, when she attained to the dignified age at which low dresses are worn. "yes, of course, that would have been dreadful, robert. still, you know, it is a pity." "i really cannot see that it is even a pity, little woman; and it would have made no great difference if he had been spotted all over, like a leopard, so that his face and arms were free. the only drawback would have been he would have got some nickname or other, such as 'the leopard,' or 'spotty,' or something of that sort, when he went to bathe with his school fellows. but this little spot does not matter, in the slightest. "some day or other tom will laugh, when i tell him what a fuss you made over it." mrs. ripon was silenced but, although she said nothing more about it, she was grieved in her heart at this little blemish on her boy; and lamented that it would spoil his appearance, when he began to run about in little short frocks; and she determined, at once, that he should wear long curls, until he got into jackets. summer, autumn, and winter came and passed. in the spring, tom ripon was toddling about; but he had not yet begun to talk, although his mother declared that certain incoherent sounds, which he made, were quite plain and distinct words; but her husband, while willing to allow that they might be perfectly intelligible to her, insisted that--to the male ear--they in no way resembled words. "but he ought to begin to talk, robert," his wife urged. "he is sixteen months old, now, and can run about quite well. he really ought to begin to talk." "he will talk, before long," her husband said, carelessly. "many children do not talk till they are eighteen months old, some not till they are two years. besides, you say he does begin, already." "yes, robert, but not quite plainly." "no, indeed, not plainly at all," her husband laughed. "don't trouble, my dear, he will talk soon enough; and if he only talks as loud as he roars, sometimes, you will regret the hurry you have been in about it." "oh, robert, how can you talk so? i am sure he does not cry more than other children. nurse says he is the best child she ever knew." "of course she does, my dear; nurses always do. but i don't say he roars more than other children. i only say he roars, and that loudly; so you need not be afraid of there being anything the matter with his tongue, or his lungs. "what fidgets you young mothers are, to be sure!" "and what heartless things you young fathers are, to be sure!" his wife retorted, laughing. "men don't deserve to have children. they do not appreciate them, one bit." "we appreciate them, in our way, little woman; but it is not a fussy way. we are content with them as they are, and are not in any hurry for them to run, or to walk, or to cut their first teeth. tom is a fine little chap, and i am very fond of him, in his way--principally, perhaps, because he is your tom--but i cannot see that he is a prodigy." "he is a prodigy," mrs. ripon said, with a little toss of her head, "and i shall go up to the nursery, to admire him." so saying, she walked off with dignity; and captain ripon went out to look at his horses, and thought to himself what a wonderful dispensation of providence it was, that mothers were so fond of their babies. "i don't know what the poor little beggars would do," he muttered, "if they had only their fathers to look after them; but i suppose we should take to it, just as the old goose in the yard has taken to that brood of chickens, whose mother was carried off by the fox. "by the way, i must order some wire netting. i forgot to write for it, yesterday." another two months. it was june, and now even captain ripon allowed that tom could say "pa," and "ma," with tolerable distinctness; but as yet he had got no farther. he could now run about sturdily and, as the season was warm and bright, and mrs. ripon believed in fresh air, the child spent a considerable portion of his time in the garden. one day his mother was out with him, and he had been running about for some time. mrs. ripon was picking flowers, for she had a dinner party that evening, and she enjoyed getting her flowers, and arranging her vases, herself. presently she looked round, but tom was missing. there were many clumps of ornamental shrubs on the lawn, and mrs. ripon thought nothing of his disappearance. "tom," she called, "come to mamma, she wants you," and went on with her work. a minute or two passed. "where is that little pickle?" she said. "hiding, i suppose," and she went off in search. nowhere was tom to be seen. she called loudly, and searched in the bushes. "he must have gone up to the house. "oh, here comes nurse. nurse, have you seen master tom? he has just run away," she called. "no, ma'am, i have seen nothing of him." "he must be about the garden then, somewhere. look about, nurse. where can the child have hidden itself?" nurse and mother ran about, calling loudly the name of the missing child. five minutes later mrs. ripon ran into the study, where her husband was going through his farm accounts. "oh, robert," she said, "i can't find tom!" and she burst into tears. "not find tom?" her husband said, rising in surprise. "why, how long have you missed him?" "he was out in the garden with me. i was picking flowers for the dinner table and, when i looked round, he was gone. nurse and i have been looking everywhere, and calling, but we cannot find him." "oh, he is all right," captain ripon said, cheerfully. "do not alarm yourself, little woman. he must have wandered into the shrubbery. we shall hear him howling, directly. but i will come and look for him." no better success attended captain ripon's search than that which his wife had met with. he looked anxious, now. the gardeners and servants were called, and soon every place in the garden was ransacked. "he must have got through the gate, somehow, into the park," captain ripon said, hurrying in that direction. "he certainly is not in the garden, or in any of the hothouses." some of the men had already gone in that direction. presently captain ripon met one, running back. "i have been down to the gate, sir, and can see nothing of master tom; but in the middle of the drive, just by the clump of laurels by the gate, this boot was lying--just as if it had been put there on purpose, to be seen." "nonsense!" captain ripon said. "what can that have to do with it?" nevertheless he took the boot, and looked at it. it was a roughly-made, heavy boot, such as would be worn by a laboring man. he was about to throw it carelessly aside, and to proceed on his search, when he happened to turn it over. then he started, as if struck. "good heaven!" he exclaimed, "it is the gypsy's." yes, he remembered it now. the man had pleaded not guilty, when brought up at the assizes, and the boot had been produced as evidence. he remembered it particularly because, after the man was sentenced, his wife had provoked a smile by asking that the boots might be given up to her; in exchange for a better pair for her husband to put on, when discharged from prison. yes, it was clear. the gypsy woman had kept her word, and had taken her revenge. she had stolen the child, and had placed the boot where it would attract attention, in order that the parents might know the hand that struck them. instantly captain ripon ran to the stable, ordered the groom to mount at once, and scour every road and lane; while he himself rode off to hunston to give notice to the police, and offer a large reward for the child's recovery. he charged the man who had brought the boot to carry it away, and put it in a place of safety till it was required; and on no account to mention to a soul where he put it. before riding off he ran in to his wife, who was half wild with grief, to tell her that he was going to search outside the park; and that she must keep up her spirits for, no doubt, tom would turn up all right, in no time. he admitted to himself, however, as he galloped away, that he was not altogether sure that tom would be so speedily recovered. the woman would never have dared to place the boot on the road, and so give a clue against herself, unless she felt very confident that she could get away, or conceal herself. "she has probably some hiding place, close by the park," he said to himself, "where she will lie hid till night, and will then make across country." he paused at the village, and set the whole population at work, by telling them that his child was missing--and had, he believed, been carried off by a gypsy woman--and that he would give fifty pounds to anyone who would find him. she could not be far off, as it was only about half an hour since the child had been missed. then he galloped to hunston, set the police at work and, going to a printer, told him instantly to set up and strike off placards, offering five hundred pounds reward for the recovery of the child. this was to be done in an hour or two, and then taken to the police station for distribution throughout the country round. having now done all in his power, captain ripon rode back as rapidly as he had come, in hopes that the child might already have been found. no news had, however, been obtained of him, nor had anyone seen any strange woman in the neighborhood. on reaching the house, he found his wife prostrated with grief and, in answer to her questions, he thought it better to tell her about the discovery of the boot. "we may be some little time, before we find the boy," he said; "but we shall find him, sooner or later. i have got placards out already, offering five hundred pounds reward; and this evening i will send advertisements to all the papers in this and the neighboring counties. "do not fret, darling. the woman has done it out of spite, no doubt; but she will not risk putting her neck in a noose, by harming the child. it is a terrible grief, but it will only be for a time. we are sure to find him before long." later in the evening, when mrs. ripon had somewhat recovered her composure, she said to her husband: "how strange are god's ways, robert. how wicked and wrong in us to grumble! i was foolish enough to fret over that mark on the darling's neck, and now the thought of it is my greatest comfort. if it should be god's will that months or years should pass over, before we find him, there is a sign by which we shall always know him. no other child can be palmed off upon us, as our own. when we find tom we shall know him, however changed he may be!" "yes, dear," her husband said, "god is very good, and this trial may be sent us for the best. as you say, we can take comfort, now, from what we were disposed to think, at the time, a little cross. after that, dear, we may surely trust in god. that mark was placed there that we might know our boy again and, were it not decreed that we should again see him, that mark would have been useless." the thought, for a time, greatly cheered mrs. ripon but, gradually, the hope that she should ever see her boy again faded away; and captain ripon became much alarmed at the manifest change in her health. in spite of all captain ripon could do, no news was obtained of the gypsy, or tom. for weeks he rode about the country, asking questions in every village; or hurried away to distant parts of england, where the police thought they had a clue. it was all in vain. every gypsy encampment in the kingdom was searched, but without avail; and even the police, sharp eyed as they are, could not guess that the decent-looking irishwoman, speaking--when she did speak, which was seldom, for she was a taciturn woman--with a strong brogue, working in a laundry in a small street in the potteries, notting hill, was the gypsy they were looking for; or that the little boy, whose father she said was at sea, was the child for whose discovery a thousand pounds was continually advertised. chapter : the foundling. it was a bitterly cold night in january. the wind was roaring across the flats and fens of cambridgeshire, driving tiny flakes of snow before it. but few people had been about all day, and those whose business compelled them to face the weather had hurried along, muffled up to the chin. it was ten at night; and the porter and his wife at the workhouse, at ely, had just gone to bed, when the woman exclaimed: "sam, i hear a child crying." "oh, nonsense!" the man replied, drawing the bedclothes higher over his head. "it is the wind; it's been whistling all day." the woman was silent, but not convinced. presently she sat up in bed. "i tell you, sam, it's a child; don't you hear it, man? it's a child, outside the gate. on such a night as this, too. get up, man, and see; if you won't, i will go myself." "lie still, woman. it's all thy fancy." "you are a fool, sam dickson," his wife said, sharply. "do you think i have lived to the age of forty-five, and don't know a child's cry, when i hear it? now are you going to get up, or am i?" with much grumbling, the porter turned out of bed, slipped on a pair of trousers and a greatcoat, took down the key from the wall, lighted a lantern, and went out. he opened the gate, and looked out. there was nothing to be seen; and he was about to close the gate again, with a curse on his wife's fancies, when a fresh cry broke on his ears. he hurried out now and, directed by the voice, found lying near the gate a child, wrapped in a dark-colored shawl, which had prevented him from seeing it at his first glance. there was no one else in sight. illustration: sam dickson finds little willie gale. the man lifted his lantern above his head, and gave a shout. there was no answer. then he raised the child and carried it in; locked the door, and entered the lodge. "you are right, for once," he said. "here is a child, and a pretty heavy one, too. it has been deserted by someone; and a heartless creature she must have been, for in another half hour it would have been frozen to death, if you had not heard it." the woman was out of bed now. "it is a boy," she said, opening the shawl, "about two years old, i should say. "don't cry, my boy--don't cry. "it's half frozen, sam. the best thing will be to put it into our bed, that has just got warm. i will warm it up a little milk. it's no use taking it into the ward, tonight." ten minutes later the child was sound asleep; the porter--who was a good-natured man--having gone over to sleep in an empty bed in the house, leaving the child to share his wife's bed. in the morning the foundling opened its eyes and looked round. seeing everything strange, it began to cry. "don't cry, dear," the woman said. "i will get you some nice breakfast, directly." the kindness of tone at once pacified the child. it looked round. "where's mother?" he asked. "i don't know, dear. we shall find her soon enough, no doubt; don't you fret." the child did not seem inclined to fret. on the contrary, he brightened up visibly. "will she beat billy, when she comes back?" "no, my dear, she sha'n't beat you. does she often beat you?" the child nodded its head several times, emphatically. "then she's a bad lot," the woman said, indignantly. the child ate its breakfast contentedly, and was then carried by the porter's wife to the master, who had already heard the circumstance of its entry. "it's of no use asking such a baby whether it has any name," he said; "of course, it would not know. it had better go into the infants' ward. the guardians will settle what its name shall be. we will set the police at work, and try and find out something about its mother. it is a fine-looking little chap; and she must be either a thoroughly bad one, or terribly pressed, to desert it like this. most likely it is a tramp and, in that case, it's odds we shall never hear further about it. "any distinguishing mark on its clothes?" "none at all, sir. it is poorly dressed, and seems to have been very bad treated. its skin is dirty, and its little back is black and blue with bruises; but it has a blood mark on the neck, which will enable its mother to swear to it, if it's fifty years hence--but i don't suppose we shall ever hear of her, again." that afternoon, however, the news came that the body of a tramp had been found, frozen to death in a ditch near the town. she had apparently lost her way and, when she had fallen in, was so numbed and cold that she was unable to rise, and so had been drowned in the shallow water. when the master heard of it, he sent for the porter's wife. "mrs. dickson," he said, "you had better take that child down, and let it see the tramp they have found, frozen to death. the child is too young to be shocked at death, and will suppose she is asleep. but you will be able to see if he recognizes her." there was no doubt as to the recognition. the child started in terror, when he saw the woman lying in the shed into which she had been carried. it checked its first impulse to cry out, but struggled to get further off. "moder asleep," he said, in a whisper. "if she wake, she beat billy." that was enough. the woman carried him back to the house. "she's his mother, sir, sure enough," she said to the master, "though how she should be puzzles me. she is dressed in pretty decent clothes; but she is as dark as a gypsy, with black hair. this child is fair, with a skin as white as milk, now he is washed." "i daresay he takes after his father," the master--who was a practical man--said. "i hear that there is no name on her things, no paper or other article which would identify her in her pockets; but there is two pounds, twelve shillings in her purse, so she was not absolutely in want. it will pay the parish for her funeral." an hour later the guardians assembled and, upon hearing the circumstances of the newcomer's admission, and the death of the tramp, they decided that the child should be entered in the books as "william gale,"--the name being chosen with a reference to the weather during which he came into the house--and against his name a note was written, to the effect that his mother--a tramp, name unknown--had, after leaving him at the door of the workhouse, been found frozen to death next day. william gale grew, and throve. he was a quiet and contented child; accustomed to be shut up all day alone, while his mother was out washing, the companionship of other children in the workhouse was a pleasant novelty and, if the food was not such as a dainty child would fancy, it was at least as good as he had been accustomed to. the porter's wife continued to be the fast friend of the child whom she had saved from death. the fact that she had done so gave her an interest in it. her own children were out in service, or at work in the fields; and the child was a pleasure to her. scarce a day passed, then, that she would not go across the yard up to the infants' ward, and bring billy down to the lodge; where he would play contentedly by the hour, or sit watching her, and sucking at a cake, while she washed or prepared her husband's dinner. billy was seldom heard to cry. perhaps he had wept all his stock of tears away, before he entered the house. he had seldom fits of bad temper, and was a really lovable child. mrs. dickson never wavered in the opinion she had first formed--that the dead tramp was not billy's mother--but as no one else agreed with her, she kept her thoughts to herself. the years passed on, and william gale was now no longer in the infants' ward, but took his place in the boys' school. here he at once showed an intelligence beyond that of the other boys of his own age. the hours which he had, each day, spent in the porter's lodge had not been wasted. the affection of the good woman had brightened his life, and he had none of the dull, downcast look so common among children in workhouses. she had encouraged him to talk and play, had taught him the alphabet, and supplied him with an occasional picture book, with easy words. indeed, she devoted far more time to him than many mothers, in her class of life, can give to their children. the guardians, as they went in and out to board meeting, would delight her by remarking: "that is really a fine little fellow, mrs. dickson. he really does you credit. a fine, sturdy, independent little chap." the child, of course, wore the regular uniform of workhouse children; but mrs. dickson--who was handy with her needle--used to cut and alter the clothes to fit him, and thus entirely changed their appearance. "he looks like a gentleman's child," one of the guardians said, one day. "i believe he is a gentleman's child, sir. look at his white skin; see how upright he is, with his head far back, as if he was somebody. he is different, altogether, from the run of them. i always said he came of good blood, and i shall say so to my dying day." "it may be so, mrs. dickson; but the woman who left him here, if i remember right, did not look as if she had any good blood in her." "not likely, sir. she never came by him honestly, i am sure. i couldn't have believed she was his mother, not if she had sworn to it with her dying breath." mrs. dickson's belief was not without influence upon the boy. when he was old enough to understand, she told him the circumstances of his having been found at the workhouse door, and of the discovery of the woman who had brought him there; and impressed upon him her own strong conviction that this was not his mother. "i believe, billy," she said, over and over again, "that your parents were gentlefolk. now mind, it does not make one bit of difference to you, for it ain't likely you will ever hear of them. still, please god, you may do so; and it is for you to bear it in mind, and to act so as--if you were to meet them--they need not be ashamed of you. you have got to earn your living just like all the other boys here; but you can act right, and straight, and honorable. "never tell a lie, billy; not if it's to save yourself from being thrashed ever so much. always speak out manful, and straight, no matter what comes of it. don't never use no bad words, work hard at your books, and try to improve yourself. keep it always before you that you mean to be a good man, and a gentleman, some day and, mark my words, you will do it." "you're spoiling that child," her husband would say, "filling his head with your ridiculous notions." "no, i am not spoiling him, sam. i'm doing him good. it will help keep him straight, if he thinks that he is of gentle blood, and must not shame it. why, the matron said only yesterday she could not make him out, he was so different from other boys." "more's the pity," grumbled the porter. "it mayn't do him harm now--i don't say as it does; but when he leaves the house he'll be above his work, and will be discontented, and never keep a place." "no, he won't," his wife asserted stoutly; although, in her heart, she feared that there was some risk of her teaching having that effect. so far, however, there could be no doubt that her teaching had been of great advantage to the boy; and his steadiness and diligence soon attracted the attention of the schoolmaster. schoolmasters are always ready to help pupils forward who promise to be a credit to them, and william gale's teacher was no exception. he was not a learned man--very far from it. he had been a grocer who had failed in business and, having no other resource, had accepted the very small salary offered, by the guardians of ely workhouse, as the only means which presented itself of keeping out of one of the pauper wards of that institution. however, he was not a bad reader, and wrote an excellent hand. with books of geography and history before him, he could make no blunders in his teaching; and although he might have been failing in method, he was not harsh or unkind--and the boys, therefore, learned as much with him as they might have done with a more learned master, of a harsher disposition. he soon recognized not only william's anxiety to learn, but the fearlessness and spirit with which he was always ready to own a fault, and to bear its punishment. on several occasions he brought the boy before the notice of the guardians, when they came round the school and, when questions had to be asked before visitors, william gale was always called up as the show boy. this prominence would have made him an object of dislike, among the other lads of his own age; had it not been that william was a lively, good-tempered boy; and if, as sometimes happened on these occasions, a sixpence or shilling was slipped into his hand by some visitor, who was taken by his frank open face and bright intelligent manner, it was always shared among his school fellows. at one of the examinations the wife of a guardian, who was present with her husband, said on returning home: "it must be very dull for those poor boys. i will pack up some of the boys' books, and send them. now they have gone to college, they will never want them again; and they would make quite a library for the workhouse boys. there must be twenty or thirty of them, at least." if ladies could but know what brightness they can infuse into the lives of lads, placed like these in ely workhouse, by a simple act of kindness of this kind, there would not be an institution in the kingdom without a well-supplied library. the gift infused a new life into the school. hitherto the world outside had been a sealed book to the boys. they knew of no world, save that included within the walls of the house. their geography told them of other lands and people, but these were mere names, until now. among the books were robinson crusoe, midshipman easy, peter simple, three or four of cooper's indian tales, dana's life before the mast, and several of kingston's and ballantyne's books. these opened a wonderland of life and adventure to the boys. the schoolmaster used to give them out, at twelve o'clock; and they were returned at two, when school recommenced; and only such boys as obtained full marks for their lessons were allowed to have them. in this way, instead of the library being a cause of idleness--as some of the guardians predicted, when they heard of its presentation--it was an incentive to work. certainly its perusal filled the minds of most of the boys with an intense longing to go to sea but, as there is always a demand for apprentices for the yarmouth and lowestoft smacks, the guardians did not disapprove of this bent being given to their wishes--indeed, as no premium had to be paid, with apprentices to smack owners, while in most trades a premium is required, a preference was given to the sea by the guardians. when william gale reached the age of fifteen, and was brought before the board to choose the trade to which he would be apprenticed, he at once said that he would go to sea. there were applications from several smack masters for apprentices; and he, with the five other boys brought up with him, were all of one opinion in the matter. "mind, lads," the chairman said, "the life of an apprentice on board a north sea smack is a hard one. you will get a great many more kicks than half pence. it will be no use grumbling, when you have once made your choice. it is a rough, hard life--none rougher, or harder. when you have served your time, it will be open to you either to continue as smacksmen, or to ship as seamen in sea-going ships. "sailors who hail from the eastern fishing ports are always regarded as amongst the best of our seamen. still, it is a rough life, and a dangerous one. the hardest life, on shore, is easy in comparison. there is time to change your minds, before you sign; when you have done so, it will be too late. are you all determined?" none of them wavered. their signatures were attached to the indentures, and they were told that the porter would take them to yarmouth, on the following day. william gale obtained leave to spend his last evening at the porter's lodge, and there he talked very seriously, with mrs. dickson, over his future prospects. "i know," he said, "from dana's book, that the life is a very rough one, but that will not matter. a sailor, when he has been four years at sea, can pass his examination as a mate; and i mean to work hard, and pass as soon as i can. i don't care how much i am knocked about, that's nothing; there's a good chance of getting on, in the end." "you will meet a great many bad boys, bill; don't you let them lead you into their ways." "don't be afraid of that," he answered, "i won't do anything i should be ashamed of, afterwards. you have taught me better." "i suppose the guardians gave you a bible, today; they always do, when boys goes out." will nodded. "be sure you read it often, my boy. you read that, and stick to it, and you won't go far wrong. you know what the parson said, last sunday: "'no one is strong in himself, but god gives strength.'" "i remember," will said. "i made up my mind, then, that i'd bear it in mind, and act upon it when i could. i think the thought of god, and the thought that i may meet my parents--and they must not be ashamed of me--will help me to be honest, and firm." "i hope, bill, you will come, sometimes, and see me, when you are ashore." "i shall be sure to do that, when i can," he answered. "but of course, i shall have no money, at first; and it may be a long time before i can pay my railway fare here; but you may be sure i will come. whoever may be my real mother, you are the only mother i ever knew, and no mother could have been kinder. when i grow to be a man, and go to sea in big ships, i will bring you all sorts of pretty things from abroad and, if ever you should want it, you may be sure that my wages will be quite as much yours as if i had been, really, your son!" sam dickson gave a snort. it was very good of the boy, but he considered it his duty to snub him, in order to counteract what he considered to be the pernicious counsels and treatment of his wife. "fine talk," he said, "fine talk. we shall see." "you ought to be ashamed of yourself, sam dickson," his wife said, wrathfully. "the boy means what he says, and i believe him. if anything was to happen to you, and that boy was growed up, i believe he would come forward to lend me a helping hand, just as he says, as if he were my son. the gals is good gals, but gals in service have plenty to do with their wages--what with dress, and one thing or another. we must never look for much help from them but, if bill is doing well, and i ever come to want, i believe as his heart would be good to help, a bit." "well," the porter said, dryly, "there's time enough to see about it, yet. i ain't dead, you ain't a pauper, and he ain't a man, not by a long way." "well, you needn't go to be short tempered over it, sam. the boy says as he'll be as good as a son to me, if the time ever comes as how i may want it. there is no call for you to fly out, as if he'd said as he'd poison me, if he'd the chance. "anyhow, you'll write to me regular, won't you, bill?" "that i will," the boy said. "every time i gets back to port, i'll write; and you'll write sometimes, won't you? and tell me how you are, and how every one is, schoolmaster and all. they have all been very kind to me, and i have nothing to say against any of them." the next morning william gale laid aside, for ever, his workhouse dress; and put on a suit of rough blue cloth, fitted for his future work. then, bidding adieu to all his friends, he--with his five fellow apprentices--started by rail, under charge of sam dickson, for yarmouth. the journey itself was, to them, a most exciting event. they had, in all their remembrance, never been a mile from the workhouse; and the swift motion of the train, the changing scenery, the villages and stations, were a source of immense interest. as they neared yarmouth their excitement increased, for now they were nearing the sea; of which they had read so much, but could form so little idea. they were disappointed, however, inasmuch as no glimpse was obtained of it, as they crossed the flat country leading to the town but, failing the sea, yarmouth itself--the town which was henceforth to be their headquarters--was in the highest degree interesting. presently the train reached the station, and then sam dickson--who had made many annual journeys to yarmouth, on the same errand--at once started off with them to the smack owners who had written to the workhouse. these lived at gorleston, a large village on the south side of the river. walking down from the station, the boys caught a glimpse of the river, and were delighted at the sight of the long line of smacks, and coasters, lying by the wharves opposite. presently they left the road, and made their way down to the river side. their guardian had great difficulty in getting them along, so interested were they in the smacks lying alongside. presently they stopped at a large wooden building, over which was the name of "james eastrey." "here we are," sam dickson said. "now, stop quietly outside. i will call three of you up, when i have spoken to mr. eastrey." presently the porter re-appeared at the door, and called three of the boys in. william gale was one of the number, james eastrey being the name of the owner to whom he had signed his indentures. a smell of tar pervaded the whole place. nets, sails, and cordage were piled in great heaps in the store; iron bolts and buckets, iron heads for trawls, and ship's stores of all kinds. mr. eastrey came out from a little wooden office. "so," he said, "you are the three lads who are going to be my apprentices. well, boys, it is a rough life but, if you take the ups and downs as they come, it is not a bad one. i always tell my captains to be kind to the boys but, when they are at sea, they do not always act as i wish them. when you are on shore, between the voyages, i give you eight shillings a week, to keep yourselves; or i put you in the smack boys' home, and pay for you there. the last is the best place for you, but some boys prefer to go their own way. "i suppose you are all anxious to go to sea--boys always are, for the first time. one of my boats is going out, tomorrow. "you," he said, pointing to william gale, "shall go in her. what is your name?" "william gale, sir." "very well, william gale, then you shall be off first. the others will only have a day or two to wait. "i can only send one new hand in each smack. the others will go to the home, till the smacks are ready. i will send a man with them, at once. they can have a day to run about the town. i shall find plenty of work for them, afterwards. "you, gale, will stop on the smack. i will take you on board, in half an hour, when i have finished my letter." the three lads said goodbye to their comrades and to sam dickson. a sailor was called up, and took two off to the smack boys' home; and will gale sat down on a coil of rope, to wait till his employer was ready to take him down to the craft to which he was, henceforth, to belong. chapter : life on a smack. "now come along, gale," mr. eastrey said, at last, "the kitty is close by." following his master, the lad went out from the store and along the wharf and, presently, stepped upon a smack on which several men, and a boy, were at work. "harvey," mr. eastrey said, "i have brought you a new lad. he will sail with you, tomorrow. i have a very good account of him, and i think you will find him quick, and ready." "so as he's not up to tricks, i shall do very well with him, i don't doubt," the skipper said; "but boys are an awful trouble, the first voyage or two. however, i will do my best for him. "are you ready to begin work at once, young 'un? what is your name?" "william gale, and i am quite ready." "very well, bill, chuck off your jacket, then, and pass those bags along from the wharf." the boy was soon hard at work. he was a little disappointed at finding that the skipper was, in dress and manner, in no way superior to the rest of the crew. the kitty was a yawl of forty-five tons, deep in the water and broad in the beam. her deck was dirty and, at present, in disorder; and she did not come up to the perfection of neatness and cleanliness which william gale had read of, in the pages of his favorite author. however--as he told himself--there must, of course, be a good deal of difference between a man of war, where the crew have little to do but to keep things neat and bright, and a fishing smack. the work upon which he was, at present, engaged was the transferring of the provisions for the voyage from the quay to the hold. these consisted principally of barrels of salt meat, and bags of biscuits; but there were a large tin of tea, a keg of sugar, a small barrel of molasses--or treacle--two or three sacks of potatoes, pepper and salt. then there was a barrel of oil for the lamps, coils of spare rope of different sizes, and a number of articles of whose use william gale had not the most remote idea. after two hours' work, the skipper looked at his watch. "time to knock off work," he said, "and we've got pretty near everything on board. now, be sure you are all here by six in the morning. tide will begin to run out at eight, and i don't want to lose any of it. "bill, you are to come home with me, for the night." it was but a hundred yards to the sailor's cottage, which stood on the edge of the sharp rise, a short distance back from the river. "here, wife," he said as he entered, "i've got a new apprentice, and i expect he's pretty hungry; i am, i can tell you, and i hope tea's ready. his name's bill, and he's going to stop here, tonight." "tea is quite ready, john, and there's plenty of mackerel. i thought you would not be getting them again, for a spell. "do you like fish?" she asked the boy. "i don't know, ma'am--i never tasted them." "bless me!" the woman cried, in astonishment; "never tasted fish! to think, now!" "i've been brought up in a workhouse," william said, coloring a little as he spoke, for he knew the prejudice against the house. "ah!" she said, "we have had a good many of that sort; and i can't say as i likes 'em, for the most part. but you haven't got the look about you. you don't seem that sort." "i hope i shall turn out none the worse for it," the boy said; "at any rate, i'll do my best." "and none can't do more," the good woman said, briskly. "i like your looks, bill, and you've a nice way of talking. well, we shall see." in a few minutes tea was upon the table, and will sat down with the skipper, his wife, and two daughters--girls of ten and twelve. the lad enjoyed his meal immensely, and did full justice to the fish. "you will have plenty of them, before you eat your next tea on shore. we pretty nigh live on them, when we are on the fishing grounds." "the same kind of fish as this?" "no, mackerel are caught in small boats, with a different sort of gear, altogether. we get them, sometimes, in the trawl--not shoals of 'em, but single fish, which we call horse mackerel." after tea, the skipper lit his pipe; and his wife, after clearing up, took some knitting, and sat down and began to question the new apprentice. "it's lucky, for you, you found such a good friend," she said, when he had finished his story. "that's how it is you are so different from other boys who have been apprenticed from the house. i should never have thought you had come from there. "and she gave you good advice as to how you should go on, i'll be bound." "yes, ma'am," will said, "and i hope i shall act up to it." "i hope so, bill; but you'll find it hard work to keep yourself as you should do, among them boys. they are an awful lot, them smack boys." "not worse nor other boys," her husband said. "not worse than might be looked for, john, but they are most of 'em pretty bad. the language they use make my blood run cold, often. they seems to take a delight in it. the hands are bad enough, but the boys are dreadful. "i suppose you don't swear, will. they look too sharp after you, in the house; but if you take my advice, boy, don't you ever get into the way of bad language. if you once begin, it will grow on you. there ain't no use in it, and it's awful to hear it." "i will try not to do so," will said firmly. "mother--i always call her mother--told me how bad it was, and i said i'd try." "that's right, will, you stick to that, and make up your mind to keep from liquor, and you'll do." "what's the use of talking that way?" the skipper said. "the boy's sure to do it. they all do." "not all, john. there's some teetotalers in the fleet." "i won't say i'll never touch it," will said, "for i don't know, yet, how i may want it--they say when you are cold and wet through, at sea, it is really good--but i have made up my mind i'll never drink for the sake of drinking. half the men--ay, nineteen out of twenty in the house--would never have been there, i've heard mother say, if it hadn't been for drink; and i told her she need never fear i'd take to that." "if you can do without it on shore, you can do without it at sea," the skipper said. "i take it when i'm on shore, but there's not a drop goes out on the kitty. some boats carries spirits, some don't. we don't. the old man puts chocolate on board instead and, of a wet night, a drink of hot chocolate's worth all the rum in the world. "as for giving it up altogether, i see no call for it. there are men who can't touch liquor, but they must go on till they get drunk. that sort ought to swear off, and never touch it at all. it's worse than poison, to some. but for a man who is content with his pint of beer with his dinner, and a glass of grog of an evening, i see no harm in it." "except that the money might be better spent, john." "it might be, or it might not. in my case, the saving would be of no account. the beer costs three pence, and the rum as much more. that's six pence a day. i'm only at home ten days, once every two months; so it come to thirty shillings a year, and i enjoy my dinner, and my evening pipe, all the better for them." "the thing is this, will: you don't know, when you begin, whether you are going to be one of the men who--like my john--is content with his pint of beer, and his glass of grog; or whether you will be one of them as can't touch liquor without wanting to make beasts of themselves. therefore the safest plan is, don't touch it at all--leastways, till you've served your time. the others may laugh at you, at first; but they won't like you any the worse for it." "thank you, ma'am. i will make up my mind to that--not to touch liquor till i am out of my apprenticeship. after that, i can see for myself." "that's right, lad. when you come back from your first trip, you can join the lodge, if you like. i and my girls are members." "thank you, ma'am," will said; "but i won't take any pledge. i have said i will not do it, and i don't see any use in taking an oath about it. if i am so weak as to break my word, i should break my oath. i don't know why i shouldn't be able to trust myself to do as i am willed, in that way as in any other. if i'd a craving after it, it might be different; but i never have tasted it, and don't want to taste it, so i don't see why i can't trust myself." "yes, i think as how you can trust yourself, will," the woman said, looking at him; "and i've noticed often that it isn't them who say most, as do most. "now, i daresay you are sleepy. there's my boy's bed for you. he is fourth hand in one of the smacks at sea." the next morning will was out of bed the instant he was called, excited at the thought that he was going really to sea. the skipper's wife had tea made, and the table laid. "here," she said, "are some oilskin suits my boy has given up. they will suit you well enough for size and, although they are not as good as they were, they will keep out a good deal of water, yet. you will get half-a-crown a week, while you are at sea so, by the time you get back, you will have enough to buy yourself a fresh suit." half an hour later will was at work, getting two spare sails and the last of the stores on board. "now, bill, come below," the skipper said. "i will show you your bunk." the cabin was larger than will had expected. it was about twelve feet square, and lofty enough for a tall man to stand upright. by the side of the companion stairs was a grate, on which a kettle was boiling; and this, as he afterwards learned, was a fixture, except when cooking was going on, and the men could have tea whenever they chose. round three sides of the cabin extended lockers, the tops forming seats. above were what looked like cupboards, running round the sides; but the skipper pushed open a sliding door, and showed a bed place. "that is your bunk," he said. "you see, there are two at the end, and one each side, above, and as many under them--eight bunks, in all. you will have to help jack--that is the other boy--in cooking, and make yourself useful, generally, in the day. the crew are divided into two watches, but you will not have much to do on deck. if the night is clear you can sleep, except when the trawl is being got up. of a thick or stormy night, you will keep your watch. "now, as the other lad is more handy on deck than you are, you can take charge here. all you have to do is to see that the kettle is kept boiling. you can come on deck and lend a hand, if wanted; but you must come down sometimes, and see the fire is all right." after inspecting the contents of the kettle, and seeing that it was full, will climbed up the steep ladder again; and was soon working away, coiling down the ropes with the other lad, while the crew hoisted sails and got the boat under weigh. "are there only two hands under the captain?" he asked the other boy. "there are two others," the boy said. "they will come on board after we get out of the river, and you'll see they will be just as drunk as they can stand." "what, drunk at this time in the morning?" "yes, they got drunk last night and, as they won't have fairly slept it off, they will be beginning again this morning. the old man will look them up, and get them off." "who is the old man?" "old eastrey, of course, stupid. "i wish they were all on board. there's a fine breeze, and i hate wasting four or five hours off the bar, waiting for the hands to come off." "i wonder the old man stands it," will said. "he can't help it," the other answered. "scarce a smack goes out of yarmouth without half the hands being drunk, when she starts. they don't get much chance afterwards, you see; and they sleep it off by night, so it don't make any odds. our skipper is always sober, and that's more than many of them are. i have gone out when me and the other boy were the only two sober on board." "but isn't it very dangerous?" "dangerous? no," the boy said, "one of them is sure to be sober enough to manage to stand at the helm and, though i've bumped pretty heavy on the sands, sometimes, we generally strike the channel. there is no fear of anything else. we never start, if a gale is blowing; and the smacks are safe in anything but a gale. they are too deep to capsize and, at sea, there's no more drinking." the smack dropped down the river and stood, off and on, near its entrance. will was delighted with the bright sea, dotted with ships and fishing craft. the sun was shining, and there was just enough wind to send the smack along briskly through the water, without raising any waves sufficiently high to give her a perceptible motion. at eight o'clock the captain went on shore in the boat, with a man, to look after the absent sailors; leaving only one hand and the two boys on board. at ten the boat was again seen, coming out. "one, two, three, four," the boy said, "he has got them both. now we shall be off." the boat was soon alongside. the two drunken men were helped on board and, at once, went below to sleep themselves sober. then the boat was hoisted on board and, the second hand taking the helm, the kitty started fairly on her way. "now," the captain said, "let us get her a little tidy." it took some hours' work before the deck was washed, the ropes coiled down, and everything ship-shape. by the time all was done, the low coast of norfolk had sunk below the horizon, and the smack was far out at sea. there was more motion now, but the wind was still light. the skipper was pleased with the earnestness and alacrity which the new apprentice showed. "now, jack," he said to the other boy, "take will below with you, and show him how to make tea." the process of tea making, on board a smack, is not a difficult one to master; the sole operation consisting in putting a few more spoonfuls of tea into the kettle boiling over the fire, when it begins to get low, and filling up with fresh water. but, simple as the thing was, william gale did not learn it on that occasion. he had been feeling somewhat shaky, even while on deck; and the heat of the cabin, and the smell of some grease which jack had just put in the frying pan, preparatory to cooking some fish brought off from shore, completed the effect of the rising sea. until next morning he was not in a condition to care, even had the tea remained unmade to the end of time. he did not go below, but lay under the shelter of a tarpaulin, on deck. in the morning, the skipper roused him up. "now, lad, just take off your coat and shirt. here is a bucket of water. put your head in that, and give yourself a good sluice; and then come down and have a cup of tea, and a bit of biscuit, and you will find yourself all right again." will followed the instructions, and found himself wonderfully better. "now, lad, lend a hand in tidying up on deck. there is nothing like work, for keeping off seasickness. jack shall cook, for today." the boy set to work with a will; and felt so refreshed that, by one o'clock, he was able to go below and take his share of the dinner. at present, while on their way to the fishing grounds, their meals were taken at the same time as on shore but, once at work, there were only two meals a day. of these the first was taken when the fishing was over, the fish cleaned, picked, weighed, and packed--the hour varying between nine and eleven. the second meal was taken before the trawl was lowered, at six or seven o'clock in the evening. after five days' sailing, the smack arrived off the fishing ground; but another two days were spent in finding the fleet, as the fishing grounds extend over a distance of some hundreds of miles. when they came up with it, william gale was astonished at the vast number of boats that dotted the sea. in the yarmouth fleet there are between four and five hundred vessels and, were it not that the most perfect order and discipline reign, the number of accidents which would occur, from so many boats fishing close to each other at night, would be terrible. the fleet is commanded by one of the most experienced skippers, who is termed the admiral. his authority is absolute. he leads the fleet to the grounds he selects for fishing and, by signals by day and rockets by night, issues his orders--when the nets are to be lowered down and drawn up, the course which is to be steered, and the tack on which they are to stand. the fishing is entirely done at night. the trawls are let down about dusk, and the fleet attached to these moving anchors forge slowly ahead and to leeward, until daybreak. then the trawls are got in, and the fleet sail in a body to the spot where the admiral decides that fishing shall be continued in the evening. at o'clock at night the trawls are hauled in, and the nets emptied. all hands are called up for this operation. when it is concluded, the trawl is again lowered and the fish cleaned and packed; by the light of a torch formed of rope, dipped in tar. the watch who have hitherto been on deck turn in, and the others remain on deck until morning, when the nets are again hauled in. there is not, indeed, much for the watch to do; as the smack needs no steering, and the attention of the men on deck is directed chiefly to see that no other smack drifts down upon them. should there appear any danger of this, a flare is lit to warn the other smacksmen. the trawl rope is slacked out or hauled in, as the case may require and, generally, volleys of strong language pass between the respective crews. the trawl beam is a heavy pole, some or feet long. at each end are fitted strong iron hoops, of about three feet in diameter. these keep the pole from touching the ground, and keep open the mouth of the net; one side of which is attached to the pole, while the other drags along the bottom. the net resembles in shape a long, deep purse; and has various pockets and other contrivances by which, when a fish has once entered its mouth, it is prevented from returning. the trawl rope--which is from to yards in length, according to the depth of water--is hauled in by means of a winch; and its great weight taxes the united strength of the crew, to get it level with the bulwark. when it is up, the net is hauled on board, the small end is opened, and the fish tumble on to the deck. they are then separated and packed in trunks--as the wooden cases, in which they are sent to market, are called. soles fetch by far the highest price, and fortunate are the crew who get a good haul of this fish; for the men work upon shares, an account being kept of all the sales made, during the fishing trip. the owner deducts the cost of the provisions and stores which have been put on board, and takes one or more shares for the vessel. each man has one share, the skipper and mate receiving rather a larger proportion than the others; thus the men have a lively interest in each haul, and great is the satisfaction when the net comes up well filled, and there is seen to be a good proportion of soles among the contents. the coarse fish--as they are called--include brill, haddock, hake, ling, whiting, and many others. turbot are also caught. in each haul there would probably be a vast number of objects which would delight the heart of a naturalist. dog fish, too, are sometimes taken; as are conger eels, and horse mackerel. stones, and oysters, too, come up in the nets; and the latter are the betes-noires of the fishing. sometimes, when the fleet gets over a bed of oysters, a score of nets will be lost in a single night for, when the bag becomes full of oysters, its weight is so great that the utmost power of the fishermen's exertions, on the winch, is insufficient to lift it from the bottom; and there is nothing to be done but to cut the rope, and abandon trawl and net. upon these occasions the language applied to the admiral is scarcely of a kind for polite ears. the food of the crews, when once upon the fishing ground, consists almost wholly of fish. with the exception of soles, each man may select any fish he fancies from the glistening mass upon the deck; and the amount which each consumed at a meal at first astonished william gale, accustomed as he was to meager workhouse rations. he soon, however, found himself able to keep up with the rest; but the operation of frying seemed sometimes interminable, so many times had the pan to be filled and emptied. hard biscuits were eaten with the fish, and the whole washed down with copious draughts of tea, without milk. two or three times a week the men would, as a change, have a meal of salt meat; and on sundays a duff--or pudding--of flour and currants was made. a few days after joining the fleet the weather changed, the sky became gloomy and threatening. the wind blew hard, and a heavy sea got up. will found that keeping watch at night--which was pleasant enough on a fine, star-light night--was a very different thing, now. it was no joke looking ahead with the wind blowing fiercely, and showers of spray dashing into the eyes; and yet a vigilant watch must be kept for, if the rockets which ordered the hauling of the trawl were not noticed, some other smack, moving rapidly when released from the drag of its net, might at any moment come into collision with the smack. still more important was it to notice upon which side the trawl was to be lowered, after being emptied; and upon which tack the vessel was to proceed. for a mistake in this respect would be certain to bring the smack across another; in which case the trawl ropes would become entangled--involving, in a heavy sea, the certain loss of one or the other. many of the smacks carry dogs, and it is found that these become even better watchers than their masters; for they can be relied on to call the attention of the watch, by sharp barking, to the letting up of the rocket, however distant. a rocket may seem to be an easy thing to see but, in a large fleet, the stern-most smacks may be three or four miles away from the leaders and, in a dark, thick night, it is exceedingly difficult to make out even a rocket, at that distance. the wind increased to a gale. the trawls were up now, and the fleet lay to. it may be explained that this operation is performed by bringing a ship nearly into the eye of the wind, and then hauling the foresail across, and belaying the sheet. the aft sail--or mizzen--is then hauled tight, and the tiller lashed amidships. as the fore-sail pays the vessel off from the wind, the after sail brings her up again; and she is thus kept nearly head to sea, and the crew go below, and wait till the storm abates. chapter : run down. william gale was astonished at the fury of the tempest, and the wildness of the sea. although, at the workhouse, he had often heard the wind roaring round the walls, there was nothing to show him the force that was being exerted. there were but few trees in the neighborhood, and william had hardly ever been without the walls, except in fine summer weather. he was, therefore, almost bewildered by the force and fury of the gale; and by the noise, as it shrieked through the rigging, and howled across the water. the occasional flapping of the sails, and the rattling of the heavy blocks added to the din; and it seemed to him that the kitty which, like all fishing smacks, was very deep in the water, must be completely engulfed by the great waves which swept down upon her. several times, indeed, he was obliged to leap down into the cabin, to avoid being swept away by the great masses of green water which--pouring over her bows--swept aft, carrying away all before them. but the yarmouth smacks are admirable sea boats and, pounded and belabored as she was, the kitty always shook off the water that smothered her, and rose again for the next wave. in twenty-four hours the gale abated, the scattered fleet were assembled--each flying its flag--and it was found that three were missing, having either foundered, or been driven away from their consorts. with the return of fine weather the fishing began again, and william thoroughly enjoyed his life. the skipper was kind and forbearing; he neither ill treated the boys, himself, nor permitted any of the crew to do so; and everything went on regularly and comfortably. there were a few books on board and, of an evening, after the trawl was lowered and before the watch below turned into their bunks, william--who was the best reader on board--would be asked to read aloud for an hour. sometimes there were songs and, as the kitty was fortunate, and her taking of fish good, the men were all cheerful and good tempered. once every three or four days, the collecting steamer came in sight; then there was a general race, in the fleet, to put the trunks of fish on board her. each did his best to be in good time for, when the catch had been heavy, the steamer was sometimes unable to take the whole of it; in which case the portion left behind would be wholly spoilt, before the arrival of another steamer. the whole of the fleet, therefore, ran down towards the steamer as soon as she was seen; the heavy boats were tossed overboard, and the trunk lowered into them, and two hands jumped in to row them to the steamer. round her a swarm of boats would soon be collected, each striving to get alongside, to deliver the fish. in calm weather the scene was simply amusing but, when the sea was high, it was exciting and even dangerous; indeed, in the course of a year more lives are lost, in the process of taking the fish from the smack to the steamer, than in vessels foundered by gales. sometimes the fleet will be joined by dutch trading smacks, who exchange fresh bread and meat, tobacco, and spirits for fish. this traffic is the cause, alike, of loss to the owners, by the fish thus parted with; and of injury to the men, by the use of spirits. fortunately the skipper of the kitty--although not averse to the use of spirits, on shore--was a strict man at sea, and saw that no one took more than a single glass of grog, of an evening. over and over again, will congratulated himself that he had the good fortune to make his first voyage under such a skipper; for he shuddered at the stories jack told him, of the cruelties and barbarities with which apprentices are treated on board some of the smacks. although, however, there is no doubt many brutal skippers hail from yarmouth; the fleet from that town bears a good reputation, in comparison with that of grimsby--where the number of apprentices returned as drowned, each year, is appalling. one night, when the wind was high and the fleet trawling lower down the north sea than usual, will--who was on deck--was startled at seeing a great ship bearing down upon the smack. he gave a shout of terror and warning, which was joined in by the crew on deck. one ran for the hatchet to cut the trawl, and thus give steerage way to the smack. it was too late. in another moment the great ship bore down upon them with a crash, and the kitty sunk beneath the waves. the bowsprit of the vessel projected across the deck, just at the point where william gale was standing and, in a moment, he caught at the bob stay and quickly hauled himself on to the bowsprit. climbing along this, he was soon on board. two or three sailors were leaning over the bows, peering into the darkness. they had not seen the smack, until too late to avoid it; and the collision, which had proved fatal to the kitty, had scarcely been felt by the ship. will was at ones taken to the captain, who spoke english. the boy implored him to turn back, but the captain shook his head. "it would be useless," he said; "the sea is heavy and, in these long boots--" and he pointed to the sea boots, up to the thigh, which all fishermen wear, "--no man could swim for two minutes; nor would there be a chance, if they could, of our finding them on so dark a night. i am very sorry, my lad, but it cannot be helped. it would take half an hour to bring the ship about, and go back to the spot where the smack sunk; and we might not get within half a mile of it. you know that, as well as i do." will had been long enough at sea to recognize the truth of what the captain said. as he was led forward, he burst into tears at the thought of the loss of his kind friend the captain, and the rest of his mates. the sailor who accompanied him patted him on the back, and spoke cheeringly to him in a foreign language; and he was soon between decks with the crew. several of these could speak english, and will found that he was on board a dutch merchantman, bound with troops for java. the wind got up and, in the morning, it was blowing a heavy gale from the east; and the vessel, with reefed topsails, was running for the straits between dover and calais, at twelve knots an hour. after breakfast, the captain sent for william. "i am sorry, for your sake, that the state of the weather will prevent our communicating with any ship we may meet. but i promise you that, if the gale breaks before we are fairly out from the channel, i will heave to and put you on board a homeward-bound ship." such a chance did not occur. for four or five days the gale continued with great severity and, before it ceased, the ship was well down the coast of spain, on her way south. when the captain saw that there was but small chance of his being able to transship his involuntary passenger, he said to him: "look you, my lad. i fear that you will have to make the voyage with me, for we shall not touch at any port, until we arrive at our destination. if you like, i will ship you as a hand on board, as from the day of the collision. a hand, more or less, will make no difference to the owners; and the money will be useful to you, when you leave the ship. of course, you can return in her, if you think fit; but it is likely enough that, when we reach java, we may be sent up to china for a homeward cargo--in which case i will procure you a passage in the first ship sailing for your home." will gladly accepted the offer. he was, however, by no means penniless for, upon the morning after his coming on board, the dutch officers and passengers--hearing what had happened in the night--made a collection among themselves, and presented the boy with a purse containing fifteen pounds. it was a long voyage, but not an unpleasant one for william. his duties were not very heavy--he had far less to do than had been the case, on board the smack. a month on board the kitty had done much towards making a sailor of him, for there are no better seamen in the world than the yarmouth smacksmen. going aloft was, at first, a trial; but he soon learned his duties and, being a strong and active lad, he was quickly able to do efficient work; and speedily gained the good opinion of the dutch sailors, by his good temper and anxiety to please. they ran some little distance to the south of the cape before shaping an easterly course, to avoid the bad weather so frequently met with there and, beyond encountering two or three gales, of no exceptional severity, nothing occurred to break the monotony of the voyage, until the coasts of java were in sight. upon their arrival in port, they found no vessel there about to sail for europe; and the captain's expectation was fulfilled, as he found orders awaiting him to proceed to china, when he had landed the troops and discharged his cargo. will determined to continue his voyage in her to that place. among the ship boys on board was one between whom, and will gale, a great friendship had been struck up. he was a year or two will's senior, but scarcely so tall; upon the other hand, he was nearly twice his girth. he talked but little, but his broad face was ever alight with a good-tempered grin. he spoke a few words of english; and will had, when first picked up, been given specially into his charge. will's superior activity and energy astonished the dutch lad, whose movements were slow and heavy; while will, on his part, was surprised at the strength which hans could exert, when he chose. one day, when will had been plaguing him, and ventured within his reach, the lad had seized and held him out at arm's length, shaking him as a dog would a rat, till he shouted for mercy. the two were soon able to get on in a queer mixture of dutch and english and, when words failed, they would eke out their words by gestures. the vessel had sailed but a few days from java when there were signs of a change of weather. hitherto it had been lovely; now a slight mist seemed to hang over the sea while, overhead, it was clear and bright. there was not a breath of wind, and the sails hung listlessly against the masts. will--who was leaning against the bulwarks, chatting to hans--observed the captain, after looking round at the horizon, go into his cabin. he reappeared in a minute, and spoke to the officer; who immediately shouted an order for "all hands to shorten sail." "what is that for?" will said, wonderingly; "there is not a breath of wind." "i egzpect captain haz looked at glass," hans said, "find him fall. i egzpect we going to have ztorm--very bad ztorms in dese zeas." will ran aloft with the sailors and, in ten minutes, every inch of canvas--with the exception of a small stay sail--was stripped from the ship. still, there was not a breath of wind. the sea was as smooth as glass, save for a slight ground swell. although the mist did not seem to thicken, a strange darkness hung over the sky; as if, high up, a thick fog had gathered. darker and darker it grew, until there was little more than a pale twilight. the men stood in twos and threes, watching the sea and sky, and talking together in low tones. "i don't like this, hans," will said. "there is something awful about it." "we have big ztorm," hans replied, "zyclone they call him." scarcely had hans spoken when the sky above seemed to open, with a crash. a roar of thunder, louder than ten thousand pieces of artillery, pealed around them while, at the same moment, a blinding flash of lightning struck the mainmast, shivering it into splinters, and prostrating to the deck five seamen who were standing round its foot. as if a signal had been given by the peal of thunder, a tremendous blast of wind smote the vessel and, stripped though she was of sails, heaved her over almost to the gunwale. for a moment, the crew were paralyzed by the suddenness of the catastrophe; stunned by the terrible thunder, and blinded by the lightning. none seemed capable of moving. will had instinctively covered his eyes with his hands. it seemed to him, for a moment, that his sight was gone. then the voice of the captain was heard, shouting: "helm, hard up. out axes, and cut away the wreck, at once!" those who were least stupefied by the shock sprang, in a dazed and stupid way, to obey the order. will drew out his knife and, feeling rather than seeing what he was doing, tried to assist in cutting away the shrouds of the fallen mast--it had gone a few feet above the deck. presently he seemed, as he worked, to recover from his stupor; and the power of sight came back to him. then he saw that the vessel--taken on the broadside by the gale--was lying far over, with several feet of her lee deck under water. so furious was the wind that he could not show his head over the weather bulwark. the sea was still smooth, as if the water was flattened by the force of the wind. the stay sail had been blown into ribbons. in order to get the ship's head off the wind, the head of the jib was hauled up a few feet. it happened to be a new and strong one and, although it bellied and lashed, as if it would tear itself into fragments, it still stood. again the captain gave an order, and the sail was hauled up to its full height. still further the vessel heaved over; and will expected, every moment, that she would capsize. then, gradually, her head paid off, and slowly she righted, and flew before the gale. "that was a near squeak," will said. "what is zqueak?" hans shouted. "i mean a close shave," will replied. hans' blue eyes opened wider than usual. "a zhave!" he repeated; "what are you talking about zhaving?" "no, no," will said, laughing, "i mean a narrow escape of being capsized." hans nodded. there was no time for talk, for orders were given for getting preventer stays on the foremast. the jib, having done its work, had been hauled down the instant the ship payed off; and a small storm sail set, in its place. the men now had time to attend to those who had been struck by lightning. three of them were found to be dead, but the other two--who were stunned and senseless--still lived, and were lifted and carried below. serious as the disaster had been, will felt that the stroke of lightning had saved the ship. the pressure of the wind, upon two masts and hull, had nearly sufficed to capsize her. had the main mast stood, he felt that she must have gone over. the sea got up in a very few minutes but, being now only in light ballast, the vessel rose easily over them. four men were at the helm, for the waves soon became so high that the ship yawed dangerously on her course. the gale seemed to increase, rather than diminish in fury; and the sea, instead of following in regular waves, became a perfect chaos of tossing water, such as will had never before seen. he understood it, however, when--half an hour after the outburst of the gale--he heard one of the men, who had just been relieved at the wheel, say that in that time the ship had already run twice round the compass. she was therefore in the very center of the cyclone, and the strangely tossed sea was accounted for. the motion of the ship was extraordinary. sometimes she was thrown on one side, sometimes on the other. mountains of water seemed to rise suddenly beside her, and tumbled in great green masses over the bulwarks. so wild and sudden were her movements that even the oldest sailors were unable to keep their feet; and all clung on to shrouds, or belaying pins. will and hans had lashed themselves by the slack of a rope to the bulwarks, close to each other, and there clung on; sometimes half drowned by the waves, which poured in above them; sometimes torn from their feet by the rush of green water, as the ship plunged, head foremost, into a wave, or shipped one over her poop. presently there was a crash that sounded even above the fury of the gale--the fore top-mast had gone, at the cap. the axes were again called into requisition, for a blow from the floating spar would have instantly stove in the side. while engaged upon this, the captain called two of the men with axes aft. these were set to work to chop through the shrouds of the mizzen and, in a minute later, the mast snapped asunder on the level of the deck, and went over the side with a crash, carrying away several feet of the bulwark. this act was necessitated by the loss of the fore top-mast, as the pressure of the wind upon the mizzen would have brought her head up, and laid her broadside to the gale. the motion of the vessel was now considerably easier, and there was no longer any difficulty in keeping her dead before the wind. she was now describing much larger circles in her course, showing that she was farther removed from the center of the cyclone. after five or six hours, the extreme violence of the wind somewhat abated, and it seemed to settle down into a heavy gale. for two days the vessel ran before it. she had made a good deal of water, from the opening of the seams by straining, and the pumps were kept going. they were, they found, able to prevent the water from gaining upon them; and all felt that they should weather the tempest, provided that they were not dashed upon any of the islands in which this portion of the ocean abounds. the crew had had no regular meals, since the gale began; for the caboose had been broken up, and washed overboard, soon after the commencement of the storm; and they had been obliged to be content with biscuits. there was little to be done on deck and, the watch over, they passed their time in their bunks. in the afternoon of the third day of the tempest, the cry was raised of "breakers ahead!" will, with his comrades of the watch below, sprang from their berths and hurried on deck. far ahead, as the vessel lifted on the waves, could be seen a gleam of white water. in anticipation of such a danger, a small spar had been erected upon the stump of the mizzen, and steadied with strong stays. sail was now hoisted upon this, and an effort was made to bring the vessel's head to wind. watching for a favorable moment between the passage of the heavy seas, the helm was put down and, slowly, her head came up into the wind. under such sail, the captain had no hope of being able to reach out, in the teeth of the gale; but he hoped to be able to claw off the shore until clear of the land, which lay to leeward of him. that hope soon vanished. one of the mates was sent to the top of the foremast, and descended with news that, as far as could be seen, the line of breakers stretched away, both on her beam and quarter. as the minutes went by the anxious crew could see, but too clearly, that the ship was drifting down upon the land; and that she must inevitably be wrecked upon it. the outlines of the shore could now be seen--a forest of tossing trees, behind which high land could be made out, through the driving clouds. orders were now given to prepare to anchor, but all knew that the chances were slight, indeed. the water is for the most part deep, close alongside the islands of the eastern archipelago and, even were the holding ground good, hemp and iron would hardly hold the vessel head to the gale, and tremendous sea. when within a quarter of a mile of the breakers, the man with the lead proclaimed a depth of ten fathoms. this was better than they had expected. the jib was lowered, and her head brought dead to wind. the captain shouted "cut," and, in an instant, the stoppers were severed, and two heavy anchors dropt into the sea. one had a heavy chain cable, the other hemp; and these were allowed to run out to the bits. the vessel brought up with less shock than could be expected. a wave or two passed under her, and still her cable held. a gleam of hope began to reign, when a mountainous sea was seen, approaching. higher and higher it rose and, just as it reached the ship, it curled over and crashed down upon her deck. the cables snapped like pack thread, and a cry of despair arose from the crew. the captain was calm and collected, and shouted orders for the jib to be again hoisted, and the helm put up; so as to run her, head first, on to the shore. as they neared the line of breakers, they could see heads of jagged rocks rising among them while, beyond, a belt of smooth water--a quarter of a mile wide--extended to the land. the ship's head was directed towards a point where no rocks appeared above the surface. everyone held their breath and, clinging to the bulwarks, awaited the shock. the vessel lifted on a great wave, just as she came to the line of broken water and, as she settled down, struck with a tremendous crash. so great was the shock that she broke in two, amidships, as if she had been made of paper; the portion aft going instantly to pieces and, at once, the sea around was covered with fragments of wreck, bales, boxes, and casks. another great sea followed, filling the now open ship, forcing up the deck, and sweeping everything before it. william gale and hans had gone as far forward as possible. "come out to the end of the bowsprit," will said to hans; and the two lads crawled out together, and sat on the end of the spar. the sea beneath them was white as milk, with the foam which poured over the reef; but will thought that they were beyond the rocks. every sea which struck the wreck added to the disaster; until a larger one than usual struck it, and broke it into fragments. the lads clung to the spar, as it fell. it sank deep in the water, but they retained their hold until it came to the surface, and will looked round. they were safely beyond the edge of the reef. the sea was still rough and broken; but it was quiet, compared to that beyond the reef. he saw that the fore mast was floating near and, to it, several were clinging. in a quarter of an hour the spar floated to land, the boys felt the bottom with their feet, and soon scrambled ashore. a few minutes later the fore mast also drifted up; and several men, clinging to fragments of the wreck, were also cast ashore. in all eleven men, including the first mate, were saved. chapter : the castaways. after waiting on the shore, until all hope that any more of their shipmates survived was at an end, the party--by the mate's orders--detached a sail from a yard that had drifted ashore, and carried it well into the wood; where they were sheltered, to some extent, from the force of the gale. a stout pole was then cut, and lashed between two trees. the sail was thrown over this, and pegged down at both sides. a fire was lit, with some difficulty. then a quantity of ferns and branches of trees were cut. these made a soft and elastic bed, and the whole party slept heavily until the morning. then they went back to the shore. it was littered thickly with fragments of wreck, casks, boxes, and other articles. here, too, were nearly a score of the corpses of their shipmates. the first duty was to dig a long shallow trench in the sand, beyond high water mark; and in this the bodies of their drowned comrades were laid. the storm was now breaking. glimpses of blue sky were visible overhead, and the wind had greatly abated. the sea upon the reef was, however, as high as ever. setting to work, they hauled a large number of boxes and bales beyond the reach of the waves. one of the casks contained biscuits and, knocking in the head, they helped themselves to its contents, and sat down to talk over their position. "i am not sure," the mate said, "that our poor comrades there--" and he nodded towards the grave, "--have not the best of it. the inhabitants of most of these islands are bloodthirsty pirates who, if they find us, will either cut our throats at once, or keep us as slaves. our only hope is that we may not be discovered, until we have time to build a boat in which to sail away to singapore, or back to java. "had we been wrecked further south, things would have been more hopeful; for the papuans are friendly, and inoffensive people. these islands here are inhabited by malays, the most bloodthirsty pirates in the world. however, we must hope that we may not be found, before we have finished a boat. "my chest is among those which have been washed up, and there are a few tools in it. i always had a fancy for carpentry; and it's hard if, in a fortnight, we cannot make some sort of craft which will carry us. indeed, if we content ourselves with a strong framework, covered with canvas, we may be ready in four or five days." the men set cheerfully to work, under his directions. in his chest was a hatchet, saw, and chisels. with these, young trees of flexible wood were cut down and split. a keel was laid, feet in length. cross pieces, feet long, were pegged to this by trenails--nails formed of tough and hard wood. the cross pieces were then bent upwards, and fastened to the strips which were to form the gunwale. strengthening pieces were placed along, at distances of or inches apart, and firmly lashed. when the whole was finished, after three days' labor, the framework of a boat feet long, feet deep, and feet in beam stood upon the beach. a barrel of oil had been thrown ashore and, with this, the mate intended thoroughly to soak the canvas with which the frame was to be covered. the boat would, he calculated, carry the whole of the men, with an ample store of food and water for the voyage. upon the morning of the fourth day as, on their way to work, they emerged from the wood upon the open beach, the mate gave a low cry, and pointed along the shore. there, between the reef and the island, was a large malay prahu. the party instantly fell back among the trees. the malays were apparently cruising along the reef, to see if the late storm had thrown up the wreckage--which might be useful to them--and a loud shout proclaimed their satisfaction, as they saw the shore strewn with the remains of the dutch ship. the prahu was rowed to the shore, and fifty or sixty malays sprang from the bows on to the sand. scarcely had they done so when a shout, from one of them, called the attention of the others to the framework of the boat. there was a minute's loud and excited chatter among them. then they dashed forward to the wood, the deep footsteps in the sand showing, plainly enough, the direction from which the builders of the boat had come and gone. the latter, as the malay boat neared the shore, had retired further into the wood but, from the screen of leaves, they were able to see what was going on. as they saw the malays rush, in an excited and yelling throng, towards the wood, the little party took to their heels. "scatter," the mate said. "together, they are sure to overtake us; singly, we may escape." "let us keep together, hans," will said, as they dashed along through the wild jungle. torn by thorns, often thrown down by projecting roots and low creepers, they kept on; their pace at times quickening, as shouts and screams told them that some of their comrades had fallen into the hands of the malays. presently they came upon the little stream which flowed into the sea, close to where they had been cast ashore. "let us follow this up," will said. "they can track us, through the forest; but the water will set them off our scent." for a quarter of a mile, they followed the course of the stream; stopping breathlessly, many times, as they heard voices in the wood, not far off. presently will pointed to a tree, rising from a clump of bushes, close to the bank. "let us get through those bushes," he said. "be careful, hans, not to break a twig, as you go. we can climb that tree. there are plants, with stems like cords, winding round it. the top is so thick and bushy that i don't think they can see us, there." very carefully they parted the bushes that overhung the stream, and entered the thicket. then they made their way, with great difficulty, to the foot of the tree. it was a very large one, with a trunk fully feet in diameter, rising some forty feet without a branch. then a number of great arms grew out, at right angles. these were covered thickly with parasitic vegetation. round the trunk, like a snake embracing its victim, a great climber had wound itself. its main stem was as thick as a man's arm, and there were dozens of smaller, cord-like climbers. thus, the lads had no difficulty in climbing to the point where the branches grew out. above these was a mass of foliage, completely covered by the climbers; whose drooping sprays, and clusters, gave the tree the appearance of a solid mass of verdure. the boys continued to climb until they were nearly at the top of the tree. "there!" will said, wiping away the perspiration which streamed from his face, "if they do not track us through the bushes to the very foot of this tree, i defy them to find us." for some hours, the wood was alive with noises. the malays were evidently beating every foot of it, and were determined that none of their victims should escape. several times parties of men came up the stream, searching the banks on both sides but, happily, even their sharp eyes did not detect the spot where the boys had entered the bushes and, gradually, the noises ceased and, at night, a great glare by the seashore told the lads that their enemies had gathered again there; and were continuing, by fire light, the work of breaking open and examining the treasures which the sea had cast up for them. "what do you zay, will? zhall we get down and go furder into wood, or zhall we wait here?" "i think, anyhow, we had better wait till tomorrow night," will answered. "they may search again, tomorrow, and might come upon our tracks. if they don't find us, they may suppose that they have caught us all, or that we have escaped right into the interior. if they find no traces of us they will, likely enough, set sail before night." there was no difficulty in finding a place in which they could sleep; for the cord-like climbers from bough to bough formed natural cradles, in which they lay as securely as if in a hammock, on board a ship. in the morning they were woke, at daybreak, by the cries of the many birds which throng the forests of the eastern archipelago. no one approached them during the day, and they doubted not that the malays were all hard at work, on the shore. that night there was no reflection of a fire on the beach. in the morning they descended from their perches and made their way carefully, and as noiselessly as possible, through the wood; to a point upon the shore, a mile distant from the point where they landed. going to the edge of the trees, they were enabled to take a view along the shore. it was deserted. the malay prahu was gone. confident that none of their enemies would have remained behind, they walked boldly along the shore to the spot where the malays had landed. every box and barrel had been broken open, and the contents carried away. planks and beams had been split asunder, to obtain the copper bolts and fastenings. the framework of the boat had been destroyed, and every portion of canvas and rope carried away. the lads sat down on the shore. "what shall we do next, hans?" hans shook his head. "perhaps some of the others may have got away, and may join us here, today or tomorrow. if any are alive, they would be certain to come back here, when they thought the malays had left." hans grunted an assent. "anyhow, the first thing to do," will went on, "is to gather up the pieces of biscuits. they have wasted lots, in breaking open the barrels, and i am famishing." hans rose with alacrity, and they soon were at work collecting pieces of biscuits. "let us gather up all the pieces, carefully. there are a good lot, altogether; and we may want them, badly, before we have done." in half an hour they had collected about pounds of biscuits and, having gone to the stream and taken a drink, they made for the spot where their tent had stood. as they expected, they found the canvas was gone. they set to work with their knives and, cutting a number of boughs, erected a shelter sufficient to shield them from the night air. all day they hoped, but in vain, that some of their comrades would return, and listened eagerly to every sound in the forest; but no call, or footstep, met their ears. they had no means of lighting a fire, the first having been lit by the mate who--being a smoker--had had a small tin box of matches in his pocket. this had fitted closely, and kept out the water. "what had we better do, if no one comes back?" will said, as they sat in their little hut. "build anoder boat," hans answered. "but how are we to do that, hans? we might make the framework, but we have no canvas to cover it with. besides, even if we had, i have no idea of the direction of singapore, and i doubt if we could find our way back to java." hans had no further suggestion to offer. "i suppose we could live in the forest for some time," will said. "i read a book called robinson crusoe, and a sailor there lived on a desert island for years; but then he had a gun, and all sorts of things. there are plenty of birds but, even if we could make bows and arrows, i suppose we should be months before we could shoot straight enough to hit them." several days passed. the lads found plenty of fruit; but the season was advancing, and will said one day to hans: "what on earth are we to do, when the fruit and biscuits are all finished?" wandering in the woods, they found the bodies of the whole of their companions. all were headless, the malays having carried off these coveted trophies. they did not attempt to bury the bodies for, in such a climate, decomposition sets in rapidly, and swarms of insects complete the work. in the grass near the hut they found one treasure--the mate's ax--which had evidently fallen from his belt, in his flight, and had been overlooked by the malays. "i tell you what, hans," will said, one day, "fruit is getting scarcer and scarcer, and there are not more than five or six pounds of biscuits left. i vote that we make through the forest into the interior of the island. there must be some villages scattered about. if we enter one boldly, they may not kill us. i don't know whether they have any respect for the laws of hospitality, as some savages have but, even if they did kill us, it's better than being starved to death, here. it's a chance, anyhow. "what do you say, hans?" "i don't zay noding," hans answered. "i don't have no obinion, at all. if you dink zat is ze best plan, let us do it." so saying, hans collected the biscuit, tied it up in his handkerchief, and was ready to start at once. "there is no hurry, hans," will said, laughing; "still, if we are to make a start, we may as well go at once." turning their backs upon the sea, they struck into the wood. they had never before gone farther than a mile from the shore. after an hour's walking, they found that the character of the forest was changing: the ground rose rapidly, the thick, tangled undergrowth disappeared, and they were able to walk briskly forward, under the shade of the large trees. the hill became steeper and steeper, as they advanced; and will knew that they were ascending the hill that they had seen from the ship, when she was coming towards the shore. three hours after leaving the coast, they were upon its top. the ground was rocky here and, in some places, bare of trees. inland, they saw hill rising behind hill, and knew that the island must be a large one. illustration: will and hans in search of a shelter. "look, hans, there is smoke curling up at the foot of that hill, over there. don't you see it? it is very faint, but it is certainly smoke. there must be a house there and, most likely, a village. "come on, we shall get there before the sun sets. i don't think it can be more than a mile and a half away." hans, as usual, assented and, in about half an hour, they arrived at a malay village. the aspect was curious, each hut being built in a tree. at the point where the lower branches started, a platform was made. the tree above this was cut down, and on the platform the hut was erected--access being obtained to it by a ladder. several of the inhabitants were walking about. these, upon seeing the lads, uttered cries of warning and, instantly flying to the ladders, which were constructed of light bamboo, climbed to the huts and raised the ladders after them. then, at every door, men appeared with bent bows and pointed arrows, threatening the invaders. will had cut a green bough, and this he waved as a token of peace; while hans threw up his hands, to show that he was unarmed. then they bowed several times, almost to the ground; held out their arms with outstretched hands and, finally, sat down upon the ground. the malays apparently understood that their visitors came in peace. they held a long conversation among themselves and, at last, the ladder of one of the huts--which appeared larger and better finished than the others--was lowered, and four men descended. one of these carried a kriss in his hand. his bow was slung behind his back. the others kept their bows bent in readiness for instant action. the chief was a tall and well-built man, of about forty years of age. he, like his followers, was dressed only in a loincloth; he had copper bracelets round his wrists. as he approached, the lads rose and bowed deeply; then will held out to him the ax and, placing it in his hand, motioned to him that it was a present. the chief looked pleased at the gift, placed his hands on will's shoulder and nodded, and performed the same gesture to hans. then he led them towards his hut, and motioned to them to sit down at the foot of the tree. curious faces were watching from every hut and, as soon as it was seen that peace was established, the ladders were lowered and a swarm of men, women, and children soon surrounded the visitors. at the chief's order a woman approached them, bringing a dish of food. this was composed, the boys found, principally of birds; cut up and stewed, with some sort of vegetable. the dish was by no means bad and, after living for nearly a fortnight upon biscuit and fruit, they much enjoyed it. presently, women brought bundles of dried fern and spread them at the foot of the tree and, soon after it was dark, the boys lay down upon them. it was long, however, before they went to sleep; for the din and chatter in the village continued, until far into the night. the lads guessed that the reason and manner of their coming was warmly debated; and judged by their reception that the prevailing opinions were favorable, and that the visit from the two white men was considered to be a fortunate omen. the next day they were again amply supplied with food, and were constantly surrounded by a little group of women and children, to whom their white skins appeared a source of constant wonder. their movements were entirely unchecked, and they were evidently considered in the light of guests rather than prisoners. the next night the village retired to rest early. the boys sat talking together, for a long time, and then lay down to sleep. presently, will thought that he heard a noise and, looking up, saw in the moonlight a number of savages, stealthily approaching. they carried with them ladders; and intended, he had no doubt, to surprise the sleeping villagers. they were already close at hand. will shook hans--who had already gone off to sleep--and pointed out to him the advancing foes. these were already in the village and, separating, fixed a ladder against each of the huts. so far the boys, who lay in the shadow of the hut, had not been noticed. the malays--who belonged to a hostile village--began to climb the ladders; when the lads, grasping the heavy sticks which they always carried, and springing to their feet with loud shouts, ran to the ladders, before the malays could recover from their astonishment at the approach of the white-faced men, rushing upon them. half a dozen of the ladders were upset, the men who had mounted them coming heavily to the ground. some of these, as they rose, at once took to their heels; others, drawing their krisses, rushed at their assailants. but the lads were no longer alone. at the first shout, the doors of the huts had opened; and the inhabitants rushed out, with their arms. the remaining ladders were instantly overthrown, and a shower of arrows poured upon their assailants. will and hans knocked down the foremost of their assailants; and the whole body, foiled in their attempted surprise, discomfited at the appearance of the strange white-faced men, and exposed to the arrows of the defenders, at once darted away--several of their number having already fallen, under the shafts from above. with exulting shouts, the warriors of the village poured down their ladders from the huts, and took up the pursuit; and soon no one remained in the village, save the white lads and the women and children. towards morning the warriors returned, several of them bringing with them gory heads, showing that their pursuit had not been in vain. the village was now the scene of great rejoicings. huge fires were lighted, and a feast held in honor of the victory. the chief solemnly placed the white men, one on each side of him, and made them a speech; in which, by his bowing and placing his hand on their heads, they judged he was thanking them for having preserved their village from massacre. indeed, it was clear, from the respectful manner of all towards them, that they were regarded in the light of genii, who had come specially to protect the village from the assaults of its enemies. after the feast was over the chief, after a consultation with the rest, pointed to a tree close to that in which his own hut was situated. the whole village set to work, ladders were fixed against it; and the men, ascending, hacked away with krisses and stone hatchets at the trunk. hans--seeing their object--made signs to the chief to lend him his ax and, ascending to the tree, set to work with it; doing, in five minutes, more work than the whole of the natives employed could have accomplished in an hour. after working for some time, he handed the ax to one of the natives, who continued the work. the tree was not a large one--the trunk, at this point, being about inches in diameter. half an hour's work sufficed to cut it through; and the upper part of the tree fell, with a crash. in the meantime the women had brought in, from the forest, a quantity of bamboos and, with these, the men set to work and speedily formed a platform. upon this a hut was erected, the roof and sides being covered with palm leaves laid closely together, forming a roof impervious to rain. two large bundles of fern, for beds, were then taken up; and the chief, ascending, solemnly invited the boys to come up and take possession. a woman was told off to prepare food for them, and attend to their wants and, by nightfall, the lads found themselves in a comfortable abode of their own. pulling up the ladder, after the manner of the natives, they sat down to chat over their altered prospects. they were now clearly regarded as adopted into the village community, and need have no further fear as to their personal security, or means of living. "for the time we are safe," will said; "but--as i don't want to turn malay, and live all my life with no other amusement than keeping my own head on, and hunting for those of the enemies of the village--we must think of making our escape, somehow; though at present, i own i don't see how." chapter : the attack on the village. a day or two later a malay ran at full speed into the village, and said a few words which caused a perfect hubbub of excitement. the men shouted. the women screamed and, running up the ladders to their tree abodes, began gathering together the various articles of value, in their eyes. the chief came up to the boys and, by signs, intimated that a large number of hostile natives, belonging to several villages, were advancing to attack them; and that they must fly into the interior. this was very unwelcome news for the lads. once removed farther from the sea the tribe might, not improbably, take up their abode there, as they would fear to return to the neighborhood of their enemies. this would be fatal to any chance of the lads being taken off by a passing ship. after a few words together, they determined to oppose the movement. will, in a loud voice and with threatening gestures, intimated that he disapproved of the plan, and that he and his companion would assist them in defending their village. the malays paused in their preparations. their faith in their white visitors was very great and, after a few minutes' talk among themselves, they intimated to the boys that they would obey their orders. will at once signed to a few men to stand as guards round the village, to warn them of the approaching enemy; and then set the whole of the rest of the population to work cutting sharp-pointed poles, boughs, and thorny bushes. with these a circle was made around the trees upon which the village was built. fortunately the hostile malays had halted in the forest, two or three miles away, intending to make their attack by night and, as the news of their coming had arrived at noon, the villagers had, before they ceased work late in the evening, erected a formidable hedge round the village. some of the women had been set to work manufacturing a number of torches, similar to those used by them for lighting their dwellings, but much larger. they were formed of the stringy bark of a tree, dipped in the resinous juice obtained from another. will had one of these fastened to each of the trees nearest to the hedge. they were fixed to the trunks on the outside, so that their flame would throw a light on the whole circle beyond the hedge while, within, all would be shadow and darkness. it was very late before all preparations were completed. will then placed a few men as outposts, some hundred yards in the forest, in the direction from which the enemy were likely to approach. they were ordered to give the alarm, the moment they heard a noise; and were then to run in and enter the circle by a small gap, which had been left in the abbatis for the purpose. many of the men then took their posts, with their bows and arrows, in the trees near the hedge. the others remained on the ground, ready to rush to any point assailed. for several hours no sound save the calls of the night birds, and the occasional distant howls of beasts of prey, were heard in the forest; and it was not until within an hour of morning--the hour generally selected by malays for an attack, as men sleep at that time the heaviest--that a loud yell, at one of the outposts, told that the enemy were close at hand. two or three minutes later the scouts ran in, and the gap through which they had entered was at once filled up with bushes, which had been piled close at hand for the purpose. aware that their approach was discovered, the enemy abandoned all further concealment; and advanced with wild yells, intending to strike terror into the defenders of the village. as they advanced the torches were all lighted and, as the assailants came within their circle of light, a shower of arrows from the malays on the ground, and in the trees above, was poured into them. yells and screams told that the volley had been a successful one but, discharging their arrows in turn, the malays, with demoniac yells, rushed against the village. the advance, however, was arrested suddenly when they arrived at the abbatis. from behind its shelter, so deadly a rain of arrows was poured in that they soon shrank back, and bounded away beyond the circle of light, while taunting shouts rose from its defenders. for a time they contented themselves by distant shouting; and then, with a wild yell, charged forward again. several dropped from the fire of arrows, from those in the trees and behind the abbatis but, discharging their arrows in return, the assailants kept on until they again reached the impediment. here they strove furiously to break through--hacking with their krisses, and endeavoring to pull up the stakes with their hands--but the defenders, in the shade behind, sent their arrows so fast and thick that the assailants again shrank back, and darted away to shelter. throughout the night there was no renewal of the attack and, in the morning, not a foe was visible. two or three scouts went out to reconnoiter; but no sooner did they enter the forest than one of them was shot down, and the rest sent flying back. "i believe the scoundrels are going to try to starve us out," will said. "let us speak to the chief, and ask how much provisions they have got." after much pantomime, will succeeded in conveying his meaning to the chief; and the latter at once ordered all the inhabitants to produce their stock of food. this was unexpectedly large, and will thought that there was sufficient for a fortnight's consumption. he now made signs of drinking, but the reply to this was disheartening in the extreme. a few gourds full of water were brought forward, and two or three of the close-woven baskets in which water is often carried, in this country. there was, in fact, scarce enough to last the defenders for a day. the stream from which the village drew its supply of water was about a couple of hundred yards away; consequently the villagers fetched up their water as they needed it, and no one thought of keeping a store. will looked in dismay at the smallness of the supply. "if they really intend to starve us out, hans, we are done for. no doubt they reckon on our water falling short. they would know that it was not likely that there would be a supply here." the natives were not slow to recognize the weak point of their defense one or two of the men, taking water baskets, were about to go to the stream; but will made signs to the chief that they must not do this. the only hope was that the enemies would draw off; but if they saw that water was already short, they would be encouraged to continue to beleaguer the place. will was unable to explain his reasons to the chief; but the latter, seeing how great was the advantage that they had already gained, by following the counsel of their white visitors in the matter of the hedge, acquiesced at once in their wishes. will then ascended to one of the huts, and carefully reconnoitered the whole ground. there was, he saw, at the end farthest from the stream, a slight dip in the land extending into the forest. beckoning the chief to join him, he made signs that, at night, the warriors should issue silently from the village at this point, and make noiselessly through the wood. they would then take a wide circuit, till they came upon the stream; and would then, working up it, fall upon the enemy in the rear. the chief was dubious; but will made an imperative gesture and the chief, in a humble manner, agreed to do as he was ordered. the day passed slowly and, before nightfall, the supply of water was entirely finished. once or twice scouts had gone out, to see if the enemy were still round the village; but returned, each time, with the news that they were there. the last time, just before nightfall, will directed two or three of them to take water buckets, and to go in the direction of the stream; signing to them, however, to return the moment they saw signs of the enemy. they were soon back and, as will had expected, the sight of the water buckets showed the enemy that the garrison of the village were badly supplied, in that respect; and taunting shouts arose from the woods, asking them why they did not go down to drink. will felt certain that the malays would now draw the greater part of their number down to the side of the stream; and that there would therefore be the more chance of the garrison making their way out, at the other end of the village. three hours after it was dark, the chief mustered all his men. they were about five-and-forty, in all. will signed that each should take with him a water basket or large gourd so that, in case they failed in defeating the enemy, and breaking up the blockade, they might at least be able to bring a supply of water into the village. will then, with much difficulty, explained to the chief that the old men, boys, and women remaining in the village were, the moment they heard the sound of the attack upon the enemy's rear, to shout and yell their loudest, and to shoot arrows in the direction of the enemy. a few sticks had already been pulled up at the point of the hedge through which will intended to make a sally, and the band now passed noiselessly out. the chief himself led the way, the white boys following behind him. lying upon their stomachs, they crawled noiselessly along down the little depression and, in ten minutes, were well in the wood; without having met with an enemy, although they had several times heard voices among the trees, near them. they now rose to their feet and, making a wide detour, came down, after a quarter of an hour's walk, upon the stream. here the gourds and baskets were filled; and then, keeping along by the waterside, they continued their march. presently they saw a number of fires, round which many malays were sitting. they crept noiselessly up until within a few yards and then, with a yell, burst upon the enemy. numbers were cut down at once; and the rest, appalled by this attack on their rear, and supposing that the inhabitants of some other village must have arrived to the assistance of those they were besieging, at once fled in all directions. those remaining in the village had seconded the attack by wild shouts, so loud and continuous that their besiegers had no reason to suppose that their number had been weakened. for a few minutes the pursuit was kept up; then the chief recalled his followers, with a shout. the water baskets--many of which had been thrown down in the attack--were refilled, and the party made their way up to the village, where they were received with shouts of triumph. the panic of the malays had been, in no slight degree, caused by the appearance of the two boys; who had purposely stripped to the waist, and had shouted at the top of their voices as, waving the krisses which they had borrowed, they fell upon the foe. the idea that white devils were leagued with the enemies against them had excited the superstitious fear of the malays to the utmost; and when, in the morning, scouts again sallied from the village, they found that the enemy had entirely gone--the fact that they had not even returned to carry off the effects which had been abandoned, in the first panic, showing that they had continued their flight, without stopping, to their distant villages. the chief, like an able politician, took advantage of the impression which his white visitors had created and, the same day, sent off messengers to the villages which had combined in the attack against them, saying that the white men--his guests--were very angry; and that, unless peace was made, and a solemn promise given that there should be no renewal of the late attempts, they were going to lay a dreadful spell upon the villages. women and children would be seized by disease, and the right arms of the warriors wither up. this terrible threat carried consternation into the malay villages. the women burst into prolonged wailings, and the bravest of the men trembled. the messenger said that the white men had consented to abstain from using their magical powers until the following day; and that the only chance to propitiate them was for deputations from the villages to come in, early the next morning, with promises of peace and offerings for the offended white men. it was not for some time afterwards that the lads learned enough of the language to understand what had been done; but they guessed, from the exultation of the chief, and the signs which he made that their late enemies would shortly come in, in an attitude of humiliation, that he had in some way succeeded in establishing a scare among them. on the following morning deputations--consisting of six warriors, and women bearing trays with fruit, birds, and other offerings--arrived at the village. the men were unarmed. at their approach, the chief made signs to the boys to take a seat at the foot of the principal tree; and then, accompanied by his leading warriors, led the deputation--with much ceremony--before them. the women placed their trays at their feet, and the men addressed them in long speeches, and with many signs of submission. the boys played their part well. as soon as they saw what was required of them they signified, with an air of much dignity, that they accepted the offerings; and then went through the ceremony of shaking hands, solemnly, with each of the warriors. then they made a speech in which, with much gesticulation, they signified to the visitors that a terrible fate would befall them, should they again venture to meddle with the village. much awed and impressed, the malays withdrew. the boys made a selection, from the baskets of fruit, for their own eating; and then signified, to the chief, that he should divide the rest among the inhabitants of the village. when this was done, the boys ascended to their tree and passed the day there quietly; the villagers indulging in feasting, singing, and rejoicing over their victory. "the worst of all this is," will said to hans, "that the more they reverence us, and the more useful they find us, the more anxious they will be to keep us always with them. however, there is one comfort: we are safe, as long as we choose to remain here; and that is more than we could have hoped for, when we first landed from the wreck. it is curious that the malays, who have no hesitation in attacking english ships, and murdering their crews, have yet a sort of superstitious dread of us. but i suppose it is something the same way as it was in england, in the days of the persecution of old women as witches: they believed that, if left to themselves, they could cast deadly spells, and yet they had no hesitation in putting them to death. i suppose that it is something of the same feeling, here." chapter : the fight with the prahus. very frequently, in the days that followed, william gale and his friend hans talked over the possibility of effecting an escape; but the difficulties appeared almost invincible. the various villages which, so far as the boys could understand, were scattered at some distance apart, had little dealings with each other; and indeed, were frequently engaged in feuds. the particular people with whom they lived had nothing whatever to do with the sea. they used--at least so the boys understood, by their signs--to fish, at one time; but they had been robbed of their boats, and maltreated, by some of the cruising tribes who lived in villages on the coast, or on creeks and rivers. the possibility of escape seemed small, indeed. to escape they must get on board a ship and, to do this, they must first go out to sea; and this could only be done in a boat of their own, or in one of the piratical prahus. the latter course could not be thought of, for the coast pirates were bloodthirsty in the extreme and, even could they change their residence to one of the seaside villages, and gain the friendship of the inhabitants, they would be no nearer to their end. for as these go out to attack, and not to trade with european ships, there would be no chance of escaping in that way. upon the other hand, they might build a boat of their own; but they considered it improbable that the malays would allow them to depart, for they evidently regarded their presence as a prodigy; and revered them as having miraculously arrived, at the moment when a great danger threatened the village. but, even should they be allowed to build a boat and depart, they knew not whither to go. they knew nothing of navigation, and were ignorant of the geography of the archipelago; and the chances of their striking upon the one or two spots, where, alone they could land with safety, were so small that it would be madness to undertake the voyage. for six months they lived quietly in the malay village. the people instructed them in the use of their blowguns, in which they are wonderfully skilful; being able to bring down a bird, sitting on a lofty bough of a tree, with almost an unerring accuracy. they also taught them to shoot with the bow and arrow, and they found that the natives used the roots of various kinds of plants for food. the time did not pass unpleasantly and, had they known that it would last but a few months, only, they would have enjoyed it much. at last, after much deliberation, they determined that they would--as a first step towards escape--construct a little boat, under pretense of wanting to fish. accordingly one day, when out with the chief and two or three of his men in the direction of the sea, they pointed there, and signified that they wished to go there--for they had picked up a good many malay words. the chief shook his head, but they insisted in so authoritative a manner that he gave way, and followed them. when they reached the shore, they made signs that they wanted to construct a boat. again the chief shook his head vehemently; and enforced his meaning by pointing along shore, and going through the action first of rowing, then of fighting--intimating that they would certainly be killed, if they ventured out, by the fierce coast tribes. the boys nodded, to show that they understood what he wished to say but, pointing to the water a few yards from shore, went through the action of fishing; then, burdening themselves with imaginary fish, they pointed to the village, and showed that they would supply it with food. the malays talked for some time among themselves. they had so vast a respect for the white men that they did not like to thwart their wishes. the thought, too, of a supply of fish--of which they had been long deprived owing to their feuds with some of the coast villages--also operated strongly in favor of their yielding an assent and, at last, the chief made signs that he agreed and, pointing to the village, intimated that assistance should be given in building a boat. the next day, accordingly, ten or twelve men came down to the shore with them. a tree was felled, the ends were pointed, and the whole formed roughly into the shape of a canoe. fires were lighted on the top and, by dint of flame and ax, a hollow was dug out. the operation lasted three days, the men having brought provisions with them, so as to avoid making the journey--two and a half hours long--to and from the village each day. the boat, when finished, was but a rough construction; and would have excited the mockery of any of the coast villagers, as they are expert boat builders. still, it was amply sufficient for the purpose for which it was intended--namely, for fishing inside the line of reefs. it was heavy, and paddled slowly; and the lads had a strong suspicion that the malays had purposely made it more clumsy and unseaworthy than need be, in order that they should have no temptation to attempt a distant journey in it. there was no difficulty about lines, the malays being skilled in making string and ropes from the fibers of trees. the hooks were more difficult but, upon searching very carefully along the shore, the lads found some fragments of one of the ship boats; and in these were several copper nails which, hammered and bent, would serve their purpose well. the lines were ready on the day the canoe was finished and, as soon as she was launched, the chief and one of the other malays, and the boys, took their seats in her. the natives paddled her out nearly to the edge of the reef. four lines, baited with pieces of raw birds' flesh, were thrown overboard. a few minutes passed--rather anxiously for the lads, who were most desirous that the fishing should be successful, so as to afford them an excuse for frequently pursuing it. then there was a bite; and hans, who held the line, found that it taxed his strength to haul in the fish which tugged and strained upon it. when it was got into the boat, it proved to be some fourteen pounds in weight. by this time two of the other baits had been taken and, in less than an hour, they had caught upwards of thirty fish, most of them of considerable size. the natives were delighted and, paddling to shore, the burden was distributed among the whole party, with the exception of the chief and the two whites. before starting, a young tree was cut down and chopped into lengths of a few feet each; and on these rollers the canoe was hauled high up the beach. then the party set out for the village; where their arrival, with so large a supply of food, occasioned great rejoicing. after this, the boys went down regularly, every day, to fish. at first three or four of the natives always accompanied them, under pretense of carrying back the fish; but really, as they thought, to keep a watch over them. to lessen their hosts' suspicions, sometimes one or other stayed in the village. as time went on, the suspicion of the malays abated. the number of the guard was lessened and, finally, as the men disliked so long a tramp, some of the boys were told off to accompany the white men, and assist in bringing back their fish. they were in the habit of starting soon after daybreak, and of not returning till late in the evening; accounting for their long absence by pointing to the sun. the fishing was always performed immediately they reached the coast. when they had caught as many as they and the boys could carry, these were placed in a large covered basket; which was sunk in the water close to the shore, to keep the fish in good condition until they started. then they would paddle about within the reef or, during the extreme heat of the day, lie in the boat, shaded by bunches of palm leaves. the malay boys--who were set on shore after the fishing--were left alone; and amused themselves by bathing, or passed the time asleep under the trees. after the first day or two, it had struck the boys that it was dangerous to leave the canoe high on the sand; as it would be observed, even at a distance, by a passing prahu. consequently a deep trench had been dug from the sea, far enough up to allow the canoe, when floating in it, to lie below the level of the beach. before leaving her she was, each day, roughly covered with seaweed; and might, therefore, escape observation by any craft passing at a short distance from the shore. in their expeditions along the reef, the boys discovered a passage through it. it was of about double the width of a ship, and of amply sufficient depth to allow a vessel of any size to cross. at all other points, for a distance of a mile or two either way--which was the extent of their excursions--the reef came very near to the surface; its jagged points, for the most part, showing above it. several months passed, and still no sail which promised a hope of deliverance had shown over the surface of the sea. scarce a day passed without their seeing the malay prahus passing up and down the coast; but these always kept some distance out, and caused no uneasiness to the fishermen. they had, during this time, completed the hollowing out of the boat; until her sides were extremely thin, and she was so light that she could be paddled at a high rate of speed. they were both now expert with the paddle; and felt that if, in a light wind, a vessel should be seen off the coast, they would be enabled to row out and reach her. it might be, they knew, months or even years before such a ship could be seen. still, as there were many vessels trading among the islands, at any moment an occurrence might arise. one afternoon, they had been dozing under their leafy shade when will, who first awoke, sat up and uttered a cry. almost abreast of them, and but a quarter of a mile outside the reef, was a large brig. the wind was light and, with every stitch of canvas set, she was making but slow progress through the water. hans leaped up, echoed the cry and, seizing their paddles, they rowed with all their strength away to the opening through the reef; passed through, and headed for the ship. they now saw what they had not, at first, observed. at a distance of some three miles astern were five large prahus, with their sails set, and the banks of oars rising and falling rapidly. the brig was chased by the pirates. the boys rested on their paddles, for a moment. "they are more than a match for her, i am afraid," will said. "what do you say, hans, shall we go on, or not?" hans made no reply. he was never quick at coming to a decision. "we had better go," will went on. "we can see whether they mean to fight, or not." the boys were naked to the waist--for the thorns of the forest had long since torn in pieces the shirts which they had on, when they landed from the wreck--and their skins were bronzed to a deep copper color still, they differed in hue from the natives of the island; and the men on board the brig regarded them with some surprise, as they approached it. "throw us a rope!" will shouted as they neared her. there was a cry of surprise from the crew, at being addressed in english; but a rope was thrown, and the boys soon sprang on board. they saw, at once, that the ship was an english one. "hallo! where do you spring from?" asked the captain. "we were shipwrecked here, ten months ago," will said, "and have been living with the natives." "at any other time, i should have been glad to see you," the captain said; "but just at present, if you will take my advice, you will get into your canoe and row on shore again. "as you see," and he pointed to the prahus, "we are chased and, although i mean to fight to the last--for there is no mercy to be expected from these bloodthirsty scoundrels--i fear the chances are small." will looked round and saw that the six cannons which the brig carried--for vessels trading in the eastern archipelago are always armed--had already been loosened ready for action; and that a group of men were at work mounting a long gun, which had just been raised from the hold. knowing the number of men that the prahus carried, will felt that the chance of a successful resistance was slight. there were about eighteen men on deck--a number larger than the brig would carry in other seas, but necessary in so dangerous a trading ground as this. the prahus, however, would each carry from eighty to one hundred men; and these, attacking at once from opposite sides, would be likely to bear down all opposition. suddenly an idea occurred to him. "look, sir, there is a passage through the reef, there; with plenty of water and width enough for your ship. i can take her through. there is no other passage, for some distance. if you take her inside, and lay her across the channel, the prahus can only attack on one side; and you can place all your guns and strength there." the captain at once saw the advantage of this scheme. "capital!" he exclaimed. "take the helm at once, my lad. "ease off the sheets, men." they were now nearly opposite the entrance, and the light wind was blowing towards the shore. the captain ordered all hands to reduce sail, only keeping on enough to give the vessel steerage way. two boats were lowered, and an anchor and cable passed into each and, as the brig passed through the opening, the rest of the sail was lowered. the boats rowed to the reef, one on either side. the anchors were firmly fixed into the rock and, one being taken from the head and the other from the stern, the crews set to work at the capstan, and speedily had the vessel safely moored, broadside on, across the entrance to the reef. the malay boats were now about a mile astern. they had ceased rowing, when they saw the vessel headed for the land, supposing that the captain was about to run on shore. when, to their astonishment, they saw her pass the reef with safety, they again set to at their work. the guns were now all brought over to the side facing the entrance, and were loaded to the muzzle with bullets. a number of shots, belonging to the long gun, were placed by the bulwarks; in readiness to hurl down into the prahus, should they get alongside. the sailors--though determined to fight till the last--had, when the boys came on board, been making their preparations with the silence of despair. they were now in high spirits, for they felt that they could beat off any attempt of the enemy to attack them. when the malays were abreast of the ship, they ceased rowing and drew close together, and evidently held a consultation. the brig at once opened fire with her long gun, and the first shot hulled one of the prahus, close to the water's edge. "that's right, tom," the captain said, "stick to the same craft. if you can sink her, there is one the less." several more shots were fired, with such effect that the malays were observed jumping overboard in great numbers, and swimming towards the other boats--their own being in a sinking condition. the other four prahus at once turned their heads towards shore, and rowed with full speed towards the ship. they knew that the entrance, of whose existence they had been previously unaware, was an exceedingly narrow one and, as they neared the shore, could see--by the line of breaking surf--that it could, at most, be wide enough for one to pass at a time, accordingly one drew ahead and, discharging the cannon which it carried in its bow, rowed at full speed for the entrance; another following so close behind that its bow almost touched the stern. "train the guns to bear on the center of the channel," the captain said. "let the three bow guns take the first boat, the other three the second. "do you, tom, work away at the two behind." the prahus came along at a great rate, the sweeps churning up the water into foam. the leading boat dashed through the channel, the sweeps grating on the rocks on either side. her bow was but two yards distant from the side of the ship when the captain gave the word. the three cannon poured their contents into her, sweeping her crowded decks and tearing out her bottom. great as was her speed, she sank below the water, just as her bow touched the side of the ship. ten seconds later the command was again given; and a broadside, as destructive, was poured into the second boat. the damage done was somewhat less, and her bow reached the side of the ship. a dozen malays sprang on board, as their boat sank under their feet; but the sailors were ready and, with musket, pistol, and cutlass fell upon them, and either cut down or drove them overboard. the sea around was covered with swimmers, but the ship was too high out of the water for them to attempt to board her; and the malays at once struck out for the shore, the sailors keeping up the musketry fire upon them, until out of range. the other two boats had not followed. the mate had plumped a shot from the long gun full into the bow of the first and--seeing the destruction which had fallen upon their leaders--both turned their heads and made for sea; the mate continuing his fire until they were out of range, one shot carrying away the greater part of the oars, on one side of the boat previously struck. when at a distance of upwards of a mile they ceased rowing and, for some time, lay close together. the men of the injured boat were observed to be stopping the yawning hole in her bows, a few inches above the water level; the other started off, at full speed, up the coast. it was now evening, and there was scarcely a breath of wind. the men crowded round the lads, and thanked them warmly for having been the means of saving them from destruction. "i am afraid you are not out of danger, yet," will said, as the captain shook him by the hand. "no doubt that boat has gone off with the news and, before morning, you will have half a dozen fresh enemies coming down, inside the reef, to attack you." "if we had but a breath of wind, we might do," the captain said. "i fear you will have none before morning; then it generally blows fresh, for two or three hours. i don't know how far it is to the village which is the headquarters of the pirates. as far as i could make out, from the malays with whom we have been living, it is about six hours' walking; but the boats will row twice as fast as a man would walk through the forest. in that case you may be attacked at two or three o'clock in the morning, and you won't get the breeze till after sunrise." "are there any other channels through the reef?" the captain asked. "i do not know," will replied. "we have never explored it very far, either way; but as i should think, from the action of the malays, that they did not know of this, they might not know of any other, did it exist." "then," the captain said, "i will warp the brig out through the channel again; and anchor her, stem and stern, across it outside. they will find it as hard to attack us, there, as they did before. then, when the breeze comes, we will slip our cable and run for it. she is a fast sailer; and can, i think, get away from the pirates, even with their sails and oars. besides, by shifting the long gun and two of the others to her stern, we can give it them so hot that, even if they are the fastest, we may sicken them." "i do not know, sir," will said. "they would be likely to hang about you, until the breeze drops; and then to attack you on all sides at once. if we could but keep them from coming through the channel, in pursuit, we should be safe." "ah! but how on earth are we to do that?" the captain asked. william gale was silent for a minute or two. "have you plenty of powder on board the ship, sir?" "plenty--we use it for barter." "it seems to me--" will went on, "--that if, before sailing, you could sink a couple of barrels of powder in the channel, with a fuse to explode them, a few minutes after we had left; the malays would be so astonished, at the explosion, that they would not venture to pass through." "your idea is a capital one," the captain said, warmly; "but how about a fuse which would burn under water? "what do you think, tom? could it be managed?" "i should think so, sir," the mate answered. "suppose we take one of those empty -gallon beer casks, and fill that up with powder--it will hold ten or twelve of the little barrels--and then we might bung it up, and make a hole in its head. over the hole we might fix a wine bottle, with the bottom knocked out; and so fastened, with tow and oakum, that the water won't get in. then we might shove down through the mouth of the bottle, and through the hole below it into the powder, a long strip of paper dipped in saltpetre, to make touch paper of it. i don't know as a regular fuse would do, as it might go out for want of air; but there would be plenty to keep touch paper alight. "we could sling three or four -pounder shots under the bottom of the cask, to make it sink upright. just before we slip our cables, we might lower it down with the boats; lighting the fuse the last thing, and sticking in the cork. if we don't put too much saltpetre, it might burn for some minutes before it reached the powder." "it's worth trying, at any rate," the captain said; "but i fear it would not burn long enough. i think that, instead of a bottle, we might jam a piece of iron tube--six or eight feet long--into the head of the cask, and cut a bung to fit it. in that way we could get a good length of fuse." this plan was carried out. a large cask was filled with powder; and an iron tube, three inches in diameter and six feet long, fitted into it, and made water tight. a long strip of paper, after being dipped in water in which gunpowder had been dissolved; was then dried, rolled tight, and lowered down the tube, until it touched the powder. a bung was cut to fit the top of the tube; a piece of wash-leather being placed over it, to ensure its being perfectly water tight. the top of the fuse was then cut level with the pipe. several bits of iron were lashed to the lower end of the cask, to make it sink upright; and the cask was steadily lowered into a boat lying alongside the ship, in readiness for use. the sailors entered into the preparations with the glee of schoolboys; but the machine was not ready until long after the ship had been towed out again through the channel, and moored broadside to it, just outside. chapter : the torpedo. it was about two o'clock in the morning when the watch awoke the crew, with the news that they could hear the distant sound of oars coming along the shore. all took their places, in silence. after a time the rowing ceased, and all was quiet again. half an hour passed, and then there was a slight sound close alongside and, in the channel, they could dimly make out a small boat--which was rapidly rowed away into the darkness again, several musket shots being fired after it. "they have sent on ahead, to find if we were lying in the same berth," the captain said. "i expect they will be puzzled when they hear that we are outside, and that the entrance is guarded. i should not be surprised if they did not attack before morning. they had such a lesson, yesterday, that i don't think they will try to force the channel in our teeth again; but will play the waiting game, sure that they will secure us, sooner or later." so it turned out. the hours passed slowly on, but no sound was heard. then, in the dim morning light, a pirate fleet of eight prahus was seen, lying at a distance of half a mile within the reef. as the day broke, the breeze sprang up, the sails were hoisted, and the captain prepared to slip his cables. a similar preparation could, through the glasses, be observed on board the malay fleet. "that will do very well," the captain said. "those fellows will be along in about eight or ten minutes after we have started; and the fuse, according to the experiments we made as to its rate of burning, will last about seven. "now, quick, lads, into the boat. "tom, you take charge of the sinking." in another minute the boat was rowed to the channel, and the cask lowered over the side. it was held there, for a minute, while the mate struck a light and applied it to the touch paper. then he pressed the bung firmly into the top of the tube, the lashings of the cask were cut, and the boat rowed back to the ship. the anchors were already on board, and the brig was getting way on her as the boat rowed alongside. the men jumped on board, and the boat was suffered to tow behind, while all hands set the whole of the sails. the vessel was soon running briskly before the land breeze. the pirate fleet was instantly in motion. every eye in the ship was directed towards them. "they will be there in less than ten minutes from the moment i lowered the cask," the mate said, looking at his watch. "not much," the captain said, "they are rowing fast, now; but the trees keep off the wind, and their sails do not help them. they were a minute or two behind us in starting." it was just eight minutes, from the time when the cask had been lowered, that the first of the malay boats rowed out through the channel. "i hope nothing has gone wrong," the mate growled. "i am not afraid of that; though we may be wrong, a minute or two, as to the length of the fuse." another boat followed the first. the third was in mid channel when, suddenly, she seemed to rise bodily in the air, and then to fall into pieces. a mighty column of water, a hundred feet high, rose into the air; mingled with fragments of wood, and human bodies. a deep, low report was heard; and the brig shook, as if she had come into collision with some floating body. although they were nearly a mile away, the yell of astonishment, and fright, of the malays reached the ship. the prahus still inside the reef were seen to turn round, and row away along the coast at the top of their speed; while those which had passed the channel, after rowing wildly for some distance, lay on their oars--the crews apparently stupefied at what had taken place. the craft which had been injured the day before still lay seaward, on watch; but now turned her head, and rowed towards the shore to join her consorts. the sea belle left the coast. the malays attempted no pursuit but, so long as they could be seen, remained inactive near the scene of the sudden and--to them--inexplicable catastrophe which had befallen their consort. once fairly freed from all fear of pursuit, the captain invited the two lads into his cabin; and there heard from them an account of all the adventures through which they had passed. when they had finished, he questioned them as to their plans. hans said that he intended to take the first ship bound for holland. "and you?" he asked will. "i have no particular plan," will said. "i am in no hurry to return to england, having no relatives there. after being so long absent--for it is now a year since i sailed from yarmouth--i should not care to return and take up my apprenticeship as a fisherman." "will you ship regularly on board the sea belle?" the captain asked. "thank you, sir, i think i would rather not decide upon anything until we get to calcutta. i have thirty pounds in money--fifteen pounds of which were given me on board the dutch ship, and the rest i received as wages for the voyage from england to java. i carried the money in a belt round my waist, and have kept it ever since. so i need not be in any great hurry to settle upon what i shall do; but certainly, after a regular sea life, i should not like to go back to being a fisherman. i am now past sixteen and, in another three years, shall be able to earn more wages. "i should have taken you for at least two years older," the captain said; "you are as big and strong as many lads of eighteen." "i have done a good lot of hard work, in the last two years," will said; "for on board the dutch ship--although, of course, i was only rated as a boy--i used to do man's work, aloft." other people would have been deceived, as well as the captain. hard work and exposure to the air had done much to age the boy. he had been tall and slight for his age when he left the workhouse and, while he had not ceased growing in height, he had widened out considerably and, had he asserted himself to be eighteen years of age, few would have questioned the statement. the sea belle for some time kept south, touching at some of the islands where a trade was done with the papuans; then her head was turned north and, after an eventful voyage, she reached calcutta, where the captain had been ordered to fill up with cotton, or grain, for england. the captain at once landed, and proceeded to the office of the agent of the firm who owned the sea belle. he was shown into that gentleman's private room where, at the time, two gentlemen were seated, chatting. the agent was personally acquainted with the captain, and asked him to sit down and smoke a cigar. "this is captain mayhew, of the sea belle," he said to his friends. "he has been trading, for the last three months, down among the islands. "these gentlemen, captain mayhew, are major harrison and captain edwards, who have just arrived from china, with their regiment, in the euphrates. "has your voyage been a pleasant one, captain?" "pleasant enough, sir, on the whole; but we were attacked by the malay pirates, and i should certainly not be here to tell the tale, at present, had it not been for the quickness and shrewdness of a lad, who had been shipwrecked on the coast." "how is that, mayhew? tell us all about it." captain mayhew related the whole story of the fight with the pirates; saying that, unquestionably, had it not been for will's pointing out the passage through the reef, in the first place, and his idea of burying a submarine mine, in the second, the sea belle would have fallen into the hands of the pirates. "but where did the boy spring from? how on earth came he to be there?" captain mayhew then related the story of william gale's adventures, as he had them from his own lips. "he must be a cool and plucky young fellow, indeed," major harrison exclaimed. "i should like to see him. "what style and type is he, captain? a rough sort of chap?" "by no means," the captain answered. "he is surprisingly well mannered. had i met him elsewhere, and in gentleman's clothes, i do not think that i should have suspected that he was not what he appeared. his features, too, somehow or other, strike one as being those of a gentleman; which is all the more singular when, as a fact, he told me he had been brought up in a workhouse. "in a workhouse!" major harrison repeated. "then i suppose his parents were farm laborers." "no," the captain answered; "he was left at the door, on a stormy night, by a tramp who was found drowned, next morning, in a ditch near. he had, when found, a gold trinket of some kind round his neck; and he tells me that, from that and other circumstances, it was generally supposed by the workhouse authorities that he did not belong to the tramp, but that he had been stolen by her; and that he belonged, at least, to a respectable family." "all this is very interesting," captain edwards said. "i should like much to see the boy. will you come and dine with us this evening on board the euphrates--mr. reynolds, here, is coming--and have the boy sent on board--say, at nine o'clock--when we can have him in, and have a chat with him?" captain mayhew readily agreed. william was even then waiting outside for him, having landed with him; and the captain, when he entered the office, had told him to walk about for an hour and amuse himself with the sights of calcutta, and then return and wait for him. he said nothing about his being close at hand, as he did not wish the officers to see him in the rough outfit which had been furnished him on board ship; intending to surprise them by his appearance in decent clothes. accordingly, on leaving mr. reynolds' office he took him to one of the numerous shops, in the town, where clothes of any kind can be procured. "now, will," he said, "i want you to get a suit of shore-going clothes. you can get your sea outfit tomorrow, at your leisure; but i want you to show up well at the mess, this evening, and a suit of good clothes will always be useful to you." captain mayhew had intended to pay for the outfit, himself, but this will would not hear of; and captain mayhew was the less reluctant to let the lad have his own way as he had, in the course of the interview with the agent, agreed that the lad's services deserved a handsome recognition from the firm; and that the sum of one hundred guineas should be given to him, at once. the agent felt, no doubt, that the firm would thoroughly approve of the payment. twenty pounds were to be given to hans, for his share of the services; but the two suggestions which had saved the sea belle had both originated with will. by captain mayhew's advice, will purchased a suit of dark-colored tweed, a black tie, and some white shirts and collars. at other shops, he bought some boots and a panama straw hat. having completed their purchases, they walked for some hours about calcutta; will being delighted with the variety of the native costumes, and the newness and singularity of everything which met his eye. on their return to the ghaut--as the landing stage is called--they found their various purchases already stowed in the sea belle's boat; which had, about an hour before, come to shore to fetch them off. at seven o'clock captain mayhew went off to the euphrates, leaving orders that the boat was to bring will over, at nine. at that hour the lad was dressed in his new clothes which, fortunately, fitted him well. "by jingo, will," the first mate said, as he entered the cabin, "you look a tip-topper, and no mistake." the mate was right. the lad, with his sunburnt face, quiet manner, and easy carriage, looked thoroughly at home in his attire. "i don't know who your parents were, but i would bet a month's pay that the old tramp you were telling us of had nothing to do with it; for you look every inch a gentleman, from head to foot." will found, on gaining the deck of the euphrates, that orders had been left by the officer in command that he was to be shown into the saloon cabin upon his giving his name to the sergeant, who came up at the sentry's call. he was at once conducted below. for a moment he felt almost bewildered as he entered; the size of the cabin, the handsomeness of its fittings, the well-laid table decked with fragrant flowers, so far surpassed anything he had ever seen, or thought of. he was conducted to the head of the table, where major harrison, with mr. reynolds on one hand and captain mayhew on the other, sat near the colonel commanding the regiment. captain mayhew, who had already told the outline of the story, smiled quietly to himself at the expression of surprise which crossed the faces of the major and mr. reynolds, as well as of the other officers sitting near, at the appearance of the lad he introduced to them. the colonel ordered a chair to be placed next to himself, and told the servant to fill a glass of wine for will, and entered into conversation with him. "i think, gentlemen," he said, after a minute or two, seeing that the lad did not touch the wine that was poured out for him, "it will be pleasanter on deck; for it is terribly hot here, and i see that most of you have finished your wine." an adjournment was at once made, to the deck. here cigars were lighted and, the colonel and senior officers taking their places in some of the easy chairs--which were still all out--the rest gathered round to hear the story, which major harrison had promised them would be an interesting one. captain mayhew first gave his account of the fight between the sea belle and the pirates, beginning at the point when, as he was hotly chased and despairing of making a successful defense, the canoe with the two lads in it came out to him. then will was called upon to explain how he came to be there, at that moment. he told briefly how the fishing smack was sunk, how he had saved himself by clinging to the bob stay of the dutch indianan, and how he had sailed in this vessel to java; and was on his way in her to china, when wrecked in the cyclone. here his audience insisted upon his giving them full details; and he accordingly told them the manner in which he and a few of the crew had escaped; how, when they were building a boat, they had been attacked by malays, and all--except another lad and himself, who were hiding in a tree--were massacred by the pirates; how they had gone inland to a village where, having aided the natives when attacked by a hostile tribe, they had been most kindly received; how they had finally obtained a canoe, and spent their time in fishing, in hopes of seeing a passing sail; until the sea belle, chased by the malay pirates, had appeared off the shore. there was a genuine murmur of approval, from those thickly clustered round, as the lad finished his story; and the colonel warmly expressed his approval of his conduct, under such exciting circumstances. "what are you going to do, now?" he asked. "i have not made up my mind, sir," the lad said. "i expect that i shall ship in some vessel sailing for england, shortly." "major harrison," the colonel said, "will you and captain mayhew come with me to my cabin? "i should like to have a few minutes' private chat with you," he went on, putting his hand on will's shoulder. a minute or two later, the three gentlemen and will were seated in the private cabin. "look here, my boy," the colonel said; "i have heard, from major harrison, what you had told captain mayhew concerning your birth and, certainly, your appearance and manner go far to sustain the belief that the tramp who left you was not your mother, and that your parents were of gentle birth. i do not say that a man's birth makes much difference to him; still, it does go for something and, in nine cases out of ten, the difference both in face and figure is unmistakable. unless i am very wrong, your father was a gentleman. "however, that is not to the point: it is your quickness and activity, your coolness in danger, and the adventures which you have gone through which interest us in you. now i think it is a pity that a lad, who has shown that there is so much in him, should remain a sailor before the mast. you have not been so long at sea as to become wedded to it, and to be unable to turn your hands to anything else. "now, what do you say to enlisting? in the ranks are men of all sorts--gentlemen, honest men, and blackguards. the steady, respectable man is sure to rise. you can, the captain tells me, read and write well. there is a chance of active service, at present; and when there is active service, a man who distinguishes himself gets rapid promotion. the regiment land, tomorrow; and go straight through, by train, to the north. there is trouble in afghanistan; and an ultimatum has just been sent, to the ameer, that if he does not comply with our terms it will be war; and we hope to be there in time for the beginning of it. i can only say that, if you like to join, major harrison and myself will keep our eyes upon you and, if you deserve it, you may be sure of rapid promotion. you have greatly interested me in your story, and i should be very glad to give a helping hand to so deserving a young fellow. "it is not usual, certainly, for a regiment to take recruits in india; but i don't suppose that there can be any objection to it." "thank you very much," will said, when the colonel ceased. "i am greatly obliged to you for your kindness. i have never thought about the army, but i am sure that i cannot possibly do better than accept your kind offer. "the only thing, sir, is about my age. "tut, tut!" the colonel interrupted, "i don't want to know anything about your age. when you go up for attestment, you will say that you are under nineteen, which will be strictly true. i will give a hint, and no further questions will be asked. neither i nor anyone else know that you are not past eighteen and, in time of war, no one is particular as to the age of recruits, as long as they are fit to do their duty. "you must work hard, to pick up enough knowledge of drill to enable you to take your place in the ranks. there is neither parade work, nor difficult maneuvering, in the face of an enemy; and you can finish up, afterwards. "are you quite agreed?" "quite, sir," will said, joyously, "and am, indeed, obliged to you." "come on board, then, tomorrow at eight o'clock, and ask for sergeant ringwood." william gale left the cabin with a new prospect of life before him. he had, of late, rather shrunk from the thought of again taking his place as a ship boy; and the prospect of adventures--to say nothing of the advancement which might befall him, through the interest taken in him by the colonel--was delightful to him. the last words the colonel had said when he left the cabin were: "say nothing about the workhouse, and as little as possible of anything which happened before you were wrecked on the island, in the barrack room." when william and captain mayhew had left the cabin, colonel shepherd sent for sergeant ringwood. "sergeant," he said, "a young fellow will come on board, tomorrow at eight o'clock, to join the regiment as a recruit. take him at once to the surgeon, and get him passed. i know we shall be able to give him but little drill, before we get to the frontier; but do all you can for him, and i will make it up to you. he is a smart young fellow, and i have a good deal of interest in him. "he was on his way to china, and was wrecked among the malays, and has gone through a good deal. finding himself here with nothing to do, and with a prospect of active service on the frontier, he has decided to enlist and, as he is a gallant young fellow, i do not wish to balk his fancy." the sergeant saluted and took his leave, impressed with the idea--although the colonel had not said so--that the new recruit was a young gentleman, who had joined the service simply for the sake of taking part in the war. the next morning will took leave of his friend hans; who had, the previous day, shipped on board a dutch ship, homeward bound; and who was, a few hours later, to shift his berth to her, after he had been on shore to fit himself out in clothes. hans was much affected at saying goodbye to his companion, and the two promised to correspond with each other. on bidding farewell to his friend the captain of the sea belle, the latter informed will that mr. reynolds had, on behalf of the owners of the sea belle, paid pounds to his account into the bank of hindustan; and that this, or any portion of it, would be paid to his order; as the captain had furnished the agent with a slip of paper upon which will had, at his request, signed his name. this had, with the money, been deposited at the bank; so that his signature might be recognized, and honored. on reaching the euphrates, will was at once taken charge of by sergeant ringwood; who took him before the doctor, to whom the colonel had already spoken. the medical examination was satisfactory, the doctor remarking: "you are rather slight yet, but you will fill out, in time." the age was asked, and given as under nineteen; and eighteen was inscribed against him, in the books. then he was taken before the colonel, and attested; and was, from that moment, a member of the regiment. a uniform was served out to him, and the usual articles of kit. the sergeant saw that his belts were put on properly, and his knapsack packed; and half an hour afterwards he fell in, with his musket on his shoulder, among the troops paraded on the deck of the euphrates, prior to embarkation. so quickly had it all been managed that will could hardly believe that he was awake as, feeling strangely hampered by his belts and accouterments, he descended the accommodation ladder, and took his place with his new comrades on board one of the great native boats, and rowed to the shore. the regiment was marched direct to the railway station, where the heavy baggage had been sent, on the previous day. the men took their places in the long train which stood in readiness and, half an hour later, steamed north from calcutta. hitherto, none of his comrades had spoken to will. in the bustle of landing, all had enough to do to look to themselves; and it was not until he found himself, with eight comrades and a corporal, in the railway carriage that he was addressed. "well, young 'un," one said, "what's yer name, and where do you come from? calcutta isn't much of a place for recruiting." "i was on my way to china," will replied, "and got wrecked among the malays; then i got picked up by a vessel, and we had some hot fighting. then i was landed at calcutta and, seeing nothing much to do, and hearing that there was a chance of a fight with the afghans, i thought the best thing to do was to enlist. "my name is william gale." "i wasn't quite sure that you were an englishman. you are pretty nigh as dark as them copper-colored niggers here." "so would you be," will laughed, "if you had been living, as i have, for ten months among savages, without even a shirt to your back." "tell us all about it," the soldier said. "this is a bit of luck, mates, our having someone who can tell us a tale, when we have got such a long journey before us." will made his story as full as he could, and it lasted a long time. when it was finished, the men expressed their opinion that he was a good sort and, will having handed over to the corporal a sovereign--to be expended on drinks by the way, as his footing in the regiment--he became quite a popular character, and soon felt at home in his new position. chapter : the advance into afghanistan. there was but little talking in the middle of the day, in the train, for the heat was excessive. all the men had taken off their coats, and sat in their shirt sleeves. but they were, nevertheless, bathed in perspiration. late at night, the train arrived at allahabad. here there was a stop, till morning. the men alighted from the train; and lay down on their folded blankets, with their knapsacks for pillows, on the platform or in the waiting rooms. a plentiful supply of water had been prepared for their use, at the station; and outside were several water carriers; and many of the men stripped off their shirts, and had water poured over their heads and bodies. will gale was among these and, greatly refreshed, he enjoyed some fruit and cakes which he purchased from native vendors; and then, lying down on a bench in the station, was soon asleep. four days' traveling brought them to the end of the railway. they were ferried across the attock, and then their real work began. although it was now late in september, the heat was still intense. tents were struck an hour before daybreak and, by eleven o'clock each day, the column was at its halting place. it was, however, hours before the tents and baggage arrived. many of the draft cattle were very poor, forage was scarce, and the arrangements far from good. the consequence was that great numbers of the oxen broke down and died, and many of the troops were often obliged to sleep in the air, owing to the non-arrival of their tents. the defects of the transport were aggravated, as the time went on; and the norfolk rangers fared much better than some of the troops which followed them. the regiment was destined to operate in the khuram valley, under the command of general roberts. the advanced column of this division consisted of the th company of bengal sappers, the rd bengal pioneers; a battery of horse artillery, one of royal artillery, and two mountain batteries; a squadron of the th hussars, and the th bengal cavalry. the first brigade of infantry comprised the nd battalion of the th foot, the th bengal native infantry, and the th punjaub infantry. the second brigade consisted of the nd highlanders, the st native infantry, the nd punjaub infantry, and the th ghoorkas. the place of assembly was kohat. the norfolk rangers were to act as a reserve. it was on the nd of october that the rangers arrived at kohat, heartily glad that their march across the sandy plains of the punjaub was at an end. the other regiments comprising the force poured in rapidly and, on the th, the general arrived and assumed the command. the next day the punjaub regiments were sent forward to thull. it was not until the middle of november that the european regiments followed them; and the six weeks were, by the rangers, for the most part employed in drill for, after their voyage and journey up the country, their commanding officer considered it necessary to work them hard, to get them to the highest state of discipline. william gale was worked exceptionally hard; as he had, in that short time, to learn the manual and platoon exercises, and to pick up enough of drill to enable him to take his place in the ranks. fortunately he carried himself well, and required far less drilling than the majority of the recruits. by the time that the regiment moved forward, he was able to take his place in his company; and had mastered all the movements which were likely to be necessary, in the campaign. the road between kohat and thull runs in a valley between mountains, those on the right being inhabited by the waziries, a fierce and independent tribe. the regiment which had first marched had exercised every precaution against an attack. the convoys of stores and provisions sent forward had always been accompanied by strong escorts, and orders were issued that officers going forward on duty should not travel without protection. the waziries, however--contrary to expectation--remained quiet; probably waiting to see the turn which matters took for, had we suffered a repulse, they would assuredly have taken part, at once, against us; and would have aided in massacring fugitives, and robbing baggage wagons. the march to thull occupied five days, which were very pleasant ones to william gale. his heavy work at drill was now over. he was no longer considered a recruit, but ranked as a soldier. the marches were not long and, for many hours in the afternoon, the high hills threw the valley in shade; and the soldiers, after pitching their tents, were able to stroll about, or to lie under the trees in which the valley abounded. the regiment reached thull on the th of november and, on the morning of the st, the column advanced. the river, whose bed was yards wide, was fortunately now low, being reduced to a stream of yards wide by deep. a trestle bridge had been thrown across it, for the use of the infantry. the river was distant a mile and a half from the town. no opposition was expected but, as a small afghan garrison was stationed in a fort at kapizang, a short distance beyond the river, an attempt was to be made to capture it. the th punjaub infantry first crossed the river, at the bridge. the th hussars forded the river and extended, in skirmishing order, to cut off the retreat of the garrison. when they reached the fort, however--which was a square enclosure, with round towers at the corners--it was found that the garrison, who had doubtless received warning from spies in thull, had abandoned the place in the night. the cavalry were now sent forward to reconnoiter, the infantry following; and the advanced force halted at ahmed-i-shama for the night. not a single habitation was passed, during the nine miles march. the road was generally a mere track, feet wide; passing through tangled brakes of dwarf palms, intersected by stony gullies, except when it ran along the steep bank of the river. the following day the rest of the first brigade marched up to ahmed-i-shama; while the advanced force, under colonel gordon, moved on to hazir-pir. the rangers were with the first brigade, but not with the advanced party. this was composed wholly of native troops, consisting of the pioneer regiments and the sappers and miners. these had hard work, for the road--which was fifteen miles in length--was scarcely passable for wheeled carriages, and the guns could not be taken along until the boulders and blocks of stone, which strewed the way, were removed or blasted into pieces. on the rd the rangers, with the horse artillery battery and two native regiments, marched towards hazir-pir; but the difficulties of the road were so great that they had to camp, for the night, four miles short of that place. general roberts and the headquarters went forward the same day. as the general passed along the road, the headmen of all the villages near came and paid their respects; and the villagers lined the roads as the troops passed, offering fowls, eggs, milk, and dried fruit for sale. as william gale had brought a supply of money with him, he was able to indulge in all those luxuries and, indeed, as the men had had few opportunities of spending money at thull, all were well supplied with cash. the halt at hazir-pir was, then, a very pleasant one. supplies of grass, fuel, and provisions were brought in, in considerable quantities, there; but much difficulty arose in settling the terms of purchase, as coin was almost unknown in the valley and, therefore, there was no established price--one native being ready to sell, for a few coppers, articles for which another demanded as many pieces of silver. on the hills around a considerable number of sheep were seen grazing; but the natives did not care about selling these which, indeed, belonged for the most part, not to the turis--the tribe which inhabit the valley--but to nomad ghilzais who, like the swiss shepherds, move about with their charges among the mountains, wherever fodder is to be obtained. khuram valley, itself, is bare and monotonous. with the exception of fruit trees planted round the villages, scarce a tree is to be found; but each village is marked by a huge chunar--or oriental plane--beneath which the villagers rest during the noonday heat. but if the valley itself was bare and desolate, the scenery around was lovely. the great range of mountains known as the safaid-koh bound the valley on the east and north. this range averages , feet high, from which spurs run out at right angles, enclosing narrower valleys, with broiling torrents rushing through boulders. the slopes of these valleys are covered with luxuriant vegetation, till the limit of trees is reached at a height of about , feet; above which, in winter, the snow lies thick while, in summer, it furnishes the finest pasture to the ghilzai flocks and herds. the valley lands and the lower slopes of the hills are laid out in terraces, and irrigated rice fields extend near the rivers. valley and hill are alike covered with stones and boulders, afghanistan being probably the most stony country in the world. on the th the headquarters, with the cavalry and two regiments, moved forward ten miles and encamped at the south end of the darwazi pass--the road leading to open, broad valleys, covered with dwarf palms, and wholly uncultivated. on the th the advanced force crossed the pass, which was a gentle slope and offered no great difficulty and, at night, encamped at the khuram fort, which had been evacuated by the enemy. the buildings--which would have been useful for the troops--had, however, been wrecked by the turis; who have a deadly hate for the afghans--their masters--and who were also animated in their work of destruction by a desire to obtain wood, which is exceedingly scarce there. at khuram there are two forts, the one yards and the other yards square. inside these were quarters for the governor, and huts for the garrison and officers; and in the smaller forts were stables for the cavalry forces. this place was made the headquarters of the forces in the khuram valley. the general now rode on, with two squadrons of the th bengal cavalry, to reconnoiter in the direction of the peiwar-khotal; towards which the enemy were supposed to be retreating, and where they were expected to make a stand. as they approached the village of peiwar, two villages were seen in flames; and news was brought in that three afghan regiments, with twelve guns, had lately passed through. the natives reported that they were encumbered by their guns, and that forced labor was procured for the purpose of removing them. later on, a rumor came that the twelve guns were stuck in the ravine at the foot of the khotal, or pass. with but a small force of cavalry at his command, the general could do nothing; and so returned to khuram, and determined to hurry up the troops faster than he had intended, so as to capture the guns reported--as was afterwards proved, falsely--to have been left behind by the afghans. the sick and all superfluous baggage were left behind at khuram and, on the th, the troops moved at daybreak; the two brigades marching in parallel columns. the cold was now severe at night, although it was hot in the daytime. it had been intended to halt at halid-kitta, four miles from the khotal; but the intelligence arriving--that the ameer's troops had abandoned their guns, and were in disorderly retreat--decided the general to push forward at once to the peiwar-khotal--seven miles further--instead of waiting, and giving the enemy time to strengthen their position. a mile from the foot of the actual ascent of the khotal lies the village of turrai, two miles and a half beyond peiwar. turrai is situated in a valley, the ground at whose entrance is very much broken up by the shoulders and spurs of the hill. the left column--the th and th punjaub in advance, with the nd battalion of the th and the rd pioneers, the rangers, and two guns of the number mountain battery in support--were sent to the left, with instructions to turn a ridge forming the south boundary of the valley, and to seize the village of turrai. they were also to follow up, closely, any body of retreating afghan troops that they might come across. the light brigade were to march up the regular road to the peiwar, thus supporting the attack of the left brigade. the left brigade followed out its orders, except that the regiment in support did not go round the southern side of the spur, but kept to the north. no enemy was seen on the south side of the spur so, when a track leading across to turrai was reached, the troops moved down towards the village; the regiments in support advancing at the foot of the open, on the north side. the mountain path that the advanced troops were now filing down did not lead directly to the village, but fell into the valley ahead of it, at a point where it widens out into what was known as the "punch bowl valley," at the foot of the peiwar-khotal. as soon as the head of the column reached this spot, they came in sight of the afghans; who showed themselves in great numbers on the crest of the mountain, far above their heads. as the troops had no orders to attack so formidable a position, they fell back towards turrai, which was about a quarter of a mile to the rear. at the sight of this movement, the afghans swarmed down a spur of the hill, and commenced an attack on the regiments that were moving towards the village. the th punjaubees climbed the hill and a sharp skirmish ensued, the two mounted guns coming into action. while this was going on, the main body of the troops arrived at turrai. the advanced troops were recalled, and the th ghoorkas were advanced to cover the movement. as it was now seen that the story of the abandonment of the guns was false, orders were given to pile arms in the village, and to encamp there. this step was an imprudent one, as the afghans speedily showed. while our men were sitting or lying upon the ground, waiting for the baggage to arrive, the afghans brought up a mountain gun from the main ridge--about three-quarters of a mile distant--to the point of the spur overlooking the village of turrai, and opened fire at yards range. the astonishment of the troops, when the first shell fell among them, was great. every one jumped to his feet, and seized his rifle; and the guns of the royal horse artillery were brought at once into action. it was four o'clock in the afternoon when the afghans opened fire. had they waited for a few hours, brought up another gun or two, and made a night attack immediately after opening fire, it is morally certain that the imprudence of camping in such a position would have been punished by a disaster, which might have vied with that of isandula. huddled together in a small village surrounded by scrub; and impeded, as the troops would have been, by the baggage animals and native followers, rushing in terror in all directions, our men would have been taken at an immense disadvantage. fortunate was it that the enemy opened fire before the darkness set in. the troops were at once ordered to fall back a mile and a half, and to pitch on fresh ground. there was much confusion in the retreat, as the road in the rear was crowded with the baggage animals. the spot chosen for the camp was a rough one; for the ground was covered with scrub, and a scattered growth of hill oak and thorny bushes, and was broken by the remains of some ancient terraces but, as the jungle and broken ground extended for three and a half miles, there was nothing for it but to take up the best position possible, under the circumstances. the troops bivouacked on the ridge of a ravine, with steep banks; which formed a line of defense in front of the camp, while the view in every other direction was obscured by trees. the regiments passed a wretched night on the rough ground. most of them were unable to find their baggage, which was wandering in the scrub in the dark; and the greater part of the troops lay down on the bare ground, and went supperless to sleep, after their fatiguing march of twenty-one miles. in the morning, both men and cattle were greatly exhausted by their long marches and almost sleepless nights; and general roberts determined to wait, for a day or two, to reconnoiter the formidable position of the enemy before undertaking its attack. the camp was shifted to a more secure site, the brushwood and trees were cleared away, the tents pitched, and the troops were again comfortable. a reconnaissance was made by colonel perkins--commanding the royal engineers--with two companies of the pioneers. he ascertained that a deep ravine lay between the ridge on which they were encamped and the khotal itself, and that it was impossible to direct an attack on that side. major collett also, with two companies of the rd, proceeded to reconnoiter the route known as the spingawi--or cow--pass. this, instead of going straight up the hill in front, wound round its foot to the right of the valley. ascending the mountain at a point some three or four miles to the east of the peiwar-khotal, the reconnaissance reached the summit of a ridge about five miles distant from the camp, and overlooking the spingawi-khotal. it was ascertained that the road up the pass seemed easy and practicable, for all arms; that the top of the pass appeared to be on the same ridge as the peiwar-khotal; and that a force, working from it towards the peiwar, would pass over a series of dominating positions. it did not appear to major collett that the enemy held the peiwar-khotal in force; although there was a gun on a commanding knoll on the south, and there seemed to be one at the top of the pass. the road from the village of peiwar to the top of the spingawi pass seemed perfectly easy, for troops of all arms. the next two days were spent in clearing the camp and, so far as possible, improving its military position; but it was still surrounded by thick oak jungle, which would have afforded cover for an enemy making a sudden attack. a further reconnaissance was made of the spingawi pass and, as the examination confirmed major collett's report, it was determined to attack by it. orders were issued, on the st of december, for a march that night. the regiments which were to form the main attack, by the spingawi plateau route, were the th punjaub infantry and the th ghoorkas--commanded by colonel gordon--in advance; these were to be followed by the mountain battery, a wing of the nd highlanders, a company of the rangers, the nd punjaubees, and the rd pioneers, under brigadier general thelwall. four guns, on elephants, were to proceed with the column. the th punjaub infantry, the th regiment, two guns royal horse artillery, three guns royal artillery, and the th bengal cavalry--the whole under the command of brigadier general cobbe--were to make an attack on the peiwar-khotal direct. the rest of the force was to remain to guard the camp and--in order to convince the enemy that a front attack upon the peiwar-khotal was intended--a party of pioneers, with an engineer officer and a covering party of the th regiment, were to construct a battery near the village of turrai. frequent reconnoitering parties had also been sent out in this direction and, so well was the secret of the general's intention to attack by the spingawi khotal kept, that everyone in camp who had not been let into the secret was confident that the peiwar-khotal would be stormed, on the morrow. the enemy--although those in camp were ignorant of the fact--were reinforced, on the st, by four regiments of infantry, with a mountain battery and, on their side, were meditating an attack upon the british camp. the regiments which had freshly arrived were, however, fatigued by their long march; and the assault on our camp was postponed until the next day, and the chance of its coming off was, therefore, lost for ever. to william gale's great satisfaction, a company of the rangers--that to which he had been posted--was the one selected by the colonel to accompany the column marching up the pass. he did not, indeed, know that this was the route by which they were to advance; but he was pleased at not being left behind, with the regiment, in charge of the camp. "well, young 'un," a corporal said to him, that evening, "we are going to be under fire, at last; and a nice climb we shall have of it. it puts one out of breath, to look at that steep road running up the hill and, when it comes to fighting one's way up it, with cannon and afghans on the top, we shall find it hard work." "i expect," william answered, "that we sha'n't go up it at any extraordinary pace. if we skirmish up--as i expect we shall--from rock to rock, we shall have plenty of time to get our wind, at each halt. we are not to take our knapsacks; so we shall fight light, and we have not much extra weight to carry. what with the heat, and what with the long marches, i should think i must have lost a stone in weight, since we landed in calcutta." "i don't think you have lost weight at all," the corporal said; "it seems to me that you have grown and widened out, in the two months and, only yesterday, when i was sizing the company, i had to move you two men higher; for a young 'un, you stand the fatigues well." "i am all right," will said, "except that i have got some frightful blisters on my feet. i was not going to say anything about it, because i should have been kept in hospital, and left behind at khuram; but i have hardly known how to march, the last few days. i don't think i could possibly have managed it, if i had not adopted the native dodge of wearing putties--which i have greased well on the inside, and wear instead of stockings." putties, it may be said, are slips of woolen cloth, about two and a half yards long and three inches wide, with a tape sewn into one end. they are wound round and round the leg, from the ankle to below the knee, and secured by the end being tied with the tape. nearly every one, officers and men, wore them through the campaign. for a long march there could be no doubt that these bandages--wound round the foot instead of stockings--are very preferable, as they obviate the liability to foot sores. even with well-made boots all pedestrians may, at times, suffer from sore feet; but the liability is immensely increased when--as in the case of the british soldier--the boots are coarse, roughly sewn, and frequently ill fitted. chapter : the peiwar-khotal. at ten o'clock at night, on the st of december, the troops detailed for the attack mustered in the camp. the assembly took place without sound of bugle, and even the necessary words of command were given in a low tone. through the still night air the afghans on the hills, little more than two miles away, would have heard the stir. it was a very dark night, although the stars shone clear. "where can we be going?" william gale asked the soldier next to him. "we are going right away from the pass, instead of towards it." "so we are!" the soldier replied. "i am blest if i know what we are up to, and it's so precious dark that i can scarcely see the file before me. i hope we ain't going to fight in the dark, anyhow. what would be the good of being a marksman, when you cannot see the end of your own rifle, let alone the man you are firing at?" "oh! we can't be going to attack in the dark," will said. "i expect we have got a long march before us; and are going to work round, somehow, and take them in rear." "well, i hope whoever is acting as guide can see better in the darkness than i can; else we are safe to lose our way, and may find ourselves anywhere, in the morning. "confound it!" the exclamation was elicited by the speaker stumbling over a boulder, and nearly going on to his head. "silence in the ranks, there!" an officer said, close by. each regiment was followed by its ammunition mules, and hospital doolies--the latter being covered stretchers, or palkies, carried by natives. besides these were dandies--or chairs--slung upon mules. this greatly added to the difficulty of a night march for, even in the daytime, the presence of baggage animals in a column, upon a narrow road, greatly hinders the troops and, at night, the delays occasioned by them are naturally very much greater. for the first three and a half miles the column marched away from the enemy upon the khotal, and the surprise of the soldiers increased at every step they took. at the end of that time they arrived at the village of peiwar. here they turned to the left and, after crossing several ravines, and stony water courses, arrived on a cultivated terrace; and kept along this till they reached a very stiff nullah, twenty feet deep. the night was bitterly cold, the bank of the nullah was extremely slippery, and the boulders in the water course below coated with ice. the difficulty of getting the loaded animals across, in the darkness, was therefore very great. the passage of the various water courses caused great delays; and it was difficult to keep the column together, in the dark. at each passage, the rear was immensely delayed while the leading troops were passing; and these again had to be halted, while those behind them struggled over the difficulties. the men suffered much from cold, as the pace was so slow that they could not warm themselves; and the mounted officers specially suffered, in their hands and feet. at midnight the ravine leading up to the spingawi pass was reached; but so dark was it that the nd punjaubees, separated by a few yards from the regiment in front of them, marched straight on instead of turning up it; and the nd pioneers, and the four artillery guns carried on elephants--being behind them--naturally went astray, also. brigadier general thelwall, who commanded the column, was at the head of his brigade; and was, for some time, unaware of the absence of two of his regiments but, after halting and finding that they did not come up, sent back a mounted officer who, after a two-mile ride, came up with the missing troops, and guided them back to the point where they had left the route. from the foot of the ravine to the top of the pass is six miles in distance and, dark as it was in the open, it was still more so in the ravine, shadowed by the steep hills on either side. as the ascent continued the road became worse; the boulders being larger, and the holes and dried-up pools deeper. the darkness, and the prevailing white color of the stones, prevented the difference of level being observed; and many of the men had heavy falls, as the steep sides of these pools were often from two to four feet deep. after marching for a mile and a half up the ravine, the report of a rifle was heard in the ranks of the th punjaubees--who were leading the column--followed instantly by another discharge. colonel gordon--commanding the regiment--halted; and he and the general tried, in vain, to discover who had fired. no one could, or would, identify them; and this seemed clearly to prove that the rifles had been fired as a signal to the enemy, for they had not been loaded before the column started. the punjaubee regiments contained many hill tribesmen--men closely connected, by ties of blood and religion, with the enemy whom they were marching to attack. a non-commissioned officer and several of the men, who were just about the spot where the guns had been fired, were placed under arrest and sent back. it was afterwards found that two of their rifles had been discharged; and the men who fired, and their non-commissioned officer were tried by court martial for treachery, and were hung. after these men had been sent back, the th ghoorkas, the company of rangers, and two companies of the nd passed the rd punjaubees, and took their places at the head of the column. in the course of the march a good many other men of the rd left the column, in the dark, and made their way back to camp. it turned out, afterwards, that the afghan sentries at the top of the pass heard the reports, and woke up the commander of the post; who, hearing no further cause of alarm, took no action in the matter. had the traitors waited until the column was within a mile of the top of the pass, the afghans would assuredly have taken the alarm but, firing at a distance of four and a half miles, they failed in the desired effect. the advance was resumed, up the bed of the stream, for another mile and a half. about three in the morning the main water course was quitted, the road now entering a ravine to the left; up which, three miles further on, was the summit of the pass. the column continued its weary way up the ravine, slowly stumbling along in the dark. one incident occurred, in this part of the road, showing the necessity, in night marching, for the regiments to keep close to each other. in one place a fir-covered island lay in the middle of the ravine, the torrent's bed lying on either side of it. when the two companies of the nd highlanders--who had been following close to that of the rangers--came to the spot, they were surprised to find that the troops in front had suddenly vanished. no explanation could be given as to the cause of this disappearance, so the company were halted until the mystery was solved. the leading regiment had taken the passage to the right of the island, while the nd had gone to the left; the separation of the roads being unnoticed, in the dark. had the roads diverged, instead of reuniting, much inconvenience might have been caused by the delay in collecting the separated portions of the force. at last the foot of the khotal was reached, where the track left the ravine and turned up the spur. the two guides--natives of the country, who had led the head of the column to this point--refused to go any further and, as the column was now at the point where the fighting might begin, they were allowed to depart. it was about six o'clock when the ghoorkas began to climb the spur. the morning had broken; but it was still dark, and the path was almost invisible in the shadow of the trees. the ghoorkas--their rifles loaded now--made their way quietly up the hill. presently the challenge of the sentry was heard, followed by two shots. it was a relief to the men, after ten hours of weary stumbling along in the cold and darkness, to know that they were, at length, face to face with their foe. cold and fatigue were at once forgotten and, with eyes strained through the darkness, and rifles ready for use, every man pressed forward. fifty yards up the hill, behind the sentry who had fired, was the first stockade of the enemy; formed by several large trees, which had been felled so as to completely block up the road, presenting an obstacle of about eight feet high to the attacking force. the afghan pickets lining the stockade poured a volley into the ghoorkas who, led by major fitzhugh and captain cook, made a rush at the place. for a few minutes there was a fierce fight at the trees but, as fresh assailants momentarily poured up, the obstruction was scaled; and the afghans retired on a second stockade, eighty yards back. here another stand was made but, the spur being a little wider, the ghoorkas were able to work round and, taking the defense in flank, soon drove the afghans back. beyond this point the ground was clear of trees; and the road ran, in short zigzags, up the steep hill to the breastwork which lined the edge of the top zigzag. a mountain gun, at this point, swept the approach to the position; while the hill at its back was now covered with afghans, who opened a heavy fire upon the troops as, in the dim morning light, they issued from the trees. by the time that the ghoorkas and the rangers had cleared the second stockade, the wing of the nd highlanders--ascending by the right flank--had made their way up to the front; and the whole now advanced together. as quickly as possible they pushed up the hill, under the heavy fire of the enemy. the latter fought well, and a number of them were killed before retiring. at the defense erected at the top of the zigzag, so obstinately did the afghans in front hold their ground that their comrades, behind, were enabled to remove their mountain gun. to the right of the enemy's position was a knoll, and the nd at once took possession of this; and two mountain guns were brought up to their assistance. the afghans were seen, in great numbers, in the broken ground ahead. the ghoorkas and the little body of rangers pushed on against them. presently the enemy gathered, and made a rush down upon them; and a desperate hand-to-hand fight took place, for a few minutes. the men were scattered among the trees, and each fought for himself. william gale had just reloaded his rifle when he saw captain herbert--who commanded his company--fall to the ground, and three afghans spring forward to finish him. with a bound, will reached the side of the officer. two of the afghans had already discharged their pieces. the third leveled and fired. so close was he that the flash almost burnt the soldier's face, and he felt a sharp pain, as if a hot iron had passed across his cheek. in an instant, he shot his assailant dead; and then, with bayonet, stood at bay as the other two afghans rushed upon him. illustration: captain herbert saved. they had drawn their tulwars, and slashed fiercely at him; but he kept them off with his bayonet until a ghoorka, running up, cut down one of them with his kookerie--a heavy, sword-like knife which the ghoorkas carry, and which they always employ in preference to the bayonet, in fighting at close quarters. the remaining afghan at once took to flight. the th punjaubees had now come into action; and the afghans, disheartened at the loss of their position, fell back and withdrew into the woods which cover the plateau. at half-past seven o'clock the whole force--except the elephant guns--had reached the plateau; and general roberts was able to flash the news, of the successful capture of the enemy's first position, to brigadier general cobbe, who was in command of the force which was to operate direct against the peiwar-khotal. a rest was given the troops after their long march and, at half-past nine, they again fell in for the attack upon the pine-covered slopes in the direction of the peiwar-khotal. how strong were the enemy who might be lurking there, they knew not. but it was certain that he would fight obstinately and, in so dense a forest, much of the advantage gained by drill and discipline is lost. a change was made in the order of the advance. the troops who had before led the advance, and had done the fighting, were now placed in the rear; and the rd pioneers led the way, followed by the nd and th punjaubees. the column crossed the plateau without opposition, and began the ascent towards the enemy's position in the woods. considerable caution was needed, as no one had any knowledge of the country, and all were ignorant of the position and numbers of the enemy; who might, for aught they knew, be massing in great numbers for an attack upon the front, or one of the flanks. the line of skirmishers entered the pine wood near the rocky hillside, and a rolling fire of musketry soon told that they were engaged, from end to end of the line. it was slow work; for fallen trees, rocks, and bushes everywhere hampered the advance. still the skirmishing line--reinforced from behind--pushed forward steadily and, presently, cleared the afghans off the hillside. when the troops reached the top, they found a valley in front of them and, from the woods on the opposite side, so heavy a musketry fire was kept up that it was evident the afghans intended to make a desperate stand here. the valley--or rather ravine--was a narrow one: fifty yards wide, at its foot; and scarce three times as much, from brow to brow. the enemy--hidden among the trees--could not be made out, except by their continual fire. they did not content themselves, however, with the mere defense of their side of the hill but, from time to time, large numbers charged down, and tried to force their way up that held by the british. each time, however, when they attempted this, the punjaubees drove them back with slaughter. it was clear that the afghans were in great numbers, for their line extended for a mile and a half along the hillside. major anderson of the rd pioneers, after repulsing one of these attacks, led four companies to the assault of the afghan position, and drove the enemy back for some little distance; but major anderson fell, and the party retired. colonel curry--who commanded the regiment--again led the men forward and, for a time, a hand-to-hand fight took place. for two hours the rifle contest continued, without cessation. the storm of bullets was tremendous, but no very great execution was done, on either side, both parties lying behind the shelter of trees. so far, no advantage had been gained by the british; and general roberts felt that, with the force under his command, it would be rash to attempt to carry so strong a position, held by a greatly superior force. in the meantime, the attack upon the peiwar-khotal from the valley had commenced. before daylight brigadier general cobbe, with the th punjaub infantry and the th regiment, left camp; his object being to cooperate with the flank attack. the th regiment moved directly towards the pass, while the th punjaubees climbed one of the principal spurs between the peiwar and spingawi khotals. the ascent was extremely difficult, and it took the troops six hours to reach the summit. during the last portion of the ascent, they came under the fire of the enemy. when near the summit, major macqueen of the th punjaubees saw, through an opening in the pine wood, the afghan camp, with their baggage animals; which were placed, for shelter, in the glade behind the peiwar-khotal. two mountain guns were at once brought up, and a fire opened upon the afghan camp. in a few minutes the tents caught fire, the animals stampeded in all directions; and the enemy in front, seized with a panic, began rapidly to retreat. the afghan troops facing general roberts' column, when they found their comrades on their right retreating, began to draw off, and the fire sensibly diminished. the movement was accelerated by the four elephant guns--which had, at length, come up--opening fire into the pine-wood forest. as the fire slackened, a reconnaissance of the hill was made by general roberts and his staff; but the result showed that the mountain was so covered with pines, and brushwood, that it formed an almost impenetrable barrier to the advance of troops--for the growth was so thick that it was impossible to say in which direction any movement should be made. the experience gained, in the last six hours of hard fighting, had shown how difficult it was to keep command over troops scattered along a front of half a mile long, in the forest, where nothing could be seen beyond a radius of a few yards. the general, therefore, determined to desist from the attempt to force his way direct to the top of the peiwar-khotal; and to march to his left and so, by menacing the afghan line of retreat, to hasten the movement towards the rear which had evidently begun. the men were, therefore, brought back to the plateau to the east of the ravine. here they were halted for a time, and the contents of their haversacks furnished them with a meal. at two o'clock they again drew up on the spingawi plateau. the nd punjaub infantry being left on the hill, to oppose the afghans, should they again advance in that direction; the rest of the column entered the defile leading into the hurriab valley, far in the rear of the peiwar-khotal. as soon as the enemy--who were still opposing the nd punjaub infantry--saw the head of the column enter the defile, they were seized with a panic lest their retreat should be cut off; and began to retreat with the greatest haste, as they had to make their way across two mountain ridges, before they could pass the spot towards which our troops were moving. the advance of the column, however, was necessarily slow; as the woods and side valleys had to be carefully examined, lest a flank attack should be made upon them. in two hours the head of the column emerged from the forest on to the open slopes above the highest cultivated point in the hurriab valley. it was now four o'clock. the short december day was drawing to a close. no enemy were in sight, for their line of retreat was hidden in the bed of the stream, a couple of miles further on; and no one knew where they were to be found. the troops were much exhausted with the want of rest, and with their heavy work--for they had now been marching, and fighting, for eighteen hours--and they were glad to receive the order to bivouac; although they had no tents, or food, and the cold--as might be expected on a winter day, at an elevation of over feet above the sea--began to be very severe. a number of the nearest trees were felled by the pioneers, and huge fires were soon alight. there was still some uneasiness, as no one knew where the force under general cobbe was, or whether the attack on the peiwar-khotal had been successful or not. while the th punjaub infantry had been mounting the spur, halfway between the peiwar and the spingawi khotal, the th regiment had moved directly upon the pass. the afghans, who had expected an attack, had remained under arms until three in the morning when, hearing no sounds in our camp, they had been dismissed to rest. three guns of the royal artillery, and two of the royal horse artillery took up their post yards in front of our camp; where their fire, at the crest of the pass, would assist the advance of the th. these, after two hours' march, found themselves at seven in the morning on the last spur, which is separated from the peiwar-khotal by a deep ravine. when it became daylight, a few minutes later, the enemy caught sight of our artillery in the valley, and at once opened fire. although they had six field pieces at the top of the hill, only three had been placed in position to command the valley and the ascent; and the mountain battery, which had arrived the afternoon before, was not brought to the front. the three field pieces, and the mountain gun on the spur kept up a continuous fire on our battery, of five guns. these were, however, almost beyond their range, and but little damage was done. on our side, the fire was chiefly directed against the mountain gun, at the end of the spur; and at any bodies of men who showed themselves. the artillery duel went on for four hours and, in the meantime, the infantry were engaged sharply with the afghans. these had taken up their position in the woods, on the other side of the ravine; and kept up a continuous fire upon the th. the distance, however, was too great for much execution on either side, especially as both parties were sheltered in the woods. about ten o'clock the afghans were seen gathering in strength, as if to come down across the road leading up to the khotal, to attack the th in the rear. a squadron of the th bengal cavalry charged up the valley, and the enemy retired up the hill again and, seeing that they could not cross the road, without the chance of being cut up by the cavalry, they did not try to repeat the experiment. at eleven o'clock brigadier general cobbe was wounded in the leg, and colonel barry-drew succeeded him in the command; receiving the orders which had been given to general cobbe--that the khotal was not to be attacked, till there was some evidence that the flank attack had shaken the enemy's defense, in front. at twelve o'clock the guns, with the nd punjaub infantry, alarmed the afghans by their fire upon the camp and, although the afghan guns in front kept up their fire, the musketry fire decreased considerably. seeing this, colonel drew ordered the artillery to be brought up nearer. when--after advancing yards--they came to a ravine crossing the road, the afghans--who had come down the hill to meet them--opened a heavy fire and, the road being narrow, only the leading gun could come into action. however, the two companies of the th--which were acting as an escort to the guns--advanced in skirmishing order, and drove the afghans up the hill. the panic among the afghans on the plateau having now spread to the troops at the khotal, their fire entirely ceased; and the th regiment descended the defile, and began to climb the path to the khotal. not a hostile shot was fired and, at half-past two, they reached the enemy's camp, which they found deserted. chapter : a prisoner. the panic which had seized the afghans, when they found their retreat menaced, had been thorough and complete and, when the th regiment entered the camp, they found that the tents were standing. food had been left, ready cooked, and every possession had been abandoned. in the artillery camp, the gunners had left their silver-mounted brass helmets and caps, as well as their guns and carriages. a body of friendly turis had accompanied the column, making a demonstration on its flank; and these, arriving upon the spot, plundered the afghan camp of everything of the smallest value. no one knew what had become of the main body, under general roberts. the bengal cavalry scouted for some distance in advance, but found no signs of the enemy. strong pickets were set, in case the afghans should rally and return. the tents were brought up from the camp below, fires were lit, and the th encamped for the night. in the morning, communication was established between the two camps and, it having been ascertained that the enemy had fled, in the greatest disorder, towards the shatur-gardan pass leading down to cabul, there was no prospect of further fighting. the afghans had abandoned all their guns, and even thrown away a great quantity of muskets, in their rapid retreats. great stores of flour and other provisions were discovered, in the various villages, and were divided among the troops. the winter was now setting in, and the shatur-gardan pass might, any moment, be closed by deep snow. there was, therefore, no prospect of a renewal of hostilities before the spring. preparations were made for putting a regiment on the top of the khotal. the rest of the force were to winter at khuram. general roberts, with an escort of cavalry, rode to the shatur-gardan pass, and assured himself that the whole of the afghan army had fled beyond this point. the troops were, for some time, kept hard at work lowering the captured guns and ammunition down to the valley. a portion of the troops advanced as far as ali-kheyl, the principal town of the plateau. the jajis--the inhabitants of the country--had hitherto been extremely hostile but, cowed by the defeat of the afghans, they submitted without resistance. on the th, all the preparations for the return were complete. it was known that there was another pass from ali-kheyl into the khuram valley, by the south. this had never been explored by any european; but general roberts determined to return by it, with a portion of his force, as the pass might be found valuable in future operations. the force detailed for the march through the sappir defile was composed of the th ghoorkas, a wing of the nd highlanders, a company of the norfolk rangers, the rd punjaub pioneers, and a mountain battery. the country through which the march was to be made was inhabited by the mongals, a turbulent robber tribe. the column marched at nine in the morning and, after their down march, arrived at the village of sappir at midday. the road lay down the hurriab river, till the khuram river was reached; and then along the right bank, passing through the village of kermana; after which it turned up a narrow road, for two miles, till an open plateau was reached, at the farther end of which stood the village of sappir. it was reported, here, that the mongals intended to defend a defile and hill pass, two miles farther on. the rd pioneers were therefore pushed on, to occupy the pass and bivouac there. the remainder of the troops camped in the village. no signs of the enemy were seen, either by the rd pioneers or in the vicinity of the camp. the troops were to march at three in the morning, and the tents were struck an hour after midnight. the track up the pass was excessively steep, and very difficult for the camels. the cold was bitter and, in places where water had crossed the road, there were slippery surfaces of ice--which hindered the camels considerably--and it was past eight o'clock before the rear guard arrived at the top of the pass. from a commanding position, overlooking the defile and surrounding waste of rugged and barren mountains, not an enemy could be seen; and it was hoped that the report of the intended attack was a false one. the troops now began to descend the defile, which was known as the manjiar pass. troublesome as the ascent had been, the descent was infinitely more so; and it was with difficulty that the camels could be made to go down the deep and slippery roads. the gorge was five miles in length. the track, for the first part, ran through a deep ravine of perpendicular walls; which narrowed in places to a few yards, overhanging the path until they seemed to meet, and form a tunnel, through which it ran. had an attack been made on the column, as it struggled with its difficulties through this portion of the pass, the result would have been disastrous; for it would have been impossible to place troops on the heights, to cover the advance. here and there side ravines broke into the road, in any of which ambushes might have been laid. it was not, however, until the difficult part of the road had been passed, and a comparatively open valley reached, that any of the natives were seen. then a few men were observed on the heights but, as they were supposed to be shepherds, no notice was taken of them. believing that all danger of attack was now over, the general ordered all the troops--with the exception of the baggage guard, which was composed of the rd ghoorkas, and a few of the nd highlanders and norfolk rangers--to march forward to the camp; which was to be pitched at a village called keraiah, in the open valley. this, as the result proved, was a very rash move. before the head of the column had extricated itself from the ravine, numbers of the country people were seen collecting, in small detached parties. by degrees they closed in, and were soon within fifty yards of the convoy. captain goad--in charge of the baggage--was close to a small guard of nd highlanders when, suddenly, a volley was fired by the mongals. captain goad fell, his thigh bone broken by a bullet. sergeant green, with three privates of the nd, picked him up and, having placed him under cover of a rock, turned to defend themselves. they were but four men against a large number; but they stood steady and, firing with careful aim, and picking off their man each time, they kept the enemy at bay until help arrived. simultaneously, all along the line of the baggage column, the mongals attacked. from the heights on both sides a fire was kept up, while the more daring swept down in parties upon the rear guard of ghoorkas, commanded by captain powell. the baggage guard all behaved with great steadiness; defending the path on both sides, while the baggage animals continued their way along it. william gale was on duty with the party; and was, like the rest, busy with his rifle. a sergeant next to him was hit in the leg; and will--laying down his rifle--stopped one of the camels, and assisted the wounded man to mount it. the attack of the mongals became more furious, as they saw their anticipated prey escaping them, in spite of all their efforts; but their attempts to close were in vain, and the convoy made its way down to the village; with the loss of one killed, and two officers, and eight men wounded. captain powell and captain goad both died, from the effects of their injuries. the enemy's loss must have been considerable, as the fire of the troop was steady and accurate, and the distance small. after a halt, for a day or two, the column marched to khuram, where it encamped. captain herbert had reported to the colonel the manner in which private gale had defended him, when wounded and attacked by three afghans; the incident, too, had been observed by many of his comrades and, as a reward, the young soldier was promoted to the rank of corporal; and the colonel told him that, had not similar acts of bravery been performed in the hand-to-hand action, on the spingawi-khotal, he would have been mentioned for the victoria cross. the mountain tops were now deep in snow; but in the valley the temperature was very agreeable, and the troops enjoyed their rest much. this was not, however, to be of long duration. from the lower end of the khuram valley runs off another valley, known as the "khost." this was an entirely unknown country to the europeans, but it was said to be extremely hostile. parties had come down and carried off cattle and, at any time, a formidable raid might have taken place, and our line of communication been entirely cut. the country was ruled by an afghan governor, who sent in to say that he was willing to hand it over to us. there was, therefore, no expectation that there would be any resistance; and the expedition was designed rather to overawe the country, and to obtain information as to its extent and capabilities, than with any idea of permanent occupation. the column consisted of a squadron of the th hussars, the th bengal cavalry, the st and th punjaub infantry, two mountain batteries, a wing of the nd highlanders, and two companies of the norfolk rangers. this force marched from hazir-pir, and halted for the night at jaji-midan, at the head of the valley leading to the darwiza pass, through which the track runs into the khost valley. at eight o'clock next morning, the troops moved forward. the ground was difficult, for the road ran between terraced fields on the side of the ravine, and obliged men and animals to pass in single file. it was not, therefore, until twelve o'clock that the rear guard moved out of the camp. beyond this point, the road up the pass was not difficult. from the summit, a wide view was obtained. at the end of the valley--six miles distant--the plain of the khost country was seen. it was seen that--owing to the slow progress the troops were making--the baggage train, consisting of camels, would not be able to reach the proposed camping ground, at the lower end of the valley, before dark. the general, therefore, ordered it to halt at the top of the pass, where the ground was open. the st punjaubees, and a mountain battery, were to stay there for its protection; and bring it on, next day. the mules, with the regimental baggage, went on with the troops. the column met with no opposition. it halted near the village of bakh, half a mile from the foot of the hills; where the valley widened into a plain, six miles long and four broad. the force encamped here on the th, to allow the convoy to come up. the following morning the column marched to the other end of the valley; and the next day the afghan governor of matun--the chief place of the khost--rode in to welcome the general. on the th of january the force marched to matun. they found that this fort was a square-walled enclosure, yards each side, with circular corner bastions. there was a central square enclosure, with round towers at its angles. as the fort was approached, its garrison--which consisted of local militia--were formed up, in two lines, at a mosque outside the fort. the general with his staff rode in, and a long interview took place between him and the governor. the troops encamped outside. in the evening information came in, from the villages in the plain, that large numbers of the mongals--who inhabited the hills--were meditating an attack. strong pickets were posted, and the night passed quietly. in the morning large numbers of tribesmen flocked down into the villages, and gradually surrounded the camp. at one o'clock the troops fell in. the cavalry were sent out against the enemy in the northwest direction, followed by the th punjaubees and number mounted battery. the mongals at once fell back to the hills. the squadron of the th hussars were dismounted, and ordered to skirmish up a small knoll to the west. from this they drove the enemy, who gathered again on a spur opposite. here they were charged by the th punjaub cavalry, and fell back higher up the ridge. the mountain guns and infantry now arrived, and speedily drove them over the crest. general roberts, with his staff, rode out to watch the skirmish; and soon after he had left the enemy, who occupied the village to the northeast, showed in force. two of the mountain guns opened upon them. on the south they now approached, under the cover of the old afghan cavalry lines, to within half a mile before being perceived; and also occupied a walled village there. the other two guns in camp shelled the village, and soon drove the enemy out. when the general returned to camp, at half-past two, he found the attack driven off in all directions; and ordered the st punjaubees, the nd highlanders, and the norfolk rangers to follow up the enemy to the east and southeast, with the mountain guns; and to burn the villages which had sheltered the enemy. the first village was found deserted. at another, a quarter of a mile behind, the enemy made a stand; but were shelled out, and the plain beyond the matun river was soon covered with fugitives. major stewart--with forty men of the th punjaub cavalry, who accompanied the column--charged of them, and cut down many; until checked by the heavy fire of matchlock men from the high bank. no more fighting took place. the combination of tribes which had attacked the camp were estimated at men. eighty prisoners were taken. these, two nights afterwards, took advantage of a night alarm to attempt to escape, and attacked the guard. the attempt, however, was frustrated; but only after several of the prisoners had been shot down. some days passed, quietly. reconnaissances were made up the valley. while waiting here, the news of the capture of candahar, by general stewart, arrived. parties of engineers surveyed the country, and all passed off quietly. on the th, a portion of the force marched back to hazir-pir on the th of january the general determined to withdraw this force altogether; as no advantage was gained by its retention, and the garrison would be constantly exposed to the attacks of the natives, who were already threatening it. the fort was handed over to sultan jan, a man of good family, who was appointed to govern the khost, temporarily. he had under him the guard of the former governor, and some fresh natives; being, in all, men. the headmen of the villages were called together, and these promised to obey his rule. some of the chiefs of the mongals, and other neighboring tribes, came in. sheep were given to them, and they were told that, so long as they desisted from interference in the valley, no steps would be taken against them. the troops, however, had only made one day's march when a messenger arrived from sultan jan; saying that, immediately the troops had marched, the mongals had come down to attack the fort. a strong party were therefore marched back at once. after destroying the stores, and setting fire to the fort, they drew off the governor and marched back to camp; the mongals, although in great force, not venturing to offer any resistance. on the return of the force to the khuram valley, a wing of the norfolk rangers was sent up to reinforce the troops stationed on the top of the peiwar-khotal; as the jajis and mongals had been gathering in large numbers, and threatening an attack on that post. william gale was, with his company, stationed at ali-kheyl. the enemy abstained from any open attack, but they often harassed the sentries. one night, will was corporal in charge of a picket of eight men, posted at a hut half a mile from the village. the object of the picket was to prevent any sudden attack being made upon the company; who were in a small village, a quarter of a mile in the rear, where a large quantity of grain was stored. two men were posted as sentries, some hundred yards in advance of the hut. will had visited the sentry to the right and, finding all was well, here, moved across to the left. "is everything quiet?" he asked the sentry. "i don't know, corporal. two or three times i have thought that i heard noises, and twice i have challenged." "what sort of noise?" "once it seemed to be a crack, like a dried stick when some one treads on it. the other time it was as if a stone had been dislodged." "i will wait with you," will said. "two pairs of ears are better than one." again there was a slight sound heard. "i don't like to fire," will said. "the alarm would spread, and the whole camp get under arms. there is something moving, i am convinced; but it may be only a stray bullock. i will go forward, and see if i can make it out; and do you stand ready to fire, if i am attacked. "after doing so, fall back on the picket, at once. if the enemy are in force, hold the hut to the last. in ten minutes you will have help from the village, behind." holding his rifle advanced, in readiness to fire, william gale made his way forward, cautiously, towards the spot whence the noise seemed to proceed. when he was some forty yards in advance of the sentry, a number of figures rose suddenly from some bushes, and fired. will fired, and saw the man at whom he aimed go down but, at the same instant, three or four guns were discharged; and he fell to the ground, shot through the leg. there was a rush of men towards him. a tulwar was waved, and fell, with a crushing blow, on his shoulder; and he became insensible. when he recovered consciousness he was being carried along, a man holding his arms and another his legs. the pain was excruciating, and he fainted again; after hearing, during his brief period of consciousness, a sharp fusilade of musketry, which told him that his comrades were defending the hut against the enemy. when again he came to his senses, it was daylight. he was lying in a small room, and an old woman was applying bandages to the sword cut on his shoulder. although he did not know it, he was ten miles from the spot where the attack had been made. among those who had taken part in it was the head of a small jaji village, lying behind the hills. this chief was a crafty old savage, who had been desirous of remaining neutral in the strife. the determination of his people to join in the attack, by the tribes, had forced him to consent to their so doing. before starting he had, however, made them swear that any wounded men who fell into their hands should not--in accordance with the afghan custom--be instantly despatched; but should be brought back to the village. his intention was to have some hostages. if the english repulsed the attack and, in the spring, again advanced; he would be able to prove his goodwill to the cause, by handing the soldiers whom he had protected over to them. upon the other hand, should the british fall back and the afghans advance in the spring, he could hand the prisoners over to them, or send them down to cabul, as a proof that his people had fought against the british. he had himself accompanied his men and, seeing after will had fallen that he was still living, had at once ordered two of his men to carry him off to the village. the attack upon the guard house proved unsuccessful. the six soldiers defended themselves until the company from the village, behind, came up to the rescue. several other attacks, at various points, took place. but the british were on the alert; and the hillsmen, finding that their enemies were not to be taken by surprise, scattered again to the village. the ball had fortunately passed through william gale's leg, without either breaking a bone or cutting an artery; but the wound in the shoulder was more serious, and the effect of the strain upon it, in carrying him, brought on violent inflammation. fever set in with delirium and, for weeks, the lad lay between life and death. the old woman who nursed him was, like most of her country people, skilled in the treatment of wounds. the bandages were kept bathed with water, snow was constantly applied to his head, and a decoction of herbs given him to drink. his good constitution was in his favor and, at last, he recovered his senses; to find himself convalescent, but as weak as an infant. in april the snow melted; and the chief, having by this time found that the english were not likely to advance beyond ali-kheyl, thought that it would best benefit his interest to send his prisoner down to cabul. the ameer was reported to be about to conclude peace with the british; and the chief thought that he was more likely to receive a reward, from him, for the care he had bestowed upon the prisoner, than from the english. moreover, it would have been difficult to send him into the english camp, through the hostile villages; while no unfavorable comment would be incited, by his sending his prisoner down to cabul. will gale was far too weak to perform the journey on foot. he was, therefore, placed on a camel. the chief himself, and four of his headmen, accompanied him as an escort and, a week after the pass was open, they started up the valley to the shatur-gardan; and thence descended into the logan valley, below, on the way to cabul. chapter : the advance up the khyber. nothing has yet been said of the doings of the other columns: that under general browne advancing, by the khyber pass, upon jellalabad; that under general stewart, by the bolan pass, upon candahar. general browne's force had been gathered at the frontier line, at the mouth of the pass, awaiting the reply of the ameer to the british ultimatum. none having been received, up to the night of the th of november, the advance took place in the morning; at the same hour at which general roberts advanced from thull in the khurum valley. the principal defense of the khyber pass was the fort ali-musjid. this fort stands on a most commanding position, on a rock jutting out from the hillside far into the valley, which its guns commanded. it was flanked by batteries erected on the hillsides, and was a most formidable position to capture. it was situated about six miles up the valley. the force under general browne was divided into four brigades. the first--under general macpherson--consisted of the th battalion of the rifle brigade, the th bengal infantry, the th ghoorkas, and a mountain battery. these were ordered to take a mountain road and--led by a native guide--to make a long circuit, and so to come down into the pass at a village lying a mile or two beyond ali-musjid. the second brigade--under colonel tytler--consisting of the st battalion of the th foot, the infantry of the guides, the st sikhs, and a mountain battery, were also to take to the hills and, working along on their crests, to come down upon the batteries which the afghans had erected on the hillside opposite to ali-musjid. the third brigade, consisting of the st regiment, the th sikhs, and the th native infantry; and the fourth brigade, composed of the st regiment, th native infantry, and the th sikhs, were to advance straight up the valley. with them was a mountain battery, a battery of horse artillery, one of royal artillery, and a battery of -pounders, drawn by elephants. these brigades marched forward until they reached some rising ground in the valley, whence they could see ali-musjid, at a distance of a mile and a half, in front of them. the enemy at once opened fire. the gunners in the fort had been practising for some weeks, and had got the range with great accuracy; and their shot and shell fell thick along the slope. the column was therefore marched back behind its crest, and there halted; and the men were allowed to fall out and eat their dinners, as it was desired that the flanking columns of macpherson and tytler--which had very much further to go--should reach the positions assigned to them before the attack began. the artillery, however, took up their position on the crest, and opened fire on the fort. the effect of the light guns was but slight, but the -pounders produced considerable effect on the face of the fort. after a halt for some time, the troops were ordered to advance. the th sikhs were first thrown out upon the hillside and, working their way along on the right of the valley, opened a heavy musketry fire against the afghans in the batteries there. presently the st and th native infantry joined them; while the st, the th, and th sikhs worked along on the left. the scene was one of the most picturesque ever witnessed in warfare. from the fortress, standing on the perpendicular rock in the center of the valley, the flashes of the great guns came fast and steadily; while the edges of the rock, and fort, were fringed with tiny puffs of musketry. from the rising ground in the valley, the smoke of the british guns rose up in the still air as, steadily and fast, they replied to the fire of the fort. both sides of the steep hill slopes were lined with british infantry--the quick flash of the rifles spurting out from every rock and bush; while continuous lines of light smoke rose from the afghan entrenchments which faced them. gradually the british skirmishers advanced, until they were close to the afghan entrenchments on the hillsides abreast of the fort. so far, there was no sign that macpherson's brigade had reached the post assigned to it, high up on the hill; or that tytler had worked round to the village in the enemy's rear. some attacks which were made upon the afghans were repulsed, with loss. major birch and lieutenant fitzgerald were killed, and captain maclean wounded; and between thirty and forty of the rank and file were killed, or wounded. as the fort and its defenses could not have been carried by direct attack, without immense loss of life; it was determined to cease operations until morning, in order to give the flanking columns time to reach the positions assigned to them. a wing of a regiment, from each brigade, was ordered to remain on the hillside facing the afghan entrenchments. the rest of the troops fell back a short distance, and lay down as they were, for the night. in the meantime, the brigades of macpherson and tytler had encountered enormous difficulties on the line of march. the roads they had taken were mere tracks, and there were many places where it was almost impossible to get the mountain guns along. from daybreak until late at night the troops labored, unceasingly. they knew, by the dull roar echoed and re-echoed among the mountains, that their comrades below were engaged; and the thought that a failure might ensue, owing to their absence from the contest, nerved them to continued exertions. late at night, however, macpherson with his brigade arrived on the top of the hill facing ali-musjid; and tytler, with his column, came down into the khyber valley in rear of the fort. but, though unopposed, their march had not been unnoticed and, late in the evening, the news reached the afghans that the british were marching down into the valley behind them. a wild panic instantly seized them. clothes, ammunition, guns, everything that could impede their flight were thrown away; and the garrison of ali-musjid, and the afghans in the hillside entrenchments fled, a herd of frightened fugitives, up the valley. hasty as was their retreat, they were not in time. tytler, with his column, debouched into the valley before they had passed the spot where the mountain path descended into it; and large numbers were taken prisoners. as at the peiwar-khotal, the afghans proved themselves capable of defending a strong position, valiantly; but were converted into a mob of panic-stricken fugitives, by their line of retreat being threatened. a european army, under like circumstances, would have fallen back in good order. their force was amply sufficient to have swept aside the little column which barred their retreat, and they would have occupied a fresh position farther to the rear, and renewed the conflict. not so the afghans. the capture of ali-musjid brought with it the entire demoralization of the afghan army which, a few hours before, had been fully confident in its power to repulse any attack which might be made upon it. the british continued their advance, passed through the khyber pass, and entered the broad valley near whose head stands the town of jellalabad. beyond a few shots, fired at them by tribesmen high up on the mountain side, they experienced no opposition, whatever and, a week after the fight in the khyber, entered jellalabad and encamped around it. further than this it was not intended to go, for the present. winter was now close at hand. between jellalabad and cabul were a series of most difficult passes. an army advancing up them would have immense difficulty to encounter, and might find itself cut off from india by the snows. in the jellalabad valley the weather is mild, large stores of provisions were obtainable, and here it was determined to remain, through the winter; and to recommence the campaign, in the spring, with the advantage of the khyber pass--one of the keys of afghanistan--being in our hands. but a day or two after reaching jellalabad--having defeated and dispersed one of the two afghan armies--the news arrived of the capture of the peiwar-khotal--the second key of afghanistan--and the utter rout of the army defending it. thus, in little more than a week after the commencement of the campaign sheer-ali, the ameer, saw the entire overthrow of the army which he had, for so many years, been occupied in organizing and training. the positions which he had deemed impregnable had both been taken, after a single day's fighting; and his capital lay virtually at the mercy of his conquerors. in one short week, his hopes and plans had been scattered to the winds. sheer-ali was not wholly to be blamed. he had for many years received an annual present of money and arms, from the british government; but upon the other hand, he saw russia marching with giant steps towards his northern frontier and, contrasting the energy and enterprise of the great northern power, with the inactivity which he may have supposed to prevail among the men who governed england, he became more and more anxious; and asked the english definitely to state whether he could rely upon them for assistance, should he be attacked by the russians. he received a reply from the duke of argyle--the british minister for india--of a doubtful nature, couched in terms which seem to have aroused his resentment. from this moment, there can be no doubt that the ameer's course was decided upon. he was between the hammer and the anvil and, as he could obtain no guarantee of assistance from england, he determined to throw himself into the arms of russia. letters were exchanged between him and general kaufmann--the russian viceroy in turkestan--and the latter gave him the warmest promises of support, if he would ally himself with russia. although he had, for years, declined to accept a british resident at cabul, or to allow englishmen to enter the country; he now, believing in the power and willingness of russia to help, received the visit of a russian general and staff, at cabul. unfortunately for the ameer, the government of england had now changed hands; and the ministry at once sent to sheer-ali, to demand that he should receive a british resident. it was late in the year, and the ameer--acting, no doubt, on the advice of his russian friends--sought to gain time by evasive answers. the british government--who saw through the ruse--ordered the envoy to advance, with a strong escort. this obliged the ameer to come to a final decision; and the die was cast by the escort being stopped, by force, on its arrival at ali-musjid. there is no doubt that the ameer, and his friends, calculated that it was already too late in the season for the english to gather a sufficient force, on the frontier, to force the passes held by the afghan army before the snows. the promptness of action of the english government, the valor of their troops, and the unusually late setting in of the winter combined to overthrow the ameer's plans. had the campaign been delayed till the spring, there can be little doubt that the british, in their advance, would have found themselves opposed--if not by a russian army--at least by an army led and officered by russians, with russian engineers and artillerymen. the promptness of their advance, and the capture of the passes and the dispersion of the afghan armies, within a week of the opening of the campaign, altogether altered this position. sheer-ali found himself a king without an army. the plains of cabul were thronged with the panic-stricken fugitives from the khyber and peiwar; and sheer-ali started at night from his capital with his russian friends, and made for the north; sending letter after letter ahead of him to general kaufmann, imploring the promised aid of russia. the rapid course of events, however, had entirely disconcerted the russian plans. in the spring, a russian army might have advanced and cooperated with that of the ameer; but the winter had set in, the distance was immense, and the russians unprepared for instant action. the appeals of the unfortunate prince were responded to with vague generalities. he was no longer a powerful ally, but a broken instrument and, heartbroken with disappointment and failure, the unfortunate sheer-ali was seized by fever and died, in an obscure village, almost alone and wholly uncared for. his son yakoob khan--who had, in his youth, proved himself a brave and able soldier; but who, having incurred his father's displeasure, had been for years confined as a prisoner at herat--was now liberated, and took his place as his father's successor. he saw at once that, with a broken and disorganized army, he could not hope to resist the advance of the three british armies which, coming from jellalabad, from the heights of the shatur-gardan, and from candahar, would simultaneously advance upon his capital, as soon as the snows melted. he therefore opened negotiations and, early in may, himself descended from cabul and had an interview with general browne, at gundamuk; when the preliminaries of peace were arranged, and signed. the terms insisted upon by the british were not onerous. yakoob was recognized as the ameer of afghanistan, the annual subsidy paid to his father was to be continued. the khyber pass and the khurum valley, as far as the peiwar-khotal, were to remain in the hands of the british; and a british minister was to be stationed at cabul. when peace had been signed, the greater portion of the british army retired to india; and the khurum column, leaving two or three regiments in that valley, also fell back. while the first and second divisions had been gaining victories in the khyber and khurum valleys, the column under general stewart had met with difficulties of another kind. between the indus, and the foot of the range of mountains through which the bolan pass leads to the lofty plateau land above, a great waste of sand stretches. in the wet season, this tract of country is overflowed by the indus. in the dry season it is a parched and bare desert, with its wells few and far apart. there were great difficulties met with in crossing this inhospitable plain, and the losses among the baggage animals were great; but the labors up to this point were as nothing, to those which had to be undergone on the way up the bolan pass. this pass--whose ascent occupies three days--is in fact the mere bed of a stream, covered deeply with boulders and stones of all sizes, in which the baggage and artillery horses sank fetlock deep. the difficulties encountered were enormous, and vast numbers of camels, horses, and bullocks died by the way. even with a double complement of horses, it was almost impossible to drag the guns up the deep, shingly pass; and great delays were experienced, before the force intended for operations against candahar were assembled, at quettah. so far, the advance had taken place through british territory, as quettah has long been occupied by us. when the advance began, it was rapid. no opposition was experienced by the way, until the column arrived within a few hours' march of candahar; and then the enemy's attack was feeble, and easily repulsed. on the th of january, general stewart entered the city. candahar, though not the capital, is the chief town of afghanistan. it stands in a slightly undulating plain; and was, at one time, a city of great importance and wealth. its position is the most important in afghanistan. it bars the road to an enemy advancing from the north, through herat; and threatens the flank and rear of one advancing against india, through cabul. the country around is extremely fertile and, were irrigation properly used, and a railway constructed to india, candahar and the surrounding country would again become one of the gardens of the world. the authorities of the city made their submission, as the column approached it, and the army settled down to quiet occupation; broken only by isolated attacks, upon individual soldiers, by fanatical ghazis. when peace was concluded, one of the conditions distinctly insisted upon by the british general, and agreed to by the ameer, was that candahar should remain in our possession. the alleged advantage thus gained, and the territory thus acquired, were afterwards abandoned by the british government succeeding that which had so vigorously carried out the war. the occupation of candahar by the british had been insisted on, at first, on the ground that, if russia should make an advance against india, the british nation would have ample cause to rue the cession of candahar; for it was declared that with this city strongly fortified, and surrounded by outlying works, , british troops there could arrest the progress of an invading army, however large, until england had had full time to put forth all her strength, and to assemble an army amply sufficient to secure the safety of the most valuable of our possessions--the empire of india. it was said that, whatever allies russia might have prepared for herself, by intrigues among the princes of india, these would not think of moving, so long as they knew that the fortress of candahar remained as a british bulwark against an invading force. it was represented that, so long as this place held out, england would be able to devote her whole force towards repelling the foreign invader--instead of being obliged, simultaneously, to oppose him and to put down a formidable rising in india, itself. it was, however, not the universal opinion that the best policy of england was to occupy this territory by an armed force; and subsequent events, with the change of government in england, led to a different determination. chapter : the massacre at cabul. at each village through which william gale and his escort passed, the inhabitants turned out, and hooted and yelled at the prisoner; and it was with the greatest difficulty that the chief protected him from personal violence. william himself was scarce conscious of what was passing. the swinging action of the camel added to his great weakness, and he would not have been able to keep his seat on its back, had not his captors fastened him with ropes to the saddle. although the snow had only just melted on the shatur-gardan pass, in the valleys below the heat of the sun was already great and, often as it poured down upon him, he lapsed into a state of semi-consciousness; and drowsily fancied that he was again in his canoe, tossing on the tiny waves, in the shelter of the reef. on the sixth day after the start, a shout from his guard aroused him, as they emerged from a steep ascent amongst some hills. before him an undulating ground, dotted with villages, stretched for three or four miles. at the foot of some steep hills, to the left of a wide valley, was a large walled town which he knew to be cabul. on the hillside above it was a strong building: half fort, half palace. this was the bala-hissar, the abode of the ameer, and the fortress of cabul. in addition to the king's residence it contained barracks, store houses, magazines, and many residences. towards this the cavalcade made its way. they halted two miles from the town, and the chief sent his son forward to the ameer, to inform him that he had brought in an english prisoner; and to request that an escort might be sent out, lest he should be killed by the people on approaching the town. an hour after the man had left, a troop of cavalry sallied out from the gate of the bala-hissar, and rode rapidly to the spot where the party had halted. surrounding the camel on which william gale was mounted, they conducted it to the fortress. illustration: william gale in the hands of the afghans. when he was lifted down from his camel, will was unable to stand. fever had set in again, and he was conveyed to an apartment in a house near the royal residence. the ameer was already negotiating with the british, and orders were consequently given that the prisoner should receive every attention. the king's own doctor was ordered to attend him, and two attendants were told off to take charge of him. the old chief received a recompense, for the care which he had taken of the prisoner, which fully answered to his expectations; and he returned home well satisfied with the success of his policy. for weeks, will lay between life and death; and he was a mere skeleton when, two months after his arrival, he was able for the first time to sit up at the window, and look across the valley. very gradually, he recovered strength. he was well supplied with food, and especially enjoyed the delicious fruits for which cabul is celebrated. his attendants were a old man and his son, the latter a lad of some fifteen years of age. the father did his duty, because ordered to do so; but his scowling face often showed the hatred which he felt of the kaffir. the lad, however, took kindly to his patient. he it was who for hours together would, while will was at his worst, sit by his bedside, constantly changing the wet cloths wrapped round his head, and sometimes squeezing a few drops of the refreshing juice of some fruit between his parched lips; and as his patient turned the corner and became slowly convalescent, his pleasure over the life he had saved, by his care, was very great. like most soldiers in the expeditionary force, will had picked up a few words of afghan; and had greatly increased his stock, during the time he lay in the hut in the mountains. alone now all day with the boy, with nothing to do but to look out on the town below, and the wide valley beyond, he made rapid progress; and was, by the time he was strong enough to walk alone across the room, able to hold some sort of conversation with his friend--for so he had come to regard his devoted attendant. one morning the boy came into the room in a state of great excitement. "english officers are coming," he said, "with soldiers." "but i thought it was peace," will exclaimed, delighted. "you told me peace had been signed, at gundamuk, two months ago." "yes, it is peace," the boy said. "the officers are coming in friendship, to be here with the ameer." will was greatly moved at the news. when he had heard, six weeks before, that peace was signed, he had begun to hope that, some day or other, he should again be able to return to india; but the news, that some of his countrymen were close at hand, almost overcame him. the next day, which was the th of july--although will had lost all account of time--he saw vast numbers of people out on the plain; and presently, far away, he beheld a large body of horsemen. these, the lad told him, were the ameer and his bodyguard, accompanied by the english officers. cannon were fired in salute, and the garrison of the bala-hissar stood to their arms and, presently, will saw a cavalcade riding up from the gate of the fortress. first came some afghan cavalry; then rode a tall and stately man, whom the boy told him was the ameer. but will had no eyes for him. all his thoughts were centered on the white officer who rode beside him: major sir lewis cavagnari, the english envoy. behind, among the chiefs of the ameer's suite, rode two or three other english officers; and then came a detachment of some twenty-five cavalry, and fifty infantry of the guides, a frontier force consisting of picked men. as they passed near his window, will stood up with his hand to his forehead, in salute. major cavagnari looked up in surprise, and spoke to the ameer. the latter said a few words in reply, and then the cavalcade rode on to the palace. ten minutes later two of the ameer's attendants entered, and told will to follow them. he had that morning, for the first time since his arrival in cabul, put on his uniform. he was still very weak but, leaning one hand upon his attendant's shoulder, he followed the messengers. he was conducted to a large room in the palace, where the ameer and his adviser, and the british officers were sitting. "well, my lad," major cavagnari said, kindly, "i hear you have had a bad time of it. the ameer tells me that you were taken prisoner near ali-kheyl, that you were badly wounded, and that after the snow melted you were brought down here. he says he gave orders that everything should be done for you, but that you have been very ill, ever since." "i have been treated very kindly, sir," will said, "and i am now getting round. i owe my life chiefly to the care and attention of the lad, here, who has watched over me like a brother." will's words were translated to the ameer, who expressed his satisfaction, and ordered a purse of money to be given to the boy, in testimony of his approval of the care he had taken of his patient. as major cavagnari saw that the young soldier was almost too weak to stand, he at once told him to retire to his room, adding kindly: "i will ask the ameer to assign you quarters in the same house with us. we will soon bring you round, and make you strong and well again." the same evening will was carried over--for the fatigue he had undergone had been almost too much for him--to the large house assigned to major cavagnari, his officers and escort. it was built of wood, surrounded by a courtyard and wall. a room was assigned to will, on the same floor as that occupied by the officers. the afghan lad had received orders to accompany his patient, and remain with him as long as he stayed in cabul. will's progress towards recovery was now rapid. he had no longer any cause for anxiety. he was carefully attended to by doctor kelly, the surgeon of the guides, who had accompanied the mission as medical officer. the escort was commanded by lieutenant hamilton; and sir lewis cavagnari was accompanied by mr. william jenkyns, of the indian civil service, as his secretary. the care of doctor kelly, and the influence of quinine and tonics quickly added to will's strength; but his best medicine was the sound of english voices, and the kindness which was shown to him. in a fortnight he was able to get about, as usual; and the doctor said that, in another month, he would be as strong as ever. for two or three weeks after major cavagnari's arrival in cabul, all went well; and it appeared as if the forebodings of those who had predicted trouble and danger to the little body who had gone up, as it were, into the lion's den, were likely to be falsified. that the mission was not without danger the authorities, and major cavagnari himself, were well aware; but it was important that the provision in the treaty of gundamuk, by which england secured the right of maintaining a resident at cabul, should be put into operation. besides, the ameer had himself given the invitation to major cavagnari, and had pressed the point warmly, giving the most solemn promises of protection. at any rate, for the first two weeks the soldiers of the escort moved freely in the city, without molestation or insult; and it appeared as if the population of cabul were content with the terms of peace which, indeed, imposed no burdens whatever upon them, and was supposed to have inflicted no humiliation on their national pride. on the th of august, several regiments marched in from herat. these troops--which were considered the flower of the afghan army--had, in consequence of the distance of herat from the seat of war, taken no part whatever in the struggle. upon the very day after their arrival they scattered through the town, and were loud in their expression of hostility to the terms of peace. had they been there, they said, the kaffirs would have been easily defeated. why should peace have been made at the very first reverse, and before the best fighting men had come to the front? that evening will gale's young attendant came to him in his room, looking very serious. "what is the matter, yossouf?" the lad shook his head. "trouble is coming," he said. "the heratee men are stirring up the people, and the budmashes are threatening that they will kill the english." "but the ameer has promised his protection," will said. "he has sworn a solemn oath to stand by them." "yakoob khan is weak," the boy said. "he was a great warrior, once; but he has been in prison for many years and he is no longer firm and strong. some of the men round him are bad advisers. yakoob khan is no better than a reed to lean upon." the next day there were riots in the town. the heratee men taunted the people of cabul with cowardice, and the excitement spread in the city. the soldiers of the escort could no longer stroll quietly through the bazaars; but were hooted at, and abused, although of the same religion and race as the people around them--for the guide regiments were recruited from pathans, and other border tribes. day after day the position became more threatening. the men of the escort were ordered no longer to go down into the town, where their presence was the occasion of tumults. a native officer of one of our cavalry regiments, who was spending his furlough at a village near cabul, came into the bala-hissar and told major cavagnari that he feared, from rumors that reached him, that the heratee regiments would break into mutiny, and attack the embassy. the officer, who was a man of immense courage and coolness, replied quietly: "if they do, they can but kill the three or four of us here, and our deaths will be revenged." he, however, made representations to the ameer as to the threatening behavior of the heratee troops; but yakoob assured him that he could rely thoroughly upon his protection, and that--even should the heratee troops break out in mutiny--he would at once suppress the movement, with the cabul regiments. yossouf became daily more anxious. going into the town, to buy fruits and other necessaries, he heard more of what was going on than could the members of the embassy. "things are very bad," he said, over and over again. "it would be better for you all to go away. why does your officer stop here, to be killed?" "it is his duty to stay at his post," will said. "he has been sent here by the commander-in-chief. he is like a soldier on outpost duty. he cannot desert his post, because he sees danger approaching; but i wish, with all my heart, that an order would come for his recall; not only because of the danger, but because i am longing to be back again with my regiment and, although i am strong enough to ride down to the punjaub, now, i cannot go except with sir lewis and his escort. although it is peace, a single englishman could not travel down to jellalabad, through the passes." will had, from the first week after the arrival of the mission, fallen into the position of an orderly-room sergeant. his duties were little more than nominal, but he acted as assistant to mr. jenkyns, and made copies and duplicates of reports and other documents which were, from time to time, sent down to jellalabad. being the only englishman there, with the exception of the four officers, these greatly relaxed the usual distance prevailing between an officer and a corporal; and treated him as a civilian clerk when in office, and with a pleasant cordiality at other times. except, indeed, that he messed alone, and kept in his own room of an evening, he might have been one of the party. each day, he reported to sir lewis the rumors which yossouf had gathered in the town. in his reports to headquarters, major cavagnari stated that trouble had arisen from the conduct of the heratee troops; but he scarcely made enough of the real danger which threatened the little party. had he done so, the embassy would probably have been recalled. "what have you got there, yossouf?" will asked one day, when his follower returned with a larger bundle than usual. "i have brought the uniform of an afghan soldier," the boy replied, "which i have purchased from the bazaar. it is for you. i am sure that soon you will be attacked. the english are brave, but there are only four of them. their soldiers will fight, but what can they do against an army? when the time comes, you must dress yourself in these clothes, and i will try to conceal you." "but i cannot do that, yossouf," will said. "it is very good of you to try and aid me to escape; but i am a soldier, and must share the fortunes of my officers, whatever they may be. if they fight, i shall fight. if they are killed, i must be killed, too. i cannot run away and hide myself, when the danger comes." the lad hung his head. "then yossouf will die, too," he said quietly. "he will not leave his white friend." "no, no, yossouf," will said, warmly; "you have nothing to do with the business. why should you involve yourself in our fate? you can do me no good by sacrificing your life." yossouf shook his head. "if," he said presently, "the time comes, and you see that it is of no use any longer to fight, and that all is lost, would you try to escape then?" "yes," will said, "certainly i would. when all hope of further resistance is gone, and fighting is useless, my duty would be at an end; and if i could manage to escape, then, i should be justified in trying to save my life." yossouf looked relieved. "very well." he said, "then, at the last, i will try and save you." "still, yossouf," will said, "we must hope that it is not coming to that. the ameer has sworn to protect us, and he can do so. the bala-hissar is strong, and he can easily hold it, with one or two of his cabul regiments, against the heratee men. he has three or four of these regiments here. he cannot be so false to his oath as to allow his guests to be massacred." yossouf made a gesture which expressed his utter disbelief in the ameer, and then again went about his duties. on the nd of september, on his return from the town, he reported that there was great excitement among the people; and that he believed that the night would not pass off, without trouble. major cavagnari, to whom will reported the news, sent in a message to the ameer--whose palace was within two or three hundred yards--and begged him to take measures to secure the bala-hissar against any attack by the heratees. the members of the escort, available for the defense of the residency, were but about fifty men. most of the cavalry were away. some were down the pass with despatches. the rest were stationed a short distance off in the plain, as forage was difficult to obtain in the fort. the ameer returned a curt message to major cavagnari, saying that there was no cause for uneasiness. the latter, however, doubled the sentries at the gate of the little enclosure. just as the officers were about to retire to rest, yossouf--who had, a short time, before gone out again, telling will that he would bring back news of what was going on, ran in. "the heratees are coming," he said. "the gates of the fort have been left open. the cabul men are all in their barracks. they are pouring in at the gates. do you not hear them?" william gale ran to the window, and could hear a loud and confused noise of yelling and shouting. he ran in to the envoy's room, and warned him that the heratees were at hand. without the loss of a moment's time, lieutenant hamilton got his men under arms; and posted them at the upper windows of the house, where their fire would command the approaches to the gate. quickly as this was done, the afghans were close at hand by the time that each man was at his post; and instantly opened a scattering fire at the residency, shouting to the soldiers to come out and join them, and to bring out the kaffir officers to be killed. the pathans were, however, true to their salt and, in reply, opened a steady fire upon the mass of the enemy. with wild yells the afghans rushed at the gate but, so steadily and rapidly did the defenders shoot, from the upper windows and loopholes cut in the gate, that the assailants were forced to fall back. "that's right, my lads," major cavagnari said cheerfully to his men; "we can hold the place for some time, and the ameer will bring the cabul regiments down in no time, and sweep away these rascals." the afghans, now some thousands strong--assisted by all the budmashes, and turbulent portion of the population of cabul--surrounded the house on all sides, and kept up a heavy and incessant fire; which was coolly and steadily returned by the guides. after an hour's fighting, there was a sudden roar above the rattle of musketry; followed by another, and another. simultaneously came the crash of shells. one burst in the house, the other tore through the gate. still there was no sign of the cabul regiments. eight or ten guns were brought to play on the little garrison. the gate was broken down, and nearly half the force of the house were already killed, or wounded, by the musketry and shell fire. still they continued the defense over and over again, the afghans swarmed up close to the gate; only to fall back again, before the steady fire of the snider rifles of the guides. major cavagnari went from room to room, encouraging the men; while the other officers and will gale, taking rifles which had fallen from the hands of men no longer able to use them, set an example of cool and steady firing to their men. for four hours the unequal contest continued; then a cry arose, from the men, that the house was on fire. it was but too true. a shell had exploded in the lower part of the house, and had ignited the woodwork; and the fire had already obtained so firm a hold that it was impossible to extinguish it. a few of the men continued their fire from the windows, to the last; while the rest carried their wounded comrades out into the courtyard. as the flames shot out from the lower windows, the yells of the afghans rose higher and higher; and a fearful storm of lead and iron swept down upon the little band, who were now plainly visible in the light of the flames. even now the enemy did not dare, although numbering hundreds to one, to come too close upon them, though they flocked up close to the gate. "now, lads!" major cavagnari exclaimed, "let us rush out, and die fighting hand to hand; better that than to be shot down defenseless, here." thus saying he led the way, and charged out upon the crowded foe. there were but lieutenant hamilton and eight men to follow him. all the rest had fallen. doctor kelly had been shot in the house, while dressing the wound of one of the soldiers. mr. jenkyns had fallen outside. will gale had twice been wounded, but was still on his feet and, grasping his musket, he rushed forward with his comrades. a figure sprang out just as he reached the gate and, with a sudden rush, carried him along for some paces. then he stumbled over a fragment of the wall, and fell just at the corner of the gate--which had swung inward, when burst open by the enemy's shell. confused and bewildered, he struggled to regain his feet. "keep quiet, master!" yossouf's voice said, in his ear. "it is your only chance of safety." so saying, he dragged will into the narrow space between the gate and the wall; then, as he rose to his feet, he wrapped round him a loose afghan cloak, and pressed a black sheepskin cap far down over his face. in a minute there was the sound of a fierce struggle, without. the shots of the revolvers of the two english officers rang out, in quick succession, mingled with the loud report of the afghan muskets. the savage yells rose, high and triumphant. the last of the gallant band, who had for hours defended the embassy, had fallen. then there was a rush through the gate, as the afghans swarmed into the courtyard, till the space around the burning house was well-nigh full. unperceived, will gale and yossouf stepped from behind the gate and joined the throng and, at once, made their way into the stables, where several of the budmashes were already engaged in their work of plunder. yossouf caught up three or four horse rugs, and made them into a loose bundle; and signed to will to do the same. the young soldier did so, and lifted them on his shoulder, so as to partly hide his face. then he followed yossouf into the courtyard again. already there was a stream of men with saddles, rugs, muskets, and other plunder making their way out, while others were still thronging in. joining the former, will and his guide were soon outside the enclosure at any other time, his disguise would have been noticed, at once; but in the crowd his legs were hidden, and all were too intent upon plunder, and too excited at their success, to notice him. once outside the wall, he was comparatively safe. the light thrown over the courtyard, by the blazing house, made the darkness beyond all the more complete. keeping carefully in shadow, yossouf led him along to a clump of bushes, in a garden a hundred yards from the house. stooping here, he pulled out a bundle. "here," he said, "is the uniform. put it on, quickly!" it was but the work of a minute for will to attire himself in the uniform of the afghan soldier. he had still retained the musket, which he had in his hand when yossouf had leaped upon him; and as he now went on with his guide he had no fear, whatever, of being detected. he still carried the bundle of rugs on his shoulder. as they walked round towards the lower gate of the bala-hissar, they met numbers of villagers and townspeople thronging in. these had waited to hear the issue of the attack before leaving their homes but, now that the arrival of the plunderers from the residency, and the cessation of the fire, told of the successful termination of the assault, they flocked up to join in the rejoicings over the annihilation of the kaffirs. chapter : the advance upon cabul. throughout the long hours of the night of the nd of september, while the roll of musketry and the roar of cannon had gone on, without a moment's pause, just outside the walls of his palace, yakoob khan had made no movement, whatever, to protect his guests or fulfil his own solemn promises. silent and sullen, he had sat in his council chamber. the disgrace of a broken promise is not one which weighs heavily upon an afghan's mind, and it is not probable that the thought of his tarnished honor troubled him, in the slightest degree; but he knew that the massacre which was being perpetrated at his door would be avenged, and that the english troops, which had so easily beaten the army which his father had spent so many years in preparing, would be set in movement against cabul the moment the news reached india. he cannot but have dreaded the consequences. but he apparently feared, even more, to incur the hostility of the heratee regiment, by interfering to save their victims. again and again during the night, his wisest councilors besought him to call upon the loyal cabullee regiments to act against the heratees, but in vain. it is doubtful whether yakoob was previously informed of the intended massacre, but there is strong reason to believe that he was so. the proofs, however, were not clear and definite. his conduct cost him his throne, and condemned him to remain to the end of his life a dishonored pensioner, and semi-prisoner, in india. many eager questions were asked of will and his companion, as they made their way down to the gate of the bala-hissar. yossouf took upon himself to answer them, and they passed through the gate without the slightest suspicion. "which way now?" "i think it will be safest to go into the city. we might lie hid for a few days in some deserted hut but, sooner or later, our presence there would excite comment. it will be best, i think, to go into the city. in the quarters of the parsee merchants there are assuredly some who would give you shelter. domajee--who was the contractor for the supply of the mission--would, i should think, be best to go to. there is little danger, for none will suspect your presence there. his servants are all hindoos." "that is the best place, yossouf. i have been down several times to domajee, and he is certainly devoted to the english. we can but try him." the first dawn of morning was breaking, when will and his faithful friend arrived at the door of the parsee trader, in the hindoo quarter of cabul. the doors were fastened and barred, for it was impossible to say whether the attack upon the mission--which had been heard going on, all night--might not be followed by a fanatic outbreak against the hindoo and parsee traders, in the hindoo quarter. therefore, there was little sleep that night. yossouf knocked gently at the door. "who is there?" a voice at once inquired, from within. "i come on urgent business with domajee," yossouf replied. "open quickly, there are but two of us here." there was a slight pause, and then the door was opened; and closed, immediately the two visitors had entered. a light was burning in the large anteroom, as they entered it; and several hindoos--who had been lying, wrapped up in cloths, on the floor--rose to their feet to inspect the newcomers. a moment later the trader, himself, came down the stairs from an apartment above. "what is it?" he asked. he did not pause for an answer. the light from the lamp he carried fell upon will's face, now white as a sheet from loss of blood. with the one word, "follow," the parsee turned on his heel, and led the way upstairs. "has the mission been captured?" he asked, as they entered an empty room. "yes," will replied, "and i believe that i am the only survivor." the fatigue of climbing the stairs completed the work caused by prolonged excitement and loss of blood and, as he spoke, he tottered; and would have fallen had not yossouf seized him and, with the assistance of the parsee, laid him on a couch. in a few words, yossouf informed the trader of what had happened; and satisfied him that no suspicion could arise, of the presence of one of the british in his house. as the residency had been burnt down, and the bodies of those who had fallen within it consumed, no one would suspect that one of the five englishmen there had effected his escape; and it would be supposed that will's body, like that of doctor kelly, had been consumed in the flames. the parsee was sure that cabul would soon be reoccupied by the british and--putting aside his loyalty to them--he felt that his concealment of an english survivor of the massacre would be greatly to his advantage, and would secure for him the custom of the english, upon their arrival at the town. he first descended the stairs; and warned his hindoo followers, on no account, whatever, to breathe a word of the entry of strangers there. then he again returned to the room, where yossouf was sprinkling water on will's face, and was endeavoring to recover him to consciousness. "there is blood on the couch," the trader said. "he is wounded, and is suffering from its loss. see! the sleeve of his coat is soaked with blood, but i see no mark on the cloth." "no," yossouf replied; "he has put on that uniform since the fight." "go downstairs," the trader said; "my wife and daughter will see to him." as soon as yossouf left the room, domajee's wife and daughter entered, with many exclamations of surprise and alarm. they were at once silenced by the trader, who bid them cut off the wounded man's uniform, and stanch his wounds. will had been hit in two places. one ball had passed through the left arm, fortunately without injuring the bone. the other had struck him in the side, had run round his ribs and gone out behind, inflicting an ugly-looking but not serious wound--its course being marked by a blue line on the flesh, behind the two holes of entry and exit. the wounds were washed and bound up, some cordial was poured between his lips and, ere long, he opened his eyes and looked round, in bewilderment. "you are safe, and among friends," the parsee said. "drink a little more of the cordial, and then go off quietly to sleep. you need have no fear of being discovered, and your friends will be here, ere long." four of the hindoo servants now, at the order of the trader, came upstairs and, lifting the couch, carried will to a cool and airy chamber, in the upper story of the house. here a soft bed of rugs and mattresses was prepared, and will was soon in a quiet sleep, with yossouf watching by his side. it was but twenty-four hours after the massacre that a well-mounted native, from cabul, brought the news over the shatur-gardan pass into the khurum valley. thence it was telegraphed to simla and, in a few hours, all india rang with it. not an instant was lost in making preparations for avenging the murder of the british mission. on the same day, orders were sent to brigadier general massy--at that time commanding the field force in the khurum valley--to move the rd punjaub pioneers, the th ghoorkas, and a mountain battery to the crest of the shatur-gardan pass, and to entrench themselves there. a day or two later, the nd highlanders and the th punjaub infantry ascended the peiwar-khotal, to ali-kheyl, to secure the road between the khotal and the pass. the nd then moved forward, and joined the rd pioneers and th ghoorkas on the shatur-gardan; and on the th general baker arrived there, and took the command, but some time was needed before the advance could commence. as is usual with the british, the great transport train--which had, with such pains, been collected and organized for the war--had been dispersed, immediately peace was signed; and the whole work had now to be recommenced. vast numbers of animals had been used up, during the campaign; and there was the greatest difficulty in obtaining the minimum number which was required before the troops could move. at last, general roberts managed to collect, in the punjaub, mules and camels and bullocks. the tribes in the khurum valley, too--who had been kindly treated, and were well satisfied with the change of masters--furnished many animals for the transport of stores, as far as the shatur-gardan. the news had thrown the gilgis, and other tribes among the mountains beyond the peiwar-khotal, into a state of ferment; and several determined attacks were made, by them, upon convoys on their way up to the head of the pass. these, however, were always successfully repulsed by the baggage guards, with considerable loss to the assailants and, on the th september--three weeks from the date of the massacre--general roberts joined the troops at ali-kheyl, and moved forward to the shatur-gardan. during this time two or three letters had been received from the ameer, who wrote to general roberts deprecating any advance of the british troops, and saying that he was trying to restore order, to put down the mutinous heratee troops, and to punish them for their conduct. as, however, the details which had been received of the massacre showed that the ameer had behaved in a most suspicious--if not in a most treacherous--manner, at the time of the massacre; and that if he possessed any authority, whatever, over the troops, he had not attempted to exercise it, no attention was paid to his letters. the advanced party of the invading force moved down from the shatur-gardan pass. it consisted of the th and th bengal cavalry, two guns of the royal horse artillery, two companies of the nd highlanders, and the th punjaub native infantry. the road was found to be extremely steep and difficult, and much labor was necessary before it could be made practicable for guns and wheeled carriages. no enemy was encountered, and the little force encamped at night in the logan valley; over which the cavalry skirmished, far ahead, but found no foes awaiting them. on the following day they made another march forward, the brigades of generals baker and macpherson from the pass into the valley. the advance force halted at zerghun-shah and, soon after they had done so, some of the cavalry rode in, with the surprising news that the ameer was close at hand. half an hour later yakoob khan, attended by some of his principal nobles, rode into camp. he was received with the honor due to his rank but, personally, general roberts greeted him with great coldness. the ameer stated that he came into camp because he could not control the soldiery of cabul; and that, therefore, he had left the place and come in, to show his friendship for the english. whatever may have been the motives for his coming, they were never fully explained. circumstances which afterwards occurred strongly confirmed the suspicion that he meditated treachery. he was treated honorably; but the guard of honor which was assigned to him was, in fact, a guard over him and, from that time, he was virtually a prisoner. general roberts declined, altogether, to discuss with him the events of the massacre of cabul; saying that this was a matter which could not now be entered into, but would be fully investigated on the arrival at the afghan capital. the following day, the brigades of generals baker and macpherson joined the advance at zerghun-shah. the amount of transport available was only sufficient for half the baggage of the army; and it was necessary, therefore, to move forward in two divisions--the one advancing a day's march, and then halting; while the animals went back to bring up the baggage of the second division, on the following day. a proclamation was now issued by the general, and sent forward among the people of the valley; saying that the object of the expedition was only to punish those concerned in the massacre at cabul, and that all loyal subjects of the ameer would be well treated. on the rd of october macpherson's brigade, with the cavalry, reached suffed-sang. here they halted, while the baggage animals went back to bring up general baker's brigade. the attitude of the people of the valley had now become very threatening. great numbers of hill tribesmen had come down; and on this day an attack was made upon the rear guard, but was beaten off with loss. that the natives were bitterly hostile was undoubted; but they were, for the most part, waiting to see the result of the approaching fight. the heratee and cabul regiments were confident that they would defeat the approaching column. they had a great advantage in numbers, had been drilled in european fashion, were armed with enfields, and had an enormous park of artillery at their disposal. they were able to choose their own fighting ground, and had selected a spot which gave them an immense advantage. they were, therefore, confident of victory. had the british troops been beaten, the inhabitants of the logan valley were prepared to rise, to a man. the ghilzais and other hill tribes would have swept down upon the line of retreat; and few, if any, of the british force would have returned to tell the tale. the next day baker's division had the post of honor, and made a short march to chaurasia. beyond this village, the enemy had taken up their position. three miles beyond the village the valley ends--a mass of hills shutting it in, with only a narrow defile leading, through them, to the plain of cabul beyond. upon both sides of the defile the enemy had placed guns in position, and lined the whole circle of the hills commanding the approach to it. mountaineers from their birth, they believed that--although the british infantry might possess a superiority in the plain--they could be no match for them on the steep hillside; and they no doubt thought that no attempt would be made to storm so strong a position, but that the british column would march straight up the valley into the defile, where they would be helplessly slaughtered by the guns and matchlock men on the heights. judging from their own tactics, they had reason for the belief that their position was an impregnable one. in their hill fights the afghans never come to close quarters. posted behind rocks and huge boulders, the opposing sides keep up a distant musketry duel--lasting, sometimes, for days--until one side or the other becomes disheartened with its losses, or has exhausted its ammunition. then it falls back, and the other claims the victory. the idea that english soldiers would, under a heavy fire from their concealed force, steadily climb up the broken mountainside, and come to close quarters, probably never entered into their calculations. at daybreak on the th, a working party were sent forward to improve the road towards the defile. but they had scarcely started when the cavalry patrol in advance rode in, and announced that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position to command the road. general roberts had now a choice of two courses--he could either attack the whole afghan force, with the one division at hand; or he could wait until joined by macpherson's brigade, next morning. the feat of carrying such a position in face of an immensely superior force, with only half of his little command, was a very serious one but, upon the other hand, every hour added to the number of hillmen who swarmed upon the flanks of the army, just beyond musket range. a delay of twenty-four hours would bring the whole fighting force of the tribesmen into the valley and, while attacking the enemy's position in the front, he would be liable to an assault upon his rear, by them. confident in the valor of his soldiers, he chose the first alternative and, at eleven o'clock, his little force marched out from the camp to attack the afghan army. by this time the enemy's position had been reconnoitered, and it was found to be too strong for a direct attack. it was therefore resolved to ascend the hills on both flanks, and so to drive their defenders back beyond the defile. this, in any case, would have been the best mode of assault; but against semi-savage enemies, flank attacks are peculiarly effective. having prepared for an assault in one direction, they are disconcerted and disheartened by finding themselves attacked in a different manner; and the fear of a flank being turned, and the line of retreat thereby menaced, will generally suffice to cause a rapid retreat. general baker, himself, took the command of the left attack. his force consisted of four guns of number mountain battery, two gatling guns, the th company of sappers and miners, a wing of the nd highlanders, six companies of the th ghoorkas, men of the th punjaub infantry, and of the rd pioneers. this was the main column of attack. the right column--under the command of major white, of the nd highlanders--consisted of a wing of that regiment, men of the rd pioneers, three guns of the royal artillery, and two squadrons of cavalry. this attack was intended only as a feint, and to distract the attention of the afghans from the main attack. a strong reserve was left in chaurasia, to guard the baggage and to overawe the tribesmen. as general baker's column reached the foot of the hills, the rd--who led the advance, thrown out in skirmishing line--began to climb the ascent. the enemy were armed with sniders and enfields, and their fire was rapid and continuous; fortunately it was by no means accurate, and our losses were small. the afghans, in their hill fighting, are accustomed to fire very slowly and deliberately--taking steady aim, with their guns resting on the rocks--and, so fighting, they are excellent shots. it is probable, however, that the steady advance of our men towards them flurried and disconcerted them; and that they thought more of firing quickly, than of taking a correct aim. the nd, pressing up the hill, were assisted by the fire of the mountain guns and gatlings, and by that of the punjaubees in their rear. gradually the upper slopes of the hills were gained; and the british troops, pressing forward, drove the afghans back along the crest. several times they made obstinate stands, holding their ground until the nd were close to them. these, however, would not be denied. the massacre of the mission at cabul had infuriated the soldiers, and each man was animated with a stern determination to avenge our murdered countrymen. for an hour and a half the fight continued; and then the afghans abandoned the ridge, and fled in confusion. they rallied upon some low hills, yards from the rear; but the mountain guns and gatlings opened upon them and, the whole line advancing to the attack, the enemy fell back. major white's column had been doing excellent service, on the right. although the attack had been intended only as a feint, it was pushed forward so vigorously that it met with a success equal to that which had attended the main column, on the left. the enemy were driven off the hills on the right of the defile. twenty guns were captured, and the direct road cleared of the enemy. unfortunately, our cavalry was in the rear. the road through the pass was difficult and, before they could get through into the plain on the other side, the masses of afghans had fallen back into the strong villages scattered over it; and could not be attacked by cavalry, alone. the enemy had from to , men upon the ridge, including thirteen regiments of regular troops. they left dead upon the field and, besides these, carried off large numbers of killed and wounded, during the night. upon our side only were killed, and wounded. had general roberts had his whole force with him, he could--after capturing the hills--have at once pushed forward, and have attacked the enemy on the plain; and the afghans, disheartened and panic stricken, would have been completely crushed. with so small a force in hand, and the possibility of a serious attack by the tribes on his rear, general roberts did not think it prudent to advance farther; and the regiments which had taken the principal part in the massacre of cabul marched away, unmolested. enormously superior as they still were in numbers, they had no thought of further resistance. the capture of positions which they deemed impregnable, by a force so inferior in number to their own, had utterly disheartened them; and the heratee regiments which, but the day before, had been so proudly confident of their ability to exterminate the kaffirs, were now utterly demoralized and panic stricken. in the night the whole of the afghan troops scattered, and fled. our cavalry--under general massy--swept along the plain of cabul and, skirting the town, kept on as far as the ameer's great entrenched camp at sherpur, three miles further along the valley. here guns were captured. in the morning, macpherson arrived. general roberts now advanced with his whole force of infantry, and found that he had no longer a foe before him. the afghan army had disappeared. there was no longer any occasion for haste, and the column halted until all the baggage had been brought up through the difficult defile. the total defeat of the afghan army had overawed the tribesmen, and these at once retired to their hills again. the villagers, however, were bitterly hostile; and seized every opportunity of firing at small bodies of troops, on cavalry patrols. this continued for some time; and general roberts, at last, was obliged to punish it with severity and, in such cases, all found with arms in their hands were at once shot. on the th of october sir frederick roberts and his staff, with a cavalry escort, rode into the bala-hissar and, the next morning, the british troops marched into the fort. the gates of cabul stood open, and a column was marched through the town, and formal possession taken of it. during the first five weeks which elapsed, after the massacre of the mission, william gale remained almost prostrate in the house of the friendly parsee trader. he had barely recovered his strength, after his prolonged illness, when the attack was made; and the events of that night, and the great loss of blood which he had suffered, had reduced his strength to that of an infant. under the care of the parsee and his family, however, he slowly but steadily regained strength. for the first month, but little news reached him from without. then a report came that the british had assembled, in considerable force, on the crest of the shatur-gardan; and were going to move on cabul from that direction. then, day by day, the tidings came in of the advance of the force. it was reported, generally, that the ameer had gone out to meet them; with the intention of leaving them, when the decisive moment, arrived and taking command of the tribesmen, who would fall upon and annihilate them. on the th the town was unusually quiet, and will heard that the afghan army had moved out, to occupy the hills commanding the approach through the defile; and that, with the aid of the tribesmen, the british army was to be exterminated there. chapter : the fighting round cabul. all day long, on the th of october, william gale sat at an open window in the upper story of the parsee's house--facing west--and listened to the distant roar of the battle; while all cabul was in a state of wild excitement, in the sure anticipation of victory. will felt equally confident as to the result of the battle. he knew that--well led--a british force could be trusted to carry any position held by the afghans; and he felt sure that, even should he fail to carry it by direct attack, the english general would, sooner or later, succeed in turning it by flank movements. about two o'clock in the afternoon, william noticed a change in the character of the sounds in the town. in the hindoo quarter all had been quiet--for the inhabitants greatly feared that, in a burst of fanaticism following a victory achieved over the british, the afghans might sack the hindoo quarter, and murder its inhabitants. yossouf, however, had been all the morning out in the town; and had, from time to time, brought in a report of the rumors current there. at first it was said that the british were being utterly routed, that they were being exterminated by the afghan fire, that the hill tribes were sweeping down upon their rear, and that not a man would escape. presently the reports became more contradictory. the firing was still heard, but it was no longer one continuous roll. some said that the british were annihilated; others that, repulsed in their attack, they had fallen back to their camp but, soon after two o'clock, yossouf rushed up to william's room with the news that the afghans had been driven from the heights, and that the british were in possession of these, and of the defile through them. yossouf had, throughout the morning, been swayed by conflicting emotions and wishes. at one moment he hoped that his countrymen might conquer; then the fear that, after victory, the hindoo quarter might be sacked, and his english friend discovered and killed, overpowered his feeling of patriotism. it must be remembered that afghanistan has, for centuries, been rather a geographical expression than a country. its population is composed of a great number of tribes, without any common feelings or interest, and often engaged in desperate wars and conflicts with each other. the two leading tribes--the ghilzais and duranees--had long struggled for ascendency in the cultivated portion of the country. for a long period the ghilzais had had the supremacy, but the duranees were now lords of the country. the mountain tribes, for the most part, held themselves entirely independent; and although, in time, they gave a nominal allegiance to the ameer of cabul, yet--as had been shown in the khurum valley--they hated their native masters, with an animosity far exceeding that which they felt towards the british. that throughout the war the tribesmen were ready, when they saw an opportunity to attack english convoys and small columns, is true; but they were animated by a love of plunder, rather than of country and, over a considerable area of afghanistan--notably at candahar--the people, in general, would have infinitely preferred the mild and just rule of the english, to the military tyranny of cabul. thus, yossouf had grown up without understanding the meaning of the feeling which we call patriotism. he had, it is true, been taught to hate the unbelievers; but this feeling had disappeared, on his acquaintance with will gale, and he now ranked the safety and happiness of his friend far before any national consideration. how weak is the feeling of patriotism, among the afghans, is shown by the fact that most of the british frontier troops consist of afghan hillmen; who are always ready, when called upon, to fight desperately against their countrymen and co-religionists. examples of treachery, such as that exhibited by the two pathans who fired their guns, to warn their countrymen of the british advance up the spingawi pass, are almost unknown. it was, then, with a feeling of joy that yossouf related, to his english friends, the news of the defeat of the afghan army. throughout the hindoo quarter there was deep, but suppressed, gladness at the news of the british victory; and this increased when, as the night went on, it was known that the afghan army was totally dispersed, that the troops remaining in cabul had fled, and that the city was virtually open for the entrance of the english. when, on the th--with bands playing, and colors displayed--the british troops marched through cabul, will would fain have gone out and joined his countrymen. but the parsee pointed out, to him, that this would draw the attention of the afghans to the fact that he had been concealed by him; and that in case, at any time, the british should evacuate cabul and return to india, he would be a marked man for the vengeance of the afghans. will therefore wrapped up in a long cloak and, accompanied by yossouf and the parsee, left the house after dark and, proceeding to the gate, walked out to the bala-hissar. explaining who he was, will was soon passed through the sentries which had been set, at nightfall; and was conducted to the quarters of the general. the latter was greatly surprised when he was told that an english soldier, who had been present at the attack upon the mission, wished to speak to him; and at once ordered will to be brought before him. great was his surprise when he learned, from the young soldier, that he had fought under him at the taking of peiwar-khotal and, having been made prisoner near ali-kheyl, had been brought to cabul; and had joined the party of sir lewis cavagnari, on its arrival at that city. still more that, having been in the residency when the attack upon it was commenced by the heratee soldiery, he had managed to escape from the massacre of that night. after having first heard a complete outline of will's story, the general called in several of his staff--who had just finished dinner--and then requested will to give a full and detailed description of his adventures. after he had concluded, yossouf and the parsee were called in, and the general warmly expressed his gratification at the kindness that they had shown to a wounded english soldier, at the risk of their lives. he ordered that a handsome present should be made to yossouf, and told the parsee to call again in the morning, when the quartermaster general would be told to arrange, with him, for the supply of such articles as the country afforded for the use of the troops. "your regiment," he said to will, "is, at present, at jellalabad. whether it will come up here i do not yet know but, in the meantime, you will be promoted to the rank of sergeant--which is the least we can do, after what you have gone through--and you will take your place with my staff orderly sergeants." he then sent for one of the sergeants and gave will into his charge, telling him he would speak further with him, when he had arranged the pressing business which the occupation of cabul entailed upon him. yossouf remained with will, being--at his urgent request--placed upon the roll as a native follower, of whom a considerable number accompany each regiment in india. his duties were but nominal for, when will's story was well known, yossouf became a most popular character among the sergeants of the staff. the money which he had received--in the first place from the ameer, and now from general roberts--would secure his future. in afghanistan animals are cheap; and the owner of a small herd of oxen, sheep, or even goats is regarded by his neighbors as a wealthy man. therefore yossouf would, on the departure of the british, be able to settle down in a position of comparative affluence. two days later general roberts, being one evening disengaged, sent for william gale. he had been much struck with the bearing and manner of the young soldier, and now requested him to give him a full history of his antecedents. "you have had a curious and eventful history," he said, when the young sergeant had finished, "and appear to have conducted yourself with great discretion, readiness, and courage. from what you tell me of your conversation with colonel shepherd, i have no doubt that he formed the same impression that i do, from your manner and appearance--that you are of a respectable, if not of good family--and i trust that you will some day discover a clue to your parents. it seems to me that, had the authorities of the place where you were left properly bestirred themselves, they ought to have been able to find out who you are. "however, that is not to the point, now. it is sufficient for me that, from your manner and address, you would not be out of place in any position. i shall, of course, report the fact of your having fought by major cavagnari's side, in the attack upon him here; and shall strongly recommend that a commission be granted you. i am sure that, from your conduct hitherto, you will never do discredit to any position in which you may find yourself. "say nothing to your fellow sergeants of what i have told you. it is possible--although not probable--that my recommendation may not be acted upon and, at any rate, some months must elapse before an answer can be received." william gale returned to his quarters in a state of extreme delight. the communication which general roberts had made to him was altogether beyond his hopes. he had, indeed, from the very day that he enlisted, often hoped that, some time or other, he might win for himself a commission; and take his place in the rank to which he had, from his childhood, believed that he was, by birth, entitled. the words and manner of his colonel had encouraged this hope, but he had never dreamed that his promotion might be attained so soon. it was but a year since he had enlisted, and five was the very earliest at which he had even dreamed that a commission might possibly be gained. the next day he had been sent from the orderly room with a note to the colonel of the th, which was the regiment now in quarters in the bala-hissar; the rest of the force being encamped in the plain, below. as he was walking across the open, he was suddenly hurled to the ground with tremendous violence and, at the same moment, a roar as loud as that of thunder sounded in his ears. bewildered and half stunned, he rose to his feet; while showers of stones, beams, and other debris fell around him. illustration: one of the gunpowder magazines had exploded. one of the gunpowder magazines had exploded. it had been known that very large quantities of powder were stored in various buildings at the bala-hissar and, at the moment of the explosion, a body of engineers, under captain shafto, were examining the buildings in which it was stored, and making preparation for the removal of the powder. singularly enough, no soldiers of the th were killed but, of the ghoorkas, who were on guard at the arsenal at the time, twelve were killed and seven wounded. shafto was, unfortunately, killed. the th were at once called out, and set to work to extinguish the flames which had been kindled by the explosion--great damage being done. the southern wall of the arsenal had been blown down, and several buildings set on fire. explosion followed explosion, and the work of extinguishing the flames was an extremely dangerous one. in the afternoon another magazine blew up. fortunately, no troops were in its neighborhood at the time; but four afghans were killed, and several soldiers hurt, at a distance of three or four hundred yards from the spot. although it was never proved, it was strongly believed that these explosions were caused by the afghans and--as large quantities of powder still remained in the bala-hissar--it was determined that, for the present, the place should be evacuated. the general therefore, with his staff and the regiment in garrison, left the place and joined the camp in the plain. the little force at cabul was now isolated. troops were slowly coming up the khyber pass to jellalabad; where a division was to be formed, destined in the spring to join the force at cabul, should it be necessary to carry on further operations. between cabul and the shatur-gardan the natives were in a restless and excited state. two attacks, by men, had been made on the garrison holding the crest of the latter position--three hundred in number. these bravely sallied out, attacked the enemy in the open, and killed large numbers of them. still, great numbers of the tribesmen were gathered round; and general gough, with the th punjaubee cavalry, the th punjaubee infantry, and four guns, was therefore sent from cabul to bring down, from the shatur-gardan, the garrison and all the stores accumulated there. the pass, which would shortly be closed by snow, was then to be deserted. several executions now took place, at cabul, of men who were proved to have shared in the attack on the embassy. some of the leading men of the place, who had instigated the troops to the attack, were among those executed. many of the villagers were also hung, for shooting at detached bodies of our troops. a proclamation had been issued by the general, on his first arrival, warning the people that any attempt against our authority would be severely punished; forbidding the carrying of weapons within the streets of cabul, or within a distance of five miles of the city gates; and offering a reward for all arms belonging to the afghan troops which should be given up, and for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the embassy. the position of the british force, at cabul, was that of a body holding only the ground they occupied, in the midst of a bitterly hostile country. the ameer was powerless and, indeed, his goodwill was more than doubtful. he had, from his arrival in the camp, been regarded as a prisoner--although treated with courtesy--and after the battle of chaurasia--feeling his own impotence, and being viewed with hostility by both parties--he resigned his position as ameer, and asked to be sent to india, which was done. the abdication of the ameer really took place on the day the troops entered cabul, but it was not publicly known until the end of the month; as nothing could be done, on the subject, until his desire was communicated to the indian authorities, and their views concerning it ascertained. from the moment of his arrival at cabul, general roberts had set to work to prepare for the winter. he would, for four or five months, be entirely cut off; and would have to rely upon himself, alone. he had before him the terrible catastrophe which had, on the same ground, befallen general elphinstone's army; and knew that it was possible--and indeed probable--that, with the memory of that success before them, the afghans would unite in another great effort to annihilate the little force shut up in the heart of their country. fortunately he had, in the ameer's barracks at sherpur, a position which he was confident he could hold against any attacks that could be made upon him. these extensive barracks had been erected by sheer-ali for the use of his cavalry, but had never been used. they consisted of a large square, three sides of which were surrounded by a lofty wall--an isolated and rocky, steep hill rising at the back, and closing the fourth side. the buildings were amply large enough to contain the whole of general roberts' force; and there was abundant room for the stores, baggage animals, and wagons. the only fault was, indeed, that the extent of wall to be defended was too long for the force at his disposal. round two sides the outer wall was complete but, on the third, it had not been taken to its full height, nor had it been continued so as to join the hill behind it. great efforts were made to bring in sufficient provisions and forage for the winter; and expeditions were made up the logan, maidan, and other valleys for the purpose. winter was fast setting in. snow had begun to fall upon the hills, and ice formed on the pools, every night. the natives of the valleys near were ready enough to sell their grain, straw, and fuel; but few supplies came in from a distance, as armed bands stopped all supplies on their way. however, a sufficient amount of food and fuel was obtained, and stored in sherpur. grain, too, was procured for the winter; and the only article of which the supply was insufficient was chopped straw, of which a very large quantity was required. the attitude of the natives grew daily more hostile. their priests were preaching a revolt to the death, and recalling to the people how their fathers had annihilated a british force, thirty years before. urged alike by fanaticism and a desire for plunder, the natives over the whole country were seething with excitement; and general roberts saw that a crisis was approaching. the afghans could assemble at least , men; and among these would be included all the troops of the ameer's disbanded armies, armed with weapons equal to our own, and burning to revenge the defeats which had been inflicted upon them. to oppose them the english general had less than men. but though prepared for trouble, the storm, when it came, burst suddenly upon the english. the enemy were known to be collecting in great numbers, in the maidan valley, and two columns were sent out to attack them. one was commanded by macpherson, the other by baker. although they were to strike simultaneously at the enemy, their route of march lay up different valleys--with a lofty mountain range between them--so they could in no way cooperate with each other. after they had started, general massy was directed to move out, with a small force of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, and cooperate with general macpherson. an hour after the cavalry had started general roberts, himself, rode out. he was accompanied by his usual escort, and by two mounted orderly sergeants. one of these was william gale. they had only proceeded a short distance when they heard, some distance ahead of them, the guns of the royal horse artillery--with massy--at work; and the general at once rode forward, at a gallop. general macpherson had found mahomed jan--one of the principal leaders of the afghans--with , men, near chardeh. a fight ensued. the guns shelled the enemy, but the water courses prevented the cavalry with macpherson acting; and mahomed jan, moving across the hills, placed himself between macpherson and cabul. shortly afterwards general massy--who had with him three troops of the th lancers, and forty-four men of the th bengal lancers, with four guns under major smith-wyndham--came in sight of a portion of mahomed jan's force. it was clear that these had, in some way, interposed themselves between the little force and macpherson's column; and massy supposed that they were a party of fugitives, flying before the force of macpherson or baker. as they came streaming down the hill, he got his guns into action. after a few shells had been fired, the enemy advanced in full force. four thousand men were extended in the shape of a crescent, advancing in fairly good order; while behind was an irregular mob, of some six thousand men. the ground upon which general massy found himself, at this time, was singularly unfitted for the action of artillery. it was cut up by deep water courses, and anything like rapidity of movement was impossible. it would have been prudent had massy--when he saw how large was the force opposed to him--at once retired, until he came to ground where his guns could be rapidly maneuvered but, relying upon the effect of the shell, he remained in the position in which he had first discovered the enemy. the shell pitched rapidly into the thick of the afghans, but no effect was produced in checking their advance. they did not waver for a moment, but came steadily on. the enemy's bullets were now dropping fast among the cavalry and guns. thirty of the th lancers were dismounted, and opened fire with their martini carbines; but the enemy were too numerous to be checked by so small a body of men. at this moment, sir frederick roberts arrived upon the spot. the position was serious and, to retire the guns in safety, it was absolutely necessary to check the advance of the enemy. general roberts therefore ordered massy to send his cavalry at the enemy. colonel cleland led a squadron of the th full at the advancing mass, the bengal lancers following; while captain gough, with his troop of the th, charged the enemy's left flank--but even the charge of balaclava was scarcely more desperate than this. two hundred and twenty men, however gallant, could not be expected to conquer , . the three bodies of cavalry charged, at full speed, into the midst of the enemy's infantry; who received them with a terrible fire, which killed many horses and men. the impetus of the charge bore down the leading ranks of the afghans, and the cavalry tore their way through the mass, until their progress was blocked by sheer weight of numbers. a desperate melee took place--the troopers fighting with their sabers, the afghans with knives, and clubbed muskets. many of the soldiers were struck from their horses. some were dragged to their feet again, by their comrades; others were killed upon the ground. the chaplain of the force--the reverend mr. adams--had accompanied the troopers in the charge and, seeing a man jammed under a fallen horse, he leaped from his saddle and extricated him; and brought him off, in spite of the attack of several afghans. for this act of bravery he received the victoria cross, being the first chaplain in the army who had ever obtained that decoration. when the dust raised by the charging squadrons had subsided, it was seen that the enemy were still advancing. the lancers had fallen back and, as the men galloped in, they rallied behind captain gough's troop; which had kept best together, and had formed up again between the guns and the enemy. lieutenants hersee and ricardo, and sixteen of their men, had been left dead upon the ground. colonel cleland, lieutenant mackenzie, and seven of the troopers were wounded. a second charge was ordered; but this time it was not pushed home, as a wide water course checked the advance. under cover of the first cavalry charge, major smith-wyndham had ordered two of the guns to be taken off and, as he now fell back with the other two, one of them stuck in the water course. the greatest efforts were made, with the horses which still remained uninjured, to get the gun out; but the enemy were pressing close on. lieutenant hardy was killed, by a shot through the head, and the gun was abandoned. the other three guns were retired or yards farther; but here they became hopelessly bogged in a channel, deeper than any that had hitherto been met with. they were spiked, and left in the water; and the drivers and gunners moved off with the cavalry, just as the enemy poured down upon them. seeing the danger of the situation, and the large force of the enemy, general roberts had, on his first arrival, sent off a trooper at full gallop to general gough--who commanded at sherpur--ordering him to send out two hundred men of the nd highlanders, at the double, to hold the gorge leading direct from the scene of conflict to cabul. there was but a very small garrison of british troops in the city and, had the enemy made their way there, the townspeople would have risen, and a serious disaster taken place. after leaving the guns behind them, the cavalry retired steadily towards the village at the head of the gorge; keeping up a hot fire, with their carbines, on the enemy who pressed upon them. "ride back, sergeant gale," the general said, "and meet the nd. hurry them up at full speed--every minute is precious." william gale rode back at full speed. until a fortnight before, he had never been on a horse; but the animal which he rode was well trained and steady and, hitherto, he had had no difficulty in keeping his seat, as he trotted along with the escort. it was a different thing, now; for the ground was rough, and the horse going at a full gallop, and he clung on to the pummel of the saddle, to steady himself. as he passed through the village, he saw the highlanders coming along at a trot, half a mile further on; and was soon beside colonel brownlow, who commanded them. "the enemy are pressing the cavalry back, sir," he said as, with difficulty, he pulled up his horse. "the general desires you to use the greatest possible speed, as every moment is precious." panting and out of breath as the highlanders were, they responded to colonel brownlow's shout and, rushing forward almost at racing speed, reached the village while the afghans were still yards beyond it. they instantly opened such a fire upon the enemy that the latter ceased their advance, and soon fell back; and cabul was, for the moment, safe. chapter : the fight in the pass. the afghan force, after half an hour's effort to carry the village held by the highlanders, moved off to their left and, working along the hills, took post on the heights beyond bala-hissar. in the meantime general macpherson, having dispersed a strong body of the enemy up the valley, marched back towards cabul and, coming across the scene of the late action, brought in the bodies of the dead officers. the guns had already been carried off for, as the enemy advanced, colonel macgregor--collecting a handful of lancers and artillery men--worked round to their rear and--dispersing a small body of the enemy, who had lingered at a village near the guns--succeeded in extricating the cannon from the swamp, and carried them off to sherpur. from the signal post established above bala-hissar, an order was flashed to general baker--who was many miles away--to inform him of what had occurred, and to order him to march back, with all speed. late that evening he arrived, with his column; and the british force was again united. the next day, men of macpherson's brigade--composed of portions of the th, the nd, the rd sikhs, and th ghoorkas--were sent out to attack the enemy; who had established themselves upon a lofty peak, south of cabul. the afghans occupied the crest in strength and, hidden behind the hill, had or men lying in wait, to attack the assailing party in the rear as they pressed upwards. the position was, however, too strong to be carried. after several hours of fighting, the little british force had driven the afghans from the lower part of the hill; but were unable to mount towards the crest, for ammunition was running short, and the enemy were too strongly posted. general roberts therefore ordered macpherson to hold the ground which he had gained, until next morning, when more troops would be sent. at eight o'clock in the morning, accordingly, general baker moved out from sherpur, with a strong force, and attacked the enemy's position in flank; while macpherson continued his advance in front. the afghans fought desperately, and clung to their position until the british were close up; when a desperate hand-to-hand struggle took place, and the british became masters of the position. while the fighting had been going on, great masses of the enemy had come down from the end of the valley, and threatened the road between sherpur and cabul. the th lancers made a magnificent charge among them, broke them, and drove them back. several other brilliant charges were made, and the plain was kept clear of the enemy. captain butson, however--who commanded--was killed, and two other officers wounded. with each hour that passed the position grew more serious, as immense bodies of the enemy were seen, advancing from all sides. the city was now in open revolt, and the small garrison there with difficulty held their own. one more effort was made to drive the enemy off the hills. early on the th general baker, with infantry and eight guns, left the cantonment. after very severe fighting, the enemy were driven from their lowest positions but, as baker advanced, a body of from , to , of the enemy marched out across the plain, towards the position just captured. steadily they advanced, and the shells which our mountain guns sent among them, and the volleys poured down from the face of the hill, did not suffice to check them in the slightest. reassured by their own enormous numbers, and feeling that success was in their grasp, they pressed forward; and desperate fighting took place. a position held by the th punjaub infantry was carried by their attack, and two guns were lost; but the rest of the positions were maintained. seeing that it was impossible to hold the bala-hissar and cabul, in the face of the hordes opposed to him--which were estimated, by the general himself, as numbering , men; but which the afghans, themselves, afterwards acknowledged were between , and , --general roberts determined to concentrate his troops at sherpur. baker was ordered to maintain the position he held, at all costs, until the troops from the bala-hissar were withdrawn. this he did; and although, as he fell back, the afghan hordes swarmed round him, he fought his way back to sherpur and, by nightfall, all the british force were safely gathered in the cantonments there. two days previously, general roberts had telegraphed for the regiments most advanced in the passes, below, to come forward. they arrived on the morning of the th, and the general had no longer any anxiety as to his ability to hold the cantonments--for months, if necessary--against the attacks of the afghans. had these attacked on the morning following what was virtually a victory--whilst still flushed with triumph and excitement--it would have needed all the efforts of the english to hold their position, against so formidable an attack. the afghans, however, contented themselves with occupying several walled villages near the cantonment, and keeping up an incessant fire upon it. meanwhile, their main body indulged in wild excesses in cabul--sacking the hindoo quarter, and plundering all the shops, without much distinction of nationality. thus, three days elapsed; the british making the most of the time afforded them, by strengthening the weak points of their defenses lines of wagons were placed in the gap between the unfinished wall and the foot of the hill. wires were stretched in all directions, and chevaux-de-frise erected beyond. on the th the enemy came down in force and, for some hours, a tremendous musketry fire was kept up at the position; but the fire of the musketry and guns, from the walls, was so hot that they did not venture upon an attack. the following day general baker sallied out and attacked a fortified post, a few hundred yards from the wall. from this place the enemy had greatly annoyed the garrison. after some severe fighting the afghans were driven out, and the place blown up. on the evening of the nd the general received news that the afghans, having prepared a great number of ladders for the assault, intended to attack that night. there had been several similar warnings but, this time, the news proved correct. a signal fire was lit upon one of the heights at four in the morning and, at five o'clock, the plain was covered with the enemy. quietly they crept up in the darkness, towards the walls; and at six o'clock a prodigious shouting was heard, and from the villages, orchards, and enclosed ground upon all sides, the enemy dashed forward to the assault. as they approached, they opened fire on all sides; pressing chiefly towards the weak point, near the foot of the hills. but, tremendous as was the roar of the afghan fire, it was drowned by the roll of musketry which broke from the whole circuit of the walls; where the british troops, rifle in hand, had been lying for three hours, waiting the attack. so terrible was the storm of lead that swept the plain that the afghans paused, in their advance. for two hours they remained around the walls--yelling, shouting, and firing heavily--but all the efforts of their leaders could not induce them to rise from the ground, and hazard a charge. many dropped within eighty or ninety yards of the wall but, beyond that, the bravest dared not advance. when morning broke, the welcome news was brought down--from the outlook on the top of the hill--that far across the plain could be seen the tents of the force of general gough; who was coming up through the passes, to the relief of the garrison. the news had reached the assailants, also. considerable bodies of the enemy were observed moving out from cabul, as if with the intention of attacking the relieving force. the assailants of the british position--finding their inability to produce the smallest impression--were now beginning to waver; and general gough ordered the cavalry and horse artillery to go out, by the road which led through a gorge in a hill behind, and to sweep round and take them in the rear. this they did, with immense success. at the moment that they fell upon the enemy, the british infantry sallied out from the cantonment and attacked them in front. a panic seized the afghans. in a few minutes the whole plain was covered with flying fugitives; among whom our cavalry swept backward and forward, cutting them up in all directions; while the fire of our infantry, and of the guns on the walls, searched them through and through, whenever they attempted to gather in a knot, and make a stand. by nightfall, the whole of the afghans had either fled to the hills, or were driven into cabul. upon the following day general gough's force marched in but, before their arrival, it was found that the enemy had again evacuated the city; and the british were, as before, masters of the position. after the decisive defeat which had been inflicted upon them, and the dispersion of the great force which had gathered, confident of victory, there was little fear of any further attempt on the part of the enemy. they had brought their whole force into the field and, as this was defeated and dispersed, before the arrival of general gough with his reinforcements, it was evident that success could not be hoped for against the united strength of the english. the time passed quietly, now. the bala-hissar and cabul were reoccupied and, as the natives were cowed by the crushing defeat they had experienced, there was no longer any repetition of the insolent and defiant manner which they had, before, manifested. on the rd of january a message was brought to the orderly room that the general wished to see sergeant gale. upon his presenting himself at the general's quarters, sir frederick roberts--to his surprise--at once advanced, and shook him warmly by the hand. "mr. gale," he said, "i am very happy to inform you that the horse guards have acted upon my recommendation, seconded by that which was sent in by your colonel--who wrote at once, upon receiving a notification from me of the step i had taken, saying that you had distinguished yourself very highly, in the attack upon the peiwar-khotal, and that he was convinced that you would make, in all respects, an excellent officer. with my despatches that have just come in, i have received a notification that my request has been attended to; together with a copy of the gazette, in which you are appointed to the th regiment. "i have to congratulate you, sir. you are now an officer; and will, i am quite sure, do every credit to my recommendation." the young soldier was, for a moment, too moved at the tidings to speak coherently; but he murmured his thanks to the general for his kindness. "do not say anything about that," the general said, heartily. "it is a pleasure, to me, to have been able to advance a promising young soldier. "i am only sorry that you are not gazetted to a regiment in my own division. the th are at candahar; and unfortunately they will not, i understand, form part of a column with which general stuart will advance, in the spring, up the valley through ghuzni to this place. had it been so, it would have been best for you to wait their arrival here but, as it is, you had better go down the pass to india, and work round and join your regiment. it is a long road, but it is always best for a young officer to be with his regiment--especially when in the field--and it is possible that they may have their share of fighting, round candahar. "and now, there is one thing more. you will have to get an outfit, and there will be the expense of your travel, until you join your regiment. there will be no difficulty about an outfit. this you can procure easily, on the sale of some officer's effects. "by the by, poor young thompson, who died yesterday, was about your size; and you had better bid a lump sum for the whole of his kit. i shall be happy to be your banker for that, and the needful sum for your traveling expenses. when you join your regiment you will, of course, be able to draw your pay, from the date on which you were gazetted." will thanked the general very heartily for his offer, but said that he had pounds standing at his account at the bank of hindostan, which had been presented to him by the owners of the vessel in which he arrived there; and that this would be more than sufficient for all his needs, if the general would kindly authorize the staff paymaster to cash his drafts upon the bank. this request was at once granted. the paymaster of lieutenant thompson's regiment estimated that the effects of the young officer would sell, at auction, for about pounds; and this sum william gale gladly paid, thereby obtaining a complete outfit of regimental and civilian clothes, and under linen of all descriptions. another pounds bought him a horse and saddlery while, for pounds, he obtained a rough pony for the use of yossouf--who steadily refused to leave him, although will pointed out to him that, glad as he should be to have him with him, it would be far more to his advantage to remain among his people at cabul, where he had means of settling comfortably. upon the following day--having obtained his new uniform, which he found required no alteration to fit him fairly--william gale dined with general roberts; who had kindly invited him in order to introduce him, in his new position, to the officers of his staff he was obliged to remain three or four days longer at sherpur, until a strong escort, with sick, was going down through the passes to jellalabad. his baggage was stowed upon a camel and, after a kind adieu from general roberts, and a very cordial one from the staff sergeants--among whom he had worked for three months--he started with the convoy for the lower valleys. the escort consisted of a hundred men of the infantry of the guides. the way down the pass was difficult; but no snow had fallen for three weeks, and the roads were fairly beaten down by passing parties. still, their progress was slow and, late on the afternoon of the second day after starting, they were still four miles from the fort of jugdulluk; which was held by a british force, and where they were to halt for the night. the guides were on the alert. a party of four men were yards ahead of the little column, which was commanded by captain edwards. presently a shot rang out from the front, followed by a scattered discharge. william gale was, at the moment, riding by the side of captain edwards. he had already placed himself under that officer's orders, in case of any emergency. "mr. gale," captain edwards said, "will you ride forward at once, with six men, to the advanced party. when you get there, take such measures as you may think fit; and send me back word as to the strength and position of the enemy." with six of the guides, will at once rode forward; while captain edwards halted, until the little column was gathered closely together: the camels and dhoolies, with sick men, in the center; the soldiers, in readiness for action, around them. a soldier now ran up with a slip of paper, upon which will had scribbled, in pencil: "the enemy are apparently in considerable force. the defile opens here. they are disposed among rocks and boulders, on either side." will, on arriving at the advanced party, had found at once that the force of the enemy was too strong for him to attempt to move forward, at present. he had posted the men behind boulders by the wayside, ordering them to pick off any man that showed himself; and they were soon engaged in a sharp musketry skirmish with the enemy. one of their number had fallen at the first discharge; and will, taking his rifle, used it with effect, until the head of the convoy arrived. it was now fast becoming dark, and the flashes of the enemy's fire, from behind the rocks, showed how numerous were the assailants. "there must be a couple of thousands of the scoundrels," will said to captain edwards, as the latter came up to ascertain the state of affairs. "hampered with the convoy, the position is an awkward one. it is fortunate they attacked where they did; for we can hold our own here while, if they had waited till we got fairly down into this comparatively open valley, and then attacked us on both flanks, it would have been very awkward. "we must try and clear them out. we cannot stop here all night. it is freezing very sharp, now; and the cold will be intense, in an hour or two." "i will take thirty men," captain edwards said, "and skirmish along among the rocks on the left. do you take as many more, and move along the right of the path. the remaining forty shall stay here, under my sergeant, to guard the convoy from an attack in rear, in case any of the enemy should come down the defile behind us." the fight soon became exceedingly hot. making their way along the rocks, on either side of the path, the guides slowly drove the enemy before them. it was hard work, however, for the tribesmen fought steadily and, as those in front fell back upon those lower down the valley, their resistance became every moment more obstinate. eight of will's party had already fallen; but although, sword in hand, he was leading them, encouraging them with voice and gesture, not a bullet had as yet struck him. presently captain edwards, having crossed the valley, stood by his side. "we are at a standstill," he said. "nine of my men are killed or wounded, already; and the fellows are as thick as peas. i am afraid we shall never be able to force our way through. "there," he exclaimed, as a sound of firing was heard in the rear, "they have come down on the convoy from behind. we had better, i think, fall back a bit; and take post near the mouth of the defile. we must defend ourselves, as best we can, till morning." the movement was steadily executed, the wounded men being carried with them as they retired. the tribesmen advanced as they fell back--not venturing to press them, however; for the rear guard kept their faces towards them, and any who ventured to show themselves instantly paid the penalty of their rashness. for an hour the fight went on. it was night now, and dark as pitch in the deep valley in which the fight was going on; the position of the combatants being only indicated by the flickering flashes of the muskets. the afghans were gradually creeping nearer, as the guides could see, by the flashes. "if the fellows only make a determined rush at us," captain edwards said to will, "it will go hard with us. fortunately, they are as much in the dark as we are, and will find it difficult to gather for a rush." "i think we may hold out till morning but, by that time, news that we are blockaded here will spread throughout the hills, and we may have , of them down on us. i think, if you will give me leave, the best plan will be for me to try and make my way down to jugdulluk, to bring up help from there." "you would never get through," captain edwards advised. "it is a brave offer, gale, but could not be done." "i think it might be done," will said. "it is as dark as pitch. i will take my lad with me, and will borrow a native cap and cloak from one of the bearers--there are some afghans among them. i will take off my patrol jacket, and leave it behind me, and my boots. we will crawl along in the dark. "if--as is likely enough--we stumble against some of them, we will say we are wounded, and are making our way to the rear. they cannot see us in the dark, and my afghan will pass muster; and yossouf will certainly not be suspected. if i am discovered and killed, he will go forward and deliver the message." the plan seemed to offer every possibility of success; and captain edwards, seeing how serious the position was, consented to allow will to attempt it. a few words to yossouf sufficed to inform him of the task will was about to undertake, and he at once agreed to share the danger. a rough sheepskin cap was obtained for will from one of the camel men. his tunic was thrown off, and a posteen--or afghan sheepskin coat--was put on, in its place. he took a long matchlock, which the camel man carried, slung over his shoulders; took off his boots, and thrust a pair of loose afghan shoes into his belt. yossouf needed no preparations, beyond borrowing a matchlock. wringing captain edwards' hand, will stooped on his hands and knees and, with yossouf a pace or two ahead, began to crawl down the path. before starting, the orders had been sent round to the soldiers to fire at the rocks on either side of the path, but on no account to fire down the road, itself. as he expected, will found this clear of afghans, for a considerable distance. a heavy fire had, previous to their starting, been directed down this path; to prevent the afghans from gathering there in the darkness, preparatory to making a rush. they came across several dead bodies, but the enemy were all behind rocks, on one side or other of the road. when they had crawled a hundred yards, they were past the front line, from which the afghans were keeping up a heavy fire; but will knew that, from their numbers, they must extend far back down the valley and, indeed, from almost every rock the flashes of the matchlocks blazed out, as the lurking tribesmen fired in the direction of the mouth of the defile. they were nearly a quarter of a mile down when an afghan--who had been crouching behind a rock, close to the path--advanced into the road to fire, when he stumbled against yossouf. "what are you doing?" he exclaimed. "we are both wounded, by the kaffirs," yossouf answered; "and are making our way back, to bind up our wounds. i think my arm is broken; but i mean to come back again, to have a few more shots at the infidels." "good!" the afghan replied. "how goes it in front?" "their fire is lessening," yossouf said. "we must have killed many. we shall finish with them in the morning, if not before." the afghan fired, and then retired behind his rock to load again; while will and yossouf continued their way. a few hundred yards farther, they rose to their feet. will slipped on the afghan shoes; and they then proceeded, at a rapid pace, down the pass. several times they withdrew from the road, and hid beside it, as they met parties of tribesmen hurrying up to join in the attack but, in an hour after starting, they heard the welcome challenge of the sentry, at jugdulluk. saying who he was, will was at once passed forward into the fort, and taken to the quarters of the officer in command. "i am lieutenant gale, of the th," will said, "and was on my way down the pass with the convoy of wounded, and men of the guides, under captain edwards. they have been attacked at the lower end of the defile, some four miles above, by a very strong body of tribesmen. they are attacked front and rear. "i have made my way through to ask you if you can despatch a force to their rescue. were the tribesmen attacked in their rear, now, they might be scattered easily enough; but they are assembling very fast and, in the morning, it will be a difficult matter to reach them." "we have fancied," the officer said, "for the last two hours that we heard distant firing; but we could not be sure, for any noise echoes so, in these mountains. i will set out at once with you, with as many men as i can spare." chapter : at candahar. the garrison of jugdulluk consisted only of sikhs. the officer in command left seventy of these in charge of one of his subalterns, with the injunction to exercise the most extreme vigilance, in his absence. then with men, a subaltern, and will gale, he started up the path to effect the rescue of the beleaguered convoy. the road wound and turned frequently among the spurs of the lofty hills, which had cut off the sound of firing from the garrison; and only a faint and distant murmur was audible, when they started. after marching two miles, however, the rattle of the musketry became clear and distinct. upon the way the officer in command learned, from will, the exact position of things in front, and the situation of the afghans. when within half a mile of the scene of action, fifty men were thrown out on either side of the road; while the other fifty advanced, very slowly, along the center the orders to the flankers were to search among the rocks, as they advanced, and to bayonet or shoot every afghan they found among them. it was not long before they came upon the enemy. then the rifles cracked out; and the wild shouts of the afghans betokened their astonishment at being thus, unexpectedly, assailed in rear. numerous as they were, they offered but a light resistance. their one thought was to effect their escape; and they hurried rapidly away as the relief advanced, climbing the steep sides of the valley by paths only known to themselves; and then, from the hillside far above, opening a scattered fire, at random, down into the valley. in five minutes, all resistance had ceased. the flanking parties were ordered to shelter themselves behind the rocks, and to return the fire of the natives on the hillsides; to retain the position until the convoy passed through, and then to close behind it, as a rear guard. with the fifty men in the road, the officer then pushed forward; and was soon greeted by a shout of welcome from the defenders of the defile. there was not a minute to be lost; for the afghans, when they recovered from their first scare, would renew the attack; and the party pressing down the defile on their rear--ignorant of what had taken place below--were still keeping up an incessant fire. twenty-eight of the guides were already killed, or wounded. several of the sick men, in the dhoolies, volunteered to walk down to the fort, and to give up their places to those of the wounded men who were unable to walk and, in a few minutes, the convoy moved forward. the fifty men of tho relieving party placed themselves in their rear and, as the tribesmen who had been attacking them from behind rushed down through the defile, with exulting shouts--believing that they were now secure of their victims--the sikhs opened so heavy a fire on them that they fell back up the defile, in disorder. as the convoy wound down the valley, the enemy again assembled on the hills and pursued them hotly. but the sikhs and guides kept up so steady a fire that they did not venture to approach to close quarters and, with a loss of eighteen more men, the convoy reached the shelter of the fort. conscious of their inability to attack this position, the afghans drew off. on returning to his friends, will had resumed his uniform; and now, on reaching the fort, captain edwards expressed to him his warmest thanks for the hazardous adventure that he had undertaken. "i shall, of course," he concluded, "furnish a full report of the affair to the general; and i should think he would recommend you for the victoria cross. if any fellow ever deserved it, you do so; for it seemed, to me, almost certain death to venture through the pass. i never expected to see you again; and i was never more glad, in my life, than i was when the firing began down below in the valley, and knew that help was at hand for, had you failed, it would have been all up with us. i doubt if we should have seen the morning and, at any rate, few of us would have been left, by that time." the convoy reached jellalabad without further adventure, and captain edwards reported to the general the events of the march. he was requested to give a full written report of the affair; and the general stated that, in forwarding it, he should certainly append a recommendation that lieutenant gale should receive the victoria cross, for his gallantry in venturing through the afghans to fetch assistance for the convoy. will himself, as soon as he reached jellalabad, hurried away to the cantonment of the norfolk rangers; who were in a village, a mile distant from the town. he was not recognized, as he passed through the soldiers scattered about the village street; and was soon at the principal house, where the colonel had his quarters. on sending in his name, he was at once shown into the room where the colonel was at work. "i am indeed glad to see you," the latter said, rising and shaking him heartily by the hand; "and i congratulate you, most warmly, on your promotion. i promised to do what i could for you, when you joined; but i did not expect that it would be so soon." "i am indeed obliged to you, colonel, for your kindness," will said; "and am conscious how much i owe to you." "not at all, my boy, not at all. it was general roberts, himself, who recommended you for your commission; and i was only too glad to back up his recommendation, to the best of my power. we all thought you were gone, when you were reported as missing at ali-kheyl, and we heard from the sentry that--having gone forward, to investigate the origin of a noise he had reported to you--you were suddenly fired upon; and that he saw no more of you, as he ran back to the picket. i was glad, indeed, when the report was received from poor cavagnari that, upon his arrival at cabul, he had found you there, just recovering from your wounds. "then, of course, we gave you up again, when we heard of the massacre of the mission; and it seemed like a resurrection from the dead when i got a letter from roberts, saying you were found again, and that he was recommending you for a commission. "i see by the gazette you are appointed to the th, and we were expecting to see you on your way down. had you any difficulty in getting through the passes?" "the convoy was attacked, sir, by the tribesmen, when near jugdulluk; but the garrison came out to our rescue, and we got through safely. but we had thirty men killed or wounded." "a smart affair!" the colonel said. "and now, of course, you will take up your quarters with us, for a day or two, before you go on. the officers will all be glad to see you; and you will be able to tell us all about the attack on the mission, and the recent fighting. roberts has been having some hot work, there. "we have been grumbling horribly at our bad luck. we thought, at the time, we were fortunate at being sent back to india, when peace was signed, instead of being kept in the khurum valley. but the consequence has been that we have been out of it all. however, we must look upon you as our representative." will hesitated about staying, but the colonel overruled his objection; saying that, as there would be no fighting until the spring, there could be no particular hurry for him to join his regiment. a spare room was placed at his disposal, in the colonel's quarters, and will was soon made at home. the officers flocked in, upon hearing of his arrival; and all congratulated him, most warmly, upon his promotion. an hour later, a mounted orderly rode up to the colonel's quarters. "is lieutenant gale here?" he asked. will went forward. "a note from the general," the orderly said and, handing it to him, "also one for colonel shepherd." illustration: letters from the general. will's note was simply an invitation to dine, that evening, with the general. the colonel's letter was as follows: "colonel shepherd, "as lieutenant gale was promoted from your regiment, i think it is likely that he has found his way to you. i have written to ask him to dinner; please spare him to me. i hope you will do me the pleasure of accompanying him. he has performed a most gallant action; and i have just had the pleasure of writing a dispatch, recommending him for the v.c." will and the colonel at once wrote notes, accepting the invitation. when these had been sent out to the orderly the colonel read aloud, to the officers present, the note he had received from the general. "now," he said, turning to will, "what is that you have been doing? you told us the convoy had been attacked, and sharply pressed; but you said nothing of your share in the affair. what was it?" "it was simple enough, sir," will answered, coloring hotly. "we were surrounded, just at the mouth of the defile. the enemy held the valley in front in great force, and another party were pressing on our rear. things looked awkward; and so i volunteered, with my faithful afghan boy, to get through the fellows in front, and make my way down to jugdulluk--which was four miles away--to bring the garrison up on their rear. "it was simple enough and, in fact, there was less danger than in remaining with the convoy, to be popped at by the afghans. the night was very dark and, down in the bottom, one could hardly see one's hand. the afghans had been cleared pretty well off the road, by our fire; so there was no difficulty, whatever, in making our way down. we were, in fact, only questioned once; and my boy's statement, that we were wounded and were going to the rear, was accepted at once." "the fact that you succeeded," the colonel said, "does not detract from the pluck required to attempt such an adventure. to my mind, there is more courage required in venturing, alone, through the midst of the afghans, at night, than there would be in charging any number of them, in hot blood, in the light. you have earned the v.c. well, gale; and i am sure we all feel proud of you, though you do not belong to us, now." there was a chorus of approval from the officers around. "i don't belong to you now, sir, but," will said, earnestly, "i shall always feel, whatever regiment i may be with, that the norfolk rangers are my corps. it is the kindness which was shown me, here, which has put me in the way of rising; and i shall never forget it." it was now time to dress for dinner; and will, for the first time, arrayed himself in full-dress uniform. the buttons and facings he would, of course, get altered when he joined the regiment. the general received gale with great kindness. he had a large party to dinner. among them was captain edwards; and after the table was cleared the latter--at the general's request--gave a full account of the attack upon the convoy; and will was then called upon to relate the part which he had taken in it, which he did very modestly and quietly. for two days longer he stopped at jellalabad; and then, with a hearty farewell to the officers of the rangers, he started down the pass. he again journeyed with a convoy for, although the tribes below jellalabad were cowed into submission, many attacks were made, by the mountaineers, upon small parties going up or down the passes; and stringent orders had been issued that no officer should go down, except when accompanied by an escort. after a week's traveling will arrived, with yossouf, at peshawur. then he rode, by easy stages, until he reached the indus where, taking his place on a steamer, he traveled down the river to sukkur; where he disembarked, and started for the weary march, across the desert, to the foot of the bolan. along the road large numbers of coolies were at work, constructing a line of railway, which was now almost complete to the foot of the pass. it did not ascend this but, turning to the right, wound up the hills to the plateau. it was intended to be taken on to candahar, and its completion would have been an immense boon, both to that city and to india; as it would have opened a great trade to the north, and have enabled the inhabitants of the fertile plain, around candahar, to send their corn, fruit, and other products down to india. unhappily, with the subsequent abandonment of candahar the formation of the railway was stopped; and the whole allowed to go to ruin. the work has, however, been recently taken in hand again. will and his follower ascended the bolan; stopped a day or two at quettah, to rest their horses; and then proceeded on through the fertile plains of pisheen, and over the kojak pass, and thence on to candahar. here will joined his new regiment, and was well received by its officers. in every regiment in the service, an officer risen from the ranks is invariably received with special courtesy, and kindness. every endeavor is made to place him at his ease, in his new position. this is specially so when--as in will's case--the promotion has been earned by distinguished services in the field. in most instances, officers promoted from the rank of sergeant are a good deal older than the young lieutenants among whom they find themselves. being often married men, and having nothing but their pay to depend upon, they find themselves, therefore, unable to take much part in the pleasures and gaieties of the regiment. in india, however, as the rate of pay is much higher, an unmarried officer can live very comfortably on his pay; and as, in the field, the expenses are far less than when a regiment is in cantonments at a large station--where there is much gaiety--will found that he was able to live very comfortably, on his pay, in the same style as that of his comrades. they, on their part, were pleased to find in will a young fellow of the same age as the other junior lieutenants and, withal, a pleasant, gentlemanly young man. the fact, too, that he had seen so much service, had gone through stirring adventures, and had fought by the side of cavagnari in the bala-hissar, made him quite a hero among them; and will was soon thoroughly one of themselves. when it was known that the regiment was likely to remain at candahar for some time, many luxuries had been brought up from india; together with means of passing away the time, such as the necessary appliances for cricket, racket, and other games. among these, too, were several boxes of books; and will--who had, at first, a little amused his comrades by his absolute ignorance of cricket, but who soon became a promising recruit at that game--steadily devoted three hours a day to reading, in order to improve his mind, and to obtain a knowledge of the various matters which were topics of conversation among his comrades. above all he diligently studied the newspapers--great parcels of which arrived every week--in order to obtain some knowledge of the political state of affairs in england, the position of parties, and the various matters occupying public attention. he had, at first, found his ignorance of these matters a great drawback to him, in general conversation; but he discovered that newspapers, rather than books, are useful in enabling a man to mix with his fellows in social talk; and that the current events of the day form ninety-nine hundredths of the subjects of conversation. the fact that all his mess mates had been thoroughly posted in the history of rome and greece, that they could read these languages almost a well as english, that they had been coached in high mathematics, and had a knowledge of french and german, gave them--will found--very little advantage in general conversation; and he was surprised to discover how entirely useless, from a practical point of view, is much of the instruction which must be mastered by young men, before obtaining a commission. many times, when talking with the young officers with whom he was most intimate, he inquired of them what good they found the learning they had obtained, during their many years of schooling; and was surprised at the universal reply: "no good, whatever!" he found, however, that some of the more thoughtful of them admitted that they had gained increased powers of thought, and reasoning, from their training. "that is the good of education, gale," captain fletcher--who commanded will's company--said to him one day. "a certain time must be spent upon education, and the course of study is intended to strengthen and improve the mental powers. as far as soldiers are concerned, it would certainly be of more practical use if the time we spent at school on greek, and mathematics, had been expended in acquiring three or four european and indian languages. but you see, boys educated at the same school must all work together, and study the same books, whatever the profession for which they are intended is. our practical--that is, our professional education--only begins when we go to woolwich, or sandhurst. "perhaps, some day, a different system will be employed. there will be special schools for lads intended for various professions, and careers. till that is done, we must all work upon a common basis; which has at least the advantage of forming the mind, for the after work of acquiring the special branches of knowledge required, by us, in the careers we may adopt. "if you ask my advice i should not, at your time of life, dream of setting to to learn the dead languages, or to study mathematics. read the histories of rome and greece, and study that of your own country. read books of travel and the biographies of great men, and keep yourself well posted--as you are doing--in current public events. you will then find yourself able to take part, on equal terms, in any conversation which may be going on. you will, indeed, be considered by strangers an exceptionally well-informed young fellow; and you may pass through life without any person having a suspicion that latin, greek, and mathematics--the cardinal points of an ordinary education--are wholly unknown to you." will was cheered by the advice and, henceforth, directed his studies only in the direction which captain fletcher had indicated. at the beginning of april, a large diminution had taken place in the force stationed at candahar; as general sir donald stewart marched, with the greater portion of the force, for cabul. the route led through a country which was the stronghold of the fanatical party--the important town of ghuzni containing the most fanatical population in all afghanistan. this had been the center whence the attacks on general roberts had been organized, and it was deemed necessary to march a strong force through the country, to overawe the tribesmen, and break up their organization. the march was uneventful as far as shahjui, the limit of the candahar province. at this point the taraki country begins. the mollahs here had been actively preaching a holy war, and several thousand men were reported as having collected. the villages were found to be deserted, and everything betokened an active opposition to the advance. when the head of the column arrived at ahmed-khel, a body of the enemy--estimated at from , to , --were seen clustered on a semicircle of hills, beyond the village. the baggage of the column stretched far along the road, and it was all important to prevent the enemy from falling upon this long line. general stewart therefore determined to attack them. the two batteries of artillery opened fire upon the enemy; who at once, in reply, rushed down to the assault. the charge was led by some or ghazis--as they were called--fanatics, who had sworn to give their lives in carrying out their object, of exterminating the hated infidel. some of these men were armed with rifles and matchlocks; some with heavy swords, knives, and pistols; others, again, with pikes made of bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened upon long sticks. some were on foot, and some on horseback. with wild yells, the mass rushed down upon our troops; and so sudden and unexpected was the attack, so swiftly did they cross the or yards of intervening ground, that they came upon the british before preparation could be made for their reception. at the moment when they charged, some of the cavalry were moving across in front of the infantry; and these, before they could be got into a line for a charge, were surrounded by the enemy. in an instant they were lost to sight, in the cloud of dust and smoke. it was a hand-to-hand struggle and, in the confusion, a troop charged to the right, in rear of the main line of the infantry, and burst into the midst of the th punjaub infantry; who were in reserve, in rear of the position occupied by the general and his staff. in a moment, all was confusion. the ammunition mules were stampeded, riderless horses dashed hither and thither and, close behind the cavalry, the ghazis--with a furious rush--dashed in among the broken infantry. upon the left flank, too, the ghazis swept round in the rear of our infantry line and, for a time, it seemed as if the whole british formation was broken up--in which case the numbers of their foes must have prevailed. colonel lister, v.c. however--who commanded the rd ghoorkas--threw his men rapidly into company squares, and poured a tremendous fire into the fanatics. all along the line the attack raged; and so hurriedly had the battle commenced that many of the men had not even fixed bayonets. desperate was the hand-to-hand fighting, and valor more conspicuous than that of the ghazis was never shown. furiously they threw themselves upon the line of their opponents; clutching their muskets and trying to wrench them from their hands, while they strove to cut down their holders. many of them threw themselves upon the fixed bayonets, and died in the endeavor to cut down the soldiers with their swords; but the three regiments which formed the line--one british (the th), one ghoorkas, and one sikhs--alike held their own, and poured rolling volleys into the ranks of the enemy. desperately the ghazis strove to capture the guns; which were firing case and shrapnel into them, at a distance of thirty yards, mowing them down in hundreds. not even would this terrible slaughter have checked them, had not the nd punjaub cavalry most gallantly charged them, again and again. the general, surrounded by his escort, was in the midst of the fight--the enemy having burst in between the guns and the th foot--and officers and troopers had, alike, to fight for their lives; several of the escort being killed and wounded. at last, however, the ghazis fell back from the terrible fire. the st punjaub cavalry, coming up from the rear, joined the nd in a hot pursuit; and our native allies the hazaras, seeing the afghans in retreat, also rushed out after them, and the rout of the enemy was complete. the fighting had lasted about an hour, and the enemy left over a thousand dead on the field, besides the bodies which had been carried off their wounded, of course, were far more numerous. ghuzni surrendered without opposition, when the column reached it; the fighting men having been engaged in the battle of ahmed-khel, and having had enough of hostilities. on the rd of april, a force under brigadier general palliser advanced against a large body of natives, who had assembled near the village of ghalez--again led by the ghazis. these rushed to the attack, with a courage and desperation equal to that shown by the fanatics in the previous battle. our men however were, this time, prepared; and were able to inflict very heavy losses upon the enemy, without allowing them to get to close quarters. this was the end of the afghan resistance. general stewart moved on to cabul without further fighting, and effected a junction there with the force under general roberts. chapter : on the helmund. with the junction of the forces of generals stewart and roberts, what may be called the second period of the afghan war came to an end. all opposition had ceased, and it appeared probable that there would be no more fighting. abdul-rahman, a prince of the royal house who--after for some time fighting against sheer ali--had been defeated, and obliged to fly the country; had, for a long time, been a resident among the russians. upon the abdication of yakoub he had crossed the frontier, and had entered at the north of afghanistan; assuming the title of ameer. he had been well received in that part of the country, and as no other competitor for the throne appeared to have chances equal to his, and as the british government were most anxious to withdraw their forces from the country, his authority was recognized by us. negotiations were opened with him; and it was arranged that, as he approached cabul, the british force would retire. the summer had passed not unpleasantly, at candahar. the country was peaceful. cricket matches were got up between the various regiments, and horse races established. candahar was governed by a protege of the british, named wali shere ali. he had organized a native army, to support his authority upon our withdrawal. the only circumstances which occurred to mar the pleasing time were isolated attacks, upon british officers and men, by ghazis. these attacks were sometimes made in broad daylight, in the streets of candahar, where the escape of those who perpetrated them was impossible. these fanatics regarding their own life with indifference, so that they could but kill one or more of the british, before being cut down. one day, as william gale was walking in the principal street of candahar, at a short distance behind colonel ripon--an indian official of very long standing and experience, who had come up on a special mission to arrange, with the wali, the details of the civil government of the province--he saw three afghans, who were loitering in the road, draw their long tulwars and dash upon that officer. the first who reached him delivered a sweeping blow; which the colonel, taken by surprise, partly received on his uplifted arm--but was struck to the ground. another of the ghazis raised his sword; but before it could fall will gale--who saw at once that he was too far behind to interpose between the assailant and the victim--drew his revolver from his belt and, taking a hasty aim, fired. the shot was an accurate one; the bullet striking the afghan on the forehead, just as he was about to strike. he fell forward on the colonel; receiving, as he did so, a tremendous blow which the third ghazi was aiming at the prostrate man. illustration: will saves colonel ripon. before the blow could be repeated, will had bounded forward and, sword in one hand and revolver in the other, faced the two afghans. another shot freed him of one of his assailants; just as the other, rushing recklessly forward, aimed a blow at him--which he was not quick enough to parry. his right arm fell to his side but, in an instant, he threw himself upon his foe; and the two fell heavily to the ground, the afghan striving desperately to shorten his sword, so as to use the point; while will strove to liberate his left arm--which was under the man--and so use his revolver, which he still grasped. at this moment some soldiers of the th ran up; and one of them, with his bayonet--which, since these attacks began, were always carried at the belt--brought the conflict to a conclusion, by running it through and through the ghazi's body. will soon rose to his feet. colonel ripon had already freed himself from the body of the dead ghazi, and had struggled to his feet; the blood streaming from his head and arm. "i have to thank you for my life, sir," he said, warmly. "had your aid come but two seconds less promptly, they would have finished me. "but i fear you are severely wounded." "oh, no!" will answered. "it is only a flesh wound, from my shoulder to my elbow. luckily, my sword partly caught the blow. i was aiming at the other fellow, and had not time to parry fairly. i shall be none the worse for it, in a week's time. my wound is less severe than yours, sir." "we are both bleeding pretty freely," the colonel said. "my quarters are close at hand and, as the principal medical officer lives in the same house, you cannot do better than come in with me." in a few minutes their wounds were bandaged, the doctor saying that no serious harm had been done, in either case; but that care and quiet, lest fever should supervene, would be necessary for a week or two. as the house was much more airy, and commodious, than that in which will was quartered, the colonel begged him so strongly to move his quarters thither, until able to return to duty, that will agreed to do so; and was soon installed, with yossouf in attendance, in the colonel's quarters. he was greatly pleased with the old officer, whose manner was most kind and courteous; and who, from his long experience in india, was full of anecdotes and information concerning the country. ten days after the struggle, the doctor told them that there was no longer any occasion for his services. their wounds were healing favorably, and all fear of fever had passed. at the same time, it would still be some time before either could take their arms from their slings. the following day, in honor of his convalescence, colonel ripon invited several friends to dinner; among them general burrows, and colonel galbraith of the th. all had, of course, heard the details of the attack on colonel ripon; and will was congratulated, warmly, upon the promptness that he had showed. "do you know, colonel," general burrows said, as they were smoking their cigars after dinner, "there is a wonderful likeness between you and lieutenant gale. i should have taken you for father and son, anywhere." the other officers agreed with the remark. the likeness was certainly strong. both were men of six feet in height. the colonel's hair and mustache were grizzled, and his face bronzed with the sun of many indian summers. he was thin and spare of habit; but his shoulders were broad, and it was evident that, in his youth, he must have possessed much of the muscular strength which was apparent in will's more rounded limbs. but it was in their eyes that there was the greatest similarity. both were gray, and of nearly the same shade; both had a simple, straightforward, and kindly expression; both were shaded by straight, and rather heavy eyebrows. the men looked at each other. "i suppose he is like me," colonel ripon said; "still more like, i fancy, what i remember myself, at his age; but curiously enough he has--ever since i met him--been recalling some one else to my mind;" and a shade passed over his face. seeing that colonel ripon was not disposed to talk further on the subject, a fresh topic of conversation was started. there was news that ayoub khan--the brother of yakoob, who was governor at herat--was marching south, at the head of a large force, with the intention of opposing abdul-rahman, and again reseating yakoob on the throne. he had also preached a holy war against the british. "i fear that the trouble is serious," general burrows said. "the troops ayoub is bringing with him have not yet met us in the field. the population on the road is wild and fanatical, in the extreme; and will, no doubt, join him to a man. on the other hand, the troops of the wali are not to be depended upon, and the brunt of the fighting is sure to fall upon us." three days later, the order was issued by general primrose that the th regiment, the bombay grenadiers, and jacob's rifles; together with the rd scinde horse and rd bombay cavalry, with a battery of artillery; were to move out with the wali's army towards girishk, on the river helmund, which formed the boundary between the province of candahar and that of herat. after the long period of inactivity at candahar, will was delighted at the thought of taking part in an expedition, with his regiment; but when they reached the helmund life was, for some time, exceedingly monotonous. the news of ayoub's advance greatly excited the population--who had been further worked up by agents, widely distributed through the country; and by the exhortations of the mollahs and ghazis. consequently, rambling at any distance from the camp was forbidden; and the shooting parties, which had been one of the great resources of their life at candahar, were peremptorily put an end to. colonel ripon had accompanied the force, as the wali's adviser. both he and will had recovered completely from their wounds. when the regiment first marched, indeed, the surgeon had strongly recommended will to remain behind, until his wound had completely healed; but the young officer had so strongly begged to be allowed to accompany the regiment that the surgeon had consented. his colonel had, for a time, relieved him from all duty, and he rode in rear of the regiment; but within a fortnight of their arrival at the helmund, he was able to lay aside his sling, and to take his turn of regular duty. the officers did all that they could to make existence tolerable, on the sandy shores of the helmund. they got up foot races and athletic sports for the men, played cricket on the sands, and indulged in a bath--twice a day--in the river. will often spent the evening in colonel ripon's tent. a warm friendship had arisen between the two officers, and each day seemed to bring them closer together. all this time, ayoub's army was known to be approaching. it had been delayed by want of transport, and by the difficult nature of the country over which it had to pass. the guns, too--of which it was reported to have a large number--had greatly hampered it but, by the second week in july, it was near at hand. for some time, the wali's troops had been showing signs of insubordination; and little doubt was entertained that they had been tampered with, by ayoub's emissaries. the question of disarming them was several times discussed; but the wali maintained his faith that they would remain true to their salt, and the british force was so small that it was deemed imprudent to take any step to diminish their strength, by dispensing with the services of a strong body of men who might, after all, be faithful at the critical moment. moreover, it was doubtful whether they would submit to be disarmed, by a force so inferior to their own. should the attempt to disarm them succeed, they must either be escorted back to candahar, by a strong detachment of the british; or be permitted to disperse, in which case they would assuredly swell the advancing army of ayoub. one day will arranged to start, the next morning at daybreak, for a day's shooting with four other young officers--hammond and fortescue of jacob's rifles, and plater and lowther of the grenadiers. the country round the camp had been already shot over, so they were to go some miles out. will's colonel--in giving him leave off parade for the day--had asked him to endeavor to ascertain, at any village he might enter, the state of the feeling of the natives respecting ayoub, and their disposition towards the british; points on which a deplorable ignorance existed, in the camp. the party started before daybreak, putting their wiry little tats--or native ponies--into a gallop, so as to reach the spot--eight miles distant--where they were to begin to shoot as early as possible; so as to get two or three hours' sport, before the heat of the day really set in. after an hour's ride, they overtook their servants; who had gone on ahead, with the guns and luncheon. the sun was but just above the horizon, and the morning air was cool and pleasant. dismounting, they handed over the ponies to the servants and, taking the guns and ammunition, set out on foot. the servants were to go on, with the ponies and lunch, to a village in the hills, four miles distant; and to get tiffin ready, by eleven o'clock. the young officers set out on foot, keeping a short distance apart. two of their servants accompanied them, to carry the game; the other three went with the two syces, who looked after the ponies the ground was broken and stony, and altogether uncultivated, except in the neighborhood of the villages. they had better sport than they expected, for hares darted out in numbers from behind the rocks. some of these were bowled over, while others escaped; and there was much bantering and laughter among the young men, none of whom were first-class shots. as the sun rose higher the game became more scarce and, by ten o'clock, the party turned their faces towards the village where they were to lunch; and which lay, they calculated, a mile or two away on their right. the sun was now blazing down upon them; and they were glad, indeed, when they came in sight of the village--which was not perceived until they were close to it, as it lay in a deep and rocky valley. yossouf met them, as they entered the village. "well, yossouf, where have you laid the tiffin?" "i have spread it, sahib, on a level piece of ground, in the shade of the chief's house. he did not seem disposed to be civil and, indeed, i thought that it would be more pleasant out of doors, in the shade, than inside." "much more pleasant, yossouf; and these forts, as they call them, are generally stuffy places, with small windows. what is the feeling of the people here?" "they are looking forward to ayoub's coming, sir, when they say a holy war will be preached, and every man will rise against the infidels. when they found i was a countryman, they talked freely enough before me; especially as i led them to believe that i had been taken prisoner, at cabul, and forced to accompany you as a sort of slave. "i should recommend that, as soon as tiffin is over, you should start for the camp; for i don't think it is quite safe, here." "they would never think of attacking us, yossouf, with our force within an easy day's march." "i don't know, sir," yossouf said, doubtfully. "they say that the wali's men are all with them; and that these, alone, are quite sufficient to eat up the three british regiments." "they will find out their mistake, if they try it. however, yossouf, i will let the others know what you think." by this time, they had arrived at the spot where the lunch was laid out; and very tempting it looked, to hungry men. a great dish of curry--made with some fowls purchased in the village--was the principal dish; but there were some fish--which yossouf had caught in the helmund, on the previous day--a roast of young kid, and several dishes of fresh fruit. a large vessel of porous clay, containing the drinking water, stood close by; and the necks of some bottles of claret peeped, out from a tub full of water; while a pitcher of cold tea was ready, for those who preferred it. the young men set to with a vigorous appetite and, when the meal was over, pipes and cigars were lighted; and they prepared to enjoy a rest, until the heat of the day was past. will now told them what yossouf had said. "oh, nonsense, gale!" hammond said. "your boy is an afghan, and these fellows are always dreaming about treachery. "they are scowling, sulky-looking brutes," he said, looking at a group of natives, who stood watching them, with lowering eyes, "and of course, they hate us as infidel dogs but, as to attacking us, it's all nonsense." "well, you know, hammond, these ghazis do attack us, in all sorts of places--as i have found, to my cost--and these villages abound with these fanatics." "oh, yes," fortescue said, lazily, "of course they do; but we have got our revolvers handy, and our guns are within reach of our hands. we should make precious short work of any ghazis who were to run amuck among us. "well, i for one don't mean to move, till it gets a bit cooler. if these fellows want to attack us, they have got the chance, now; and there is no more reason they should do it, three hours hence, than when we are having our breakfast, quietly." chapter : the battle of maiwand. the servants were squatting in a circle near their masters, and enjoying their share of the breakfast. the two syces were beloochees, the others were men from the deccan--the regiment having been stationed at poona, before going up into afghanistan. of these, the syces alone understood the afghan language. after the men had finished their meal, yossouf strolled away by himself into the village. when he returned, will saw that he wished to speak to him so, rising carelessly from the ground, he walked to the ponies--which were tied up near--and called yossouf, as if to give him some instructions respecting them. "well, yossouf, what is it? have you learned anything?" "no, sir, nothing. but the people no longer speak to me freely. they must have guessed, when they saw me speaking to you, that i was warning you; but i don't think things are right. the children are all in the houses, instead of playing about in the street. a few of the women are standing at their doors, but most of them are inside, too." "but if the men are thinking of attacking us why shouldn't they do so, at once?" "there are not above twenty or thirty men here, sahib. they may not think they are strong enough. perhaps they have sent to some of the villages, for help." "likely enough, yossouf; i did not think of that. do you go up above the village, and have a good look round. i will try and persuade my friends to be moving." yossouf moved off at once; and will stood for a minute or two, thinking what was the best to do. the position was not pleasant. yossouf's suspicions might be altogether unfounded; but will had found him to be so uniformly right, on former occasions, that he did not like to neglect his advice, now. after a little further thought, he joined his companions. "come," he said, "we had really better be moving. i believe we are in real danger." the earnestness with which he spoke roused the others, who were all lying at full length on the ground. "but as we said before, gale," fortescue urged, "why shouldn't they now attack us, if they wanted to? we have been here more than an hour." "perhaps they may think we shall all take a nap, after our tiffin," will replied; "perhaps--as yossouf thinks--they have sent off to some other villages, for assistance. he has gone up the hillside to look out. anyhow, i can assure you, i think we had better be moving." "it is beastly hot," hammond said, getting up and stretching himself; "but as you are so earnest about it, gale, perhaps we had better make a move. as you say, you know no end more of these fellows than we do; and you certainly ain't a fellow to get into a funk about nothing. "come on, boys, we had better do as gale tells us." "that's right," will said, cheerfully. "and look here, if we get away from here without any disturbance, and find it all right, we can halt again, at the first shady place we come to; and stop there for two or three hours, till it gets cool." "wait a moment," he went on, as hammond was about to order the ponies to be saddled. "just let us settle what we had best do, should they attack us; which, if they mean it, they will do when they see we are moving off. "i have been thinking it over. we have all got bullets in our pockets, to drop into our guns over the shot, in case of necessity. but these smooth-bore fowling pieces are of no good, except at close quarters; while the afghan matchlocks will carry straight, a long way. therefore, if we had to make a running fight of it, we should get the worst of it; for these fellows could keep up with us, easily--besides, there are the servants. therefore, if a shot is fired, my advice is that we should make a dash at the chief's house. seize that, and hold it." "yes, that would be a good plan," fortescue said, for they were all sobered now, by will's gravity; and convinced that there must be good grounds for his belief in danger. "look here, gale, we are all senior to you in the date of our commissions, but you have seen no end of service and adventure; therefore i vote that you shall be commanding officer, until we get back to camp." the others willingly agreed. "very well," will said, "i will do my best. "hammond, will you tell your servant to get ready for a start, at once. speak to him quietly and carelessly. then, as the men move up more towards the ponies, tell them--in hindustanee--to go about their work quietly but, in case of any trouble with the afghans, to out with their swords, and join us in a rush at the chief's house." hammond carried out his instructions. the two beloochees were not taken by surprise; for they, as well as yossouf, had been feeling uneasy at the disappearance of all women and children from the scene. the other men looked startled; but they were stout fellows and, as all the native servants, were armed with swords, to enable them to resist sudden attacks by the country people; and as they had unbounded faith in their masters, they went about the work of packing up the plates and dishes, and preparing for a start, quietly enough. as the syces began to put the saddles on the tats, the afghans spoke quickly and angrily together. two or three minutes later, yossouf arrived. he had evidently been running, for his breath came quick; but he now walked forward in a leisurely way. "two large parties are coming, master; one down the valley, and the other across the hills. they have got flags with them, and i am sure they are going to attack us." just at this moment an afghan lad joined his seniors, and spoke rapidly to them. will judged at once that he also had been placed on the watch. the chief of the village, accompanied by two or three of his men, now stepped forward. "ask the sahibs," he said to yossouf, "why they are in such a hurry--why they want to start in the heat of the day? they had better wait till it is cooler." will did not wait for yossouf's translation, but answered direct: "we have duties at the camp, and must return at once." the chief was surprised that one of the young officers should speak his tongue so fluently. "it looks as if you were not pleased with the hospitality of our village," he said, "that you should hurry away so quickly." "we are content with it--so far--but we must be off, now. "bring up the ponies quickly," he said to yossouf. "never mind those things, there is not a moment to be lost." yossouf and the servants brought up the ponies. the chief laid his hand on one of the bridles, and drew a pistol. "kaffir dogs," he said, "you shall not leave us, at all." will's hand was already on his revolver and, before the chief could level his pistol, he fired; and the afghan fell dead. there was a shout of rage from the others, and their long matchlocks were leveled it was well the party were prepared, or all might have been shot down, at once; but the instant will fired, his friends raised their double-barreled guns to their shoulders and let fly the contents among the afghans who--thrown into confusion by the sudden and unexpected attack--fired wildly, several of them dropping, from the effects of the shot. "now," will shouted, "to the house, everyone of you!" there was a rush and, before the afghans knew what had happened, the little party had burst through those standing at the door of the house, and had barred and bolted it within. there were but two men inside; and these, running upstairs, leaped from the windows. a wild screaming was heard from the women and children. "yossouf, tell these women that we don't want to hurt them; but that they must be silent, and keep the children quiet, we have got enough to think about without this frightful row, inside. then, when you have got them quiet, put them all in one room together, upstairs, and keep guard at the door. see that none of them leave the room; for they might steal down and open the door, to admit their friends, while we are busy. "what! fortescue, are you hit?" "i am done for!" the young officer replied, faintly; "one of their bullets has gone through my body; but never mind me, now." as he spoke he tottered, and would have fallen; had not the others supported him, and gently laid him down on a heap of skins, which served as an afghan bed. then--leaving his servant to attend to him, for a minute--the others ran upstairs, to see what was going on, without. "be careful!" will exclaimed. "don't show a head above the roof, or at a loophole, or you will get a bullet in your brain, to a certainty. stand well back, so that they can't see you." already a pattering fire of musketry had broken out, round the house; but not an afghan was to be seen, every man having taken his position in shelter. "there is nothing to do, at present," will said. "when the other parties arrive, they may make an attack; but i don't think they will do so, till night. "hammond, you had better go down to fortescue, at present. one of the syces can take yossouf's place on guard over the women, and he can help you. the lad is a good nurse, but i fear there is nothing to be done for the poor fellow." a few minutes later a wild outburst of shouts and yells, and a great firing of guns, announced that the other parties had arrived; and the cracking fire of the matchlocks around the fort became incessant. the defenders did not attempt to return it. it would only have been throwing away lives, uselessly, to approach any of the loopholes. in a quarter of an hour, hammond rejoined his companions. "he is gone, poor fellow!" he said. "he never spoke again. the bullet went close to the heart. i think he has bled to death, internally. "i have handed his revolver to one of the syces, and his gun to the other. your man, yossouf, has a revolver." "what on earth are we to do now, gale?" plater asked. "you have been right thus far and, if it hadn't been for you putting us up to make a rush here, we should have been done for, long ago. but we are not much better off; for here we are, cooped up, and the betting is a hundred to one against our being rescued, in time. no one will know where to look for us and, though we may beat them off two or three times, in the end it is likely to go hard with us." "couldn't we send a messenger, with the news of the fix we are in?" lowther asked; "though i don't see how any one is to get through." "that's what i have been thinking about, ever since i first planned coming here," will said; "but i am sure no one could get through. the afghans know the importance of it and, when it gets dark, they will be so thick round the place that a mouse couldn't make its way through them, unobserved." the situation was gloomy enough; but there was no lack of good spirits among the young officers, the danger causing their blood to course rapidly through their veins. will sat on the floor, apart from the others. they had made him their commanding officer, and the responsibility of thinking for them devolved upon his shoulders. suddenly a thought struck him, and he leaped to his feet, with a shout. "i've got it!" "you will get it, if you don't mind," hammond said, dryly; as a bullet passed through one of the loopholes, and struck the wall an inch or two from will's head. "but what is it?" "when it gets quite dusk we will call a parley, and tell them we don't want to keep the women here. they are only in our way, and eat up the food; so we will open the door, and let them go." "but what will you do that for, gale? you were saying, a short time ago, that the women could be kept as hostages." "so they might, hammond; but it will be more useful to us to let them go. there are seven women here. six of them shall go out; and with them, in the clothes of the seventh, yossouf." "capital! capital!" the others exclaimed. "don't you think they will notice him?" "no," will said, "we won't do it till dusk, and some of these women are as tall as he is. they will hurry them away as quickly as possible, so as to recommence the attack and, wrapped up as these afghan women are, no one could see the difference. once fairly away, we can trust yossouf for finding an opportunity of slipping away, and bringing us help." will now laid the plan before yossouf, who at once agreed to attempt it. the day passed slowly, the fire of the enemy being kept up, without intermission. "now," will said at last, "it is getting dark enough, let us put the plan into operation. in the first place the women must be separated, and taken into separate rooms; the one yossouf has fixed upon, as nearest his height, into a room by herself. then yossouf must tell the old mother of the chief that they are to be released; and that she must show herself on the roof, and make them stop firing, till they have gone out. while she is doing that, he can slip down and dress himself in the robes of the woman. she must be gagged, to prevent her screaming, or making a row, as her companions go out." greatly surprised was the old woman, at being told that she was to be released. these kaffirs must be mad, she thought, to give up their hostages. however, she at once proceeded to carry the orders into effect. before raising her head above the roof, she uttered a loud quavering cry--the cry of welcome of the afghan women. the firing without instantly ceased. again raising the cry, she stepped out on to the roof; and shouted that the english did not want to keep the women, and that the door would be open for them to come out--providing the afghans promised that no attempt to enter should be made, and that none should move from their present places, until the women had fairly left. there was a shout of surprise and satisfaction; and one of the chiefs rose to his feet, and gave the promise in the name of his companions. "how many are there of you?" he asked. "seven," the woman answered. "are the children to come?" "we may take away the babies, but the three boys are to remain behind." five minutes later the door of the fort opened, and seven figures came out. not a shot was heard, until they had passed down the street of the village, and had entered a house at the further end; then the rapid fire commenced again. twice, during the evening, did the afghans attempt to storm the little fort, but were each time repulsed, with loss; the fire of the five double-barreled guns--loaded with shot and bullets--and of the revolvers proving too much for them. the second attack was made about eleven. a quarter of an hour later, wild shouts were heard outside. there was an instant cessation of the enemy's fire; and then, in the silence, the deep thundering sound of galloping horses was heard. "hurrah!" will shouted, "here they are." a minute later, the third bombay cavalry dashed up to the fort. the door was thrown open, and the little garrison ran out. "all safe?" the officer in command asked. "all safe, except fortescue--who was killed at the first attack." "so we heard, from your boy," the officer said. "he has ridden back with us, as guide. "now, lads, dismount and clear the village. shoot every man you find, turn the women out of the houses, and then set them on fire. don't waste any time over it, for the rascals are swarming round the place. "captain lawson, you take your troop and dismount it as skirmishers, round the place; and keep them off, till we have done here. "here, you four men who brought the powder kegs, carry them inside this fort. we are going to blow it up, to give them a lesson." ten minutes later, the cavalry were again in their saddles. spare horses had been brought for the four officers; and the servants mounted the tats, which would be able to keep up with the cavalry. the flames were already bursting out brightly from the houses. the yells of the afghans rose high, and their bullets flew thickly over the village; but they kept at a respectful distance. the officer in command gave the word, and the party set off at a trot. before they had left the village a deep roar was heard, and they knew that the afghan fort was destroyed. two hours later they arrived safely in camp; where the four rescued officers were warmly congratulated, on their narrow escape, by their friends. on the th of july, the conspiracy among the wali's troops came to a head. they openly mutinied; and marched out, with their cannon and arms, from the camp. this was situated at a short distance from that of the british, and colonel ripon was the first to gallop in with the news. unfortunately, the british commander was not a man endowed with promptness of decision; and no steps were taken, until the mutineers had proceeded a considerable distance. then the cavalry and artillery were despatched, in pursuit. had the order been given at once, there can be no doubt that the wali's force would have been completely cut up; and those who escaped would have arrived a mere horde of fugitives, for the most part without arms, at ayoub's camp. late as was the pursuit it was not ineffectual. six british guns opened fire upon the wali's artillery--which was in rear of the retreating column--with such effect that the gunners were seized with a panic and, cutting the traces, fled for their lives. a good many were cut down by the british cavalry, and the six guns deserted by them were brought into camp. colonel burrows' little force now stood alone; for he had with him but infantry, cavalry, and six of his own guns, besides those taken from the mutineers--a force altogether disproportioned to that with which ayoub was advancing; swelled, as it was, by the accession of the wali's army. a message was sent to general primrose at candahar, asking for reinforcements; but that officer, although he had a considerable force at his disposal, declined to despatch any reinforcements, whatever. news now arrived that ayoub, instead of marching direct upon girishk, had crossed the helmund higher up; and was moving across the country, by a line parallel with the road from candahar to girishk. by this movement he would have the option of placing himself either between colonel burrows' force and candahar; of marching direct upon the latter city; or of keeping to the north, and coming down upon the road between candahar and shahpur, and then marching direct for cabul. under these circumstances general burrows determined to fall back, at once, to a spot where he might oppose ayoub's advancing force. accordingly, the brigade marched from the helmund to a village called khusk-i-nakhud, and there encamped. general nuttal, with the cavalry, made reconnaissances in the direction of the enemy. the people of the country held altogether aloof, and no accurate information was obtained as to the strength of ayoub's army; which was believed, by general burrows, to be very much smaller than it really was. early in the morning of the th, it was known that ayoub was marching upon maiwand--a village farther to the north--and at half-past six, the troops moved out to intercept him. it was at this time believed that it was only the enemy's cavalry with whom we should have to deal. upon arriving near maiwand, however, news was brought in, by spies, that the whole of the enemy were at hand. the force was at once halted, in a position singularly ill-adapted for a fighting ground. deep ravines ran both to the right, and to the left, of the ground occupied by the british. by these, the enemy could advance under shelter, until within a short distance. on either side were ranges of hills, completely commanding the position. it is difficult to imagine a more unsuitable position than that which general burrows prepared to hold, with a mere handful of troops, against an enormously superior force. what was the total strength of ayoub's army was never exactly known--as it was swollen by enormous numbers of ghazis, and tribesmen from the villages. these were, in fact, far more formidable opponents than the regular afghan troops; as their tremendous rushes, and indifference to the loss inflicted upon them, were trying in the extreme for even the best-trained troops to withstand. the morning was thick, and but little could be seen of ayoub's army. his cavalry, indeed, were found to be moving about in large masses; but these fell back, at our advance. lieutenant maclean--with two horse artillery guns, and a small cavalry escort--galloped out on the extreme left, and opened fire on the afghan cavalry. his infantry at once appeared in force, swarming down towards the guns; and these were withdrawn, to a position nearer to our line. the british infantry were formed in the following order: the th were on the right, the bombay grenadiers in the center, and jacob's rifles on the left. two guns were placed in position to support the th, on the right. the remaining four british guns, and the six smooth-bore guns--captured from the wali's mutineers--were placed between the grenadiers and jacob's rifles. the rd scinde horse and rd bombay light cavalry were formed in the rear of the line. as the enemy advanced, our guns opened a heavy fire upon them; but it was fully an hour before their artillery replied. then thirty guns were unmasked, and opened fire upon the british line. under cover of this heavy fire, swarms of the enemy's irregulars advanced towards our position. when within or yards of the th, the british opened with their martini rifles; and the shower of lead, at such an unexpected distance, checked the advance of the enemy. for some time the artillery duel continued; but the enemy's guns were then moved on to the hills, on either side of the british position, and a terrible crossfire was opened from both flanks. at about two o'clock, the smooth-bore guns began to get short of ammunition. only sixty rounds had been captured with them and, there being no reserve of ammunition fitting them, they ceased fire. the position now became most serious. from the ravines on either side the ghazis swarmed up, in vast numbers. the artillery thundered from the heights upon our troops. some of their batteries were brought up to within very short distances; and great numbers of the enemy, keeping along the ravines sheltered from our fire, came up in the rear and seized the villages there. the companies of jacob's rifles on the left; after resisting, for some time, the furious attacks of the ghazis, began to waver. the enemy's cavalry swept down in heavy masses; while our cavalry--for some reason which has never been explained--remained inactive. the general has stated that he ordered them to charge, but that they would not do so; the cavalry affirm that they never received orders. anyhow, at this critical moment the rd scinde horse and the rd bombay cavalry remained inactive. the confusion amid jacob's rifles rapidly grew, in spite of the efforts of the officers to rally them. the ghazis swept down upon them; and the rifles broke in confusion, and rushed among the bombay grenadiers who--hitherto fighting steadily--also fell into confusion, as the rifles and ghazis burst into their ranks. "this is hot work," will gale said to his captain, when the enemy's guns, on the heights on either side, began to play on the line of the th with their flank fire. "it is, indeed," the officer answered, "and the fire of the enemy, from the edge of that ravine, is very trying. i wish to heaven the general would move us farther back. he has made a hideous mistake in fighting on such ground as this." "it would be difficult to withdraw, now," will said. "it would shake the confidence of the men. i think, myself, that we ought to advance, and drive the enemy before us, till we take up some really defensible position; but i doubt if the afghans would wait for that. in all our history, a british charge against an indian enemy has always been successful, no matter how great the odds." "it is a bad lookout," the captain said, as a shell burst close by him, killing and wounding five or six men. "it is quite evident that if we stay where we are we must, in time, be annihilated. our fellows will stand, no doubt; they are english soldiers, and well officered. but how can one expect the two indian regiments--with only three or four white officers, each--to remain steady, under such a fire as this, and with these desperate charges of ghazis upon them?" very steadily the th held their ground, in spite of a flanking fire of artillery and musketry. every time the enemy gathered at the edge of the ravine, for a rush, the heavy fire of the company on the flank--which was wheeled back at a right angle to the line, so as to face them--drove them back to shelter again. the regiment had suffered very heavily. still, the officers felt that they could endure, till nightfall. of victory, there was now no idea; for to conquer, men must act and, here, they were only called upon to suffer. presently a wild tumult was heard to the left; and then the men of the scattered native regiments burst, in a tumultuous mass, into the ranks of the th. "steady, men, steady!" shouted the officers. but it was of no avail. all was in hopeless confusion. the artillery fired, until the ghazis were within a few yards of them; then they hastily limbered up, and fell back. but the ghazis were too close at hand, and two of the guns were lost. even now, had the cavalry charged upon the afghans, time would have been given to the broken infantry to form again into a solid mass, and to draw off from the field in good order. but the cavalry remained inactive. both these regiments had a record of good service in the field; but their conduct, on this occasion, was little short of disgraceful. among the infantry all order was lost and, mixed up in a confused mass, hemmed in on all sides by the enemy, they fell back--each man fighting for himself--upon the village behind. here, in the walled enclosures, the th and the grenadiers rallied, and fought nobly. each house was used as a fortress, and only carried after a desperate struggle. here colonel galbraith, and nine other officers of the th were killed; and the greater portion of the regiment shared their fate. some bodies of the troops--entirely cut off from the rest, in their retreat--stood their ground in the open, and fought desperately to the end; surrounding themselves, ere they died, with a ring of slaughtered enemies. so desperate was the defense in some cases that--outnumbering them fifty to one--the enemy never dared to come to close quarters with the gallant band; which kept up a rain of fire on them, till the last man had fallen. so long and stoutly was the village defended, that the great majority of the broken fugitives had time to pass out behind. general burrows--who had done his best to stem the rout--drew off the shattered remains; and fell back with them, in fair order. will gale's company was in the right flank of the regiment and, therefore, farthest from the point where the line was broken by the rush of the native troops. seeing what was taking place, the captain formed his men into company square; and fell back to the village, in fair order. the company then threw itself into a house, with a walled garden, to the right of the village; and its steady fire, in no slight degree, helped to keep back the afghans, and cover the retreat. this they did, until general burrows himself rode up, and ordered them to fall in. "your company has done good service, sir," he said to captain fletcher; "and it is for you, now, to cover the retreat." slowly and in good order the company fell back and, joining the troops who still retained their formation, retired slowly; facing about, and pouring volley after volley into the afghans, as they came out through the village. for two miles, the enemy pressed closely upon them; but their loss had already been immense, and all desired to join in the plundering of the british camp. therefore the pursuit slackened and, three miles from the village, the rear guard were ordered to the main body, at quick march. chapter : candahar. "thank god that is over," captain fletcher said, as he lifted his cap and wiped the perspiration from his forehead; "but the regiment is almost annihilated." "i fear the worst is yet to come," will said. "we are fifty miles from candahar; and when we came out we had to carry water with us, for there was none to be found, on the way. we have a fearful march before us. "what on earth has become of the cavalry? they have done nothing to cover the retreat." "they have ridden on ahead," the captain said, bitterly, "without having drawn a sword in this day's fight; and will ride into candahar tomorrow morning, without losing a man, save the few who were knocked over by the artillery." presently an officer rode up. "ah! gale," he exclaimed, "thank god you are safe. i rode back to see." and colonel ripon shook hands warmly with the young officer. "i am glad to see that you are safe, sir," will answered. "this has been a terrible day." "it has, indeed," the colonel said, mournfully, "terrible! there has been nothing like it, since the retreat from cabul in . and how many of these poor fellows will reach candahar, god only knows! the water bottles wore emptied, hours ago. the men are already exhausted with the long day's work, and parched with thirst; and we have fifty miles' tramp before us. have you any wounded men here with you?" "several, sir, some of them badly hurt." "put one of the worst on my horse," colonel ripon said, dismounting; "and push on briskly, lads. there are some carts ahead. we will turn out the stores, and put the wounded in. "you had better let the men throw away their knapsacks, and all useless encumbrances," he said to captain fletcher. "you will have to march--and perhaps fight--all night; and must husband your strength." steadily, the rear guard followed the broken column. it consisted of men of the th and grenadiers, mingled together; and well did they carry out their arduous duties. a portion were thrown out on each flat, while the rest kept to the road. this was strewn with arms and accouterments of all kinds. the men's hearts were wrung to the core, by the sight of the number of wounded who had dropped by the roadside; and who implored them, as they passed, not to leave them to be murdered by the enemy. many of them were lifted and placed in carts--everything else being turned out, to make way for them--but many had to be left behind; for it would be impossible to carry them, on such a march. slowly the long night passed. all along the line ahead, a scattered fire of musketry could be heard; as the villagers shot down the fugitives who, in hopes of finding water, straggled from the road. sometimes sharp volleys rang out, as the troops stood at bay, and drove back the natives, when they pressed upon them. several times the rear guard were hotly engaged as the afghans--furious at seeing their prey slipping from their fingers--mustered and fell upon them; but each time they were repulsed, and the column held on its way. will was in command of a mixed band, of some forty men, which moved to the right of the road. colonel ripon kept by his side, but few words were spoken, through the long night. the men were half mad with thirst and, had there been water near, nothing could have restrained them from rushing to it; but they knew that none could be obtained, until they reached candahar. many, in utter despair at the distance before them, threw themselves down on the ground to die. but the others kept on--stumbling and staggering as they marched, stupid and half blind--rallying only when the order came to turn, and repulse the enemy. two or three times in the night the rear guard halted, for a few minutes; and the men threw themselves down on the sand, where they picked the scattered herbage within their reach, and chewed it to quench their burning thirst. daylight was a welcome relief. they knew indeed that, with the rising of the sun, their torments would grow still greater; but the change from the long dreary darkness cheered them; and they could now see, from the nature of the country, that they were within fifteen miles of candahar. they marched on for two more hours, and then the officer in command of the little body saw that they could do no more. he therefore led them to a village on rising ground, a short distance from the road, and halted them there. the exhausted men threw themselves down in the shade of the houses. they had the long day yet to pass, and their thirst seemed unendurable; still, the halt was welcome, for there was not a man but felt that his strength was at an end, and that it would have been an impossibility to reach the city. captain fletcher picked out a few of the least exhausted men, and placed them in the outskirts of the village to call the rest to arms in case the afghans--numbers of whom were hovering round--should venture upon an attack. for the first hour after reaching the village, not a man moved from the spot where he had thrown himself down. the officers had searched the houses, and found some jars of water. these they carried round, and doled out a few mouthfuls to each man. small though the amount was, the relief afforded was immense and, as soon as their first exhaustion had subsided, the men scattered through the gardens; plucking the vine leaves and chewing them and, fortunately, discovering a few gourds, which were cut up into small fragments, and divided. the day wore on; and at one o'clock there was a shout of joy, for a body of cavalry were seen approaching, at a rapid trot, from the town. soon they rode up, and proved to be a regiment which had been despatched, from the town, for the relief of the stragglers. at daybreak the cavalry, riding in many miles ahead of the infantry, brought the news to the city of the defeat; and something very like a panic at first ensued. it was some time before anything was done to succor the exhausted fugitives, who were pressing forward to the city. but at last a force was sent out with wagons, and bullocks with water-skins; and thus hundreds of lives, which would otherwise have been sacrificed, were saved. the cavalry had come out with full water bottles, and relief was soon afforded to the worn-out rear guard, who at once fell into rank, and resumed their march towards candahar; the cavalry, who had brought a few light carts with them, pursuing their journey for some distance further, to succor and collect those who had fallen on the road. the sun was just setting as the rear guard of general burrows' brigade reached candahar; after having marched, since the previous morning, sixty miles without food, and with only a few mouthfuls of water; and having fought for nearly twenty-four hours of that time. every preparation was made, in the city, for the expected attack. the defenses were strengthened; the lower portion of the populace--who would be likely to declare against them--were turned out of the town; and provisions were collected from the country round. fortunately, ample time was afforded them for these preparations. ayoub's army had been, to a great extent, demoralized by the tremendous losses which it had sustained, in the defeat of this handful of british troops; and some days elapsed before it moved forward from maiwand. then, by easy marches, it approached candahar; and took up its position in the plain, to the north of the city. just as the rear guard of general burrows' force were starting from their halting place, for their last march into the city, will gale was delighted at seeing yossouf approaching. he had not seen him since the regiment marched out from khusk-i-nakhud. the young afghan had remained, with the other followers, in the village behind maiwand during the battle when, while the resistance of the british was still continuing, the afghans had worked round by the ravines and entered the village. yossouf had been obliged to join in the retreat, which was at once commenced by the baggage train. full of anxiety for the fate of his master, he had hurried forward at his best speed to candahar; reaching the city only an hour or two after the arrival of the cavalry. in spite of the distance he had already performed, he did not delay for an instant; but set out again with some provisions, and a bottle of wine, and one of water hidden away in his dress. he had resolved to push forward, at all hazards, until he had either joined his master--whether on his retreat, or as a prisoner in ayoub's army--or had discovered his body on the field of battle, and given him burial. passing through the throng of fugitives, and questioning any of the men of the th he met, he made his way forward. he had learned that will's company had withdrawn, in a body, from the battlefield to the village but, further than this, none of the fugitives could tell him; and his delight was exuberant, when he saw will marching along with his company. the little supply which he had brought was at once served out, among the men who most needed it; and will--who had been in a state of great uneasiness concerning the safety of his faithful follower--was greatly cheered by finding him alive, and unhurt. the news of the defeat of maiwand produced an immense sensation, in india; and measures were at once taken for the relief of candahar. a strong division was ordered to march from cabul, through ghuzni; while general phayre, who commanded the force at quettah, was also ordered to advance to the assistance of the garrison. general phayre, however--although comparatively close to candahar--was unable to advance, for some time. the same miserable economy which had dispersed the transport train, after the signature of the treaty of gundamuk; and had so delayed the advance of general roberts towards cabul, after the massacre of the mission, again paralyzed the action of the british troops--the whole of the transport train, collected at so much cost and difficulty, having been dismissed to their homes, as soon as the negotiations with abdul-rahman held out a prospect of peace. many weeks elapsed before a sufficient number of baggage animals could be collected to enable general phayre to advance, with his relieving column. in candahar, things passed quietly. the enemy, from time to time, fired shot and shell into the city from distant positions but, believing that no relief could reach the garrison before the supplies of food were exhausted, and that it must therefore yield to hunger, ayoub's army contented themselves by watching the city from a distance; and by keeping a cordon of troops round its walls, to prevent the country people from bringing in provisions. detached bodies, indeed, often crept up near the walls; and kept up a musketry fire at any troops showing themselves, there. but no attempts were made to batter down the walls, or to make anything like a resolute assault. ayoub's army had, indeed, greatly lost heart. if british soldiers, attacked under circumstances of the greatest disadvantage, had killed or of their assailants; what might not be the slaughter which a greatly superior force would inflict, when sheltered behind stone walls? from one village, situate half a mile from the eastern gate of the city, so constant and harassing a fire was maintained, by the enemy, that general primrose resolved to make a sortie, to capture it. the affair was, however, badly planned, and resulted in failure. the afghans--sheltered in the strongly-built houses--kept up so severe a fire upon the assailants that these were obliged to fall back, with a considerable loss. after that, no further sorties were attempted; and the city remained in quiet, until the relieving columns were close at hand. the force selected to march from cabul to the relief of candahar, under the command of general roberts, consisted of the nd highlanders, rd pioneers, th and th punjaub infantry; the nd, th, and th ghoorkas; the nd highlanders, nd battalion of the th, the norfolk rangers; the rd, rd, and th sikhs. there were three batteries of artillery, and four cavalry regiments: the th lancers, the rd bengal cavalry, the rd punjaub cavalry, and the central india horse. this gave a total of about , fighting men. there were, in addition, followers to feed, horses, and some transport and artillery mules, and ponies. the ameer did his best to assist the force; which was, indeed, going to fight his battle, as well as their own. the question was whether so large a force would be able to subsist on the road and, in order to assist them to do so, he sent orders to all the tribes along the line of march to aid the column, in every way. in consequence, no difficulties were met with; and scarce a shot was fired on the way down. in seven days after starting ghuzni was reached, and in fifteen khelat-i-ghilzai--where colonel tanner, with a small garrison, had been besieged by the local tribes since the advance of ayoub. khelat-i-ghilzai stood near the lower end of the valley down which the column was advancing, and was but three days' march from candahar. from the day of their leaving cabul, to their arrival at khelat-i-ghilzai, the troops had marched a distance of fifteen miles a day--not an extraordinary distance for a single regiment to perform, but a wonderful feat for a force containing some , persons and baggage animals, marching through mountains and valleys. as the relieving force approached candahar, ayoub drew off his troops from around the city; and took up a strong position on some hills, a few miles to the north. on the th of august roberts' cavalry were near enough to establish heliographic communication with the town and, on the st, the column entered candahar. during the siege, the duties of the garrison had been heavy. a strong force was always held ready to get under arms, instantly, in case of an attack by the enemy. the number of sentries on the walls, magazines, and lower important points was large. the town had to be kept in order, and the inhabitants strictly watched. house-to-house requisitions were made for provisions; and the greatest economy was used in the distribution of these, as the garrison had no means of knowing how long a time might elapse before any could arrive. the death of ten officers of the th--all of senior standing to himself--had placed will gale at the top of the list of lieutenants and, as several officers were disabled by wounds, he was now performing captain's duty, and was in charge of a company. there were, indeed, but three companies now in the th regiment; so great having been the loss, that the whole of the survivors now made up but this number. among the other duties of the troops was that of protecting the many houses which had been left vacant, by the hasty retirement of many of the native merchants and traders, at the approach of ayoub's force. colonel primrose--anxious to lessen the number of mouths to be fed--encouraged the exodus; promising to take charge of all property left behind. this duty proved a troublesome one, as the lower class--which still remained in the city--were constantly endeavoring to break into, and loot, the houses thus left vacant by their proprietors. in order to protect these as much as possible, many of the officers were directed to move from their quarters in the barracks, and take up their residence in them; an order which was gladly obeyed, as the exchange, from hot confined quarters to the roomy dwellings of the merchants, was a very pleasant one. will gale was one of those who so moved and, with yossouf and two native followers, had been quartered in the house of a wealthy silk merchant. one night, he was aroused from sleep by yossouf. "sahib!" the latter whispered, "i hear people moving below. i think there are thieves in the house." will rose noiselessly, slipped on his trousers and shoes and--taking up a revolver in one hand, and a sword in another--stole downstairs; followed by yossouf, with his long afghan knife in his hand. the door of the warehouse was open; and within it will saw, by the faint light of a lamp which one of them carried, four afghan ruffians engaged in making up silks into large bundles, in readiness to carry off. his approach was unnoticed; and on reaching the door he leveled his pistol, and shouted to the afghans to surrender, as his prisoners. in reply, they dropped the lamp, and made a sudden rush at him. he fired his pistol hastily in the darkness but, in an instant, the afghans were upon him. the first man he cut down, but he was knocked over by the rush of the others. two fell upon him; but yossouf bounded upon them like a tiger, and buried his knife to the hilt in their backs, in quick succession. the last of the party--without staying to see what was the fate of his friends--at once took to his heels and, rushing to the door leading to the street, made his escape. yossouf raised will to his feet, "are you hurt?" he asked, anxiously. "nothing to speak of," will replied. "i am a bit shaken, and bruised by the fall. those fellows, in the darkness, were upon me before i could see them. "thanks to you, i have escaped without hurt, yossouf; and had it not been for your aid, they would assuredly have made an end of me. my pistol had fallen from my hand as they knocked me down and, on the ground, i could not have defended myself with my sword, for an instant. once more, yossouf, i owe my life to you." so many attempts, similar to that made upon the house occupied by will gale, took place that sentries were posted, at ten o'clock at night, at the entrances to the various streets in which the houses left deserted by the native traders were situated; and orders were given that no natives should be out of their houses, after that hour, unless provided with a pass signed by the commandant of the city. several messengers were from time to time sent out, to endeavor to get through the enemy's, lines and to carry to general phayre the news of what was going on in the city. a few of these succeeded in getting through, but none returned; so that, until the signal lights were seen flashing from the distant hills, in the direction of khelat-i-ghilzai, the garrison were unaware of the steps which were being taken for their rescue. even had unforeseen obstacles prevented the advent of either of the relieving columns, it is probable that the garrison of candahar would finally have freed itself. colonel primrose had, at his disposal, a force more than double that which had fought at maiwand; and had the british advanced into the plain, and offered battle to ayoub on a fair fighting ground they should, without difficulty, have defeated his army; whose long delays and hesitation showed how immensely their morale had been affected by the previous battle. thus it was that sale--after sustaining a long siege in jellalabad--finally sallied out, and completely defeated the besieging army, before the arrival of the force marching to his relief. the candahar force was not commanded by a sale but, had it been given a chance to retrieve maiwand, there can be little doubt of what the issue would have been. over and over again, the subject was discussed at the messes of the various regiments; and immense indignation was felt at the force being kept cooped up in candahar, when the history of india recorded scores of examples of victories won, by british troops, against greater odds than those now opposed to them. it must be said, however, that the native portion of the army, in candahar, was of very inferior fighting quality to that which operated in eastern afghanistan. those regiments were, for the most part, either ghoorkas, sikhs, or punjaubees--than whom no braver men exist. the ghoorkas are small, active men; mountaineers by birth, and to whom war is a passion. the sikhs and punjaubees, upon the contrary, are tall, stately men; proud of the historical fighting powers of their race. they had fought with extreme bravery against the english but, once conquered, they became true and faithful subjects of the english crown; and it was their fidelity and bravery which saved england, in the dark days of the mutiny. the bombay troops, upon the other hand, were drawn from races which had long ceased to be warlike. they possessed none of the dash and fire of the hardier troops; their organization was--and still is--defective; and the system of officering them was radically bad. the contrast between the two was strongly shown, in the conduct of the sikh and ghoorka regiments with general stewart, when attacked by the sudden rush of the ghazis, at ahmed khil; and that of the bombay grenadiers and jacob's foot, under precisely similar circumstances at maiwand. there is no doubt, however, that the main reason why general primrose did not sally out and give battle on the plain of candahar was that, in case of defeat, the populace of the city would assuredly have closed their gates against the army; and that nothing would have remained but a disastrous retreat across the kojak pass--a retreat of which very few would ever have survived to tell. their enforced idleness, in candahar, made the time pass slowly and heavily; and it was with the greatest joy that the garrison hailed the entry of the columns of general roberts. upon his arrival the general lost no time in reconnoitering the position of the enemy. it was well chosen for defense his army was encamped behind the range of hills known as the baba-wali hills. a road ran direct over these hills; and here a strong force was stationed, supported by artillery in position. the last hill of the range, on the southwest, was known as the pir-paimal hill; and by turning this the camp of ayoub's army would be taken in flank, and the defenses in front rendered useless. the reconnaissance which was made by the cavalry; supported by the th sikhs, advanced close to the central hill. the enemy unmasked five guns and opened upon them, and the afghans poured down to the attack. there was, however, no intention on the part of the british commander of bringing on a battle; and the troops accordingly fell back, in good order, to the main body. a mile and a half from the city stood a low ridge of rock--called the picket hill--in the line by which the column would have to move, to turn the pir-paimal hill; and this was at once seized. a number of ghazis stationed here fought, as usual, desperately; but the th ghoorkas repulsed their charge, and cleared the ridge of the enemy. the general determined to attack the enemy's position with his whole force, on the following day. chapter : the battle of candahar. the plan of action upon which general roberts determined was simple. the st and nd brigade were to advance abreast, the rd to follow in support. as the th were to take no part in the fight, will gale obtained leave to ride out with general weatherby, with the rd division. the enemy were well aware of the weak point of the position which they occupied; and they had mustered thickly in the plain, in which were several villages; with canals cutting up the ground in all directions, and abounding with hedges, ditches, and enclosures--altogether, a very strongly defensible position. it was at o'clock, on the st of september, that the british force advanced. the first division, on the right, advanced against the large walled village of gundi, which was strongly held by the enemy. against this general macpherson sent the nd and the nd ghoorkas and, stubbornly as the enemy fought, the place was carried by the bayonet. on the line taken by the nd division--under general baker--three villages had successively to be carried: abasabad, kaghanary, and gundigan. the nd highlanders and the nd sikhs advanced to the attack of these. the resistance of the afghans was stubborn in the extreme, but they were driven out. the fighting line of the two divisions kept abreast and, for two miles, had to fight every inch of their way; from wall to wall, from garden to garden and, here and there, from house to house and from lane to lane. illustration: gundi carried by the bayonet. once or twice the attack was checked, for a few minutes, by the desperate resistance of the afghans--at the crossing places of canals and in walled enclosures--and again and again, the ghazis rushed down upon the troops. the rd sikhs and the th ghoorkas joined the fighting line and, step by step, the ground was won; until the base of the hill was turned, and the attacking force saw, in front of them, the great camp of ayoub's troops. up to this point, the enemy had fought with the greatest bravery; but a sudden panic seized them, now they saw that their line of retreat was threatened by our cavalry--for an afghan always loses heart, under such circumstances. as if by magic, the defense ceased; and the enemy, horse and foot--abandoning their guns, and throwing away their arms--fled up the argandab valley. everything was abandoned. there was nothing more for the infantry to do but to sack ayoub's camp, and to park the captive guns, thirty in number. the amount of stores and miscellaneous articles in the camp was enormous: arms, ammunition, commissariat, and ordnance stores; helmets, bullock huts crammed with native wearing apparel, writing materials, korans, english tinned meats, fruit, and money. here, in fact, was all the baggage which the army had brought from herat; together with all the spoil which they had captured at maiwand. the cavalry took up the pursuit. unfortunately they had met with great difficulties, in advancing through the broken country in rear of the infantry. had they been close at hand, when the latter fought their way into ayoub's camp, very few of the fugitives would have escaped. as it was, they did good service in following up the rout; and driving the enemy, a dispersed and broken crowd, into the hills. to the fury of the men they found, in ayoub's camp, the body of lieutenant maclaine; who had been taken prisoner at maiwand, and who was barbarously murdered, a few minutes before the arrival of the english troops. the battle cost the lives of three officers: lieutenant colonel brownlow, commanding the nd highlanders; captain frome, of the same regiment; and captain straton, nd battalion of the nd. eleven officers were wounded, men were killed, and wounded. the enemy left dead on the field. ayoub's regular regiments scarcely fired a shot, and the british advance had been opposed entirely by the irregulars and ghazis; the regular regiments having been drawn up behind the pir-paimal pass, by which they expected our main attack to be made--a delusion which was kept up by our heavy fire, from early morning, upon the afghan guns on the summit of the pass. when our troops appeared round the corner of the spur upon their flank they lost heart at once; and for the most part, throwing away their arms, joined the body of fugitives. "it would have been hard work, sir," will gale said to colonel ripon, as they rode forward in rear of the fighting brigade, "to have taken this position with the candahar force, alone." "it could not have been done," colonel ripon replied, "but no one would have dreamed of attempting it. the afghans say that the force which roberts brought down, from cabul, was so large that they stood on the defensive; but they would have ventured to attack us, had we sallied out and offered battle on the level plain, round the city. then, i have no doubt we could have beaten them. "however, all is well that ends well. roberts has come up in time, and has completely defeated the enemy; still, it would have been more satisfactory had we retrieved maiwand, by thrashing him single-handed. "well, i suppose this is the end of the afghan war. we have beaten ayoub: i hope, so effectually that abdul-rahman will have no difficulty in dealing with him, in future and, if he really means the professions of friendship which he has made us, we may hope for peace, for some time. probably the next time we have to fight, in this country, it will be against the russians and afghans, united. "there are men in england who persist in shutting their eyes to the certain consequences of the russian advance towards the northern frontier of afghanistan; but the time will come when england will have to rue, bitterly, the infatuation and folly of her rulers. when that day arrives, she will have to make such an effort, to hold her own, as she has never had to do since the days when she stood, alone, in arms against europe." upon the following day, will paid a visit to his friends in the rangers. "so you got through maiwand safely!" the colonel said. "upon my word, i begin to think that you have a charmed life. "i hear one of your captains died, last night. that gives you your step, does it not?" "yes, sir." "you are the luckiest young dog i ever heard of. you got your commission, within a year of enlisting; and now, by an extraordinary fatality, your regiment is almost annihilated; and you mount up, by death steps, to a captain's rank, nine months after the date of your gazette. in any other regiment in the service, you would have been lucky if you had got three or four steps, by this time." "i am fortunate, indeed, sir," will said. "i can scarcely believe it, myself." "ah! whom do i see here?" the colonel exclaimed, as a mounted officer rode through the camp. "my old friend, ripon! "ah ripon, how are you?" the colonel reined in his horse; and the two officers, who had not met for some years, entered into a warm conversation; while will strolled away to talk to some of the younger officers, who congratulated him most heartily on the luck which had, in a few months, taken him over their heads. in the afternoon will received a note from colonel ripon, asking him to dine with him, as colonel shepherd was going to do so. will replied that he would gladly dine, but must be excused for a time, afterwards; as he was on duty, and would have to go the rounds, in the evening. there were three or four other officers at dinner, as colonel ripon had many friends in the relieving column. when dinner was over, will made his excuses and left; promising to look in again, in a couple of hours, when he had finished his rounds. soon afterwards, the other young officers left. colonel shepherd, only, remained. "that is a singularly fine young fellow--young gale, i mean," colonel shepherd said; "and a singularly fortunate one. i feel quite proud of him. it was upon my advice that he enlisted; but if any one had told me, at the time, that he would be a captain in two years, i should have said that it was absolutely impossible." "yes," colonel ripon replied, "his luck has been marvelous; but if ever a fellow deserved it, he did. i have a very warm liking--i may say an affection--for him. he saved my life, when i was attacked by some ghazis here, and must have been killed, had it not been for his promptness, and coolness. he was wounded, too; and we were nursed together, here. since then i have seen a great deal of him and, the more i see him, the more i like him. "do you know anything of him, previous to the time of his enlisting? you told me he joined your regiment, on the day when it arrived at calcutta. i know nothing of his history, before that. the subject never happened to occur, in conversation; and it was one upon which i naturally should have felt a delicacy in asking any questions--though i have sometimes wondered, in my own mind, how he came to be penniless in calcutta; as i suppose he must have been, to have enlisted. did you happen to hear anything about it?" "yes, indeed," colonel shepherd answered. "curiously enough, he was by no means penniless; as he had just received pounds reward, for the services he had rendered in preventing a ship from being captured, by the malays. i happened to meet its captain on shore, the day i landed; and heard from him the story of the affair--which was as follows, as nearly as i can recollect." colonel shepherd then related, to his friend, the story of the manner in which the brig--when chased by malays--was saved, by being brought into the reef, by will. "naturally," he went on, "i was greatly interested in the story and--expressing a wish to see the young fellow--he was brought off that evening, after mess, to the euphrates; and told us how he had been wrecked on the island in a dutch ship, from which only he, and a companion, were saved. i was so struck with his conduct--and, i may say, by his appearance and manner--that i took him aside into my own cabin, and learned from him the full particulars of his story. i don't think anyone else knows it for, when he expressed his willingness to take my advice, and enlist, i told him that he had better say nothing about his past. his manner was so good that i thought he would pass well, as some gentleman's son who had got into a scrape and, as i hoped that the time might come when he might step upwards, it was perhaps better that it should not be known what was his origin." "but what was his origin, shepherd? i confess you surprise me, for i have always had an idea that he was a man of good family; although in some strange way his education had been neglected for, in fact, he told me one day that he was absolutely ignorant of latin." "well, ripon, as you are a friend of the young fellow, and i know it will go no further, i will tell you the facts of the case. he was brought up in a workhouse, was apprenticed to a yarmouth smack man and--the boat being run down in a gale by a dutch troopship, to which he managed to cling, as the smack sank--he was carried in her to java. on her voyage thence, to china, he was wrecked on the island i spoke of." "you astound me," colonel ripon said, "absolutely astound me. i could have sworn that he was a gentleman by birth. not, mind you, that i like or esteem him one iota the less, for what you tell me. indeed, on the contrary; for there is all the more merit in his having made his way, alone. still, you astonish me. "they tell me," he said, with a smile, "that he is wonderfully like me but, strangely enough, he reminds me rather of my wife. you remember her, shepherd? for you were stationed at meerut, at the time i married her there." colonel shepherd nodded and, for a few minutes, the two friends sat silent; thinking over the memories which the words had evoked. "strange, is it not," colonel ripon went on, arousing himself, "that the child of some pauper parents should have a resemblance, however distant, to me and my wife?" "curiously enough," colonel shepherd said, "the boy was not born of pauper parents. he was left at the door of the workhouse, at ely, by a tramp; whose body was found, next morning, in one of the ditches. it was a stormy night; and she had, no doubt, lost her way after leaving the child. that was why they called him william gale. "why, what is the matter, ripon? good heavens, are you ill?" colonel shepherd's surprise was natural. the old officer sat rigid in his chair, with his eyes open and staring at his friend; and yet, apparently, without seeing him. the color in his face had faded away and, even through the deep bronze of the indian sun, its pallor was visible. colonel shepherd rose in great alarm, and was about to call for assistance when his friend, with a slight motion of his hand, motioned to him to abstain. "how old is he?" came presently, in a strange tone, from his lips. "how old is who?" colonel shepherd asked, in surprise. "oh, you mean gale! he is not nineteen yet, though he looks four or five years older. he was under seventeen, when he enlisted; and i rather strained a point to get him in, by hinting that, when he was asked his age, he had better say under nineteen. so he was entered as eighteen, but i know he was more than a year younger than that. "but what has that to do with it, my dear old friend? what is the matter with you?" "i believe, shepherd," colonel ripon said solemnly, "that he is my son." "your son!" his comrade exclaimed, astonished. "yes, i believe he is my son." "but how on earth can that be?" his friend asked. "are you sure that you know what you are saying? is your head quite clear, old friend?" "my head is clear enough," the colonel replied, "although i felt stunned, at first. did you never hear of my having lost my child?" "no, indeed," colonel shepherd replied, more and more surprised--for he had at first supposed that some sudden access of fever, or delirium, had seized his friend. "you will remember that, a week or two after you were married, my regiment was moved up to the north; and we remained three years longer in india. when i got back to england, i heard that you had lost your wife, a short time before, and had returned. i remember our ships crossed on the way. when we met again, the conversation never turned on the past." "i will tell you the story," the colonel said, "and you will see that, at any rate, the boy may be my son and, that being so, the double likeness proves to me, incontestably, that he is. "i had, as you know, been ill before i left india. i had not been home for fifteen years, and got two years' leave. as you may know, i had a good fortune, irrespective of the service; and i took a place called holmwood park, near dawlish and, as i had thought of retiring, at the end of my leave, i was put on the commission of the peace. my boy was born a few months after i got home. "soon after i took the place, some gipsy fellows broke into the poultry yard, and stole some valuable chickens--which were great pets of my wife. i chased them and, finally, brought home the guilt of the theft to one of the men, in whose tent a lot of their feathers were found. he had been previously convicted, and was sentenced to a term of penal servitude. "before the trial his wife--also a gipsy--called upon me, and begged me not to appear against her husband, this, of course, was out of the question, as he had already been sent to trial. when she found that her entreaties were useless she, in the most vindictive tone, told me that i should repent it; and she certainly spoke as if she meant it. "i heard nothing more of the matter, until the boy was sixteen months old. then he disappeared. he was stolen from the garden. a clue was left, evidently that i might know from whom the blow came. the gipsy had been convicted partly on the evidence of the feathers; but principally from the fact that the boot, which he had on, had half the iron on the heel broken off, and this tallied exactly with some marks in my fowl house. an hour after the child was gone we found, in the center of the drive, in the park, a boot, conspicuously placed there to catch the eye; and this boot i recognized, by the broken iron, as that which had transported the gipsy. "that the woman had stolen the child, i had not the least doubt; but neither of her, nor it, could i ever gain the slightest clue. i advertised in every paper in the kingdom, i offered a reward of pounds, and i believe the police searched every gipsy encampment in england, but without success. "my wife had never been strong and, from that day, she gradually sank. as long as there was hope she kept up, for a time. i hoped all would go well; but three months afterwards she faded rapidly and, ere six months had passed from the loss of the child, i buried her, and came straight out to india. i went home once, for two or three months, upon business connected with my property there, some seven years since. that was when we last met, you know, at the club. with that exception, i have remained here ever since." "the trouble will be, i fear," colonel shepherd said, "for you to identify him. that vindictive gipsy woman, who stole your child, is not likely to have left any marks on its clothing by which it might be identified at any future time, and her revenge on you frustrated." "thank god!" the colonel said, earnestly, "if it be my son, he bears a mark by which i shall know him. that was one of his poor mother's greatest comforts. the child was born with an ugly blood mark on its neck. it used to bother my wife a good deal, and she consulted several surgeons whether it could not be removed; but they all said no, not without completely cutting out the flesh--and this, of course, was not to be thought of. after the child was lost i remember, as well as if it had been spoken today, my wife saying: "'how strange are god's ways! i was foolish enough to fret over that mark on the darling's neck; and now, the thought of it is my greatest comfort and, if it shall be god's will that years shall pass away, before we find him, there is a sign by which we shall always know him. no other child can be palmed off upon us as our own. when we find tom we shall know him, however changed he may be.' "listen, shepherd! that is his step on the stairs. may god grant that he prove to be my son!" "be calm, old friend," colonel shepherd said. "i will speak to him." the door opened, and will entered. "i am glad you have not gone, colonel--i was afraid you might have left, for i have been longer than i expected. i just heard the news that the th are in orders this evening to march, the day after tomorrow, for kurrachee; to sail for england, where we are to be reorganized, again." "gale, i am going to ask you a rather curious thing. will you do it, without asking why?" colonel shepherd said, quietly. "certainly, colonel, if it is in my power," will said, somewhat surprised. "will you take off your patrol jacket, open your shirt, and turn it well down at the neck?" for a moment, will looked astounded at this request. he saw, by the tone in which it was made, that it was seriously uttered and, without hesitation, he began to unhook his patrol jacket. as he did so, his eye fell upon colonel ripon's face; and the intense anxiety, and emotion, that it expressed caused him to pause, for a moment. something extraordinary hung on what he had been asked to do. all sorts of strange thoughts flashed through his brain. hundreds of times in his life he had said to himself that, if ever he discovered his parents, it would be by means of this mark upon his neck, which he was now asked to expose. the many remarks which had been made, of his likeness to colonel ripon, flashed across his mind; and it was with an emotion scarcely inferior to that of the old officer that he opened his shirt, and turned down the collar. the sight was conclusive. colonel ripon held out his arms, with a cry of: "my son, my son!" bewildered and delighted, will felt himself pressed to the heart of the man whom he liked, and esteemed, beyond all others. with a word of the heartiest congratulation, colonel shepherd left the father and son together; to exchange confidences, and tell to each other their respective stories, and to realize the great happiness which had befallen them both. their delight was without a single cloud--save that which passed for a moment through colonel ripon's mind, as he thought how his wife would have rejoiced, had she lived to see that day. his joy was, in some respects, even greater than that of his son. the latter had always pictured to himself that, if he ever discovered his father, he should find him all that was good; but the colonel had, for many years, not only given up all hope of ever finding his son, but almost every desire to do so. he had thought that, if still alive, he must be a gipsy vagabond--a poacher, a liar, a thief--like those among whom he would have been brought up. from such a discovery, no happiness could be looked for; only annoyance, humiliation, and trouble. to find his son, then, all that he could wish for--a gentleman, a most promising young officer, the man, indeed, to whom he had been so specially attracted--was a joy altogether unhoped and unlooked for. morning had broken before the newly united father and son had done their long and happy talk, and they separated only to take a bath, to prepare them for the day's work. the astonishment of everyone was unbounded when colonel ripon announced, on the following morning, that in captain gale of the th--who, it was known, had risen from the ranks--he had discovered a son that had been stolen from him, as a child. no one entertained a doubt, for an instant, that any mistake had arisen; for the likeness between the two men, as they strode down the street together, on their way to general roberts' quarters, was so marked that--now that men knew the relationship--none doubted for a moment that they were, indeed, father and son. the warmest congratulations poured in upon them, from all sides; and from none more heartily than from the general, who was more than ever pleased that he had been the means of will's obtaining his commission from the ranks. the same day colonel ripon sent off, by a mounted messenger carrying despatches, a telegram to be sent from the nearest station of the flying line--which the engineers advancing with general phayre's force had already carried as far as the kojak pass--to the government of india; asking leave to go home, at once, on the most urgent and pressing family business. yossouf's grief, when he heard that his master was going to leave for england, was very great. at first, he begged that he might accompany him; but tom pointed out that--much as he should like to have him with him--his position in england would be an uncomfortable one. he would meet with no one with whom he could converse; and would, after a time, long for his own country again. yossouf yielded to his reasoning; and the picture which will drew of his own loneliness when in cabul, separated from all his own people, aided greatly in enforcing his arguments on his mind. he said however that, at any rate, he would not return to afghanistan, at present. "it will be long," he said, "before things settle down there; and it will be useless for me to put my money into a herd which might be driven off by plunderers, the next week. "besides, at present the feeling against the english will be strong. so many have lost men of their family, in the fighting. if i returned, i should be a marked man. it is known that i threw in my lot with the english, and it will be cast in my teeth, even if no worse came of it. "no, i will enlist in the guides. i shall be at home with them, for most of them belong to the afghan tribes. i am young yet, not fully a man, and i have my life before me. some day, perhaps, if things are quiet and prosperous at home, i will go back and end my days there." so it was arranged. one of the officers of the guides had accompanied general roberts, as interpreter; and will handed over yossouf to him, telling him how well the lad had served him. the officer promised to enroll him in the corps, as soon as he rejoined it; and also that he would not fail to report his conduct to the colonel, and to obtain his promotion to the rank of a native officer, as soon as possible. from will yossouf would accept nothing except his revolver, as a keepsake; but colonel ripon insisted upon his taking, from him, a present which would make him a rich man, when he chose to return to his native country. chapter : at home at last. the next day colonel ripon started with the th and, at the end of the first day's march, met a messenger who, among other despatches, carried a telegram granting him, at once, the leave he asked for--and which, indeed, had been due, had he asked for it many years before. his intention was to accompany the th to kurrachee, and to sail with it to england. this intention was carried out, and the remnant of the regiment safely reached england. one of colonel ripon's first steps was to accompany will--or, as he ought now to be called, tom--to the horse guards; and to procure an insertion in the gazette stating that captain william gale, of the th, would henceforth be known by his true and proper name of thomas ripon. the colonel purchased a fine estate in somersetshire and, retiring from the service, settled down there. there was a considerable discussion, between father and son, as to whether the latter should remain in the army. colonel ripon was unwilling that his son should relinquish a profession of which he was fond; and in which, from his early promotion, he had every chance of obtaining high rank and honor--but tom, who saw how great a pleasure his society was to his father, and how lonely the latter's life would be without him, was resolute in his determination to quit the service. he had already, as he said, passed through a far greater share of adventure than usually falls to one man's lot; and the colonel's property was so large that there was not the slightest occasion for him to continue in the service. not long after his return to england, will paid a visit to ely workhouse. he was accompanied by the colonel, and the two men walked together up to the gate of the workhouse. he rang at the bell, and a woman opened the door. she curtsied, at seeing two tall, soldier-like gentlemen before her. "your name is mrs. dickson, i think?" the younger said. the woman gave a violent start, and gazed earnestly at him. "it is will gale!" she exclaimed, drawing back a step. "they said you were dead, years ago." "no, i am very much alive, mrs. dickson; and glad, most glad, to see an old friend again." "good lord!" the woman exclaimed, "it is the boy himself, sure enough;" and, for a moment, she seemed as if she would have rushed into his arms; and then she drew back, abashed at his appearance. tom, however, held out his arms; and the woman fell sobbing into them. "why, you did not think so badly of me," he said, "as to think that i should forget the woman who was a mother to me. "father," he said, "--for i have found my real father, mrs. dickson, as you always said i should, some day-- "it is to this good woman that i owe what i am. but for her, i might now be a laboring man; but it is to her kindness, to her good advice, to her lessons, that i owe everything. it was she who taught me that i should so behave that, if my parents ever found me, they should have no cause to be ashamed of me. she was, indeed, as a mother to me; and this lodge was my home, rather than the work house, inside. "ah! and here is sam!" sam dickson, coming out at this moment, stood in open-mouthed astonishment, at seeing his wife standing with her hand in that of a gentleman. "oh, sam! who do you think this is?" sam made no reply, but stared at tom, with all his eyes. "if it warn't that he be drowned and dead, long ago," he said, at last, "i should say it was will gale, growed up and got to be a gentleman. i shouldn't ha' knowed him, at first; but when he smiles, i don't think as how i can be far wrong." "you are right, sam. i am the boy you and your wife were so kind to, from the time you picked him up, just where we are standing; and whom you last handed over to go aboard a smack, at yarmouth. she was--as you have heard--run down in the north sea; but i was saved, in the ship which ran over her, and was taken on it to the east. there--after being wrecked again, and going through lots of adventures--i went to india; enlisted there, and fought through the afghan war. "i am a captain, now; and my name is no longer will gale, but tom ripon, for i have found my real father--this gentleman, colonel ripon." "who feels," colonel ripon went on, "how much he and his son owe to your kindness, and that of your good wife, here; and who, as you will find, is not ungrateful. i have just bought an estate, down in somersetshire; and i mean to install you and your wife in a pretty lodge, at the gates, with enough to live upon, comfortably, to the end of your lives." mrs. dickson cried with joy, as colonel ripon entered into details of what he intended to do for them; and sam--although, as was his way, much less demonstrative in his gladness--was yet greatly delighted. there was a good garden to the lodge. they were to have the keep of a cow, and thirty shillings per week, as long as they lived. before the colonel left, sam dickson's resignation of his post was handed in to the master. the colonel told them that at the end of the month, when sam's notice would expire, they were to sell off what furniture they had, as it would cost more, to convey it so long a distance, than it was worth; and he would take care that they should find everything comfortable and ready for occupation, at the lodge, upon their arrival. tom called upon the master and matron and schoolmaster, and thanked all for the kindness that they had shown him, when a boy; and colonel ripon left a check with the master, to be expended in tobacco, tea, and sugar for the aged inmates of the house. no words can express the delight of sam dickson and his wife when, a month later, they arrived at their new home. tom had spared no trouble in seeing that it was comfortably and cosily furnished. the garden had been thoroughly dug up, and planted; and mrs. dickson could scarcely believe that she was the mistress of so pleasant a home. tom was forgetful of none of his old friends; and he wrote to an address which hans--his companion among the malays--had given him when they separated, and forwarded to him a handsome watch, as a souvenir of his comrade. there is no more to be told. captain ripon--still a very young man--is living with his father, the colonel. he is one of the most popular men in his county; and there is some talk of his standing for one of its boroughs, at the next election; and it is rumored that he is likely, ere long, to bring home a lady who will be the future mistress of burnham park. he is quite content that he has left the army--though he fidgeted a little, while the egyptian war was going on, and could not help feeling a little regret that he did not take part in the storming of tel-el-kebir. this ebook was produced by gail j loveman, david starner, avinash kothare and the online distributed proofreading project indian frontier policy an historical sketch by general sir john adye, g.c.b., r.a. with a map preface the subject of our policy on the north-west frontier of india is one of great importance, as affecting the general welfare of our eastern empire, and is specially interesting at the present time, when military operations on a considerable scale are being conducted against a combination of the independent tribes along the frontier. it must be understood that the present condition of affairs is no mere sudden outbreak on the part of our turbulent neighbours. its causes lie far deeper, and are the consequences of events in bygone years. in the following pages i have attempted to give a short historical summary of its varying phases, in the hope that i may thus assist the public in some degree to understand its general bearings, and to form a correct opinion of the policy which should be pursued in the future. john adye, _general_. contents chapter i events prior to, and including, first afghan war of - proposed invasion of india by napoleon i.--mission of burnes to cabul --its failure--hostility of russia and persia--first afghan war, - --its vicissitudes and collapse. chapter ii events prior, and leading up, to second afghan war conquest of khiva, bokhara, and kokand by russia--british conquest of scinde and the punjaub--our policy with the frontier tribes--treaty of with dost mahomed--shere ali succeeds as ameer, --war of -- abdul rahman becomes ameer--withdrawal of british army from afghanistan, . chapter iii frontier policy since second afghan war, including expedition to chitral further advance of russia--merv occupied--sir west ridgeway's frontier commission of --the durand agreement with abdul rahman--the chitral expedition of --its results--sudden outbreak of frontier tribes, . [illustration: afghanistan and north-west frontier of india.] indian frontier policy an historical sketch chapter i events prior to, and including, first afghan war of - proposed invasion of india by napoleon i.--mission of burnes to cabul --its failure--hostility of russia and persia--first afghan war, - --its vicissitudes and collapse. in considering the important and somewhat intricate subject of policy on the north-western frontier of our indian empire it will be desirable, in the first place, to give a concise history of the events which have guided our action, and which for many years past have exercised a predominating influence in that part of our eastern dominion. speaking generally, it may, i think, be said that the main features of our policy on the north-western frontier have been determined by the gradual advance of russia southwards, and partly also by the turbulent character of the people of afghanistan, and of the independent tribes who inhabit the great region of mountains which lie between russia and ourselves. these two circumstances--the first having been the most powerful--have led us into great wars and frontier expeditions, which as a rule have been costly, and in some cases unjust, and their consequences have not tended to strengthen our position either on the frontier or in india itself. it will be well therefore to give an outline of the russian conquests in central asia to the north of afghanistan, and also of our dealings with the rulers of cabul in bygone years, and we shall then be better able to judge of our present position, and to determine the principles which should guide our north-western frontier policy. one of the first threats of invasion of india early in the century was planned at tilsit, and is thus described by kaye:[footnote: _history of the war in afghanistan_] 'whilst the followers of alexander and napoleon were abandoning themselves to convivial pleasures, those monarchs were spending quiet evenings together discussing their future plans, and projecting joint schemes of conquest. it was then that they meditated the invasion of hindostan by a confederate army uniting on the plains of persia; and no secret was made of the intention of the two great european potentates to commence in the following spring a hostile demonstration--contre les possessions de la compagnie des indes.' the peril, however, was averted by a treaty at teheran in march , in which the shah of persia covenanted not to permit any european force whatever to pass through persia towards india, or towards the ports of that country. and so the visionary danger passed away. the old southern boundary of russia in central asia extended from the north of the caspian by orenburg and orsk, across to the old mongolian city of semipalatinsk, and was guarded by a cordon of forts and cossack outposts. it was about , miles in length, and [footnote: _quarterly review_, oct. .] 'abutted on the great kirghis steppe, and to a certain extent controlled the tribes pasturing in the vicinity, but by no means established the hold of russia on that pathless, and for the most part lifeless, waste.' during all the earlier years of the century, while we were establishing our power in india, constant intrigues and wars occurred in persia, afghanistan, and central asia; and rumours were occasionally heard of threats against ourselves, which formed the subject of diplomatic treatment from time to time; but in reality the scene was so distant that our interests were not seriously affected, and it was not until that they began to exercise a powerful influence as regards our policy on the north-west frontier. in that year lord auckland was governor-general, and captain alexander burnes was sent on a commercial mission up the indus, and through the kyber pass, to cabul, where he was received in a friendly manner by the ameer dost mahomed. it must be borne in mind that neither scinde nor the punjaub was then under our rule, so that our frontiers were still far distant from afghanistan. it was supposed at the time that russia was advancing southward towards india in league with persia, and the mission of burnes was in reality political, its object being to induce the ameer to enter into a friendly alliance. dost mahomed was quite willing to meet our views, and offered to give up altogether any connection with the two powers named. it, however, soon became apparent that our interests were by no means identical; his great object, as we found, being to recover the peshawur district, which had been taken a few years previously by runjeet singh, while we, on the other hand, courted his friendship chiefly in order that his country might prove a barrier against the advance of russia and persia. these respective views were evidently divergent and the issues doubtful; when suddenly a russian envoy (vicovitch), also on a so-called commercial mission, arrived at cabul, offering the ameer money and assistance against the sikhs. this altered the aspect of affairs. burnes wrote to the governor-general that the russians were evidently trying to outbid us. still some hope remained, until definite instructions arrived from lord auckland declining to mediate with or to act against runjeet singh, the ruler of the punjaub. the ameer felt that we made great demands on him but gave him nothing in return. it then became evident that the mission of burnes was a failure, and in april he returned to india. it was our first direct effort to provide against a distant and unsubstantial danger, and it failed; but unfortunately we did not take the lesson to heart. in the meantime the shah of persia, instigated by russia, besieged herat, but after months of fruitless effort, and in consequence of our sending troops to the persian gulf, the shah at length withdrew his army. it was not only the hostile efforts of the shah on herat in which were a cause of anxiety to the indian government; but, as kaye writes,[footnote: kaye's _war in afghanistan._] 'far out in the distance beyond the mountains of the hindoo koosh there was the shadow of a great northern army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweeping across the wilds and deserts of central asia towards the frontiers of hindostan.' that great northern army, as we know now, but did not know then, was the column of perofski, which had left orenburg for the attempted conquest of khiva, but which subsequently perished from hardships and pestilence in the snowy wastes of the barsuk desert, north of the aral. in view of all the circumstances--of the supposed designs of russia and persia, and of the hostility and incessant intrigues in afghanistan--the government of india were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst the authorities widely differed as to the policy to be pursued. lord auckland, however, at length decided on the assemblage of a british force for service across the indus. in his manifesto issued in december he first alluded to the burnes mission, and the causes of its failure. he then referred to the claims of shah soojah, a former ruler of afghanistan (who had been living for some years in exile within our territories) and said we had determined, in co-operation with the sikhs, to restore him to power as ameer of cabul. it was arranged that shah soojah should enter afghanistan with his own troops, such as they were, supported by a british army marching through scinde and beloochistan. the governor-general expressed a hope that tranquillity would thus be established on the frontier, and a barrier formed against external aggression; and he ended by pro claiming that when the object was accomplished the british army would be withdrawn. this was indeed a momentous decision. the commander-in-chief in india, sir henry fane, had already given an adverse opinion, saying that 'every advance you make beyond the sutlej in my opinion adds to your military weakness.' on the decision becoming known in england many high authorities, and the public generally, disapproved, of the expedition. the duke of wellington said that 'our difficulties would commence where our military successes ended,' and that 'the consequences of crossing the indus once, to settle a government in afghanistan, will be a perennial march, into that country.' the marquis wellesley spoke of 'the folly of occupying a land of rocks, sands, deserts, and snow.' sir charles metcalfe from the first protested, and said, 'depend upon it, the surest way to bring russia down upon ourselves is for us to cross the indus and meddle with the countries beyond it.' mr. elphinstone wrote: 'if you send , men up the bolam to candahar, and can feed them, i have no doubt you can take candahar and cabul and set up soojah, but as for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country, among a turbulent people like the afghans, i own it seems to me to be hopeless. if you succeed you will i fear weaken the position against russia. the afghans are neutral, and would have received your aid against invaders with gratitude. they will now be disaffected, and glad to join any invader to drive you out.' mr. tucker, of the court of directors, wrote to the duke of wellington: 'we have contracted an alliance with shah soojah, although he does not possess a rood of ground in afghanistan, nor a rupee which he did not derive from our bounty as a quondam pensioner.' he added, that 'even if we succeed we must maintain him in the government by a large military force, miles from our frontier and our resources.' the above were strong and weighty opinions and arguments against the rash and distant enterprise on which the government of india were about to embark. but there is more to be said. independently of the result in afghanistan itself, it must be borne in mind that the proposed line of march of the army necessarily led through scinde and beloochistan, countries which (whatever their former position may have been) were then independent both of the ameer and of ourselves. the force from bengal, consisting of about , men of all arms, with , camp followers, accompanied by shah soojah's levy, left ferozepore in december, and crossing the indus, arrived at dadur, the entrance to the bolam pass, in march . difficulties with the ameers of scinde at once arose, chiefly as to our passage through their territories; but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they were informed that 'the day they connected themselves with any other power than england would be the last of their independence, if not of their rule.' [footnote: kaye's _war in afghanistan_.] the army then advanced through the bolam, and reached quetta on march th. but here again obstacles similar in character to those just described occurred, and sir alexander burnes visited the ruler of beloochistan (the khan of khelat), demanding assistance, especially as to supplies of food. the prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out that though we might restore shah soojah, we would not carry the afghans with us, and would fail in the end. he alluded to the devastation which our march had already caused in the country; but having been granted a subsidy, unwillingly consented to afford us assistance; and the army, leaving possible enemies in its rear, passed on, and reached candahar without opposition in april. at the end of june it recommenced its march northwards, and ghuznee having been stormed and captured, our troops without further fighting arrived at cabul on april . dost mahomed, deserted for the time by his people, fled northward over the hindoo koosh, finding a temporary refuge in bokhara, and shah soojah reigned in his stead. so far the great expedition had apparently accomplished its object, and the success of the tripartite treaty between ourselves, the sikhs, and the new ameer had been successfully carried out, almost entirely, however, by ourselves as the pre-dominant partner. the time therefore would seem to have arrived when, in fulfilment of lord auckland's proclamation, the british army should be withdrawn from afghanistan. for the moment this appeared to be the case. but in reality it was not so, and our position soon became dangerous, then critical, and at last desperate. in the first place, the long line of communication was liable at any time to be interrupted, as already mentioned; then, again, the arrival of shah soojah had excited no enthusiasm; and the very fact that we were foreigners in language, religion and race, rendered our presence hateful to his subjects. in short, the new ameer was, and continued to be, a mere puppet, supported in authority by british bayonets. these conditions were apparent from the first day of his arrival, and grew in intensity until the end. shah soojah himself soon discovered that his authority over his people was almost nominal; and although he chafed at our continued presence in the country, he also felt that the day of our departure would be the last of his reign, and that our withdrawal was under the circumstances impossible. but the situation was equally complicated from our own point of view. if, as originally promised, the british troops were withdrawn, the failure of the expedition would at once become apparent by the anarchy which would ensue. on the other hand, to retain an army in the far-distant mountains of afghanistan would not only be a breach of faith, but, while entailing enormous expense, would deprive india of soldiers who might be required elsewhere. after lengthy consideration, it was decided to reduce the total of our force in the country, while retaining a hold for the present on cabul, ghuznee, and candahar, together with the passes of the kyber and bolam. in short, the british army was weakly scattered about in a region of mountains, amongst a hostile people, and with its long lines of communication insufficiently guarded. both in a military and a political point of view the position was a false and dangerous one. general sir john keane, who was about to return to india, writing at the time, said 'mark my words, it will not be long before there is here some signal catastrophe.' during the summer of there were troubles both in the kyber and bolam passes. in the former the tribes, incensed at not receiving sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts and plundered our stores; while in beloochistan matters were so serious that a british force was sent, and captured khelat, the khan being killed, and part of his territory handed over to shah soojah. [footnote: in the life of sir robert sandeman, recently published, it is stated that the alleged treachery of mehrab khan, which cost him his life, was on subsequent inquiry not confirmed.] rumours from central asia also added to our anxieties. although the failure of the russian attempt on khiva became known some months later, it excited apprehension at the time amongst our political officers in cabul. sir alexander burnes, during the winter of , expressed opinions which were curiously inconsistent with each other. 'i maintain,' he said, 'that man to be an enemy to his country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of the indus; 'while at the same moment he advocated the advance of our troops over the hindoo koosh into balkh, so as to be ready to meet the russians in the following may. sir william mcnaghten, the chief political officer in cabul, went still further, and in april not only urged a march on bokhara, but also contemplated sending a mission to kokand, in order, as he said, 'to frustrate the knavish tricks of the russians in that quarter.' our position, however, at that time was sufficiently precarious without adding to our anxieties by distant expeditions in central asia, even had the russians established themselves in the principalities, which at that time was not the case. not only was afghanistan itself seething with treachery and intrigues from one end to the other, but the sikhs in the punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since the death of runjeet singh, become disloyal and out of hand. beloochistan was in tumult; the tribes in the kyber, ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened our communications; so that we were certainly in no condition to enter upon further dangerous expeditions against distant imaginary foes. sir jasper nicholls, the commander-in-chief, strongly objected to any advance. 'in truth,' he said, 'we are much weaker now than in .' during the latter months of , and in , matters became steadily worse, and all afghanistan seemed ripe for revolt. 'we are in a stew here,' wrote sir william mcnaghten in september; 'it is reported that the whole country on this side the oxus is up in favour of dost mahomed, who is certainly advancing in great strength.' again, in a letter to lord auckland, he said 'that affairs in this quarter have the worst possible appearance'--and he quoted the opinion of sir willoughby cotton, that 'unless the bengal troops are instantly strengthened we cannot hold the country.' at this critical period, however, dost mahomed was heavily defeated at bamian, on the hindoo koosh, voluntarily surrendering shortly afterwards, and for the moment prospects looked brighter; but the clouds soon gathered again, and the end was at hand. the governor-general of india had throughout the whole war wisely and steadfastly resisted the proposed further operations in central asia; and the court of directors in london wrote as follows: 'we pronounce our decided opinion that, for many years to come, the restored monarchy will have need of a british force in order to maintain peace in its own territory, and prevent aggression from without.' and they go on: 'we again desire you seriously to consider which of the two alternatives (a speedy retreat from afghanistan, or a considerable increase of the military force in that country) you may feel it your duty to adopt. we are convinced that you have no middle course to pursue with safety and with, honour.' the government of india, hesitating to the last, failed in adopting either of the alternatives. in november, , sir alexander burnes was treacherously murdered by a mob in cabul, which was followed by an insurrection, and the defeat of our troops. general elphinstone, who was in command, writing to sir w. mcnaghten on november , said that 'from the want of provisions and forage, the reduced state of our troops, the large number of wounded and sick, the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated cantonment we occupy, the near approach of winter, our communications cut off, no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms against us, i am of opinion that it is not feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country, and that you ought to avail yourself of the offer to negotiate that has been made to you.' this was conclusive. our envoy early in december met the afghan chiefs, and agreed that we should immediately evacuate the country, and that dost mahomed, who was in exile in india, should return. on december , sir william mcnaghten was treacherously murdered at a conference with the afghan sirdars, within sight of the british cantonment, and then came the end. the british force at cabul, leaving its guns, stores and treasure behind, commenced its retreat on january , ; but incessantly attacked during its march, and almost annihilated in the koord cabul pass, it ceased to exist as an organised body. general elphinstone and other officers, invited to a conference by akbar khan, were forcibly detained as hostages, and on january a solitary englishman (dr. brydon) arrived at jellalabad, being, with the exception of a few prisoners, the sole remaining representative of the force. i have given this short sketch of the first afghan war because, disastrous as it was, the causes of our failure were due throughout far more to rash and mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the british troops engaged. kaye in his 'history' gives a clear summary of its original object and unfortunate results: 'the expedition across the indus was undertaken with the object of creating in afghanistan a barrier against encroachment from the west.' 'the advance of the british army was designed to check the aggression of persia on the afghan frontier, and to baffle russian intrigues by the substitution of a friendly for an unfriendly power in the countries beyond the indus. after an enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left every town and village of afghanistan bristling with our enemies. before the british army crossed the indus the english name had been honoured in afghanistan. some dim traditions of the splendour of mr. elphinstone's mission had been all that the afghans associated with their thoughts of the english nation, but in their place we left galling memories of the progress of a desolating army.' the history of the war from first to last deserves careful consideration; and if the lessons taught by it are taken to heart, they will materially assist in determining the principles which, should guide our policy on the north-west frontier of india. chapter ii events prior, and leading up, to second afghan war conquest of khiva, bokhara, and kokand by russia--british conquest of scinde and the punjaub--our policy with the frontier tribes--treaty of with dost mahomed--shere ali succeeds as ameer, --war of -- abdul rahman becomes ameer--withdrawal of british army from afghanistan, . for a few years subsequent to the war, our frontier policy happily remained free from complications, and it will be desirable now to refer shortly to the progress of russia in central asia, and of her conquests of the decaying principalities of khiva, bokhara and kokand. previous to the old boundary line of russia south of orenburg abutted on the great kirghis steppe, a zone [footnote: parliamentary papers: _afghanistan_, .] (as the late sir h. rawlinson told us) of almost uninhabited desert, stretching , miles from west to east, and nearly , from north to south, which had hitherto acted as a buffer between russia and the mahomedan principalities below the aral. [footnote: extract from _quarterly review_, october .]'it was in , contemporaneously with our final conquest of the punjaub, that the curtain rose on the aggressive russian drama in central asia which is not yet played out. russia had enjoyed the nominal dependency of the kirghis-kozzacks of the little horde who inhabited the western division of the great steppe since ; but, except in the immediate vicinity of the orenburg line, she had little real control over the tribes. in - , however, she erected three important fortresses in the very heart of the steppe. these important works--the only permanent constructions which had hitherto been attempted south of the line--enabled russia, for the first time, to dominate the western portion of the steppe and to command the great routes of communication with central asia. but the steppe forts were after all a mere means to an end; they formed the connecting link between the old frontiers of the empire and the long -coveted line of the jaxartes, and simultaneously with their erection arose fort aralsk, near the embouchure of the river.' the russians having thus crossed the great desert tract and established themselves on the jaxartes (sir daria), from that time came permanently into contact with the three khanates of central asia, and their progress since that date has been comparatively easy and rapid. the principalities had no military organisation which would enable them to withstand a great power; their troops and those of russia were frequently in conflict of late years; but the battles were in a military sense trivial; and the broad result is, that russia has been for some years predominant throughout the whole region; and her frontiers are now continuous with the northern provinces of both afghanistan and persia. it is this latter point which is the important one, so far as we are concerned, but before entering into its details, it will be well to consider the nature of the great country over which russia now rules. until within the last few years our information as to its general character was very limited; but the accounts of numerous recent travellers all concur in describing it as consisting for the most part of sterile deserts, deficient in food, forage, fuel and water. there are a certain number of decayed ancient cities here and there, and there are occasional oases of limited fertility, but the general conditions are as just described. with the exception of the one railway from the caspian to samarcand, the means of transport are chiefly pack animals. speaking roughly, the dominions of russia in central asia, south of orenburg, may be taken as almost equal in geographical extent to those of our indian empire; but there is this striking difference between the two, that whilst the population of india is computed at millions, that of central asia, even at the highest computation, is only reckoned at four or five millions, of whom nearly half are nomadic--that is, they wander about, not from choice, but in search of food and pasturage. the extreme scantiness of the population is of itself a rough measure of the general desolation. the military position of russia in central asia, therefore, is that of a great but distant power, which during the last fifty years has overrun and taken possession of extended territories belonging to fanatical mahomedan tribes. the people themselves are, many of them, warlike and hostile; but they are badly armed, have no discipline, training, or leaders, and are not therefore in a position to withstand the advance of regular troops. consequently russia is enabled to hold the country with a comparatively small force of scattered detachments, which are, however, supplied with arms, munitions and stores under great difficulties from far distant centres, and her troops are practically incapable of concentration. indeed the farther they go the weaker they become; the very magnitude of the area being an additional cause of weakness. this is a condition somewhat precarious in itself, and would certainly not appear to be an alarming one as a basis of attack against our empire, even were india close at hand. while russia, however, was completing the subjugation of the principalities, and advancing her frontiers until they became conterminous with the northern provinces of afghanistan and persia, the government of india, by the great wars of and , having annexed scinde and the punjaub, advanced our frontiers in a similar manner, so that the people both of beloochistan and afghanistan, hitherto far remote from our dominions, now became our neighbours. in the life of sir robert sandeman recently published, a very interesting account is given, not only of the nature of the country along the border, but of the policy pursued for many years with the independent tribes. it says: 'by the conquest of scinde in , and the annexation of the punjaub in , the north-west frontier of india was advanced across the river indus to the foot of the rocky mountains which separate the plains of the indus valley from the higher plateaus of afghanistan and khelat. these mountain ranges formed a vast irregular belt of independent or semi-independent territory, extending from cashmere southward to the sea near kurrachee, a total length of about , miles.' the belt of territory above described was 'inhabited by fierce marauding tribes, often at war with each other, ever and anon harrying the plains of the punjaub and scinde, and the constant terror of the trade caravans during their journey through the passes.' the policy pursued for many years is thus described: 'the disasters of the first afghan war, and the tragical episode of khelat, were fresh in men's recollections, and created a strong feeling against political interference with tribes beyond our border'.... 'accordingly, from the very first, the system of border defence maintained by the punjaub government was not purely military, but partly military, partly political and conciliatory. while the passes were carefully watched, every means was taken for the promotion of friendly intercourse.' roads were made, steamers started on the indus, and inundation canals developed along the border. so long as they were friendly the tribesmen had free access to our territory, could hold land, enlist in our army, and make free use of our markets. as a result, the deadly hatred formerly prevailing between the sikhs and the hill tribes soon disappeared; raids became exceptional; cultivation increased; the bazaars of our frontier stations teemed with afghans, with trains of laden camels, who at the close of the season returned laden with our goods. disputes were voluntarily referred by independent tribesmen for the arbitration of british officers. such, (it is stated in the life of sir robert sandeman) were the results of lawrence's frontier policy, and no words are required to emphasise these excellent arrangements, which remained in force for many years. before leaving this part of the subject, it may be as well to anticipate a little and to allude to the successful part taken by sir robert sandeman in on his appointment as our agent to the khan of khelat. it is important in the first place to mention, that whilst in afghanistan the tribes all along the frontier were for the most part independent of the ameer of cabul, and were ruled by their own 'jirgahs' or councils, in beloochistan the mode of government was so far different that the chiefs, whilst acknowledging the khan as their hereditary ruler, were entitled, not only to govern their own tribes, but to take part in the general administration of the country as the constitutional advisers of the paramount chief. the dangers arising from the vicinity of three powerful kingdoms, persia, afghanistan, and scinde, had no doubt led them to perceive the necessity of co-operation, which was established about the middle of the eighteenth century. although the constitution as above described secured to the confederated tribes nearly a century of prosperity and peaceful government, it so happened that for some years before , owing to the weakness of the then ruler, and partly to turbulence of the chiefs, the government of the country fell into disorder, and the commerce through the bolam pass altogether ceased. from to lord northbrook was viceroy of india, and one of his last acts before leaving was the appointment of colonel sandeman as our envoy, with a view to mediate between the khan and his subordinates, and which proved successful. the principal terms which were finally accepted by the khan and his tribal chiefs were, that their foreign policy was to be under our guidance, and we were also to be the referee in case of internal disputes; that the commerce of the bolam was to be opened and protected, the annual subsidy hitherto granted to the khan of , _l_. being doubled to cover the necessary expenditure; and, finally, that a british agent with a suitable contingent should be established at quetta. it is important to observe that the negotiations were conducted throughout in a spirit of conciliation, and that their beneficial results remain in force to the present day. the policy pursued for many years on the afghan frontier, although regulated by the same general principles as in khelat, was not altogether so rapidly accomplished, or so entirely successful. the circumstances were in some degree different and less simple. in the first place the frontier was miles long, and was inhabited by afghan tribes, who were more predatory and intractable than the beloochees; they were not only independent of each other, but for the most part acknowledged no allegiance to the ameer of cabul. border disputes therefore had to be settled with individual chiefs; and no opportunity was offered for our mediation in internal feuds, or for joint agreement on external policy, as was so successfully accomplished by sandeman in beloochistan. there was no general federation with which we could enter into negotiation. as a consequence, we were compelled to maintain a large force and fortified posts along the frontier; and many punitive expeditions became necessary from time to time against lawless offending tribes. still, on the whole, and considering the difficulties of the situation, the policy of conciliation, subsidies, and of non- interference with their internal affairs, gradually succeeded; raids once chronic became exceptional, and were dealt with rather as matters of frontier policy than of war. [footnote: see parliamentary papers: _afghanistan,_ , page , and _beloochistan,_ no. , .] it must also be remembered, as an additional complication, that in annexing the punjaub, although it is essentially the country of the sikhs, who are hindoos, the inhabitants of the trans-indus districts are for the most part what are termed punjaubee mussulmen, that is, afghans, in race, religion and language. from what has been said as to our dealings with the border tribes, it will be evident that while our difficulties were continuous and often serious, still, they were chiefly local; and that the defence of the empire on that frontier against foreign aggression depended in a great measure on our relations with the ruler of afghanistan itself. when dost mahomed, after the great war, returned in to his former position as ameer of that distracted country, it was hardly to be expected that, although acquiescing in his reinstatement, we should be regarded by him in a friendly light; still, some years passed away without any important change in our relative positions, one way or the other. in , lord dalhousie was governor-general, and a treaty was made with dost mahomed, by which both parties agreed to respect each other's territories. in january, , a still more important one followed. we were then once more at war with persia; and at a meeting between sir john lawrence and the ameer, an agreement was entered into that dost mahomed, acting in co-operation with us, should receive , _l_. a month for military purposes, to continue during the war; that english officers should reside in his country temporarily, to keep the indian government informed, but not to interfere with the administration, and that when peace ensued they should be withdrawn, and a native agent alone remain as our representative. [footnote: in view of the strong objection to the presence of english officers in afghanistan, sir john lawrence intimated to the viceroy of india that he had given an assurance to dost mahomed that it should not be enforced unless imperatively necessary.] it is important to note that this friendly treaty was made at peshawur, just before the great mutiny, and that the ameer, though urged by his people to attack us in our hour of danger, remained faithful, and would not allow them to cross the border. dost mahomed died in june, , and for some years after his death family feuds and intestine wars occurred as to his successor, during which we carefully abstained from interference, and were prepared to acknowledge the _de facto_ ruler. ultimately, in , his son shere ali established his authority in afghanistan, and was acknowledged accordingly. lord lawrence was then the viceroy, and in a despatch to the secretary of state expressed his views as regards the advances of russia. after pointing out that they were now paramount in central asia, he suggested a mutual agreement as to our respective spheres and relations with the tribes and nations with whom we were now both in contact, and he went on to welcome the civilising effect of russian government over the wild tribes of the steppes, and pointed out that if russia were assured of our loyal feeling in these matters, she would have no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the afghans. the secretary of state (sir stafford northcote) replied 'that the conquests which russia had made, and apparently is still making, in central asia, appear to be the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country.' it is a great misfortune that such sensible, conciliatory views did not continue to guide our policy in the events which a few years later led us into the second great war in afghanistan. shere ali did not inherit the great qualities of his father, and was also somewhat discontented that we had not abetted his cause during the internal troubles in afghanistan. however, in he met lord mayo at umballa, and after careful discussion it was agreed that we should abstain from sending british officers across the frontier and from interfering in afghan affairs; that our desire was that a strong, friendly, and independent government should be established in that country. it was further decided to give shere ali considerable pecuniary assistance, and presents of arms from time to time. the ameer, while gratified at these results, wished us also to give a dynastic pledge as to his lineal descendants, which, however, was not acceded to. in lord northbrook was viceroy of india, and a further conference took place at simla with the ameer's prime minister, chiefly as to the northern afghan frontier in badakshan and wakkan, which were at the time somewhat uncertain, and a matter of dispute with russia. this somewhat delicate question was, however, settled in a friendly manner by lord granville, then secretary of state for foreign affairs. prince gortschakoff's final despatch to him on the subject was as follows: [footnote: _central asia_, --c. .] 'the divergence which existed in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the dominion of shere ali. the english government includes within them badakshan and wakkan, which according to our views enjoyed a certain independence. considering the difficulty experienced in establishing the facts in all their details in those distant parts; considering the greater facilities which the british government possesses for collecting precise detail, and above all considering our wish not to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due to it, we do not refuse to accept the boundary line laid down by england. we are the more inclined to this act of courtesy as the english government engages to use all its influence with shere ali in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or further conquest. this influence is indisputable. it is based, not only on the material and moral ascendency of england, but also on the subsidies for which shere ali is indebted to her. such being the case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of peace.' prince gortschakoff admitted more than once that the emperor of russia looked upon afghanistan as completely outside the sphere of russian influence, and within that of ours; at the same time, claiming similar independence for russia in central asia. during the next few years, subsequent to the simla conference, shere ali, though he had received considerable assistance from us, both in money and arms, was not altogether satisfied, and one or two incidents occurred during that period which gave him umbrage. lord northbrook, the viceroy in , was not unaware of the somewhat cold and capricious spirit of the ameer, but in writing to london he pointed out that shere ali's situation was difficult, not only from the risk of revolution at home, but also of attack from abroad, but that on the whole he was to be relied on. a change, however, was coming over the scene, and our policy reverted from conciliation to compulsion. it was a critical period in the history of frontier policy, and demands careful consideration. it must not be forgotten that although amongst those best qualified to judge the majority had long been opposed to advance and conquest in territories beyond our north-west frontier, and entertained but little fear of russian aggressive power, still there were others--men of long experience, who had filled high positions in india--who held different views; and it is probable that not only successive british governments, but the public generally, who have no time for carefully weighing the diverse aspects of the subject, were influenced sometimes one way, sometimes another. in the many difficulties connected with our world-wide empire this must always be more or less the case. for instance, the late sir h. rawlinson, a few years before the second afghan war, took a very alarmist view of the progress of russia, not only in central asia but also in asia minor. he considered that her advance from orenburg was only part of one great scheme of invasion; and he averred that the conquest of the caucasus had given her such a strong position that there was no military or physical obstacle to the continuous march of russia from the araxes to the indus. [footnote: parliamentary papers, _afghanistan_, .] he described it as the unerring certainty of a law of nature. but, throughout, he ignores distances, blots out the mountains, deserts, and arid plains of persia and afghanistan, and takes no account of the warlike races who would bar the path. it requires a very large map to embrace all the details of this widespread strategy. some account has already been given of the weakness, in a military point of view, of russia in central asia, and of the distance of her scattered troops from the main resources of the empire. but, in addition, it must be remembered that the mountains of afghanistan also form a natural and enduring barrier against a further advance. the great hindoo koosh range, running all along the northern part of that country, forms indeed the real scientific frontier between the two empires, the few passes over its snowy crests ranging from , to , feet high, and only open for a few months in the year. another supposed line of advance for a russian army, namely by the pamirs, has of late years been brought forward; but its main features are more discouraging than those of any other. this elevated region consists of a mass of bare snow-capped mountains attaining elevations of over , feet, intersected by plateaux almost as devoid of vegetation as the mountains themselves. the lakes are about , feet above the sea, the population is scanty, and consists chiefly of nomads in search of food and pasture during the short summer; so that although the russians might, if unopposed, possibly move in small isolated detachments carrying their own food and munitions over the pamirs, it would only be to lose themselves in the gorges of the himalayas. the conditions above mentioned are for the most part permanent. russia may not, and probably has not, any intention of trying to invade and conquer india--but she has not the power, which is a far more important consideration. to return to the position of affairs previous to the second afghan war. [footnote: see _afghanistan_, , published by secretary of state for india, p. et seq.] early in , lord northbrook, the governor -general, received a despatch from the government at home, pointing out that the information received from afghanistan, not only in respect to internal intrigues but also as regards the influence of foreign powers, was scanty, and not always trustworthy. he was, therefore, instructed to procure the assent of the ameer to the establishment of a british agency at herat, and also at candahar. the viceroy of india and his council having consulted various experienced officers on the subject, replied in june, that in their opinion the present time and circumstances were unsuitable for taking the initiative. they pointed out that the sirdars and many of the people of afghanistan would strongly object, and that in the ameer's somewhat insecure position he could not afford to disregard their feelings in the matter. they advised patience and conciliation. in november a second despatch was received from england, reiterating the necessity of more complete information as to afghanistan, especially in view of recent russian advances in central asia; and the viceroy was directed to send a mission to cabul without delay, to confer with the ameer on central asia, and requesting that british officers should be placed on the frontier to watch the course of events. the government of india, in january , again urged the undesirability of forcing the hands of the ameer, and pointed out that his objections to english officers were not from a feeling of disloyalty, and that to force his hands was not desirable. they did not apprehend any desire of interference on the part of russia, and they concluded by alluding to the careful conciliatory policy carried out by lords canning, lawrence, and mayo, as giving the best promise of peace, and satisfactory results in afghanistan. consequently they deprecated the proposed action by the home government in forcing british officers upon shere ali. in april lord northbrook quitted india, and was succeeded by lord lytton; and a further reply from lord salisbury, the secretary of state for india, was received by the viceroy. it reiterated that the government at home considered our trans-frontier relations unsatisfactory; that permanent british agencies should be established in afghanistan; and that we were willing to afford the ameer material support against unprovoked aggression, our object being to maintain a strong and friendly power in that country. the despatch went on to say that should the ameer decline to meet our request, he should be informed that he was isolating himself from us at his peril. the next step was taken in may, when the ameer was invited to receive a special mission, which he politely declined. in october our native agent at cabul came to simla and had an interview with lord lytton, who reiterated the demands of the british government, pointing out that in the event of a refusal there was nothing to prevent our joining russia in wiping afghanistan out of the map altogether, of which shere ali was duly informed. in january a final effort was made to come to terms, and sir lewis pelly and the afghan prime minister, noor mahomed, had a conference at peshawur. the first, and indeed the only point discussed, was the demand that british representatives should reside in afghanistan, which was a _sine qua non_. noor mahomed pathetically pleaded that lords lawrence, mayo, and northbrook, successive viceroys, had all in turn promised that this should not be insisted on; and he ended by saying that shere ali would rather perish than submit. it was evident that further discussion was useless, and the conference was closed; noor mahomed, who was ill, dying shortly afterwards. in march our native agent at cabul was withdrawn, and direct communication with shere ali ceased. i have given the above _resume_ of the correspondence in - , and of the abortive efforts to induce the ameer to comply with our demands, because it is evident that if he continued to resist compulsion must almost inevitably ensue. at about the same time, quetta, in the bolam, was occupied by a considerable british force, which was naturally regarded as a threat on afghanistan. a concentration of troops also took place in the northern punjaub, and preparations were made for the construction of bridges over the indus. all these were indications of coming war. it must also be noted that our relations with russia in europe were much strained at the time, so that probably the preparations in india were in some degree due to the apprehension of war in other parts of the world. in the summer of a russian envoy arrived at cabul, which under the circumstances is hardly to be wondered at. some months however elapsed, and it was not until november that war was declared. lord lytton, the viceroy, in his proclamation stated: 'that for ten years we had been friendly to shere ali; had assisted him with money and arms; and had secured for him formal recognition of his northern frontier by russia.' it went on to state, that in return he had requited us with active ill-will; had closed the passes and allowed british traders to be plundered; and had endeavoured to stir up religious hatred against us. it then pointed out that whilst refusing a british mission he had received one from russia; and ended by saying that we had no quarrel with the afghans, but only with shere ali himself. from official correspondence published subsequently [footnote: parliamentary papers, _afghanistan_, , no. .--c. .] it appeared that in entering afghanistan our chief object at the outset was to establish what was called a strategical triangle, by the occupation of cabul, ghuznee and jellalabad; and it was stated that by holding this position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, we should have the power of debouching on the plains of the oxus against russia in central asia! 'it is difficult,' said lord lytton, 'to imagine a more commanding strategical position.' the events of the war, however, soon put an end to this somewhat fanciful strategy. in november the british forces entered the country by three main routes, the kyber, the koorum, and the bolam, and hard fighting at once ensued on the two northern ones. the results were immediate: shere ali fled northwards, and died soon after. his son, yakoob khan, assumed temporarily the position of ameer, but in the convulsed state of the country lie possessed little real power or authority. in may, , he met the british authorities at gundamuk, and after considerable discussion signed a treaty, the chief points of which were as follows:-- the foreign affairs of afghanistan were to be under our guidance; and we undertook to support the ameer against foreign aggression; british agents were to reside in the country; the koorum, pisheen, and sibi valleys were assigned to the british government; and finally, yakoob khan was to receive an annual subsidy of , _l_. so far, it would appear as if the campaign had at once realised the main objects of british policy; but tragic events rapidly followed, active hostilities were resumed, and the treaty of gundamuk became mere waste paper. as a first result of the treaty, sir louis cavagnari [footnote: _afghanistan_, , no. .] was appointed our envoy, and accompanied by a few officers and a small escort, arrived at cabul in july, being received in a friendly manner by the ameer; although influences adverse to his presence in the capital soon became apparent. suddenly, on september , the british residency was attacked by several afghan regiments, and after a desperate resistance, cavagnari and the whole of his officers and escort perished. this deplorable event, of course, upset all previous arrangements, and led to an immediate resumption of hostilities. our troops at once advanced and captured cabul, yakoob khan voluntarily abdicating and becoming an exile in india. ghuznee also was occupied shortly afterwards by our advance from candahar. the government of india, in a despatch in january, , pointed out that, in view of the complete change in the political situation, it was necessary, in the first place, fully to establish our military position in the country. they acknowledged that the hopes entertained of establishing a strong, friendly, and independent kingdom on our frontier had collapsed; and that afghanistan had fallen to pieces at the first blow, its provinces being now disconnected and masterless. in view of these unexpected results, they went on to recommend the permanent separation of the provinces under separate rulers; and having regard to the special difficulties connected with herat, advocated its being handed over to persia! this was indeed a policy of despair! lord hartington, who had become secretary of state for india, writing in may, , summed up the situation as follows :--'it appears that as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the state which it was desired to see strong, friendly and independent; the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country.' long and careful consideration was naturally given to the solution of the difficulty in which this country found itself owing to the untoward circumstances just related. two important decisions were however ultimately arrived at: [footnote: _afghanistan_, , no. .] . that authority in afghanistan, and the unity of its provinces, should as far as possible be restored by the appointment of a new ameer; and abdul rahman, a nephew of shere ali, who had been for twelve years an exile in bokhara, was invited to cabul, and was supported by us in assuming the title. the chief conditions were, that his foreign policy was to be under our guidance, that no english officers were to reside as our representatives in afghanistan, and that he was to receive a subsidy. . that the british troops should be withdrawn as soon as the pacification of the country would permit. this decision was recommended not only by the viceroy, the marquis of ripon, but by the higher officers who had held command during the war. sir donald stewart, who was in chief command, and sir frederick roberts, both, concurred in our withdrawal from the country; the kyber pass was to be held by subsidised tribes, and the koorum valley to be altogether abandoned; the independence of the tribes being in each case recognised. sir john watson, who was in command in that valley, pointed out that as a route from india into afghanistan it was practically useless. as a further argument in favour of withdrawal, it may be well to allude to the fact that the men of our native regiments were sick of serving in afghanistan, far away from their homes, and that it would be impolitic to keep them there. some differences of opinion existed as to whether we should relinquish possession of candahar; but as it was miles from the indus, in a foreign country, and as our remaining there would not only be hateful to the afghans, but in a military sense would be dangerous and costly, its final abandonment was decided on; the valley of pisheen, between candahar and quetta, being alone retained by the british government. so ended the great war of - . at its close we had over , men in afghanistan, or on the border in reserve; and even then we really only held the territory within range of our guns. the whole country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy; whilst the total cost of the war exceeded twenty millions sterling, being about the same amount as had been expended in the former great war of - . the military operations in themselves had been conducted throughout with great skill in a most difficult country, and the troops, both british and native, had proved themselves admirable soldiers; but as regards the policy which led us into war, it appears to have been as unjust in principle as it was unfortunate in result. the facts, however, speak for themselves. chapter iii frontier policy since second afghan war, including expedition to chitral further advance of russia--merv occupied--sir west ridgeway's frontier commission of --the durand agreement with abdul rahman--the chitral expedition of : its results--sudden outbreak of frontier tribes, . the reaction after the war naturally inclined the authorities in both countries to leave frontier policy alone, at all events for the time. our professed object for years had been to make afghanistan strong, friendly, and independent. the first had certainly not been accomplished, and the other two were doubtful. still, by patience, conciliation, and subsidies, we might hope in the course of time that the wounds we had inflicted would gradually be healed, and a more stable condition ensue. for a short period it was so; but then the old bugbear of russian advance over the dreary wastes of central asia again supervened, and exercised its malign influence on our policy. in and the following years, russia, whilst completing her conquests, and improving her communications in the south-western part of central asia, became involved in somewhat prolonged hostilities with the tekke-turcomans, ending in their subjugation, and in the occupation of the long, desolate strip of country extending eastwards from the caspian, which had hitherto been independent. a railway was gradually constructed from the vicinity of kras-novodsk, on the caspian, towards samarcand. merv, formerly a city of importance, but of late a mere village in the desert, was also occupied. these acquisitions of russia, accomplished in districts far removed from india, would not appear to involve any special consideration on our part; but as the southern frontiers of russia thus became conterminous for a long distance with northern persia, and also with some districts of afghanistan, their new position was regarded as possibly involving designs against our indian empire, and remonstrances were made by us, more especially as regards the occupation of merv.[footnote: _central asia_, no. , .] in a strategical point of view the question would not appear to be of much importance, and would probably have dropped; but early in the russians attacked and drove the afghan troops out of penjdeh, a small, hitherto almost unknown village in the desert. it was a high-handed measure, and the relations between the two governments, british and russian, which were already rather strained, became critical, and war at one moment appeared to be almost inevitable. it is not necessary, nor would it be desirable, now to recapitulate the details of this serious crisis; because, happily, owing to the prudence exercised by both governments, the danger gradually passed away, a joint commission being agreed on, to meet on the frontier, and to report as to its delimitation. it may, however, be as well to mention that it seems rather doubtful whether penjdeh at the time absolutely belonged to afghanistan. frontiers in the east are proverbially uncertain and shifting, and in our own official maps, not very long before the occurrences in question, it was marked as outside the afghan border. colonel stewart, reporting in on the northern frontier of afghanistan, and alluding to penjdeh, said that it was inhabited by turcomans, and he thus described the position: 'the state of affairs seems to have been that the turcomans acknowledged that they were squatting on afghan land, and were liable to pay taxes, and each year they paid something as an acknowledgment of afghan rights; but so long as this was done, the afghans looked upon them as a protection against the tekke further north, and left them very much to themselves.' the appointment of a joint commission of russian and british officers to delimit the northern frontiers of afghanistan proved of great value, not only in gaining information regarding districts hitherto but little known, but also because its conjoint work tended to engender feelings of respect and goodwill between the two nations concerned. its labours commenced in the autumn of , and the report of sir west ridgeway, the british commissioner, is full of interest and encouragement. in an article in the 'nineteenth century' of october, , on the completion of his work, he gives some details of the country, and also of the position of russia in central asia, which are worth quoting. as to the afghan border he says: 'the three or four hundred miles of country through which the new north-western frontier of afghanistan runs is a sandy, treeless, waterless desert, except where it is traversed from south to north by the heri-rood, the murghab and the oxus. the only cultivable ground is on the banks of these rivers; but in spring time, after the winter snows have melted, the intervening plains afford good grazing for sheep.' but perhaps the most important part of his article is his view of the position of russia in central asia: 'if any russian general,' he writes, 'were so reckless as to attempt the invasion of india, and relying on the single line of lightly constructed rails which connects the caspian with the oxus, and which are liable in summer to be blocked by the moving sands of the desert, and in winter by the falling snows of heaven--if, relying on this frail and precarious base, he were to move an army through the barren plains bordering the oxus, and leaving in his rear the various hostile and excited races of central asia, he were to cross the difficult passes of the hindoo koosh, and entangle his army in the barren mountain homes of the fanatical and treacherous afghan, then indeed our fortunate generals may well congratulate themselves that the lord has delivered the enemy into their hand....' whilst, however, his conclusions as to the military weakness of russia in that part of the world are clear and decisive enough, he at the same time does full justice to the good work which she is carrying out in that vast area. he says: 'hitherto russia's advance in central asia has been the triumph of civilisation. wherever she has planted her flag slavery has ceased to exist. this was keenly brought home to us in the course of our travels. for hundreds of miles before we reached herat we found the country desolated and depopulated by turcoman raids, while even in the herat valley we continually came across the fathers and brothers of men who had been carried off from their peaceful fields by man-stealing turcomans, and sold into slavery many hundred miles away. all this has ceased since the russian occupation of merv; the cruel slave trade has been stamped out....' lord salisbury, speaking in , at the conclusion of the frontier delimitation, happily described the situation as follows: 'i value the settlement for this reason--not that i attach much importance to the square miles of desert land with which we have been dealing, and which probably after ten generations of mankind will not yield the slightest value to any human being: but the settlement indicates on both sides that spirit which in the two governments is consistent with continued peace. there is abundant room for both governments, if they would only think so....' what a pity that some statesman could not have persuaded england to that effect fifty years before! during the next few years no events of special importance occurred to affect our general frontier policy in india, so far as russia and afghanistan proper are concerned. the ample information we now possess of the relative power and position of each country, and the experience gained in bygone wars, enable us to form a correct judgment of the great strength of our empire in the east; and it is to be hoped that in the future we shall hear less of those alarmist views which have so frequently led us into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions. russia and england are now, happily, on friendly terms, and abdul rahman, the ameer of cabul, although his position is difficult in the midst of a turbulent people, has proved himself a loyal neighbour. but another cloud has appeared on the horizon, and our troubles with the intervening frontier tribes are now apparently worse than ever. from accounts already given of those who dwell along the border, it is evident that although our differences with them, during past years, have been frequent and often serious, they have been more or less of a local character. troublesome as our neighbours have proved, still they have no power of inflicting serious injury, or of endangering our rule. under these circumstances, the best policy, whilst firmly repressing their predatory instincts, is to leave them alone. in the absence of full official information as to the origin of recent difficulties, which have culminated in the present frontier war, it is only possible to speak in general terms. it may be mentioned, in the first place, that owing to the uncertain line of demarcation between the territories of the ameer of cabul and those of his independent tribal neighbours, constant feuds and local hostilities occurred from time to time in the mountains; and with a view of defining their respective spheres, the government of india, in , sent a mission to cabul for the purpose. this in itself would appear to have been a reasonable step; and the 'durand agreement' which ensued (but which has not been published) would, it was hoped, tend to a cessation of conflicts between the ameer's subjects and their neighbours. but there is a further aspect of the question. so far as is known, not only were the respective borders laid down, but it is understood that in many cases the intervening tribes are now assumed to be what is termed 'within the sphere of british influence.' in maps recently published, presumably with some authority, vast mountainous districts are now included in this somewhat mysterious phrase. for instance, the koorum valley, the samana range, the countries of the afredis and the mohmunds, the districts of chitral, bajour, dir, swat, bonair, and others, are all included within it; and in many instances fortified positions, occupied by british troops, are to be found either within or along their borders. surely this opens out a wide question, and it would be interesting to know whether, in the discussions at cabul, the chiefs of the intervening tribes were present, and whether they acquiesced, not only in the new boundaries, but also in being included as within our sphere of influence? it is evident it should have been a tripartite, and not a dual, agreement. it is perfectly well known, and has been proved by long experience, that these frontier tribes value their independence and liberties, beyond everything else, and will not submit peacefully to interference; and if they were not consulted in the arrangements just described, we may begin to trace the origin of the present crisis. although, as i have explained, we are unable, from want of official information, to deal fully with, the larger topic of recent border policy, we have, at all events, ample details as regards the chitral question in the parliamentary papers published [footnote: _north-west frontier, chitral_, .] in . it appears that so long ago as the ruler of chitral voluntarily tendered his allegiance to the maharajah of cashmere, and endeavoured, but without success, to persuade the neighbouring chiefs of swat, bajour, and dir, to follow his example. now chitral and cashmere are not only far apart, but are separated by lofty mountain ranges, inhabited by other tribes, so that this sudden offer of vassalage seems rather inexplicable. it transpired, however, a few years afterwards, that his real motive in seeking the friendship of cashmere was due to his fear of aggression by the ameer of cabul.[footnote: _ibid_, page .] the government of india at the time encouraged this somewhat sentimental friendship, and in order to obtain influence over the intervening tribes established a fort at gilgit, in an almost inaccessible position, not far from the snowy crests of the hindoo koosh. the position, however, proved to be costly, and also dangerous from unfriendly neighbours, and, as after three years' experience no special object was attained, it was withdrawn in . in the old fears of possible russian aggression again revived, and gilgit was reoccupied with a strong detachment of cashmere troops, accompanied by several english officers. the government of india pointed out that the development of russian military resources in asia rendered it necessary to watch the passes over the mountains, in order to prevent what was called a _coup de main_ from the north. in short, they dreaded the march of a russian army over the pamirs and the hindoo koosh --a region where nature has constructed for us perhaps one of the most formidable frontiers in the world. friendship with the ruler of chitral was also cultivated. he was given an annual subsidy, and a present of sniders; being visited also by english officers. it was even contemplated at the time to construct a direct road from his capital to our frontier near peshawur; but as he was suspicious, and as his neighbours in swat, bajour, and others would probably have objected, the suggestion was happily postponed. in october the ruler of chitral died, and after the usual family contests and intrigues, nizamul-mulk, his son, established his authority in the country. in january, , dr. robertson arrived at chitral as our representative, accompanied by two officers and fifty sikhs. although he was received in a friendly manner by the new ruler, his account of the state of affairs in april was discouraging and ominous. he wrote: 'we seem to be on a volcano here. matters are no longer improving; the atmosphere of chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue.' a few weeks later he gave a more cheerful account, and although he described the people as fickle, he considered that englishmen were safe. it became evident, however, that the nizam-ul-mulk was weak and unpopular, and dr. robertson described the country as 'in a distracted state, and torn by factions.' the reports of our agent, in short, would seem to prove that he was in a false and dangerous position, with a small escort, far away in the mountains, about miles from our frontier. in january, , the nizam was murdered by his brother, and the whole country at once again fell into anarchy. dr. robertson, who had been temporarily absent, but had returned in february, was besieged in a fort, with his escort, which, however, had been increased to about men. the crisis had come at last, and there was no time to spare. a strong force under sir robert low was assembled at peshawur, and crossed the frontier on april . it must be pointed out that, in proceeding to chitral, the british troops had necessarily to pass through a difficult mountainous country inhabited by independent tribes; and the government of india issued a proclamation in which they pointed out that their sole object 'is to put an end to the present and to prevent any future unlawful aggression on chitral territory, and that as soon as this object has been attained the force would be withdrawn.' the proclamation went on to say, that the government 'have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which mura khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes.' the military operations were conducted with great skill and rapidity, and dr. robertson's small garrison, which at one time had been hard pressed, was saved: a small force under colonel kelly, which had left gilgit, having by a daring and successful march arrived just before the main body from peshawur. the short campaign having thus accomplished its object, the gradual withdrawal of the british troops in accordance with the proclamation would seem to have been a natural sequence. in the weak, distracted state of the country, and in the assumed necessity of not losing our influence in those distant regions, the government of india, however, considered that a road from our frontier to chitral should be made, and certain positions retained in order to guard it. this vital question having been carefully considered at home, the secretary of state for india, on june , , telegraphed to the viceroy that her majesty's government regretted they were unable to concur in the proposal. he went on to say that no 'military force or european agent shall be kept at chitral; that chitral should not be fortified; and that no road shall be made between peshawur and chitral.' he added that all positions beyond our frontier should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed. it so happened that within a few days of this important decision a change of government occurred at home, and the question was reconsidered; and on august , fresh instructions were telegraphed to india, by which it was ordered that british troops should be stationed at the malakund pass, leading into swat, and that other posts up to, and including, chitral, should also be held, and a road made through the country. in short the previous decision was entirely reversed. before going further it may be as well to point out that this is no mere question between one political party and another. it goes far beyond that, and we may feel assured that in considering the subject, both governments were actuated by a desire to do what was considered best in the interests of the indian empire. still, it is i think impossible not to regard the ultimate decision as very unfortunate, and as likely to lead to serious consequences. in a mere military point of view, it was a repetition of the policy pursued of recent years of establishing isolated military posts in countries belonging to others, or in their vicinity; inevitably tending to aggravate the tribes, and which in time of trouble, instead of increasing our strength, are and have been the cause of anxiety to ourselves. therefore, not only as a matter of policy, but in a purely military sense, the arrangement was dangerous. i would further observe that many officers, both civil and military, men of the highest character and long experience in the punjaub and its borders, did not hesitate to express their opinions at the time, that retribution would speedily follow; and their anticipations appear now to have been verified. suddenly, not many weeks ago, the people of swat, who were said to be friendly, violently attacked our position on the malakund, losing, it is said, , men in the attempt; and also nearly captured a fortified post a few miles distant at chakdara. not only that, but this unexpected outbreak was followed by hostilities on the part of the tribes in bajour, and by the mohmunds north, of peshawur, and also by the afredis, who, subsidised by us, had for years guarded the celebrated kyber. again, the tribes of the samana range, and others to the west of kohat, rose in arms; and a very large force of british troops had to be pushed forward in all haste to quell this great combined attack on the part of our neighbours. general sir neville chamberlain, perhaps the greatest living authority on frontier questions, has written quite recently, pointing out that never previously had there been a semblance of unity of action amongst the different tribesmen.[footnote: _saturday review_, th oct. .] there surely must have been some very strong feeling of resentment and injustice which brought so many tribesmen for the first time to combine in opposition to what they evidently considered an invasion of their country. as regards the afredis, who are spoken of as treacherous and faithless, it must be borne in mind that in we specially recognised their independence,[footnote: _afghanistan_ no. , , page .] and have ever since subsidised them for the special purpose of guarding the commerce through the kyber; a duty which they have faithfully carried out until the present summer. lord lytton, who was viceroy when the arrangement was proposed at the end of the war, wrote in [footnote: _ibid_, page .]--'i sincerely hope that the government of india will not be easily persuaded to keep troops permanently stationed in the kyber. i feel little doubt that such a course would tend rather to cause trouble than to keep order. small bodies of troops would be a constant provocation to attack; large bodies would die like flies....' 'i believe that the pass tribes themselves, if properly managed, will prove the best guardians of the pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it open for us, if we make it worth their while to do so....' many of these very men, and those of other tribes on the frontier, have for years enlisted in our ranks, and have proved to be good soldiers. i repeat that some strong cause must have influenced them suddenly to break out into war. until the present military operations have been brought to a close, and until full official information has been given of the circumstances which have led to them, it is not possible to pronounce a final judgment; still, it seems to me, that we have strong grounds for believing that the border policy of late years has in many instances been too aggressive and regardless of the rights of the tribes; and that the course finally pursued of the retention of fortified posts through swat and bajour to chitral, has been the ultimate cause which has excited the people against us, and produced so great and costly a border war. it must also not be forgotten, that even now we are merely on the fringe, as it were, of the question; and that if we persist in forcing ourselves forward, we shall have many a costly campaign to undertake far away in distant, little-known regions, more difficult and more inaccessible even than those in which we now find ourselves. on the whole it appears to me that we should as far as possible withdraw our isolated posts, so many of which, are either within the tribal country or along its borders. it is sometimes argued that any withdrawal on our part would have a demoralising effect on the tribes, who would ascribe our retirement to inability to maintain our positions. [footnote: _chitral_, , page .] the best reply will perhaps be to quote the words of lord hartington, when under similar circumstances it was decided in to retire from candahar. he said: [footnote: _afghanistan_, no. , , page .] 'the moral effect of a scrupulous adherence to declarations which have been made, and a striking and convincing proof given to the people and princes of india that the british government have no desire for further annexation of territory, could not fail to produce a most salutary effect, in removing the apprehensions, and strengthening the attachment of our native allies throughout india, and on our frontiers....' these remarks may now be brought to a close. my object throughout has been to give an historical summary of the various wars and expeditions in which we have been engaged during the present century on the north -west frontier of india; and of the causes which have led to them. my observations are founded on parliamentary official papers, and on other works of authority; and i hope they may prove useful to the public, who have not, as a rule time to study the intricate details of this difficult subject. i have endeavoured to prove that the tribes on the frontier, and the people of afghanistan, have no real power of injuring our position in india; and turbulent as they may be, a policy of patience, conciliation, and subsidies, is far more likely to attain our object than incessant costly expeditions into their mountains. our influence over them is already great, and is increasing year by year. by carefully maintaining the principles i have sketched out, we shall gradually obtain their friendship, and also their support, should other dangers ever threaten our dominions. we are the rulers of a great empire in the east, with its heavy duties and responsibilities, and in devoting ourselves to the welfare of the millions under our sway, and in developing the resources of the country, we shall do far more for the happiness of the people and the security of the empire than by squandering our finances in constant expeditions beyond its borders. file was produced from images generously made available by university of california libraries) recollections of a military life [illustration: head quarters, crimea. winter of _farm house, in which lord raglan died_] recollections of a military life by general sir john adye, g.c.b., r.a. london smith, elder, & co., waterloo place _all rights reserved_ introduction having served for many years in the royal artillery, and taken part in some of the campaigns in which the british army has been engaged during my period of service, i am in hopes that my recollections may be of some interest, and my views on military subjects worthy of record; and i therefore publish them, dedicating my book to the officers and men of the regiment amongst whom i have passed my career. . contents chapter page i. days of peace ii. commencement of crimean war--interview with napoleon iii. at paris iii. battle of alma iv. the flank march v. battle of balaclava vi. battle of inkerman vii. the winter of viii. bombardment of april, ix. capture of the mamelon and quarries--interview with general pÉlissier x. battle of june , and death of lord raglan xi. battle of chernaya and the fall of sebastopol xii. the indian mutiny xiii. the battles at cawnpore xiv. causes of the mutiny, and policy of lord canning xv. recollections of the madras presidency xvi. return to bengal--amalgamation of the artillery regiments xvii. frontier campaign in the afghan mountains--its origin--political and military difficulties xviii. hard fighting in the mountains xix. political complications--end of the war xx. visit to peshawur--sir hugh rose returns to england--sir william mansfield appointed commander-in-chief xxi. the war in bootan xxii. farewell to india--return to regimental duty at woolwich--appointed director of artillery--war office organisation xxiii. short service and reserve xxiv. localisation and county regiments--interview with napoleon iii. xxv. visit to the crimea with charles gordon, --report on the cemeteries xxvi. rifled ordnance and naval and military reserves--appointed governor, royal military academy--the british army in xxvii. central asia and the afghan war of - xxviii. appointed surveyor general of the ordnance--principles of army promotion--egyptian war of xxix. gibraltar--its value from a naval and commercial point of view--zobehr pasha a state prisoner--sanitary condition of gibraltar list of illustrations full-page illustrations head quarters, crimea, winter of . farm house in which lord raglan died _frontispiece_ battle of alma, september , _to face p._ balaclava. scene of light cavalry charge, october , " the garrison of lucknow returning to cawnpore, november " going to the war. crossing the indus at attock, november " afghan frontier campaign. storming the conical peak, december " sketch map to illustrate tour in bootan, january " war in bootan, . outpost in valley of the chin-chu " ruins of the tuileries, november . libertÉ--egalitÉ--fraternitÉ " eve of tel-el-kebir. encampment of british army at kassassin lock " gibraltar from queen of spain's chair " zobehr pasha " illustrations in text page diagram of french and english armies formation of light brigade under the earl of cardigan plan of cawnpore, to illustrate battle of november , dutch monumental inscription sketch map of north-west frontier copy of sketch by napoleon iii. sketch map to illustrate battle of tel-el-kebir visiting card of arabi pasha found at tel-el-kebir arms of gibraltar maps battle of alma _to face p._ sketch showing the position of the allied armies before sebastopol, october " sketch to illustrate the battle of inkerman " recollections of a military life chapter i days of peace 'wakening the echoes of joys long fled.' in recording personal recollections of the varied scenes and events in which, during a long military service, it has been my lot to take part, it is scarcely necessary to enter into family details, and i will therefore merely state that my grandfather, stephen payne adye, entered the royal artillery in , and served in the war in germany and in america; and since that date various members of the family have served in uninterrupted succession in the regiment down to the present day. of his four sons, three became officers of artillery. the eldest, ralph willett adye, was the author of the 'pocket gunner,' which was a standard book of reference for many years. he died at gibraltar in , and his monument still exists there, in the so-called trafalgar cemetery. the second son, stephen gallwey adye, saw much active service. he was with sir ralph abercromby in egypt in , and was slightly wounded in action near alexandria. he was also at walcheren in , at cadiz in , and at quatre bras and waterloo. he died a major general and superintendent of the laboratory, woolwich arsenal, in . the third son, john miller adye, was an officer in the royal navy. he served as a lieutenant in lord nelson's flagship, the 'vanguard,' at the battle of the nile, and was wounded. in he was in command of the 'partridge' corvette cruising off the island of elba, and conveyed sir neil campbell (who was british commissioner there) to leghorn in february. sir neil, having received information that napoleon intended to escape, returned hastily to elba, but owing to light winds was delayed, and only arrived on the morning of february th to find that napoleon had left on the night of the th. the 'partridge' went in pursuit towards the antibes, but, it being uncertain to what part of the coast he had sailed, failed to overtake him.[ ] the fourth son, james pattison adye (my father), was also in the artillery, and was present at copenhagen in , and served for several years in the mediterranean. in i received a nomination to a cadetship at the royal military academy woolwich from the master general of the ordnance, sir james kempt, and went up for examination in february, at the age of fourteen. there was no competition fortunately in those days, and the whole affair, including medical examination, only lasted an hour and a half, and i was reported as having passed very satisfactorily. my career at the academy was a happy one. i was treated with much kindness, and experienced none of the bullying or ill-usage which was supposed to exist. an amusing incident occurred soon after i joined. each room contained four cadets, the head of my room being the late general william gardner, r.a. he was at that time about twenty-one years of age, and having quarrelled with another cadet, who was a good fighter with his fists, a meeting was arranged in the racket court. gardner, however, said that a pugilistic encounter was very well for boys, but as a man he claimed to fight with pistols. this gave a more serious turn to the matter, and i, as junior of the room, was ordered to prepare the bullets for the duel, and well remember remaining up late at night, melting lead in the fire shovel, and pouring it into bullet moulds. these serious preparations led to some arrangement, and the affair never came off. colonel parker was at that time captain of the cadets, and wilford one of the subalterns. parker, a fine old soldier, had lost his leg at waterloo and wore a wooden one. he was nicknamed peg parker. one sunday afternoon the cadets were being marched to church across the 'barrack field' at woolwich, parker as usual riding in front on a small white pony. all at once wilford ran up to him and said, 'beg your pardon, sir, but you have lost your leg!' and sure enough, on looking down, parker saw that his wooden one was missing. it had tumbled off. wilford, however, who had picked it up, screwed it on again, and the march was resumed. in december , after nearly three years' residence, i received my commission as a second lieutenant. i was head of the academy, and just seventeen. the late sir frederic campbell was second, and we both selected the royal artillery. in the spring of i attended a levee of william iv., and, to my surprise, on hearing my name he kindly spoke to me and asked what relation i was to general adye. the current story was that the king asked me what relation i was to my uncle, and that in my confusion i replied grandson; but this is apocryphal. speaking of william iv. reminds me of a story about him which i believe is well founded. soon after becoming king he one day visited woolwich, and after inspecting the artillery, &c., inquired who was commanding officer of the marines, and was told it was sir john mccleverty. the king said that sir john was an old friend and comrade of his, and went off at once to call on him at the barracks. he expressed great pleasure at seeing his old companion, and asked if he could do anything for him, adding, 'you know i am a king now, and can do what i like.' old sir john mccleverty replied: 'yes, your majesty, you can do something for me. my son not long ago was a lieutenant on board a man-of-war, and in the channel one night in a thick fog, when he was on watch, they came into collision with another ship, and the admiralty have in consequence tried him by court martial, cancelled his commission, and have nearly broken my heart, for he is an excellent officer.' the king promised that he should be restored, was as good as his word, and the son rose afterwards to some distinction, commanding the 'terrible' in the black sea during the crimean war. as the earlier years of my service were passed during a period of peace, they call for little remark. towards the end of i embarked at woolwich with my company for malta in an old sailing transport, the 'numa pompilius,' and, owing chiefly to bad weather in the bay, the voyage occupied no less than two months. we sailed into malta on the same morning that the british fleet under sir robert stopford arrived from the capture of acre. in , having returned home, i was appointed adjutant of the artillery in dublin, and was present when daniel o'connell was put into prison in richmond bridewell, and made a sketch of the building, which was published in the 'illustrated london news.' i also witnessed the great procession through the streets of dublin when o'connell and the other prisoners were released. in i was appointed to c troop, royal horse artillery, at woolwich. there were three troops there, each consisting of two guns, a waggon, and forty horses. they were all commanded by officers who had been present at waterloo thirty years before--fox strangways, frank warde, and ingilby; but only one of them (strangways) was even a brevet major, and they were all between fifty and sixty years of age. those were days of slow promotion. on one occasion major chalmers, r.a., had an interview with william iv., who incidentally asked him how long he had been a captain of artillery. 'twenty-three years, your majesty,' replied chalmers. the king hastily said, 'i didn't ask you how long it was since you were born, but how long you had been a captain.' 'well, your majesty,' says chalmers, 'i am very sorry, but i have been twenty-three years in that rank.' the king, who apparently could hardly believe it, laughed and said, 'and a very fine position, too.' 'oh yes,' said chalmers, 'undoubtedly so.' in the spring of i was in command of an artillery detachment in the tower of london. there was at that time much anxiety about the chartists, and as to the result of a meeting under fergus o'connor which took place on kennington common on april . the walls of the tower and the top of the bank and the mansion house were to some extent prepared for defence, and sandbags were placed to form loop-holes for musketry, an attack by the mob being apprehended. the lord mayor applied for some hand-grenades to be thrown from the mansion house in case of need, and i sent him a boxful in a cab, at the same time giving a hint that in using them he should not hold them too long in his hand, as they might explode prematurely. this caused a little uneasiness, and subsequently a bombardier was ordered to give him instructions as to throwing them. the clerks in the ordnance department at the tower were sworn in as special constables, and were served out with batons cut out of old mop-sticks. on the morning of april sir george cathcart, then lieutenant of the tower, sent for me. he had three large canvas frames in his drawing-room, and on them was painted in great letters: 'the tower guns are loaded to the muzzle. if you attempt to enter, they will be fired!' he said his intention was, when the expected mob came, to hang them (the frames, not the mob) over the walls, with a bit of string. i ventured to point out that, if loaded as stated, the guns, which were old cast-iron carronades, would infallibly burst, but he replied that it was only to frighten the people, who would probably run away. we waited all day, but no crowd ever came near the tower, and the whole affair collapsed. it is often said that extravagance prevails amongst the officers in some regiments of the army, and there is probably a good deal of truth in the remark. but at all events in the earlier days of my service real economy prevailed in the artillery, as is proved by the following facsimile copy of my mess-bill in dublin in may , now in my possession. _may _ £ _s._ _d._ share of mess guest - / to ale cigars luncheon share of h.r.h. prince george's luncheon - / breakfasts cigar cigars luncheon and soda water dinners -------------- -------------- entertaining royalty for - / _d._ can hardly be considered extravagant. footnotes: [footnote : _napoleon at elba_, sir neil campbell.] chapter ii commencement of crimean war--interview with napoleon iii it is time now to pass on from the early reminiscences of a period of peace to the more interesting and important events of active service, in which for some years it was my good fortune to share. in the spring of , after a peace which in europe had lasted nearly forty years, the british navy and army were again called upon to take part in a great war; and the whole nation soon became deeply absorbed in the stirring events of the crimean campaign. lord raglan at that time was master general of the ordnance and was also appointed to command the expedition, and i had the good fortune to be selected as brigade major to the artillery under general cator. there is perhaps no operation of war more difficult than that which this country has to undertake in the embarkation of its army for a continental campaign. it is not merely as regards its _personnel_; but large reserves of ammunition and stores, and the armaments and equipments of the artillery, engineers, medical, commissariat, clothing, and other departments have to be embarked, and all so arranged as to be prepared for rapid landing after a long voyage, and possibly in the face of an enemy. in proceeding to the crimea eight batteries of horse and field artillery, several siege train companies, and large reserves of munitions for the army were embarked in woolwich dockyard during march and april. the combined naval and military arrangements were efficiently carried out; and although the field artillery were conveyed in sailing vessels, and were several weeks at sea before arrival at constantinople, the loss of horses was only per cent. out of about , embarked. towards the end of april colonels strangways and lake, captains patton, gordon, and myself (all artillery officers) were directed to proceed _viâ_ france to marseilles for malta. on arrival at paris, colonel strangways, who was personally known to the emperor napoleon, received a message that his majesty wished to receive him and his brother officers at the tuileries. strangways informed our ambassador, lord cowley, who, however, said it was not according to etiquette, and that we ought to attend a levee in the usual way, and declined to go with us; so we put on our uniforms and drove to the tuileries in a _fiacre_ without him. the servant at the entrance seemed rather surprised when we said we had come to see the emperor; but after conference with a staff officer, we were conducted through the 'salle des maréchaux' to an inner room, and were received very kindly by napoleon, who was in the uniform of a general. he made inquiries about the amount of artillery we had embarked for the east; spoke about the difficulty of conveying horses for a long voyage; and expressed a hope that the french and english armies combined would be able to act decisively--and then, wishing us prosperity, he invited us to come and see him again on our return. alas! we were not destined to do so. strangways was killed at inkerman; lake, who had a horse shot under him at alma, and another at inkerman, was invalided and died soon after; captain patton died of cholera at balaclava; and many years elapsed before i had another interview with napoleon, under very altered conditions, shortly before his death at chiselhurst. we arrived at malta about the middle of may. the streets were full of french soldiers on their way to the east; and there was a great deal of cheering and enthusiasm. on the th we embarked in the 'medway' for constantinople with the th regiment. as we approached the dardanelles we passed a sailing transport, with part of a cavalry regiment on board, and as they had been some weeks at sea, and were making no progress owing to calm weather, we induced our captain to take her in tow. the officers in the transport made signs of their wish to communicate, so we lowered a bottle tied to a long string, which they picked up as it floated past, and we then pulled it back. we expected their inquiries might be as to the position of the russians and the progress of the war, but their message was: 'can you tell us who won the two thousand guineas? we have several bets, and are very anxious!' as we entered the dardanelles we were boarded by two french officers from a small transport, who begged assistance, as they were short of provisions, having only biscuits, and no water. we provided them with what was requisite, and also took them in tow. they belonged to the chasseurs d'afrique, and had been forty days on passage from algiers. passing gallipoli, where there were several men-of-war at anchor and considerable french and english encampments on shore, we arrived at constantinople on may . our troops of the various arms were now arriving daily, and were accommodated either in the great barrack at scutari, or encamped on the plain outside, in close proximity to large turkish cemeteries. all was bustle and animation. the scene, however, soon changed, and at the end of may the light division under sir george brown re-embarked, entered the black sea, and landed at varna, followed shortly after by the whole of the allied armies. until my arrival at constantinople, i had never seen lord raglan. owing, however, to the failure of general cator's health almost immediately on his landing, and to the numerous artillery matters which required discussion and decision, it so happened that i had from that time almost daily interviews with the commander-in-chief. in fact, during the succeeding twelve months, and until his death in june , it was my good fortune to be closely associated with lord raglan in the great events which rapidly succeeded each other. general cator's advice to me was, never to trouble lord raglan more than absolutely necessary with details, to listen carefully to his remarks, to try and anticipate his wishes, and at all times to make as light as possible of difficulties. these excellent suggestions i did my best to carry out. the original intention in massing the allied armies at varna was with a view of an advance to the danube, although, in regard to land transport, the english force was but little prepared for rapid movement. however, the raising of the siege of silistria towards the end of june and the retreat of the russians led to an entire change of plan, and the expedition to the crimea was decided on. the duke of newcastle was then minister for war, and in his despatch to lord raglan, of june ,[ ] he gave instructions that no campaign in the principalities should be undertaken, but that measures should at once be concerted for the siege of sebastopol.' lord raglan's reply on july said, that 'the descent on the crimea is decided upon, more in deference to the views of the british government than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities as to the extent of the enemy's forces or to their state of preparation.' owing to the continued and severe illness of general cator he was invalided home in august, and had to be carried on board ship in a hammock, being succeeded in command of the artillery by general strangways. lord de ros, quartermaster general, went home ill at the same time. during the month of august incessant preparations were made for the embarkation of the great expedition. the fleets of the allied powers arrived, and the bay of varna was crowded with hundreds of transports, steam-tugs, flat-bottomed boats, and rafts; and the beach was strewn with thousands of gabions, fascines, and baggage of all kinds. towards the end of the month the troops commenced embarking. one morning early, whilst superintending the departure of some batteries from the shore, lord raglan came up and spoke to me. he remarked that the artillery staff was insufficient, and that i had too much to do; and added, 'if you were a field officer i would appoint you assistant adjutant general, and give you help.' having heard a rumour that an officer of high rank was coming from england as chief of the artillery staff, i ventured to say that i hoped lord raglan would not supersede me. he replied at once: 'certainly not. i will take good care that you are not superseded.' the next day he sent for me, and said, 'i have got the duke of newcastle in a corner.' this rather puzzled me for the moment, but he continued: 'i have requested him at once to give you either brevet or local rank as a major, and then the difficulty will be met.' the result of this was that within a month i was gazetted as a major.' after the expedition had been decided on, and even after it had embarked, great difference of opinion existed amongst the generals and admirals of both nations as to its expediency. the late season of the year, the want of accurate information as to the actual force of the russians and of the condition of the defences of sebastopol, all were matters of grave concern. the prevalence of cholera and fever--which had greatly weakened the allied armies and fleets, and which continued after leaving varna--also added to the difficulties. these considerations, however, were not allowed to prevail, and on august marshal saint-arnaud issued a proclamation to the french army, in which he said that providence had called them to the crimea, a country healthy as france, and that ere long the three united flags should float over the ramparts of sebastopol. lord raglan also issued his instructions, which were as follows: 'the invasion of the crimea having been determined on, the troops will embark in such ships as shall be provided for their conveyance.' notwithstanding his proclamation, saint-arnaud, even when approaching the shore of the crimea, remained in a somewhat vacillating condition of mind. during the voyage across, he made a signal requesting lord raglan and admiral dundas to come and see him on board the 'ville de paris.' they proceeded alongside in the 'caradoc,' but lord raglan, having only one arm, was unable to go on board.[ ] admiral dundas, however, visited saint-arnaud, who at the time was very ill and in great pain, and unable to converse. he handed the admiral a paper without signature, in which it was urged that it would be too hazardous to land in face of a powerful enemy having a numerous cavalry; that the season was too late for a siege of sebastopol, which, moreover, was known to be stronger than anticipated; and that consequently it was necessary to reconsider the situation and the measures to be adopted. admiral dundas, accompanied by some french generals, then returned to the 'caradoc,' and a long debate took place with lord raglan, who at length ended the discussion by declaring that he would not now consent to alter a decision which had been come to after careful consideration at the last council at varna. without doubt the enterprise was a bold and dangerous one, undertaken at a late period of the year, with troops that were physically weak from cholera and fever. the orders of the french and english governments were, however, peremptory, and therefore the allied generals had in reality no option in the matter. on the morning of september the allied fleets and transports arrived off the coast of the crimea, and the troops at once commenced landing on the shore about twenty-five miles from sebastopol. the french were very quick in their movements, and, on our part, the light division under sir george brown lost no time; by the end of the day almost the whole of the british infantry, and twenty field guns horsed and equipped, were on shore. just as the disembarkation commenced in the early morning a russian officer with a cossack orderly, rode up on some high ground between the french and english landing places, dismounted, and leisurely surveyed the scene; and then as our men on landing approached, he remounted and quietly trotted away. with that solitary exception, no enemy came near us during the five days occupied in disembarkation. the first night on shore it rained heavily, our troops were without tents or shelter, and the operations on several subsequent days were considerably retarded by rough weather and a heavy surf, rendering our position somewhat precarious. it has always appeared inexplicable why prince menschikoff should have allowed so critical an operation on the part of the allies to be completed, without any attempt on his part to oppose or delay it; for nothing can be more helpless than an army with men, horses, and material of all kinds huddled together in boats, and landing on an open beach. the probabilities are that he was occupied in concentrating his troops at the strong position on the alma, and felt himself unable to disturb our operations. one morning after landing, i rode with general strangways inland for a mile or two to get water for our horses, and found a battalion of the rifle brigade in possession of a large farm. the officers complained that some of the french soldiers were pillaging the neighbourhood, and driving off the cattle, &c. sir george brown had sent a remonstrance to the french on the subject. as we left the farm we saw a french staff officer, evidently very angry and in pursuit of some of his men, and general strangways recognised prince jerome napoleon, who was in command of the division close by. at length, on september , all being ready, the allied armies commenced their celebrated march on sebastopol. the french were close to the shore, and the order of march is shown on the following plan. [illustration: english army. french army. sir sir de prince g. brown l. evans napoleon canrobert bosquet +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ |light| | nd. | | rd. | | st | | nd. | |div. | |div. | |div. | |div. | |div. | +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ duke of sir cambridge r. england +-----+ +-----+ +---------+ | st. | | rd. | | baggage | _black |div. | |div. | | | sea_ +-----+ +-----+ +---------+ earl of sir cardigan g. cathcart forey +---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+ | cavalry | | th. | | baggage | | th. | | | |div. | | | |div. | +---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+ +-----+ |turks| | | +-----+ diagram of french and english armies] the strength of the british army was approximately as follows: officers and men cavalry , artillery guns , infantry , ------ total , the french were rather stronger in infantry, but had no cavalry. the division of turks was about , strong. the troops were in excellent spirits at the prospect of immediate action. the country was open and undulating; the distant smoke of burning villages, and the occasional appearance of a few cossacks hovering about on the flank, were the only evidences that we were in an enemy's country. the arrival in the afternoon at the small fresh stream of the bulganac was most welcome to the men and horses of the allies, who for days had suffered from a scanty supply of indifferent water. late in the afternoon the enemy's cavalry showed in considerable force, at a distance almost out of range, beyond the stream, and lord raglan with his staff moved to the front, accompanied by the light cavalry under lord cardigan. suddenly a russian battery opened fire and a round shot passed through the light cavalry, taking off a man's leg, and bounding like a cricket ball over the heads of the staff. that was the first shot of the campaign in the crimea. two batteries of horse artillery were at once sent forward, and on their coming into action the enemy fell back out of range, covered by a cloud of skirmishers. our loss was four troopers severely wounded. it was almost dusk, and lord raglan, being anxious to inform prince napoleon of what had occurred, as he was with his division about a mile distant, directed colonel count lagondie, the french military attaché, to ride over and give him the necessary information. the french colonel was riding a fat flemish mare which he called 'medore,' and as he cantered leisurely off the remark was made, 'if lagondie does not move a little faster it will be a long time before he comes back.' he never did come back, as will be explained presently. shortly after dusk all staff officers were directed to attend at head quarters, which were established in a small hut close to the bulganac. general airey, the quartermaster general received us, and desired that all general officers should be informed that the enemy in considerable numbers being in the vicinity, a good look-out must be kept during the night, and that there should be no sounds of drums or trumpets. he then went on to say that the russian army, computed at , men with a powerful artillery, occupied a strong entrenched position on heights beyond the alma, a few miles distant, and that a general action was imminent on the morrow. the night passed quietly. footnotes: [footnote : committee of the house of commons on the state of the army before sebastopol.] [footnote : this account is taken from a pamphlet written by the late general sir w. brereton, r.a., who was on board admiral dundas's flagship at the time.] chapter iii battle of alma 'though till now ungraced in story, scant although thy waters be, alma, roll those waters proudly; roll them proudly to the sea.' _september ._--in the early morning the allied armies formed up in position as on the previous day's march, in readiness for the battle. it was then discovered that colonel lagondie was absent from head quarters, and inquiries were made without result. as it was supposed he might have remained during the night with his french comrades, a message was sent to prince napoleon. the prince, however, said that lagondie had arrived the previous evening with lord raglan's message, and then left. the mystery of his absence remained for the time inexplicable. soon after the battle of the alma, however, menschikoff's carriage, containing a number of his papers and letters, was captured, and amongst them a note from a lady in sebastopol saying how much pleased they were with the charming french colonel he had sent in to them, and hoping he would soon send some more. this at once cleared up the mystery of our friend lagondie; and it subsequently transpired that on leaving napoleon at dusk, being short-sighted, he had missed his way, and had ridden straight into the russian cavalry and was made prisoner. considerable delay occurred on the morning of september , before our troops were prepared to advance, owing to numerous cases of cholera and fever amongst the men during the previous night, and the necessity of conveying them to the shore, for embarkation in the transports. the french, being close to the sea, had a considerable advantage in this respect. during the morning marshal saint-arnaud, with a large staff and an officer carrying a silk tricolor standard, rode along the front of the british army to confer with lord raglan, and was loudly cheered by our men. whether the french marshal was a great general or not, i had no means of judging; but when we consider that he was then suffering from a mortal disease--of which, indeed, he died a few days later on board a french man-of-war--i think that he evinced a brave and heroic spirit under such circumstances in leading and commanding a french army in a great and successful battle. [illustration: battle of alma.] at about eleven o'clock the allied armies advanced, the whole front covered by a cloud of skirmishers. the order of battle was an _échelon_ from the right. general bosquet's division led off, marching along the sea shore, with the turkish force in rear. then came the divisions of canrobert and prince napoleon, with that of general forey in rear in reserve. the english then took up the _échelon_; the second division under de lacy evans being next to that of napoleon, then the light division under sir george brown, followed in a second line by the troops of sir richard england and the guards and highlanders under the duke of cambridge, the batteries of artillery in the intervals of brigades--the fourth division under sir george cathcart and the cavalry under lord lucan being held in reserve on the outward flank, which was three or four miles from the shore. as the armies thus advanced to the attack we were able to take a more complete survey of the russian position, and whilst the ground in front of the french was seen to be precipitous and difficult, it was evident that the main body of the russians was in position, and partly entrenched, on slopes which the english forces were about to storm. it has sometimes been argued that the english ought to have attempted a movement turning the russian right; but when it is considered that our base was the sea, it is, i think, evident that the only prudent course in attacking a strong, partially entrenched position on the other side of a river, was the _échelon_ movement as described. it was about noon when the first gun was fired; bosquet's brigades crossed the river near its mouth, and commenced climbing the precipitous slopes, their advance being assisted by the fire of some vessels of the fleet. the enemy, however, were not in great force at this point, and the french gained the crest with comparatively few casualties. the divisions of canrobert and prince napoleon as they reached the river crossed in succession, and were vigorously opposed as they swarmed up the heights. great difficulties also were encountered in bringing up their artillery; but a flank movement of bosquet's troops along the crest finally enabled the french army to make good the ascent, although with considerable loss, and the russians were compelled to yield the ground.[ ] so far the battle had satisfactorily progressed, but a sterner and far more terrible struggle had commenced on the left. the two leading english divisions as they approached the river and came within long range of the enemy's guns were deployed into line, and, whilst waiting for the completion of the french attack, were ordered to lie down. the english batteries came into action; but the enemy's guns were both powerful and numerous, and on commanding ground, so that at the beginning we were rather at a disadvantage. urgent messages having been received from the french, it was apparent that the moment of action had at length arrived, and lord raglan then gave the order for the advance of the whole army. the village of burliuk on our side of the river, in front of sir de lacy evans' division, was set on fire by the enemy, and led to the temporary separation of his two brigades, one passing it on either side. lord raglan, having given the order, passed with his staff through the burning village to the right, and by a narrow lane came suddenly down to a ford of the river. in riding through the village we passed the body of lieutenant cockerell, a young officer of artillery, who with his horse had just been killed by a round shot from the heights. a sharp skirmish was going on between the russian outposts and the zouaves of napoleon's division as we reached and crossed the ford. at that moment lieutenant leslie, of the life guards, orderly officer to lord raglan, fell from his horse, shot through the shoulder, and was laid under the bank on the opposite side. the horse of captain fortescue, r.a., was killed at the same time by a bullet in the head.[ ] lord raglan pressed on, and passing some french skirmishers in the vineyards, soon reached high ground, from which he had an excellent view of the russian position. perceiving the important advantage he should gain by artillery fire from this spot, he consulted general strangways and then sent me back for some guns. fortunately captain turner's battery was just crossing the ford, and two guns were quickly brought up, followed shortly by the others. their fire, directed against the russian columns and batteries, who were now heavily engaged with the advance of the light and second divisions, had a powerful effect, not only materially but morally, as showing the russians that whilst their front was being stormed their flank was already turned. lieutenant walsham, r.a., was killed whilst with these guns. [illustration: battle of alma, th september, ] in the meantime the two leading divisions, covered by skirmishers, moved steadily across the plain. their ranks became somewhat disarranged by the gardens and vineyards as they approached the river, and still more so as they waded across the stream, which was fordable at many places. they, however, found a momentary shelter behind the broken ground on the opposite bank, and then the great crisis began. it was a moment of intense anxiety as the men of the light and part of the second divisions jumped from their cover, and with a rattling fire commenced the charge. the ground over which they had to pass was of the nature of a smooth, steep glacis, and was swept by infantry and artillery fire. three of our batteries, however, had converged towards the bridge over the alma, and gave material support to the advancing troops. up to this time every advantage had been on the side of the enemy. the scale, however, now began to turn. as the english line approached the russian columns, its formation, straggling and irregular as it was, enabled it to open a continuous line of fire. the enemy's forces could be seen opening out and endeavouring to deploy; but it was too late--our regiments were close upon them. then the russian masses began to shake; then men from the rear were seen to run; then whole columns would turn and retire, halting and facing about at short intervals, but, with artillery smashing on their flank, and with codrington's and pennefather's brigades still streaming upwards, the enemy's troops could no longer hold their ground, but fled disordered up the hill. the converging fire of their batteries, however, still made a fearful havoc in the english ranks, and a wide street of dead and wounded, the whole way from the river upwards, showed the terrific nature of the fight. breathless, decimated and much broken, but with victory crowning their efforts, the centre regiments at length dashed over the main entrenchment and captured two guns. but the battle was even then by no means over. the russian reserves moved down, and codrington's brigade, whose force was almost expended, was obliged to give way, and victory for a moment seemed doubtful. succour, however, was at hand. the three regiments of guards, with the highlanders on the left, the whole under the duke of cambridge, were now advancing up the hill in grand array. some slight delay occurred until codrington's brigade had fallen back and cleared the front, during which time the casualties were numerous, but then the chance of the russians was over and their whole army retreated in some confusion. lord raglan in the meantime had left his position on the hill and joined his victorious troops, and by his orders five batteries of artillery were concentrated and fired on the broken columns of the enemy until they were out of range. it was a great victory, not only in its immediate result, but in its general effect on the russian army. our losses in killed, wounded, and missing were very severe--amounting to , officers and men. about half of the entire number occurred in the light division alone. the following diagram gives the position of the infantry regiments chiefly engaged, and of the casualties in each: th rd rd th fus th th coldstream guards scots guards grenadier guards the joy and excitement of the english troops were intense as lord raglan rode along the line formed on the heights they had just won. on coming to the highland brigade rather an amusing incident occurred. sir colin campbell addressed the commander-in-chief, and begged him to do him a favour. lord raglan, in reply, said it would give him pleasure to serve him in any way. sir colin then said: 'my lord, you have in years gone by shown me kindness when i was a young officer, and now i am an old one. my request is that, so long as i am at the head of the highland brigade, i may be allowed to wear the highland bonnet.' this delighted the scotchmen, and great cheering followed. in addition to the two guns captured, two russian generals were taken prisoners and about of their wounded men were left on the field. the total loss of the russians in the battle is stated to have been upwards of , . the battle ended about four o'clock in the afternoon, the head quarters camp being pitched near the river, and lord raglan then went in search of his orderly officer, lieutenant tom leslie, and with the help of some guardsmen, with a stretcher, brought him to his tent. lord raglan asked me if i knew tom's mother, and on my replying in the negative, he said: 'a charming woman. i must write to her. how proud she will be to hear that he has a bullet in his shoulder!' several years after the battle, when in india, i met an old artillery man at delhi, who claimed my acquaintance, and reminded me of the incident of bringing up turner's guns from the ford. he said he was one of the drivers of the battery at the time, and that i rode up to him in the river and said: '"johnson," says you, "you'll not spare whip nor spur till you get to the top of that hill, for lord raglan wants you."' i cannot vouch for the absolute correctness of his personal reminiscences, but the main fact is correct enough. the two days following the victory were passed in collecting our wounded (upwards of , ), and carrying them in hammocks and stretchers to the beach for embarkation. amongst others i remember saying a few words to baring of the coldstream guards, as he was carried away from the field. he had lost an arm. reserves of ammunition were also landed from the transports to meet the expenditure, which, however, was not large, the infantry having fired about six rounds a man and the artillery fifteen rounds a gun. the russians' muskets, lying about the field in thousands (many of them with the old flint lock) were broken, and the accoutrements, knapsacks, &c., collected in heaps and burned. the russian commander-in-chief having omitted to send in a flag of truce, or to make any inquiry as to his wounded left on the ground, they were collected in a field and as far as possible attended to. an english medical officer, having volunteered, was left in charge of them as we marched away; a message being sent to prince menschikoff informing him of the arrangement. footnotes: [footnote : general canrobert was slightly wounded during the attack.] [footnote : nearly two years afterwards, when peace was signed, i re-visited the scene of the battle, and found the skeleton of the horse lying in the lane, with its skull pierced by a bullet.] chapter iv the flank march on the morning of, september the allied armies left their position on the alma, and after a march of about seven miles arrived at the katcha, meeting with no opposition, and on the following day reached the belbec, a small stream within a short distance of sebastopol. from our pickets on the heights we could see the harbour and their line-of-battle ships at anchor. hitherto the intention of the allies had been to attack the forts on the north side, but the plans were suddenly altered, chiefly in consequence of the recommendation of sir john burgoyne. in a very able memorandum, written the day after the alma, he pointed out in the first place, that the city of sebastopol, with its docks, wharves, reserve armaments and stores--in fact, its chief resources--were on the south side of the harbour, and that the land defences there were imperfect and incomplete. in the second place, that the harbours of kameisch and balaclava would give the allied forces a safe base of operations, and free communication with the fleet, whereas on the north they had only the sea shore to rely on. under these circumstances he recommended the abandonment of the north altogether, and establishing ourselves to the south of the city. the strategical advantages of this course were apparent, and the plan was adopted, and on september the flank march began, the english army leading off, and proceeding for some miles in a south easterly direction through the woods. i remember when the duke of cambridge received the order to march south-east through the forest, he remarked that he had received many orders in his day, but that was the first time he had ever marched by compass. it so happened that on the same morning prince menschikoff, ignorant of our sudden change of plan, was moving a considerable force inland from sebastopol, in order to take the allies in flank, and as we emerged from the woods on the open ground at mackenzie's farm, our advanced troops suddenly ran into the rear guard of the russians. in fact, both the opposing armies were making a flank march at the same time, and the head of one came into collision with the tail of the other. both sides were taken unawares, but some of our cavalry and maude's troop of horse artillery at once pursued and captured a few prisoners and a considerable number of waggons, with ammunition, supplies, and baggage. this unexpected encounter must have rather mystified the enemy; but lord raglan, knowing that his forces were scattered for some miles on a long thin line, pushed on, and towards sunset the light and first divisions reached the bridge over the chernaya on the road leading to balaclava, and bivouacked for the night.[ ] the following morning the march was resumed across the plain for two or three miles to balaclava, that small fishing village, with its land-locked harbour scarcely larger than a dock, which was destined to be the british base throughout the war. as the staff and leading troops approached the village, a deputation of the inhabitants came out bearing bread and salt as a token of submission. almost at the same time a gun was suddenly fired from the ruins of the old castle on the heights, and a shell splashed into the marshes close by, followed by another. lord raglan, through an interpreter, asked the deputation the reason of this unexpected demonstration, as bread and salt and bursting shells seemed inconsistent with each other; but the only explanation they could give was that the small garrison had not been formally summoned to surrender. the troops of the light division at once swarmed up the heights, and half of c troop of horse artillery, under brandling, came into action; the other half i took, by lord raglan's orders, up the steep hill overlooking the castle. just as we got into action, the 'agamemnon,' with admiral sir edmund lyons, arrived off the harbour, and the small garrison, finding themselves under a converging fire from three sides, hoisted a white handkerchief on a pole in token of surrender. their armament consisted of four antiquated brass mortars. the commandant, an old greek colonel, had been wounded in the foot, and was carried down to balaclava, where he met the staff who had just ridden in. the commandant's wife, on seeing her husband's condition, rushed out of her house in a flood of tears, fell on his neck, and kissed him repeatedly. lord raglan, however, spoke kindly and reassured her. in the meantime some russian ladies who had left sebastopol and taken refuge in balaclava, terrified by our sudden arrival, crossed the harbour in a small boat in the vain hope of escape. accompanied by another officer i followed them across, and we tried to reassure them. knowing nothing of their language this was a difficulty. we tried 'buono, russ buono,' but it was not sufficient. fortunately, at length we found one who spoke a little french, and then they became comforted and returned with us to the village, and were taken care of. such was the capture of balaclava. many years after, in , on re-visiting the crimea with the late colonel charles gordon of khartoum, we found that the old commandant (colonel mammoo) was still alive, being over eighty, and we called on him. he was much pleased to see us and to talk over old days, and said that he should never forget the kindness he had received from the english when a prisoner of war. the officers and men of the navy in the man-of-war which took him to constantinople treated him, he said, like a prince. in the meantime the condition of marshal saint-arnaud had become critical, and on september he resigned the command of the french army, and was succeeded by general canrobert, who was then forty-five years of age. saint-arnaud embarked at balaclava on board the 'berthollet,' and was visited by lord raglan and sir edmund lyons. he was then almost at the point of death, and his last words to lord raglan were: 'je vous suivrai toujours par la pensée.'[ ] he died on board on september . at the end of september the allied armies took up their position on the plateau in front of sebastopol, the french on the left with their base at kameisch; lord raglan establishing his head quarters at a farm house. [illustration: sketch showing the position of the allied armies before sebastopol oct. .] [illustration: russian names. t. _malakoff tower_ _kornileff bas._ m. _mamelon. gordon's hill_ r. _great redan_ _bastion no. _ d. _barrack batteries_ g. _garden batteries_ b. _bastion du mât_ _bastion no. _ c. _bastion centrale_ _bastion no. _ l. _lancaster battery_ x. _left attack. chapman's batteries_ y. _right attack. gordon's batteries_ s. _sand bag battery at inkerman._ _english_ _french._ references to balaclava. _a. b. c. d. e. f._ {_english {batteries._ . . . . . . {_redoubts {manned by turks._] the land defences of the city at the time were incomplete and not continuous. on the east stood a round tower with four guns (the malakoff), and on the west a crenelated wall, with another tower overlooking quarantine bay, and between these were some earthworks (called afterwards the redan, bastion du mât, &c.), unfinished and unarmed. these defences were not formidable, and the idea of an immediate assault suggested itself and was advocated by some officers of high rank. on the other hand, the garrison was almost equal in number to the allies; the approaches were commanded by guns, although few, of heavy calibre; and the enemy had so placed their line-of-battle ships in the harbour as to sweep the ravines leading down to the city. on the whole it was considered more prudent to land the french and english siege trains, with a view to a bombardment, to be followed by a general assault. as to the general plan of attack, sir john burgoyne, having, with lord raglan, surveyed the position, drew up a memorandum in which he indicated the malakoff as the chief point for consideration. he said: 'on the right, the great tower appears to be the key of the whole position, and the only work to prevent an assault at any time; a good site, or sites for not less than eight guns ... must be sought for to demolish that tower.' the french, however, demurred to this view, and it was finally decided that the main attack should be made by them on the bastion du mât, an earthwork in their immediate front on the left. when we remember that at the end of the siege, which lasted nearly a twelve-month, the city fell chiefly by an assault on the very position originally indicated by sir john burgoyne, we have a striking proof of the clear insight and great ability of that distinguished soldier. during the first fortnight of october the allied armies were incessantly occupied in landing and moving up heavy guns and ammunition from kameisch and balaclava, and in constructing batteries and trenches in front of sebastopol, and it was arranged that the bombardment should open on the th, to be followed by a general assault, the combined fleets simultaneously attacking the forts at the mouth of the harbour. lord raglan's order was as follows: 'the fire upon sebastopol to commence at . a.m. from the french and english batteries, in co-operation with the allied fleets--the signal to be the discharge of three mortars by the french. the troops off duty to be ready to fall in at a moment's notice. horses of the field batteries to be harnessed.' a thousand seamen with heavy guns were landed from the british fleet, and formed a naval brigade to act in co-operation with the royal artillery in the trenches. the enemy, however, were equally energetic in developing and completing their earthworks, and, having an almost unlimited supply of heavy ordnance and munitions close at hand, they were in reality, as the event proved, able to strengthen their defensive position faster than the allies could concentrate their powers of attack. the bombardment commenced at daylight on october , the infantry and field artillery being held in readiness for a general assault during the day. our hopes and expectations were, however, destined to a great and speedy disappointment. the french siege batteries in front of the bastion du mât were soon seen to be in difficulties, being over-matched by those of the enemy; and early in the morning one of their magazines exploded, followed by a second, resulting in great loss of life, and practically putting an end for the time to their fire. the russians, having thus gained a considerable advantage in one direction, turned their attention more immediately towards the english position, and a vigorous bombardment was maintained on both sides. lord raglan, in his despatch of october , alluding to the british batteries, speaks in high terms of the conduct of the sailors and of the royal artillery. he says that they kept up their fire with unremitting energy throughout the day, to his own and the general satisfaction, and to the admiration of the french army. about three o'clock in the afternoon, a magazine blew up in the redan, and for a time the russian guns were silent. lord raglan said that, under other circumstances, this explosion would have been the proper moment for assault. the combined fleets during the day also engaged the sea forts and suffered considerably, but from our inability to take advantage of their action no decisive results were achieved. in short, the great bombardment of october was a _coup manqué_, and although the conflict was still vigorously maintained, and although the french in a few days partially re-opened fire, it began to be apparent that the allies were growing weaker by the wearing out of their guns and carriages and the exhaustion of their ammunition, whilst the russian defences were becoming consolidated and their armaments augmented. general canrobert did not at first take so gloomy a view of the position. writing a few days after, he stated that his means of attack were concentrated on the bastion du mât, and that, assisted by the english, he hoped soon to gain possession of it. lord raglan, however, writing on the rd, said that the fire of the enemy was not seriously diminished; that, with plenty of men and unlimited resources, they were able to repair their works, remount guns, and re-open fire from batteries which had been silenced, and that consequently, he was unable to say when ulterior measures could be undertaken. the situation was growing serious. in the meantime the enemy were also beginning to appear in strength on the chernaya, in the direction of balaclava. since our arrival, at the end of september, considerable attention had been given to the defence of this important base of our operations. defensive entrenchments were constructed on the heights immediately surrounding and overlooking the harbour, armed with guns of position, and held by a force of marines; whilst the rd highlanders and a battery of artillery were in front of kadikoi, the whole under the command of sir colin campbell. in the plain beyond, and about a mile in advance, a girdle of small detached hills extended in a curve across the valley, and upon these, several battalions of turks were distributed and began to entrench themselves. as they had no ordnance suitable, some cast-iron howitzers were by lord raglan's direction lent to them for the purpose. such were the main outlines of the precautions taken for the defence of balaclava. they were by no means too strong; but what with the incessant duties before sebastopol and the great extent of ground to be covered, our troops were overworked, and no more were available for the defence of this flank of the position, covering, indeed, the sole base of our supplies of food and munitions. footnotes: [footnote : lord raglan's despatch, september , .] [footnote : bazancourt, ii. .] chapter v battle of balaclava 'not once or twice in our rough island story, the path of duty was the way to glory.' early on the morning of october , the russian army having received large reinforcements, general liprandi advanced in force and attacked the unfinished redoubts held by the turks; and although the latter were supported in the plain by the british cavalry and maude's troop of horse artillery, they were not able to hold their ground, and, after a short defence, fell back disordered to balaclava, leaving their guns behind, many of the turks calling out 'ship--johnnie--russ no bono' as they ran past our troops. it was during this early part of the action that captain maude[ ] was seriously wounded and had his horse killed under him. soon after the commencement of the battle, lord raglan, general canrobert, and their staffs, arrived, and took up a position on the edge of the sebastopol plateau overlooking the plain, and thus gained a complete panoramic view of the scene below. lord raglan, on perceiving the defeat of the turks in the outlying forts, at once ordered the first division under the duke of cambridge, and the fourth under sir george cathcart, to proceed from the front to strengthen the force at balaclava. the enemy, having somewhat easily gained an important advantage by the capture of the turkish position, after a short delay made a further movement towards the inner line of defence, and a large mass of russian cavalry advanced rapidly and with great boldness across the plain. one portion approached the rd, who were in line in front of kadikoi, but, being received with perfect steadiness by the highlanders, they did not follow up the attack. the main body bore down towards the english heavy cavalry under general scarlett, who, however, wheeled into line as the russians approached, and charged straight into them. having been sent with an order to brandling's c battery of horse artillery, it so happened that i was at the moment only a few hundred yards distant, and witnessed the whole affair. for a few minutes it seemed as if our cavalry, owing to the great superiority of the enemy's numbers (estimated at three to one), were almost surrounded. then small bodies of red-coats could be seen vigorously fighting and in close personal combat with the russians. at length the latter gave way, their retreat being hastened by the fire of two batteries of horse artillery. lord raglan in his despatch said that the charge was one of the most successful he had ever witnessed. it was made at an opportune moment, and completely checked the enemy's movements, their infantry remaining at a distance, partially concealed behind the captured turkish forts. a pause now ensued. whilst the events just related were taking place, the first and fourth divisions were marching down, and arrived in the plain. in the meantime, the light cavalry under lord cardigan had moved to the outer valley, just beyond the turkish forts. a small force of french chasseurs d'afrique was on their left. lord raglan, being anxious to recover the position lost by the turks, sent the following order in writing to the earl of lucan, who was in chief command of the cavalry: 'the cavalry to advance and take advantage of every opportunity to recover the heights. they will be supported by infantry, which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.' instructions of a similar purport were sent to the infantry divisions. as some delay occurred and the object was not accomplished, and, further, as lord raglan from his position on the heights observed that the enemy were removing the captured guns, he sent a second order, _also in writing_, to lord lucan, by captain nolan, as follows: 'lord raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent them carrying away the guns. troop of horse artillery may accompany, french cavalry on your left. immediate.' [illustration: balaclava. scene of light cavalry charge, th october, ] the fair construction of the above orders would appear to be that the cavalry were to follow the retreating enemy, and that they were to be supported by artillery and two divisions of infantry. what followed is thus related by lord lucan himself. 'after carefully reading this order, i hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack and the dangers attending it. the aide-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were lord raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. i asked, where and what to do, neither enemy nor guns being in sight? he replied in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley: "there, my lord, is your enemy; there are your guns." so distinct, in my opinion, was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aide-de-camp, that i felt it was imperative on me to obey, and i informed lord cardigan that he was to advance, and to the objections he made, and in which i entirely agreed, i replied that the order was from your lordship.' such are the main outlines of the circumstances which led to the celebrated light cavalry charge. formed as shown in the diagram, they moved rapidly and steadily down the plain. they did not attack the enemy behind the turkish entrenchments, nor did they attempt to intercept the captured howitzers which were being withdrawn, but rode straight into the main body of the russian army, far away at the other end of the valley. artillery opened upon them on either flank and in front, but still they rode on, and at length passed right through the enemy's guns; but assailed by artillery, infantry, and cavalry they were at length almost broken up, and only scattered fragments of each regiment ever came back. the chasseurs d'afrique, who were on the flank of the light brigade, gallantly charged the enemy on the fedhukine heights, and thus made an important diversion, in which they suffered severely. the loss of the cavalry during the day amounted to officers and men killed, wounded, and missing; and horses killed. formation of light brigade under the earl of cardigan. th. lancers th. light dragoons +-----------+ +------------+ | | | | +-----------+ +------------+ th. hussars th. light dragoons +-----------+ +------------+ | | | | +-----------+ +------------+ th. hussars +-----------+ | | +-----------+ having been sent a second time to balaclava with orders and my horse becoming lame, i was returning leisurely just as the charge took place, but, owing to the ridge of intervening hills intercepting the view, was not aware of it. meeting h.r.h. the duke of cambridge a few minutes afterwards at the head of the guards, he spoke of the sad loss the army had just sustained; and, seeing that i was ignorant of the circumstances, went forward a little and pointed down the outer valley, where small groups could be seen in the distance of men and horses of the light cavalry lying about, and in some cases being attended to by the russians. the duke added: 'the officer who brought the order lies dead in that ditch.' there, a few yards off, was the body of captain nolan, with a large wound in his chest. in the course of the afternoon part of sir george cathcart's division advanced a short distance, and re-took one of the outlying forts, in which were found two of the lost howitzers upset in the half-formed entrenchment. lord raglan, in his despatch of the battle of balaclava, alluding to the circumstances which led to the light cavalry charge, limited his remarks to the statement that 'from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the lieutenant-general considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards.' the earl of lucan, however, took exception to this description of his action in the matter, and, persisting in his objections, was ultimately recalled. the consequences immediately resulting from the battle of the th were not of a decisive character. the enemy had no doubt achieved a partial success in getting possession of the outer line of defence, but had not obtained their main object--the capture of balaclava. the position however, was precarious, and two regiments of highlanders were added to sir colin's force, and a brigade of french infantry were encamped on the heights in rear. still lord raglan was anxious, and in his despatch of november says that he should be more satisfied if he could have occupied the position in considerably greater strength. greater anxieties were, however, awaiting him. on the afternoon following the battle of balaclava the russians came out in considerable strength from sebastopol (about , men and guns) and attacked the right of our position on the heights of inkerman, but were vigorously met by the artillery and infantry of the guards and second division, and were driven back into the city with a loss of about men. this attempt of the enemy proved to be the shadow of a coming event. during the next few days no incident of special importance occurred, but the crisis was approaching, and the russians, having received large reinforcements, on november made another determined attack in great force on the right of the english position, which, had it succeeded, would not only have raised the siege, but would probably have entailed the abandonment of the crimea by the allies. indeed, although unsuccessful in its main purpose, still the results of the great battle on that day were by no means insignificant. the allies were compelled to postpone any idea of assault, and they thus afforded the enemy time to complete their defences, which enabled the city to hold out for ten months longer. in connection with this subject there is another point which deserves consideration. although probably fortuitous, still it is a fact that both on landing in the crimea, and on taking up ground in front of sebastopol, the english army occupied on each occasion the exposed flank, so that at the three successive battles the brunt of the actions, and consequently the chief losses, fell upon them. not only that, but whilst their numbers--owing to deaths, wounds, and sickness--were constantly and rapidly diminishing, they had, in addition to their work in the trenches, to guard a very extended position. general canrobert, perhaps unduly cautious, did not feel able at that time to give us any more assistance in the defence of balaclava.[ ] lord raglan himself so informed me at the time. as regards the ground at inkerman on which the great conflict took place, it did not in itself offer any very inviting facilities to an enemy's attack. it formed the right-hand corner, as it were, of our position on the elevated plateau south of the city; and the ascent to it from sebastopol and the chernaya was precipitous, its area being restricted by the careening bay ravine on one side, and by steep slopes on the other--so that the enemy's columns as they arrived were rather huddled together, and got in each other's way. todleben wrote: 'although the nature of the ground rendered this position a strong one in itself, it was to be considered that the number of english troops which occupied it was very weak.'[ ] the general plan was as follows:[ ] [illustration: sketch to illustrate the battle of inkerman] two corps of the russian army under general dannenberg, computed at , infantry and guns, were detailed for the attack. one under dannenberg and pauloff was to cross the marsh at the mouth of the chernaya, climb the heights, and force the english right; whilst the other, under soimonoff, was to leave sebastopol, near the malakoff, and advance up the _left side_ of the careening bay ravine. these arrangements would appear to be simple enough, but as it turned out they were in a great measure frustrated by a singular mistake. it appears that general soimonoff, looking from sebastopol, imagined that he was to advance up the _left side_ of the ravine as he saw it from that point of view, whereas the intention was precisely the reverse. the intention of general dannenberg seems clear from the following short extract from his instructions to soimonoff, issued the day before. he says: 'votre flanc gauche sera parfaitement couvert par le ravin du carénage, et la coopération des troupes qui traversent la chernaya.' again he says: 'un ravin profond et très long, connu sous le nom de ravin du carénage, nous sépare, le général soimonoff et moi, au commencement de l'attaque.' as it was, however, before daybreak on the th soimonoff led his corps across the ravine, and marched up on the other side, so that when pauloff arrived immediately after he found the heights already occupied and the battle begun. this initial blunder (although we were of course ignorant of it at the time) hampered the russians throughout the day; and the death of soimonoff early in the action probably rather added to their confusion. a russian account quite confirms this view. it says: 'the disadvantage of this false direction was that from the confined nature of the ground soimonoff's troops were very much in the way of pauloff's columns, and neither the one nor the other could find space to deploy.' ... 'while the russians were moving about in columns, the english were drawn up in a line two deep, and their long-ranging guns enabled them to inflict mortal wounds on the russians at a time when the latter were unable to reach them at all with their firearms.' as regards the arrangements of the english previous to the battle, men of the second division and three guns were detailed daily to watch the ground at inkerman, and one or two slight earthworks were thrown up; a picket of the light division being also posted in the careening bay ravine, which, however, was captured on the morning of the th. footnotes: [footnote : the late sir george maude, crown equerry.] [footnote : see lord raglan to the duke of newcastle, november , kinglake's _inkerman_, p. .] [footnote : kinglake's _inkerman_, p. .] [footnote : see kinglake's _inkerman_, pp. and ; dannenberg's orders to soimonoff.] chapter vi battle of inkerman before giving a slight sketch of the events of this momentous day, it is necessary to bear in mind that the original numbers of the english army had become much reduced since their landing, by the casualties of war and by sickness; that they had also to guard the trenches day and night, and to be ready to defend the extended position in front of balaclava. in short, their numbers were not by any means adequate to the various and widely detached duties they were called upon to perform. the consequence was that on the day of inkerman they had only , infantry and guns available for the defence of the position. it was dark and wet and a thick fog lay on the ground as day dawned on sunday, november . my servant came into my tent and woke me about daylight, saying that heavy firing had just commenced not far away. in a few minutes i was off, but found that lord raglan and general strangways had already left. on approaching the scene, and riding through the camp of the second division, it was apparent that the enemy were close at hand. round shot were bounding along, tents were being knocked over, horses killed at their pickets, whilst blankets and great coats were lying about among the brushwood, thrown down, apparently, as our men had hastily fallen in and hurried to the front. the centre of our position on the ridge was held by the second division under pennefather, with the guards in advance on the right under the duke of cambridge and bentinck, and one brigade of the light division under buller on the left--six batteries of artillery being in action in the intervals. on joining lord raglan about a.m. it was evident from the very heavy fire both of infantry and artillery that the russian columns were close upon us, and were indeed forcing our position at various points. in fact, owing to the rain and thick mist, the troops of both the opposing forces were in immediate proximity several times during the day almost before they were aware of it. on the extreme right, and in advance, a small sandbag work had been established and armed with two -pounders many days previously, not with a view to local defence, but to silence some russian guns on the other side of the chernaya which annoyed our camp, and having achieved the object our guns had been withdrawn. it was in the neighbourhood of this earthwork that very severe fighting took place, and it was captured and re-taken several times, the guards especially sustaining the brunt of the conflict and suffering great losses. the russian account says: 'the battle raged forward, backward, beneath, above, among bushes and underwood; above all, the sandbag battery on the wing had been the object of many an attack, until at length general bentinck led up his guards, the _élite_ of the english army. these chosen troops pressed irresistibly forward to the redoubt, and tore it from the russians....' in the meantime sir george cathcart, with part of the fourth division, arrived to the support of our hardly pressed troops. conceiving the extreme right to be the point most open to danger, he was marching in that direction when he received urgent messages requesting assistance in the centre and on the left. he accordingly detached the greater part of his brigade and a battery towards these points, but proceeded himself, with a small number of men, to reinforce the guards. the enemy, in fact, were forcing our line at several places at once. hardly had the battery just named got into action and fired a few rounds of case than it was run into and three of its guns momentarily captured, the officer commanding (major townsend) being killed. three guns of turner's battery were also taken and some of the gunners bayonetted at their posts; but in both instances the guns were re-taken immediately afterwards by the th and th regiments.[ ] sir george cathcart, under the impression that he could assist the guards by a flank movement, moved for some distance down the slopes, near the sandbag battery, but suddenly found himself surrounded by a superior force, and fell, shot through the heart; general torrens, who was with him, being also severely wounded.[ ] at about o'clock a.m., lord raglan with his staff was moving along the ridge, and halted about the centre of the line. perceiving the advantage he should gain by the fire of heavy guns from such commanding ground, he sent an order for the two -pounders, which were near at hand at the mill, to be brought up. it so happened that the officers in charge of them, anticipating his wishes, had already packed the necessary ammunition in waggons, and were, therefore, ready when his message came. colonel gambier, r.a., in command, was wounded, and had to retire as they moved up; but under colonel collingwood dickson[ ] and captain d'aguilar these guns were speedily brought into action on the ridge, and rendered excellent service throughout the day. prince menschikoff, in his despatch after the battle, makes special allusion to the fire of the british heavy guns. there were no less than seventeen casualties with these two guns, and they fired about rounds a gun. just before the arrival of the -pounders, lord raglan, accompanied by his staff, was on the ridge surveying the position, having general strangways on his right. at that moment a shell, supposed to have been fired at long range from a russian vessel in the harbour, passed between them and burst amongst the staff, killing the horses of colonels gordon and paulet somerset. these two officers, however, were unhurt.[ ] a few seconds afterwards general strangways turned round to me, saying, quite calmly, 'help me off my horse,' and he was then seen to be falling. general estcourt and myself jumped off and caught him as he fell; and we then found that his left leg had been taken off below the knee by the shell as it passed between him and lord raglan. we laid him on the ground and i tied my handkerchief round his shattered limb. the staff moved on a short distance, and i was left with him alone. the enemy at the time were close upon us. after looking about in vain for a doctor, or a stretcher to carry him away, i at length saw two men bearing a wounded comrade, and, when they had deposited him in a tent, induced them to return with me. a medical officer also arrived. we gave the general some wine and water from a flask, which temporarily revived him. he did not seem to suffer pain, gave me many messages to his wife and daughter, and begged me to take him to the siege train camp, which was done. almost his last words were, 'take me to the gunners, let me die amongst the gunners.' as we were carrying him off we passed the body of another officer on a stretcher, and it proved to be that of sir george cathcart. on arrival at the hospital tent, general strangways became faint and insensible; it was evident that no operation could be performed, and soon afterwards he passed away, with wounded gunners lying round him, lord raglan coming to see him just before he died. he was much beloved and respected by all his officers and men, and his death at such a critical time was a great misfortune. when general strangways fell on the ridge, his horse got away in the confusion, but was afterwards recovered, and singularly enough, was untouched, not even the stirrup leather being cut. on going up to rejoin lord raglan, after the death of strangways, i met sir edmund lyons, captain drummond, and other naval officers on ponies, and conducted them, at their request, to the front. subsequent to the events just sketched out, from which it will be apparent that our position was very critical, the battle still continued with unabated energy for several hours. the arrival of some french battalions and batteries under generals bosquet and bourbaki, however, gave valuable support to our sorely pressed troops, and lord raglan, in his despatch of november , drew special attention 'to the brilliant conduct of the allied troops.' 'french and english,' he said, 'vied with each other in displaying their gallantry and manifesting their zealous devotion to duty, notwithstanding that they had to contend against an infinitely superior force, and were exposed for many hours to a very galling fire....' general canrobert also joined lord raglan on the field, and was again slightly wounded. i remember his inquiring of me how many guns we had in action, and i replied: 'thirty-six, in addition to the two -pounders.' the russian account, though not altogether correct, is worth perusal. it says: 'the battle had now attained its climax. most of the english generals were _hors de combat_. the britons, sadly reduced in numbers and exhausted by the struggle, defended themselves but faintly. more and more the fortunes of the day inclined to the russians. it was about o'clock when, on a sudden, the shrill tones of horns were heard above the rolling and rattling of the fire. the third act, the turning point of the battle, commenced. the french arrived. in the same proportion as the assurance of their timely aid revived the sinking spirits of the english, it discouraged the russians, who felt themselves at once on the point of being deprived of the fruit of five hours' hard fighting.' about noon i was directed by lord raglan to go to general codrington, whose brigade was on the other side of the careening bay ravine, to inquire how he was getting on, and whether he required assistance. codrington's brigade, be it observed, was on the very ground up which it had been intended that soimonoff should advance. i found his troops lying down, and temporarily out of action. general codrington informed me that he had been occasionally attacked by russian troops coming suddenly out of the ravine, but that he had driven them back, and that they were not in great force. as the fog was lifting he invited me to go with him some distance to the front, to try and gain a better general view of the russian position. we did so, and looking across the ravine to inkerman were able, for the first time, to see the great masses of the enemy. whilst carefully observing their movements, the russian batteries were seen to be retreating in _échelon_. codrington looked at his watch--it was ten minutes to one. he then desired me to return forthwith to lord raglan and let him know what we had seen. on delivering the message to the commander-in-chief, and saying that the battle seemed coming to an end, his reply was: 'yes, i believe so,' showing that he had already become aware of the commencement of the retreat. lord raglan's despatch, speaking of the latter part of the battle, said: 'subsequently to this, the battle continued with unabated vigour and with no positive result, the enemy bringing upon our line, not only the fire of all their field batteries, but those in front of the works of the place, and the ship guns, till the afternoon, when the symptoms of giving way first became apparent; and shortly after, although the fire did not cease, the retreat became general, and heavy masses were observed retiring over the bridge of the chernaya, and ascending the opposite heights, abandoning on the field of battle , or , dead and wounded, multitudes of the latter having already been carried off by them.' the russian account says: 'thus ended the battle, one of the most sanguinary on record, at o'clock p.m., after lasting eight hours.' it attributed their defeat partly to the bravery and steadiness of the english and french troops, partly to the superiority of their arms, and finally to the wrong direction of soimonoff. when it is considered that the english had only , infantry and guns available for the defence of the position, and with this small force had to bear the brunt in all the earlier hours of the battle, it is not necessary to dwell on the courage and discipline of the officers and men; the facts speak for themselves. and the quotation i have given from lord raglan's despatch is sufficient proof of the timely support and great gallantry of our brave allies. the english losses were very serious: no less than eight generals and , officers and men were killed, wounded, or missing.[ ] the names of the generals are as follows: {sir george cathcart killed {fox strangways {goldie {sir george brown {adams, died of his wounds wounded {torrens, died of his wounds {bentinck {buller the losses of the russians are computed to have been between , and , . we also captured one gun-carriage and five ammunition carts, left on the heights. our allies, the french, lost about officers and men, killed and wounded. late at night on the th i was sent for by lord raglan, who wished for information as to the supply of ammunition at inkerman, in the event of a second attack. h.r.h. the duke of cambridge was with him. i was able to give a satisfactory statement, and to inform him that captain gage, r.a., who had been sent during the battle down to balaclava to bring up a large supply, both for infantry and artillery, had just returned, reporting that the mill, which was our magazine at the front, was amply stocked. it appears that prince menschikoff and two russian grand dukes were present on the field of inkerman during the day; and that reminds me of a curious incident which occurred in relation to one of them long years afterwards. a gunner of the royal artillery served throughout the war, and was wounded, receiving the victoria cross for his gallant conduct. subsequently he served during the indian mutiny, and was again wounded. after he was pensioned i was partially instrumental in obtaining for him an appointment in the yeomen of the guard. being on one occasion on duty in one of the corridors of buckingham palace (at a state ball, if i remember rightly), a foreign officer, who proved to be a russian grand duke, came up, spoke to him, and examined his decorations. he asked him about his victoria cross, and then, seeing he had the crimean medal and clasp for inkerman, said: 'were you at that battle?' 'yes, sir,' was the reply. 'so was i,' said the grand duke. the old yeoman, in telling me the story, said he thought he might be so bold, so he replied to the grand duke, 'well, sir, if you was at inkerman, i hope we may never meet again on so unpleasant an occasion.' footnotes: [footnote : lord raglan's despatch, november , .] [footnote : now generals sir c. dickson and sir c. d'aguilar.] [footnote : it is interesting to note that nearly forty years before this day lord raglan and strangways, then both young men of twenty-six years of age, had been present at waterloo, when both were severely wounded, lord raglan losing his right arm. the staff present were as follows: sir john burgoyne, generals estcourt, strangways, and airey; colonels steele, paulet somerset and the hon. a. gordon; captains n. kingscote, lord burghersh, hon. l. curzon, hon. e. gage, wetherall, stopford, hon. s. calthorpe, e. gordon, and myself.] [footnote : eighty artillery horses were killed.] chapter vii the winter of whatever hopes or expectations might have been previously entertained as to the speedy fall of sebastopol, the battle of inkerman, at all events, utterly and rudely dispelled them. the facts were now plain enough--nearly , russians were on the spot, with an almost unlimited supply of guns and ammunition to defend their city, whilst the allies had not much more than half the number of men; and their siege material was nearly worn out and its ammunition expended. the fortresses in the mediterranean might in some degree help us to replenish our batteries, but there was no hope of efficient operations being renewed until the allied armies had been largely reinforced, both with men and material. months must thus elapse, during which time the enemy would have leisure to strengthen their armaments and complete their defences. thus the first attempt on sebastopol had failed. but even these were by no means the worst features of the case. the allies had open trenches to maintain, and at the same moment a widely extended frontier to guard from attack. it is as well to pause for a moment and to consider the circumstances of the english army at the time. in the first place the force sent to the east had been raised with difficulty, was quite inadequate to the occasion, and was insufficiently provided with commissariat and transport. mr. sidney herbert, minister for war, said: 'the army in the east has been created by discounting the future. every regiment at home or within reach, and not forming part of the army, has been robbed to complete it.' again, it was entirely devoid of reserves. the house of commons committee of reported 'that the men sent to reinforce the army were recruits who had not yet become fit for foreign service. when the duke of newcastle acquainted lord raglan that he had , recruits to send him, he replied that those last sent were so young and unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies--he preferred to wait....' we must, however, go further. it will be remembered that the expedition proceeded to the crimea at a late season, and after much sickness at varna, in obedience to the orders of the home government--who apparently did not foresee the probability of a winter campaign with open trenches before a half-beleaguered city, and the inevitable hardships and losses which must ensue. for some time during the winter of the english army was diminishing from invaliding and casualties at the rate of men a day. in short the winter was upon them, and standing on the bare plateau, with greatly diminished numbers, several miles from their base, and without proper food, shelter, or clothing, they must now be prepared to maintain their dangerous position. a consideration of these circumstances will enable us to form some idea of the difficult position of lord raglan at that time. he had, moreover, other anxieties pressing upon him--anxieties of divided councils, and of indecision in his french colleague--who, however brave as a soldier, allowed himself to be swayed and overborne by incessant and rash proposals from paris, and even by subordinates on the spot. these latter facts were not generally known at the time, and the people of england were misled; but in proof of them i will shortly enter into some details, quoting official documents published afterwards. there is almost always an element of weakness in allied operations, but during the earlier part of the crimean war they became more than usually apparent and mischievous. on the death of general strangways, colonel dacres[ ] succeeded to the command of the artillery, and one morning soon after, he waited on lord raglan, who, in his usual good-natured way, asked him how he was getting on. 'my lord,' said dacres, 'when a man has been twenty-one years a subaltern, he never can get on.' however, his turn came at last. at the beginning of he was only a lieutenant-colonel, but before the year was at an end he had been promoted to colonel, brigadier-general, major-general, and lieutenant-general, and had received the order of the bath, the legion of honour, the medjidi, and an italian order. the english army had hardly begun to realise the difficulties and sufferings it was destined to endure throughout the winter when an additional misfortune was caused by a terrific gale on november , during which no less than fifteen transports containing clothing, food, ammunition, forage, and other stores were sunk in the black sea. a large number of tents on the plateau were also blown down, and great misery ensued. notwithstanding all our troubles, there were occasional incidents of an odd and amusing kind, which now and then helped to enliven us. among others was one relating to a dead man, who came to life and appeared at woolwich. soon after our arrival before sebastopol it was found that many men of the different regiments were unaccounted for, some having died on the march, others been carried on board ship sick, and some taken prisoners. courts of inquiry were held, and as regards the artillery the results sent home. some time afterwards a letter was received from the horse guards that a gunner brown, who was reported as dead, had arrived at woolwich, and an explanation was requested. the officer commanding the battery, in reply to the query, stated to the effect 'that brown was an old comrade of his, that he had visited him when he was dying, and attended his funeral; therefore,' he said, 'i know he is dead, and am surprised to hear of his return to woolwich, but am not responsible for his subsequent movements.' on december i had the gratification of receiving a note from lord raglan of which the following is a copy: 'december , . my dear adye,--i have great satisfaction in announcing your promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and that of captains fortescue, gordon, and gage to the rank of major. captains paynter,[ ] wodehouse, maude, swinton, d'aguilar, brandling, turner, anderson, morris, hamley, hoste, yates, and pennycuick have also got a step. a pretty christmas box for you all. pray accept my congratulations, and offer them to captains fortescue, gordon, and gage. yours faithfully, raglan.' the rations served out by the commissariat during the winter of were not very varied or specially inviting, and consisted chiefly of lumps of salt beef or pork (with occasional fresh meat), ship's biscuits and rum, but no bread or milk. luxuries of any kind were difficult to obtain at balaclava, and were expensive. a ham cost two guineas, beer three shillings a bottle, and so on. our chief difficulty, however, was fuel. there were several english travellers, called t.g.'s (travelling gentlemen), who paid the crimea a visit during the winter. on one occasion i was asked if i would entertain one of these travellers at dinner, as the headquarters' farm was full and the accommodation limited, and of course consented. my friend turned out to be an old gentleman of position and large fortune, but of delicate health, and was accompanied by a valet. what induced him to come out at such a time is inexplicable. as my tent was rather larger than the others, the three or four officers of the artillery staff usually dined together in it. the table was a plank, and the seats chiefly empty boxes on end. as soon as our friend arrived, dinner was served, cooked, of course, in a hole in the open air, and consisted of a lump of salt pork, more or less boiled. it was soon apparent that the old gentleman was making a wretched effort, and i tried to encourage him with a glass of rum and some biscuit; but he said he had a poor appetite, which was evident. presently he turned round to me and said, 'you won't be offended, will you?' i replied, 'not in the least. what is it?' 'well,' he said, 'i don't mind for myself, but i know my valet can't eat salt pork; if i were to give him a sovereign, do you think he could go to some place of refreshment near, and buy some food?' i assured him that there was nothing better to be had nearer than constantinople, which was several hundred miles away. after that he collapsed, and left for england the next morning. the history of the siege for the next few months is a record of hardships and privations nobly borne. the officers and men of the naval brigade, the artillery and infantry, who had to take their turn of duty in the trenches for twenty-four hours at a time, were the chief sufferers; having to lie in muddy ditches and batteries, without shelter, with scanty clothing, and very indifferent food. there were officers and men, however, in all branches of the service who, in spite of hardships, went through the whole siege and never missed a tour of duty. in january the english sick list amounted to , men. the country was often deep in snow, and the road to balaclava became almost impassable. four fifths of the artillery horses died. pending the arrival of wooden huts from england several officers dug holes in the ground, and by means of planks and tarpaulins obtained rather better shelter than was afforded by a tent. among others, colonel wood, r.a.,[ ] constructed a rough hut of the kind. he had brought out a french cook, whom he accommodated in the hut, living himself in a covered cart. on being asked his object in this arrangement, his reply was that if he could save the life of the cook, the latter in return would do the same for him by giving him good food, otherwise both would probably perish. his precaution proved successful. warm clothing, in large quantities, was sent out from england, and as the weather began to hold up in february the condition of the troops gradually improved. in addition to government supplies, many persons in england, deeply affected by the sufferings of the army, sent out bales of mitts, comforters, flannels, under-garments, and even plum puddings. occasionally the distribution was somewhat embarrassing. for instance, on one occasion, in opening some parcels for the artillery, we found a warm pair of drawers ticketed, 'for the brave jones in the trenches.' who was the brave jones? we also sometimes received curious letters and inquiries about artillerymen, of which the following is an example:--'to the right honourable colonel, commanding the th battalion royal artillery, field of battle, crimea. your honour--your petitioner is extremely anxious to know if james winch under your command is still alive, if otherwise, by sword or epidemic.' subsequently to the great battle of november it became evident that the english army, which was so rapidly diminishing in numbers, could not adequately guard the positions at balaclava and on the heights, in addition to the hard work in the trenches. consequently, the ridges and slopes of inkerman were gradually occupied by a portion of the french army. the russians, ever on the alert, came out in february, and established outworks near the harbour, beyond the careening bay ravine--known subsequently as the 'ouvrages blancs'--and it became necessary to dislodge them. the duty was undertaken by the french, and on the night of february , after a severe fight, in which they suffered considerable loss, the position was captured, but was not held, so that a few days afterwards it was again occupied and strengthened by the russians; and it is important to bear in mind that no further attempt was made to dislodge them until after general canrobert had resigned his command at the end of may. in fact, the russians, who had received large reinforcements, became more bold and aggressive daily, and during march commenced and armed a formidable outwork on the mamelon, considerably in advance of the malakoff. their night sorties against the trenches of the allies were both vigorous and frequent, with severe losses on all sides. it is computed that the russian army in april amounted to nearly , men. the english batteries during the long severe winter only maintained a desultory fire on the city, waiting for fresh armaments; and as ammunition ran short we had frequently to obtain supplies from the navy for current use. i was sent on many occasions to admiral sir edmund lyons in connection with these details. on one occasion, on being shown into his cabin on board the flagship, he said: 'colonel adye, whenever i see your face it always reminds me of a -pounder shot.' i thought at first he meant that it was too round, or was wanting in expression, and began to explain that i was not altogether responsible; but he said it was not that, but whenever i came to see him i always wanted a fresh supply of -pounder shot. my reply was that he had exactly foreseen my request, and promised if he would meet our wishes they should be safely delivered the next day into sebastopol. the argument convinced him, and he complied at once. _flag of truce._--the following extract from my journal refers to rather an interesting event. ' rd of march. accompanied lord burghersh, a.d.c., with a flag of truce, by order of lord raglan. we first went to the advanced french trenches on the left, near the sea, hoisted a white flag, and sounded a bugle. in a few minutes firing ceased on both sides. we stepped over the parapet, advanced about yards, and were met by the enemy's riflemen out of their pits. a russian officer on horseback, with two orderlies, galloped out to meet us, dismounted, and the conversation was then carried on in french. we handed him some letters, clothes, and money for french and english officers who had been taken prisoners, also a letter for madame osten-sacken from lord raglan. his letter enclosed one from the mother of the midshipman (giffard) who was killed in the fight at odessa. it appears that madame osten-sacken had cut off a lock of the poor boy's hair, and had sent it to his mother, who sent a letter of thanks. we offered the russian officer a cigar, which he declined, and we also asked him a few questions, but his manner was stiff, and he shortly remounted and rode off. we returned to the trenches; the white flag was pulled down, and firing re-commenced. the french soldiers were always cheerful and good-natured in their monotonous duties. lord burghersh, as we passed along through their trenches, heard two of them chatting. one, looking over the parapet, said to his comrade: "alphonse, êtes-vous prêt?" "oui, mon ami, toujours prêt." "eh bien! allons faire la guerre;" and then they both jumped up and fired away through the loop-holes at the russians.' during the month of march strenuous efforts were made by the allies to prepare for a second bombardment, and, fresh armaments having arrived, it was decided to re-open with nearly guns on april . it was, however, at this period that considerable hesitation and conflicting opinions became more or less evident at french head quarters. it was understood that the emperor of the french would shortly arrive and take the command, and de bazancourt, in his history of the campaign, states that general canrobert received secret instructions which tied his hands. their general scope was that the siege should be turned into a blockade, and a campaign undertaken in the interior of the crimea.[ ] the french army had about this time received large reinforcements, and was divided into two corps, one under bosquet on the extreme right, the other under general pélissier (who arrived in march) on the left; the english holding the centre of the position. the french strength was estimated at about , men. omar pasha also arrived in april with , turkish troops. great events were therefore anticipated. footnotes: [footnote : the late field-marshal sir richard dacres, g.c.b.] [footnote : these were all artillery officers.] [footnote : the late general sir david wood, g.c.b., r.h.a.] [footnote : the history of the crimean campaign by the baron de bazancourt is often incorrect, and sometimes unjust as regards the british army, and is therefore not altogether to be relied on. but in his account of the french views and proposals he has more complete knowledge, and, in fact, usually quotes official documents, and i have therefore made some quotations from his work, especially as to this critical juncture.] chapter viii bombardment of april on april the second bombardment, for which such incessant preparations had been made during the winter, at length commenced, and was vigorously maintained for the following ten days; and although the russians carried out numerous sorties, and were also unceasing each night in repairing their shattered batteries, still it became evident that the allies had achieved a virtual mastery and had laid open paths for a general assault. it was a momentous crisis. as regards the condition of sebastopol at that time, todleben, writing of the bastion du mât, said[ ] 'that after having undergone a constant and violent bombardment, the work was in a desperate plight. its artillery had been dismounted, its embrasures and its merlons almost entirely demolished, and a part of its salient had fallen in,' ... 'that they were constantly expecting to see the enemy take advantage of the critical state to which the bastion was reduced, and advance to the assault of the work.' he adds, that the french might have advanced to the assault of the bastion with an absolute certainty of success ... and that would have carried with it the fall of sebastopol.' ... the allied armies were indeed in full expectation of being at length led to the assault, and the result was almost a foregone conclusion, but no order was issued and no decisive action taken. the real history of the case was not known at the time, but the accounts published by de bazancourt in , and confirmed long afterwards by kinglake's account, have cleared up the mystery. de bazancourt[ ] said: 'la pensée d'une opération à l'extérieur planait toujours, on le voit, sur les décisions, et empêchait de tenter contre la place une action décisive. les instructions secrètes du général canrobert lui liaient les mains, à moins de force majeure.' again, he quotes a despatch of canrobert of april as follows: 'les officiers généraux des armes spéciales des deux armées, les chefs de nos deux corps d'armée, ont été unanimes pour céder dans cette circonstance aux cris de nos soldats français et anglais, demandant l'assaut. lord raglan partage fermement leur avis. j'ai pensé que mon devoir était de m'y joindre....' it seems remarkable, considering the unanimity which prevailed amongst the allied generals, and that the french commander-in-chief himself said he felt it his duty to join them, that no assault took place. kinglake,[ ] however, by means of french official documents brought to light after the fall of the empire, proves that general canrobert was in reality held back by instructions from paris and by the influence of general niel, and, in view of the expected arrival of the emperor, would not join in a general assault. lord raglan had apparently been informed of the expected arrival of the emperor napoleon, which he considered ill-advised, but both he and the english government were kept for some time in the dark as to the special instructions which fettered the action of general canrobert. various interviews took place towards the end of april between the two commanders-in-chief, and in my journal i find a remark as follows: 'met lord raglan out riding; he invited me to dinner, but added: "canrobert is coming to a council of war at half-past six, so we shall be late." the council did not break up till ten p.m.' days thus passed away, and the allies were gradually losing the opportunity for which they had so long waited. in fact, the second bombardment of sebastopol failed, from causes, however, very different from those which prevailed in the first. in october, , our failure was due to want of power; in april, , it was from want of will. events, however, were hurrying on, and the crisis soon came. towards the end of april the emperor napoleon[ ] relinquished his intention of coming to the crimea, but sent out his proposed plan of an external campaign, to which, however, lord raglan strongly objected.[ ] whilst matters thus drifted, and whilst the batteries of the allies were again becoming weak and their ammunition exhausted, a new actor appeared on the scene in the person of general pélissier, who was commanding the french _corps d'armée_ on the left. amongst other matters, he pointed out to canrobert in clear and forcible language[ ] that the russians were establishing counter approaches in his front, and that he, and those under him, were fully convinced that the enemy's new position must be taken by a _coup de main_. he concluded: 's'il m'était donner de décider, je n'hésiterais pas.' general canrobert wavered, but at length accepted the responsibility, and the order for the attack was given for may . in my journal is a record as follows: 'returned from balaclava about o'clock p.m. on the st of may and had an interview with lord raglan. lord stratford was there, when a message came that a severe battle was going on in front of the french trenches near the sea. we went off to a post of observation. the scene was striking. the sky was lit up with constant flashes--shells whizzing through the air; and amidst the incessant rattle of musketry could be heard the cheers of the troops as they stormed the works. it lasted four hours. canrobert was with us, walking up and down, flourishing his stick and greatly excited. the result was that the french captured an outwork, and took eight mortars, and also five officers prisoners.' in addition to the many difficulties of lord raglan's position at this time, he was also much worried by receiving a notification that lord panmure was about to abolish the master-general and board of ordnance, and to absorb their duties in the newly constructed war department. speaking to me one day, he deplored the change, and said that the ordnance was one of the most efficient and economical departments of the state, and that a much greater man than himself, the late duke of wellington, was of the same opinion.[ ] in the meantime, lord raglan, backed by the opinions of admirals bruat and sir edmund lyons, strongly advocated a naval and military force being sent to kertch at the entrance to the sea of azov, with a view of cutting the russian communications and stopping their supplies; and the expedition, consisting of about , troops (one-fourth being english) started at the beginning of may. hardly had it got out to sea than general canrobert received an order by telegraph from paris to concentrate all his troops for an external attack, and in consequence recalled the kertch expedition, to the dismay, not only of lord raglan, but of the admirals and generals, and indeed of the officers and men of the allied fleets and armies.[ ] matters were evidently coming to a deadlock. on may lord raglan, canrobert, and omar pasha had a long and final consultation as to the proposal of the emperor napoleon, which was in effect to separate the allied forces into three armies acting independently--one to blockade sebastopol, the second to storm the mackenzie heights, and the third to march to the centre of the crimea. the scheme was rejected on the broad ground that it would render each separate force liable to attack and defeat in detail.[ ] this decision brought affairs to a crisis, and on may general canrobert telegraphed to the emperor resigning his command, partly on the plea of ill health, but chiefly because his recall of the kertch expedition and the rejection of the emperor's scheme had placed him in a false position.[ ] general canrobert's resignation was accepted, and by his own wish he resumed command of his old division. on may general pélissier was appointed commander-in-chief of the french army, and the situation was at once completely altered. writing to marshal vaillant, minister for war at paris, he said: 'i have already seen lord raglan, and we are in complete accord; please ask the emperor to give me liberty of action indispensable under the actual conditions of the war, and especially in view of the preservation of the intimate alliance of the two countries.' efforts, however, were still made from paris to regulate the strategy of the campaign, but they were virtually disregarded, and general pélissier, acting with lord raglan, in the course of a few days carried out a series of important movements which put an end not only to the delays and disappointments that had so long trammelled the actions of the allies, but entirely altered the conditions of the campaign. the strength of the allies towards the end of may was approximately as follows: french , english , sardinians , turks , _may ._--accompanied lord raglan and la marmora round the english trenches. the first movement by pélissier was a renewed attack on the russian counter approaches in front of the french left, on the night of may ; and as, owing to the desperate nature of the fighting, the object was not fully accomplished he refused an armistice to bury the dead, and followed it up the following evening with complete success, and his troops then entrenched themselves in the captured cemetery. i accompanied lord raglan and omar pasha on the second night to the french post of observation. the losses on both sides were very severe, being computed at , on the part of the french, and at , of the russians.[ ] on may general canrobert was ordered to take up the line of the chernaya, which he accomplished with ease and almost without loss. in this operation he was assisted by the sardinians under la marmora, who had arrived some days previously. i remember riding in the morning down to the chernaya with lord raglan and his staff on the occasion. general canrobert galloped up to meet him, in the highest spirits, and speaking in french said: 'my lord, when i was a great man and commander-in-chief you used to come and visit me, and now when i am only commanding a division you again come to see me.' lord raglan, in reply, expressed his pleasure that canrobert had gained so extended a position, and with such trifling loss. he afterwards joined general la marmora, and made a reconnoissance towards baidar, being altogether ten hours in the saddle. this movement in advance was of the greatest benefit to the allies, who, instead of being cooped up in a corner, had now ample space in a fertile valley, with plenty of grass, fuel, and fresh water at their disposal. on may the expedition to kertch re-embarked, and sailed the following day. it consisted of , french, , english, and , turks, with batteries of artillery, and was attended with complete success. kertch and yenikale were captured without loss, the russians retreating, after destroying large depots of supplies, &c. a considerable number of guns were taken, the sea of azov was opened to our fleets, and the enemy's communications interrupted. sir edmund lyons reported that in four days the squadron had destroyed vessels employed in transporting provisions to the crimea, besides four war steamers and six million rations of flour and corn.[ ] footnotes: [footnote : kinglake, vii. .] [footnote : bazancourt, ii. - .] [footnote : kinglake, vii. .] [footnote : kinglake, vii. , and de bazancourt, ii. .] [footnote : de bazancourt, ii. - .] [footnote : _ibid._ ii. .] [footnote : see also clode's _military forces of the crown_, ii. .] [footnote : kinglake, vii. - .] [footnote : kinglake, vii. ; also de bazancourt, ii. - .] [footnote : _ibid._ .] [footnote : kinglake, viii. .] [footnote : lord raglan's despatch, june , .] chapter ix capture of the mamelon and quarries--interview with general pÉlissier the next combined action of the allied forces took place against the mamelon, the _ouvrages blancs_, and the quarries in front of the redan. as the capture of these important outworks involved not only a partial re-armament of the siege batteries and a renewal of their munitions, but also a careful consideration of engineer arrangements, some short delay necessarily followed before decisive action could be taken. towards the end of may a meeting was arranged to take place at the french head quarters between the senior artillery and engineer officers of the two armies, with a view to discuss the various details. as general dacres was temporarily absent, owing to illness, and had gone for a few days to constantinople, lord raglan directed me to accompany general harry jones, the commanding engineer. the meeting took place in a hut, at a.m. to my surprise general pélissier came in and presided; and, instead of the conference being limited to officers of the special arms, the following were present: french generals martimprey, niel, bosquet, trochu, frossard, beuret, and thiry, and one or two more; general jones and myself being the only english officers at the meeting. major claremont and prince polignac were also in the room, to act as interpreters if required. general pélissier, in opening the proceedings, said it was decided that in a few days the french were to attack the mamelon and other adjacent positions, whilst the english would seize the quarries in front of the redan; and he invited those present to offer any remarks on details. a plan of sebastopol was lying on the table for reference. general niel began the discussion, stating that on an important occasion like the present it was necessary to take a general survey of the allied position and of the trenches, and he would begin with the left attack. pélissier stopped him at once, and declined to enter into any such general considerations, saying that all he wanted was assistance as to details. he then took a ruler, laid it across the left attack, and said: 'l'attaque gauche n'existe plus.' general niel under these circumstances abstained from taking any further part in the discussion. general bosquet having made a few remarks as to the troops to be detailed for the assault of the mamelon, in which the zouaves were to occupy a conspicuous place, pélissier objected to the arrangement, contending that the zouaves were not the best troops--'pourquoi toujours les zouaves?' he added. he went on to say that these, however, were small questions of detail to be settled afterwards. he was evidently determined to assert his position as commander-in-chief, and told us that there were persons in france of the highest position (evidently alluding to the emperor) who read history and studied campaigns, and then sent him out their ideas as to what should be done. he told us that he had written respectfully to the minister for war that, so long as he commanded the french army in the field, he declined to carry out any plans except such as were arranged and concerted between lord raglan and himself. a few other officers offered some observations, and then pélissier turned to general harry jones. apparently he had some difficulty in pronouncing his name, and approximately addressed him as general hairy-joze.[ ] the general--who, i found afterwards, was considerably ruffled by pélissier's arbitrary language--speaking in somewhat moderate french, said that when the french were ready to take the mamelon the british troops were prepared to storm and capture the quarries in front of the redan, and then sat down. pélissier at once expressed his pleasure at hearing the statement of general hairy-joze. the english, he added, were evidently waiting for their allies, and with that 'solidité' which so distinguished them would no doubt succeed in what they undertook. the day and hour of the attack were known only to lord raglan and himself, but they should not have long to wait. pélissier ended by stating that the discussion had been very interesting (no one having practically spoken except himself), and then he wished us all good morning. lord raglan was much interested and amused when he heard of the interview, saying that had he known general pélissier would be present he would have gone himself to listen to his lecture. it was known at the time that considerable differences existed between pélissier and niel. years afterwards, in kinglake's 'history of the crimea,'[ ] he quotes extracts of letters written at this time by general niel to the emperor napoleon, and which evidently refer to the conference i have just described. in one general niel says: 'at a meeting which took place yesterday he, general pélissier, ordered me to be silent with a harshness not to be characterised.... we were in the presence of english officers.' again, he writes to the minister for war: 'knowing nothing of what is going on, i abstain from all reflections. i asked leave to offer some observations on the state of the siege, and was told that it was not the time....' it must be borne in mind that the active measures which had been carried out by the allied generals during the latter part of may were by no means approved of in paris, so much so that on june napoleon telegraphed to pélissier as follows:[ ] 'je vous donne l'ordre positif, de ne point vous acharner au siège, avant d'avoir investi la place.' general pélissier, however, entirely ignoring the veto, simply replied that he was in perfect accord with lord raglan, and was making final dispositions for the assault of the white redoubts, the mamelon, and the quarries; and adds, that he should commence on the th and push on with the utmost vigour. and so he did. a few days later, in writing to paris, he speaks of himself as being at the paralysing extremity of an electric wire.[ ] lord panmure, the minister for war, however, about this time informed lord raglan that the english and french governments had arranged that no orders should be sent out as to operations, without mutual consent,[ ] and it seems curious that so obvious and common-sense a plan had not been in force throughout. on the afternoon of june the third great bombardment of sebastopol commenced. my brother, captain mortimer adye, r.a., was in command of an advanced battery in the trenches, and, the weather being hot, was fighting his guns in his shirt sleeves, when a shell from the enemy burst in the battery, exploding some loose gunpowder which was lying there, and burned him and two sergeants seriously; in fact, nearly blew them away. his face, neck, and arms were scorched, blackened, and blistered, and his flannel shirt smouldering. some infantry soldiers, seeing his condition, threw some water over him, and he was then conveyed to camp; but some weeks elapsed before he was able to resume his duties. the fire of the allied batteries soon obtained a mastery, and the mamelon especially was in ruins. todleben, speaking of the bombardment, said that more terrific than all else was the fire of the english.[ ] it was arranged that the assault of the russian advanced works should take place shortly before sunset, and during the afternoon of the th the french columns, in the highest spirits, marched under cover and unobserved down the ravines in readiness. the signal was given about half-past six, and the french first attacked and occupied the _ouvrages blancs_, near the careening bay ravine, taking several hundred prisoners. they then assaulted the mamelon, took it with great rapidity and comparative ease, and hoisted their flag on the work; but, led away by success, they impetuously, and contrary to the intention, followed the enemy even up to the glacis of the malakoff. the russians, however, came out in great force, and not only drove back the french columns, but followed them into the mamelon and recaptured it, the french retreating down the slopes in disorder and with great loss. it was a critical moment, but pélissier was equal to the occasion. having large reserves in the adjoining ravine, he at once sent them forward and for a second time occupied the great outwork; and, darkness coming on, its entrenchments were turned during the night and the position firmly held. at the same time, whilst these serious battles were taking place, the english troops, consisting of part of the light and second divisions, stormed the quarries in front of the redan in the most brilliant manner; and although they were furiously attacked several times during the night by sorties from the russian adjacent works, and suffered great loss, they resisted all efforts to dislodge them, and the next morning found them firmly established in comparatively close proximity to the redan. the great energy and activity of the allies during the fortnight since pélissier had been in command of the french army and in full accord with lord raglan had thus been attended with important results, not only on the chernaya and at kertch, but also in depriving the enemy of the outworks in front of the city which they had established during the previous winter. within a day or two of the successful actions of june , another meeting took place of the senior artillery and engineer officers of the two armies, at which i was present with general dacres. the subject considered had reference to the arrangements in the trenches necessary for the further prosecution of the siege. opinions rather differed, some considering that in view of the recent success, and its moral effect on the russians, a general assault should speedily follow. colonel frossard, a distinguished engineer of the french army, however, urged that as we were still at a distance of some hundred yards from the malakoff and redan we should continue to advance cautiously by means of sap and trench as heretofore. he pointed out that an assault from our present position would involve the carrying of scaling ladders and woolbags to fill the ditches, for a considerable distance in the open under heavy fire, and that under all the circumstances we might be liable to defeat in assaulting prematurely. general dacres entirely concurred in the views of colonel frossard, and the event proved that their misgivings were justified. some days passed away, during which time the batteries in the trenches were augmented and again prepared for a fresh effort, and it was finally decided that a general assault should be made on the malakoff and redan on june , to be preceded by a vigorous bombardment at daylight for two or three hours, so as to smash and silence the enemy's batteries and open a road for the attacking columns. it is important, however, to bear in mind that general pélissier declined to make a simultaneous movement against the bastion du mât. a heavy fire was opened at daylight on june from the english and french trenches, and continued throughout the day. in the evening lord raglan sent for me, and directed orders to be issued at once to all the batteries, that the renewed bombardment at daylight the next morning was not to be carried out. i ventured to remark that every preparation had been made, and that it would not only be a great disappointment to the navy and artillery, but it seemed to me that a concentrated fire for two or three hours on the points to be assaulted would produce a great effect. lord raglan replied that he entirely agreed with me, but, he added, it was useless to argue the question, as he had just received a message from general pélissier altering previous arrangements, and saying that the french columns would attack at daylight.[ ] the necessary orders were, of course, given. footnotes: [footnote : soon afterwards, when he was knighted, he called him 'sairey-joze'! (sir harry jones).] [footnote : 'extracts from french official documents,' kinglake, viii. and .] [footnote : kinglake, viii. - .] [footnote : _ibid._ viii. .] [footnote : _ibid._ .] [footnote : kinglake, viii. .] [footnote : see lord raglan's despatch, june , . also kinglake, viii. .] chapter x battle of june and death of lord raglan the night of the th was passed in concentrating the allied forces destined for the great assault. lord raglan and his staff arrived in the english trenches shortly before daylight. two important circumstances occurred at the very outset, both of bad omen for the allies. one, that the russians by some means had become aware of, and were consequently prepared for, the attack; the other, that one of the french generals, under a mistaken idea that the signal had been given, led his troops to the assault prematurely, and before all was ready. it was, in fact, still dark, when the ground in front of the malakoff became suddenly the scene of a terrific conflict, of which for some time it was not possible to form a judgment, or to forecast the result. as the day dawned it soon became apparent that the french were in difficulties, and were not within the malakoff. lord raglan had always reserved to himself freedom of action as to the proper moment for ordering the advance of the english. as he wrote to lord panmure afterwards, he felt that there ought to be some hope of the french success before committing his troops.[ ] however, when he observed the serious condition of affairs, and that his allies were in dire conflict and suffering great losses, but were still persisting in their attack on the dominating position of the malakoff, he felt that it was impossible for the english troops to remain inactive, and therefore gave the requisite signal. our troops, composed of parts of the light, second and fourth divisions, accompanied by a storming party of seamen carrying scaling ladders and of gunners with means for spiking guns, jumped from their cover and made straight for the redan; but the whole ground was torn and swept with grape and musketry from the enemy's works, both in front and on the flanks, and our men, gallantly as they were led and bravely as they advanced, were quite unable to enter the work. lord raglan, when the advance commenced, desired his staff to sit down in the trench; but he and general jones, r.e., stood up together, anxiously watching the event. in the midst of the carnage, general jones was struck on the forehead with a glancing grape-shot, and for a moment as he fell back it was feared the wound was mortal. he was taken away for medical aid, but in a minute or two suddenly returned with the blood streaming down his face, being anxious to speak to the commander-in-chief on some point which he deemed important; and it was with difficulty that he could be induced to have his wound attended to. it was about this time that captain william peel, r.n., who had led the seamen with the scaling ladders, passed us on his return, wounded, together with a great many other officers and men. the battle continued for some time, but at length ended in the failure of the allies at every point, and lord raglan then directed the batteries to re-open fire, in order to cover the retreat and to hold in check the russian forces. soon after the termination of the various attacks, general hugh rose,[ ] the british commissioner at french head quarters, came to lord raglan with a message from general pélissier, to ascertain his views on the situation. lord raglan said that in his opinion pélissier had made two great mistakes--one, in attacking prematurely before a bombardment and the other that he had not simultaneously assaulted the bastion du mât. 'however,' he added, 'i will go myself and see him,' and he then left the trenches with general harry jones, who in the meantime had returned, having tied a handkerchief over his forehead, making light of his wound. the losses during the day were serious. of the english--general sir john campbell was killed, with many other officers of rank, and our total casualties were , . the french suffered far more, their losses amounting to no less than , . in fact, during the month that general pélissier had been in command of the french army it is estimated that their casualties in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to upwards of , officers and men. the failure of the great assault on sebastopol on june was undoubtedly the severest blow which the allies had received since their landing in the crimea; and indeed it became difficult to forecast the future, as the activity, courage, and great resources of the russians in men and material apparently rendered the capture of the city a somewhat remote and uncertain speculation. the british army were, however, destined in a few days to suffer another great misfortune, by the death of their beloved commander-in-chief on june . there is no doubt that the failure of the attack on sebastopol, and the great losses on that eventful morning, had a serious effect upon lord raglan, following, as they did, on the accumulated anxieties of the previous months; so that his strong constitution at length gave way. within a few hours of his death he happened to send for me on some matter of business, and then complained of illness and of great thirst; but he made light of it, and i had no idea that his condition was serious, or that it was destined to be my last interview with one with whom i had been so closely associated. it will be well to consider briefly some of the great events which had occurred during the period of his command, as illustrative of his conduct and character during the campaign. in the first place, it must always be remembered that we entered into a war against a great power after a peace in europe of nearly forty years, when we had with difficulty collected about , men for the purpose; and when even these were inadequately provided with commissariat and transport, and there were no reserves existent to replace casualties as they arose. again, the order to proceed to the crimea came from home, without any specific knowledge of the resources and preparations of the russians; it was given at a late season, and when the troops were physically weak; and as the government did not anticipate a winter campaign, no provision had been made to meet it. in view of these circumstances marshal saint-arnaud, as i have shown, hesitated at the last moment. it is true that he was then very ill--in fact, a dying man--but this must have added greatly to lord raglan's responsibilities at a critical time. when the siege of sebastopol commenced, the failure of the first bombardment was due in a measure to the weakness of the french siege train, and to the unfortunate explosion of some of their magazines. in the three great battles of alma, balaclava, and inkerman, the english lost about , men, and as the winter came on, and found the allies with open trenches, it was evident not only that great sickness and suffering must ensue, but that our numbers and means were quite inadequate. in short, the english and french governments entered into the war apparently under the impression that with a force of , men they could crush an empire, and that sebastopol would fall by a _coup-de-main_. as regards the events which followed, i have quoted official documents which prove that general canrobert, brave and good soldier as he was, still allowed himself to be constantly controlled and over-influenced by secret orders from paris, which practically set at naught the plans of the allied generals and at last brought matters to a dead lock; and it is important to bear in mind also that, steadfast as lord raglan was in his opinions, yet so loyal was he to his colleague, and so magnanimous, that no word in his public despatches gave a hint of the enormous difficulties caused by the circumstance i have described. he submitted to great personal injustice, rather than say or do anything to weaken the _entente cordiale_ between the two powers, or to attach blame to others. again, when the allies landed in the crimea their numbers were approximately equal, but, as the english had no reserves to replenish their rapidly diminishing ranks, the equality soon disappeared, and early in the french forces were at least three times greater than ours; and this disparity, whilst it gave increased authority to their views, must have tended to complicate lord raglan's position in council. there is another point to be noticed--namely, that all the commanders of the allied armies and fleets, french, sardinian, and turkish, entertained the highest opinion of the ability, high courage, and character of lord raglan. i had good means of knowing, and believe there was no difference of opinion on the subject. general canrobert always expressed these views, and indeed was anxious that lord raglan should be appointed to command all the allied forces. pélissier, from the day he assumed command of the french army, was in complete accord with him, and so stated over and over again. lord lyons, i remember well, after the war told me that it was the proudest boast of his life that he should have been closely associated with lord raglan, during all the exceptional difficulties and dangers of his position. i have recapitulated these points because they were by no means known to the people of england at the time; in fact, it was not until years afterwards, on the fall of the empire, and by the publication of the french despatches, that many of the circumstances were brought to light. finally, lord raglan, during all these months of incessant and harassing anxiety, had to bear a trial even greater than those i have attempted to describe. the english press at home, and their correspondents in the crimea, day after day continued to criticise his conduct, and to misrepresent his character in violent and unmeasured terms; describing him as indifferent, incompetent, and unfit for command; and attributing to his supposed incapacity and want of foresight the sufferings of the troops and the delays of the campaign, whilst during the whole time the facts were all the other way. having been closely associated with lord raglan, and knowing a good deal of the circumstances, i feel it a matter of common justice to defend the memory of a great and distinguished man, the close of whose life was embittered by the feeling that the government at home would not defend him, and that the people, grossly misled as they were, had withdrawn from him their confidence. one day, not long before his death, in conversation with him i expressed a hope that he would soon return to england, and have the opportunity of defending himself against the unjust attacks of which he was the object, when he replied--smiling, perhaps, rather bitterly--'return home? i shall never return home. why, i should be stoned to death before i could get to stanhope street.' but there is a still more important aspect of the case than the personal one. it is a great injury to the public service that a commander-in-chief in the field, surrounded, as he must be, by constant difficulties and anxieties, should be thus misjudged by violent and erroneous statements, and be attacked behind his back at a time when from absence, want of leisure, and from the nature of his position he is unable to reply. i must add that in almost every campaign in which i have borne a part, the same tendency to hasty criticism has been more or less observable, and always at moments when the people at home, being naturally anxious, are all the more susceptible and easily misled. the death of lord raglan tended, no doubt, to diminish the influence of england in the councils of the war at a critical period of the campaign, and the _entente cordiale_ between the generals of the allied armies which his influence and high character had done so much to maintain, gradually weakened. it was in every sense a calamity. the appointment, however, of general simpson as his successor at all events prevented any divergence of opinion as regarded the immediate operations against sebastopol. general pélissier and himself were in entire accord that the malakoff was the dominant feature of the situation; and although other parts of the enceinte, such as the great and little redans and the bastion du mât, could not be left out of account, still in the final assault the attacks on these points would not necessarily lead to the fall of the place, and would, therefore, be subsidiary diversions, as it were, to the capture of the central position. in one of his first despatches general simpson said that 'we were repairing and improving our works, to be in readiness to co-operate with the french, when their approaches towards the malakoff shall be completed.' the opinion given at the beginning of the siege by sir john burgoyne, that 'the great tower was the key of the whole position,' had at length become the axiom of all.[ ] footnotes: [footnote : see lord raglan's despatch, june , . also kinglake, viii. .] [footnote : afterwards field marshal lord strathnairn.] [footnote : general pélissier, in his despatch of september on the fall of sebastopol, specially says that the malakoff was the key of the defences, and that the other attacks were subordinate.] chapter xi. battle of chernaya and the fall of sebastopol. during the month of july and the early part of august the allies were occupied in pushing on their trenches, in obtaining fresh armaments and munitions, and adding to their batteries. about this time i was present at several interesting councils connected with these preparations, and partly with the consideration of suggestions from home. in my journal is a record as follows:-- first conference, august , . present: generals pélissier, simpson, niel, thiry, barnard, airey, sir h. jones;[ ] colonels dupuis, steele, and adye. subject: 'whether, in case the town should not fall before the winter, it may not be necessary to raise the siege?' general pélissier refused to entertain the idea, and the meeting broke up unsatisfactorily. the conference took place at the english head quarters, and during the discussion one of the french generals having made some remarks as to the great losses daily in the trenches, general pélissier turned to him and said, 'did you ever hear of a war without losses? we are not here to make war _à la_ monsieur cobden!' after the meeting, in passing through general simpson's room, pélissier took up a book, and asked me what was the inscription on its cover. it was a bible, and i told him the words were 'society for the promotion of christian knowledge.' he laughed, and said it was a good society, but whether he was a subscriber i do not know. second conference, august . present: artillery and engineer officers of both armies only. subject considered: 'a telegraphic despatch from england, can the town be destroyed? can it be taken? what will you do next?' answer: no amount of fire, both vertical and horizontal, would destroy the town--that is to say, the forts, docks, basins, and all that give importance to sebastopol. answer to second question: this question is one for the commanders-in-chief to decide. the meeting stated the general condition of the trenches for their information. the third question was also for the generals-in-chief. third conference, august . 'two hundred mortars being expected from france and england, can the town be destroyed by this means and an assault obviated?' answer: no. fourth conference, august . the french state that their batteries on the mamelon and careening bay are ready to open. proposed, therefore, that we open on the th all round, and then push forward our approaches. in the meantime, and before the final preparations for the assault of sebastopol were quite complete, the russians determined to make one more effort to raise the siege by an attack on the position of the allies on the chernaya. it was a desperate movement on their part. in the first place, the fedhukine heights were held by , french troops with guns, and the sardinians on the hills to their right near tchergoum were , strong with guns, and in rear were , turks in reserve. the heights themselves, which were well adapted for defence, had been strengthened by entrenchments, and the river chernaya, as well as a narrow canal, acted as wet ditches along the front, and rendered an assault very difficult. it so happened also that a few days before the battle the allied generals had received information through spies of the intentions of the enemy, and were therefore fully prepared. on august i was sent to balaclava to call upon general la marmora, who wished that some english guns should be placed at his disposal, and by his invitation rode with him to the heights occupied by the sardinian army, and received his directions as to the position to be taken up by the battery in the event of an assault. at daylight on august the russians advanced with great courage to the attack. general pélissier, in his general order to the french army on the following day, estimated the forces of the russians as being , strong, with a numerous artillery and considerable masses of cavalry. notwithstanding all the obstacles, the enemy succeeded in temporarily capturing the _tête-du-pont_, and in advancing for a considerable distance up the heights; but, after five hours' fighting, were ultimately driven back and defeated all along the line, losing more than , men, some of whom were drowned, and leaving , wounded and prisoners behind. general pélissier specially alluded to the good service rendered by the english heavy battery, which took part in the action in co-operation with the sardinians. c troop horse artillery was also present towards the close of the battle. on the following day the allies commenced another bombardment, and in three days alone threw , shells from mortars into the doomed city, independently of the fire from the heavy guns. the batteries of the malakoff and redan were reduced to ruins and were almost silent. the end was approaching. the english artillery at this time, having been largely reinforced, were about , strong, and, in addition to pieces of ordnance in the trenches, they had guns horsed and ready for the field. under cover of this great bombardment, work in the trenches was actively carried on, and the french approached close to the counter scarps of the malakoff. their losses, however, were reckoned at daily. in view of the crisis which was at hand, the russians, towards the end of august, constructed a bridge of rafts across the harbour; an evident symptom of a possible withdrawal of the garrison and surrender of the city. at the beginning of september a final meeting of the french and english officers of artillery and engineers took place, and a careful memorandum was then drawn up for the consideration of the commanders-in-chief. after recapitulating the general condition of the trenches, and pointing out that the french were within twenty-five yards of the place, they recommended that the whole of the batteries should re-open at once and maintain a vigorous fire for three days, and that the assault should then be given without delay; the malakoff to be first attacked and captured, and then the great and little redans, and the works near the bastion du mât, so as to divide the russian forces as much as possible.[ ] the end had come at last. on september the bombardment re-commenced, and the russians were speedily driven to seek refuge in their numerous underground shelters, in the midst of crumbling ruins and dismantled batteries. on the morning of the th the troops of the allies marched quietly down to their allotted positions; and at noon, all being ready, general mac mahon led his division straight to the malakoff, and in a few minutes entered it and hoisted the tricolor. this was the preconcerted signal, and then the other columns also rushed to the assault. on the extreme right, the french in great force attacked the little redan and works near the harbour, but, after a prolonged struggle and heavy losses, failed to maintain their ground. the english troops, composed of parts of the light and second divisions and accompanied by a ladder and spiking party, advanced on the salient of the great redan, entered the work, and held it for some time. the interior of the work, however, was swept by the fire of artillery and infantry in rear, and they were ultimately forced back with great loss. at the same time, far away on the left, the bastions centrale and du mât were stormed by french columns, but also without success--in fact, the three subordinate assaults on the city all failed. mac mahon, however, having once gained possession of the redoubt surrounding the old malakoff tower, held it in spite of the furious efforts of the russians for hours to drive him out. as one cause of the failure of the subsidiary attacks, it is as well to point out that they were all open works, swept by batteries and interior entrenchments; whilst, on the other hand, the ground round the malakoff had been converted by the russians into a closed redoubt which, whilst it may, at the outset, have added to the difficulties of its capture, still, when once taken, gave the french under mac mahon the advantage of comparative shelter. the losses on all sides were very severe, and were as follows: french , english , russians , ------ , thus ended, after a siege of eleven months, the series of battles in front of sebastopol. the russians, aware that their position on the south side was no longer tenable, during the night set fire to the city, exploded their magazines, sunk their fleet, and, having withdrawn the garrison by means of the floating bridge across the harbour, then destroyed it, leaving their arsenal, docks, and large remaining supplies of guns and stores in the hands of the allies. as pélissier said in his order of the day, 'le boulevard de la puissance russe dans la mer noir n'existe plus.' in the afternoon of the th fort paul blew up with a great explosion, and then all was still. what a comfort it was, after months of incessant anxiety, that the uproar had for a time ceased, and that there was nothing to do! during the next few days we buried the dead, wandered about the desolate city, took stock of the armaments and reserves, and were occasionally shelled by the enemy at long range from the north side of the harbour. one large hospital which i visited presented a dreadful spectacle. there were hundreds of dead bodies of russians lying in the beds; of men who had been wounded before the retreat, and then left at the last to die unheeded and alone. in a few of the beds were found wounded men still living! with the fall of sebastopol the crimean war had virtually reached its termination, although several months elapsed before this was recognised. the emperor of the french still hankered after a campaign in the interior; but the season was late, and the corner occupied by the allied armies formed a bad base for operations in the field. marshal pélissier, obstinate and determined as ever, would have none of it, and wrote to paris: 'thank god! it is not difficulties which frighten me.... but here the situation is not the same. i see the obstacles, but i do not perceive the success, nor even the hope of it. i should be perplexed to form a plan of campaign, still more to carry it out.' in short, the fall of sebastopol had destroyed the power of russia in the black sea; and therefore the occupation of the crimea, whilst it would entail great losses and considerable risk, would be of no special value. the two allied commanders-in-chief, simpson and pélissier, were men of very different character and also of general appearance. the one was a tall, thin scotchman; the other a short, stout, thick-set norman. the first time they met after the capture of the city, pélissier rushed up to the english general and embraced him with great fervour, having almost to climb up to reach his cheek. the english staff were amused at this demonstration, and said to simpson, 'why general, pélissier kissed you!' and his reply, with a strong national dialect, was: 'well, it was a great occasion, and i could na' resist him.' as there was nothing specially to be done--at all events, until the english and french governments had made up what they were pleased to call their minds as to future operations--i was fortunate enough in november to obtain a few weeks' leave, and went off to malta for a holiday. on arriving at constantinople i embarked in a small store steamer, in which there was only one passenger besides myself--a private soldier on his way to england. so, we talked of the war, and on my asking who had ordered him home, he replied: 'the minister for war, sir.' on my asking why, he said, 'i'm in charge of his brother, sir.' this seemed rather incomprehensible, so i added, 'where is his brother?' 'sure, he's in the hold, sir.' this bewildered me still more; but it appeared that the soldier had been present at the funeral of colonel the honourable lauderdale maule, who died of cholera at varna just before we left in the autumn of , and had been sent to exhume the body and bring it to england at the request of his brother, lord panmure. when i returned to the crimea at the end of the year, although active operations were necessarily suspended for the winter, we were busily occupied in blowing up the docks, forts, and barracks, and in carrying off the russian guns out of the arsenal (about , in number) and thus completing the destruction of sebastopol. preparations were also being made for a renewal of hostilities in the spring in some other part of the russian empire. but in reality a change was coming over the scene, and, instead of action, reaction had set in. in the first place, france was tired of the war. her finances were exhausted and her troops anxious to return home. on the other hand, russia also was crippled, both as to men and means. england, so tardy at the outset and so unprepared, was indeed the only power which apparently had the will or vigour left to continue the contest. our troops during the second winter were well clothed, housed, and fed, and as healthy as at home; and their numbers were daily increasing. at the beginning of we had upwards of , men and field guns in the crimea, with considerable reserves both at malta and in england. the administrative departments, also, were becoming models of efficiency; and the transport branch, which hardly existed at the outset, had no less than , animals collected and ready for the field. in the meantime the turkish contingent had occupied kertch and enikale, at the entrance to the sea of azov; and in january i was sent by sir william codrington (who had succeeded sir james simpson as commander-in-chief) on a mission to general vivian in command of the troops there. a french officer accompanied me, and we were conveyed in h.m.s. 'stromboli,' our instructions being, in the first place, to make a rapid survey along the coast of the crimea in order to ascertain if the bay of kaffa, or its neighbourhood, were fortified and held in strength by the russians; and, if not, whether it offered facilities for landing. on arrival at kertch, we were directed to confer with general vivian as to the defences and to inquire whether he desired reinforcements or assistance of any kind, naval or military, and then to return forthwith to sebastopol. the fact was, that information had been received that kertch was shortly to be attacked by the russians in force, and the commander-in-chief was desirous of ascertaining general vivian's views on the position. i remember when handing him the letter from sir william codrington, he confirmed the rumour of the expected attack, and as to holding out said, 'i can tell you at once; i shall be able to hold out for about five-and-twenty minutes.' he did not, of course, intend his words to be taken literally, but explained that in his opinion the place was not tenable against a powerful assault. extensive earthworks had been constructed and armed on some of the heights; but they were commanded by others, and there was an entire deficiency of water in the outlying forts. however, after remaining a few days at kertch, information was received of the probabilities of peace, and in february the representatives of the allied powers having met at paris, towards the end of march an armistice was proclaimed, and the war came to an end. so ended the great crimea campaign, of which my narrative necessarily gives but a short and imperfect sketch. to the present generation it is now a mere matter of history, and few remain of all those who took part in a contest which, at the time, so deeply affected the people of this country, and, indeed, of the whole of europe. the long siege, with its battles, vicissitudes, and sufferings, forms, however, a remarkable page in the annals of war. of my own corps, officers were killed[ ] and wounded. altogether, no less than , officers and men of the royal artillery served during the campaign, of whom , died, either killed in action or from wounds and sickness. many weeks elapsed before the allied armies had altogether quitted the crimea; and in the meantime we wandered about and formed acquaintances with the russians, who were always civil and good-natured. at the end of the harbour of sebastopol were extensive marshes, filled with frogs, which kept up an incessant croaking. the french soldiers were in the habit of catching and eating them in large quantities, but the english despised such food. it was said that the frogs, after a time, learnt to distinguish between the two nations, and that when our men appeared in their _red_ coats the frogs chirped away merrily, but when they saw soldiers in _red_ trousers approaching, down they went, and remained perfectly mute till the danger had passed away. _se non è vero, è ben trovato._ i did not leave the crimea until june, and then embarked with a battery of horse artillery for home. the weather was beautiful, and, after passing through the bosphorus and dardanelles, we were steaming along past the greek islands when my servant one morning came into the cabin and said i had better get up. as it was only just daylight i did not take the hint. presently, however, he looked in again, repeating his suggestion. on my asking why he disturbed me at such an early hour, he replied: 'i beg your pardon, sir, but the ship is on fire!' this altered the situation; i lost no time in jumping into my clothes, went on deck, where i perceived smoke coming up through the hatch-ways. going on to the bridge i inquired of the captain, who informed me that the fire was in the powder magazine! it seems that having all the ammunition boxes and stores of a battery of horse artillery on board, the ordinary magazine was insufficient, and a temporary arrangement had been made on the lower deck. it is supposed that by some accident a box of lucifer matches had ignited, and set fire to the whole concern. captain dyneley, r.h.a., with a few men at once went below, and passing down buckets of water the fire was gradually extinguished, the boxes hauled up and laid on deck, several of them considerably burnt. it was a critical half-hour, but nothing could be more quiet and steady than the conduct of all on board. in the midst of our trouble the 'charlemagne,' a french line-of-battle ship, came up close to us, crammed with troops, and offered help. we, however, explained that we had plenty of men on board, and in a short time we were able to say that all danger was at an end, and separated with three cheers from both vessels. that was my last adventure connected with the crimean war. footnotes: [footnote : general dacres was at constantinople sick.] [footnote : general simpson's despatch of september , , specially alludes to this report, which, he says, was agreed to and acted on.] [footnote : names of artillery officers killed: brig.-general strangways, major townsend; captains oldfield, fitzroy, childers, dew, a. gordon, and snow; lieutenants cockerell, walsham, luce, mitchell, and asst.-commissary hayter.] chapter xii the indian mutiny in the early part of i was stationed at cork harbour in command of a few men on spike island, a period of tranquillity after all the anxieties of the great crimean war. the tranquillity, however, was not destined to last very long. one day towards the end of may i crossed the harbour to call on a gentleman in the neighbourhood who had just returned from cork, and on my asking if there was any news, he said that a remarkable telegram had been received from india that a native regiment at meerut had killed its english officers and was marching on delhi. that was the first news of the great mutiny. it also stated that the natives in parts of india were passing chew-patties from village to village. what was a chew-patty? nobody could tell us. it turned out to be a sort of pancake; but why the natives should specially pass round pancakes, and presumably eat them, as a signal of rebellion no one could explain. week after week the news became more serious, and troops of all arms were sent off in large numbers round the cape. towards the end of july, being in london, i received information that the duke of cambridge had appointed me assistant adjutant-general of the batteries of royal artillery, then on their voyage; and about the middle of august i left _viâ_ egypt. there was, of course, no suez canal in those days, and the railway from alexandria only went as far as cairo. generals dupuis and windham, and many other officers, were of the party; and from cairo we had to cross the desert (about ninety miles) in uncomfortable carriages like bathing machines. there was no steamer at suez, and we were detained a week at that dismal village of the desert, receiving occasional news that matters were becoming worse and worse in india. the only hotel was crowded with english officers, with little to eat and not a drop of water except what was brought in skins on camels from the nile, nearly miles away. at last, however, the 'bentinck' arrived, carried us slowly down the red sea, with the thermometer at degrees; in a week we were at aden, thermometer still rising, and ten days afterwards at galle. at madras we heard of the fall of delhi, and on october our long voyage in the 'bentinck' came to an end, and we steamed up the hoogly to calcutta. several years afterwards, when inspecting the defences of the river with sir william mansfield, the commander-in-chief, we came across the wreck of the 'bentinck' lying in a field at some distance from shore, and found that a short time previously she had been caught by a tidal wave called 'a great bore,' and was thrown up high and dry in the field. in the course of my career i have occasionally met a great bore, but never to be so completely stranded as was the case with the old steamer. matters were in a somewhat critical condition on our arrival at calcutta, for although the fall of delhi had given a severe blow to the mutineers, still we had no force of much strength to take the field; and the garrison of lucknow under outram and havelock, with many women and children, were entirely surrounded, mere scraps of intelligence only arriving from them occasionally. i had several interviews with sir colin campbell, who was very anxious to collect a sufficient force for the relief of lucknow. during october troops of all arms arrived in quick succession after a three months' voyage round the cape, but the great difficulty was transport. the railway extended to raneegunge, miles up country, but beyond that point our means only enabled us to push forward about men a day, either in bullock carts or by march. another difficulty was the provision of horses for the artillery. in fact, the whole of central india from delhi to lucknow was practically in the possession of the mutineers, who fortunately had no generals to lead them, and were content for the most part to hover about and pillage as they could. slowly, however, as our forces in a long thin line marched upwards towards allahabad and cawnpore, the tide began to turn, and on october the commander-in-chief left calcutta for the north. the general conditions of the mutiny campaign formed, indeed, a striking contrast to those of the crimean war. in the latter case, the allied armies--english, french, sardinian, and turkish--amounting to nearly , men, had been virtually shut up in a corner, and compelled to fight a series of battles on the same ground, in order to gain possession of the russian stronghold. in the present instance the circumstances were all the other way. a vast continent was in a great measure over-run, and its munitions and military stores were temporarily in the hands of a great mutinous army, more or less in sympathy with the inhabitants; whilst the english troops in small scattered detachments, often hundreds of miles apart, were fighting a succession of battles, with their communications precarious, and for the moment without the power of concentration. to a stranger landing in india for the first time, knowing nothing of the language or the customs of the people, more especially in the middle of a revolution, there were many minor personal perplexities, especially about servants. their very titles were embarrassing. bearers, kitmagars, dhobies, durzees, bheesties, chuprassies, punkah-wallahs, hookahbadars, syces, and others. what were their duties? that was the point. because in india, as we soon found, one man will only do his own mite of work, and scorns the idea of making himself generally useful. any attempt to enlarge the sphere of their duties would lead, so we were told, to loss of caste. there were, of course, exceptional cases, such as that of the native servant who, on being asked by a new-comer as to his caste, replied, 'same caste as master, drink brandy sahib.' owing to the great influx of officers from home, all in a hurry to be off, servants were especially difficult to find. i was fortunate enough to get an old fellow whose name was buktum hassan to take care of me. he could not speak a word of english, and slept away his time on a mat outside my door. i believe he was a bearer, and a hindoo, but he would not come near me at dinner time. subsequently i procured another servant, who condescended to wait on me at dinner, but i was cautioned not on any account to eat ham in his presence. curry and rice he did not object to. two sepoys, also, were appropriated for my service as orderlies. they were tall, dark, spare men, and all day waited patiently in the corridor in uniform, strictly buttoned up, with belts and boots. the first evening they said something, which being interpreted was that they wished to go home: they then proceeded to take off all their clothes, except a loin cloth, made them up into a bundle, and leaving them in a corner of my room, marched happily away. the greater portion of the batteries from england having arrived, general dupuis and his staff followed the commander-in-chief up country on november . the journey to benares occupied five days, and from raneegunge we were conveyed in dawk gharries about eighty miles a day, passing on the road every few hours detachments of troops of all arms, hurrying forward, some in bullock carts, some on the march. portions of the road, especially near the river soane, were unsafe from the vicinity of straggling parties of mutineers, and we had to be protected occasionally by an escort. remaining a few hours in a bungalow outside benares, we found time to pay a hurried visit to this celebrated city. as an instance of the precarious nature of our long line of communications, it may be mentioned that although its inhabitants were in a restless, disaffected condition, the garrison only consisted of a weak company of infantry and two field guns. on the morning after our arrival i was informed that 'the elephant was at the door,' in readiness to take us into the city. it had no howdah, so we climbed up and sat on a large stuffed mattress. the environs consisted of tombs, temples, ruins, mosques, and gardens. the streets were crammed with people, and with little brahminy bulls wandering about; in some parts the elephant was too wide for the narrow, tortuous passages, so that we had to dismount and walk. in one hindoo temple which we visited, a fanatic, or possibly a lunatic, was seated in a niche. he was quite naked and covered with dust, but, oddly enough, had a fuschia flower lying on the top of his shaven head. he sat perfectly mute and still, and took no apparent notice of anybody, so that it was impossible to ascertain what object he expected to accomplish by so sedentary and monotonous an existence. we were rather a large party at the hotel bungalow, some being officers newly arrived and others who had served for years in the country, and who were very good natured in giving us information. colonel david wood, of the horse artillery, was one of the newcomers, and had a habit occasionally of assuming ignorance on minor points which perhaps was not always genuine. during dinner he turned gravely to one of the old indian officers and said, 'can you tell me, what is a dhobie?' they all laughed, and it was explained that a dhobie was a man who washed your clothes. wood, still quite grave, said: 'oh, that accounts for the difficulty. i told mine to clean my horse, and he refused. i will discharge him tomorrow.' the old indian officer, however, assured him that a dhobie was absolutely necessary. wood replied that he never required washing on active service. 'you must surely have your shirts washed,' was the rejoinder. 'not at all,' said wood. 'i always wear a flannel shirt in the field, and as soon as it gets dirty or worn out i throw it away and put on another.' chapter xiii the battles at cawnpore on november we reached allahabad, an interesting old fortress at the junction of the ganges and jumna; but important events were taking place, and we hurried on and reached cawnpore on the st. on our arrival we found that sir colin campbell, with nearly all the troops available, had left a few days previously for lucknow, and that serious fighting had taken place there on the th and th; but the communications were subsequently interrupted by the mutineers in oude, and for some days no further information could be obtained as to the progress of affairs. it was a critical period of the campaign. as already explained, the garrison of lucknow, with many women and children, fifty miles distant, had been entirely shut up and surrounded by multitudes of mutineers for weeks past, and was running short of provisions, so that its relief had become a very urgent necessity. on the other hand, the great bulk of our troops, anxious as they were to reach the scene, owing to want of means of rapid conveyance, were still moving up in driblets along the miles of road from calcutta to cawnpore. so that when the commander-in-chief had crossed the ganges on his adventurous march to lucknow, he was only able to take with him about , infantry and a moderate force of cavalry and artillery. but that was not all. cawnpore, his only base, was in a precarious, defenceless condition, and when sir colin had left and placed windham in command of it, there were only infantry remaining for its protection. the defences of cawnpore were insignificant. a small incomplete earthwork had been made on the bank of the river with a view to protect the bridge of boats, and lying all round it were the ruins of burnt bungalows and a general scene of confusion and desolation; and beyond again, at a few hundred yards, stood the large city, composed, as usual, of a wilderness of narrow tortuous streets, and devoid of any external defences. so that it was not a favourable position to hold, even had a considerable force been available. the difficulties and dangers of the situation were indeed obvious. no sooner had the commander-in-chief crossed the ganges and marched in one direction, than the gwalior contingent--a well trained force which, joined by other mutineers, amounted to about , men--with a powerful artillery of guns, field and heavy, was reported as advancing in several columns from calpee forty-six miles distant on the other side. the instructions given to general windham were as follows. the force at his command for the time was estimated at about men; and the detachments of troops as they arrived up country were to be sent on to sir colin campbell at lucknow. windham was directed to strengthen the entrenchment, and also to watch carefully the movements of the gwalior contingent; and should it indicate an intention of advancing, he was to make as great a show as possible by encamping his small detachments conspicuously outside the city, leaving a guard in the earthwork. if he should be seriously threatened, he was to communicate with the commander-in-chief as to detaining some of the troops arriving, to assist in the defence. from a military point of view, it is evident that, whilst sir colin's position was somewhat critical, that of windham was far more so. the general, however, lost no time in carrying out his orders. the entrenchment was extended and strengthened with a few guns, and its glacis cleared. the troops were encamped outside; but whether this rather transparent artifice would have much moral effect on the enemy may be doubted, especially as they had ample means of obtaining correct information from their friends in cawnpore. on the other hand, it was very difficult to procure accurate accounts of the movements of the gwalior force. in the absence of cavalry, native spies were the only resource; but some of these were caught and mutilated by the enemy; besides which, under the circumstances of the general disaffection, their fidelity could not in all cases be relied on. the duty of obtaining intelligence was entrusted to captain bruce, commonly called 'the intelligent bruce,' an excellent officer who was also a magistrate. as all the prisons had been destroyed, the only punishments available for criminal natives were hanging and flogging, and in this horrible occupation he was engaged every day. he held his court in the open air in the yard of a ruined bungalow, surrounded by the _débris_ of smashed furniture. amongst others, he captured a native of rank, a friend of nana sahib's, and on threatening him with death, the native reluctantly gave information which led to the discovery of about £ , in money and a quantity of jewellery, &c., which had been looted and hidden away. i paid one or two visits to the bungalow, which had been the scene of the massacre, a few months previously, of the english women and children by nana sahib. the well into which their bodies were thrown had been filled up and closed; but on the walls of the house were still remaining some half-obliterated writing and stains of blood, and in the bushes of the garden, fragments of children's clothing. events were now hurrying on to a climax. general windham, a few days after the departure of sir colin, sent a message informing him of the rapid approach of the gwalior contingent, and obtained authority to detain some of the new arrivals, so that by november , when the first battle occurred, he had about , men and guns drawn by bullocks at his disposal. but of these, four companies of infantry and a few artillerymen had to be left on guard in the entrenchments, so that his movable field force was still very limited. in the meantime, however, the road to lucknow became closed, and for several days after november no information whatever was received. on the night of the rd a tiny note, rolled up and concealed in a quill (which was the method commonly adopted), was brought in by a native from lucknow. it proved to be from a commissariat officer, who asked for more provisions at once, but said he could give no opinion on military matters, except that they were complicated. the native who brought the note received rupees (£ ). on the other side the mutineers from calpee were now rapidly approaching in distinct divisions, and had arrived at several villages within a few miles of cawnpore, and general windham felt he could no longer remain inactive. on the th he advanced his camp a few miles along the calpee road up to the ganges canal, which runs across the country, and when its bridges were guarded it served as a wide wet ditch along his front. the gwalior contingent, however, began to assume the offensive, and spies reported the advance of their main body from akbarpore to suchonlee, and that their leading division was on the pandoo river, only three miles from the british camp. at daybreak on november our men were under arms, and windham, with ten men of the th lancers and a few sowars, went forward to reconnoitre, and, finding that the mutineers were on the move, led forward his troops at once to the attack. his force consisted of about , men, being detachments of the th, nd, th, and rifle brigade. he also had eight guns, all drawn by bullocks; four manned by natives from madras, the others by a few gunners of the royal and bengal artillery and some sikhs--a sort of improvised battery got up for the occasion. the british troops advanced cheerfully to the attack. when these reached the enemy's position, which was on the other side of the almost dry bed of the pandoo river, the mutineers opened fire from some heavy guns, and poured in several rounds of grape, as we neared them. our artillery at once replied. nothing, however, could restrain the eagerness of our men, who came on with a rush, cheering as they went, crossed the river, and captured the position. the enemy retreated in haste, leaving three guns and some ammunition waggons in our hands. we followed them for some distance, and windham, having halted for a couple of hours to rest his men, then withdrew, as he had intended, to his original position outside cawnpore, taking the captured guns with him. the mutineers were evidently in considerable strength, and, notwithstanding their defeat, followed us at a distance as we withdrew. our loss was rather severe, considering the rapidity with which the attack had been carried out. one young officer, captain day of the th, was killed, being struck by a round shot and knocked down a well. our total casualties were:-- killed officer men wounded officers " ------------- = general windham on his return at length received the long desired letter from lucknow. it was a short note from general mansfield, chief of the staff, saying that all was well and they were coming back at once to cawnpore. [illustration: plan of cawnpore to illustrate battle of th. nov. .] november proved to be a very eventful day. our small field force, as i have explained, was encamped outside the city, not far from the point where the great trunk road crossed that from cawnpore to calpee. general windham naturally hoped that the successful blow he had delivered on the previous day would at all events so far tend to discourage the mutineers as to delay their movements and give time for the return of the commander-in-chief. the position, however, was critical. whilst desirous of presenting a bold front and of protecting the city, it was evident not only that our force was insufficient, but that the right flank towards the ganges was open to attack and liable to be turned. at daylight the troops were again under arms, and part of the th and nd regiments, with four madras guns, were detached to the flank, to watch the road from bithoor. two -pounder heavy guns on travelling carriages, each drawn by a string of bullocks and manned by seamen of the 'shannon,' under lieutenant hay, r.n., were brought out from the entrenchment to strengthen the position in front. lieutenant hay had a difficult duty to perform. in the first place, his guns were very heavy for field work; and the draught animals, though obedient to native drivers, were so timid that if an english soldier or sailor approached, they at once began to bolt, and became unmanageable. i remember discussing the matter with him in the morning, and suggested that in the event of a fight he should, if possible, bring his guns into action on the high road, as if he were to leave it, and get into heavy ground and were pressed, he might be in difficulties. he quite concurred, and during the battle, which lasted all day, he acted accordingly, and performed excellent service, he himself being twice wounded.[ ] about a.m. a cannonade suddenly commenced away on the right, followed shortly afterwards by a similar demonstration in front. the mutineers were evidently determined to make a simultaneous attack on both points, and although for the time they held back their infantry, their artillery fire was very severe and continuous. windham, conceiving that the flank attack might prove the more dangerous of the two, proceeded there himself in the first instance, but on his return to the front an hour afterwards, found that matters were becoming serious. not only was the fire incessant, but there were indications that our left as well as our right was threatened--in fact, the enemy were in great strength (in a semicircle) all round us. the battle continued for several hours without signs of abatement, our ammunition was running short, and the bullock drivers began to desert. under these circumstances general windham directed his troops to fall back a short distance, until they found a temporary shelter under cover of some mounds and remains of old brick kilns just outside the city. it seemed now that the position might be held. still anxious about the right flank, late in the afternoon he sent an aide-de-camp to obtain information, and shortly afterwards directed me to ride through the streets and ascertain the state of affairs. whilst threading the narrow lanes, i suddenly met the aide-de-camp coming back in haste, who informed me that the mutineers were in possession of the lower parts of the town and had just fired a volley at him. at this moment windham himself joined us. whilst deliberating on the critical position, two companies of the rifle brigade also appeared on the scene, as if they had dropped from the clouds. they had been marching all day up the trunk road, hearing firing in various directions, but unable to find anyone to give them information. windham said a few words to them, and, placing himself at their head, away they went cheering, and soon cleared the streets of the enemy. it was, however, becoming dusk, and the general, feeling that it was impossible to remain in the exposed position outside the city, especially as his troops were exhausted and the ammunition running short, sent me to general dupuis, who was for the moment in command at the front, with orders to withdraw the whole force and return to the entrenchment on the ganges, as otherwise the position might be lost and the bridge of boats destroyed. the retirement through the streets was conducted without haste and in good order, and was not interfered with by the enemy. it was rather remarkable that although so closely hemmed in by the mutineers, they did not at first take the precaution of cutting the telegraph wires, so that messages were sent to lord canning at calcutta of the results of each day's fighting. during the evening general windham held a consultation with the senior officers with a view to a night attack on the mutineers, but in the absence of reliable information as to their position the idea was relinquished. the chief officers of the staff were temporarily accommodated in a bungalow outside the fort; and late at night windham came in and stated that one of the heavy naval -pounders had been upset somewhere in the streets during our retreat and had been left behind, and he requested me to go out and if possible recover it, giving me _carte blanche_ to make any arrangements necessary for the purpose. it was rather like looking for a needle in a bundle of hay. i went to the entrenchment, obtained the assistance of some seamen under midshipman garvey[ ] and a guard of infantry, and, with a cart containing a triangle-gyn and the necessary tackle, we prepared to start. most fortunately at the last moment we found one of the native bullock drivers, who said he knew the position of the lost gun, and on a promise of a few rupees agreed to conduct us to the spot; and so under his friendly guidance we marched off into the darkness. our friendly native, however, instead of entering the city, led us for a considerable distance through its outskirts, along the banks of the ganges canal, and some doubts arose as to whether he was not wilfully misleading and taking us into the enemy's camp. however, there was nothing for it but to go on, and at length, becoming very excited, he turned sharply into the town, and after wandering through some of the narrow lanes, sure enough there was the gun lying upset against a small shop, with its wheel sunk in a narrow, deep, perpendicular drain. there were planks lying about, and indications that the enemy had been trying to extricate it. small parties of the infantry were immediately placed at the corners of the adjacent streets, so as to isolate us from sudden attack. their orders were to keep perfectly silent, but should an attempt be made to force their position they were to fire a volley and charge. as time was precious, and as mounting a gyn with its tackle, &c., in the dark would cause delay, it was decided to try and pull the gun out of its awkward position by main force; and, the seamen having fastened a rope to the trail and working with a will, the attempt succeeded, and so, withdrawing the infantry, we marched back to the fort in triumph. the coolie got his rupees and every man a glass of grog, and thus all ended well. on returning very late to the bungalow, the staff were all lying about asleep on the floor in the various rooms. the only one who woke was colonel charles woodford, of the rifles, to whom i mentioned our successful adventure. poor fellow! he was out at daylight the next morning, engaged in the severe contest which took place, and was killed in capturing some guns from the mutineers in the open plain. the fighting was incessant. on the morning of the th it re-commenced on both sides of the city simultaneously, and for the third day in succession. away on the left in the open plain, near the ruins of the 'old dragoon lines,' the rifles, with part of the nd and a battery, after a hard contested fight drove back the mutineers in a brilliant manner and captured two -pounder guns. on the right, along the bithoor road, a second battle was going on at the same time, and continued all day. brigadier carthew, with parts of the th and nd regiments and the madras battery, held a position somewhat in advance, between the city and the ganges, and was attacked with overwhelming numbers, but maintained the position until sunset. carthew was supported by a part of the th, commanded by colonel wilson, who during the day, in endeavouring to capture some of the enemy's guns, was killed, together with three of his officers and many men. our losses during the three days' fighting were officers killed, and upwards of officers and men killed and wounded. [illustration: the garrison of lucknow returning to cawnpore, november ] i have thus related as shortly and clearly as possible the general features of the battles round cawnpore, at the end of november, as they came under my notice; because, in my opinion, much injustice was done at the time to general windham, who was a brave soldier and an excellent leader, and whose difficulties were by no means understood and appreciated. general windham, in anticipation of the return of sir colin campbell from lucknow, had sent him several messages, pointing out the serious nature of the attack on cawnpore; and on the evening of the th the commander-in-chief at length arrived, and with the chief part of his force encamped on the other side of the ganges. what with the women and children, the wounded (amounting in all to , people), and the usual accumulations of camp equipage and stores which are inseparable from an indian army in the field, his line of march extended for about twenty miles; and when the strings of elephants, camels, bullock waggons, palanquins, &c., began to cross the bridge of boats the following day, the scene was more like the emptying of noah's ark than anything else. the mutineers, who had now full possession of the city and its suburbs, brought some heavy guns to bear on the bridge, and struck the boats several times. however, on november and the whole force crossed the ganges from oude and encamped outside cawnpore, near the 'old dragoon lines.' although all pressing danger was at an end on the return of sir colin's force, still the commander-in-chief had to proceed with considerable caution. his great anxiety, before assuming the offensive, was to provide for the safety of the women, children, and wounded. on december they were sent under convoy down the road to allahabad, and the commander-in-chief at length was free to act against the mutineers, who, in the meantime, had harassed the camp by occasional demonstrations and artillery fire. although the enemy were in full possession of cawnpore, their main position was on the plain outside, and the ganges canal between us acted as a wet ditch along their front. sir colin campbell computed their numbers as about , men with guns. on the morning of december the british camp was struck, and about noon the whole force, consisting of , infantry, cavalry, and guns, advanced across the open to the attack. the cavalry and horse artillery made a detour to the left, so as to pass over the canal by a bridge a mile and a half distant, and threaten the enemy's flank. the brigades of infantry supported by the artillery, advanced steadily in line across the plain, but were somewhat delayed at the ganges canal owing to there being but one bridge within reach. this obstacle and the necessary crowding once overcome, they rapidly regained their formation, and, spreading out like a fan, soon drove the enemy back, and ran into their main camp at p.m., sir colin, fine old soldier as he was, riding in front with his helmet off, cheering on his panting troops. the mutineers were disorganised, the retreat became a rout, and they fled in all directions, being pursued by sir colin and staff with the cavalry and horse artillery up to the fourteenth mile-stone along the calpee road, every gun and ammunition waggon which had gone in that direction falling into our hands. heartily tired, we returned and bivouacked that night in the plain outside cawnpore. i could not help admiring the toughness of old sir colin, who rolled himself up in a blanket, lay down to sleep in a hole in a field, and seemed to enjoy it. the following day brigadier-general hope grant, with the cavalry and horse artillery, followed up such of the mutineers as had retreated by the bithoor road, caught them just as they were about to cross the ganges, capturing the remainder of their guns without any casualties on our side. that was the end of the gwalior contingent as a fighting force. the loss of the british troops on the th was about , and guns[ ] in all were taken, besides quantities of munitions and stores. the following is a translation of a hindostani document issued by the gwalior contingent, and found on the field of battle outside cawnpore: 'cawnpore. by order of the great rajah--the leader.[ ] may his shadow never be less. let all the lords of the manor and the rajahs of this country know that a dromedary rider, for the purpose of finding out all about the roads, and defiles, and ferries, is about to be sent, in consequence of the departure of the gwalior contingent towards cawnpore; that no person is to molest or hurt in any way the above-mentioned dromedary rider; and let them, in fact, assist him to the best of their power.... it is written on the rd of the month of suffer, and it corresponds with of the year of the flight.' footnotes: [footnote : this gallant officer was killed in action two years subsequently, in the new zealand war, where he had command of the 'harrier.'] [footnote : this young officer was subsequently killed at lucknow, in march .] [footnote : guns captured from the gwalior contingent-- by general windham, november " " " " battle of december by sir hope grant -- total ] [footnote : probably the nana sahib.] chapter xiv causes of the mutiny and policy of lord canning the fall of delhi in september, the relief of lucknow in november, and the severe conflicts round cawnpore, had shattered, as it were, the main force of the mutiny; and although during active military measures were carried out in various parts of the country, still in reality the great crisis was past. the absence on the part of the natives of any men of military genius to lead them, the want of mutual confidence amongst their widely dispersed forces, and their tendency to marauding expeditions rather than to combined operations, all led to their final defeat in detail. on the other hand, the vigour of our movements, and the large reserves of men, arms, and munitions brought from england, at length restored our shaken power, and enabled us gradually, but firmly, to re-establish our authority throughout the numerous provinces under our rule. owing to the wide distribution of the large force of artillery which had arrived from home, it was considered necessary, for administrative purposes, that general dupuis and his staff should return to the seat of government at calcutta; and therefore, after the battles at cawnpore in november and december, i took no further active part in operations in the field. residence in india, however, was full of interest at that time, when the causes of the revolution, together with the military changes which ensued, were matters of constant discussion and consideration. the idea that the serving out of greased cartridges to the native soldiery was a dominant factor in the crisis is of course a mere exaggeration of a minor ultimate detail. it may possibly have been the final exciting cause, in the same way that a lucifer match suddenly lighted in a powder magazine may lead to a great explosion; but the causes which conduced to the revolution had been accumulating long before , and were partly political, partly military; and it will be interesting to quote briefly the opinions of various statesmen and high authorities who took part in and studied the history of our conquests, and who traced the results caused by our gradual absorption of the kingdoms, principalities, and provinces into which, until our advent, the vast peninsula of india was divided. sir john malcolm, in his 'political history of india,' in , wrote: 'the great empire which england has established in the east will be the theme of wonder to succeeding ages. that a small island in the atlantic should have conquered and held the vast continent of india as a subject province, is in itself a fact which can never be stated without exciting astonishment. but that astonishment will be increased when it is added that this great conquest was made, not by the collective force of the nation, but by a company of merchants, who, originally vested with a charter of exclusive commerce and with the privilege and right to protect their property by arms, in a few years actually found themselves called upon to act in the character of sovereigns over extended dominions before they had ceased to be the mercantile directors of petty factories.'[ ] sir john goes on to show that our rapid progress was due in a great measure to two leading causes: one, that coming originally as unpretending traders, we disarmed suspicion, and were, indeed, welcomed by the natives; the other, that the gradual rise of our power was coincident with the decline of the mogul empire. general sir thomas munro--an officer who entered the madras service of the east india company as a cadet in , and who by his genius and statesmanlike qualities rose to be governor of that presidency--writing in to the governor general on the effects of our policy, said: 'the strength of the british government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no native power enjoy. its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression unknown in those states; but these advantages are dearly bought. they are purchased by the sacrifice of independence of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable. the natives of the british provinces may without fear pursue their different occupations as traders, meerassidars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labours in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace, none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or military government of their country.'[ ] ... 'it is from men who either hold, or are eligible to hold, public office that natives take their character; where no such men exist, there can be no energy in any other class of the community. the effect of this state of things is observable in all the british provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in india. no elevation of character can be expected among men who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of subadar, where they are as much below an ensign as an ensign is below the commander-in-chief, and who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty judicial or revenue office, in which they may, by corrupt means, make up for their slender salary. the consequence, therefore, of the conquest of india by the british arms would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people. there is, perhaps, no example of any conquest in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as in british india.' again in , in a letter to lord hastings, he says: 'our government will always be respected from the influence of our military power, but it will never be popular while it offers no employment to the natives that can stimulate the ambition of the better class of them. foreign conquerors have treated the natives with violence and often with great cruelty, but none has treated them with so much scorn as we; none has stigmatised the whole people as unworthy of trust, as incapable of honesty, and as fit to be employed only when we cannot do without them. it seems to be not only ungenerous, but impolitic, to debase the character of a people fallen under our dominion.' again in : 'with what grace can we talk of our paternal government if we exclude them from every important office, and say, as we did till very lately, that in a country containing , , of inhabitants no man but a european shall be trusted with so much authority as to order the punishment of a single stroke of a rattan? such an interdiction is to pass a sentence of degradation on a whole people for which no benefit can ever compensate. there is no instance in the world of so humiliating a sentence having ever been passed upon any nation....' 'the advocates of improvement do not seem to have perceived the great springs on which it depends; they propose to place no confidence in the natives, to give them no authority, and to exclude them from office as much as possible; but they are ardent in their zeal for enlightening them by the general diffusion of knowledge. no conceit more wild and absurd than this was ever engendered in the darkest ages, for what is in every age and every country the great stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, but the prospect of fame, or wealth, or power?' ... 'in proportion as we exclude them, we lose our hold upon them; and were the exclusion entire we should have their hatred in place of their attachment, their feeling would be communicated to the whole population and to the native troops, and would excite a spirit of discontent too powerful for us to subdue or resist....' 'it would' (he says) 'certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether than that the result of our system of government should be made a debasement of a whole people.' the above are wise and weighty words, and it would be well perhaps, even in these days, if more heed were taken of these outspoken opinions of sir thomas munro. there is, however, another and more recent authority, greater perhaps than any; one who, year after year, and not long before the mutiny, urged that we should give opportunities to the natives, and enable them to rise to power, civil and military; and who predicted that unless this were done our system must collapse, either in a mutiny or in general despair. that authority is sir henry lawrence, who fell at his post in the residency of lucknow, killed by the mutineers in the very crisis which he had, as it were, foretold. writing in [ ] he pointed out that the natives had no outlet for their talents and ambition as of old, and said: 'these outlets for restlessness and ability are gone; others are closing. it behoves us therefore now, more than ever, to give legitimate rewards, and as far as practicable employment, to the energetic few, to that leaven that is in every lump--the leaven that may secure our empire, or may disturb, nay even destroy, it.' again, he says: 'legitimate outlets for military energy and ability in all ranks and even among all classes must be given. the minds of subadars and resseldars, sepoys and sowars, can no more with safety be for ever cramped, trammelled, and restricted as at present than can a twenty-foot embankment restrain the atlantic. it is simply a question of time. the question is only whether justice is to be gracefully conceded or violently seized. ten or twenty years must settle the point.' leaving for the moment the political results of our conquests in india, it will be well now to consider its military aspects; to trace the formation and services of our native armies, and to watch the signs of their gradual decline both in efficiency and loyalty; and i will again give short quotations from the writings of recognised authorities as conveying clear outlines of this interesting and important subject. sir john malcolm, writing of our early levies, said: 'a jacket of english broadcloth made up in the shape of his own dress, the knowledge of his manual exercise and a few military evolutions, constituted the original sepoy.' he goes on to tell us that the only english officers were a captain and adjutant per battalion; that the native officers were treated with great kindness and consideration, were often in high command, and that many of the oldest regiments were known by the names of their former native commandants. after dwelling on the efficiency of our original native corps, he points out that their constitution was gradually changed by the increase of european officers, involving alterations of dress, more rigid rules, and with so-called improvements in discipline, until at length in they were organised like the king's regiments, with the full complement of officers, and with the expectation of greatly increased efficiency--an expectation which was never fulfilled. he wrote in : 'in the native army, as it is at present constituted, no native can rise to the enjoyment of any military command.' again, he says, the danger lies in 'confiding too exclusively in our european troops and altogether undervaluing and neglecting our native army. from the day of that fatal error we may date the downfall of our eastern empire.' sir john kaye, in his history of the mutiny, says[ ]: 'our first sepoy levies were raised in the southern peninsula, where the english and french powers were contending for the dominant influence in that part of the country. they were few in number, and at the outset commonly held in reserve to support our english fighting men. but little by little they proved that they were worthy to be entrusted with higher duties; and once trusted they went boldly to the front. under native commandants, for the most part mohammedans or high caste rajpoot hindoos, but disciplined and directed by the english captains, their pride was flattered and their energies stimulated by the victories they gained. all the power and all the responsibility, all the honours and rewards, were not then monopolised by the english captains. large bodies of troops were sometimes despatched on hazardous enterprises, under the independent command of a native leader; and it was not thought an offence to a european soldier to send him to fight under a black commandant. that black commandant was then a great man in spite of his colour. he rode on horseback at the head of his men, and a mounted staff officer, a native adjutant, carried his commands to the subadars of the respective companies. and a brave man or a skilful leader was honoured for his bravery or his skill as much under the folds of a turban as under a round hat.' again he writes: 'the founders of the native army had conceived the idea of a force recruited from among the people of the country, and commanded for the most part by men of their own race but of a higher social position.... but it was the inevitable tendency of our increasing power in india to oust the native functionary from his seat, or to lift him from his saddle, that the white man might fix himself there, with all the remarkable tenacity of his race.... so it happened in due course that the native officers who had exercised real authority in their battalions, who had enjoyed opportunities of personal distinction, who had felt an honourable pride in their position, were pushed aside by an incursion of english gentlemen who took all the substantive power into their hands. as the degradation of the native officer was thus accomplished, the whole character of the sepoy army was changed. it ceased to be a profession in which men of high position accustomed to command might satisfy the aspirations and expend the energies of their lives.... thenceforth, therefore, we dug out the materials for our army from the lower strata of society.' captain macan, an officer who had long experience and knew the sepoys well, gave evidence before a parliamentary committee in , and declared that 'in all the higher qualifications of soldiers, in devotedness to the service, cheerfulness under privation, confidence and attachment to their officers, and unhesitating bravery in the field, the native soldier is allowed by all the best informed officers of the service, and by those who have most experience, to have infinitely deteriorated.' the late rev. mr. gleig, in a remarkable article in the 'edinburgh review' in , wrote: 'the original native army consisted chiefly of infantry, who, though drilled after european fashion, worked both in peace and war under chiefs connected with the men by ties of consanguinity and friendship.' he goes on to point out that the english element gradually increased until , when a european subaltern was allotted to command each company, and he says: 'though the subalterns thus disposed of were carefully selected, and the feelings of the subadars spared as much as possible, the native gentleman could no longer disguise from himself or from his men that his shadow was growing less. he supported himself, however, tolerably well till the tide which had begun to set in against him acquired greater force. in , and again in , the european element became still stronger, and then, and not till then, the spirit of the native sank within him. the effect produced by these changes upon the native officers, and ultimately upon the service at large, has been deplorable.' mr. gleig's article--written, be it borne in mind, in , shortly before the mutiny--concludes as follows: 'we have won an enormous empire with the sword, which is growing continually larger. we have established a system of civil administration there which protects the peasant and disgusts all the classes above him.... with a large body of discontented gentry everywhere, and whole clusters of native princes and chiefs interspersed through our dominions, it is idle to say that the continuance of our sovereignty depends from one day to another on anything except the army. now the army is admitted by all competent judges to be very far in many respects from what it ought to be.' the extracts which i have quoted of the opinions of various authorities all appear to point in the same direction, and to prove that both in a political and a military sense the various races under our rule in india were gradually becoming degraded and demoralised, and that these results were observed years before the crisis came, and when our power was, for the time, subverted by the general mutiny of . our intentions throughout were doubtless good. we introduced sound laws for the people, though not perhaps always in accordance with their customs and prejudices. we also gave them security of life and property, such as they had not enjoyed for centuries; and to some extent we promoted education and commerce and more general prosperity. these benefits are by no means to be ignored. but, on the other hand, in our advance across the great continent we had dethroned kings, upset hereditary princes, and had removed from positions of authority not only men of high rank, great possessions, and ancient lineage, but also men of vast influence, religious and other, and often of great ability and courage. these all found themselves pushed aside and superseded; whilst the various races of people, hindoo and mohammedan, not only perceived that their ancient leaders were gone, but that their new governors were aliens in race, religion, language, and customs. all these considerations cannot be carelessly disregarded. the situation is undoubtedly difficult. there is, indeed, one solution, and one only, which must ever be kept steadily in view--namely, that men such as i have indicated must gradually be admitted to positions of responsibility and power, both civil and military; that the people of all ranks, classes, and religions may feel that a career is open to them, and that they are to be allowed to participate in the government of their own country. i do not urge that the time has by any means arrived when the natives should be admitted to the public service by competitive examinations. it is not a system adapted to the circumstances. that, however, is comparatively a minor detail; but there are many other and better modes by which they can and ought to be selected for service under the government. in the ultimate reorganisation of the native armies after the mutiny, the number of english officers to each regiment was restricted to six, so that in some degree the influence of native officers was recognised; but the restriction did not amount to much, and the apparently inevitable tendency is to an augmentation of the english element, the present number being eight. it is also to be observed that there is no instance of a native regiment commanded and led entirely by officers of their own race and faith, so that no opening exists for the many brave and loyal chiefs, men of ability and influence, to serve in the army. whether under such circumstances we can hope to maintain the military virtues of our indian troops is a grave question on which opinions differ. judging by the history of the past, by the views of the soldiers and statesmen which i have quoted, and by the culminating experience of the mutiny, it seems to me that our policy is rather timid and retrograde, and that we can only govern successfully by gradually entrusting power to the natural leaders of the people. there is yet another consideration, which relates specially to india of the present day. education and enlightenment are progressing all over the country, not only by means of schools and colleges, but also by the establishment of railways, roads, and river communications, so that the people now move about freely and exchange ideas to a degree formerly unknown. literature and the press, the telegraph and the post office, are also exercising increasing influence; and these various causes are somewhat rapidly undermining many ancient prejudices and superstitions. all these are, doubtless, beneficial influences in themselves, and are likely to produce great results, but they require watching, as they inevitably will tend to increase the legitimate desire of the people for more self-government. we cannot stand still. i have heard it said sometimes that such principles as i advocate would, if carried out, cause to us the loss of the empire of india; and my reply is, that if such principles are _not_ carried out, we shall not only lose india, but shall deserve to do so. others talk of the people of india as being composed of inferior races. i am not aware that god has created any races of men who are inferior; but at all events in india, we know that centuries ago they were civilised and distinguished in arts and sciences, in government, and in war--long, indeed, before we had become so. we hear a great deal nowadays of the depreciation of the rupee; but in our government of india, unless we act on the principles which i have endeavoured to illustrate, by quotations from the writings of statesmen of the highest authority and experience of india, we may find in the days to come that we have a far more dangerous result to face, and that is the depreciation in the character of the millions under our rule. sir henry lawrence wrote: 'we cannot expect to hold india for ever. let us so conduct ourselves in our civil and military relations, as, when the connection ceases, it may do so not with convulsions, but with mutual esteem and affection; and that england may then have in india a noble ally, enlightened, and brought into the scale of nations under her guidance and fostering care.' finally, before leaving this part of the subject i will quote extracts from the noble proclamation issued by the queen in , on the termination of the mutiny, and which should ever be considered as the magna charta of the people of india: 'we declare it to be our royal will and pleasure, that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law.... and it is further our will that, so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.' it is often said that india has been won by the sword, and must be governed by the sword. the first statement is in a great measure true; but to the second, as laying down a principle of government, i demur. no nation can be permanently or successfully governed by the sword. as the crisis of the mutiny gradually passed away, and as the people of the various provinces, though still violently agitated, began to realise that the british authority was being firmly re-established, it became evident to the viceroy that the time had arrived when the summary powers which had been exercised, and the severe punishments which had been inflicted, all over the country, must be modified, and that a policy of conciliation should gradually replace that of stern repression. these views of lord canning were, however, by no means in accord with the general sentiments of the european population, and of the press of calcutta at the time, and his policy was strongly condemned. this feeling on their part is perhaps not altogether surprising. the terrible scenes which had been enacted in so many parts of the country on the outbreak of the mutiny--the cruel murders, and the atrocious conduct of the natives, not only to men, but to innocent and defenceless english women and children--all these sad events had naturally roused feelings of intense anger; and the idea of conciliation was repugnant to the minds of the great majority. so much was this the case, that even at the end of the europeans of calcutta and bengal sent home a petition to the queen, urging that, owing to the weakness of the government and in disapproval of the views of the viceroy, he should be recalled. lord canning, however, fully convinced that a policy of vengeance was not only wrong in principle, but impossible, was by no means persuaded or moved from his purpose. writing to the queen in september ,[ ] he said: 'there is a rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness abroad, even among those who ought to set a better example.' again, to lord granville he wrote: 'as long as i have breath in my body, i will pursue no other policy than that i have been following.... i will not govern in anger.... whilst we are prepared, as the first duty of all, to strike down resistance without mercy wherever it shows itself, we acknowledge that, resistance over, deliberate justice and calm patient reason are to resume their sway; that we are not going, either in anger or from indolence, to punish wholesale, whether by wholesale hangings and burnings, or by the less violent, but not one bit less offensive, course of refusing trust and countenance and favour to a man because he is of a class or a creed.' the violent opponents of the viceroy at the time were in the habit of calling him 'clemency canning' as a term of reproach. they did not seem to be aware that, under the circumstances, it was the highest honour they could pay him. in my opinion, lord canning proved himself to be a wise and courageous viceroy, and in a period of great difficulty and danger rose superior to the violence of many of those by whom he was surrounded. when the mutiny was at an end a thanksgiving service was held in the cathedral at calcutta, and a special collection made for some charitable purpose to commemorate its termination. there was at that time, and probably is now, a peculiar system of collecting subscriptions at the church services there. it was not the custom to carry money in your pocket. i asked the reason, and was told that the climate was too hot. the consequence was that when a collection was made, the persons who carried round the plates also brought packets of small pieces of paper and bundles of pencils, and each person had to write down and sign the amount of their gift. it was a tedious, but possibly an advantageous, process from a charitable point of view. the following day the collectors went round and called for the amount subscribed. on the occasion in question lord canning's secretary informed me that when the collector presented his paper at government house, the sum inscribed was so large that, imagining there was an error, he took it to the viceroy, who, however, merely remarked that the occasion was a memorable one, and the amount was paid accordingly. it was for , rupees ( , _l._). i doubt whether many instances can be given of such a sum having been put into the plate at a church collection. during my residence at calcutta i became acquainted with an english official who appeared to possess an extraordinary amount of intuitive knowledge. whatever the subject discussed, he was always at home, and could lay down the law, and did so. it is not, perhaps, agreeable to find yourself always in a position of ignorance and inferiority. still, on the whole, society, it may be presumed, benefits. i inquired of an old indian officer what position this exceptional person held. 'oh!' he replied, 'that's what in india is called a "sub-janta"--a man who knows everything better than anyone else--be careful not to contradict him.' however, i found that you must have been thirty years in the country and speak all the languages before becoming qualified for the position, so that, fortunately, there are very few sub-jantas to be found. i occasionally received invitations from natives of rank at calcutta to be present at family festivities, and the following is a copy of one of them: 'wedding party. cowar kallykissen bahadoor presents his respectful compliments to colonel adye and requests the favour of his company to a dinner at . p.m., and a nautch and fireworks at . p.m., in honour of his daughter's marriage, on monday, february , at rajah badinath bahadoor's garden house at cossipore.' on one occasion i paid a visit to the celebrated chinese commissioner yeh, who was a state prisoner at calcutta, and lived in a large house in the environs. he was dressed in loose white chinese clothes, with wooden shoes, and was very polite but extremely cautious. we conversed by means of an interpreter. nothing would induce yeh to leave his house, although a carriage and horses were kept for him. my efforts to interest him in various subjects entirely failed. i asked if he liked the indian climate, and he replied that he had not turned his thoughts in that direction. i described the bazaars and shops, and recommended him to go out in his carriage and visit them; but he only said he had heard about them, and would send his secretary to make a report. he told me he was much occupied, and on my asking what he did, he replied that he liked to 'sit down.' he was offered books to be translated to him, but remarked that the contents of all the best ones were already in his stomach, so that he did not require them. he died soon afterwards, presumably of indigestion. in the early part of another serious and untoward event occurred, in the discontent of the men of the local european forces at many of the large stations all over the country. hitherto, in each presidency, the artillery and three regiments of infantry consisted of men recruited at home, but who served continuously in india--in fact, a local european army distinct from the queen's troops. in the years gone by, and during the mutiny, they had performed great services, and were deservedly held in high esteem. when, however, in the rule of the old east india company came to an end, the great majority of these men considered that, as the queen had assumed direct authority over the local armies, they were entitled either to their discharge, or, at all events, to a bounty on the transfer of their services to the crown. their claims were referred to england for consideration, but were ultimately refused by the home government; and, as a consequence, serious disaffection, combined in some cases with violence and a refusal to perform their duties, ensued. it may perhaps be conceded that the curt refusal of their claim was not altogether judicious, but in reality the causes of discontent lay deeper and had been accumulating for some time. the commander-in-chief, who was ill at simla, was much impressed with this unfortunate state of affairs, and was in frequent communication with lord canning at calcutta. writing in may , he said:[ ] 'i am irresistibly led to the conclusion that henceforth it will be dangerous to the state to maintain a european local army.... we cannot afford to attend to any other consideration than those of discipline and loyalty, which may be constantly renovated by the periodical return to england of all the regiments in every branch of the service.' the viceroy was much pressed by some authorities at the time to grant the bounty, notwithstanding the refusal of the home government; but to have done so and to have given way to violence would have been a virtual abnegation of authority, and would not in reality have removed the disaffection. in this dilemma, lord canning at length gave a free discharge and passage home to all who wished it, and about , men then left for england. the cost is said to have been a million sterling. many of these men, after a short holiday at home, re-enlisted in various queen's regiments and returned to india. the general result, however, was that ere long the local european troops ceased to exist as a separate force, and became merged in the army of the empire. footnotes: [footnote : _political history of india_, major general sir john malcolm, k.c.b. (john murray, .)] [footnote : gleig's _life of sir thomas munro, bart, k.c.b._] [footnote : _essays_, by sir henry lawrence, .] [footnote : kaye's _sepoy war_, , vol. i.] [footnote : _rulers of india: earl canning_, by sir h.s. cunningham, k.c.s.i.] [footnote : shadwell, _life of lord clyde_, ii. .] chapter xv recollections of the madras presidency in may i left calcutta, having been appointed to command the royal artillery in the madras presidency. speaking generally, the affairs, both civil and military, of southern india had remained for many years in a condition of comparative inaction and tranquillity. indeed, ever since the great campaigns towards the close of the last century, ending with the fall of seringapatam and the death of tippoo sahib, the tide of war had drifted away to the north-west, and the madras army had thus been deprived of much active experience in the field. fortunately, even the mutiny had failed to entangle the southern native troops in its disastrous meshes. as a term, perhaps, of undeserved reproach, madras was often called the benighted presidency. shortly before my arrival a new governor, sir charles trevelyan had been appointed, and being a man of great energy and ability, soon succeeded in temporarily galvanising the administration into unwonted life and activity. his somewhat abnormal qualities were not, however, generally appreciated. one of his first efforts was to improve the sanitary condition of the large native city, which stretches for a mile or two along the flat, sandy, surf-beaten shore. during the latter years of the last century the city had been enclosed on its land front with a series of old bastions and curtains and a continuous stagnant ditch--works which were intended as a defence against the hordes of mahrattas and pindarees who were then in the habit of swooping down on our cities and settlements. but these hostile races had long ceased their swoopings and lootings, and the decaying fortifications were not only obsolete, but by their existence prevented a due circulation of light and air, and were highly insanitary. sir charles accordingly decided on their entire removal, and the conversion of the vacant space and of the ancient glacis into a people's park. the idea was received with considerable scorn. few people in madras had ever heard of people's parks in those days. i, however, had the satisfaction of being present at the destruction by successive explosions of the old, useless bastions, and in my opinion the governor conferred a great benefit on the city by his enlightened policy. more serious events, however, soon followed. when the mutiny came to an end, its financial bearings and the enormous expenditure incurred, not only on account of the large reinforcements from home, but also in the arrangements which had been necessary for the due prosecution of active operations all over the country, pressed heavily on the government of india; and it became an urgent duty to meet the financial deficit, which amounted to several millions sterling. amongst other measures it was decided to introduce an income tax. sir charles trevelyan, backed by his council, protested against such a policy. in his opinion, an income tax, in the condition of the native feeling, was likely to revive dangerous discontent; further than this, he argued in successive despatches to calcutta that, as the mutiny was over, the proper way of meeting the deficit was by a reduction not only of the english reinforcements, but also by disbanding many of the new native regiments which had been hastily and temporarily raised during the crisis. finding that his remonstrances were in vain, he at length published the entire correspondence in one of the madras daily journals. as governor of a presidency containing fifty millions of people, he considered it his duty that his views should be made public. the result was that in a few days he received a message by telegraph from sir charles wood, the then secretary of state for india, announcing his recall. whether the governor acted with due discretion in the measure he took to ensure publicity for his views, may be questioned; but, in my opinion, he was perfectly right in his main principle that, the crisis being over, the financial equilibrium could best be attained, not by unusual and obnoxious taxation, but by a reduction of the enormous military expenditure, the necessity for which had passed away, and which was eating up the resources of our empire in the east. his recall was a public misfortune. soon after my arrival in madras i made the acquaintance of an old colonel, who had served many years in the country and was an excellent officer, but who, owing to absence of mind or partial loss of memory, had great difficulty in correctly remembering people's names. for instance, one morning he came into the club, and told us that he had just met sir john trelawney taking a walk in the park. as there was no one of that name in madras we were rather puzzled, but on inquiry found he alluded to the governor, sir charles trevelyan. that was harmless enough, but on another occasion he fell into a more serious error. it occurred in the neilgherries. there was a lady residing there, a mrs. coffin, the wife of a general officer. it is the fashion up in the hills for ladies to be carried about by coolies in a sort of sedan chair, called a tonjon. one afternoon, the general's wife was paying a visit to a neighbour, where she met the colonel, and on her rising to take leave the old officer jumped up, and, meaning to be extremely polite, said, 'mrs. tonjon, allow me to hand you to your coffin!' military service in the tropical climate of the madras presidency in time of peace, and with the thermometer never below degrees, is not an exhilarating experience. there were no railways to speak of in those days, and no bridges over the rivers, so that during tours of inspection i had constantly to pass many weary days and nights in travelling hundreds of miles, along bad roads, over dusty plains, in what is called a bullock bandy, at the rate of two miles an hour, not including accidents, and probably without meeting a single englishman. on one occasion, i went from madras northwards by steamer along the coast to masulipatam, on my way to the deccan, and found the tomb of an old dutch admiral, the inscription on it being as follows: hier leyt begra ven den. e. jacob dedel [illustration] in syn leven raet van in dien ende opper hooft te water ende te lande over de neder lantse negotie de ser cust cormandel. over leden. den. . augusty anno. . (here lies buried e. jacob dedel, in his lifetime councillor of the indies, and commander-in-chief on sea and land, over the dutch company of the coromandel coast. died, th august, .) during i was in command of the artillery at secunderabad, a large station near hyderabad in the deccan, the latter city being supposed to contain a somewhat turbulent dangerous population, but who in reality gave no trouble. the monotony of life was occasionally varied by hunting wild animals in the hills and jungles. although a very bad shot, i took part in the sport on two special occasions. the one was in pursuit of a bear, and the other of a tiger. in the first case we rode by night to some distant hills, and were posted in the dark behind rocks by the shikarree; and, being a novice, i was given the place of honour, the native kindly remaining at my side, and explaining that the cave of the bears was just above and behind me, and that at daylight i should find several coming straight up the hill on their way home. sure enough, as day dawned, two large black objects appeared leisurely crossing the plain, snuffing about, as they slouched along, and presently they began the ascent. the critical moment had arrived, and, on a signal from the shikarree, i fired, and the bears immediately bolted. the shikarree threw up his hands, and, much disappointed, said that my shot had missed. it was not so, however, for on going to the spot we discovered traces of blood, and were able to track the wounded animal up the hill to his home--a dark, narrow, steep cleft in the rock. here a consultation was held, and it was decided by the experts that we must follow up the track, and enter the den. a procession was formed accordingly. first came a coolie with a long lighted torch, which he waved about and pushed into the crevices; then i followed, crawling on all fours with a gun on full-cock ready for all emergencies. two or three companions came on similarly prepared. all at once we heard a scream and a rush, and i was about to fire at anybody or anything, and should probably have killed the coolie, when it turned out to be merely a bat fluttering against the lighted torch. the smell of bears, bats, rats, and other creatures was horrible. still we struggled on, until the narrow tortuous passage gradually ramified into large fissures, and we then discovered that the bear had passed out of its home by another opening, and so escaped. the adventure ended, and we were glad to crawl back into the open air again. the other expedition was also exciting in its way. in hunting tigers in bengal it is the custom to be seated in a howdah on the back of an elephant, so as to stamp through the jungle and shoot the animals from a commanding position in comparative safety. in madras, however, it is considered fairer to advance on foot, on the principle, i presume, of giving both sides a chance. one afternoon we were again conducted by the shikarree to a distant hill, and on an elevated plateau were all posted in a large semicircle, each hidden behind a rock, and in the centre a young kid was tied to a stone. the expectation was that the tiger would come to eat the kid, and then we were all to fire and kill the tiger. as this was my first experience, i inquired, with some interest, whether possibly the animal might not approach from behind, and begin to eat me instead of the kid. the suggestion, however, was scouted, and i was assured that it would much prefer the latter. so we took up our positions, and remained on watch. after a time the young goat, finding the entertainment dull, laid down and tried to go to sleep; but the shikarree advanced and with a knife cut a small slit in its ear, which made it bleat piteously; and this, it was hoped, would afford an additional attraction. again we waited, and i could not refrain from occasionally looking over my shoulder, to assure myself that the expected wild beast was not surreptitiously altering the programme. it was getting dark when a breathless coolie arriving from a distant hill, brought the news that the tiger was asleep in a cave a long way off; so the kid escaped, and we all went home. i thought the sequel rather flat. society at secunderabad was occasionally enlivened by amateur theatricals in the assembly rooms, and, being fond of painting, i was induced on one occasion to produce a drop-scene for the stage. one afternoon i was seated accordingly, in some old clothes, on the top of a step-ladder, with a large brush and a bucketful of sky-blue, attempting to produce some lovely cloud effects, when a private soldier of the th royal irish strolled in smoking his pipe. after admiring the scenery for some time, and evidently taking me for a professional, he remarked: 'i say, guv'nor, is that a good business out here?' my reply was, 'no, it isn't a very permanent affair, but i like it.' then he went on, 'i think i've seed you afore' (which was probable). 'was you ever engaged at the surrey in london?' i said that i had been at that theatre, but had never been engaged. 'well, then, i _have_ seed you afore,' he continued; 'you was acting the part of belphegor.' what play he was alluding to i had no idea, or who belphegor was, but unfortunately at that moment a brother officer casually looked in and said, 'well, colonel, how are you getting on?' the soldier at once took in the situation, stood up, saluted, and saying, 'i'm thinking i'm in the presence of my sup_a_riors,' faced about and left the room. the drop-scene was finished, and was considered a great success. chapter xvi return to bengal--amalgamation of the artillery regiments towards the end of i left the deccan on a pleasant visit to sir william denison, then governor of madras, and in february , having served upwards of five years in india, was on the eve of embarkation for england when a telegram came from sir hugh rose, commander-in-chief, inviting me to return to bengal to become adjutant-general of all the artillery in india. my plans were therefore entirely altered, and i embarked for calcutta instead of england, and, after a long journey up to meerut, joined sir hugh, and went with him to simla in the himalayas. at this time great changes had become necessary in the army in india in consequence of the mutiny of , and of the subsequent discontent of the local european forces in . in fact, the whole administration, both civil and military, was undergoing revision and reform. the direct assumption of the government of india by the crown, and the disappearance of the old east india company, though a beneficial change in itself, still naturally caused some confusion and revived old controversies. hitherto there had been two armies in the country, serving side by side, with two separate staffs, with somewhat different sentiments, and not devoid of feelings of jealousy. the artillery were specially affected by the contemplated changes. although in the early days of the east india company a battery or two from england had occasionally served in india, still they were exceptions, and for many years each presidency had maintained a regiment of its own, partly english, partly native; and as we gradually conquered one province after another, they took part in many campaigns, performing distinguished services, and were deservedly held in high esteem. therefore, when it became evident that unity of administration must be introduced as regards our military forces, and when, in the autumn of , the three regiments of indian artillery were incorporated with the royal--losing, as it were, their separate individuality--it was only natural that the officers and men of all the four corps should have felt some regret at an arrangement which, however necessary it might be, was not in accord with old feelings and sentiments. all organised bodies may be said to be conservative, in so far that they dislike change. the foregoing remarks may be sufficient to indicate the general conditions of the artillery problem when i was invited to become the chief staff officer, and to carry out the amalgamation. there were not only sentimental feelings and differences to be considered, but the systems of training, discipline, and even the _matériel_, were all to some extent different. still, all these were comparatively minor and transient questions; and i fully recognised in the first place that whilst the batteries of old royal artillery would benefit by the wide experience of service in india--from which, previous to the mutiny, they had been debarred--those of the local regiments would, on the other hand, benefit even more largely by periodical return to england, especially in these days of constant change and progress in the science of artillery. it was with these views that i entered on the somewhat difficult task of producing unity of system and of feeling in the hundred and four batteries which at that time were serving in india. sir hugh rose, the commander-in-chief in india, and h.r.h. the duke of cambridge, the head of the army at home, were in full accord in these matters; and notwithstanding certain differences of opinion, i also received loyal support from the officers of artillery all over the country, so that in the course of all real difficulties gradually disappeared. my great desire was, as far as possible, to respect the interests of all, and to promote unity, not only as good in itself, but also as conducing to the efficiency of the regiment and to the advantage of the state. it was not altogether an easy task, but i was amply rewarded by the generous confidence of my brother officers. reminiscences of the bygone system of the east india company still, however, prevailed more or less in the councils of the government of india, and nothing could be more difficult than the position of sir hugh rose at that period of change; and it was a pleasure to me to serve under, and if possible to assist, so distinguished a soldier and one with whom i had been in frequent association during the crimean war. lord elgin was at that time viceroy, and i had one or two conversations with him regarding the alleged danger from the turbulent population of hyderabad, and gave my opinion that these fears were exaggerated, and that, especially with a prime minister such as salar jung, there need be no real apprehension of an outbreak. it is sometimes supposed that red tape is peculiar to official departments at home, but that is an error. there are large consignments of it sent to india, and i will give an instance. one day at simla an old artillery officer called and requested me to give him a certificate of his being alive, as the audit office refused to give him his pay without it. he seemed to be well and lively, and i therefore complied at once; and as his visit was in august, dated it accordingly. on looking at it, he remarked: 'ah, you have dated it august. that is of no use. i have already sent them one of that kind, but what they require is a certificate that i was alive in july.' this opened out a new aspect of the case, but, after consideration, i certified that to the best of my belief he was living the previous month. whether he ever received his pay, i am not sure. chapter xvii frontier campaign in the afghan mountains--its origin--political and military difficulties in the autumn of our somewhat tedious devotion to military administration in all its complicated details was suddenly interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities on the north-west frontier, which rapidly and unexpectedly developed into a war of considerable magnitude in the afghan mountains. its origin was of a rather singular and exceptional character. for many years previously a number of violent fanatical outlaws, chiefly from the lower provinces of bengal, hundreds of miles away, had fled from our territories, and settled amongst the independent afghan tribes who live in the countries across the border. these outlaws, occasionally reinforced by disaffected mohammedans from the plains, lived chiefly in a village called 'sitana' on the lower slopes of the mahabun mountain, about forty miles north of the old mogul fortress of attock, and on the western side of the indus--hence their name of sitana fanatics. their ordinary occupation consisted of incursions into the plains of eusofzye, and in robbing and murdering peaceful traders in our territories. in the late sir sydney cotton led an expedition against them and burnt some of their villages; but as they were harboured, and probably to some extent encouraged, by their afghan neighbours, and as the country of their adoption was devoid of roads and almost inaccessible, they soon re-established themselves in the large new village of mulka, high up on the slopes of the mountain, and re-commenced their depredations. it was under these circumstances that a fresh expedition was determined on; and as, from causes which were not foreseen at the outset, it rapidly developed into a considerable campaign, it will be interesting to take a short survey of the conditions, military and political, of our north-west border. [illustration: sketch map of north-west frontier] a glance at the map will show that our frontier in that part of india is composed of great rugged mountain ridges which, radiating southerly from the hindoo koosh, terminate somewhat abruptly in the plains, and form, as it were, a great natural boundary of the empire. these mountains are inhabited by tribes who, though afghan in language, religion, and race, are for the most part independent of the ruler at cabul. they are poor but brave, fanatical, and half civilised, and are governed by native 'jirgahs' or councils; and, although turbulent and difficult to deal with, still have a great love of their country and cherish its independence, possessing qualities that we admire in ourselves, and which deserve consideration and respect. except in the narrow and secluded valleys there is little cultivation, and the whole country is almost devoid of roads, beyond mere goat paths. military operations are therefore difficult. the commander-in-chief, when the expedition was under consideration, pointed out that the season was late, as snow falls in november, and that to march a force through such a country of scant resources would necessitate careful preparations and ample transport, and he advised postponement until the following spring; but his views were disregarded by the punjab government, who entered into the campaign in a somewhat heedless, lighthearted fashion, which speedily brought its own punishment. it is further to be remembered that in those days our line of frontier for hundreds of miles was guarded chiefly by the punjab irregular force, consisting of about , men of all arms recruited from the martial races within our border, many of whom were really afghans in religion and race. strange to relate, also, this army was under the orders of the punjab government, and altogether independent of the commander-in-chief. to guard a long and exposed frontier by native levies raised on the spot, and to the almost total exclusion of english soldiers, was a bold and possibly a dangerous policy; but to increase the risk by a complex division of military authority appears to be a violation of all commonly received maxims of war. the force decided on for the sitana expedition consisted of about , men, chiefly of the punjab force just mentioned, to which, however, was added the st highlanders, the st bengal fusiliers, and a battery of royal artillery, with its field guns carried on elephants. the government were fortunate in one respect, that the expedition was placed under the command of sir neville chamberlain, an officer of long experience and of the highest ability and courage. indeed, it was a happy circumstance that in the serious complications and hard fighting which ensued a man of such great qualities should have been at the head of affairs; and although he was struck down and severely wounded before the operations came to an end, still it may be admitted, without disparagement of his successor, that the neck of the confederacy had been broken by his vigorous measures, and that the tribes were sick at heart and weary of the combat. in entering on a campaign against the sitana fanatics, who doubtless were tolerated and harboured by the inhabitants, it must still be borne in mind that in crossing the border we were entering upon foreign territory; and a question therefore arose as to the light in which our suspicious afghan neighbours would regard our advance. there was also another important point which must not be overlooked. in determining the exact direction of our march, it was considered, as a matter of strategy, that instead of moving straight up the mountain, towards the enemy's stronghold, we should enter the country by the umbeylah pass, a narrow gorge to the west of the mahabun, and proceed through the chumla valley on its north side (see map); and thus by a flank march, as it were, attack the fanatics in rear and cut off their line of retreat. our intentions in this respect were kept secret. in a military point of view the proposal had advantages, but politically it had quite another aspect--it being evident that we were thus entering the territory of neighbours, many miles distant from the real object of the expedition, who might, and indeed did, at once take violent exception to our proceedings. official documents published afterwards explain this clearly. speaking of the intended march through the pass, colonel taylor, the commissioner with the expedition, wrote: 'it was, under the circumstances, impossible to examine the proposed route by questioning those of our own territories best acquainted with it, without raising suspicions as to the line we proposed to take in entering the hills.' again, general chamberlain's first despatch after the advance of the force, on october , said: 'i should here mention that on the afternoon of the th,[ ] when it would be too late for the chumla or other tribes to make any preparations on a large scale for impeding the march of the troops through the umbeylah pass, a proclamation was forwarded by the commissioner, to the chumla and bonair tribes, stating the object with which the force was about to enter the chumla valley, and assuring them that it was with no intention of injuring them, or of interfering with their independence; but solely because it was the most convenient route by which to reach the hindostanee fanatics, and to effect their expulsion from the mahabun.' but the question was, in what light were the bonairs and others likely to regard our sudden and unexpected arrival at the door of their house, our purpose having been carefully hid until the time for their objecting or defending themselves had passed away? the late major james, who was the commissioner when peace was made, alluding to these circumstances, makes a significant remark: 'even supposing, therefore,' he says, 'that the proclamations actually reached their destination, was it likely that a brave race of ignorant men would pause to consider the purport of a paper they could not read, when the arms of a supposed invader were glistening at their doors?' it so happened, also, that the fanatics, when they heard of the assembly of our troops in the plains and became aware that we were about to call them to account, although not cognisant of our exact plan, nevertheless wrote a very crafty letter to their neighbours, which subsequently fell into our hands, as follows: 'the evil-doing infidels[ ] will plunder and devastate the whole of the hilly tract, especially the provinces of chumla, bonair, swat, &c., and annex those countries to their dominions, and then our religion and worldly possessions would entirely be subverted. consequently, keeping in consideration a regard for islam, the dictates of faith, and worldly affairs, you ought by no means to neglect the opportunity. the infidels are extremely deceitful and treacherous, and will by whatever means they can come into these hills, and declare to the people of the country that they have no concerns with them, that their quarrel is with the hindostanees, that they will not molest the people, even as much as touch a hair of their heads, but will return immediately after having extirpated the hindostanees, and that they will not interfere with their country. they will also tempt the people with wealth. it is therefore proper for you not to give in to their deceit, or else, when they should get an opportunity, they will entirely ruin, torment, and put you to many indignities, appropriate to themselves your entire wealth and possessions, and injure your faith.' from the foregoing remarks it will, i think, be evident that our policy was not only somewhat rash, but was not altogether straightforward. in the first place, we undertook the expedition with an inadequate force, chiefly comprised of native troops, raised on the spot, at a late season of the year, and without sufficient preparations as to supplies and transport; in the next, we attempted to march through a country inhabited by tribes with whom we had no cause of quarrel, and from whom we carefully concealed our intentions. the result of the first day's march (october ) brought matters to a climax, and instead of being able to cut off the 'sitana' fanatics, we found ourselves face to face with the bonair and other tribes, whose territory we had invaded, and who, scoffing at our professed strategy, at once united and determined if possible to drive us out of their country. the whole condition of affairs was thus entirely altered, and general chamberlain found himself holding the end of a narrow gorge, with steep mountains running up several thousand feet on either side, and attacked incessantly day and night, not only in front, but on either flank. in the meantime another unfortunate circumstance had occurred. it so happened that towards the end of october both the viceroy and sir hugh rose had left simla, on short expeditions towards the distant ranges of the himalayas. accidentally i had seen lord elgin when he started, and he appeared to be in good health; soon afterwards, however, owing, it was supposed, to his having ascended and crossed some high passes, or whatever the cause, he suddenly became dangerously ill with an affection of the heart, and when he arrived at drumsala in the kangra valley, his case was deemed hopeless. sir hugh also, for the moment, was almost out of reach, but on hearing of the untoward development of the military operations, he at once proceeded to lahore, where his staff joined him in november. the successive despatches of general chamberlain give a clear account of the altered condition of affairs. writing on october , he said: 'the bonair people having thus taken a hostile part against us is extremely serious, and has altered our whole position and probably our plan of operations.' he then goes on to explain the necessity of guarding his communications through the pass, and asks for reinforcements. again, on october , he writes: 'there appears to be reason to believe that the bonair people have applied to the akoond of swat for aid, and should they succeed in enlisting him in their cause--which is not improbable, as they are his spiritual followers--the object with which this force took the road to the chumla valley would be still more difficult of attainment.' footnotes: [footnote : october , .] [footnote : meaning the english.] chapter xviii hard fighting in the mountains general chamberlain now took steps to clear himself of encumbrances, and to prepare for hard fighting. the sick, the baggage, and spare transport animals were sent back to the plains, and the road was improved. a breastwork was thrown across the front of the camp and flanked with guns; the steep slopes on either side were occupied by strong pickets, stockaded and entrenched. still the position was weak. far above on the extreme left our troops held a post called the 'eagle's nest;' and opposite, on the right, another named the 'crag picket,' a commanding pinnacle of rocks scantily clothed with pines and towering up into the sky. both were vital points to hold, for they entirely overlooked the lower defences. but high as they both were, there were other ridges and dominant points still far above, and our troops were thus exposed to sudden overwhelming attacks, from enemies who could collect unseen at their leisure and choose their time for an assault. the men of the tribes were brave and worthy foes. these bold mountaineers, ignorant of what is termed discipline, or of any regular art of war, armed only with old matchlocks and short swords, nevertheless, by a kind of rude instinct, discovered at once our weak points; and by feints at the centre, combined with furious assaults on the isolated flanks, not only inflicted heavy loss upon us, but succeeded occasionally in endangering the whole position. the crag picket alone fell three times into their hands by direct assault in open daylight, at different periods of the campaign, although in each case we drove them out again. the despatches received day after day, though hastily written, gave a vivid reality to the scenes depicted, and extracts from them will perhaps convey the best idea of the fierce nature of the contest and of its vicissitudes. on october large bodies of men, with numerous standards, appeared in the chumla valley, and were ascertained to be arrivals from some of the minor hill tribes, and a portion of the fanatics under mobarik shah. at daylight the next morning they appeared above our right defences on the mahabun, but were driven off by major keyes,[ ] who chased them along the ridges and forced them back precipitately into the valley. the events of the following day (october ) were serious. chamberlain, having some reason to apprehend an attack on the eagle's nest, reinforced the troops on the mountain, sending up of the st highlanders, the th and th punjab regiments, and a mountain battery. the eagle's nest itself was held by men under major brownlow.[ ] the enemy, who had established a breastwork of their own on the heights above and were in great strength, no sooner observed our preparations for battle than they joyfully accepted the challenge. the scene is well described by colonel vaughan, who was in command: 'the troops were hardly in position when a very large body of the enemy rushed down the steep slopes, and, with loud cries, attacked at once the picket and the troops. the mountain train guns fired upon them with shrapnel, common case, and round shot, and this fire checked those advancing against the troops in position, but not those advancing against the picket. the latter were attacked with the greatest determination, and two of the enemy's standards were planted close under the parapet. all the efforts of the picket failed to dislodge them for some time, notwithstanding that the direct fire from the picket was aided by a flanking fire from the mountain train guns and from the enfield rifles of the st.... when the enemy had been checked by the guns, they were charged by the th punjab infantry, but the regiment was unfortunately carried too far in the ardour of pursuit, and lost heavily before it could regain the position.' major brownlow, who was standing at bay in the eagle's nest, gives a simple and vivid account of the attack upon him. 'about o'clock (noon) the bonairwals commenced to move down from their position, matchlock men posting themselves advantageously in the wood, and opening a very galling fire upon us, whilst their swordsmen and others advanced boldly to the attack, charging across the plateau in our front, and planting their standard behind a rock, within a few feet of our wall. the steady fire, however, with which they were received rendered their very gallant efforts unavailing, and they were driven back and up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead.' our casualties on this occasion were as follows: killed wounded total english officers native officers men -- --- --- the great losses incurred by the native corps in this as in every action during the campaign, are proofs of the loyalty of the men to our cause. general chamberlain, in his despatches, bears warm testimony to their devotion; and points out that although there were men in the native regiments of almost every tribe on the frontier, including those which were fighting against us, still there were no desertions, nor was there any instance of backwardness in engaging the enemy. after the th there was a lull for a few days, but the storm soon gathered again, and important events followed each other in rapid succession. general chamberlain, in his despatch of october , reports 'that the akoond has joined and has brought with him upwards of standards from swat, each standard representing probably from twenty to thirty footmen.' other distant tribes had also been summoned, and in fact there was a general combination all along the border against us. he goes on to say: 'it is necessary that i should place the state of affairs thus distinctly before his excellency, in order that he may understand how entirely the situation has altered since the force entered the umbeylah pass.' and he goes on to explain that with his present numbers he could only stand on the defensive. during the early part of november vigorous efforts were made to strengthen our outposts and to improve the communication to the plains of eusofzye; but the confederate tribes jealously watched our movements and incessantly attacked us day and night; and on the morning of the th succeeded a second time in capturing the crag picket. general chamberlain in his despatch said: 'i was in the camp when the picket fell into the hands of the enemy, and my attention having been accidentally drawn to the unusual dust and confusion caused by the rush of camp followers down the hill, i felt convinced that some reverse had occurred, and immediately sent forward her majesty's royal bengal fusiliers.' lieutenant-colonel salisbury[ ] was in command of the regiment, and his orders were to push on and retake the position at any cost. the ascent was long and steep, but the fusiliers never halted, and in five-and-twenty minutes the key of the position was recovered. an important change was now made in the disposition of the force. as already explained, the prolonged halt in the pass was due to unforeseen causes, and the general had to make the best of it, its great weakness consisting in the isolation of its flanks. as some delay must occur before sufficient reserves could arrive, so as to enable chamberlain to resume the offensive, he determined to abandon the gorge and also the pickets on the mountain to his left, and to concentrate his whole force on the slopes of the mahabun. in a military point of view this was a judicious arrangement. instead of holding a series of straggling posts, perched upon rocks, on two separate mountains, and with his main body far down in a hollow gorge, our troops would thus be concentrated and able to reinforce any point required. the movement was quietly carried out during the night of november . the vigilance of the tribes for once failed them, and when daylight broke on the th, to their astonishment the eagle's nest and all the pickets on that side were silent and empty. exasperated by the success of our manoeuvre, and imagining probably that it was the precursor of a general retreat, the enemy swarmed up the mahabun ridges, and before our troops were well settled in their new positions, attacked them fiercely, and for the moment with some success, but were finally driven off. general chamberlain, writing at the time, said: 'the troops have now been hard-worked both day and night for a month, and having to meet fresh enemies with loss is telling. we much need reinforcements. i find it difficult to meet the enemy's attacks, and provide convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear.... this is urgent.' the confederate tribes, consisting of the fanatics, the men of the mahabun, of bonair, swat, bajour, and of other distant secluded valleys, joined also by a sprinkling of men from our own border villages, were now in such numbers that the hill sides literally swarmed with them; and although they had failed in their efforts to capture the position they had not lost heart, but again made a vigorous effort; and on november advanced on the crag picket, coming boldly up, with their standards flying, to within a few feet of our breastworks; and at length, after a desperate hand-to-hand encounter, for the third time took possession, amidst shouts of triumph from the afghans on the hills all round. victory, however, did not long remain with them. the st highlanders, who had taken a full share in every action of the campaign, were selected, with a regiment of goorkas, to retrieve the fortunes of the day, and they were not wanting in this hour of need. whilst the troops were being assembled for the assault of the captured work, the field and mountain guns were turned on the enemy, who were thus forced to lie close under cover of the rocks. under a perfect storm of matchlock balls and of stones hurled from the summit, colonel hope, the gallant leader of the highlanders, deliberately formed his men at the foot of the crag; and sending the goorkas to turn the flank, he placed himself at the head of his corps, and, with a cool determination which excited the admiration of every soldier of the force, proceeded to march up the rocky height. the mountaineers throughout the war had shown themselves ready to do and to dare a great deal, but they were not quite prepared for the direct assault of a highland regiment which in open day, with its colonel at its head, was steadily approaching, and would infallibly in a few seconds close upon them, with a volley and a bayonet charge. the storm of shells which had been raining on them for the preceding half hour, shattering the rocks and trees, had somewhat shaken their confidence; and almost as soon as the highlanders reached the summit the mountaineers evacuated the position, and were chased along the ridges. sir neville chamberlain, ever foremost in danger, having felt it his duty to accompany the troops in so critical an attack, was unfortunately severely wounded, and colonel hope was also dangerously wounded in the thigh. our lost ground was thus recovered, but at the cost of two distinguished men, the first and second in command, who were rendered unable to take any further part in the war. our losses up to this time had been considerable; no less than english[ ] and native officers, with men, had been killed, whilst english, native officers, and men were wounded, making a total of casualties, and so far as the original object of the war was concerned, we had as yet really accomplished nothing. footnotes: [footnote : now general sir charles keyes, g.c.b.] [footnote : now general sir charles brownlow, g.c.b.] [footnote : now general salisbury, c.b.] [footnote : the following officers were killed: lieutenant gillies, r.a., captains c. smith and aldridge, and ensign c. murray, st highland light infantry; lieutenants dougal and jones, th highlanders (doing duty with st); lieutenant h. chapman, ensign a. sanderson, and surgeon pile, st bengal fusiliers; lieutenant j. davidson, st punjab infantry; lieutenant clifford, rd punjab infantry; lieutenant w. moseley, th ferozepore regiment; lieutenant richmond, th native infantry, and major g. harding, bombay staff corps.] chapter xix political complications--end of the war the preceding remarks will be sufficient to give a general idea of the difficulties, both military and political, which had ensued on our crossing the border. the situation was undoubtedly grave. major james, the commissioner, wrote, that it was a truly formidable and dangerous combination, and that immediate action was necessary to save the government from a war involving us not only with all the tribes on the border, but also in all probability with afghanistan. the lieutenant-governor of the punjab, sir robert montgomery, had doubtless long and anxiously considered the untoward aspect of affairs; and at length, when the telegrams arrived announcing the severe actions just described, he looked upon the matter as so serious, that he was actually prepared to order an immediate withdrawal of the whole force to the plains; and in this view he was supported by some members of the viceroy's council; in fact an order to that effect was sent to the commander-in-chief. what sir hugh rose thought of the proposition is plain enough. in the first place he remonstrated against the withdrawal, pointing out the danger of such a policy and the loss of prestige which would result. in the next he ordered large reinforcements to proceed by forced marches to the frontier, so that the great northern road from lahore to peshawur was crowded with cavalry, artillery, and infantry, all hurrying upwards. at the beginning of december there were five-and-twenty thousand men north of the jhelum. soon after my arrival at lahore in november, i had written to my old friend sir william denison at madras, giving him a short description of the state of affairs.[ ] on november lord elgin died, and sir william, as the senior governor present in india, was summoned by telegraph to calcutta, and assumed temporarily the functions of viceroy. his reply to my letter is dated calcutta, december , and is interesting as giving his views on the situation. it is as follows:-- 'my dear adye,--thanks for your letter. i got the whole of the papers relating to the business in the north-west on my way up the river, and spent my time in reading them and making notes. it is hardly worth while to say anything about the commencement of the affair beyond this, that if any move was to have been made at all, the plan proposed by sir h. rose was clearly that which should have been adopted. with reference, however, to the future, i trust i have been in time to check further evil.... i found an order had been sent to the commander-in-chief, telling him that their wish was that the force should be withdrawn, thrusting upon the commander-in-chief the responsibility of deciding not only the mode of doing this, and the time, but also that of determining whether such a move would peril our reputation. the first step i took was to press for a modification of the order. i pointed out that it was unfair to the commander-in-chief; and that, as we had a sufficient force, it would be decidedly impolitic to withdraw, until we had accomplished the design for which we had made our inroad into the country. after a good deal of talk, i carried with me the majority of the council, and it was decided to bring the bonairs to terms before withdrawing the troops. to leave without doing this would almost insure another campaign in the spring, and this would be expensive and useless. i trust that our orders may arrive in time to prevent any hasty move to the rear.'[ ] [illustration: going to the war. crossing the indus at attock, november ] many days, however, before i received sir william's letter, circumstances had occurred at lahore which led to my making a long and rapid journey of several hundred miles northwards, and joining the force in the mountains during the remainder of the war. on november sir hugh spoke to me of his difficulties and of the suggested retreat, which seemed both impolitic and unnecessary. the letters and telegrams received from the front were, however, necessarily somewhat short and hasty, and did not give full details of the position; and i offered my services as a staff officer, to pay a rapid visit to chamberlain, hear his views, take a personal survey of the country, and then return. the commander-in-chief accepted my offer, and also selected major roberts,[ ] who knew the people and the language, to accompany me. he was a delightful companion. on the evening of the th we left lahore on the mail cart, placing the driver behind, and ourselves driving each stage alternately. we galloped up the trunk road all night, and all the next day, crossing the ravee, the chenab, and the jhelum, and were nearly done up from want of sleep, when we fortunately drove into the camp of a battery of horse artillery and obtained a few hours' rest. before daylight we were off again, passed through rawul-pindee, and in the afternoon crossed the indus by a bridge of boats close under the old mogul fortress of attock; and at sunset on the second day our long drive of nearly miles came to an end at nowshera, on the cabul river, where the officers of a battery under captain nairne, r.a.,[ ] hospitably received us. until our arrival at nowshera, we had not heard of the latest fight at the crag picket, and that chamberlain and hope were severely wounded. in the meantime horses had been laid out for our use across the plains of eusofzye; and, crossing the cabul river, we galloped about thirty miles, passing numerous detachments of seiks and pathans, with elephants and camels, and on the evening of november reached the camp of major probyn,[ ] in command of a native cavalry regiment at the foot of the mountains. the weather was fine but cold, and altogether the long journey was very enjoyable. sir neville chamberlain's force was about ten miles distant on the heights of the mahabun, whose ridges run up to , feet. our instructions were urgent, and we were very anxious to be off. probyn, however, whose troops were patrolling the frontier, pointed out that the communications were uncertain, and that the road, such as it was, was only opened occasionally by armed convoys taking up food and munitions to the front. however, as delay was unadvisable, after considering the matter, he said: 'you can, if you like, go up with the "catch-em-alive-ohs."' i inquired who these interesting people were, and his reply was that they were afghans--in fact, the same people we were fighting against; but he added that these were friendly and in our pay, and would take care of us. he had them paraded for our inspection. these 'catch-em-alive-ohs' were a rough, handsome, picturesque lot of fellows, armed with old matchlocks, shields, and short knives, and seemed very good-natured and friendly; so, in default of better, we determined on accepting their escort, and away we went, accompanied by the reverend mr. cowie, afterwards bishop of new zealand. the mountain was steep and rugged, and the route a mere goat path, so that our progress was slow. after climbing for some miles, we suddenly observed a large number of people on a high, distant ridge, but whether friends or enemies was not so certain. the body of a native just killed was lying in the path. at that moment a messenger ran up bringing me a small note in pencil, and reading it hastily i made it out to be 'the road is _now_ safe, push on as fast as you can.' this was satisfactory, but on looking more carefully we found the message really was, 'the road is _not_ safe, push on,' &c. this rather altered the conditions; but fortunately the men we had observed on the heights were a party of goorkas, and the note was from the officer in command, who was looking out for us, so that our journey soon came to an end, and we arrived safely in camp. the next morning i paid a visit to chamberlain. we had been cadets together many years before at woolwich, but he left the academy before obtaining a commission, joining the bengal army, and we had never met since those early days. his wound, however, was severe and his condition serious, so that i was unable to discuss the position of affairs with him, as had been intended, and in a few days he was carried down to the plains. i found a strong and unanimous feeling amongst the officers against any withdrawal. although the tribes were in great force in the valley, with their standards flying, it was evident that we only required reinforcements; and that a movement in advance would soon scatter the brave but badly armed, undisciplined hosts of our mountain foes. i lost no time in sending day by day, detailed reports, sketches, and plans of the position to sir hugh rose, urging also the necessity for an early forward movement, and in reply received an order by telegraph, to remain with the force until the termination of the war. the scenery all round us from our elevated camp was very varied, and had many elements of grandeur. looking back to the south through the dark defiles of the pass, we could see the fertile plain of eusofzye stretching away to the indus and cabul rivers, whilst in front the sheltered chumla valley and the village of umbeylah were lying beneath us; and away in the distance to the north, high ranges of mountains, capped by the snowy peaks of the hindoo koosh, closed in the horizon. owing to the success which had been achieved on several occasions by the tribes in capturing our outlying breastworks--due, perhaps, in some cases, to want of vigilance on our part--strict instructions had been given that our pickets were to hold their ground at all hazards; and on one occasion a soldier coming on duty was heard to say to his comrade, 'well, jim, what's the orders at this post?' and jim replied, 'why, the orders is, you're never to leave it till you're killed, and if you see any other man leaving it, you're to kill him.' our life was a very open-air kind of existence, a sort of prolonged picnic, and we lived partly in small tents and partly in caves, always sleeping in our clothes; our dinners such as they were, being cooked and laid out on the rocks. the afghans perched themselves about, and now and then made long shots at us with their matchlocks. one old fellow took up his position every day on an elevated spot, on the other side of the pass, at a distance, and watched the proceedings. our men frequently fired at him, but apparently without effect; so at last they gave it up, and nicknamed him 'oh! willie, we have missed you.' there was another peculiarity amongst the tribes which is, perhaps, unusual in warfare. some of our native troops, when on isolated pickets at night, used to pass away the dreary hours by singing some of their national airs; and the enemy, apparently not wishing to be left out, would cheerily join in the chorus. [illustration: afghan frontier campaign. storming the conical peak, december ] at the end of november general garvock[ ] arrived, taking command of the expedition; and during the next few days considerable reinforcements marched up from the plains, including amongst others the th fusiliers, the rd highlanders, and probyn's horse, strong. our total force was over , men, with light guns, some carried on elephants and the rest on mules. the men of the tribes, no doubt, were quite aware of these accessions to our strength; and although guzzhan khan, from the distant province of dher, had joined them with , followers, they hesitated to attack our position, which was now strongly entrenched and vigilantly guarded. early in december a small deputation of bonair chiefs came into camp to confer with major james, the commissioner, with a view to peace; and after a parley withdrew to consult the other tribes as to the terms we offered; which were the destruction of mulka, and that the fanatics should no longer be harboured and protected by the afghans. we could hardly demand less. it was understood that there were considerable dissensions amongst the native chiefs, and on the afternoon of december a solitary messenger returned, stating that our proposals were rejected. it was also known that an attack by the combined tribes was imminent on the morrow. the moment of action had at length arrived. general garvock, forestalling the intentions of the enemy, assembled a force of , men, including the th and st fusiliers, at daylight near the crag picket, leaving the remainder to guard the camp, and at a.m. led off his troops along the ridges to the attack. about two miles beyond the crag stood the small village of laloo, and a few hundred yards in front of it, one of the great spurs running up from the chumla valley, terminated in a lofty peak dominating the whole ridge. on this natural stronghold the men of the tribes had established themselves in great force, flying their standards, and prepared to abide the last issues of war. the ordinary difficulties of the ascent had been increased by numerous 'sungas' (breastworks), so that it was a formidable position to take by assault. our skirmishers, who had easily driven in the outlying mountaineers, then halted about yards in front of and looking up at the conical peak, and, supported by the mountain guns, waited for the arrival of the main body. these mountain batteries rendered great service during the war. their light ordnance, carriages, and ammunition being all carried on mule back, they are thus independent of roads, can accompany infantry over any ground, and come into action on the most restricted space. as the several regiments came up they sought a momentary shelter in the broken ground, and when all was ready, general garvock sounded the 'advance.' at that signal , men rose from their cover, and with loud cheers and volleys of musketry, rushed to the assault; the regiments of pathans, seiks, and goorkas vieing with the english soldiers as to who should first reach the enemy. from behind every rock and shrub at the foot of the peak small parties of mountaineers jumped up, and fled as the advancing columns approached. it took but a few minutes to cross the open ground, and then the steep ascent began, our men having to climb from rock to rock, and their formation necessarily becoming much broken. foremost among the many could be distinguished the scarlet uniforms of the st fusiliers, who, led by colonel salisbury, steadily swarmed up the mountain and captured the defences in succession at the point of the bayonet, the enemy's standards dropping as their outworks fell; whilst here and there the prostrate figures of our men scattered about the rocks, proved that the hill-men were striking hard to the last. nothing, however, could withstand the impetuosity of the assault, and ere many minutes had elapsed the conical peak from foot to summit was in the possession of british soldiers. i had the misfortune during the assault to fall over a large rock, seriously injuring my right knee and tearing the ligaments, becoming for the moment incapable of climbing; but by the help of a mule, lent from one of the batteries, managed to reach the crest of the mountain. our panting troops still pushed on, captured the village of laloo, and the mountaineers were then driven headlong in thousands, down the steep glades, through the pine forests to the chumla valley, many hundred feet below. this was the first general defeat the enemy had experienced, and they were not left long to recover from its effects. at daylight the next morning our troops were again in movement; one brigade marching down direct on umbeylah, accompanied by probyn's cavalry, who, however, had to lead their horses down the precipitous slopes until they reached the valley. in the meantime the other brigade descended from laloo and deployed at the foot. the tribes, although at first they seemed inclined to make a stand, gradually fell back. the brigade from laloo followed them up, passed the village of umbeylah, and approached the hills leading to bonair. the enemy, who had been lying concealed in the ravines and broken ground, suddenly rushed out, sword in hand, wildly attacked one of our seik regiments, and for the moment even penetrated its ranks. the seiks, however, were rallied by their officers, and supported by the th fusiliers, and the enemy in a few minutes were driven back with great loss. in the meantime three field guns, under captain griffin, r.a., which had been brought down on elephants, got into action and shelled the crowded heights, the tribes withdrawing out of range. our losses during the two days were: one officer killed,[ ] four wounded, and there were casualties amongst the men. as all tents and baggage had been left on the mountain, we bivouacked for the night outside umbeylah, which was set on fire. the weather unfortunately was wet and cold, so that lying in the open wrapped up in a blanket was not luxurious; and, to add to my discomfort, all at once i felt what seemed to be a snake crawling about my legs. having with difficulty obtained a lighted match, i suddenly threw aside the blanket, when a huge black rat darted out, but, as i found the next morning, had eaten large holes in my only pair of trousers, so that i presented altogether a somewhat damp and dilapidated appearance. these, however, were but minor incidents in a very interesting campaign. the effect of our vigorous movements on the th and th was immediate and decisive. the men of bajour and dher, who had come so far and were so eager for war, now fled to their native fastnesses. the akoond and his followers were no more to be seen; and the chiefs of bonair, relieved from the presence of overbearing allies, came into camp the next day to discuss terms of peace. under ordinary circumstances a force of sufficient strength would no doubt have been sent forward to drive away the original offenders, and to destroy their chief village--mulka. but the punjab government were anxious to limit the scope of the expedition, and to withdraw from the mountains. consequently a somewhat hazardous compromise ensued; colonel reynell taylor, the commissioner, proceeding with one native regiment, about strong, accompanied by an escort of the bonairs, to burn the distant village. roberts and myself, being anxious to visit a part of the country hitherto unexplored, joined the party. the first day's march, on december , was along the chumla valley to kooria. we saw little of our new friends the bonairs, but the inhabitants were civil and met our requirements as to food; the next morning we commenced our long and toilsome march up the mountain to mulka; which proved to be a large, new, well-built village of wood, where we remained for the night. the inhabitants had all fled. the following morning the whole place was set on fire; the hill tribes of the mahabun, armed and in large numbers, however, watching us at a distance. the native officers of our regiment represented that the tribes were greatly exasperated, and might at any moment fire off their matchlocks and make a rush at us. however, we kept well together, and as soon as the village had been destroyed, steadily marched back to the valley, and rejoined the main force under general garvock. on christmas day the british troops left the mountains and once more stood on the plains of eusofzye, the bonairs destroying the entrenchments and breaking up the roads as we marched away. thus ended the frontier war of . intended at the outset as a mere excursion against fanatical robbers, who had long infested the border, it speedily grew into a considerable war, the mohammedan tribes, under the impression that their independence was in danger, combining against us. the campaign was interesting in its military aspect, in giving experience of the extreme difficulty and expense of carrying out offensive operations in a country composed of mountain ranges, devoid of communications, and inhabited by races of men whom we may consider half civilised, but who, at all events, possess the virtues of courage, independence, and love of their country, and physically are as active and handsome a people as exists anywhere. from a political point of view the north-west frontier of india is also full of interest. after a century of conquest, with dominions now extending , miles from calcutta to peshawur, we have at length arrived at a region which seems marked out by nature as the boundary of our empire. the conditions of the north-west frontier no doubt involve difficult considerations, but it seems to me clear that, whilst guarding against incursions, our policy towards our somewhat turbulent neighbours should be one of forbearance and conciliation, combined in some cases with subsidies. as sir charles wood, the secretary of state for india, wrote in : 'our true course ought to be, not to interfere in their internal concerns, but to cultivate friendly relations with them, and to endeavour to convince them, by our forbearance and kindly conduct, that their wisest plan is to be on good terms with us, in order that they may derive those advantages from intercourse with us which are sure to follow from the interchange of commodities and mutual benefits.' it is a policy necessarily requiring patience and somewhat slow in its effect, but will in due time bring its reward, and indeed it has already done so of late years. our trans-indus districts, which were formerly harried by the neighbouring tribes, are now comparatively safe and prosperous; and many afghans who have served in our ranks have returned to their native villages with pensions, and with a kindly feeling and remembrance of those under whom they have served. before leaving this subject, it may be well to point out that there is another and a far larger question beyond that of the immediate frontier which must be kept steadily in view by the british government, and that is our relations with the ruler of afghanistan in connection with the advance of russia in central asia. i propose, however, to defer the consideration of those important questions until a later period, when the afghan war of - brought matters to a crisis. footnotes: [footnote : my letter was published _in extenso_ in _varieties of viceregal life_, by sir w. denison. .] [footnote : sir hugh rose, in writing to me from lahore on the same date as sir william denison (dec. ), said that the governor general had entirely approved of his not consenting, although hard pressed, to give up the umbeylah pass and retreat to the plains.] [footnote : now general lord roberts, g.c.b.] [footnote : now general nairne, c.b., commander-in-chief, bombay.] [footnote : now general sir dighton probyn, v.c.] [footnote : the late sir john garvock.] [footnote : the names of the officers were, lieutenant alexander killed; major wheeler, captain chamberlain, lieutenants nott and marsh wounded.] chapter xx visit to peshawur--sir hugh rose returns to england--sir william mansfield appointed commander-in-chief the good sense and judgment of sir william denison, with the cordial co-operation and support of sir hugh rose, had extricated the government of india from a somewhat dangerous military and political crisis on the north-west border; and although the fierce passions of the tribes had been considerably roused, the excitement gradually cooled down when our troops returned to the plains. one hill chief, however, had the temerity to come into the open, and make a dash at one of our patrolling columns, but was speedily driven back. i forget his exact name, but by the english soldiers he was commonly called sawdust khan. in the unsettled condition of the frontier, the commander-in-chief found it necessary to remain for some weeks at the large and important station of peshawur, which stands half encircled by the afghan mountains and only a few miles distant from the entrance to the celebrated kyber pass. peshawur, the central military position at this part of our territory, has a large old-fashioned mud fort, containing considerable reserves of armaments, munitions, and stores. it is probably strong enough to resist the desultory attacks of afghan tribes; but in my opinion it would be more convenient, and more prudent from a military point of view, were the chief reserves of the district withdrawn to attock, on the other side of the indus. the afghan hill-men at the time of our visit were in a very lively condition, and constantly robbing the station. the very first night that the large camp of the commander-in-chief was pitched on the plain outside, although guards and patrols were plentiful, they succeeded in carrying off some bullocks and two camels, and the theft of horses was not of rare occurrence. the frontier chiefs, however, were friendly to a limited extent, and on one occasion accompanied a party of us for a few miles within the rocky defiles of the kyber, which at that time had not been visited by any englishman for years. they made it a condition, however, that we should trust ourselves entirely to their protection, and not take any military escort; and they loyally carried out the compact. our relations with them at the time, were, in fact, a curious mixture of friendship by day, combined with occasional brigandage on the part of their followers by night. towards the end of february the camp of sir hugh rose and the staff marched slowly southwards through the punjab, crossing in succession by bridges of boats, the indus, jhelum, and chenab rivers to lahore. what with the elephants, camels, horses, bullocks, sheep, and goats which, combined with hundreds of followers, form essential features of military out-of-door life in india, the camp resembled an oriental fair and menagerie more than anything else; and, owing to the vast impedimenta considered essential, the marches did not exceed twelve miles a day. we took the opportunity one day of visiting the sandy plain of chilianwallah, on which in the great battle had been fought between the british army and the seiks. the th regiment specially suffered great losses on that occasion, and an officer who had been present, informed me that on the evening of the battle the bodies of thirteen officers of that regiment were laid side by side in the mess-tent, including the colonel (pennycuick) and his son, the adjutant. the obelisk erected on the plain in memory of the conflict bears the following inscription: 'around this tomb was fought the sanguinary battle of chilianwallah, th january, , between the british forces under lord gough, and the seiks under rajah sher-sing. on both sides did innumerable warriors pass from this life dying in mortal combat. honoured be the graves of these heroic soldiers! in memory of those who fell in the ranks of the anglo-indian army, this monument has been raised by their surviving comrades, at whose side they perished, comrades who glory in their glory, and lament their fate.' having served for six years and a half continuously in india, and having obtained leave of absence, i left the camp on its arrival at lahore, hurried to calcutta, and embarked for england in april. as, however, many changes were still in progress, in respect both to the _personnel_ and _matériel_ of artillery, and in the ordnance department in india, it was deemed expedient that i should cut short my visit home; and in october i accordingly returned to resume my duties and landed in bombay. as regards the ordnance department, the fact was that, owing to the triplicate system of military administration, which had prevailed in the days of the old east india company, the arrangements in each presidency varied; and the armaments, munitions, and stores were not identical in pattern, whilst many were old and obsolete. the depots were scattered about without much reference to strategical considerations, and were too numerous. the system was not only costly but inefficient; and, in view of the great advances of artillery science, a general reorganisation had become necessary. during my visit to england, i had been in communication with sir charles wood, the then secretary of state for india, on these matters. on arrival at bombay i had an interesting conversation with the governor, sir bartle frere, on military subjects; more especially as to whether the native troops should be thoroughly trusted and armed with the best modern weapons, or be relegated, as it were, to an inferior position, and be looked on as more or less subordinate auxiliaries. i gave my opinion that a policy of mistrust was not only a mistake, but would in reality defeat itself; that the native regiments should be armed and equipped like the english soldiers in every respect; the numbers to be maintained, and their nationalities, resting of course with the government. it was a satisfaction to find that sir bartle frere entirely concurred in these views. leaving bombay, and being anxious to rejoin sir hugh rose quickly, i travelled through central india, first of all for about three hundred miles on a partly finished railway, with occasional breaks; and then for five hundred miles outside a mail-cart, passing hastily through indore, gwalior, agra, and delhi to meerut. although i found time to make a few hasty sketches, it has always been a matter of regret that military exigencies rendered me unable to pay more than mere flying visits to so many native cities of great historical and architectural interest. delhi and its neighbourhood especially is rich in picturesque mosques, tombs, palaces, and forts of the former mogul dynasties. on arrival at meerut i found that sir hugh rose had seriously injured himself, having broken several ribs by a fall out hunting, so that for the time our movements were at a standstill. however, early in , as soon as he had recovered, the head quarters staff continued their tour, and arrived at lucknow, where a somewhat amusing incident occurred. during the mutiny, an officer had gained the victoria cross for gallant conduct in the residency, but owing to some delay had not actually received the decoration; and the commander-in-chief was therefore glad of the opportunity of presenting it to him on the very spot where he had gained it. a general parade was ordered, the troops to be formed up round the ruins of the residency; and all the civilians and ladies of lucknow were invited to be present. on the morning, when the hour of parade was at hand, the staff assembled in readiness in a bungalow, and it was understood that the commander-in-chief was preparing an appropriate speech for the occasion. search was then made for the box containing the victoria cross, but it was nowhere to be found, and after an anxious hurried inquiry we discovered that by some mistake it had been left behind at simla in the himalayas. this was awkward, especially as sir hugh would naturally be annoyed at so unfortunate an error. the suggestion was made that some officer of the garrison should be asked to lend his for the occasion; but that also failed, no officer nearer than cawnpore (fifty miles off) having gained one. there was no time to be lost, and at length colonel donald stewart,[ ] the deputy adjutant general, volunteered to inform the commander-in-chief: an offer which was at once accepted. stewart on entering the room found sir hugh engaged in considering his speech, and then cautiously and gently announced that a slight mistake had occurred, and that the victoria cross had been left behind. the commander-in-chief, as anticipated, was angry, and complained that he had been treated with neglect. however, after he had cooled down, donald stewart said that in his opinion the difficulty could readily be got over; and, taking the cross of the companionship of the bath from his breast, suggested that it should be presented to the officer on parade, in lieu temporarily of the other; pointing out that the troops and the assembled company would not be near enough to distinguish the difference. sir hugh at once took in the situation, accepted the compromise, and acted accordingly. the decoration was presented, the commander-in-chief made an appropriate speech, and the demonstration altogether was a success. my remark to the officer afterwards was that as the queen had given him the victoria cross, and the commander-in-chief the bath, i thought he was entitled to wear both for the future. there was a ball in the evening in honour of the occasion, and in default of a real cross he had to wear a painted leather imitation one. in march the term of office of sir hugh rose came to a close. his services in india had been of an eventful and distinguished character, not only in the field, in his celebrated march through central india during the mutiny, but also in military administration at a period of important changes. the position of a commander-in-chief in india, always a difficult one, was peculiarly so during his term of office. the extinction of a great institution such as that of the old east india company could not be accomplished without considerable difficulty and delay; prejudices had to be overcome, and vested interests to be considered. all these circumstances must be borne in mind in judging the career of sir hugh rose from to . the appointment of sir william mansfield as his successor, an officer of long experience in the country, and of great ability as an administrator, tended to complete the work, and to produce unity of system, so essential an element of military efficiency. as he acted in concert with the viceroy sir john lawrence, old prejudices and difficulties gradually disappeared, to the great advantage of the army and to the security of the empire. footnotes: [footnote : now field-marshal sir donald stewart, g.c.b.] chapter xxi the war in bootan during another border war occurred in india; not as usual on the north-west frontier, but with bootan, an almost unknown country away in the far east, and north of the great river brahmapootra. the causes were of the usual character--incessant depredations in our districts of assam and cooch-behar. the territory of bootan, with a length of about miles, lies amidst the southern slopes of the highest ranges of the himalayas, the eternal snows forming its frontier towards thibet. it is, in fact, a country of stupendous mountains, intersected by narrow, precipitous valleys and rapid streams. the rainfall is excessive;[ ] and all along its southern border, in the low grounds at the foot of the mountains, are dense forests and marshy jungles, almost impenetrable and choked with vegetation. the whole of the lower district is very unhealthy, and is the home of wild elephants, rhinoceros, and tigers--natural zoological gardens, in short, free of charge. the people of bootan have little or no organised military force, and such fighting men as exist are only armed with knives, bows and arrows, and a few matchlocks; so that in a military sense they are not at all formidable. the inaccessible nature of the country is its best, and indeed almost its only, defence. the people are chinese in type, and nominally buddhists in religion; but, though brave and hardy, are almost entirely uncivilised, and the ruling authorities are weak and treacherous. the government of bootan appears to be of a duplicate character; one rajah being a kind of spiritual head of the state without power, whilst another has all the power but apparently no head. the result, as might be expected, is frequent anarchy, whilst the subordinate rulers along the frontier district tyrannise over the people and plunder their neighbours at discretion. for a century past, indeed, the people, instigated by their chiefs, had incessantly committed depredations in our territories in the plains: carrying off men and women as slaves, and also elephants, buffaloes, and property of all kinds. remonstrances had been made time out of mind, and missions sent to try and bring them to reason; but all our efforts were met by incivility, almost amounting to insult, and by evasion. the rulers of the country, no doubt, relied in a great measure on its inaccessibility; and, ignorant more or less of our power, were defiant and treacherous accordingly. in the government of india decided on sending a mission, under the honourable ashley eden, to poonaka, the capital. his instructions were to demand the release of all captives, and to endeavour to arrange for peaceful commercial intercourse in the future. leaving darjeeling in january, he crossed the river teesta, the western boundary of bootan; but throughout his long and difficult journey to the interior, although he succeeded in reaching poonaka, and although the poor villagers appeared well-disposed, he was met with evasion and constant delay from those in authority; and, when he arrived at length at the capital, the conduct of the government was so threatening and grossly insulting that he only got away with difficulty, having under compulsion signed an obnoxious treaty, which, on his return to india in april, was immediately disavowed and repudiated. it was quite evident that, unless we were content to submit to violence and insult, the time had fully arrived for a recourse to arms. an expedition was arranged accordingly, and our troops entered bootan from the plains in three separate, widely detached columns, of no great strength.[ ] the one in the east marched a few miles up a gorge to dewanghiri, and took it; but subsequently, on being attacked, abandoned the position, and fell back with the loss of two guns. the temporary defeat was, however, speedily avenged by a force under the command of the late general tombs, of which the th regiment under colonel hume[ ] formed part, and the place was re-taken and held. the centre column also advanced into the hills and established itself at buxa; whilst the third assaulted and captured dalimkote, an old fort on a mountain ridge in the western ranges, and about , feet above the sea. dalimkote, a few miles from the plains, was only formidable owing to its almost inaccessible position; and our troops engaged in its capture had to climb the steep sides of the mountain, by tortuous and narrow paths, and through thick jungles. in fact, the whole neighbourhood was a mass of dense forest and luxurious undergrowth. the officers and men of a battery of artillery had managed with difficulty to carry a small mortar up the hill-side with a view to a short bombardment, preceding assault. hardly had it been brought into action near the entrance gate than by some unfortunate accident a barrel of gunpowder exploded, killing captain griffin, r.a.,[ ] both his lieutenants, and six gunners, besides wounding several others. the small garrison, however, did not wait for an assault, but bolted, and the fort fell into our hands. our columns had not penetrated for any great distance into the country, still the occupation of three important passes not only prevented the booteas from plundering, but also put a stop to their commerce, which, though comparatively trifling in amount, proved a great blow to these isolated mountaineers; so that, after many attempts at evasion, towards the end of they were prepared to come to terms. being desirous of visiting a part of the country so little known, and of so much interest at the time, i left calcutta in january, made a rapid journey of about miles due north to darjeeling, and from that hill station started on an expedition for a fortnight along the bootan frontier, returning by a voyage down the river brahmapootra. the first part of the journey from calcutta to the ganges was by rail; and having crossed the river to caragola, i was then carried by coolies in a palanquin, a sort of elongated bandbox, for miles to the foot of the mountains, not meeting a single englishman during the journey. the country was perfectly flat, and at night a native walked in front with a lighted torch, in order, so it was stated, to scare away the tigers. the coolies as they carried me along sometimes broke out into a low monotonous chant, occasionally varied by a dismal moaning chorus. i tried to ascertain the burden of their song, and found that it was myself, and that the coolie refrain was somewhat as follows: 'this is a heavy man. oh! what a fat man,' and so on. colonel bourchier, r.a.,[ ] joined me in the 'terai,' a narrow belt of marshy forest lying at the foot of the slopes; and then, on a couple of mules, we ascended the himalayas to darjeeling. not being encumbered with any baggage to speak of, our arrangements for the expedition were simple. leaving darjeeling, we rode due east for about twenty miles, and by a gradual descent reached the banks of the teesta, a rapid river about yards wide, remaining for the night in the hut of a young officer who, with a picket of native troops, was in charge of this corner of the frontier. the scenery was charming, and we met occasional parties of booteas carrying fruit to the darjeeling market. [illustration: sketch map to illustrate tour in bootan, january ] the passage across the teesta was by means of a cane bridge; and, considering that the inhabitants are ignorant and uncivilised, was a wonderful specimen of ingenuity and skill. these bridges, of which there are several in different parts of the country, are on the suspension principle, and made entirely of bamboo canes fastened together. there is not a nail or a single piece of rope used in the whole construction. they swing about in an uneasy way in passing over them; and as the canes soon become rotten, the whole structure gradually perishes and falls into the river, and has to be renewed. indeed, as i understood, they require re-building annually. our mules were pushed into the rapid torrent and pulled across by a long line, also made of flexible bamboos and devoid of string. altogether it was a curious experience; and we felt much sympathy for the young officer who had to pass months on guard in this secluded valley, without a fellow-countryman to speak to. after crossing the teesta, we entered bootan territory, began a long ascent, and at the top of a mountain found another officer with a picket in a solitary stockaded fort. the scenery all round was magnificent. dense forests filled the deep valleys, and far away to the north stood the snowy crest of kinchinjunga, , feet high, standing out clear in the horizon. proceeding along over the mountains, we passed an old monastery at tasigimpoo, and in the evening reached a deserted bootea stockade, where we remained for the night. the country seemed to be thinly inhabited, but the few people we met were good-natured and friendly. i had been warned not to sleep in the jungle, as we should be devoured by leeches; so, what with possible tigers on the one hand, and hungry leeches on the other, caution was necessary. however, i escaped, except that on one occasion a superfluous leech--not a tiger--attacked my leg during the night. otherwise all went well, and the following evening, passing through glades of oak, we came in sight of the picturesque old walled fort of dalimkote, overlooking the plains of bengal, and surrounded with feathery woods of bamboo. although the war was supposed to be virtually at an end, i had been informed by sir john lawrence before leaving calcutta that their chief warrior tongso penlow was still at large and defiant, and sure enough on arrival at dalimkote it was found impossible to advance further into the country. consequently, in order to reach the next column at buxa we were compelled to return to the plains, and after a ride of fifty miles reached julpigoree on the teesta. during the night horses were placed along the road eastwards to cooch behar; and, sending on our baggage with a native servant on an elephant, we started early the following morning, galloped for sixty miles over the plains, and, crossing several rivers on rafts, reached cooch behar in the afternoon. there was no time to spare, so after a few hours' rest we turned our faces again northwards, and after another long ride reached the centre column at buxa. the hostility of tongso penlow had thus compelled us to make a detour of about miles; but leaving buxa, pushing on over the mountains, and then down to the deep secluded valley of the chin-chu, we at length reached our most advanced post at the small village of tapsee, and were rewarded by a view of the magnificent scenery of a country hitherto unknown and unexplored. our pioneers had for some months past been engaged in constructing a road towards the interior, cutting through forests, blowing up rocks, and constructing temporary bridges over precipitous gorges and mountain torrents. we were, in short, advancing steadily through a remarkable and very difficult country towards poonaka; and the perception of this fact no doubt compelled the bootan government at length to sue for peace, and caused even the warlike tongso to cease his opposition. hurrying back by forced marches, i took leave of colonel bourchier at cooch behar; and then finally, after a long solitary gallop, reached dobree, on the brahmapootra, just in time to get on board a steamer on its return voyage. although several hundred miles from its mouth, the river at dobree resembled a great inland sea. its navigation, owing to numerous sandbanks, is somewhat dangerous, so that we could only move during daylight, passing numerous picturesque native boats and occasional alligators, lying like logs of grey wood along its banks. after a few days we arrived at kooshtea, near the junction of the ganges and brahmapootra, and then reached calcutta by railway. the expedition was hurriedly carried out; still it was most interesting in its variety, and in giving a glimpse, at all events, of a country so peculiar and hitherto so little known. [illustration: war in bootan, . outpost in valley of the chinchu] footnotes: [footnote : the rainfall in that part of india is said to exceed inches a year.] [footnote : see map of bootan.] [footnote : now general sir henry hume, k.c.b.] [footnote : captain griffin had been in command of a battery, and had done excellent service during the previous frontier war of umbeylah. the names of the two lieutenants were e. walker and e.a. anderson.] [footnote : now general sir george bourchier, k.c.b.] chapter xxii farewell to india--return to regimental duty at woolwich--appointed director of artillery--war office organization having completed an almost continuous service of nine years in india, the time had at length arrived for my return to england. after many wanderings in distant lands, it is always a happiness to return home; still, no one, i think, can derive other than benefit from a residence for a time in the great empire which england has established in the east. to a soldier the experience gained is invaluable, not only in regard to the incidents of camp life and of marching, but also from the exceptional character of the campaigns in which our troops are so often engaged. desirous as the government may be for peace, still even now other military expeditions may be looming in the future; and under any circumstances the preparations for possible wars require constant care and watchfulness. indeed, in the wide range of their duties in india, the officers and men of the british forces gain a varied experience such as does not fall to the lot of any other european army. the subjects of interest in our eastern dominions are, however, by no means confined to arrangements for military expeditions. the various races of people whose customs, laws, and religions are so diverse in themselves, and so different from our own, the remarkable history of the country in the years gone by, and its successive invasions--all these are matters of a specially interesting character; and never more so than at the present time, when the results of our conquest, and the effects of modern civilisation, are beginning to exert so powerful an influence amongst the millions over whom we hold sway. old customs and ancient superstitions are being rapidly and almost violently disturbed. in short, the establishment of our rule in the country is not only an unprecedented event, but involves a gradual and an almost entire change in the views and habits of the people. we have given them internal peace, sound laws, and safety of life and property, such as they have never enjoyed before; but we cannot stand still. enlightenment, and the diffusion of what is termed education, are gravely affecting the character of the people; and it is not sufficient to guarantee them a mere peaceful existence; we must look forward to the results as they develop, and as we commenced by a bold policy, to subjugate a vast continent, so we must equally boldly be prepared to trust the people, and gradually to allow all ranks and classes to take part in the political, civil, and military events as they arise. by consistently and courageously following out such a policy, we shall present a noble spectacle to the world of a great, prosperous, and, what is more, an enduring empire established by england in the east. we have, indeed, but one course to pursue. military service at home in time of peace is naturally of a less interesting character than travels and occasional expeditions in distant lands; and the training of young soldiers at woolwich, which fell to my lot for some time after my return to england, did not present incidents of a striking character. at one period, i remember, there was a considerable dearth of recruits, especially of drivers for the horse artillery, partially due to the frequent changes in war office regulations as to the height and dimensions of the men enlisted. we were allowed to take short men, provided they were of exceptional width of chest and shoulders. meeting an old recruiting serjeant one day, i inquired if he had been successful, but he was by no means sanguine; and, on my pressing him for the reason of his comparative failure, he replied: 'beg your pardon, sir, but the almighty doesn't make the men the shape you order 'em.' i received occasional curious letters from soldiers, one or two of which are worth quotation. the first was from a gunner who was anxious to be married, as in the days of long service it was necessary to obtain previous permission from the commanding officer. it is as follows: 'sir, i beg you will pardon the liberty i take, in requesting the favour of your permission on a subject which depends on my future happiness. during my stay in winchester, i have formed an attachment with a highly respectable young person, to whom i wish to develop my sentiments, by a matrimonial engagement, for which purpose may i beg, sir, the favour of your liberty?' the man, so far as my recollection goes, was duly married, and happy ever afterwards. the second letter accidentally fell into my hands, and is of a romantic character, from a soldier to a girl to whom he was devoted. 'my darling jane, it is with great plesur that i sit down to right a fue lines to you, with the intenchun of cheering your drooping sperits, for the tempest that ranges before you, the storm is hie, the tempest's winds blows through the parish, the throushes is warbling their songs of melode, but by far the sweetest song thare singing, his hover the water to charley' ... and so on. whilst stationed at woolwich an incident occurred connected with a young artillery officer, of irish family, who had been absent for some years on foreign service; and who, on his return to woolwich, was taken to the large handsome messroom to see some recent improvements. amongst other things, a new patent stove was pointed out to him; and it was explained that, whilst it gave the same amount of heat as the old fireplace, there was a considerable economy of coal--in fact, there was a saving of half the fuel. the officer at once remarked: 'if one stove saves half the fuel, why don't you buy two of them, and save the whole of it?' this view had never occurred to the mess committee. it was not until the early part of that i again took an active part in military administration, being unexpectedly offered the appointment of director of artillery at the war office, by the minister for war, mr. cardwell, whom until then i had never seen. it happened to be a period when considerable reforms in the army were under consideration; and i was fortunate in being associated for three or four years with a statesman of resolution and great ability, who, in the face of much opposition, parliamentary and other, laid the foundation of several important and beneficial changes, not only in the war office itself, but also in the terms of soldiers' service and in general improvement of their condition. in order to understand the general bearing and scope of some of the chief reforms inaugurated by the late lord cardwell during his term of office as minister, it will be desirable to give short accounts of the arrangements formerly existing in each case; and as some of his measures, from their nature, only arrived at maturity years after he had ceased to be secretary of state, i propose to trace their gradual development, and the results achieved, down to the present day. one of the first subjects which engaged the attention of mr. cardwell was the difficult one of war office administration. the authority over the army was formerly more or less of a dual character; the _personnel_ of the infantry and cavalry being under a commander-in-chief, whilst a master general had charge of the ordnance corps, as well as the provision of armaments for the naval and military services. these arrangements would not in themselves at first sight appear to have much to recommend them, the responsibility being rather diffused. still it must be remembered that they bore successfully the stress of the great wars at the end of the last and in the earlier years of the present century. as the master general was always a distinguished officer, and was often a member of the cabinet, and further was assisted by a board, some of whom were men of military experience and in parliament, the system apparently suited itself more or less to our constitutional form of government. the great duke of wellington, who was for some time master general, stated that the ordnance department was careful, economical, and efficient. he spoke of it as one of the most ancient departments of the monarchy, and that it was a pattern for others.[ ] when, in , a proposal had been made to abolish the board, he strongly opposed it, and said: 'i warn the government of the danger of this alteration in a military view.' sir henry hardinge, and other experienced general officers who had held the same office, were of similar opinions. when at length, after a peace of nearly forty years, we again in took part in a great european war, the difficulties which at once ensued, the enormous cost involved, and the sufferings of our troops during the winter in the crimea, led the government of the day suddenly to inaugurate a new _régime_; and early in the administration of the army in all its departments was vested in a minister for war. in short, we made the somewhat hazardous experiment of swopping horses when crossing a stream. as a matter of general principle, it is probable that some such arrangement was desirable, an army being a department of the state which requires concentration of authority. but it is to be observed that the minister for war is usually a civilian, and changes with each government, so that neither concentration of knowledge nor unity of purpose necessarily followed on the change; and, further, when the new system came into force the master general and board, instead of being simply absorbed, were abolished, their duties being divided in a slap-dash fashion amongst various departments. mr. clode[ ] says that after the first cabinet of lord palmerston as premier, early in , the secretary-at-war 'brought home half a sheet of paper, containing a memorandum that the ordnance department was to be abolished.' it is hardly a matter of wonder that this sudden concentration of the military departments in a new war office, under a parliamentary chief, and in the midst of a great war, should have led to some confusion, which continued for several years. soon after mr. cardwell became minister, he appointed a committee under lord northbrook (then under-secretary) to investigate the matter; and the results of their inquiries led to a reconstruction, in , of the various departments on an intelligible and sound basis. the war office was then divided into three main branches: ( ) _personnel_, under the commander-in-chief; ( ) _matériel_, that is, armaments for navy and army, fortifications, barracks, commissariat and clothing, under a surveyor general of ordnance, who it was specially stated should be an experienced officer--in fact, it was a virtual revival of the office of master general; ( ) finance, to be represented by an under-secretary in parliament. the arrangement was simple, and soon in working order; but, unfortunately, after mr. cardwell had ceased to be war minister one of its main principles was ignored, and the office of surveyor general, which obviously required military experience, came to be regarded chiefly as a civil and political appointment, and was usually conferred on a member of parliament, coming and going, of course, with the government of the day. the result was a gradual weakening of the whole organisation. as a proof of the numerous changes which may occur, i may point out that between and there were no less than five ministers for war, and four surveyors general, all civilians, in office in rapid succession. it so happens that in there were two royal commissions, the one under the late sir james stephen, and the other under sir matthew ridley; both of whom advised the revival of the master general. sir james stephen's commission said: 'the office of master general of the ordnance should be revived, so far as the management of the stores and manufacturing departments is concerned. he should be a soldier of the highest eminence....' sir matthew ridley said: 'that the intentions of lord northbrook's committee of have not been carried out, and the idea of securing the highest professional acquirements for the position has been entirely abandoned.... we are of opinion that the surveyor general of the ordnance should in future be what he was intended to be, viz. a military officer of high standing and experience, and that he should not be a member of the house of commons.' their views, however, were not acted on; and in the office of surveyor general was abolished, and its numerous duties sub-divided, some being transferred to the already over-burdened shoulders of the military staff, and the rest handed over to the financial secretary; and this condition of affairs exists to this day. in short, the war office is now divided into two branches: the one military, with great responsibilities; the other civil and financial, with great power.[ ] in my judgment, should war occur, such a system would inevitably break down at once. further evidence, however, exists, which will, i think, be conclusive on this point. in still another royal commission, that of lord hartington, examined and reported on this question, so vital to military efficiency; and it is to be observed that of its members three had already held the office of minister for war--namely, lord hartington, the late mr. w.h. smith, and mr. campbell bannerman. in their report they practically condemn the system then and now existing. in the first place, they point out that the various heads of the spending departments have no direct access to the secretary of state and are subordinate one to the other. they consider that the present organisation of the war office is defective in principle, and they go on to recommend that the heads of departments should be directly associated with the minister for war[ ]--in short, a board of officers, such as now exists at the admiralty. in considering this great national question i would point out that this country holds quite an exceptional position as regards its military arrangements and preparations for war. other nations maintain far larger armies, but their troops as a rule have no foreign duties, or distant possessions to protect. our condition is much the reverse. we are a great naval, military, indian, and colonial empire; with fleets, troops, fortresses, and reserves of munitions to maintain in every quarter of the world; and it is essential, not only that the two fighting services should act in unity, but that their armaments should be identical in pattern, and that the reserves at home and abroad be available for both. then, again, on entering on a foreign expedition, we have at once to undertake a most difficult operation in the rapid embarkation of men, horses, guns, munitions, engineer, medical and commissariat stores; so that from every point of view a strong administration is required, and one in which the unrivalled experience of our officers should be fully utilised and trusted. no doubt the requirements of constitutional government must be considered and provided for. indeed, it is essential that the naval and military services should be adequately represented in parliament, and this principle was fully recognised in the years gone by. for instance, in , when the duke of wellington was prime minister, and when our military expenditure was far less than now, the army was officially represented in the two houses of parliament as follows:-- secretary of state, war, and colonies general sir george murray,g.c.b. commander-in-chief general lord hill,g.c.b. master general of ordnance general lord beresford,g.c.b. secretary at war general sir henry hardinge,k.c.b. clerk of ordnance rt. hon. spencer percival lieut.-general of ordnance lieut.-gen. lord edward somerset surveyor general of ordnance major-gen. sir henry fane,k.c.b. principal storekeeper colonel trench clerk of deliveries general phipps secretary to master general colonel lord downes treasurer of ordnance william holmes paymaster-general rt. hon. j. calcraft judge advocate general rt. hon. sir john beckett we must always bear in mind that the army is no mere inanimate piece of machinery. on the contrary, it is one of the most vital and powerful elements of the state; and its efficiency can only be maintained by placing the administration of its various departments in the hands of competent and experienced general officers, and investing them with adequate power. if i have dwelt at some length on this abstruse subject, it is because, having served both as director of artillery and surveyor general of ordnance, i have gained some insight into its difficulties, and feel earnestly the necessity of reorganising the department. although the war office, as will be seen, is a department of hard work and great responsibility, still even within its gloomy portals there are now and then incidents and stories of an amusing character. many years ago, when the late sir cornewall lewis was minister for war, on one occasion he visited the infantry depot at warley in essex, and was shown a handsome room.[ ] after admiring its proportions he inquired as to its use, when, suddenly observing a wooden vaulting horse at the far end of the building, he said: 'oh! i see--the riding school.' the late lord longford, who had seen much active service both in the crimea and india, was under-secretary for war in . he was an excellent administrator, and occasionally very humorous in his minutes. at the period in question it so happened that there were two officers of high rank and position in the war office who disagreed in their views on almost every subject, and were constantly in collision--on paper. the correspondence became so voluminous, and the difficulty so perplexing, that at length the whole matter was placed before lord longford. i am unable to give his exact words, but his minute to sir john pakington, then minister for war, was to the following effect. 'secretary of state,--this is a very interesting correspondence. from a careful perusal i have arrived at the conclusion that both these gentlemen are in the _right_. the case is now for your disposal.' on another occasion, another under-secretary wrote a minute as follows: 'secretary of state,--this is a very important subject. you will observe that the paper is folded the wrong way.' when sir henry storks was surveyor general of the ordnance, he was waited upon by an excellent old messenger, who, however, in his conversation was apt to omit his h's. one day he came into the room, and said: 'sir 'enery, mr. owl wishes to see you.' 'who?' asked sir henry. 'i never heard of him.' 'beg your pardon--it is mr. owl, the director of contracts.' 'oh, mr. howell; show him in!'[ ] some years ago the minister for war, so it is said, being desirous of acquainting himself with the work of the different branches, visited the various rooms and inquired as to the details. meeting a gentleman in the passage, he asked at what hour he usually came to his duty. 'oh!' said the gentleman in reply, 'i usually stroll in about eleven or twelve o'clock.' 'stroll in,' said the minister, in surprise; 'then i presume you do not leave until a late hour?' 'well,' replied the gentleman, 'i generally slip off about three o'clock.' 'slip off at three?' said the minister, much scandalised. 'pray, sir, may i ask what department you belong to?' 'certainly,' said the young man; 'i come every saturday to wind up the clocks!' i also remember a curious incident which happened to lord cardwell, but which is social rather than military. after he had ceased to be minister, it so happened that the wife of one of his former colleagues in the government gave birth to a child, and lord cardwell called to make inquiries. when the butler opened the door, he announced that her ladyship was going on well. 'a girl?' said cardwell, inquiringly. 'no, my lord.' 'oh, a boy?' remarked cardwell. 'no, my lord.' 'why, surely--' but before he could say more, the butler interposed, 'beg pardon, my lord, but it's a little hare' (heir). footnotes: [footnote : clode's _military forces of the crown_, ii. .] [footnote : clode's _military forces of the crown_, ii. .] [footnote : see evidence of h.r.h. the commander-in-chief (_second report of committee of the house of commons on army estimates_, , pp. , , , and .)] [footnote : see _commission on the administration of the naval and military departments_, february , pp. , , , , and .] [footnote : the gymnasium.] [footnote : i once knew a gentleman of far higher rank than a war office messenger who laboured under the same defect. we were at one time interested in an association which, though useful, constantly met with opposition. coming across him one day after a meeting which he had attended, i inquired how matters were going on, and he replied, 'i was determined there should be no 'itch, so i brought them up to the scratch.'] chapter xxiii short service and reserve among the numerous measures carried out by the late lord cardwell during the period of his administration of the war department, none has exercised a wider or more beneficial influence than the introduction of short service and reserve for the non-commissioned officers and men of the army. indeed, when we consider the results achieved, it seems rather surprising that such a change had not been made long ago, not only in the interests of the men, but also in the reserve of strength which it gives to the country in the event of war. in considering the subject in its various bearings, both military and financial, it will be desirable to refer shortly to the methods by which we had endeavoured to maintain our forces in former days. during the great wars in which this country was engaged at the end of the last and in the earlier years of the present century, although the arrangements for recruiting occasionally varied, the main principle adopted was one of long service with high bounties on enlistment, and small pensions on retirement. yet, so difficult was it found to keep the ranks complete, that debtors and even criminals were pardoned on condition of serving abroad.[ ] the cost was enormous. for instance, in the levy and bounty money alone exceeded _l._ for each man, before he had been trained or had done a day's service. this was not only wasteful, but led to drunkenness and desertion[ ]; and, notwithstanding its cost, the plan failed in providing sufficient recruits, and the army at critical moments was lamentably behind the numbers required. for instance, early in the peninsular war it was about , [ ] short of the desired establishment, and during the crimean war the deficiency was over , .[ ] the real fact was that the system of recruiting up to was, and always had been, unpopular. the service was a very hard one. regiments were kept abroad for upwards of twenty years, often in tropical, unhealthy climates; and of the thousands who enlisted yearly but few ever returned, and even those were often prematurely aged and broken down. it is no wonder that the poor people of the country looked upon enlistment of their sons with dread, and as almost equivalent to a sentence of banishment and of death. so great was the difficulty, that between and --although the men were then better paid, fed, and clothed than in former years--the average number of recruits obtained was only , per annum.[ ] in general peel, the minister for war, said that 'the question now is whether the british army should be allowed to collapse.' in that year another royal commission was appointed to consider the subject, and in their report said: 'the military history of this country, even up to the date of the last great war in which we were engaged, shows that it has been our practice during periods of peace to reduce our military establishments to the lowest possible point.... no preparations for a state of war were thought of; and the consequence has been that, when war occurred, everything had to be done in a hurry at the most lavish expense.... men were enrolled and sent half-trained into the field, material manufactured, transport provided, and accommodation for the sick and wounded devised and organised.' they went on to say that 'wars will be sudden in their commencement and short in their duration, and woe to that country which is unprepared to defend itself.' the above remarks will probably be sufficient to demonstrate the difficulty which the country had experienced over and over again, not only in maintaining its forces in the field during a campaign, but even in providing sufficient numbers for our garrisons at home and abroad in time of peace. but whatever may have been the merits or shortcomings of the arrangements up to , one point, at all events, was perfectly clear--that the army had no reserve. one or two feeble efforts in that direction had been made, but had failed. when a great war came upon us, the only resource was to try and stimulate recruiting by lowering the physical standard and by raising the bounties, so that often the campaign was over before the desired numbers had been obtained.[ ] the time, indeed, had fully come for a change of system. in march , mr. cardwell, speaking in the house of commons, indicated his intention of abolishing the plan of long enlistments, and the following year introduced the bill affirming the principle of short service and reserve. what he said was 'that in time of peace the army would feed the reserve, and in time of war the reserve would feed the army.' having confidence in the scheme, he boldly abolished the old costly system of bounty on enlistment. the principle, when first established, was tentative and optional, and naturally required time before a correct opinion could be formed of its progress; indeed, it is only within the last few years that the reserve has developed to its normal figure. the change was much criticised at the time, and it was confidently asserted that men would not care to engage for a short period; and that even were they to do so, the reserves would not be forthcoming if called out. no sooner, however, had the system been adopted than its success year by year became apparent. not only did the numbers enlisting largely increase, but the proportion of those selecting long service rapidly declined. then again, although the formation of a reserve was necessarily gradual, we have had two proofs of its reliable nature; the men composing it having been called out, first in under apprehension of war, and again partially in during the egyptian campaign; and in both cases the percentage of absentees was very small. i have already mentioned that during the last years of the long service system the average annual number of recruits was only , , whereas in no less than , men joined the army, and the reserve had in january reached the large figure of , . before leaving the subject of reserves, it will be as well to mention that lord cardwell, in , also gave effect to the militia act of , by which a certain number of men of that force, on receiving a small annual bounty, engage to join the regular army in case of war. this reserve now amounts to , , in addition to the numbers just quoted. these facts are undeniable proofs, not only of the popularity of the present arrangement, but also that the army can at once be largely augmented in case of necessity by men thoroughly trained and in the prime of life. there are, however, other satisfactory elements in the present system. the old feeling that the man who enlisted was virtually lost to his family is becoming a tradition of the past. in former times, as i have said, but few returned, and even they were often prematurely aged by long residence in unhealthy climates; whereas nowadays the men who come back to civil life are, on an average, little over twenty-six years old, and their numbers amount to more than , per annum, whilst their few years passed in the army have been beneficial in giving them habits of discipline and obedience. from a financial point of view--which, it is needless to say, is an important feature--the results are equally satisfactory. in the first place, the enormous sums formerly spent in bounties and levy money are now in a great measure saved. then, again, the pension list is decreasing. had the old plan continued, with the army at its present strength, the annual cost of pensions would have been nearly , , _l._ per annum. it will now gradually decrease to less than one-third of that amount. by an actuarial[ ] calculation it is estimated that, taking all charges into consideration, the economy of the present system over the old one will be a saving in the normal of · per cent. for great britain and of · for india. the above statements are made, not as mere matters of opinion, but as facts founded on official records and parliamentary reports; and afford proofs that whilst military service is more popular, and our strength and elasticity for war considerably greater than formerly, at the same time the annual cost is much less. it may, perhaps, be said that the army estimates are increasing; and my reply is that as the empire is expanding, it requires not only more men, but more numerous and costly armaments for defence, than in the past. even the results just quoted do not conclude the story. several other incidental advantages arise from the abandonment of long service, which may be shortly alluded to. many persons, for instance, appear to be under the impression that a large proportion of the men now serving are less efficient in point of age than formerly, but the evidence points the other way. the following are the ages of the non-commissioned officers and men serving in january and respectively.[ ] _proportion per , men_ +------+----------+-----------------+---------+-------+ | year | under | between & | over | total | +------+----------+-----------------+---------+-------+ | | | | | , | | | | | | , | +------+----------+-----------------+---------+-------+ the above figures are somewhat remarkable, as showing that the number of men of the most serviceable ages (that is, between and ) has largely increased since the introduction of short service; and i believe that experienced officers will concur with me that the army of is, in respect of age, superior to that of former days. then, again, in the consideration of the foreign duties which devolve on our forces, it is often urged that long service, at all events, is best adapted to meet indian requirements, on the two grounds that young soldiers cannot stand tropical climates and that frequent reliefs are costly. neither of these views will bear the test of examination. the report of the sanitary condition of the army in india said that 'upon the whole, early entry into india appears to be an advantage, not only at first, but in after life.'[ ] at a subsequent period, sir ranald martin stated that 'all statistical observations go to disprove anything like acclimatisation in the east indies.' on the contrary, he declares that 'disease and death increase with length of service and age.' dr. brydon also said: 'the death-rate of shows that the death-rate for the men above thirty has been consistently double that of men below that age.' lord airey's commission of [ ] quoted figures proving that the proportion of deaths, and of invalids sent home, increases in a rapid ratio with age. for instance, the number of deaths and invalids per , men on the average of ten years is-- deaths invalids under years old · · over and under · · the above figures indicate that men should be sent to india young, and not be kept there beyond a few years. if men, whose service in india is prolonged, die twice as fast after thirty as they do when under that age, it is evident that, as they must be replaced by drafts from home, even from a financial point of view such a system is not to be commended. so far from a short period not being adapted for india, it is the only one which ought to be allowed, on grounds alike of humanity, efficiency, and economy. there still remain a few other points, regarding the men serving in the present day, which are worthy of notice. the effects of the education act of have been very marked on the army. for instance, the proportion of men in the ranks of what is termed 'superior education' was in per thousand, whereas in it had risen to .[ ] again, as regards crime, in [ ] the proportion of courts-martial per thousand was , whereas in it was only . desertions also are steadily decreasing. in [ ] upwards of , men disappeared. in the net loss from desertion per thousand was . in it was .[ ] finally, there remains one more subject regarding the men in the army on which i would say a few words, and that is the marriage question. so long as a system of long service prevailed, a married establishment of only per cent. was recognised by the government. the virtual result was, that the great majority of men serving year after year were not allowed to marry; and this state of affairs was neither natural nor desirable, tending also to render military service unpopular. under the present system, as the great majority of the men only remain for a few years in the ranks, they are for the most part single, and on return to civil life can marry at will. the foregoing remarks will, i hope, be of some interest in indicating the beneficial effect of the changes introduced as regards service in the army by the late lord cardwell, when minister for war in . the men who now enter the ranks are probably of much the same class as formerly, but they serve under improved conditions; and whilst i believe that they retain all the enterprise and courage of those who preceded them, they are undoubtedly far better educated, and therefore to some extent require more discrimination in their treatment than formerly prevailed. footnotes: [footnote : clode's _military forces of the crown_, vol. ii., pp. - .] [footnote : _commissions on recruiting_, , p. xiii., and , p. x.] [footnote : _militia report of _, app. xvii., p. .] [footnote : _commission on recruiting_, , p. .] [footnote : _army return for ._] [footnote : see _commission on recruiting_, , p. iii.] [footnote : _actuarial war office report_, january .] [footnote : _annual army returns_, and .] [footnote : _sanitary condition of the army in india_, , p. xxxi.] [footnote : _lord airey's committee of _, p. .] [footnote : _army annual returns_, and .] [footnote : _army annual returns_, and .] [footnote : _recruiting commission of _, p. iii.] [footnote : _annual army return of ._] chapter xxiv localisation and county regiments.--interview with the emperor napoleon iii. another important measure introduced during the administration of the late lord cardwell was that of localisation. in the old days, when the infantry regiments were scattered all over the world, and for the most part consisted of single battalions, it had been the custom, on their proceeding abroad, to leave behind a small depot, which was constantly moved about in the united kingdom and obtained recruits as best it could, without regard to local ties or associations; so that, although many of the older regiments bore county titles, which had been given them so long ago as by king george the third, in reality men of the various counties and nationalities served together indiscriminately. field marshal conway, who was commander-in-chief at the time in question, specially stated that the object of the king was 'to create a mutual attachment between the county and the regiment, which may at all times be useful towards recruiting.' the scheme, however, for all practical purposes had no force or reality until . lord cardwell first of all established fixed depots in the counties, each representing two battalions; and thus not only engendered local ties, but also brought the regular army into permanent association with the militia and volunteers. in his speech in the house of commons in february he emphasised the desirability of combining our military institutions. he said: 'there is the standing army, with its historical association and glorious memories, and having a larger amount of foreign service than any other army in the world; there is the militia, whose theory is conscription, but whose practice is voluntary enlistment; and then there are the volunteers, who have most of the attributes of military life, and all the independence of the most perfect civil freedom. to combine these different institutions in one complete whole is, as i believe, the desire of the house of commons and of the english nation.' he quoted mr. pitt, who in spoke as follows: 'i am of opinion that to a regular army alone, however superior, however excellent, we ought not solely to trust; but that in a moment so eventful we ought to super-add to the regular army some permanent system of national defence.... the army must be the rallying point; the army must furnish example, must furnish instruction, must give us the principles on which that national system of defence must be formed; and by which the voluntary forces of this country, though in a military view inferior to a regular army, would, fighting on their own soil, for everything dear to individuals and important to a state, be invincible.' these quotations will, i think, give a general idea of the views which were uppermost in the mind of the minister for war when he gave vitality to the principle of localisation. the change, like many others, was criticised and somewhat retarded, and was not brought into full maturity until several years afterwards. in a committee on the militia, of which colonel stanley[ ] was chairman, however, gave the subject a fresh impetus. in their report they spoke strongly of the advantage of unity between the line and the militia, and said: 'we have no hesitation in replying that they should be constituent parts of one body.... we consider that this is best to be effected by their being treated as one regiment, such regiment bearing a territorial designation; the line battalions being the first and second, the militia the third and fourth, of such territorial regiment, the depot being common to all.' there was still hesitation and delay, but on mr. childers becoming minister for war in the recommendations of colonel stanley's committee were adopted, and are now in full force; and the beneficial results are becoming more apparent year by year. for instance, general sir edward bulwer, in his report on recruiting in ,[ ] stated 'that the number of men in infantry regiments, who were born in the district to which the regiment belongs, increases every year.' he also mentions, that upwards of , militiamen transferred their service to the regular army in the preceding twelve months. the most recent committee on army service, that of lord wantage of , speaks plainly on the subject. it says 'the evidence as to the value of the territorial connection is overwhelming;' and added, that the double battalion system is the most economical and best machinery for furnishing foreign drafts and reliefs.[ ] i might go on to allude to other measures connected with the army and its administration which were introduced by lord cardwell--to the vigour and influence which he imparted to the intelligence department, to the doubling the field artillery at home, to the rank of field officer given to captains of batteries, and so on--but it is perhaps hardly necessary. lord cardwell did not live to witness the results of some of his measures; but there was hardly a branch of the army which did not feel the benefit of his wise and far-seeing administration.[ ] in may i had an interesting interview with the late emperor napoleon iii. at chislehurst, only a few months before his death. during his career, he had always shown great interest in artillery questions, and had published works on the subject.[ ] in may he expressed a wish to see me, being desirous of discussing a plan for checking the recoil of guns, by means of water compressed within the bore. the nature of his proposal is contained in the following letter. [illustration: copy of sketch by napoleon iii.] camden place, chislehurst: mai . 'mon cher général,--il y aurait une expérience d'artillerie, assez intéressant à faire, et qui, si elle réussissait, pourrait diminuer le recul des grosses bouches à feu. il s'agirait comme dans le dessin cijoint de prendre un ancien canon, de forer au point a un trou d'un certain diamètre, de forer à un point b une lumière pour mettre le feu. la partie o près de la culasse serait remplie d'eau. on mettrait auparavant à k une rondelle à gutta-perka pour séparer la poudre de l'eau, et en chargeant le canon comme à l'ordinaire. 'en mettant le feu, à la charge, l'eau jaillirait en dehors par l'orifice a, et la force employée pour rejeter l'eau en dehors du canon diminuerait d'autant le recul. je ne prétends pas que ce système soit très pratique, mais il serait néanmoins assez intéressant de l'essayer. je vous confie cette idée pour que vous en fassiez l'usage que vous croirez convenable. je vous renouvelle, général, l'assurance de mes sentiments d'amitié. 'napolÉon. 'la question serait de savoir quelle est la quantité d'eau qu'il faudrait introduire dans le canon, et quel diamètre il faudrait donner à l'orifice.' during the interview, which lasted about half-an-hour, we were quite alone; and he made some pen-and-ink sketches, which he gave me, to illustrate his views. the proposal was ingenious, although it would probably be difficult to apply it in the field. the emperor also referred shortly to one or two incidents of the great war of , especially as to the employment of mitrailleurs; and i ventured to point out that, although of use against savage races, they had not, in my opinion, much future in a campaign against a modern army; as, although efficacious for short distances, they were of limited range and power, having neither shattering nor incendiary force, as compared to artillery, whilst they would add considerably to the impedimenta of troops in the field. i was particularly struck by the quiet unimpassioned way in which he alluded to the past; and he certainly appeared to bear his great reverses with fortitude and calm resignation. when the interview ended, i left with him at his request, a small pamphlet on rifled ordnance; and on returning it he sent me the following note: camden place, chislehurst: le mai, . 'je vous renvoie, général, avec mes remercîments, la brochure que vous avez bien voulu me prêter, et je vous prie de recevoir l'assurance de mes sentiments distingués. napolÉon.' monsieur le général adye, woolwich. subsequently, her majesty the empress eugénie was kind enough to present me with the emperor's work, 'organisation militaire,' dated 'wilhelmshoehe, ,' with her name inscribed upon it. it so happened that a few months before seeing the emperor napoleon i had had an opportunity of discussing the subject of mitrailleurs with general von blumenthal, who had been chief of the staff to the crown prince of germany during the war; and his views agreed with those i have just expressed. he said that the german soldiers at the outset were considerably impressed with the numerous batteries of mitrailleurs with which the french began the campaign of ; but they soon found out that their range was limited, and that by concentrating the distant fire of field guns upon them the mitrailleurs could not hold their ground, but were driven off the field. prince frederick charles said 'that for near ranges he would rather have ten good riflemen; for far ranges a field gun.' footnotes: [footnote : now earl of derby.] [footnote : _report of inspector-general of recruiting_, .] [footnote : _report of lord wantage's committee_, pp. and .] [footnote : an important reform carried out by lord cardwell was that of the abolition of purchase; but i do not propose to enter into the question, as it had been virtually decided before i entered the war office.] [footnote : one of his works is entitled _a new system of field artillery_, by louis napoleon bonaparte, .] chapter xxv visit to the crimea with charles gordon. report on the cemeteries in the autumn of i was sent by the government to the crimea, to report on the condition of the british cemeteries and monuments, and also as to their restoration and care for the future. colonel charles gordon (of khartoum), an old friend of mine, was associated with me in the work. he was at that time a member of the international commission for improving the navigation at the mouth of the danube. travelling rapidly through europe, i met him at galatz at the end of august; and we embarked on board h.m.s. 'antelope,' which had been sent from constantinople to convey us across the black sea. gordon's views about the work of the danube commission were, as usual, rather peculiar. he explained to me that, as the river had been adequately dredged and buoyed, and as the lighthouse at its mouth was completed, there was really nothing more to do; and that the commission was practically useless. as i understood, he had written to the foreign office to that effect, adding also that his salary was too large. in the ordinary concerns of life he was actuated by one principle which is rare--namely, a contempt for the accumulation of money. in fact, he gave it away almost as fast as he received it. his experience in eastern countries, also, had given him a distrust of pashas and men in high places; and all his sympathies were for the poor and friendless. soon after our visit to the crimea he was appointed governor-general of the soudan, and it is said that at an interview with ismail pasha before starting for khartoum he objected to the large amount of his salary, as being more than necessary; and when he left, the khedive remarked: 'what an extraordinary englishman! he doesn't want money!' on leaving galatz, we went first of all to odessa, to call on general kotzebue, the governor-general of southern russia, who, however, was unfortunately absent; but we had an opportunity of meeting, and of receiving assistance from him later on. indeed, during the whole of our visit to the crimea, every attention was paid to us by the authorities; and two russian officers were specially detailed to accompany and assist us in our investigations. we arrived at sebastopol on august , and found the city in ruins, and almost exactly in the same condition as when the allied armies had left it seventeen years before. the churches, barracks, theatres, and store-houses were all roofless; and the malakoff, redan, and other defences mere crumbling earthworks. all was so quiet and still, and such a contrast to the stirring times of the years gone by, in the hardships and vicissitudes of which gordon and myself had shared. we seemed to know every inch of the ground, and for many days wandered about, taking notes of the various cemeteries, great and small, scattered over the country. although comparatively few officers and men remain of all those who took part in the great crimean war of forty years ago, its reminiscences will still, no doubt, be of interest to many in the present day; and i will therefore quote some extracts from the report made by gordon and myself on our return home:[ ] 'from the day of our arrival until september , we were engaged many hours each day in making a careful inspection of every cemetery and memorial of the british army in the vicinity of sebastopol.' 'it will be remembered that after the battle of the alma the allies marched on sebastopol, and in consequence of their long detention before that city the great body of the british army did not move again during the war, but remained encamped on the plateau on the south side; consequently, with the exception of a few monuments at the alma and at kertch, the whole of the cemeteries, one hundred and thirty in number, are to be found on the ground which extends from sebastopol to balaclava, and from kamiesch to the tchernaya.' 'the cemeteries vary much both in their position and size. some are in the rocky ravines leading down to the trenches, whilst others are on the hills and downs which surround balaclava. some lie in the sheltered valleys about kadikoi and karani; but by far the greater number extend along the bare plateau in front of the city, upon which the army so long remained encamped; and pre-eminent among them is that on cathcart's hill, distinguished alike by its commanding central position and by the numerous monuments it contains, many of them to officers of high rank and distinction.'[ ] 'the cemeteries also differ considerably in the number of graves and monuments which they relatively contain. some are large, with hundreds of graves, and many inscribed tablets and crosses; others in isolated spots with only a few. a considerable number contain no monuments whatever. the majority are those to officers; but there are also many to soldiers, and a few to women, nurses, or the wives of soldiers.' 'a small proportion of the monuments have been erected since the termination of the war. some are of marble, but as a rule they are of the soft stone found upon the spot. they were for the most part hurriedly erected toward the end of the campaign, often by unskilful hands, without sufficient foundations, and with slightly cut inscriptions. originally there were also a considerable number of wooden crosses. under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, exposed to the vicissitudes of climate, especially to the rigour of crimean winters, a large number of them have perished, and almost all of those remaining show signs of weather and decay.' 'the walls which enclose the cemeteries were in the first instance roughly built, without mortar or foundations, and of the loose uncut stones in the neighbourhood. time and weather have led to their rapid decay, and the shepherds have occasionally hastened the destruction by making entrances for their flocks.' 'we endeavoured to visit every cemetery and memorial of which we could find a record; the total number in the neighbourhood of sebastopol and balaclava amounting to .[ ] the farm-house which was so long the head-quarters of the british army is well cared for, and in good preservation; and in the room in which lord raglan died a marble slab has been inserted in the wall, with the following inscription: "in this room died field-marshal lord raglan, g.c.b., commander-in-chief of the british army in the crimea, june , ."' 'the circumstances of the french army were very similar to our own, and they had numerous cemeteries widely dispersed from kamiesch to baidar. feeling the inconvenience and difficulty as regards their care and preservation which have so long perplexed ourselves, they determined to disinter the remains of their officers and men, and to remove them to one central spot near the former french head-quarters. this arrangement was carried out in , each cemetery being denuded of its dead, and then abandoned. about , bodies are said to have been removed; those of the officers having been as far as possible identified.' ... 'although a course similar to that followed by the french has been from time to time advocated, with regard to the remains of our officers and men, it does not appear to colonel gordon and myself that any general disinterment or removal is necessary or even desirable. independently of the difficulty, it might almost be called impossibility, after the lapse of so many years, of collecting the remains or of in any way identifying them, we believe that it would be repugnant to the feelings of the army and of the british public generally that any such plan should be attempted. our officers and men were buried by their comrades on the ground where they fell; the whole scene is sacred and historical; and the remains of the dead should not be disturbed. as regards the cemeteries generally, our view is that those which contain no monuments should be covered with mounds of earth and turf, and that the ruined walls should be removed.' ... 'we are of opinion that the larger cemeteries, which contain numerous mementoes and tombstones, should be preserved, a substantial wall being built round them, and that all monuments, tablets, and crosses should be repaired and the inscriptions renewed. the three memorial obelisks at inkerman, balaclava, and the redan, should be protected by a good wall, with a substantial railing....' these extracts will probably suffice as a general view of the condition of the british cemeteries in the crimea at the time of our visit, and of the proposals for their restoration, which were subsequently adopted and carried out by the government. the cost was estimated at , _l._ leaving sebastopol in the 'antelope,' we called at yalta, and had an interview with general kotzebue, who was much interested in our work, and anxious that the british memorials should be respected, at the same time pointing out the difficulty of adequately guarding so large a number. the late empress of russia was at the time residing at the palace of livadia at yalta, and sent us a kind message, regretting her inability owing to illness to receive us, and wishing us _bon voyage_. having paid a short visit to kertch and yenikale, at the entrance of the sea of azoff, we then returned to constantinople, and were immediately, for some inscrutable reason, placed in quarantine for a week, although we were all perfectly well. as soon as we were free, the british ambassador, sir henry elliot, kindly received us for a few days at his palace at therapia, on the bosphorus; and at his request, i paid a visit, accompanied by an interpreter, to the grand vizier, midhat pasha, who was anxious to discuss the turkish armaments and defences. i had previously inspected the arsenal and manufacturing departments; and frankly told him that they were in considerable confusion, and that a great deal of money had apparently been wasted in the purchase of second-rate half-obsolete material, partly on the continent and partly in america; and that, in view of the rapid advances in the science of artillery, and in small arms, i advised prudence and economy. he listened attentively, and his reply was 'pekki,' which i found meant approbation (literally, 'very good'); and went on to say, that the lavish expenditure had been incurred by his predecessors, but that he would be careful. he then alluded to the defence of constantinople against naval attack; and i pointed out that, considering the comparative narrowness of the bosphorus, it offered great facilities for the employment of ground torpedoes. midhat pasha was apparently ignorant on the subject, so i explained as lucidly as possible that a torpedo was a case of gunpowder, which, placed at the bottom of the channel, could be exploded by electricity as the enemy's vessel passed over it; and that such defence was simple, efficient, and cheap. this gave him much satisfaction, and he replied, 'pekki, pekki,' with great fervour. i heard afterwards that he had been pleased with the interview, and especially with my economical views. he had, however, no opportunity of acting on them, having been dismissed from office almost immediately afterwards. having taken leave of gordon, who returned to his improvements on the danube, i then proceeded to smyrna, where a few british tombs and memorials of the war existed; and on my arrival called on the british consul, who lived in a charming house overlooking the bay. on expressing my admiration of his residence, the consul's wife explained that there was a difficulty in keeping it in order, on account of incessant earthquakes; although lately they had been more free from them. hardly had i returned to the hotel than i heard a rumbling noise. then the whole house commenced rocking violently to and fro, and it became evident that the overdue earthquake had arrived. fortunately not much damage was done. during my stay at smyrna i paid a visit to ephesus, meeting mr. wood, who had been sent out by the authorities of the british museum, and was excavating the recently discovered ruins of the temple of diana. my duties, however, required me to return home; and travelling through france, i took an opportunity, when at paris, of sketching ruins of a very different character--those of the tuileries, on which were inscribed in large letters, 'liberté--egalité--fraternité.' on arriving in england i was invited by mr. lowe, the chancellor of the exchequer, to call in downing street to discuss the purport of my report. the conversation began by his inquiring, somewhat abruptly, whether i considered it one of the duties of the british government to keep in repair the cemeteries and monuments of the army in all parts of the world. my reply was that i had never considered so wide and interesting a question, but had limited myself simply to those in the crimea. he at once said, that the report was sensible enough, involved no great expenditure, and should be carried out; and so we amicably left the main problem unsolved. [illustration: ruins of the tuileries, november _liberté--egalité--fraternité_] subsequently i sent a few copies of the report and some photographs to those who had assisted us at sebastopol; and one of the russian officers sent me a reply, which, although not altogether perfect in its english, is very friendly in its tone: 'my general,--i have the honour to accept your lovely letter, with the photographie of mitrailleuse, and i your transport my deep thanksgiving. i observe of your letter, that you forget not sebastopol and cemetery, who to ask by repair. your report of british cemetery i have forward of general kotzebue, and if you possess one copy, take my,' &c. footnotes: [footnote : _report on the crimean cemeteries_, december .] [footnote : we found no less than graves of english officers on cathcart's hill, including those of generals sir george cathcart, fox-strangways, goldie, and sir john campbell.] [footnote : to those persons who had relations or friends buried during the crimean war, it may be interesting to know that, in the report of details are given of all the names found on the various tombstones.] chapter xxvi rifled ordnance and naval and military reserves--appointed governor, royal military academy--the british army in one of the most important and interesting subjects connected with the navy and army of late years, and with the changes in which i was at one time much associated, is that of the gradual advance of modern armaments, not only in size, but in range, power, and accuracy. until forty years ago the science of artillery had practically remained stagnant ever since the time of the tudors. indeed, it may be said that the guns used during the crimean war, although less cumbersome, were in all essential particulars much of the same type as those of the days of queen elizabeth. the introduction, however, of rifled small-arms, and of armour-plating for vessels of war, indicated the necessity of improved ordnance; and what may almost be termed a revolution commenced, which has had many vicissitudes, and even now has hardly reached its final solution. it was in that lord armstrong first took up the subject, of which he has ever since been acknowledged as one of the chief authorities. he has also rendered good service in the establishment of a manufacturing arsenal at elswick, which, in the event of a great war, would become of national advantage. the first rifled breech-loading guns of his pattern were adopted in , and gave results in range and accuracy far beyond anything that had hitherto been achieved. they were followed by the introduction of others of a larger calibre; and so enthusiastic were the navy and artillery, that many of our vessels of war and fortresses were speedily supplied with them. between and , two millions and a half sterling were expended on new armaments. notwithstanding their great success and superiority, however, they developed considerable defects in regard to breech mechanism; and numerous accidents occurred both by sea and land, due in a measure to want of skill in their handling. it became evident from experience in the war in china in , and in japan in - , that they were somewhat delicate weapons.[ ] in the armstrong and whitworth competition took place, in which both firms were represented on the committee; and after lengthened trials they reported[ ] in that the breech-loading system was inferior for purposes of war to that of muzzle-loading, and was more expensive. other experiments followed, leading to a similar conclusion, and as a consequence the latter was adopted, and continued in force for many years; the guns rising rapidly in size and in weight from five up to one hundred tons. in a committee of thirteen artillery officers, under the late field-marshal sir richard dacres, inquired into the subject as regards field guns, and reported unanimously in favour of muzzle-loaders. in the admiralty were asked whether they wished the subject re-opened as regards naval guns, but they declined. having served in india from to , i had, of course, no practical knowledge of the earlier stages of this difficult and much-debated subject; but on becoming director of artillery in , i found that the two services were in practical unanimity as to the advantages of the rifled muzzle-loading system--that it was simpler, better adapted for war, and cheaper than the other. in the admiralty were again consulted on the question, but with the same result as before. in that year, a german -pounder breech-loading field gun was obtained for comparison with our own; and after a long series of trials the committee reported that the english gun was superior, not only in simplicity, but in range and power, and in rapidity of fire.[ ] it was also known that during the great war of upwards of two hundred german guns had become unserviceable. all experience, therefore, appeared at the time to point in one direction; but a change gradually arose, the causes of which were partly scientific, partly mechanical. whilst the attention of experts was engaged in the effort to produce the best gun, it ultimately proved that the real solution rested not so much with the weapon as with the motive power which gives life and force to the projectile. the question of gunpowder had until about remained much in the same stagnant, neglected condition as that of ordnance. long and careful researches were, however, carried out at that time, chiefly by sir andrew noble and sir frederick abel, which led to the introduction of a comparatively mild and slow-burning explosive, and finally determined the system of gun-construction. in the first place, owing to its gradual combustion, the excessive strain on the breech mechanism was much diminished; and further, as an improved system of closing had been adopted, the difficulties, and the accidents at critical moments, which had been so perplexing, were in a great measure at an end. that was one important result; but there was a second. as the explosion was no longer instantaneous, but comparatively gradual, it followed that larger charges could be employed, and in order to utilise them greater length of bore became necessary, as, within limits, the longer the gun the greater the initial velocity and consequent range and power. these altered conditions were manifestly both in favour of breech-loading, not so much as a matter of principle, but of convenience. sir andrew noble, in writing to me on the subject in , said: 'as regards the effects to be produced from a gun, precisely the same results can be attained, whether it be made in the form of a muzzle or a breech-loader. there is no magic, as many seem to imagine, in one form or the other.... as regards convenience in using, there may be, and undoubtedly are, differences.' between and experiments were somewhat slowly carried out, with a view to re-introducing breech-loading. having been appointed surveyor-general of the ordnance in the latter year, i advised that the experiments should be pushed on vigorously, and on a larger scale. the adoption of steel, to the exclusion of wrought iron, in the construction of guns, was another important change about to take place; and, with a view to a full consideration of these great questions, mr. childers in re-established a permanent ordnance committee, which for some reason had been abolished in . the main principles thus established, the naval and military armaments have since proceeded uninterruptedly. many improvements, especially as regards quick firing, have recently been introduced; and we have every reason to believe that they are fully equal in all respects to those of any other nation. that this subject has been a difficult and an anxious one is evident. lord armstrong, in his address to the civil engineers in , said: 'all breech-loading mechanism is of a nature to require very accurate fittings, and require care both in use and for preservation.' again, in a work published as late as by commander lloyd, r.n., and mr. a. hadcock, late r.a., of the elswick establishment, they say 'that it has taken all the ingenuity, backed by all the mechanical resources of the present day, to obtain a satisfactory breech-loading arrangement.'[ ] the whole question is extremely technical; but i have endeavoured to give an outline of its broad characteristics; and it is evident that the consideration of so vital a question requires a permanent committee of naval and artillery officers, and of scientific civil engineers; we may then feel confidence that the requirements of the two services will be adequately dealt with. even the placid and scientific temperament of an ordnance committee may, however, occasionally be subject to a severe strain. many years ago, a proposal was submitted by some inventor that a small gun, strapped broadside across a horse's back, and fired from that position, would be useful, especially in mountain campaigns. the experiment was made in the arsenal at woolwich, the horse's head being tied to a post, with the muzzle of the gun pointed to an old earthen butt; the committee standing on the other side of the horse to watch the result. the gun was loaded, and, in order to give time, a slow-burning fuse was used to fire it. the committee, however, in tying the animal's head, had omitted to take the precaution of also making fast its tail. the first result was that, when the horse heard the fizzing of the fuse on its back, it became uneasy and walked round the post, so that the gun, instead of pointing at the butt, was thus directed straight at the heads of the committee. not a moment was to be lost; down went the chairman and members, lying flat and low on their stomachs. the gun went off; the shot passed over the town of woolwich, and fell in the dockyard; the horse being found lying on its back several yards away. the committee were fortunately unhurt, and gradually recovered their equilibrium, but reported unanimously against any further trial. _armaments and reserves._--amongst the many subjects which constantly occupy the attention of the war department is the provision of adequate reserves of armaments, small arms, gunpowder, accoutrements, camp equipage, harness, clothing, and the numerous engineer, medical, and commissariat stores which have to be maintained in readiness for war, not only in the united kingdom, but at our stations in various parts of the world. the great majority of these reserves are required for both the fighting services; and until recently have been provided and cared for by the war office, acting in co-operation with the admiralty. the subject is not only complex, but very little is known by the public as to its administration and cost. formerly, the provision of these costly armaments and stores rested with the ordnance department; and, as the successive master generals were men of the highest distinction and experience in war, the country had a guarantee that the national requirements would be duly considered and maintained. as the duke of wellington wrote in , 'the ordnance department and the office of master general is constituted for the service of the navy as well as that of the army.' it is not necessary, nor indeed would it be proper, to give details of the amount of these various reserves, which, of course, have been modified and increased from time to time according to circumstances. it may be sufficient to say that in [ ] their value was reckoned as being upwards of eleven millions sterling; and since that date has undoubtedly risen, partly from the increased cost of modern armaments and appliances, and partly from the additional requirements of our enlarged empire. it is sometimes asserted that, owing to financial pressure, or to false ideas of economy, the maintenance of these essential requisites for defence is apt to be starved and neglected. my experience does not confirm this view. having served at the war office for years, under three ministers of war, statesmen of divergent political views, i have found them all of one mind as to the necessary provision year by year of sufficient funds for the purpose. naturally and properly they looked into the details. the estimates are presented to parliament annually, and no reluctance is shown to vote the requisite supplies. indeed, there are many influences in the house of commons which rather tend the other way--that is, to extravagance. an unfortunate change, however, was made a few years ago--namely, in the separation of the naval and military reserves at home and abroad; and duplicate establishments, store-houses, and staff, now exist, which are leading to increased cost, some loss of efficiency, and eventually to diversity of patterns. as a great naval, military, and colonial power, with fleets, fortresses, and depôts all over the world, it seems apparent that, both in regard to efficiency and economy, unity of system is essential. not only the great duke of wellington, but successive master generals of ordnance, concurred in this view, and agreed that the ordnance was an efficient department of the state,[ ] and should hold the reserves of both services. according to my judgment, we should revert at once to the former arrangements, and indeed, should war unfortunately arise, we should in all probability be compelled to do so. having been appointed governor of the royal military academy at woolwich in july , i left the war office, and did so with much regret. although, as i have tried to explain, its system of administration is not altogether adapted to meet the requirements of parliamentary government, and although in some respects the navy and army are not in such close association as seems desirable, still these defects are capable of remedy, and, at all events, are in no way attributable to the chiefs of the various departments, military and civil, of the war office, who are men of the highest character and experience, and who carry out very difficult duties with loyalty and success, even under a somewhat imperfect system. during my five years of office as director of artillery, the following sovereigns and foreign princes visited the manufacturing departments of the arsenal: the late emperor alexander ii. of russia--the late emperor napoleon iii.--the late emperor of brazil--the late grand duke constantine of russia--the late comte de paris--and the shah of persia. some years after the inspection of the arsenal by the shah he paid a second visit to england, in , and i had then an interesting interview with him at lord armstrong's in northumberland. having heard that i had served in india, the shah came up during the evening and alluded to our position on the north-west frontier. it must be understood that the conversation was entirely through a persian interpreter, the shah knowing only a few english words. he discussed the subject in a very sensible manner, and said we should avoid entering into war with the afghans, and should endeavour to keep on terms of friendship with the ameer at cabul; to which i cordially assented. looking about the room, and seeing a general officer at some distance, he inquired: 'who is that great man in a red coat?' i replied that it was sir edward blackett, high sheriff of the county. perhaps that did not convey much to his mind, so i said to the interpreter: 'tell the shah that five and thirty years ago, sir edward was in the crimean war, and one day a shot came and took off his leg.' the shah threw up his hands and was much impressed, but presently the interpreter said that his majesty couldn't understand it, as he had two legs now. 'that is quite correct,' i observed; 'but tell the shah that one of them is made of wood.' his majesty said at once: 'i must go and talk to that great man.' he went up to sir edward, and remarked: 'you lost your leg in the crimea?' to which blackett assented. 'ah,' says the shah, 'i remember. it was in the same battle that lord raglan lost his arm!' the late emperor of brazil also paid a second visit to england, after he was dethroned, and on one occasion was shown a wheel by lord armstrong, which by some scientific arrangement made rapid revolutions, and he remarked: 'how very interesting. its revolutions appear to me to be quicker even than those in south america.' the record of the royal military academy during my period of command was like that of a nation without a history. as the governor has been invested of late years with adequate power, and is assisted by a competent staff, civil and military, he has only himself to blame if its administration is not successful. the two hundred gentlemen cadets, youths just rising to manhood, no doubt require tact and discretion in those having authority over them; but if they are treated with confidence and kindness, we may feel assured that no real difficulties will arise. indeed, during my period of office, speaking generally, the conduct of the cadets was admirable throughout; and it is a gratification to me to know that many of those who were then at the institution are now becoming distinguished as officers of artillery and engineers. as regards education, the cadets, in my opinion, have too many subjects imposed upon them during their two years' residence at woolwich. in addition to following up their previous studies in mathematics, french, and german, they have to learn artillery, fortification, military surveying, landscape drawing, chemistry, military history, riding, gymnastics, and drills of all kinds. there is, however, another point, not due to any defect in the regulations, which injuriously affects candidates for the military colleges--namely, the apathy of many of the great public schools, in not teaching the boys who may desire to follow a military career the subjects which are held to be essential to the profession. the result is that a large proportion of those who go up for the competitive examinations are compelled to leave the colleges at a critical period, and to be hastily educated by special teachers. unjust criticisms are often made on what are commonly called the 'crammers,' whilst the real fault lies elsewhere; and if those in authority at the public schools would take more pains to have the boys educated for the profession in which they are ultimately to serve, the army and other branches of the public service would reap the benefit. during the year , the late mr. john holms, then member of parliament for hackney, constituted himself a vigorous critic of the army reforms which had been instituted by lord cardwell, and also put forward a distinct plan of his own of military organisation. his view was that we should maintain three separate armies--one for home, a second for the colonies, and a third for india--all recruited and organised on different systems. it is not necessary now to discuss these proposals; but as his criticisms at the time attracted some attention, i was asked by lord cardwell in to publish a short reply; and as soon as it was ready he gave me a letter of introduction to the late mr. john murray, the well-known publisher of albemarle street, with a view to his bringing it out. when mr. murray had read lord cardwell's note, he turned to me and said: 'so you wish to publish a pamphlet--why, an archangel wouldn't read a pamphlet!' my reply was that we were not thinking so much at the present moment of archangels, as of members of parliament and others, who were of quite a different class. the argument was so conclusive that he published the article in the course of a few days, and it may, perhaps, to some extent have accomplished the intended object.[ ] at all events, i received many letters of approval of its contents, and amongst others, the following from my old friend the late lord airey, who had been governor of gibraltar:-- 'lowndes square, march . 'my dear adye,--you were so kind as to send me and ask me to read your reply to mr. holms. when i was at gibraltar, drummond hay, our minister at the court of morocco, sent me over the grand vizier and the commander-in-chief of the moorish army. 'they were solemn, silent, but not unobservant parties. amongst other things, i showed them some long-range seaward artillery practice. when they saw the little flag shot down two or three times, they turned to me, and simply said, "the spaniards may go to bed!" i think mr. holms may go to bed. 'yours truly, my dear adye, 'richard airey.' i also received the following letter from mr. gladstone:-- 'september . 'dear sir john adye,--amidst a great pressure and many interruptions, i have been able to gather very interesting information from your valuable pamphlet. for the last three years my attention to current public questions has been much relaxed, while the work of dilapidation incident to an unrefreshed memory has gone on. i do not now recollect as i ought, the precise terms of the present contract of the soldier with regard to the three years, which i have been accustomed to regard as the proper term of short service. to reaching that term for the british army, i attach (ignorantly) a great value, with this idea among others, that it will very greatly popularise the service, besides its favourable bearing on the question of marriage. 'it will be a great pleasure as well as advantage to me, if i should have an opportunity of resuming the conversation which we began under lord sydney's hospitable roof. 'believe me, faithfully yours, 'w.e. gladstone.' footnotes: [footnote : _treatise on construction of ordnance_, .] [footnote : _textbook on rifled ordnance_, .] [footnote : _treatise on construction of ordnance_, .] [footnote : _artillery, its progress and present position_, . by commander lloyd, r.n., and a.c. hadcock, late r.a.] [footnote : clode's _military forces of the crown_, ii. .] [footnote : see appendix to fifth report of committee of house of commons on army and navy estimates, , in which correspondence is quoted between the treasury, war office, and admiralty, confirming the above views.] [footnote : _the british army in : a reply to mr. john holms, m.p._] chapter xxvii central asia and the afghan war of - the gradual advance of russia, and its conquest of the ancient principalities of central asia during the present century, have from time to time formed subjects of great interest to the people of this country, chiefly on account of the possible effect of the russian approach to the borders of our indian empire; and, having studied the question for many years, i propose to give a short summary of its rise, progress, and present position, more especially from a military point of view. at the beginning of the century, the southern boundary of russia extended from the north of the caspian by orenburg and orsk, and then across to the old mongolian city of semipalatinsk, and was guarded by a cordon of forts and cossack outposts. this line was no less than , miles in length, and abutted on the great kirghis steppe, and to a certain extent controlled the tribes pasturing in its vicinity, but by no means established the hold of russia on that pathless, and for the most part lifeless waste. nevertheless, even in those early days, we experienced occasional alarms from imaginary invasions of our eastern possessions. in we were threatened with a joint attack of the french, persian, and afghan armies; but finally we made a treaty with the shah, in which it was stipulated that 'should an army of the french nation, actuated by design and deceit,' attempt to establish themselves in persia, a conjoint force of english and persians should be appointed to put an end to them. in , another great expedition against the east india company's possessions was planned--on paper--between napoleon and the emperor alexander of russia; but this danger was also averted by a second treaty at teheran in , in which the shah covenanted 'not to permit any european force whatever to pass through persia.' again, for a third time, in , we were supposed to be threatened by a combined attack of persians, russians, and afghans, of which kaye gives the following account: 'it was believed,' he says, 'that the danger was great and imminent. there was a persian army, under the command of the king of kings himself, investing herat, and threatening to march upon candahar and cabul. there were russian diplomatists and russian engineers in his camp, directing the councils of the shah and the operations of the siege. the barukzye sirdars of afghanistan were intriguing with the persian court; and far out in the distance, beyond the mountains of the hindoo koosh, there was the shadow of a great northern army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweeping across the wilds and deserts of central asia towards the frontier of hindostan.'[ ] all these shadows, however, passed harmlessly away; and the so-called great northern army, as we now know, but as we did not know then, was the russian column of perofski, consisting of a few thousand men, which had left orenburg with a view to chastise the khan of khiva, and which perished from famine and pestilence in the snowy wastes of the barsuk desert, north of the aral. it was not until , contemporaneously with our final conquest of the punjab, that the russian advances in central asia assumed an important aspect. she had held nominal sway since over the kirghis tribes in the western division of the great steppe; but, except in the vicinity of orenburg, had little real control. in - , however, russia erected three fortresses in the heart of the steppe--thus forming a connecting link with the sir daria--and established fort aralsk, near the embouchure of the river. the russians having thus crossed the great desert, came permanently into contact with the three khanates of central asia, and their progress and conquests since that date have been comparatively easy and rapid. the principalities had no military strength which could long withstand the advance of a great power, and the russians are now predominant in that part of the world, and are masters on the aral and caspian seas. drawing a line from east to west, their outposts are dotted along the crests of the tian-shan mountains, looking down on kashgar; in the centre their frontier touches the outlying provinces of afghanistan which lie to the north of the hindoo koosh; whilst on the west their possessions run along the border of persia. what we have to consider, therefore, is the fact that a great power, within the last forty or fifty years, has virtually advanced its old frontier for many hundred miles southwards, rapidly overrunning the country like a tidal wave over sands; absorbing decaying principalities, establishing forts at strategic points, taking possession of inland seas, routes, and river communications, until its frontier posts not only approach our own, but are on the confines of countries with which we are closely associated, and some of which are more or less under our direct influence and control. her long line of frontier is devious, and not always perfectly defined; it wanders along the crests of mountains, is marked sometimes by the course of rivers, and occasionally almost lost in pathless deserts. so far as the principalities themselves are concerned, it is admitted that their conquest by russia is an unmixed blessing to the inhabitants. in their bare outline these changes are certainly matters of interest to us; but they do not necessarily constitute a great danger. there is undoubtedly a difference between the present and the past. the military forces of a great power are now in comparative proximity to our indian empire, and hold ground formerly in possession of governments which, although usually unfriendly, had no real means of injuring us. we need not now discuss the causes of russian activity; whether they have been the result of the apocryphal will of peter the great, or of the military restlessness and ambition of her generals on the spot, or the inevitable consequence of collision with half-civilised decaying states. what we have to consider is the effect on our position in india. perhaps the most striking feature is the vast extent of country absorbed by russia. from orenburg in the north to samarcand in the south is more than , miles in a straight line, and from the caspian to kuldja, west to east, about , miles. increased military power is not, however, a necessary result of extended dominion. the annexation of a country well peopled, fertile, rich, and civilised, and whose inhabitants are in accord with their new rulers, may give a great accession of strength, but when none of these conditions are fulfilled, conquest may lead to military weakness. the population of central asia is not only extremely sparse, but, owing to extensive deserts and to the vicissitudes of climate, many of the tribes are nomadic in their habits. the whole population is estimated not to exceed four millions and a half. when we consider that our empire of india, which approximately is of about the same geographical area as russian central asia, contains a population of over millions, we have at once a striking example presented to us of the difference of the two regions. the power of conducting military operations on a great scale depends not only on the resources of the country to be traversed as regards supplies of food, pasture, fuel, and water, but also on facilities of communication and transport. in discussing, therefore, the possible future danger to our eastern possessions from a further advance of russia, the sterility and general characteristics of the country in which she has established herself, and also the great distance of her troops from the main resources of the empire, become important elements for consideration. war is a science which depends for its success not only on the courage of well armed, disciplined hosts, and of skilled generals as leaders, but also on the means of rapid concentration and of bringing up reserves of munitions and _matériel_. modern armies are specially tied by such considerations. now central asia is exceptionally deficient in all these essential requirements, and these conditions are abiding. it therefore forms a very weak base of operations against a great empire like india, whose general characteristics are of an exactly contrary character; and although the construction in recent years of a railway from the caspian to samarcand will to a certain extent give facility for transport, still it will not in itself alter the general features of the pathless deserts of which the greater part of the country consists. between the recently conquered provinces of russia and our empire of india lies the mountainous country of afghanistan, inhabited by warlike tribes of brave, fanatical mohammedans who certainly have no love for russia. in a geographical and indeed in every sense, it is laid out, as it were, as the natural frontier of an empire. all along its northern provinces stands the snow-capped range of the hindoo koosh, stretching away from east to west: a line of mountains between , and , feet high, with few practicable passes, and even these are closed in winter. it thus presents for the greater part of its length a natural barrier against aggression, which a few military works at the passes would render impregnable. even as far west as herat, the ranges to the north of it are several thousand feet high. but this is not all. the great ridges which run away in a south-westerly direction from the hindoo koosh, and which, enclosing long narrow valleys of limited fertility, form the greater part of afghanistan--all these present a series of additional natural defences. afghanistan resembles switzerland, but its mountains are higher, its defiles more difficult, its resources very scanty, and it has no roads properly so called; so that an enemy advancing from the north can only come in any force by one route--that is, by skirting the successive ridges where they sink into the southern deserts. it is indeed remarkable that india is surrounded for hundreds of miles to the north-west by a vast zone of barren country, including afghanistan, persia, and the principalities; territories unequalled perhaps in the world for their misery and desolation; but which, regarded from a purely military point of view, offer a great impediment to projects of invasion. the afghans are poor, but brave, hardy, fanatical, and no doubt somewhat turbulent. they hate all intruders. in former days the hordes of asia, composed chiefly of cavalry, could disregard bases of support and supply, and, being unencumbered with siege trains or other modern appliances, could sally out from these desert wastes, and, braving all risks, overflow the comparatively rich fertile plains of india. but all such incursions are now happily impossible. circumstances have entirely altered. modern science has so expanded the means of defence that armies of invasion must necessarily bring with them a corresponding power; and this entails vast encumbrances, numerous depôts, good roads, and safe communications. it now becomes time to consider the military position of our empire in india, and here we are met at once by conditions the very opposite of those i have described as prevailing in central asia. whilst russia has been engaged for many years past in the almost futile effort of establishing her power amongst the remains of decaying principalities, and of introducing civilisation in regions where almost every element of prosperity is deficient, we have also consolidated our empire in the east. order now reigns in india in place of anarchy, the government of the law has replaced that of the sword, and provinces formerly almost depopulated by depredations and misrule have become fertile and prosperous. life is safe, and religion and property respected. the value of land has increased; great commercial cities have arisen and trade flourishes.[ ] good civil government, in causing contentment to the people and in developing the resources of the country, gives vast additional strength to our military power. in addition to the british troops, we maintain highly efficient armies recruited from the many martial races under our rule, and are able to increase them almost at will. at the same time, the improved means of communication by railways, roads, and rivers enable us to concentrate our forces, supplies, and munitions with comparative ease. it may seem almost unnecessary to dwell upon facts so well known; but judging from much of what we often hear and read, the enormous latent strength we possess in india appears not to be fully appreciated. we hold a central position of great concentration and power, whilst that of russia is necessarily much the opposite; so even were the two empires in contact, the danger would not be on our side. we are the great and predominant naval and military power in the east, and russia is comparatively the weak one; and there is nothing in the present aspect and condition of affairs likely to cause any important alteration in these respects. russia may not have the wish to attack us in india, but she has not the power, which is a far more important consideration. but the two empires are not in contact, or near it. the most advanced cossack outpost on the murghab is several hundred miles from the indus; so that, far as the russians have already advanced, and far removed as their outposts are from the bases of supply, they have still a whole continent of very difficult country to traverse before they would even be in sight of our frontier river and of the plains of india. the views on this important question which i had formed and published years ago, were fully confirmed in by sir west ridgeway, who was our representative at the joint commission, which, between and , finally marked out the northern frontier of afghanistan; and who, from his position and the accurate knowledge he obtained of the country, was able to give an authoritative opinion. he wrote: 'if any russian general were so reckless as to attempt the invasion of india, and, relying on the single line of lightly constructed rails which connect the caspian with the oxus--and which are liable in summer to be blocked by the moving sands of the desert, and in winter by the falling snows of heaven--if, relying on this frail and precarious base, he were to move an army through the barren plains bordering the oxus, and, leaving in his rear the various hostile and excited races of central asia, he were to cross the difficult passes of the hindoo koosh and entangle his army in the barren mountain homes of the fanatical and treacherous afghan, then indeed our fortunate generals may well congratulate themselves that the lord has delivered the enemy into their hand. the same objection applies to an invasion of india by the herat road. imagine the plight of the russian army when it arrived before our entrenched camp at candahar, connected, as it would be, by railway with our immense resources in india. the russian army would find itself in a country stripped of supplies and carriage, with a powerful enemy in its front, and fanatical tribes waging a guerilla war on its flanks and rear.'[ ] sir west ridgeway also bore testimony to the beneficial rule of russia in central asia, and that her officers on the frontier were conciliatory, moderate gentlemen. if the foregoing statements and the opinions which i have offered upon them are sound, then it is evident that our general line of policy towards the people of afghanistan is simple and clear. they hold important outworks, as it were, just outside our frontier; and, whilst not interfering with their independence, we should do all in our power not only to maintain the authority of their ruler, the ameer of cabul, but also to keep on friendly terms with the tribes, many of whom, especially those along our frontier, are more or less independent. our policy should be one of conciliation and of subsidies; and although in dealing with half-civilised, turbulent chiefs and tribes the beneficial results are achieved slowly, still, year by year, a patient and forbearing policy will bear good fruit, and indeed is now doing so in a marked degree. it is important to note that in our dealings with the ameer, and in granting him subsidies and arms, we only claimed in return that his foreign policy should be under our guidance. our principle for years past had been that afghanistan should be strong, friendly, and independent. the gradual approach of the russian frontier towards india led to a diplomatic correspondence in - [ ] between lord granville, then secretary of state for foreign affairs, and prince gortchakoff, with a view to a clearer definition of the afghan frontier north of the hindoo koosh. it was not that the forces of either power were then on the ground, nor had the country been accurately surveyed; but the object was to avoid complications in the future, and it is to be observed that the russian government ultimately acquiesced in all lord granville's proposals as to the provinces and districts which were to be considered as afghan territory. though russia claimed independence of action so far as the principalities[ ] were concerned, it also fully accepted the principle that afghanistan was within the sphere of our influence. during the period from to , when lords lawrence, mayo, and northbrook were successively viceroys of india, the general policy which i have indicated was carefully pursued, but in the latter year a serious change occurred which eventually led to a great war in afghanistan in - . there were apparently two main causes for the alteration in the views of the british government. one was a restless feeling that we were somewhat in the dark as to the conduct of affairs in cabul, and that the then ameer shere ali was becoming unfriendly; the other that the long range of the suliman mountains trans-indus formed a somewhat insecure border line, and that we should take possession of some of the passes with a view of establishing what was called a scientific frontier. in pursuance of the first a violent effort was made to force english representatives on the ameer at cabul, candahar, and herat, a policy known to be specially feared by the afghans, and which we had hitherto engaged more than once not to adopt.[ ] in january an afghan envoy, noor mahomed khan, held prolonged meetings with the late sir lewis pelly on the subject at peshawur, and begged that the proposal might be dropped. he said: 'why all this pressing to send british officers, when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of afghanistan? it has roused the suspicion of the ameer.... he is now convinced that to allow british officers to reside in his country will be to relinquish his own authority.' ... again he said: 'your government is a powerful and a great one; ours is a small and weak one. we have long been on terms of friendship, and the ameer clings to the skirt of the british government, and till his hand be cut off he will not relax his hold of it.' sir lewis pelly, however, stated that the presence of english officers in afghanistan was a _sine quâ non_; and as lord lytton, the viceroy, had already, in speaking of the position of shere ali between russia and england, described it as that 'of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots,' it was evident that no friendly arrangement was likely to ensue. during our native agent at cabul was withdrawn, our subsidy ceased, and shere ali remained in a position of isolation, and was left to form friendship elsewhere. in fact, we washed our hands of him and were evidently drifting into war. as regards the other cause of dispute--the rectification of the trans-indus frontier--the opinion of our government at the time was that we should march into afghanistan, and establish what was termed a strategical triangle between cabul, ghuznee and jellalabad, and thus guard, as it were, the avenues to india.[ ] being greatly interested in the proposed military operations at the period in question, i wrote a letter to the times,[ ] pointing out the serious results which were likely to ensue on our advance into afghanistan, and of which the following are extracts. 'in my opinion such an idea is a dangerous delusion. afghanistan is a country of mountains, and the suliman range, which forms our boundary, is merely the first of a series of great ridges running down south-westerly from the hindoo koosh. if we enter the country and merely hold the nearest passes, we shall at once find ourselves in a maze of mountains, with dozens of other passes and strong positions in our front. not only that, but we shall become involved with other tribes; and as soon as our flag is seen flying within the afghan mountains, our influence will begin to extend, political and military complications will arise, and we shall inevitably be carried forward.' alluding to the policy which had for some years past been followed, i went on to point out that 'the frontier throughout its length is far quieter now than in the years gone by. occasional acts of outrage and robbery are treated as matters of police. many of the men of the afghan tribes beyond the border now enter our service, and do their duty well.... therefore, i maintain that a conciliatory policy has been in a great measure successful, and was leading straight to the object we had in view, although time, patience, and forbearance are required before the results become palpable and confirmed.' lord lawrence, the greatest authority then living on the subject, wrote several letters to the 'times' in strongly deprecating our change of policy, and i had the satisfaction of receiving from him a note expressing his entire agreement with the military views which i had put forward. whilst the two causes i have described gradually led to the estrangement of the ameer of cabul, an additional fear arose in his mind owing to our dealings with the ruler of the neighbouring country of beluchistan.[ ] here also we had for many years past, and amidst some difficulties, pursued a course of conciliation and subsidies with the ruler, the khan of khelat; one of our objects being to insure the safe passage of caravans with goods through the bolam. in , however, a new treaty having been made, a small british force entered the country, and, marching through the pass, occupied and fortified quetta, on the borders of afghanistan, ostensibly as a protection to our representative. it was, perhaps, only natural under the circumstances, that shere ali should look with some distrust at the presence of our troops on his immediate southern border, and on the direct road to candahar. matters drifted on during , but shere ali having finally rejected our ultimatum, war was declared in november, and british troops entered afghanistan in three columns--one by the khyber as far as jellalabad, the second occupied the koorum valley, whilst the third, marching through the bolam, reached candahar in january . these operations were accomplished with comparative ease, and for the moment our success seemed complete. shere ali fled from cabul, and died soon afterwards, and his son and successor, yakoob khan, having sued for peace, a treaty was signed in may, the chief items of which were that we should permanently retain the koorum and pisheen valleys, and also send an english officer with a suitable escort as our representative at cabul, major cavagnari being selected for the purpose.[ ] so far all seemed well; but in reality the war, instead of being at an end, was only at its commencement. in september, cavagnari and his escort were surrounded and murdered, and the whole country was disorganised and seething with excitement. the treaty of peace was torn up,[ ] and the khyber and koorum columns marched at once upon cabul, and after severe fighting established our authority at the capital. so completely had these serious and untoward events changed the aspect of affairs that lord lytton, the viceroy, in january stated that we must recognise disintegration as the basis of our policy. the province of cabul was to be given over to one afghan chief, candahar to another, and as to herat, the most flourishing and important district of all, it was proposed to hand it over to persia. it is not necessary to describe the military measures which followed, which were brilliantly carried out, but towards the close of the campaign we had about , men either actually in afghanistan or on the frontier, and even then we only commanded the ground on which we stood; whilst the cost of the war amounted to nearly twenty millions sterling. in the end, and after much discussion, however, the british government reverted to the original policy of a strong, friendly, and independent afghanistan; and abdul rahman khan, who had been a refugee for years in russian territory, was acknowledged by us as the ruler of the country. our forces were withdrawn early in , and the strategical triangle was, by common consent, consigned to the waste paper basket.[ ] in my opinion the war of - was bad in policy and unjust in principle from beginning to end. it is a matter of history now, but we not only were fighting against those we ought to have conciliated, but nearly ended in disintegrating the country and taking a large portion of it ourselves. subsequent to the withdrawal of our army the country became more settled, although the position of abdul rahman was for some time precarious. by our support, financial and other, however, he slowly established his authority, and has continued on terms of friendship with our government. reverting to central asia, the capture of merv by the russians and their gradual approximation to the northern provinces of afghanistan, combined with the somewhat overbearing conduct of their military subordinates on the spot, led in to a conflict at penjdeh between the russian and afghan outposts, which at one time threatened to lead to a great war. i have already explained that although by the granville-gortchakoff agreement of the northern afghan provinces were settled, their actual boundaries, in the absence of full information, remained somewhat indefinite. indeed, in countries chiefly inhabited by nomadic tribes, wandering about in search of pasture, such questions are often more or less uncertain. as a proof of the doubtful nature of the facts at that time, i may point out that in the official english maps published a few years before the penjdeh incident, that hitherto almost unknown village was marked as outside the afghan frontier. it would answer no good purpose to re-open a subject which involved no great principle, and the issues of which were exaggerated at the time by violent and imprudent language, both in england and russia. it was eminently one for diplomatic arrangement and not for war, and found its solution in the joint boundary commission which was originated by lord granville,[ ] and brought to a friendly conclusion in . the marquis of salisbury, who was prime minister at the time, alluding to the arrangement, said: 'i believe a more well-balanced and equable settlement could hardly have been arrived at. there has been no great sacrifice on either side; but i value the settlement for this reason, not because i attach much importance to the square miles of desert with which we have been dealing--and which probably after ten generations of mankind will not yield the slightest value to any human being--but because it indicates on both sides that spirit which in the two governments is consistent with continued peace.' that, in my judgment is the spirit in which two great powers should always be prepared to act in international disagreements. one more subject remains, as regards central asia, which deserves a few remarks--that of the pamirs, on the north eastern confines of afghanistan. the country, until recently very little known, is an elevated desolate plateau ringed round with snowy ridges, and is the point of junction of the three great mountain ranges--the himalayas, the hindoo koosh, and the tian-shan. the fact that some of the lakes on this elevated region are over , feet above the sea is a proof of its exceptional character. the climate is very severe, and its inhabitants appear to be chiefly nomadic tribes from afghanistan, russia, and china respectively, who bring their flocks there for pasture during the three or four summer months. the actual delimitation of the frontiers, it is understood, is now being amicably arranged between the powers concerned. as a base for military operations for an advance on india, the very nature of the country offers insurmountable obstacles and hardly needs discussion. i have dealt in some detail with the subject of central asia, as one of great and general interest, and have endeavoured to explain the military aspect of the case, because it is the one perhaps not so generally understood. there are people who say that war, sooner or later, is inevitable. as the late lord derby once very sensibly remarked: 'of the two i prefer it later.' it appears to me that there is no cause for war, or indeed probability of it, between russia and england in that part of the world; but should such unfortunately arise, the danger would not lie on our side. footnotes: [footnote : kaye's _history of the war in afghanistan in _.] [footnote : _what england has done for india_, dr. w. hunter, .] [footnote : 'the new afghan frontier,' by col. sir west ridgeway, k.c.s.i., c.b.; _nineteenth century_, october .] [footnote : _parliamentary paper_: central asia, c , ; also c , .] [footnote : central asia, no. , .] [footnote : _parliamentary paper_: afghanistan, .] [footnote : _parliamentary paper_: afghanistan, no. , , c .] [footnote : _times_, october , .] [footnote : _parliamentary paper_: beluchistan, february .] [footnote : afghanistan, no. , , c .] [footnote : afghanistan, no. , , c , and no. , .] [footnote : _afghanistan_, , no. , pp. - .] [footnote : _central asia_: no. , , c ; and no. , , c .] chapter xxviii appointed surveyor general of the ordnance--principles of army promotion--egyptian war of on the formation of mr. gladstone's government in i was offered by him, and accepted, the appointment of surveyor general of the ordnance. mr. childers, on becoming minister for war in , at once took vigorous measures to bring to maturity the changes which had been instituted by lord cardwell, but of which some, from one cause or another, had been rather retarded. one of his first acts was to complete the localisation of the infantry regiments in counties, which had been so strongly recommended by colonel stanley's[ ] commission of ; and which is now exercising so beneficial an influence in welding the regular and militia forces, and in the gradual formation of local ties and associations. another measure, introduced in , was an increase in the pay and pension of non-commissioned officers, and the appointment of those in the higher grades as warrant officers. essential as it is to maintain the system of short service for private soldiers, as affording the only method of creating a reserve and of giving strength and elasticity to the army in war, it is at the same time desirable that a proportion of the non-commissioned officers should be induced to prolong their duties in the ranks. the same difficulty, it may be observed, is felt, and the same remedy adopted, in the chief european armies, where considerable advantages as to pay, pensions, and ultimate civil employment are given to non-commissioned officers who extend their service. _principles of promotion and retirement of officers_ amongst the many problems which have to be considered and solved by the war office, none perhaps is more complex than that of providing a system of promotion for officers in order that a sufficient proportion of the most capable may attain to the higher positions at a time of life when their previous experience can be fully utilised. the great and real difficulty may be explained in a few words. in the army, as probably in every profession more or less, the number of employments available for the higher ranks is comparatively limited, whilst the junior branches are crowded with young men, all full of life and energy, gradually gaining experience, and all animated with the one laudable hope of rising to the top. in the military profession perhaps more than in others, the organisation of ranks is strictly defined as to numbers, and is supposed to require a considerable excess of officers in the lower grades, who, in time of peace at all events, have not adequate occupation, and some of whom as the years pass away, losing their zeal and activity, become unfitted for responsible posts, when their long deferred opportunity arrives. there are two methods of partially solving the difficulty: one, which is now mainly in force in the british army, is a graduated scale of compulsory retirements with pensions at certain fixed ages. no doubt it tends to clear the list, and thus to make room for the juniors. but it has great drawbacks; first of all in its excessive cost, and secondly, that it does not in reality discriminate between the efficient and the inefficient. age alone being the criterion, it often happens that promising officers who have no wish to retire, are compelled to do so--and this is not only a hardship on individuals, but injurious to the state, in depriving it of men who carry away with them into private life valuable experience gained in various parts of the world. it is, in short, a system which, if rigidly enforced, is costly in both senses, without adequate benefit to the army. in a commission under lord penzance investigated and reported on the subject, and it is chiefly on their recommendations that the above arrangements were adopted. there are, however, other ways of meeting the difficulty which would at all events tend to remove some of these objections. in the first place it must be remembered that the duties of the british army are far more varied and severe than is the case with the continental powers. more than half our troops are always at foreign stations. many officers, therefore, as they arrive at middle life, and whose health has suffered from tropical climates, find themselves compelled to retire; and a scheme of voluntary, in lieu of compulsory, pensions would meet their cases without injuring capable officers, and without inflicting individual hardships. but there is another and a more efficacious mode of meeting the difficulty; namely, by a careful reorganisation of ranks. lord penzance's commission was quite alive to this alternative, and said that a reorganisation of ranks would meet the question in another way, would be less costly, and would prevent the loss of valuable officers, but that it was beyond their instructions. as i have already mentioned, the present organisation rests on the hypothesis that a fixed proportion of officers is requisite in each rank, with a vast preponderance of juniors. but is this really essential? now it so happens that of late years considerable modifications have been made in every army in europe except our own, tending to reduce the disparity. on the continent the infantry regiments, for instance, are now organised in double companies under mounted officers, and the cavalry in squadrons. it is held that under the modern system of fighting such arrangements are more efficient; and they virtually lead to an increase in the upper, and a diminution in the lower, ranks, which in point of promotion is exactly the remedy wanted. mr. childers in introduced changes with this two-fold object in view, and the following table exemplifies the result in an infantry regiment of two battalions. +---------------+-------------------------+------------------------+ | ranks |establishment before |establishment after | +---------------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |lieut.-colonels| } | } | |majors | } | } | |captains | } | } | |lieutenants | } | } | +---------------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |total | | | +---------------+-------------------------+------------------------+ by the old plan the number of field officers to juniors was, as will be seen, to --or to - / . by the new one it became to or to - / . it will be evident at once that the prospects of the juniors as regards promotion were greatly improved, and it had the additional merit of being more economical as regards pensions, and further, as it is held by many that the new organisation is more efficient for war, it would appear to have everything in its favour. unfortunately, owing to diversities of opinion, although the ranks were thus re-arranged, the battalions have never been divided into double companies; so that the most important part of the scheme has not been completed and remains untried. indeed, the tendency during the last few years has been of a retrograde nature. in my opinion, the proportion of the ranks should be rigidly enforced so as to reduce the juniors to a minimum in time of peace, as being better in the interests of the officers, more in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare, and more economical to the state. the following figures giving the proportion of senior officers to juniors in the army in and respectively, will illustrate my argument, and will afford proof that the changes made three or four years ago have injuriously affected the prospects of young officers in respect to promotion. +------------------------------------+-------+-------+ | -- | | | +------------------------------------+-------+-------+ |number of general and field officers| , | , | |number of captains and lieutenants | , | , | +------------------------------------+-------+-------+ | -- | , | , | +------------------------------------+-------+-------+ it will be observed that the proportion of seniors to juniors in was nearly to , whereas in it is about to . again, the annual cost of pensions in was about £ , , but in it has risen to about £ , , . so that not only are the prospects of promotions less, but at the same time the cost to the country in pensions is greater. there remains one more point connected with the subject which must be mentioned--namely, that of selection. the principle is a valuable one, and should be carefully carried out in the higher ranks. it will affect individuals and be beneficial to the army; but it will not in itself have much bearing on promotion generally. speaking of retirement, it is related that some years ago the late lord airey went to the german manoeuvres, and on being introduced to the old emperor william, his majesty said: 'i hear, lord airey, you are going to retire. what is your reason?' lord airey replied that, being seventy years old, by the regulations he had no option in the matter. 'retire at seventy!' said the emperor; 'why, all my best generals are over that age!' 'oh yes, your majesty,' said airey, 'i quite agree with you, but in england they get tired of us at seventy, and get rid of us.' _expedition to egypt_ at the beginning of the war office in pall mall had for a time to put aside what may be called its domestic reforms, and, in concert with the admiralty, to prepare for an expedition to egypt, in which our naval and military forces were destined before the close of the year to take a leading and a successful part. the causes of the revolution in egypt (which commenced in ) appear to have been a complicated mixture of intrigues, military discontent, and a sham national uprising; and it is difficult now to understand how a man like arabi pasha, who had neither political experience nor military skill, could, even for a time, have become the virtual master of the situation. but if the local causes are somewhat obscure, the diplomatic action, or rather inaction, of the various powers of europe is almost equally strange. england alone from the first seems to have perceived the true issue, and by denouncing arabi as a mere mutinous adventurer, and by insisting on the necessity of crushing the rebellion and restoring the authority of the khedive, she protected not only her own interests in the country, but also those of turkey, and, indeed, of europe generally. the government of france at the outset appeared to be quite in accord with our own. in january a joint assurance was given to the khedive of adequate support, and in may the french and english fleets accordingly arrived at alexandria for the maintenance of order. it is further to be observed that the other european powers, recognising the superior interests of france and england, acquiesced in their proposed intervention. so far unanimity apparently prevailed. and yet, when an insurrection headed by arabi occurred in alexandria the following month, france for some reason withdrew her ships and left england alone. and again, when it became evident in july that a military force could alone restore order, notwithstanding the oft repeated desire of the british government that the two nations should act in concert, the french chamber, which on the th of july had voted the necessary supplies for their part of the expedition, on the th reversed their policy, and by a majority of declined to take any part in the campaign. judging by the debates in the french chamber at the time, it would appear that their ministers were disinclined to embark on a distant expedition on two grounds: ( ) that they had anxieties nearer home and wished to keep themselves free; ( ) that the people of france were really sick of campaigns, and would not therefore give their support to a policy of distant adventure--not perhaps an unnatural view on their part. so uncertain, indeed, was the policy of the french government up to the last moment that towards the end of july, when i was appointed chief of the staff to the expedition, i received instructions to proceed to paris, to discuss with the french military authorities as to the place of landing, and to ascertain their views on the joint operations. the vote of the chamber on the th, however, of course rendered my visit unnecessary. the policy of turkey as to egypt was still more uncertain. it would naturally have been supposed that when one of its tributary states had broken out into insurrection, and when the power of the local ruler had been subverted, the sultan's government would have been anxious to quell the revolution, as we invited them to do, and would have welcomed the assistance of allies like ourselves who had a similar object in view. instead of that the turkish government not only hesitated, but after the outbreak at alexandria in june actually conferred the grand cordon of the medjidi on arabi pasha, the rebel leader. the sultan, however, must be a man of great impartiality and discrimination, for when i arrived at cairo in september, after the short desert campaign, he also conferred on me the grand cordon of the medjidi. whether he was under the impression that i was a friend or an enemy of arabi i never cared to inquire. before proceeding to give details of the preparations for the expedition to egypt, it will be as well to allude shortly to certain misconceptions which appear to prevail as to the supposed want of concert between the navy and army in war. even as recently as these misconceptions were prominently alluded to, and indeed endorsed in the report of lord harrington's commission.[ ] whilst pointing out that the two services are 'to a large extent dependent on each other,' the report goes on to say that 'little or no attempt has ever been made to establish settled and regular relations between them.' this, if correct, would be serious. my experience in the crimea, in egypt, and at the war office does not lead me at all to the conclusion stated by the commission. the two professions are so distinct in themselves that they require separate administration, but that does not necessarily entail any want of co-operation in war. on the contrary, they thoroughly understand their relative positions; and whether as regards preparations for national defence, or in operations for the expansion of the empire in various parts of the world, our success has been remarkable, and the results are due to the united efforts of the navy and army. the present arrangements are, in my opinion, efficient, and should be left alone. the egyptian expedition of affords the most recent proof of what i have urged. no sooner was it determined on, than the minister for war and the first lord of the admiralty, with their chief advisers, held constant meetings, and discussed and decided difficulties and details day by day, and nothing could be more complete than the cordial co-operation of the two departments--a co-operation which was not limited to the authorities at home, but was equally conspicuous at the seat of war. throughout the operations the naval and military authorities on the spot fully appreciated their relative positions; and it was due to their combined efforts, backed by the discipline and courage of the officers and men of both services, that the campaign was carried to a speedy and successful conclusion. although the egyptian expedition of bears no comparison either as to its duration, difficulties, or hard fighting with that of the crimea, still in respect to the number of troops embarked at the outset the two closely approximate. the force sent to egypt from england, and from the mediterranean garrisons, amounted to about , men, with field guns and , cavalry and artillery horses. to these were shortly added about , men from india, consisting of the seaforth highlanders, a battery of artillery, and several regiments of native cavalry and infantry. the troops from home commenced embarking towards the end of july; and so complete and satisfactory were the arrangements of the admiralty, due in great measure to the energy and experience of admiral sir william mends, the director of transports, that after a voyage of , miles they arrived at alexandria without a _contretemps_ of any kind. the general outline of the campaign and of the movements to be undertaken had been discussed before the departure of the expedition, and it was virtually decided to take temporary possession of the suez canal; ismailia becoming the base of operations with a view to an advance upon cairo. there were obvious political and strategical reasons for the decision. in the first place the occupation of the canal would secure its safety, and prevent its being blocked or injured by the enemy--a most important european interest in itself; and it is curious that the late monsieur de lesseps, who was in communication with arabi and who was at ismailia at the time of our arrival, was violently opposed to our action in this respect. in the next place cairo was then the centre of disaffection, and as it was known that the egyptian army, reinforced by bedouins, was in considerable strength and entrenching at tel-el-kebir, on the verge of the desert, it was probable that a rapid advance from ismailia and a severe defeat of the enemy would cause a general collapse, and thus save cairo from fire and pillage. these various considerations determined the general plan of the operations, and the result amply justified the anticipations formed. to have advanced from alexandria, or from the neighbouring bay of aboukir, would have entailed a long and difficult march south, through the delta of the nile, a country without roads and intersected by irrigating canals. further, the distance to cairo was about miles, as compared with from ismailia. in short, no striking or rapid result could be anticipated by an advance from alexandria, and in the meantime cairo would have been left at the mercy of a mutinous army, and of other elements of disaffection and disorder. it was very important that the decision as to entering the canal, and using it as a base, should be kept secret; and therefore, on the arrival of our troops at alexandria, during august, it was ostentatiously announced that our great object was to land in strength at aboukir bay, and from that position and from alexandria to attack arabi pasha, who with a large force was entrenched at kaffr-dewar, a few miles distant; and fortunately the device succeeded. all being ready, the british fleet and transports left alexandria on the afternoon of august , a considerable force having to be left behind temporarily for the protection of the city. in order still further to mislead arabi pasha, the fleet and the great majority of the transports proceeded in the first instance to aboukir bay, and anchored for the night; a few shots being fired at the works on shore. one brigade, however, went on to port said, which was reached on the th, when the two ends of the canal were temporarily closed. on august , sir garnet wolseley[ ] and staff arrived at ismailia with the brigade of general graham, which was landed, pushed on at once, and seized the railway station at neficè, two miles outside. from the moment, indeed, of our arrival it became an urgent necessity to land troops of all arms as fast as possible, in order to take possession of what was called (somewhat figuratively) the sweet-water canal and also the single line of railway which ran parallel to each other in the direct line of our destined march across the desert. ismailia, from its limited resources and with only a small wooden pier, was not well adapted for the disembarkation of an army. however, in the course of three days nearly , men, with a portion of the household cavalry and two horse artillery guns, had been landed. as the water in the sweet-water canal began to fall rapidly, it was evident that the enemy were at work not far off and were obstructing its flow. accordingly, at daylight on the th a small force advanced into the desert, and found the enemy in considerable strength at magfar, about six miles from ismailia. they had constructed a dam across the canal, which after some sharp fighting was captured, the egyptians falling back two or three miles to some sandhills at mahuta, where they were in considerable numbers and entrenched. as a serious engagement was likely to take place at mahuta, reinforcements of all arms were pushed on during the day and following night as soon as landed; the brigade of guards under h.r.h. the duke of connaught having to make a hurried and harassing march across the desert in the extreme heat, on the afternoon of the th. at daylight on the th the british troops were formed up across the desert at magfar in order of battle, and advanced to the attack on tel-el-mahuta. but the egyptians at once lost heart, and were observed to be retiring in haste, partly by rail; and, being followed by the cavalry and horse artillery, they not only evacuated their strong position at mahuta, but were driven out of mahsamah, eight miles further on, where seven krupp guns, large numbers of rifles, and a quantity of ammunition, food, stores, camp equipment, and seventy-five railway waggons fell into our possession. considering that the troops had only just landed, that the heat was extreme, and that the cavalry and artillery horses were in bad condition from their long voyage, these operations of the th and th were not only highly successful, but were very creditable to the various arms engaged. sir garnet wolseley did not fail to take full advantage of the demoralisation and feeble tactics of the enemy, and on the following day general graham's brigade made a farther advance of two or three miles to kassassin lock on the canal, and within a few miles of the egyptian main position at tel-el-kebir. thus, within five days of our arrival at ismailia, notwithstanding the restricted facilities for landing, and in spite of the difficulties of marching during the hottest season of the year across the desert, we had been able to drive away the enemy and to take possession of twenty miles of the fresh-water canal, and of the railway and telegraph line. as an interval of some days now elapsed before further movements of importance took place, it may be interesting to give a short summary of the strategy of the egyptian leaders, which appears to have been faulty throughout. in the first place they divided their main forces into two parts far removed from each other, one being placed in front of alexandria, and the other behind a long weak line of entrenchments across the desert at tel-el-kebir. they may no doubt have been somewhat uncertain at the outset as to our general plan; but at all events, when the arrival at ismailia had made our intentions clear, their troops outside alexandria should have gone forthwith to the scene of active operations. instead of doing so, they remained stationary throughout the short campaign, with the result that they had eventually to disband without firing a shot. in the desert they were equally blind to the real position. if on our arrival they had at once blocked the fresh-water canal, diverted its stream before it had reached the desert, and had entirely destroyed the railway and telegraphic lines, they would at all events have greatly added to the difficulties and hardships of our march. by neglecting these obvious precautions, they enabled us within a week to advance and hold these important resources, and to establish ourselves at kassassin lock, where, as soon as our army was concentrated, we crushed their power by capturing their main position and brought the war to an end. in addition to the guns, ammunition, and railway plant secured at mahsamah on the th, we were fortunate also in taking prisoner mahmoud fehmi pasha, one of the chief leaders of the insurrection. i had a short interview with him on his being brought to ismailia. he was naturally rather excited, and, speaking in french, said that as he had been fighting against us we could dispose of him as we chose. 'fusillez-moi, si vous voulez,' he remarked; but he begged not to be handed over to the khedive's government, as they would torture him. he added, that he knew the english were just people; and i replied that he might feel sure that the british government would treat him as a prisoner of war, and give him a fair trial. in sketching the history of a campaign, it is always desirable, if possible, to ascertain the views of the combatants on both sides; and as regards the earlier incidents in the desert, it so happens that we were fortunate enough to find at the railway stations copies in arabic of various telegrams which had been sent from cairo, and also from arabi pasha to the egyptian leaders on the spot; and i will quote english translations of a few of them, as examples of the different conclusions which two opponents may come to on the same events. . 'from under minister of war, cairo, to mahmoud pasha fehmi, informing him that his telegram had been read in council, and complimenting him on his victory over the english at mahsamah.' . 'from the military commander, cairo, to h.e. rashid pasha husni. we, and the entire egyptian nation, congratulate your excellency on your defeat of the enemy. may god be pleased to bless your crusade.' . 'telegram of three pages from arabi pasha, complimenting rashid pasha husni, the commander of the eastern division, on his frequent defeats of the english, who are the enemies of religion and of humanity. hopes the honour of the egyptian nation may be written with the blood of the english.' speaking of telegrams, towards the end of september, when the british army had arrived at cairo a rather bewildering message was received by us from kaffir-zoyat. 'atrocity has taken place in all the stations from the inhabitants and immigrants. the station master is helpless, and now is the time for the arrival of local train. the station master requires help soon. a copy has been sent to sultan pasha.' notwithstanding the congratulations which the egyptian generals in the desert had received on their imaginary victories, they became gradually alive to the necessity of making an effort to recover their lost positions, and on august , arabi pasha having arrived, they seriously attacked kassassin with about , men and guns. the battle lasted all day, with occasional intervals, but general graham (who had rather less than , men under his command), supported by the cavalry and horse artillery from mahsamah under sir drury lowe, at length drove off the enemy, and their retreat was hastened by a brilliant cavalry charge after dark in the desert. our losses on the occasion in killed and wounded were . subsequent to this attack on kassassin there was a lull in active operations for about a fortnight. although the rapidity of our earlier movements had gained us possession of the fresh-water canal and railway, still, as both had been blocked with large dams and embankments, they were for the moment of limited service for transport, and in reality we had, as it were, out-run our commissariat. consequently for a few days the troops suffered some hardships, although their general health was not apparently affected, the sick list being less than six per cent. there were no resources, of course, in the desert, and it was calculated that we had to send forward about sixty tons a day of food and forage. by incessant exertions, however, the obstructions were removed, and early in september many barges were placed on the fresh-water canal; and, the single line of rail and the telegraph having been repaired, the chief difficulties were thus overcome, and we were able to send up about tons of supplies daily. from that moment we became masters of the situation, and gradually accumulated a large reserve of food, forage, munitions, medical and other stores. the highland brigade of four battalions, with sir edward hamley and sir archibald alison, had arrived at ismailia on september , and by the th the british forces were concentrated at kassassin in readiness for decisive action. previously, however, on september , a considerable portion of the egyptian army from tel-el-kebir again attacked the position at kassassin at daylight; but we were too strong for them, their opportunity was gone, and under the orders of general willis our troops advanced boldly across the desert, and drove the enemy back, capturing three of their guns. our losses on the occasion were: killed, ; wounded, ; total, . arabi's estimate was very different. in his telegram, september , to the ministry of war, cairo, he says: 'moreover, from true observation it has been proved to us that the number of the enemy killed and remaining on the field of battle is about , , and their carts were insufficient for carrying off the wounded.' during the early part of september, reconnoissances were made with a view of ascertaining the general position of the enemy's defences, and, as far as possible, their armament and progress. our reconnoitring parties consisted of one or two officers with a small mounted escort, who approached the egpytian entrenchments at daylight and made careful observations from different parts of the desert; the enemy taking little or no notice of their appearance. indeed, it was rather remarkable that, although the egyptian leaders must have been aware of the near approach of the british army, they apparently sent out no cavalry at night, and even their infantry pickets were, as a rule, lying about close to their works and only roused themselves at dawn. the right of the enemy's earthworks rested on the fresh-water canal, and then stretched away northerly for nearly four miles across the desert, their left being _en l'air_. their very extent was a great weakness. so far as could be ascertained before the battle, the entrenchments towards the canal, which were subsequently stormed by the highlanders, were the most complete and formidable, being armed with many krupp field-guns, and supported by retrenchments inside. about , yards in advance of that part of the defences the egyptians had constructed and armed a detached outwork, which, curiously enough, escaped the observation of our reconnoitring parties. most fortunately when we advanced on the th, and when a portion of our troops must have passed close to it just before daylight, they were not discovered; otherwise our great object of reaching the main line of works unperceived might have been prematurely divulged at a critical moment. the egyptian forces were estimated as being about , men, with guns, of which we captured . [illustration:] the plan of attack of the lines of tel-el-kebir was one requiring the greatest care and consideration. the enemy had been for several weeks on the spot, and had not only entrenched their position and armed it with many guns, but the whole of the ground in their front was a flat, sandy desert, without cover of any kind. an attack by us in open daylight under such circumstances must inevitably have entailed a prolonged conflict and enormous losses. by a wide flank movement we might, no doubt, have turned their left with comparative ease, and have captured the position without great loss, experience at tel-el-mahuta and elsewhere having proved that the enemy were not prepared for, and in fact would not stand against such a manoeuvre; but, as sir garnet wolseley clearly stated in his dispatch after the battle, 'it would not have accomplished the object i had in view--namely, to grapple with the enemy at such close quarters that he should not be able to shake himself free from our clutches except by a general flight of all his army. i wished to make the battle a final one.... my desire was to fight him decisively when he was in the open desert, before he could take up fresh positions, more difficult of access, in the cultivated country in his rear.' all these considerations led to the decision to make a night march across the desert, to be followed by an assault along the whole line of entrenchments at dawn. no doubt there was risk, but the object to be attained was supreme, and wolseley relied, and with good reason, on the steadiness and courage of his troops. early on the morning of september (twenty-four hours before the battle) sir garnet wolseley, accompanied by all the general officers, rode out towards tel-el-kebir, so as to arrive at daylight in sight of the works, and as near as prudence would allow; and he then explained to them his plan of attack, and gave to each a rough sketch of the intended formation, which is shown by the diagram on preceding page. the day preceding the battle passed quietly, and no movements of any kind gave signs of the coming event. as soon as it was dark the whole of the tents were struck, rolled up, and, with the baggage, stacked alongside the railway and left behind. the strength of the army was about , infantry, , cavalry, and , artillery, with guns. [illustration: eve of tel-el-kebir. encampment of british army at kassassin lock] during the early part of the night the troops moved out about , yards into the desert, and, having taken up their respective positions, bivouacked. perfect silence was maintained; no lights were permitted, the men not being even allowed to smoke. except the occasional neighing of a horse, all was still. the general direction of the march was west and by north; and as the night was dark with occasional clouds, and as the stars were our only guides, lieutenant rawson, the naval _aide-de-camp_, volunteered to accompany the highland brigade, and gave them the benefit of his experience in regulating their course.[ ] at half-past one in the morning the march was resumed; admirals sir beauchamp seymour,[ ] sir anthony hoskins, and several other naval officers who had done so much to assist us in all the difficulties of disembarkation and transport, joined the head quarter staff and accompanied us during the operations. the enemy apparently kept no look-out, and were quite unaware of our approach. sir garnet wolseley and the staff during the latter part of the march rode in company with the highlanders, and when about , yards from the entrenchments halted and dismounted, in order to watch the development of the attack and to give such orders as circumstances might render necessary. a battalion of the royal marine artillery under colonel tuson remained in reserve with head quarters. the troops, who were now approaching the egyptian position, moved steadily forward over the firm, dry sand, and so complete was the silence that it was difficult to realise the fact that two armies were close to each other and just about to meet in dire conflict. at about . a.m. the first faint glimmerings of the dawn were observed, and in the course of a few minutes some straggling musket shots were heard, fired evidently by the feeble pickets of the enemy just outside their works. then all along the line in front of the highlanders a perfect blaze of musketry fire commenced, and continued for the next half-hour without intermission. the egyptian artillery were also in action, but, being fired at a high elevation, their shells for the most part burst wildly all over the desert. general graham's brigade on the right had slightly deviated from its course in the darkness. this, however, was soon rectified, and as the day dawned the leading brigades, in the most gallant and determined manner, stormed the whole line of the enemy's works; and followed up by the guards under the duke of connaught, and by colonel ashburnham's brigade in rear of the highlanders, they swarmed over the parapets and held their ground inside. in the meantime the seven batteries of artillery under general goodenough, in the centre of the line, had also continued their advance; and although from the nature of the assault they were unable to give active support to the infantry at the first onset, they watched their opportunity, and as soon as our men were on the crest of the parapets, several batteries succeeded in getting through the works, and, by following up the egyptians, contributed to their defeat and flight. one battery, just before entering the entrenchments, was brought into action against the detached outwork which i have previously mentioned, and, taking it in reverse, led to its immediate abandonment by the enemy. at length came the opportunity for the cavalry and horse artillery under general drury lowe. they had purposely been held back until the infantry had established their footing on the works, but then, sweeping round the northern extremity, they charged the retreating egyptians, who were now in headlong flight all over the country, and also captured several trains and locomotives on the railway. it is necessary now to turn to the movements of sir herbert mcpherson, who, with the seaforth highlanders and part of the indian contingent, marched from kassassin during the night on the south side of the canal, supported on their right by a naval battery of gatlings, which moved along the railway. their advance was never checked, and after some smart skirmishing in the cultivated ground near the village, and taking twelve guns, they arrived at the bridge at tel-el-kebir on one side, just as our other victorious troops had reached it on the opposite bank. the short account i have given of the various movements in the field during the eventful night march, and the battle at the dawn, will, i think, afford proofs not only of the gallantry and perfect discipline of the troops of all arms engaged, but also of the skill and care with which the general officers in command had carried out their arduous and anxious duties. the severe fight within the entrenchments did not last much more than half an hour, and the egyptians, finding their works and guns all captured, broke and fled in thousands, throwing away their arms, arabi having been one of the first to make his escape. the entrenchments inside were crowded with dead and wounded; and in addition to guns, an immense quantity of arms, ammunition, and stores, together with the whole of their large camp, fell into our possession. the egyptian losses amounted to , killed and about , prisoners, large numbers of them being wounded. the losses of the british army in killed, wounded, and missing were . the victory was complete, but no time was lost in taking advantage of the flight and utter disorganisation of the enemy. sir herbert mcpherson's force, strengthened by a battery of artillery, marched at once along the line of railway to zagazig, and, arriving during the afternoon, captured several trains and locomotives, the egyptian soldiers bolting without firing a shot. the movements of the cavalry division are graphically described in sir garnet wolseley's despatch: 'major general lowe was ordered to push on with all possible speed to cairo.... these orders were ably carried out, general lowe reaching the great barracks of abbassich just outside cairo, at . p.m. on the th instant. the cavalry marched miles in these two days. the garrison of about , men, summoned by lieutenant colonel h. stewart to surrender, laid down their arms, and our troops took possession of the citadel. a message was sent to arabi pasha calling upon him to surrender forthwith, which he did unconditionally. he was accompanied by toulba pasha, who was also one of the leading rebels in arms against the khedive.' the divisions of general mcpherson and drury lowe having thus been despatched to zagazig and cairo, the head quarter staff and remainder of the army rested for the day on the field of tel-el-kebir, awaiting the final _dénouement_. in fact, the result of the battle of the th and the flight of the egyptian forces became known by telegraph throughout the country in the course of a few hours, and the war came to a sudden termination. the medical arrangements at tel-el-kebir were admirably carried out. as soon as the position had been taken, large marquees were erected close to the fresh-water canal, and our wounded officers and men, having been attended to, were then conveyed in covered barges to ismailia; thus avoiding a long rough journey in carts across the sandy desert. late in the afternoon, i rode along the captured entrenchments, the ground being covered with dead and wounded egyptians--the latter faint and helpless, and praying for water. parties of our men had been sent out during the day with carts of provisions and barrels of water, and did all in their power to mitigate the sufferings of these poor creatures. thousands of muskets and vast quantities of ammunition lying about were broken up, and then buried. on the afternoon of the th the head quarter staff, accompanied by the duke of connaught and prince teck, with a part of the brigade of guards, left the field of battle by rail for zagazig; but the line was a single one and in disorder, so that we were constantly delayed, and did not arrive till o'clock p.m. our baggage animals were wandering about somewhere in the desert, and none of us had even a change of clothes; and, with the exception of a tin of meat, a few biscuits, and bottle of claret--fortunately brought by the duke of connaught, who kindly shared his scanty supplies with us--we had no food. our troops of all arms were marching along the line of railway, and once, when we were detained, a weary gunner passed the carriage, and on being asked where he was going replied, 'to zig-zag.' two other gunners had captured a dromedary, and were riding along in high spirits. the inhabitants of the villages as we passed through the cultivated country came out and salaamed, and seemed quite happy. they had stuck poles with white rags flying on the tops of their houses in token of surrender. altogether it was an interesting and amusing scene. i slept that night on the railway platform at zagazig, surrounded by myriads of flies. however, these were the last of our hardships, if such they can be called; and on the following morning we arrived by train at cairo, and were cordially received; in fact, the whole population had turned out in the streets to give us welcome. every english soldier walking about was followed by an admiring crowd. the khedive, telegraphing from alexandria, placed the abdin palace at the disposal of the staff and begged us to consider ourselves as his guests. from a small tent in the desert to a royal palace in two days--with a battle in the interval--was certainly an unusual but welcome change of scene. there was, however, one drawback. although the abdin palace contained suites of handsome state apartments, gorgeous in satin and gold, there were no bed-rooms! whether rulers in egypt never sleep, or whatever the explanation, we had to make the best of it, and i took possession of one large state room; but my little camp-bed looked very shabby and insignificant amidst such splendid surroundings. there were upwards of wax candles in glass chandeliers hanging from the ceiling. as several thousand egyptian soldiers were still in arms on our arrival at cairo, many of them in a large barrack just opposite the palace, an order was sent over that they were to give up their muskets and were then free to return to their homes. hardly had the order been received than it was acted on, and crowds of them, divested of their uniforms, were seen running as if for their lives, and in a few minutes the barrack was deserted. i inquired the reason of their extreme haste, and was informed that the news was so good they could hardly believe it to be true, and were afraid we might change our minds and detain them. the incident i have mentioned affords a good indication of the real feeling of the inhabitants, who were not anxious to fight anybody, but rather to be allowed to return and live in peace in their native villages. egypt is probably not the only country in which these sentiments largely prevail, but do not always find expression. in the prison within the citadel we found a large number of people in chains; criminals, political prisoners, even arab women and children, and two english subjects (maltese) all jumbled together, ill-treated, and nearly starved. separating the real criminals, after inquiry, the remainder were set free, and by way of a change the jailor was placed in one of the cells. in some small rooms in a corner of the great barrack, in abdin square, arabi and toulba pashas were confined as prisoners, with an english guard over them. as there were several passages and staircases about the place, with arab servants and others constantly going to and fro, and as, to an english sentry, one native is very like another, there seemed a possibility of arabi's attempting to escape. so, under pretext of calling to inquire as to his health (for he had been unwell), i paid him a visit, with an interpreter, in order to inspect the premises. arabi came up and shook hands, and, on my asking if he were better, he replied that now i had come to see him he was quite well--which was encouraging. then he went on to say that the english were famous for their love of freedom, of liberty, and of justice, and that, relying on our honour, he had surrendered unconditionally. he seemed inclined to enter into a discussion, so i replied that no doubt his case would receive careful consideration and justice from the british government. he did not strike me as a man of much education or intelligence. subsequently, colonel thynne, grenadier guards, was specially appointed to take charge of him.[ ] although during the short period of active operations our troops had enjoyed excellent health, notwithstanding the heat and the occasional hardships they had undergone, soon after their arrival at cairo considerable numbers were struck down by fever and dysentery; probably attributable to the bad water in the canal at kassassin, and partly to the insanitary condition of cairo itself. acting on advice, large numbers of the sick were conveyed by rail to alexandria, embarked for home, and speedily recovered at sea. without wishing to exaggerate the events of the campaign, i think it will be admitted that the difficult arrangements connected with the embarkation of our troops were carefully carried out; and that the expedition was conducted with great promptitude and success. these results testify to the efficiency of the naval and military administration at home, and also to the courage and discipline of the two services under somewhat trying circumstances. from a financial point of view, the rapidity of the operations enabled us on arrival at cairo at once largely to reduce expenditure, by cancelling contracts for food, forage, transport animals, and stores at various ports in the mediterranean. so sudden, indeed, was the transition from war to peace, and so completely had the insurrection collapsed, that in the course of a few weeks a large proportion of our forces were withdrawn from the country and returned to england. the campaign being at an end, i left egypt early in october in order to resume my duties as surveyor general in the war office; but before embarking had a farewell audience with the khedive, ibrahim tew-fik. i had had interviews with him on one or two occasions previously. he was quiet and friendly in manner, and apparently of a gentle disposition; was cordial in his recognition of the good services rendered to him by the british forces. i said i hoped that the conduct of our men since their arrival at cairo had been satisfactory, and he at once expressed his admiration of their good discipline, and remarked that in every respect, whether in the streets or in the bazaars, their conduct had been most orderly. what vexed him was that some of his people in the bazaars cheated our men, and demanded extravagant prices for their goods. i assured him, however, that he need not worry himself on that point, as the english soldiers would readily discover the market value, and matters would soon find their level; and that they enjoyed their visit to cairo. statements were current at the time that the khedive was not really loyal to england. on this being brought to his notice, it is said, and i believe truly, that he observed: "not loyal to the english? when my country was in insurrection and my authority and life in danger, there was only one power in europe which would move a finger to help me--and that was england. if i am not faithful to them it would be strange indeed!" [illustration] footnotes: [footnote : now earl of derby.] [footnote : _report of royal commission on the relations of the naval and military departments to each other_, .] [footnote : now field marshal viscount wolseley, g.c.b.] [footnote : this gallant young naval officer, whose services were so valuable during the night march, unfortunately received a wound on entering the works, of which he died a few days afterwards.] [footnote : now lord alcester.] [footnote : visiting card of arabi pasha, found at tel-el-kebir. [illustration]] chapter xxix gibraltar--its value from a naval and commercial point of view--zobehr pasha a state prisoner--sanitary condition of gibraltar. soon after my return from the expedition to egypt i was appointed governor of gibraltar, and on january , , took over the command from my distinguished predecessor, field marshal lord napier of magdala. before alluding to the present position of gibraltar, and to the duties in connection with it during my tenure of office, it may be as well to refer shortly to its eventful history in the past. one of the most ancient fortresses in europe, it owes its exceptional interest and importance partly to its position at the entrance to the mediterranean and partly from its vicinity to the kingdom of morocco. from the early part of the eighth century, when first occupied and fortified by the moors, it became, as it were, their chief base of operations in the gradual conquest of the greater part of spain. its history in those days is indeed one continual record for several centuries of sieges, and of battles fought in its vicinity; and although re-taken in , and held for a few years by the spanish forces, it may be said to have been in possession of the moors during almost the whole of the eight hundred years of their rule in that country. during that long period its value was chiefly of a military character; and it is only in more recent times, as circumstances in europe gradually changed, that its unique position in regard to naval power in the mediterranean has been fully recognised and developed. subsequently to the expulsion of the moors in the sixteenth century it was held by the spanish government, but its defences were apparently neglected and its importance little appreciated; so that when attacked by the british fleet under admiral rooke in it was captured with comparative ease, its possession being confirmed to us by the treaty of utrecht in . since that date, although it has undergone several sieges--notably that by the allied armies and fleets of france and spain, which lasted from to , it has successfully resisted all attacks; and its past history would appear to prove that, if properly armed and resolutely held, it is practically safe from capture by land or sea. [illustration: gibraltar from queen of spain's chair] coming down to modern days, the first and perhaps the most important point relates to its value as a harbour; and in this respect it is, and always has been, somewhat defective from a naval point of view in time of war. although its anchorage is so far good that well-found vessels can remain there in safety during the heaviest weather, still it cannot be considered a harbour in the ordinary technical sense. it has no narrow entrance or channel which by means of land armaments, lines of torpedoes, or other means can be absolutely denied to a hostile fleet. in fact, it is an open bay several miles wide. these general conditions are, of course, permanent; but it is to be observed that the increased range, power, and accuracy of modern ordnance have to some extent given the fortress a greater command over the sea approaches than it had in former days; so that, although hostile vessels cannot be absolutely interdicted from paying flying visits in war, they would be unable without great risk to remain for any length of time within range. the conditions of modern warfare, therefore, have not been of an unfavourable character in that respect. another point has to be noticed. the shores of the bay consist for the most part of territory belonging to spain; consequently, its waters are more or less under the command of that country, and the improvement in modern artillery, no doubt, has extended their power in this respect. it is, however, clear that only in the event of war with spain would this aspect of the case assume importance; and, as a matter of fact, so little is the contingency regarded that no batteries containing modern armaments have been erected along their coast. on the whole, although the position of gibraltar may not in all respects be an ideal one, its general conditions remain very much as they always have been; and to a great naval, colonial, and commercial nation such as great britain it is of the highest value, not only in war, but also in peace. its possession gives us a place of rendezvous and of observation for our fleets; so that in time of war, with ordinary vigilance, no hostile vessels can enter or leave the mediterranean without our knowledge. that of itself is an important consideration. we are also enabled to maintain within the fortress reserves of naval munitions, food, coals, and stores, available for our vessels of war, either in the mediterranean or coming from the atlantic. its value, however, is not limited to a period of war. gibraltar has been for many a year to a certain extent a centre of trade, not only with the neighbouring towns of spain, but also with the ports along the coast of morocco. and since the opening of the suez canal its mercantile interests have greatly increased, the number of trading and passenger vessels of all nations calling in daily for provisions and coals and other requisites being much larger than of yore, as will be seen by the following table, giving the number and tonnage of vessels calling at gibraltar during and respectively:-- +------- +-------------------------- +-------------- + | year |number of vessels calling |total tonnage | +----------------------------------- +-------------- + | | , | , , | | | , | , , | +--------+-------------------------- +-------------- + as a proof of its commercial activity i may point out that linea, which five and twenty years ago was a mere spanish village at the other end of the neutral ground, is now a town of twelve thousand people, large numbers of whom visit gibraltar daily, bringing in supplies of food, forage, vegetables, and fruit, &c., and leaving again at night with english goods. in fact, it has become a suburb, as it were, of the city. the trading facilities of gibraltar are beneficial to the country round, and are fully appreciated by the inhabitants of that part of andalusia. taking all these matters into consideration, it will, i think, be apparent that the value of the city and fortress to this country are greater now even than in former days. it is no doubt quite natural that the government and people of spain should feel regret at the permanent occupation of gibraltar by a foreign power; and it has been suggested that we should accept in exchange the town and fortress of ceuta, which holds a somewhat analogous position on the other side of the straits and which belongs to spain, and thus remove any cause for unfriendly feeling on their part. the question, however, is not so simple as at first sight it would appear. assuming for the moment that the strategical value of ceuta as a naval station equals that of gibraltar, on which i offer no decided opinion, it is by no means certain that the proposal if made by us would be accepted. the spanish government are very tenacious of their possessions on the coast of morocco, as giving them great influence in that country. their apparent desire is to hold a powerful, if not a predominating, influence on both sides of the straits; and, although they would no doubt gladly obtain possession of gibraltar, it does not therefore follow that they would give up possession of one of their most valuable positions on the opposite coast in exchange. other mediterranean powers also are carefully watching events in morocco, and it is very possible they might not acquiesce in our occupation of ceuta. these are diplomatic rather than military questions, and i only allude to them as proofs that the subject is rather involved and goes beyond a mere exchange of territory. so far as morocco is concerned, its present condition is deplorable. it is a country situated only a few miles from europe, with an excellent climate and great agricultural and mineral resources; inhabited, moreover, by a fine, brave race of people, and yet, notwithstanding these advantages, owing partly to the jealousies of its neighbours, its resources remain undeveloped, whilst its government is weak and cruel to a degree. in considering the two-fold aspect of gibraltar as a fortress and a commercial city combined, it is sometimes argued that its dual interests are antagonistic, and that the presence of a large civil population would add to the difficulties of its defence. to a certain extent no doubt the position is anomalous, as in other fortified cities. should hostilities occur, and should the fortress be seriously threatened, its trade would certainly suffer and a considerable proportion of the inhabitants would probably seek temporary refuge elsewhere. still we must bear in mind that war is the exception; and as not a shot has been fired at gibraltar for upwards of a century, it would appear senseless to paralyse its commercial advantages in time of peace in anticipation of what an enemy might attempt to accomplish in war. in short, the remedy would be far worse than the disease. the shipping trade of gibraltar in the present day is subject to one disadvantage, from the absence of any wharves for coaling the numerous steam vessels which call daily throughout the year. in order to remedy this deficiency, the coal reserves of the mercantile marine are stored in large old wooden hulks, about thirty-five in number, which are moored in _échelon_ down the bay, inconveniently crowding the anchorage. the arrangement is not only costly in the purchase and maintenance of the hulks, but in time of war they would be liable to be sunk either by ramming or by torpedoes. the difficulty, however, could be met by an extension of the new mole pier, and by the construction of a wharf from the ragged staff bastion; which would not only enclose a considerable area of deep water and give facilities for coaling vessels, both of war and of commerce, but would also enable a large reserve of coals to be maintained on shore, under protection of the guns of the fortress. the enclosed area would also be an appropriate site for the proposed dock. one of the first subjects brought to my consideration on arrival as governor, was that of coaling merchant vessels at night. ever since the days of the great siege it had been the custom to close and lock up all the gates of the city at sunset, and to prevent any communication with the outer world until the following morning; just as if an enemy at the gate outside were waiting to rush in and take possession. one consequence of this extreme vigilance was that all vessels arriving after dark had to remain at anchor for many hours before their wants could be supplied. a deputation of merchants represented to me that great advantage would arise if the detention could be avoided. their request seemed reasonable enough, and as on inquiry it appeared that their wishes could be met by permitting a few coal-heavers to leave the city at night, orders were given accordingly; and the result not only obviated the inconvenience, but led to an increase in the vessels visiting the port, thus adding considerably to the harbour dues. the old records of gibraltar[ ] during the eighteenth century contain some interesting and amusing regulations concerning matters both of civil administration and army discipline, and i will quote a few examples. 'any donkeys loose in the town are to be the property of the person taking them away, and any straying on the ramparts are to be shot by the sentries. 'fishermen are only to sell their fish after the servant of the governor has bought what he requires. 'whatever suttler doth not inform against men that swear in their houses contrary to the orders given out shall be turned out of town. 'a hat having been taken from the convent by some gentleman who left his own instead, mr.---- takes this method that the gentleman may exchange hats _if he pleases_. 'no gaming to be allowed in wine houses, particularly including the games of the devil-and-the-taylors and skuttles. 'all oysters which come from portugal are to lie in the sea for at least a fortnight before they are brought into the garrison, as they are found very unwholesome without this precaution. 'if sentries are attacked by bullocks in the streets or on the line wall, they are to retire into an embrasure or get upon the parapet; but they are not to fire inconsiderately. 'a loose ball and a charge of powder in a cane is to be issued to each man on guard to save their cartridges. the loose ball to be carried in the cock of their hats. 'on account of the scarcity of flour soldiers are not to have their hair powdered till further orders. 'officers and non-commissioned officers commanding guards are frequently to send out patrols through the day with their arms unloaded to kill every dog they see going about the streets. 'the governor recommends it to the commanding officers of regiments to give directions that the cartridges may not be made too large for firing at exercise or reviews, some barrels of firelocks having split in firing. 'no person whatever is to be suffered to go on the line wall or ramparts in a night-gown, night-cap, or binyan on any pretence whatever, and all sentries are to turn off such as shall attempt to come near their posts in any of the said dresses without distinction of persons. 'all sentinels who do not call out "all's well" every half minute shall be punished with two hundred lashes. 'the queue is to be fixed to the hair of the head, but when an officer's hair is not long enough for this purpose he may be allowed to fix the queue otherwise till his hair is sufficiently long, but this is not to continue longer than two months on any account. 'no one to suffer any person to stand at their doors or go into the streets that has marks of the smallpox. no mackerel to be suffered to come into town. 'no woman to beat a soldier; the first that doth shall be whipped and turned out of town. 'any man who has the misfortune to be killed is to be buried by the guard where it happens, and his clothes to be sent to his regiment. 'officers at guard-mounting will bring their espantoons to a half recover and come to the right about together upon a flam and not upon the ruffle, which will be previous to it.' (the terms are meant for certain beats on the drum. the espantoon for officers was done away with in .) the conditions under which our soldiers serve in the present day as compared with those of the last century are certainly of a much improved character, and the results in all respects are very satisfactory. they are better paid, clothed, fed, and generally cared for than in the days gone by. during my residence at gibraltar, i obtained permission from the war office to convert some old store-houses within the city into reading and recreation rooms for the garrison, and it was carried out on a considerable scale. the chief room was capable of seating , persons; and every week a free smoking concert or entertainment was given, open to all soldiers, their wives, and friends; each regiment taking its turn to arrange a programme. ladies and officers were sometimes kind enough to take part in the concerts, which were always crowded. the institution also contained a library, a billiard room, and was provided with games, such as bagatelle, chess, draughts, &c. tea, coffee, and non-intoxicating drinks, at moderate prices were sold all day at a buffet; and after sunset until roll-call a bar was opened, at which the men could get glasses of beer, &c. the expenses were not large, and the financial results were satisfactory. the non-commissioned officers and men of the garrison only paid one halfpenny a month each, and were then free to use the institution every day during their leisure hours; and to attend the free concerts and other entertainments at will. their subscriptions, added to contributions from officers and to the profits from sale of beer and refreshments, &c., were found to be sufficient for the purpose. the furniture and gas were supplied by government. during the period of my command there was not a single case of disturbance or trouble of any kind; and in my opinion such institutions are excellent in every way, not only as places of innocent recreation, but, especially in a place like gibraltar, as tending to draw the men away from the numerous wine-shops in the lower parts of the town. i may add that during the visits of the channel fleet the seamen and marines were invited to make free use of the rooms, and did so in considerable numbers: the institution thus contributing to promote that friendly association between the men of the two services which is so desirable from every point of view. a somewhat singular story is told of general sir robert wilson on his arrival as governor of gibraltar in . it may be premised that sir robert's services in the army had been of a very distinguished character. born in , he was appointed a cornet of dragoons in , and saw active service in flanders and in holland, and then in egypt in . in he became a lieutenant colonel and went to brazil, and was also at the capture of the cape of good hope in . in subsequent years he served in poland, and also in portugal and spain during the peninsular war. he was with the russians in the campaign of , and with the allied armies on the continent up to . from to he was member of parliament for southwark. in september , however, he was dismissed from the service by king george iv. on account of his participation in the london riots which occurred on the death of queen caroline. on the accession of william iv, in , he was restored to his rank in the army, and in , was appointed governor of gibraltar, in succession to sir alexander woodford. it is related that on his arrival he inquired of sir alexander if he remembered the last occasion on which they had met? woodford's reply was that so many years had elapsed that he was unable to recall the exact time or incident. sir robert wilson then said: 'the last time we met was in , when you were at the head of the guards and i was with the mob, and you were driving us through the streets of london!' it is not often, perhaps, that two general officers meet on two occasions under such very different circumstances. [illustration: zobehr pasha] in march zobehr pasha, accompanied by two sons, an interpreter, and several servants, arrived at gibraltar from egypt as a state prisoner by order of the british government, and he was detained there during the remainder of my period of office. i had many conversations with him on the subject of the soudan, and found him to be a man of considerable ability; and, although cautious in the expression of his views on egyptian affairs, i gathered from him that the people of the soudan specially detested the rule of the egyptian pashas, and that the cause of their hostility to us arose solely from a belief that in sending an expedition up the nile to khartoum in , our object was to reinstate the rule of egypt in that country. without entering at any length into this much discussed question, it must be borne in mind that until conquered in by the late mohammed ali the soudan was entirely independent of egypt, and separated from it by a great desert. colonel charles gordon wrote: 'from wady halfa southwards to hannek, a distance of miles, an utter desert extends, spreading also for miles eastwards and westwards, on both sides of the nile.... it was this boundary that kept the warlike and independent tribes of the soudan quite apart from the inhabitants of egypt proper, and made the soudanese and the egyptians two distinct peoples that have not the least sympathy one with the other.' of the result of egyptian rule, the late sir samuel baker, writing in , drew a melancholy picture. he described the provinces as utterly ruined and only governed by military force, the revenue unequal to the expenditure, and the country paralysed by taxation; shut in by deserts, all communication with the outer world was most difficult, and the existing conditions rendered these countries so worthless to the state that their annexation could only be accounted for by the fruits of the slave trade. zobehr pasha's opinion as expressed to me was, that if the people of the soudan were assured that no attempt would be made to restore the authority of egypt, their hostility would cease, and they would be anxious to open their country to trade. speaking generally, it appeared to me that his views were sound, and that if we were to proclaim a policy of peace at souakim, combined possibly with some annual payment to the neighbouring chiefs, the road to berber and khartoum would soon re-open and commerce be renewed. at all events i cannot see that it is any part of our duty to assist the egyptians to reconquer the soudan. gibraltar, like many another ancient fortress, has undergone frequent changes in its defences from time to time, owing to the advances in military science, and to the constantly increasing power of modern artillery. these changes have been incessant during the present century, and it has been re-fortified and re-armed over and over again. it is said that many years ago the inspector general of fortifications of the day, desirous of bringing it up to date, recommended an extra expenditure of , _l._, and had an interview with the chancellor of the exchequer for the purpose of obtaining his consent. he explained to the chancellor the steep and isolated nature of the rock, and, after giving him a graphic account of its numerous sieges, asked his opinion. the chancellor of the exchequer's reply was discouraging, and he said that, from the lucid and interesting description of the inspector general, it appeared to him that gibraltar would be perfectly impregnable if the military authorities would only leave it alone. the money, however, was ultimately granted, and i only mention it as an example of the different conclusions which financial and military authorities may arrive at from a consideration of the same facts. the one was evidently thinking of bastions and the other of budgets. gibraltar has a population of about twenty-four thousand persons, of which between four and five thousand are military, and as it is said to be one of the most thickly inhabited places in the world[ ] its sanitary condition is a matter not only of importance, but under the circumstances one of some difficulty. in the early part of the century it was frequently visited by severe epidemics of fever, and more recently by serious attacks of cholera. of late years, however, its sanitation has been under the careful supervision of a sanitary commission, which during my period of office consisted of twelve members, four official, and eight civilians selected from the grand jury list, and all unpaid. they had charge of the drainage, water, gas, and general improvements of the city; and, under the authority of the governor, levied an annual rate on the inhabitants to meet the necessary expenditure. it is evident that their duties were arduous and responsible. the sanitary commission may be said to be the only form of representation given to the people, and it is one which should be carefully preserved. however necessary it may be that the governor of a city, such as gibraltar, enclosed within a fortress should have full power and authority, still it must be an advantage to him and to the public service that in a matter of vital interest to the people, in which also their local knowledge can be utilised, they should be consulted and associated with the government. i may go farther and record my opinion that at gibraltar, as elsewhere, it is desirable that representatives of the people should be freely consulted, not only in regard to sanitation, but also in commercial and other matters; and during my residence there i derived much assistance from their knowledge and friendly co-operation. the results of the care bestowed, for many years past, on the sanitary arrangements at gibraltar have been very satisfactory. not only is its condition far better than that of the neighbouring towns of spain, but it is now one of the healthiest stations of the british army at home or abroad, as the following statistics will prove. annual death rate per thousand of the troops at various stations at home and abroad, on the average of ten years from to --[ ] united kingdom · gibraltar · malta · egypt[ ] · bermuda · ceylon · india · a striking proof of the excellent sanitary condition of the city was afforded in , when the greater part of spain was visited by a severe attack of cholera, which gradually spread southwards; and early in august several cases suddenly occurred both in gibraltar and in the neighbouring town of linea. bearing in mind the crowded population, the matter was very serious, and certain additional precautions were at once taken in order as far as possible to mitigate the severity of the attack. one difficulty which has always existed more or less is that of good drinking water. the chief supply is obtained from rain water, collected from the surface of the rock during the wet season, and stored in large reservoirs above the town. a considerable quantity is also pumped up from shallow wells on the north front, but although available for flushing, washing, &c., it is brackish and unfit for drinking. as a consequence of this scarcity, there always has been a considerable trade in water brought from spain in barrels and sold in the streets; but as on analysis it was found to be very impure, its introduction on the appearance of cholera was stopped. fortunately, my predecessor, lord napier of magdala, with a view to the possible requirements of a state of siege, had commenced in the erection of works for distilling sea water in large quantities; and, as they were just completed, they were put into operation, and for some weeks about , gallons a day were distilled and sold to all comers at the rate of six gallons for a penny. a medical authority, speaking not long since, said that 'cholera is an exclusively water-carried disease, and all european countries may be rendered impervious to its attacks by close attention to the purity of water.' that, i may say, was the view of my medical advisers at gibraltar at the time, and i attribute our escape from a severe attack very much to this supply of pure water to the inhabitants. another precaution taken was the establishment of a camp just outside the fortress for the inhabitants of the houses attacked. indian experience has proved that it is very advantageous to regiments when visited by cholera to move them out of their barracks and place them under canvas on fresh ground. the cases at gibraltar nearly all occurred among the poorer inhabitants living in very crowded dwellings; and the families attacked being at once sent to the camp and supplied with pure water, the disease was immediately checked. their houses were temporarily closed, the drains disinfected, cisterns emptied, and rags and rubbish burnt; and in the course of a few days they returned home, and the cholera, so far as they were concerned, was at an end. the epidemic at gibraltar lasted for about two months, and great misery resulted amongst the poorer classes, owing to the city being placed in quarantine by the other ports of europe. as a consequence very few vessels called, and large numbers of the inhabitants were out of employment. so great was the poverty that public soup kitchens were established, and for some time about , persons a day received free rations of soup and bread. in the meantime the disease was raging at linea and other neighbouring towns, and, considerable alarm being felt, i was constantly urged to establish a cordon of troops across the neutral ground, and to prevent all communication from the outside. but although the precise causes of cholera may be somewhat obscure, it appeared to me that, as the chief supplies of food came from spain, had a cordon been established, prices would have risen at once, and the misery already existing would have been considerably increased. all indian experience proves that such arrangements are useless. in fact, a line of sentries cannot stop the march of a disease; and therefore, advised by experienced medical officers who had served in the east, i refused to close the communications with spain. the actual cases of cholera at gibraltar and at linea respectively in the autumn of were as follows: +-----------+-------------+--------------------+------------------+ | | population, | number of cases of | number of deaths | | | approximate | cholera | | +-----------+-------------+--------------------+------------------+ | gibraltar | , | | | | linea | , | | [ ] | +-----------+-------------+--------------------+------------------+ so that whilst in gibraltar one person in was attacked, in linea it was one in . these facts speak for themselves, and prove that adequate sanitary measures and precautions will to a great extent serve to prevent the spread of epidemic disease. before leaving this subject, i would mention that at the end of a numerous committee of distinguished members of the medical profession, including amongst others, sir william jenner, sir william gull, and sir joseph fayrer, conducted an inquiry into the subject of asiatic cholera, and at the end of their report they state as follows: 'the committee feel that they ought not to separate without expressing their conviction that sanitary measures in their true sense, and sanitary measures alone, are the only trustworthy means to prevent outbreaks of the disease, and to restrain its spread and mitigate its severity when it is prevalent. experience in europe and in the east has shown that sanitary cordons and quarantine restrictions (under whatsoever form) are not only useless as means for arresting the progress of cholera, but positively injurious; and this not merely because of the many unavoidable hardships which their enforcement involves, but also because they tend to create alarm during periods of epidemics of the disease and to divert public attention at other times from the necessity which constantly exists for the prosecution of sanitary measures of assured value--measures which, moreover, tend to mitigate the incidence of all forms of disease.' the story of my 'recollections' now draws to a close. whatever vicissitudes or occasional hardships i may have experienced during my long service in various parts of the world, i was in great measure free from them during the period of my government of gibraltar. there were, of course, numerous duties, and sometimes anxieties, connected with its administration, but these were rendered comparatively easy by the warm support of all classes which was so heartily given during the four years of my residence amongst them. they are a loyal people, and were most grateful for any efforts of mine to promote their welfare. the conduct of the troops in garrison throughout was excellent, and a friendly spirit prevailed at all times between the civil and military population. i left gibraltar with much regret, feeling deeply the kindness shown to my family and myself by the inhabitants who came to bid us farewell on our embarkation for england in november . i hope that the narrative which i have given of the campaigns in which i bore a small part, and the views which i have expressed on military and political matters, may be of some interest to the public generally. it will always be a gratification to me that throughout my career i have been so closely associated with the officers and men of the royal artillery, a corps in which members of my family have served in uninterrupted succession from down to the present day. footnotes: [footnote : see _gibraltar directory_, in which many others are recorded.] [footnote : _colonial office book_, .] [footnote : _army medical department report_, .] [footnote : average of nine years.] [footnote : these figures were given me by the spanish authorities.] _spottiswoode & co. printers, new-street square, london._ smith, elder, & co.'s publications. the life of his royal highness the prince consort. by sir theodore martin, k.c.b. with portrait and views. vols. demy vo. s. each. also a 'people's edition,' in vol., bound in cloth, _s._ _d._; 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reproduction of the originals. with a preface and editorial notes by miss thackeray. a new edition, in a new style of binding, bevelled boards, gilt edges, royal to. price one guinea. london: smith, elder & co., waterloo place. to herat and cabul [illustration: angus and pottinger watching the fight from the walls of herat. _frontispiece._] to herat and cabul a story of the first afghan war by g.a. henty author of "with buller in natal" "at the point of the bayonet" "the bravest of the brave" "won by the sword" &c. _with eight illustrations by charles m. sheldon_ new york charles scribner's sons copyright, , by charles scribner's sons _published september, _ the caxton press new york. preface in the military history of this country there is no darker page than the destruction of a considerable british force in the terrible defiles between cabul and jellalabad in january, . of all the wars in which our troops have taken part never was one entered upon so recklessly or so unjustifiably. the ruler of afghanistan, dost mahomed, was sincerely anxious for our friendship. he was alarmed at the menacing attitude of russia, which, in conjunction with persia, was threatening his dominions and intriguing with the princes at candahar. our commissioner at cabul, mr. burnes, was convinced of the ameer's honesty of intention, and protested most strongly against the course taken by the indian government, who determined upon setting up a discredited prince, who had for many years been a fugitive in india, in place of dost mahomed. in spite of his remonstrances, the war was undertaken. nothing could have been worse than the arrangements for it, and the troops suffered terribly from thirst and want of transport. however, they reached cabul with comparatively little fighting. dost mahomed fled, and the puppet shah soojah was set up in his place; but he was only kept there by british bayonets, and for two years he was so protected. gradually, however, the british force was withdrawn, until only some five thousand troops remained to support him. well led, they would have been amply sufficient for the purpose, for though the afghan tribesmen were dangerous among their mountains, they could not for a moment have stood against them in the open field. unhappily the general was old and infirm, incapable of decision of any kind, and in his imbecile hands the troops, who in october could have met the whole forces of afghanistan in fight, were kept inactive, while the afghans pillaged the stores with the provisions for the winter, and insulted and bearded them in every way. thus a fine body of fighting men were reduced to such depths of discontent and shame that when the unworthy order for retreat before their exulting enemy was given they had lost all confidence in themselves or their officers, and, weakened by hunger and hampered by an enormous train of camp followers, they went as sheep to the slaughter in the trap the afghans had prepared for them. it would almost seem that their fate was a punishment for the injustice of the war. misfortunes have befallen our arms, but never one so dark and disgraceful as this. the shame of the disaster was redeemed only by the heroic garrison of jellalabad, which, although but one-fourth of the strength of that at cabul, sallied out after a noble defence and routed the army which dost mahomed's son akbar had assembled for their destruction. contents chap. page i. alone in the world ii. an unexpected meeting iii. the siege of herat iv. a sturdy defence v. in candahar vi. an escape vii. in the service viii. the advance ix. just in time x. a mission xi. a dangerous journey xii. troubles thicken xiii. the murder of sir a. burnes xiv. a series of blunders xv. a doomed army xvi. annihilation of the army xvii. jellalabad xviii. the advance on cabul xix. the british captives illustrations angus and pottinger watching the fight from the walls of herat _frontispiece_ page "a man walking just in front of him ... was knocked down" azim surprises the spy "he took down the prop, and thrust it suddenly with all his force through the hole" "there, lying close under a rock, was a young afghan" "as they passed the corner ... some men sprang on them" "angus was half-mad with grief and with fury that he was not in his place among the troops" angus shows his goods to the prisoners * * * * * map of afghanistan and north-west frontier of india to herat and cabul chapter i alone in the world on the th of september, , a lad was standing before mr. m'neill, the british minister at the persian court. both looked grave, for the interview was an important one. the former felt that it was the turning-point of his life, the opening of a fresh career, the introduction to a service in which he might gain honourable distinction and credit. to the british minister it was of scarcely less importance, for the interests of great britain were gravely involved in the success of the mission that he was now entrusting to this young clerk in the employment of the embassy. it was nothing less than thwarting the designs of persia, aided and instigated by russia, to capture herat and to conquer at least the western portion of afghanistan, the alliance of the princes of candahar having already been secured. angus campbell was now about sixteen years old. his father was a trader, who had for twelve years been settled in tabriz, carrying on business on his own account in some branches of trade, and as agent for a scotch firm in others. the boy had been left with some relations in scotland until he was twelve years old, when his parents had paid a short visit to their friends in scotland, and had brought him back with them. the change of life was not an agreeable one to him. in the eight years that had elapsed since he had last seen his parents, he had, of course, almost forgotten them, and it would be some time before any real affection for them would spring up. it was the companionship of his school-fellows that he missed rather than that of his aunt, a strict woman, who made no allowance whatever for a boy's restlessness and love of fun, and who was continually shocked by the complaints made by members of her chapel as to the conduct of the boys at dr. murray's. it was the principal school in the little town. the teaching was good, the application of the rod frequent, but neither teaching nor thrashing availed to soften the manners of the healthy and somewhat riotous lads, who once out of school threw themselves with all their hearts into their favourite diversions, among which the most conspicuous were fishing in forbidden parts of the river, bird-nesting in woods which were kept strictly private and guarded by keepers, playing hare-and-hounds across the fields of the crustiest of farmers, and above all engaging in desperate battles with the boys of other schools. in all these pastimes angus campbell took as large a share as his age entitled him to, and the state of his clothes and his face when he returned home was a source of continual amazement and irritation to his aunt. she had even endeavoured to arrange for a deputation to wait upon dr. murray with a list of grievances suffered by the townspeople, such as broken windows, the yells and shouts of conflict, and the destruction of the boys' garments caused by the various fights, and to propose that the hours of play should be shortened, and that some sort of supervision should be exercised at all times over the boys. however, although there were many who agreed with her that the present state of things was disgraceful, nothing came of the movement; for the fathers, remembering their own boyhood, were to a man against the idea. "we did just the same in our young days," they said, "and are none the worse for it now. lads cannot be like lassies, and we don't want them to be even if they could; if you were to speak to the doctor, he would just laugh in your faces, and would tell you that he kept a school for boys and not for girls. if you have complaints to make against any of his scholars, make them, and he will punish the lads as they deserve. his boys are no worse than others, and he does not wish to see them better. if they do some mischief occasionally, it is because they are in good health and in good spirits, and a lad of that kind is far more likely to turn out well than one who spends all his spare time in poring over his books." as the doctor's opinions on these subjects were known to all the town, miss campbell's proposal came to nothing. she would herself have gone to him to complain of the doings of her nephew, but there was a strong feeling in the town that while all things connected with the school were under the doctor's charge, parents should take other matters into their own hands, and maintain discipline by the use of the tawse in their own dwellings, and that they had no right to trouble dr. murray about private delinquencies. he had, indeed, sufficient on his hands, for although no actual supervision was maintained when the lads were once dismissed from school, there were bounds set beyond which they were not allowed to go, and when they were caught upon any of their frequent forays beyond these limits, he had to adjudicate and punish the offenders. but it was not often that this happened; for while the boys considered it not only justifiable but meritorious to break bounds, they looked upon anyone caught in the act of showing a want of craft and of judgment, and so, having good legs and lungs, they were generally able to outdistance their pursuers. thus, then, when his parents returned to scotland they found angus a healthy, active, and high-spirited boy, somewhat rough in manners, but straightforward and honourable, for it was a tradition in the school that no boy should ever try to screen himself by a lie. when questioned by his father, he acknowledged that he would like to stay at school for a few years longer. "and i should like you to do so too, angus; but it is a long, long journey, and a difficult one, from tabriz to scotland, and it may be many years before i return home again. it is a journey that it is impossible for a boy to make alone. but this is not the only reason why i wish to take you back. i want to train you to help me in my business, and until you speak persian fluently you will be of no use whatever to me. at your age you will pick it up rapidly, far more rapidly than you could if you did not begin till you were seventeen or eighteen. we will generally speak to you in persian, and you will have many opportunities for practising it. in two years you ought to speak it like a native. arabic will also be very useful to you. i have constant communications with india, with turkey, and with herat. i buy goods from all these countries; and sell persian products to them. in afghanistan, indeed, persian is spoken generally by the trading and upper classes; but arabic is essential to trade with constantinople and smyrna, with bokhara and the turkomans; and it is our chief medium of communication with india traders, who, although speaking several distinct languages, all have more or less knowledge of arabic. it has been a great privation to your mother and myself to be so many years without you. we have no other children, and it would be a great joy and comfort to our lives, as well as a great assistance to me in my business, to have you with me." "i understand, father," the boy said; "i did not think of these things before. i am sure i should be very glad to be able to help you, and i won't say another word about being sorry to leave all my friends." "it is quite natural that you should be sorry, angus; it would be strange indeed if you were not. however, i don't think you will dislike the life out there when you get accustomed to it. we will certainly do our best to make you happy." so angus had returned with them, and soon settled down to his new life. devoting himself earnestly to acquiring the language, at the end of six months he came to speak it fairly, and before he had been out a year could have passed as a persian lad; at the same time he had made considerable progress in arabic. his father had then dressed him in persian fashion. there was a good deal of ill-feeling among the lower class against foreigners, and the pugnacity that had been fostered in angus at school had frequent opportunities of displaying itself; for, in spite of good resolutions to the contrary, he was often goaded into fury by the taunts and abuse with which the boys assailed him when he went out alone, and had thrown himself upon them, and used his fists with such effect that he had sometimes put to flight half a dozen lads of his own age. but in persian costume he could move about the streets unnoticed; and although he did not like the change at first, he acknowledged that it was useful, for his father pointed out to him that it was essential that nothing should take place that could add to the dislike with which foreigners were regarded. already several angry complaints had been made by neighbours of the state in which their sons had come home after an encounter with him. nearly four years after angus arrived at tabriz the plague made its appearance in persia. it spread rapidly, and tabriz was one of the cities which suffered most severely. one evening mr. campbell returned home from a visit to a customer and complained of feeling unwell. the next morning it was too evident that he had caught the infection. before nightfall his wife also sickened. twenty-four hours later both were dead. mr. campbell had a long talk with his son as soon as the disease manifested itself in the case of his wife. "angus," he said, "you must prepare for the worst. the cases of recovery are few indeed. the servants have already fled, and even did i wish you to leave us, i know that it would be too late now. god's will be done, my boy, and i can only hope that you may be spared. however that is in his hands. you have been my assistant now for the past three years, and know how matters stand. i have no debts. the books will show you how much is due to me from the house at home and how much by my agent at bombay. the stock of goods in the warehouse is worth a considerable sum. i am unable to think very clearly now, or to advise you what to do should you be left alone; but it is clear to me that you are too young yet to manage the business, and it is not likely that the firm would entrust their affairs to a lad of your age. i should say, therefore, that you had best dispose of all the goods; the books will show you their prices. as for yourself, i will give you no advice. it will be open to you to return to england or to go to bombay, and i have no doubt my agent there will obtain employment for you, especially as you will have money to embark in any business you may go into. but do not invest a penny until you become of age; you will by that time be able to judge wisely whether the business you are in is that in which you can best employ your mind. "whatever you do, do not remain in tabriz. as is always the case in times of plague or famine, there is sedition and trouble, and foreigners become the object of hatred, for the poor people have some sort of superstitious idea that they are responsible for the scourge. the best thing you can do is to consult our armenian friend, who is also our vice-consul; he will view matters more clearly than i can do at present. put your trust always in god, my boy. my own opinion is that you had better remain in the east. your knowledge of languages would be absolutely useless to you at home, and you could only hope to obtain a place in a counting-house." "i will do as you tell me, father," angus said, trying to speak steadily. "i will try always to be what you would wish me." his grief was terrible when his mother expired two or three hours after his father. he roused himself, however, to see to the simple preparations for their funeral, and late that evening buried them in the garden behind the house. the next day as he was sitting alone he heard a tumult in the street. looking out, he saw that several houses, which he knew belonged to foreign traders, were in flames, and a mob of maddened men were rushing down the street towards his house. resistance would have been madness. he ran to the safe, seized the bag containing the cash, and had just time to run out at the back of the house and escape by the gate in the garden when the rioters burst in. for a few minutes they were engaged in the work of pillage. shawls from cashmere, native embroidered silks, costly goods from india, turkish, persian, turkoman, and heratee carpets, and british goods of all kinds were scrambled and fought for. when the house was sacked from top to bottom it was set on fire, and as a volume of smoke rose from it, angus turned away from the spot where from a distance he had been watching the scene, and made his way to the house of the armenian merchant. the loss of the house and the contents of the warehouse affected him little--although he knew that it had cost him more than half his inheritance--but this was as nothing to what he had so recently suffered. the vice-consul had been an intimate friend of the family. on approaching his house angus stood some distance from the door and called. a servant looked out. "will you tell izaac effendi that i desire greatly to speak to him?" the armenian quickly came to the door. "my poor lad," he said, "i grieve deeply for you. i heard of your losses, and the news has just been brought in of the burning of the house and magazine. but why do you stand so far away?" "because i would not bring contagion near you, effendi. i came to tell you what had happened, and to say that i shall buy some food and go out into the country, and there remain until i die of the plague or can be sure that i have escaped contagion." "you will come in here at once," the armenian said. "does not one in the street run against persons who may be affected. many of my compatriots have come here to ask my advice, and some of them have stricken friends in their houses. since i came to reside here i have four times seen the plague raging, and each time it has passed me over. whether it is the will of god that i should thus be spared i know not, but i am in his hands. come in, lad, i will take no denial. shall i desert my friends when they most need comfort and aid? what is my friendship worth if i should, now in your hour of need, turn my back upon you? come in, i pray you." seeing that the old man was thoroughly in earnest, angus, too greatly touched by his kindness even to speak, silently entered the house. "i will take you through at once to the pavilion in the garden," the merchant said. "although i have no fear myself, there are my servants and clerks. 'tis like enough that some of them may be stricken, for they, like all of us, are liable to be smitten when they go into the streets, and should this be so they might blame me for your presence here; therefore 'tis best that you should for three or four days live in the pavilion; i will bring you out cushions and pillows. but i do not think that you will be attacked; had you taken the plague you would probably have shown symptoms of it ere now. keep your thoughts from dwelling on it. i will bring you out some books; try to fix your mind on them and abstain as much as possible from dwelling on the past. i will bring your food out to you, and we will talk together to-morrow, there is much that you will have to consider." "what are you thinking of doing?" his host asked him when he came in to see him on the morning after his arrival. "i have been trying to think, but i cannot decide on anything. i do not wish to go back to scotland. i have an aunt living there, but she would not welcome me warmly. besides, if i were to do so, i do not see how i could earn my living; for my knowledge of persian and arabic would be of no use to me. if i had been ten years older the firm for whom my father was agent might have appointed me in his place, but of course i am a great deal too young for that. they acted as his agents also, and bought for him the goods in which he dealt outside their business; and he told me when he was taken suddenly ill that they had about a thousand pounds of his money in their hands. that would be of no use to me now, and i should very much prefer not to touch it until i am old enough to set up in trade." "the position is certainly a grave one, angus. i agree with you that it would be better for you on all accounts to remain out here, at any rate for a time. your father had correspondents also in bombay, had he not?" "yes, he made purchases of persian goods for a house there; but he did not do much for them, as the trade is principally in the hands of the parsees." "there is one thing that you might do," the armenian said, after thinking for some time. "i have heard that mr. m'neill is on his way to teheran as british minister there. you might be able to obtain a post in his embassy. you can write both persian and arabic, and might be useful in many ways. it would not be necessary for you to ask a large salary, but, however small, it might lead the way to better things. at present there is much political disturbance. the shah is meditating an attack upon herat, and has already given orders for an army to be collected. certainly the british government will feel jealous of any movement that would extend the power of persia farther towards afghanistan, especially as they are, i hear, about to take steps to interfere in that country by placing a rival of dost mahomed on the throne. then, too, it is no secret that russia is encouraging the shah, and it is probable that russian influence will become predominant in persia. the conquest of herat would matter little to england were it by persia alone, for persia is powerless to damage india; but with persia acting as the tool of russia, which some day or other will assuredly swallow her up, the matter is very much more serious. this being so, there can be little doubt that the new british minister will be charged with a mission to counteract the designs of russia as much as possible, and might be glad to take into his employment one who knows the language well and could gather news for him in the guise of a native--for there are so many dialects spoken in different parts of the country that any imperfection of speech would pass unnoticed." "i think that would be an excellent plan, sir, if it could be carried out." "i will give you a letter stating the circumstances, speaking of the esteem in which your father was held, and vouching for your character. if you decide to take this course, think it would be well for you to leave at once, for from what i hear of the new minister's course you would then arrive at teheran within two or three days of his getting there, and might have a better chance, therefore, of obtaining a post in his office. as to the money you speak of, it seems to me that, as your country is a long way off, it would be better if it could be sent to the house with which you father had dealings at bombay, since there are constantly vessels sailing thither from ports in the persian gulf; and whether you saw an opportunity for doing a trade with india, or thought of going there yourself, it would be an advantage to have your money ready to your hand. you must already know a good deal of trade matters, having, as i know, worked as your father's assistant for the past two years. at any rate a year or two at teheran in the service of the british minister would be an advantage to you in many respects. there is a caravan starting to-morrow, that is why i suggested that you should leave at once. a merchant who travels with it is a friend of mine, and i can recommend you to his care, but it would certainly be best for you to travel as a native." "i thank you, sir, very heartily, and shall certainly do as you advise me, for as an english lad going alone with a caravan i could scarcely hope to escape trouble with camel-drivers and others. if i fail to obtain employment at the embassy, i shall probably travel down with a caravan to bushire, and take ship to bombay. i have plenty of money to do that, for the expense of travelling with a caravan is very small--nothing is needed except for food--and the passage in a native craft would not be more than a pound or two. i have nearly two hundred, so that i could live for a long time in bombay if i failed to obtain employment there. when it is gone, i could at least enlist in one of the british regiments." "it is a poor trade soldiering, lad, though in your case it might not do you harm for a few years, especially if you turned your attention to learning some of the indian languages. with such knowledge you should certainly have no difficulty in making your way with the little capital you will receive from home." and so it was settled, and angus travelled to teheran. the journey did him good. he had bought a donkey, and trotting along by the side of the merchant to whom his friend had introduced him, the novelty of the life, the strangeness of passing as a native among the travellers, and the conversation of the persian merchant kept him from brooding over his sorrows. he felt that, suddenly thrown as he was upon his own resources, and compelled to think and act for himself, when but a fortnight before he had others to think and care for him, he must bear himself like a man. it was only at night, when rolled in a blanket he prepared to sleep, that he gave way and lay for hours weeping over his loss. the merchant, who had been much pleased with his conversation, and had made many enquiries as to the ways of his countrymen, and to whom he had told his plans, invited angus to take up his abode with him at a khan until he found whether he could obtain employment at the british minister's. issuing into the town, after having seen his animals attended to and his goods stowed away, the merchant went to see some friends, and on his return told angus that the new british minister had arrived two days before. the next morning angus went to the envoy's, and sent in the letter with which the armenian had furnished him, together with the translation which he had made and the vice-consul had signed and stamped. he had not waited many minutes when one of the attendants came to him and led him in to the minister's room. "you are mr. campbell, the young gentleman of whom our vice-consul at tabriz writes to me?" "yes, sir." "it is a sad story that he has told me, and i would willingly do anything in my power for a young countryman thus left so sadly and suddenly on his own resources in a foreign land. he tells me that you speak arabic as well as persian, and have some acquaintance with armenian colloquially, though you cannot write it as you can the two former languages. do you know any other language at all?" "i know some kurdish. one of my father's porters was a kurd, and i was able to get on fairly with him." "he tells me that it is your wish to obtain employment of some sort with me, as at present you are not old enough to enter upon trade for yourself, and that you do not wish to return to scotland." "no, sir. i have been away for four years, and were i to go back i should lose the advantage that i have gained in learning these eastern languages." "quite right; very sensibly decided," the minister said. "and i suppose that you know something of trade?" "yes, sir, my father took much pains in instructing me, and for the past two years i have acted as his assistant, and have learned the value of most articles of trade." the minister nodded. "very good; it will doubtless be of value to you hereafter. however, i can at present utilize your services here. i have with me my secretary, and i have the dragoman employed by my predecessor, who speaks half a dozen languages; but in many ways a sharp young fellow like yourself, able if necessary to mix with the people as one of themselves, and to gather me information as to popular opinion, and who can read and write persian fluently, would be a welcome addition to my staff. of course i cannot offer you high pay, as i have an allowance for the expenses of my office upon the same scale as that of my predecessor." "the pay is quite a secondary matter with me, sir. even if there were no pay, i should be glad to accept a temporary post under you, as it would be a great advantage to me afterwards to have been employed by you, and i should at least have time to decide what to do next." "i will think the matter over," the minister said; "at any rate there will be a room assigned to you in the house, and for the present thirty shillings a week for your living. you had better continue to wear your persian attire. have you european clothes with you?" "no, sir, everything was burnt." the next day angus was installed in a small room next to that of the secretary, and set to work translating persian proclamations, edicts, and other matters. a fortnight later the minister decided that he should be dressed as a european when in the house, and a tailor was sent for and ordered to make him clothes of the same style as a suit of the secretary's, which was given him to use as a pattern. the minister nodded approvingly when he entered the little office on the day when angus first wore his new suit. his work was now changed, and while visitors of distinction were ushered in directly to the minister, and others of less importance were first interviewed by the secretary, people coming in with complaints or petitions were shown in to angus, who took down what they had to say, and then dismissed them to call the next day for an answer. he was amused at the general impression prevailing among these people that if the british minister could be induced to take up their cases he could obtain justice and redress for them, and how evidently they disbelieved his assurances that a foreign official could not interfere in such matters. six months passed, the shah had started with his army towards herat, and the evidences that russia was at the bottom of the movement, and that he was acting in accordance with her advice, became stronger and stronger. angus stood high in the minister's good opinion, from the steadiness with which he worked, the tact and good temper that he showed with the natives he interviewed, and the willingness with which he would, after the office was closed, work until late at night at his translations. sometimes he changed his attire again, and slightly darkening his face, and tucking away his light hair, would go out into the streets, mingle with the crowd in busy quarters, and listen to the talk. from the fact that the expedition against herat was seldom spoken of, he gathered that the war was not popular except among the trading class, who thought that the possession of herat would lead to a large increase of trade with afghanistan, and even through candahar to northern india. it was, however, but seldom that he went on these expeditions, for it was certain that any private arrangement that had been made between the shah and russia would be known only to two of the former's principal officers. one evening mr. m'neill summoned him to his own apartment, and said: "i have obtained information from a source i can rely upon that russia is encouraging the shah, and that there are other russian officers besides their accredited envoy in the shah's camp. mr. corbould started half an hour ago, and will carry the news himself to london; it is too important to be trusted to other hands. i have no doubt whatever that orders will be sent to me at once to mediate between the parties, and to put a certain amount of pressure upon the shah. herat is considered the key of afghanistan, and although we could do nothing to assist its defenders, even were a force to start at once from bombay, i fancy that i should be authorized to say to the shah that england would greatly resent the town being permanently occupied; and that she might even go so far as to blockade the ports on the persian gulf, and so put a stop to the whole trade of persia with india. the great question, of course, is how long herat can hold out against the persians. the place has the reputation of being strong, but i hear that the fortifications are much dilapidated. the afghans are likely to fight well up to a certain point, but they might, and probably would, get disheartened after a time. i am anxious to assure them that if they will but hold out, england will do all in her power to induce the persians to give up the siege. the messenger i send must at once be altogether trustworthy, must be able to make his way through the country as a native, and must have a sufficient knowledge of arabic to make himself understood there, although this is less important, as there must be many traders in the town who understand persian." "if you would entrust me with the message, sir, i would gladly undertake to carry it to herat." "that was my purpose in sending for you, mr. campbell. i have the greatest confidence in you, and as your persian is good enough to pass in teheran, it is certainly good enough for the country districts. but it is not only because i should trust you thoroughly, and have every faith in your being able to carry out the mission, but also because i thought that it would be of great utility to you to be engaged in the performance of such a mission. if herat defends itself successfully until relieved either by afghan troops, or as a result of our diplomacy, it will undoubtedly be a feather in the cap of the gentleman i select to undertake the commission of encouraging the heratees to hold out; and, with my report of the valuable services that you have rendered here, might obtain for you a better position in the diplomatic service than i can offer you, or some post in india where your knowledge of persian and arabic would be valuable." "i thank you very much indeed, sir. the change to an active life would not only be very pleasant to me, but i can quite understand that if good comes of it i might benefit greatly. would you wish me to return as soon as i have delivered your message?" "no, i think it would be better for you to remain there. i myself will shortly join the shah in his camp; the office here will be closed." on the following day angus started. the back of his head having been shaved, his hair was completely covered by his turban. he wore wide turkish trousers, a loosely fitting blue embroidered vest, and a long kaftan thickly padded and falling below his knees, a coloured sash, with two long-barrelled pistols, and a curved sword. his attire was that of a persian trader. he rode on a camel, which, although not a handsome animal to look at, was of good blood and fast. slung over his shoulder was a long matchlock; he carried behind him a great bale of goods. accompanying him was a persian boy, whose father was a door-keeper at the mission; the boy himself was a hanger-on there. he was a bright-faced lad of some fifteen years old, who ran messages, and made himself generally useful. between him and angus a sort of friendship had sprung up, and of an evening when the latter went out he often took the boy with him, his shrewdness and chatter being a relief after a long day's work in the office. azim had accepted with delight angus's proposal that he should accompany him, as his attendant, on a journey that he was about to make. the matter was settled in a few minutes, a donkey purchased for him, suitable clothes for travel, and a couple of kurd blankets. angus himself had a large fur-lined coat reaching to his feet, and four blankets, two of which were of very large size and capable of being made into a tent, for he knew that the khans and the houses in the villages swarmed with insects, and was determined that, unless circumstances prevented it, he would always encamp in the open air. azim's camel carried, in addition to a bale of goods, two water-skins, a sufficient supply of flour for the journey, a bag of ground coffee, and another of sugar; meat would always be procurable. it was a long journey, but angus enjoyed it. the road was a frequented one, for a considerable trade was carried on between herat and persia, and traders frequently passed along. azim turned out a bright and intelligent companion, and no suspicion was anywhere entertained that angus was aught but what he seemed. some little surprise, however, was occasionally expressed that he should be making the journey at a time when the persian army was marching against herat. to such remarks he always replied that he should probably stay there but a few days, and hoped to be well on the road to candahar before the army arrived at herat. he was certain that he should arrive in time, for the army with its huge baggage train had already taken nearly six months in accomplishing a journey that he had performed in little over as many weeks. chapter ii an unexpected meeting when near the frontier angus sold the camels. he had already parted with all the goods that he had carried, and he now bought peasant dresses, such as those worn by the afghan cultivators, for himself and azim. it was but some seventy miles on to herat, but the persian army was on the direct road, having just laid siege to ghorian, and it was necessary to make a detour to avoid both the plundering parties of the persians and the afghan horsemen who would be hovering round the enemy's camp. before crossing the frontier he purchased sufficient food to last for four days, as it would be dangerous to enter any place where they might be accosted, as their ignorance of the language would seem to prove that they were persian spies. both carried swords and long knives, as a protection rather from the attacks of village dogs than from trouble with men. as it was now november and the weather was becoming cold at night, they were glad of the long coats lined with sheep-skin. the country through which they were passing was fertile, and when on the afternoon of the third day they came in sight of herat, even azim was struck with the richness and fertility of the country. it was well watered by several small streams; fortified villages were scattered here and there over the plain. round these were gardens, orchards, and vineyards, the intervening spaces being in summer covered by wide expanses of corn. as they neared the city they saw that numbers of people from the villages were making their way towards it, many with bullock waggons carrying stores of grain and household goods, while women and men were alike loaded. they entered the gate of the city unquestioned and unnoticed in the crowd of horse and footmen, cattle, bullock-carts, sheep, and goats. striking as was the appearance of the town without, inside everything showed signs of neglect and poverty. herat contained some forty-five thousand inhabitants; the majority of these were persian sheeahs. once the capital of the great empire of tamerlane, it had greatly fallen from its former splendour, its decline having been rapid since its capture from the persians by the afghans in . it had been retaken by the persians, and recaptured by the afghans, under whose savage rule its prosperity had greatly diminished. it was still an important trading centre, being situated on the one great thoroughfare between india and russia, and being celebrated for the beauty of its carpets and for the temper of its sword-blades. its trade was principally in the hands of hindoos, who numbered no fewer than a thousand, some of whom were traders, while others were occupied in the various branches of work to which they had been accustomed in india. there were several families of armenians and a few jews. the city had for years suffered under the horrible tyranny of shah kamran, now an old and feeble man, and of his wuzeer or minister, yar mahomed khan, who held the post of governor of the city. under these men neither life nor property was respected; men and women were seized and sold into slavery under the smallest pretext, often without any attempt whatever to justify the action. armed bands of ruffians broke into the houses and plundered at their will, and the peaceful portion of the population were in a state of utter misery and despair. on entering the gate, angus proceeded along the bazaar, an arched street about a mile long, which extended from one side of the city to the other. this was crossed at right angles by another bazaar of equal length, and the city, which was built in the form of a square, was thus divided into four quarters. round the wall was a wide ditch, which was at all times kept full of water from springs rising in the town. when he had proceeded some distance, angus heard two traders in one of the shops speaking in armenian. he at once entered. "effendi," he said in that language, "i am a stranger here and but newly arrived. can you tell me where i can procure a lodging?" the two men looked in surprise at this afghan peasant who addressed them in their own tongue, and one of them, after a moment's hesitation, bade him come into his private apartment behind the shop. "who are you?" he said; "and how come you to speak our language?" "i learned it in conversation with some of your people in tabriz, and especially from one who was the british vice-consul there. i also speak persian and arabic." the trader's surprise increased as angus spoke. "but who are you, then, who have travelled so far, and how is it that having learned so many languages you are now here as a peasant?" "it is a disguise," angus said. "my father was a british merchant at tabriz, and i myself am in the service of the british minister at teheran, and am the bearer of a letter from him to shah kamran." "you are young indeed, my son, to be engaged on so difficult and dangerous a mission. surely i can find you a lodging. all trade is at a stand-still now, and we armenians suffer like the rest. my brother, whom you saw in the shop, is a weaver of carpets; but none will buy carpets now. he has a house larger than his needs, and would, i am sure, gladly take you in." he called his brother in from the front, and explained to him who this strange visitor was and what he wanted. "i have money," angus said, "and am prepared to pay well for my accommodation. i have a servant with me, he is the son of a door-keeper at the embassy, and is altogether faithful and trustworthy. unfortunately, i do not speak the afghan tongue." "that will matter little in the town; the majority of the people still speak persian, although they may know pushtoo. it is the same with many of the fugitives who have come in from the plain. you will have difficulty in seeing the prince. he is old and feeble, and for the greater part of his time he is drunk. everything is therefore in the hands of the wuzeer, who is one of the worst of men--cruel, avaricious, and unscrupulous. we have had many tyrants, but he is the worst; and i can assure you that the success of the persians would fill all but the afghan portion of the population with the deepest joy. it will be necessary for you to see him first before you see shah kamran. the hour is getting late, and i shall close my shop shortly. if you will go round with my brother to his house i will join you there presently. we all love and respect the english. they have always been our good friends, and glad indeed should we be were they masters here as they are in india; for i have been there, and know how just is their rule--how they oppress no one, and will not suffer others to do so. this would be a happy city indeed if your people were our masters." a short walk brought angus and azim to the house of the carpet-weaver. it was of some size, but bore a neglected and poverty-stricken aspect, which was not belied by its appearance when they entered. the doors stood open, and it could be seen that looms stood idle now in all the rooms. the man led the way upstairs, and unlocking a door there entered the family apartments. the contrast between these and the floor below was great indeed. afghan carpets covered the passages and floors, well-stuffed divans ran round the rooms, and although there were no signs of wealth, everything pointed to comfort. the armenian led them into a room, where his wife and two daughters were seated. they rose in some surprise at seeing him enter accompanied by an afghan peasant. azim had remained in the passage without. "do not be surprised," the trader said; "this person is not what he looks, but is an english effendi, the bearer of a letter from his minister at teheran to shah kamran. he is going to do us the honour to lodge here for a time. he speaks our language as well as persian." "he is welcome," his wife said courteously; "and indeed his presence here will afford us a protection which we shall need more than ever when the passions of the people are excited by the siege." "as you are accustomed to our ways," the husband said, "you will not be surprised at my bringing you in here or at seeing the women unveiled. as a rule, everywhere in the east we adopt the customs of the country so far that our women veil when they go out, and my wife and daughters would do the same here if they were to walk through the streets. but my daughters have not left the house since they were children; my wife has not done so since we took up our abode here twenty-three years ago." angus uttered an exclamation of surprise. "you would not be astonished if you knew the lawlessness that prevails here. no young woman can venture safely into the streets, for as soon as a report that she was good-looking reached kamran she would be seized and carried off to his harem even in broad daylight. no respectable woman would think of going out save with an armed escort." "that is indeed a terrible state of things." "we are accustomed to it now, effendi, and at any rate we are not molested here. i make a present now and then to yar mahomed khan and also to his principal officer, and i am let alone by them. my brother does the same. they know that i am a carpet-weaver employing eight or ten men, and as they believe i could not be squeezed to any large amount, they are satisfied to let us go on. so as long as we keep quietly at home we are not molested, and we both intend ere long to move from here to teheran or tabriz. we have only been waiting until we can manage to get away with our belongings without attracting notice. we have done very well since we came here, for trade has been good. my brother buys up the products of many other looms, and we have both made good profits, but we take care that we do not keep more money than is necessary here. now i will show you the room that will be at your disposal. you will, i hope, join us at our family meals, so that we shall not have to cook for you separately." "certainly, it would be very much more pleasant for me." the terms were arranged without difficulty, for the armenian felt that it might be a great protection for them to have an englishman in the house. the merchant then arranged to obtain a dress for angus similar to that worn by himself and his brother. this was brought in on the following morning. having put it on, angus went out accompanied by azim. he decided to wait for a day or two before seeing the wuzeer, so as to ascertain the state of things in the town and the preparations for defence. he was going through one of the narrow streets when a loaded camel came along behind him, its paniers nearly touching the houses on each side. its rider did not give the usual shout of warning, and angus had but just time to jump into a doorway when it brushed past him, the afghan driver grinning maliciously at so nearly upsetting one whom he regarded as a sheeah trader. a man walking just in front of him, who was not quick enough to get out of the camel's way, was knocked down. as he got up angus to his astonishment heard him mutter angrily, "confound you! i wish i had you outside this town, i would give you a lesson you would not forget!" astonished to find another englishman here in afghan costume, angus stepped up to him and said, "i did not expect to find an englishman here, sir." the other turned sharply round. "i am as surprised as you can be, sir! but we had better not be speaking english here. i am lodging within fifty yards of this, if you will follow me i will take you there, and we can then introduce ourselves properly." in three minutes they were in the room occupied by the stranger. "as host i will introduce myself first," he said with a smile. "my name is eldred pottinger; i have been travelling through afghanistan on an unofficial mission to explore and report on the country to my uncle, colonel pottinger, resident in scinde. happening to arrive here at the present crisis, and thinking that i might be useful if the city is besieged, i have declared myself to the wuzeer, and although i still retain my disguise there are many who know that i am an englishman." "my name is angus campbell, mr. pottinger. i am in the employment of the british minister at teheran, and am the bearer of a letter from him to shah kamran encouraging him to maintain the defence of the city as long as possible, and holding out hopes that the british government, which would view the attack upon herat with grave dissatisfaction, will endeavour to mediate between him and the shah, and may even take measures to put pressure upon the latter to withdraw his forces." "that is very satisfactory. of course i have had no shadow of authority to speak in that way, and could only assure him generally that he would have the good will of the english, and that as an english officer i would on my own part put any military skill that i possess at his service, and, being myself an artillery officer, might be of considerable assistance to him in the management and working of the guns. but your letter will place me in a more favourable position. what are your instructions? are you going to return to the embassy or remain here?" "mr. m'neill left it to myself. he will join the shah's army, as the russian ambassador is also with it. as he takes the dragoman of the legation down with him, he has no absolute occasion for my services. from what i have seen of the place so far, though i only arrived yesterday, it does not seem to me possible that these mud walls can withstand a battering fire. the place will therefore very likely be taken in a few days; and as i should not care about being in a town sacked by persian troops, i had intended to leave it as soon as i delivered my letter." "there is no doubt about the weakness of the place; a european army would carry it in three days. but the persians have never been remarkable for their courage, while the afghans are undoubtedly a fighting people. i think it is quite possible that the siege may last for months. you know the dilatory way in which these eastern people go to work. of course i can give no opinion whatever as to what would be your best course. it would depend upon so many things--your position at the embassy, your chances of promotion there, and other matters of which i am altogether ignorant. i suppose you speak persian well?" [illustration: a man walking just in front of him ... was knocked down.] "yes, and also arabic, and i can get on in armenian and kurdish. as to my position, it is scarcely an official one. i am the son of a scottish trader who for twelve years carried on business at tabriz. he and my mother were carried off eight months ago by an outbreak of plague, and his house and store were burned in some street riots. i consulted the british vice-consul there, an armenian who was a friend of my father, and we agreed that from my knowledge of languages i ought to be able to get on better in the east than at home, where it would be of no use to me. i had acted as my father's assistant for the last two years of his life, and had therefore acquired a knowledge of trading; and i have a small capital with which, when i get older, i can either enter into business myself or join someone already established. i was very glad to obtain this place in the embassy as a temporary employment until i could see my way, for although mr. m'neill kindly took me on as an extra assistant, of course his successor, whoever he may be, may not want me." "i think you have done very wisely. how old are you now?" "i am a few months over sixteen." "you are young indeed," pottinger laughed, "to be engaged in political affairs. well, i should say that if the afghans really mean to fight, as i believe they will, they can hold the town for some time, and you will therefore be able to learn their language, which would be invaluable to you if you go in for commerce, or in fact whatever you do out here. things are in a disturbed state in afghanistan, and i should be surprised if the indian government does not interfere there before long; and in that case anyone acquainted with pushtoo and with arabic and persian will have no difficulty in finding employment with the army, and through my uncle i might be able to put you in the way of it. and now about your mission. "the wuzeer for some reason or other--i own i don't see why--has been exceedingly civil to me. on my arrival i sent to say that i was a stranger and a traveller, and that, should it be pleasing to him, i would wait upon him. he sent down at once to say that he would see me the next day. of course on occasions of this sort it is usual to make a present. the only thing that i could give him was a brace of detonating pistols. he had never seen any but flint-locks before, and accepted them graciously. finding that i was a british artillery officer, he at once asked my opinion on a variety of matters, and took me round the walls with him, consulting me as to how they had best be strengthened, and so on. "i will go up and see him presently, and tell him that you have arrived and are the bearer of a letter from our minister to shah kamran. i shall of course mention that you have come in disguise, and that you have therefore been unable to bring the customary presents, and i shall point out to him that you possess the confidence of the british minister. i shall say that for that reason i have persuaded you to remain here during the siege, and that i am sure you will act with me, and moreover will endeavour to keep m'neill well informed of everything going on here, and will continually urge him to impress upon the british government the importance of the position and the necessity for interfering to prevent it from falling into the hands of the persians. as to its importance there is no doubt, especially as russia appears to be making persia a cat's-paw in the matter. that is why i feel that while fighting for these heratees--who between ourselves seem to me to be unmitigated ruffians--i am merely fighting for england, for it is of the utmost importance that the gate of india should not be in the hands of persia, especially if, as you say, russian influence is dominant at teheran." "i am sure i shall be delighted if you will accept me as your assistant, though i don't see at present what possible service i can be." "you will be of use. there will be no end of things to see about." then he burst out laughing. "it does seem absurd, doesn't it, that we two, i a young lieutenant and you a lad not yet seventeen, should be proposing to take a prominent part in the defence of a city like this against an army commanded by the shah of persia in person." angus joined in the laugh. "it is not ridiculous for you," he said, "because as an artillery officer you must know a great deal more about the defence of towns than these afghans can do; but it certainly is absurd my having anything to do in it." pottinger went with angus to the house of the armenian in order that he might know where to find him. leaving him there he went up to the citadel, which stood on rising ground at one corner of the town. he returned in an hour, and said that the wuzeer would receive him at once. "he is a good deal impressed," he went on, "with the fact that our minister should have sent a messenger here with the letter. at first he did not see why england should be interested in the matter, and i had to explain to him about the russian intrigue in persia, and that there was no doubt that sooner or later they would invade india, and that this would be rendered comparatively easy by herat being in the hands of their friends the persians. he enquired of me what rank you held. i told him that you were a member of the embassy, acting as assistant-secretary to the minister, and, as was evident by his entrusting you with so important a despatch, were deep in his confidence." on arriving at the citadel they were at once conducted to the apartment of the wuzeer. yar mahomed rose from his seat and greeted them politely. angus walked forward, bowed, and delivered his letter. "you speak persian, your excellency?" the minister said. angus had difficulty in restraining a smile at his new dignity, but said gravely: "yes, your highness, i speak it and arabic." "you journeyed here comfortably, i hope?" "yes; there were a few adventures on the way, but not more than i had expected." yar mahomed opened and read the letter. "you are aware of its contents?" he asked. "yes, i learned them by heart before i left teheran, in case i should be robbed of the letter on the way." the wuzeer sat in thought for a minute. "but how," he said doubtfully, "can your country, which is, as i hear, very far distant, exercise any influence with the shah? surely you could not send an army all that distance?" "not from england, your highness; but we could send a fleet that could shut up all the ports in the persian gulf, and we could send troops from india to occupy those places, and so destroy all their trade. moreover, we could put a stop to all trade passing by land through this town to scinde, and send a great army by sea and invade persia, and, as our soldiers are much better than the persians, might even take tabriz and teheran. the shah knows that they have done great things in india, and will see how they might bring ruin on persia." "yes, what your minister says is true; but will he do this at once?" "that i cannot say," angus replied. "at first, no doubt, the government of england would say, 'herat is very far off; it will fall before we can do anything.' but if they find that it holds out bravely, they will say, 'we must help these people who are fighting so well.' there is another thing. it is said that there are already some russian officers with the shah's army. the english are very jealous of the russians, and when they come to understand that it is russia who has sent the shah to capture herat their anger will speedily be roused, and they will bid their minister say to the shah, 'if you continue to fight against herat, we shall send our ships and our army against you.' the shah knows that we have conquered in india people far more warlike than the persians, and he will say to himself, 'why should i run the risk of losing my kingdom merely to please the russians, who are really much more dangerous neighbours than the english?'" "the words of your excellency are wise," the wuzeer said. "you will see that we shall hold out for months, or even for years if necessary. i can understand now why the british minister has confidence in you though you look so young. how many years has your excellency?" "i am not yet thirty," angus said calmly. the wuzeer looked surprised. "it is because your face is smooth that you look so young. we afghans wear our beards; i see that you do not, for even this brave officer, who has come to fight for us, has no hair on his face. he has told me that you will stay here, and assist with your advice." "so far as i am able to do so, i will; but i am not greatly skilled in such matters. still, i will assist him so far as i can." "it is good," the afghan said. "it would be better, your highness, that it should not be known that i am an agent of the british minister; though of course you can, if you find it necessary, cheer your soldiers by telling them if they fight bravely and well the british minister will try and mediate between you and the shah, and to persuade him to draw off his army. but were the shah to know that the british minister has an agent here, he would be wroth with him, and might not listen so willingly to his representations. let it then, i beg you, be supposed that, like mr. pottinger, i am but an english traveller, who, chancing to be here, is willing to do all that he can to aid in the defence of the town against the persians." "your words are good; so let it be. where are you dwelling now?" "at the house of the armenian carpet-weaver kajar. the times being bad, his looms are at a stand-still, and he was glad to let me an apartment." "he is a good man," the wuzeer said, "a good man and honest, but not rich." angus felt that the last words were rather a question than an assertion, and he said: "surely no. his rooms are very simple, but they are clean, and if a traveller can but find a clean lodging, he cares not how poor it is." "shall you be sending a message to the minister?" "i shall endeavour to do so by a servant lad i have brought with me. i will tell him that his mind may be at ease, for herat can hold out." "the persians are cowards!" the wuzeer said angrily. "my horsemen have been round them for many days, but they give them no chance. they keep together like a flock of sheep, with their guns and their infantry, instead of riding out bravely to bring in plunder and fight with their enemies when they meet them." then turning to pottinger he went on: "i have sent out, as you advised me, to cut down all the trees within half a mile of the town, so that the persians will have no shelter from our guns; and as all the granaries are emptied for miles round, they will have a long way to go to get food. a number of men are also at work at the place where, as you showed me, the wall was rotten; and others are clearing out the ditch, and making the bank steeper where it has slipped down, so that if they should be so mad as to rush forward and try to cross the moat, they will not be able to climb up." "that is important, wuzeer, and still more so is it that the little wall at the foot of the mount of earth that surrounds the city wall should be repaired. that is of the greatest importance. they may manage to fill up the moat and cross it, but as long as the lower wall stands they cannot climb up, even if a breach was made in the main wall." "i will go round now with you," the wuzeer said, "and we will see where the worst places are." angus accompanied them, and found that pottinger's statement as to the weakness of the fortifications was well founded. from a distance the wall had looked imposing, for it was of considerable height and great thickness, but it was entirely constructed of dried mud, and heavy guns could effect a breach anywhere in the course of a day or two. it was evident that if the place was to hold out, it must depend upon the bravery of its troops and not upon the strength of its walls. for the next week the work went on incessantly. every able-bodied man in the town was employed in the repairs of the wall and in cutting down trees, while the work of destroying grain and all kinds of necessaries which could not be brought into the town was performed by the troops. these were all afghans, were in regular pay, and formed the fighting army of the ruler of herat. their discipline was at all times very lax, and the permission to destroy and burn, which naturally included looting everything of value for their own benefit, rendered them even less amenable to discipline than before. eldred pottinger, as far as he could venture, tried to induce the wuzeer to have the work executed in a more regular manner and under strict supervision by officers told off for the purpose, but yar mahomed viewed the matter with indifference. "what does it matter," he said, "whether the soldiers take things or not? it would be all the same to the owners whether they have them, or whether they are destroyed, or fall into the hands of the persians. in a few days the enemy will be here, and it would be foolish to cause dissatisfaction among the soldiers over a matter of no consequence whatever." the country, indeed, was now deserted by all its inhabitants. immense stores of food had been brought into the city, every unoccupied piece of ground between the city walls was crowded with cattle, sheep, and horses, and there was no fear that famine would for a very long period be a serious trouble to the besieged. eldred pottinger's time was principally occupied in seeing to the repair of the guns and their carriages. without any definite rank having been given to him, it was understood that all his orders had the support of the wuzeer, and were to be obeyed as if they came directly from him, and that the young man with him was also an englishman of some importance, and possessed similar powers. while pottinger looked chiefly after the military work performed by the afghans who had come into the town, angus superintended that upon which the sheeahs were engaged. these persian-speaking people carried out his instructions cheerfully, because they were given in their own language, and were not accompanied by the contemptuous haughtiness and animosity which would have characterized the orders of an afghan, the hostility between the two great religious sects of islam being even greater than that entertained by both against the infidel. pottinger had now taken up his abode at the house of kajar, where there were several apartments unoccupied. as he did not speak armenian, and knew but little persian, angus and he arranged to have a mess of their own, engaging a man recommended to them by the armenian as a good cook. this had been rendered the more necessary, as the trader with whom angus had first spoken had also moved with his wife to his brother's house. he had taken this step because he foresaw that as the siege went on the position of the sheeahs would become more and more unbearable, and that the protection the presence of the two englishmen could afford would be most valuable. indeed kajar, as soon as he saw that angus had been favourably received by the wuzeer, had himself suggested that pottinger might also be offered accommodation at his house. "there need be no further talk of payment, effendi, between us. your presence here will be of vastly greater importance than any money you could give us. no one can say what will happen here. it is not only our property, but our lives which will be at stake; but with you as inmates here, no one would dare interfere with us, and we all regard the fact that you should almost accidentally have been brought here as a special blessing that has been sent from heaven to us." the young englishmen thus strangely thrown together soon became fast friends, and it was pleasant indeed to them to enjoy their evenings together, after each had been engaged during the whole day at the duties they had undertaken. a couple of hours, however, were always spent by them, each in his own room. pottinger engaged the services of a mollah, or priest of the sheeah sect, to give him lessons in persian, while angus worked at pushtoo with kajar, who spoke the afghan language perfectly. chapter iii the siege of herat on nd of november, a fortnight after angus arrived at herat, the persian army took up its position on the plain to the north-west of the city. the inhabitants crowded the walls to watch the advancing host--the afghan portion of the population with scowling faces and muttered imprecations, the sheeahs prudently abstaining from all demonstrations of their feelings, but filled with hopes of deliverance from their tyrants. pottinger learned that the afghan horse were going to make a sortie, and he and angus went together to the north-west angle of the wall. "a good deal will depend upon this first fight," pottinger said. "if the persians easily repulse the assault, it will cause a deep depression among the afghans. if, on the other hand, the heratees obtain a fair amount of success, it will so encourage them that they will not fear another time to encounter the enemy, and will fight strongly when the walls are attacked." in a short time the afghan horse were seen pouring out of the western gate. there was but small attempt at anything like military order. it was a mob of horsemen; individually splendid riders, and for skirmishing purposes unsurpassed, but, as pottinger remarked to his companion, quite unfit to stand against a charge of regular cavalry equally endowed with courage. keeping near the city wall until facing the persian position, where a regiment of cavalry were hastily mounting, they wheeled round and rode against the enemy with loud shouts. the persians rode to meet them, but were unable to withstand the impetuosity of the charge, and, amidst the exulting shouts of the afghans on the wall, wheeled round and fled in disorder. the afghans then turning, flung themselves upon a strong body of infantry that was advancing against them in good order. these, however, stood firm, emptying many saddles by a heavy volley they poured in when the afghans were close, and presenting so steady a line of bayonets that the horsemen recoiled. as they did so, the persian artillery opened upon the afghans, who retired until near the wall, and then dismounted and opened fire with their long matchlocks upon the persian gunners. pottinger ran at once to a couple of guns close to where they were standing, and under his directions the afghans in charge of them at once replied to the persian guns. a number of the afghan footmen ran out from the gate on that side, and, joining the dismounted men, kept up a hot fire, while those on the wall also joined in the conflict. as the persian guns could effect little against the infantry lying in shelter, they were now directed against the wall, causing a rapid dispersal of the peaceable portion of the spectators. the effect of their fire showed at once the rottenness of the fortifications. although but light guns, they knocked down portions of the parapet, which crumbled as if it had been made of rotten timber. pottinger shook his head as he and angus walked along to watch the effect of the fire. "if a six-pound shot can effect such damage as this, it is clear that when they get their siege guns to work a few hours will effect a breach in the wall itself." on their side the persians also sent out skirmishers. these pushed forward to a point where they could take the afghans in flank, and cause them to retire nearer to the walls. the fighting was continued until dark, when the persians drew off, and the afghans retired into the city. no material advantage had been gained by either side, but the heratees were well content with the result. they had shown themselves superior to the persian cavalry, and had maintained themselves against the infantry. the persians lost no time, and during the night pushed forward and occupied all the gardens and enclosures on the west of the city, and placed a strong force among the ruins of a village there. in the morning they began to advance against the wall. the afghans sallied out horse and foot; the cavalry, unable to act in such broken ground, moved round, and hanging on the flanks of the persian camp, continually threatened an attack. the infantry, taking advantage of every wall and bush, maintained a heavy fire upon the enemy. the artillery on both sides opened fire, but at the end of the day neither party had gained any advantage. the afghans brought in the heads of several whom they had killed, and a few prisoners. the heads were placed on pikes and exhibited on the walls. the prisoners were bartered as slaves in exchange for horses to the turkomans, of whom a considerable party were encamped at a short distance from the walls. "it is horrible and disgusting," pottinger said to his companion that evening as they sat together, "this custom of cutting off heads, but as it is, i believe, universal in the east, it would be worse than useless to protest against it. it is the custom always to reward a soldier for bringing in a head as a proof of his valour, though, in fact, it is no proof, as he may simply, as he advances, cut it from the body of a man shot by someone else. putting aside the brutality, it operates badly, for instead of following up an advantage hotly, the men stop to collect these miserable trophies, and so give time to an enemy to escape or rally. i have read in the accounts of the campaigns of the turkish conquerors that the heads were always brought in to the general and piled before his tent, and that each soldier was rewarded according to the number he brought in, and i fancy it was the same thing with mohammedan conquerors in india. well, i am afraid that we shall see a number of things that will disgust us before the siege is over. if i were fighting solely for the heratees, i should certainly retire if they continue these barbarities. but i have no interest whatever in them; in fact, i see that the greater portion of the population would be benefited by living under the persian rule. i go into this matter solely because it is one i consider of vital interest to england, and therefore, as an englishman i am willing to do my utmost to keep, not the persians, but the russians from seizing this place." angus had now completely caught the enthusiasm of the young artilleryman. he was perhaps less horrified than his companion, for he had seen so much of eastern modes of punishment, that he had learned to regard them with less horror than that felt by europeans unaccustomed to oriental methods. "i have been accustomed to look on at acts of brutality," he said, "for from the time when i first came out, my father always impressed upon me that we were strangers in this part of the world, and must be very cautious not to show any aversion to its customs. it would lead us into endless trouble if we were to show in any way that what to them seems only natural, was to us revolting; and though i have often been tempted to interfere when i have seen some act of brutality, i have always followed my father's instructions, and walked away without showing any anger or disgust. i agree with you that it is horrid, but it is not like seeing living men tortured; at least, when one is dead it can make no great difference if one is buried with a head or without one." pottinger laughed. "that is certainly one way of looking at it, and i can understand that as the custom has prevailed among these peoples for centuries they can scarcely understand our feelings of abhorrence and indignation. however, i am determined that, whatever i do or feel, i will keep my mouth shut, and not say a word that would anger the wuzeer and shake my influence with him. at present he is well disposed towards me, and i have been of real assistance to him. when things become critical i may be of vital service. from what kajar says there is a strong suspicion that he is not personally brave, which i can quite believe, as very few thorough-paced brutes are. now old shah kamran is, i must own, an exception; an absolutely greater scoundrel than he has proved himself to be probably never existed, but he is known to have been in his earlier days as brave as a lion. if he had been some twenty years younger i should have stronger hopes of eventual success than i have now. personal bravery in a general is of no extraordinary advantage in a european army, where he is not expected to lead men into battle, but with irregular troops like these heratees it is of vital importance. they will follow their leader anywhere, but if he sends them into danger while he himself remains at a distance, they lose their enthusiasm directly, and are half thrashed before the battle begins." "do you not think that kamran will be able at any important moment to come forward and show himself among the defenders of the breach? i hear that only a month or so ago he returned from a campaign." "i am afraid not. i have seen him twice, and although it cannot be said that he is an imbecile, he is next door to it. he understands what is going on, but his nerves are utterly shattered by drink; he is in what may be termed the lachrymose condition of drunkenness. he works himself into a state of childish passion; sometimes he raves, then he whimpers. certainly his appearance would have no inspiring effect upon these rough afghan soldiers. they want a man who would rush sword in hand at their head, call upon them to follow him, and then dash into the middle of the foe, and the miserable old man could scarcely hold a sword in his shaking hand." "well, at any rate, the afghans have fought bravely yesterday and to-day." "excellently; but it is the work they are accustomed to. an afghan battle consists of two sets of men snugly hidden away among the rocks, firing away at each other until one side loses a few men and then retires. so they were quite at home at their skirmishing work, and certainly more than a match for the same number of persians. what they will do when an attack on a breach is made by a column remains to be seen." night and day the heratees worked at their defences, while the persians raised batteries and fortified their camp against sudden attacks. after four or five days of comparative quiet a heavy cannonade broke out. artillery played upon the walls, mortars threw shell into the town, and rockets whizzed overhead. for a time the consternation in the city was prodigious; the rockets especially, which were altogether new to them, appalled the inhabitants, who, as night came on, gathered on the roofs of their houses and watched with affright the sharp trains of light, and shuddered at the sound of the fiery missiles. the sound of lamentation, the cries of fear, and the prayers to allah resounded over the city; but the panic abated somewhat when it was found that comparatively little injury was effected. but while the peaceful inhabitants wailed and prayed, the troops and the men who had come in from the afghan villages laboured steadily and silently at the work of repairing the damages effected by the fire of the persian batteries. but little could be done to the face of the wall, but the crumbling parapets and earth dug up from open spaces were used to construct a fresh wall behind the old one at points against which the persian guns played most fiercely, so that when a breach was formed the assailants would find an unlooked-for obstacle to their entrance into the town. this work was directed by pottinger, who took but little rest, remaining constantly at his post, and only snatching an hour's sleep now and then. angus assisted to the best of his power, always taking his place when his comrade could no longer battle against sleep, and seeing that everything went on well. the afghans yielded a willing obedience to the orders of these young strangers. they saw the utility of the work upon which they were engaged, and laboured well and steadily. the persian artillery were, fortunately for the besieged, badly commanded. instead of concentrating their fire upon one spot, in which case a breach would have been effected in a few hours, each gunner directed his aim as he thought best, and the shot which, if poured upon a single point, would have brought down the crumbling wall, effected no material damage, scattered as it was over a face a mile in length. it was all the less effective, inasmuch as the artillerymen generally aimed at the parapet of the wall instead of the solid portion below it. it was a delight to them to see a portion of the parapet knocked down by their shot, whereas when the wall itself was hit comparatively small show was made. many of the shot flew high and passed over the town into the fields beyond it, and at the end of four days' almost continuous firing, herat was stronger and more capable of resistance than it was when the persians first appeared before the walls. the absence of any tangible result evidently lowered the spirits of the besiegers, while it proportionately raised those of the defenders. moreover, the immense expenditure of projectiles by the persians showed the shah and his generals that, large as was the store of ammunition they had brought with them, it might prove insufficient, and the labour and time which would be entailed in renewing the supply from the magazines at the capital would be enormous. consequently the fire became irregular, sometimes for an hour or two all the batteries would play, while at other times only a few guns would be discharged in the course of an hour. the shells that were thrown into the city did much more damage than the round shot of the batteries. many houses were almost destroyed by them, and whole families killed. these, however, were for the most part peaceable sheeahs, and the matter in no way affected the defenders of the wall, whose spirits rose daily as they perceived that the persian artillery was by no means so formidable as they had anticipated. the persians made no attempt to blockade the city, evidently fearing the sorties the defenders made, and confined their operations to that side of the city before which they were encamped. this was a great advantage to the besieged. three out of the five gates of the city stood open, communications were maintained with the surrounding country, the cattle and other animals went out to graze, and firewood and other commodities passed freely into the town. throughout december the persians were harassed by nightly attacks. the working parties in their entrenchments were driven out, tools carried off, the workmen killed, and the work performed during the day destroyed, the assailants retiring before heavy masses of infantry could be brought up to repel them. upon many days scarce a shot was fired, then for a few hours there would be a lively cannonade, but of the same scattered and wasteful fashion as before. on december th all the persian prisoners who had been captured in the sorties were sent off for sale to the frontier of the turkoman country. the shah retaliated by putting to death in various cruel manners the afghan prisoners who had fallen into his hands. two days later a mine was sprung and a breach effected in the wall. the persians advanced to storm it, but were met with the greatest resolution by the heratees, who repulsed them with considerable loss, their leader being severely wounded, and a deserter from herat, a man of high military reputation among the afghans, killed--a fact that caused almost as much joy to the defenders as the repulse of the assault. the success, however, of the mine, and the knowledge that the persians were engaged in driving several tunnels towards the wall, caused a considerable feeling of uneasiness. nevertheless, the th, which was the day of the termination of the long mohammedan fast, was celebrated with the usual rejoicings, which the besieged were enabled to take part in without fear of an attack, as the day was being celebrated with similar festivities in the persian camp. shah kamran went with his family in procession to the principal mosque, and after the conclusion of the prayers usual to the occasion, observed the custom of scattering sweetmeats to be scrambled for by the priests. to their disappointment, however, he did not follow this up by inviting them to a banquet, but sent extra provisions to the troops and the workers on the walls. there was now a pause in active operations for more than three weeks. the persians laboured at their mines, but either from ignorance of their work, or on account of the water flowing from the moat into their galleries, no damage resulted. the heratees countermined under the advice of pottinger, but beyond proving that the persian galleries were not being driven where they expected, nothing came of it. but on the th of january the afghans determined to give battle to the persians in the open. again the whole population gathered on the walls, and the two young englishmen were also there. "the wuzeer asked me this morning whether i would go out with them," pottinger said to angus, "but i replied that, although acquainted with artillery and siege operations, i did not know enough of the afghan way of fighting to accept even a small command in the field. i am useful here," he went on, "and i should be of no use whatever outside. the afghans have their own ideas as to when to advance and when to retreat; besides, it might offend some of the leaders were i, a stranger, to interfere in any way. there is no jealousy of me at present, at least i think not. they know nothing of sieges, and there is no one who holds any special post in connection with the fortifications. no one therefore feels superseded. in the next place, the work is for the most part carried out by labourers, who get paid for their services, and not by the troops, and it is nothing to them whether they get their orders from an englishman or an afghan. in an attack on a breach i should certainly fight; in the first place, because i consider it my duty, and in the second, because, if the persians get inside the walls, you may be sure that there will be something like a general massacre." the afghan cavalry and infantry poured out from the gate, and spread themselves over the open country to the east of the persian camp. the men on foot took possession of a village, and established themselves in its houses and the gardens surrounding it. from the wall a view could be obtained of the movements in the enemy's camp. the vedettes had fallen back as soon as the afghans issued out, drums were beaten and horns sounded, the troops ran hastily together, and their general, mahomed khan, could be seen galloping about issuing orders. presently a strong column moved out. it was headed by cavalry; and as soon as these made their appearance the afghan horse galloped across the plain, while the crowd on the walls burst into shouts of encouragement, although the troops were too far off to hear them. "it is a pretty sight, angus, but about as unlike modern warfare as could well be. european cavalry seeing a mob of horsemen coming down upon them in such disorder would ride at them, and no irregular horse could withstand the impact of a well-disciplined and compact cavalry charge. there, the persians are forming line; but there is no smartness about it, it is done in a half-hearted sort of way, as if they did not like the business before them. there, they are off; but they are too slow, they won't be fairly in a gallop before the afghans are upon them." for a minute or two the contending bodies were mixed in a confused mass, then the shouts of the spectators rose high as the persians could be seen flying towards their infantry hotly pursued by the afghans. then came the rattle of musketry, the quick reports of cannon, as the infantry and artillery covered the retreat of their cavalry. presently the heratee horse were seen retiring from the village in which the struggle had taken place; another body, which had not yet been engaged, instead of riding forward to support them, also, turned, and for a time all rode off, while the persian cavalry were reinforced from the camp and pursued them. the heratees soon recovered themselves and again charged, but again the leading squadrons were badly supported by those behind. these were under another leader, who was probably influenced by jealousy or by tribal hostility, and the persian horse, well supported by their infantry, gradually gained the advantage, their own infantry coming to the support. the afghan footmen also advanced, and the fight was maintained during the whole day. "it is like playing at war," pottinger said irritably; "except in that first charge they have never really come to blows. it is skirmishing rather than fighting. here there are some ten or twelve thousand men, taking both sides, cavalry, infantry, and a few guns. i don't think that when our men come in again it will be found that they have lost a hundred, and i don't suppose the persians have lost much more. it is a fair field for fighting, and between two european forces of the same strength a long day's battle would probably have caused three or four thousand casualties. one would think that neither party was in earnest. certainly the heratees are, though i don't suppose the persian soldiers have any particular personal interest in the matter." the action was altogether indecisive, and at the end of the day the persians held no ground beyond the village where their infantry first opened fire, while the heratees had gained nothing by their sortie. when the afghans re-entered the walls it was found that pottinger's estimate as to the amount of loss was very near the truth; there were between twenty-five and thirty killed, and some four times as many wounded, more or less seriously. they of course claimed a victory, and were highly satisfied with their own doings, but the operations only tended to show that neither party had any eagerness for real fighting. on the th of february pottinger said: "i have received permission to go into the persian camp to-morrow. kamran has given me a message on his part to the persian king. it is an appeal to him to retire. he says that when khorassan was in rebellion he refused the entreaties of its chief to aid them, although at that time he could have raised ten thousand horsemen, and might, with the rebels of khorassan, have marched to teheran. he had sent one of his highest officers to congratulate the shah on his succession, and now the latter is without provocation marching against him. he prays him therefore to retire, to aid him with guns and men to recover the dominions he has lost in afghanistan, and if he be successful he will hand over herat to him. yar mahomed has also given me a message to the persian minister, just the sort of message i should have expected from him. he declares that he is devoted to the shah and to him, but that he is bound to stand by his master. that whatever might be his own wish, the afghans would never surrender the city, and that he dare not propose such a thing to them, but that he shall ever remain the faithful servant of the shah and of the minister whom he regards as his father. i will take you with me if you wish, but that must be a matter for your own consideration." "i should, of course, like to go," angus said, "but i do not know that it would be wise for me to do so. mr. m'neill may be in the persian camp. it is not probable that i should be recognized, still there must be many officials there who came frequently to see him at the embassy, and who would know me. should one of these declare that i was a member of the mission, it might create a very bad impression against m'neill, as it would seem that he was in secret communication with kamran." "that is just what i was thinking," pottinger said, "and i must say that i agree with you. it certainly would be awkward for him if it were known that one of his suite was in herat. yes, i think it would be better that you should not go. we shall certainly be the centre of curiosity while we are in the camp, and there would be no possibility of private communications between you and m'neill. but should i see him have you any message for him? i think we have agreed that when this business is over it will be much better for you to go with me back to india than to return to teheran." "yes, i have quite settled that," angus said. "with the kind offer you have made to present me to your uncle i should think that the prospect of my obtaining advancement there is very much greater than it is in persia, where i might be left altogether in the lurch if m'neill were recalled. i shall be obliged, therefore, if you will tell him of my intention, and thank him for me very heartily for his kindness. he will, i am sure, approve of the step, for he has several times told me that he was sorry he could see no chance of my obtaining more than a clerkship at the mission, and advised me on no account to think of remaining there if i could see my way to doing better for myself." "i will be sure to give m'neill the message if i see him but i don't expect to be long in the camp. i am charged with such a ridiculous message that there is no likelihood of any discussion taking place. the minister will, of course, scoff at yar mahomed's declarations of respect for the shah and affection for himself, and the shah, after taking the trouble to collect an army and come here himself, is not likely to retire at the request of kamran. my real hope in going is that i may find a british officer with the persians. there is almost certain to be one, as the russians have, it is said, several. through him i may send messages to friends at home and to my uncle in scinde. they must all begin to feel anxious about me." angus saw his companion ride out the next morning with some anxiety as to his reception, but with no particular regret that he did not accompany him. he had often been in the encampments of the persian troops before the army left teheran, and there would therefore be nothing new to him in the scene. pottinger as usual wore the dress of an afghan of some standing, and was accompanied only by one mounted attendant and a runner to hold his horse. a small party of afghans rode with him for some distance beyond the walls, and then, shouting good wishes for his return in safety, left him. angus continued to watch the men at their work for two or three hours, and then took his place on the walls again and watched for his comrade's return. it was not, however, till the th that he came back to herat. on the previous day he was prevented from returning by a violent storm which raged from morning till night, and considerable anxiety was felt in the town. that he had gone on a mission from kamran was generally known, but none save the shah and his wuzeer were aware of its nature. angus was much alarmed, as he thought it too probable that his friend had been shot by the persian outposts as soon as he arrived among them, for there was nothing to show that he came as an envoy. he was therefore greatly relieved when a native brought the news to him that the englishman was returning. as the news spread it caused great excitement. when pottinger rode in at the gate a great crowd had assembled there, and all thronged round him asking for information. he replied that they must enquire of the wuzeer, who alone could deliver it. as he saw angus in the crowd he shouted to him, "as i expected, nothing has come of it; meet me at the house." an hour later pottinger arrived there. "i was getting very anxious about you," angus said, "and was beginning to fear that you had been shot by the persian outposts." "i was a little uncomfortable myself, and i kept a good look-out, as you may suppose. the roads led through those ruined villages, and at any moment i might have a bullet whizzing about my ears. presently i saw some persian soldiers running towards the road, and i told my man to take off his turban and wave it to show that our intentions were peaceable. when they perceived this they came straggling up. i told them that i was an english officer, and the bearer of messages to the shah and his minister. they seemed delighted, chiefly perhaps from the fact of my being an englishman, but also because they hoped that i had come with an offer of surrender. however, they shouted 'welcome, welcome! the english were always friends of the shah.' the officer who commanded the picket turned out to be a major who had served under major hart, and who knew all the english officers who had of late years been in persia. he took me to the major-general commanding the attack, who turned out to be a russian in the persian service commanding a corps of russians--men who had left their own country for doubtless good reasons. at any rate, he received me courteously. we had tea, and smoked a pipe together, and he then sent me on with an escort to the persian camp. [illustration: afghanistan and north west frontier of india] "the news that someone had come in from herat to arrange terms for its submission having preceded me, almost the whole camp came out to see me, and if my escort had not used their iron ramrods most vigorously upon the heads and shoulders of the crowd i should never have got through. when i reached the minister's tent he received me graciously, but we did not enter into business; it was necessary that the shah should first decide whether he would receive me. "i had learned from the russian general that colonel stoddart was in camp. as it was known before i left india that he would accompany the persians i had letters for him, and received permission to go to his tent to deliver them. his astonishment at finding that i was a british officer was, as you may imagine, great. however, i had but little time to talk, for in a few minutes a message came that i was to go back at once to the minister, or, as he is called there as well as here, the wuzeer. stoddart accompanied me. the persian asked me what were the messages that, as he had been informed, kamran and yar mahomed had sent to the shah and himself. i told him that i could only deliver kamran's message to the shah, and that i thought his own message had better be given him privately. "the wuzeer, who is a bilious and excitable little man, sent everyone out from the tent but stoddart and myself, and i then delivered the message. we had a long discussion. the wuzeer declared that the english themselves had put down herat as forming part of the persian dominions in the map that burnes had made. i said that i thought not. he produced the map to convince me, but to the little man's intense disgust he found that he was altogether wrong. he then appealed to stoddart. the latter, as our military representative at the shah's court, replied diplomatically that he had no instructions on the subject, and would refer the case to the envoy at teheran. (m'neill, by the by, has not yet reached the camp.) stoddart said that he was not aware that the persian government had annexed herat, as its ruler had, both with the british government and the late shah, been acknowledged as sovereign in afghanistan; so, as i expected, nothing came of the interview. we went back to stoddart's tent, and shortly afterwards were sent for by the shah. he received us with courtesy, and i delivered kamran's message. "the shah replied, speaking with dignity and calmness, and stating his complaints against kamran, that he had permitted his soldiers constantly to make incursions into persian dominions, robbing and slaying, and carrying off persian subjects to sell as slaves; then gradually warming up as he recited a number of such forays and depredations, he denounced kamran as a treacherous liar, and said that he would not rest satisfied until he had planted a persian garrison in the city of herat. of course there was nothing more to be said. we were formally, though courteously, dismissed, and i went back with stoddart to his tent, where i remained till this morning. i was by no means sorry that the tremendous storm yesterday afforded an excuse for stopping, and i enjoyed my day of quiet talk with stoddart immensely. "he thinks that if the persians do but make an attack with all their strength the town must be taken, in which i entirely agree with him. he said, however, that, as the slackness of their fire for some time past has shown, the persians are heartily sick of the business, and if the shah had some really good excuse for retiring he would gladly do so. i said that the best excuse would be some strong action on the part of our government. he replied that he had himself urged this upon m'neill, and that the envoy had already written urgently home in that sense. of course i told him of your being there. he had already heard from m'neill that he had sent you here to encourage kamran to hold out. he asked a good deal about you, and quite agreed with me that with your knowledge of languages--and i told him that in the three months during which you had been here you had already learned enough pushtoo to converse in it freely--you would be sure to get an appointment in india, as it was extremely probable that an army would shortly be sent into afghanistan to support shah soojah against dost mahomed, especially as the latter had received vickovich, an aide-de-camp to the governor of orenburg, as an envoy at cabul. "of course i had heard about the intention of supporting dost mahomed before i started. i know that my uncle and mr. burnes, who is our agent at cabul, are both strongly opposed to this. dost mahomed has always defeated shah soojah, he is firmly established on his throne, and burnes believes that he is very well disposed towards us. however, that is not our affair; but if there should be such an expedition it much increases your chance of obtaining an official post. i took the opportunity to write to my uncle and to send my report to the indian government, and in both cases i stated that i had received the most valuable assistance from a young gentleman who was temporarily attached to the mission at teheran, and who, speaking as he did, persian, pushtoo, and arabic, would, i considered, be of great service should any difficulties arise with afghanistan. i said that i had seized the opportunity of recommending you, as it was possible that i myself might fall in the defence of herat." "it was awfully kind of you, pottinger, and i am extremely obliged to you." "i felt that i was acting in the interest of the indian government as well as of yourself. the siege may last for another month yet, and by the end of that time you will be able to pass as easily as an afghan as you now can as a persian, and may be invaluable; for as we have as yet had very little contact with afghanistan there are not, i should say, half a dozen officers in our service who can speak pushtoo--probably not one who could do so well enough to pass as a native. i myself knew but little of it when i started, so my disguise was that of a cutch horse-dealer, and i passed through afghanistan as a native of india. even now i do not speak pushtoo as well as you do, having devoted myself to persian, while you have been working at afghan. for your sake i hope that the siege may last for some time yet, as it may be a great advantage to you when you apply for an official post to be able to say that you can pass anywhere as a native." chapter iv a sturdy defence pottinger's belief that the shah was anxious to bring the war to a conclusion was confirmed by the arrival of the major he had met when going into the persian camp, with instructions from the russian general, endorsed by the minister, to endeavour to persuade the afghans to consent to the terms offered by the shah. it was better, he urged, for them to settle their differences among themselves than to employ mediation. he warned them that as the english had come to india under the pretence of trading, and had finally conquered the whole country, they should on no account be trusted. he assured them that the shah had no desire to interfere in the internal administration of herat, the present movement was not an expedition against herat but against hindostan, and that all true mohammedans should join the shah's army, and that he would lead them to the conquest and plunder of all india and turkestan. pottinger was sent for privately, and consulted by the kamran and the wuzeer as to what answer should be sent. his advice was taken, and the next day the envoy returned to his camp with vague assurances of regard, and the suggestion that if the persians were really inclined for peace, the best proof that they could give of the sincerity of their inclination would be the retirement of the besieging force. there was much excitement in the city when the proposals brought by the persian officer became known, and many of the older men began to argue that it did not matter much whether kamran was called prince or king, or whether the supremacy of the persian shah was or was not acknowledged in herat, as long as no persian garrison was placed in the city. the wuzeer, however, remained firm. he declared that he had no confidence in the persians, that he desired to be guided by the advice and be aided by the mediation of the english, and that if the shah would place the conduct of negotiations in the hands of colonel stoddart, he on his part would trust everything to lieutenant pottinger, and would accept whatever was decided upon by the two english officers. "that was his own decision, and not mine," pottinger said, when he returned from an interview with the wuzeer. "there is no doubt that, ruffian as he is in many respects, he is a clever man. you see, he shifts all the responsibility for the continuance of the war off his shoulders on to those of the persians, for their refusal to accept the decision of the british officer in their camp will convince the afghans that the persians will be satisfied with nothing but their destruction." two days later the persian officer returned to herat with a letter stating that the shah had no desire to possess himself of the town, but only claimed that his sovereignty should be acknowledged. the answer was the same as before. kamran was willing to do all that was required if the persian army would but retire. the negotiations were carried on for a day or two longer, but though both parties desired peace, the one would not surrender, the other would not retire and acknowledge failure. hostilities, therefore, continued without intermission, and a fortnight later the persians gained possession of a fortified place three hundred yards from the north-east angle of the wall. the afghans stationed there had made but a poor resistance, and upon entering the town their faces were smeared with mud, and they were sent through the city accompanied by a crier who proclaimed their cowardice. a month passed without any incident of importance, and at the end of that time m'neill arrived at the persian camp. every effort had been made to hinder him on his way from teheran, and he was at first coldly received. a week later he had an audience with the shah, and stated to him that the attack upon herat was an obvious violation of the treaty between great britain and herat, and the british government would therefore be justified in taking active measures to enforce its terms. the shah upon this consented to accept the british mediation. three days later, however, the persians made a serious attack. some new batteries opened against the ramparts near the great mosque. their fire was this time concentrated, and the wall crumbled so rapidly that by the evening a practicable breach had been made. the afghans, however, did not lose heart, declaring that they trusted to themselves, and not to their walls, to defend the city. they had, indeed, gained an advantage in the middle of the day. they blew in a mine that had been carried almost up to the wall, and taking advantage of the alarm caused by the explosion rushed out and furiously attacked the besiegers, carrying the trenches for some distance before a strong persian force came up and drove them back again. so heavy a fire was then opened from the trenches on the musketeers on the walls, that these were completely overpowered, and were unable to show a head above the parapets. as evening came on the persians shouted that an english officer wished to enter the town, but the wuzeer shouted back that no one would be allowed to enter at that hour. the next day major todd, who was attached to the embassy, entered the town. he was in full regimentals, and his appearance excited the most lively admiration of the populace. he announced that the shah was ready to accept the mediation of the british government. he was received with the greatest courtesy by shah kamran, who after the interview took a cloak from his own shoulders and sent it by the wuzeer to major todd, who returned to the persian camp with the assurance of kamran's desire to accept the mediation of the british minister. but though apparently both parties had at last arrived at an understanding, that evening the aspect of affairs became more warlike than ever. the persian trenches were filled with men, the bodies of horse and foot on the line of investment were strengthened, and there were all appearances that an assault would be made that evening; and the afghan chiefs were called together and each had his post assigned to him. but scarcely had they separated when mr. m'neill himself arrived. he was conducted at once to kamran's palace, and the greater part of the night was spent in discussion. it was nearly dawn when the minister accompanied pottinger to the latter's residence. as he had arranged when he arrived that he would sleep at pottinger's, a room had been prepared for him, angus sat up for several hours, but then feeling sure that the minister would at once retire to bed on his return, had lain down. when he awoke it was half-past six, and dressing hastily he went into the sitting-room that he shared with pottinger, and to his surprise found mr. m'neill writing there. the minister greeted him cordially. "i heard all about you from colonel stoddart, and approve highly of your remaining here to give pottinger what aid you can during the siege. i also think that you have done very wisely in determining, as pottinger told stoddart you had done, to go to india. i myself will write to the english government saying what you have done, how intelligently you carried on your work at the mission, and recommending you for an appointment on the northern frontier either with the army or the resident at scinde, or perhaps better still, with mr. burnes at cabul." at this moment pottinger entered the room, and he was as surprised as angus had been at seeing the minister at work after only a couple of hours in bed. there was another meeting with kamran, who placed himself entirely in the hands of the british envoy, and said that he would gladly consent to any terms agreed upon by him. at the conclusion of the meeting mr. m'neill returned at once to the persian camp. to the disappointment of all, major todd rode in two days later with the surprising news that the shah had entirely changed his attitude, and absolutely refused to submit the dispute to british arbitration, and that unless the whole people of herat acknowledged themselves his subjects, he would take possession of the city by force of arms. this sudden change was the result of the arrival of the russian representative, count symonwich, on the morning of the day of m'neill's visit to the city. the russian party at once became ascendant. he himself took the conduct of the operations of the siege, the officers with him taught the persian soldiers how to construct batteries, and russian money was freely distributed among them. pottinger's task of explaining to kamran the news brought by major todd was an unpleasant one; but the old man took the news quietly, and said that he never expected anything else, for the persians had always been noted for their treachery and want of faith. the news, however, caused great discouragement in the town, and it was determined at a meeting of the chiefs that they would send to the russian ambassador and place themselves under the protection of his master. meeting after meeting was held, at all of which pottinger was present. sometimes he was received and listened to with respect, and other times he was treated with marked discourtesy. the influence of mr. m'neill at the persian court declined rapidly, while that of the russians became supreme. for some months past he had failed to obtain any satisfaction for matters of serious complaint. as far back as october a courier bearing despatches from colonel stoddart to him at teheran had been seized by a russian officer, stripped and imprisoned by the persians, and his despatches taken from him. the british resident in the persian gulf had been grossly insulted by the governor of bushire, and the persian government had continued to evade its obligations under the commercial treaty between the two nations. so marked was the indignity with which m'neill was now treated in the persian camp, that on the th of june he left it with colonel stoddart and all his suite and attendants, a step equivalent to a rupture of the relations between great britain and persia. in the meantime the pressure of famine and sickness became more and more intense in herat. the city was altogether without drainage, and the stench from the bodies of those who had died or been killed, and of the dead animals, was dreadful. but although much depressed, the courage of the afghans still sustained them, and when on the th of june the persians surprised the outer works, they held the connecting passage and defended it until assistance came, when the garrison poured out, rushed down the slope, and dislodged the assailants with much slaughter. another attempt on the same day at a fresh point was equally unsuccessful, and the storming party were twice repulsed. pottinger was now armed with an authority that he had not before possessed, for he had been appointed by m'neill british envoy at herat. the news of the departure of the embassy, and pottinger's assurances that this was a prelude to war between england and persia, had but little effect. it was certain that the city could not possibly hold out many weeks, and it might be months before the arrival of a british fleet and army could influence the persians. happily, however, lord auckland, governor-general of india, had not waited for instructions from home, but at the news of the investment of herat, and the outrage upon our resident in the persian gulf, had begun to take steps early in the spring; and on the th of june two transports and some vessels of war left bombay harbour with detachments of two british regiments and a marine battalion, and on the th anchored off the island of karrack in the persian gulf. upon the th of june herat went through the most terrible experience of the siege. at daybreak a heavy fire opened from the persian batteries on all four sides of the city. it ceased suddenly after a time. pottinger, who was at breakfast, exclaimed to angus, as he leapt up from his seat: "they are going to assault; the batteries have done their work. quick, to the wall!" warning the soldiers they came upon as they ran, they made their way to the wall. just as they arrived there another gun was fired, and at the signal the batteries on all sides again broke into life. a storm of rockets carried dismay into the town, the mortars dropped their shells into it, and most conclusive of all, a rattle of musketry broke out, growing every moment in power. against five points was the assault directed. that on the gate of candahar was repulsed, and the enemy chased back to their trenches. that upon the south-west angle was but a feint, and was never pushed home against the western gate. the russian regiment under sampson, and a strong force under a persian officer, pressed up to the breach; but the persian was killed and sampson carried off wounded, and the troops fled after suffering immense loss. the attack on the north-western face was similarly repulsed, but the fifth contest was desperate. the storming party gained the _fausse braye_. the afghans defending it fought desperately, and all fell at their post. the storming party rushed up the slope. the officers and leading men were mown down by a heavy musketry fire, but after a fierce struggle the upper _fausse braye_ was carried, and some of the assailants gained the head of the breach. but now the afghan reserves were brought up, and the persians on the breach were driven back. again and again, the persians fighting this time with desperate courage, struggled to effect a lodgment, only to be repulsed, and fell back in confusion on their comrades behind. for a long time the issue was doubtful; a desperate hand-to-hand conflict raged, the assailants and defenders swayed up and down the breach, which was covered with corpses and slippery with blood. yar mahomed arrived almost at the same time as pottinger and angus, for these, before coming here, had seen that all was going well at the other points attacked. they had observed as they came along men leaving the breach by twos and threes under pretence of assisting wounded comrades, and pottinger saw to his dismay that the men were losing heart. as they came to the breach they found other soldiers coming up. the wuzeer was sitting down close by. pottinger ran up to him. "you must encourage your men, wuzeer; go forward and join them, or all will be lost." the afghan scarcely seemed to hear what he said. "you must come," pottinger repeated loudly; "there is no time to be lost." then he turned to angus: "do what you can," he said. "i must rouse the wuzeer; evidently his nerves have suddenly given way." glad at last to be free to join in the struggle, angus drew his sword and ran down, thrusting back those who were mounting, and pushed his way forward to the front, shouting in pushtoo: "fight, men! fight for your faith, your wives, and your children! everything is going on well elsewhere. are you alone going to fail?" the bearded afghans, astonished at seeing this young englishman rushing forward in advance of them, followed him, and again the persians were beaten back. but although the afghans in front had been animated by the lad's example, those behind were still dropping off. the wuzeer, aroused by the vigorous exhortations of pottinger, had risen up and neared the breach. the persians were renewing their attack, and the wuzeer called upon his men to fight. the fugitives paused irresolute. the wuzeer's heart failed him again, and he turned back, his action still further discouraging the men. pottinger, in the most vehement language, exhorted him to set an example. again he turned and advanced, but again shrank back. pottinger now instead of entreating reviled and threatened him, called him opprobrious names, and at last, seizing him by his arm, dragged him forward to the breach. this astounding treatment maddened the afghan. he shouted to the soldiers to fight, and as they continued to fall back, seized a large staff, and, rushing like a madman upon the soldiers, drove them forward again with a shower of heavy blows, while pottinger sword in hand seconded him. cooped up as they were, and seeing no other outlet of escape, many of them leapt wildly down over the parapet, rushed down the slope, and fell upon the persian stormers. believing that great reinforcements must have arrived, these were seized by a panic, abandoned their position, and fled. herat was saved entirely by the energy and courage of the young english lieutenant. pottinger's first question was as to his companion. he had, while urging the wuzeer to advance, caught sight of him fighting desperately in the midst of the persians, and he at once made his way down to that spot. he was not long in discovering angus, who was lying insensible, bleeding from a number of sabre wounds. calling four afghans, he ordered him to be carried on to the wall. there he bandaged his wounds, and then had him placed on a stretcher and carried to their lodging, taking on himself to send an order to the wuzeer's own medical attendant to go there at once and attend to his wounds. then he turned his attention to the wuzeer. the mind of the minister had been almost unhinged by the terrible events, and he was still wandering about in a confused and bewildered way. several of the other chiefs were similarly affected, and were unable for days afterwards to perform their usual duties. the soldiers themselves, instead of being excited over their victory, were as gloomy and depressed as if they had suffered a defeat. the peril had been so great, the city had been so nearly lost, that there was a general feeling that another such attack would be successful. their confidence hitherto had rested upon the wuzeer, and on the conviction that their courage was infinitely greater than that of the persians, and they had found that the persians could now fight as well and stoutly as they themselves. they were humiliated by knowing that it was to a young english officer they owed it that the persians had failed in their object, and that another young englishman, scarce more than a boy, had led their best and bravest into the thick of the fray, and had himself penetrated beyond them into the midst of the persians and had fallen there. none appreciate bravery more than do the afghans. it was not so much that pottinger had exposed himself recklessly to the shower of bullets with which the persians in their trenches swept the spot where he was standing with the wuzeer, but that he should have ventured to abuse, revile, and even forcibly drag their dreaded leader forward astounded them. all herat felt that it was he who had saved the city, and the fame of the deed spread through the country round, and men when they came in sought him out and kissed his hand with enthusiasm. a deep gloom, however, hung over the city. even the work of repairing the damaged fortifications was carried on apathetically. they had repulsed the persians, but it was felt that nothing but a miracle could enable them to withstand another such assault. food was all but exhausted, the treasury was empty, the inhabitants could not be fed, the soldiers could not be paid. but an equal amount of depression was felt in the persian camp. five assaults had all failed, and some eighteen hundred of their best troops had fallen. the loss of officers had been enormous; the russian general, berowski, had been killed, and two of the principal persian generals. another russian general, sampson, and two pashas had been wounded, and almost all the field officers of the regiments engaged in the attack were hors de combat. pottinger's position was a very painful one. the need for money to pay the troops was absolute, and the wuzeer, when he had recovered from the effects of his scare, instituted a reign of terror even more terrible than anything the wretched inhabitants had ever before felt. the soldiers went from house to house, and all suspected of possessing money were seized and tortured. even ladies of rank were so treated, and the very inmates of kamran's zenana were threatened and had to contribute their jewels. pottinger felt that it was solely owing to his influence that the city had so long held out, and as he went through the streets starving men reproached him as the author of their sufferings. he did all that he could, but that was little. men of all ranks came to him imploring his aid and protection. some he was able to save, but for others he could do nothing. never was a young soldier placed in so terrible a dilemma. as a man he was agonized by the sufferings he saw round him--sufferings he could at once bring to an end by advising the wuzeer to surrender: as a soldier and an englishman, he felt that it was his duty to hold out to the bitter end. his position became still more difficult when, a fortnight after the assault, the persians again opened negotiations, demanding, however, as a first step that he should be expelled from the city. pottinger declared that no thought of personal safety should persuade him to stand in the way of any arrangement conducive to the safety of herat and the welfare of his country, and that if these could be gained by his departure he would willingly leave the town. but yar mahomed was undecided. he felt that the dismissal of the man who had saved herat would be a stain on his character, and, moreover, that the persians having obtained his dismissal, would become still more exorbitant in their demands. he had long expected the arrival of a relieving force of turkomans, and pottinger was convinced that ere long the intervention of england would compel the persians to fall back. the bombardment of the city had not been renewed since the repulse of the attack, and the persians relied now solely upon famine to reduce it, and maintained a strict blockade. in order to mitigate the horrors he saw around him, pottinger undertook that all who voluntarily brought in their money should be reimbursed at his recommendation by the british government. this brought some money in, though slowly, and july passed. then a deserter from the persian camp brought in news that there was a report that a great british army had landed in the persian gulf, had taken bushire, and was advancing. this report had fortunately enormously magnified the strength of the british expedition, and the news gave fresh life to the defenders of herat. the persians again opened negotiations, waiving the question of the expulsion of pottinger, but the wuzeer was less inclined than before to yield to the persian demands. m'neill was on his way to the frontier when he was informed of the arrival of the british expedition to the persian gulf, and at the same time received instructions from the foreign office in anticipation of the refusal of the shah to retire from before herat. fortified by these instructions, he despatched colonel stoddart to the persian camp with a message to the shah. he arrived there on the th of august, and on the next day had an interview with the shah, who welcomed him with cordiality, and listened to the message from the british government. "it means, then," he said, "that if i do not leave herat there will be war?" "it all depends upon your majesty's answer," stoddart replied. two days later stoddart was again summoned to the royal presence. "we consent," the shah said, "to the whole of the demands from the british government. we will not go to war. were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before herat. had we known that by our coming here we should risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly should not have come at all." in reply, colonel stoddart said he thanked god that his majesty had taken so wise a view of the real interests of persia. but as he left the audience, he hinted to the persian minister that although the shah's answer was very satisfactory, it would be more satisfactory still to see it at once reduced to practice. although rumours reached the city that the persians were about to leave, it was not for another week that the rumours became a certainty. an effort was made to induce the wuzeer to make some concessions that would give a better grace to the withdrawal of the shah. some of the conditions suggested were refused by pottinger's advice; but on the th of september the persian prisoners in the town were sent into camp, and on the th the persian army began their march back to teheran. it was time indeed that they did so, for they had but three or four days' supply of forage remaining, and their flour and grain were almost all exhausted. their failure to capture so weakly fortified a place was, in pottinger's opinion, due to the fact that there was no union of effort. the commanders of the various sections of the army acted independently, and except when, under the command of the russians, they made a simultaneous attack, they never acted in concert with each other. it was his opinion that the shah might have carried the city by assault the very first day that he reached herat. he declared that the persians were equally as brave as and far better soldiers than the afghans, and that they had an ample supply of artillery to capture a strong fortress if properly employed. for a week after the struggle of the th of june angus campbell lay between life and death. he had lost a great quantity of blood, and when first carried to his room his armenian friends believed him to be dead. pottinger, who had hurried back as soon as he saw that there was no chance of a renewal of the assault, went to kamran's and obtained some spirits, and with the aid of these the action of the heart, which had before been so slight that the pulse could not be felt, was stimulated, and respiration grew stronger. kamran's doctor had already declared that none of the wounds were in themselves dangerous, but that he despaired of the patient recovering. pottinger, however, by no means despaired; he procured some fresh meat, and ordered a servant to make the strongest broth possible, and to pour a spoonful between the patient's lips every few minutes. angus was wrapped in warm blankets, and a large bottle of hot water placed against his feet. the wounds had already been carefully dressed and bandaged by the surgeon, for although almost entirely ignorant as to the use of drugs, afghan doctors had abundant practice in the treatment of wounds. pottinger remained two or three hours, and then, seeing that angus was breathing regularly though feebly, and that the pulse could now be felt at the wrist, hurried off to see that the work of repairing the breach had been taken in hand, kajar's wife undertaking to look after the patient. for a week the issue of the struggle was doubtful; then the improvement, although slow, was distinct, and day by day some slight advance was made. the ladies of kamran's zenana were much interested in the young englishman, and frequently sent down presents of fruit and perfumes. both were welcome. the air of herat was very unfavourable to wounds, but a little scent sprinkled on a muslin curtain drawn across the window to some extent neutralized the terrible stenches of the town, and a handkerchief steeped in water to which a little of the perfume had been added, was laid lightly over the bandages. in three weeks angus was able to sit up for a time, and a week later he walked across the room. his progress was now more rapid, and by the end of july he was able to sit on a donkey as far as the city wall, where he could breathe a purer air than that of the city, and by the end of august he could walk freely about the town. but he was listless and without energy. it was now certain that in a very short time the persians would draw off. "you must be out of this as soon as you can, angus," pottinger said to him one evening. "what you want is some mountain air. you will never get better as long as you remain in this pestilential atmosphere. it is enough to kill a healthy dog, and i only wonder that the whole population has not been swept away. when m'neill was here, he told me that if our people interfered and herat was saved he should appoint me officially as the british resident envoy. he said that he was sure the british government would send money and do all that was possible to alleviate the misery that has been suffered by the inhabitants; and although i would infinitely rather have other employment, it seems to me that it is clearly my duty to stay here. it is largely owing to me that these poor people have suffered for ten months the horrors of the siege, and the least i can do is to help them now, for if i did not you may be sure that any money sent by england would simply remain in the coffers of kamran and the wuzeer. it is said, and i quite believe it, that a large proportion of the money wrung by torture from these wretched people has been retained by yar mahomed. it is therefore absolutely necessary, if the people are to be fed, their houses rebuilt, and matters tided over till trade recovers, that a british officer be here to receive and superintend the distribution of british money. but the very day the gate is open you had better be off. you speak afghan now perfectly, and i am glad to see that azim has picked it up too. he is a capital fellow, and has watched over you since you have been ill as if you had been his father. the question is, do you feel strong enough to travel through the mountains? if not, there is nothing for it but for you to return to teheran and stay there till your strength is restored." angus shook his head. "i don't think that i could stand the journey across the plains," he said, "nor that i should pick up much at teheran, while i believe that in the hills i should soon get braced up. there is nothing really the matter with me now, except that i feel lazy. if there had been fighting going on, and there was something i must do, i should soon shake it off; but what with the sight of the misery of the people here, and the stinks, and the heat, i feel myself that i am making no progress. i believe i shall be a different man as soon as i am once out of this place and on my way to the hills. it will soon be getting cold up there, and in a fortnight i shall be fit for anything." "i think you are right, angus; i would give a good deal myself for a few hours in the fresh mountain air. i do think that you are strong enough to travel quietly. of course you will have to do so, as i did, in disguise; and indeed this will be much more necessary now than it was a year ago. it is well known that the chiefs at candahar have been long negotiating with persia, and have offered to place themselves under the shah's protection, and that, encouraged and pushed on by russia, they have meditated an invasion of india. the news of the failure here will no doubt moderate their ardour, but from all that has been learned from afghans who have come into the town during the siege, there is throughout the whole country a feeling of deep excitement at the prospect of another mohammedan invasion of india, and a conviction that the whole country would rise and join the persians were they to advance to candahar. "the afghans consider that russian influence really means persian influence, whereas we know that it is just the other way, and that russia only uses persia as her cat's-paw. as for the persians, we know now what they are worth, and that a british division would be sufficient to smash them up. but the afghans don't know that. they believe that persia is the persia of old, and that with her aid they could assuredly drive the british out of india. this being the state of feeling, your chance of getting through were it discovered that you were british would be small indeed. you must pass as a persian who, having long traded with herat, has learnt the afghan language. it would be a natural story that, finding that herat is ruined, and that there can be no trade between it and persia for a long time, you are travelling south with the intention of fixing yourself at candahar, and of trading between that town and india on the one side and persia on the other. you can account for your not having merchandise with you by saying that owing to the presence of the persian army, and marauders from herat, and the general disturbance of the country, it would not have been safe to travel with merchandise." "i will certainly carry out your plan," angus said. "i don't think there will be any difficulty in getting through. but i do wish that you were coming with me." "i hope it will not be very long before i follow you, for i think there will be some stirring work there soon." angus was well provided with money. he had received from mr. m'neill a sum that would not only cover all the expenses of his journey to herat, but would enable him either to return to teheran or proceed to india, as circumstances might determine. in addition to this, he had received a year's salary in recognition of the risk he incurred. he had this sum still in his possession. the money he had brought from tabriz he had left at the embassy, mr. m'neill promising to send an order for the amount should he write for it from india. chapter v in candahar on the th of september angus started, after a tearful farewell from his armenian friends. their gratitude to him and pottinger was unbounded. the presence and influence of their two english guests had preserved them from the rapacity and cruelty of the wuzeer, while all other merchants and traders in the town had been maltreated and robbed, and in many cases had died under the tortures inflicted to wring from them treasures it was believed they possessed. kajar and his brother and their families alone enjoyed an immunity from persecution. both had determined that they would leave herat, and taking with them their workmen, establish themselves at teheran or tabriz, where the profit of their work might be less, but they would at least be able to enjoy it in security, such as could never be hoped for as long as yar mahomed was the virtual ruler of herat. the period that had elapsed since angus left teheran had changed him much. he was no longer a boy, for he had been doing man's work. he was now nearly eighteen years old, and had attained his full height of nearly six feet. his illness had pulled him down much, and sharpened his features, and except for his lighter colour, he really more closely resembled an afghan than the persian trader he was dressed to represent. the pallor caused by his illness had been succeeded by a deep tan, caused by his passing so many hours daily in the sun during his convalescence. "i am glad to be out of herat," azim said, as he looked back at the walls. "so am i, azim. i thought at one time that i was never coming out at all." "it is a very bad place, master. in persia the governors squeeze the people a bit, and sometimes there is much grumbling, but the worst of them are very much better than yar mahomed, who is a son of sheitan, whom may allah confound." "he is a scoundrel," angus agreed heartily. "i wonder myself that the people of herat have not long since risen and torn him to pieces. i know that if i had been a merchant there i should have tried to stir them up to do it." azim shook his head. "they cannot trust each other, effendi. there are many who would like to do as you have said, but there are many who cannot trust their own neighbours." "then i would do it myself. look how many old men were tortured to death; some of them must have had sons. had my father been so tortured i would have lain in wait for the wuzeer day after day in some empty house--there are plenty of them in one of the streets by which he usually went from his palace to the walls--and as he rode past i would have put a bullet in his head. i would then have escaped from the back of the house if possible. no one would have seen who had fired the shot, and i should have been safe if once away. if i were overtaken i would put a pistol to my head, so as to avoid being tortured to death. i cannot understand thirty or forty thousand people continuing to support the rule of a tyrant, when one bold man could put an end to it." once on his way angus felt new life in his veins, and in a week he had entirely shaken off the feeling of lassitude that had oppressed him in the poisoned air of herat, and felt equal to any ordinary exertion. as he had expected, he met with no difficulties whatever on his way, for on the road between herat and candahar the afghans were accustomed to see persian traders passing, and no suspicion whatever was felt that angus and his attendant were other than they represented themselves to be. the journey was a long one, but angus did not hurry. it was pleasant to him, after being for a year cooped up in the besieged city, to travel quietly in the fresh mountain air. the scenery was all new to him, and though azim felt the cold a good deal, angus enjoyed it immensely. he made short stages, and never exceeded twenty miles a day, and often, when he arrived at a village which offered fair accommodation, he was content to stay when only fourteen or fifteen had been traversed. as this was the great high-road of trade there were khans in almost every village, and there was no difficulty in purchasing the necessaries of life. everywhere the talk was of war. once beyond the territory over which shah mahomed ruled, the news that the persians had failed to take herat and had retired had excited regret. it had been regarded as certain that the place would fall, and all had anticipated the march of a persian and russian army to candahar, to be followed by a grand invasion of india. the mountaineers had felt sure that the army would gladly pay whatever was demanded for permission to pass unmolested; that they would be ready to pay high prices for provisions and the hire of transport animals, so that they would enrich themselves in the first place, and then have a chance of sharing in the plunder of india, and the destruction of the infidels. angus was appealed to by all with whom he conversed to explain how it was that the shah with his great army had failed to take herat. he was eagerly questioned, too, with regard to russia, a country of which they had heard many strange rumours. were they very strong? were they really in alliance with persia? were they infidels? if so, how was it that the shah was friendly with them? to the first of these questions angus could only reply that, not having been in the persian camp, he was unable to give them information. there were certainly russian generals and officers leading the persians at the siege of herat. they were infidels, and neighbours of the persians. for himself, he thought that while no doubt the shah wished to be at peace with such powerful neighbours, he would be wise not to trust them very far. he could not really wish for them to become more powerful, and if they aided him, it could only be for their own objects. as a peaceful man he himself only desired to trade, and left these matters to wiser heads. but at the same time he knew that russia was constantly extending its dominions at the expense of its neighbours; and that, as it was a christian country, it certainly could not be thinking of invading india for the benefit of the mohammedans of that country, or those of afghanistan--certainly not those of persia. whatever the shah and the military officers might think, the trading classes were uneasy at the influence that russia was gaining, and apprehensive of the growing power and proximity of a neighbour possessed of such immense forces, and of ambitious views. two months after leaving herat angus entered candahar. the journey had been wholly without any incident of importance. the appearance of candahar somewhat resembled that of herat. situated in a fertile plain, with a range of craggy hills at no great distance, and surrounded by a wall, it was incapable of offering any prolonged resistance to the attack of a european force provided with siege artillery. the town was a comparatively modern one, being founded in on the site of an ancient city. it was built on a regular plan, the streets all crossing each other at right angles. like herat, it had four principal streets meeting in the centre, each of these feet wide, and lined with shops. streams of water ran down almost every street. the town made a very favourable impression on angus after the ruin and dirt of herat. as a persian he felt at home here, for persian inscriptions and names met his eye everywhere, as throughout afghanistan the whole of the trade is carried on by persians or by natives of india, the afghans themselves deeming the profession of arms the only one honourable. the upper classes among them all habitually spoke persian; which language was generally employed in writing and in all official communications. angus put up at a khan which he learned was frequented by traders passing through the city, and soon made the acquaintance of several merchants lodging there. from them he learned much more of the state of affairs than he had gathered in the afghan villages he had passed through on the journey. the english were, it was said, gathering a great army in scinde with the intention of placing shah soojah on the throne of afghanistan instead of dost mahomed. of all the blunders that have been committed from the time of our first arrival in india, none is comparable, in point of injustice, hopeless blundering, or misfortune, to the policy thus inaugurated in afghanistan. shah soojah was the head of the dooranee tribe, and had been overthrown by the barukzyes, who had gradually attained a power which the dooranee monarch was unable to withstand. the four princes of that tribe divided the kingdom between themselves, and after waging many wars against each other dost mahomed, the youngest of the four brothers, became ruler of cabul. during these wars peshawur had been captured by the great sikh ruler, runjeet sing. in shah soojah made an effort to recover his kingdom, but was defeated, and again became a fugitive in british india. dost mahomed, alarmed at the preparations made by the sikhs for still further dismembering his country, and by the fact that his two brothers, who were lords of candahar, might at any moment take advantage of his troubles with the sikhs to throw off his authority altogether, was anxious to enter into an alliance with the british, all the more so as he had learned of the ever-increasing influence of russia in persia. lord auckland sent captain burnes to cabul; nominally his purpose was to arrange for a larger commercial intercourse between the two countries. he was received with great honour in cabul, but he had come altogether unprovided with the customary presents, and dost mahomed reasonably felt this as a studied slight. nevertheless he exerted himself to the utmost to obtain the alliance of the british. but burnes had no authority whatever to treat with him, and could give him no assurances that aid would be forthcoming if, on the fall of herat, which was considered certain, the persians and russians, aided by the candahar chiefs, who were known to be in correspondence with them, were to invade his territory. nor could he obtain any promise that the british would use their influence with runjeet sing to restore peshawur. burnes saw how sincere was the desire of the ameer for a close friendship with england, and wrote strongly to lord auckland in favour of an alliance with him. he pointed out that dost mahomed was firmly seated at cabul, where he had reigned for ten years, that shah soojah had no adherents, and even if placed on the throne could not maintain himself there. colonel pottinger, the resident in scinde, also gave the same advice, but lord auckland paid no attention whatever to their representations. a weak man, he was guided chiefly by mr. macnaghten, his secretary, a comparatively young man, with great ambition and an unbounded belief in himself, but, as events proved, with few of the qualities required in a man placed in a highly responsible and difficult position in india. burnes was instructed to insist upon the ameer's binding himself to make no alliances whatever without the consent of england, and at the same time he was to refuse to give any pledges in return for such a concession. a more preposterous demand was never made upon an independent sovereign. for a long time the ameer strove in vain to obtain some sort of conditions, and at length, finding this hopeless, he threw himself into the arms of the russian agent, whom he had hitherto treated with great coldness. burnes's position became intolerable, and he was recalled; and lord auckland at once prepared to place shah soojah on the throne by force. runjeet sing was asked to join in the undertaking, and at a great durbar held in the punjaub, the conditions were arranged, under which shah soojah was to pay a large amount to runjeet as well as to the british for the aid they were to give him. as if it was not enough to have united all afghanistan against us, the people of scinde, who had hitherto been on good terms with us, were treated as if they were enemies. they were ordered to furnish provisions and carriage for the army, and to pay large sums of money, although they had, by the terms of a treaty with us, been guaranteed against any claim whatever for money or services. it would seem, indeed, that lord auckland and mr. macnaghten had neglected no step whatever that could ensure the failure of their enterprise. when, after the war, the papers relating to the policy that had occasioned it were published in the form of a blue-book, it is significant that the passages in the letters of burnes and pottinger remonstrating against the course proposed by lord auckland were suppressed, dishonesty being thus added to the terrible blunders of the weakest and most obstinate of the governor-generals of india--blunders that caused not only the utter destruction of a british army, but led to an almost equally unjust war for the conquest of scinde. as far as angus could learn the candahar princes were making no preparations whatever to take part in the war. the general idea was that they would gladly see dost mahomed overthrown and shah soojah placed on the throne, feeling certain that the latter would not be able to retain his position, and that they would have a far better chance of becoming masters of the whole of afghanistan then than they could have so long as their brother remained on the throne. three days after his arrival an officer from the palace called upon angus and requested him to accompany him there, as the princes wished to question him as to the reasons for the persians retiring from before herat. on arriving at the palace he was shown into a small chamber, where kihur-el-khan, with two of his brothers, was sitting. "i have heard that you have arrived here, and that you passed by herat just as your shah had left with his army." "that is so, prince," angus said, bowing deeply. "you have come hither for purposes of trade? from what city do you come?" "from tabriz. i represent one of the largest merchants there." and he mentioned the name of a well-known trader. "when i left it was considered certain that herat would speedily be captured, and that the shah would move forward here, having, it was said, entered into an alliance with you. 'therefore,' my patron said to me, 'go you to candahar. doubtless, in future, trade with northern india will go by that route instead of by sea, and candahar will be a mighty centre of trade. therefore go and see for yourself what are the prospects, and the price at which goods can be carried from the present frontier to that city and thence into scinde. find out for me whether there are any hindrances to trade along the road, what are the charges for permission to travel through the passes held by various tribes, and the disposition of the people towards traders.'" "how was it that you did not turn back when you found that your army was retiring without having captured herat?" "i thought it best still to go on as i had come so far," angus replied. "the shah, it is true, was retiring, but he might return in the spring; and i could not doubt that with your powerful friendship he would the next time succeed, and the information that i should gain would enable my patron to send off without delay a large caravan of merchandise if he found it expedient to do so." "were you in the persian camp?" "no, your highness. an army when it is retiring is best avoided by peaceful men. when all goes well the camp officers see that traders are not meddled with by the soldiers, but when things are not going favourably and there is discontent in camp, discipline is relaxed, and it is useless for those who are robbed or maltreated to make complaints." "that is no doubt true, but doubtless you heard a good deal from those who have been in the camp. how did men say it was that they failed to capture herat, which is but a weak town?" "some say one thing and some another, your highness. some declare that had it not been for a british officer who happened to be there the place would have fallen in a very short time. others say that it could have been taken easily had all the persian generals been of one mind, but that each acted for himself, and that only once did all attack at the same time." the prince nodded. he had seen very many times the evil of divided counsels, and knew how necessary it was that there should be a strong leader who could make himself obeyed by all. "and what do people say about the russians? we know that they had officers there. we hear that they are a great people, and are good friends with persians." "opinions are divided, prince. there are those who believe that their friendship will indeed be a great advantage to persia. there are others, especially among the trading class, who think otherwise, and believe that russia is too strong to be a real friend, and that it would be far better to maintain a close alliance with england, which would support them against russia, and which lies so far away across the seas that it could gain nothing by meddling in her affairs or taking her territory." "but it is reported that it is the english who have now interfered and have saved herat, and are sending a fleet and an army to compel persia to desist." "that is what was reported and generally believed, prince, but i cannot say how truly; i merely heard the common talk on the way." "but why should england have interfered? what does it matter to them whether herat belongs to persia or to the suddozye, prince kamran." "according to the opinion of the traders in tabriz, england would not have cared at all had persia been strong and been fighting only for the conquest of herat, but it was known that england regards with great jealousy the approach of russia to india, and considers that as persia was certainly acting under the influence of russia, it was the latter who would be the real masters of herat, and not the persians. then, too, it was said--though we know that rumour often lies--that russia and persia had many friends in afghanistan, and that the conquest of herat would only be the first step to further advances south." kihur-el-khan frowned. such an undertaking had certainly been made by him and his brothers, but the retreat of the persians from herat at the dictation of the english, and the fact that the latter were now gathering an army with the avowed purpose of placing shah soojah on the throne of afghanistan, gravely altered the position. they had no love for their brother, and had a british force advanced through the khyber passes to cabul, and placed shah soojah on the throne, they would certainly have rendered no assistance to dost mahomed, for they felt sure that soojah would not be able to maintain himself, and saw that there was a good chance that in the confusion which would prevail, they themselves might obtain the mastery of cabul. but as the english army was evidently intending to advance through the bolan pass, it would probably in the first place march on candahar, and they themselves would, in consequence of their intrigues with persia and russia, be regarded as enemies. he was therefore silent for a minute or two, and then said: "if the shah has retired because he is afraid of the english, he will not venture to send another army to aid us against them." "i do not think that he could do so. his army suffered very heavily." "i hear that you speak the language of our country. how is that?" the afghan asked suddenly. "i do not speak it well, your highness," replied angus, who had thought is possible that this question might be asked him. "having known for some time that i should make this journey hither, i studied for a time with a slave who had been bought by a merchant of my employer's acquaintance, who had himself bought him from the turkomans in a journey that he made in their country. but i speak it only well enough to make my way through the country, and to obtain such necessaries as may be required on the journey, and to converse in some fashion with such travellers as i might meet on the road or in the khans." "it was reported to me that you spoke so that all could understand you," he said. "it was this that seemed strange to me that you, a persian, should speak pushtoo. i will speak to you further another day." as angus returned to the khan, he felt that he was an object of suspicion. up to the point when the prince had sharply and suddenly asked how he came to speak pushtoo, his bland manner had led him to believe that he had been simply desirous of obtaining the last news from the frontier. but this showed him unmistakably that the prince had learned something which had excited his suspicions that he was there either as an emissary from kamran, or of russia or persia, desirous of ascertaining the position of affairs at candahar, the forces at the disposal of the princes, and the feeling among the people in general with reference to a protectorate, or occupation by one or other of those powers. angus knew the naturally suspicious character of eastern princes. in persia no one ever ventured to discuss any public affairs openly. in herat, hated as kamran and yar mahomed were, no one dared breathe a word of aught but adulation, for the slightest suspicion of disloyalty sufficed to bring about the ruin and death of the unfortunate man on whom it fell. the last words of the prince were in fact a sentence of imprisonment to the city for an indefinite time. the prince might not send for him again for months. but the mere intimation that he would do so was sufficient. he could not continue his journey without running the risk of being pursued and brought back again, in which case he might first be tortured to extract any secret he might possess, and then be put to death. he might, for aught he knew, be already spied upon, and everything that he said or did reported. consequently, when he reached the khan, he took care to evince no appearance of thoughtfulness or uneasiness, but chatted with the traders there upon commercial matters, respecting the advantages of cabul and candahar as trading centres, the amount of the taxes laid upon goods in the two cities, and other topics that would naturally be of interest to a merchant intending to establish himself in afghanistan. he was under no uneasiness as to azim. he had instructed him carefully in the account he should give of himself, the city from which he came, the merchants whose agent he was, the route he had followed, and other similar matters, so that their stories should correspond in all respects. when all had lain down for the night, angus was able to think over quietly what was to be done. as to remaining where he was, it was clearly out of the question. for aught he knew, the british force said to be gathering to advance on cabul might be months before it was put in motion, or the expedition might be abandoned altogether. even if the advance was made, it might not pass through candahar, and he might be detained in that city for an indefinite time. it was evident, therefore, that he must somehow escape. the question was how this could be managed. what disguise could he adopt, and how could he evade the vigilance of those who were watching him? the matter was rendered all the more difficult by the fact that there were practically but two roads open to him, that through the kojak pass to quettah, and that to the north-east through kelat-i-ghilzye and ghuznee to cabul. if he moved off either of these regular lines of traffic he would be unable to give any reason for his divergence, and in any case would be subject to plunder. even on these roads it was only as a travelling merchant he would be respected, and as a travelling merchant he would be quickly overtaken by the prince's followers. think as he would, no plan occurred to him, and he at last went to sleep determining to consult azim, in whose sharpness he had much faith. in the morning, accordingly, as soon as he was up, he sauntered across the yard to where the boy was watching the horses feed, and preventing other less fortunate animals from robbing them. "azim," he said, "the princes have their suspicions of me, and have as much as ordered me not to leave the town; try and think over some manner in which we may get away, and if overtaken may not be recognized. i do not wish to talk with you now, because for aught we know a spy may be at present watching us, but at mid-day i will come out and speak to you again. in the meantime think it over. now, when the horses have done feeding, take your basket, go into the bazaar, and buy food for our dinner, so that anyone who may be watching us may suppose that i have merely been giving you orders what to purchase." he then went out into the town, and spent the morning looking into the shops, and asking questions as to the prices of the goods, so that he might appear to be ascertaining what profits would be made. he also went to several shops which happened to be untenanted, asked the rent, and made enquiries about the accommodation. at dinner-time he went over to where azim was squatting, attending to two earthenware pots that were simmering over a small charcoal fire, which he was fanning to keep it going. "i can think of nothing, master." "then to-night, azim, after everyone is asleep, get up quietly and go round to the back of the khan. i will join you there, and we will talk it over together. do not be surprised if i keep you waiting some time. some of these people may sit up late talking. i cannot move till all are asleep. it is quite possible that someone who is lodging at the khan may be watching us." it was indeed late before the talk ceased and all lay down to sleep. angus waited for another hour and then got up quietly and went out. two minutes later he joined azim. "well, lad, have you thought of any plan yet?" "nothing, master; unless we leave our animals and goods behind us." "that we could do," angus said. "i can get rid of the goods to-morrow. why leave the animals?" "because, sir, they will be looking for a man with a fair complexion, and a boy, mounted on horses." "that is so; but if we left the horses behind us and walked it would be just as bad." "i did not think of walking, master. i thought that perhaps you might buy a camel and go on that." "that would be better certainly, azim. we might both darken our faces, and in my afghan dress might make our way easily enough, if it were not that we should be hotly pursued, and then a man and boy, however they were dressed, or however they were travelling, would be sure to be closely examined. i have it!" he said after a pause. "you might go as a woman; well wrapped up, little more than your eyes would be seen. you might ride on the camel, and i might lead it. in that way we might pass as natives of some village among the hills. the first difficulty, however, is how to buy a camel. i have my afghan dress, and, if i were sure that i was not watched, could get to some quiet spot, change my persian dress for it, and go boldly into a shop and buy a woman's clothes for you; i could then go down into the quarter where the tribesmen encamp and buy a camel. but if i were caught doing so, it would be almost proof positive that i was going to try to leave the city, and in that case i should no doubt be arrested and thrown into prison at once." "we might steal one," azim suggested. "there are many always grazing outside the wall while their masters are here doing their business." "yes, but they have not saddles. however, i will think it over, azim. your idea about having a camel has certainly shown me a way in which we can get away if it is managed well, and i ought to be able to find some plan by which we can carry it out. it is of no use talking any longer over it, there is no hurry for a day or two; and the longer i appear to be really engaged in looking for a place of business, the more careless the watch may become." angus did not go to sleep that night, but thinking the situation over in every way decided that the first step to be taken was to ascertain for certain whether they were watched. if they were not, the matter would be comparatively easy, but if his every movement were followed, he could see no way out of the difficulty. when he paid his usual visit to azim in the morning, he said: "i want to find out if i am followed. i will walk straight along this street towards the southern gate. when i get to the last turning to the left, i will turn up it; then i shall be out of the crowd. do you keep a good long way behind me. i shall go on for some distance, and then mount the wall and walk along there, looking over the country. i want you to observe if any man follows me. you must be so far off that even if he looks round he will not recognize you. i don't want you to find out this time who he is, we can do that later on; i only want to know if i am followed. each time i turn a corner he is likely to look round before he turns, so when you see him getting near a corner that i have turned, hide yourself if you can." "i understand, master." accordingly, when half an hour later angus came out, the lad waited for a time, and then followed him. his master was out of sight, and azim walked quickly till he saw him looking as usual into one of the shops, and then dropped behind again and followed slowly until angus turned off the street that he had named. azim walked still more slowly, and on reaching the corner saw him a considerable distance ahead. there were but a few people about, for beyond the four principal streets were many large open spaces dotted here and there with ruined walls of houses that had stood there at the time when the city was far more populous than it was at present. angus was walking at a steady pace, as if he had some definite object in view, and of the various people in sight only one, who was about half way between him and azim, was walking at anything like the same rate. a hundred yards farther angus turned to the right. azim kept on until he saw the man he was watching was close to that point; he then stepped aside into an empty piece of ground between two houses. half a minute later he looked out; the man was no longer visible. he walked on fast until he reached the corner, and saw the man again turn off after angus. they were near the wall now, and the boy went forward with greater caution than before. when he got to where he had last seen his master, he caught sight of him on the wall some fifty yards away. the man who had been following him had stopped at a low wall, and over it was watching angus furtively. that settled the point, and azim at once returned to the khan. it was an hour later before angus came in. he did not pay any attention to azim, but went in and engaged in talk as usual with some of the occupants. it was an hour before he came out to the yard. "well, lad?" he asked. "you were watched, master. a man followed you all the way, and hid behind a wall to watch you when you went on the wall. i thought at the time that i might have crept up to him and stabbed him if i had wanted to, but of course i would not without your orders." "no, that would not have done at all till we are ready to go; and i don't like stabbing anyhow. still, i will think it over. come round again to the same meeting-place to-night; by that time i shall have decided what to do." chapter vi an escape "i think, azim," angus said, when they met that night "you must buy some clothes for yourself. you may be pretty sure that no one is watching you. you must not get them at any shop in the main street, because there are always passers-by who stop and listen to the bargains made; but there are some by-streets where there are a few shops. of course you will go into a persian's. if you give a fair price--not too high, you know, so as to seem too anxious to buy--i don't suppose he will trouble much what you may want them for. you must make out some likely story--say, for example, that your master keeps a sharp look-out over you, and that you want to be able to go out sometimes in such a dress that he would not know you if he met you. i don't know that that is a good excuse, but i am unable to think of a better one. all you will want will be a long white robe coming over the head and down to the eyebrows, and falling to the feet; and a white cloth coming across the face below the eyes, and falling down over the throat. there is no occasion to buy other garments. a rug torn asunder and wrapped round the waist, falling to the feet, so as to fill up the outside robe, is all that will be required. but the more i think of it, azim, the greater appears the difficulty about the camel; indeed, now that we have ascertained about this spy, it seems to me hardly possible to make a start without being pursued at once." azim nodded approvingly. "that is just what i think, master. but i could put a knife into him, and then all trouble would be over." "i don't like the idea of killing the man, azim." "you killed many men at herat." "that was in battle, which is a very different thing from stabbing a man to enable us to get away." azim shook his head. this was quite beyond him. "he is fighting against you now, master. if the princes find out that you are english they will put you in a dungeon and most likely kill you, and kill me too, so as to shut my mouth. this man is paid to act as a spy on you. why not kill him? thousands of people were killed or died at herat. i cannot understand why one man should not be killed, when we can perhaps get free away if he is dead." "if he found us escaping and attacked us, we could kill him, azim, but it is not an englishman's way to kill men, except in fight." azim shook his head. to his mind this was very foolish. "perhaps we might make him prisoner, azim." "where could we put him in prison?" azim enquired, with his eyes wide open in surprise. "i don't mean in a prison, azim, i mean in some empty house or some out-of-the-way place; we might tie his arms and legs and gag him." azim's eyes twinkled. "i see, master, you do not like to use a knife. good, we can bind and hide him. perhaps no one would come for a long time, may be a year, and, finding only a skeleton, would not bother about him. he would just say it was some fellow killed by robbers." "no, no, azim," angus said in a tone of horror. "i never thought of such a thing. no doubt someone would come along and let him out." "someone might come, master. he might come a few minutes after we had gone, then they would catch us at once. if someone did not come in an hour, why should he come in a week or a month?" angus was silent. "no, azim, you don't quite understand me. i meant that he should be gagged and bound after dark, and then be left in some place a little distance from the road, where he would not be seen till morning. then the first person who came along would turn aside and look at him, and he would be loosed, but we should have got twelve hours' start." "that would be a good plan, master. but how should we get the camel?" "in that case we should make a start without it, for we might ride fifty miles, perhaps a good deal more than that, before it would be discovered that we had gone. we could do that in our present dress, and then i could put on my afghan clothes and go into a village off the road and say that the horses were tired and that i wanted to go on, and so buy a camel." azim shook his head. "anyone who wanted to go on fast, master, would not buy a camel." angus uttered an exclamation of disgust, and azim struck another blow at his plan by saying, "how would you get the horses out, master? the gates are shut at dark. you could not tie up the spy till after the gates were shut, and in the morning he might be found, and we should be caught as we went out." "i am getting altogether stupid," angus said. "of course you are right; the horses could not be sent out beforehand, for if the spy saw them going out he would at once inform his employers, and i should be arrested. ah, i have an idea! that trader from scinde, who arrived here yesterday, was saying that as he intended to stay here for some time he would sell his horses if he could get a fair price for them. i might say that i would buy two of them, as they are better than mine, and as i wanted to travel fast, i would give him my two and some money for them. i dare say he would be willing to do that, as our horses would sell more easily than his. one can always sell a poor horse, while one might have to wait some time before finding a purchaser for a good one. i don't suppose really there is much difference in value between his and mine, and he would think he was making a good bargain. i should say that for certain reasons, which it would not be necessary to explain to him, it must be a part of the bargain that he should deliver them outside the city, and that one of his men should take them out during the day and wait for us at a spot we could agree upon." "that would be a capital plan, master." "then we will carry it out, azim." "shall i get the woman's dress?" "yes, you may as well do that. we may want all sorts of disguises before we get down. we need not talk any longer now; at any rate we certainly shall not try the plan to-morrow. we must not appear in any hurry with the trader, and there are several things we shall have to talk over when i have struck a bargain with him." the next night angus was able to inform his follower that he had made his arrangements with the scinde trader. "i am to buy his horses," he said, "and he will deliver them in the way i want. without saying it, he evidently understood that i wanted to get quietly out of the city to escape some trouble. he asked a very reasonable price, but he would have nothing to do with my horses. he said that if there should be any trouble about my leaving, the change of horses might be noticed. if he said he had bought them of me, and sold me two of his, he might get into trouble too. however, i afterwards talked to one of the other merchants, who was going away in a day or two, and told him that i might be kept here for a considerable time, and should therefore be glad to get rid of my horses. he said he would be glad to buy them, as he was taking down a number of heratee carpets and other things. so we struck a bargain at once, and he paid me the money and i gave him the receipt. "i said that you would continue to look after the horses as usual until we started, so that matter is quite arranged. the scinde man will keep the horses i have bought with his others till he sends them out through the gate. when he does so, he will put our saddles on them. now for our plans to-morrow. i shall go out as usual in the morning; the spy will of course follow me. while i am away make up our rugs and disguises and fasten them upon the saddles, and take these to the new horses, so that the trader's servant will put them on with the saddles and take them out with the horses before sunset. he is to stop at those three palm-trees that grow by the roadside a quarter of a mile out of the town. even if the spy is looking on as they go out of the yard, he will have no idea that i have anything to do with the horses. "when you have seen to that, you will buy twenty yards of rope for us to get down over the wall. i shall start at about four o'clock. i shall go exactly the same way as i did the last time you followed me. it is a very lonely part there. he is sure to watch me very closely, as he will wonder why i choose that way for my walks. i shall stay there for a bit, and shall lean over the wall as if i were calculating its depth and intended to make my escape there. he is sure to be intent on watching my movements, and will get up as close as he can. then is your time to steal up. do you think that you can do it without his hearing you? if not, i should think that a better plan will be for you to hide close to the way we shall come back. i shall not return till it is beginning to get dark, and he will probably keep closer to me than he would going, so as to better watch my movements. when he comes along you will spring out and knock him down, and i will, as you shout, run back to your assistance." "i shall not want any assistance, master," azim said confidently. "i am sure i am quite as strong as he is, and as i shall take him by surprise i shall have no difficulty in managing him." "don't use your sword, azim." "no, master, i will get a thick stick." "of course you will bring the rope with you, azim; the twenty yards will be ample to spare a length to tie him up with, and to reach to the ground from the top of the wall. you may as well put enough food for a couple of days in the saddle-bags, and a supply of grain for the horses, then we shall not have to stop to buy anything." the day passed quietly. azim bought the heaviest staff that he could find, and brought it back and stowed it away during his master's absence, as he did not think that the latter would approve of its weight. he considered his master's objection to his stabbing the spy to be a weakness which he was quite unable to understand. at four o'clock angus started, and a few minutes later the trader's servant led the two horses he had bought through the streets and out at the southern gate. azim waited till he saw him go, as there was no occasion for him to follow the spy closely, and indeed it had been arranged that he should not do so, lest the spy should this time notice him and perhaps take alarm. he therefore strolled leisurely along until he neared the spot where angus was standing on the wall. the spy had taken up his post nearer to him than before, and was evidently watching narrowly what he was doing. as he might turn round suddenly, azim seated himself behind a ruined hut within a couple of yards of the road, and there patiently waited until, as darkness fell, angus came along. "i am here, master," azim said. "take care of yourself," angus replied without stopping; "he will probably have pistols, and certainly a knife." "all right, master." azim stood up now grasping the heavy staff firmly in both hands. listening intently he heard a minute later a soft footstep, and the spy passed him keeping his eye fixedly on the figure ahead of him. azim sprang out, and swinging his staff round his head, brought it with all his strength against the back of the man's head, just below his turban. he fell without a sound. "he is down, master," the lad cried. angus, who had been listening for the sound of a struggle and had heard the blow, came running back. "why, it was almost like the sound of a pistol," he said, as he saw the motionless figure. "yes, master, i was obliged to hit him hard, because, as you said, he might have pistols." "you have stunned him," angus went on, going up to the prostrate figure. "now, cut off a length of that rope and we will tie him up securely." he tied the man's legs, and then turned him over. the inertness of the body struck him, and he placed his ear over his heart. "he is dead," he said. "he is not breathing, and his heart is not beating. you have hit him too hard." "well, i did hit him hard, master. it is a misfortune, but perhaps it is all for the best. undoubtedly it was allah's will that he should die." "well, it cannot be helped," angus said, "and undoubtedly it will make it safer for us. well, let us move on." "do you go on, master, and i will take his clothes off and drag him into this hut. he may lie there for months before anyone comes along and looks in." "very well, i will walk on to the wall; don't be long." five minutes later azim rejoined him carrying a bundle. "we do not want to be bothered with the clothes," angus said. "no, master; but if we left them there, they might be found to-morrow morning. someone might recognize the man by them, so i thought it would be better to carry them away with us for a few miles, and then throw them in some bushes. i have got his pistols and knife. he was well paid, master; he had ten gold pieces in his sash--here they are." "put them in your own pocket, azim. i do not want to have anything to do with them; they are your spoil." azim, who had no compunction in the matter, at once put the little bag into his sash. the rope was now fastened to the battlement, and they slid down. the wall was about forty feet high, and unprovided with a moat. they started at once for the place where the horses were to be waiting for them; a quarter of an hour's brisk walk took them there. angus made a present to the man in charge of them, who, while they were tightening the girths, at once wrapped himself in the blanket he had brought out and lay down to sleep till morning. [illustration: azim surprises the spy.] "we need not press the horses," angus said as they rode off. "we shall certainly have twelve hours' start, and i hope twenty-four. it all depends on how often the man reports to his employer, who is no doubt an official at the palace. probably he goes once a day, though, as there has been nothing suspicious about our movements and no signs of any intention of leaving, he may have been ordered to go only every two or three days unless he has news to give. of course in that case we are all right; but if he reports every evening, how long a start we shall get depends entirely upon what sort of a man the official is. in any case, he would hardly give a thought to his spy not coming in this evening, but would suppose that i had been out till late. when he does not appear in the morning, if the official is of a suspicious nature he will enquire for the man, and when he is not found will send down to the khan to see if he is there, and to ascertain if things are going on as usual. "when the news is brought him that the man is not there, and that we have been out all night, he will become alarmed. he will go himself and question the traders there, and will doubtless ascertain that i have sold our horses. i don't suppose he will hear that we have bought others. the trader will see that there is going to be trouble about it, and is likely to hold his tongue and tell his servant to be silent on the subject; and as the official could have no reason for imagining that we should sell our horses and buy others, he will conclude that we have made our escape over the wall on foot. that is the report which he will probably make to the prince, and we may safely calculate that it will be afternoon before parties of horse are sent off in pursuit by the herat, ghuznee, and quettah roads, and will probably be instructed to enquire for two young persians on foot. they will lose time by stopping at every village to make enquiries, and after going forty or fifty miles will begin to feel sure that we have not come along that road, but have gone by one of the others, or perhaps hidden up in some village at a distance from the road. "they may have instructions to go as far as quettah; but suppose they get thirty miles before sunset--and they certainly won't get farther than that, as they will have to make enquiries, and will probably halt as soon as it gets dark,--we shall have a start of nearly sixty miles before morning, and will hide up and go on as soon as it is dark, and shall be another thirty or forty before they start next day; so we shall then be some sixty miles ahead of them and within from twenty to thirty from quettah. we will skirt round the town without going into it, and then make down the bolan pass. i don't think there is the least chance of any pursuit being kept up beyond quettah, and we can travel at our own pace down the pass. we shall have to lay in a good stock of provisions at the last village we pass before beginning to descend, and must travel at night, for otherwise we may be plundered by the tribesmen, who have the worst possible reputation." "how long is the pass, master?" "fifty-five miles long, mr. pottinger told me. he says that it is a frightful place. a river runs through it, and in the wet season anyone caught in it would be drowned, for in some places the sides are perpendicular, and the channel is only sixty or seventy feet wide. there are caves along there in which the tribesmen hide, and rush out and plunder, and often kill, travellers. we must get through in two nights, and must be extremely careful where we stop for the day, choosing some place where we can hide ourselves and our horses." "well, master," azim said after a pause, "if it is the will of allah that we are to get through, we shall; if not, not." "that is it, azim. i do not think that there is much fear of our lives. we know that travellers do use that pass. i believe they generally pay so much to one of the chiefs of the tribesmen, and we will do the same if, on arriving at the top of the pass, we find that we can arrange it. we shall want money to take us from dadur across the plain to the indus. it is a barren and desolate country, and we shall have to buy some supplies at dadur. coming down without merchandise, the tribesmen will make sure that we have money, as we should naturally have sold the goods we brought from persia at candahar, and must intend buying a fresh stock in india. therefore, you may be sure, that if captured we should be stripped of every penny we have about us." they rode for eight hours, and reckoned that they had made some fifty miles. they gave the horses a good feed and lay down until daylight, for they were now at the foot of the kojuk, a gorge so steep and difficult that it could not be passed at night. just as they were starting, three tribesmen rode up, and in the name of the local chief demanded two gold tomauns, one for each horse and rider, as tribute for a free passage. as the money was paid without question, they rode off without giving further trouble. the passage was long and difficult, and in many cases they had to lead their horses. once through, they allowed the animals another hour's rest and a feed, and then mounting, rode on briskly again. a few miles farther on they halted in a clump of trees, and slept until nightfall, and then rode another twenty miles. as speed was of less consequence than keeping their horses in fair condition, they turned off at a little stream, followed it for half a mile up, and then halted in a dip through which it ran. here there was good grass for the horses. they remained for the rest of that day, and until within three hours of daybreak next morning. as angus had calculated, they saw at sunrise the mud fort and town of quettah standing on its rocky eminence. they made a detour, and came down upon the road again round the town, and then rode briskly down the shawl valley. the country round was rich and fertile, and dotted with villages, orchards, and vineyards. they stopped late in the afternoon at a village near the entrance to the pass. two armed men came out from a hut as they drew up. the leader said, "our chief is master of the pass, travellers find it wise to pay for right of passage." "that we are ready to do," angus said. "but does your chief guarantee that we shall go unmolested down to dadur?" "the chief cannot guarantee that, he can only guarantee you from hurt or damage from his people. he is lord of the eastern side of the pass, but there are others--men of no account, and who own no chief--among the mountains to the west. they sometimes waylay travellers. our chief punishes them when he can do so; but it is seldom that he is able to catch them. he does all that he can, for he wishes well to traders and others who pass along, for when ill happens to them others are afraid to pass, and he loses his tribute. when a large caravan comes up, and is able to pay handsomely, he furnishes an escort of twenty men or more; but he will not send less than twenty, for a smaller party might not be able to defend the caravan, and he would suffer loss of honour from failing to give protection to those to whom he guaranteed it." "we cannot afford to pay for an escort of twenty men, and have but little to be robbed of, for you see we carry no merchandise, having disposed of what we bought at herat and candahar, and sent the proceeds by sure hands back to persia." as their attire gave no signs of their being men of substance, the tribesman said: "in that case you will only have to pay one tomaun each; that is the price for a man and horse, and the same for each camel- or horse-load of goods; that is the regular toll." "that we can pay. as to the brigands you speak of, we must take our chance." he handed the money to the man, who in return gave him a little white-and-red flag, which he was to show should he encounter any of his tribesmen. they stopped here all day, and purchased food for their journey. "i should think it would be a very good thing, azim," angus said in the afternoon, "if we could engage a guide. we might break our necks making our way down here in the dark. i will speak to those two fellows. i suppose they are on duty here, and cannot go themselves, but there may be others of the tribe in the village; or, if not, some of the people here may be accustomed to going down the pass with caravans." angus went to the hut occupied by the two tribesmen and called them out. "we are intending to travel at night," he said, after offering them a packet of tobacco. "in that way we may escape being seen by these brigands." "it will be almost impossible for you to go at night--quite impossible without a guide." "that is what we came to you about. are there any of your tribe who would act as a guide for us? how long would it take us?" "it would take you four nights' journey. you could do it in two stages if your horses are sure-footed and you travelled in the day, but at night it would take four at least. how much would you be willing to pay?" "how much would be charged?" angus said quietly. "you should have two men," the man answered, "two men who know the pass well. yakoob and i could go with you. we have been here six days, and two others will come to take our places and collect tolls to-morrow, so we shall be free. we know every foot of the pass, having travelled up and down it scores of times. we cannot guarantee your safety, but you would have a better chance with us than with others. we will take you into dadur. we do not promise to fight; when twenty attack four, fighting is foolish. we have our horses; there are parts where the pass opens out and the bottom is level." "well, how much would you charge?" the two men talked together in an undertone, and then the one who had before spoken turned again to angus. "we would take you for three gold pieces each." "it is a large sum," angus said; "but as i hear in the village that it is not safe to go unless with a large caravan, and that it might be three weeks or a month before a sufficiently large number of travellers arrive, we will pay you that." "it is a bargain, then," the man said. "we had best start at four o'clock; the descent here is very steep, and it is not overlooked from the hills to the west. therefore, we can go down there by daylight, and then rest our horses for an hour and move forward again when it is quite dark. you had better buy four black blankets, to cut up and tie round the horses' feet, so that when we are passing the bad points, where the brigands generally lurk, no noise will be made in climbing over the boulders or slipping on smooth rocks. it will be necessary, of course, to get food for us all and for the horses." "i will buy that to-morrow," angus said. "i suppose it would be of no use taking torches?" "you might take some," the man said. "in some places the rocks are so steep that no one could look down from above, and at these points there are no caves where the thieves would be hiding, and we should certainly get on a good deal faster with torches." "i will take some then. have you ever been through by night before?" the man shook his head. "we have not. it is seldom attempted; but it is because you are willing to travel so that we are ready to accompany you, for the brigands would expect no one at that time, and will most likely be asleep." "then, if we are attacked we must be taken prisoners?" "no," the man said; "there are many places where the hills can be ascended by men who know them. should we be attacked near one of these spots we must leave our horses and fly; that is what we should do, and what i should advise you to do also. a man's life is worth more than a horse and saddle. of course in the daytime there would be no escape in that way, for they would bring us down with their matchlocks; but at night we could elude them, and if they did follow us we could defend ourselves, taking shelter and shooting them as they came up." "well, it is a satisfaction, anyhow," angus said, "that there would be a chance for us. our horses are good beasts, but we value our lives more." "i think they are honest fellows," he went on after telling azim the substance of his conversation with the tribesmen. "they say that the afghans have a treacherous disposition, but i believe these men can be trusted to keep their engagements. they did not exaggerate the difficulties of the journey as some would have done, nor did they pretend that they would join in a hopeless fight. in fact, although of course the actual difficulties of the journey would be very much greater in the dark than in daylight, they evidently considered that the danger from the other tribesmen would be by no means great." it was, however, a terrible journey, and angus felt that without the guidance of the tribesmen it would have been an impossible one. they knew exactly where the river was fordable, and on which side the pass was most free from great boulders and obstruction, and where torches could be safely used. but at times progress was terribly slow, their horses having to pick their way among rocks and boulders, and taking more than an hour to cover a mile. at other times they were able to go at a brisk walk, and even break into a trot. whenever they neared spots where the caves frequented by the robbers were situated, the horses' feet were muffled, and they were led with the greatest care. it was indeed comparatively seldom that the riders mounted; where it was dangerous to have torches, they walked along by the side of their horses, allowing the animals to pick their own way, which they were able to do better than they could have done if led. the horses angus had bought having made the ascent of the pass were to some extent accustomed to the work, and not having to carry the weight of the riders were able, save in exceptional places, to get along more easily than angus and azim were able to do. both of these had many falls, and would have had many more had not their guides at such times stood close beside them and rendered them assistance, often warning them of obstacles of which they themselves were unable to make out the faintest outline. several times they saw the glow of fires burning in the caverns. at such points the strictest silence was observed. they had purchased afghan shoes at the village, and round these had wound strips of thick woollen stuff like felt, so that their steps were as noiseless as those of the horses. the stirrups were fastened over the animals' backs so as to avoid contact with rocks; and any slight sound that might be made was to a great extent drowned by the murmur and rattle of the rapid stream. the long halts during the daytime were made at points, carefully chosen by the guides, at the foot of precipitous rocks. fragments that had fallen from above formed a bank at a short distance from the foot, the greater part of the rocks having bounded outwards with the impetus of their fall. between the bank and the cliff there was a depression partly filled with splinters of rock. it was, however, considerably lower than the bank, and the men and horses stationed in it were hid alike from observation from above and from the eye of those passing along the valley. here they slept on beds composed of their saddles and rugs laid on the rough stones, their guides by turn keeping watch. as a whole they got on faster than the guides had anticipated, and were fairly down at the mouth of the pass at daybreak on the fourth morning after their start. here the tribesmen received their pay, angus adding another pound to the amount agreed on, for the care and assistance given. they waited two days at dadur to allow their horses rest. here they were fortunate in finding two men well acquainted with the road. they had so far guided a party who were proceeding up the pass to quettah, and as they were now returning, were glad enough to accept the offer of a couple of pounds to act as guides across the desert. in accordance with their advice two rough ponies were bought to carry water-skins and provisions, while smaller skins were to be taken on their own horses, as the country to be traversed was for a considerable distance a waterless desert. even this part of the journey would not be accomplished without danger, for the belooches of the district were to a man plunderers, and cared nothing for the authority of the khan of khelat. the distance from dadur to shikarpore is nearly a hundred and fifty miles across a flat and dreary country, almost unpopulated; but as they were unencumbered by baggage, and carried sufficient water for their wants and those of their horses, it was performed in seven days. at rojhan they came upon captain thompson, who was in command of a party which had gone forward to examine the state of the water-supply, and if necessary to sink more wells. he was surprised when a young persian trader addressed him in english, and informed him that he had just come through from herat. this was quite enough to assure a warm welcome, and the officer put him up for the night in his own tent and made him in all respects comfortable. after hearing something of the siege of herat, and of his journey, he asked anxiously as to the water-supply in the villages on the way to dadur. on hearing that few of them were much better supplied than rojhan he threw up his hands in despair. "two or three thousand natives ought to have been engaged," he said, "and a couple of hundred set to work to dig deep wells in these villages. a hundred wells would be little enough for the army, its horses and baggage animals, and its native followers. even when they are dug the water runs into them slowly. i have sent down my report from here. there are only three wells, one of which sir alexander burnes sank when he was here a week ago; the others contain such bad water as to be quite unfit for human use. i am really frightened at the thought of what will take place before the army gets to dadur. however, i hear that they will not advance for another month, and that some very energetic steps will be made to secure a water-supply before they come along." on the following day angus passed several working parties who were engaged under the superintendence of major leech, assistant to sir alexander burnes--for captain burnes had been knighted as a reward for his services in cabul. with the exception of these parties they scarcely encountered a human being on the way down, except in the miserable little villages which were situated where the soil permitted the cultivation of a scanty crop, which was for the most part cut when green and sold to passing travellers. angus was heartily glad when shikarpore came in sight. he had learned from captain thompson that shah soojah had arrived there with a native army which he had raised, that the bengal army under general cotton, which had marched down by the indus, was expected to arrive there in a day or two, and that the bombay army under sir john keane was but a few days behind. upon entering the town he was glad to see british uniforms in the street, and addressing in english the first officer he met, he found that the division of general cotton had arrived two days before. "i have just come from herat," angus said. "i left there after the siege was raised. i have some despatches from lieutenant pottinger, which should be given either to colonel pottinger or to sir alexander burnes." "burnes is here. i think that colonel pottinger is at sukkar, he was there a few days ago; you will find burnes at the head-quarters. he is the political officer and so forth of the army; but macnaghten is envoy and commissioner to soojah, and generally at the head of all political business." the army was encamped round the town, and angus had no difficulty in finding the quarters of sir alexander burnes. dismounting a short distance away, he left azim to look after the horses and went towards the tent. he was stopped by a sentry, who on learning that he wished to see sir alexander, called an attendant. the latter, coming up, took angus's name in, and reappearing at the entrance almost immediately, signed to him to enter. chapter vii in the service "i am glad to see you, mr. campbell," sir alexander burnes said as the lad entered his tent. "colonel pottinger was asking me only three or four days ago to keep a look-out for you. he had received a letter from his nephew saying that you were going to travel down _via_ candahar, and that he was afraid that you would not manage to get through. i myself received a letter from lieutenant pottinger speaking very highly of services that you had rendered, and i understand that both he and mr. m'neill, our minister in persia, spoke very favourably of you in their despatches to the governor-general. how have you got through?" "i had very little difficulty, sir, except that i was detained at candahar, and had to effect my escape secretly." and he gave a short account of his journey, and the manner in which he had escaped from candahar and avoided recapture. "you managed it very cleverly, mr. campbell. i will take you in at once to macnaghten, who is supreme here, for shah soojah is at present little more than a puppet. i have no doubt that he will be very glad to learn what is the feeling throughout the country as to shah soojah. i may tell you in confidence that i am convinced that a terrible blunder has been made in taking up his cause. i was, as you no doubt know, several months at cabul, and i am convinced that dost mahomed was sincere in his desire for our friendship, and that he can support himself against his brothers at candahar, who have, as we know, been intriguing with persia and russia. i have all along urged the indian government to give him warm support and to enter into a firm alliance with him. however, the governor-general and his advisers have taken the other view, and i have only to do my best to carry out their orders, although i have strongly represented my own opinion. "i do not think that government has any idea of the difficulties to be encountered. so far as fighting goes there is no doubt whatever that the afghans cannot stand against us, but the operation of feeding the troops and animals will be a troublesome one indeed. the heat will increase every day, and even the march up to quettah will present enormous difficulties, as you who have just descended the pass will readily understand; but the great problem will not be how to place shah soojah on the throne but how to maintain him there. i tell you this because macnaghten, who really knows nothing of the matter, is extremely sanguine. i warn you that it will be as well that you should not express any strong opinion against the enterprise. it is determined upon, and will be carried out, and without in any way shaking his opinion you would only set him against you and might seriously injure your own prospects. as it is, he has much to irritate him. there have already been serious troubles with the ameers of scinde, who have been treated in a very high-handed manner instead of being conciliated in every possible way. this alone has vastly added to the difficulty, by rendering it almost impossible to obtain carriage or provisions. "then he differs greatly from general cotton, who, since his arrival here two days ago, has shown himself an officer who has an immense opinion of his own dignity. as general in command he declines to take any orders, or indeed to listen to any advice, from macnaghten. this is certainly not macnaghten's fault, who, although, as i consider, mistaken in his opinions, is very conciliating in his manner, and would willingly avoid all friction, which can but be disadvantageous to the enterprise on which he has set his heart. cotton's transport is really insufficient for his own army; shah soojah has hardly any transport at all. cotton cares not in the slightest about the shah or the shah's army, and, to say the truth, they are of no great value. "macnaghten, however, attaches, and reasonably from his point of view, great importance to the fact that shah soojah should appear as arriving to claim his throne as an independent prince with his own army, supported by his allies the british, and not as a mere puppet forced upon the afghans by british bayonets; and he is therefore most anxious that he and his force should occupy as prominent a position as possible. it is as well for me to give you these hints as to the situation before you see macnaghten, and to warn you against speaking to him strongly of any hostile opinions as to shah soojah's chances that you may have gathered on your journey. when a man has an open mind it is well to give him both sides of the case, but when he has pledged his reputation and thrown himself heart and soul into one side of the case it is worse than useless to endeavour to turn him, especially when the die is cast and the day for drawing back is past. if my opinion, gathered from nine months' residence in cabul and almost daily interviews with dost mahomed, has been altogether unheeded, certainly yours, gathered in a passing trip through the country, would have no effect whatever beyond setting him against you." "thank you, sir, i will be careful; and indeed my opinion would in any case be of little value. i certainly conversed a good deal with the natives on my way from herat to candahar, but at that city i spoke only to persian merchants, and had no intercourse whatever on my way down, except with my guides in the bolan passes." "well we will call on him now," sir alexander burnes said, taking his cap. mr. macnaghten's tent was next to his own, and he at once took angus in with him. "i have come, mr. macnaghten, to introduce to you mr. angus campbell, who has just come down through candahar from herat. his name was, i know, very favourably mentioned both by lieutenant pottinger and mr. m'neill. he has brought down letters of introduction to me and colonel pottinger." "i know your name well, sir," macnaghten said. "mr. m'neill told us that you had been in his service, and had gone to herat on a mission to induce shah kamran to hold out to the last, and that when the siege was raised you had started from there with the intention of journeying down through afghanistan into scinde, in hopes of obtaining employment in some capacity where your knowledge of persian and arabic would be of service. i also understand, by lieutenant pottinger's last despatch, that you have learned pushtoo. the governor-general was very favourably impressed with these reports, and authorized me to employ you at once as one of the junior assistants. i should think, sir alexander, that you can employ mr. campbell to greater advantage than i can, as the work of making the arrangements for the advance of the army is in your hands." "i shall be very glad of an addition to my staff, for as we get on i foresee that the three officers who now assist me will be altogether insufficient; and the high terms in which mr. m'neill and lieutenant pottinger have written about him, and the fact that he has been able to travel about the country unsuspected, shows his fitness for such work." "you must understand, mr. campbell," macnaghten said, "i cannot guarantee that the position will be a permanent one, as all such appointments in the service must be confirmed by the court of directors; but i shall at once acquaint lord auckland of your arrival here and of your nomination, and i have no doubt that he will himself confirm it so far as this expedition continues, and will strongly recommend the court of directors that your appointment to the service shall be a permanent one, in view of your exceptional knowledge of persian and pushtoo." "i thank you very much indeed, sir, and will do my best to merit your good opinion." as angus left the tent with sir alexander burnes he said: "i am indeed obliged to you, sir. i had hoped that i might obtain an appointment of some sort, but i never hoped for one like this. it is the work, too, of all others that i should like, and you may rely on me to carry out your orders to the full extent of my power." "i have no doubt you will, mr. campbell. i am glad to have one of my officers speak pushtoo, for although both in scinde and afghanistan persian is the language most spoken by the upper classes, it is of no use with the peasants. in the work of digging wells, bargaining for fodder for the horses, and so forth, pushtoo will be very useful, for although it differs from the language of the belooches, it is near enough for them to understand it; and, of course, when we are once through the bolan it is the language of all the countrymen." "may i ask what dress it will be proper for me to wear?" "as it is a civil appointment you will not wear uniform, but either the ordinary civilian dress, or, if you like, a dress of oriental character. i generally dress so, and it certainly has its advantages, and favourably predisposes chiefs you may have to visit. a british uniform they understand, but a purely civilian dress is too simple for them, and does not convey any sense of importance." "very well, sir; i am glad that you have decided so. i have no civilian clothes with me, and should find it very difficult, if not impossible, to get them here." "your appointment will be a thousand rupees a month, so long as the campaign lasts; after that it would, of course, depend upon the future employment you might have. if you would like to draw a month's pay in advance you can do so." "no, thank you, sir; i am fairly provided with money." "i have four officers employed on similar duty, mr. campbell, i will introduce you to them at once; and you will, of course, mess with our party." major leech, the chief assistant, was away on duty, but the other three officers were at once sent for. "captain jones, captain arbuthnot, and lieutenant macgregor, i wish to introduce to you mr. campbell, whom i have just appointed as one of my political assistants. he has distinguished himself greatly under lieutenant pottinger throughout the siege of herat, and was previously an assistant to mr. m'neill, our ambassador at the court of persia. he speaks persian, arabic, and pushtoo, and has been specially recommended to the governor-general by mr. m'neill and pottinger. he has now made his way from herat through candahar, and the fact that he has done so safely shows that he knows how to use these languages to advantage." as lieutenant pottinger's gallant defence of herat was the theme of general admiration throughout india, angus could not have had a better introduction, and he was warmly received by the three officers, who at once took him away with them. "you will share my tent with me," lieutenant macgregor said. "i am alone at present. you have a horse, of course, and a servant, i suppose?" "i have a very fair horse, and an excellent servant, who is a young fellow, a persian, the son of a door-keeper at the embassy. he was with me through the siege, and i found him invaluable. he is a strong fellow, and has plenty of courage and shrewdness; i should never have got away out of candahar had it not been for his assistance. "sir alexander has advised me to get an eastern dress, as i cannot wear uniform; and i must see about that at once, for this persian dress would in any case have been out of place, and my journey down the bolan has ruined it altogether. but in the first place, i shall be obliged if you will tell me where my two horses are to be put up." "your horse will be picketed with ours in our tents; our servants' horses are in the line behind them. is that your man over there with the two horses? i will send an orderly to tell him to take them over and picket them. now, i suppose you want something to eat? we had tiffin an hour ago, but the servants can get something for you." "thank you; i will go down into the town. i had something before mounting this morning, and i own i should not care about going into the mess-tent till i have got something to wear a little more respectable than these clothes." "oh, that is nonsense. besides, you need not go into the mess-tent. i will order them to warm something up at once, and to bring it into my tent. we are all wanting to hear more about herat. the official despatches only give us bare facts." for the next two hours angus was fully occupied in relating his experiences of the siege to the three officers; after that he went down with azim to the town. there he bought for himself a dress such as would be worn by a native of some rank--a white turban, a blue tunic opening at the breast and showing a white cambric shirt, several white robes, and loose white linen trousers tightened in at the ankle. he bought a good supply of under-linen and a couple of pairs of native riding-boots. for azim he bought clothes appropriate to a retainer of a mohammedan gentleman. as he was unable to procure a camp bed of european make, he bought a native charpoy, which could be taken to pieces and conveniently carried. he had found that his fellow-officers had each three native servants--a butler or body servant, a syce for their riding horses, and a man who looked after and led on the line of march two baggage animals. he had no difficulty in engaging a syce, and let the question of the baggage animals stand over until next day. azim would, of course, act as his personal servant. the lad, who had during the past year become imbued with the spirit of adventure, was delighted to hear that his master was to accompany the army. he had, during his stay in herat, picked up the language, and could converse in it as fluently as angus himself was able to do; and although he had no pleasant recollections of the journey from candahar, he felt sure that it would be a very different affair when accompanying a british army. he expressed as much to his master, who said: "i should not make so sure of that, azim. we had no great difficulty in obtaining provisions for ourselves, but it will be a very different thing with an army of thousands of men, with an even larger number of camp followers and five or six thousand camels. except just round one of those little villages, we did not see a blade of grass from the time we left the shawl valley, and how the animals will exist till we get up to quettah i have no idea. once there no doubt we shall do fairly well, but we shall have a very bad time on the journey, unless i am mistaken. if i had the management of affairs, i should send off at once the whole of the camels with a sufficient escort as far as dadur. there they should leave the provisions and forage they took up, and return here to accompany the army with a further supply. no doubt it would cause a month's delay, but it would be better to do that than to lose half our baggage animals and to risk famine for the troops." "i believe," captain arbuthnot said when angus joined the others, "that ten days' supply are ready at dadur, and twenty days' supply at quettah." "certainly there were no supplies at dadur when i came through, but i know nothing about quettah," angus said; "still i think that if any supplies of consequence had been collected there i should have heard about it from the men who guided us through the pass." "there were no troops there, then?" "no, not the slightest sign of them, nor did we pass any on the march down from candahar; but of course the khan of khelat may have collected a great force of belooches, and if he did so, he would naturally keep them at khelat until he heard that the army was approaching, as it would be an immense deal of trouble to victual them in the pass." "i know that mr. macnaghten received news which induced him to believe that a large force would be likely to march down from candahar, and that the attitude of the princes was altogether hostile. it is on account of that news that we are going to advance in two or three days' time, instead of waiting for another three weeks for a larger stock of supplies to be collected. it was but ten days ago that the commissary-general sent off four thousand camels to bring up supplies from the rear. however, they will be useful for the bombay column which is coming up, as it is arranged that we shall collect transport and supplies for them. "therefore the decision has been taken to march at once, so that we can ascend the pass before the enemy send a sufficient force to hold it against us. no doubt the report that we were not going to leave here for another three weeks has been sent up to candahar. the prince is sure to have agents and spies here. we ought to be at the foot of the bolan before it is known in candahar that we have started. as to khelat, the khan has sent in assurances of his friendship, and i expect he will make himself safe by assuming neutrality; but the belooches are a warlike people, and born plunderers, and his authority is very slight, except in khelat and the district near it. we are sure to have trouble with the mountaineers, but beyond having to protect the convoy strongly, i do not suppose we shall have serious fighting with them. i expect that we shall be sent off to-morrow or next day to khelat and quettah, perhaps one of us may even go to candahar. i know that mr. macnaghten thinks that possibly the princes may not take an active part on dost mahomed's side. everyone knows that they have no great love for their brother; which is not surprising, for he, who is the youngest of the family, has managed to secure the sovereignty. besides, they would see that if they took up arms in his favour the whole brunt of the fighting would fall upon them, for cabul could render them no real assistance. they are very shifty gentlemen, and though they may make a show of force at first, it would probably be only for the purpose of securing advantageous terms for themselves." "i saw them when i was at candahar," angus said, "and they, or at least one of them, questioned me closely; but supposing me to be a persian just arrived from herat, he naturally said nothing about a british invasion. his great anxiety was to know what the intentions and power of russia and persia were. no doubt the plans that were formed were entirely disconcerted by the shah's retreat from before herat. i saw no signs whatever of any gatherings of the afghans, nor was the subject ever alluded to in the conversations i had with traders at the place where i lodged." at this moment a native officer came in and said that sir alexander desired to see captains arbuthnot and jones. as they buckled on their swords the latter said: "you have told us about herat, mr. campbell, and this evening i hope you will tell us about your journey down." when the officers returned angus found that arbuthnot was not mistaken as to the probable work they would have to perform, for he was to accompany major todd the next morning with an escort of cavalry for khelat. they were to see the khan and arrange with him for supplies to be sent to dadur. captain jones was to remain there to see that his promises were carried out, and arbuthnot, unless he learned that a force from candahar had arrived at quettah, was to go on there and see to the collection of grain and cattle. "a squadron of cavalry is going forward to-morrow morning, campbell. four hundred labourers are going with it, and you are to be in special charge of half of them. of course, they will have eight or ten headmen, but they will want looking after all the same. they are to dig wells at burshoree; the other half, under you, macgregor, are to do the same thing at meerpoor. it is a thousand pities it was not done before, for the army is to begin its advance the day after to-morrow. however, you will gain a couple of days on them, and that is something. if you meet major leech, who is at work improving the roads, you will, of course, report yourself to him, and he will doubtless be able to advise you as to the best place for the wells." angus heard the news with much satisfaction. in the first place it meant active work, and in the second it would save him from the slow and toilsome march of the army, which would, he felt sure, be accompanied with enormous hardship. the four officers dined together. sir a. burnes was not present, as he was dining with general cotton and mr. macnaghten. after dinner angus related his adventure at candahar; how he evaded pursuit, and his passage through the pass. he had hardly finished when he was sent for to the general's tent. "i have just been telling general cotton, mr. campbell," said mr. macnaghten, "that you arrived this morning from candahar. he wishes to learn as much as you can tell him of the state of the pass at present, and of the country between dadur and this place. i told him that i had not been able to find time to question you on these points." "in the first place," the general said, "what is the state of the bolan?" "as i only travelled during the night i cannot tell you very much about it. the river is not high, and there is no difficulty whatever on that score. the ground is generally extremely rough, and covered not only with rounded boulders, but by rocks that will prove very trying to the feet of the animals. we bandaged very thickly the hoofs of our horses to deaden the sound, and so saved them from being lamed, which they otherwise would certainly have been. the bandages were of felt, and these were completely cut to pieces the first night. after that we cut up one of the water-skins i had with me, and we covered the felt with the leather, but even this was cut to pieces, and had to be renewed the next night. although this is the general character of the pass, there are places at which, by skirting the foot of the hills at points where the pass opens out--and the hills are not precipitous, although everywhere steep--it is possible for mounted men to go along at a fast walk, the stones being much smaller, and like, i should think, what i have heard of a sea-beach, though i never saw one, at least that i can remember." "still, there were no insurmountable difficulties, mr. campbell?" "no, sir, though there were places where certainly not more than two laden camels could pass abreast." "well, next as to the country between this place and dadur. we know about it as far as the edge of beloochee desert; what is it beyond that? did you suffer from want of water?" "no, sir, at the villages where we stopped there was always water; but there were, as far as i saw, but a few small wells, which would seem to me very insufficient for the supply of an army and its train." "well, we are going to dig more wells," mr. macnaghten said rather impatiently. "if the water will run into three or four wells it would run into fifty. now, about forage?" "there were small patches of cultivation round each of the villages; at bhag more than elsewhere, as it lies nearer to the foot of the hills; but at meerpoor, burshoree, and rojhan i should not say there were more than twenty or thirty acres of cultivated land. at bhag i was strongly advised to take the road at the foot of the hills to dundeaver down to larkhanna, and from there to follow the indus up to sukkar; but the guides said that i should be more likely to be troubled by the beloochees along that route, and as it was also twice as far i took the straight way here." "thank you. we will not detain you any longer, mr. campbell, and we are obliged for the information that you have given us." angus bowed and retired. he felt that mr. macnaghten was vexed that he could not report better upon the chances of obtaining sufficient supplies of forage and water. but he felt that it was clearly better that he should give, in the plainest terms, the true state of affairs, for when, as he was sure would be the case, there was immense suffering of men and animals, the blame would fall upon him if he had given a more hopeful account than the facts warranted. sir a. burnes sent for him on leaving the general's tent. "you did quite right in not giving a rose-coloured description of the state of things along the line of march, mr. campbell. of course neither mr. macnaghten nor general cotton liked it. neither of them, in fact, has the slightest idea of the troubles ahead of them, and both were inclined to view me as a pessimist. however, it will not matter to you very greatly whether macnaghten is pleased with you or not, because your reports will be sent in to me. this sort of work will not last very long. i have only undertaken it because major garden, general cotton's quarter-master-general, has been taken ill. major craikie, the adjutant-general, will go forward with me the day after to-morrow to superintend matters generally. i hope by that time to have a thousand more men for well-digging. major leech has gone to sebee to cut a dam there on the river naree, which it is hoped will fill the small water-courses and greatly assist us. i have more fear about forage than water. you can dig wells and cut dams, but you can't get a crop to grow at a day's notice. however, we must hope for the best." the next morning at three o'clock angus and lieutenant macgregor started with the labourers and an escort of fifty native cavalry. "i am very glad to be off, campbell," macgregor said. "it has been disheartening work for some time. somehow or other nothing has gone smoothly since we started. of course i am only a sub, but certainly it seems to me that so far there has been an enormous amount of unnecessary friction, and that the chiefs have not gone the right way to work. i don't believe myself in this shah whom we are going to force upon the afghans. dost mahomed is worth a dozen of him, and no one who knows anything of the affairs of afghanistan is able to understand why lord auckland and macnaghten and the rest of them should ever have conceived the idea of supplanting a man who has shown himself really desirous of our alliance and friendship, and who undoubtedly possesses the support of a majority of his countrymen, by one who has never shown any talent, who has no party whatever in afghanistan, and is a member of a discredited and fallen family. "still, that is their affair; but matters have been complicated by the manner in which the emirs of scinde have been treated. instead of regarding them, as they have always shown themselves, as friendly to us, we have gone out of our way to render them hostile, by the manner in which we have, in absolute contradiction of the terms of their treaty with us, compelled them to furnish carriage, provisions, and money. had they been a conquered country we could not have carried matters with a higher hand. it will be sure to lead to trouble some day, and certainly adds immensely to our difficulties. now, the very fact that, in the days when he was for a short time ruler in afghanistan, soojah advanced all sorts of preposterous claims of suzerainty over a large portion of scinde, was in itself a reason why, if we took the absurd step of placing him on the throne of cabul, we should have advanced from peshawur through jellalabad direct, instead of taking this roundabout journey through scinde. of course there would have been great difficulties in the khyber, and we should have had to encounter fierce opposition from the hill-tribesmen, but that will have to be met in any case. and after installing soojah at cabul, we could have gradually extended his power--or ours, for of course he would be but a puppet in our hands--through ghuznee to candahar. of course you won't hear any talk like this among the officers of the bombay or bengal army. they know and care nothing about the matter. it is just among the men who have been employed here in the north, and who know something about it, that there is any doubt as to the wisdom of the affair. i know burnes considers that the whole thing is a mistake. colonel pottinger, who, as our resident in scinde, knows a great deal about the afghans, says little, but i know that he disapproves of it; and so, i think, do all of us juniors, who have worked either under him, or with burnes, or up in the punjaub, and have, of course, always taken an interest in the affairs of afghanistan, especially since russian influence has become so preponderant in persia. well, we can only hope for the best, and do our best in our own little way. thank goodness, whatever comes of it, we have no responsibility in the affair." "i really know very little about it," angus said; "but i do know that it will be a terrible business getting the army to quettah, and that directly it was determined to come this way arrangements should have been made to dig sufficient wells to ensure a supply of water at every watering-place, and to collect stores of forage and grain. i really don't see how it is to be done now. from all that i could hear as i came down, there will be a lot of trouble with the beloochees." the difficulties of the advance had already been felt. great numbers of camels had died between sukkar and shikarpore, and those that accompanied the party of well-diggers were enfeebled, and looked as if they had accomplished a long forced march instead of the strong and fresh animals one would expect to see setting out on such an enterprise. the first halting-place was jagan. the next day they started at the same early hour and proceeded to janeedera. here they had passed beyond the boundary of the scinde ameers, and had entered the territory over which the khan of khelat held nominal authority. at this place there was a small mud fort, outside of which straw had been collected for the use of the cavalry, and to guard this a small party of shah soojah's troops had been posted. these, however, had been attacked and driven off by a beloochee band, and the straw carried away. however, there was sufficient water in the wells for the men and animals. the next day's march was a long one, but at rojhan a certain amount of forage had been collected, and there was a fair supply of water. the country so far had been barren, with occasional bushes, but beyond rojhan they had nothing but an absolutely flat surface of sand, without a blade of grass or a bush to break the level expanse; across this desert the party toiled on for twenty-seven miles. a little water was carried by the camels, but this supply was soon exhausted, and with parched lips and throats the men plodded on, knowing that until the end of the journey no water could be obtained. scarce a word was spoken during the painful journey. passing over the ground as he came down at a canter, angus had thought but little of it; he had done it in less than four hours, and there was no trouble from the dust. it was very different now. it was fourteen hours from the time of starting before they reached burshoree, the mounted men having to accommodate their pace to that of the labourers, and the dust rose in dense clouds. a part of the cavalry rode ahead, the rest some half a mile behind the main body of the footmen. but before half the journey was done these began to straggle, and the dust had no time to settle before the horsemen came along. fully half the labourers, indeed, threw themselves down on the sand incapable of going farther, and lay there until the cool evening air revived them, and it was long after midnight before many of them reached burshoree. here a considerable number of wells had already been dug by the party under major leech. the water was muddy, and trickled in but slowly. still it was water, and men and horses drank it eagerly as fast as it could be brought up in buckets and emptied into troughs which had been erected. although the village--a mere collection of native huts, surrounded by a wall as a protection against the plundering beloochees--offered a most uninviting prospect, angus was well pleased that he had arrived at the end of his journey, and had not, like macgregor, another day's march to perform. the latter started as usual at three o'clock, and an hour later angus, with some difficulty, roused his two hundred weary men and set them to work, promising them that if they laboured hard he would allow them to rest during the heat of the day. cheered by the promise, the labourers set to work under their headmen. each of these had charge of twenty workmen; these were divided into two gangs and worked wells close together. angus had nothing to do save to exercise a sort of general superintendence. the soil became much more firm a few feet below the surface, and as the sides stood satisfactorily it was not necessary to make the wells of any great depth. it was found that four men only could be employed on each, two working in the bottom and the others bringing up the earth with buckets and ropes, consequently, the number of the wells was largely increased. after three days of prodigious toil, water was reached in the majority of the wells, and by the end of the fourth day fifty had been added to those already dug. the liquid, however, oozed in but slowly, and when a well was emptied it was two or three hours before water could again be drawn from it; thus although the amount that could be obtained altogether was considerable, it was still wholly insufficient for the supply of an army. five-and-twenty of the native cavalry were kept constantly on the alert, for parties of plundering beloochees hovered round, and several of the well-diggers who, in spite of orders, ventured to wander some distance away were robbed and killed. the next morning general thackwell, with a body of cavalry, a small force of infantry, and some irregular horse, rode into the place. he brought with him an order from sir a. burnes for angus to accompany him. the well-diggers were to remain there and continue their work. the general had intended to stop there for two or three days, but finding that no forage could be procured, he started the next morning early and rode through meerpoor to oostar, a distance of twenty-seven miles, where, as had been reported by major leech, there was a small reservoir of water, and a store of straw and grass had been collected. angus stopped for an hour at meerpoor and had a talk with macgregor, whose men had also accomplished a great deal of work, and who bewailed his fate at having to remain there instead of going forward with general thackwell. chapter viii the advance the cutting of the dam of the naree did not afford so much aid as had been hoped for, for the thirsty soil absorbed the water almost as fast as it poured out, and it was not until many days later that it began to fill the little irrigation canals at the villages through which the army passed. after resting two days at oostar, the force proceeded to bhag, a town of some size. here water was found in abundance, and grain in considerable quantities, and also a supply of carrots, which were eagerly purchased by the officers for the use of their horses. at the various places where they halted angus acted as interpreter, and rode out with a small body of cavalry to villages at which they learned a certain amount of forage could be obtained. at bhag, to his great satisfaction, sir alexander burnes joined the party. he had paid a visit to the khan of khelat, and obtained from him stringent orders to the headmen of villages and others to do all in their power to aid the army. the inhabitants were all to be set to work to dig the holes, for which they would receive payments from the british. the khan also promised to despatch to dadur what supplies he could gather, but explained that unfortunately there was a much greater difficulty than usual in collecting provisions, as the previous season had been a very bad one, and in many parts of the country the villagers had not been able to gather sufficient for their own needs. as angus had heard the same at candahar, at the village near quettah, and from his guide, there could be no doubt that this excuse was a genuine one, and indeed the officers who had been engaged in scinde and in the country bordering the indus affirmed that the supplies obtainable there were also vastly smaller than had been anticipated. throughout the next week angus was continually employed in riding among the towns in the khanate, interviewing headmen, and expediting the despatch of convoys. he was always accompanied by a troop of cavalry, for plundering parties of beloochees were making their way on all sides towards the line followed by the army, where they murdered stragglers, captured lagging camels, and were so bold that they ventured close to the outskirts of the villages occupied by the british camps, robbed the natives of the moneys paid them for forage or grain, and rendered it necessary that every convoy should be protected by a considerable escort. after a week of this work, angus received orders to join the force that was gathering at dadur. during the last two days' march the difficulties with regard to water had disappeared. the villages had all been situated on the bolan river, and little irrigation canals enabled the cultivation of a considerable tract of country to be carried on, which supplied forage in sufficient quantity for the first division of the army which came along. dadur, a town of some four thousand inhabitants, stands on the eastern branch of the bolan river, whose banks were fringed with high reeds and groves of dwarf trees. the country round was well cultivated, and the fields were covered with young crops of wheat and barley. close to the town were gardens, and the whole presented an agreeable appearance to the troops, who had for nearly three weeks been painfully making their way across country which, even at its best points, was little more than a sandy desert. here angus again met sir alexander burnes, who had been making the greatest efforts to accumulate supplies at the town. his success, however, had been very small, nor had major leech, who was also at dadur, been more fortunate. it had been reckoned that twenty days' supplies for the whole army would have been accumulated there, but not more than sufficient for two or three days had been gathered, and general cotton, on arriving there with the bengal army, decided that it was necessary for at least a portion of the army to advance without delay. sir alexander burnes started at once with major cureton of the th lancers, with a troop of that regiment, three companies of the native infantry, and a strong party of sappers and miners, to survey the pass up to quettah. major leech was sent to khelat to maintain a strong pressure upon the khan, and it was still hoped that stores might be collected by the time the bombay army came along. the report sent down was satisfactory inasmuch as the physical difficulties of the journey were concerned. in spite of the fact that heavy rains had fallen, the river had not risen sufficiently to interfere seriously with the passage of troops and animals, and on the th of march the horse artillery, nd light cavalry, the th regiment of the line, and the th native infantry, started early in the morning, forded by torchlight the bolan river, and at eight o'clock pitched their camp in the valley, where they were to rest for the day. the road had so far offered no difficulties, except that the river had to be forded no fewer than eight times. the baggage animals which started at midnight had already arrived, but the tents were pitched with some difficulty owing to the rocky nature of the ground, which necessitated the use of iron tent-pegs instead of the wooden ones previously used. fortunately, owing to the pause that had been made by the advance parties at dadur, and the abundance of succulent food they had obtained there, the animals had recovered to a large extent from their previous fatigues and hardships, and the journey through the pass was accomplished with less loss and suffering than had occurred during the march from sukkar. vast numbers of animals, however, died, and the troops, who had started full of life and strength, were sadly changed, many of them being utterly worn out and a mere shadow of their former selves. the rumour that had precipitated the march by three weeks, upset all the transport arrangements, and caused so vast an amount of suffering, proved to be false--no forward movement had been made by the candahar princes, and except for some little trouble with the marauding villagers, the march was entirely unopposed. once in the shawl valley the fatigues of the army were over for the time, but in spite of the efforts of sir a. burnes and his assistants, only a very small amount of food and forage had been collected in readiness for them. so small indeed was the supply that it was necessary to place both the troops and native followers on reduced rations of flour, rice, and ghee. meat, however, was plentiful. the proceedings of the khan of khelat were not of a character to inspire confidence in him. while protesting strongly his friendship for us, he told our officers frankly that he was certain shah soojah would not retain his position for a day after the british troops marched away; that the whole feeling of the country was against him, and that although, had he advanced with only a native army raised by himself, he might have been accepted, the people would never submit to a sovereign thrust upon them by british bayonets. opinions differed much as to his sincerity. those who doubted it pointed to the fact, that although he was said to have large stores of provisions at khelat, he had scarcely sold any to our troops, and had failed in all his promises in that direction. on the other hand, sir a. burnes maintained that the stores of provisions spoken of did not exist; and that in any case, having no belief in the possibility of shah soojah maintaining himself, it was but natural that he should hang back until he saw how matters went, for if he were to give any active aid to the british he would be considered a traitor by his countrymen, and would imperil his khanate and his life when our protection was withdrawn from him. the question was never satisfactorily cleared up. some of those who took part in the proceedings and wrote on the subject regarded him as a very ill-used man, while others considered the measures afterwards taken against him as being fully justified by his conduct. as it was absolutely necessary that food should be obtained, parties were sent into the villages and a rigorous search instituted, and in this way a considerable quantity of hidden grain was discovered. this was taken and paid for at the market price. in quettah itself one very large store was found and taken up for the use of the army. the climate was pleasant, and in spite of reduced rations the men benefited by the halt, which was not without its excitement, for large bands of plunderers hovered round, attacks were frequently made upon parties going out with camels to graze, and expeditions to punish the villages to which the marauders belonged were undertaken. at length general sir john keane, who was in command of the whole expedition, arrived at quettah, to the satisfaction of the army, for it was thought that some decision must now be arrived at. it was evident to all that, unless something were done, famine would ere long stare them in the face. the european troops could indeed exist upon meat, but the native troops and camp followers, the greater portion of whom were not meat-eaters, were already in sore distress, the supply of grain and rice barely sufficing to keep life together. the hope was justified. as soon as the general arrived the heads of the departments were assembled and arrangements were made for an advance. the greater portion of the bombay army arrived soon after their commander, and although the men were still weakened by privation the army was in most respects perfectly capable of carrying out the work successfully. there was, however, one serious drawback which threatened to destroy their efficiency: the horses of the cavalry and artillery and the animals of the transport were so weakened by want of grain and hay that they were altogether unfit for hard work. it was upon the th of april that the army moved forward, seven weeks having elapsed since they started from shikarpore. the march to candahar was long and painful, several passes had to be traversed, food became more and more scarce, and hundreds of animals died daily. beloochee plunderers during the first portion of the journey, and afghan raiders during the second, hung along the line of march, murdering all who straggled, capturing camels, at times even threatening an attack in force. they were able to do this, as our cavalry horses were so broken down that they could scarcely proceed beyond a walk. the candahar princes with a large following came out to give battle; but hajee khan kakur, one of the leading chiefs, had been bribed by our political officers, and deserting, came into our camp with a large body of followers, and this so disheartened the princes, and excited so much fear among them of further treachery, that they withdrew at once to candahar, and a few hours after their arrival there took the northern road. after immense suffering from want of water and food, the army entered the city on the th of april, shah soojah having gone on with hajee kakur and made a formal entry into the town two days previously. angus had had little to do during the march from quettah. the chances of obtaining forage or food at the deserted villages near the line of march were so small that sir john keane decided that it would be useless to endeavour to obtain anything there, especially as an officer leaving the main body had to be accompanied by a strong escort to protect him from the bands of marauders, and it was deemed inadvisable to give the horses any work that could be avoided. angus's own animal, being accustomed to the country, suffered less than those from the plains, and in order to spare it as much as possible, and keep it in such a condition that it would be fit for work were he ordered to make any expedition, he generally walked by its side the greater part of the day, preferring this, indeed, to sitting on horseback and moving at the snail's pace necessitated by the difficulties of the road and the slow progress of the weakened animals of the baggage train. among these the mortality had been terrible, and one writer estimated that no fewer than thirty thousand transport animals died on the road between sukkar and candahar. shah soojah had at first established himself in his camp outside the city, but two days after the arrival of the army he took up his abode at the palace. he was accompanied by his own officials and by macnaghten and burnes and their assistants. "what are you smiling at, campbell?" lieutenant macgregor, who had been his companion and tent-fellow since they left dadur, asked as they rode together into the city. "i am thinking of the difference between my position in this procession, and the fact that i am going to take up my quarters in the palace, and the position i occupied when i was last here--a pretended trader, suspected and watched, and obliged to escape by night." "yes, it is a change, certainly," macgregor said, "and one for the better, though, after what we have gone through and all we may have to go through before we leave this wretched country, i don't think it would be safe to assert that it is less dangerous now than it was then. from the time we left shikarpore till we arrived here three days ago, we have never had a decent meal, we have practically never had enough to eat, we have suffered horribly from thirst, we have never dared to ride a hundred yards beyond the column or camp; we have lived, in fact, dogs' lives--not the life of a respectable dog in england, but of a starving cur in an indian bazaar. we don't know much about the future; i don't suppose we shall suffer from hunger and thirst as we have done, but our dangers of other kinds will certainly not be abated. everything looks smooth enough here. i don't think there is any enthusiasm at all for soojah, but there is no doubt that the princes were hated, and the people heartily glad to be rid of them. i fancy that we shall not have much difficulty in reaching cabul. they say ghuznee is a strong place, but we have taken scores of places in india that the natives considered impregnable. still, considering the way in which these marauding afghans hover round us, i think we shall have a very uncomfortable time of it." as the soldiers were not at first allowed to enter the city, the merchants there speedily established a temporary bazaar outside the walls. here vendors of rose-water, of sherbet, and of a drink concocted of the juice of fruits, took up their stalls. people from the country round brought in loads of lucerne, wheat, barley, wood, and chopped straw. other merchants displayed posteens, pelisses made of sheep-skins, with the wool inside and embroidered outside with blue, red, and yellow thread; fowls, sheep, onions, milk, tobacco, and spices were also on sale, and before long the horse-dealers of herat brought down large numbers of good animals, which were eagerly bought up by officers who had lost their chargers. as soon as the soldiers were allowed to enter the town they poured into it. wheaten cakes, cooked meat, and mulberries tempted their appetite, and a little later plums and apricots were brought in in great profusion. the scenes in the streets were very amusing. the british soldiers and sepoys with their large variety of uniforms mingled with the people of the town and country round. some of these wore long cloaks of chintz or woollen cloth, with large turbans; their hair, beards, and moustaches being allowed to grow very long, and the beards being dyed red. others were closely shaven, and dressed in jackets and trousers of blue linen, and tunics of brown cloth with long hanging sleeves, their heads being protected by skull-caps of various colours. with may the heat, which already had been great, became even more oppressive. water was abundant, but the troops and camp followers were still on short rations of food. the price of grain was enormously high, and there was no chance of the magazines being replenished until the fields were ripe for harvest. it was not until nearly three weeks after possession was taken of the capital that a force was despatched under brigadier sale in pursuit of the princes--a grievous mistake; for shah soojah had entered candahar on the day they left, and as they were greatly encumbered by their baggage train, the ladies of the harems, and a host of camp followers, they might easily have been overtaken; whereas, after their escape, they became the centre of intrigues against the ameer. in june the harvest ripened, large quantities of grain were bought up by the commissariat, and preparations began for the advance to cabul. candahar was quiet and apathetic. so far no signs were visible of any enthusiasm for their new ruler among the people. not only did none of the neighbouring chiefs come in to pay their allegiance, but the shah's orders were everywhere disregarded. marauding bands harassed and sometimes attacked convoys coming up; and even close to the city it was dangerous for the soldiers to move many hundred yards beyond the limits of their camps. the health of the troops was far from good. the plains of candahar, fertile as they are, are unhealthy, as water can be found everywhere six or seven feet below the surface. the native troops suffered comparatively little, but the european soldiers were attacked by dysentery, jaundice, and fever, and large numbers were carried off by these diseases. at the end of june the necessary amount of grain was accumulated by the arrival of a large caravan from mooltan. the army was now to cut itself entirely free from its former lines of supplies, and would have to depend solely, upon the country for food, as the ever-increasing boldness of the beloochees in the bolan pass, and of the afghan marauders between quettah and candahar, had made it impossible for convoys, unless very strongly guarded, to make their way up. the advance began at two o'clock on the morning of the th, and four hours later, after passing through a fertile district, the troops encamped at the village of killa azim. here they obtained barley for their animals, and peasants from other villages brought in an abundance of chopped straw for the camels. at midnight the trumpet sounded, and an hour later the army moved forward again as far as kheil. four days' further march brought them to kelat-i-ghilzye, the chief town of the ghilzye tribes. two or three hundred of their horsemen galloped away as the troops approached. marching ten miles a day, the army followed the valley of the turnak, which afforded an ample supply of water for all their needs. the country was mountainous and desolate, the dreariness being only broken by small villages with their orchards and patches of cultivated ground. grain was brought in in abundance. the force was now far above the plain, the heat ceased to be oppressive even in the middle of the day, and the mornings and evenings were delightfully cool. nevertheless, the number of sick increased, owing to the bad quality of the flour and the absence of vegetables. the country now became more thickly populated, little villages, with the fortified dwellings of their chiefs, being thickly scattered about. the hostile tribesmen followed the march on both flanks, and many skirmishes took place; on one occasion the ghilzye marauders made an attack on the line of march, but were driven off with heavy loss. on the th a nephew of the ameer rode in with fifteen followers. he had gone to ghuznee with his brother to aid in its defence, but suspicions being entertained by mohummed hyder, the governor, of their fidelity, his brother was seized and put to death, and he himself only escaped a similar fate by flight. as they approached ghuznee, sir alexander burnes said to angus: "mr. campbell, i shall be glad if you will resume your afghan costume and ride to-morrow at daybreak with a party of six of hajee khan kakur's men, and ascertain whether the enemy are in strength outside the fortress and intend to oppose our approach. if they do, we shall leave the baggage here under a strong guard and proceed to attack them. if they retire into the fortress, we shall advance as we have been doing, for possibly the siege may last some time, and it would be as well to take our ammunition and stores with us. will you undertake that mission? i do not wish you, of course, to approach the enemy very closely. they will naturally take you for a party coming to join them, and will pay no attention to you. half a mile will be near enough for you to go to the fortress. the disguise is only necessary because they too may have parties out, and should any come suddenly upon you, you would pass without suspicion or question; and indeed should you be stopped, your knowledge of the language is quite good enough to pass in any case. i have requested hajee khan to choose well-mounted men. we shall remain here to-morrow, and the general will send out a troop of cavalry to meet you on your return half-way between this and ghuznee, so that should you be pursued, you will know that you will meet with succour before going many miles. the fortress itself is some twelve miles from this camp." "i will undertake it willingly, sir alexander." accordingly on the following morning angus set out. azim asked leave to accompany him, but he refused. "your horse is not a very fast one," he said. "it is a good beast, but we may have to ride for our lives, and you would soon be left behind. it is not a dangerous expedition, but in a country like this there is always the possibility of a surprise." after riding for two miles the fortress of ghuznee was seen. it was situated on a high rock and surrounded by a wall of great height and strength, and was regarded by the afghans as absolutely impregnable. as they approached, and could make out the strength of the fortifications, it seemed to angus that, except by famine, it would be next to impossible to capture it. the general had left the few heavy cannon he had brought with him at candahar because of the extreme difficulty of getting transport, and the light field-pieces could make but small impression indeed on these massive walls. when he approached within a mile he halted. there were no signs of any afghan force in front of it. it was, of course, possible that they might sally out when they saw the army approaching, but at present there was nothing to show that they meant to do so. he was about to turn, when he was suddenly seized from behind, and in a moment his hands were bound tightly to his side by the sashes of two of his escort. the afghans burst into a shout of triumph. "infidel dog," one said, "did you think because hajee khan kakur is a traitor that all his men are also. you came to see ghuznee. you shall see the inside as well as the outside." angus was brave, but a shudder ran through him as he thought of the fate that awaited him. the afghans never spared those who fell into their hands, and fortunate were those who were speedily killed, for in many cases they were tortured before they were done to death. it had never occurred to him to doubt for a moment the good faith of the men who accompanied him; and yet, now he thought over it, such a possibility should have been foreseen, since there was no reason why the men should be traitors to their race, although for the moment they had obeyed their commander's orders and ridden with him into the british camp. they might even have remained faithful to him had not this opportunity of rejoining their countrymen presented itself. even in the midst of his own deadly peril he was glad to think that, by his refusal to allow azim to accompany him, he had saved him from the fate that awaited himself. he knew well that no entreaties would avail to soften the heart of the afghan commander, and determined that, whatever came, he would maintain a firm countenance and meet his fate bravely. the gate of the fortress stood open. the men as they entered said a few words to the guards stationed there. "we were forced," they said, "to accompany the traitor hajee khan kakur to the camp of the infidel, but we have taken the first opportunity to desert, and have brought with us this man, who is one of their officers, as a prisoner." "why trouble to bring him as a prisoner?" "we thought that mohummed hyder would like to question him, and are bringing him here to show that we are true men." climbing a steep road, they entered a great courtyard. here they dismounted, and their leader, a sub-officer, went forward to the governor's house, followed by two others, between whom angus walked. the leader entered, the others remained outside until he returned. "follow me with the captive," he said, "mohummed hyder will speak to him." a minute later angus stood before the governor. he was seated on a divan, and several other chiefs of importance were standing or sitting round. "they tell me," the governor said, "that you can speak our tongue?" "i can do so," angus said quietly. "where did you learn it?" "in herat, where i fought during the siege, against the persians." "and now you come hither as a spy?" "not as a spy. i came here only to view the fortress from a distance." "is it true that the kafirs are bringing no big guns with them?" as the governor was doubtless well informed as to the strength of the british army and the number of its guns, angus felt that there could be no harm in answering the question. "they are not," he said. "how do they intend to take ghuznee? will they fly over the walls or burrow through the rock?" the governor said scoffingly. "are they madmen, who think they can tear down the walls of ghuznee with their finger-nails?" "i know nothing of the plans of the general," angus replied. "but the british have taken many strong places in india when it seemed that it could not be done." "they will not take ghuznee. when the first shot is fired at its walls we will throw over to them your head and your limbs, to show that we despise them and mock their foolish effort. take him away, yakoob. do you see him safely bestowed." angus was led to a cell in one of the turrets on the wall. his weapons had been taken from him when he was first captured, and when he reached the prison his arms were unbound by the leader of the band, who carried off the sashes to the men to whom they belonged. a massive door was closed behind them, and angus heard two heavy bolts shot--a proof that the tower was often used as a prison. listening, he heard another door at the foot of the turret closed and bolted. the window was a mere loophole, but it commanded a view of the road by which he had been brought up. the cell was circular in shape, and some ten feet in diameter; it was absolutely bare. angus stood for some little time looking through the loophole. it was three feet wide on the inner side, but narrowed to six inches at the outlet; the wall was more than two feet thick, and of solid stone. "it is evident that there is no possibility of escape," he said aloud as he turned away from the loophole. "even if i could widen the hole so to be able to creep through, there is a fall of a hundred feet or so; and there is nothing of which a rope could be made. i have my knife," he said, "fortunately they did not think of looking in my pockets; but though it has a good long blade, and i might at the end sell my life as dearly as possible, and force them to kill me, it can be of no earthly use here, for there is nothing to cut except that rough plank in the corner, which was, i suppose, brought up for some purpose or other and forgotten." the day passed slowly. no one came near him until, just as the sun was setting, two soldiers came in bringing a jug of water and some bread. angus had little sleep that night. he dozed off occasionally, but the hardness of the stone floor and the cold speedily roused him, and he was glad indeed when daylight returned and the sun shone out. an hour later, when looking from his prison window, he perceived a party of horsemen. long before he could distinguish their figures he made sure that they were british troops, from the fact that two or three rode ahead, and the rest, evidently an escort, in a close body behind them. they approached within musket-shot. as soon as they did so a fire of matchlocks broke out from the walls. they drew off a little, and then turned and rode off. there was no doubt that they were a reconnoitring party, who had ridden forward to ascertain the best spot for an attack. two hours later three regiments of infantry came up, followed by a battery. the object of their approach was to discover whether ghuznee was held in force, for reports had reached the camp that the greater portion of the garrison had retired. it answered its purpose, for the guns of the fortress opened fire, and for an hour there was an exchange of shot between them and the battery. the object of the reconnaissance being fulfilled, the british returned to their camp. not until five o'clock was any further movement perceptible; then angus saw a long dark line ascending the pass. on reaching its head the column made a wide detour, so as to keep beyond the range of the guns of the fortress, and then entered a rocky and difficult country to the east. as he knew that the gates had all been walled up with masonry with the exception of that through which the road from cabul entered it, he had no doubt that it was intended to encamp on that side, thus cutting off the fortress from relief by the army assembled under another of the ameer's sons, and at the same time preventing the flight of the garrison. as long as it was light the column was still passing on--a long line of baggage waggons and native followers, guarded by bodies of troops against any sortie that might be made. during the night occasional shots were fired from the fortress, and at various points of the plain and on the surrounding hills fires raised gave indications of gatherings of tribesmen. it had indeed been a painful and difficult march. several streams and water-courses swollen by rain had to be crossed, but with enormous exertions the whole force was established, and on the following morning tents were erected along the position chosen. sir john keane, accompanied by general cotton, ascended the heights, took a survey of the fortress, and decided upon the plan of attack. at two o'clock in the afternoon a body of afghan horse suddenly attacked the camp in the rear, but were beaten off by our own cavalry. angus heard the outburst of firing, and concluded that the governor would ere long carry out his threat. he had no idea what the commander-in-chief's plan was, but he felt certain that the attack when made would be sudden and sharp, and would be in the nature of a surprise, for in no other way did it seem possible that a force, however strong, could without artillery capture the place. in that case there was just a possibility that in the excitement of the moment his existence would be forgotten. "at any rate," he said to himself, "i will do what i can to defer the moment of my execution. i don't suppose it will be of the smallest use, but as i have nothing else to do, i will cut some wedges, and as soon as the attack begins in earnest i will jam them in round the door." for the rest of the day he occupied himself in cutting strips of wood off the plank and fashioning wedges, of which he made about four dozen, the work sufficing to keep his thoughts from dwelling upon his probable fate. he concealed all these in his clothes; then he cut off a stout piece of plank and fashioned it into the form of a short thick bat, with which to drive the wedges into their place. then he laid the plank in its place again, with the freshly-cut side against the wall, swept up the chips, and threw them out of the loophole. he thought it probable that sir john keane would attack without any delay, as it was all-important to capture the citadel before the relieving army from cabul and the forces of three or four great chiefs which were also in the neighbourhood could join hands and attack him in the rear, while the powerful garrison sallied out and fell upon him in front. chapter ix just in time the plan of the british general for the capture of ghuznee was a bold one. he knew that his little guns could make no impression upon the walls, and that it would take weeks before it would be possible to effect a breach. his idea was to blow in the gate and to pour his troops in through the opening. his plans were admirably laid. at midnight six companies of infantry established themselves in the gardens to the right and left of the spot where the assaulting column were to take up their position, ready to advance as soon as the gate was blown in. two hours later three companies of a native regiment made a detour and took up a position to the north of the fortress. the field artillery took up their post on a height. at three o'clock in the morning the infantry on the north opened a musketry fire. at the same moment the artillery on the hills began a brisk cannonade, while a camel battery directed its fire against the walls. the guns of the fortress at once replied, and the walls were fringed with the musketry fire. it was still an hour to daylight when captain thompson, of the royal engineers, with a party of his men, crept forward to the gate, carrying with them nine hundred pounds of gunpowder in twelve sacks. the movement was altogether unobserved by the garrison, who had been taken completely by surprise by the sudden fire. the night had been exceptionally favourable for the attempt. the wind blew so strongly that the tramp of the columns and the sound of the wheels of the guns failed to reach the ears of the sentries on the walls. when the fire broke out the afghans at once burned numbers of blue lights to endeavour to obtain a clear view of the attacking force; but the light failed to pierce the darkness, and the fireworks burned but fitfully owing to the force of the gale. they therefore distributed themselves along the whole circuit of walls instead of concentrating upon the point where the attack was about to take place. the engineers had done their work admirably. they crept silently along the causeway which afforded a passage across the moat, and then up the steep ascent which led to the gate, unnoticed by those who manned the loopholes. two minutes sufficed to place the sacks in position. the fuse was then fired, and the party ran back to such cover as they could find. at this moment the afghans lit a large and brilliant blue light immediately over the gate, but before they could obtain any idea of what was passing below the explosion took place. the gate was blown to pieces, and masses of masonry and fractured beams fell into the passage beyond. then a bugle was sounded by the engineers, and the storming party rushed down and crept into the dark, blocked-up passage. here they were fiercely opposed. the afghans had rallied almost instantly from their first surprise, and rushed down to defend the passage. a desperate struggle took place in the dark, but british valour was triumphant, and the four companies of the nd and th regiments fought their way into the interior of the fortress. had they been at once supported by the column behind them, commanded by brigadier-general sale, the capture of ghuznee would have been comparatively bloodless; but as he was advancing he met one of the engineer officers, who had been terribly bruised and injured by the explosion. upon being questioned, the latter said that the gate had been blown in, but that the passage was blocked with the ruins. as in that case it would have been madness to advance, the general ordered the retreat to be sounded. the call was heard by the leading companies, but not obeyed. instead of the troops retreating, they halted irresolutely, rather than carry out an order the most unwelcome that can be given to british soldiers. fortunately another engineer officer soon came along and assured the brigadier that, although the passage was greatly blocked, the storming party had made their way through; whereupon the column at once rushed forward. the delay, however, had given the garrison time to rally, and large numbers had run down from the wall to take part in the fight. many, however, despairing of successful resistance now that their assailants had won their way into the town, allowed the storming party to pass and then attempted to escape through the gateway. but as they did so, general sale with the head of his column arrived, and another desperate fight took place among the ruins of the gate. the general himself was cut down, and his assailant endeavoured to complete his work. sale succeeded in grasping his sword hand, but, weakened by his wound, must have been overpowered had not an officer run up and severely wounded the afghan. the struggle continued, but the general managed to gain his feet and cut down his assailant. the column was a long time in passing over the heap of ruins, now further encumbered by wounded and dead. as soon as they had entered, the reserve, who had been suffering from the fire of the afghans still on the walls, followed them, and while general sale's division ascended the steep path that led to the citadel, which rose far above the rest of the fortress, the reserve began the work of clearing out the afghans from the houses. large numbers of afghans had taken refuge here as the troops entered, and these, rushing out, flung themselves upon the troops with the fury of despair. many of these who had first entered, exhausted by their exertions, were with the wounded sitting in the courtyard at the foot of the citadel. upon these the fanatics rushed, cutting and slashing with their keen tulwars alike at the soldiers who started to their feet, the wounded on the ground, and their own horses, who, mad with terror, were galloping wildly over the courtyard. a series of desperate hand-to-hand conflicts were waged until the last of the afghans were shot or bayoneted. the walls were cleared with little difficulty, but many soldiers were shot as they passed through the narrow streets of the native town. all resistance ceased at a quarter past five. thus in two hours and a quarter after the first shot was fired, a fortress deemed impregnable and garrisoned by three thousand five hundred men was captured. ghuznee had been provisioned for six months, and so certain was mohummed hyder of the ability of the place to hold out that he had brought with him all the ladies of his zenana. in spite of the desperate nature of the fighting, not one of the afghans who surrendered was injured, nor was the slightest insult offered to the ladies of the zenana or the women in the native town. the troops who had ascended to the citadel found the gates open, the afghan prince having lost all hope as soon as he found the lower fortress in possession of the british. he was found hiding in disguise, and was brought before shah soojah. the latter magnanimously said to him: "what has been has been; you have deserved evil at my hands, but you have this day behaved like a brave man. i forgive thee the past; go in peace." the young prince was then handed over to sir alexander burnes for safe custody. the success had been cheaply purchased. only seventeen non-commissioned officers and privates had been killed, and eighteen officers and a hundred and forty-seven men wounded. of the afghans, five hundred and fourteen bodies were buried next day; more than a hundred fugitives were killed outside the walls; upwards of a thousand horses, a great number of camels and mules, vast quantities of provisions, ammunition, and arms fell into the hands of the conquerors, together with more than fifteen hundred prisoners. over a thousand made their escape. at the first outburst of firing angus had sprung to his feet; as the fight increased in fury he was certain that a night attack was in progress, and he at once proceeded to drive in the wedges he had prepared. just as he had completed this he heard the dull roar of the explosion, followed by loud and excited shouts, but the noise of the gale prevented him from catching the words. he had no doubt, however, that either the gate had been blown in or that a mine had been driven into the wall, and that the explosion of an immense charge of powder had effected a breach. then came the sound of a heavy and continuous rattle of musketry. the cannon of the fortress opened fire, while those of the besiegers answered. by the occasional fall of masses of masonry, and the screams of women, he had no doubt that the british artillery were now directing their fire against the citadel, in order to add to the confusion among the defenders of the fortress. [illustration: he took down the prop, and thrust it suddenly with all his force through the hole.] presently he heard a rush of feet up the staircase, then the bolts of the door were pulled back, and a yell of rage and surprise arose as the door did not yield to the push against it. the staircase was a very narrow one, and but one person could mount at a time. as it terminated at the door, one man only could use his strength against it, and angus felt perfectly sure that it would need a much greater pressure than this to force it open. he had already propped the plank against it, and stood with his foot at the lower end to prevent it from slipping. the man next to the door, finding that it did not yield, began to hammer with the hilt of his sword, but soon desisted, finding that his blows did not even shake it. there was a confused sound of talking, and then silence for a few minutes; then there was a renewed noise, and a heavy blow was struck at the door. evidently a large block of wood had been brought up; but this did not greatly alarm angus. the staircase was a circular one, and at most but two men could work the battering-ram, which on account of the confined space was necessarily short. this proving unsuccessful, there was again silence. after an interval came blows of a sharper sound, an axe of some sort was being used. during the lulls of the wind the sounds of the struggle below could be plainly heard, and as it was now dawn angus could have seen what was going on had not the loophole been on the opposite side, but from the sharpness of the sound he had no doubt that the firing was in the courtyard, and that his countrymen had effected an entrance. the chopping went on regularly. the door was thick and strong, and it was half an hour before the edge of the axe first showed through it; another five minutes and a hole a foot wide appeared some four feet from the ground. at this rate it would be some time before an opening large enough for a man to pass through could be made. he took down the prop, and thrust it suddenly with all his force through the hole, striking the man who was wielding the axe full in the face. there was a terrible cry, mingled with yells of rage from the others. presently a pistol was thrust through the hole and fired; he had expected this, and had stood back. again and again shots were fired. it was evident that there was an unwillingness on the part of his assailants to try the axe again. presently he heard a shout from below. the words came up distinctly, "mohummed hyder's orders are that the attack is to cease," and angus felt that he was saved. the prince, indeed, seeing that all was lost, had sent an officer in great haste to put a stop to the attack on his prisoner's cell. he no longer thought of carrying out his former intentions. the british army was not after all an impotent enemy to be insulted, but a victorious one to be appeased, and as soon as he was informed of the attack on his prisoner's cell he had sent off to put a stop to it. it had not been made by his orders, but was the act of the soldiers on the wall near it, who, seeing that the british had entered, had determined to take vengeance upon the captive. a few minutes later angus heard the triumphant cheers of the troops as they poured in through the open gate of the citadel. it was another hour before the contest in the courtyard below and on the walls of the fortress came to an end. shortly afterwards he heard steps approaching, and through the hole in the door saw a british officer coming up the stair; behind him was azim. "i am glad indeed to see you, campbell," the officer said, as he caught sight of his face. "we had all given you up as dead when we found that none of your escort came back; but your boy, on questioning the prisoners, found out that you were confined here, and came at once to tell me. i see by the state of the door that you have been standing a siege. are you uninjured?" "yes, my rascally troops seized me suddenly and brought me here. i will tell you about it as soon as i have unfastened the door." "it is the first time i ever heard of a prison door having bolts on the inside." "they are not bolts, as you will see directly." it took some minutes to get all the wedges out. macgregor then entered and shook angus warmly by the hand, while azim threw himself on his knees, and seizing his master's hand kissed it again and again, tears of joy streaming down his cheeks. "where in the world did you get these wedges?" macgregor asked. "i cut them out of this plank. it took me all day yesterday to make them and this mallet. how the plank came here i don't know, but it certainly saved my life." "that and your wits, campbell. it was a capital idea, first-rate. i see there is blood on the staircase." "the plank came in useful again. i used it as a battering-ram on the fellow who was chopping, and as i caught him full in the face, the blood is accounted for. as you see by the opposite wall, they fired a few shots through the hole afterwards, but of course i took good care to be out of the line of fire." "well, come along. sir alexander has been asking about you, but could get no information, and it might have been some time before you were set free had it not been for your boy." on going down into the body of the citadel, angus was most warmly greeted by sir alexander burnes and the other officers who knew him, for all supposed that he had been murdered. he explained to his chief why his life had been spared. "you had a narrow escape indeed," the latter said, "for i have no doubt whatever that the afghan would have carried out his threat had we attacked in a regular way. it is quite in accordance with their barbarous customs. but i certainly wonder that they did not kill you when we entered the fortress." macgregor then told the manner in which angus had converted his little cell into a fort, and had resisted successfully the attacks made upon it. "a very narrow escape indeed, mr. campbell," sir alexander burnes said. "it was fortunate indeed that that piece of wood had been left in the cell; but the idea of cutting wedges from it and fastening the door would not have occurred to everyone. it was a most happy thought, and certainly was the means of saving your life. it was a treacherous business indeed of hajee khan kakur, for i have no doubt that he was the concocter of the plot. he has given us the strongest grounds for suspicion ever since we left candahar, and has continually been making excuses for lagging behind. we have strong reason for believing that if we had failed here, he would at once have turned against us." "i do not think he knew of this, sir. when i was seized, the trooper said. 'do you think that because our chief is a traitor we are traitors too?'" "these fellows are very crafty, mr. campbell, and hajee has a special reputation that way, having before now turned traitor in spite of promises and vows. he may very well have instructed one of his men to say this, in order that if, contrary to all probability, you ever rejoined the army, he himself might be shielded by your repeating this speech. we have never put any trust in him since he joined us, though of course it was politic to seem to do so, as other chiefs might follow his example. he was questioned very sharply as to the orders he had given his men when you did not return that afternoon. of course he swore by the prophet that he had chosen men in whom he had the greatest confidence, which was, i have no doubt, true. however, as it was possible that you and they might have fallen into an ambush, the matter was dropped for the time. but our suspicions gained ground when, as we came up here, no signs of a fight were discovered, no bodies either of men or horses, and i intended to reopen the matter as soon as things were a little settled down. well, i can assure you i am heartily glad to see you back again safe and sound, and i shall not fail to report the matter to sir john keane, and tell him how cleverly you escaped the fate intended for you." the army remained for a week at ghuznee while preparations were being made for converting the fortress into a base from which further operations could be carried on. it was thought well to pause, so that the full effects of the disaster might be felt throughout the country before the advance began again. the fall of ghuznee had indeed entirely disarranged the plan of campaign that had been decided upon by dost mahomed. the fortress had been provisioned for six months, and it was confidently believed that it could resist all attacks for that time. with the approach of winter, the position of a besieging army would be desperate. the cold would be intense, they would be surrounded on all sides by swarms of fierce tribesmen, would be unable to obtain provisions in the country round, and must either retire through the passes they had ascended, to candahar, or be forced by famine to surrender. in the former case, the disaster that afterwards occurred in endeavouring to retire from cabul would probably have befallen them. this plan was entirely brought to naught by the fall of ghuznee, and six days later the brother of dost mahomed arrived in camp with an offer from the ameer to surrender the government to shah soojah, on condition that he himself should, as the head of the barukzyes, fill the hereditary office of wuzeer, or prime minister. as this would have placed the whole power of the state in his hands, the offer was refused, and on the st of july the army resumed its march. after three days' march, they learned that the kuzzilbashes had mutinied. this body of troops were of persian descent, and had for very many years formed an important part of the military power of cabul, and held a position similar to that of the janizaries of constantinople and the mamelukes of egypt. under but very slight control, they were constantly causing trouble by their insolence and exactions, and they now showed that they entertained no feeling either of loyalty or gratitude towards the dynasty which they served. in spite of the exhortations of the ameer, they insisted upon his granting them a discharge from his service, and as it was evident that the news from ghuznee had so much dispirited the whole army that no reliance whatever could be placed on their fidelity, the unfortunate monarch was obliged to allow the kuzzilbashes to disband, and the rest of the army to disperse, and to take to the mountains as a fugitive, accompanied only by a small party of personal followers. a force was at once sent in pursuit of him; but as the following of the traitor, hajee khan, formed the principal part of this force, the double-faced chief, who desired to make himself safe whatever turn affairs might take, so contrived that dost mahomed and his party were not overtaken. in the meantime the main force marched forward to cabul wholly unopposed. twenty-two guns were found abandoned at the spot where the ameer's army had dispersed. these, placed in a strong defile, and supported by a large force of tribesmen, might have long resisted our advance had the kuzzilbashes and other afghan horsemen swept round on our rear, and although british valour might have finally succeeded, it could only have been after a terrible struggle. but now the ameer was a fugitive, the guns were in our hands, the kuzzilbashes and native tribesmen had come in to salute their new ruler, and nothing remained but to enter the capital in triumph. the entry took place on the th of august. the ceremony was an imposing one. shah soojah, after an exile of thirty years, rode at the head of the cortege, on a white charger with golden trappings. he wore a jewelled coronet, his arms and garments were ornamented with precious stones, and his waist encircled with a broad girdle of gold encrusted with rubies and emeralds. accompanying him were the commander-in-chief, and mr. macnaghten and sir alexander burnes, who were in full diplomatic dress. two of the shah's sons and a few of the principal chiefs rode behind him with a number of staff officers in full uniform. following him came the army that had performed so long and difficult a march to place him on his throne. the surrounding country traversed was rich and fertile in the extreme, and almost covered with orchards of peaches and other fruits; under these crops of all sorts grew luxuriantly. on the eminences commanding the plain immense numbers of tribesmen assembled to witness the martial display. on entering the city, the victors found the inhabitants clustered in the streets through which they passed to the royal residence in the bala hissar, a great citadel situated on a hill commanding the town, and so strongly fortified that it would have been difficult to capture it unless by the aid of a regular siege train. the aspect of the inhabitants was perfectly peaceful; there were no shouts or exclamations of enthusiasm, but it was evident from the expression of satisfaction on their faces that the majority were well satisfied with the termination of the rule of the barukzyes, whose exactions had pressed heavily upon them. dost mahomed himself was popular. he was affable and kindly in disposition; his decisions on all matters brought before him were just and fair; he was accessible to all having complaints to bring before him; and had he possessed a body of trustworthy infantry to overawe the marauding kuzzilbashes and the semi-independent chiefs, there can be no doubt that his rule would have been a wise and beneficial one. shah soojah was the reverse of his rival. haughty and arrogant, he regarded and treated with contempt his new subjects, seldom granted audience, or troubled himself in any way with their affairs, rarely went abroad, and remained in almost constant seclusion in his palace. the shops of cabul excited the admiration of the officers and men of the british force. probably nowhere else in the world could such a display of fruit have been collected. here were piles of peaches equal to the finest product of english hothouses, grapes of five varieties, rosy apples, juicy pears, several delicious kinds of melons, almonds, pistachio nuts, walnuts, quinces, cherries, and red and white mulberries, and vegetables of all kinds. the butchers' shops were cleanly and well arranged; there were public ovens, in which loaves, and the cakes of which the afghans are extremely fond, were baking when the force entered. in the potters' shops were jars and drinking vessels of all kinds; afghan, persian, and russian cloths, cloaks, furs of many kinds, sets of china and dresden porcelain in the shops of the wealthier traders; and behind these open shops were inner apartments with very fine and costly shawls, silks, precious stones, valuable carpets, and tea imported by way of bokhara. conspicuous were the shops of manufacturers of swords and daggers, and makers of scabbards and belts, shields and chain armour, and even of bookbinders, who manufactured covers for manuscript copies of persian poems and stories. unfortunately for the moral of the army, there were also manufactories of spirits. since leaving candahar no spirit rations had been served out, and the troops had greatly benefited in health during their arduous work by the privation, but the power to purchase vile spirits at a very low price now tempted many into drinking to intoxication, and lowered at once their health and discipline. mr. macnaghten and his staff had a fine building in the bala hissar allotted to them. sir alexander burnes with his assistants occupied a house in the city. the position of burnes was an unsatisfactory one. he had a right to expect that after his previous residence in cabul he would be appointed british resident there, and he had only accepted a secondary position upon the understanding that macnaghten's appointment was a temporary one. he had on the way up rendered much valuable assistance, but he had no strictly defined duties. his opinion was seldom asked, and if given, was wholly disregarded. for this he was himself somewhat to blame. his temperament was a changeable one. at times he was full of enthusiasm and saw everything in the rosiest light; at other times he was depressed and despondent, and came to be regarded as a prophet of evil. having no serious work to occupy his mind, he worried over trifles, exaggerated the importance of the bazaar rumours, and was often filled with the gloomiest anticipations. the war had been undertaken altogether in opposition to his advice. he had been most favourably impressed with dost mahomed, and his remonstrances against the attempt to force shah soojah on the afghans had been so strong and persistent, that the home government, in defending themselves from the public indignation excited by subsequent disaster, even went the length of suppressing some of his despatches and garbling others, after he was no longer alive to proclaim the falsification. once at cabul, his opportunities for doing useful service came to an end. macnaghten, who was always sanguine to an extent that, in the light of subsequent events, seemed to border on insanity, was all-powerful with the new ameer. the expression of any opinion which ran counter to his own was in the highest degree distasteful to him, and it was only in negotiations for the supply of the troops, and with the petty chiefs, that burnes and his staff found any employment. although pushtoo was the language of the country-people who came in with goods, the inhabitants of cabul almost universally spoke persian, and angus campbell and azim found themselves quite at home among them. on the rd of september, a force under colonel wade, which had advanced through the khyber pass, arrived at cabul. it was a mixed body composed principally of pathans and sikhs. it had met with comparatively small resistance, but had rendered valuable service, as a large force had been detached from dost mahomed's army to oppose its advance, and thus greatly weakened the army with which the ameer had intended to meet the british advance from candahar. the afghan force had been recalled in haste after the news of the fall of ghuznee, but had not arrived until after the disbandment of the ameer's army and his flight to the bamian pass, when it had also broken up, and wade was therefore able to reach cabul without opposition. it was now necessary to decide what should be done with the army of occupation. macnaghten was pressing by a constant succession of letters that large reinforcements should be sent up in order to win back for shah soojah the territories that had once formed part of the afghan empire. he urged that in order to check russian aggression an army should not only occupy herat, but should extend its operations until it became paramount at bokhara; while, on the other hand, peshawur and the territory wrested from afghanistan by the sikhs should be reconquered, and the sikh nation, which was becoming more and more hostile to us, should be brought into subjection. but fortunately lord auckland, now freed from the pernicious influence of macnaghten and surrounded by discreet counsellors, was by no means disposed to turn a favourable ear to these fantastic projects. the cost of the army of occupation was a heavy drain on the revenue of india, and so far from any assistance being rendered by afghanistan, shah soojah was constantly clamouring for subsidies to enable him to maintain his position. the absence of so many troops was also much felt in india, for they were greatly needed on the frontiers of the beloochees as well as those of the sikhs. macnaghten had so persistently asserted that shah soojah was personally popular with the afghans, that it was decided that only a comparatively small force was needed to uphold his authority in case dost mahomed should make an effort to recover his throne, and orders were given that the greater portion of the bombay army should march down through the kojuk and bolan passes, and most of the bengal troops through the khyber, leaving some six regiments, with a proportion of artillery, at cabul, with garrisons at ghuznee, candahar, quettah, and jellalabad. macnaghten in vain remonstrated and entreated. it was settled that the movement should begin at the end of september, so that the troops could regain the plains before winter set in in earnest. september passed quietly. the climate at this time was perfect, and the troops enjoyed the rest, with the abundance of fruit and vegetables. there were reviews and races. shah soojah established an order of knighthood, and held a grand durbar, at which the principal officers were invested, with great ceremony, with the insignia of the new order. on the th of the month the bombay column started on its march, but news having been brought down from the force that had occupied the bamian pass, that dost mahomed was collecting a formidable army, the authorities were induced to maintain a great portion of the bengal force round cabul. great difficulties arose with reference to provisioning these troops through the winter. there was abundant accommodation for them in the bala hissar and its citadel, but shah soojah strongly objected to the presence of a large body of troops there. macnaghten, with his usual weakness, gave way. on the th of october sir john keane, with that portion of the bengal force that was to return, set out. the ameer left two days later, to spend the winter in the more genial climate of jellalabad, and macnaghten accompanied him. sanguine as he was, he could not help feeling uneasy at the situation. the british occupation had greatly benefited the merchants and traders, the farmers and cultivators of cabul, but it had seriously injured the poorer portion of the community. the natural result of so large an army, well supplied with money, being stationed in the city, was to raise the price of all articles of consumption prodigiously, and to cause wide-spread discontent. the exactions of the native tax-collectors pressed heavily upon all the tribesmen. the british officers, by the terms of the treaty with shah soojah, were unable to interfere in any way with the internal affairs of the country; but when the natives revolted against the unjust exactions it was they who were called upon to suppress them, consequently the infidel supporters of the ameer became more and more hated by the people, and it was soon dangerous for them to go beyond the limits of their camps. the ameer himself resented the state of subjection in which he considered that he was held, though he could not dispense with british bayonets and british money. macnaghten left behind him experienced administrators. burnes, conolly, leech, todd, and lord had all long acquaintance with the country, and if anyone could, under such circumstances, have reconciled the country to foreign occupation, they would have done so. chapter x a mission "i wish that we had trustworthy news of what dost mahomed is doing," sir alexander burnes said one morning when he and his assistants were talking over the work for the day. "of course one hears from the hindoo merchants what rumours are circulating, but these are so contradictory that they are not to be relied upon. one day it is said that dost has retired to bokhara, another that he has already gathered a formidable force. it is certain that if he does not recross the bamian soon he will not give us any trouble till the spring, for i doubt whether even the afghans, hardy as they are, could traverse the passes when winter has fairly set in. still, it would be very useful to us to obtain some sort of inkling as to what his movements and intentions are. he may intend to make a bold stroke to recover his kingdom, he may wait until there is a popular rising here. in the first case, our force here must be maintained at the present strength, and it would be well to warn lord auckland as soon as possible that next spring its strength must be increased rather than diminished. if, on the other hand, dost depends upon a rising here rather than upon any force he may himself gather, there will be no occasion for more troops than we have, for these should suffice to crush any tribal rising." "i should be happy to undertake the mission if you would confide it to me, sir," angus said. "i travelled as a persian without exciting suspicion, and i can do the same again. i might obtain a couple of horse-loads of indian silk and cashmere goods, and travel as a persian trader who has been settled here, but who, fearing that fresh disturbances might occur, had decided to make a trip himself to bokhara with a view of establishing himself there. i see all trade is at present at a stand-still, as the northern traders dare not venture down here. the fact that i can also speak pushtoo will, of course, be an advantage, and would seem to show that i had, as i gave out, resided here for some time." "it would be a dangerous enterprise, mr. campbell." "there would be a certain amount of danger in it, sir, but not, it seems to me, excessive--not more than i met in my journey from herat. there is danger, as you have frequently said, even here; and at any rate, i am ready to take all risks if you think that the mission would be of utility." "that it would certainly be, and i admit that no one would be more likely to carry it to a successful conclusion, but i fear that it would be impossible for you to return before the spring." "i do not think that i could return across the mountains, but i might dispose of my goods to the turkomans. from what we hear, dost mahomed is either at balkh or kunduz, or possibly tashkurgan, half-way between them. balkh would, of course, be more convenient, for it is but a couple of days' journey to kilif, on the other side of the oxus. there i might dispose of my goods, and buy carpets and shawls of bokhara; and then travel across the plains to herat; thence, by the trade route, to candahar; and so back through ghuznee. that would, of course, be a long journey, but there would be no very lofty passes to traverse. i need hardly say that i should not enter herat, as i might be recognized there; but there would be no fear of recognition elsewhere. as my servant is really a persian, and has also picked up pushtoo, he would greatly aid me in preserving my disguise. at any rate, i would rather be doing something than remaining here idle through the winter." "then i accept your offer, mr. campbell. the information you would give as to the feeling of the people on the other side of the mountains would be invaluable. i will myself question one or two of the hindoo merchants as to the goods that are generally sent to bokhara. i know, of course, that the bulk of that trade with india is carried on through candahar and herat, but it would be natural that a trader residing here and wishing to leave should prefer the direct route, however toilsome it might be. i should say easy loads for three animals would be sufficient, and as the merchandise would be of light materials, a considerable value could be carried by three horses. you will need a fourth for a small stock of provisions, for you will have to depend on yourselves until you are on the other side of the passes. you will require two men to look after the four horses. i will obtain two soldiers from one of the pathan regiments. it would be dangerous for you to hire a man in the city; i will get a couple of men of approved fidelity. they will, of course, be in native dress, and will pass as peasants hired for the journey by you. four of you, well armed, should be able to give a good account of yourselves if you should fall in with any small party of freebooters, though that is more likely to happen on your return journey than on your way across the hills." "thank you, sir." "well, to-day is monday; it will take two or three days to make all the preparations and get the sort of men you require. would you be ready to start on thursday?" "certainly, sir. as far as i and my man are concerned, we should be ready to start at a moment's notice, as there will be no difficulty in buying the clothes we require." "very well, then, it shall be settled for thursday. i know i need not tell you to warn your servant to maintain absolute secrecy as to the fact that you are leaving the town." azim was greatly pleased when angus told him of the intended expedition, for, having few duties to perform, he had found the time hang heavily on his hands, and was glad to hear that he was not to spend the long winter at cabul. he purchased in the bazaars all the garments for his master and himself--high boots lined with fur, and cloaks of thick cloth similarly lined, and afghan hats of black lamb's wool. [illustration: there, lying close under a rock, was a young afghan.] on wednesday evening sir alexander burnes said to angus: "it is just as well that you did not make your start this morning, for there has been a sharp skirmish on the road ten miles off between a squadron of our cavalry and a party of afghan horse. i hear the fellows fought well, but were driven off with considerable loss. i have seen the two men who have been selected to accompany you, they have both been some time in our service. their colonel spoke highly to me of them. i explained to them the nature of the duty on which they were going, and gave them the option of declining it, but said that if they carried it through successfully they would on their return receive a present of six months' pay and would at once be promoted. they accepted without hesitation, and i feel certain that you can rely upon them. they were recruited from the border tribes, which have ever held themselves independent of the afghan factions, and have no sympathy whatever either with the kuzzilbashes or soojah himself, and care not a snap who rules over afghanistan. if questioned, their story will be that they came up as camp followers with colonel wade's force, and that on arriving at cabul their work with the army was at an end, and they took service with the persian trader. all the goods and packs have been marked in persian characters, with the prices they would fetch in persia, and those at which they would probably sell at bokhara; so that you will know how to carry on your trading without exciting suspicion either by asking too little or by demanding an unusual price. each man will lead two horses, and i have provided rough ponies for them to ride. i think you will find that no detail has been neglected. i have had a thousand rupees sewn up in the saddle of your horse. i sent for one of the cavalry saddlers, and your man showed him which was your saddle. another five hundred are sewn in the saddle of your servant in case of mishap. here is a letter to lieutenant mackenzie, who commands the troop of horse artillery which is at bamian with the ameer's ghoorka regiment. you may be questioned there, so without giving him any details i have simply requested him to allow the bearer and his party to pass on without question or interference." the start was not made from the house of sir alexander burnes, but from that of the hindoo merchant from whom goods had been purchased. as there was nothing unusual in a trader starting with some horse-loads of merchandise, no attention was attracted, and the party crossed the plain four miles farther up, and skirted the foot of the mountains until they reached the gorge through which the track--for it could not be called a road--led over the mountains to bamian. they had decided to camp here, but they found that it was the scene of the previous day's combat. dead horses and men were scattered about, and it was evident that the afghans had been lying in ambush here, aware that at times parties of our cavalry rode some distance up the pass. they determined to go half a mile farther up the gorge, as there was no danger of disturbance by the afghans, who, after their defeat on the previous day, were not likely to be in the neighbourhood. after proceeding a quarter of a mile angus, who was riding ahead, suddenly stopped his horse, hearing a deep groan. as the ground was strewn with rocks on either side of the track, he concluded at once that some poor fellow had crawled away to die, unnoticed by our cavalry returning from pursuit. knowing what tortures he must be suffering from thirst he dismounted, and filling a pannikin from one of the skins, he bade azim bring some fruit, and then made his way to the spot from which the sound proceeded. there, lying close under a rock, was a young afghan, whose clothes showed that he was a chief of some rank. his eyes were closed, his face pallid and drawn, his lips black and cracked with thirst. angus knelt beside him, and poured a few drops of water between his lips. this he repeated again and again. the wounded man opened his eyes with a deep exclamation of thankfulness. then his face darkened, and he said: "you meant kindly, good friend, but you have done me a cruel service. the worst had passed; i had sunk into unconsciousness, and should have passed into paradise without more pain." "where are you wounded?" angus asked. "perhaps we can do something for you." the afghan slightly shook his head. "nothing can be done for me," he said. "i have a musket-ball in my shoulder, and my right leg is broken above the knee." "at any rate we can make you comfortable. we were going to camp a short way ahead, but we will now do so here." "may allah bless you, but it would be better to leave me to die at once." "that i cannot do. now, have a good drink of water, and then i will cut a melon into pieces for you to suck while we are preparing our camp." the horses' loads were removed and the animals turned loose to graze on the grass growing among the rocks. then the tent was erected and the afghan carried into the shade of a high rock close by. by this time he was able to speak more strongly, and said: "you are persian, i see, by your dress. how comes it that you have entered this lonely gorge with your pack-horses and your goods?" "we are going to make our road to bokhara. there are rumours of disaffection in cabul, and if there is fighting the houses of the traders will be looted. therefore i resolved to leave while i could, and am taking my indian goods for sale there." "it will be a terrible journey," the young chief said. "there is already snow in the upper passes. i wish you success. i shall think of your kindness as i lie here, and pray allah to protect you. before you go i pray you to carry me down to the edge of this stream, so that i may drink when i will." "we will certainly do that, and give you a supply of fruit if we can do no better. now we must look and see to your wounds. i can at least bandage them, and make you somewhat easier." to his surprise angus found no wounds in the leg. "i see no bullet mark," he said. "no, the leg was broken in my fall. my men had fought well, but the feringees were too strong for them, and we fled. i was riding in their rear, when a shot struck me in the shoulder. i fell from my horse, and when i found that my leg was broken i felt my end was at hand; but i heard no more shots nor any further sound of galloping horses, and i knew that by allah's mercy they had ceased their pursuit. my horse had galloped on after the others, and my men might not notice that i had fallen until they had gone some distance, when they would probably conclude that i had been killed. i managed to crawl out of the road to the shelter of that rock where you found me, as the infidels might come up in the morning, and i would rather die quietly there than be shot down." "they would not have injured you," angus said. "they kill many in battle, but it is a rule with them never to touch an injured man; and had they come along they would have taken you back to their camp and have done all they could for you." "i have heard that they were strange in that respect; but i did not think of it--my only wish was to die quietly and alone. i tried several times to crawl to the stream, but the agony was so great that i could not do it." angus while he was speaking was feeling the limb. "the first thing to do," he said, "is to bring the ends of the bone together; the operation will be painful, but it will greatly relieve your sufferings." "do as you will, stranger; allah has sent you to my side, and what you do must be right." "in the first place, i must prepare some splints to keep it in its place." leaving the afghan, angus searched among the bushes until he found a shrub which was thick enough for the purpose. he and azim with their knives cut this down near the root, and then divided it into lengths, split each of these and smoothed the pieces until they were perfectly even. he then tore off several long strips of cloth to form bandages, and calling to the two men, he returned to the wounded afghan. the patient was lifted into another position, where he could place his left foot against a rock. "now, chief," angus said, "you must with that leg prevent yourself from being pulled forward; my servant will hold you round the body, so as to aid you; the other two men will take hold of your right leg and pull it, while as soon as it is sufficiently stretched i shall press the broken ends into their position. i am afraid that the pain will be very severe, but you will be much easier afterwards. at present the ends of the bones are tearing your flesh." "an afghan can bear pain," the chief said quietly; "do as you will." "now," angus said to the soldiers, "take a firm hold above the ankle, and draw as steadily and quietly as you can, but with all your strength." the resistance of the muscles was so great that it was only by exercising their utmost power that the men got them to yield. at last angus felt the end of the bone on which he was pressing suddenly slip into its place. then for the first time he looked round. no sound had escaped the afghan's lips, but the agony had been so intense that he had fainted. "now, give me a long bandage, azim; you need not hold him any longer. double up a cloak or something and lift him and put it under him, so that i can pass the bandage round and round." first a wad of thick material soaked in water was placed round the leg at the point of the fracture, and then bandage was added to bandage, until the limb down to the knee was surrounded by a casing half an inch thick; then the splints were applied, some reaching only down to the knee, others to the ankle. these were held in their place by the three assistants, while angus again firmly bandaged them. the operation being completed, he dashed some water on the afghan's face. the latter soon opened his eyes. "it is all over, chief; the bones are in their place again, and if all goes well, in time the ends may knit firmly together." "it is easier already," the chief said gratefully. "i no longer feel as if an evil spirit from eblis were torturing me with a hot iron." "i will now see to your shoulder. the wound has ceased bleeding; therefore i shall but sponge it with cold water and put a bandage on in case it should break out afresh." this was soon done. some cloths soaked in water were laid over the bandage, then some more fruit was given to the wounded man, and he was left in the shade, and the men set about cooking a meal. angus from time to time went across to see him, and had the satisfaction in the evening of finding that he had fallen asleep. "now, azim," he said when he returned, "the next thing to do is to settle what is to be done with him." "i have been wondering that ever since we found him, master." "there is a choice of two things: one is that i mount my horse, ride back to cabul, report having found a wounded man, and ask that a party with a stretcher may be sent out to fetch him in early in the morning; the other is to take him on with us." azim looked in surprise. "that would be very difficult, master." "no doubt it would be difficult, but i think it might be done. there is no doubt that from his dress and appearance, and from the fact that he speaks excellent persian, he is a chief of considerable standing. in that case his friendship might be invaluable to us, both on our way down to the frontier, and possibly in the future, which sir alexander burnes regards as very threatening. it would be worth while, therefore, to make some sacrifice to carry him down to his friends. i would not do it if i thought the journey would harm him, but i believe the cold air of the mountains would be vastly better for him than the heat of the plains round cabul. he may suffer somewhat from jolting, but i think that we can obviate that if we cut two strong poles about fifteen feet long, attach them to the pack-saddles of two horses, and by securely fastening a blanket between them make a hammock, in which he can ride comfortably. the poles would be elastic enough to save sudden jolts; we can only go at a foot's pace in these passes, and these native horses are so sure-footed that i think the chance of any accident is extremely slight. the horses are but lightly weighted, and as the provisions are consumed we can move a portion of the weight they carry to the one who takes our food." "yes, that would be a good plan, master." "another advantage of it would be," angus went on, "that whereas he would chafe at being in a hospital in care of the people he hates, his spirits would naturally rise as he felt that he was returning to his friends, and this would hasten his recovery. however, i will put the question to him in the morning. if he decides upon being kept in camp, i will send you back with a letter to sir alexander burnes for stretcher-bearers, and you will easily overtake us at our camping-place to-morrow evening." in the morning the young chief was better than angus had even hoped for. once or twice during the night fresh water had been poured gently over the bandages on the wounded shoulder. like all people living chiefly in the open air, accustomed to climbing, and to hard exercise, the afghans suffer less from wounds than europeans do. abstemious in their habits, comparatively small meat-eaters, lithe and sinewy in their figures, they speedily recover from wounds unless of a mortal nature. angus found that the chief's forehead and hands were cool, and there were no signs of fever setting in. "i have been thinking over what would be best for you, and decided to leave the choice to yourself. i am acquainted with burnes sahib, and if i send my servant with a letter i know that he will at once send out a party to carry you into hospital, where you will be well cared for." "i would rather die than accept kindness at their hands," the afghan said firmly. "in that case there seems no other course but for me to construct a litter between two of my pack-horses, and to carry you over the mountains to kundur." "and would you thus burden yourself with a stranger?" the afghan asked in a tone of great surprise. "certainly i would for a wounded stranger," angus said; "but i do not think that there will be any great trouble, and i will try to make the journey as easy for you as possible." he then explained how he intended to carry him. the face of the wounded man lit up. he had permitted angus to set his limb because he believed it was destiny that had sent him to his aid. he felt sure that the man who had taken such trouble with him would leave a store of provisions within his reach, and that possibly some of the natives might come along and carry him to their village, and so tend him until his strength was restored. it was but a faint hope, for now that winter was approaching the men from the upper villages would have come down into the plain, and the chances were but slight that any would enter the gorge. his hope rested chiefly in the belief that, as he had been so unexpectedly saved from death, his final deliverance would also be effected; but that this kind trader should offer to carry him up the passes had never entered his mind, and his pale cheek flushed with pleasure. "certainly i will go with you if you will take me," he said joyfully; "nobly indeed do you carry out the precept of the prophet, to be compassionate to all those who need it." "let us say no more about it, chief. it will be a pleasure to me to see you grow stronger, and i doubt not that the mountain air will benefit you greatly, and i shall have my reward in seeing you regaining your strength. we have meat with us, but it will be better for you to take fruit and a little bread." two soldiers were sent out, and presently returned with poles of the desired length and thickness. breakfast was then eaten. afterwards the poles, a long blanket having been firmly lashed between them, were securely fastened against the horses' flanks under their burdens. in this way a hammock was formed in which, while the body and legs were below the level of the poles, the head was somewhat above them. a cloak was rolled up to make a pillow, and the chief was then gently lifted and laid in it. they started at daybreak, rested in the shade for three or four hours in the middle of the day, and then continued their journey till late in the evening. after two days' travel the halt was no longer necessary, for they were now far above the level of the plain. the air was fresh during the day, and at night all were glad to cover themselves with their long coats lined with sheep-skin. angus had made no attempt to discover the position of the ball in the shoulder of the wounded chief. even if he found it, he had neither the instruments nor the skill necessary for its removal. the only thing he could do was to keep the cloths bathed with cold water to prevent inflammation setting in. the track they were following sometimes disappeared altogether, and angus often congratulated himself upon having the young chief with him, for the latter had twice before crossed the mountains, and was able to tell him which line to take. the day's journey varied much in length, being from fifteen to twenty-five miles, according as they found a suitable halting-place. they always camped where there was water, emptying the skins and filling them afresh as often as possible. at times the ground was covered with snow. this they thawed in a pot over a fire of brushwood, of which they were careful to gather some at every opportunity on the day's march. the chief and angus occupied the little tent, while azim slept with the two soldiers in a shelter composed of blankets. every day there was a visible improvement in the state of the wounded man; the cool air acted as a tonic to his system. the first two or three days his arm pained him a good deal, though he had never once complained of it. it was kept bound to his side, and by means of splints and bandages the shoulder was held in its natural position; more than this angus had not attempted. he believed that the shoulder was broken, but even of this he was not sure, and could only hope that the bone would knit together itself. one day, however, in reply to his questions the afghan admitted that he felt a burning pain just over the left shoulder, and feeling, angus perceived a hard substance apparently but a short distance under the skin. "there is no doubt that this is the ball," he said. "a surgeon would cut down upon it, and get it out easily enough." "then why do you not do it? you seem very skilful." "i have had no practice," he said. "my father was a trader of tabriz. he was a good man and very much respected. the poor often came to him in cases of accidents, and i have many a time seen him bandage broken limbs, that is why i was able to do it; but of bullet wounds i know nothing." "take my dagger and cut down to it at once; the pain of a cut is nothing. cut fearlessly and deeply, so that you can take hold of the ball with your fingers." after some hesitation angus agreed to do so, for, by the pain it was causing, the bullet might set up inflammation. "it is a mere nothing," the afghan said. "i have frequently cut out bullets from my tribesmen." the chief's dagger was as keen as a razor, and seeing that his patient really wished it, angus performed the operation. he had to cut three times before he could manage to get hold of the bullet. the afghan himself did not once flinch. "that is well," he said, when the ball was extracted. "now, bring the edges together again, put a piece of wet rag over them, and then tie a bandage tightly round me; by the end of a week there will be nothing but a scar remaining." two days later they arrived at bamian. as they entered the little town a native officer of a ghoorka regiment came out and demanded their business. for the first time angus was unable to give an answer in the language in which he was addressed. knowing, however, the purport of the question, he showed his letter to lieutenant mackenzie. the native was unable to read english, but called to an english artilleryman, who at once came up. on seeing the letter he motioned to the pretended trader to follow him, and conducted him to the house where lieutenant mackenzie lodged. "there is a man outside who has a letter for you, sir," he said saluting. "an englishman?" "no, sir, one of these traders, i think. he has some horses with packs, and he has a wounded or dead man in a litter." "show him in." angus on entering said in persian, "my orders are to deliver this letter to you when alone, sir." the lieutenant signed to two orderlies, to whom he had at the time been giving orders, and angus then went on in english: "you do not remember me, lieutenant mackenzie. i am angus campbell, on the staff of sir alexander burnes." "oh, yes, i remember you now," the officer said, rising and shaking him by the hand. "of course we have met many times, but in that persian dress i did not know you again. i suppose you have come to see how we are getting on?" "no. i am on a mission across the mountains to see what dost mahomed is really doing there, as you will see by this letter." the officer glanced through it. "i see you do not want the natives here--there are not many of them--to be asking any questions. let me see. we are pretty closely packed, as you may imagine. i could give you a room here, but that would hardly do." "no, it would not do at all," angus said. "it would appear strange indeed to the natives if you were to so honour a travelling merchant. i can do very well without a room, for i have a tent that i have used on my journey. all i wish is that you give an order that we shall not be in any way interfered with." "that i can do easily enough, and will put a sentry over your encampment with orders that no one is to enter into conversation with your followers." "thank you; that is just what i desire." "i hear that one of your men is ill, can anything be done for him? we have a doctor with us, and you could leave the man in hospital, and he could either make his way back when cured, or follow you--though i doubt whether that would be possible, as the passes will soon be completely blocked with snow. as soon as we are sure of this we shall return to cabul, so we are looking forward eagerly, as you may imagine, for the news that they have become impassable." "thank you. the man met with an accident by falling from his horse, but i doctored him as well as i could, and i think in another day or two he will be able to sit a horse; and as he knows the passes, i must keep him with me, for already the paths are in many cases obliterated by snow, and i should fare badly indeed without him." "yes, i see that. how long are you going to stay here?" "i shall start again the day after to-morrow. it is most important that i should push on, for the passes may be closed any day. i will give the horses and men one day's rest, that is all that i can afford now. i will say good-bye, for it would not do for you to be seen speaking to me again." "no, i suppose it would not do for you to come here, but i will after dark to-night come down and have a chat with you. i have had no news from cabul for the last fortnight. there would be no harm in that, would there?" "no; i should be very glad if you would come in that way." half an hour later the tents were erected, and two sentries were placed near them to warn off all intruders. angus went into the little town, and made some purchases from three small traders who had remained there, and had been well rewarded for doing so by the prices they obtained from the troops for their stores. lieutenant mackenzie, on his arrival, had ordered them to send all the liquor they had to his quarters, telling them that unless they agreed to this they would not be allowed to remain, and promising that the liquor should be returned to them when the troops left. their stores were almost exhausted, but angus was able to purchase some rice, a pot of ghee, and a sack of grain for the horses. at eight o'clock mackenzie came down. sadut khan had been apprised of the intended visit, and had willingly consented to be carried for the time into the other tent, so that angus had his to himself. "it is a snug little tent," mackenzie said when he entered it; "not much head room, but that is of no consequence, as it is only a place for sleeping in. i am ashamed to come empty-handed, but i only brought a couple of bottles of spirits with me, and they are both empty long ago. i can't drink this beastly native stuff. and besides, the room in which i stored all there was in the place when i got here is locked up. i made the traders put their seals to it so that there could be no dispute about the quantities when i handed them over." "thank you," angus said; "i don't touch spirits. whatever may be the case in other places, i am convinced that men are better off without them in a country like this. certainly they are best avoided in hot weather; and i think even in the cold weather coffee is infinitely better, and i have brought a good store of that with me. now, make yourself as comfortable as you can. fill your pipe from that jar, it is the best persian tobacco. then when the coffee comes in i will give you the news from cabul." a large jug of coffee, with two silver horns which angus had bought before starting, was soon brought in, and then angus told what had happened at cabul since the last letter mackenzie had received. "then you don't think things are going on well?" mackenzie said when he had concluded. "no, there is much disaffection among the lower class in the city. the tribesmen are restless and discontented. it was a great mistake to allow shah soojah the entire control of all civilian matters; the consequence is that the people are grievously oppressed by the tax-gatherers. the ameer himself is impatient at the slightest attempt to control him. he renders himself intensely unpopular by hardly ever appearing in public, by his refusal to grant audiences, and by his haughtiness and arrogance to those whom he does admit to his presence. i am certain that he could not maintain himself for a day if we were to march away, and i don't see how we can leave him to his fate. altogether the situation is very difficult, and i am afraid it will end badly. they want a strong man at the head of affairs. i do not think that macnaghten is a strong man. keane is a good soldier, but it is said that he will return to england in the spring." "and how about burnes?" "burnes is my chief," angus said with a smile; "but i can say this, i believe that if he were in macnaghten's place things would go on better. at present, however, he has no authority of any kind. he differs from macnaghten on almost every point, and any advice he gives is almost contemptuously neglected." "it is a queer state of affairs," mackenzie said. "however, i suppose we shall get out all right in the end. it is a way we have. we generally make a muddle in the beginning, but our fighting power has pulled us through. well, i will be going now; it is eleven o'clock. i think that it would be better that i should not come again to-morrow." "i think so too. if the afghans here entertained the smallest suspicion that you were visiting me, they would feel sure that i was not the trader i pretended to be, and would find means of sending a message across the mountains, which would result in the failure of my mission and my own certain death." after a hearty farewell, and an expression of the best wishes for the success of his mission, mackenzie said good-bye and left the tent. the afghan chief was carried back into it, and in a few minutes all in the little camp were asleep. chapter xi a dangerous journey angus made every effort to secure the services of a native well acquainted with the passes as guide, but was altogether unsuccessful. the difficulties were, they declared, insurmountable, the danger overwhelming. "i must see what i can do," sadut khan said, when angus informed him that the natives were all of opinion that the snow was too heavy and the danger too great for the pass to be attempted. "we stayed here for some days, when i crossed the hills with dost mahomed. there is a petty chief living in a village two miles away; if he is still there, i think he would accompany you. whether or not, i am certain he would not divulge the secret of my being here to anyone." "i will go myself to see him," angus said. "i hope indeed he will accompany us, for if not, i fear that our journey has come to an end, as the offers i have made would have tempted any of the natives here to go with me if they had thought it possible. shall i mention your name to him?" "say to him only that a chief of the momunds, whom he knew here three months ago, desires to speak to him." angus at once mounted his horse and rode to the foot of the hill upon which the village with the tower of its chief was perched. then fastening the bridle to a stunted shrub, he made his way up the steep ascent on foot. the place did not contain more than a dozen houses. as he passed through these, natives wrapped in sheep-skin jackets came to the door and gazed at him with angry scowls. as he reached the door of the tower four armed men came out. "what would you here, stranger?" one of them said. "i would speak a few words with your chief." "he does not want either to buy or to sell," the man said shortly. "i do not seek to sell," angus said. "i have a message of importance to him." one of them went into the tower, and returning in a minute, motioned to angus to follow him. the chief, a tall and powerful man of middle age, was seated on the floor of a room in the upper story of the tower. near him was a large earthenware pan, in which a charcoal fire was burning. "why come you here, persian?" he said, "and what message can one like you bear to me?" angus repeated the message that sadut khan had given him. the chief rose to his feet suddenly. "you lie!" he said fiercely, "he is dead. the news came to us a week since." "nevertheless, he gave me that message; and if you will come with me to bamian you will see for yourself that he is not dead, though it is true that he has been sorely hurt." "i go not into bamian," the chief said. "i have not put foot in the town since the accursed infidels came there. they have held no communication with me, nor i with them. this may be a trick to lure me there and make me prisoner." "if they had desired to do so," angus said quietly, "they would have sent a hundred men with a gun or two, and not a mere trader. besides, how could they have told that a momund chief had been here with dost mahomed when he passed through?" "many could have told you that," the chief said, "seeing that, next to the ameer himself, he was the most observed of the party." "well, chief, if you will not go, i have nothing to do but to return and inform him that you refuse to come and see him." "how can he be there, in the midst of the enemy, unless indeed he is a prisoner?" "he is not a prisoner; he lies in my tent. you can see him without entering bamian, for my camp is outside the town. what motive, chief, could i have in deceiving you?" "i will go," the chief said suddenly. "it shall not be said that i refused to answer such a call, however improbable it might seem." he threw on a cloak lined with sheep-skins, and telling his men that unless something befell him he would be back by noon, he led the way down the hill. angus mounted his horse when he reached it and rode beside him. for some distance the afghan did not speak. "do you know the name of this chief?" he asked abruptly when half the distance had been traversed. "it is sadut khan, the fighting chief of the momunds, and a nephew by marriage of the ameer." the afghan had not expected this reply. "you must be in his confidence indeed, persian, or he would not thus have disclosed himself when in the midst of those who would hail his capture as one of the most valuable prizes." "he has, as you say, faith in me," angus said quietly, "and will, doubtless, when you see him, give you his reason for that trust in me." "your story must be true, and i believe it; forgive me for at first doubting it. but having heard that the chief had been killed, i thought this was a plot of some kind." "it was natural that you should not believe me," angus said. "you could scarce credit that he was alive, and, what was still more strange, that he should be in a town occupied by the english, and yet not be a prisoner." "this is a fortunate day for me, indeed," the afghan said. "there is no chief whose name is more honoured in the country than that of sadut khan. he is as brave as a lion, good to his people, and faithful to dost mahomed, when so many have fallen away from him. the ameer regards him as if he were a favourite son, and it will gladden his heart indeed, and lessen his troubles, when he learns that he is still alive." avoiding the town they went straight to sadut. angus dismounted and led the way to his little white tent, and, raising the flap, said to the chief, "he is here; enter." the afghan did so; and thinking it best to leave them together for a time, angus strolled away and saw that his horse was, as usual, well wrapped up in a thick felt blanket. it was half an hour before the chief made his appearance at the entrance to the tent and looked round. angus at once spoke to him. "my friend," said the chief, "i again ask your pardon for doubting you for a moment. allah will surely bless you for the good work you have done. sadut khan has told me all, and it passes my understanding why a stranger should have cumbered himself with a wounded man of whom he knew nothing." "does not the koran bid us succour the afflicted?" "that is true, my friend, but there are surely limits. one will do great things for a friend, one may do something for a stranger, but to hinder one's journey and cumber one's self with a wounded stranger is surely more than can be expected of us." angus now entered the tent. "my trust in the chief was not misplaced," sadut khan said. "he will act as our guide across the mountains, though he doubts whether it will be possible to cross the passes. if it is the will of allah, persian, that we should not, we can but die." "that is so," angus said; "but the passes may not be as badly blocked as we expect." "we can hardly hope that," the chief replied, shaking his head. "the last party that came over reported that they had never known it so bad. this was a week ago, and since then the sky has always been dull to the north, and it has surely been snowing there. however, to-day it is lighter, and maybe no more snow will fall for a time. we had best lose not an hour in starting. i shall take four of my men with me. we have no horses, but that matters not at all, for the passage will have to be made on foot. let us move to-morrow at daybreak, and travel as far as we can before it is dark." when the arrangements were all settled, angus went into the village and bought some more grain, cheese, and other food, also a store of extra blankets, and two other native tents; these were to be packed on his horse and azim's. among other things he bought two native lamps for each tent, and a good supply of oil, a roll of flannel for tearing into strips for winding round the feet and legs, and he was then satisfied that he had done all in his power to render the enterprise a success. before daybreak next morning hassan, the afghan chief, arrived with four of his followers, all strong and sinewy men. the animals were speedily packed; sadut's litter was placed between two of the horses which were more lightly loaded than the others, and they set out just as daylight was spreading over the sky. the speed with which the start was effected was in itself a sign that all felt the gravity of the task before them. angus had the evening before explained to the two soldiers that the journey before them was one of tremendous difficulty, and offered to leave them in charge of lieutenant mackenzie till spring, when they could return to cabul and rejoin their regiment; but they would not hear of it. "we are both mountain men," one said, "and if others can get through we can. at any rate, we will risk anything rather than return with blackened faces and say that we had feared to follow our officer." the morning was bitterly cold, but the sky was clear. "we shall do well to-day," hassan said to angus, "and the horses are fresh. as for to-morrow, who can say?" the snow was knee-deep when they got beyond the village. the ascent began almost at once and was heavy work both for men and horses. they continued their journey till it was too dark to go farther, then they halted in a ravine which afforded some shelter from the piercing wind. all set to work to clear away the snow where the tents were to be pitched, but before raising these the horses were attended to. blankets were girded round them from the ears to the tail, and they were picketed touching each other for mutual warmth. a supply of corn was then laid down before each on some square pieces of felt placed on the snow. when the tents were pitched the lamps were lighted and the flaps closed, then snow was scraped up outside until the canvas was covered nearly to the top. in spite of the intense cold all were thoroughly warmed by their hard work before they turned in. angus took azim into his tent, the rest divided themselves among the other two. at other times it would have been unpleasant to be so closely packed, but in such weather it was an advantage. before setting to work to pile the snow against the tents a brass kettle filled with water had been suspended from the ridge-pole over the lamps, and the water was almost boiling by the time the work was finished, and in a few minutes coffee was made. the frozen carcasses of four sheep had been brought, as well as a large quantity of meat that had been cooked on the previous day. some slices of the latter were thawed over the lamp and eaten with bread that had been purchased at bamian. but few words were spoken after the meal was finished, their fatigue and the warmth of the tent rendering it difficult for them to keep awake. in a few minutes all were sound asleep. the next day's march was even more arduous. sadut had given up his litter and again mounted his horse, as it was found impossible for the two animals linked together by the hammock to make their way up the steep place. the work was toilsome in the extreme, but all worked cheerfully. hassan and his four men laboured with the greatest vigour, carrying burdens to places which horses when laden could not have climbed, hauling the animals out of deep drifts into which they frequently fell, carrying sadut khan in his litter at points where the ascent was so steep that, crippled as he still was by his injured leg, he could not have retained his seat in the saddle. the party worked in almost complete silence, but with a stern determination and energy which showed their consciousness that every moment was of importance. twelve miles were the result of as many hours of labour. no signs of a track had been visible since they left bamian, and angus felt how absolutely impossible it would have been to cross the pass had it not been for the intimate knowledge of hassan and his followers; even these were sometimes at fault. none of them had ever passed over the mountains when so deeply covered with snow, and consultations constantly took place between them as to the line to be followed. when they arrived at their halting-place for the night, hassan told angus and the momund chief that they were now within two hundred feet of the top of the pass. "to-morrow's work will be the most dangerous; the north wind sweeps across the plateau with terrible force. moreover, i do not like the look of the sky this evening. we have been fortunate so far, but i think that there will be a change." "it is well, indeed," sadut said as they ate their supper, "that we crossed the highest pass before the snow began in earnest; we certainly could not have supported that journey had we been ten days later. we have got through the hardest part of the work, and everything now depends upon the weather. may allah grant that there be no more snow. the pass to-morrow is but twelve miles across, and if all goes well we shall begin to descend on the following morning. if the snow holds off we shall be able to do that distance easily, for it is almost a level plain that we have to traverse. parts of it will be nearly clear of snow, which the fierce blasts sweep away as fast as it falls, while in other places the surface will be hard enough to walk on, the snow being pressed firmly together by the weight of the wind." they were on foot again next morning even earlier than usual. all were aware of the importance of haste. the tents were pulled down and loaded with the greatest rapidity. the cold was intense, and but few words were spoken until they reached the summit of the ascent, by which time the effort of climbing had restored the heat that had been lost as soon as they left their warm tents. the sky was cloudless, and angus felt hopeful that the day's journey would be accomplished with comparative ease. he noticed, however, that there was an anxious look on the faces of the five tribesmen, who, although they were travelling more rapidly than they had done since they left bamian, were constantly urging horses and men to press forward at a greater speed. angus had expected that they would have to face very strong wind, but scarce a breath was blowing. as sadut had predicted, the rock was in many places completely bare. the fields of snow were so hard that, instead of struggling knee-deep as before, they now seldom sank over their feet, and sometimes left scarcely a track upon the surface. the hills on either side stood up clear and hard, and the silence was almost oppressive. they were, they calculated, half-way across the pass three hours after leaving their camp, when hassan, who was walking beside angus and sadut, stopped suddenly and pointed to the sky. looking up angus saw two or three little wisps of vapour passing overhead with extraordinary speed. "the storm!" hassan exclaimed. "see, others are coming; it will soon be upon us. we can go no farther, but must prepare to meet it instantly or we shall be overwhelmed." knowing that hassan would not have spoken thus unless from the direst necessity, angus at once ordered a halt. the plateau was perfectly flat, and nowhere could any shelter be obtained, and they were now on an expanse of hard snow. urged by the shouts and exclamations of hassan all hastened to unload the animals. as soon as this was done, angus ordered the tents to be pitched. "it is useless," hassan said, "they would be blown down in an instant. let them lie open on the snow. let each man take his two blankets and keep them by him in readiness, and when the storm begins let him wrap himself up in these, and then let those who are tent-fellows lie down together on one side of the tent, pull the other over them, and roll themselves in it. i and my men will be the last to take shelter, and we will pile the sacks and saddles over the ends to keep them down. but first put all the extra blankets over the horses and fasten them over their heads, and let them hang down well behind. they will turn their backs to the wind. make all those that are accustomed to lie down do so. range the others close to them." ten minutes of hard work and all was ready. then they had time to look round. the sky was hidden from view by masses of black clouds streaming along. the men took their places on their tents and wrapped their blankets round in readiness. "lie down at once!" hassan ordered. "it will be upon us almost immediately." the men did so. hassan and his followers pulled the felt covering over them, pushing the edge of the upper side under them as far as possible. then they piled baggage and saddles on the ends. angus, with azim and sadut, remained standing till the last. hassan ran up to them with his men. "quick!" he said, "the storm will be upon us immediately." glancing ahead as he lay down, angus saw what looked like a white mist in the distance, and knew that it must be snow swept up by the force of the wind. half a minute and they were tucked up in the thick felt; this was weighted at both ends. "allah preserve you!" hassan shouted, then all was silent. a minute later the storm struck them with such force that they felt as if pressed down by a heavy weight. had they been inclined to speak they could not have heard each other, so loud was the howl of the wind. wrapped up in their sheep-skin posteens and blankets, they did not feel the cold. for some time angus lay and wondered how long this would last. presently he fell asleep, the warmth, after the bitterly cold air outside, overpowering even the thought of danger. he was lying between sadut and azim, who, like himself, lay without moving. indeed, movement would have been difficult, so tightly was the tent wrapped round them. he slept for many hours vaguely conscious of the roar and fury of the gale. when he awoke at last it was with a sense of suffocation, a heavy weight seemed to press upon him, and the sound of the storm had ceased. "are you awake?" he asked the others, but he had to shake them before he obtained an answer. "something must be done," he went on, as soon as they were capable of understanding him. "we shall be suffocated if we don't let some air in." "that is true," sadut said. "the snow is evidently piled up round us. we must let air in, or we shall perish." but in spite of their efforts they found it impossible to move forward to get to the end of the roll. "we must cut our way out; it is our only chance," angus said, and turning on to his back, he managed to get out his long afghan knife, and cut a slit three feet long in the felt. as he did so, the snow came pouring in through the opening. "do you both put your hands under my shoulders," he said, "and help me to sit up." it was not until he had cut a transverse slit so as to allow the hole to open wider that he was able to do so. "the snow is not packed very hard," he said, as he pressed it aside. "it can't be very deep, for i can see light." it was not long before he was on his feet, and had pushed the snow sufficiently back to enable his companions to get out also. the feeling of suffocation was already relieved, as a sufficient amount of air made its way through the snow, and after five minutes' hard work they clambered out. the gale was still blowing, though not so violently as at first, the snow still falling thickly. two white mounds marked the position of the other tents, elsewhere a wide expanse of level snow was seen. it was evident that, as it drifted, it had first heaped itself against the tent. more had settled beyond it, and so gradually mounds had risen until they were seven or eight feet high. "we must rescue the others at once," angus said. on the windward side the snow was so hard that their hands made no impression upon it, but on the sheltered side it was lighter, and working with their hands they were soon able to clear it away down to the end of the tent beneath which hassan and three of his followers were lying. it was not, like the others, closed there, as its occupants had been unable to place weights on it after they had rolled themselves up. as soon as they had cleared the snow and opened the felt out a little, sadut called-- "are you awake, hassan?" "i am awake," he replied, "but am bound down hand and foot." they cleared the snow off until they saw a foot. taking hold of this together they pulled and gradually drew one of the men out. the other three were extricated more easily. they found that these had not suffered so much from a sense of suffocation as the first party had done, as, the ends of the roll being open, a certain amount of air had found its way through the snow. half an hour's hard work sufficed to rescue the occupants of the other tent. the three were unconscious, but the cold blast speedily brought them round. "what is to be done next?" angus asked hassan. "the gale is still far too severe for us to move," the latter answered. "we had best clear away the snow over the tents, and then take to them again." after two hours' work the tents were cleared. the men had worked from above, throwing out the snow over the sides of the mound, so that when they had finished the tents lay at the bottoms of sloping holes. a meal was then eaten, and lifting the upper covering of felt they lay down again and closed it over them. the sun was in the east, and they knew that some fifteen hours had elapsed since the gale had struck them. a mound of snow had marked where the horses were lying. they did not interfere with these, for hassan said that the horses would be able to breathe through the snow, and probably the heat of their bodies had melted it immediately round them, and they would be much warmer than if the snow were cleared off. before turning in hassan and his men managed to erect the tent of their leaders. lying as it did in a crater of snow, it was sheltered from the force of the wind. holes were made with a dagger on each side of the slit that angus had cut, and the edges tied together by a strip of leather. a couple of lamps and oil were taken from the sack in which they were carried, and also the bag of corn, and the little party after filling their vessels with snow and hanging them over the lamps, and closing the entrance to the tent, soon felt comfortable again. "it has been a narrow escape," sadut said. "had it not been for your thinking of cutting the tent, and so enabling us to make our way out, the whole caravan would assuredly have perished. now, we have only an imprisonment for another day or two at most, and can then proceed on our journey." the next morning the gale had ceased, though the snow continued to fall. by mid-day the sky cleared, and all issuing out from their shelters prepared for a start. it took them an hour's work to extricate the horses; one of these, a weakly animal, had died, the others appeared uninjured by their imprisonment. all the vessels in the camp had been used for melting snow, and a drink of warm water with some flour stirred into it was given to each of the animals, and an extra feed of corn. as soon as they had eaten this, the baggage was packed on their backs, and the party moved forward. it was heavy work. the snow that had fallen since the force of the wind had abated was soft, and the animals sank fetlock-deep in it. but after three hours' travelling, they reached the end of the pass and began to descend. two hours later they halted at a spot where a wall of rock afforded shelter against the wind from the north. "allah be praised that we have reached this point!" hassan said. "now the worst is over. i can see that we shall have another storm before an hour is past, they generally follow each other when they once begin. but here we are safe, and it was for this that i said 'no' when you proposed that we should halt at the mouth of the pass." the tents were soon erected, great stones being placed on the lower edge to steady them against the gusts of wind. then a diligent search was made for wood, and enough bushes were found to make a good fire. strips of meat from one of the frozen sheep were cooked, the kettles were boiled, cakes of flour and ghee were baked, and the travellers made a hearty meal. the horses were each given half a bucket of warm water, thickened with flour, and a double feed of grain. then all sat round the fire smoking and talking until it burned low, when, in spite of their sheep-skin coats, the bitter cold soon made itself felt. they had scarcely turned into their tents when the storm, as hassan had predicted, burst. except for an occasional gust they felt it but little, and slept soundly until morning, when they found that light snow had eddied down, and was lying two feet deep. the day was spent in cooking and attending to their own wants and those of the horses. for two days they were prisoners, then the gale abated, and they continued their journey, and late that evening arrived at the village of chol. here they were received with hospitality by the natives, who were astounded that in such weather the caravan should have made its way over the pass. resting here for two days, they travelled to kala sarkari. sadut now took the lead, for the chief of the village seeing three horses loaded with merchandise demanded toll; but, sadut announcing himself as a nephew of dost mahomed, and saying that the whole party were under his protection, the threatening attitude that the inhabitants began to assume was at once calmed. four days' travel, with halts at small villages, took them to balkh. here, on declaring himself, sadut was received with great honour, and was entertained at the governor's house, where dost mahomed was lying ill. no attention was bestowed upon hassan and his followers, who walked behind him, and were reported as having been the means of his safety. angus with his party kept some little distance in the rear and took up their quarters at a khan unnoticed, but when sadut was seen to call early the next morning upon the persian trader and remain with him for a considerable time, it was understood that they were under his protection, and no enquiries were made by the authorities of the town. on the third day sadut said to angus: "i regret that the ameer is ill. had it not been for that he would have received you. i told him of the services you have rendered me, and that but for you a few hours would have ended my life. he said that he would like to see so noble a man, and to give him a fitting testimonial of gratitude for the service done to his sister's son. he requested me to bring you to him as soon as he is able to rise from his couch; and when he enters cabul in triumph, as he assuredly will do ere long, he hopes that you will establish yourself there. i can promise you that your business shall flourish." "i thank you heartily, khan, for having spoken to the ameer about me," angus said gravely, "but i cannot receive a present from dost mahomed. i have intended many times to tell you more about myself, and i feel that i must do so now. you are my friend, and i cannot remain in a false position with you. as long as we were travelling together, no harm was done; it mattered not to you who was the man who had aided you in your extremity. but the case is different now. you were then a sorely wounded man, who needed what aid i could give you; now you are a close relation of dost mahomed, and a powerful afghan chief, so the case is changed. dost mahomed, and no doubt yourself, know what is passing in cabul by means of your friends there, who see all that is going on. the english general, on the other hand, knows nothing of what is passing beyond the ground patrolled by his cavalry. "it was important for him to learn what was passing on this side of the mountains, and he selected me, an officer in his army, on account of my knowledge of persian and pushtoo, to cross the mountains and ascertain what prospect there was of dost mahomed's returning with an army to cabul in the spring. i confide my secret to you as to a friend. you can see that it would be impossible for me to accept presents from dost mahomed in my character of a persian merchant, and for the same reason i should abstain from questioning you, or even allowing you to give me any information as to the military preparations going on. to do so would be to take an unfair advantage of the chances that enabled me to be of service." angus had thought the matter over, and knew that while such work as he was engaged in would, if discovered, cost him his life, it would be regarded by the afghans as a legitimate means of obtaining information; and although if caught he would be killed as an enemy, his action would be regarded as showing that he was a man of great bravery thus to place himself in the power of an enemy. this was the view, indeed, in which sadut khan regarded it. "you have done well to tell me," he said gravely. "it was truly the act of a brave man not only to risk discovery here, but to undertake the terrible adventure of crossing the passes when winter had fairly set in, in order to obtain information for your general. still more do i wonder that you should have burdened yourself with the care of an enemy, one who was fighting against your people. it was wonderful on the part of a persian trader, it is far more so on the part of one against whom i was fighting, who is not of my religion, who was engaged upon an enterprise of such a nature, and to whom speed was a matter of the greatest importance. had it not been for the slow pace at which you travelled with me, you might have crossed all the passes before they were blocked. i shall fight against your people as before, but i shall respect them now i see that although our religions differ, there are good things in their beliefs as in ours, and that even the koran has no lessons in charity and kindliness stronger than those that you have learned from the teaching of your own religion. "what i thought wonderful on the part of a persian merchant is still more marvellous on the part of an english officer, who could have no possible interest in saving a dying man; and who, indeed, might have gained credit by delivering him into the hands of his countrymen, since so long as i was a prisoner in their hands, i should be a hostage for the quiet behaviour of my people. you can do no harm to us by your enquiries here; it is known by all on this side of the mountains that the ameer will in the spring endeavour to turn out the usurper; it is known already to every sheik from candahar to jellalabad. whether he will come with ten thousand or twenty thousand men matters little; when he appears, all afghanistan will rise. your generals might have been sure that it would be so without sending to make enquiries. i cannot tell you with what force we shall come. it will not be a great army; even in summer a large force could scarcely traverse the passes. it is not on the force that he will take from here that dost mahomed relies; it is on the host he will gather round him when he crosses the mountains. we have learned that the disaffection to soojah is everywhere on the increase. there were many who did not love the barukzyes, but they know now that things are worse instead of better since the change, for the man has made himself hated by his arrogance, his contempt for the people in general, and the extortion exercised by his tax-gatherers. "there is no secret in all this, your own officers must know it. what you will not learn, for the decision will not be made until the spring, is the line by which the ameer will advance. there are many passes by which he may then cross; or he may go round by herat, and gather forces as he advances. or again, he might go east, and crossing by the passes there, come down through chitral to jellalabad." "that i can well understand, khan. of course i have already learned that there is no doubt that dost mahomed is preparing to cross the passes in the spring, and that he is sure of the support of the tribesmen on this side of the mountains." "he could gather a very large army if he chose," sadut said, "but the difficulty of transporting food for so large a body would be very great, i think that ten thousand men will be the utmost he could move with. i am doing no harm in telling you this, because you would soon learn it in the town, and it is certain that your people could not prevent his passing the hindoo koosh, since he has so many routes to choose from. his force is not like your army, which, moving with great trains of baggage, cannon, and ammunition, could only cross by one or two passes; we can move wherever our horses can climb. and now i will leave you, for i have some business to attend to; but i will return this evening." chapter xii troubles thicken angus saw that as he could not hope to obtain further information, however long he might stay, and as he had fulfilled the main object of his mission by discovering that dost mahomed would not be content with remaining master of the northern province, but would certainly advance in the spring, he could do no good by remaining any longer. the information that he could give would enable macnaghten and burnes to show the indian government that their intention of withdrawing more troops in the early spring would be disastrous; and it was with this special object in view that he had been sent. he had on the two previous days sold a portion of his goods, but had held out for the prices with which they were marked. he was now more willing to bargain, as he wished to travel in future as lightly as possible. accordingly, before nightfall he had disposed of nearly half the stock with which he had started; but he had at the same time purchased a certain amount of goods from turkestan, as these would be more appropriate as merchandise when he started from balkh for herat. sadut came again in the evening. "my friend," he said, "i have been thinking over your position. doubtless you might stay here for some time without its being suspected that you were other than you seemed to be, but a chance word from one of your men might betray you, and as you have really learned all that there is to learn, it seems to me that there is no use in your tarrying any longer here. it is true that dost mahomed, for my sake, would protect you, even were you discovered. still, you know the nature of our people, and were it rumoured that you were an infidel, you might be torn to pieces before either the ameer or myself knew aught about it." "i have come to the same conclusion. if i thought i could gain anything by remaining i should do so, whatever the risk; but as it would be useless to stay, i intend to leave to-morrow. i have a long journey to make via herat; the sooner i am off the better. my men are now packing up my goods and preparing for a start at daylight." "i felt so sure that this would be your course that i have brought with me an order from the ameer to the governor and headmen of all towns and villages through which you may pass, enjoining them to give you good treatment, as he holds you in high esteem for having rendered most valuable services to me." "i thank you very heartily," angus replied. "this will greatly facilitate my journey and save me from all small annoyances. i trust that we shall meet again." "i hope so indeed. never shall i forget the debt of gratitude that i owe you. perhaps some day i may be able to repay that debt to a small extent. remember, that in case of need you may rely upon me to the utmost. at any rate, you must not refuse to accept this; it is a present from dost mahomed, not to an english officer, but to a persian merchant who has saved the life of his sister's son. he talks continually while with me of the nobility of your action, and when i told him that you were going he had his turban brought and took out this gem, which was its chief ornament, and bade me hand it you in remembrance of the deed. i told him you had said that you would receive no present for a simple act of humanity. more i could not tell him without revealing your secret, though i know that it would be safe with him. you cannot refuse to take this. as for myself, i am here an exile far away from my own people, and have but this to give you as a token of my love. it is my signet ring. if you send it to me i will go through fire and water to come to you. my tribesmen will all recognize it, and will do anything in their power for its possessor." angus saw that, offered as it was, he should greatly hurt the afghan's feelings if he refused the immense ruby surrounded by diamonds that dost mahomed had sent him. "i will not refuse the gift of the ameer so given to me, and shall cherish it as my most valued possession and the gift of a man whom i for one, and i may say most british officers, consider to be very badly treated by us. i know from sir alexander burnes that dost mahomed was most anxious for our alliance. shah soojah is as unpopular among us as among his own people. of course, as soldiers, it is not our business to concern ourselves with politics; that is a matter for the government only. still we cannot but have our feelings, and i am sure that should the fortune of war ever place dost mahomed in our hands he would receive honourable treatment. your gift i shall prize as highly, as a token of our warm friendship, and trust that the time may never come when i have to put its virtue to the test, though i well know that i could in necessity rely upon any help that you might be able to give me." after talking for some time of the best route to follow, sadut khan took an affectionate leave, and angus started the next morning with his party. before setting out he bestowed handsome gifts upon hassan and his followers, whom he had learned to like greatly for the devotion they had shown to sadut and the energy and courage with which they had worked during the journey. travelling from twenty to five-and-twenty miles a day, with occasional halts, he reached cabul after two months of travel. his journey had been greatly facilitated by the order that he carried from dost mahomed. he had not entered herat, as it was probable that he would be recognized there. avoiding the city, he travelled by the same route as before to girishk, and then took a road running a few miles north of candahar and falling into the main road at kelat-i-ghilzye. his first step was to see sir alexander burnes and to report to him that assuredly dost mahomed would come south with a considerable force as soon as the passes were opened. his following would not itself be very formidable, but he relied upon being joined by all the tribesmen south of the hills. "your news is most opportune," the agent said, "and can hardly fail to induce the governor-general to alter his determination to withdraw the greater part of our force in the spring. already we have not a man too many for contingencies that may arise. now, tell me about your journey. the winter set in so severely directly you left us that i have been seriously uneasy about you. i had only one message from mackenzie after you had left, it was brought by a native; and he told me that you had passed through, but that the weather had changed for the worse the day after you started, and the universal opinion among the natives was that you and your party had perished." angus gave an account of his journey. he had thought over the question whether it would be wise to mention the episode of the wounded afghan, but he concluded that it would be better to do so, as mackenzie, when he rejoined the force, might casually mention that he had a sick man with him; and he therefore told the whole story as it happened. "i admire your humanity, mr. campbell, though it seems almost quixotic to burden yourself with a wounded man. but, as you say, it was evident that if you could manage to carry him through he might be of great service to you. undoubtedly he would have been a valuable prisoner to have in our hands, but his gratitude to you may prove valuable to us, for the momunds are a powerful tribe, and your conduct to him cannot but have inspired him with a better feeling towards us than he has hitherto shown." "he may have less animosity, sir, but i fear that he will still be found fighting against us. on the way he spoke many times of his determination to continue the struggle until afghanistan was free from the infidel; i am convinced that his indignation at the treatment of dost mahomed, and his fanaticism are so strong that no private matter is likely to shake them." the winter passed quietly, and the attention of burnes and macnaghten was turned rather towards the frontier than to the state of things round cabul. yar mahomed, virtual ruler of herat, although he was receiving large sums of money from us, was known to be intriguing with persia, and trying to form an alliance with the shah to expel the british from afghanistan. russia had sent an expedition against khiva, and the conquest of this little state would bring her more closely to the frontier of afghanistan. dost mahomed, however, had gone on a visit to the ameer of bokhara, and had been detained for the present by that treacherous ruler; thus for a time the prospect of an invasion on his part was greatly diminished. in the spring macnaghten and shah soojah returned to cabul. the former continued to ignore the warnings of sir a. burnes, as to the ever-growing hostility of the afghans to the british and the man they had forced upon them. his advice and that of burnes had been so far followed that the force at cabul had not been diminished; but, not content with this, macnaghten continued to urge on the indian government the necessity of sending a great force to occupy herat and another to cross the mountains and thwart the projects of the russians by carrying our arms into bokhara. moreover, he was continually applying for money to meet the expenses of shah soojah's government. as if the drain that these demands would entail upon the indian treasury and upon the indian army were not sufficient, he insisted upon the necessity of conquering the punjaub, where, since the death of runjeet sing, the attitude of the population had been increasingly hostile. it is difficult to understand how any perfectly sane man could have made such propositions. it would have needed the whole army of india to carry them out, to say nothing of an enormous outlay of money. although the governor-general and his council firmly declined to enter upon the wild schemes proposed to them, macnaghten did not cease to send them lengthy communications urging the absolute necessity of his advice being followed. as the summer came on there were everywhere signs of unrest. in april the ghilzyes cut the communications near candahar, but were defeated by a small body of troops sent from that city. the beloochees, whose country had been annexed, were bitterly hostile, and convoys were cut off. candahar was invested by them, quettah besieged, and khelat captured. with the exception of macnaghten himself, there was scarcely an officer in the army but was conscious of the tempest that was gathering round them. shah soojah was as unpopular among them as among the native population. macnaghten was almost as unpopular as the shah. everyone knew that it was his influence that had first induced lord auckland to enter upon this war, and the levity with which he replied to every warning, and the manner in which he deferred to shah soojah in every respect, and allowed him to drive the tribesmen to despair by the greed of the tax-gatherers, incensed the officers of the army to the utmost. in the spring the little garrison of bamian were on the point of being reinforced by a sepoy battalion when dr. lord, who had been sent as political officer, received information that led him to believe that jubbar khan, one of dost mahomed's brothers, who was in charge of dost's family at khooloom, was ready to come in. one of his sons had already done so, and lord thought that by sending forward a force to the fortress of badjah he would quicken jubbar khan's movements. it had the desired effect, and jubbar khan came into bamian bringing with him dost mahomed's family and a large party of retainers. this, however, in no way improved the position of the little party at badjah, for the natives in the vicinity exhibited the greatest hostility. the officer in command sent a detachment under sergeant douglas to escort another officer to badjah. the party was, however, attacked, and although they made a gallant resistance, they would have been destroyed had not two companies of ghoorkas arrived on the spot and beat off the enemy. in august the startling news arrived that dost mahomed had escaped from bokhara. he was received with open arms by the governor of khooloom and a large force speedily gathered round him. early in september he advanced upon bamian with eight thousand men. badjah was attacked, and although the ghoorka regiment kept back the assailants, it was evident that so advanced a post could not be held, and the force retreated, leaving all their baggage behind them. a regiment of afghan infantry had been raised and were stationed at bamian, but on hearing of dost mahomed's approach they deserted to a man, most of them joining the enemy. even macnaghten could no longer shut his eyes to the serious nature of the position. cabul was full of sikh emissaries, who were stirring up the population to revolt, promising them that the sikh nation would join in driving out the infidel. reinforcements under colonel dennie reached bamian on the th of september, and on the th dost mahomed with his army approached the place. ignorant that the whole force was upon him, dennie sent mackenzie with two guns and four companies of native infantry and some four hundred afghan horse, and himself followed with four more companies in support. on joining the advanced party, he found that the whole of dost mahomed's force was in front of him. in spite of the enormous disparity of numbers, he determined to attack; a wise resolution, for although in our indian wars the natives often fought bravely when they attacked us, they seldom offered a vigorous opposition when we took the offensive. mackenzie's two guns opened fire with shrapnel, which had a terrible effect upon the dense masses of the enemy. these were unable to withstand the fire, and soon began to fall back. mackenzie followed them, and again opened fire. before long, dost mahomed's levies broke and fled; and dennie launched the afghan horsemen in pursuit. these cut down great numbers of the enemy, and dispersed them in all directions. the effect of this signal defeat was at once apparent. the governor of khooloom entered into negotiations without delay, and pledged himself not to harbour or assist dost mahomed; the country south of khooloom was divided, he taking half, while the southern portion came under the authority of shah soojah. the victory caused great satisfaction in cabul, but this feeling was short-lived. dost mahomed after his defeat went to kohistan, where there was great discontent among the chiefs, some of whom were already in revolt. general sale sent a force from jellalabad, which attacked a fortified position held by them, but the assault was repulsed with heavy loss. it was about to be renewed, when the kohistanees evacuated the fort and fled. the fact, however, that our troops had met with a repulse had a great effect upon the minds of the natives. for the first time the afghans had successfully withstood an attack by british soldiers. throughout the month of october dost mahomed was busy, and at one time approached within forty miles of cabul, when guns were hastily mounted on the citadel to overawe the town, and orders sent to the force at bamian to return at once. dost, however, moved no nearer. sir robert sale was pursuing him, and it was not until the th that he moved down again towards cabul, and on the th the greater part of the force there marched out to give him battle. on the nd of november the two armies came face to face in the valley of purwandurrah. the ameer at once moved from the village to the neighbouring heights, and the british cavalry galloped to outflank the afghan horse. these were comparatively few in number, but headed by dost mahomed himself, they advanced steadily to meet the indian cavalry. gallantly as indian troops have fought on numberless fields, on this occasion they disgraced themselves utterly. turning rein as the afghans approached, they galloped away in headlong flight, pursued by the afghans until within range of the british guns. their officers in vain attempted to arrest their flight, charging alone into the midst of the enemy. two of them were killed when surrounded by enemies, dr. lord was shot, and the other two cut their way through their assailants and reached the british line covered with wounds. no more disgraceful affair has taken place in the story of our wars in india than this rout of indian cavalry by a third of their number of wild horsemen. but even yet the affair might have been retrieved had an officer like dennie been in command; had the guns opened and the infantry advanced it might still have been a repetition of the victory of bamian. but sir a. burnes was in authority, and, easily discouraged, as was his nature, he gave no orders, but sent off word to macnaghten that there was nothing for it but to fall back to cabul. suddenly, however, the position was changed by dost mahomed himself. as he rode back after the victorious charge he thought over his position. his imprisonment at bokhara had not broken his spirit, but it had affected him by showing him that the mohammedans of central asia could not be trusted to work together or to unite to beat back the ever-advancing wave of infidel aggression by the british on the south, and the russians on the west. but more than this, the defection of his brother at khooloom, and the surrender by him of his family, had convinced him that it would be vain for him to continue to struggle to regain the throne that he had lost. the kohistanees had risen before he joined them, and he had the satisfaction of showing that his bravery was in no way shaken by his misfortune, and of gaining a success of a most striking description. now at least he could lay down his sword with honour. accordingly, without telling anyone of his intention, he rode off the field with a single attendant, and on the following day reached cabul and rode to the british embassy. as he approached it he saw macnaghten returning from his evening ride. his attendant galloped forward and asked if the gentleman was the british envoy, and on macnaghten saying that he was so, he then returned to his master; and dost mahomed riding forward, dismounted, saluted the envoy, and handed him his sword, saying that he had come to surrender and to place himself under his protection. macnaghten returned it to him, and told him to remount, and they rode together into the residency, dost mahomed asking eagerly for news of his family, of whom he had not heard since their surrender. being assured that they were well and were honourably treated, he was greatly relieved. a tent was pitched for him, and he wrote at once to his son, begging him to follow his example. he conversed freely with macnaghten, gave him the history of his wanderings and adventures, and assured him that there was no occasion to place a guard over him, as his mind had quite been made up before he came in, and nothing short of force would compel him to leave. his only anxiety was that he should not be sent to england, and on macnaghten assuring him that this would not be the case, and that an ample maintenance would be assigned to him in india, he became perfectly contented and calm. as a result of his letter, three days later his eldest son, mahomed afzul, came into camp and surrendered. dost remained two days at cabul, where he was visited by many of the british officers, all of whom were impressed most strongly by him, comparing him very favourably with the man for whom we had dethroned him. macnaghten wrote most warmly in his favour to the governor-general, urging that he should be received with honour and a handsome pension assigned to him. he was sent down to india with a strong escort, where he was kindly received by the viceroy, who settled upon him a pension of two lacs of rupees, equivalent to £ , . unfortunately, just at the time that the ex-ameer returned to cabul a european regiment, a battery of horse artillery, and a regiment of native infantry were recalled to india, and with them went sir willoughby cotton, and the command for the time being remained in the hands of sir robert sale. angus campbell had not accompanied sir a. burnes when he left cabul with the force which marched out to encounter dost mahomed, but had been left in charge of the office at cabul. he was now his chief's first civil assistant, his temporary appointment to the civil service having been approved and confirmed by the court of directors at home in consequence of the very warm report in his favour sent by eldred pottinger and mr. m'neill. sir a. burnes, too, had in his letters spoken several times of his energy and usefulness, and on his return from his expedition through the passes, both burnes and macnaghten had reported most highly both of his volunteering to undertake so dangerous a mission, and of the manner in which he had carried it out. in return the directors had sent out an order for his promotion to a higher grade, and had ordered that a present of £ should be given him in token of their recognition of his conduct. "your foot is well on the ladder now," sir a. burnes had said on acquainting him with the decision of the board. "you will now have your name on their books as one of the most promising of the younger officers of the company, and you may be sure that they will keep their eye upon you. macnaghten will shortly return to england, and i have long been promised the succession to his post. i shall certainly request, and no doubt my wishes will be acceded to in such a matter, that you should hold the position of my chief assistant. as such you will have many opportunities of doing good service, as you will naturally proceed on missions to the chiefs of neighbouring peoples, and will so qualify yourself for some important post in the future." macnaghten, indeed, was extremely anxious to leave. bodily and mentally he had suffered from the strain and anxiety. he had been promised a high post in india, probably the succession to the governorship of bombay, but it was considered advisable that he should remain at his present post till the country was more settled. the winter passed quietly. with the submission of dost mahomed and his sons there was now no rival to shah soojah, no head round whom those discontented with the ameer's rule could rally. he was the less unwilling to remain, as he thought that an era of peace had now begun, and that his anxieties were at an end. he was soon, however, undeceived. on shah soojah's first arrival in india he had naturally looked to the dooranees for aid against the barukzyes, who had so long oppressed them, and had made many promises of remission of taxation as an incentive to their zeal. these promises had so far been kept, that no taxes whatever had been exacted from the dooranees; but in view of the absolute necessity of raising an income for the expenses of the government, and for the personal expenditure of the ameer and his favourites, it became necessary that all should contribute to some extent to the revenue. although this tax was but a tithe of that which they had paid under barukzye rule, the dooranees of the district of the north-west of candahar rose in rebellion, and general nott marched out from that city and defeated them in a pitched battle. for a time the movement was crushed, but the discontent remained. this was rendered more formidable by the fact that the heratees had taken up so offensive an attitude that our mission there had been withdrawn, and proofs were obtained that its ruler was fomenting the discontent in the western province, and was encouraging the disaffected by promising them assistance. in may more serious trouble arose, this time with the ghilzyes. it had been determined to restore the dismantled fort of kelat-i-ghilzye. the tribesmen viewed the work with hostility, and assembled in larger numbers, and nott sent a force against them under colonel winder, with four hundred british troops, a sepoy battalion, a battery of horse artillery, and a small body of cavalry. the ghilzyes advanced to the attack in great force. the battle was long and desperate, but the volleys of grape from the guns, and the steady fire from the infantry, at last turned the scale, and after five hours' fighting the ghilzyes retired. the dooranees were again in arms, and three thousand men were assembled under their chief at girishk. a small force, under colonel woodburn, marched out against them and defeated them, but having no cavalry on which he could rely, he could not prevent the rebels from retiring in fair order. major rawlinson, the political officer at candahar, again warned macnaghten that the situation in western afghanistan was extremely threatening, but was answered that this was an unwarrantable view of our position, and that there were "enough difficulties, and enough of croakers, without adding to the number needlessly." but rawlinson was perfectly right, and macnaghten was living in a fool's paradise. the defeated chief of the dooranees was joined by another, and in august a force of eight hundred cavalry, of whom some were regulars, three hundred and fifty infantry, and four guns, under captain griffin, met the insurgents. they were strongly posted in a succession of walled gardens and small forts, but the fire of the guns and infantry drove them from the enclosure, and the cavalry then charged them with great effect and scattered them in all directions. another defeat was inflicted upon the ghilzyes in the same month. for the moment all was quiet again; the only drawback to macnaghten's satisfaction was that akbar khan, dost mahomed's favourite son, was still in the north, and was reported to be gathering troops somewhere near khooloom. in september macnaghten received news of his appointment to the governorship of bombay, and began his preparations for leaving cabul, and burnes looked forward to receiving at last the appointment for which he had so long waited. his position had been in every respect irksome. his views differed from those of macnaghten; he saw the dangers of the position which macnaghten refused to recognize. the reports he addressed to the envoy were generally returned with a few lines in pencil of contemptuous dissent; but he believed that with power to act in his hands he should be able to remedy the blunders that had been made, and to restore peace and contentment in afghanistan. the troops were now commanded by general elphinstone, who had succeeded cotton. he was a brave old officer, but almost incapacitated by infirmities. he obtained the post simply as senior officer, and was wholly unfitted for command in such a critical time and in such a position. probably had it not been for the assurances of macnaghten that all was going on well, and that the trifling risings had been crushed without difficulty, lord auckland would have yielded to the opinion of his military advisers and appointed general nott. had he done so the greatest disaster that ever fell upon the british army might have been avoided. nothing could be worse than the position in which the british camp and mission were established. they were on low ground, commanded on every side by hills, and surrounded by forts and villages. they were nearly a mile in extent, defended only by so contemptible a ditch and rampart, that an english officer for a bet rode a pony across them. the commissariat compound was near the cantonment, and occupied an extensive space with the buildings and huts for the officers. it, too, had a rampart, but this was even less formidable than that which surrounded the camp. things had now settled down. many of the officers had sent for their wives and children, and lady macnaghten, lady sale, and others were established in comfortable houses. the climate was exhilarating, the officers amused themselves with cricket, horse-racing, fishing, and shooting, and lived as if they had been at a hill station in india, instead of in a mountainous country surrounded by bitter foes. october came in quietly, though pottinger, who was now in kohistan, sent unfavourable reports of things there. but these were as usual pooh-poohed by macnaghten. the latter's troubles with the indian government, however, continued unabated. the expenses of the occupation of afghanistan, amounting to a million and a quarter a year, were a terrible drain upon the revenues of india, and it had become necessary to raise a loan to meet the outlay, and the question of a withdrawal from afghanistan was being seriously discussed. none of the good results that had been looked for had been achieved, nor did it appear likely that the situation would improve; for it was evident to all unbiassed observers that the ameer was upheld solely by british bayonets, and that when these were withdrawn the whole fabric we had built up at so enormous an expense would collapse. the uneasiness of the indian government was increased by the fact that a change of ministry was imminent at home, and that the conservatives, who had always opposed the invasion of afghanistan, would at once take steps for the withdrawal of the troops from the country; and the investigation which would be made into the whole affair would create intense dissatisfaction in england, and lead to the recall of the indian politicians responsible for it. the news stirred macnaghten to fury; but he saw that it was necessary to make retrenchments, and accordingly he largely cut down the subsidies paid to the chiefs. the consequence was, that the leaders of the whole of the powerful tribes, including those round cabul, the kohistanees, ghilzyes, and momunds, at once entered into a hostile federation against the british. sale's brigade, that was about to start on its way to india, was ordered to attack the ghilzyes at jellalabad, and on the th colonel monteith was sent with a sepoy regiment, a squadron of cavalry, and a party of sappers and miners, to keep the passes clear. the force was, however, attacked at the first halting-place, and sir robert sale marched with the th regiment to clear the pass from his end. joined by monteith's force, he succeeded in driving the natives from their heights, the sepoys and the british soldiers vying with each other in climbing the almost inaccessible crags. the th retired down the valley, and monteith encamped in the khoord cabul pass. he was attacked at night, the enemy being aided by the treachery of the afghan horsemen, who admitted them within their lines. they were, however, beaten off, and monteith was joined by sale on the following day. negotiations were then opened with the ghilzyes; terms were made, but broken by the treacherous tribesmen a few hours after they had been signed. on his way back to jellalabad sale was attacked more than once in great force, and with difficulty cut his way down. macnaghten, who had determined to leave on the st of october, but had postponed his departure for a short time, wrote on that day that he hoped the business just reported was the expiring effort of the rebels. angus had remained with burnes at cabul. the latter was much depressed by the occurrences that had taken place. he had greatly disapproved of macnaghten's wholesale cutting down of the subsidies of the chiefs. "how unfortunate am i!" he said many times to angus. "had macnaghten gone but two months earlier, this would never have happened. it has been money alone that has kept the tribesmen quiet, and the very worst form of retrenchment has been chosen. had he gone i should have acted in a very different way. in the first place, i should have told the ameer frankly that the troubles were solely caused by the rapacity of the men he had appointed to receive the taxes. these must be dismissed, and honest and faithful ones appointed in their place. it is the abominable tyranny with which the taxes--of which i believe but a small portion ever get into the treasury--are collected that has brought about the trouble. with proper administration the revenue could be doubled, and the taxation would press much more lightly upon the people than it does at present. now the evil is done, and i shall have to take over the administration when everything points to a terrible catastrophe, with which my name will ever be associated." chapter xiii the murder of sir a. burnes october passed quietly, and macnaghten arranged to leave on the nd of november. burnes had received several warnings as to the formidable nature of the confederacy of the chiefs. mohun lal, the principal moonshee, who had been down to sale's camp, told him that if the conspiracy was not crushed in its infancy it would become too strong to be suppressed. burnes replied that he had no power at present, but that as soon as macnaghten left he would conciliate the chiefs by raising their allowances to the former point. on the st of november mohun lal again expressed his opinion of the danger. burnes replied that he feared the time was coming when the british would have to leave the country. he was in one of his moods of depression, but from this he recovered in the evening, and congratulated macnaghten upon leaving when everything was quiet. at the very time he was speaking the hostile chiefs were assembled together, and were discussing the methods that were to be taken to overthrow the british power. they determined that the first step was to forge a document in the ameer's name, ordering all the people to rise, and at the same time to spread a report that it was the intention to seize all the principal chiefs and send them prisoners to england. it was singular that they should not have waited a few days, for the indian government had sent peremptory orders that the whole force at cabul, with the exception of a single brigade, should return with macnaghten to india. the chiefs decided that as a first step a tumult should arise in the city, and this they at once set about exciting. they had no idea that it would succeed, and none of them ventured to take any part in it, as it was only intended to excite the passions of the rabble of the city. early the next morning a friendly afghan brought burnes news that the residency was about to be attacked. he did not believe the intelligence, as the city had of late been as quiet as usual; but on sending out some of his servants into the street they reported that there was certainly an unusual stir and excitement. he wrote to macnaghten saying so, but stating that he did not think the matter at all serious, although at the same time he requested that a military guard should be sent to him in order to overawe any disaffected persons. angus had gone out early with azim. the latter had for some days past spent his time in the city, and each evening had returned with the rumours he had gathered. the talk in the lower quarters was all of the understanding at which the chiefs had arrived, and the general opinion was that in a few days these would pour down with all their forces and annihilate the infidels. angus himself noticed the sullen expression on the faces of the lower class and the manner in which they scowled at him as he passed, and quite agreed with his follower that the troubles he had long foreseen were about to come to a head. when in the streets, too, he had an uneasy consciousness that he was being followed. several times he turned sharply round, but in the throng of natives in the streets he could recognize no face that he knew. this morning the feeling was particularly strong, although, as he had often done before, he assured himself that it was pure fancy on his part. "i am not conscious of feeling nervous," he said to azim, "but i must be getting so. it has been a very anxious time all the year, and i suppose that without my knowing it it must have told upon me. however, i will turn down this quiet street, and if anyone is following us we shall certainly detect him." a hundred yards down another lane crossed the one he had taken. azim had looked several times, but no one else turned down the lane, which was entirely deserted. as they passed the corner of the next lane some men suddenly sprang upon them. cloths were thrown over their heads, and in spite of their struggles they were lifted up and carried along rapidly. in a couple of minutes they stopped. angus heard a door open. they were borne along what he thought was a passage, thrust into a room, and a door was slammed to and locked behind them. they tore off their mufflers and looked around. it was a room of no great size, with strongly-barred windows. there were cushions on a divan that ran along one side. on a low table in the middle of the room were two cold chickens, a pile of fruit, a large jar of water, and two bottles of native wine. "what on earth does this mean?" angus said, "and why have we been carried off?" azim did not attempt to reply. "we are prisoners, that is certain," angus went on; "but it would certainly look as if they meant to make us comfortable, and the room must have been prepared in readiness for our reception. i see no hope of getting away; the windows are very strongly barred, and," he continued as he walked across and looked out, "this little yard is surrounded by houses without windows on the ground floor, and with no door that i can see. i suppose there is one below us; anyhow, if we could get through these bars we should be no nearer liberty, for at best we could only re-enter the house, and possibly the door is fastened on the inside. there are certainly men in the house; i heard voices in the passage just now, and no doubt one of the fellows is stationed there. the only reason i can imagine for their carrying us off is that we are to be kept as hostages. of course i am known to be burnes's chief civilian assistant, and they might think that if i were in their hands he would be willing to make some concessions to get me back again. it is of no use worrying over it; we are not so badly off as we were in that snow-storm in the pass. the best thing we can do for the present is to make a meal, for we did not take anything before we started." [illustration: as they passed the corner ... some men sprang on them.] they had just finished their breakfast when the sound of musketry was plainly heard. "there is fighting going on," angus exclaimed. "what can it mean? there are no troops in the city except the native guards at our house and the treasury next door. it is either a fight between two factions in the city, or they are attacking our place. it is maddening being fastened up here just at this moment. the news brought by that afghan this morning that we were to be attacked must be true, though sir alexander altogether disbelieved it. he was in one of his happiest humours this morning, as to-day he was to obtain the goal of his hopes and to be the resident political officer, with all power in his hands. when he is in that mood he disbelieves all unpleasant tidings, while in his fits of depression he gives credit to every rumour that reaches his ear. still, the house should be able to hold out against a mob until help arrives from the camp; but whether or not, my place should be by his side whatever comes of it." "if there is really a rising in the town, sir, we are certainly safer here than we should be in the streets, or even in the house." "that may be," angus said impatiently, "but my duty is to be there." he paced restlessly up and down the room. presently azim said: "i can't think how the men who seized us knew that we were coming along. it was quite by chance that you turned down the lane." "they must have been close to us when we did so," angus said, "and must at once have run round by another lane and posted themselves at the corner where we were seized. we were not walking fast, and there would have been time for them to get there before us if they had run. but why should they have taken this trouble? and why should they have prepared this place beforehand for our reception? it beats me altogether." after the firing had continued for a few minutes it ceased; then they could hear a confused roar of shouting. "good heavens!" angus exclaimed, "they must have taken the house. the troops cannot have arrived in time, or we should have heard sharp volleys. this is maddening." "well, sir," azim said philosophically, "if we had not been carried off we should have been in the house when they attacked it, and should have shared the fate of the others, whatever it may be." "that is true enough," angus agreed; "still, i ought to have been there. ah!" he broke off suddenly, "they have not taken either your sword or mine, or my pistols"--for although not in military uniform the civilians generally carried swords, a necessary precaution when the whole native population always went about armed; and angus in addition carried pistols also concealed in his dress. "it is extraordinary that they should not have disarmed us." "i do not think that they intended to do us harm," azim said; "they could have cut our throats had they chosen to do so, when they brought us here, without fear of discovery. why should they leave us our swords and provide a good meal for us if they intended to murder us afterwards?" "that is so, azim, and it makes the affair more incomprehensible. i tried to get at my pistols as they carried me along, but they held my arms too tightly for me to do so. it seems to me possible that this is the work of someone who was aware of the intended attack, and who doubted whether the troops would not enter the city and slaughter many of the inhabitants, and so thought that by producing us at the right moment he would not only clear himself, from any charge of taking part in the affair, but would earn a reward for having saved our lives. i certainly have no friend in the city who would be likely to seize me for any other object. of course, i was in communication with most of the important persons here, but it has been simply in an official way." "whoever it is must have been watching you for some days, master, if, as you thought, he has been following you whenever you went out." "i can have no doubt on that subject now, azim," and angus sat thinking for some time. "i think," he said suddenly, "it must be sadut khan; if so, we are safe. we know that he was with the ameer, and rode with him when he defeated our cavalry, and it has been reported that he has since returned to his tribe, though we have no certain information about it. it is possible that, knowing we were about to be attacked by the whole force of the tribesmen, he has borne his promise in mind, and has employed men to watch me and take steps, if necessary, to secure my safety. that certainly would explain what before it seemed impossible to understand." the noise in the town still continued. at one time there was sound of heavy musketry firing. "the troops have entered the city," angus exclaimed; "there will be hard fighting, for in the narrow streets an armed mob can offer a desperate resistance even to the best troops. but in the end they will put down this tumult, and if sir alexander has been murdered, exact a heavy penalty for his death." in half an hour the firing gradually abated, and the musket shots came more faintly through the air. "our men are falling back, azim, there can be little doubt about that by the sound. there cannot be any great number of troops engaged. what on earth can macnaghten and elphinstone be doing?" the roar of shouting in the streets became louder, and there was an occasional sound of firearms. "it is quite evident that the mob are in entire possession of the city, azim. they are looting the traders' quarter, and probably murdering all the whites who have taken up their residence there." these fears were fully justified. the houses of sir alexander burnes and captain johnson, the paymaster of the ameer's troops, adjoined each other. johnson had, fortunately for himself, slept that night in the camp. sir alexander had with him his brother, lieutenant burnes, and lieutenant broadfoot, his military secretary, who had just arrived. curiously enough, it was the anniversary of the disastrous fight at purwandurrah, in which fight broadfoot's eldest brother had been killed. soon after angus had gone out the ameer's minister arrived and repeated the warning already given by the friendly afghan. burnes could no longer doubt that there was danger, but he refused to leave his house, saying that as soon as the news that there was a tumult reached the camp, the troops would be at once despatched to put it down. he, however, wrote urgently to macnaghten for support, and sent messengers to the most powerful native chief in the town begging him to calm the people, and assure them that all grievances should be redressed. one of the messengers was killed on the way, the other managed to return to the house desperately wounded. the gathering in the street increased every moment. burnes with the two officers went out on to a balcony, and from thence harangued the mob. his voice was drowned by yells and curses, weapons were brandished, and an attack was made on the doors of both houses. part of the mob were fanatics, who thought only of slaying the infidels, but a still larger party were animated solely by a desire to share in the sack of the ameer's treasury next door. the native guards both of sir alexander and the treasury opened fire, and for a time maintained themselves with the greatest bravery. of the english officers, broadfoot was the first to fall, shot through the heart. the position became more and more desperate. a party of the insurgents had set fire to the stables and forced their way into the garden. burnes was still attempting to lull the fury of the crowd. long ere this troops should have arrived to his rescue, but there were no signs that they were approaching. at last, seeing that all was lost, he disguised himself and went out into the garden with a man who had sworn by the koran to convey him and his brother safely into camp. no sooner, however, did they issue out than the traitor shouted: "this is burnes." the mob rushed upon the brothers and hewed them to pieces. the defenders of the two houses fought bravely to the last, but were finally slaughtered to a man. sir alexander burnes owed his death to the faults of others rather than his own. having been previously at cabul as the british agent, and speaking the language perfectly, it was to him the people made their complaints, to him they looked for redress. they knew nothing of macnaghten. when they found their condition growing from bad to worse, their taxes increasing, their trade at a stand-still, food extremely dear, and employment wanting, it was on burnes that they laid the blame; and yet he was all the time endeavouring, but in vain, to persuade macnaghten that it was absolutely necessary to compel the ameer to abandon a course that was exasperating for people of all classes, from the most powerful chiefs to the poorest inhabitants of the city. burnes was unquestionably a man of great ability, and had he been in macnaghten's place with full power and responsibility, things would probably have turned out differently. the expedition from the first was a gigantic blunder, undertaken in the teeth of his remonstrances. in any case it was doomed to failure. it was impossible that we could maintain on the throne a man hated by the whole of his subjects--a race of fighting men, jealous to the last degree of their independence, and able to take full advantage of the natural strength of the country. but under the administration of an officer at once firm and resolute, and anxious to conciliate them in every way, the british force might have remained until the indian government could no longer support the expense of the occupation, and could then have withdrawn quietly with the puppet who had proved himself so utterly incapable of conciliating the people upon whom we had thrust him. the great fault in the character of burnes was instability--his alternate fits of sanguine hopefulness and deep depression, and his readiness to believe what suited his mood of the moment. these characteristics were no doubt heightened by the unfortunate position in which he found himself. he had had every reason to expect that in view of his previous residence in cabul and his knowledge of the character of the people, he would have the post of political officer of the afghan capital, and he only accepted a secondary position upon the understanding that macnaghten's appointment was a temporary one, and that he would succeed him. when, however, months and years elapsed, and he was still without any recognized position whatever, when his advice was never adopted and his opinions contemptuously set aside by a man infinitely his inferior, he naturally came to take the worst view of things, and his fits of depression became more frequent. at last he fell, not because his house was isolated, for it could have held out until aid had come, but because the three men whose duty it was to rescue him--macnaghten, the ameer, and elphinstone--were alike vacillating, undetermined, and incompetent. the ameer was the only one of these three to take any steps. when he heard of the riot he sent down a regiment of hindoostanee troops to rescue burnes. instead, however, of marching outside the town to the end of the street in which burnes's house was situated, they entered the city by the nearest gate, and tried to make their way through a maze of narrow lanes. their advance was desperately opposed. from every house and roof a fire of musketry was kept up, and, after losing two hundred of their number, they fled in utter confusion to the shelter of the citadel. elphinstone in his report says that he received the news at half-past seven that the town was in a ferment, and shortly after the envoy came and told him that it was in a state of insurrection, but that he did not think much of it, and expected the revolt would shortly subside. macnaghten suggested that brigadier shelton's force should proceed to the bala hissar to operate as might seem expedient, while the remaining force was concentrated in the cantonment, and assistance if possible sent to sir alexander burnes. it was not, however, until between nine and ten that shelton received his orders; and almost directly afterwards another note arrived telling him not to move, as the ameer had objected. to this shelton replied that in an insurrection of the city there was no time for indecision, and recommended the general at once to resolve upon what measures he would adopt. he was then told to march immediately to the bala hissar, where he would receive further instructions from macnaghten. just as he was marching off, a note came from this officer telling him to halt for further orders. he sent an engineer to ask the reason for this order, but the officer was cut down by an afghan while dismounting just outside the square where the ameer was sitting. soon after this the military secretary himself came with orders for him to enter the citadel. when he arrived there, the ameer asked him who sent him and what he came there for, and he was forbidden to enter the town. all that he could do was to cover the retreat of the ameer's hindoostanee troops. in consequence of all these delays, it was twelve o'clock before shelton moved into the bala hissar, by which time burnes and his friends had been murdered and the riot had spread. houses were burned, shops sacked, and the families of several british officers massacred. it is certain that had the slightest energy been shown, and had a small body of troops been despatched when burnes's first request for help arrived, the riot would have been nipped in the bud, for all accounts agree that for a considerable time not more than three hundred men took part in the attack, and even when shelton urged the necessity for prompt measures burnes might have been saved. except in the case of the rising at meerut in the indian mutiny, never did such disastrous effects result from the incompetence of a british general. the day passed slowly to angus. it was maddening to be helpless when great events were happening. until it became quite dark no one came near them, but at seven o'clock they heard the bolt of the door withdrawn, and a man entered with a torch, by whose light they at once recognized hassan, their guide over the passes. "you here, hassan!" angus exclaimed. "i had always thought of you as back again in your tower near bamian. is it you who has thus made us prisoners?" "we were sorry to use force, effendi, but there was no other way. sadut khan charged us to look after your safety, and we have kept you in sight for some days. he was living in this house in disguise. he was absent yesterday evening to take part in the conference with the other chiefs, and did not return until after midnight. then he said, 'there will be a tumult in the city to-morrow, hassan, and probably the house of the officer burnes will be attacked. what will come of it i do not know. i myself and the other chiefs are leaving at once, so that if things go badly we can disavow any connection with the affair. the young officer, my friend, is, as you know, at burnes's house. he must be rescued. prepare this room for him. if he leaves the house before the attack begins, you must seize him and carry him in here. if his servant is with him, bring him also; he too must be saved. he waited on me kindly, and did all in his power for me. if he should not leave the house, then you and your followers must join the mob and keep together, forcing yourselves to the front, so that you will be the first to enter the house. take long cloaks to throw round them, and get them out, even at the cost of your lives.' "i told him that it should be done. you saved his life, and you also saved ours, for we should have been suffocated in the snow-storm had you not cut your way out and come to our rescue. so it has been done. we were glad indeed when we saw you come out. had you not turned down that lane, i should have come up and accosted you, and, telling you that i had an important message to deliver to you, should have asked you to come with me to a quiet spot, where i might deliver it safely. as it was, directly you turned down, we ran round, and, as you know, captured you without noise and without being observed by you. you will, i trust, pardon me for having laid hands on you; but i had orders from the khan, who told me that i should have to use force, as he was sure you would not, however great the danger, he persuaded to leave burnes." "what has happened?" "the englishman and two others with him have been killed. one of the ameer's regiments entered the town, but was driven back. there is looting going on everywhere. many have been killed, and many houses burnt." "but what is our army doing?" "nothing. there is a force at the bala hissar, the rest are under arms in their camp." "it seems impossible!" angus exclaimed. "however," he went on, stifling his indignation for the time, "i have to thank you deeply, hassan, you and sadut khan, for having saved our lives. assuredly you took the only way to do so; for had you only told me of the danger that threatened sir alexander burnes, i should have returned to warn him and share his fate, whatever it might be. as it was, i cannot blame myself that i was absent. i thank you with all my heart. pray tell the khan when you see him that i am deeply grateful to him. he has nobly redeemed his promise, and i hope some day to thank him in person." "now, sahib, we will start at once," hassan said. "i have clothes for you to put over your own, and there is no fear of our being suspected. we will take you to within shot of your camp." he called out, and his four men entered, bringing with them afghan disguises. when these were put on, they sallied out at once. the five men were fully armed, and long afghan guns were given to angus and azim. the streets were full of people, for the most part in a state of wild excitement, though the better class looked grave at the prospect of the retribution that would probably fall upon the city, perhaps to-morrow or certainly in a day or two. none paid any attention to the group, who differed in no respect from the majority of those around them. issuing from one of the gates, they made their way to the cantonments. when within a few hundred yards the afghans stopped. after a hearty farewell and renewed thanks, angus and azim left them. they had taken off their disguises, and offered them to hassan to carry back, but he said, "you had best keep them; you may want them again. there is no saying what may happen." and they accordingly carried them with them. in a short time they were challenged by a sentry, and halted till the latter had called a sergeant and four men. then they went forward. angus was recognized at once, as he was known by sight to everyone in the camp. in a short time they met an officer, who told them the news of the massacre of burnes, his brother, and broadfoot, and their guard, which was already known, as one man had escaped the general slaughter, and had, after hiding for some hours, come into the camp. angus went at once to macnaghten's house and sent in his name. the envoy came out into the hall. "i am glad to see that you have escaped, mr. campbell. i thought that all had perished, though your name is not specially mentioned as among the victims." "i was not in the house, sir," angus replied. "sir alexander burnes had sent me out to gather information, and i and my servant were suddenly seized and carried into a house, where we were kept as prisoners all day. after it was dark we made our escape, having obtained disguises from a friendly afghan." "well, i am glad," macnaghten said; "but you must excuse me now, for the general is here, and we are holding a council. you had better for to-night take up your quarters in poor burnes's tent. i shall have time to attend to matters to-morrow." although burnes had his residence in the city, he had a large tent not far from the envoy's house. this he occupied when he had business in camp, and it was here that he received natives who brought him news, or who had grievances that they wished to report to him. here angus lay down for the night, with a deep feeling of thankfulness that his life had been spared, mingled with a foreboding that the troubles had only begun, and that there was yet much peril in store before the army were safely out of afghanistan. in the morning angus again went up to the envoy's. "i have been thinking, mr. campbell," macnaghten said when he entered, "as far as i have been able to think on any one subject, how your services can be best utilized temporarily. i think that, if you would not mind, you might be attached to the commissariat, and assist captain boyd and captain johnson." "i will gladly do so, sir," angus said. "i will take up the work at once." "anticipating your consent, i have already written a letter for you to take to those officers." glad to have work before him, angus went at once to the commissariat camp. the two officers were at breakfast. both rose and congratulated him heartily on his escape. "how on earth did you manage it?" he gave as brief an account as he had done to sir william macnaghten, and then handed them the letter he had received from the envoy. "that is good news," captain johnson said heartily. "we shall be glad indeed to have your aid. i will have a tent pitched for you at once by the side of ours. of course you have not breakfasted. sit down with us. what do you think of the state of affairs? you know a good deal more than we do of the disposition of the afghan chiefs." "i think things look very bad," angus said gravely. "after what seems to me the imbecility shown yesterday, to which the death of my chief is due, it is impossible to feel anything like confidence in the general." "that is the universal feeling in camp," captain johnson said. "if we had sale here i believe everything would go right, but poor elphinstone is only fit for a snug armchair in a comfortable club. he is no more able to cope with a crisis like this than an old woman would be. in fact, for choice i would take the average old woman. "orders have been given for an attack upon the town to-day, but it is more than likely that it will be countermanded. if elphinstone can make up his mind to throw his whole force, with the exception of a strong camp guard, against the city, we should certainly carry it. no doubt there might be a considerable loss of life, but that could not be helped. it would certainly be successful. then i should say we ought to turn the whole of the afghan population out of the town, move all our provisions and stores there, and settle down for the winter. we could beat off any attack that the afghans could make against us. as it is, we are terribly anxious about the stores. you know that i originally established all the magazines for the ameer's army in the bala hissar. then macnaghten came up with the ameer from jellalabad, and he told me that the ameer objected to the magazines being there. that was quite enough for macnaghten. he always gives in to the ameer's wishes, however ridiculous. so we had to leave the storehouses i had built and move out bag and baggage. "the only place that i could get was the camel sheds half-way between this and the town, and unless a strong garrison is sent down there the afghans are certain to take possession of them. but boyd's stores are even more important. they are within four hundred yards of the defences of the camp, and contain all our grain, our hospital stores, our wine and beer, our sugar, and everything else. and if his stores and mine are both lost, we shall have starvation staring us in the face at the end of a week. just look out over the plain. since daylight there has been a steady stream of men from the hills, and from all the villages round, flocking into the city; they have heard of the capture of my treasury, and are eager to share in the looting. if they succeed in capturing the stores and provisions, god help us all." chapter xiv a series of blunders numerous as had been the blunders, and great the mismanagement up to the nd of november, matters might yet have been retrieved had the conduct of affairs been in resolute and energetic hands. macnaghten was personally a brave and fearless man. had he at last felt the necessity for strong measures, an attack upon the city would certainly have been attended with success. now that the first burst of hate and passion had passed, the inhabitants were filled with apprehension at the punishment that would fall upon them, and none doubted that the british army would at once attack the town. the army itself expected this, and, furious at the treacherous massacre of sir alexander burnes and his comrades, were burning for the order to attack. the troops were under arms early, but no orders were issued for a forward movement. some hours later the th regiment of native infantry, with two mountain guns, came in from khoord cabul, having brushed aside the opposition it had met with on its march. with this valuable addition to the fighting strength in the camp all opposition could have been easily overcome, and yet until three o'clock in the afternoon nothing whatever was done. by this time what could have been effected with comparative ease in the early morning had become a far more difficult operation. vast numbers of the tribesmen had been pouring into the city since daybreak, and the two miles of plain between the camp and the city, which earlier in the day could have been traversed without a shot being fired, were now covered by a host of fierce enemies; and yet, after wasting so many valuable hours, the general, instead of throwing the whole of the force in the cantonments, and that of brigadier shelton at the bala hissar, against the city, sent only three companies of infantry and two guns to the attack. naturally this handful of men failed; and it was well for them that they did not penetrate into the city, for had they done so they would assuredly have been overwhelmed before they had gone fifty yards. however, the officer in command, seeing the impossibility of the task set him, withdrew his detachment in good order. the result of the day's operation, if it could be so called, was disastrous, the troops, who had until then been eager to be led against the enemy, and confident of success, were irritated and dispirited, and lost all confidence in their commander; while, on the other hand, the afghans were jubilant over what they considered the cowardice of the enemy. the next day the misfortune invited by the passive attitude of our troops happened. only eighty men were in charge of the commissariat fort. the little party were commanded by lieutenant warren. early in the day a threatening force of the enemy approached, and warren sent a messenger urgently asking for reinforcements. but the afghans had already occupied an old fort that commanded the road between the camp and the commissariat fort. considering the enormous importance of the stores, an overwhelming force should have been sent out to drive off the assailants, and to occupy the fort in such strength that it could be held against any assault. instead of doing this, two companies only of the th regiment were sent. the two captains in command were killed by the fire from the afghan fort, other officers were wounded, and the men fell so fast that the officer who was senior in command, seeing the impossibility of reaching the store, drew them off. then an order was issued--which was practically the death-warrant of the army--by general elphinstone, for a party of cavalry to go out and bring in the little garrison. this party suffered even more severely than the preceding one. from every wall, building, and orchard a storm of musketry broke out, and the troopers, after suffering great loss, again retired. the news that the general intended to abandon the store struck dismay into the officers of the commissariat. captain boyd hurried to head-quarters, and urged the general to send a force that would sweep away all opposition, and to hold the fort at all hazards. the general promised to send a reinforcement, but no relief was sent. as night was coming on, captain boyd and captain johnson again went to the general and pointed out in the strongest language the result that would follow the abandonment of the stores. the unhappy old man hesitated, but on a letter being brought in from lieutenant warren saying that the enemy were mining the walls, and some of the sepoys, seeing their position was desperate, were deserting, he promised that a strong detachment should be sent at two o'clock in the morning to storm the afghan fort and relieve the guard at the commissariat stores. orders were accordingly issued, but these were presently countermanded, and it was decided that the force should not move until daylight. by that time it was too late. warren had repulsed an attack on the walls, but seeing that the enemy were preparing to fire the gate and renew the attack, he retired through a passage that had on the previous day been dug under the wall, and reached the camp in safety. but this was not the only disaster that happened that day. captain johnson's store of provisions for the use of the ameer's troops, on the outskirts of the city, was also attacked. captain mackenzie, who was in command of the little garrison there, defended his post throughout the day with the greatest gallantry; but water was scarce, and ammunition failing, and large numbers of women and children were in the fort, with great quantities of baggage. urgent letters were sent asking for reinforcements, but no reinforcements came. had they arrived the situation would have been saved. the kuzzilbashes were ready to side with the british. several of their commanders were with mackenzie, but when they saw that no help was sent, they refused to join a cause that seemed to them lost. all night the fighting went on, and all next day, until his men were utterly worn out, and the ammunition exhausted. no more could be done, and when night came on, he moved out of the fort and fought his way to the cantonments--a brilliant action, which showed what could be accomplished by a mere handful of men well led. while mackenzie was thus fighting for the stores under his charge, the troops in the cantonments were condemned to see crowds of afghans looting the stores within four hundred yards of our camp, carrying off the supplies that had been garnered for their subsistence through the winter, and this without a man being set in motion or a gun brought to bear upon the plunderers. furious at the imbecility of their leaders, the soldiers clamoured to be led against the enemy. unable to resist the demand, the general ordered the th native infantry to move out; but instead of being led straight against the enemy, the officer in command hesitated and halted, and soon fell back with the indignant sepoys. general elphinstone was already talking of making terms with the enemy, and seemed to despair of victory when no attempt had been made to gain a success. on the th, however, a party of the th were again sent out under major griffiths. again it was seen what could be done by an energetic officer. the afghan fort was stormed, the enemy were driven out, and were routed by a party of horse, who dashed at them gallantly. the troops could be no longer restrained, and cavalry, infantry, and artillery poured out; but there was no general plan, and the consequence was, that although desultory fighting went on all day, nothing was accomplished. had any general plan of operation been laid down, and a combined action fought, the enemy would have been utterly unable to withstand our troops, worked up to fury as these were by the disgraceful inaction that had been forced upon them. in the meantime, starvation would have already stared the troops in the face had not captains boyd and johnson, aided by angus and other officers of their department, gone out to the native villages and succeeded in purchasing a certain amount of grain. but already the troops were on half rations, and even these scanty supplies could not long be available. the general, while his troops were out fighting, wrote to macnaghten, urging that negotiations should be opened with the enemy, and saying, "our case is not yet desperate, but it is becoming so very fast." macnaghten himself was conscious of this, conscious that, under such leading, the situation was fast becoming desperate, and he employed the moonshee, mohun lal, who was still in cabul under the protection of the kuzzilbash chief, to endeavour to bribe the chiefs of the ghilzyes. two lacs of rupees were offered. the chiefs gave a favourable reply, and then macnaghten, with his usual instability, was seized with a suspicion that they were not sincere, and abruptly broke off the negotiations, thereby mortally offending the ghilzye chiefs. fresh danger was threatening in another direction. mahomed akbar khan, the second son of dost mahomed, was on his way with a force from the north, and had already advanced as far as bamian. mohun lal suggested that an emissary should be sent to offer him a large allowance if he would join the british. his suggestion was carried out, and money was spent in other quarters lavishly. but it was now too late. a quarter of the sum would, a fortnight earlier, have sufficed to satisfy the demands of all the chiefs of the tribesmen. now that success had encouraged the assailants of our force, and the whole population had taken up arms against us, inspired alike by fanaticism and hatred and thirsting for blood, it was doubtful whether even the chiefs could restrain them had they chosen to do so. in their letters and journals the officers still spoke with kindness and respect of their unfortunate general. he had been a brave and able soldier, but age and terrible infirmities had rendered him altogether incapacitated for action. he had for months been suffering from gout, and had almost lost the use of his limbs. only once or twice, after his arrival to assume the command, had he been able to sit on horseback; for the most part he was wholly unable to walk. sometimes he was confined altogether to his couch; at others he was able to be taken out in a palanquin. his mind was also enfeebled by suffering. on the very day of the first outbreak he had been a little better, and had mounted his horse; but he had suffered a very severe fall, and was carried back to his quarters. it was altogether inexcusable that lord auckland, against the advice of the commander-in-chief and the remonstrances of his other military advisers, should have appointed such a man to a command which, beyond all others in india, demanded the greatest amount of energy and activity. there were many men who might have been worthily selected, men with a knowledge of the political conditions of afghanistan, of the feelings of the people, of their language and of their country. general elphinstone knew nothing of these things, and depended entirely upon the advice of others. had he relied solely upon that of macnaghten, things might have gone differently, but he asked advice from all around him, and took the last that was offered, only to change his mind again when he heard the opinion of a fresh counsellor. he was himself conscious that the position was too onerous for him, and sent down a medical certificate of his incapacity for action, and requested to be relieved. the request had been granted, and he was to have returned to india with macnaghten, but unhappily no other officer had been appointed to succeed him. it is upon lord auckland, rather than upon the unfortunate officer, who, in the teeth of the advice of his counsellors and of all common sense, was thrust into a position for which he was wholly unsuited, that the blame of the catastrophe of cabul should be laid. macnaghten, in hopes that brigadier shelton, a brave officer, but hot-tempered and obstinate, would be able to influence the general and to put an end to the deplorable indecision that paralysed the army, persuaded elphinstone to send for him to come in from the bala hissar to the camp and bring in with him a regiment of the ameer's troops. he came into the cantonment of the th, and his arrival was hailed with the greatest satisfaction, as it was believed that at last something would be done. unfortunately, however, shelton's energy and the general's weakness were as oil on water. no two men were less calculated to pull together. shelton enforced his arguments with a vehemence that seemed to the general insubordinate in the extreme; while the brigadier, on the other hand, was unable to make allowance for the physical and mental weakness of the general, and was maddened by the manner in which orders that had but an hour before been issued were countermanded. on the morning of the th the enemy mustered in great force, and occupying a small fort within musket-shot of the defences, opened a galling fire. macnaghten only obtained the general's consent to a party going out to capture the fort by telling him that unless he gave the order he should himself take the responsibility of doing so, for that at any risk the fort must be captured. thereupon shelton was instructed to take two thousand men and attack it. when they were on the point of starting elphinstone countermanded the orders. shelton, in a fury, laid the case before the envoy, who was as eager as himself, and the general was again persuaded to give the order and the force advanced. it was intended to blow open the gate with powder, but by some accident only a wicket by the side of the main entrance was blown in. led by colonel mackrell the storming party, consisting of two companies of europeans and four of native infantry, advanced. they could with difficulty make their way through the narrow entrance, for they were exposed as they did so to a heavy musketry fire, but two officers and a few soldiers pushed through, and the garrison, believing that the whole column was following them, fled through the opposite gate. but unhappily they were not followed. a body of afghan cavalry threatened to attack the storming party outside, and these, native and british alike, were seized with an unaccountable panic and fled. in vain their officers endeavoured to arrest their flight. the events of the previous week had terribly demoralized them. shelton set them a noble example by remaining on horseback alone, and at last shamed them into returning. again the afghan horse approached, and again they fled. again shelton's expostulations and example brought them back. the guns in the cantonments drove the afghans off, and shelton led his men up to the capture of the fort. in the meantime the handful of men who had entered the fort had been engaged in a desperate struggle for life. the afghans, discovering how small was the number of their assailants, re-entered the fort and fell upon them in overwhelming numbers. when shelton's force entered, colonel mackrell had fallen mortally wounded, and was carried into the cantonments to die. lieutenant bird, with two sepoys, were the sole survivors. they had, when the enemy poured in, taken possession of a stable and barricaded themselves there, and had successfully repulsed every attack. when they were rescued their ammunition was almost exhausted, but they were uninjured, and no fewer than thirty dead afghans lying in front of the stable bore mute testimony to the steadiness and accuracy of their aim. several small forts were abandoned by the enemy, and a quantity of grain was found in them, but as no measures were taken to convey it into the camp, it was lost again when the troops retired. desultory fighting went on all the afternoon without any decisive results, and the next two or three days passed quietly. in the meantime the moonshee was making every effort to bring over some of the chiefs to our side. macnaghten was sending off letter after letter to the political officer with sale, urging the necessity for an instant advance of the force at jellalabad. on the th the enemy occupied a hill within range of the cantonment, and planting two guns there opened a steady fire. macnaghten spent hours in endeavouring to persuade the general and brigadier of the absolute necessity for driving the enemy off the hill, but without success, and it was not until he took the responsibility upon himself that a detachment under shelton was ordered to be sent. it was then four o'clock in the afternoon. the troops advanced in three columns, and the infantry rushed forward with such impetuosity that the two guns with them could not arrive in time to herald their attack. the detachment poured in a volley within ten yards' distance, but they were unsteady from their exertions in mounting the hill, and their fire took no effect. a minute later the afghan cavalry charged down upon them. the attack was unexpected, the men in confusion, and the afghans rode through and through the ranks. the british troops retreated down the slope, where they re-formed behind the reserve; the guns opened fire with great effect, and the infantry again marched up the hill. our cavalry now came into action and drove the enemy before them. the infantry carried the height, and the enemy fled, abandoning their guns. it was now getting dark. a party of the ameer's infantry removed one of the guns; but the afghan marksmen were keeping up a heavy musketry fire, and the troops, british as well as sepoys, were so demoralized that they refused to advance and carry off the other. it was therefore spiked and rolled down the hill, while the smaller gun was brought by the ameer's troops into the cantonment. the enemy, now strongly reinforced, attempted to intercept the retreat, but were beaten off. on the th major pottinger and another officer came in wounded, and reported that the ghoorka regiment that had been retiring from kohistan had been entirely destroyed. they defended themselves courageously against overwhelming forces, and held the barracks they occupied until maddened by thirst; then they rushed to a stream, where the enemy fell upon them and cut them to pieces, the two mounted officers alone escaping after innumerable dangers. on the th macnaghten heard that there was no hope whatever of assistance from sale, who was himself surrounded with difficulties. he now urged that the force should all retire to the bala hissar, behind whose strong walls they could have maintained themselves. but shelton vehemently opposed the step, which would have saved the army from destruction, urging that the abandonment of the cantonments would be an acknowledgment of defeat. on the rd of november the enemy again appeared on the hill from which they had been driven, and a strong force moved out against it. strangely enough, however, they only took one gun with them. the day was disgraceful as well as disastrous, for the british force was signally defeated and the gun was lost, and the troops re-entered the cantonment in headlong flight, hotly pursued by the afghans till they reached the protection of the earthworks. their conduct showed how completely the imbecility and vacillation of their commanders, and the effect of the insufficient rations on which they had to subsist, had destroyed the moral of the troops. the men who a month before could have driven the afghans before them like sheep, were now unable to cope with them even when in superior numbers. on the th elphinstone addressed a letter to macnaghten stating his opinion that their position could no longer be maintained, and that he should at once enter into negotiations with the enemy. he accordingly sent a message to the insurgent chiefs inviting them to send in a deputation to discuss the conditions of the treaty. two of their leaders came in, but as they demanded that the british should surrender at discretion, giving themselves up, with all their arms, ammunition, and treasure, as prisoners of war, macnaghten resolutely rejected the offered terms. angus had been constantly employed from the day he reached the cantonments. his work was to go out with small parties of the natives employed by the commissariat to bring in the grain that boyd and johnson had purchased. there was no slight risk in the work, for although the villagers were glad to sell their corn on good terms, the party who fetched it ran the risk of being cut off by any band of tribesmen they might encounter. of an evening he talked over the situation and prospects with the two officers. absorbed in work as they all were, they were less influenced by the feeling of hopelessness than those who had nothing to do but to rage over the trap into which they had fallen through the incapacity of their leaders. still, they did not attempt to disguise from themselves the magnitude of the danger. "i have no faith in any treaty that could be made," boyd said. "an afghan is only bound by his word as long as it pays him to keep it. they will take macnaghten's money, and will promise that we shall be allowed to go down the passes without molestation; but i am mistaken indeed if we shall not be attacked the moment we enter them. if they do so, few of us will ever get through. the men are weak now from want of sufficient food. they are utterly dispirited and demoralized, as is shown by their shameful flight yesterday. besides, they will be encumbered with a host of camp followers, women, and children. i am still of opinion that our only hope is to take refuge in the bala hissar, and shelton's vehement opposition has already put a stop to that. for myself, i would rather that they attacked us here, even if the attack meant our annihilation. it would be better to die so than cooped up hopelessly in the passes. at best the march would be a terrible one. the cold is severe already, and we hear that the snow is deep in the passes; not so deep as to render them impracticable, but deep enough to render the passage a terrible one." "of course we are bound to stay with the rest and do our best to the end. were it not for that, we three might escape. we all speak the language well enough to pass as natives. you, indeed, have already done so. however, of course that is not to be thought of; indeed, it would probably amount to the same thing in the end, for we could scarcely hope to reach either jellalabad or candahar." "no, it is not to be thought of, johnson," his companion said. "we have to do our duty to the last. i still hope that the general may yet have an hour of inspiration and deliver battle in good order. i believe that the troops would fight well if they did but see that they were properly handled." on the following day they learned that akbar khan had arrived. he was greeted with great enthusiasm and much firing of guns. macnaghten had a faint hope that he would side with us, as his father, mother, and brothers were in our hands in india; but, on the other hand, he had every reason for bitter animosity against the british, who had, without any ground for complaint, invaded the country and dethroned his father. the prince bore the reputation of being frank, generous, and far brighter and more cheerful than the majority of his countrymen; at the same time he was passionate and impulsive, given to sudden bursts of anger. the wrongs that he and his family had suffered were, indeed, at present predominant in his mind. for two years he himself had been an exile from his country. his father, who had tried so hard to gain the friendship of the british, had been dethroned by them; and as it was notorious that their captives were always honourably treated, he felt that no action upon his part would recoil upon their heads. he himself was now the heir to the throne if he could win it. he was extremely popular among the people, who hailed his advent as giving them a leader whom they could rely upon, under whom the chiefs of the tribesmen could lay aside their mutual jealousy and animosity and join in the effort to drive the foe for ever from their country. he did not, however, at once assume the chief authority. the nawab mahomed zemaun khan, a cousin of dost mahomed, had been proclaimed ameer by the tribesmen, and all orders were sent forth in his name. he was a man of humane and honourable nature, of polished manners, and affable address. as soon as he learned the state of affairs, akbar khan took immediate steps to prevent further supplies being taken into camp. he burned the villages where grain had been sold, and placed bands of men to attack any parties coming out from the camp to purchase grain. day after day passed, messengers came and went between macnaghten and the nawab, but nothing was done; the food supply dwindled; only three days' rations remained in camp. the supplies doled out were scarcely sufficient to keep life together. the oxen and other baggage animals were in such a state of starvation as to be wholly unfit for service. the store of fuel had long been used up, some men died of cold, and all suffered much. macnaghten was still hopeful, and early in december again urged a retirement, but in vain. the enemy had now guns planted in several positions, and kept up an almost constant cannonade on the camp. on the th there were but three days' half rations left, and the general informed macnaghten by letter that it was absolutely necessary to surrender upon the best terms that could be obtained; and the three senior officers also signed the letter, saying that they concurred in it. on the th there was but one day's food left for the fighting men, the camp followers were starving. again and again macnaghten urged that a force should sally out and at all costs bring in provisions, but the general knew that the men could not be relied upon to fight. the time had come when even macnaghten saw that all hope had gone save in surrender. he drew out the rough draft of a treaty, and met the leading chiefs of the afghans at about a mile from the river. by this treaty the british were to evacuate afghanistan. they were to be supplied with provisions for the journey, shah soojah was to abdicate, and to have the option of accompanying them; but if he did so, his wife and family were to remain as hostages until dost mahomed and his family were released. the troops at jellalabad were also to retire, as well as those at ghuznee and candahar. four british officers were to be left as hostages, to return to india on the arrival of dost mahomed and his family on the frontier. the conference lasted two hours, and its main stipulations were agreed to. the meeting then broke up, on the understanding that the british troops were to evacuate the cantonments in three days, and that provisions should in the meantime be sent in. the treaty was a humiliating one, but macnaghten was not to blame for it. when the three military chiefs had declared that there was nothing for it but surrender, he was forced to make the best arrangement he could, and the terms of the treaty were as good as could have been expected in the circumstances. when the conference broke up captain trevor, one of macnaghten's staff, accompanied the chief to the city as a hostage for the sincerity of the envoy. on the th the bala hissar was evacuated. akbar khan pledged himself to conduct the garrison safely to the cantonments, and kept his promise, succeeding in inducing the crowds of horsemen who gathered round to let the little detachment pass. the provisions, however, were not sent in as agreed, and the chiefs refused to send them until the garrisons were withdrawn from the forts they occupied round the cantonments. the parties were each suspicious of the other's good faith. on the th snow began to fall heavily. macnaghten tried desperately to win over some of the chiefs, lavishing money among them. the afghans made fresh demands, and demanded more hostages, and lieutenants conolly and airey were handed over to them. on the nd akbar khan sent in fresh proposals, to the effect that the british were to remain in afghanistan till the spring, and then to withdraw as if of their own free-will. shah soojah was to remain as ameer, and akbar as his minister. as a reward for these services akbar was to receive an annuity of £ , and a bonus of £ , . macnaghten accepted the terms, and agreed to meet akbar. the offer was so strange that elphinstone and others thought that it was probably a plot. macnaghten replied that he did not think that it was so, but in any case he would go. after breakfast he sent for the officers of his staff, lawrence, mackenzie, and trevor, who had returned, and begged them to accompany him to the meeting. an hour later they set out with a few horsemen. as they rode on macnaghten admitted to his officers that he was well aware that it was a dangerous enterprise, but that he was playing for a heavy stake and the prize was worth the risk. "at all events," he said, "a thousand deaths are preferable to the life i have of late been leading." the parties met at some hillocks six hundred yards from the cantonments, where some horse-cloths had been spread upon the snow by akbar khan's servants. macnaghten presented to akbar a splendid horse he had admired. they dismounted, and macnaghten took his place on the blankets. trevor, mackenzie, and lawrence sat behind him. suddenly the envoy and his companions were violently seized from behind. the three officers were dragged away, and each compelled to mount horses ridden by afghan chiefs, who rode off through the crowd. trevor unfortunately slipped from his insecure seat, and was instantly cut to pieces, while the other two reached mahomed khan's fort alive. in the meantime the envoy himself was struggling desperately on the ground with akbar khan. exasperated by the resistance of his victim, whom he had only intended to seize, the afghan's passion blazed out, and drawing from his girdle a pistol, which macnaghten had given him the day before, he shot him through the body. instantly his followers closed round and hacked him to pieces. thus died a gentleman who, in other circumstances, might have made a great reputation for himself. possessed of unusual talent, his course was marred by his propensity to believe all that he wished, to disbelieve all that ran counter to his own sanguine projects. during the last month of his life he did all that man could do to avert a catastrophe, but he had been unable to instil his spirit into any of the military commanders, or to induce them to take the only course to redeem the position, by giving battle to the foe that surrounded them. he was the author of the ill-fated expedition to afghanistan, he was its noblest victim. his peculiar temperament was fatal to him. even when there was no longer any ground for hope he still continued to be sanguine. he had all along believed in himself, and scoffed at the warnings of men who knew the country and people--of burnes, rawlinson, pottinger, and others. he was thoroughly sincere; he was always able to convince himself that what he believed must be true, and he acted accordingly. he was not a strong man; had he been so the course of events might have been altered. he deferred in every way to shah soojah's wishes, however much these might be opposed to his own judgment. he allowed him to misgovern the country, to drive the natives to desperation by the exactions of his tax-gatherers, and to excite the bitterest animosity of the chiefs by the arrogance with which he treated them. a strong man would have put a stop to all this--would have intimated to the ameer that he held the throne solely by the assistance of british bayonets, and that unless he followed british counsels he would at once yield to the oft-repeated wishes of the indian government and order the retirement of the troops. chapter xv a doomed army even the murder of the british envoy within sight of the camp failed to arouse the military authorities from their deadly lethargy. sullenly the troops remained in their cantonments. not a man was put in motion to avenge the deed or to redeem the honour of the army. the only idea was to renew the negotiations that had been broken short by the murder of their political chief. the commissariat had nothing to do. beleaguered as they were, it was impossible to collect provisions unless a strong force was sent out, and the military authorities refused to allow a man to be put in motion. they had no confidence in their soldiers, and the soldiers had none in them. it was their leaders who had made them what they were. macnaghten in his wrath had spoken of them as miserable cowards, but they were not cowards. they had at first full confidence in themselves, and if ordered would gladly have attacked the afghan forces in the open and have carried cabul by storm. but kept in enforced inactivity, while fort after fort was wrested from them without an effort being made to relieve the garrisons, while the whole of their provisions for the winter were carried off before their eyes by an enemy they despised, and feeling that on the few occasions on which they were led from their entrenchments there was neither plan nor order--no opportunity for showing their valour, none for engaging in battle, they lost heart. day by day they were exposed to continual insults from their exultant foes, day by day exposed to a heavy cannon and musketry fire, while the food served out was insufficient to maintain their strength--almost insufficient to keep them alive. it is not wonderful that their fighting powers were lost, and that they had become little more than a rabble in uniform. angus had now no official duties to perform, and he spent much of his time with his old friend eldred pottinger, now a major, who, after macnaghten's murder, took his place, by right of seniority as well as of energy and talent, as chief political officer. he had been employed in the west, but had been sent to cabul, and very shortly afterwards had proceeded to kohistan, returning almost the sole survivor of the little force that was stationed there. his counsel since then had always been for energetic measures, but his voice, like that of macnaghten, availed nothing. he had, however, taken no prominent part in affairs, having been confined to his bed by the wound he had received. he was now recovering from it, and took up the work with the same energy as he had displayed at herat. as he said to angus, "it seems to be my fate to have to do with incapable men. at herat it was yar mahomed and kamran, here it is shelton and elphinstone. elphinstone and kamran have both in their younger days been fighting men. both are utterly worn out bodily and mentally by disease and age. "shelton is a brave man, a hard fighter, but his temper overmasters him. when in the field he shows personal gallantry, but no military capacity whatever. at first he was always in opposition to the general; he has given that up as useless, and beyond always endeavouring to thwart his chief when the latter was roused to momentary flashes of energy by macnaghten, he has sunk into a deep gloom, as if he regarded it as absolutely hopeless to struggle further. i would that any other than myself had been placed in the position i now hold. the terms proposed to macnaghten were hard enough, they will be still harder, still more disgraceful, now. but however disgraceful they may be, they will be accepted by the military leaders, and my name will be associated with the most humiliating treaty a british officer has ever been called upon to sign." his previsions were correct. negotiations were renewed without the slightest allusion being made to the murder of macnaghten, and as if such an event had never happened. while these were going on, little food was allowed to enter camp--enough to sustain life, but no more. at last the terms were settled. the afghan chiefs agreed to supply provisions, and to send in baggage animals, upon payment being made for them. six officers were to be handed over as hostages, all muskets and ordnance stores in the magazines, all money in the treasury, and all goods and property belonging to dost mahomed, were to be surrendered, and dost himself and his family to be returned. no provision whatever was made for the safety of the man we had placed upon the throne. pottinger endeavoured in vain to obtain better conditions. he received no support from the military chiefs; and even when at last he agreed to the terms, he did so with little hope that they would be observed. warnings came from friends in the city that no dependence whatever could be placed upon the chiefs, and that in spite of all promises the force would certainly be attacked on its way down through the passes. no step was taken by the chiefs to send in either provisions or carriage animals, and the escort that was to accompany them did not make its appearance. on the th of january the military authorities determined to march out, contrary to the advice of pottinger, who argued that without carriage and provisions, and without the protection of the chiefs as promised, the prospects of four thousand troops and twelve thousand followers being able to make their way down through the passes was small indeed. angus had come to rely very much upon azim for information as to what was passing outside the cantonment. the latter had during the three years come to speak the afghan language perfectly, and in the attire of a peasant often went out after dark, mixed with the insurgents, and entered the city. he had each time he went out brought back a less hopeful report than on the previous one, and angus was the more impressed since the young fellow was generally cheery, and disposed to look on the bright side of things, taking indeed comparatively little interest in what was going on around him, having absolute confidence that his master would find some way out of any difficulty that might confront him. "i quite agree with all you say, azim, but i am powerless to act in any way. if i were here as a private person i should certainly disguise myself and endeavour to make my way down to candahar, but as an officer i must remain at my post, come what may, and share the fate of the rest. but if you are disposed to try and get down, i will not throw any obstacle in your way, and will furnish you with money sufficient to pay your way either back to persia or down into india, where, with your knowledge of languages, you will have no difficulty in finding employment." azim laughed. "no, master, whatever comes, i will stay with you. just as you are in the employment of government and cannot leave, so am i in your employment." angus did not attempt to push the matter further, for he felt that it would be useless; and indeed, although he would have done what he could to procure his follower's safety, he felt that he would be a great loss to him in many ways. they had been so long together, and had gone through so many dangers in companionship, that he regarded azim as a friend rather than as a servant. "when you have been in the city, azim, have you ever seen our friend sadut?" "no, sir; i have heard that he has been in the city many times, and that he was with the afghan horsemen who drove our people in, but i have not seen him. should i speak to him if i do so?" "yes, you might thank him in my name, and your own, for having saved our lives the other day; but on no account say anything to him about the future. i cannot make any overtures for help to a man who, though a friend of my own, is fighting against us. and indeed, however willing he might be to aid me to the best of his power, he could not do so. if we are really attacked in the pass, mixed up as we shall be with the camp followers, we could not be found in the crowd; and you may be sure that the tribesmen and the ghazee fanatics will be mad with bloodshed and hate, and that even a chief would be unable to stand between them and their victims. even if he were to send a messenger to me to say that he and his men would again save me, if i would let him know in which part of the column i shall ride, i should refuse to do so. it would be an act of treachery on my part to others, weaker and less able to take care of themselves than i am." on the afternoon of the day when the force moved out of the cantonments eldred pottinger sent for angus. "are you ready to undertake a hazardous mission?" he asked. "it is so hazardous that i would send no one upon it, were it not that i consider that those who stay here are running as great a risk. after the murder of burnes and macnaghten, i have not the smallest faith in the chiefs keeping to their promises, and the manner in which they have failed now to carry out the terms of the treaty heightens my distrust in them. i do not believe that any of the messengers that have been sent down of late have succeeded in getting through; and indeed, until to-day it was impossible to say whether we should really start or not. the messages sent down were necessarily vague, and were indeed only requests for aid. i know, and no doubt sale knows, that it is as difficult for him to fight his way up the passes as it is for us to make our way down; but now that, in spite of my advice, elphinstone and shelton and the other officers have decided to wait no longer, but to start at once, a specific message must be sent." "i am ready to try to get through," angus said. "i have no doubt that while we have been negotiating here, the tribesmen from all the country round have been gathering in the passes. the only way would be for me to join some party of men from the villages going that way. once fairly in the pass and among the tribesmen, i could leave the party and mingle with others. of course it would be slow work going on afoot, but i should say that it would be quite impossible on horseback." "i have not much hope that the mission will be of any real use, for sale is himself besieged in jellalabad. still, one must make an attempt. i shall enter in my journals--trusting that they will some day be recovered--that as a last hope i have accepted the offer of mr. angus campbell to carry a message to general sale saying that we are starting, and begging him, if it be possible, to make a diversion in our favour by advancing as far as he can to meet us. i will not give you any written document. you are well known to many of the officers who went down with sale, therefore no question can arise as to the message you bear being a genuine one. if you were searched and any letter found upon you, it would be your death-warrant. still, i believe if anyone could get through alive, you can." "i will do my best anyhow," angus said, "and i will start as soon as it becomes dark. it is all easy enough as far as khoord cabul, after that i shall keep a sharp look-out; if i overtake any party of villagers i shall join them." "i shall come and say good-bye to you before you start, campbell." angus returned at once to his tent. "you have my disguise ready and your own, azim?" "yes, sir, i have both ready, and have two of their long guns and some daggers and pistols." "i have my own pistols, azim." "yes, master, and it will be as well to take them; but they would be seen directly if you had them in your girdle." "no doubt they would, azim, but there are a good many english pistols among them now. there were three pairs they got at sir alexander's house, and there have been several officers killed since. i can give out that i took part in the fight at sir alexander's and got these pistols as my share of the plunder." "are you going anywhere, master?" "yes, i am going to try to get down through the passes to jellalabad. we shall start as soon as it is dark. it will be a terribly dangerous journey, but i hardly think it will be more dangerous than going down with the troops." "what are we to take, master? i will get it ready." "there is not much that we can take. i will go down to the store myself and get eight or ten pounds of ground grain. there is not much of it, for the mills have all been smashed, and we have had to serve the grain out whole; but i know that there are two or three sacks left in the stores. there is no meat to be had, nor spirits--not that i would take spirits if i could get them, for if they were found upon me it would excite suspicion at once. another thing, i must stain myself. my face and hands are nearly as brown as those of the afghans, but if we were searched and they took our things off, they would see in an instant that i was a white. i don't know how we are to get stain." "i should think, master, that if we were to bake some grain quite black, and then pound it and pour boiling water over it so as to make it like very strong coffee, it might do." "a very good idea. well, i shall not want you for the next two hours. i shall go round and see some of my friends and say good-bye to them. mind, whatever you do don't say a word to anyone about our leaving." "i will be sure not to do that, master." azim went out to a little tent of thick native blanket a few yards from that of his master. there he sat looking through the entrance until he saw his master leave his tent. five minutes later he issued out in his afghan dress, long coat lined with sheep-skins, black lamb's-wool cap, high boots, and sheep-skin breeches, and at once set off at a brisk walk. there were at all times many afghans in the camp, and indeed many of the camp followers had, since the cold set in, adopted the same dress; therefore no attention was paid to him, and no questions were asked by the sentries as he passed out at the gates. as soon as he got among the gardens and enclosures he broke into a run, which he continued until he reached a village a mile and a half away, and here he entered one of the cottages. "have you news for us?" one of the four men sitting there said. "yes, and good news. my master starts as soon as it is dark. he will be on foot, and he is going to try and make his way down through the passes." "that is good news indeed," the afghan said. "i was afraid that we should never get a chance. which road will he go by?" "i can't say exactly, but he is sure to leave by the western gate. he would have more chance of getting away unnoticed on that side. of course we shall both be in our afghan dress." "we will be on the look-out. i suppose that he will be armed?" "yes, he will carry one of your long guns and a brace of pistols. you had best choose some spot where you can close on him suddenly, for he would certainly fight till the last." "we will be careful," the man said. "i don't want to get a pistol ball in my body. we shall follow at a distance until we find a convenient spot." "he is sure to keep along at the foot of the hill so as to avoid your people on the plain." "it will suit us best also, as we shall not have far to carry him." "mind, you must make a struggle when you seize me as if i was violently resisting. then, when we start you must order me to walk, and threaten to blow out my brains if i try to escape. my master can learn the truth afterwards. if he were to know it now, he would be furious with me; but in a few days, when fighting is going on in the passes, and a great disaster occurs, he will thank me for having prevented him from throwing away his life, especially as he knows perfectly well that the english in jellalabad could not come out to assist those here." when angus returned to the tent he found azim busy roasting the grain. the afghan costume had been laid aside. "everything is ready, master. the grain is nearly done, and it won't take me long to pound it up. i got a few sticks down at the stores and the kettle is just boiling." "then as soon as it is ready i will stain myself, but i sha'n't put on the afghan dress until the last thing. have you cooked some of the flour?" "yes, sir, i have made four cakes. they are baking in the ashes now. i thought perhaps you would eat one before we started, and we can carry the others for to-morrow." "i wish, azim," angus said, "that there was some chance of this journey being useful, but i feel convinced that no good can come of it. the moonshee has sent in a report that confirms the rumours we heard. there can be no doubt that general sale is strongly beleaguered in jellalabad, and will have all his work to do to hold the place, and therefore it will be absolutely impossible for him to fight his way up the pass." "then why should you go, master?" "because i have been asked to go as a forlorn hope; and also because, however great the risk i may run, i do not think that it is greater than it would be if i went down with the army. we have no baggage animals. we have food for only three days more, and it will only last that time by cutting down the rations still further. the unfortunate camp followers are for the most part without warm clothing of any sort, and will die by thousands. as to the troops, i have no doubt that most of them will fight when they know that unless they cut their way through they are doomed, but their chance of victory is small. here in the open plain they might even now, if well led and worked up to enthusiasm by a stirring speech, thrash the afghans, numerous as these may be; but pent up in the passes, under a fire from every hillside by a foe they cannot reach--for in their present weak state they could never scale the mountains--i believe it will be a massacre rather than a fight. at any rate, if we are to be killed, i would rather be shot as a spy than go through such awful scenes as there will be before a bullet finishes me." "i don't want to die at all, master; but if it be the will of allah, so be it. but, as you say, i would rather be killed straight off than struggle on through the snows in the passes and get killed in the end." as soon as it became dusk, angus and his follower put on their disguises. a few minutes later eldred pottinger came in. "well, as far as looks go you will pass anywhere, campbell, and certainly as regards language there is no fear of your being suspected. the real difficulty will be in explaining where you came from. every village has sent its contingent of fighting men, and if it happened that you met anyone from the place you pretended to come from, the consequences would be very awkward." "i intend to give out that i have come down from arcab, which is a little village to the south of ghuznee. i went out there once with a detachment to buy some cattle. it is hardly likely that any of the men from that place would have come here, for they would naturally join the bands that are threatening our garrison there. of course i can invent some story to account for my not doing the same." pottinger nodded. "well, campbell, i hope that you will get well through it. as i told you, i have not a shadow of hope that sale will be able to lend a hand to us. still, although it is but one in a thousand chances, i feel that it ought to be attempted; and in your case i say honestly that i consider there is no greater risk in your going down by yourself, and having your own wits to depend upon, than in going down with the army--if one can call this broken and dispirited soldiery an army--for in that case the bravest and clearest head would share the fate, whatever that may be, of the dullest and most cowardly." "i quite see that, and agree with you that nothing can be slighter than the chances of the army getting down safely. be assured that whatever happens, so far from blaming you, i shall consider that you did the best for me by sending me on this mission." "i will walk with you to the gate," pottinger said. "in the daytime there is no check upon anyone passing in or out, but at night the sentries are on the alert, and as you are both armed, you would certainly be stopped." a minute was spent in packing their scanty stores into the pockets of their coats, then they started for the gate. here pottinger, after seeing them through, shook hands cordially not only with angus but with azim, whom he had learned to like and value for the devotion he showed to his master in herat. they proceeded on their way without meeting any parties of afghans until they neared the foot of the hill, then, as they were passing along a path through an orchard, a party of men suddenly sprang out upon them, and they were thrown down on their faces before either had time to offer any resistance. angus, indeed, had repressed the natural impulse to try to draw one of his pistols. resistance would have meant death, and it seemed to him that these could only be plunderers. "what are you doing, fools?" he exclaimed. "do you not see that we are friends?" no answer was given. his captors were binding his hands tightly to his side; then before raising him they muffled his head in a blanket. he was then lifted to his feet. he heard the men say to azim that he was to accompany them, and that if he attempted escape he would at once be shot. a man on each side of him put his hands on his shoulder, and one said: "you are to walk quietly with us; escape is impossible, and it were well for you not to attempt it." angus indeed felt that escape was out of the question. he was unable to conjecture into whose hands he had fallen. they were not bent upon plunder, for had they been so, they would have taken his arms, searched him, and probably cut his throat afterwards. it seemed impossible to him that they could know he was a british officer, and the only conceivable explanation he could think of was that men had been scattered all round the cantonment to prevent anyone from leaving, or going out with messages to one or other of the chiefs, and that they had seen him and azim come out, had followed and seized them, and were now taking them to some chief to be questioned as to why they were in the british camp after dark, and for what purpose they had left. certainly the affair reminded him of his friendly capture at cabul; but it seemed to him altogether impossible that sadut could have learned that he was about to start on a mission, or that had he even learned it, he could have known that he and azim would have followed the road on which they had been captured. he soon found that the path they were following was an upward one, and as it became steeper and steeper, he was sure that he was being taken into the hills. once or twice he addressed his captors, but received no answer. he walked, as far as he could tell, for two hours. at last there was a pause. he heard a door open, and felt that he was being taken into a hut. then for the first time the pistols and knives were taken from his sash. his captors, after addressing a few whispered words to some men who were already in the hut, retired, closing the door behind them and piling heavy stones against it. the blanket was then taken off his head. a bright fire was burning in the hut, which he saw was some fifteen feet square. four men, armed to the teeth, were standing by the fire. there was no door save the one by which they had been brought in, and it was evident that the hut consisted only of this room. "you are unhurt, i hope," he said to azim. "yes. i was knocked down before i had time to think of doing anything." "do you know where they have brought us?" "no. they threw a cloth over my head." "how could this have happened, azim? i cannot understand it at all." "no more can i, sir." "when we started to fight against the infidels we never thought that we should be attacked by our own countrymen. it seems to me that there must be some mistake." then he turned to the afghans. "why are we brought here? what harm have we done?" "that i know not," the man said. "you must have done something, or our comrades would not have brought you here. that is their business." "it seems to me," angus said angrily, "it is our business too. our tribe are not at war with any others, and it is a new thing that afghans should attack each other when all are uniting to fight the strangers." "i know nothing about it. i only know that our comrades brought you here, and left us to look after you. there are plenty of traitors among the men who have taken the infidel's gold. they will all be reckoned with when we have finished with the white men. well, they did not tell us to keep you bound, and we will take off the cords if you swear by the faith that you will make no attempt to escape." angus hesitated. it seemed to him that if two of the four men slept he and azim could, if unbound, snatch at their weapons, and at least make a fight for it; that chance would be gone if he gave his word. "no," he said; "i will make no bargain with men who have deprived me of my liberty." "well, just as you like," the other said, seating himself by the fire, "it makes no matter to us." "we may as well sit down too," angus said, and advancing near the fire he sat down by the side of the afghans. azim did the same. "where did you say you came from?" the man who had been the spokesman of the party asked. angus briefly named the village he had before decided upon, and then sat looking silently at the fire. he saw that his chance of being able to discover at present any plan for escape was very small. presently one of the men said, "let us have supper," and rising he went to a corner of the hut, where the carcass of a sheep was hanging from the rafters. he cut off a leg, divided this into slices, which he spitted on a ramrod, and then put it over the fire. in the meantime another had unceremoniously placed the four cakes that were taken from the captives in the embers to warm up. when the meat was done, the leader said to angus: "we do not wish to starve you. we will untie the hands of one of you, and let him eat; when he has done, we will fasten him up again, and let the other eat in the same way." this was done. when they were again securely bound angus said in pushtoo: "you may as well lie down now, friend. perhaps in the morning the men who have taken us will find out that they have made a mistake and will let us go, with apologies for having treated friends so roughly." they lay down close together, but angus was afraid even to whisper to his follower, lest it should excite the suspicion of their guard. for an hour he remained watchful, then he saw two of the afghans lie down, but the other two lighted their pipes, and were evidently going to keep watch. he had tried quietly once or twice to see if the cords that bound him could be loosened, but he found that although they had not been tied unpleasantly tight, they were securely fastened, and did not yield in the slightest to his efforts. he therefore gave up the idea of trying to free himself from them; and indeed, even if the guards should all sleep, the prospect was hopeless, for from the noise made in rolling the rocks against the door, it was certain that this could not be opened without waking the sleepers. it would therefore be necessary as a preliminary to kill all of them, and even then he might not be able to break open the door. at any rate, there was nothing to do at present. after trying in vain to discover an explanation of their capture he fell asleep. he woke several times in the night, but found that two men were always on guard. the next morning he heard the stones removed from the door, but no one entered. the afghans breakfasted, and this time permitted their captives to share the meal with them. from time to time one or other of the afghans went to the door and looked out, and at two o'clock one of them said, "the infidels are moving." the others went out. "have you thought of any way of escape?" angus whispered in persian to his follower. "i can think of nothing," azim murmured. as there seemed no obstacle to their going out angus joined his captors. he could see on the snow which covered the plain below, the dark masses of the troops surrounded by a host of camp followers, while beyond these hovered hordes of afghans. from time to time horsemen rode in, evidently delivered some message, and then went off again. the departure of the troops had been fatally delayed. it was ordered to begin at eight o'clock in the morning, and at that hour they stood to their arms. the day was clear and bright, and although four miles from the camp, angus could clearly see what was going on. although it was now two in the afternoon, only a portion of the troops had left the camp, and it was not till six o'clock, when night had already fallen, that the rear-guard left it. already confusion had set in; the ranks of the soldiers were broken up by the terrified camp followers, and presented the appearance of a vast mob rather than an organized army. had they started at the hour fixed they might have reached khoord cabul in safety, but the loss of time was fatal. only six miles were accomplished, and it was two o'clock in the morning before the whole gathered, when it was seen that their numbers were already diminished. the wretched camp followers, accustomed to the heat of the plains of india, and thinly clad, were the first to succumb. hundreds, especially of women and children, sat down in the snow and were frozen to death. already the afghans were hanging on the flanks, and sometimes making rushes and cutting down many of the unresisting multitude. soon after two o'clock a native came up to the hut and delivered an order to the afghans, who at once cut up the remainder of the sheep, and divided it between them. then their leader said, "we are to move." the ropes that bound the prisoners were loosened. one end was tied round the wrist of each captive, the other being wound round the waist of an afghan, allowing a slack of a yard and a half. as soon as this was done the party moved off. they descended the hill for some distance, and then followed the lower slopes in the direction in which the army was moving. they kept on till long after midnight, and then halted at a deserted hut. far behind them they could see the flames of the burning cantonments, which had been fired by the afghans as soon as they had removed everything of the slightest value. in the morning angus saw that their halting-place was high up above the entrance of the khoord cabul pass. there was as yet no sign of the army, but in the afternoon it was seen approaching in a confused mass. the night had been a dreadful one; soldiers and camp followers, horses and baggage and cattle were huddled in a confused mass. no warm clothes had been served out to the followers, and hundreds were frozen to death during the night, while others were so badly frost-bitten that they were unable to walk. as soon as the troops started again the afghan horsemen attacked the rear, seizing the baggage, capturing the guns, and cutting down all they encountered. at noon akbar khan, with six hundred horsemen, rode up. pottinger sent captain skinner with six horsemen to communicate with him. akbar said that he had been sent out by the nawab to protect them from the attacks of the ghazees. his instructions were to demand other hostages as security for the evacuation of jellalabad, and to arrest the progress of the force, supplying it in the meantime with everything it required, until news of the evacuation of jellalabad by sale was received. the troops, however, did not halt until they reached the entrance of the cabul pass. the night was even more dreadful than the preceding day had been. the sepoys burned their caps and accoutrements to obtain a little warmth, and numbers were frozen to death. at daybreak the crowd of soldiers and camp followers began to push forward, their only thought now being how to escape death. akbar khan spent some hours in negotiations. four more hostages were demanded; pottinger volunteered to be one of them, captain lawrence had been specially named, and pottinger chose mackenzie as the third. it was agreed that the force should move down through the khoord cabul pass to tezeen, there to await tidings of the evacuation of jellalabad. chapter xvi annihilation of the army in terrible confusion the crowd of fugitives--they were now nothing more--all entered the terrible pass. the ghilzyes at once commenced their attack. in vain did akbar khan and his chiefs endeavour to restrain the fanatics. from the hillsides, from every rocky crag they opened a murderous fire. that day three thousand men fell, either from the musket fire or from the knives of the afghans. the dooly-bearers had all deserted on the first day, the greater portion of the camels and ponies had been captured. so far the ladies had escaped; they all rode next to the advanced guard, as this was considered the safest point, for the soldiers here maintained some sort of order, and the afghans, therefore, devoted their attention to the helpless crowd in the rear. again the column halted in the snow. in the morning the camp followers made another rush ahead, but the troops, who were ordered to march at ten o'clock, did not move, for in spite of all the remonstrances of the officers, the general countermanded the order, believing that akbar khan would send in provisions and troops to protect them. another terrible night was passed, and then captain skinner rode into camp with a new proposal from akbar khan, namely, that all the english ladies of the force should be placed under his charge, and that they might be accompanied by their husbands. pottinger remembering that akbar khan's family were in the hands of the british, and believing that he was sincere in his wish to save the ladies and children from destruction, sanctioned the proposal. elphinstone at once accepted it. it was the choice of two evils. on the one hand akbar khan had proved faithless, and on the other certain death awaited the ladies. they were insufficiently clad, had scarcely tasted food since they left cabul, and had passed three terrible nights in the snow. undoubtedly it was the wiser course to trust them to akbar khan. accordingly a party of afghan horse rode in, and lady macnaghten, lady sale, and ten other ladies, some twenty children, and eight officers rode away under their escort. the next morning the survivors started. the sepoys had already lost the greater portion of their numbers; the remainder threw away their guns, which they could no longer use owing to their hands being frost-bitten, and joined the disorganized rabble in front. they were attacked in a narrow gorge, and the pass was soon choked with dead and dying. not a single sepoy survived. of the sixteen thousand men, soldiers and camp followers, that had left cabul four days before, not more than a quarter were now alive. akbar khan watched the slaughter that was going on, declaring that he was powerless to restrain the ghilzyes, whom even their own chiefs could not control. he advised that the remnant of the british army should lay down their arms and place themselves under his protection. the general very properly refused the offer, for akbar khan had already acknowledged that he was incapable of restraining the tribesmen. the march was continued. the rear-guard was commanded by shelton, and nobly they did their work, repulsing several attacks of the enemy, and giving time for those ahead to pursue their way. before daybreak they started again in hopes that they might reach jugduluk that day. despair gave the soldiers strength, and they moved off quietly in order to obtain a start of the camp followers, who paralysed their action. the latter, however, were soon on their feet, and as usual endeavoured to push on ahead of the troops. for some miles the retreat was uninterrupted, but presently a heavy fire opened on the rear-guard. the camp followers then rushed in a tumultuous crowd past the troops, and when, a little later, the head of the column was attacked, they again fled to the rear, not only hampering the movements of the soldiers, but carrying many of them away by the impetus of their rush. steadily until day broke the afghan marksmen maintained their fire. soon afterwards the advanced guard reached a village ten miles from jugduluk, and halting only till the rear-guard came up again pushed forward. shelton, with a handful of the rear-guard, kept the afghans at bay, and covered the retreat until all arrived in jugduluk, where they took their post behind some ruined walls. there was, however, little rest for them; the afghans, in ever-increasing numbers, posted themselves on the heights and opened a terrible fire. three bullocks were found among the camp followers; these were instantly killed and served out to the famishing soldiers, who devoured them raw. again akbar's party approached, and captain skinner went out to remonstrate with him for permitting the continued attacks, but the afghan prince declared himself incapable of repressing his men, as his orders were disregarded. a handful of the th regiment issued out and made a gallant rush at the enemy and drove them back, but as the main body did not follow their example, they again retired behind the ruined walls. all night long and through the next day the force remained at jugduluk. akbar khan sent in a message inviting the general, shelton, and captain johnson to a conference, and promised to send in provisions. this promise he as usual broke, and insisted on retaining the three officers as hostages. the conference was resumed the next morning. akbar now seemed in earnest in his desire to put a stop to the slaughter; but the petty chiefs of the tribes between jugduluk and jellalabad were now present, and these would listen neither to his entreaties nor commands, nor to the offer of large sums of money. they thirsted for blood, and were determined to extirpate the infidels. mahomed shah khan, to whose daughter akbar was married, then came forward and asked whether the british would pay two lacs of rupees for safe-conduct to jellalabad. the general agreed to this, and it seemed that at last the safety of the survivors was ensured. at eight o'clock in the evening the survivors, who now numbered but a hundred and twenty of the th and twenty-five artillerymen, again set forth. no provisions had been sent in during the two days' halt, and all were terribly reduced by famine. the afghans rushed down among the camp followers, killing them unresistingly. the soldiers, however, held together, and, bayonet in hand, drove off their assailants until they reached the jugduluk pass. they struggled up the narrow and terribly steep ascent until when near the summit they came upon a barricade composed of bushes and branches of trees. here the column was thrown into great confusion, the camp followers crowding upon the soldiers. the latter fought with desperation, while the afghans massacred the unresisting camp followers. twelve officers fell here. their number was large in proportion to that of the men. they had been no better clothed, and had suffered equally from cold and hunger; but they did not give way to the depression that during the first two marches had reigned among the troops. they were upheld, too, by the feeling of responsibility, and the necessity of keeping up an appearance of cheerfulness and hopefulness in order to encourage the men. after desperate fighting some twenty officers and twenty-five soldiers managed to break their way through the barricade, and at daybreak reached gundamuck. there were but two rounds of ammunition remaining in the men's pouches. most of them were already wounded, but they were resolute not to lay down their arms, and when called upon to do so they refused. then the mob of afghans rushed down upon them. one officer and a few privates were taken prisoners, but seven officers succeeded in cutting their way through, and being mounted, left the afghans behind them, and reached futtehbad, but sixteen miles from jellalabad. here, however, they were attacked by the peasantry. two were cut down at once; the others rode off, but were pursued and overtaken. four of them were killed, and one only, dr. brydon, reached jellalabad alive, the sole survivor of four thousand five hundred fighting men and twelve thousand camp followers, with the exception only of those who had been taken over by akbar as hostages. this, the greatest disaster that ever befell a british army, was due to the vacillation and weakness that had characterized every action since the murder of sir alexander burnes. had the force pressed forward at once on the morning when it left its cantonment, the greater portion would probably have reached jellalabad, but two days had been lost before the army reached khoord cabul pass, about ten miles from the city. there were fresh halts, fresh delays, fresh futile negotiations again and again, and during the time thus thrown away the enemy from all the mountains round were gathering in the passes to oppose them, and building the fatal barricade in the pass of jugduluk. had the force pushed forward with only an occasional halt of a few hours, they would not have been enfeebled by hunger. by slaying the baggage animals an abundance of food could have been obtained for all, the opposition they encountered would have been comparatively feeble, and cold would have been their only formidable antagonist. truly it seemed that a curse had fallen upon the army; that it was divine retribution for a most unjust and iniquitous war. each day angus and his followers had been taken along, always being halted in positions whence they could see the terrible tragedy that was being enacted. angus was half mad with grief and with fury that he was not in his place among the troops. azim in vain endeavoured to comfort him, by pointing out that it was not his fault that he was not there, but that he had been sent away from the army by the order of his superior; and that even had he not been taken prisoner, he would not be a sharer in what was going on in the pass. "that is true, azim, but it is a poor consolation to me. i feel sure that pottinger foresaw what would happen, and that it was as an act of friendship, in giving me a chance of getting through safely, that he sent me down. it was no doubt kindly meant, but i would a thousand times rather have shared the fate of the rest." "well, master, for my part i own that i am glad we are up here. i have no wish to be killed, especially as it would do no good to anyone. why should a man throw away his life? allah has given it to us, and we shall die when our time comes. but it would be wicked to throw it away uselessly." "it is all very well to talk like that, azim, when one is in safety, but when one sees one's comrades being slaughtered, a man would not be worthy of the name did he not long to be with them and to die fighting by their side. indeed, we know not at present whether our lives are to be saved. we know not into whose hands we have fallen, or why we should thus be taken along to be spectators of this massacre. the whole thing is bewildering to me." [illustration: angus was half mad with grief and with fury that he was not in his place among the troops] they now generally conversed in persian. their guards, although keeping as strict a watch as ever on them, interfered with them but little. fortunately the worst scenes took place at night, and were therefore hidden from those on the hill, the incessant rattle of musketry alone telling of the relentless pursuit. on the night of the th the roar of fire had been louder than ever. at last it ceased suddenly. angus and his guards alike remained awake, angus listening in agony to the sounds of the combat, the afghans talking together in low tones. "what do you think has happened?" he asked them when some minutes had passed without the sound of a shot being heard. "either akbar khan has succeeded in persuading the ghilzye chiefs to spare what few there are left of the infidels, or the last man has been slain." angus felt that the latter was by far the more probable solution, and throwing himself down on the ground he burst into tears. the eight days of mental suffering had shaken him terribly, and now, feeling that his worst fears had been realized, he broke down altogether. before daybreak his captors moved some distance farther up into the mountains, and by the cautious manner in which they made their way, often pausing to look back and round, angus concluded that they were desirous of avoiding all contact with their countrymen. he had indeed before observed how careful they were to avoid the afghans scattered on the hillside, and he now concluded that they must be taking him to the tower of the chief, to be dealt with as he might direct, either shot at once or held by him as a hostage, for whose delivery he might obtain a handsome sum should the british again advance up the passes. all day they travelled among the hills. at last they came upon a large village. there were no men about, doubtless all had gone to take part in the fray. the women came out and eagerly questioned them as to the fighting on the night before. "we know nothing," the leader said. "we believe that the last of the infidels has fallen, but we know nothing for certain." without pausing they took the two prisoners, whose appearance had created no surprise, as they were taken for natives, to the chief's tower, a much larger building than the abodes of most of the petty chiefs. standing upon a crag of rock, it overlooked the village; entrance was only obtainable by a ladder leading to a door some thirty feet above the rock. their coming had been observed. an old man stood at the door. "so you are back, suffyd?" "yes, as you see. has the chief returned?" "no; it is two weeks since we saw him last. he started then with all the fighting men from here and the other villages; but i expect it will not be long before he returns, for, from what we have heard, the work must be nearly done." the party ascended the ladder, and the leader spoke a word or two with the old man, who looked greatly surprised. the captives were taken into a room, which by its furnishing was evidently one of the chief's private apartments. "you are free to move about the house," the leader said, "but you must not leave it." in a few minutes a woman entered, bringing a dish of boiled grain with portions of mutton in it. she gave the usual afghan salutation. she was followed by another woman with a jug of water, two mugs, and a bottle. these were placed on a low table, and then without another word they left the room. a minute later they returned with a large earthenware dish full of burning charcoal. "this is a good beginning, azim," angus said, his spirits rising at the sight of the hot food; for although they had not been actually starved, they had been on extremely short rations when their supply of flour was exhausted, their captors being, like themselves, reduced to a handful of unground grain each day. "this does not look as if they meant to cut our throats. evidently our afghan is acting under orders. those orders must have been that we were to be well treated." they ate a hearty meal; then angus said: "see what there is in that bottle, azim." the cork had already been taken out, and azim poured some of the liquor into a tin, and handed it to his master. the latter smelt it. "it is afghan spirits," he said, "the same as they sell in the bazaars in cabul." he filled it up with water, and drank it off. "now, azim, do you do the same." azim, who was not a very strict mohammedan, and had more than once tasted the forbidden drink at cabul, needed no pressing. "well, master," he said, as he put the cup down, "after all this is better than lying dead and frozen down in the pass." angus, warmed with the good meal and by the draught that he had taken, could not disagree with his follower. "i begin to think that you are right, azim, though i did not believe so yesterday. it is certain that had i joined my countrymen i should have perished with them, and assuredly i have been saved from eight days of awful suffering and from death--if, indeed, we are saved from death." "i think we can feel certain of that, master. this is not the way the afghans treat a man whose throat they intend to cut. they certainly do not make a pillau for him, or provide him with a bottle of spirits." "do you know, i have been thinking, azim," angus said after a short silence, "that if it had been possible for sadut khan to know that we intended to leave camp in disguise, this might be his work again. but he could not have known it. no one but you and i, and major pottinger, and the three or four officers to whom i said good-bye, knew anything about it. besides, he would have sent the men who captured us before, and who knew us by sight. and even supposing, which seems to be impossible, that this was his doing, why not have sent us here straight, instead of taking eight days to do a journey that could have been made easily in two, and forcing me to witness the awful scenes in the passes? it is all most extraordinary." "however, there is no question, sir, that whoever our captor may be, he has been the means of saving our lives." "there can be no doubt of that, azim; and though i may not feel that at present, i shall in the future be very grateful to him. even if he were to have us shot directly he comes here, i should still be grateful, for it would be a sudden death and not a lingering one, as it has been to those below. well, it is of no use puzzling ourselves over the matter. i suppose we shall learn how it all came about when the chief, whoever he be, returns here. in the meantime we are certainly a great deal better off than we have been for the past two months in cantonments." "that we are, master. to begin with, i am warm for the first time since the winter set in; and in the next place, i have had a good meal, and do not feel that i could grumble at anything. as to your mission, you said yourself that nothing could come of it, even if you succeeded in getting through, so that in that respect nothing has been lost by our journey being so suddenly brought to an end." the next day some of the men who had been away with their chief returned, and the old man in charge told angus that only one man out of all who had started from cabul had reached jellalabad, but that several officers had been taken as hostages, including the two generals, major pottinger and captain johnson, and two others; also, that all the ladies and children, and the ladies' husbands, had accepted the protection of akbar. it was a relief, indeed, to angus to find that his friends pottinger and johnson had been saved, and as captain boyd was one of the married officers, he also must have escaped the massacre. as to the fate of elphinstone and shelton he was indifferent, it was to them that the misfortune that had befallen the army was largely due; but the thought that his three greatest friends had escaped gave him much pleasure. with these exceptions, that but one man out of sixteen thousand five hundred should have escaped was appalling. that the loss had been terrible he was well aware, but he was hardly prepared for the total annihilation of the force. another two days passed. they continued to be well fed and treated, and the women who waited upon them seemed to regard them as guests rather than as captives, talking freely with them, and only being silent when angus endeavoured to find out the name of their chief. it was evident that on this point they had orders to keep silent. on the third day they heard a stir in the village, and shouts of acclamation and welcome. the room in which they were confined was at the back of the house, and they were therefore unable to obtain a view of what was passing. "we shall learn our fate now, azim," angus said. "i have no fear of its being a bad one, master. we cannot doubt that orders were given that we should be well treated. if we are kept prisoners till the spring, for my part i shall not grumble if they continue to treat us as well as they have been doing." they heard the sound of many footsteps and loud talking, then the door opened and sadut khan entered. he advanced with both hands outstretched to angus. "my dear friend," he said, "how thankful i am that you have been saved where so many have perished!" "and so it is you, chief, to whom i owe my life?" angus said, returning the warm grasp of sadut's hand. "i did not thank you at first, for it seemed to me shameful that an english officer should not share in the fate of his comrades." sadut smiled. "but in no case would you have shared their fate. it is not from that i have saved you, but from being killed on your way down. knowing that the passes were full of our people, i was sure that you must have been taken and murdered. no story you could have told would have availed you. you were not a ghilzye, nor a member of any of the tribes there, and you would assuredly have been detected and killed had i not saved you." "that is so, sadut; and although at first i was half-mad at being unable to join my countrymen, i saw before the end came that, had i done so, my life would have been thrown away uselessly." "exactly; and that was why i ordered that you should be enabled to see all that passed. from what i had seen of you, i was sure that at first you would bitterly resent being taken prisoner, and that even if you knew into whose hands you had fallen you would resist; and it was for that reason that i did not this time employ hassan and his followers to seize you, though all through your journey they kept close at hand, to use my name and authority should any party of tribesmen meet you--not that i had much fear of your detection had they done so. the men with you had orders that in case they did meet such a party, they were to treat you both, not as captives, but as forming part of their own band. still, it was as well that hassan should be at hand in case of need." "i thank you with all my heart, sadut. i could not have done so at first, but i can do so now; you have indeed saved my life. a few days ago that seemed to me as nothing, for i felt that i was dishonoured in looking on at the massacre of my countrymen. i have had time to think it over since, and i now know that the view i took was exaggerated. could i have joined them it was plainly my duty to have done so, but if i was a prisoner no blame could attach to me. have you, chief, taken part in this terrible business?" "no. with twenty of my own horsemen i rode with akbar, who is my friend and relative, but i had no intention of drawing my sword against your people. i knew that they had been promised protection, and i thought that akbar and his force were going to escort them. his word had been given, and i did not think he would withdraw it. "i do not think it was his intention to do so. he could have done much more than he did, but he could not have saved the fugitives. the nawab was alone among the afghan chiefs in the sincerity of his assurances. akbar had no influence with the ghilzye chiefs, and even had he influenced them they could not have restrained their tribesmen and the ghazees. the die was cast. it was allah's will that those who had invaded the country without any pretext, dethroned dost mahomed, who had eagerly sought their alliance, and forced a man we all hated upon us, should meet their fate. over and over again we implored akbar, for the sake of his pledge and his word, to assist your people; even if, in his efforts to do so, he fell, then his name would go down as long as our nation existed as one who died in defence of his oath and his honour. he was all along irresolute. at times he did his best short of attacking the ghilzyes, at other times he held aloof altogether from the scene. at any rate, i can feel that my honour is not soiled. i was not one of those who signed the treaty, but i have done my best to prevent that treaty from being violated. had your people sallied out from the cantonments and given us battle, i should have fought against them. but even had there been no treaty, i would not have taken part in the massacre of men who were practically defenceless, and who were in no way responsible for the crime of their government." "i am glad to hear you say so, chief. i should have been grieved indeed had you taken part in so treacherous and terrible a massacre. but how did you learn that i was going to try to make my way down to jellalabad? that i have never been able to understand." "i kept a watch over you the whole time, my friend. either hassan, or one of his men who knew you, was always in the camp, dressed as one of the camp followers." "but even then i cannot imagine how he could have told that i was going. i knew it myself but a few hours before i started, and only major pottinger and three or four of my friends were aware of it." "my watch was a good one," the chief said, "and when two afghans issued from your tent you may be sure the news was quickly brought to the men who had for some days been lying in readiness, and who were prepared to repeat the adventure in the city." suddenly, to the astonishment of angus, azim threw himself on his knees. "master!" he exclaimed, "you can kill me, but i own that it was i who betrayed you. i had met hassan in the camp, and he told me that assuredly no white man would escape alive, that it was settled that all should be attacked and slain in the passes. he said that sadut khan had resolved to save you, but that to do this with certainty it would be necessary that he should be informed as to your movements, and where you would ride when the army started. he said that unless i helped them it might be impossible to save you. then i agreed to do so, and met him or one of his men every day. as soon as you had left the tent after telling me of your expedition, i ran to the spot where i knew i should find hassan, and told him that we were going alone. he said at once that it would be certain death were you to try to go down the pass, and that you must be carried off as soon as you had left the camp. i knew well that you would be greatly angered, and that if you suspected me you would kill me for my treachery; but that was nothing compared to your life, and so i turned traitor to you, and am willing now that you should order me to be taken out and beheaded." angus held out his hand to his faithful follower. "i should have been angry at first--grieved and angry too, but i cannot be angry now. you did what you believed to be best for me, and i acknowledge that it has turned out so. your treachery was but an act of fidelity, and undoubtedly was the means of saving my life. you did wrong, but it was with the best intentions. you ought to have confided in me." "but i knew that if i did so you would not have consented." "that is true enough; still, i was the best judge of what was consistent with my honour. however, next to sadut khan i owe you my life, and it would be but poor gratitude were i to reproach you. let us say no more about it. i shall remember always that you saved my life, and shall forget that you somewhat betrayed my trust. i have for four years past regarded you as my friend rather than as my servant, and i shall esteem you even more so in the future." azim retired with tears of joy in his eyes. sadut and angus had a long talk together. as if by mutual consent, the subject of the late events was avoided, and the conversation was upon their journey across the bamian and sadut's doings since that time. "i stayed at khooloom until the governor, whom we had trusted implicitly, handed over dost mahomed's family and mine to your people. i happened to be away at the time, and on my return two days later was warned by hassan of what had taken place. when dost returned from captivity among the turkomans, of course i joined him and accompanied him to kohistan, and fought by his side in the battle of purwandurrah. the ameer had said no word even to me of his intention to surrender, and i was thunder-struck when i heard that he had given himself up. i remained there, and took part in the attack on the ghoorka regiment, at charekar. after that i returned home. my fortress, as you know, lies far to the west among the momunds. this place does not belong to me, but to the husband of a sister of mine. she is at present at my place with her husband, who is ill; and as i wished to be nearer to the scene of action, he begged me to use his fort as a residence. i desired to hold myself aloof from the negotiations, as i knew that most of the chiefs were open at any moment to betray the cause for british gold. still, i was often down in the city, where i own the house to which you were taken. i no longer hated your people as infidels--your kindness to me showed me that there was goodness in your religion as well as in mine--but i was still ready to fight against them as the invaders of my country." "and now, chief, what do you propose to do with me?" "that is for you to decide, my friend. i know what you will say, but, though i may regret it deeply, i shall certainly offer no opposition. you are my guest, and it is not for me to dictate to you. i should be happy if you would stay with me till these troubles have passed, but i place myself wholly at your disposal, whatever you may decide upon." "thank you, indeed. it is clear to me that if it is in my power i should immediately rejoin our forces." "i was sure that that would be your wish, and i will send you down with a strong escort to peshawur." "i would rather join sale at jellalabad." sadut khan shook his head. "in that case," he said, "i shall have rescued you in vain. sale's force is already besieged, and it will be but a repetition of cabul. by orders of akbar khan, the ghilzye chiefs have all risen. the town is practically without fortifications, though i hear that the white soldiers have been labouring hard to put the place in a state of defence. but if the army at cabul could not withstand us, still less will sale's force, which is only a third of its strength, hold jellalabad." "you forget, chief, that they are commanded by a man, and not by an utterly incapable person. they are not dispirited by forced inaction or want of food. i do not say that jellalabad may not be taken, but i feel sure that it will offer a sturdy resistance, and the news of what has happened in the passes will only fill the soldiers with fury. at any rate, sale's is the only force that remains of the army to which i was attached, and it is there that it is my duty, with your permission, to go. i am sure that were you in my place that would also be your decision." "so be it," sadut said after a long pause. "were you to go to peshawur you might meet your death there also, as doubtless a force will endeavour to relieve jellalabad, and in that case you would certainly go with them. they will never force their way through the khyber pass. from what i hear the sepoys at peshawur are almost in a state of mutiny. the sikhs have sapped their loyalty, and have assured them that they will never be able to force the pass; and when they do move forward they cannot be depended upon to stand by the british troops so that your danger may be as great one way as another. however, jellalabad is your choice and not mine. the citadel there is strong, and when the town is captured, as it certainly will be soon, the troops can retire there, and may hold out until they make terms and are allowed to return to india." "i do not think they will make terms, sadut. they have had a terrible lesson as to the manner in which treaties are respected by the greater portion of your chiefs, and are not likely to trust again to any promises, but will hold out until they have fired their last cartridge." "they cannot hope to defend themselves," sadut said positively. "akbar khan will himself head the army." "i do not think, sadut, that you know yet what a british soldier can do when well led. there has been no great battle fought since we entered afghanistan, and you must not judge them by the small fights that took place round cabul; the soldiers there had lost heart and confidence in their commander. it will be a very different thing when you meet them confident in themselves and in their leaders. believe me, your hosts, however large, do not frighten them. you know how they have overcome many of the best fighting races in india, and that in the teeth of odds as great as can be brought against them here. i say not a word against the courage of your people, but they want discipline and training, and even a host of men fighting each for himself, cannot withstand the charge of well-disciplined soldiers." "why did they not come up the passes, then, to aid their friends." "because they were deficient in carriage, they were in a country altogether hostile to them, they had many sick, and must have left a strong force to guard them. there may have been other reasons of which i know not, but these are sufficient. for a force to enter these passes without animals to carry their food and their wounded would have been madness. and i believe that sale has not more than twelve hundred bayonets, a force sufficient to do wonders in the plains, but which could hardly fight their way up the passes against thousands of good marksmen, as the afghans assuredly are, armed with guns which carry much farther than their own, and firing in safety behind inaccessible rocks. but whether jellalabad can resist all attacks, as i believe, or whether the place falls, is a matter which does not affect my resolution. it is my duty to be there, and if you will afford me means of getting there i will assuredly go." "we will start to-morrow, then, and the sooner we are off the better. the news of what has happened in the passes will spread like flame through the country, and every fighting man will turn out to complete the work. there is a pathway from here which goes straight down to gundamuck. i will ride with you with half a dozen of my followers; there are plenty of ponies on the hills. certainly no questions will be asked, no suspicions can arise. when we get near jellalabad we shall see how you can best enter. i will ride round the place with you. as i am a friend of akbar's, it will be supposed that i am examining the place to see where an attack had best be made. there are many orchards and small villages round. when we are as near the town as we can get, you can slip from your horse as we go through an orchard. keep under cover in the gardens until close to the walls. when you get within musket-shot you can tie a white cloth to your gun, and you will then be safe." this plan was carried out, and two days later, after a grateful parting from his preserver, angus stood at the edge of the moat opposite one of the gates. chapter xvii jellalabad a sentry had already sent down word that two afghans had approached carrying a white flag, and an officer appeared on the wall. "what do you want?" he asked. "we want to come in, thompson. i am angus campbell, and have escaped almost by a miracle." there was a shout of pleasure, and a minute later the gate was opened, and thompson ran out and warmly shook angus by the hand. "i am delighted to see you," he said. "we all thought you among the slain in the passes. what an awful time it has been since we left cabul on our way, as we believed, to india! we can scarcely believe the terrible news even now. we have learnt but little from brydon, who was, he thought, the only survivor, except the hostages who, he tells us, were given over a few days before the end came. he was desperately wounded, and could scarce sit his horse when he arrived, and has been too ill to give us any details." "i can give very little, for i was not with the army. i started the evening before they left camp, on a mission from pottinger to sir robert sale. pottinger did not think that any help could possibly come, but at the same time he thought it right to make one more effort to communicate with your general, and to tell him that they were on the point of starting. i had gone but a short distance when i was captured. fortunately the men who took me were followers of sadut khan. i was taken to his fort. he was absent at the time; when he returned he at once gave me my liberty, and escorted me to within a quarter of a mile of the wall, as a return for a service i had rendered him two years ago." "that was a piece of luck indeed. then you saw nothing of it?" "yes, i saw a great deal. my captors were, i suppose, anxious to see what was going on, and we followed the course of the army, keeping on the hill; and, except for the fighting at night, i saw almost the whole of the tragedy." while they were talking they were approaching the head-quarters of the general. angus was well known to sir robert, to whom he had often carried messages and notes from burnes or macnaghten. when their first greeting was over, he repeated the story he had told captain thompson. he thought it best to say no word of his escape being the result of a preconcerted plan on the part of sadut khan, as he felt that some might suspect that he was privy to the scheme, and had taken advantage of the friendship of the momund chief to make his escape. "i am not so surprised as i might otherwise have been," the general said, "since i received a letter from pottinger yesterday. akbar had allowed him to send it down, thinking that the information that elphinstone, shelton, lawrence, mackenzie, and pottinger himself were all right might induce us to submit to terms. he said, 'i trust that before this you will have heard that we are about to start from mr. angus campbell, who nobly accepted the desperate mission of penetrating through the passes and bringing you word of our intention. should he have arrived safely, i beg to recommend him most strongly to the authorities for accepting the mission, which seemed almost a hopeless one. he has rendered great service during the time the troops have been in cantonments, by aiding the commissariat officers in bringing in grain.' as you had not arrived we naturally feared that you had been murdered on your way down. i am glad indeed that you have escaped. you will now, of course, give your assistance to macgregor, our political officer." "if he cannot utilize my services, sir, and he can have but little political work to do now, i shall be glad if you will attach me to one of the regiments where you think i may be most useful." "you had better talk it over with macgregor first. you know him, of course; and if he does not want you, i will attach you to my own staff. with your knowledge of the afghan language, your services might be invaluable in obtaining information; or, should we make a sortie--and we have already made one with effect--i should be glad, if you wish it, to attach you either to the infantry or cavalry, whichever you prefer. now that you have told us about yourself, please give us any details you can of what you saw of the fighting?" "it can hardly be said that there was any fighting, sir; until the last day the troops were so completely surrounded, and i may say overwhelmed by the camp followers, that they were practically unable to use their arms. general shelton with the rear-guard fought nobly, and covered the retreat into jugduluk, until the time when he was enticed with the general into akbar's camp, and there held as a hostage. by what i heard, the handful of men left, only about a hundred and fifty all told, fought desperately to break their way through a barricade with which the afghans had blocked the top of the pass. only ten officers succeeded in breaking through, and of these all but one were killed on the road. all the soldiers died fighting at the barricade, and many officers. the last sepoy had fallen two days before." "it has been a bad business," general sale said, "bad not only in its terrible result, but in the manner in which affairs were conducted. we here received with astonishment the news that four thousand five hundred british troops were cooped up by a horde of afghans without one single attempt being made to bring on a battle in the open. officers and men alike were astounded when pottinger's first letter arrived, saying that negotiations were continued after the murder of macnaghten. however, all this is a matter for future investigation. and now a personal question. can you tell me how it was that my wife, lady macnaghten, and the other ladies, escaped uninjured? i only know from pottinger that the ladies and children were handed over to the protection of akbar, and that those who had husbands were also accompanied by them." "the ladies were always kept close behind the advanced guard, sir. as these showed an unbroken front, the afghans allowed them to pass without opposition, falling upon the confused mass behind them." "do you think that akbar was a sharer in this treacherous attack?" "i think his conduct was doubtful in the extreme, sir. he certainly did try more than once to persuade the ghilyze chiefs to allow the survivors to pass on unmolested, but by that time the passions of the afghans were absolutely beyond control. i myself have great doubts whether he would have interfered had he not been well aware that his interference would be useless. but this is only my opinion, based upon the facts, that in the first place he himself shot macnaghten, whom he had invited to a conference; in the second place, he took no step whatever to carry out the condition to supply baggage animals and provisions; and lastly, because i know that long before the column set out on its march, he sent out orders to the ghilzye chiefs to attack you." "the case certainly looks very black against him," the general said; "but at least we may hope that, as his family are in our hands in india, he will protect the hostages." "i hope, sir, that he will hand them over to the nawab, who appears to me to be a thoroughly honest man. undoubtedly he did his best to persuade the chiefs to agree to the treaty with us. he certainly did send in some provisions to the camp, and generally we formed a high opinion of his kindness of heart. your fortifications are stronger than i expected to find them, from what i have heard, sir." "yes, the men have worked incessantly at them ever since we came here. the mud walls can scarcely be said to have existed when we marched in. there was no parapet, the ditch was filled in with rubbish, and the walls had so crumbled away that carts could cross over them at almost every point. fortunately the men were in good heart, and all, europeans and sepoys, have worked with an energy beyond praise. the moat has been cleared out and filled with water, the walls have been scarped, and a parapet twelve feet high erected. the bastions have been put in order; and though, had we been seriously attacked at first, we must have retired to the citadel, we are now ready to withstand any assault." angus next went to macgregor, who received him most warmly. "i am glad indeed to see you, campbell. pottinger mentioned you in his reports as doing invaluable service with boyd and johnson. you will not find much in our line here. when the sword is once drawn, there is nothing for us to do until it becomes a question of our dictating terms, a contingency not likely to arise for some time." "had you hard fighting to get here?" angus asked. "no fighting at all. as we marched down from gundamuck, the natives all supposed that we were on our way to peshawur, and when we suddenly turned and marched towards the city, it was too late for them to think of resistance, and they simply bolted on one side of the town as we marched in on the other. we were bitterly disappointed when we saw the state of the walls, and it was a question for some time whether we should not content ourselves with holding the citadel only. but it was at last determined, for a time at least, to hold the town, as our retirement to the citadel would look like weakness. another consideration was, that once in the citadel we should be shut up entirely, for, as you see, it stands in the middle of the town, and with the streets crowded with the enemy, there would be no getting out to obtain provisions. "the result has proved the wisdom of the step we took. the walls are now strong enough to be obstinately defended, and from their extent we have been able to sally out at one gate or another and bring in provisions. we had but two days' food when we arrived here; now we have succeeded in gathering in a sufficient quantity to keep the troops on half rations for two months, and i hope that before it is finished we shall be relieved from peshawur. we gave the natives a handsome thrashing on the day before we got in here. they attacked us in great force, trying especially to carry off our baggage, but the infantry repulsed them splendidly. however, they came on to renew the attack. the cavalry were placed in ambush, and the troops, after at first advancing, suddenly wheeled round and went off at the double. the enemy, believing that they had achieved a great victory, rushed after them. as soon as they reached an open space, the cavalry fell upon them. for months they had been inactive, being of no use among the hills. now was their chance, and in a moment they were in the thick of the afghans. they made terrible havoc among them, and thus it was that we were able to enter the town without further trouble. the next day, the th of november, broadfoot was appointed garrison engineer. he had a small corps of sappers with him, and they soon set to work. "on the morning of the th, the enemy were thick in the gardens round the town, the principal body being on the hillside. it was resolved to give them another lesson. they were, as could be seen from the highest point in the city, some five thousand strong, and colonel monteith of the th bengal infantry, took out eleven hundred men at daybreak. the advance was covered by the guns which had been mounted on the walls, and their shrapnel soon drove the enemy into the open. the infantry pressed forward and scattered them, and the cavalry completed their rout. it was this defeat that so cowed them for a time, that i was able to fetch in grain, sheep, firewood, and other necessaries. i may mention that i took upon myself, as soon as we came in here, the post of commissariat officer. it was not until the end of the month that they again mustered in force sufficient to attack us; they contented themselves with hovering round and keeping up a desultory fire. "on the st of december, however, they gathered in great numbers, and seemed to threaten an attack. colonel dennie commanded this time, and he took out the greater portion of the garrison and a couple of guns. it was noon when he sallied out. abbot's guns commenced the action by pouring a tremendous fire of grape into the thick mass. they fled in wild confusion; the cavalry cut them up terribly, and the infantry overtook and bayoneted many of them. it could scarcely be called a fight. the day was won directly the guns opened fire, and we did not lose a single man. since that time they have not ventured to attack us. "news came day after day of the terrible mess at cabul. the news was kept as far as possible from the troops, so as not to discourage them; but, of course, since brydon came in, the truth of the terrible massacre had to be told. i am happy to say that, although filling them with wrath and indignation, it has in no way abated their spirit. during the six weeks' rest we have had since the battle of the st of december, we have, as you see, really done wonders in the way of fortification, and consider that we are in a position to repulse any attack however formidable." "when do you expect that a relief column will arrive from peshawur?" "that is a grave question which i cannot answer. our last news was that brigadier-general wyld was on the point of advancing, but from the tone in which he wrote he had evidently no great hope of success. his four sepoy regiments had been corrupted by the sikhs, who, having themselves a great repugnance to enter the passes, had endeavoured, and successfully, to inspire the sepoys with the same feeling. the sikhs, who were to co-operate with him, were themselves in a state of open mutiny, and threatened to kill general avitable if he interfered with them. he intended, however, to advance, as the case was so urgent, but with little hope of success. he was without cavalry, and had but two guns on sikh carriages, which would probably break down after a few rounds had been fired. it was the letter of a brave man surrounded with difficulties, but ready to attempt almost the impossible to bring aid to us. i fear, however, that there is little chance of our relief until reinforcements from india reach peshawur." this opinion was justified when, on the th, news was brought that the movement had failed. on the th colonel moseley had started under cover of night with the rd and th native regiments to occupy the fortress of ali musjid, which had been held by a small corps of men of one of the native tribes under mr. mackeson. they had been true to their salt, and had resisted every attack of the afridis. moseley's force arrived there at daybreak, and met with but little opposition on the way. but it was discovered that, owing to some blunder, only fifty supply bullocks had been sent on instead of three hundred and fifty that should have accompanied the force. therefore, instead of having a month's provisions, they had but enough for a few days. brigadier wyld started on the morning of the th to relieve them, but on the preceding day the sikh troops refused to enter the pass and marched back to peshawur. nevertheless, wyld determined to press forward with the two native regiments. as soon, however, as the enemy attacked them the sepoys at the head of the column wavered and opened an aimless fire. in vain the brigadier and the officers endeavoured to persuade them to advance. they would not move forward, nor would the rest of the troops advance to their assistance. the two guns broke down after a round or two, and what little spirit remained among the sepoys evaporated at once, and the column had to fall back. one of the guns was spiked and left behind, the sepoys refusing to make any effort to bring it off. the brigadier, who with several of our officers was wounded, saw that it was impossible to persevere, and the force fell back beyond the pass. moseley could obtain no news, and was unaware of the repulse of the relieving column. although the troops were on half rations supplies were nearly exhausted. the water was bad, and numbers of the sepoys fell ill, and on the rd he determined to evacuate the fortress. two officers volunteered to hold it, but the sepoys would not support them, and the former native garrison had lost heart; so, on the th, the force marched out. the afridis mustered strongly to oppose the retreat. the sepoys, animated now by the hope of safety, fought well. two british officers were killed, most of the baggage lost, and some of the sick and wounded had to be abandoned, but the main body got through safely. such was the news that was brought by a native in our pay, together with a letter from brigadier wyld saying that it would be impossible to renew the attempt until reinforcements of at least one british regiment with some guns arrived. but the news that help was still far distant in no way discouraged the garrison of jellalabad, who redoubled their efforts to strengthen the fortifications and to prepare by their own unaided efforts for the worst. at peshawur wyld's repulse bore the natural consequences. the discontent among the sepoy's increased, many deserted, and expressions of determination never to enter the pass again were common among them. sickness broke out, and when on the th of february general pollock, who had been selected to command the force gathered there, and invested with full authority on all other matters, arrived, he found a thousand men in hospital; a week later the number was increased to eighteen hundred. no better man than pollock could have been chosen. he possessed at once great firmness, kindness of heart, and a manner calculated to inspire confidence. he declared to the central authorities at once that, even with the brigade which had come up with him, to advance up the pass would be to court another defeat. the four sepoy regiments that had been engaged could, in their present state, not be counted on for service, and the force at his disposal was therefore no greater than that which wyld had lost. he set to work in the first place to restore confidence. it was a difficult task. many even among the officers had become affected with the spirit of defection, and did not hesitate to express their opinion that an advance through the khyber pass would involve a repetition of the cabul disaster. the new sepoy regiments were at once visited by emissaries from those of wyld's brigade and from the sikhs, who endeavoured in every way to persuade them also to refuse to enter the pass, and succeeded in the case of the th native regiment, who joined the four other battalions in refusing to advance. on the day after his arrival general pollock visited all the hospitals, enquired into the ailments of the sick, and talked encouragingly to them. then he went to the sepoy regiments, enquired into the cause of their discontent, and exhorted them to return to their duty, and not to bring disgrace upon regiments that had so many times in the past proved their courage and loyalty. his task was a hard and difficult one, but his method of mildness and firmness combined gradually restored their spirits and discipline; and the knowledge that reinforcements were on their way, with a good proportion of european troops, including cavalry and artillery, greatly aided his efforts. still, until these reinforcements arrived, pollock could do nothing but reply to the urgent letters of sale and macgregor by pointing out his inability to move. on the th of february angus was with macgregor on the walls of jellalabad. the men were as usual working hard and steadily, grateful in the thought that their long labour had borne its fruits, and that in a few days they would be able to lay by their picks and shovels, the work that they had been set to do having been accomplished. "another week," captain havelock, who was acting as persian interpreter to macgregor, said to angus, "and the whole work which broadfoot traced out will be finished. in one respect i am sorry that it should be so, for there is nothing like active work for keeping men's spirits up and preventing them from feeling the effects of idleness. i think--" and he stopped abruptly. there was a sudden tremor of the earth and a deep sound like thunder, then they were both thrown off their feet. the walls, the houses, the whole city, swayed and shook. then came the crash of falling houses, wild shouts of alarm and pain; the earth crumbled beneath them, and they rolled down together into the moat. on finding that they were unhurt they scrambled up the slope of earth. a terrible sight presented itself. a third of the buildings in the town had fallen. but this was not the worst. several of the bastions had been destroyed; almost all the parapets were thrown down; several great breaches were made in the wall, one of them eighty feet in length; and the moat had in many places been filled up with the debris of the wall and parapet. the soldiers were extricating themselves or helping their comrades from the earth that had almost overwhelmed them; others were standing gazing with a dazed air at the destruction that had been wrought. "we had better go to head-quarters," havelock said, "and see what has happened there." they made their way with difficulty through the ruins that blocked the streets. the movements of the earth still continued, and they had all they could do to keep their feet. on reaching head-quarters they found to their satisfaction that all was safe. the general and macgregor had both been occupied in writing despatches to peshawur, and had rushed out into the little courtyard of the house. the offices round it fell in ruins at their feet, but the dwelling-house, although it swayed to and fro, did not fall. enquiries were at once set on foot, when it was found that no lives had been lost among the garrison, although two natives had been killed by the fall of their houses. no time was lost. the whole of the garrison were told off into working parties, and in half an hour were diligently at work repairing the wall at the most important points. they worked until late at night, by which time the breaches were scarped, the rubbish all cleared away, and the ditches dug out again, while a parapet of gabions was erected along the great breach. a parapet was erected on the remains of the bastion which flanked the approach to the cabul gate, that had been entirely ruined, a trench had been dug, and a temporary parapet raised on every bastion round the place. never, probably, was so much work accomplished by an equal number of men in the same time. day after day the work was continued, until by the end of the month the parapets were restored, the breaches built up, the rampart increased in thickness, every battery re-established, and the gates entrenched; and yet the troops were in hourly anxiety that their work might be again destroyed, for during the month succeeding the great earthquake fully a hundred shocks were felt. so extraordinary was the vigour with which the repairs had been accomplished, that when akbar khan moved down with his forces early in march and saw the formidable defences, he and his followers were unable to understand it, and declared that the preservation of jellalabad from destruction must have been the result of witchcraft, for no other town or village had escaped. while at work the garrison had been in constant expectation of attack, for akbar's army lay but a few miles from the town. but the success of the two sorties had shown the afghan leader that he had very different foes to deal with from the dispirited force that had been annihilated in the passes. here were men ready to work and to fight, while those at cabul had done neither; and he resolved to attempt to starve them out, hoping for the same success as had attended a similar step at cabul. he kept on, therefore, drawing in more closely, harassing the foraging parties, and having occasional skirmishes with the bodies of cavalry sent out to protect the grass-cutters. on the night of the th the enemy threw up sangars, small defences of earth or stone, at many points round the town, and from behind them opened a brisk fire. there was a report that behind these shelters they were mining towards the walls, and a strong party of infantry and cavalry, with two hundred of broadfoot's sappers, commanded by colonel dennie, were sent out. as they poured out through the gate, akbar advanced with his forces; but the guns on the ramparts received them with a heavy fire, and although they came on several times as if prepared to give battle, they eventually drew back, unable to withstand the storm of shot and shrapnel. the working parties of sappers set to work to destroy the sangars, and in doing so discovered that there was no foundation for the report that the enemy were mining. when the work was done, the troops began to fall back to the town, as ammunition was beginning to run short. on seeing their retirement the afghans again advanced; but on our troops halting and facing them, they at once turned and fled, having lost considerably by our artillery and musketry fire. dennie's force sustained no loss in killed, but broadfoot was wounded, and the loss of his services as engineer was serious. time passed quietly. the whole of the ground had been cleared of trees, houses, and walls for some distance round the town, and the afghans were no longer able to crawl up under shelter and keep up a galling fire on our men. early in april a messenger brought in news that pollock had now received his reinforcements, and would advance in a day or two, the sepoys having recovered their health and spirits. his force had been joined by the th foot, the rd dragoons, nine guns, and the st native cavalry. on the th these started from jumrood. brigadier wyld commanded the advance guard, general m'caskill the rear. two columns of infantry were to scale the height on either side of the pass, major davis in command of that on the right, colonel moseley of that on the left. at three o'clock in the morning they started. the heights on either side and the pass were crowded with the enemy, who were always well informed of the british movements by the natives in the town. they expected that the force would all move along the road, and anticipated an easy success. the two flanking parties moved off so quietly in the dim light of the morning that they were not perceived by the enemy until they began to scale the heights. then a lively combat began, and the afghans learned for the first time that even among their own hills the british could beat them. the difficulties of the ascent were great, but the _moral_ of the sepoys was now completely restored, and they stormed the heights on either side with great gallantry, driving the afghans before them. while this was going on, the main column in the valley had cleared away a formidable barricade that had been erected at the mouth of the pass, and which could not have been destroyed without much loss had the afghans maintained their position on the hills. pollock now advanced, and the afghans, who had assembled in large numbers at the mouth of the pass, bewildered at finding themselves outflanked, fell back, and the column with its great convoy of animals moved forward. the number of draught animals was very large, although the baggage of the advancing force had been cut down to the narrowest dimensions, in order that provisions and ammunition for the garrison at jellalabad might be taken on. the march occupied the greater part of the day. the heat was great, and the troops suffered from thirst; but animated by their success, they thought little of this, and before nightfall bivouacked round ali musjid, whose garrison had evacuated the place when they saw that the day had gone against them. all night long the afghans kept up a fire from among the hills, but did not attempt an attack. the sikhs had joined the main body, as the general, doubtful as to their fidelity, had sent them by another pass. the general's estimate of them was not a mistaken one. they were left to occupy ali musjid and guard the pass, but shortly after the army had moved on they quitted the position and marched away, seizing some of the baggage animals on their way up, and, throwing their loads on the ground, employing them to carry their own baggage. the crushing and altogether unexpected defeat that the tribesmen had suffered had its effect. they had found themselves beaten at their own game and withdrew at once to their fastnesses, and pollock's force marched on without meeting with any serious opposition. chapter xviii the advance on cabul the garrison of jellalabad found themselves pressed for provisions at the end of march, and on the st of april made a gallant sortie, and swept into the town a flock of five hundred sheep and goats. on the th macgregor's spies brought in news from akbar's camp that it was reported there that pollock had been beaten with great loss in the khyber pass, and on the following morning akbar's guns fired a royal salute in honour of the supposed victory. sale, now confident of the fighting powers of his men, determined to make a great effort to break up the blockade; as if pollock had really been defeated it would be some time before relief could come to them, and they could not hope again to make such a capture as that which they had effected on the st. a council of war was held, and action was decided upon, as success would not only free them from all apprehensions of being starved out, but would effect a diversion in favour of pollock. the force was but a small one for the enterprise which they moved out to undertake. the centre column, consisting of the th regiment, mustering five hundred bayonets, was under the command of colonel dennie; the right, consisting of some three hundred and fifty men of the two native regiments and a detachment of sappers, was commanded by captain havelock; the left column was about the same strength, under lieutenant-colonel monteith; the light field battery and a small cavalry force were to support them. they advanced from the city at daylight on the th. akbar khan drew up his force, six thousand strong, before his camp, his right resting on a fort, and his left on the cabul river. havelock's column commenced the fight by attacking the enemy's left, while dennie advanced to the assault of the fort, which was vigorously defended. dennie himself fell mortally wounded by an afghan ball, but his men captured the place in gallant style. a general attack now took place on akbar's camp. the artillery advanced at a gallop, and poured their fire into the afghan centre, the th and colonel monteith's column pierced their right, while havelock drove back their left from the support afforded by the river. the afghans fought sturdily, their musketry keeping up a heavy fire, and large bodies of horse again and again threatened havelock's column, while three guns from a hidden battery opened fire. the struggle, however, was a short one. their cannon were taken, every position held by them was captured, and by seven o'clock they were in full retreat. two cavalry standards were taken, four guns lost by the cabul and gundamuck forces were recaptured, a vast quantity of ordnance stores destroyed, and the whole of the enemy's tents burnt. the loss of the afghans had been heavy, and several chiefs were among the fallen. the loss of the victors was small indeed. colonel dennie and ten sepoys were killed, three officers and some fifty men wounded. a day or two later pollock's force reached jellalabad, and the joy of both parties was great. indeed, no stronger contrast can be found than that between the leading and conduct of the force at cabul and that at jellalabad. the one showed the british leader and the british soldier at their worst, the other the british commander and men at their best. it may be confidently affirmed that had sale been in the place of elphinstone, with full power of action, the fight in the passes would never have taken place, and within three days of the murder of burnes the afghan host would have been a mob of fugitives, and cabul would have been in our hands. the british soldier is always best in the attack. he is ready and eager to fight against any odds, but when kept in a state of inaction, under a commander in whom he has lost all confidence, he speedily deteriorates. happily there are few examples in our military history such as those of cabul and walcheren, where the british soldier has been placed in such a position. while pollock was forcing the khyber pass the reign of shah soojah came to a sudden end. after the departure of the british no hostility was shown towards him by the afghans, and he continued at the bala hissar in the position of nominal sovereign of afghanistan the nawab having willingly resigned the difficult and dangerous post and accepted that of wuzeer. he himself had his troubles. most restless and dangerous of these afghan leaders was aneen-oollah-khan, who had played fast and loose with the british while secretly working against them. he demanded the surrender to him of the hostages. the nawab steadily refused, and as threats of force were used against him, raised a body of three thousand men for their protection. these, however, were corrupted by aneen, but the nawab remained faithful to his trust. on the th of april shah soojah left the bala hissar with his retinue to go down to join akbar khan. an ambush was laid for him by one of the sons of the nawab. these poured in a volley, and shah soojah fell dead, shot through the head. the nawab was filled with horror at the deed, and swore an oath never again to see his son beneath his roof or suffer him to be named in his presence. while jellalabad was being besieged, the situation at candahar had been precarious. ghuznee had been captured by the tribesmen after a gallant defence, and its garrison had been massacred. kelat-i-ghilzye was besieged, and without hope of succour. candahar was surrounded by the insurgent dooranees, but these had been twice defeated by general nott. during one of these expeditions the city was in imminent danger, for the enemy, gradually retiring, drew the sortie-party a considerable distance from the walls, and then at night slipped away and attacked the place. one of the gates was destroyed by fire, and for many hours the issue of the contest was doubtful. at last, however, the assailants were beaten off with very heavy loss. a force marching up to the relief of the town, under general england, being very badly handled, were opposed on their way up from quettah, and fell back and remained there until nott sent a peremptory order for them to advance again. he himself marched to meet them, and on the united force arriving at candahar, the town was placed beyond all risk of capture. nott was preparing to march on cabul, while pollock advanced on jellalabad; but, to the stupefaction and disappointment of all, an order arrived from calcutta for the abandonment of candahar and the return of the force to india. there had been a change of governors. lord ellenborough had succeeded lord auckland, and immediately set to work to overthrow the whole policy of his predecessor. similar orders were sent to pollock. the latter, however, mindful of the honour of his country, and the safety of the hostages and ladies, replied that, being almost without carriage, it would be impossible for him to retire at once, thus gaining time, which he utilized by entering into negotiations with akbar khan for the release of their prisoners. both generals wisely kept the order they had received a secret from the troops, who would have been profoundly disheartened. however, no secret had been made as to the orders issued in calcutta, and the news soon spread all over india, and reached pollock's camp, that the army was to be withdrawn. pollock did his best to throw doubts upon the truth of the reports by marking out a new camp two miles in advance, and arranging with the natives to bring in supplies there, so as to give grounds for a belief that, so far from leaving the town, he was preparing for an advance. in the meantime he had written an urgent letter pointing out the evils and difficulties of an immediate withdrawal, and the immense advantage that would arise by striking a heavy blow before retiring, and so to some extent retrieving the reputation of the british army. the letter had its influence, and the governor wrote: _it would be desirable undoubtedly, before finally quitting afghanistan, that you should have an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy, and since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there till october, the governor-general earnestly hopes that you will be able to draw the enemy into a position in which you may strike such a blow effectually._ this was good news. every effort was being made to collect carriage cattle in hindostan for the purpose of the withdrawal, and pollock determined to turn these to account. if there was carriage enough to enable him to fall back upon peshawur, there would be carriage enough for him to advance on cabul. in the meantime negotiations were going on for the release of the captives. the married families had, on the day of their arrival at akbar's camp, been placed in a small fort with pottinger, lawrence, and mackenzie. two days later they were taken down to jugduluk, where they found general elphinstone, brigadier shelton, and captain johnson, and thence travelled down to a fort, the property of the father of akbar's wife. the party consisted of nine ladies, twenty officers and fourteen children; seventeen european soldiers, two women and a child were confined in another part of the fort. here they remained three months. two more officers were brought in, and a month after their arrival two other survivors, major griffiths and captain souter, were added to the party. on the day after akbar's defeat they were hastily taken away and carried to tezeen, and thence to a place called zanda, far up in the hills. general elphinstone had been bed-ridden for some weeks, and was left behind at tezeen, where he died. akbar khan sent in his remains to jellalabad. civil war was raging in cabul. shah soojah's second son had succeeded him, but he was altogether without power. some of the chiefs supported him, others opposed; but finally the bala hissar was stormed by akbar, who was now the most powerful chief in afghanistan. pollock was still harassed by letters from lord ellenborough insisting upon his retiring; but public opinion throughout india was so opposed to a course that would bring the deepest disgrace upon the british power, that at last, in august, he wrote to nott saying that he must withdraw his force from afghanistan, but that if he chose he might take the route through ghuznee and cabul. he similarly issued his orders for pollock to retire, but added that "you will be at liberty to first march to cabul to meet nott." both had been preparing for the movement. pollock had sent several expeditions against hostile tribesmen, and had recovered one of the captured guns. on the th of august he left jellalabad with eight thousand troops, and on the rd reached gundamuck. the next day the village was cleared of a strong body of the enemy. while concentrating his troops there and waiting intelligence from nott, the british force remained at gundamuck till the th of september. on the st, futteh jung, who had succeeded his father, rode into camp. akbar khan had stripped him of all power and all his wealth, and imprisoned him in the bala hissar, from which he had now escaped, and with much difficulty made his way to pollock's camp to seek the protection of the british government. on the th the first division of the army, under the command of sale, moved forward; the second division, under general m'caskill, marched on the following day. sale found the hills commanding the roads through the jugduluk pass occupied by large bodies of the enemy, who opened a heavy fire. the guns replied, and the infantry then in three columns dashed up the hills and drove the ghilzyes from them. one strong body had taken refuge at an apparently inaccessible point, but the british storming party scaled the height, and the enemy fled without waiting for the assault at close quarters. thus on the hills where the afghans had massacred elphinstone's troops they were now taught that, if well led, the british soldier could defeat them in a position they had deemed impregnable. at tezeen the second division joined the first. the force halted for a day, and the afghans, believing that this betokened indecision, mustered their forces for a final engagement. akbar had, as he had threatened to do if they advanced, sent off the captives to the bamian pass, with the intention of selling them as slaves to the turkomans. on the th the two armies were face to face. the valley of tezeen was commanded on all sides by lofty hills, and these now swarmed with men. the enemy's horse entered the valley, but the british squadrons charged them, drove them in headlong flight, and cut down many. the infantry climbed the hills on both sides under a terrible fire from the afghan guns. to these they made no reply, well knowing that their muskets were no match for the long firearms of the enemy. as soon, however, as they reached the summit, they fixed bayonets and charged with a mighty cheer. only a few of the enemy stood their ground, and fell, the rest fled. all day firing was kept up, until at last the enemy occupying the highest ridges were, in spite of a sturdy resistance, driven off, fairly beaten on their own ground and in their own style of warfare. our troops fought with extraordinary bravery. they were animated by a desire to wipe out the disgrace that had fallen on our arms, and were maddened by the sight of the numerous skeletons of their comrades in the jugduluk. akbar khan saw that all was up, and fled, while the tribesmen scattered to their homes, and the army marched forward without opposition to cabul. in the meantime, nott had been busy. on the th of may he inflicted a decisive defeat upon the dooranees outside the walls of candahar. on the th of august the army evacuated that city, and on the th arrived at mookoor. up to this point no opposition whatever had been offered. the inhabitants had been friendly, and supplies were obtained without difficulty. but the afghan governor of ghuznee had raised all the country, and had taken up a very strong position near the source of the turnuck. on the th the forces met. the position of the enemy was unknown, as a thick mist covered the country. the cavalry rode forward to reconnoitre, cut up a party of afghan infantry in the plain, and pursuing them hotly came upon hills crowded by the enemy, who opened a heavy fire. they fell back in an orderly manner, when a body of the enemy's horse appeared on the hill above them. a squadron of native cavalry charged them, but were cut up by the fire of a body of afghan foot who had hitherto been hidden. the enemy's horse poured down, and the troopers, already suffering from the infantry fire, turned and fled. the panic spread, and the whole of the cavalry were soon in flight. two british officers had been killed and three wounded, and fifty-six men disabled. nott, on hearing the loss, marched out with his infantry, but on reaching the scene of the fight found that the enemy had retired. on the afternoon of the next day nott, marching forward, came upon a fort held by the enemy. our artillery opened upon it with little effect. the afghan army, some ten thousand strong, had been watching us, and now opened an artillery fire from the heights, and its foot men moved forward to the attack; but as they neared us our infantry charged with a cheer and they broke and fled. two of their guns, and their tents, magazines, and stores were captured. on the th of september nott encamped before ghuznee, and began to prepare for the assault. the enemy, however, were in no humour for fighting; the greater portion of the tribesmen had scattered to their homes after their defeat. the garrison lost heart altogether and evacuated the city, and the governor set off with a few followers for cabul. the next morning the british entered the town without firing a shot. on the following day, however, the governor returned with a large number of the tribesmen who had just arrived, and on the th nott attacked them. a hard battle was fought, but it was indecisive. on the following morning the enemy disappeared; they had received the news of the defeat of akbar at tezeen. the column, however, was again harassed when the troops advanced, but they cleared the way in good style. the tribesmen here had been actively engaged in the cabul insurrection, and twenty-six of their forts were burned as punishment. on the th the army encamped four miles from the city, and learned that pollock had occupied cabul two days previously. angus campbell had taken no part in the operations of that advance. on the th of august news had arrived at gundamuck by a messenger from the moonshee, mohun lal, who had throughout kept the force at jellalabad well supplied with news of what was passing at cabul; he now sent to say that on the previous day akbar had despatched all the captives under an escort of three hundred horse to bamian, and that they were to be taken on to khooloom, and there handed over to the governor. once there, it was certain that they would remain in captivity among the tribes until death released them. as soon as he heard the news angus went to macgregor. "i am going to ask," he said, "if you will allow me to go on an expedition on my own account. i was thinking that it was just possible that the captives might be overtaken. it is probable that they will halt some time at bamian, and certainly we could come up to them there. with so many women and children it will be impossible for the convoy to move fast, and they may stay at bamian until the result of our operations here are known. you have already promised me that the part taken by sadut khan shall be forgiven, seeing that he did his best to persuade akbar to give protection to the retreating army, and also because he showed great kindness to me when i was in his hands. if you can obtain permission from the general i will start at once in disguise for his fort in the mountain. i cannot but think that he will aid me, and i might, with four of his followers, who have come from bamian, and are personally well known to me, succeed in some way in rescuing at least a few of the captives. eldred pottinger, captain boyd, and captain johnson are all dear friends of mine, and i would willingly run any risk in the endeavour to save them. possibly, if we overtake the party, we may in some way cause a delay which would enable any rescue party sent off when you reach cabul to get up in time." "it is a brave offer, campbell, but the enterprise seems to me an almost desperate one. however, i don't think that i should be justified in refusing it, and i am sure that if anyone could succeed, you will do so. when will you start?" "in ten minutes, sir, if you will furnish me with an authority to offer a bribe to the officer in command of their escort." "i will go and see the general at once. he is well aware, from the report that i have made, of the kindness sadut showed you, and of his efforts to save our army. i have no doubt that the chief has fought against us in the last battle, but that was only natural. i feel sure that above all things pollock would embrace any offer that promises the slightest chance of rescuing the hostages, but the risk would be terrible, campbell." "of course there would be risk," angus agreed, "but i do not see how it would be exceptionally great. i have journeyed as an afghan two or three times already without detection, and i could just as well do so again. at any rate, i am willing to undertake the enterprise. it would, of course, be useful for me to take a considerable sum of money to win over the guard; still more useful if the general would authorize me to offer terms that would tempt the cupidity of the commander, as we have always found that the afghans are ready to do almost anything for bribes." "i will take you at once with me to the general. he is well acquainted with the services you rendered pottinger at herat, and have rendered the army ever since it began its march from the indus, and he knows the favourable report that has been sent in by pottinger and burnes." angus had, indeed, been introduced by sir robert sale to general pollock on his arrival at cabul. on reaching his tent they found him for the moment unoccupied. he listened gravely to macgregor's statement of the offer that angus had made. "it is a noble proposal, mr. campbell," he said, in his usual kindly and courteous way, "but the risk seems to me terrible, and should anything happen to you, the service would be deprived of one of its most promising and meritorious officers. at the same time, there seems a fair possibility that you may succeed in rescuing one or more of the captives. of course it would be quite out of the question that any of the ladies could escape. there would be a hot pursuit, and only horsemen well mounted could hope to get off. however, i do not feel justified in refusing any offer that affords a shadow of hope of saving such men as pottinger, and will do all that mr. macgregor suggests to facilitate your operations. you will doubtless pass through cabul, and i will at once write a letter to mohun lal, requesting him to give you authority, in his name as well as mine, for payment to the leader of the prisoners' escort of any sum in reason. at present native opinion is strong that we shall not be able to force the passes, and the name of the moonshee may have greater effect than any promise on my part; but at the same time, until you can get into communication with the captives and learn something of the officer and his disposition, it would be madness to attempt to bribe him. the difficulties of the journey appear to me to be great, but not insuperable. the real difficulty will only begin when you overtake the captives' escort." "i feel that, sir, but i rely greatly upon the men i hope to obtain from sadut. although not of his tribe, they have attached themselves most strongly to him. they are strong, resolute men, and as one of them was a petty chief near bamian, he may be able to gather a few others to aid me. i shall, of course, be very glad to have authority to offer a bribe to the officer in command of the party, but i rely chiefly upon these men and my own efforts, at any rate as far as pottinger is concerned. captains boyd and johnson can hardly leave their families. possibly, by the aid of these men, i may be able to collect a sufficient number of fighting men to make a sudden attack upon the escort, and to carry off all the captives to some hiding-place among the hills, and there keep them until you send on a force to bring them in. of course i must be entirely guided by circumstances, but it is impossible for me to have any fixed plan until i see how matters stand." "i can quite see that, mr. campbell, and that, greatly as you may desire to rescue the whole party, it is eldred pottinger who is the first object of your expedition." "that is so, colonel. he was most kind to me in herat, and it is to him i owe my present position; therefore he is my first object. if i can free him it will be a great step gained towards rescuing the others. i feel sure that he would not think for a moment of leaving his companions to their fate. but his name as the defender of herat is known to every afghan, and he would be able to bring a great influence to bear upon the tribesmen round bamian, whose interests must lie quite as much with herat as with cabul." the general nodded approvingly. "i see that you have thought matters over well. if you will call here again in half an hour the letter for the moonshee shall be ready for you, and a thousand pounds in gold." at the appointed time angus called upon the general, and received the money and letter; then returning to his own tent, he rode out with azim. when fairly away from the camp they dismounted and put on their afghan disguises. they had brought an orderly with them, who took back the clothes they had discarded and angus's sword to macgregor's tent, he having undertaken to have them brought up to cabul with his own baggage. they had no difficulty as to the way, as the path they had followed with sadut had come down close to gundamuck. they had little fear of being interfered with on the road. the afghans would have gathered in the passes, and should they meet any they would only have to say that their village near gundamuck had been burnt by the british, and they were now on their way to join sadut and fight under his orders. although they saw several parties in the distance making their way towards the pass, they did not encounter any within speaking distance, and just at sunset reached sadut's fort. they had passed through the village unnoticed. tribesmen were frequently coming and going, and there was nothing to distinguish them from others. they dismounted in front of the fort. a man was sitting at the top of a ladder, and angus held up his hand to him, and hassan--for it was the man who had twice captured him--at once waved his hand in welcome, and stood up. "you have come willingly this time," he said with a smile, as angus reached him. "of course you wish to see sadut khan. he is within. it is lucky that you have arrived to-day, for to-morrow he sets out." sadut greeted him with pleasure mingled with surprise. "i did not expect to see you here, my friend." "no, i suppose not, chief; but i am on a mission with which i am sure you will sympathize, and in which i hope you will aid me, so far as to spare me hassan and his four men." "what is its nature?" the chief asked. "i know that you would not come and offer me english money to abstain from fighting again." "i should not think of such a thing, sadut. i know that you are a fair and open enemy, and i think the better of you for fighting for your country. i may say that general pollock has been informed of your kindness to me, and that you did your utmost to make akbar keep his word to grant protection to the retiring army, and i can assure you that, in any event, no harm will happen to you or yours. i will tell you what i have come for. do you know that all the hostages, ladies and children, have been sent away by akbar from cabul, that they are to be taken over the bamian pass to khooloom, and handed over to the governor there, and that, doubtless, they will be sold as slaves to the turkomans?" "i had not heard it," sadut said angrily. "it is a disgrace to us. they were delivered up trusting to our word and honour, and it is a foul deed of akbar to harm them in any way after taking his oath for their protection. it is infamous! infamous!" and he walked up and down the room in fierce indignation. "what should we say," he burst out, "if the families of dost mahomed and akbar himself were to be sold by your people as slaves to some barbarous race? could we complain if, when the news of this treatment of the hostages becomes known in india, dost mahomed's family should be treated in a similar way?" then he stopped abruptly. "what is it that you have come to ask of me? the thing is done, and cannot be undone. akbar and i are ill friends now, for i have bearded him in the council and denounced his conduct. certainly i have no influence that could assist you. i am an afghan, and am pledged to join the force that will oppose the march of your troops up the passes, and i am a man of my word. but even were i free to help you, i could be of little assistance. i have here not more than thirty or forty fighting men, and i doubt if even these would obey me on such an enterprise. i might ride to my own fort and summon the momunds, whom i have so far kept quiet; but the enterprise would be a desperate one, we should set all the other tribes against us, and they would not risk destruction merely for the sake of rescuing a few white men and women. their sympathies are all with the tribes round cabul, and they share in their hatred of the infidel invaders. it would be as much as i could do to keep them quiet, and certainly i should fail if i called upon them to embark on such an enterprise." "i have no intention of asking it of you, chief. i am going myself to see what can be done to save my friends, and have come to ask you to allow hassan and his men to go with me. they are from bamian, and at bamian it is likely that the captives will be kept for some time. i should, of course, pay them well for their aid." "you can take them," the chief said at once. "they are good men and faithful to me, and i rely upon them as i could not do on any of my own tribesmen. i will call them in at once." hassan and his four men entered the room a minute later. "hassan," sadut said, "you and your men have proved yourselves true and faithful followers from the day when you left your homes to carry me over the passes, although you all thought that there was no hope of our getting through. you have fought by my side in kohistan; you twice at my orders carried off my friend here. he appreciates the service you did him, and is in sore need of five men upon whom he can rely to the utmost. he has come to ask me to let you go with him. a sore disgrace has fallen upon our nation. akbar khan has sent the men who placed themselves in his hands as hostages, and the women whom he swore to protect, over the hindoo koosh to be sold as slaves to the usbegs. my word has been given to fight against the army of gundamuck if it attempts to ascend the passes, and i at least will keep faith. this british officer is going to attempt to free some of the captives. how he will do so i know not, but my best wishes will go with him. he thinks it likely that the escort of the prisoners will halt for some little time at bamian, and you more than any others might therefore be able to help. i do not order you to go, but i ask you to do so. it is a good work, and concerns the honour of every afghan." "and moreover," angus said, "i will pay a thousand rupees to you, and five hundred to each of your followers. i will hand them over to you at once, and if we are successful i will pay you as much more." the sum was a huge one in their eyes. it would suffice to settle them in comfort for the rest of their lives. hassan looked at his men, and saw by the expression of their faces that they were more than willing to accept the offer. he held out his hand to angus, "we are your servants," he said, "and will serve you truly, and if needs be, lay down our lives for you, not only for the sake of the money you offer us, but because sadut khan has told us that for the honour of the nation these people ought to be released. we have been comrades in danger before, and were nigh dead when you rescued us when buried in the snow. i see not how this enterprise can be carried out; but we will do what you tell us, and men cannot do more. when do we start?" "every hour is of consequence," angus replied. "can you find your way across the mountains in the dark? if so, we will start at once." "i certainly can find the way." "you must all have a meal first," sadut said. "besides, you will need horses. they shall be brought in and got ready for you in an hour. see that the english officer's horses have a good feed, and that his servant eats with you. the food will be ready in half an hour." no time was lost, and in an hour and a half after the arrival of angus at the fort the party set out. fortunately the moon was nearly full, and hassan had so frequently gone down to cabul from the fort that he had no difficulty whatever in following the track. this in many places was so steep that all had to dismount and lead their horses down. however, they reached cabul an hour before sunrise, and all lay down in an empty hut for three or four hours' sleep. then angus, with hassan and three of his men, entered the town, leaving azim and the other man to look after the horses. as there were numbers of tribesmen in the streets, they attracted no attention whatever. proceeding to the house of the moonshee, angus enquired if mohun lal was in. "he is busy. he does not grant audiences till ten o'clock." angus moved away and returned at half-past nine. already five or six persons were waiting to see the moonshee, and by ten the number had considerably increased. it was eleven before angus's turn arrived. the moonshee was alone. angus took out his letter and handed it to him. he knew mohun lal well, having often taken communications to him from burnes. the afghan read the letter, and looked up in surprise. "you are well disguised indeed, sahib," he said, rising, "for, often as i have seen you before, i did not recognize you in the slightest, but thought it was, as usual, an afghan peasant with complaints to make against plunderers. so you have undertaken the dangerous mission of endeavouring to rescue some of the prisoners. truly you english have courage thus to thrust yourself into the midst of enemies, and on such a mission. however, i will do what i can to help you. i do not say that it is altogether hopeless, for i know my man; the commander of the escort is saleh mahomed. he is an adventurer, and has served under many masters. he was at one time a subaltern in one of your native regiments, but deserted with his men to dost mahomed just before the fight at bamian. such a man might be bought over, but not cheaply." "general pollock said he left the sum to be offered to him entirely to you." mohun lal thought for some time, and then said: "i should say that a pension of a thousand rupees a month, and a present of thirty thousand would tempt him as much as a larger sum. it would, i think, be best for you to disguise yourself now as a cashmerian. you know syud moorteza?" "i know him well," angus said; "he helped captain johnson to collect grain from the villages." "it would be as well for you to use his name. as an afghan, saleh might doubt you. altogether, it would be more likely that a man who may be considered a neutral should be employed on such a mission, and the offer to sell goods would make an opening. of course you could take the dress you now wear with you in case of necessity. it would be too dangerous for me to give you a letter, for if saleh, when you opened the subject to him, at once ordered you to be arrested, it would certainly be found on you, and would cost me my life. you will require to take a small escort with you, or you might be robbed at the first place you come to." "i have five men with me," angus replied. "they come from bamian; one of them is a petty chief there, and might, if i find that saleh cannot be approached, persuade or bribe some of the people there to aid." "i fear you would not succeed in that way. saleh had, i believe, two hundred and fifty men with him. i suppose you will start at once?" "our horses are outside the town, and we shall mount as soon as i return to them." "i wish you good fortune. there are many afghans who feel deeply the disgrace akbar has brought upon himself, and upon all of us, by breaking his plighted word." taking leave of the moonshee, angus joined his companions, and after having bought in the bazaar a costume suitable for a trader from cashmere, and two bales of goods from that country, left the city. chapter xix the british captives "why are you going as a cashmerian?" hassan asked. "i thought that you were going in the disguise that you now have on." "i had intended to, hassan; but mohun lal suggested that as a trader i should have more chance of going among the escort than as an afghan, and i see that this would be so. and, moreover, as afghans can enter into fellowship with the men of the escort better than i can, and as you come from bamian, no doubt would arise as to the truth of your story, namely that, having been absent for more than two years from home, you were anxious to get home, and that as this trader had offered you money to serve as his escort it was a good opportunity for you to return." hassan nodded. "that makes a good story of it, certainly." the change of disguise was made, two ponies were purchased to carry the bales of goods and provisions for the journey, and they then started. in buying his goods angus had only purchased two costly shawls, which he intended as a present for saleh, or, if he failed with him, for one of the officers under him. with this exception, the bales were filled with trifles such as might tempt the soldiers, and with stuffs which would, he was sure, be very welcome to the ladies, who must, naturally, be in a sore plight for garments, as what baggage they had started with must have been lost in the passes, and they could have had little opportunity of replenishing their wardrobe during their captivity. they travelled rapidly, halting only for a few hours when it was necessary to give their horses a rest. as the ladies were carried in litters, and there was no reason why they should be hurried on their journey, angus knew that he must be gaining fast upon the captives and their escort, and indeed he reached bamian only a few hours after them. he put up at a little khan, while hassan and his men went off to their village to see the families from whom they had been so long separated. hassan found his wife in undisturbed possession of the little fort, and there was great joy in the village when it was found that he and his men had returned with funds that would enable them to pass the coming winter in comfort, and largely to increase their stock of animals. that evening two or three sheep were killed, and a general feast was held in honour of the return of the chief and his followers. as nothing was talked of in the little town but the arrival of the british captives, angus had no difficulty in learning that these had been lodged in a little fort close to the place. he did not attempt to open his bales of goods, although several of the people came to him to ask him to do so, for so few traders had visited the place since the troubles began, that the stores had long been empty. there had, too, been a good deal of plundering since the british force there had retired. angus was obliged to explain that he had only brought a few trifles with him, as his purpose was to buy turkoman carpets and other goods at khooloom, and that he had sold off almost all the stock he had brought from cashmere at cabul. leaving azim at the khan to see that his goods were not stolen, he strolled out. the place was full of the men of the escort, who showed much discontent on finding that neither fruit nor any other of the little luxuries to which they were accustomed could be bought at bamian. angus had no difficulty in entering into conversation with some of them. he had brought with him a considerable quantity of good tobacco, and when he produced a pouch and invited them to fill their pipes he at once won their good-will. "how quickly have you come from cabul? was there any news when you left there?" "we have travelled fast," he said. "you have had three days' start of us, and i arrived here this afternoon. no, there was no news. they say that the infidels are halting at gundamuck. the chiefs are gathering in the passes with all their forces, but have not yet moved." "i should have thought that they would have had enough of our passes; they will meet with the same fate as those who tried to go down them." "it should be so," angus replied. "who can withstand your people when they are fighting among your own hills? you must have travelled slowly, since we gained three days upon you." "we made very short journeys," the man said. "you see, we were encumbered with these women and children, for whom it must have been rough work, for the nights are already cold. i shall be glad when we get to khooloom and hand them over to the governor there. but i will say for them that they have borne up bravely. i can tell you that we are all disgusted at having to be making this journey with them instead of taking our share of the spoil that will be gathered in the passes." "yes, it must be annoying to brave men to be thus wasting their time when great things are being done, to say nothing of losing their share of the booty to be gathered. have you a good commander?" "yes, we have no cause to grumble on that account. saleh mahomed is a bold soldier and a cheerful fellow, is not unduly harsh, and as long as we keep our arms in good order, and obey his orders, he asks no questions when one of us comes in with a sheep fastened to his saddle. but there has been no chance of getting anything to help out our rations, for the two or three little villages we have passed since we left the valley are for the most part deserted. there are women there, but the men have not yet come down from the hills with the flocks, and none of us have tasted meat since we started. saleh mahomed is a man who has travelled much and seen many things. he was an officer in the english army, but he would not fight against us, and two years ago, when dost mahomed with his army came here, he went over to him with his company of sepoys. he was not a chief, but was a tribesman near the frontier. there are many of them, they say, in the service of the infidels; and he had done well for himself." "i suppose the captive women must be in want of warm clothes. i have not a large stock of goods, but among them are several warm robes, which i would sell cheaply to them, for i wish to clear away my remaining stock, as i intend to buy turkoman carpets at khooloom and balkh; and besides these i have some stuff which doubtless the women here would buy to make garments for the children. think you that saleh would let me traffic with them?" "that i could not say; but if you have anything in your pack that would please him he might perhaps let you do so. you seem a good fellow, if you like i will take you to him to-morrow morning." "thank you for your offer. when i meet you i will have a pound of good tobacco, which i shall beg you to accept." "i will be here. i shall be one of the guards to-night round the fort, but shall be free in the morning." "does saleh mahomed sleep there?" "no, it is a miserable and dirty place. he lodges at the house of the headman there." early in the morning hassan came down to the khan. "now, sahib, you have only to tell us what you want us to do, and you can rely upon us." "for the present there is nothing. i am going to see saleh mahomed this morning, and try to get permission to sell some of my goods to the captives. i may then be able to learn something of his disposition towards them, and how he behaved to them during the journey. it is important that i should know this before giving him the message from the moonshee." "it would be well to do so, master; but from what i hear the moonshee has been negotiating with many of the chiefs, who are willing enough to take his money, but who do not carry out their part of the bargain. however, i have not heard that any of them have denounced him. he is always considered to be the chief agent of the english, but as he spends english gold freely, and as it is well to have some one in cabul through whom negotiations could be entered into with them, no one interferes with him." "the only thing that you can do for the present is to go round among your friends, talk to them about the captives, and say that it is a disgrace that they should be sent as captives among the usbegs after having received promises of protection, and having willingly submitted themselves as hostages. of course you will do it carefully; but if you can create a feeling in their favour, and make them afterwards win over a portion of the escort, something might be done. of course you can say, and truly, that sadut khan, dost mahomed's nephew by marriage, is most indignant at this breach of faith, and that you believe that many other chiefs share his feeling." "i will set about it at once. the tribesmen here have not the same animosity against the english as those at cabul. the english troops when they were here behaved well; they took no man's goods without payment, and the tribesmen got better prices for their sheep and cattle than they had ever got before. they care little who rules at cabul, and it is nothing to them whether it is the barukzyes or a dooranee." the next morning angus met the afghan soldier. "here is the tobacco i promised you; it is good stuff." "if it is like that you gave me yesterday, i shall be very content. now, come with me to saleh; he is a good fellow if you find him in the humour." the officer was alone when they entered. "saleh mahomed," the soldier said, "this is a trader from cashmere, syud moorteza; he will tell you his business. he seems to be a good fellow, and has some excellent tobacco." having thus introduced angus he left the room. "what is it that you want with me?" saleh asked in persian. angus replied in the same language, "i am a trader, my lord, and wish to get rid of some of the wares i am carrying. they are but few, as i am going north to purchase and not to sell. i would willingly rid myself of a part of them. among them are warm dresses and stuffs. i am told that the persons in your charge are but thinly clad, and i doubt not that they would willingly buy these goods of me." the afghan laughed. "they would willingly have them, no doubt; but as to buying, they are altogether without money. those who were in charge of them saw to that before they were handed over to me." "i should not mind that, my lord. i have had dealings with englishmen who have come up to cashmere, and they generally take a store of shawls and other things back with them to india. we always find that they are true to their word, and we take their orders as willingly as gold--more so, indeed, because the shroffs in india take them anywhere, and it saves our having to send money there for the purchase of goods in india. thus, then, if they gave me orders on their people at calcutta or bombay, i would more willingly accept them than gold, which is a dangerous commodity to carry." "but you say that you are going to purchase goods." "that is so, my lord, but i do not carry money to do so. i pay for them with orders upon a merchant at herat to whom i am well-known, and who acts as my agent, and buys for me such goods as i require from persia. i have not come empty-handed to you, my lord. it is right that if you do me the favour of allowing me to trade with your prisoners, you should share in the benefit. i have with me here a cashmere shawl. i do not say that it is worthy of your acceptance, but it is handsome and of the best wool, and will make a warm girdle." saleh was fond of finery. "let me look at it," he said. angus undid the parcel and held the shawl up, and closely watched the afghan as he examined it. he saw that he was pleased with it. however, the chief said, "i say not that it is not a good shawl, but it is not of the best quality. i have been at srinagar." "'tis not of the best, my lord--i would not try to deceive one like yourself--but it is the best i have, and i can hardly hope to make more than its value from these people." "it is worth about two hundred rupees," saleh said. "your lordship is not to be deceived, that is the very sum i gave for it; but it is worth much more here." "you seem to be an honest man," saleh said, throwing the shawl down on the divan from which he had risen. "and in truth i should be well content that the prisoners were better supplied with garments in the cold weather that is setting in. i am ordered to conduct them safely to khooloom, but nought was said against my providing them with such comforts on the way as they could obtain. to-day i am busy; i have to see that the men are well quartered and fed. to-morrow if you come here with your goods i will myself take you to the place where they are confined; but mind that no word is said to them save concerning your merchandise." "what words should i say, my lord? but doubtless one of your men will be present and see that i confine myself to my business." "then come at this hour to-morrow." angus bowed deeply and then left, delighted that he had obtained permission to see the captives. that day the prisoners were taken to another fort, saleh being moved by their complaints of the dirt and want of accommodation in the little fort in which they were crowded. the place was but a little better than the one they had left, but there was somewhat more room. hassan came to angus in the evening. "i have seen many of my friends," he said, "and have spoken as you told me. they are indignant. i told them that dost mahomed and his family, and that of akbar, are honourably treated in india, and are allowed a large income by the government there, and live with every comfort and luxury, and it is a disgrace to our nation that such treatment should be meted out to the officers who are hostages, and the ladies and their families. i do not say that they will be disposed to hazard their own safety by taking any active measures, but if the soldiers were to show any disposition favourable to the captives, they would assuredly take no hostile steps against them." "i have strong hopes that i may succeed with saleh. he has taken a bribe from me to permit me to sell goods to the prisoners, and he may be willing to take a vastly greater one to release them." "my men have been going about among the soldiers, sahib. they are discontented at this journey they have taken, and at the prospect of a still farther one, and if their commander gave them the order to return, they would not, i think, hesitate to obey." "let your men continue at that work, but let them be careful not to appear to be too warmly interested. let them avoid at present all mention of captives, and simply inflame the men's minds by talking of the hardships of their being sent on such a journey when so much booty is likely to be picked up in the passes. it is not likely that if saleh orders them to proceed on their journey they will refuse to do so, but if he learns from his officers that the men would gladly obey him if he ordered them to return, it may help him to decide to accept the offer i have to make him. i shall put off doing so till the last moment, because at any time news may come that pollock and nott are both beating back all opposition and advancing on cabul, and in that case he may see that his interest lies in siding with them rather than with akbar." in the morning angus rode with saleh to the fort, azim following with the pony carrying the bales of goods. two men stood as sentries on the platform on the top of the plain, half a dozen others were posted round it. the officer in charge came out. "have you anything to report, suleiman?" "no, captain, except that the prisoners complain that this place is little better than the last they were confined in." "they are particular, these ladies and gentlemen," saleh said with a laugh. "the place might be better, no doubt, but they will be lucky if they do not find themselves very much worse lodged when they get among the usbegs." "major pottinger was asking, captain, that a few blankets should be given them for the use of the women and children." "we will see about it. however, this trader here has some warm robes to sell, and they may just as well pay for the things themselves as that i should put my hand into my pocket, for my instructions said nothing about buying things of this sort for them; and from the manner in which prince akbar gave me my orders, i should say that the more they suffered the better he would be pleased. however, i am sorry for them, and have given permission to this cashmerian to see them and try to sell his goods to them." the officer looked doubtful. "i do not think there is a rupee among them." "no, but the trader has faith that if they give him notes for his goods, their people will assuredly cash them." "he must be a very confiding fellow," the officer said. "no; by what he says the shroffs of all the large cities in india are always ready to take the notes of english officers, and that he himself has done so in cashmere. "at any rate you can take him up to their apartments, but remain in the room while he bargains with them. i do not mind his carrying on his trade, but see that he in no way communicates with them save in the matter of his business." saleh went up with angus, followed by the officer and azim, who was assisted by the soldiers to carry up the goods. a sentry was sitting before the door at the top of the stairs with his musket across his knee. as saleh came up, he rose and took a key hanging on a nail on the wall beside him and opened the door. "i hear that you are still not content with your lodging, captain johnson," saleh said as he entered. "well, what would you have? these towers are all alike, and do not come up to our ideas of comfort in cabul; and as glass is scarcely known in bamian, no doubt you feel it cold at night." [illustration: angus shows his goods to the prisoners.] "if we had a few blankets to hang across the windows the ladies would not feel it so much, saleh." "that is so; and as i am anxious that they should not, while under my charge, feel greater discomfort than necessary, i have permitted this trader, syud moorteza, to enter. he has, he tells me, some warm robes and other things which he is ready to sell, and as i told him that before you came into my charge all your money had been taken away, he is ready to take your notes upon a banker at calcutta or bombay in payment." captain johnson knew the cashmerian, as he had rendered invaluable assistance in obtaining grain. angus, who was acquainted with him, had the more willingly adopted his name because the man was about his own height and build, and there was even some resemblance in feature. captain johnson therefore looked with interest at the trader, who was standing a little behind saleh. for a moment he seemed puzzled but angus had his hand on his chin and suddenly moved two fingers across his lips and very slightly shook his head. johnson understood the gesture, and replied to saleh: "the man is right; he may be sure that whatever happens to us our friends will see that he is paid for any goods we may buy of him. we will write a letter in persian, which you can read to our friends, saying that this man has trusted us and that our orders are to be honoured." the ladies, who were in the next room, were called in. the afghan commander, who had nothing to do, remained with his officer, being interested in the contents of the trader's bales. azim opened them, and spread the articles out on the floor for inspection. angus was greatly concerned at the appearance of the ladies, to all of whom he was known. his disguise, however, had so completely changed his appearance that none of them recognized him. his face was darkened, his eyebrows and hair had been stained black, and by the assistance of some false hair the latter was arranged in the fashion worn by the man he represented. syud moorteza was of the hindoo religion, and angus had imitated his caste marks on the forehead, which alone greatly altered his appearance. but the ladies scarcely looked at him. their delight at seeing the warm robes and woollen cloths was great indeed. here was a prospect that their sufferings from cold would be alleviated, and that their children could now be warmly clad. among the smaller articles in his bale angus included a good supply of needles and thread, buttons, and other small necessaries. the ladies saw at once that from the soft woolen cloths they would be able to make an abundance of warm clothing for the children. angus expatiated after the manner of a trader on the quality of his goods. holding up a warm robe to captain johnson, he said: "this would suit you, my lord; it will keep you warm in the coldest night." "you have not more than enough for the ladies," captain johnson said. "if there is anything over after they have made their purchases, we shall be glad to take the rest of your cloth. we can wind it round us." "but feel the quality of this robe, my lord," angus urged, with a wink that was understood by the officer, who at once took hold of it. as he did so angus slipped a note, which he had folded to the smallest possible dimensions, into his hands. "yes, it is good material," he said quietly; "but, as i have just said, these must be for the ladies." and he turned away as if unwilling to be tempted, and presently sauntered into the next room. in order to keep up his character angus asked fully five times the proper value for his goods. but the captives had no thought of bargaining; for these goods would be of the greatest comfort to themselves and their children, as coverings for the night, and as wraps during the passage of the passes, for in addition to the clothes and cloth, there were silk mufflers for the neck, and warm jackets lined with astrakhan fur. nor were the needles and thread less prized. their clothes and those of the children were in rags, and they would be most useful for mending, as well as the making of new clothes. some of them almost cried with joy at the thought of the comfort that this would be to their little ones. in a few minutes the greater portion of the contents of the bales was disposed of. "the best way," pottinger said, "will be for lawrence, mackenzie, and myself, as the three political officers, to give this man an order signed by the three of us on our agent at calcutta, and i will write an open letter to accompany it, authorizing any british officer or banker to cash the note when it is presented, and to send it on to my agent. the man has done us an inestimable service, and it will facilitate his getting the money. where are you thinking of cashing this?" he asked. "at herat." "then i will also give you a note to a trader there. he has a shop in the great bazaar, and is a friend of mine. he has relations with business men in india, and will, i am sure, cash it for you at once should you desire cash, or will furnish you in exchange with bills on some merchant in candahar." he then mentioned the trader's name. "that will suit me well," angus said. "i know the man by name, having been myself at herat. he is of good repute, and i am sure that he or any other merchant having dealings in india would gladly cash the order, as it would be far safer to send than money." it was not until the purchases had all been made that captain johnson re-entered the room, came and stood by angus, asking a few questions as to the goods; when the two afghans were looking another way he passed a note into the pretended merchant's hand. presently he said: "but we have no pen and ink to write this order?" "i have them, sahib," angus said, taking an ink-bottle and pen, such as were always carried by traders, from his pocket, together with several sheets of paper. the price of all the goods was added up; then pottinger wrote an order for the amount, which was signed by himself, lawrence, and mackenzie. then johnson took pottinger aside as if to discuss the terms of the letters. "that man is not syud moorteza at all," he said. "don't turn round and look at him. he has given me a note, and i am answering it. who do you think it is?" "i have been a little puzzled, not by his face, but by his voice. i have it now--it is angus campbell." "you have guessed right. he has come up by himself through the passes to try and overtake us. he bears a message from mohun lal to saleh, saying that he shall be given a pension of a thousand rupees a month and a present of thirty thousand if he will hand over the captives to the british general when he reaches cabul. he has asked my opinion as to whether it would be safe to make the proposition to the man, or whether he had better wait until news comes that pollock has defeated akbar in the passes. i have told him that i have already sounded saleh, and that though he passed the matter off, i believe he is open to take a bribe if he hears that nott and pollock are making their way up. he says that if bad news comes--and i think it would then be useless to approach saleh--he will make an attempt with some men he has with him to effect your escape, and also mine, and that of mackenzie and lawrence. boyd, of course, would not leave his wife and family, and it would be impossible to take the women and children with us." "campbell is a splendid fellow!" pottinger said. "he behaved wonderfully well at herat, and i was sure that in time he would make a very fine officer. it is a noble thing, his undertaking such a tremendous risk." the letters were now written and handed to angus. saleh, however, took them from his hands and read them, and then handed them back, after assuring himself that there was nothing written but what had been agreed upon. then he and the officer went downstairs with angus and azim, the latter carrying easily enough the one small bale that sufficed for the goods unsold. "you have made a nice sum out of this," saleh said. "i have had a long journey with my goods," angus replied humbly; "but they were well contented, and paid without bargaining the prices i asked. i feel, my lord, that i am greatly indebted to you for the opportunity. i have not money with me--we traders never carry cash, and i shall have to wait many months before i receive the price of the goods--nevertheless, my lord, i will willingly give you in token of my gratitude another shawl equal to the last; i have brought with me only two. and you can select any goods you like from those remaining. there are many silk things among them, for they only bought such as were needed for wear." saleh was well satisfied, and telling angus that he might call round in the evening with some of the silk embroidered scarfs, he allowed him to return to the camp. two days passed, and then a horseman rode in with the news that akbar had been defeated at tezeen, but would fight another battle, and, as he was being joined by many chiefs, would doubtless overthrow the infidels. the news spread rapidly and caused much excitement in the camp, which was heightened by the fact that the man said that there was a report that ghuznee had been captured by the british force that was marching from candahar. angus went in the evening and requested a private interview with saleh. as johnson had told him in his note, the afghan had already been revolving in his mind whether he could not do better for himself by halting at bamian until he knew how affairs would turn out at cabul. johnson, who had become very intimate with him on the journey, had said casually that the british government would assuredly pay a large sum for the return of the captives. he had taken no notice of the remark at the time, but had thought a good deal of it. he knew that money had been lavishly spent among the chiefs, and it seemed to him that he too might have a share in the golden flood. he was a shrewd man as well as an unscrupulous one. he had three times before deserted his employers when better offers had been made to him, and it seemed to him that he had it now in his power to procure a sum that would make him rich for life. he had been told by his sub-officers that there was a growing disaffection among the men, that many of them openly grumbled at the prospect of the journey to khooloom, and that some of the bamian petty chiefs had been going among them, and, they believed, stirring up a feeling against the journey. he had from the first entertained some suspicion of this cashmerian trader. why should he not have bought a larger store of indian goods to exchange with the turkomans? his doubt as to the best course to pursue had been heightened at the news that he had received that afternoon. what would happen if the british again settled down at cabul? they would doubtless send a force to endeavour to rescue the captives. and although he might be at khooloom before they did so, his situation would then be a most unpleasant one. akbar, as a fugitive, could no longer pay him and his troops; they would, of course, leave him, and he would not dare to return to cabul. he was thinking over these matters when angus was ushered in. the latter had already decided that he would for the present maintain the character that he had assumed. if saleh knew that he was a british officer he would assuredly, if he remained faithful to his charge, arrest him also; but as merely the agent of mohun lal, one of the most influential men in cabul, the afghan would probably allow him to depart unharmed, even if he refused the offered bribe. "i have not come to you this evening to talk of merchandise, saleh mahomed," angus began. "i have come upon a more important matter. as you know, the troops from jellalabad have defeated akbar, and are making their way up through the passes. they will defeat him again if he fights them. the troops from candahar have reached ghuznee, and assuredly there is no force that can arrest their progress to cabul. i have only waited for this to speak openly to you. i am sent here by mohun lal. he authorizes me to promise you, in his name and that of general pollock, a pension of a thousand rupees a month, and a gift of thirty thousand rupees, if you will hold the prisoners here until a british force arrives to carry them back to cabul." the afghan showed no surprise. "i suspected," he said, "all along that you had come here for some other motive than trade. what guarantee does mohun lal offer that these terms shall be fulfilled?" "it would not have been safe for him to have entrusted such a message to paper," angus said, "but he gives you his word." "words are no guarantee," saleh said, "especially the word of a chief." "i would suggest, saleh mahomed, that you have it in your power to obtain a guarantee that even you will acknowledge to be a binding one. you have in your hands three men whose names are known throughout afghanistan and through india as those of men of honour. you have major pottinger, captain lawrence, and mr. mackenzie, all men whose word would be accepted unhesitatingly to whatever promise they might make. they and the other officers would, i am sure, give you a written guarantee that the offer made by mohun lal shall be confirmed and carried out by the government of india." "what should i do with money without employment?" "if you desire employment, i have no doubt that you would be granted, in addition to the money payment, the command of a native regiment raised among the pathans of the lower hills." "i will think the matter over," the afghan said, and with a wave of the hand dismissed angus. but the latter had seen, by the expression of saleh's face when he mentioned the terms, that these were far higher than he had himself ever thought of, and he had no doubt whatever that they would be accepted. the first thing in the morning he received a message from saleh mahomed requesting him to accompany him to the tower. the afghan, beyond the usual salute, was silent during the ride. on dismounting saleh told him to follow him. on entering the prisoners' apartments the officer said: "you are aware that prince akbar's orders are that i am to take you to khooloom. i had certainly intended to do so, but i have received news that leads me to doubt whether he may be in a position to support you if i carry out the orders. yesterday afternoon i heard that he had been defeated at tezeen. he will fight again with a stronger force than before, still the issue is doubtful. i may tell you that the messenger also brought to the fort news that the force from candahar had taken ghuznee." an exclamation of joy broke from the prisoners. "another thing has happened," the afghan went on. "this trader last night informed me that he really came here on a mission from mohun lal. he promises me, in general pollock's name, that if i release you and carry you to cabul i shall be granted a pension of a thousand rupees a month and thirty thousand as a present. i know nothing of general pollock, and have no great faith in mohun lal, but seeing that akbar may be even now a fugitive and your two armies in cabul, if you gentlemen will swear by your god to make good to me what syud moorteza states he is authorized to offer, i will hand you over to your own people." the offer was joyfully accepted. angus was requested by saleh to draw out a bond to that effect in persian, and this was signed by pottinger, lawrence, johnson, and mackenzie. another agreement was then drawn up by johnson, by which all the officers bound themselves to pay as many months' pay and allowances, in accordance with their rank, as should be necessary to carry out the terms of the agreement, thus satisfying saleh that, should the english general refuse to ratify the first agreement, he would receive the money from them. to this all the prisoners and the ladies signed their names, brigadier shelton heading the list; while lady macnaghten and mrs. sturt, who were widows, bound themselves in a codicil to pay such sums as might be demanded from them by major pottinger and captains lawrence and johnson. "you are no longer my prisoner, sahibs," saleh said when the two documents were handed to him, and he on his part had given a bond to perform his share of the conditions. "now, i should like your counsel as to how i had best proceed. i believe that my men will gladly obey me in this matter, because they are discontented at being sent so far away, and i feel sure that a very slight inducement on your part to them will settle the matter. if i could offer them in your name a gratuity of four months' pay when we arrive at cabul, it would settle matters." to this the officers willingly agreed. "i have been thinking over the affair all night," he went on. "which, think you, would be best--to travel straight for cabul when you hear that the british have arrived there, or to wait here? i hear that many of the petty chiefs in the neighbourhood are indignant that akbar khan should have broken all the promises he made, and have treated so badly those who placed themselves under his protection, while at the same time his father, together with his own family, are receiving most honourable treatment in india. doubtless you would rather go straight down to cabul, but we must remember that if defeated, akbar with a very large number of his followers may again fly by this route and make for khooloom, as he and dost mahomed did when the british first marched to cabul. should they meet us on our way down they would assuredly attack us, and their numbers might be so great that we should be overwhelmed. on the other hand, if we stay here we can occupy the largest of these little forts and set to work to strengthen it, and might then resist any force akbar could bring against us until the british troops arrive to our assistance." the officers were silent for a minute, and then pottinger said: "what do you think, brigadier? this is a military matter." "i should say the last proposition is the safest," shelton replied. "we may be sure that the moment pollock reaches cabul he will send off a body of cavalry to rescue us. akbar would have at best only forty-eight hours' start, perhaps not half that, and he would scarcely venture to stop here to undertake a siege. he will certainly have no guns with him, and the three hundred men of our escort, with ten or twelve of us to lead them, could be trusted to withstand any hurried assault he might make upon us." the others all agreed that this would be the safest plan. "very well," saleh said. "i will go now and harangue my men, and in the meantime you can prepare to move. i will select the largest and most defensible of these forts. we will move quietly in there, and then i will summon the bamian chiefs, and proclaim that i have abandoned the cause of akbar, and now with my british allies summon them to invite their men to join me, so that when an english force arrives here they will be free from all molestation, and will receive presents in accordance with the number of men they furnish." so saying he left the room, and the joy of the captives broke out in general congratulations among the men, and tears of joy from the women. pottinger, johnson, and boyd gathered round angus and poured forth their thanks to him. nothing had hitherto been said to the ladies as to the real character of the supposed trader, for it was felt that if this enterprise failed the disappointment would to them be terrible. as soon as they learned who he was and what he had done, they too crowded round, and angus was for a time quite confused with the expressions of gratitude showered upon him. "i see," pottinger said, when the din of voices had quieted down, "that you have not informed saleh mahomed of your real character." "i thought it better not to do so. i really came from mohun lal, and if he thought i had not done so, he might have doubted whether i had any authority to make such a proposal; therefore, i thought it would be well to keep up my present character to the end." "perhaps it is best so," pottinger agreed. "these afghans are always suspicious, and a man who has several times betrayed his employers would be more suspicious than other people. i quite agree with you that it is best you should keep up your present character. i suppose mohun lal really did give you the assurance about the ransom?" "yes, general pollock told me that he would give any sum mohun lal might think it desirable to offer, and that was the figure fixed upon as being high enough to tempt saleh, and yet not excessive for such a service. besides, he thought that he might ask more, in which case i should of course have bargained with him." "it is a sum that would tempt any afghan chief," pottinger said, "and to a mere military adventurer like saleh would appear prodigious. well, we will hear of your adventures afterwards. he may return at any moment, and it might put him out of humour if he found that we were not ready. not, indeed, that there is much to do. even the ladies will be able to pack up their scanty belongings in a few minutes. there would, in fact, be nothing at all to pack had it not been for the things they bought of you. the next room is all in confusion, for every one of them is hard at work making clothes for the children." it was half an hour before saleh mahomed returned. "all is well," he said; "the men did not hesitate for a moment. they are delighted at the prospect of returning to cabul, and declare they will fight till the last if they are attacked. i set them to work at once to clear out the largest of the forts here. the chief, when i told him what it was required for, refused his consent, so i at once turned him out, and have appointed another favourable to us in his place. we will move there at once." the news infused fresh strength into the ladies, several of whom were suffering from sickness, and all from long-continued anxiety and the hardships of the journey; they were able to proceed on foot to the fort. hassan was the first to come in with ten followers to give in his adherence to the new order of things. many others followed the example; and as angus was able to supply money, strong parties were soon at work throwing up entrenchments round the tower. pottinger, convinced that audacity was the best policy, at once issued a proclamation calling upon the people of the town and the chiefs of all the surrounding villages to come in at once and pay their respects, and it was not long before they began to arrive. the next day still larger numbers were set to work, and by evening the earthworks were so advanced that they were in a position to offer a very strong resistance. late that evening a friendly chief brought in the news that general pollock was within a day's march of cabul, that all resistance had ceased, and that akbar had fled no one knew whither. it was immediately decided that a start should be made for cabul on the following morning. it was evident that akbar had not retired by that route--had he done so he would have arrived before the news of his flight--and that therefore the risk of meeting any strong force on the road was very slight. they set out at eight o'clock in the morning. horses had been procured for the whole party; the officers took the children before them, the ladies rode. that night all slept on the rocks within shelter, but at midnight they were awakened by the arrival of a horseman. he brought a letter from sir richmond shakespere, general pollock's military secretary, saying that he was on the point of starting with six hundred native horse for bamian. at daybreak the party were astir again, pressing their horses eagerly, their sufferings all forgotten in the hope of speedily meeting their friends. at noon a cloud of dust was seen to rise from the road far ahead; then some straggling horsemen were made out, and behind them a body of cavalry. it was still possible that this might be a body of the enemy, and preparations were at once made for defence. the drums were beat, a line formed, and muskets loaded. soon, however, it could be made out that an officer riding at the head of the party was in british uniform, and in a few minutes shakespere rode up, followed by his men. the joy of the meeting was almost beyond words. a few days before a hopeless captivity among wild tribesmen seemed to be their certain lot; now they were among friends again. they learned from sir richmond that general sale himself was to set out at the head of a brigade to support the advanced party. the next morning they started again, and on the th met sale's column. that evening they passed near the camp of the candahar force, and the next day rode through cabul on their way to pollock's camp, where their arrival excited unbounded delight, for it had generally been felt that the victories that they had won would be incomplete indeed unless their fellow countrymen and women had been rescued. general pollock thanked angus publicly that evening for the service that he had rendered, and the manner in which he had carried out the perilous scheme he had volunteered to perform, and he received innumerable congratulations from all the officers with whom he had shared in the defence of jellalabad. the army remained but a few days at cabul, for the winter was at hand. it was at first proposed to destroy the bala hissar, but the idea was given up, as it was represented that no ruler of afghanistan would be able to maintain his position unless he had that fortress to rely upon. instead of this the great bazaar, through which macnaghten's body had been carried in triumph, was destroyed, and in spite of the efforts of their officers many of the troops entered the city and punished the treachery of its inhabitants by sacking a considerable portion of it. the united army then marched down the passes and retired to india. pollock's division met with no resistance whatever; that of nott, which followed it, was more than once attacked by large bands of plunderers. the report that general pollock had sent in to the governor-general on the day the captives reached the camp gave full credit to angus for the courage and devotion that he had shown, and stated that had he not succeeded in bringing saleh mahomed over to our side, the latter would probably have reached khooloom with the captives before they could have been overtaken, and in that case they might have been sent far away on the approach of sale's brigade and been lost for ever to their friends. the consequence was that he was at once appointed political officer to one of the rajput states. henceforth his promotion was rapid. six years later he went to england on three years' leave. on the ship on which he sailed were four officers of his acquaintance, some of whom were accompanied by their wives. from several of these he received the most pressing invitations to stay with them at their country houses. these he gladly accepted, for except among military men who had returned home, he was without friends. feeling at a loss for employment after a life of such activity as he had led, he threw up his leave at the end of the year, and took back with him to india a wife, the daughter of a colonel who had sailed with him from india. at the end of another ten years he returned home for good. his pay had been large. he had laid by a considerable sum before he first went home, and this he had placed in the hands of the firm to whom he had sent his money before leaving teheran for herat. it had been well employed by them, and at the age of forty he returned home with a considerable fortune, besides a pension, after twenty-three years of service. he had been reluctant to quit his work, but his wife's health had suffered from the climate. his three children had been sent home to her family, and he now bought a place near her people. at first he felt altogether out of his element, but he gradually fell into the ways of country life, and no longer regretted that his work in india had come to an end. the end. "wherever english is spoken one imagines that mr. henty's name is known. one cannot enter a schoolroom or look at a boy's bookshelf without seeing half-a-dozen of his familiar volumes. mr. henty is no doubt the most successful writer for boys, and the one to whose new volumes they look forward every christmas with most pleasure."--_review of reviews._ a list of books for young people ... by ... g.a. henty g.m. fenn s. baring-gould kirk munroe f. frankfort moore gordon stables robert leighton harry collingwood rosa mulholland alice corkran, etc. published by charles scribner's sons to fifth avenue new york g.a. henty's new stories for - "his books have at once the solidity of history and the charm of romance."--_journal of education._ with roberts to pretoria a story of the boer war. by g.a. henty. with illustrations. $ . net. the boer war gives mr. henty an unexcelled opportunity for a thrilling story of present-day interest which the author could not fail to take advantage of. every boy reader will find this account of the adventures of the young hero most exciting, and, at the same time, a wonderfully accurate description of lord roberts's campaign to pretoria. boys have found history in the dress mr. henty gives it anything but dull, and the present book is no exception to the rule. at the point of the bayonet a story of the british conquest of india. by g.a. henty. illustrated. mo, $ . net. one hundred years ago the rule of the british in india was only partly established. the powerful mahrattas were unsubdued, and with their skill in intrigue, and great military power, they were exceedingly dangerous. the story of "at the point of the bayonet" begins with the attempt to conquer this powerful people. harry lindsay, an infant when his father and mother were killed, was saved by his mahratta ayah, who carried him to her own people, and brought him up as a native. she taught him as best she could, and, having told him his parentage, sent him to bombay to be educated. at sixteen he obtained a commission in the english army, and his knowledge of the mahratta tongue combined with his ability and bravery enabled him to render great service in the mahratta war, and carried him, through many frightful perils by land and sea, to high rank. to herat and cabul a story of the first afghan war. by g. a henty. with illustrations. mo. $ . net. the greatest defeat ever experienced by the british army was that in the mountain passes of afghanistan. angus cameron, the hero of this book, having been captured by the friendly afghans, was compelled to be a witness of the calamity. his whole story is an intensely interesting one, from his boyhood in persia; his employment under the government at herat; through the defense of that town against the persians; to cabul, where he shared in all the events which ended in the awful march through the passes, from which but one man escaped. angus is always at the point of danger, and whether in battle or in hazardous expeditions shows how much a brave youth, full of resources, can do, even with so treacherous a foe. his dangers and adventures are thrilling, and his escapes marvellous. new volumes for - . mr. henty, the most popular writer of books of adventure in england, adds three new volumes to his list this fall--books that will delight thousands of boys on this side who have become his ardent admirers. with buller in natal or, a born leader. by g.a. henty. with illustrations by w. rainey. mo, $ . . the breaking out of the boer war compelled chris king, the hero of the story, to flee with his mother from johannesburg to the sea coast. they were with many other uitlanders, and all suffered much from the boers. reaching a place of safety for their families, chris and twenty of his friends formed an independent company of scouts. in this service they were with gen. yule at glencoe, then in ladysmith, then with buller. in each place they had many thrilling adventures. they were in great battles, and in lonely fights on the veldt; were taken prisoners and escaped; and they rendered most valuable service to the english forces. the story is a most interesting picture of the war in south africa. out with garibaldi a story of the liberation of italy. by g.a. henty. with illustrations by w. rainey, r.i. mo, $ . . garibaldi himself is the central figure of this brilliant story, and the little-known history of the struggle for italian freedom is told here in the most thrilling way. from the time the hero, a young lad, son of an english father and an italian mother, joins garibaldi's band of , men in the first descent upon sicily, which was garrisoned by one of the large neapolitan armies, until the end, when all those armies are beaten, and the two sicilys are conquered, we follow with the keenest interest the exciting adventures of the lad in scouting, in battle, and in freeing those in prison for liberty's sake. in the irish brigade by g.a. henty. mo, $ . . desmond kennedy is a young irish lad who left ireland to join the irish brigade in the service of louis xiv. of france. in paris he incurred the deadly hatred of a powerful courtier from whom he had rescued a young girl who had been kidnapped, and his perils are of absorbing interest. captured in an attempted jacobite invasion of scotland, he escaped in a most extraordinary manner. as aide-de-camp to the duke of berwick he experienced thrilling adventures in flanders. transferred to the army in spain, he was nearly assassinated, but escaped to return, when peace was declared, to his native land, having received pardon and having recovered his estates. the story is filled with adventure, and the interest never abates. by g.a. henty. "surely mr. henty should understand boys' tastes better than any man living."--_the times._ won by the sword a tale of the thirty years' war. with illustrations by charles m. sheldon, and plans. mo, $ . . the scene of this story is laid in france, during the time of richelieu, of mazarin and anne of austria. the hero, hector campbell, is the orphaned son of a scotch officer in the french army. how he attracted the notice of marshal turenne and of the prince of conde, how he rose to the rank of colonel; how he finally had to leave france, pursued by the deadly hatred of the duc de beaufort--all these and much more the story tells with the most absorbing interest. no surrender the story of the revolt in la vendée. with illustrations by stanley l. wood. mo, $ . . the revolt of la vendée against the french republic at the time of the revolution forms the groundwork of this absorbing story. leigh stansfield, a young english lad, is drawn into the thickest of the conflict. forming a company of boys as scouts for the vendéan army, he greatly aids the peasants. he rescues his sister from the guillotine, and finally, after many thrilling experiences, when the cause of la vendée is lost, he escapes to england. a roving commission or, through the black insurrection at hayti. with illustrations by william rainey. mo, $ . . this is one of the most brilliant of mr. henty's books. a story of the sea, with all its life and action, it is also full of thrilling adventures on land. so it holds the keenest interest until the end. the scene is a new one to mr. henty's readers, being laid at the time of the great revolt of the blacks, by which hayti became independent. toussaint l'overture appears, and an admirable picture is given of him and of his power. at aboukir and acre a story of napoleon's invasion of egypt. with full-page illustrations by william rainey, and plans. mo, $ . . the hero, having saved the life of the son of an arab chief, is taken into the tribe, has a part in the battle of the pyramids and the revolt at cairo. he is an eye-witness of the famous naval battle of aboukir, and later is in the hardest of the defense of acre. by g.a. henty "mr. henty is the king of story-tellers for boys."--_sword and trowel._ under wellington's command a tale of the peninsular war. with illustrations by wal paget. mo, $ . . the dashing hero of this book, terence o'connor, was the hero of mr. henty's previous book, "with moore at corunna," to which this is really a sequel. he is still at the head of the "minho" portuguese regiment. being detached on independent and guerilla duty with his regiment, he renders invaluable service in gaining information and in harassing the french. his command, being constantly on the edge of the army, is engaged in frequent skirmishes and some most important battles. both sides the border a tale of hotspur and glendower. with full-page illustrations by ralph peacock. mo, $ . . this is a brilliant story of the stirring times of the beginning of the wars of the roses, when the scotch, under douglas, and the welsh, under owen glendower, were attacking the english. the hero of the book lived near the scotch border, and saw many a hard fight there. entering the service of lord percy, he was sent to wales, where he was knighted, and where he was captured. being released, he returned home, and shared in the fatal battle of shrewsbury. st. bartholomew's eve a tale of the huguenot wars. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by h.j. draper, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero, philip fletcher, has a french connection on his mother's side. this induces him to cross the channel in order to take a share in the huguenot wars. naturally he sides with the protestants, distinguishes himself in various battles, and receives rapid promotion for the zeal and daring with which he carries out several secret missions. redskin and cow-boy a tale of the western plains. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearse. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the central interest of this story is found in the many adventures of an english lad, who seeks employment as a cow-boy on a cattle ranch. his experiences during a "round-up" present in picturesque form the toilsome, exciting, adventurous life of a cow-boy; while the perils of a frontier settlement are vividly set forth in an indian raid. by g.a. henty "no country nor epoch of history is there which mr. henty does not know, and what is really remarkable is that he always writes well and interestingly."--_new york times._ with frederick the great a tale of the seven years' war. with full-page illustrations. mo, $ . . the hero of this story while still a youth entered the service of frederick the great, and by a succession of fortunate circumstances and perilous adventures, rose to the rank of colonel. attached to the staff of the king, he rendered distinguished services in many battles, in one of which he saved the king's life. twice captured and imprisoned, he both times escaped from the austrian fortresses. a march on london a story of wat tyler's rising. with full-page illustrations by w.h. margetson. mo, $ . . the story of wat tyler's rebellion is but little known, but the hero of this story passes through that perilous time and takes part in the civil war in flanders which followed soon after. although young he is thrown into many exciting and dangerous adventures, through which he passes with great coolness and much credit. with moore at corunna a story of the peninsular war. with full-page illustrations by wal paget. mo, $ . . terence o'connor is living with his widowed father, captain o'connor of the mayo fusiliers, with the regiment at the time when the peninsular war began. upon the regiment being ordered to spain, terence gets appointed as aid to one of the generals of a division. by his bravery and great usefulness throughout the war, he is rewarded by a commission as colonel in the portuguese army and there rendered great service. on the irrawaddy a story of the first burmese war. with full-page illustrations by w.h. overend. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero, having an uncle, a trader on the indian and burmese rivers, goes out to join him. soon after, war is declared by burmah against england and he is drawn into it. he has many experiences and narrow escapes in battles and in scouting. with half-a-dozen men he rescues his cousin who had been taken prisoner, and in the flight they are besieged in an old, ruined temple. by g.a. henty "boys like stirring adventures, and mr. henty is a master of this method of composition."--_new york times._ at agincourt a tale of the white hoods of paris. with full-page illustrations by walter paget. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the story begins in a grim feudal castle in normandie. the times were troublous, and soon the king compelled lady margaret de villeroy with her children to go to paris as hostages. guy aylmer went with her. paris was turbulent. soon the guild of the butchers, adopting white hoods as their uniform, seized the city, and besieged the house where our hero and his charges lived. after desperate fighting, the white hoods were beaten and our hero and his charges escaped from the city, and from france. with cochrane the dauntless a tale of the exploits of lord cochrane in south american waters. with full-page illustrations by w.h. margetson. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero of this story accompanies cochrane as midshipman, and serves in the war between chili and peru. he has many exciting adventures in battles by sea and land, is taken prisoner and condemned to death by the inquisition, but escapes by a long and thrilling flight across south america and down the amazon, piloted by two faithful indians. the tiger of mysore a story of the war with tippoo saib. with full-page illustrations by w.h. margetson, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . dick holland, whose father is supposed to be a captive of tippoo saib, goes to india to help him to escape. he joins the army under lord cornwallis, and takes part in the campaign against tippoo. afterwards he assumes a disguise, enters seringapatam, and at last he discovers his father in the great stronghold of savandroog. the hazardous rescue is at length accomplished, and the young fellow's dangerous mission is done. through russian snows a story of napoleon's retreat from moscow. with full-page illustrations by w.h. overend, and maps. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero, julian wyatt, after several adventures with smugglers, by whom he is handed over a prisoner to the french, regains his freedom and joins napoleon's army in the russian campaign. when the terrible retreat begins, julian finds himself in the rear guard of the french army, fighting desperately. ultimately he escapes out of the general disaster, and returns to england. by g.a. henty "here we have mr. george henty--the boys' own author."--_punch._ a knight of the white cross a tale of the siege of rhodes. with full-page illustrations by ralph peacock, and a plan. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . gervaise tresham, the hero of this story, joins the order of the knights of st. john, and proceeds to the stronghold of rhodes. subsequently he is appointed commander of a war-galley, and in his first voyage destroys a fleet of moorish corsairs. during one of his cruises the young knight is attacked on shore, captured after a desperate struggle, and sold into slavery in tripoli. he succeeds in escaping, and returns to rhodes in time to take part in the defense of that fortress. wulf the saxon a story of the norman conquest. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by ralph peacock. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero is a young thane who wins the favor of earl harold and becomes one of his retinue. when harold becomes king of england wulf assists in the welsh wars, and takes part against the norsemen at the battle of stamford bridge. when william of normandy invades england, wulf is with the english host at hastings, and stands by his king to the last in the mighty struggle. beric the briton a story of the roman invasion. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by w. parkinson. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . this story deals with the invasion of britain by the roman legionaries. beric, who is a boy-chief of a british tribe, takes a prominent part in the insurrection under boadicea; and after the defeat of that heroic queen (in a.d. ) he continues the struggle in the fen-country. ultimately beric is defeated and carried captive to rome, where he is trained in the exercise of arms in a school of gladiators. at length he returns to britain, where he becomes ruler of his own people. when london burned a story of the plague and the fire. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by j. finnemore. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero of this story was the son of a nobleman who had lost his estates during the troublous times of the commonwealth. during the great plague and the great fire, cyril was prominent among those who brought help to the panic-stricken inhabitants. by g.a. henty "ask for henty, and see that you get him."--_punch._ the dash for khartoum a tale of the nile expedition. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by john schönberg and j. nash. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . in the record of recent british history there is no more captivating page for boys than the story of the nile campaign, and the attempt to rescue general gordon. for, in the difficulties which the expedition encountered, in the perils which it overpassed, and in its final tragic disappointments, are found all the excitements of romance, as well as the fascination which belongs to real events. bonnie prince charlie a tale of fontenoy and culloden. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the adventures of the son of a scotch officer in french service. the boy, brought up by a glasgow bailie, is arrested for aiding a jacobite agent, escapes, is wrecked on the french coast, reaches paris, and serves with the french army at dettingen. he kills his father's foe in a duel, and escaping to the coast, shares the adventures of prince charlie, but finally settles happily in scotland. under drake's flag a tale of the spanish main. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . a story of the days when england and spain struggled for the supremacy of the sea. the heroes sail as lads with drake in the pacific expedition, and in his great voyage of circumnavigation. the historical portion of the story is absolutely to be relied upon, but this will perhaps be less attractive than the great variety of exciting adventure through which the young heroes pass in the course of their voyages. with wolfe in canada or, the winning of a continent. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . mr. henty here gives an account of the struggle between britain and france for supremacy in the north american continent. the fall of quebec decided that the anglo-saxon race should predominate in the new world; and that english and american commerce, the english language, and english literature, should spread right round the globe. by g. a henty "mr. henty is one of the best of story-tellers for young people."--_spectator._ by pike and dyke a tale of the rise of the dutch republic. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by maynard brown, and maps. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . this story traces the adventures of an english boy in the household of william the silent. edward martin, the son of an english sea-captain, enters the service of the prince as a volunteer, and is employed by him in many dangerous and responsible missions, in the discharge of which he passes through the great sieges of the time. by england's aid or, the freeing of the netherlands ( - ). by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearse, and maps. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the story of two english lads who go to holland as pages in the service of one of "the fighting veres." after many adventures by sea and land, one of the lads finds himself on board a spanish ship at the time of the defeat of the armada, and escapes, only to fall into the hands of the corsairs. he is successful in getting back to spain, and regains his native country after the capture of cadiz. in the heart of the rockies a story of adventure in colorado. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by g.c. hindley. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero, tom wade, goes to seek his uncle in colorado, who is a hunter and gold-digger, and he is discovered, after many dangers, out on the plains with some comrades. going in quest of a gold mine, the little band is spied by indians, chased across the bad lands, and overwhelmed by a snow-storm in the mountains. by right of conquest or, with cortez in mexico. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by w.s. stacey, and maps. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . with the conquest of mexico as the groundwork of his story, mr. henty has interwoven the adventures of an english youth. he is beset by many perils among the natives, but by a ruse he obtains the protection of the spaniards, and after the fall of mexico he succeeds in regaining his native shore, with a fortune and a charming aztec bride. through the sikh war a tale of the conquest of the punjaub. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by hal hurst, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . percy groves, a spirited english lad, joins his uncle in the punjaub, where the natives are in a state of revolt. percy joins the british force as a volunteer, and takes a distinguished share in the famous battles of the punjaub. by g.a. henty "no living writer of books for boys writes to better purpose than mr. g.a. henty."--_philadelphia press._ true to the old flag a tale of the american war of independence. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . a graphic and vigorous story of the american revolution, which paints the scenes with great power, and does full justice to the pluck and determination of the soldiers during the unfortunate struggle. the lion of st. mark a tale of venice in the fourteenth century. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . a story of venice at a period when her strength and splendor were put to the severest tests. the hero displays a fine sense and manliness which carry him safely through an atmosphere of intrigue, crime, and bloodshed. the lion of the north a tale of gustavus adolphus and the wars of religion. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by john schönberg. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . in this story mr. henty gives the history of the first part of the thirty years' war. the issue had its importance, which has extended to the present day, as it established religious freedom in germany. the army of the chivalrous king of sweden was largely composed of scotchmen, and among these was the hero of the story. in greek waters a story of the grecian war of independence ( - ). by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by w.s. stacey, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . deals with the revolt of the greeks in against turkish oppression. mr. beveridge and his son horace fit out a privateer, load it with military stores, and set sail for greece. they rescue the christians, relieve the captive greeks, and fight the turkish war vessels. with lee in virginia a story of the american civil war. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne, and maps. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the story of a young virginia planter, who serves under lee and jackson through the most exciting events of the struggle. he has many hairbreadth escapes, is several times wounded and twice taken prisoner; but his courage and readiness bring him safely through all difficulties. by g.a. henty "mr. henty's books never fail to interest boy readers."--_academy._ with clive in india or, the beginnings of an empire. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the period between the landing of clive in india and the close of his career was eventful in the extreme. at its commencement the english were traders existing on sufferance of the native princes; at its close they were masters of bengal and of the greater part of southern india. the author has given a full account of the events of that stirring time, while he combines with his narrative a thrilling tale of daring and adventure. the young carthaginian a story of the times of hannibal. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by c.j. staniland, r.i. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . there is no better field for romance-writers in the whole of history than the momentous struggle between the romans and carthaginians for the empire of the world. mr. henty has had the full advantage of much unexhausted picturesque and impressive material, and has thus been enabled to form a striking historic background to as exciting a story of adventure as the keenest appetite could wish. for the temple a tale of the fall of jerusalem. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by s.j. solomon, and a colored map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . mr. henty here weaves into the record of josephus an admirable and attractive story. the troubles in the district of tiberias, the march of the legions, the sieges of jotapata, of gamala, and of jerusalem, form the impressive setting to the figure of the lad who becomes the leader of a guerrilla band of patriots, fights bravely for the temple, and after a brief term of slavery at alexandria, returns to his galilean home. through the fray a story of the luddite riots. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by h.m. paget. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the story is laid in yorkshire at the commencement of the present century, when the high price of food induced by the war and the introduction of machinery drove the working-classes to desperation, and caused them to band themselves in that wide-spread organization known as the luddite society. there is an abundance of adventure in the tale, but its chief interest lies in the character of the hero, and the manner in which he is put on trial for his life, but at last comes victorious "through the fray." by g.a. henty "the brightest of all the living writers whose office it is to enchant the boys."--_christian leader._ captain bayley's heir a tale of the gold fields of california. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by h.m. paget. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . a frank, manly lad and his cousin are rivals in the heirship of a considerable property. the former falls into a trap laid by the latter, and while under a false accusation of theft foolishly leaves england for america. he works his passage before the mast, joins a small band of hunters, crosses a tract of country infested with indians to the californian gold diggings, and is successful both as digger and trader. in freedom's cause a story of wallace and bruce. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . relates the stirring tale of the scottish war of independence. the hero of the tale fought under both wallace and bruce, and while the strictest historical accuracy has been maintained with respect to public events, the work is full of "hairbreadth 'scapes" and wild adventure. a jacobite exile being the adventures of a young englishman in the service of charles xii. of sweden. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by paul hardy, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . sir marmaduke carstairs, a jacobite, is the victim of a conspiracy, and he is denounced as a plotter against the life of king william. he flies to sweden, accompanied by his son charlie. this youth joins the foreign legion under charles xii., and takes a distinguished part in several famous campaigns against the russians and poles. condemned as a nihilist a story of escape from siberia. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero of this story is an english boy resident in st. petersburg. through two student friends he becomes innocently involved in various political plots, resulting in his seizure by the russian police and his exile to siberia. he ultimately escapes, and, after many exciting adventures, he reaches norway, and thence home, after a perilous journey which lasts nearly two years. by g.a. henty "mr. henty is one of our most successful writers of historical tales."--_scotsman._ in the reign of terror the adventures of a westminster boy. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by j. schönberg. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . harry sandwith, a westminster boy, becomes a resident at the chateau of a french marquis, and after various adventures accompanies the family to paris at the crisis of the revolution. imprisonment and death reduce their number, and the hero finds himself beset by perils with the three young daughters of the house in his charge. after hairbreadth escapes they reach nantes. there the girls are condemned to death in the coffinships, but are saved by the unfailing courage of their boy-protector. st. george for england a tale of cressy and poitiers. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . no portion of english history is more crowded with great events than that of the reign of edward iii. cressy and poitiers; the destruction of the spanish fleet; the plague of the black death; the jacquerie rising; these are treated by the author in "st. george for england." the hero of the story, although of good family, begins life as a london apprentice, but after countless adventures and perils becomes by valor and good conduct the squire, and at last the trusted friend of the black prince. a chapter of adventures or, through the bombardment of alexandria. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by w.h. overend. crown vo, $ . . a coast fishing lad, by an act of heroism, secures the interest of a ship-owner, who places him as an apprentice on board one of his ships. in company with two of his fellow-apprentices he is left behind, at alexandria, in the hands of the revolted egyptian troops, and is present through the bombardment and the scenes of riot and bloodshed which accompanied it. held fast for england a tale of the siege of gibraltar. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . this story deals with one of the most memorable sieges in history--the siege of gibraltar in - by the united forces of france and spain. with land forces, fleets, and floating batteries, the combined resources of two great nations, this grim fortress was vainly besieged and bombarded. the hero of the tale, an english lad resident in gibraltar, takes a brave and worthy part in the long defence, and it is through his varied experiences that we learn with what bravery, resource, and tenacity the rock was held for england. by g.a. henty "among writers of stories of adventures for boys mr. henty stands in the very first rank."--_academy._ for name and fame or, through afghan passes. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . an interesting story of the last war in afghanistan. the hero, after being wrecked and going through many stirring adventures among the malays, finds his way to calcutta and enlists in a regiment proceeding to join the army at the afghan passes. he accompanies the force under general roberts to the peiwar kotal, is wounded, taken prisoner, carried to cabul, whence he is transferred to candahar, and takes part in the final defeat of the army of ayoub khan. orange and green a tale of the boyne and limerick. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the record of two typical families--the davenants, who, having come over with strongbow, had allied themselves in feeling to the original inhabitants; and the whitefoots, who had been placed by cromwell over certain domains of the davenants. in the children the spirit of contention has given place to friendship, and though they take opposite sides in the struggle between james and william, their good-will and mutual service are never interrupted, and in the end the davenants come happily to their own again. maori and settler a story of the new zealand war. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearce. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the renshaws emigrate to new zealand during the period of the war with the natives. wilfrid, a strong, self-reliant, courageous lad, is the mainstay of the household. he has for his friend mr. atherton, a botanist and naturalist of herculean strength and unfailing nerve and humor. in the adventures among the maoris, there are many breathless moments in which the odds seem hopelessly against the party, but they succeed in establishing themselves happily in one of the pleasant new zealand valleys. a final reckoning a tale of bush life in australia. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by w.b. wollen. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero, a young english lad, after rather a stormy boyhood, emigrates to australia and gets employment as an officer in the mounted police. a few years of active work on the frontier, where he has many a brush with both natives and bush-rangers, gain him promotion to a captaincy, and he eventually settles down to the peaceful life of a squatter. by g.a. henty "mr. henty's books are welcome visitors in the home circle."--_daily news._ the bravest of the brave or, with peterborough in spain. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by h.m. paget. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . there are few great leaders whose lives and actions have so completely fallen into oblivion as those of the earl of peterborough. this is largely due to the fact that they were overshadowed by the glory and successes of marlborough. his career as general extended over little more than a year, and yet, in that time, he showed a genius for warfare which has never been surpassed. the dragon and the raven or, the days of king alfred. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by c.j. staniland, r.i. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . in this story the author gives an account of the fierce struggle between saxon and dane for supremacy in england, and presents a vivid picture of the misery and ruin to which the country was reduced by the ravages of the sea-wolves. the hero, a young saxon thane, takes part in all the battles fought by king alfred. he is driven from his home, takes to the sea, and resists the danes on their own element, and being pursued by them up the seine, is present at the long and desperate siege of paris. facing death or, the hero of the vaughan pit. a tale of the coal mines. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . "facing death" is a story with a purpose. it is intended to show that a lad who makes up his mind firmly and resolutely that he will rise in life, and who is prepared to face toil and ridicule and hardship to carry out his determination, is sure to succeed. the hero of the story is a typical british boy, dogged, earnest, generous, and though "shamefaced" to a degree, is ready to face death in the discharge of duty. by sheer pluck a tale of the ashanti war. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the author has woven, in a tale of thrilling interest, all the details of the ashanti campaign, of which he was himself a witness. his hero, after many exciting adventures in the interior, is detained a prisoner by the king just before the outbreak of the war, but escapes, and accompanies the english expedition on their march to coomassie. by g.a. henty "mr. henty might with entire propriety be called the boys' sir walter scott."--_philadelphia press._ the cat of bubastes a story of ancient egypt. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . a story which will give young readers an unsurpassed insight into the customs of the egyptian people. amuba, a prince of the rebu nation, is carried with his charioteer jethro into slavery. they become inmates of the house of ameres, the egyptian high-priest, and are happy in his service until the priest's son accidentally kills the sacred cat of bubastes. in an outburst of popular fury ameres is killed, and it rests with jethro and amuba to secure the escape of the high-priest's son and daughter. one of the th a tale of waterloo. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations by w.h. overend, and maps. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero of this story, ralph conway, has many varied and exciting adventures. he enters the army, and after some rough service in ireland takes part in the waterloo campaign, from which he returns with the loss of an arm, but with a substantial fortune. sturdy and strong or, how george andrews made his way. by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, $ . . the history of a hero of everyday life, whose love of truth, clothing of modesty, and innate pluck, carry him, naturally, from poverty to affluence. george andrews is an example of character with nothing to cavil at, and stands as a good instance of chivalry in domestic life. tales of daring and danger by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, cents. containing five stories, varied in scene and character, but all of adventurous interest and telling of youthful heroism under dangerous and trying circumstances on land and on sea. yarns on the beach by g.a. henty. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, cents. this book should find special favor among boys. the yarns are spun by old sailors, and are admirably calculated to foster a manly spirit. droll doings illustrated by harry b. neilson, with verses by the cockiolly bird. to, decorated boards. $ . . a new, original, and very amusing book of animal pictures in color. by carton moore park a book of birds profusely illustrated with full-page plates, vignettes, cover design, &c., &c. demy to ( inches by inches). $ . . no artist has caught more thoroughly the individualities of the bird world, or has reproduced them with more lifelike vivacity and charm. an alphabet of animals with full-page plates, a large number of vignettes, and cover design by carton moore park. demy to ( inches by inches), $ . . a strikingly artistic alphabet book. mr. park's drawings are marked by extraordinary boldness and vigor of treatment; but they display in addition a rare appreciation of the subtler characteristics of the animal world. of these individual traits mr. park has an intuitive perception, and his pictures may almost be said to live upon the page. bright and original fairy tales the princess of hearts by sheila e. braine. with illustrations by alice b. woodward, and frontispiece in colors. square vo, gilt edges, $ . . go tell the king the sky is falling by sheila e. braine. with illustrations by alice b. woodward. square crown vo, $ . . the little browns by mabel e. wolton. with illustrations by h.m. brock, and a colored frontispiece. square vo, gilt edges, $ . . the little browns are a delightful set of youngsters, more than usually individual and self-reliant. during their parents' absence they extend hospitality to a stranger, under the belief that he is their uncle from australia. the supposed uncle is really a burglar, and by their courage and childish resource they outwit him. _the little browns_ is the work of a true child-lover. by professor a.j. church lords of the world a story of the fall of carthage and corinth. by professor a.j. church. with full-page illustrations by ralph peacock. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the scene of this story centres in the destruction of carthage by the romans. the young hero is captured by the romans, but wearing the dress of his twin sister, escapes death. entering the army of carthage he is in the thick of the long conflict and passes through many thrilling adventures. he is present at the final scene, and that awful catastrophe is most vividly told. the story is full of valuable historical details and the interest never flags. two thousand years ago or, the adventures of a roman boy. by professor a.j. church. with full-page illustrations by adrien marie. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero is a young roman who has a very chequered career, being now a captive in the hands of spartacus, again an officer on board a vessel detailed for the suppression of the pirates, and anon a captive once more, on a pirate ship. by s. baring-gould grettir the outlaw a story of iceland. by s. baring-gould. with full-page illustrations by m. zeno diemer, and a colored map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . no boy will be able to withstand the magic of such scenes as the fight of grettir with twelve bearserks, and the wrestle with karr the old in the chamber of the dead. by f. frankfort moore highways and high seas cyril harley's adventures on both. by f. frankfort moore. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearse. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the story belongs to a period when highways meant post-chaises, coaches, and highwaymen, and when high seas meant privateers and smugglers. under hatches or, ned woodthorpe's adventures. by f. frankfort moore. with full-page illustrations by a. forestier. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . in rescuing another lad from drowning, ned woodthorpe is taken on board a convict ship. after a series of exciting events the convicts and crew obtain the mastery. ultimately the ship is recaptured and ned and his friends escape from their troubles. capt. f.s. brereton with rifle and bayonet a story of the boer war. with illustrations by wal. paget. crown vo, olivine edges. $ . . jack somerten, the hero of _with rifle and bayonet_, is an english boy who chances to be spending a vacation at the home of a school friend in the transvaal just before the outbreak of the boer war. jack is the first uitlander to find actual evidence that the boers are importing arms and ammunition in large quantities, but the boers soon learn that he has discovered their secret and from that time his life is in constant danger. the account of his adventures and escapes during this time and throughout the war makes one of the best war tales of many years. the story gives also the most interesting details of transvaal history, who the boers were, how they came to settle the transvaal, and the government and customs that have arisen among them. in the king's service a tale of cromwell's invasion of ireland. with eight page illustrations by stanley l. wood. crown vo, olivine edges. $ . . dick granville is the son of a royalist who is driven from his home in cheshire and takes refuge at castle driscoe, in ireland. when the parliamentary army crosses to ireland young dick granville and his cousin join a body of royalist horse. they take part in the defense of drogheda, only escaping from the slaughter there by a miracle, and afterwards go through a series of thrilling adventures and narrow escapes in which dick displays extraordinary skill and resource. with shield and assegai a tale of the zulu war. with illustrations by stanley l. wood. crown vo. $ . . donald stewart, the son of an english missionary in zululand, when at school in england, is wrongfully accused of theft. he runs away, enlists in the british army, and is sent to africa. there he learns that his sister and a friend are in the hands of cetewayo. disguised as a zulu, he rescues the two girls; and after the attack upon ulundi, he hears from a dying officer a confession of the theft of which he was accused. fighting the matabele by j. chalmers. with illustrations by stanley l. wood. mo. $ . . a stout english bowman being a story of chivalry in the days of henry iii. by edgar pickering. with illustrations. price, $ . . in press-gang days by edgar pickering. with full page illustrations by w. s. stacey. crown vo. $ . . by robert leighton "mr. leighton's place is in the front rank of writers of boys' books."--_standard._ the golden galleon illustrated, crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . this is a story of queen elizabeth's time, just after the defeat of the spanish armada. mr. leighton introduces in his work the great sea-fighters of plymouth town--hawkins, drake, raleigh, and richard grenville. olaf the glorious by robert leighton. with full-page illustrations by ralph peacock. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . this story of olaf, king of norway, opens with his being found living as a bond-slave in esthonia, and follows him through his romantic youth in russia. then come his adventures as a viking, his raids upon the coasts of scotland and england, and his conversion to christianity. he returns to norway as king, and converts his people to the christian faith. wreck of "the golden fleece" the story of a north sea fisher-boy. by robert leighton. with full-page illustrations by frank brangwyn. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero is a parson's son who is apprenticed on board a lowestoft fishing lugger. the lad suffers many buffets from his shipmates, while the storms and dangers which he braved are set forth with intense power. the thirsty sword a story of the norse invasion of scotland ( - ). by robert leighton. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearse, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . this story tells how roderic macalpin, the sea-rover, came to the isle of bute; how he slew his brother in rothesay castle; how the earl's eldest son was likewise slain; how young kenric now became king of bute, and vowed vengeance against the slayer of his brother and father; and finally, how this vow was kept, when kenric and the murderous sea-rover met at midnight and ended their feud in one last great fight. the pilots of pomona a story of the orkney islands. by robert leighton. with full-page illustrations by john leighton, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . halcro ericson, the hero, happens upon many exciting adventures and hardy experiences, through which he carries himself with quiet courage. the story gives a vivid presentation of life in these far northern islands. by kirk munroe midshipman stuart or, the last cruise of the essex. a tale of the war of . illustrated. mo, $ . in pirate waters a tale of the american navy. illustrated by i.w. taber. mo, $ . . the hero of the story becomes a midshipman in the navy just at the time of the war with tripoli. his own wild adventures among the turks and his love romance are thoroughly interwoven with the stirring history of that time. the "white conquerors" series with crockett and bowie or, fighting for the lone star flag. a tale of texas. with full-page illustrations by victor pérard. crown vo, $ . . the story is of the texas revolution in , when american texans under sam houston, bowie, crockett and travis, fought for relief from the intolerable tyranny of the mexican santa aña. the hero, rex hardin, son of a texan ranchman and graduate of an american military school, takes a prominent part in the heroic defense of the alamo, and the final triumph at san jacinto. through swamp and glade a tale of the seminole war. by kirk munroe. with full-page illustrations by v. pérard. crown vo, $ . . coacoochee, the hero of the story, is the son of philip the chieftain of the seminoles. he grows up to lead his tribe in the long struggle which resulted in the indians being driven from the north of florida down to the distant southern wilderness. at war with pontiac or, the totem of the bear. a tale of redcoat and redskin. by kirk munroe. with full-page illustrations by j. finnemore. crown vo, $ . . a story when the shores of lake erie were held by hostile indians. the hero, donald hester, goes in search of his sister edith, who has been captured by the indians. strange and terrible are his experiences; for he is wounded, taken prisoner, condemned to be burned, but contrives to escape. in the end all things terminate happily. the white conquerors a tale of toltec and aztec. by kirk munroe. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, $ . . this story deals with the conquest of mexico by cortes and his spaniards, the "white conquerors," who, after many deeds of valor, pushed their way into the great aztec kingdom and established their power in the wondrous city where montezuma reigned in splendor. by dr. gordon stables courage true heart a brilliant new story of danger and daring on the sea. by gordon stables, m.d., c.m. illustrated, crown vo, $ . . a naval cadet a story of adventure by sea. by gordon stables, m.d., c.m. illustrated, crown vo, $ . . for life and liberty a story of battle by land and sea by gordon stables, m.d., c.m. with full-page illustrations by sidney paget. mo, $ . . the story of an english boy who runs from home and joins the southern army in the late civil war. his chum enters the navy, and their various adventures are set forth with great vigor and interest. to greenland and the pole a story of adventure in the arctic regions. by gordon stables, m.d., c.m. with full-page illustrations by g.c. hindley, and a map. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the author is himself an old arctic voyager, and he deals with deer-hunting in norway, sealing in the arctic seas, bear-stalking on the ice-floes, the hardships of a journey across greenland, and a successful voyage to the back of the north pole. westward with columbus by gordon stables, m.d., c.m. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearse. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the hero of this story is columbus himself. his career is traced from boyhood onward through the many hazardous enterprises in which he was at various times engaged. the narrative deals chiefly, however, with the great naval venture which resulted in the discovery of the american continent. 'twixt school and college a tale of self-reliance. by gordon stables, m.d., c.m. with full-page illustrations by w. parkinson. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . by harry collingwood the log of a privateersman by harry collingwood. with full-page illustrations by w. rainey, r.i. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . in the war between napoleon and the british, many privateers were sent out from england to seize and destroy the french merchant vessels. on one of these george bowen went as second mate. long distance duels at sea, fights at close quarters, fierce boarding attacks, capture and recapture, flight and pursuit, storm and wreck, fire at sea and days without food or water in a small boat on the ocean, are some of the many thrilling experiences our hero passed through. the log of "the flying fish." a story of aerial and submarine peril and adventure. by harry collingwood. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . in this story the aim of the author has been, not only to interest and amuse, but also to stimulate a taste for scientific study. the missing merchantman. by harry collingwood. with full-page pictures by w. h. overend. crown vo, $ . . a fine australian clipper is seized by the crew; the passengers are landed on one deserted island, the captain and a junior officer on another; and the young hero of the story is kept on board to navigate the ship, which the mutineers refit as a private vessel. after many adventures ned succeeded in carrying off the ship, and in picking up the captain and the passengers. the congo rovers a tale of the slave squadron. by harry collingwood. with full-page illustrations by j. schönberg. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the scene of this thrilling tale is laid on the west coast of africa among the slavers. the rover's secret a tale of the pirate cays and lagoons of cuba. by harry collingwood. with full-page illustrations by w.c. symons. crown vo, $ . . the hero of "the rover's secret," a young officer of the british navy, narrates his peculiar experiences in childhood and his subsequent perils and achievements. the pirate island a story of the south pacific. by harry collingwood. illustrated by full-page pictures by c.j. staniland and j.r. wells. olivine edges. crown vo, $ . . this story details the adventures of a lad who was found in his infancy on board a wreck, and is adopted by a fisherman. going to sea, he forms one of a party who, after being burned out of their ship, are picked up by a pirate brig and taken to the "pirate island," where they have many thrilling adventures. by george manville fenn "mr. fenn is in the front rank of writers for boys."--_liverpool mercury._ dick o' the fens a romance of the great east swamp. with full-page illustrations by frank dadd. crown vo, $ . . brownsmith's boy with page illustrations. crown vo, $ . . yussuf the guide being the strange story of travels in asia minor. with full page illustrations. crown vo, $ . . the golden magnet a tale of the land of the incas. with full-page pictures by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . nat the naturalist a boy's adventures in the eastern seas. illustrated by full-page pictures by george browne. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . quicksilver or, a boy with no skid to his wheel. with full-page illustrations by frank dadd. crown vo, $ . . devon boys a tale of the north shore. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . mother carey's chicken her voyage to the unknown isle. with full-page illustrations. crown vo, $ . . bunyip land the story of a wild journey in new guinea. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . in the king's name or, the cruise of the _kestrel_. illustrated by full-page pictures by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . menhardoc a story of cornish nets and mines. with full-page illustrations by c.j. staniland. crown vo, $ . . patience wins or, war in the works. with full-page illustrations. crown vo. $ . . stories of adventure by sea and land paris at bay a story of the siege and the commune. by herbert hayens. with full-page illustrations by stanley l. wood. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . the turkish automaton a tale of the time of catharine the great of russia. by sheila e. braine. with full-page illustrations by william rainey, r.i. crown vo, $ . . a mystery of the pacific by oliphant smeaton. with illustrations by wal paget. mo, olivine edges, $ . . gold, gold, in cariboo a story of adventure in british columbia. by clive phillipps-wolley. with full-page illustrations by g.c. hindley. crown vo, $ . . his first kangaroo an australian story for boys. by arthur ferres. with illustrations by p.b.s. spener. crown vo, $ . . sou'wester and sword by hugh st. leger. with full-page illustrations by hal hurst. crown vo, $ . . with the sea kings a story of the days of lord nelson. by f.h. winder. with full-page illustrations by w.s. stacey. crown vo, $ . . the wigwam and the war-path stories of the red indians. by ascott r. hope. illustrated by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . "mr. hope's 'wigwam and war-path' is notably good; it gives a very vivid picture of life among the indians."--_spectator._ the seven wise scholars by ascott r. hope. illustrated by gordon browne. square vo, $ . . young travellers' tales by ascott r. hope. with full-page illustrations by h.j. draper. crown vo, $ . . wulfric the weapon thane the story of the danish conquest of east anglia. by charles w. whistler. with illustrations by w.h. margetson. crown vo, $ . . a tale in which is set forth:--how wulfric saved the danish warrior's life; how he fought in the viking ship; how he was accused falsely; how he joined king eadmund, as his weapon-thane; how he fought for the king; and how he won the lady osritha and brought her to his home. tommy the adventurous the story of a brother and sister. by s.e. cartwright. with illustrations. crown vo, $ . . silas verney a tale of the time of charles ii. by edgar pickering. with full-page illustrations by alfred pearse. crown vo, $ . . an ocean outlaw a story of adventure in the good ship _margaret_. by hugh st. leger. with page illustrations by wm. rainey, r.i. crown vo, $ . . this is a breezy sea-yarn in which the reader is made acquainted with jimmy ducks, a tiptop sailor-man and a hero at cutlass work; and all his cleverness was needed when he and his messmates came to tackle the ocean outlaw. the loss of john humble what led to it, and what came of it. by g. norway. with full-page illustrations by john schönberg. crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . hal hungerford or, the strange adventures of a boy emigrant. by j.r. hutchinson. with full-page illustrations by stanley berkeley. crown vo, $ . . "there is no question whatever as to the spirited manner in which the story is told; the death of the mate of the smuggler by the teeth of the dog is especially effective."--_london spectator._ sir walter's ward a tale of the crusades. by william everard. illustrated by walter paget. crown vo, $ . . "a highly fascinating work, dealing with a period which is always suggestive of romance and deeds of daring."--_schoolmaster._ hugh herbert's inheritance by caroline austin. with full-page illustrations by c.t. garland. crown vo, $ . . "a story that teaches patience as well as courage in fighting the battles of life."--_daily chronicle._ jones the mysterious by charles edwardes. with illustrations by harold copping. mo, cts. a bright story of english schoolboy life, with mysterious happenings to the hero, who has a secret and weird "power," bestowed upon him by his east indian bearer. the history of gutta-percha willie the working genius. by george macdonald. with illustrations by arthur hughes. new edition. mo, cts. "hallowe'en" ahoy! or, lost on the crozet islands. by hugh st. leger. with page illustrations. crown vo, $ . . the search for the talisman a tale of labrador. by henry frith. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . famous discoveries by sea and land illustrated. crown vo, $ . . from the clyde to the jordan by hugh callan. with illustrations and a map. crown vo, $ . . jack o'lanthorn a tale of adventure. by henry frith. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . tales of captivity and exile by w.b. fortescue. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . historical stories a thane of wessex being a story of the great viking raids into somerset. by charles w. whistler. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . a prisoner of war a story of the time of napoleon bonaparte. by g. norway. with full-page illustrations by robert barnes, a.r.w.s. crown vo, $ . . some books for girls the reign of the princess naska by amelia hutchison stirling. with illustrations by paul hardy. mo, $ . . the whispering winds and the tales that they told. by mary h. debenham. with illustrations by paul hardy. crown vo, $ . . "we wish the winds would tell us stories like these."--_london academy._ things will take a turn by beatrice harraden, author of "ships that pass in the night." illustrated. mo, $ . . it is the story of a sunny-hearted child, rosebud, who assists her grandfather in his dusty, second-hand bookshop. naughty miss bunny her tricks and troubles. by clara mulholland. illustrated. crown vo, cents. "this naughty child is positively delightful."--_land and water._ unlucky a fragment of a girl's life. by caroline austin. illustrated. crown vo, cents. a touching story of an unlucky girl at odds with her stepmother. laugh and learn the easiest book of nursery lessons and nursery games. by jennett humphreys. charmingly illustrated. square vo, $ . . "one of the best books of the kind imaginable, full of practical teaching in word and picture, and helping the little ones pleasantly along a right royal road to learning."--_graphic._ adventures in toyland by edith king hall. with colored plates and other illustrations by alice b. woodward. square vo, $ . . the story of what a little girl heard and saw in a toy shop. some books for girls. a newnham friendship by alice stronach. with illustrations by harold copping. crown vo. $ . . in _a newmham friendship_ we have a description of life at newnham college. carol martin, a third-year student, befriends a "fresher," elspeth macleod, a shy, sensitive highland girl, who has worked her way from a board school to college. the enmity of a fellow-student and a mystery about some parodies cloud elspeth's happiness for a time. but the clouds clear. men students play their part in the story, and the closing chapters describe the work of some of the girls as "social settlers" in the east of london. three fair maids or, the burkes of derrymore. by katharine tynan. with illustrations by g.d. hammond. crown vo, olivine edges. $ . . a story of irish country life. the three fair maids are the daughters of an impoverished irish lady. their father had been disinherited by his uncle for marrying against his wish. sir jasper's disinheritance obliged them to give up their great house, derrymore, but the family is ultimately reconciled with uncle peter, who makes elizabeth his heiress. queen charlotte's maidens by sarah tytler, author of "girl neighbors." with illustrations by paul hardy. mo. cts. girl neighbors or, the old fashion and the new. by sarah tytler. with full-page illustrations by c.t. garland. crown vo. $ . . "_girl neighbors_ is a pleasant comedy, not so much of errors as of prejudices got rid of, very healthy, very agreeable, and very well written."--_london spectator._ the heiress of courtleroy by anne beale. with page illustrations by t.c.h. castle. crown vo, cloth; elegant, olivine edges. $ . . "miss anne beale relates how the young 'heiress of courtleroy' had such good influence over her uncle as to win him from his intensely selfish ways in regard to his tenants and others."--_london guardian._ some books for girls the lady isobel a story for girls. by eliza f. pollard. with illustrations by w. fulton brown. mo, $ . . a tale of the scottish covenanters. a girl of to-day by ellinor davenport adams. with page illustrations by gertrude demain hammond, r.i. crown vo, $ . . the boys and girls of woodend band themselves together, and that they have plenty of fun is seen in the shopping expedition to purchase stores for their society, and in the successful christmas entertainment. max brenton's fight with joe baker, the bully, shows that their work has its serious side as well. a dreadful mistake by geraldine mockler. with page illustrations by william rainey, r.i. crown vo, $ . . the mistake occurs at the very beginning of the book, gradually rights itself during the course of the story, and at the end is found to be the very best thing that could have happened. a very amusing character is an eccentric aunt. her friend and mine a story of two sisters. by florence coombe. with illustrations by wm. rainey. mo, $ . . the eagle's nest by s.e. cartwright. with illustrations by wm. rainey. mo, $ . . my friend kathleen by jennie chappell. with illustrations by john h. bacon. mo, $ . . a daughter of erin by violet g. finny. with illustrations. price, $ . . under false colors a story from two girls' lives. by sarah doudney. with full-page illustrations by g.g. kilburne. crown vo, $ . . a story which has in it so strong a dramatic element that it will attract readers of all ages and of either sex. by m. corbet-seymour a girl's kingdom illustrated. crown vo, $ . . olive and her story will receive welcome from all girls. dulcie king a story for girls. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . some books for girls by alice corkran down the snow stairs or, from good-night to good-morning. by alice corkran. with character illustrations by gordon browne. square crown vo, olivine edges, $ . . "a gem of the first water, bearing upon every one of its pages the signet mark of genius.... all is told with such simplicity and perfect naturalness that the dream appears to be a solid reality. it is indeed a little pilgrim's progress."--_christian leader._ margery merton's girlhood by alice corkran. with full-page illustrations by gordon browne. crown vo, $ . . the experience of an orphan girl who in infancy is left by her father, an officer in india, to the care of an elderly aunt residing near paris. joan's adventures at the north pole and elsewhere. by alice corkran. illustrated. crown vo, cts. a beautiful dream-land story. adventures of mrs. wishing-to-be by alice corkran. with full-page pictures in colors. crown vo, cts. by mrs. r.h. read dora; or, a girl without a home. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . nell's school days a story of town and country. by h.p. gethen. with illustrations. price, $ . . violet vereker's vanity by annie e. armstrong. with illustrations by g. d. hammond. crown vo, $ . . three bright girls a story of chance and mischance. by annie e. armstrong. with full-page illustrations by w. parkinson. crown vo, $ . . "among many good stories for girls this is undoubtedly one of the very best."--_teachers' aid._ a very odd girl life at the gabled farm. by annie e. armstrong. with full-page illustrations by s.t. dadd. crown vo, $ . . white lilac or, the queen of the may. by amy walton. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . by margaret parker for the sake of a friend a story of school life. illustrated. crown vo, $ . . charles scribner's sons - fifth ave., new york.