The atheistical objections against the being of a God and his attributes fairly considered and fully refuted in eight sermons, preach'd in the cathedral-church of St. Paul, London, 1698 : being the seventh year of the lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq. / by John Harris ... Harris, John, 1667?-1719. 1698 Approx. 370 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 118 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2005-12 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A45638 Wing H845 ESTC R15119 12337341 ocm 12337341 59815 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A45638) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 59815) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 533:21) The atheistical objections against the being of a God and his attributes fairly considered and fully refuted in eight sermons, preach'd in the cathedral-church of St. Paul, London, 1698 : being the seventh year of the lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq. / by John Harris ... Harris, John, 1667?-1719. [226] p. Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin ..., London : 1698. Each sermon has special t.p. except the fifth which is combined with the fourth. Each of the titles in this volume has a special t.p., is paged separately, and is catalogued separately. Reproduction of original in the Cambridge University Library. [I] Immorality and pride, the great causes of atheism -- [II] The atheist's objection, that we can have no idea of God, refuted -- [III] The notion of a God, neither from fear nor policy -- [IV-V] The atheist's objections, against the immaterial nature of God and incorporeal substances, refuted : in two sermons ... -- [VI] A refutation of the objections against the attributes of God in general -- [VII] A refutation of the objections against moral good and evil -- [VIII] A refutation of the atheistical notion of fate or absolute necessity. Created by converting TCP files to TEI P5 using tcp2tei.xsl, TEI @ Oxford. Re-processed by University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. Gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. EEBO-TCP is a partnership between the Universities of Michigan and Oxford and the publisher ProQuest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by ProQuest via their Early English Books Online (EEBO) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). The general aim of EEBO-TCP is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic English-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in EEBO. EEBO-TCP aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the Text Encoding Initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). The EEBO-TCP project was divided into two phases. The 25,363 texts created during Phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 January 2015. Anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor. The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines. Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements). Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site . eng Atheism -- Sermons. Atheism -- Early works to 1800. 2005-03 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2005-07 SPi Global Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2005-08 John Cords Sampled and proofread 2005-08 John Cords Text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-10 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion THE Atheistical Objections , AGAINST THE BEING of a GOD , And His ATTRIBUTES , Fairly Considered , and Fully Refuted . IN Eight Sermons , Preach'd in the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , London , 1698. Being the Seventh Year of the LECTURE Founded by the Honourable ROBERT BOYLE , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. Academiae Cantabrigiensis Liber . Immorality and Pride , The Great Causes of ATHEISM . A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , January the 3 d. 1697 / 8. BEING The First of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. TO THE Most Reverend Father in God THOMAS Lord Archbishop of Canterbury ; Sir HENRY ASHURST Baronet ; Sir JOHN ROTHERAM Serjeant at Law ; JOHN EVELYN Senior Esquire ; Trustees appointed by the Will of the Honorable ROBERT BOYLE Esquire . Most Reverend and Honoured , AS I had the Honour to Preach this Sermon by your Kind and Generous Appointment , so I now Publish it in Obedience to your Commands , and humbly offer it , as also my ensuing Discourses , to your Candid Patronage and Acceptance . I have ( in pursuance of Your Grace's direction ) studied to be as Plain and Intelligible as possibly I could , and shall , by the Divine Assistance , prosecute my whole Design after the same manner ; which Method of Treating this Subject , appears very Suitable to the Pious and Excellent Design of Our Noble and Honourable Founder . I humbly desire your Prayers to Almighty God , that He will vouchsafe to render my weak Endeavours effectual to shew the Groundlessness and Inconclusiveness of those Objections which Atheistical Men usually bring against the great and Important Truths of Religion ; which is the End they are sincerely directed to , by Most Reverend and Honoured , Your most obliged humble Servant , J. HARRIS . PSALM X. 4 . The Wicked through the Pride of his Countenance , will not seek after God : Neither is God in all his Thoughts . IN this Psalm is Contained a very lively Description of the Insolence of Atheistical and Wicked Men , when once they grow Powerful and Numerous ; for then , as we read at the Third Verse , they will proceed so far , as openly to boast of and glory in their Impiety : They will boldly defie and contemn the great God of Heaven and Earth , v. 13. They will deny his Providence , v. 11 . and despise his Vengeance : And , as we are told in these words of my Text , They will grow so Proud and high , as to scorn to pay him any Honour or Worship , to Pray to him or Call upon him ; but will endeavour to banish the very Thoughts of his Being out of their Minds . The Wicked through the Pride of his , &c. In which words , we have an Account more particularly , by what Methods and Steps Men advance to such an Exorbitant height of Wickedness , as to set up for Atheism , and to deny the Existence of a God ; for there are in them these Three Particulars , which I shall consider in their Order . I. Here is the general Character or Qualifications of the Person the Psalmist speaks of ; which is , That he is a Wicked Man. The Wicked through the Pride , &c. II. The particular kind of Wickedness , or the Origin from whence the Spirit of Atheism and Irreligion doth chiefly proceed ; And That is Pride . The Wicked through the Pride of his Countenance , &c. And , III. Here is the great Charge that is brought against this Wicked and Proud Man ; viz. Wilful Atheism and Infidelity : He will not seek after God : Neither is God in all his Thoughts : Or , as it is in the Margin of our Bibles , with good Warrant from the Hebr. All his Thoughts are there is no God. In discoursing on the two First of these Heads , I shall endeavour to shew , that Immorality and Pride are the great Causes of the Growth of Atheism amongst us : And on the Third , I shall consider the Objections that Atheistical Men usually bring against the being of a Deity , and shew how very weak and invalid they are . And first I think it very Necessary to say something of the Causes of Infidelity and Atheism , and to shew how it comes to pass that Men can possibly arrive to so great a height of Impiety . This my Text naturally leads me to , before I can come to the great Subject I design to Discourse upon ; and I hope it may be of very good use to discover the Grounds of this heinous Sin , and the Methods and Steps by which Men advance to it ; that so those who are not yet hardened in it , nor quite given up to a Reprobate Mind , may , by the Blessing of God , take heed , and avoid being engaged in such Courses as do naturally lead into it . I. Therefore let us consider the general Character or Qualifications of the Person here spoken of in my Text , And that is , that he is a Wicked Man. The wicked through the Pride , &c. And this is every where the Language of the Sacred Scripture , when it speaks of Atheistical Men. David tells us ( Psal. 14.1 . and 51.1 . ) that 't is the Fool ( i. e. the Wicked Man , for so the word Nabal often signifies , and is so here to be understood ) 'T is he that hath said in his heart there is no God. 'T is such an one as is a Fool by his own fault ; one stupified and dull'd by Vice and Lust , as he sufficiently explains it afterwards ; one that is corrupt and become filthy , and that hath done abominable works . So the Apostle St. Paul supposes , that those Men will have in them an evil heart of unbelief , who do depart from the living God , and live without him in the world . And indeed , it is very Natural to conclude , That those which are once debauched in their Practices , may easily grow so in their Principles : For when once 't is a Man's Interest that there should be no God , he will readily enough disbelieve his Existence : We always give our assent very precipitantly to what we wish for , and would have to be true . A Man oppressed with a Load of Guilt , and conscious to himself , that he is daily obnoxious to the Divine Vengeance , will be often very uneasie , restless , and dissatisfied with himself , and his Mind must be filled with Dismal and Ill-boding Thoughts . He is unwilling to leave his Sins , and to forego the present Advantage of Sensual Pleasure ; and yet he cannot but be fearful too , of the Punishments of a Future State , and vehemently disturbed now and then , about the account that he must one day give of his Actions . Now , 't is very Natural for a Man under such Circumstances , to catch at any thing that doth but seem to offer him a little Ease and Quiet , and that can help him to shake off his melancholy Apprehension of impending Punishment and Misery . Some therefore bear down all Thought and Consideration of their Condition , in an uninterrupted enjoyment of Sensual Delights , and quite stupifie and drown their Conscience and Reason in continual Excesses and Debauchery ; and thus very many commence Atheists , out of downright Sottishness and Stupidity , and come at last to believe nothing of the Truths of Religion , because they never think any thing about it , nor understand any thing of it . Others , who have been a little enured to thinking , and have gotten some small smattering in the superficial Parts of Learning , will endeavour to defend their wicked Practices by some pretence to Reason and Argument . These will one while justifie their Actions , by forced and wrested Citations and Explications of some particular Texts of Scripture ; at another time they will shroud themselves under the Examples of the Prevarications of some great Men in Sacred Scripture , as a Licence to them , to be guilty of the same or the like wicked Acts ; without considering at all , of their great Penitence afterwards . Sometimes they will dispute the Eternity of Hell Torments , deny that their Soul shall survive the Body , and please themselves with the glorious hopes of being utterly annihilated . Now they will argue against the Freedom of their own Wills ; and by and by , against that of the Divine Nature : and from both conclude , that there can be no harm nor evil in what they do , because they are absolutely necessitated to every thing they commit . But against all this precarious stuff , the Sacred Scriptures do yet appear and afford a sufficient Refutation . The next Step therefore must be to quarrel at , and expose them ; to pretend that there are Absurdities , Contradictions and Inconsistencies in them : To assert that the Religion they contain , is nothing but a meer Human and Political Institution , and the Invention of a Crafty and designing Order of Men , to promote their own Interest and Advantage ; but that they are of no manner of Divine Authority , nor Universal Obligation . And when once they get thus far , they begin to be at Liberty ; now they can pursue their vicious Inclinations without controul of their Consciences , or the Conviction of God's holy Word , and are got above the Childish Fears of Eternal Misery . By this time , the true and through Calenture of Mind begins ; they grow now deliriously enamoured with the feign'd Products of their own Fancies ; and these Notions appear to them now , adorned with such bright and radiant Colours , and so beautiful and glorious , that they will rush headlong into this Fools Paradise , though Eternal Destruction be at the bottom ; for now they stick at nothing ; They Retrench the Deity of all his Attributes , absolutely deny his Presidence over the Affairs of the World , and make him nothing but a kind of necessary and blind Cause of things , Nature , the Soul of the World , or some such word , which they have happened to meet with in the Ancient Heathen Writers . But they Profess that 't is impossible to have any Idaea of him at all ; and what they cannot conceive or have an Idaea of , they say is nothing , and by Consequence there can be no such thing as a God. This , or such like , I 'm perswaded is the usual Method , by which these kind of Men advance to absolute Infidelity and Atheism : And in this , they are every step confirmed and established by the seeming Wit , and real Boldness , with which Atheistical Men dress up their Arguments and Discourses ; and of which , if they were stripped and divested , their weakness and inconclusiveness must needs appear to every one . But the Mirth and Humour , and that Surprising and Extravagant Vein of talking which always abounds in the Company of such Men , so suits and agrees with his own vicious Inclinations , that he becomes easily prejudiced against the Truth of Religion , and any Obligation to its Precepts and Injunctions : And so he will soon resolve to seek no more after God , but will employ all his Thoughts to prove that there is no such Being in the World. But on the other hand , it appears wholly impossible for a Man to arrive at such a pitch as absolute Infidelity and Atheism , if he hath been virtuously Educated , and be enclined to live a Sober and a Moral Life . For there is certainly nothing that Religion enjoins , but what is exactly agreeable to the Rules of Morality and Virtue ; nothing but what is conformable to right Reason and Truth ; nothing but what is substantially good and pleasant , and nothing but what will approve it self to a thinking Mind , as certainly conducing to the good of Human Society , and to every one's Quiet , Ease , and Happiness here in this Life : And over and above this , it gives us an assurance of a glorious Immortality in the World to come . Now , Can it be imagined , that any sober and virtuous Man , and one that is not prejudiced by the Inducements of Sensual Pleasure , if he seriously considers things , will not be induced to take upon him the Profession of our holy Religion : and with all due Gratitude to our Gracious God , accept of so vast a Reward as this of Eternal Happiness ? Especially too when it is ▪ for doing that only out of a true Principle of Religion , which it is supposed he was inclined to perform without it , by the Principles of Reason and Honour . A Man that is enclined to live virtuously , justly , temperately , and peaceably in this present World , will soon be satisfied , if he read the Holy Scriptures , that it is this which lies at the Bottom of all Revealed Religion , and for whose Advancement and Propagation among Mankind , all that gracious Dispensation was contrived and delivered to us . What reason can therefore be possibly assigned , why such a Person should disbelieve the Truths of Religion ? Is not a desire of Happiness so Natural to us , that 't is the great Inducement of all our Actions ? and will not every Man aim to get as much of this as he can , according to the Notion he hath of it ? what is there then that can prejudice such a Man's Mind against the Belief and Expectation of a future Reward at the hand of God ? Is it not Natural to embrace any offer that proposes to us a great Advantage ? and are not we very ready to believe the Truth of any thing that is advanced of that Nature ? The Great Truths therefore of Religion , containing nothing impossible , absurd or improbable in them , and exhibiting to him Infinite Advantages on such easie Conditions , must needs be the delightful Objects of a Good and Virtuous Man's Faith. He , indeed , that hath just Grounds to fear that his Irregular Life will incapacitate him for the Favour of God , and the Joys of another World , may be willing , and at last infatuated so far , as really to disbelieve what he knows he cannot obtain . But one that is of a Moral , Sober and Virtuous Disposition , can never be supposed to be so unaccountably absurd , as to commence Atheist contrary to his Interest , his Inclination , and his Reason . And as 't is hardly possible to conceive a Person can be an Atheist , without being first Wicked ; so it appears as difficult to imagine , that if he be an Atheist , he should not continue to be so . I know the Contrary is often pretended ; viz. That one that believes nothing of a God or Religion , may yet be , and often is guided by a Principle of Reason and Honour , and will do to others as he would be done unto himself : Such an one ( it is said ) will be satisfied of the Necessity of Humane Laws , and of the Advantages that do thence arise to Mankind : He will think himself obliged to submit to the Laws of his Country , and consequently will keep up to the Rules of common Justice and Honesty ; and this ( say they ) is enough , and all that Religion can pretend to enjoin . (a) There is a late French Author , that endeavours to maintain by Arguments and Examples , that the Principles of Atheism do not necessarily lead to Vice and Immorality . But in the Proof of this , he comes very short of his Design . He alledges , That some Professing Christianity have always , and do still , live as bad Lives and as wickedly as any Atheists whatsoever can do : And that some Atheists have lived very Regularly and Morally . But what then ? Allowing and granting all this ; it doth not in the least follow that Atheism doth not lead to Immorality and a Corruption of Manners . For it is neither asserted that Atheism is the only way of becoming Wicked ; nor that an Atheist must necessarily be guilty of all manner of Vice. No doubt very many Men betake themselves to a sinful Course , without having any Principles to justifie themselves by , as the Atheist pretends to : But are drawn into Wickedness purely by Incogitancy and want of Consideration . And such kind of Persons , though they make an outward Profession of Christianity , yet they may be , and doubtless often are , as Vicious and Immoral as any other Men , without ever arriving at the Point of Speculative Atheism , or perhaps without ever so much as doubting of the Being of a God , of the Truth of Religion , or of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments . No one saith also that an Atheist must necessarily be guilty of all manner of Vice and Immorality : But 't is plain enough , that his Principles lead him to prosecute any vicious Inclination that is suitable to him , and to do any thing that he can safely , to procure to himself that kind of Happiness or Satisfaction he proposes to enjoy . Many Sins are disagreeable to some particular Periods and Circumstances of a Man's Life , to his Constitution , Genius and Humour . Now 't is easie to suppose a Man may abstain from such , for his own Ease , Health and Quiet 's sake . Self-Love will preserve the Atheist from such open and notorious Acts of Wickedness , as will expose him to the Capital Punishment of Human Laws ; and which will endanger depriving him of his Being here , where he only proposes to be happy . This Principle also of Self-Love , will hinder him from exposing himself to Ignominy and Scandal ; and will make him endeavour to keep fair in the Opinions of those whose disesteem would give him a great degree of Unhappiness . But it doth not in the least follow from hence , that because he is not guilty of all manner , or of this or that particular Vice , that therefore he is a good Moral Man , and guilty of none at all : It cannot be concluded from hence , that such a Person will avoid committing any Fact , be it never so Wicked , when it is stript of all these Inconveniences , and can be done secretly , safely and securely : when 't is agreeable to his Constitution and Humour , fashionable and gentile , and contributes very much to that kind of Satisfaction he is inclin'd to ; for as one that had consider'd this Point well , observes , Self-Love , which like Fire covets to resolve all things into it self , makes Men they care not what Villany or what Impiety they Act , so it may but conduce to their own Advantage . ( Preface to Great is Diana of the Ephesians . ) And indeed , if he be not absolutely Stupid , and one that proposes to himself no manner of End at all , he will certainly do this very thing : He will pursue and practise Indifferently such kind of Designs and Actions , be they good or bad , as will give him as much Pleasure and Happiness as he can have here in this short Life , where , Miserable Wretch as he is , he only hath any hope . And nothing can nor will hinder such a Person from endeavouring to do or obtain any thing he hath a Mind to , but the fear of being exposed to Punishment and Misery here , from those among whom he lives . Now , this Consideration can have no place in secret Actions , and consequently nothing will hinder a Man of these abominable Principles from committing the most barbarous Villany that is consistent with his Safety , and subservient to his Desires ; that can be either concealed in Secresie , or supported by Power . For , as to the Principle of Honour , that such Men will pretend to be governed and guided by , and which they would set up to supply the Room of Conscience and Religion ; 't is plain , that 't is the veriest Cheat in Nature : 't is nothing but a meer abusive Name , to gull the World into a Belief that they have some kind of Principle to act and proceed by , and which keeps them from doing an Ill Thing : Whereas the Atheist can have no Principle at all , but that sordid one of Self Love ; which will still carry him to the perpetrating of any thing indifferently , according as it best conduces to his present Interest and Advantage . They deny that there are any Actions truly Good or Honourable , or Wicked and Base in themselves ; but that this is all owing to the peculiar Customs , Laws , and Constitutions of Places and Countries : And that as all Men are , so Actions also , are naturally equal and alike : And how far such Notions as these will carry Men , 't is very easie both to Imagine and to Observe . One would think nothing could be more Noble , Honourable and Comely , than for a Man to stick firm and constant to those Principles that he pretends to , and by no means whatever to be brought to abjure and deny them . Sincerity is so lovely and desirable a Vertue , that it doth approve it self , as it were naturally , to the reason of all Mankind : and 't is equally Useful , nay , indeed Necessary , to the due Government of the World. But this Noble Virtue , so peculiar to a Man of True honour and greatness of Mind , the Atheist will practise no longer than it is for his Interest and Advantage , and while it is consistent with his Safety . That Men may profess or deny any thing to save their Lives , is the avowed Principle of one of their great Writers . And the same is expresly asserted in other words , even in lesser Cases than that of Danger of Death , by the Translator of Philostratus's Life of Apollonius Tyanaeus , with a great Pretence to Wit and Humour . But if Men may Lye and Prevaricate from so base and abject a Principle as Fear , no doubt they may do so for Interest and Advantage , for that is certainly as good a ground , as Cowardliness and Baseness ; and then what becomes of this boasted Honour that is so much talk'd of ; this greatness of Mind , that will keep a Man from doing an ill thing . In reality , 't will at last amount to no more than this , that he will forbear doing an Ill Thing , when he thinks it will prove ill to him : he will be Just , Honest and Sincere when he don't dare be otherwise , for fear of the Law , Shame , and Ignominy : For all Men of Atheistical Principles would be Knaves and Villains if they durst , if they could do it safely and securely : such a Man ( 't is like ) shall return you a Bag of Money , or a rich Jewel you happen to depose in his Hands ; but why is it ? 't is because he dares not keep it and deny it ; 't is great odds but he is discovered and exposed by this means ; and besides , 't is Unfashionable and Ungenteel to be a Cheat in such Cases . But to impoverish a Family by Extravagance and Debauchery , to defraud Creditors of their just Debts , or Servants of their Wages , to Cheat at Play , to violate one's Neighbour's Bed to gratifie one's own Lust , are things , which though to the full as Wicked and Unreasonable in themselves , are yet swallowed down as allowable enough , because common and usual , and which are not , the more is the pity , attended with that Scandal and Infamy that other Vices are . Thus 't is very plain , that this pretended Principle of Honour in an Atheist or a Wicked Man , and this Obedience and Deference that he pretends to pay to the Laws of his Country , is a most Partial and Changeable thing , and vastly different from that true Honour and Bravery that is founded on the Eternal Basis of Conscience and Religion ; 't is an Airy Name that serves only to amuse unthinking and short-sighted Persons into a Belief , that he hath some kind of Principles that he will stick to ; that so he may be thought fit to be trusted , dealt and conversed withall in the World. And thus , I think , it is very clear and apparent that Wickedness naturally leads to Infidelity and Atheism , and Infidelity and Atheism to the Support and Maintenance of That : And that it is the Wicked that will not seek after God , and whose thoughts are that there is no God. Which was my First Particular . I come next to Consider , II. That Peculiar Kind of Wickedness which the Psalmist here takes notice of , as the chief Ground from whence Infidelity and Atheism proceed : And that is Pride . The Wicked , through the Pride of his Countenance will not seek after God , neither is God in all his Thoughts . And I question not but this Vice of Pride , is generally the Concomitant of Infidelity , and the chief Ground from whence the Spirit of Speculative Atheism proceeds . When Men of proud and haughty Spirits lead ill Lives , as they very often do , they always endeavour to justifie themselves in their Proceeding , be it never so Irregular and Absurd , and never so contrary to the considerate Sentiments of all the rest of the World. A Proud Man hates to acknowledge himself in an Errour , and to own that he hath committed a Fault : He would have the World believe that there is a kind of Indefectibility in his Understanding and Judgment , which secures him from being deceived and mistaken like other Mortals . Whatever Actions therefore such a Person commits , he would fain have appear reasonable and justifiable . But he sees plainly that he cannot make Wickedness and Immorality do so , as long as Religion stands its Ground in the World. The Sacred Scriptures are so plain and express against such a course of Life , that there is no avoiding being convicted and condemned while their Authority remains good : 'T is impossible any way to reconcile a vicious Life to the Doctrine there delivered : And therefore he sees plainly , That one that Professes to believe the great Truths of Religion , and the Divine Authority of those Sacred Books , and yet by his Practices gives the Lye to his Profession , and while he acknowledges Jesus Christ in his Words , doth in his Works deny him ; he sees , I say , that such an one stands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Self-condemned , and can never acquit himself either to his own Conscience , or to the Reason of Mankind . Now this is perfectly disagreeable to the Genious and Humour of a Proud Man ; he cannot bear to be thought in any respect Incoherent or Inconsistent with himself : And therefore having vainly tried to justifie himself in his Wickedness , by alledging the Examples of some good Men in Sacred Scripture , that have been guilty of great Sins , but whose Repentance he can by no means digest : And having also fruitlessly endeavoured to rely on the perverted Sense of some particular Texts of Scripture , which he knows are sufficiently refuted by the Analogy of the whole ; he finds at last that 't is the best way to deny the Divine Authority of the Bible , and the Truth of all Revelation , and so boldly shake off at once all Obligation to the Rules of Piety and Virtue ; and since Religion can't be wrested so as to give an allowance to his way of living , he will take it quite away , Banish that and God Almighty out of the World , and set up Iniquity by a Law. And nothing can be more pleasing and agreeable to the Arrogance of such Men than this way of Proceeding : It gratifies an insolent and haughty Spirit prodigiously , to do things out of the common Road ; to pretend to be Adept in a Philosophy that is as much above the rest of Mankind's Notions , as 't is Contradictory to it : to assume to himself a Power of seeing much farther into things than other Folk , and to penetrate into the deepest recesses of Nature . (a) He would pass for one of Nature's Cabinet Councellors , a Bosome Favourite that knows all the secret Springs of Action , and the first remote Causes of all Things . He pleases himself mightily to have discovered with what Ridiculous Bugbears the Generality of Mankind are awed and frighted ; he can now look down (b) with a Scornful Pity on the poor groveling Vulgar , the Unthinking Mobb below , that are poorly enslaved and terrified by the Fear of a God , and of Ills to come they know not when nor where : He despises such dull Biggots as will be imposed upon by Priests , and that will superstitiously abstain from the Enjoyment of present Pleasure , on account of such idle Tales as the Comminations of Religion . And as he despises those that are not Wicked , so he upbraids those that are so , with inconsistency with their Principles and Profession , and for doing the same things that he doth , when they have nothing to bear them out : And thus he doubly gratifies his Pride , by justifying himself , and condemning and triumphing over others . Nay , the very Mistakes and Errours of such a Man , we are told , appear laudable and great to him , and he can please himself at last , with saying , That he hath not Erred like a Fool , but Secundum Verbum . Vid. Oracles of Reason , p. 92. When Men have a while enured themselves to talk at this rate , and to blow themselves up with such lofty Conceits and Fancies , they grow by degrees more and more opinionated , and do dote more and more on their own dear Notions ; and finding by this means quiet and ease in the Practice of their Sins , they at last degenerate so far as firmly to believe the Truth of what they perhaps at first advanced and talk'd only from a Spirit of Contradiction ; and become so stupid and blind , as , like great Liars , to believe their own Figments and Inventions (a) To such any Extravagant and Inconsistent Hypothesis , so it do but clash with Sacred Scripture , shall be no less than a real Demonstration ; a Bold and daring Falsity shall pass for undoubted Truth ; and a Prophane Jest , or a Scurrilous Reflection on the Character or Person of one in Holy Orders , shall be a sufficient Refutation of the plainest Demonstration he can bring against their Principles and Practices . For it is most certain , that though a Proud Man always think himself in the right , and arrogate to himself an Exemption from the common Frailties and Errours of Mankind ; yet there is no body so frequently deceived and mistaken , as he ; for he doth so over-estimate all his Faculties and Endowments , and is so much enamoured of , and Trusts so much to his own Quickness and Penetration , that he usually Imagines his Great Genius able to Master any thing without the servile fatigue of Pains and Study : and therefore he will never give himself Time seriously to examine into things , he scorns and hates the Drudgery of deeply revolving and comparing the Idaeas of things in his Mind , but rashly proceeds to Judgment and Determination on a very Transient and Superficial View : And there will he stick , be the Resolution he is come to never so absurd and Unaccountable ; for he is as much above confessing , an Errour in Judgment , as he is of Repenting of a Fault in Practice . And indeed , as the absurd and ridiculous Paradoxes which Atheistical Writers maintain , shew their shallow insight into things , and their Precipitancy in forming a Determination about them ; so the Pride and Haughtiness with which they deliver them , abundantly demonstrates the True Spirit of such Authors , and the Real Ground both of their Embracing and Maintaining their Opinions . Plato describes the Atheists of his Age , to be a Proud , Insolent , and Haughty sort of Men , the Ground of whose Opinion was , he saith , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in reality , a very mischievous Ignorance ; though to the conceited Venders and Embracers of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . It appeared to be the greatest Wisdom , and the Wisest of all Opinions . Lactantius tells us in his Discourse , De Ira Dei , p. 729. Oxon. that the true Reason why Diagoras Melius and Theodorus , two of the Ancient Atheists denied a Deity was , That they might gain the Glory of being the Authors of some new Opinion , contradictory to the common Notions of Mankind . And of the former of these , Diagoras , Sextus Empiricus acquaints us , That because a certain perjured Person , who had wrong'd him , lived unpunished by the Gods , he was so enraged at it , that he undertook to maintain there were no Gods at all . Lib. Adr. Mathem . Edit . Genev. 1621. The like Pride and Arrogance Lactantius tells us he found in the two great Writers that appeared against Christianity , in his time , in Bithynia . The former of these , who , 't is probable , was the famous Porphyry , called himself Antistes Philosophiae , the Chief or Prince of Philosophers ; and saith Lactantius , Nescio utrum Superbius an Importunius , pretended to correct the blind Errors of Mankind , and to guide Men into the True Way ; He could not bear , that Unskilful and Innocent Persons should be enslaved by the Cheats of , and become a Prey to , Crafty and Designing Men. Lib. de Justit . p. 420 , 421. Oxon. With the like Assurance do the Modern Writers of this kind express themselves : And though they have in reality very little or nothing New , but only the Arguments of the Ancients a little varied and embelished , ( as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter more at large , ) yet they all set up for new Lights , and mighty Discoverers of the Secrets of Nature and Philosophy ; and all of them assume the Glory of first leading Men into the way of Truth , and delivering them out of the dark mazes of Vulgar Errors . This was the pretence of Vanini , who was burnt for Atheism at Tholouse , A. D. 1619. whose Mind , he says , grew more and more strong , healthful and robust , as he exercised it in searching out the Secrets of that Supreme Philosophy , which is wholly unknown to the common and ordinary Rank of Philosophers : And this , he saith , will soon be discovered , by the perusal of his Physico-Magicum , which was now to see the Light. Vid. Vanini Amphitheatr . in Epist. Dedicat. After the same manner do Machiavel , Spinoza , Hobbs , Blount , and all the late Atheistical Writers , deliver themselves ; Instances of which , I think , I need not stay to give , since 't is conspicuous through the whole course of their Writings , and , no doubt , taken notice of by every Reader ; only of the first of these , viz. Machiavel , I cannot but take notice , that Vanini himself saith , that 't was his Pride and Covetousness that made him deny the Truth of the Miracles recorded in Sacred Scripture . Amphitheatr . p. 51. Edit . Lugduni , 1615. And as the Writings , so the Discourses of these Gentlemen do equally discover this Pride and Vanity : for they do usually deliver themselves with such a scornful and contemptuous Air , when they either endeavour to establish their own , or to overthrow their Adversaries Arguments , as sufficiently shews the Propriety and Truth of the Psalmist's Observation here , that 't is through the pride of his countenance , that the wicked will not seek after God. The LXXII . indeed render it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Through the abundance of his wrath : and therein they are followed by the vulgar Latin. As if the Wicked were angry against God , and enraged at his Presidency over Humane Affairs : as if they fretted under , and quarelled at the Severity of his Laws and Government , and scorned to apply themselves to him by Prayer , and to submit to him by Obedience . But though this may be a good sence of the words ; and though , I doubt not , a stubborn Frowardness and Perverseness of our Wills against the Will of God , may be a frequent cause and ground of Infidelity : yet our English Translation appears to me to be much better warranted from the Hebrew ; for there it is properly , through the Elevation of his Nose or Face . Which , truly , is very emphatical , and expresses such a proud and scornful gesture of Face , as is the natural Indication of the Internal Haughtiness of a Man's Mind ; or as the Targum , on this place , render it , of the arrogance of his Spirit . Such a Turn and Air of Countenance as argues a proud contempt of all the rest of Mankind , who trot on in the common road , believe and worship a God , and poorly submit to be governed by his Laws and Precepts . And thus having dispatched my Two first Particulars , and shewed , That Wickedness and Pride are two great Causes of Infidelity and Atheism ; I should now proceed to speak to the Third thing observable in my Text , viz. III. The great Charge which the Psalmist brings against the wicked Person here mentioned , That he will not seek after God ; neither is God in all his Thoughts . But this I must leave for my next Discourse , and shall now Conclude with a word or two by way of Application . Since the Case stands thus , That Wickedness in general , and Pride in particular , do so naturally lead to Infidelity and Atheism ; and that 't is hardly possible to imagine a Man can entertain such an Opinion without them : Let every one then , that hath any Inclination or Temptation that way , seriously examine his own Mind , whether he be not prejudiced towards it by some vitious Desires and Affections ; whether he doth not heartily wish that there were no God nor Religion ; whether he hath not , by his past Actions , really loaded himself with guilt , and therefore is disturbed in his Mind with the apprehension , that the Divine Punishment will overtake him , and light upon him , for his Sins : Let him search diligently whether he hath not recourse to Infidelity , as to an Opiate in this case , to allay the Pains of his Conscience , and to compose the Disorder of his guilty Mind , and to gain , as it were , an Insensibility in Sinning . For if the case be thus , 't is plain , he is not free , and at liberty , to make a just Judgment of the Truth of Things ; he is already a Party , and much more enclined to one side of the Question than to the other ; and consequently , he will pitch on that as Truth , which he would have to be so . But this is certainly a very partial way of proceeding , and such as no wise Man would use in a matter of so very great moment , to engage one's self rashly in a Determination , before a thorough and careful Examination of the Evidence on both sides : This is to look on things in a false Light , through coloured Glasses , through Diseased and Icterical Eyes ; and then to believe them to be in reality , what our depraved and prejudicate Apprehensions make them . The Enemies to Religion say , That the Preachers of it are not to be minded ; the Arguments they bring are all forced and strained , because 't is their Trade , and they get Money by it ; and their Craft obliges them to cry out , Great is Diana of the Ephesians ! I hope therefore this being so Precarious and Partial a way of Proceeding , to subscribe to Religion by Implicit Faith , and to take it up upon trust from those , whose Interest ( they say ) it is to propagate it in the World : I hope , I say , that Men will not act so on the other hand , and embrace Atheism and Infidelity on the same Precarious Grounds . I hope all such Persons can clearly approve themselves to be truly Virtuous and Moral in their Inclinations and Practices ; and are sure that they have no strong Inclinations to such Actions as the World calls Vicious . For if they have , and do take real Pleasure in the Practice of Wickedness , 't is plain that they must be Prejudiced and Bigotted to their Lusts and Humours ; they cannot be Free-thinkers in the Case ; the Cloggs of ill Custom , and a loose Education bear them down , and they cannot shake them off . Their present Interest influences and governs their Belief , and enslaves and Tyrannizes over their Reason . Let them consider impartially the Arguments for Infidelity , and they will find them all forced and strained Paradoxes , Invented by Sceptical and Canting Philosophers , a Crafty and Designing sort of Men , who set up Atheism because they Get by it , and whose Interest it is that there should be no God and Religion . Let not therefore Men be so stupid and blind as to talk of Prejudices on the side of Religion , and never perceive that there are any at all on that of Infidelity . If they scorn to take up Religion on trust , without examining into its Grounds and Reasons ; for their Own sakes let them be as Cautious and Inquisitive on the other hand , and not run Hood-winked into Eternal Destruction , by subscribing to Atheism in hast , and without that previous Consideration and Regard , which so great and important an Affair requires : For if they will but strip themselves of those Prejudices which arise from their Vices , and avoid being impetuously born down by their depraved Inclination ; they will soon perceive that the Grounds and Principles of Infidelity are abundantly too precarious to afford them any thing like a Demonstrative assurance of the Falsity of Religion : Without which , surely no Man of Sense , and that can think at all , will ever run the hazard of Damnation . FINIS . Books printed for Rich. Wilkin at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-yard . DR . Woodward's Natural History of the Earth . in Octavo . Remarks on some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge , and to the Natural History of the Earth ; By J. Harris , M. A. and Fellow of the Royal-Society . In Octavo . Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Truth of the Christian Religion , against the Objections of all Modern Opposers ; in Two Volumes . In Octavo . A Serious Proposal to the Ladies , for the Advancement of their true and greatest Interest ; Part I. By a Lover of their Sex. The Third Edition . In Twelves . A Serious Proposal to the Ladies ; Part II. Wherein a Method is offer'd for the Improvement of their Minds . In Twelves . Letters concerning the Love of God , between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. John Norris . In Octavo . An Answer to W. P. his Key about the Quakers Light within , and Oaths ; with an Appendix of the Sacraments . In Octavo . A Letter to the Honourable Sir Robert Howard : Together with some Animadversions on a Book , entituled , Christianity not Mysterious . In Octavo . Now in the Press . Discourses on several Practical Subjects , By the late Reverend W. Payne , D.D. With a Preface giving an Account of his Life , Writings , and Death . In Octavo . The ATHEIST's Objection , That we can have no Idea of GOD , REFUTED . A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , February the 7 th . 1697 / 8. BEING The Second of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. PSAL. x. 4 . The Wicked , through the Pride of his Countenance , will not seek after God ; neither is God in all his Thoughts . IN these words , I have , in a former Discourse , taken notice of these Three Particulars : I. The General Character or Qualifications of the Person here mentioned , which is , That he is a Wicked Man. II. The Particular Kind of Wickedness , or Origin from whence the Spirit of Atheism and Irreligion doth chiefly proceed , and that is Pride ; The Wicked , through the Pride of his Countenance , &c. III. The great Charge which the Psalmist brings against the Person here spoken of in my Text , viz. Wilful Atheism and Infidelity ; He will not seek after God , neither is God in all his Thoughts . The Two first of these I have already dispatch'd , and therefore shall now proceed to discourse on my Third Head , viz. The great Charge here brought against this Wicked Person , That he will not seek after God ; neither is God in all his Thoughts : or , as it is in the Margin , with good grounds ( as I have before observed ) from the Hebrew , All his Thoughts are , There is no God. Which appears to me to imply a wilful and malicious slighting and contemning of God , and his Laws , and an endeavour to banish the very Thoughts of his Existence out of their Minds . And under this Head , I shall make it my business to enumerate all the pretended Arguments and Objections which I have met with , and are of any weight , against the Being of a God , in general ; and then endeavour to shew how Weak and Inconclusive they are , and how miserable a Support they will prove for Atheism and Infidelity . But first it will be necessary , briefly to clear up one Point , and to obviate one Objection that may be made against this very Attempt of mine , of Refuting and Answering the Atheists Arguments and Objections . It will , I doubt not , be said , That there is not now , nor ever perhaps was in the World , any such Person as a Speculative Atheist , or one that believes , there is no God. It is said , with great assurance , by some , That the Ancient Atheists were only such as declared against the Plurality of Gods , and the Idolatry and Superstition of the Heathen Worship . And we are told by one , very lately , (a) That he hath travelled many Countries , and could never meet with any Atheists , ( which are few , if any ; ) and all the Noise and Clamour , saith he , is against Castles in the Air. To which I Answer , That nothing can be more plain and clear , than that both Ancient and Modern Writers do give us an account of such Persons as were known and reputed Atheists , by those that were Contemporary with them , and did well understand their Principles and Tenets . I need not insist on Proofs from any of the Ancient Christian Writers ; for 't is sufficient , that Plato , Diogenes Laertius , Plutarch , Cicero , and many others , do acquaint us , that such kind of Men there have been in the World. Tho' I shall particularly produce the Testimony of two Authors , one ancient , and the other , 't is probable , now living , to prove this Point ; and these are , Sextus Empiricus , and he that wrote the Thoughts on the Comet that appeared in the Year 1680. Sextus is express , (a) That Diagoras Melius , Prodicus Chius , Euemerus , Critias Atheniensis , Theodorus , and many others , were absolute Atheists , and denied that there were any Gods at all . And the French Gentleman (b) saith the same of most of those mentioned by Sextus , and other Ancient Writers ; and to the number , adds some others of a Modern date : And Mr. Blount saith , (c) that the Epicureans constantly affirmed , there were no Gods. Now the Evidence of these Authors will , I hope , be allowed , because they seem Well-wishers to the Cause of Infidelity themselves . To these I might add , were it necessary , That Vaninus himself tells us frequently of Atheists that he met with , ( and no one will doubt but that he knew where to find one at any time , ) and he calls Machiavel , expressly , Atheorum facilè Princeps (d) But indeed , this Assertion of these Gentlemen , That there is no such thing as an Atheist in the World , is like most other things that they advance , Uncertain and Precarious , and often contradicted by what at other times they deliver : for though they are sometimes , and in some Companies , for Reasons that are very obvious , unwilling to take the Title of Atheist on themselves or their Party ; yet they are often ready enough to bestow it on others ; and when it is subservient to their purpose , will insinuate , (a) That the greatest Lights and Teachers of the Church believe as little of Religion as themselves . But I say also , 2. That 't is one thing to disbelieve the Existence of a God , and another to declare so to the World. And it doth not at all follow , that a Man is not an Atheist , because he doth not openly profess himself to be so , at all times , and in all Companies . There are no Writers so insincere as these kind of Gentlemen ; they are very cautious and tender how they expose themselves to the just Punishment of the Law. Vaninus himself , though he did at last suffer Death madly , for his Infidelity , ( as one (b) saith of him , that died as madly himself , ) yet is he very cautious and careful , in his Writings , how he renders himself obnoxious to the Censure of the Inquisition ; and he declares , (c) That he will submit all things to the Judgment of the Roman Church . So a Gentleman of our own Nation , though he endeavours , as effectually as 't is possible , under-hand , to ridicule and undermine Religion ; yet he would sain appear to the World to be a good Christian , and one that hath a mighty Veneration for God and his Laws : but , in the mean time , 't is very easie to discover his true Principles and Design ; for he declares ▪ (d) That he thinks it much safer to believe as the Church believes , and to pin his Faith always on my Lord of Canterbury ' s Sleeve , as he saith he will do , and subscribe to any ridiculous Legend , rather than incurr the Censure of the Popish Clergy ; as he basely calls the Ministers of this most Excellent Protestant Church : for the same laudable Reasons also , he forbears communicating , what he doth , or ought to think Truth , to Mankind , ( as he tells us in many places . ) Now if this be the case with these Men of Honour , that they dare not speak their Minds , nor discover their true Sentiments plainly to the World ; we must by no means conclude over-hastily of their Orthodoxy , by what they say in Discourse at some times , or publish in Print at others : but , in short , if they set up such a Notion of a God , as is essentially inconsistent with the Idea that all Mankind have of such a Being ; if they make him either a Necessary Agent , or a Blind , Idle and Unactive One ; if they divest him of his Providence , or cramp him in his Attributes , as those that call themselves Deists generally do : in a word , if they make him such an Impotent and Careless Being , as either cannot or will not govern the World , give Laws to his People , vindicate his own Honour , and punish and reward Men according to their Actions : 'T is plain , I say , that though in words they may profess to believe and honour a God , yet in reality they deny him , and have no manner of Notion of his true Nature and Perfections . But 't is not the Name only , nor the empty Sound of the word Deity , but the Thing , that is wanting in the World ; 't is the true Knowledge and Belief of this only , that can clear a Man from the imputation of Atheism : If he be not right in this Point , i. e. if he have not such a belief of God , as implies in it a knowledge of the Perfections of his Nature , he may call himself by as fine and fashionable Names as he pleases , and pretend to Deism and Natural Religion ; but in reality he is an Atheist , and so ought to be esteemed by all Mankind ; for as one saith , (a) that knew very well what an Atheist was , Such are Atheists , as deny God's Providence ; or who restrain it in some particulars , and exclude it in reference to others , as well as those who directly deny the Existence of a Deity : And Vaninus (b) calls Tully Atheist , on this very account ; and in another place , he saith , (c) That to deny a Providence , is the same thing as to deny a God. This therefore being returned in Answer to the Objection , That there is no such thing as an Atheist : Let us now go about to examine and consider the Arguments and Objections that are usually brought by Atheistical Men , against the Being of a God. And these , one would think , should be exceeding weighty ones , and no less than direct Demonstrations ; for if they are not such strenuous Proofs as are impossible to be refuted , I 'm sure the Atheist ought to pass for the most senseless and stupid of all Mankind . He slights and despises that inestimable Offer of being Happy for ever ; he runs the risque of being eternally Miserable ; he bids open defiance to the Laws of God and Man ; and he opposes his own Opinion and Judgment , to the sober and considerate Sentiments of the judicious part of Mankind , in all Ages of the World. Now surely , in such a case , he ought to be very sure that he cannot be mistaken ; and to be as demonstratively certain , as of the truth of any Theorem in Euclid , that there is no God , no Moral Good nor Evil , no Revealed Religion , nor any Future State of Rewards and Punishments . But can any Man have the face to pretend to this ? Will not the common sense of all Mankind pronounce this impossible ? and that a Demonstration of the Non-Existence of these things , is not to be obtained ? Can any one be directly assured , that there is not so much as a Possibility that these things should be true ? And if so , then 't is plain , that for any thing he can directly prove to the contrary , the Atheist may be in the wrong , and consequently be Eternally damned and miserable . Now would any one , that can think at all , run this Dreadful Hazard ? much less sure , one that pretends to be a Man of Penetration and Judgment , and to Philosophize above the Vulgar : And yet this every Atheist doth ; and that too on no other Grounds but the Strength of some trifling Objections against , and seeming Absurdities in , the Notion of a God , and Religion , which the Extravagant Wit of wicked Men hath invented and coined to stop the Mouths of those that reprove them , to stifle and bear down the Stings of Conscience , and to gain some pretence to Reason and Principles in their Impious Proceedings . But surely these Persons must know well enough , that 't is a very easie thing to start Objections against the most plain and obvious Truths ; They know also , that in other Cases , themselves think it very unreasonable to disbelieve the truth of a Thing , only because they can't readily answer all the Objections a witty Man may bring against it , and because they cannot solve all the Phoenomena of it . Now , why should not they proceed so in Matters of Religion ? They know that all the great Truths of it , have been demonstrated over and over , by those Learned and Excellent Persons which have written in the Defence of it ; Nay , they know too , that most of their Objections have been already refuted and answered , and that they adhere to a Cause that hath been frequently baffled . They know the weight and importance of the Subject , and that if Religion should at last prove to be true , they must be for ever Miserable : All this , I say , they very well know ; and therefore it looks strangely like an Infatuation upon them , that they will run this Dreadful Hazard only on the Strength of a few Objections , and a bare surmise only that there is no such thing as a God or Religion . These Objections are their only Hold and Pretence that they can stick to and abide by , and what and how Great they are , I shall now proceed to Examine . These I shall take in their Natural Order : And , 1. Consider such Objections as are brought against the Being of a God in General . 2. Such as are alledged against his Attributes and Perfections . 3. Such as are advanced against the Truth and Authority of revealed Religion . The Groundlessness and Inconclusiveness of all which I shall endeavour as clearly as I can to Demonstrate . And First , I shall consider and refute the Objections and Arguments that are brought against the Being of God in General ; and these are ( as far as I can find ) all reducible to these two Heads . It is said , 1. That we can have no Idea of God. 2. That the Notion of a Deity owes its Original , either to the foolish Fears of some Men , or the Crafty Designs of others . I shall at this Time handle the former of these , and Refute the Objections that are brought against the Existence of a Deity , from our not being able ( as they say ) to have any Idea or Notion of him . The Atheist alledges , That whatsoever is Unconceiveable is really nothing at all : that we can have no Idea , or possible Notion of any thing that is not some how or other an Object of our Senses ; for all Knowledge is Sense : and we can only judge of the Existence of things by its Evidence and Testimony . Now God is by Divines said to be Incomprehensible , Infinite , and Invisible ; i. e. Something that 't is impossible to know any thing about ; that is every where , and yet no where ; that sees every thing , and yet no body can see him ; nor can we perceive any thing of him by any other of our Senses : We cannot tell what to make of such an Account as this of a God ; we can have no ●●●tasm , Idea or Conception of any such Thing ; and therefore we justly conclude , There is no such Being in Nature . And as for that precarious Notion of a God , that is so much talk'd of in the World , 't is nothing but a meer Phantome or Mormo devised and set up by Politick and Designing Men to keep the Rabble in awe , and to scare such Fools as are afraid of their own Shadows . The several Points of this Objection , I shall singly consider ; and , As to the First Part of it , That what we cannot attain any Idea of ; or , That what is absolutely Vnconceiveable , is really nothing at all ; perhaps it may be true , taking it in the most strict and proper sence of the words ; for though I am not of Protagoras's Mind , that Man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet as I think , that That which is absolutely Unconceivable in its own Nature , is not possible to be Existent ; so what is absolutely so to us , we can know nothing at all of , nor reason , nor argue about it ; since there is no doing of this but from our Ideas . But I cannot see how this will be advantageous at all to the Cause of Infidelity : For there is neither any one that asserts , nor is the Atheist able to prove , that That Being which we call God , is absolutely Unconceiveable . There is a vast difference between a thing 's being Vnconceivable , and Incomprehensible ; between our having no Idea at all of a thing , and our having an Imperfect one ; and between our knowing Nothing at all of a Being , and our comprehending all the Possible Perfections and Excellencies of such a Being . We readily grant that the Immense Nature of God is incomprehensible to our finite Understandings ; but we don't say 't is absolutely Unconceivable , and that we can know nothing at all about it . The common Notion (c) which all Mankind have of a God , is a sufficient Refutation of this Part of the Objection , as it is also a very good Proof of the real Existence of a Deity ; for if there were no such Being , 't is impossible to conceive how any Idea of him could ever have come into any one's Mind , as I shall hereafter more largely prove . 2. There is implied in this Objection , That we can have no possible Idea , nor Notion of the Existence of any thing that is not the Object of our Senses : And from hence these Sublime Thinkers argue against the Existence of a Deity , and conclude there is no God , because they cannot see him , and because he is not perceivable by any of our Bodily Senses . Thus one of our Modern Atheistical Writers asserts , That the only Evidence we can have of the Existence of any thing , is from Sense . And in another place , (a) Whatsoever we can conceive ( saith he ) hath been perceived first by Sense , either at once or in Parts , and a Man can have no Thought representing any thing not subject to Sense . And he defines Sense to be Original Knowledge . Which is but the Reverse of what Protagoras , long ago determin'd : for Plato , in his Theaetetus , tells us , That he defined all Knowledge to be Sense . Now , is not this admirable Philosophy ? and worthy of those that pretend to a sublimer pitch of Knowledge than the Vulgar ? There is no Knowledge , say they , but Sense . If so , then , as Protagoras saith , all Sense must be Knowledge ; and consequently , he that sees , hears , smells or feels any thing , must immediately know all that is to be known about it : By seeing the Letters of any Language , or hearing the Words pronounced , a Man or a Beast must needs understand all the Sense and Meaning of it ; and the Philosophick Nature of all Bodies will be perfectly comprehended , as soon as ever they once come within the reach of our Senses . This is , indeed , a good easie method of attaining Learning ; and perhaps very suitable to the Genius of these Gentlemen ! But I cannot account from this Notion , how they come to have so much more Penetration and Knowledge than their Neighbours . Are their Eyes and Ears , Noses and Feeling , so much more accurate than those of the Vulgar ? Yes , doubtless , these are truly Men of Sense ! their Lyncean Eyes can penetrate Mill-stones , and the least silent whisper of Nature moves the Intelligent Drum of their tender Ears ; nothing escapes their Knowledge , but what is undiscoverable by the nicest Sense , and can only be comprehended by Reason . Reason ! an Ignis Fatuus of the Mind , whose uncertain Direction they scorn to follow , while this Light of Nature , Sense , can be their Guide . Nor will it avail them to alledge here , that when they say , we have no Knowledge but what we have from our Senses ; they mean only , that all our Knowledge comes in that way , and not by Innate Idea's : for the Author I have mentioned above , is express , that we can have no thought of any thing not subject to Sense ; that the only Knowledge we have of the Existence of all things , is from Sense ; and that Sense is Original Knowledge . And if so , there can be no such thing as comparing or distinguishing of Idea's in our Mind ; but the simple Idea's of Sensible Objects being impressed upon our Brain , must needs convey to us , by that means , all the Knowledge that we can ever obtain about them , and that as soon too as ever the Objects are perceived . But than this , nothing can be more false and absurd : for 't is plain , that by our bare Sensations of Objects , we know nothing at all of their Natures . Our Mind , indeed , by these Sensations , is vigorously excited to enquire further about them : but this we could by no means do , if Sense were the highest Faculty and Power in our Natures , and we were quite devoid of a Reasoning and Thinking Mind . This , Democritus of old was very well aware of , ( however he comes now to be deserted by the Modern Atheistick Writers , ) for saith he , (a) There is in us two kinds of Knowledges ; one Dark and Obscure , which is by the Senses ; the other Genuine and Proper , which is by the Mind . And nothing can be more plain , than that we have certain Knowledge of the Existence of many things , which never were , nor perhaps can possibly be the Objects of our Bodily Senses . Protagoras himself saith , (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : Take heed that none of the Uninitiated hear you , who are such as think nothing to Exist , but what they can lay hold of with their Hands ; and who will not allow any thing that is Invisible , to have a place among Beings . The Epicurean Atheist must needs grant the Existence of his Atoms , and his Empty Space ; when yet they must be both acknowledged to be no way sensible . Those that hold a Soul or Life in Matter , Plastically diffused through all Parts of the Universe , by which all things are actuated and regulated , cannot deny but this Power is Invisible , and no way the Object of Bodily Sense . Nay , those that assert a Corporeal Deity , and say , that nothing can possibly exist but Body ; must needs own , that something of this Deity , as his Wisdom , Power and Understanding , which is certainly the Chief and most Noble of all his Essence , can no ways fall under our Bodily Senses . Let him that asserts , That what is not the Object of Sense , is really nothing at all ; let him tell me , if he ever saw that Power , Faculty , Understanding or Mind , by which he is enabled to make such a Determination ? That there is such a Power or Mind in him , 't is impossible for him to doubt or deny : for that very doubting and denying , will refute him ; and must convince him , that there must be something in him of a Real Nature , that can thus Think and Consider , Doubt and Deny ; and at last conclude , That there is nothing Actually Existent , but what is Sensible : For what is really and absolutely Nothing , can never Think , Consider , Doubt or Determine . Now let him call this Mind or Soul of his what he pleases , I do not here consider its Nature ; let it be a Substance distinct from Matter , be it a happy Combination of Animal Spirits ; or the brisk Agitation of any fine and subtile Parts of Matter , 't is all one to our present purpose , it certainly Exists , or is ; and yet is it by no means an Object of Sense . For Animal Spirits , Motion , and the sinest and subtilest Parts of Matter are no more sensible to us now , than an Incorporeal Substance is . And as he is thus assured that there is something real in himself , which yet is the Object of none of his Senses ; so he cannot but conclude the same of other Men that are round about him , that they also have a Soul or Mind of the same Nature : for he must know and be satisfied , that they can think , reason , doubt , affirm , deny and determine , as well as himself . Now , if he must grant that there are on this Account many things existent in the World , which do no way fall under the cognisance of our Senses , it will be strangely senseless and ridiculous to argue against the Being of a God from His not being so ; and to deny that there is any such thing , because he cannot see Him with his Bodily Eyes , because he cannot feel Him with his Hands , and hear the Sound of his Voice actually speaking from Heaven . For the Existence of that Divine Being whom no Eye hath seen nor can see , is as plainly demonstrable from Reason and Nature , from his visible Works in the World , and from the inward Sentiments of our unprejudiced Minds , as the Being of our Own and Others Minds is from the power of thinking and reasoning that we find in our selves and them . 3. But Thirdly , 't is objected further , (a) That we cannot have any Idea of God , and consequently may conclude , There is no such Being ; because he is , by Divines , said to be Incomprehensible and Infinite : ( That is , say they ) something which we can know nothing at all about ; for we cannot have any Phantasm or Conception of any such thing . Thus saith that famous Atheistical Writer , Whatever we know , we learn from our Phantasms ; but there is no Phantasm of Infinite , and therefore no Knowledge or Conception of it . No Man , saith he , can have in his mind an Image of Infinite Power or Time : And there is no Conception or Idea of that which we call Infinite . In another place , he asserts , (c) That the Attributes of God signifie Nothing true nor false , nor any Opinion of our Brain ; and are not sufficient Premises to inferr Truth , or convince Falshood . And the Name of God ( he saith ) is used , 〈◊〉 to make us Conceive him , but that we may Honour him . And he elsewhere saith , (d) That those that venture to discourse Philosophically of the Nature of God , or to reason of his Nature from his Attributes , losing their Understanding in the very first attempt , fall from one Inconvenience to another , without end or number , and do only discover their Astonishment and Rusticity . This Bold Writer doth in another place tell us , (e) That God must not be said to be Finite ; and so being neither Finite nor Infinite , he must be nothing at all : Which is the very same Dilemma that the Sceptick , Sextus Empiricus , (f) makes use of against a Deity . Another Modern Author of the same stamp , tells us , That he that calls any thing Infinite , doth but , Rei quam non capit attribuere nomen quod non Intelligit ; Give an unintelligible Name to a thing which he doth not understand . All which agrees exactly with what Sextus also saith , in many places of his Book ; and whom these Gentlemen follow pretty closely in most things , without taking any notice at all of him . Now to this , I return ; That as 't is very foolish and precarious , to deny the Existence of a God , because He is not an Object of our Bodily Senses ; so , to conclude , that there is no such Being , from our not being able perfectly to comprehend Him , and to have a true and adequate Idea of him , is equally absurd and unaccountable . For at this rate , we may soon come to deny the Existence of most things in Nature , since there are very many of which we do not adequately comprehend the Nature of , and know all that is to be known about them . There is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , something Incomprehensible in the Nature of all things . Are there not a thousand Beings , which we are sure are truly and actually existent in Nature , the manner of whose Operation and Action we cannot comprehend , and whose Phaenomena we cannot Philosophically explain ? Let any of these Penetrating Gentlemen try their Skill at Gravity , Light , Sound , Magnetism and Electricity , and oblige the World with such an adequate Account of any one of them , as shall make all impartial and curious Men acquiesce in it as satisfactory . Let him clearly shew us how his own Sensations are made ; how the Circulation of the Blood first begins , and continues its Vital Tour round his Body ; how Pestilential and Contagious Diseases first invade and are propagated ; how several Medicines , that may be properly enough call'd Specifick's , operate ; and particularly , how the Cortex Peruvianus cures an Intermitting Fever : In a word , let him tell us how his own Body ( setting aside Accidents ) decays , grows old , and dies , when the same Digestions and Assimulations are made to Day , as were Yesterday , and there is no apparent defect in the Nutriment of any one part of it . He that can account for these , and many other such like things , which are obvious to every one's daily Observation , will certainly approve himself to be a Man of very curious and acute Thought , and of very deep Insight into Nature : and when he hath fully convinced me , that he throughly comprehends the Nature of but these few things , I will allow that he hath some ground to disbelieve the Existence of whatever appears to him Incomprehensible . But if a Person will candidly own , as he that hath any Knowledge and Modesty must do , That there are many things in the History of Nature , of which he cannot meet with a satisfactory Solution and Explication ; he hath certainly no manner of reason to disbelieve the Existence of a God , on the same account ; and to say , There is no such Thing , because his Nature is Incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect Capacities . We cannot , by searching , find out God , nor discover the Almighty unto perfection , Job xi . 7 . But again ; There is a vast difference between Apprehending and Comprehending of a thing ; between knowing a thing really to be , and knowing all that is possible to be known about that thing . We cannot indeed perfectly comprehend the Nature of God , because we have shallow , limited , finite and imperfect Capacities and Faculties ; and the Deity contains in himself all possible Perfection . Every one must grant , that 't is impossible the lesser should contain and comprehend the greater , especially too when the Extent and Fulness of one , Infinitely exceeds the Capacity of the other . From hence therefore to inferr that we can have no Idea nor Knowledge at all of God , is very absurd and incongruous . 'T is a strange Method of Arguing , that I can know nothing at all of a thing , because I can't know every particular that belongs to it ; and he would deservedly be esteemed a Madman , that should deny that there is any such thing as the Sun , because he cannot tell how many Miles he is in Diameter , how far he is from us , and which way he comes by a supply of Matter to continue his enlivening Fire and Heat . When some great and advantageous Revolution is brought about in any Nation ; when the Publick Good is secured , the Laws and Liberties preserved , and Confusion , Bloodshed , and Misery of all Kinds , prevented , by the wise and deep Council and Conduct of Him , or Those that are at the Helm of Affairs : Would it not be gross Stupidity , for a Man to assert , That all this came about by Chance , and that there was no Wisdom nor Conduct , that so opportunely managed all things ; only because he cannot penetrate into all the secret Steps and Methods of it , and see all the hidden Springs , by which it was moved regularly on to its intended Perfection ? There are many things whose Existence 't would be ridiculous to doubt of , whose Nature and Qualities we are very far from being able perfectly to Comprehend and Explain . And amongst the rest , there is nothing but our own Existence , that we can be more assured of , than that there is a God. For as to all Objects of Sense , we may , as Monsieur Des Cartes shews , have some reason to doubt of their actual Existence without us , till we are first satisfied that our Senses do not deceive us : Till we know this , for any thing we can demonstratively prove to the contrary , all sensible Objects may be meer Phantasms and Delusions , and nothing but the internal Configurations of our own Brains , and the result of Imagination and Fancy . But when once we are assured that there is a God , who is perfectly Knowing , Wise , and Good , we shall discover that He can be no Deceiver ; we shall find that 't is not suitable to the Idea we have of Him , that He should delude and cheat us with false Appearances ; and consequently we may well conclude , that he hath appointed our Senses to be proper Judges of their own Objects , and that those Things are actually existing without us , whose Idea's we so plainly perceive in our selves , and which we truly judge to be so . And if we will impartially consult our own Thoughts , and reason clearly from those Idea's that we have within us ; I think , we may most demonstratively be assured of the Existence of a God , and that He is such a most Perfect or Infinite Being , as the Sacred Scriptures and Divines describe Him to be . I will allow that the greatest Certainty that we can have of the Existence of any thing , is of our own Being ; of which , as I have already said , no one can possibly doubt : for whatsoever can Think reason , doubt , will , and determine , must needs be Something , and have a true and real Being . And because we find by this means , that there is certainly something actually existing ; it will plainly follow , that something or other must always have been so : for if ever there was a time when there was Nothing , there never could have been any thing at all : for absolute Nothing could never have done , or produced any thing . Something therefore ( 't is plain ) must have been always , or eternally existing , and which never could have had any beginning . For if it ever had any beginning , tho' never so many Thousands of Millions of Ages ago , it must have then began from meer Nothing , which 't is impossible for any Man to conceive . Now , if we consider our selves , or any things else that are round about us in the world ; we shall plainly find , that neither we nor they , can be this thing that always was existent , and which we have discovered must have been without beginning ; for we know well enough , that it was but a little while ago when we began to be , and that 't is but a short space before we shall die , and cease to be in this World any more . Besides , we find in our selves , and discover in things without us , such Defects , Limitations and Imperfections , as sufficiently must convince us , that neither we nor they can be Independent Beings , nor indeed the Cause of one another's Existence . We must therefore in our Thoughts have recourse to some first Cause or Origin , from whence all things do proceed : And that there must be some first Cause , or some Being , which produced both our selves and the things that are round about us in the World , we cannot but be assured of , for we know , nothing can cause , or make it self to be ; and we see that we cannot make or produce each other ; and we perceive that none of our Forms or Modes of Existence are Indestructible and Eternal ; but that all things are continually slitting and changing : some improving and increasing , while others are decreasing and dying . The common Matter , indeed , of all Bodies will remain , and we do not find it to be perishable , as their forms are ; But then , this we may easily know cannot be the first Cause of all other Things ; since we have no Idea of its being an Active , Intelligent , Wise , and Powerful Being , as that must be ; but the Notion we have of it is , that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , purely Passive , and obsequiously Capable of all variety of Forms and Motions ; as I shall hereafter more largely shew . If we farther carefully consider of this Being , that we have thus found must have eternally been or existed ; we shall find also , that it must for ever continue to be for the time to come ; for we cannot imagine , how a Being that hath Eternally existed for the time past , should ever terminate or cease to be for the time to come ; since there is nothing in its self , or in any thing without it , that can possibly be the Cause of its Destruction . Such a Being therefore will be properly Eternal , and necessarily Self-existent , without Beginning or End , or any Possibility of Dying or Ceasing to be . Such a Being also , must on this Account , be the Creator , Author , and Cause of all things : because , nothing can be the Cause of it self ; and therefore they must either be Eternal and Necessarily Self existent , as we are assured they are not ; or else derived from , and produced by this Eternal and Infinite Being . And as the Beings themselves are derived from , and produced by this Eternal and Self existent Being , so must all their Perfections and Qualifications too : for they are indeed the most Noble Things in their Natures . Knowledge therefore , and Wisdom , Thought and Reasoning , and all the excellent Powers and Faculties that are found in any Creatures , must come from the same Power that produced those Beings and Natures in which they are inherent . And if these Excellencies and Perfections are derived from this Necessarily existent Being , they must certainly be in Him in the greatest Perfection : for if they were not in Him , they could not be derived from him ; since 't is unconceivable that any thing can give or communicate to another , either what it hath not it self , or a greater degree of any thing than it is Master of . This Eternal and Self-existent Being therefore must have in it , and that in the utmost Perfection , all the Excellencies that we admire and value in any other things . It must have the Power of doing all things that are possible to be done , and therefore be Almighty ; it must know all things that are possible to be known , and therefore be Omniscient : In a word , it must be All-Wise and Good , Just and True , Merciful and Gracious , and contain in it all possible Excellencies and Perfections . Now this may very well pass for a Description of the Deity ; and 't is such an One as is very Intelligible and Plain to the meanest Capacity that can but think at all . And it gives us such an Idea of God , as we see is easily attainable by an obvious and familiar Chain of Consequences , and which puts our Minds not at all on the wrack to conceive . As for the word Infinite , which is often applied to God , and which these Gentlemen quarrel so much at , and of which they affirm , that it is impossible to have any Conception or Idea ; I say , that it is groundlessly and precariously asserted : and that nothing but the wilful Darkness and Confusion which they have brought upon their own Minds can make it appear Unintelligible . For as the Excellent Dr. Cudworth hath proved the Idea that we have of Infinite , is the same with that which we have of Perfection . And therefore when we say , that God is Infinite in Power , Wisdom or Goodness , we mean by it , that He is most perfectly or compleatly so ; and that he wants nothing which is necessary to render Him most Perfect , and Excellent in that Respect of which we speak of Him. Now a Being that any way is Deficient or Imperfect , and that hath not all the possible Excellencies that are to be had , is Finite , and that in the same proportion as it is defective . Thus , for Instance , those Beings which endure but for a time , which had a Beginning , and will have an end , are finite or imperfect , as to their existence : But GOD , who is , was , and is to come , who is and will be from Everlasting to Everlasting , He is properly said to be Infinite (a) or Perfect , as to Existence or Duration . For there is no Restriction , Limitation or Imperfection in His Nature , in this respect , as there is in that of all Creatures whatever . A Being whose Power extends to but a few things , is very imperfect or finite in Power ; and if there be any Possible thing that it cannot do , 't is still so far imperfect in Power . But a Being that can do all things that are not contradictory to his Nature , or all possible things , is properly said to be Infinite or Perfect in Power , or Almighty ; so a Being that knows all things possible to be known , is Infinite or Perfect in Knowledge : and the like of any other Attributes or Perfections : In all , the Comparison or Proportion is the same . A Being that wants no degree of Excellency or Perfection is God ; Infinite in Power , Wisdom , Justice , Goodness and Truth . But if a Being want any one , or any degree or proportion of These Things , it is Finite and Imperfect , and that in the same degree or Proportion . Now , where is the Inconceivableness , Confusion , Absurdity , and Nonsence of all This ? is it not as easie to conceive or apprehend that a Being may have in his Nature all possible Perfection , as it is to have an Idea of one that is Imperfect and Deficient ? for how comes the Idea of Imperfection into our Mind ? how come we to know that a Thing is Finite , Defective and Limited , unless we have also an Idea or Notion of Infinity or Perfection ? how can we know what is wanting in any Being , unless we have an Idea of it , that it is in some other Being ? Most certain therefore it is , that we may have as true and clear an Idea of the Existence of a God , as of any thing in Nature : (b) and in Fact it is most notoriously true , that a clear and distinct Notion that there is such a Being , hath and doth still appear in the Minds of all Mankind ; and it is impressed there , I doubt not , by the peculiar Care of that Divine and Merciful Being Himself . And therefore those that assert , that we have not , nor can have any Notion or Idea of a God , nor of his Attributes and Perfections , and that on that Account deny his Existence ; discover such wretched Ignorance as well as Obstinacy , that they are really a Disgrace to Humane Nature . For pretending to be over-Wise , they become Fools , they are vain in their Imaginations , and their foolish heart is darkened ; Their vicious Inclinations have debauched their Reason and Understanding : And though God be not far from every one of us , since in Him we live , move , and have our being ; yet their Wickedness and Pride is such , That they will not seek after God , neither is God in all their Thoughts . From which wilful Blindness and Stupidity , may the God of Truth deliver them , by the gracious Illuminations of his Blessed Spirit ; To whom , with our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ , be all Honour and Glory , &c. FINIS . Books printed for Rich. Wilkin at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-yard . MR. Harris's Sermon , Preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul , January the 3d. 1697 / 8. being the First of the Lecture for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esquire . — His Remarks on some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge , and to the Natural History of the Earth . In Octavo . Dr. Woodward's Natural History of the Earth , in Octavo . Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Truth of the Christian Religion , against the Objections of all Modern Opposers ; in Two Volumes . In Octavo . A Serious Proposal to the Ladies , for the Advancement of their true and greatest Interest ; Part I. By a Lover of her Sex. The Third Edition . In Twelves . A Serious Proposal to the Ladies ; Part II. Wherein a Method is offer'd for the Improvement of their Minds . In Twelves . Letters concerning the Love of God , between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. John Norris . In Octavo . An Answer to W. P. his Key about the Quakers Light within , and Oaths ; with an Appendix of the Sacraments . In Octavo . A Letter to the Honourable Sir Robert Howard : Together with some Animadversions on a Book , entituled , Christianity not Mysterious . In Octavo . The Notion of a GOD , Neither from FEAR nor POLICY . A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , March the 7 th . 1697 / 8. BEING The Third of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. PSALM x. 4 . The Wicked , through the Pride of his Countenance , will not seek after God : neither is God in all his Thoughts . IN my last Discourse on these words , I came to consider the Third Particular I had before observed in them ; which was , The great Charge the Psalmist brings against the Wicked and Proud Person here spoken of , viz. Wilful Atheism and Infidelity . He will not seek after God : and all his thoughts are , There is no God. Under which I proposed to Consider and Refute the Atheist's Objections , against the Being of a God in general . And these I found might be reduced to these Two Heads : I. That we can have no Idea of God. II. That the Notion of Him , which is about in the World , owes its Original to the foolish Fears and Ignorance of some Men , and to the crafty Designs of others . The former of these I have already refuted , and shewed that it is Groundless and Precarious in all its Parts . I shall now therefore consider the Second Objection against the Being of a God in general , viz. That the Notion of a Deity , which is so generally found among Mankind , owes its Original to the foolish Fears and Ignorance of some Men , and to the designing and crafty Figments of others . And here I shall first give you the Sense of these kind of Writers on this Point : And then endeavour to shew you , how very weak and trivial their Arguments are , and how very far short they come of Disproving the Existence of a Deity . And first I shall give you the full sense of this Objection , from the words of those that bring it ; beginning with the Modern Writers , who , as you will find by and by , have little or nothing new , but like Carriers Horses , follow one another in a Track , and because the first went wrong , all the rest will succeed him in the same Errour ; not considering , that he who comes behind , may take an advantage to avoid that Pit , which those that went before , are fallen into . ( as it is in the words of the Translator of (a) Philostratus . ) But here it must be premised , That since these kind of Men do frequently disguise their true meaning ; It is not the bare Words only , but the Scope of a Writer , that giveth the true Light by which any Writing is to be interpreted , ( as Mr. Hobbs (b) very well observes : ) yet this must be said for both him and the other Modern Atheistick Writers , That their Disguise is so very thin and superficial , that any one may easily see through it , and discover their true Meaning and Design . Nothing can be clearer , than that 't is the great scope of the Author of Great is Diana of the Ephesians , to persuade the World , That the first Original of all Religion , was from Craft and Imposture , and that it was cultivated and carried on by the Cunning and Avarice of the Priests . And in his Anima Mundi , pag. 13 , 14. he tells us , That Superstition ( by which these kind of Writers always mean Religion in general ) did certainly proceed from some Crafty and Designing Person , who observed what were the Inclinations of Mankind , and so adapted his Fictions accordingly : He pretended to have some extraordinary way revealed to him , from an Invisible Power , whereby he was able to instruct the People ; and to put them into a way of being happy in a Future State. And in another place , he saith , (a) That Mankind being ill-natured , and unapt to oblige others without Reward , as also judging of God Almighty by themselves , did at first conceive the Gods to be like their Eastern Princes , before whom no Man might come empty-handed ; and thus came the Original of Sacrifices : And this Institution , he saith , was improved by the crafty Sacerdotal Order , into all that costly and extravagant Superstition that did afterwards so abound in the World. Now in this passage , 't is plain , that he makes all the Jewish Religion to be nothing but Priest-craft and Imposture ; tho' on wretched poor grounds , as I shall hereafter sufficiently make appear . And his Opinion of the Christian Religion , may easily be guessed , by what he delivers , Anim. Mund. pag. 124. viz. That most Christian Churches , like the Musk-melon from the Dunghill , were raised from the filthy Corruption and Superstition of Paganism . And in another place , he saith , (b) That he will engage to make appear , That a Temporal Interest was the great Machine on which all Humane Actions ever moved ; ( he means , in the Establishing of the Jewish and Christian Religions ; ) and that the common Pretence of Piety and Religion , was but like Grace before a Meal : i. e. according to him , nothing but a meer customary piece of Folly that signifies nothing at all , and which he frequently ridicules and exposes (c) . Now all this , though not in plain and express words , yet in the most obvious sense and meaning , is equally applicable to the Notion of a God ; and no doubt was so intended by the Author . And , indeed , take away Religion and the Notion of a God must of course follow : For 't is impossible to think that if there be a God , he should not expect Veneration and Worship from those Creatures of his , that he hath rendred capable of doing it ; which therefore is their reasonable Service , Rom. 12.1 . After the same manner doth Spinoza declare himself as to the Origin of Religion ; which he also calls by the Name of Superstition . (a) He tells us , That the true Cause from whence Superstition took its rise , is preserved and maintained , is Fear . (b) That if all things would but succeed according to Mens Minds , they would never be enslaved by Superstition : But because they are often in great streights , and so put to it , that no Counsel or Help will be beneficial to them , they are tossed and bandied about between Hope and Fear , and at last have their Mind so debilitated , that they are prone to believe any thing . (c) But that in reality all those things which have been the Objects of Mens vain Religious Worship , are nothing but the dreadful Phantasms and mad Figments of a sorrowful and timorous Mind . (d) And the reason ( he saith ) why all Men are thus subject by Nature to Superstition , is only from Fear ; and not as some have fansied , from any confused Idea of a God , which they will have to be impressed on all Mankind . The Author of the Leviathan , speaks yet a little plainer as to this Point ; (e) Ignorant Men ( saith he ) feign to themselves several kinds of Invisible Powers , stand in awe of their own Imaginations , in time of Distress invoke them , in time of Success give them thanks , making the Creatures of their own fancy Gods. This is the Natural Seed of Religion , which Men taking notice of , have formed into Laws , &c. And he tells us in another place , (f) That Fear of Power invisible feigned by the Mind , or imagined from Tales publickly allowed is Religion , not allowed , is Superstition . So that according to Mr. Hobbs , Religion and Superstition differ only in this , that the latter is a Lye and a Cheat standing only on the Authority of Private Men , whereas the former is supported by the Power of the Government . In these Four Things , saith he , elsewhere , (a) consists the Natural Seed of Religion , viz. Ignorance of Second Causes , Opinion of Ghosts , Devotion toward what Men Fear , and taking things casual for Prognosticks . These are the Accounts which our Modern Atheistical Writers give of the Origin of Religion , and the Notion of a God among Men. And this they , with great assurance , put off as their own new Invention ; without being so just as to mention any of the Ancients , from whom they have borrowed every Article of it . That trite Passage every Body knows Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor ; and Lucretius mentions Fear and the Ignorance of Second Causes , as that which gave the first rise to the Notion of a God : For , saith he , (b) When Men with fearful Minds behold the things in the Earth and Heavens , they become abject and depressed under the fear of the Gods ; whose Empire Ignorance of Causes sets up in the World : for when Men cannot see any natural Reason for any Effect , they strait fansie 't is the Product of some Divine Power . The very same thing he saith also in another place , (c) where he attributes likewise the Notion of Ghosts , and consequently of the Gods interfering with the Affairs of the World , to Mens not being able to distinguish Dreams from Real Appearances . Tully tells us , That there were some in his time , and no doubt , long before , who attributed the Opinion and Belief of the Gods to have been feigned by Wise Men for the good of the Commonwealth . (d) And Plato acquaints us , (e) That the ancient Atheists did affirm , that the Gods were not by Nature , but by Art and Laws only , and so were different in different places , according as the different humour of the Law givers chanced to determine the Matter . Sextus Empiricus saith , That there were at first some Intelligent and Prudent Men (f) who consider'd what would be beneficial to Humane Life ; and these first feigned the fabulous Notion of Gods , and caused that Suspicion that there is in Mens Minds about them . Afterwards he saith , That heretofore Men lived wild and savage , and preyed upon one another like wild Beasts ; till some Men being willing to prevent and repress Injuries and Rapine , invented Laws to punish those that did amiss : And then they feigned , that there were Gods also , who took cognizance of all Mens Actions , whether good or bad ; that so no one might dare to commit any secret Wickedness , when he was by this means persuaded , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Gods , tho' unseen by Men , did yet inspect into all Humane Actions , and take notice who did well , and who the contrary . Sextus also attributes the Rise of Mens Belief of a God , to their ignorance of Second Causes , ( as I shewed you before that Lucretius doth : ) for he makes Democritus speak thus , (a) When Men of old saw strange and frightful things in the Air or Heavens , such as Thunder , Lightning , Thunderbolts , Eclipses of the Sun and Moon , &c. not knowing the Natural Causes of them , but being terrified by them , they strait imagined the Gods to be the Authors of them . This therefore being proved to be the true sence of the Ancient Atheistical Writers , and from them copied by the Moderns , viz. That Fear , Ignorance and Cunning were the first Originals or Causes of the Notion and Belief of a God. Let us now fairly examine the Case , and see what ground there is for such an Assertion ; and whether this can account for that Universal Notion of a Divine and Omnipotent Being , which we find every where in the World. And , 1. I say , That the Notion of a GOD , could not come from Fear ; for if it did , either this Fear must be universally inherent in all Mankind , or else peculiar only to some Dastardly and Low-spirited Mortals . If the former be asserted , 't is a very convincing Argument , that there is a just ground for such a Fear ; and that it hath something that is Real for its Object , that can thus affect all Men , after the same manner . And if it be so , that all Men are naturally subject to this Fear of a Deity ; how could any one ever discover , that there was no real ground for this , in the nature of the thing ? how came he himself exempted from this poorness of Spirit ? And if he were not exempted from this terrible Passion , how came he to discover , that the Object of this Fear is all a Cheat , and nothing but a meer Mormo and Bugbear ? 'T was very lucky for him , that the rambling Atoms of his Constitution jumpt by chance into such a couragious and noble Frame and Temper ! But pray who was this mighty Man ? when and where did he live ? what Ancient History gives us any Account of this happy Person , that laughed at that which all the World besides were afraid of ? Let the Atheists give us but any Relation of him , that is Authentick , and it shall be allowed as the greatest thing they have ever yet advanced . But I suppose they will not say that this Fear is Universal ; but that it only possesseth mean and abject Spirits , and never invades the Great and Brave Soul. Let us see whether this will do them any service . Now by Brave and Great Souls , who do they mean ? Do they intend by them , such as have Power , Command and Empire over others ? Nothing is more certain , than that Kings and Princes have been equally subject to these Fears of a God , and of Divine Punishment , with the meanest and most contemptible of their Subjects . And this (a) Lucretius himself owns , ( as also that this Fear of a Deity is Universal ) and we have Examples of it in the Histories of all Ages and Parts of the World. But they will say , 't is like , that by Brave and Great Souls , they don't mean Kings and Princes , but the Wise , Knowing , and Learned part of Mankind : These were they that first discovered this Cheat , and who , finding its Advantage to Mankind , have ever since continued it and carried it on for the Publick Good. These Cunning Men finding the Vulgar generally subject to dismal Apprehensions and Fears of they knew not what kind of Invisible Powers , took advantage from thence to tell them of a God , and to form the product of their Fears into the Notion of a Deity . Now to this I say , That if these cunning Politicians found that there was a Fear , Dread and Apprehension of some Divine and Almighty Being , Universally impressed upon the Minds of Men , as no doubt but there is ; this , I say , is a very convincing Argument that such a Belief hath a good Foundation in the Nature of the thing , and consequently hath Truth at the bottom . And therefore 't is plain , that these Men did not Invent , but find this Notion and Belief actually Existing , by a kind of Anticipation in the Hearts of all Mankind . And that they could not possibly invent it , had there been no Ground nor Reason for such a Belief , I shall plainly prove by and by . But again ; That the Notion of a God , did not arise only from Fear , is plain from hence ; That Mankind hath gotten an Idea of Him , that could never proceed only from that Passion . If Fear only were to make a God , it would compose him of nothing but black and terrible Idea's : it would represent Him to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , all envious and spiteful ; a grim , angry and vindicative Being ; one that delights in nothing but to exercise his Tyrannical Power and Cruelty upon Mankind : we should then believe him to be such a Power as the Indians do their Evil God , and we do the Devil ; a mischievous and bloody Deity , that is the Author of nothing but Evil and Misery in the World : for these must be the dreadful Attributes of a Being which Fear only would create and set up in our Hearts . But now , instead of this , we find a quite different Notion of God in the World. We justly believe Him to be a most Kind , Loving and Gracious Being , and whose mercies are over all his works . We are taught by the Scriptures , those Sacred Volumes of his Will , to believe that He at first Created the World , and all things that are therein , to display his Goodness and Kindness to his Creatures : That he wills not , nor delights in the death of a sinner , nor in the evil and misery of any thing ; but that He hath by most admirable methods of Divine Love , provided for our Happiness both here and hereafter . Now such an Account as this of the Deity , could never take its Rise from Fear only : And therefore since it cannot be denied but that we have such a Notion of God , it must have some more Noble and Generous an Original . We find , indeed , in our selves a just Fear and Dread of Offending so Good and Gracious a God ; and we believe it suitable to his Justice , to punish those that will pertinaciously continue in a state of Rebellion against Him , after having refused and slighted the repeated Overtures of his Mercy . But then we know very well , That the Notion we have of a Deity , is not occasioned by , and derived from this Fear ; but , on the contrary , this Fear from it . 'T is the Natural Consequence and Effect of the Belief and Knowledge of a God , but it cannot be the Cause and Original of it . For Fear alone can never dispose the Mind of Man to imagine a Being that is infinitely Kind , Merciful and Gracious . The Atheist therefore must here taken in Hope too , as well as Fear , as a joint Cause of his pretended Origin of the Belief of a God ; and say , That Mankind came to imagine that there was some Powerful and Invisible Being , which they hoped would do them as much good , as they were afraid it would do them hurt (a) . But these two contrary Idea's , like Equal Quantities in an Equation with contrary Signs , will destroy one another , and consequently the Remainder will be nothing . And therefore the Mind of Man must lay aside such an Idea of God , as soon as he hath well considered it , for it will signifie just nothing at all . Another very good Argument , That the Notion of a God , did not take its first Original from Fear only , may be drawn from hence , That those that do believe and know most of God , are the least Subject to that servile Passion . If Fear only occasioned Mens Notion and Belief of a God , the consequence must be , that where the Notion of a Deity is most strong and vivid , there Men must be most timorous and apprehensive of Danger ; there the greatest distrust , suspicion , and anxious sollicitousness about the Events of Futurity would be always found . But this is so far from being true in Fact , that no one is so free from those Melancholy and Dreadful Thoughts and Apprehensions , as he that truly believes in , and Fears God. For he can find always in Him Almighty Defence and Protection ; he can cast all his care on God who he knows careth for him : When all the treacherous Comforts of this World leave him , and when nothing but a gloomy Scene of Affliction , Distress and Misery presents its self here ; yea , even when Heart it self and Strength begin to fail , God will be ( he knows ) the Strength of his Heart and his Portion for ever ; and even in the vast Multitude of his Afflictions , God's Comforts will refresh his Soul. But 't is far otherwise with the miserable Wretch that hath no Belief of , nor any Knowledge of God ; if he fall into Affliction , Trouble , or Misery , he hath nothing to support him : He is the most abject and dispirited of all Mankind , his whole head is sick , and his heart is faint , and his Spirit cannot sustain his Infirmity ; for he hath not only no Power and Ability to bear the present load of Misery , but he expects yet much worse to come ; and notwithstanding all his former Incredulity and Bravery , he now , as the Devil himself doth , believes and trembles . And therefore , though as Plutarch observes , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it be the chief Design of Atheism to give Men an Exemption from Fear ; yet 't is a very foolish one , and falls very far short of answering its End : for it deserts and fails its Votaries in their greatest Extremities and Necessities , and by depriving them of all just Grounds for hope , must needs expose them to the most dismal Invasions of Fear . And thus , I think , it is very plain , That the Notion of a God could not take its first Original from Fear . As to the Ignorance of Second Causes , which is sometimes alledged as another Occasion of the Notion of a Deity ; the Modern Atheists do not much insist upon it , and therefore I need not do so in its Refutation . I have shewed already whence they had it ; and I think it sufficient to observe here , that there are no Men so Ignorant of Second Causes , nor any that give so poor and trifling Accounts of the Phaenomena of Nature as these Atheistical Philosophers do . And therefore Ignorance ought rather to be reckoned among the Causes of Atheism and Infidelity , than of the Idea of God and Religion ; for I am very well assured that a through insight into the Works of Nature , and a serious Contemplation of that admirable Wisdom , excellent Order , and that useful Aptitude and Relation that the several Parts of the World have to each other , must needs convince any one , that they are the Products of a Divine and Almighty Power . The Invisible things of God may be understood by the things that are made , and his Eternal Power and Godhead discovered by this means (a) ; as hath been excellently demonstrated by the learned Dr. Cudworth , Dr. Bentley , Mr. Ray , and many others . And these kind of Gentlemen have betrayed their shallow and superficial Knowledge of things , by nothing more , than by pretending to give an Account of the Original of the World , the Motion of the Heavenly Bodies , of Gravity , and several other Phaenomena of Nature , without having recourse to a Deity ; as I shall hereafter more particularly observe . But I now hasten to Refute that which they make their Great and most Common Objection against the Being of a God ; And to shew , 2. That the Notion of a God did not , nor could not , arise from Cunning and Contrivance ; and that it was not invented by any Crafty and Politick Person . Though that it did do so , is the constant Assertion of these Gentlemen ; and they do it with as much assurance , as if it were a Self-evident Proposition . In all Companies they will nauseously tire you with this Battology , over and over again . That All Religion is a Cheat , and the greatest Cheat of all is Religion . But this themselves have happily discovered ; and therefore they Scorn to be imposed upon by Priest-craft ; they will neither be ridden by Priests , nor lead by them ; they can go without Leading-strings ; and won't be put to the Temporal Charge of a Spiritual Guide : and they have quitted the Thoughts of going to Heaven by the same means as they go to the Play-house , ( i. e. ) by giving Money to the Door-keepers . As the Translator of Philostratus insolently expresses it . (a) Now after all this bold and repeated Exclamation against Priest-Craft and Holy Shams , &c. Would not one think that they had some demonstrative Ground , to prove that the Notion of God , and Religion is all a Cheat and Imposture ? Would not one suppose that they could name the very Person that first Invented this Fourbe ; tell us when , and where he lived , and plainly prove by what means he came to impose so grosly on Mankind , and how they came to be such Fools as to take it , and dully to submit to it ever since ? Nothing sure , that is less than a direct Demonstration , ought to protect a Man under so rude a Liberty as these Gentlemen take , of ridiculing all the Sacred Laws of God and Men. But have they any such Proof ready ? or have they ever yet produced it ? No , nor is it possible they ever should ; as appears plainly from the Ancient Histories of all Nations in the World. In no one of these do we ever find the least mention made of any one that Invented the Notion of a God. 'T was a Thing taken for Granted by all the Ancient Law-givers , that there was a God : This they never went about to prove ; nor had they any need so to do , or to feign it , for they found it universally and naturally stamp'd upon the Minds of Mankind . This Moses himself doth not so much as attempt to teach the Jews , as knowing very well that it was what they had a general Notion and Idea of before . And Homer speaks every where of the Gods , as of Beings universally known and believed , and never goes about to prove their Existence . The same thing appears in Hesiod , and in the Fragments that we have of all the Ancient Greek Poets . And though it be not true in Fact , yet 't is a good Argument ad Hominem against the Atheists , that Lucretius pretends to tell you when Atheism began , and who was the first Bold Man that disputed and denied the Being of a God. This , he saith , was Epicurus . (a) But he cannot deny but that in so doing , Epicurus contradicted the common Sentiments of all Mankind , and broke through those Fears and Obligations that the generality of Men were under to a Divine Power . But to Refute a little more Methodically this trite Objection . I say , that the Notion of a God could not derive its Original from the cunning Invention of any Politick Person , for these Reasons : 1. Because the pretended Inventor himself could never possibly have come by such a Notion , had there been no such Being as a God. Sextus Empiricus observes very well , That though (b) 't is pretended that Law-givers and Politicians invented the Notion of a God ; yet the Asserters of it are not aware of an Absurdity that arises thence : for if it should be asked , how they themselves came by such a Notion ? they must be at a loss ; they will not say they had it from others , nor can they account how they came by it ; and therefore it must have been from the beginning ; and so all Men must have a Notion of God , though not all after the same way . And , indeed , 't is not possible to imagine that such a Notion could ever have come into any one's Head , had there been no such Being as a Deity . Were he an absolute Non-entity , and really Nothing at all , 't is unconceivable how any one could ever attain an Idea of God , or have coined any word that should so have expressed that Idea , as to render it intelligible to any one else . The Mind of Man cannot invent , or make any new simple Idea or Cogitation ; it cannot possibly make a Positive Conception of that which is really nothing at all . Which way soever we come by our Idea's , we cannot have one of what is absolutely a Non-entity ; for what is absolutely Nothing , can neither come into us by our Senses , nor be innate in our Minds . And therefore if there were no God , we could never have had any Idea of Him ; nor could any one ever possibly invent , or frame such a Notion in his Mind . I know the compounding , ampliating and feigning Power of the Mind will here be alledged ; and it will be said that we may by that means frame Notions of things which perhaps did never , nor ever will Exist : Thus we may gain the Notion of a Flying Horse , of a Creature , half a Man and half a Horse , a Man of a Thousand Foot high , &c. and therefore say they , (a) why might not the Mind of Man , by this compounding and ampliating Power , feign as well the Notion of a Deity ? To which I answer , That this Power in our Minds doth not , nor cannot extend so far . All that we can do by it , is to connect together two or more possible and consistent Idea's , or to Ampliate or Enlarge any one or more of them , in point of Time , Extent , &c. Thus , as was before said , by connecting the Idea's of Wings and a Horse , or of a Horse and a Man , we may feign a Pegasus or a Centaure ; and I can imagine either of these Creatures , or any other , to live Five Thousand times as long , or to be Fifty thousand times as big , as is usual . But all this is still short of what 't is brought for , and will give no account at all of the Invention of the Idea of a God. For suppose the Mind would endeavour to amplifie the Idea of a Man into that of God , which is the Way Sextus Empiricus says Men might and did come by the Notion of a Deity . (b) First , he saith , the Mind can give him Eternity of Duration : But how came it by that Idea of Eternity ? was that Idea previous to the Invention of a Deity ? and had Mankind a clear Conception of it ? if they had , the Notion of God could not be then invented , for one of his chiefest Attributes was known before . But I suppose they will say that the Notion of Eternity was gained by Ampliating the Idea of Duration or Time beyond the common and ordinary Term : And thus by imagining a Man to live a Thousand or Ten Thousand Years , I may come to frame the Notion of a Being that should always exist . But that is a gross Mistake ; for a Being that should endure Ten Thousand , or Ten Millions of Years , is not therefore exempt from dying at last , any more than one that endures but Ten Minutes . Had I not in my Mind before a clear Idea of Eternity , I could no more by this Ampliating Power gain a Notion of an Eternal Being , than I could believe my self to be Eternal ; for every thing about me would contradict that Notion ; and 't is very strange that I should come to believe any Being could have an Eternal Duration from considering of things that are all perishable and mortal . That which leads Men into this mistake , is , I suppose this : We have all of us a Notion of a Being , Perfect or Eternal , as to his Duration , because there is such a Being in Reality : And therefore , whenever we go about to consider of Time , or of the Period or Term of the Duration of a Being , we can ampliate it so , as to suppose it shall never cease to be , but have its Being still continued on without end : That is , we can connect the Idea that we have of Eternity with a Being , and so render it Eternal . But this could never be done , if there were no Idea of Eternity at all , if there were nothing Eternal , if there were no God. The case is the same as to all the other Perfections of the Divine Nature . We have clear Idea's and Notions of them in our Minds ; and therefore we can talk about them , and be understood : because there are real Idea's that answer to those words that we use ; and something really existing , that answers to those Idea's . But were there no such Being , nor any thing Real in Nature , to deduce our Idea's from , were there no God , 't is impossible there could be any such Idea's at all . But however , this Assertion , That the Mind of Man was able to Invent the Notion of a Deity , and communicate it to the World , is a most flat and palpable Contradiction to what the Atheist at other times urges , and that too , as founded on Principles that he is very fond of . In my last Discourse , I shewed you , That he objected against the Being of a God , from our not being able to have any Idea of Him ; and this he endeavours to support , by asserting also , That we have no Knowledge but Sense , and that all our Conceptions are Passive . Now both these are absolutely inconsistent with the Original that he is now attributing to the Notion of a God. For if it be true , as he saith it is , That we can have no Idea of God ; 't is very strange to suppose , that a Politick Man should Invent , and the World Receive the Idea or Notion of That which 'tis impossible for any one to invent , or receive . 'T is a little odd , that a Man should first cunningly devise he knew not what , and then the affrighted World believe they knew not what ; and that we should prove and assert , and the Atheist ridicule and deny the Existence of That which we do none of us all know any thing about ! But so it must be , according to the Atheist's Uniform Scheme of Things . Again , If , as he asserts , all our Conceptions be Passive , and all our Knowledge , Sense : which way could this Cunning Inventer of a God , come by his Notion or Idea of Him ? how could his Mind attain any such feigning and ampliating Power ? For according to the Atheist's Principles , the Mind could have no Active , much less Spontaneous Power at all ; but all our Idea's and Conceptions would be meer necessary Motions , mechanically occasioned by the Impressions of External Objects . So that as Protagoras tells us ( in Plato's Theoetet . ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : 'T is neither possible to conceive that which is not , nor indeed any thing else , but only just as our Mind suffers it by Impressions from without . And therefore no Man could ever possibly Invent any thing at all , nor have any Power within him of putting or joining together two or more simple idea's , or of ampliating or enlarging any Idea or Notion at all ; much less could he grow so very subtle as to Invent the Notion of a Deity . And as no Law-giver nor Politician could , we see , have Invented the Notion of a Deity , if he had had a mind so to do ; so it appears very weak and foolish in him to do it , if he could . For while there was no Belief among Men , of any Divine and Almighty Power , he would have been a mortal God himself , (a) as Hobbs calls the Commonwealth : His Will would have been his Law ; and Men's Obedience to Him , would have been founded in the Fear they were under of his great Power . And this , according to the Atheistical Principles , would have been a much better Stay and Support to his Authority , than the idle Obligations of Conscience and Religion : For the aforesaid Author tells us , (b) That if the Fear of Spirits ( i. e. of a God ) were taken away , Men would be much better fitted for Civil Obedience . And in another place he goes a little further yet , and saith , (c) That 't is impossible any Government can stand , where any other than the Sovereign hath a Power of giving greater Rewards than Life , and greater Punishments than Death . That is , where there is any Obligation on Mens Minds to a Divine and Almighty Power : which they will chuse to obey , rather than the Unlawful Commands of an Arbitrary Prince , that can only kill the Body . Now there is no doubt but that this is true of such a Power or Government , as that he calculated his Leviathan for ; i. e. One absolutely Arbitrary and Tyrannical . And all Power must be so , if there be no God , and no Antecedent Good and Evil , but what the Will of the Sovereign shall make so , as Mr. Hobbs positively asserts there is not . Therefore that Man must act very unwisely , who when he was possessed of Power enough to give Laws to , and govern others by his sole Will and Pleasure , would ever invent the Notion of a God and Religion . For this was the direct way to cramp himself in his Power , to tie up his own Hands , and to let the People see that he himself is accountable to God , as well as they ; 't is to teach them , that the Power he hath , is but a Trust committed to him by God , which he is to discharge for his Subjects Good and Advantage , and not only to gratifie his own Will and Humour . And this Notion might induce the Subjects of an Arbitrary and Tyrannical Prince , to ease him of the Trouble of a Government , that they perceived involved him in a great deal of Guilt , and would proportionably encrease the Account that he must one day give of his Stewardship . But , 2. As the Idea and Notion of a God , cannot possibly have been invented by any one ; so neither could it have been understood or believed by Mankind , if it had been so . Had there been only one Person that had coined the Idea of a God , and no manner of Notion at all of any of his Attributes or Perfections previous to this , in the Minds of Men ; what would it have signified , to tell them , that there was a God ? how could they understand the meaning of a meer Arbitrary word , that had no manner of foundation in Nature , nor any Idea or Notion answering to it ? Words are but Marks of Things , or Signs to know them or distinguish them by : and therefore a Word that is the Sign of what is absolutely Nothing , or a Non-Entity , must needs be nonsense and unintelligible . And consequently , he that should attempt to awe Mankind with an empty Sound , that had no Signification , would certainly be exposed to contempt ; and instead of affrighting others , would only be laughed at himself . The Author of Anima Mundi , saith , (a) That to tell a Prophane Rabble of an Invisible Deity , and of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments , will signifie nothing at all : and , That Men will not for such Metaphysicks , forbear any manner of Pleasure or Profit , how base soever . How then could the Figment of a Deity gain admittance into the Minds of Men , at first ? What would it signifie to tell Men of an Invisible Power , that presides over , and governs the World ; when ( according to the Atheist's Supposition ) they had no manner of Notion of any such Being before , and consequently could not know what was meant by such Words and Expressions . Should you tell them , indeed , of a potent Neighbour , that was coming strongly armed , to take away their Life or Goods , they would look about them , and endeavour , by flight or force , to secure themselves . But to tell them of a Power that they never saw nor heard any thing of before , and which they are told withal , is impossible to be seen or heard , or any way rendred an Object of their Senses , could make no impression at all on Mankind : or suppose that it could make some impression , and frighten some Men at its first proposal , how long would this last ? No longer , at farthest , than till they were by Experience convinced that it was false and precarious , and that there was no Ground nor Reason to believe any such thing . And this they must arrive at in a small time , if the Thing were false . 'T is impossible such a Cheat as this , which it would have concerned every one to have examined , could long have maintained its Ground . Time discovers , and certainly lays open all impostures ; and that the sooner , the more are concerned to enquire into it . And therefore had this Notion and Belief of a Deity had no other Original and Foundation than what the Atheists pretend , 't is impossible it could have continued so long in the World ; and much more so , that it should have gained ground as we know it hath continually done , and be established on better Principles , the more it hath been considered and understood . Opinionum commenta delet dies , naturae judicia confirmat , saith Cicero . Besides , It cannot well be imagined that any Man should have the vanity to believe , that a thing which he knew he had invented himself , and which had no manner of ground nor foundation to support it from the Nature of the thing , could ever impose upon and delude Mankind , or indeed find any admittance in their Belief . He must needs think that others would be as sagacious to discover the Cheat , as he could be to contrive it ; and that among so many Heads , some one would soon detect the Forgery of what must necessarily appear false and precarious to the common Sense and Reason of all Men. But , 3 dly , and lastly , The Universality of the Notion and Belief of a God , is also a most demonstrative Argument , that it could not arise from the Invention of any Cunning and Designing Person . That there is such an Universal Notion of a Deity , cannot , I think , be denied by any one ; and I doubt not but farther Discoveries will satisfie us , that there is a Notion of God even among those Barbarous and Savage People that are said to have no manner of Idea of Him , by a late Ingenious Author . But supposing that it were so , that the Knowledge of a God were quite lost , in three or four dark and uncultivated parts of the Earth , whose Inhabitants are so brutish , as scarce to think at all : this is no more an Argument against the Belief of God's being Universally diffused throughout the World , than Monsters and Fools are , that Men have not generally a Humane Shape and Reason . There are some Anomalies , Irregularities and Exceptions in all Things and Cases , which yet are not by any accounted of force enough to over-turn a general Rule . I shall not say much to this Point , it having been so largely and frequently handled already ; only I cannot omit the Testimony of some of the Ancient Writers , who are very express , that there is an Universal Notion of a God among Mankind , and which they looked upon to be Natural , or by way of Anticipation . There is , saith Cicero , (a) a Notion of a God impressed on the Minds of all Men. And in another place , saith he , (b) What kind of Nation or People is there any where to be found , who have not , without learning it from others , a Prolepsis or Anticipation of a Deity . And in two other places , he tells us , (c) That there is no Nation so barbarous and wild , who do not acknowledge the Being of a God , and some how or other revere and worship him . Seneca , in his Epistles , (d) frequently saith the same thing . Sextus Empiricus owns also , (e) That all Men have a common Notion of God , by way of Prolepsis ; and believe Him to be a most Blessed and Happy Being , Incorruptible , Immortal , and uncapable of any kind of Evil. And he concludes , That 't is unreasonable to assert , that all Men should come to attribute the same Properties to God by Chance , and not rather be induced thereunto by the Dictates of Nature . Maximus Tyrius hath a very plain Passage , to prove this common Notion of a God , (f) Though , saith he , there be so much quarrelling , difference and jangling in the World , yet you may see this agreed in all over the Earth , that there is One God , the King and Father of all . This the Greek and the Barbarian both say , the Islander and the Inhabitant of the Continent , the Wise and the Unwise alike . Aristotle saith , (g) That all Men have a Pre-notion concerning the Gods , even both Greeks and Barbarians . And in another place , he hath a very remarkable passage to this sence , That there is a very Ancient Tradition ( which our Fore-fathers have handed down to Posterity , in a Mythological Dress ) That there are Gods ; and that the Divine Nature sustains or encompasseth all things . But this Tradition , he saith , had , in process of time , some Figments connected with it ; as , that the Gods had Humane Shapes , or those of other Creatures , &c. which if we separate from it , we may suppose it at first divinely spoken and delivered , That the Gods were the First Beings . (h) Many more Testimonies might be produced to prove this Point , that it was the concurrent Opinion , of all the Ancient Heathen Writers , that there was a common Notion or Belief of a Deity in the Minds of Men ; But these , I think , are sufficient . And now what can the Atheist say to such a Proof as this ? What greater Evidence can be desired of the Truth of any thing , than that it hath been believed by all Men in all Ages and Places of the World ? 'T is a very good way of Arguing from Authority , that Aristotle uses in his Topicks . That , saith he , which seems true to some Wise Men , ought to appear a little probable ; what most Wise Men believe , is yet further probable ; and what most Men , both Wise and Unwise do agree in , is much more probable yet ; But what is received as Truth by the general consent of all Mankind in all Ages of the World , hath certainly the highest degree of Evidence , of this Kind , that is possible . And what hath such a Testimony , 't is intolerable Arrogance and Folly for any Men to deny ; and to set up their single Judgments and Opinion contrary to the common Suffrage of all Mankind . But they are so puff't up with Pride and Vanity , that they do not see the Weakness and Precariousness of what they advance , nor how inconsistent it is with their other Tenets . If it have but the appearance of contradicting the received Notion that we have of a God , and if it do but seem never so little to Undermine Religion , they will set it up at a venture as a Demonstration , and stick to it , let it be never so inconsistent with what at other times they deliver . Thus sometimes they will assert , that there is no Universal Idea or Notion of a God. At other times they will grant there is such an One , but that it was Coined and Invented by some Cunning Politician a long while ago , before any Books or Histories were written , and by him communicated by Tradition to Posterity . But here they do not consider that this will necessarily derive all Mankind from one common Parent : which is a thing they will , at another time , by no means admit of , lest it should seem to countenance the Story of Adam or Noah : which is said to be nothing but an old Jewish Tradition . And that 't is impossible to account for the Peopling of America and All Islands remote from the Continent , without supposing their Inhabitants to be Aborigines , and to spring out of the Earth like Mushrooms . And then , to account for the General Notion , that they cannot deny , these Aborigines have of a God ; as before they made One Wise Man Invent it , now they will suppose it to be done by a Hundred such Cunning Politicians : who , though in different Places and Ages of the World , yet did all light by chance on the very same Notion of a God , and Abuse and Cheat Mankind just after the same manner ; and though this be the most extravagant and ridiculous Assertion that ever can possibly come into the Mind of Man , as well as contradictory to the former , yet 't is all one for that ; this , or any thing else , shall be supposed rather than they will yield to the Conviction of Truth , and allow the Notion of a Deity to have a real Foundation . But 't is no wonder to find Men that wilfully shut their Eyes against the clearest Light , to go forward and backward , and often times run against each other in the dark Mazes of Error : those must needs be at a Loss who neglect His Guidance , who is the Way , the Truth and the Light , and that Spirit which would lead them into all Truth ; and those , no doubt , may easily miss of the true Knowledge of God , who are resolved they will not seek after Him , and all whose Thoughts are , that there is no God. FINIS . Books printed for Rich. Wilkin at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-yard . IMmorality and Pride the Great Causes of Atheism . A Sermon Preach'd at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul , January the 3 d. 1697 / 8. Being the First of the Lecture for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq In Quarto . The Atheist's Objection , That we can have no Idea of God Refuted . A Sermon Preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul , February the 7 th . 1697 / 8. Being the Second of the Lecture for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq In Quarto . Remarks on some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge , and to the Natural History of the Earth . In Octavo . All three by J. Harris , M. A. and Fellow of the Royal-Society . Dr. Woodward's Natural History of the Earth , in Octavo . Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Truth of the Christian Religion , against the Objections of all Modern Opposers ; in Two Volumes . In Octavo . The Atheist's Objections , Against the IMMATERIAL NATURE of GOD , AND INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES , Refuted . In Two SERMONS Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , April 4 th . and May 2 d. 1698. BEING THE Fourth and Fifth of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. JOHN iv . 24 . God is a Spirit — THE Occasion of these words was this : Our Blessed Lord , in his way into Galilee , passed through Sychar , a City of Samaria , near to which was the famous Well of the Patriarch Jacob. To this Well our Saviour went to refresh himself on his Journey ; and as he always made it his business to be doing Good , took occasion from a Woman's coming to draw Water , to discourse with her about the Business of his Mission . By way of Introduction to which , He first gives her some Proofs of his being endowed with a Super-natural Knowledge . From whence she justly concluding Him to be a Prophet , or a Person enrich'd with Divine and Extraordinary Gifts and Qualifications ; she ask'd Him concerning one great Point that had been long in dispute between the Samaritans and the Jews , ( i. e. ) about the true Place for Religious Worship . The Jews rightly asserted Jerusalem to be the Place where Men ought to Worship . The Samaritans contended , that it ought to be with them , at Shiloh , in Mount Ephraim , where the Ark and Tabernacle were placed long before the building of the Temple at Jerusalem , and where also the Patriarchs , before the Law , did use to sacrifice to , and worship God. They pretended also to be the true Successors of Jacob , and of the Ancient Patriarchs , and consequently , that their Place of Worship had the greatest Support from Antiquity . This Pretence was an Umbrage to that Temple that they set up in Mount Gerizim ( in the time of Darius ) in opposition to that at Jerusalem , (a) and which they supposed to give an Holiness to that Mountain , even after the Temple was destroyed . And the Samaritan Version of the Pentateuch hath plainly falsified the Text of Moses , in Deut. xxvii . 4 . by substituting Mount Gerizim instead of Mount Ebal , in order to gain some Honour to this Celebrated Place . But notwithstanding all these mighty Pretensions , the Samaritans were perfectly in the wrong . The Ancient Pedigree that they boasted so much of , was wholly false and precarious . For they were , in reality , only the Successors of some Assyrians , who were planted in the Cities of Samaria by Salmaneser , when he carry'd the Tribe of Ephraim Captive into Assyria ; as you may read at large , 2 King. xxvi . 24 . This therefore being the true State of the Case between the Jews and the Samaritans ; our Saviour's Answer to the Woman was , That the Jews were in the right , because they worshipped the True God , and that too in such a manner as was agreeable to that Revelation God had given them of his Will : We know what we worship — But the Samaritans were doubly mistaken , both as to the Object , and as to the Place of their Worship . They , He tells her , worshipped they knew not what . In which , it seems probable , that he may allude to what is said of their Ancestors the Assyrians in the Place before mentioned , 2 King. xvii . 26 . ( viz. ) . That they worshipped the God of the Land. That is , They blindly paid their Devotion to the God of their New Country , without having any true and real Knowledge of him : But along with him , they worshipped their own Assyrian Deities too ; such as Succoth-Benoth , Ashima-Nergal , and the like . Our Saviour tells this Woman also , That a Time of Reformation was now at hand , when the Worship of God should not be confined either to Jerusalem , or Mount Gerizim ; and that a more pure and Spiritual manner of Worship should be established ; one that was not embarrass'd with so vast a number of External Rites and Ceremonies , but one more suitable to the Nature of God , and to the Improved Sentiments of Mankind : for God , saith he , is a Spirit ; and they that worship him , must worship him in Spirit and in Truth . This seems to be the Occasion and Connexion of these words : which having briefly shewed you , I proceed now to speak to the words themselves , God is a Spirit . By which Terms , God and Spirit , thus connected together , we understand an Infinite Being , most Wise and Powerful , containing in Himself all possible Perfection , without being subject to any of those Defects and Limitations which we plainly discover in Material Beings . And after this manner the Holy Scriptures do describe God Almighty to us ; they attribute such Perfections and Qualifications to Him , as we can have no possible Idea of , as belonging to Matter . Body or Matter is a Sluggish , Insensible , Passive and Unintelligent Thing , not possibly able to move of it self , or to act or perform any thing by its own Power ; but all the Motion and Activity that it hath , comes to it by Communication from something that is without it , or distinct from it . But all Power , both in Heaven and Earth , is the Lords : In his Hands are Power and Might : with Him is Wisdom and Strength , he hath Counsel and Understanding . He made all Things ; He stretcheth forth the Heavens alone , and spreadeth abroad the Earth by himself . There is none like to Him , who created and maintaineth all things , and in whom all Things Live , and Move , and have their Being (a) . The Form and Fashion of all Material Things , we see , is continually flitting and changing , and there is nothing among them of any constant and lasting duration . But God is Immutable and Eternal , the same Yesterday , to Day , and for ever ; He was , and is , and is to come , and with him is no variableness , neither shadow of Turning (b) . Material Beings are all limited and imperfect as to their Extent . The Place they are in confines and circumscribes them ; Nothing else can be there with them , nor they themselves any where else . But the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain God , which yet he more than fills with his Presence : which Presence no one can flee or hide himself from : He is the searcher even of our hearts , and knoweth the most secret thoughts of Men. There is no Creature that is not manifest in his sight , but all things are Naked and open before him (c) . This and such like is the Account that the Sacred Scripture gives of God , which is plainly Inconsistent with his being Material or Corporeal : and therefore it calls him in the words of my Text a Spirit , a Divine , most Excellent and Perfect Being , that discovers himself to our Reason and Understanding , but cannot possibly do so to our Senses ; for him no Eye hath seen nor can see ; he is Invisible , he is a Spirit . But here the Atheist thinks he hath a sufficient Ground for insuperable Objections ; Here his Philosophy is called in to his Assistance ; and by the Strength of that , he will undertake to maintain , that there is not , nor cannot be any such thing as a Spirit , ( i. e. ) Any Incorporeal or Immaterial Being or Substance . And therefore since the Sacred Scripture and Divines do describe the Deity after this absurd and impossible manner , 't is a good Argument ( say they ) that there is no such Being at all : For when Men pretend to Describe God after such a manner as is Nonsensical , Unintelligible and Impossible , ( and yet say , that theirs is the only right way of Speaking of him ) : When Men attribute such a manner of Existence to him , as we know is contradictory to the Nature of Things ; we have then just Ground to disbelieve all that they advance , in defence of so ridiculous and absurd a Notion , and consequently to conclude that there is no God at all . And hence we see these Men raise another Great Objection against the Being of a God , viz. That his Nature is so Described as to be Unintelligible and Nonsense , Which I shall now therefore endeavour to Refute . And in Order to shew the Groundlesness and Invalidity of this Objection , I shall in pursuance of my former Method : I. Give you the sense of the Modern and Ancient Atheists on this Point . And then , II. Endeavour to Refute what they Advance , and shew how Unreasonable it is to build Atheism and Infidelity on so weak and invalid a Foundation . And , 1. I shall give you the Modern and Ancient Atheists Sense on this Point . Mr. Hobbs , that lofty Pretender to Philosophy , declares that to say there is any Immaterial Substance , is not so much an Error , as it is Nonsense ; 't is using an Insignificant word , whereby we conceive nothing but the Sound (a) . And in his Kingdom of Darkness , where he undertakes to correct the University Learning , he is very Angry with Aristotle's Metaphysicks , because it brought in , as he saith ( tho' falsly , as I shall prove hereafter ) the Doctrine or Notion of Separated Essences , and also of Immateriality and Incorporeity ; for what is not Corporeal , he saith , is Nothing , and consequently no where . And this he undertakes to prove from a Passage which he seems to have borrowed from Ocellus Lucanus , tho' without naming him ; and which , tho' it be a poor Sophism , and much worse than those he is condemning ; yet he boldly lays it down as a Demonstration . The Universe , saith he , is Corporeal , that is to say Body , and hath the Dimensions of Magnitude , namely , length , breadth , and depth ; also every Part of Body is Body ; and consequently every Part of the Universe is Body , and that which is not Body is no Part of the Universe . And because the Universe is all , that which is no Part of the Universe is Nothing , and consequently no where (b) . In another place he saith , That no Man can conceive any thing but he must conceive it in some place , of some Determinate Magnitude , and as that which may be divided into Parts (c) . And again , p. 17. and 207. he tells us , That an Incorporeal Substance is a Contradictory and Inconsistent Name ; 't is all one as if a Man should say , an Incorporeal Body ; which words when they are joined together , do destroy one another ; and therefore Body and Substance are all one (a) . Elsewhere he tells us , That the proper Signification of the word Spirit in common speech , is either a subtile , fluid and invisible Body , or else a Ghost or other Idle Phantasm of our Imagination (b) , and a little after he asserts , that to Men that understand the meaning of the words Substance and Incorporeal , they imply a Contradiction ; and that to say an Angel or Spirit is an Incorporeal Substance , is to say in effect there is no Angel nor Spirit (c) . And this Notion he defends in his Answer to Bishop Bramhall's Book written against his Leviathan ; and perseveres in asserting that God himself is a Most Pure simple and corporeal Spirit ; and he defines a Spirit in General to be a thin , fluid , transparent and invisible Body (d) . Thus also Spinoza , in his Opera Posthuma , p. 13. determines Extended Substance ( that is Body ) to be one of the Infinite Attributes of the Deity , and this he undertakes to demonstrate from hence ; that there is not ( as he saith ) any Other Substance but God ; and who consequently is a Corporeal , as well as a Cogitative Being . Deus est res extensa (e) . This , you perceive , is the plain sense of these Writers , That there is no other Substance but Body ; and consequently to talk of a Spirit or an Incorporeal Substance , is to them perfect Nonsense and Contradiction . But tho' this be their Opinion and Assertion , yet they did not Invent it , nor first find it out : they are as far from being Originals in this , as in other things ; for herein they do but Copy the Sentiments of the Ancient Atheists , and tread exactly in their Steps . That there was nothing but Body in the World , was long ago the Assertion of such unthinking Men as our Modern Atheists are . Plato tells us , That there were some in his Time , who asserted nothing to be Substance but what they could feel , and which would resist their Touch : and these Men affirmed Body and Substance to be the same thing ; and what they were not able to lay hold of , and to grasp with their Hands , they said was really nothing at all . And if any one happened to talk with them about any thing that was not Body , they would ridicule and despise him , and not hear a word more that he should say (a) . Aristotle acquaints us , That just such were the Atheistical Principles of his Contemporaries . They affirm ( saith he ) Matter or Body to be the only Substance ; and that all other things are only Passions and Affections of it . And in another place , he saith , that these Men asserted all things to be one ; That there is but one Nature only , which is the Matter of all Things , and this is Corporeal , and hath magnitude (b) . And this was long before the Opinion also of Leucippus , and Democritus . Epicurus argues against Plato , that there can be no Incorporeal Deity ; not only because no Man can frame a conception of an Incorporeal Substance , but also because whatever is Incorporeal , must needs want Sense , and Prudence and Pleasure ; all which things are included in the Notion of God : And therefore an Incorporeal Deity , saith he , is a Contradiction (c) . And his Followers , as appears by Lucretius , continued in the same Opinion , that there is no other Substance in Nature but Body (a) ; and they had no Notion of any Incorporeal thing , but their Vacuum or Empty space , which was really nothing at all . Sextus Empiricus tells us , that all the Epicureans , and some of the Stoicks , as Basileides in particular , maintained 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that there was nothing Incorporeal or Immaterial (b) . By these Testimonies we see plainly , that the Modern Atheists transcribe the Ancient Opinions exactly , and have been able to add very little to them . And the Notion that Mr. Hobbs seems so fond of , and which he would fain set up as his own Discovery , That a Spirit is nothing but a Thin fluid and transparent Body : seems to me to be plainly taken from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which Aristotle tells us , was the Definition that some then gave of a Spirit , or the Soul of Man. And thus having truly stated the Case , and shewed you what the Sentiments of the Ancient and Modern Atheists were and are , as to the Matter before us . I shall now proceed to Examine by what Reasons and Arguments they endeavour to support their Assertion , That there is no such thing as any Incorporeal Substance , but that whatever really is , is Body . And here I find their main and chief Argument to be This ; that an Immaterial Substance is an Unconceivable Thing : 'T is what no Man can possibly have any notion or conception of ; 't is a perfect contradiction in Terms , and consequently Nonsense and Impossible . This is every where almost the Language of Mr. Hobbs , as I have before observed . He also pretends to discover the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the true Cause of this Fiction about Immaterial Substances . The Notion , he tells us , took its rise from the Abuse of abstracted Words , and such-like Metaphysical and Scholastical Terms , which some have fansied as real Entities separated and distinct from the Subject , or Matter , of which they are Attributes or Qualities only . Thus for Instance , because we can consider Thinking or a Reasoning Power alone by it self , and distinct from Body ; therefore some have been so foolish as to conclude that it is not the Action or Accident of that Body in which it is , but a real Substance by it self . And 't is upon this Account , that (a) when a Man is dead and buried , they will say , his Soul ( that is , his Life ) can walk separated from the Body , and is seen by Night among the Graves , whereas Life is only a Name of Nothing , (b) and the Soul or Mind of Man is in reality Nothing else but the result of Motion in the Organical Parts of his Body (c) . 'T is like the forms and qualities of Other things , depending purely on the Mechanism , Modification , and Motion of the Parts of Matter , according as it happens to be variously disposed , figured and agitated ; and consequently it can be nothing at all distinct from that Body whose Form or Quality it is . And this Soul or Mind , or any other Faculty or Quality in Man , coming once to be conceived as a thing distinct from the Body , and being Invisible and Insensible , hath been called by such Names as we use to give to fine Subtile and aereal Bodies . Such as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Spiritus , and the like : which do properly signifie the Wind , or , which is near akin to it , the Breath of Man (d) . And so Mr. Hobbs tells us , that in order to express our greater honour of God , the name of Spirit hath been given to him likewise , as better expressing to vulgar Apprehensions his fine aereal and Subtile Nature , than the grosser word of Body . But however , Philosophers and Men of sense must take care , and not be imposed upon by insignificant words , so far as to imagine there can in reality be any such thing as an Incorporeal Substance : for that is , when throughly considered , an absolute Contradiction and Nonsense . 'T is nothing but an empty Name , with which some poor Wretches are frighted , as the Birds are from the Corn by an empty Doublet , a Hat and a Crooked Stick (e) ; as he is pleased to express himself . And this is the summ of what this mighty Philosopher advances against Immaterial Substances . Spinoza is the only Man besides , which I have met with , that aims at disproving the Existence of Incorporeal Beings : Which in his Opera posthuma he pretends demonstratively to do . But his chief and indeed only Argument is this ( as I hinted before ) that there is but one only Substance in the World , and That is God. Matter or Body he asserts to be one of the Attributes of this Substance , or the Mode by which God is considered as Res extensa ; from whence he concludes , that there can be no Substance but what is corporeal , because Body is an Essential Property of his one only Substance , the Divine Nature . The Precariousness of which Obscure and Metaphysical way of Arguing , I shall plainly shew below . And , Thus having given you the sum , of what these Writers advance against the Doctrine of Incorporeal Substances , I shall next proceed to Refute it , and to shew you how weak and inconclusive their Arguments and Objections are . In order to which , I say , In the First place , 1. That 't is a very precarious and groundless way of arguing , to deny the Existence of any thing only from our particular Apprehensions and Conceptions not being able to master it . For it will not in the least follow , that there can be no such thing as an Incorporeal Substance or a Spirit , because some few Men pretend that they cannot conceive how any such thing can possibly be . And I have already shewed , (a) that we have very just reason to allow the truth of , and to be satisfied of the Existence of many things , whose Nature neither we , nor perhaps any one else , can fully Understand and Comprehend . These Gentlemen pretend that they cannot conceive or have any Idea of an Incorporeal Substance . But yet they think , I suppose , that they have a clear Idaea and Conception of Body . Tho' should you put them to describe it , they would be very much at a loss . For as one hath well observed , ( Mr. Lock in his Essay of Humane Understanding , Book 2. c. 23. ) if we carefully examine our Idea of Substance , we shall find that it is a kind of complex one , consisting as it were of several Idea's coexisting together : which because we are apt to conceive as one thing , we give it the General Name of Substance : as imagining that word to express something , tho' in reality we know not what , which is the support of these Accidents or Qualities which occasion the Idea's we have in our Minds of it . Let us therefore take any corporeal Substance , as suppose Gold ; and inquire in our Mind what is that Support , Substratum or Substance , in which the Accidents of Yellowness , great Specifick Weight , and strange Ductility under the Hammer do inhere ; all which concurr to give us that complex Idea which we have of Gold ; Shall we not find our selves put to it how to conceive , or to have a clear Idea of this ? If we should say that the subject of these Properties are the solid extended Parts ; we shall not be much the nearer Satisfaction : for our Mind will be inquisitive agen what is the Support or Subject of that Extension and Impenetrability . We may say , indeed , that 't is the Substance it self : which is a word that we use , and implies something or other that is the Support of these Properties , but what that is , we have , I think , no clear and certain Idea . When yet we have clear and distinct Conceptions enough of these Properties which we find in this Body , and from whence we pronounce it to be Gold. So if on the other hand we take any Incorporeal Substance , as suppose the Mind or Soul of Man ; and enquire what is the true Support of that Self-moving Power , that Reasoning and Cogitative Faculty , and that Liberty or Freedom of Action which we plainly perceive to be inherent in it : we shall indeed be at a loss , but yet no more than we were before in reference to Gold. For as from considering the Properties peculiar to that Body , we were satisfied that they must be inherent in something , tho' how or in what , we have no clear Idea ; so when we consider Life , Cogitation and Spontaneous Motion in our Soul , we know very well that those more real Properties must have something also for their Support , or some Substance to inhere in : tho' what that is , and the peculiar manner of this we are wholly ignorant of . But then we have as just reason to believe that this Substance is real , as that the Substance of Gold is so . For Cogitation , Life , and Spontaneous Action , are Properties undoubtedly of as real a Nature as great Intensive Weight , Yellowness and Ductility can possibly be . And as we cannot but conclude both these to be real Substances , so we cannot also but conceive them as Natures absolutely distinct and different from each other , and which can have no necessary dependance upon and relation to each other : for we can never imagine that Gold can be ever brought to think , reason or move it self spontaneously , any more than we can conceive a Soul or Mind to be yellow , heavy or ductile . That is , we have quite different Idea's of each of them , and which nothing but wilful or long habituated Ignorance can ever make us confound together . And thus it appears to me that we may have as clear an Idea of Incorporeal Substance , as we have of Body ; and that the former is no more unconceivable than the latter . And therefore 't is as absurd to argue against the Existence of a Spirit , only from our not having any clear Idea of the Substance of a Spirit ; as it would be to say there is no such thing as Body , because we don't know exactly what the Substance of Body is : which I dare say no Man can affirm that he doth . 'T is very possible that Men may be so blinded and prejudiced by false Principles , so stupified by Ignorance , Idleness or Vice , and so engaged and enslaved to a peculiar sett of Notions , which advance and support that way of acting and proceeding which they take delight in , that a great many things may appear Unconceivable and Impossible to them , which shall be far from being so to others , whose Minds are free , and more enured to thinking . Should you tell a Man , who is a Stranger to Geometry and Astronomy , of the many admirable and surprizing Truths that can certainly be demonstrated from the Principles of those Noble Sciences , he would boldly pronounce them Impossible ; and all your Discourse and Proof ( should you attempt any such thing ) would to such a Person be Nonsense , and your words meer empty and insignificant Sounds . And there are many Persons in the World , on whom the clearest and strongest Method of Reasoning that ever was , will make no manner of impression at all , because their Minds are not at all enured to a close way of Arguing and Thinking . And truly the Atheistical Writers do discover so poor a Knowledge in Philosophy , and so very little acquaintance with true Reasoning and Science ; that 't is no wonder at all that they should not be able to conceive and comprehend a great many things which others are very well satisfied with . I know very well , saith the Ingenious Person before cited , that People whose Thoughts are immersed in Matter , and who have so subjected their Minds to their Senses , that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them , are apt to say they cannot comprehend a thinking thing ; which perhaps is true , &c. And therefore such a Philosopher as Mr. Hobbs , that defines Knowledge to be Sense ; and saith , that the Mind of Man is nothing but Motion in the Organical Parts of his Body , may easily be infatuated so far as to assert that there is no other Substance but Body , and that a Spirit or Incorporeal Being , is a Nonsensical , Contradictory and Impossible Notion . While Others , who can raise their Minds a little higher , and who can penetrate farther into things , will be fully satisfied that such Philosophy is Nonsense and Impossibility . As indeed some Persons , in all Ages of the World , of which we have any Account , have ever been . For , 2. Which is another very good Ground , from whence to refute this absurd Opinion that there is no such thing as an Incorporeal Being : I say , there have been always many Persons in the World , that have firmly believed and embraced the Doctrine of Immaterial Substances , and who have also asserted the Deity to be of that Nature . And this will Undeniably refute the two great Points of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion . For , if it be proved plainly that there hath been all along a received Belief and Opinion that there are Immaterial Substances , and that God himself is such an One : it is then most clear and certain , that the Notion is neither inconceivable , contradictory , nor nonsense : and also that it did not take its Rise and Original only from the Abuse of the Philosophy of Aristotle . Not the former ; for what is in its own Nature unconceivable , nonsensical and absurd , could never sure gain an Admittance into the Belief of so many great Men , as we shall see presently this Opinion did . Not the latter ; for what was commonly received in the World before the time of Aristotle , could never be derived only from his and the Schoolmen's Philosophy , as Mr. Hobbs is pleased to say this Belief of Immaterial Substances was . And that there was always in the World , a Notion and Belief of another more noble Substance than Body , and that the Deity was of an Incorporeal or Spiritual Nature , we have the united Suffrages of all the Ancient Writers that are preserved down to our time . Cicero tells us , That the Heathen Philosophers generally defined God to be Mens pura & sincera , soluta & libera ab omni concretione mortali (a) ; and speaking of Thales Milesius in particular , he saith of him , Aquam dixit esse Initium Rerum , Deum autem cum Mentem quae ex aquâ cuncta fingeret . Now this Mind they all distinguished plainly from Matter , and looked upon it as a much more Noble Principle than 't was possible to conceive Matter to be . Lactantius acquaints of Pythagoras (a) . Quòd unum deum confitetur , dicens Incorporalem esse mentem , quae per omnem Naturam diffusa & intenta , vitalem sensum cunctis Animalibus tribuat . And Plutarch gives us much the same Account of him in his Books , De Placitis Philosophorum , viz. That he made two Principles ; one Active , which was Mind or God : The other Passive , or the Matter of the World. And those Verses of Empedocles , are very remarkable ; wherein speaking of the Deity , he asserts Him not to be of Humane shape : And also that , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — ( i. e. ) That he is no way perceivable by any of our Senses ; which is as much as to say , he is Incorporeal . And in the next Lines he doth expresly tell us what he is : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . A sacred and ineffable Mind , which by swift Thoughts moves and actuates the whole World. Anaxagoras also asserted , That (b) an ordering and regulating Mind was the first Principle of all things ; and this Mind he made , as Aristotle saith of him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . The only , pure , simple , and unmixt thing in the World : thereby plainly distinguishing it from Matter , the Parts of which , he , who was as Sextus Empericus calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 knew very well to be promiscuously blended and mixed togethere very where . Sextus also tells us , That That Mind which Anaxagoras asserted to be God ; was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an Active Principle ; in opposition to Matter , which is a Passive one , * and this is agreeable to what the Poets say of Spiritus intus alit ; mens agitat molem , &c. We are told likewise by Sextus , That Xenophanes held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , That there is but One God , and he Incorporeal . And Plutarch describing the Deity , hath these remarkable words , God is Mind , a separated Form perfectly unmixed with Matter , and without any thing that is passible , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And in another place he asserts , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . That 't is impossible Matter alone can be the sole Principle of all things (a) . Plato every where distinguisheth between corporeal , and incorporeal Substances , calling the former by the Names of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sensible , and the latter always either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , immaterial or intelligible ; and he saith , That certain intelligible and incorporeal Forms , are the true and first Substance ; and that incorporeal Things which are the greatest and most excellent of all others , are discoverable by reason only , and nothing else (b) . And in another place , he saith , That they were instructed by their forefathers , that Mind and a certain wonderful Wisdom , did at first frame , and doth now govern all things , His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . In Phileb . p. 28. Which sufficiently shews the Antiquity of the Notion of an Incorporeal Deity , and the way also how they came by it . Of the same Opinion also was Socrates , as we are told by Plutarch , and others . Lib. de Placit . Philos. 1. c. 3. Zeno and the Stoicks defined the Deity to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an Intellectual and Rational Nature ; or as Plutarch recites their Opinion , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; an Intelligent Spirit devoid of all Bodily shape . Ibid. And Sextus Empericus tells us of Aristotle , that he constantly asserted God to be Incorporeal , and the Utmost Bounds of the Universe (a) . And Aristotle concludes his Book of Physicks with affirming (b) that 't is impossible the first Mover ( or God ) can have any Magnitude ; but he must needs be devoid of Parts , and Indivisible . And Plutarch gives us this as the received and common Opinion of the Stoicks , that God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a Spirit that was extended , or did penetrate throughout the whole World. De Placitis Philosoph . lib. 1. c. 3. p. 882. Now by these Passages , and many others that might easily be produced , it appears very plain that the most Ancient Writers had a good clear Notion of God , and that they speak of him as of a Mind perfectly distinct from Matter , or as an immaterial or incorporeal Being . Many of them also deliver themselves very expresly as to the Soul of Man ; which , as Plutarch tells us (c) , they generally asserted to be Incorporeal ; and that it was naturally a Self-moving and Intelligible Substance . But of this , more in another place . And that the Ancients did believe God to be a Spirit , or a most Powerful , Intelligent , and Perfect Immaterial Substance will yet farther appear , if we consider what Notion they had of , and how they defined Matter or Body . Plato describes it by the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that which thrusts against other Bodies , and resists their Touch or Impulse . Others call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that which so fills up a place , as , at that time , to exclude from it any other Body . Sometimes they called it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in contradistinction to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . That is , they distinguished it to be of a pure passive Nature , and which was acted and determined only by Impulse from without it , or distinct from it ; they knew very well that there was also besides it , some Active Thing , something that was the Cause of Motion and Action in the Universe . For , as Plutarch well observes , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) 'T is impossible Matter alone can produce any thing , unless there be besides it some Active Cause . Sextus Empiricus also gives this Definition of Matter or Body (b) That it is that which resists other things which are brought against it ; for Resistance , saith he , or Impenetrability , is the true Property of Body . By these Accounts that they have given us of Matter or Body , 't is very easie to understand their Notion or Idea of it ; which , indeed , was the Just and True one . They thought Matter or Body to be a purely Passive Thing , incapable of moving or acting by it self ; but wholly determined either by some Internal and Self-moving Mind , or by the Motions and Impulses of other Bodies without it : That it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , as we now adays speak , Impenetrably extended , and did so fill up space or place , as to exclude any other Body from being in the same Place with it at the same Time : If to this you add what Aristotle , and some others , said of it , that it was also capable of all Forms , Figures and Modifications , you have then the whole that ever they thought Matter could do or be . Now from hence 't is exceeding clear that they could not , as indeed we find actually they did not , think Matter or Body the only Substance in the World ; and that the Deity was Material or Corporeal . For they always described the Divine Nature by Attributes and Properties that were the very Reverses of what they appropriated to Matter or Body . God , they have told us , is an Intelligent Mind , pervading and encompassing all things ; an Active Energetical Principle ; the Cause of all Motion and Operation whatever ; Intangible , indivisible , invisible , and no ways the Object of our Bodily Senses ; But yet whose Essence is plainly discoverable by our reasoning and Understanding Faculty . This was , as we have seen , the Notion or Idea that many of the Ancient Philosophers had of the Deity ; and this plainly shews us , that they look'd upon him to be what St. John here defines him , an Incorporeal Being , or a Spirit . There were indeed some even then , as I have before shewed , who being wholly immersed in Matter themselves , did assert that there was nothing else but Body in the World. Such were Leucippus and Democritus ; and afterwards Epicurus and his Sect , who perverted the Ancient Atomical and true Philosophy to an Atheistical Sense , and made use of it for the banishing the Notion and Belief of a God out of their own and others Minds : as , indeed , some others long before them had attempted to do (a) . But in this , 't is very plain ( as (b) an Excellent Person of our Nation hath observed ) that these Men did not understand the Philosophy they pretended to : For it doth most clearly follow from the Principles of the True Atomical or Corpuscular Philosophy , that there must be some other Substance , distinct from , and more Noble than Matter ; and which is of an Immaterial , Incorporeal or Spiritual Nature . And this , I hope , it will not be judged impertinent briefly to prove at this Time ; because some , who seem not so throughly to understand it , have of late reckoned the Mechanical Philosophy among the Causes of the growth of Atheism and Infidelity . It is very much to the Purpose , that the Ancient Atomists before Democritus and Leucippus , did plainly assert and maintain the Doctrine of Incorporeal Substances , and that the Deity was also of that Nature himself , as I think I have sufficiently proved in this Discourse ; and therefore those confident Modern Writers , who say that the Ancients never had any Notion of an Immaterial Being , betray equally their Ignorance with their Assurance : for the Doctrine of Immaterial Substances was as well the Concomitant , as indeed it is the Necessary result of this kind of Philosophy . The Embracers of it , found plainly that they had a clear and distinct Idea of two Things , viz. Passive Matter , and Active Power ; and these they found were perfectly distinct from each other , and no way dependent at all upon each other . To the former of these , they only attributed extension and impenetrability , and a Power of being variously figured , modified , disposed and moved . To the latter , they ascribed Cogitation , Life , Sensation , and the Power of Motion , which they plainly saw did belong to this , and could not do so to the other . And these Two , they made the Two Great Principles or General Heads of Being in the Universe , and called them by two vastly different Names , as I have before shewed , viz. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . The one Passive Matter or Bulk , and the other Self-Activity , or Life . In the former of these , viz. Passive Matter ; they found that there was nothing Real , besides its Bulk , or impenetrably extended Parts : and that consequently all Forms and Qualities in Bodies were no real Entities distinct from the Body in which they inhered , but only the Parts of the Body differently modified , disposed and agitated , and therefore they held , that when any Body received a new Form or Quality differing from what it had before , there was no new Entity produced , any more than an old one destroyed ; for that they look't upon to be perfectly Impossible : And this was the true Ground of that Fundamental Axiom of theirs , That Nothing could be made or produced out of Nothing ; which they did not ( as the Modern Atheists do ) advance at all in Opposition to a Creative and Almighty Power 's producing all things at first from Nothing ; but purely against the producibleness of real Entities out of Nothing , in an Usual and Natural way : which those that assert Forms and Qualities to be Substantial and Real Beings , must needs grant to be daily done . But it was this , and this only , that that Axiom was levelled against . And hence it was that they asserted the Deity and the Souls of Men to be real Entities distinct from Matter , and not to be producible out of the Power of Matter ; as all Qualities which are nothing but Modes of it , they maintained , were : and this made them perhaps have recourse to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the Prae-existence and Transmigration of Souls ; for they could never believe their Souls were , as one expresses it , younger than their Bodies , and that they perished , when the Bodies died . And therefore nothing can be plainer , than that the very Principles of this Philosophy did lead Men to the Acknowledgment of Incorporeal Substances , and forced them to believe Life , Motion , and Cogitation to be things that could not be Modifications of Matter , nor perishable and producible , as the common Qualities and Forms of Body or extended Bulk are . And thus when it is rightly considered and throughly understood , the Atomical or Mechanical Philosophy is so far from being any way instrumental to the leading Men into Atheism , that there is none other that doth so truly distinguish between Matter and Incorporeal Beings ; none that renders the Operations and Qualities of Bodies so Intelligible , and none that prepares so clear , natural , and easie a way for the Demonstration of Immaterial Substances , as this kind of Philosophy doth . Indeed , as almost all things are , so This is capable of , and hath been made use of to ill Purposes by its Atheistical Votaries ; who did anciently , as they do now , assert that Cogitation , Life , Sensation , and Active Power , were all producible out of bare Matter without a Deity . But as this was what the True Atomists never could think possible ; so it is really involved with the most monstrous Absurdities that ever any Opinion was : and which therefore ought not to be charged on the Philosophy it self , but only on that Dark , Unintelligible and Inconsistent System of it , which the Ignorant Atheists have Compiled ; and that only to render it subservient to their wicked Designs of excluding the Idea's of God and of Incorporeal Substances out of the World. Tho' ( God be thanked ) they do in this Point so far fail of Success , that nothing can be clearer than that 't is utterly impossible to account for any first Cause of things , for Cogitation , Life , Sensation , or Motion , according to their Principle , that there is no other Substance but Body : And this necessarily leads me to another very good Argument , for the Necessity of allowing Incorporeal Substances , and to prove that God himself is of that Nature , or a Spirit , viz. The strange Absurdities of the contrary Opinion . But these being very many , and it being of great moment truly to clear up this Point , in an Age wherein Men are so fond of Corporealism . I shall deferr this till my next Discourse : wherein I shall finish this and my remaining Arguments to Prove God to be a Spirit , and that there are Beings of an Immaterial and Incorporeal Nature . The End of the Fourth Sermon . THE Fifth Sermon . JOHN iv . 24 . God is a Spirit . — I Have already shewn the Meaning and Import of these Words , and what we understand by God's being a Spirit . I have shewn you also the Atheist's Objections against the Immaterial Nature of God , and the Existence of Incorporeal Substances ; and have endeavoured to Refute them , from Two Arguments . I have proved , 1. That 't is a precarious and unfair way of Arguing against the Existence of any thing , only because our particular Apprehensions and Conceptions cannot master it : And that it will not follow , That there is no such thing as an Incorporeal Substance , on the Account only of some Mens declaring that they cannot conceive how any such thing can be . Where likewise I shewed , That the Notion of a Spirit , or an Immaterial Substance , is as Intelligible as that of Body ; and that we have as much reason to believe the Existence of the former , as of the latter . 2. I have plainly proved , That the Notion of Incorporeal Substances hath all along been believed and received by many Knowing and Judicious Men amongst the most Ancient Writers and Philosophers ; and consequently that it can neither be Nonsence and Impossible , nor of so late an Original as the perverted Philosophy of Aristotle : both which the Atheists are pleased to assert . 3. I proceed now to speak to a Third Argument , To prove the Deity to be of a Spiritual or Immaterial Nature , and that there are Incorporeal Substances : And this I shall draw from the many and strange Absurdities of the contrary Opinion , That there is nothing but Matter in the World. And if these can fully be made to appear , I hope the Doctrine involved with them will also appear false and precarious ; and that the contrary Opinion , of the Real Existence of Incorporeal Beings , will find an easie admittance into our Faith. But here I must premise , as taken for granted , That we are all agreed on the Definition of , or know what we mean by Matter or Body , viz. That it is Substance Impenetrably extended ; whereby we distinguish it from Spirit , which is a Thinking Substance without Corporeal Extension , or without having Partes extra Partes . For if this be not the Notion which our Adversaries have of it , as well as we ; 'T is in vain to dispute about it at all . If therefore they have any other Idea of it that is different from this , let them produce it , and make it as clear and Intelligible as this is ; for without doing so , they do nothing to the purpose . And if they have not a clear and distinct Idea of Matter or Body , how come they so boldly to say that Matter and Substance are all one ? how can they distinguish the Idea's of Body and Spirit so plainly , as to be sure there can be no such thing as an Incorporeal Substance , but that it implies a Contradiction ? Unless they fully know what Matter or Body is , there may be Millions of Varieties and Degrees of Immaterial Substances ; or there may be no such thing as Body at all , for any thing they can prove to the contrary . The Atheist must then do one of these two things ; he must either establish a new Notion of Matter , that shall be so intelligible and plain , that all Mankind shall as readily acquiesce in it , as they do in the old and common one , or else he must resolve to keep to That . The former of these he hath not yet done , nor I believe is very ready to do ; but when he doth it , 't will be time enough to consider it . In the mean while , I will readily join Issue with him , on the common and received Notion of Body : And from thence undertake to maintain , That nothing is more absurd and unaccountable than their Assertion , That there is no other Substance but Matter or Body in the World. For , First , Had there been nothing else but Matter in the World from Eternity ( and if there be nothing else now , there never was any thing else ) I cannot possibly see how these Gentlemen can account for Motion , (a) or shew us how Matter came first to be moved . And Matter without Motion sure could never be God , never be the Cause of any thing , nor could it ever produce , act , or do any thing whatever . Before Motion began , Matter could have been nothing but an heavy , lifeless Lump of vast extended Bulk ; which must have lain also for ever in the same dead and unactive Position , if nothing had been superinduced to put it into Motion and Action . And no one sure can be so stupid as to call this a Deity ! This is as Mr. Blount rudely and irreverently expresseth himself , worse than to suppose (a) a Hum-Drum-Deity , chewing of his own Nature ; a Droning God , that sits hoarding up of his Providence from his Creatures . And this even he can't but acknowledge , is an Atheism no less Irrational , than to deny the very Essence of a Divine Being . I hope therefore they will grant , that Matter without Motion cannot be suppos'd to be a Deity . And if so , then the Divine Nature ( whatever it be ) must be something distinct from , and more Noble than Matter , and more akin to Motion , than to Matter or Body in general , or to it quatenus Matter , as the Schools speak . And indeed , Motion taken in this sense , not for a translation of Body from one place to another , but for the Active Cause of Motion , may be very well said to be Incorporeal , or the Deity it self . But how came this Motion into Matter at first ? and which way did Matter attain this Divine Activity , or God-like Energy ? Here they must assert one of these three things , either , 1. That Motion came into Matter from something without it , and distinct from it . Or , 2. That Motion is Essential to Matter , and Co-eternal with it . Or , 3. That it came into it afterwards by Chance , or without any Cause at all . The First of these they will not say , I doubt , because it 's Truth : but however , if they do , our Controversie is at an end ; for we believe that 't was a Divine and powerful Mind , perfectly distinct from , and more Noble than Matter , who first made it , and moved it , and doth still continue to modifie and dispose it according to his Infinite Wisdom and Providence . And one would think no Man can be so senseless as to maintain the last , viz. That Motion came into Matter without any Cause at all , and that it was Chance only that first produced it ; for Chance here signifies nothing in reality : And truly , Men that will be so ridiculously absurd as to assert , that a Body , or Particle of Matter , that is once at rest , may move by Chance only , or may Chance to move of it self , though there be nothing to cause its Motion , deserve no serious Refutation , but ought to be treated only as we do Fools and Madmen , with silent Pity and Compassion . And yet so very fond are some Persons of any thing that opposes Truth , that they will run into the greatest Absurdities to maintain it . For a late Corporealist is pleas'd to say , (a) That Matter can move of it self : and to shew his deep Skill in Philosophy , he tells us , that Wind , Fire , and very fine-sifted small Dust , are Matter , and yet Self movers . And of Wind and Fire , he profoundly asserts , That they cannot lose their Motion , or cease Moving , so long as they continue to be Wind and Fire . That is , As long as Wind and Fire are in Motion , they cannot cease to move . This , indeed , is a very deep and important Discovery ! But yet 't is what hardly any Man would have publish'd in Print , but one that concludes a Body must needs move of it self , only because he can't see with his Eyes the Cause or Origin of its Motion . And yet even this he may often see in the case of Fire , if he will but vouchsafe to observe how 't is usually kindled . A little Consideration would have satisfied him also , that Winds may be produced in the Atmosphere , by the Air 's being moved some way , by Heat , Compression , or some other Accidental Cause , as well as in an Eolipile , or a Pair of Bellows . And as for his fine Dust's rising up in a Cloud of it self ; had he understood that the Agitation of any Fluid will keep the small Particles of any heavier Matter mixed with it from descending to the bottom of it , nay , and raise them up from thence too ; and had he not forgotten that this was the case here , ( the Air being so agitated by the Motion of Sifting ) he would not , sure , have been so silly as to have brought these as Instances of Spontaneous Motion in Matter . But however , he is not the first that hath been guilty of this Absurdity . For Aristotle upbraids some , in his time , (a) with introducing Motion into Matter , without any Cause , or without supposing any Principle whence it should proceed . The Second Point therefore , is , I suppose , that which our Corporealist will adhere to , viz. That Motion is Essential to , and Co-eternal with Matter ; and that either all Matter and Motion taken together , or else some Fine and Subtile Parts of it are the Deity . But this , if it be throughly considered , will appear almost as absurd and unaccountable as that Matter should be moved without any Cause at all . For , in the first place , 't is plain , That Motion is not Essentially included in the Idea of Matter . I can conceive Matter to the full as well , if not better , when it is at rest , as when it is in Motion . When I look on any Body , or consider any determinate quantity of Matter , I can conceive that 't is a Substance that is impenetrably extended , divisible , and moveable ; that it fills up such a space , and that it excludes any Body from being there with it at the same time , without conceiving it to be in Motion at all ; much less being forced to acknowledge that it must be , and was always in Motion . Whereas certainly , if Motion were as Essential to Matter , as Impenetrability and Extension , 't were as impossible for me to conceive it at rest , as it is to conceive it without those Qualifications or Properties : But no doubt I have as true an Idea of a Stone or a Bullet , or of any other Body or Part of Matter , when it lies still on the Ground , as I have of it when 't is projected from a Sling or a Gun. Now if Motion be not Essentially included in the Idea or Notion that we have of Matter , how can any one suppose it as Essential to , and Co-eternal with it ? This is a Conclusion beyond the power of our Reason to make ; no one can come to it naturally , and in the ordinary way of Apprehending and Reasoning ; and 't is much more Unintelligible and Mysterious than a great many other things which they pretend they cannot believe purely on this account . But supposing that Motion be Essential to Matter ; it must then be so to every Particle of it , and that Uniformly alike , or in the same Proportion . And if so , then every Atom of Matter must always retain its Original Degree of Motion or Velocity , and can never possibly be deprived of it : For no Accidental Cause can any way either encrease or diminish , promote or hinder the Essential Properties of a Being . Thus , for Instance , take a Particle of Matter , or any Body whatever , and move it as fast or as slow as you please , place it where or how you please , separate it from other Particles or Bodies , or combine it with them ; still 't will retain its Essential Properties of Extension and Impenetrability , and they will receive no Intension and Remission all this while . But now 't is quite otherwise in the case of Motion ; we find the same Body may be brought to move sometimes faster , sometimes slower , and sometimes ( to all appearance ) be reduced to absolute rest ; which could never be , if Motion were Essential to each Particle of Matter , in such a Determinate Degree of Velocity , and there were ( as is now supposed ) Nothing else without or distinct from Matter to put it into Motion . For then nothing could ever accelerate or retard its Motion : no one Body could ever move faster or slower than another . But a Snail or the Pigritia would keep pace with the seemingly Instantaneous irradiations of Light. And thus we may see plainly , that without supposing some Principle of Motion distinct from Matter , Motion could never have come into it , nor have been co-eternal with it . But allowing them that Motion should get into Matter neither they nor we know how , or that it is Eternal and Essential to it : If there be nothing else but Matter and Motion in the Universe , which way will they account for the Deity ? they dare not say Matter alone without Motion can be God ; and I think there can be nothing more clear , than that Bare Motion in Matter can never make a Deity . For if Motion came into Matter any time after its Existence , the Deity must then be produced , and consequently receive a Beginning ; and so the First Cause of all things must be caused himself after all things , which is contradictory to the Notion of a Deity . If they say that Motion is Co-eternal with , and Essential to Matter , and the Deity be Matter thus Eternally moved ; then either every Particle of Matter must be essentially God , or else he must be the result of the whole , or of some Parts of Matter combined together . If the former be asserted , there must of necessity be as many Gods as there are Atoms or Physical Monads : for each of them are Individually distinct from each other , and have their separate and peculiar Properties of Impenetrability , Extension and Motion ; which in this fine Hypothesis , are the only Perfections of the Divine Nature . But no doubt they will say , that 't is not any one Particle of Matter that is a God alone , and therefore they cannot be all Deities singly ; But 't is all of them , or at least a good convenient Number of these luckily combined together , out of whom the Deity is composed . Though which of these to stick to , our Corporealists are very much at a loss ; Spinoza asserting the former , and Mr. Hobbs the latter . But I think 't is no great matter which they adhere to ; for both are alike unaccountable and absurd : For if there be not a Divine Nature , and its Perfections , in each single Atom of Matter ; will barely combining some , or all of them , together make a Deity of them ? Can it ever enter into the Heart of Man to conceive that barely collecting together a parcel of roving Particles of Matter , such as agitated Dust , or Motes moving up and down in the Sun , will ever unite them into a God ? give the Combination Almighty Power , Wisdom , and Goodness ? when there was nothing like this before in any of the Atoms themselves ? Certainly , Men that can assert such monstrous Opinions as these , do not think as other People do ; or , indeed , rather do not think at all . These certainly labour under the Disease mentioned by Epictetus , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , (a) a stony Insensibility or Deadness of Understanding , by which they are besotted and stupified in their Intellectuals ; so that they can believe and assert any thing , if it be subservient to their designs , tho' never so contradictory to the clearest light of Reason and Truth . But to go on : Granting to the Corporealists that Matter either hath been always in Motion , or for what time they please ; allowing its Particles to be small or great , to move swiftly or slowly , and to be combined together , or disjoined from each other as they think fit . I enquire what all this will signifie towards producing of Cogitation , Wisdom , and Vnderstanding ? or to the production of Life , Self Activity , or Spontaneous Power ? And yet These are the most Great and Noble Things in the World ; these are the highest Perfections of the Divine Nature , and in these we place the Essence of the Deity . Now here Matter and Motion is more than ever at a loss ; and I think it demonstratively certain that it cannot account for these things . Aristotle did very truly find fault with the Corporealists of his Time , that they did not , as ours cannot now , assign 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , (b) any Cause of well and fit ; any Origin of , or Reason for that Wisdom and Regularity , that harmonious Relation and Aptitude of one part of the Creation to another , which is so very conspicuous in all things ; supposing that there is nothing in Nature but Matter and Motion . And it is most certainly true , that the Idea which we have of Body doth not necessarily include Cogitation in it , nor our Notion of Cogitation include Body : but they are two as distinct Idea's as any we have . So far are they from being the same thing , that we cannot possibly conceive Cogitation with Extension . No Man ever conceived a Thought to be so many Inches or Yards long ; to be deep , thick or broad , to be divisible into two or more Parts , or to have any Kind of Figure or determinate Position or Extension ; whereas if whatsoever be unextended , or not Body , be absolutely Nothing , as these Gentlemen assert : Cogitation , Wisdom , Understanding , and Spontaneous Power must be nothing : or else they must be figurate Bodies ; than which nothing can be more absurd . And if we farther examine our own Mind , and consult our own Reason , we shall find that we cannot possibly conceive how thinking , Wisdom , Consciousness , and Spontaneous Power can possibly be the result of Bare Motion of the Parts of Matter . Was there ever any one that seriously believed a Particle of Matter was any Wiser or had any more Understanding for being moved than it was before when it lay still ? for let it be never so briskly agitated , is it not still Body ? there is no other Idea ariseth from hence , but only that it changeth its place , and is united successively to several parts of space , that it will move such other Particles of Matter as 't is capable of , and be retarded in its Motion by hitting or striking against them ; these , and such like , are all the Ideas that we can have of a Body in Motion ; but what is this to Thought and Consciousness ? Did ever any one but a stupid Corporealist imagine that a Particle of Matter by being moved , was made Intelligent ? and that its travelling from place to place , made it understand all things in its way ? and did any one ever think that the Knowledge of such a rambling Atom encreased in Proportion to the velocity of its Motion ? Yes , doubtless ! and thus a Bullet discharged from the Mouth of a Cannon , ought to be look'd upon as one of the most Ingenious Beings in Nature . And hence it will follow , that the more hast any one makes to tumble over Books , or to ramble over Countries ; and the more precipitantly he makes a judgment of Notions or Opinions , the Better Account he can give of Authors and Places ; and the more solid and substantial will be his Learning . This , indeed , is the best Account that can be given of the fineness and quickness of Thought , that some Men so much pretend to ; for this way they may come by a vast share of Penetration , and be volatilized far above the dull studious and considerate Vulgar : and the Event shews that they frequently make use of the Experiment . But again ; As we cannot possibly conceive that the Motion of one Particle of Matter alone , can give it Knowledge and Understanding ; so neither can we suppose that a Body composed of many of them , can acquire any such thing barely on the Account of the Motion or Agitation of its Parts , for Motion only will do no more to the whole , than it did to each one singly ; and 't is not conceivable that Three , or Three Millions of Bullets will be any wiser for being discharged together , than if they were all shot singly in pursuit of Understanding . Nor can any happy Combination or Constitution of Parts avail any thing in this Case , any more than Motion ; nor can that be effectual to super-induce Wisdom and Understanding into Matter . The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will be no more a God , than Jupiter's Log was among the Frogs , nor than the most dense and gross body in Nature . For after all the various Positions , Configurations , and Combinations of Matter , is it not Matter still ? will rarefying or subtilizing of Matter change its Nature and Essential Properties ? A Rare Body is nothing but a contexture of fine and subtile Particles , which being separated farther asunder than is usual , are also perhaps more briskly agitated and moved . And pray what is here new ? what will this do towards Divinity ? will bare Figure and Position of Parts change the Nature of those Parts , and give them Cogitation and Knowledge when they had no such thing singly and before ? will adding , subtracting , multiplying or dividing of Numbers , make them any thing else more Noble than what they were before ? will not the Summs , Remainders , Products , or Quotients be still Figures and Numbers like the first Digits , out of which these do by Combination or various Positions arise ? and is it not just so with Matter ? will a Particle of it be made any more Wise and Intelligent , for being render'd smaller than it was before ? and hath a little Particle more Sense than a larger ? will Three or Four , or Four Millions of these be more ingenious than a Body or Lump that is as big as them all ? and will moving a few Atoms a good distance from each other , Separate them into Knowledge , and Disjoin them into an Understanding Power which none of them had before ? If Men can swallow such things as these , and think at this Extravagant and Unaccountable Rate ; I fear all good Arguments and sound Reason will be lost upon them , and they ought to be neglected as downright Stupid or Distracted . And yet these , and such like Absurdities , must be the Natural Consequences of supposing Matter and Motion alone capable of thinking , that Matter can be rarified into a Deity , and that Divine and Almighty Wisdom , Knowledge , Goodness and Power , are the result of Body luckily disposed and moved ; which yet was the Opinion of Hobbs , and is still of many of his Admirers and Followers . For notwithstanding those Excellent Demonstrations that many Learned Men (a) amongst us have established , that Matter and Motion cannot possibly produce Cogitation , Consciousness , Understanding and Liberty of Will : There is lately an Ignorant Corporealist who asserts , (b) That the Inflamed and glowing Particles of the Blood , called Spirits , tho' they are not in themselves Sentient and Intelligent , are yet the active Principle of Life and Motion , of Sense and Understanding in Man and Beast ; and do act the Understanding or Brain to apprehend , judge and remember . Now by this 't is plain that he supposes Cogitation , Understanding , Consciousness and Liberty , and all the Faculties of the Soul of Man to be nothing but the result of some peculiar Motions in a Fitly organized Body . The Animal Spirits he thinks are like the Elastick Particles in the Spring of a Watch , tho' they cannot tell what a Clock it is themselves , yet they can by means of the Spring which they actuate , do that and many other things that the Movement shall be fitted for : Or to make use of a Comparison of his own ; The Animal Spirits may do as the Wind doth in the Chest of an Organ , tho' it can make no Musick of it self , yet by being communicated so as to inspire the several Pipes , it may actuate them into a very fine Harmony . It is not my Business nor Design to discourse here of the Soul of Man : but yet I would fain beg these Corporealists clearly to explain , how Self-Consciousness , Reflection , and Liberty of Action can possibly be accounted for by this Hypothesis . For this necessarily makes Men meer Machines at long run . An Engine is never the more free and conscious to its self of its own Operations for being fine and curiously contrived : And the wonderful Clock at Strasburgh knows no more what it doth , nor is it any more the Spontaneous Cause of its so many and curious Motions , than the Ancient Clepsydra , or a modern Hour-glass knoweth what it is about , when it rudely measureth the Duration of any Part of Time. For whatever is performed by meer Matter and Motion must needs be necessary in every step and degree of its course , be the way of acting in the Engine never so curious , and never so remote from the cognisance of our Senses . They know well enough , as I shall shew below , that there is no possible room for freedom of Action , Consciousness of any Operation , nor for a Cogitative and Reasoning Power , according to this way of explicating the Operations of the Humane Soul. For in the Animal Spirits they grant there is no such thing ; they are only a fiery and briskly agitated Fluid , which serves to actuate any Part of the Rational Machine pro re natâ : And these several Parts or Organs of the Machine can no more produce any such thing without the Animal Spirits , than the Hand or Dial-Plate of a Watch can , or any other Part of a curious Instrument . If therefore you enquire of them , wherein they place this Cogitation , Self-Consciousness and Liberty ; they will tell you 't is in the Man , 't is in the whole ; 't is neither his Soul alone , nor his Body alone ; 't is no Spiritual Substance distinct from Matter , but 't is the whole Man that thinks , reasons , and acts freely by the form of the whole : But this is very unaccountable , and is what neither they nor any one else , I believe , can ever apprehend or conceive ; that Liberty should be the result of Necessarily moved Matter ; that Cogitation should arise from Senseless and Unthinking Atoms , and that Knowledge and Consciousness of its own Operations should come into any Engine by its being finely and curiously contrived , and be nothing but the necessary result of bare local Motion , and rightly Organized Matter . These Absurdities some other Corporealists clearly perceiving , and being fully convinced that 't is impossible to account for Cogitation , Consciousness , and the like , from bare Matter and Motion ; and to educe the Perfections of the Deity out of the Power of Matter only . These , I say , had recourse to another way of maintaining their beloved Assertion , that there is no other Substance but Body . They assert , that Cogitation is Essential to Matter : or , as Spinoza words it , All Substance is essentially Cogitative and Extended ; so that as there is no Substance but what is Material , so there is none but what is Cogitative too . Indeed , as I shewed you before , he asserts that there is but One only Substance , which is God , or in other words , Universal Matter ; and Cogitation and Extension ( he saith ) are the two Infinite Attributes , or else the Affections of the Attributes of the Deity (a) . And this , with a great deal of Assurance ( as the way of these Writers is ) he pretends to demonstrate Mathematically , by a Pompous , tho' a very Obscure , Apparatus of Definitions , Axioms , Postulates and Propositions . But it is not calling a thing a Demonstration , that will make it to be so ; nor concluding with Quod erat Demonstrandum , that will make every body acquiesce in a Proposition , when it is either perfectly unintelligible or false . And yet such are those that Spinoza brings to prove and support this strange Opinion . The Monstrous Absurdities of which , I shall now consider . And First , 'T is plain , That if Cogitation be as Essential to Matter as Extension ; Then all and every Particle of it must needs be a Thinking Substance or Body by it self , Distinct from all Other Particles of Matter in the World. There is no one doubts but 't is so , in reference to the proper and allowed Affections of Body , Impenetrability and Extension . Every least Particle or Atom of Matter hath these Properties as compleat within it self , as they are in the whole Bulk of the Universe , or in any larger Body whatsoever : These are also individually distinct in each Particle ; so that its Properties , though of the same kind , are not the very same with those of other Parts of Matter . Now if to each such Particle of Matter Cogitation be also added ; then every Atom in the Universe will be a Thinking , Intelligent and Reasoning Being , distinct from all the rest , and have its own proper and peculiar Faculties and Operations ; 't will be a different Person from all Others ; and every Individual Particle of Matter will be so from it , and from every one else in the World. Every Atom also will be equal to any of the rest , in respect of this Cogitative Power ; will have it in the very same Proportion , and not be wiser or more foolish , duller or more ingenious than its neighbours . And if this be so ( as it must necessarily be , if all Matter be Essentially Cogitative ) then there must either be no God at all , or else every Particle of Matter must be a distinct God by it self ; and so the most ridiculous Polytheism that ever was imagin'd , must be introduced and allowed of . For if there be any such things as Perfect Knowledge , Power , Wisdom and Goodness , every one of these Particles must have it : For 't is impossible Infinite or Perfect Power , Wisdom , Knowledge and Goodness , can be produced out of finite ; the lesser can never produce the greater , nor any thing make or give that which it hath not within it self : And therefore it plainly follows , that either there is no Deity at all , or else that every Particle of Matter must be a God by it self , according to this Hypothesis . For finite or imperfect Cogitation can no more be the Cause of Infinite , than Cogitation can arise from incogitative Matter . And this Spinoza saw very well ; and therefore he asserts all Cogitation , as well as all Substance , to be Infinite (a) . Indeed , to avoid this abominable Absurdity of each Particle of Matter 's being God by it self ; he saith , that there is but one only Substance in Nature , and that this is God (b) But this will not help him out , nor do him much service in defending him from the horrid Absurdities of this Notion . For if by Substance , he mean only Substance in general , or the Idea that we have of some Substratum , Support or Subject of Inhesion in which we conceive the Properties and Accidents of Real Beings to inhere ; as by his Definition of Substance he seems to imply ; 'T is plain , this is only a Metaphysical Notion , only a general Word or Term that serves to denote our conception of something in a Being that doth not depend upon the Properties of it , nor inhere in them , but they upon and in it . But we can have no Notion of Substance existing without any Properties , any more than of Properties without it . If therefore he mean that God is such a Substance as this , that God is the Term or Idea of Substance in general , he makes the Deity nothing at all but a meer Name , a meer Ens Rationis , or Creature of the Brain only ; than which nothing can be more ridiculous and foolish . For 't is the Attributes or Properties of the Deity that we chiefly contend for , and which we are chiefly obliged to Acknowledge and Reverence ; and 't is These that we assert must be inherent in an Infinite and Immaterial Substance , or Spirit . But if by there being but one only Substance , which he saith is God , Spinoza means , that the Deity is the whole Mass of Beings or of Matter in the Universe , as by what he delivers in many places , I do really believe that he did ; for he asserts , that all Corporeal Substance is Infinite and One (c) ; and that Extension and Cogitation are the Attributes , or the Affections of the Attributes of God , as I hinted before . I say , if this be his Opinion , there cannot possibly be a more unaccountable , absurd and impossible Notion of God advanced . And 't is also absolutely inconsistent and contradictions with what he doth at other times assert . For if Substance , Matter , and God , signifie all the same thing , and all Matter be Essentially Cogitative , as such ; Then 't is plain , as I have shewed already , that God cannot be the whole Matter of the Universe , but each Particle of Matter will be a God by it self . For if there be any such thing as Infinite Perfection , it must be Essentially in every Particle of Matter ; otherwise Infinite Perfection may arise out of what is only Finite , which is impossible . And if every Particle of Matter have this Infinite Perfection , the whole Mass of these , Collectively considered , will be by no means One God , or One Being , Infinitely Perfect , but a Swarm of Innumerable Deities , every one of which will be Personally distinct from each other , and yet contain all possible Perfection in it self . But allowing him all the Collective Mass of Beings , or the Universe to be God ; What a strange kind of a Deity would this make ? The Divine Nature must then necessarily be Divisible , part of it here , and part there ; part of it in Motion , and part of it at Rest ; part of it Hot , and part Cold ; part Fire , and part Water ; and , in a word , subject to all manner of Imperfections , Vicissitudes , Changes , Contrarieties and Alterations that can be imagined . But this the common Sense of all Mankind will abhorr and detest to be spoken of the Deity : and besides , 't is contrary to what Spinoza asserts in other places , where he saith Substance is Indivisible (d) . But how there can be but One Only Substance , and that the Matter of the Universe ; and how this Substance can be Indivisible , when yet each Particle of Matter must be a distinct Substance by it self , and is divisible , and divided from all others , as our Reason and our Senses do every day inform us , is a flight of Metaphysicks above my Understanding , and can , I believe , never be conceived by any one that understands the meaning of the Words or Terms such an Opinion shall be delivered in . But he indeed that doth not , and that will admire lofty and insignificant Sounds , without Sense , or he that hath some wicked and base Design to cover under such Cant , may conceive any thing , or at least say that he doth so . The Operations and Actions also of a Corporeal Deity ( were it possible there should be such an one ) must be all absolutely Necessary , and determined by pure Physical and Mechanical Fatality . For he would be really and truly Natura Naturata , only the bare Result of Motion in Matter , as 't is variously formed , figured , moved and disposed so as to produce any Natural Effect . And this , I doubt not but some of these Corporealists very well understand ; and that is the reason that makes them so very fond of the Notion of a Corporeal Deity , and of asserting , That there is nothing in the World but Body : For then they know very well , that there can be nothing but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Nature , such a Physical Necessity as will perfectly exclude all Freedom and Liberty of Will amongst Men , and consequently destroy all Notions of , and Distinctions between Good and Evil. They don't care to say plainly there is no God , that looks a little too bare-faced : for Atheism is a Name they don't love to take . But they will readily and studiously endeavour to advance such an Account and Notion of a Deity as shall do as well ; such an one as they know is in effect the same as to say there is no God at all . And this the representing him as Corporeal , will effectually do ; for this subjects Him to a Physical Necessity , makes Him nothing at all but Nature , and deprives both Him and us of the Noble Principle of Freedom of Will : and then they know that there can be no such things as Rewards and Punishments proportionate to Mens Actions ; but that all things are alike , without any distinction of Good and Evil , and consequently that they may do any thing that they have a mind to . And this appears to be the Issue that they would willingly bring all things to ; For if this were not the case , what Reason can be given why Men should be such zealous Sticklers for a Corporeal Deity ? Why should they still , in spite of Sense , Reason and Philosophy , maintain , That there can be no such thing as an Incorporeal or Immaterial Substance ? Is it purely out of a devout and holy Desire to understand the Divine Nature more clearly , in order to speak of him more properly , to adore him more religiously , and obey him more heartily ? I fear , not : For if Matter and Motion can Think , and ( as they say ) the Properties or Attributes of God can be accountable that way , and there be really and truly a Wise , Powerful , Just and Good God , though Corporeal ; why should not these Gentlemen look upon themselves obliged to obey such a God , as well as a Spiritual one ? Why do they quarrel with , and cast off his Holy Word , and reject and despise his Revealed Will ? Is not a Corporeal Deity ( according to their Notion ) truly a Being endowed with all possible Perfections . Is not He the First Cause , Maker and Preserver of all Things ? and consequently is not He as fit and worthy to be worshipped as well as a Spiritual One ? and cannot such a Deity acquaint his Creatures how he will be worshipped and served ? cannot He Reward them for so doing , and Punish them for offending against Him , equally as if He were Incorporeal ? If he cannot , indeed , then there is something more than bare Speculation in the case , and there must be some substantial Reason why Deists and Antiscripturists are always Corporealists . And this is the truth of the Matter ; the God of the Corporealists is not the True Deity , whatever they may pretend , but a blind , stupid , senseless Idol , that hath nothing but the Name of God wickedly applied to it . 'T is only Nature or a Plastick Power in Nature , the whole mass of , or some sine , subtile and active Parts of Matter in rapid Motion , without any Understanding , (a) Wisdom , or Design , without liberty of Will or freedom of Action ; but Physically and Mechanically Necessary in all its Operations . Their God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as Herodotus speaks , he is the Servant of Necessity , and cannot possibly himself avoid the destined fate . And to be sure , if God be not a free Agent , Nothing else can : for all things flowing from him by an inevitable Necessity (b) , or being Parts of Him , as Spinoza asserts , they must be under the same Necessity with the Deity , and he saith plainly , That every thing that is determined to Operate , is so determined necessarily by God , and could not act at all if God did not thus necessarily determine it (c) . That the Will of Man cannot be called free , but is only a necessary Cause (d) . And in another place (e) he tells us plainly , that there are no such things as final Causes in Nature , they being only the Ignorant Figments of Mankind ; but that all things are Governed by Absolute Necessity . A while after this , (f) he asserts Man to be a meer Machine , and saith , that 't is only those who are Ignorant of Causes that say he was thus finely formed by any Art or Design ; or who attribute his Composition to any Supernatural Wisdom . And then at last he comes to the great Point on which all this Philosophy turns ; which is , That Good and Evil are not by Nature ; but that the Notions of them came only from Mens mistaken Opinion , that all things were made for them ; and who therefore call that Good which is agreeable to their Fancy , and that Evil which is contrary to it . By which short Connexion of their Opinions , 't is clear enough why Spinoza was a Corporealist , as also why Mr. Hobbs advanced the same Notions . And I doubt those that Espouse the same Opinions now adays , know too well the Consequences of them . But of the Precariousness of these Notions , I must say no more now ; designing particularly to confute them hereafter , as they are made Objections against the Truth , and Obligation of Religion in general . FINIS . ADVERTISEMENT . REmarks on some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge , and to the Natural History of the Earth ; By John Harris , M. A. and Fellow of the Royal-Society . In Octavo . Discourses on several Practical Subjects ; By the late Reverend William Payne , D. D. with a Preface giving some Account of his Life , Writings , and Death . Both Printed for Richard Wilkin . A REFUTATION of the Objections Against the ATTRIBUTES of GOD in general . IN A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , September the Fifth , 1698. BEING The Sixth of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. JEREM. ix . 24 . Let him that glorieth , glory in this , that he understandeth and knoweth me , that I am the Lord , who exercise loving kindness , judgment and righteousness in the earth : for in these things I delight , saith the Lord. PRide and Vain-Glory , are Things which Human Nature is strangely subject to ; there being scarce any one so mean , but who judges that he hath something or other that he may justly be Proud of , and value himself for . But as Pride is Folly in the general , so it apparently discovers itself in this respect , That those Men are usually most Vain , who have the least Reason to be so , and that too in Things that are the least valuable in themselves . Thus , as the Prophet intimates in the Verse before the Text , Men frequently glory in Bodily Strength , in Beauty , and Agility , and in the Affluence of external Possessions : Things which are the meanest Appurtenances to our Natures , and which are neither in our Power to get nor keep . Wisdom indeed , and Judgment , Learning and Parts , Wit and Penetration , and all the Nobler Endowments of our Minds , are things of the greatest intrinsick Worth and Value , and we have much more reason to esteem our selves for them , than for all the Goods of Fortune , or any Bodily Excellencies . But yet , Let not the wise man Glory in his Wisdom and Knowledge neither ; tho' as the Targum on the place hints , it were as great as that of Solomon himself ; for we have in reality no just ground to value our selves for even this , when we consider that the best of us have it but in a very slender Proportion ; and that our highest Knowledge is very imperfect and defective . Hence it comes to pass , or at least ought to do so , that the Modesty and Humility of truly knowing Men encreases with their Learning and Experience : Their being raised something above the common level , instead of lessening and shortening in their Eyes the Statures of other Men , encreases their Prospect of a Boundless Field of Knowledge all around them ; the more of which they discover , the more they find yet undiscover'd . But he that knows but little , vainly thinks he knows every thing , and judges all is empty and void that is without the Bounds of his scanty Horizon . Another great Vanity there is also in Pride , which is , That Men are frequently conceited and Proud of those things , which they have the least share of , and are fond of such Actions as do plainly discover their Defects . For usually those Men are most forward to talk of Learning , who are least acquainted with Books ; and those make the greatest Noise about , and Pretensions to Philosophy , who have the least insight into Nature . Those who talk most of Certainty and Demonstration have usually the most confused Idea's , and the most Superficial Notions of things , and are the farthest of all Men from true Science . This is apparently seen in the Pretenders to Scepticism and Infidelity , and in all the Atheistical Writers . No Men express themselves with such an insupportable Insolence as these New Lights , these Reformers of our Philosophy and our Politicks ; who yet after all are Proud knowing nothing , as St. Paul speaks , Rom. 1.21 . But are vain in their imaginations ; their foolish heart is darkened , and professing themselves to be wise , they become fools . And therefore it is that the wisdom of God appears as foolishness to them , because the carnal mind savoureth not the things that are of God. Tho' would Men but studiously apply themselves to consider of , would they carefully and impartially examine into , and would they but seriously make use of those Means that God hath graciously given Mankind , in order to attain a sufficient Knowledge of his Nature and Perfections ; They would then find so much Beauty , Wisdom , Harmony , and Excellency in this inexhaustible Fund of Knowledge , as would sufficiently Reward their Pains and Endeavours . And this we may glory in ; this Knowledge will be the most noble and honourable that our Capacities can attain unto ; and in comparison of which , there is no other Qualification and Excellence in our Natures at all valuable . For here we have an Object the greatest and most perfect that can be , the more we know of which , the more we shall exalt and perfect our selves . Here are no empty Speculations ; no difficiles Nugae , no false Lights , nor Phantastical Appearances ; but 't is a real and substantial , an useful and practical Knowledge ; a Knowledge that doth not only delight us for the present , but which brings constant and lasting Satisfaction here , and eternal Happiness hereafter . Let him therefore that glorieth , glory in this , that he understandeth and knoweth God , that He is the Lord , who exerciseth loving kindness , judgment and righteousness in the earth , for in these things do I delight , saith the Lord. In which words , there are these two Things chiefly considerable : I. A Supposition that God is capable of being known to us by his Attributes . II. An Account of some of those Attributes which he exerciseth in the Earth , and in which he delights . Under which Two Heads , I shall , in pursuance of my general Design , endeavour to Answer those Objections that Atheistical Men have brought against the Attributes and Perfections of the Divine Nature . 1. Here is a Supposition that God is capable of being known to us by his Attributes . He that glorieth , let him glory in this , that he understandeth and knoweth God , that he is the Lord , who exerciseth loving kindness , judgment and righteousness in the earth . 'T is plainly supposed here , That this Knowledge which we are directed to acquire , is a possible Knowledge . God would not command us to understand him by his Attributes of Goodness , Mercy and Justice , which he continually exerciseth in the Earth , if it were impossible for us to attain to it : He would not delight to do such Works in the World , if nothing of them could be known , nor himself by them . But the Psalmist tells us , the Lord is known by his Works : And that the Heavens declare his Glory , and the Firmament sheweth his handy work : And St. Paul is express , That the Invisible Things of Him are clearly seen , being understood by the things that are made , even his Eternal Power and Godhead . And indeed , These Attributes of God are what is most and best known to us , and from the certain Knowledge that we have of these , we may be effectually assured of the Existence of some first Cause , some Supream Being in whom all these Attributes and Perfections must inhere . The Infinite Nature , indeed , of This Divine Being is Incomprehensible to our shallow and scanty Understandings , and we cannot by searching find it out , nor discover the Almighty unto Perfection . But notwithstanding we have as certain a Knowledge , and as clear Idea's of his Attributes as we have of any thing in the World. And Grotius's Gloss on this place is very just and proper : God doth not bid Men know him according to his Nature , which exceeds Humane Capacity to do , but according to those Attributes or Properties of his which relate to Mankind , which the Hebrews call Middôth , i.e. those Measures or Dimensions of Him which are proportionable to our Understandings and Capacities . And such his Attributes are , for we see them visibly exerted in the Works of the Creation , and we find them necessarily included in the Notion that we have of the Supream Being , or the First Cause of all things ; as I have already shewed in another Discourse . But this , some are pleased to deny ; and say , That nothing at all can be known of God , but only , that he is : for his Nature is perfectly Incomprehensible ; that we do but dishonour God , by pretending to Understand and to talk about his Attributes ; about which we can say nothing but only what serves to express our Astonishment , Ignorance , and Rusticity ; and therefore the Civil Magistrate ought to determine what Attributes shall be given to the Deity . This seems to be the Sense of Vaninus , and is plainly of Mr. Hobbs ; and was before them of Sextus Empiricus . Which take in their own words : Non Deum melius Intelligimus quam per ea quoe negamus nos Intelligere , saith Vaninus (a) . Again , Deum nuuis tam plenè indicatum intelligimus Vocibus , quàm iis quoe Ignorantiam nostram proetendunt . We can have , saith Mr. Hobbs , no Conception of the Deity , and consequently all his Attributes signifie only our Inability and Defect of Power to conceive any thing concerning Him , except only this , that there is a God (b) . And in another place , saith he , God's Attributes cannot signifie what he is , but ought to signifie our desire to honour him ; but they that venture to reason of his Nature from these Attributes of honour , losing their Vnderstanding in the very first Attempt , fall from one Inconvenience to another without End and Number , and do only discover their Astonishment and Rusticity (c) . Again , When Men ( saith he ) out of Principles of Natural Reason dispute about the Attributes of God , they do but dishonour him ; for in the Attributes we give to God , we are not to consider Philosophical Truth (d) . And therefore he concludes , That those Attributes which the Soveraign Power shall ordain in the Worship of God , as signs of Honour , ought to be taken and used for such by Private Men in their Publick Worship (e) . In which he agrees as he useth to do , exactly with Sextus Empiricus ; who tells us that the Sceptick is in the right for asserting Gods according to the Laws and Custom of his Country ; and in paying them that veneration and worship which on the same account becomes due to them , will not venture to determine any thing Philosophically about them (a) . Now from these Passages , I think it appears plain enough , that tho' these Men did in words pretend to own and acknowledge a God , yet in Fact they were Atheists , and had no true Belief of any such Being . For a Deity without the Attributes of Understanding and Wisdom , without Ends or Design ; none of which Mr. Hobbs asserts expresly , can be in God (b) , is a Ridiculous stupid Being , an Idol that every rational Agent must needs despise , and which can never be the Object of any one's Adoration , Love , or Obedience . To assert therefore that the Attributes of God are not discoverable by Reason , nor agreeable to Philosophical Truth , but may be declared to be any thing which the Soveraign Power pleases to make them ; this is designedly to expose the Belief and Notion of a Deity , and to render it so Precarious , that it can be the Object of no Rational Man's Faith. And this last named Writer Treats the Deity after the same manner in most other Places of his Works ; He saith , we must not say of Him that he is Finite , that he hath figure Parts or Totality , that he is here or there , that he moveth or resteth , or that we can conceive or know any thing of him ; for all this is to dishonour him : And yet to say that he is an Immaterial Substance , that he is an Infinite and Eternal Spirit , is , he saith , Nonsense , and what destroys and contradicts it self . However he is willing to allow the word Immaterial or Spirit to be used towards God , as a Mark of Honour and Respect . That is , we may attribute to God what we know to be Nonsense and Contradiction , and this is the Way to Honour him ; and to speak of him any other way , is to Dishonour Him ! Who doth not perceive that it was plainly the Design of this Writer to treat of the Deity after such a manner , as should deprive Him of all Knowledge and Care of Humane Affairs , and consequently , effectually Banish out of Mens Minds a just Veneration for Him , and Adoration of Him ? Such Men are the most Dangerous and Mischievous of all others ; Profess'd Atheists can do no great Harm ; for all Persons are aware of them , and will justly abhor the Writings and Conversation of Men that say boldly there is no God. But there are but few such ; they have found a way to pass undiscovered under a fairer Dress and a softer Name : They pretend to be true Deists and sincere Cultivators of Natural Religion ; and to have a most Profound Respect for the Supream and Almighty Being : But when this Profound Respect comes to be throughly examined and duly understood , it will appear to be the most abominable Abuse that can be , and a most wicked and Blasphemous Idea of the Deity . For they make him either nothing but the Soul of the World , Universal Matter , or Natura Naturata , a God that is an absolutely necessary Agent , without any Rectitude in his Will ; without any Knowledge , Wisdom , Goodness , Justice , Mercy , or Providence over his Works . But let such Persons take what Names they please upon themselves , a little consideration will soon discover what they are in reality ; and , I hope , give Men a just abhorrence of such Notions , tho' never so speciously put forth . But let us now proceed to examine what Ground there is from the Nature of the Thing , for Men to advance such wicked Opinions , and to shew the weakness and precariousness of them . And here it must be premised and taken for granted , that there is a God. This is what the Persons I am now concerned with , pretend to own , and to acknowledge . Which being supposed : It appears very plain that we may have if we will , and some Persons , as I have shew'd (a) , have always had , a very clear Notion or Idea of the Attributes and Perfections of such a Being ; as also that they are fixed and immutable Properties in the Divine Nature . For by professing to believe a God , they must mean , if they mean any thing , The first Cause and Author of all Things , and the Governour and Disposer of them ; A Divine Being , containing in himself all possible Perfections ; without being subject to any manner of Defect . This I have already hinted at in another place (b) , and shall now more largely prove . So far is it from being true , that we cannot reason of the Nature of God from his Attributes , nor Discourse of those Attributes from our Reason ; That this seems to be the only proper Way of enquiring into the wonderful Depth of the Divine Perfections . I mean , the only Way we have without Revelation , for I am not now considering what God hath farther discovered of Himself to us by his Word . For tho' the Deity doth abound with Infinite Excellencies and Perfections ; yet by the Light of Nature we can discover those only , of which he hath given us some Impression on our own Natures ; and these are the Scales and Proportions by which our Reason must measure the Divine Attributes and Perfections . For in order to gain good and true Notions of these , we ought to take our Rise from those Perfections and Excellencies which we find in the Creatures , and especially in our selves . There can be but two Ways of coming to the Knowledge of any thing ; by its Cause , and by its Effects . 'T is impossible for us to make use of the former of these , in Reference to the Deity : For He being himself without Cause , and the First Cause and Original of all Things cannot be known to us this Way . But by the second Way , he very properly may be the Object of our Knowledge , and we ought to apply our selves to this Method , in order to understand the Attributes of God. For whatever Excellency or Perfection we can any way discover in the Effects of God in the World , i. e. in the Works of the whole Creation ; the same we cannot but suppose must be in Him , in the highest and most noble Proportion and Degree ; since they are all owing to , and derived from Him. And if we take a serious and considerate View of the Excellencies and Perfections that are to be found in the Creatures , or the Works of God in the World ; we shall find that they may be reducible to these Four general Heads ; Being or Substance , Life , Sensibility , and Reason . All which we find to be in our selves , and therefore they are at hand , and ready to assist our Meditations ; and these will , if duly considered , lead us into a good Way of discovering the Attributes and Perfections of the Divine Nature . And I doubt not but a great Reason why Men have had and advanced wrong Notions of God , hath been because they have had such of themselves , and of those Perfections that are in our own Natures . Men that do not understand that the true Perfection of Humane Nature consists in Moral Goodness , or in an Universal agreeableness of our Will to the Eternal Laws of Right Reason , cannot conceive aright of the Attributes and Perfections of God : For they will be for making him like themselves , guided by vehement Self-love , and inordinate Will , or whatever predominant Passions possess them . 'T were easie to Trace this in the Epicurean Notion of a God dissolved in Ease and Sloth , and who neglects the Government of the World , to enjoy his own private Pleasures ; and in the Hobbian one of a Deity not guided by any Essential Rectitude of Will , but only by Arbitrary , Lawless , and irrisistible Power ; for both these Opinions are exactly agreeable to the Genius and humours of their Authors and Propagators . But to proceed with our Deduction of the Divine Attributes from the Excellencies and Perfections which we find in our selves . 1. If in the first place we consider Being , and the high Perfections that do belong to it ; we shall find that they must needs be in the Deity , who is the First and Supream Being , and the Cause and Author of all others in the World , in the utmost Perfection . Now the highest Perfections belonging unto Being , we find to be these two : 1. That it shall have an underivable and necessary Existence , always be , and never cease , die , terminate or be extinct ; and , 2. That it be Great and Ample as to its Extent , in opposition to Littleness or Scantyness , and to being Limited , Circumscribed , Bounded or Restrained by any Other Thing . And if we attribute these two Perfections to God , thence will plainly Arise his Eternity , and his Immensity or Omnipresence . For what cannot possibly cease to be , but hath necessary Existence included in its Nature , is Eternal . And what cannot be any way Limited , Circumscribed or Restrained , must needs be Boundless and Immense , and present every where . And I dare say , that these Notions of God's Eternity and Immensity , do find an easie admission into , and are firmly rooted in all considerate and unprejudiced Minds ; and who are not debauched by Sceptical and Atheistical Metaphysicks . For 't is impossible for any one that thinks at all , to have a Notion of a Deity that can die , or cease to be ; or that is so confined and imprisoned in any one part of Space , that he can extend himself no farther : No! it must be an Epicurean Stupefaction of Soul , indeed , that can induce a Man to fancy a Mortal or a Topical God ; one that may be slain , or die of old Age , or be shackled and confined to any one part of the Universe , exclusive of the rest . And tho' a Man cannot find perhaps that he hath an adequate Idea of Eternity ; yet that God must be without Beginning or End , he will readily allow , as soon as he considers the Thing ; for he will perceive that the First Cause of all Things could not be caused by any thing else , but must be Self-existent , and without Beginning : and if nothing could cause his Being , nothing can take it away neither , and consequently he must be Everlasting or Eternal . And of this Attribute the Heathens had a clear Idea and Belief , giving God the Title of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and Swearing usually by the Immortal Gods. Tully saith , Deum nisi Sempiternum Intelligere quî possumus ? How can we conceive the Deity any otherwise than to be an Eternal Being . And Aristotle in many places makes Eternity Essential to the Idea of God ; and particularly , Lib. 2. de Coelo . And so as to Immensity or Omnipresence , tho' he , indeed , cannot tell the manner how a Spirit or Immaterial Substance permeates Matter , or is present to every part of it ; yet he will conclude that the Deity must some how or other actually fill and be present with all things ; since 't is impossible he should be excluded any where , or be in any respect bounded or limited ; as 't is also that he should act or operate where he is not . Nor would , I believe , any free and unprejudiced Mind have recourse either to the Notion of God's being Universal Matter or Infinite Space , in order to solve His Immensity or Omnipresence . For the former , he would see , necessarily makes the Deity materially divisible , into Parts actually separated from each other ; and to be part of him here , and part there ; which he could not but think monstrously absurd and impossible : and the latter renders God nothing at all , but Imaginary Room , Vacuity or Space , in which Bodies are capable of Moving up and down , or to and fro , without hindrance or impediment from any Medium . Which how it should , any more than the former account for the Energetical Power , Wisdom , Justice and Goodness of the Divine Nature , ( the noblest Perfections he can have any Idea of ) 't would be as impossible for him to conceive , as it is for the Assertors of it to prove . The ancient Heathens allowed this Attribute of Immensity to the Deity , by common consent . Tully tells us , That Pythagoras asserted , Deum esse animum per Naturam Rerum omnium intentum & comeantem , De Nat. Deorum . And he cites it as the Opinion of Thales Milesius ; Deorum omnia esse Plena , De Legib. lib. 2. which Virgil also affirms expresly , — Jovis omnia plena . And again , Deum namque ire per omnes Terras tractusque maris , coelumque profundum , Georg. lib. 4. And Seneca tells us , That God is ubique & omnibus proesto (a) . And in another place (b) , Quocunque te flexeris , ibi Deum videbis Occurrentem tibi , nihil ab illo vacat , Opus suum ipse Implet . 2. If we consider Life ; Another Perfection which we find in our selves , we must needs conclude that this is in the Deity too , who is the great Author and Fountain of Life , in the highest Degree and Proportion imaginable . Now the Perfection of Life seems to consist in Activity , or an Energetical Power to Act , or Operate ; in opposition to Impotence , Weakness , or Inability . And this Perfection , no one sure can possibly doubt to be in the Deity . For besides that 't is impossible for us to conceive that Life and Activity in our selves can proceed from a Dead and Unactive Principle ; our Reason must needs reject the Notion of an Inanimate , and Impotent Deity , or of one that is any way defective in Power , as soon as it can be proposed to it . Can we imagine that a Being from whom all Life , Power and Energy is derived , can be without it himself ? and that he who hath , as Simplicius calls it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a whole entire or perfect Power , that hath all the Power of Nature at His Command , can be unable to perform whatever is possible to be done ? that is , whatever is agreeable to , and consistent with , the other Attributes of the Divine Nature ? And if so , must not then such a Being be own'd to be Almighty or Omnipotent ? From whence we see another great Attribute doth plainly arise . And of this Attribute of the Deity , there was a plain and clear Notion all along among the Heathen Writers ; as appears from Homer in many places , who speaking of God , says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . The same thing also we have in the Fragments of Linus , long before Him. And in Callimachus also , in express words . As also in Agatho , an Ancient Greek Poet cited by Aristotle in his Ethicks . So in Virgil and Ovid , you have frequently the Title of Pater Omnipotens given to the Deity . And this Attribute of Infinite Power in God , Epicurus set himself with all his might to confute ; denying there was any such thing as Infinite Power at all ; that thereby ( says Lucretius , lib. 1. ) he might take away Religion too . And from hence also his Eternity might be naturally deduced . For we cannot conceive this Life or Activity , this Almighty Power that is in God , can ever cease , decay or determine , any more than it can have had a beginning , and consequently such a Being must necessarily Exist , be Eternal , or Endure and Live for Ever . 3. If we proceed a little higher , and consider Sensibility which is another great Perfection that we find in our selves , and some other Creatures , we must needs Attribute This also , and that in the highest degree , to the Divine Nature . I take this now in the general , for that Power or Faculty whereby any Being is capable of taking Pleasure or feeling Pain . And such a Sensibility , or something Analogous to it , we cannot but think God must have in the most exquisite Perfection , since our Own , as well as that of all other Creatures , must be derived from Him. And tho' , indeed , we ought to think that the Infinite Perfection of his Nature secures him from all Possibility of feeling Pain , ( since nothing can contradict his Will , run counter to his Desires , or frustrate his Expectations ) yet we have no reason to suppose the Deity insensible of Pleasure ; but may justly conclude from hence , that he is always most perfectly happy . For he contains in Himself all Possible Good and Infinite Excellencies and Perfection , and of this He is most exquisitely sensible , and consequently must eternally be Pleased and delighted with himself in the Enjoyment of his own Infinite Fulness : And this Notion many of the Heathens had of God , that he was a most Happy Being ; stiling Him frequently , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 4. But the Highest Perfection which we can discover in our selves , and in any created Beings whatever , is Reason . And this , no doubt , we ought also to attribute to God in the highest Degree and Perfection . Now the Perfection of Reason seems to consist in these two Things : 1. In Knowledge and Wisdom in the Understanding Faculty . And , 2. In Rectitude or Righteousness in the Will. All which we cannot but suppose the Divine Nature to be perfectly endowed with . And first as to Knowledge and Wisdom ; The former of which , implies an Understanding of things as they are in themselves , according to their true Natures and Properties : And the latter , a considering of them as to their Relations to , and Dependances upon one another ; or in other words , according as they are fit or qualified to be Ends or Means . And these must certainly be in God , for the same reason that we have found in Him the other Perfections above-mentioned . To the Deity therefore , from this Consideration , we ought to Attribute Omniscience , and Infinite , or most perfect Wisdom ; for no doubt we ought to conclude , That the Deity both knows every thing according to its Nature , and also understands its Usefulness and Subservience to any End , Design or Purpose whatsoever . And therefore it was as stupidly or impiously said by Mr. Hobbs , That there can be no such thing as Knowledge in God , and that he can have no Ends. For I cannot imagine there can one so grossly Ignorant and Foolish be found among Mankind , who doth really believe there can be an ignorant or a foolish God ; and who would not abhor such a Position as monstrously absurd and impossible . A Man must be a long while conversant with Atheistical and Sceptical Philosophy , before he can grow so dull as not to perceive the force and Power of the Psalmists Logick and reasoning in Psal. 94. v. 8 , 9 , &c. and he must be very Studiously brutish and Learnedly foolish , before he can think that he that planted the Ear , should not be able to hear himself ; and that he that formed the Eye should not see ; and that he that gave and taught all Knowledge to Men should have none himself . The mighty Reason that Mr. Hobbs is pleased to give , Why there can be no Understanding in God is , because that Faculty being in us nothing but a Tumult of Mind , raised by External Things that press the Organical Parts of our Bodies (a) , there can be no such thing in God. And in other places , he sagaciously determines , that 't is impossible to hear without Ears , to see without Eyes , and to Understand without Brains , none of which God hath ; and therefore must be Ignorant and Stupid . But , methinks , 't is very hardly done of Him , to determine the Deity to be Corporeal ▪ and yet to assign Him none of these Material Organs in order to make him an Intelligent Being . Why should not the same Matter which is able to form the Mechanick Understanding of so great a Philosopher , be capable of being modified as Intelligently in the Divine Nature ? Must the Deity have the worst and most stupid Body of All others ? Into what abominable Absurdities will such Principles as these lead a Man ! or rather into what abominable Impieties and Blasphemies will Vice and Pride hurry him ! He doth not only think wickedly that the Deity is such an one as himself , but infinitely worse ; a Corporeal Being that hath less and fewer Perfections than a Corporeal Man ! But I must not dwell on shewing the Design of this Writer , having sufficiently done it already . I shall only now add , that I think I have already proved that Matter alone cannot think , know , nor understand ; and therefore it is not Mens Brains , but their Soul that hath this Intelligent Power ; and no doubt an Infinite and Immaterial Mind , needs not any Material Organs to convey Knowledge to him , in whom all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge do Inhabit , and from whom they are all derived and do proceed . And there was , Anciently amongst the Heathens , a clear belief of the Infinite Knowledge and Wisdom of God. Tully tells us , that Thales used commonly to say , Deos omnia cernere , the Gods behold or know all things . And Seneca saith , Deo nihil Clausum est ; interest Animis nostris , & mediis cogitationibus intervenit . And as to the Wisdom of God , Tully deduces it after the same manner as we now have done , by attributing the Excellencies of the Creature to the Deity in the Highest Perfection . Sapiens est Homo , saith he , & propterea Deus ; Man hath Wisdom , and therefore God , from whom the Wisdom in Man is derived , must needs have it himself . But again , As we must attribute to God Infinite Knowledge and Wisdom ; so we must Rectitude of Will or Perfect Righteousness too . And since the Rectitude of the Will consists in an exact Conformity of it and all its Affections to the Impartial Rule of Right Reason ; we cannot but suppose also , that the Will of God is in a most exquisite Conformity to the Dictates of his Unerring Reason ; and that the Deity doth in every respect act exactly agreeable thereunto . And by this means we shall find that God must be Just and Righteous in all his Proceedings , and that he always executeth Justice and Righteousness in the Earth , and delights in these things . Our Adversaries , indeed , do assert , That there is no such thing as any distinction between Good and Evil , Just and Vnjust , that can be taken from any common Rule , or from the Objects themselves ; but only with Relation to the Person that useth them ; who calls that Good which he loves , and that Evil which he hates (a) . That God doth every thing by his Irresisistible Power ; and that in that is founded our Obedience to Him , and not in any Principle of Gratitude to him (b) for Benefits which we have received from him . That Justice is founded in Power , and that whatever is Enacted by a Soveraign Power can't be Unjust . The Groundlessness of which Impious and Dangerous Notions , I shall fully shew in a subsequent Discourse ; and therefore shall only now observe , that this Way of depriving the Deity of these most excellent and lovely Attributes of Justice and Goodness , and making Him to Act only according to the Arbitrary Dictates of Irresistible Power , gives us the Notion of a Devil instead of a Deity , of an absolute Tyrant , instead of a righteous Governour of the World ; and is directly contrary to the Sober and Considerate Sentiments of all Mankind * , in whose Minds a plain Distinction between Good and Evil is founded , and who can never be brought without doing great violence to themselves , to assert that the Deity is not guided in all things by the Eternal Rules of Truth and Justice , and that the Judge of all the Earth should not do right . They see the comliness and loveliness that there is in good and just Actions among Men ; and therefore cannot suppose that an Infinite and Almighty Being can do any thing contrary to them ; they are sensible that Deviations from those Rules proceed only from the Defects and Imperfections that are in our Natures ; but that God , who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who possesseth and sustaineth all things , cannot make use of any indirect Means to procure himself Happiness , or to stave off Misery ; since the Perfection of his Nature gives him all the one , and secures him from all the other . And they which certainly never believe that God will do any Action , that they do not think suitable to be done by a good and just Man ; But will on just Grounds conclude , That whatever Excellence or Perfections they can any way discover to be in a Good Man , must needs be in the highest Proportion in God , and consequently that the Deity must be most Righteous , Just and Good , and most Kind , Merciful and Gracious in all his Dealings with his Creatures . And thus we see how by considering the Excellencies and Perfections which we find in our selves , and attributing them in the Highest Proportion to that Supream Being the Deity , from whence they must all be derived ; we may attain to a good and clear Knowledge of the Properties and Attributes of the Divine Nature : We may find them to be such as are agreeable to the plainest Reason and to Philosophical Truth : and consequently conclude , that they can have no such weak and precarious Foundation as the Order of the Civil Power , and the Will of the Supream Magistrate . And were it now my Business , 't were very easie from hence to shew also the True Foundation of Religious Worship ; that it doth depend on the Right Apprehensions and Notions that we have of the Attributes of God ; and that our Obedience to Him , is founded in our Gratitude to him for the Benefits which we receive from Him , and consequently is our Reasonable Service . But the Proof of this will be more proper in another Place . FINIS . A REFUTATION of the Objections Against MORAL GOOD and EVIL . IN A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , October the Third , 1698. BEING The Seventh of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. JEREM. ix . 24 . Let him that glorieth , glory in this , that he understandeth and knoweth me , that I am the Lord , who exercise loving kindness , judgment and righteousness in the earth : for in these things do I delight , saith the Lord. IN these Words , as I have already shewed , there are these two Things considerable : I. A Supposition that God is capable of being known to us by his Attributes . II. An Account of some of those Attributes which he exerciseth in the Earth , and in which he delights . On the former of these , I did , in my last Discourse endeavour to remove the Objections against the Attributes of God in general , and to shew that they are plainly discoverable by Reason , and agreeable to Philosophical Truth . As to the Second , The Attributes of God mentioned here by the Prophet , and which he is said to delight to exercise in the Earth . I think it not necessary to discourse particularly of them , having in my last Sermon shewn how They , as well as all other Excellencies and Perfections which we can discover in the Creatures , must of necessity be in the Divine Nature in the greatest Perfection ; because they are all derived from Him. But that which I judge will be more proper to be done now , as being agreeable to my Design of Answering the Atheistical Objections in their Natural Order , will be from hence to Remove two Great Barrs to the true Knowledge of God and of his Attributes , which Sceptical and Unbelieving Men have here placed in the Way . For indeed , till this be done , no true Notion of God or of his Perfections can be established in Mens Minds ; nor any Ground fixt whereon to build a Rational Belief of Natural or Revealed Religion , or any kind of Worship of the Supream and Almighty Being . And these Two great Objections of our Adversaries are , 1. That there is in reality no such thing as Moral Good and Evil ; but that all Actions are in their own Nature indifferent . 2. That all things are determined by Absolute Fatality : And that God himself , and all Creatures whatsoever , are Necessary Agents , without having any Power of Choice , or any real Liberty in their Nature at all . These are two of the strongest Holds of Atheism and Infidelity , which 't is therefore absolutely necessary to batter down and demolish : And these do in some sense communicate with and run into one another ; and indeed the former plainly follows from the latter . But however , they being very frequently made use of distinctly by the Opposers of Religion , and the former being maintained by some Persons whom I cannot find do hold the latter ; I shall endeavour to Refute them severally . Beginning with that which I have first proposed ; viz. That there is in reality no such things as Moral Good and Evil , but that all Actions are in their own Nature purely Indifferent . And this Position our Adversaries are very express in maintaining , as will sufficiently appear by their own Words . The Virtues that Men extoll so highly , saith Mr. Blount (a) , are not of equal weight and value in the Balance of Nature ; but that it may fare with them , as with Coin made of Copper or Leather : which tho' it may go at a high Rate in one Country by Proclamation ; yet will it not do so in another , for want of Intrinsick Value . 'T is plain enough what he means by this ; but how this Assertion will agree with his allowing some things to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (b) , Good and Just in their own Nature , as he doth in his Account of the Deists Religion , let the Admirers of those Contradictory Oracles of Reason , consider . But , indeed , 't is no new or uncommon thing with these kind of Men to make Contradictory Propositions subservient to their Purposes : as they often do in this very Case . For when you upbraid them with a Disbelief of Revelation , they will say , that 't is enough for any Man to live up to the Principles of Natural Religion , and to adhere inviolably to all things , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for those are things that are Obligatory on all Mankind , and not like Revealed Truths , mere Political and Topical Institutions . Whereas at another time , if you tell them of some gross Immoralities that they are Guilty of , and which are plainly contrary to Reason , and to the clearest Light of Nature ; Then they will answer you , That Good and Evil are only Thetical things ; which receive their very Essence from Human Laws or Customs only , but that by Nature nothing is either Good or Bad ; and that all Actions are alike and Indifferent ; so hard is it , as an Excellent Person observes (a) , to contradict Truth and Nature , without contradicting ones self . But to go on , Spinoza takes care to deliver himself very plainly , as to this Matter . Bonum & Malum nihil Positivum in Rebus sc. in se consideratis indicant (b) . And in another Place , he tells us , Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt , omnia quae fiunt , propter ipsos fieri , id in unaquàque re praecipuum judicare debuerunt , quod ipsis , utilissimum ; & illa omnia praestantissima aestimare , à quibus optimè afficiebantur . Unde has formare debuerunt Notiones , quibus Rerum naturas explicarunt , sc. Bonum & Malum , Ordinem & Confusionem , &c. (c) . And the same thing also he asserts in many other places . Mr. Hobbs also expresly maintains , That there is nothing simply nor absolutely Good or Evil , nor any common Rule about them to be taken from the Objects themselves , but only from the Person ; who calleth that Good which he likes or desires , and that Evil which he hates , &c. (d) Nothing , saith he , is in its own Nature Just or Vnjust , because naturally there is no Property , but every one hath a Right to every thing (e) ; And therefore he defines Justice to be only keeping of a Covenant (f) . And in another place he tells us , That Good and Evil are only Names that signifie our Appetites and Aversions ; which in different Tempers , Customs and Doctrines of Men are different (g) . The same thing he asserteth also in many other places of his Writings (h) . And this Doctrine the Translator of Philostratus is so fond of , that , tho' he be sometimes very desirous of being thought an Original , yet he Transcribes this entirely from Mr. Hobbs (a) ; as indeed Mr. Hobbs , according to his usual way , had before , in a great measure done from Sextus Empiricus ; who in very many places declares that it was the Opinion of the Scepticks , that there was nothing Good or Evil in it self (b) . And he endeavours to prove this Point , by the very same Arguments which the Modern Assertors of this Opinion , do make use of (c) . And tho' Mr. Hobbs boast much of his Notions about these things to be new , and originally his own ; yet 't is plain , that it was the Old Atheistick Doctrine long before Plato's Time. For he tells us , Lib. 2. De Rep. p. 358. That there were a sort of Men who maintained , That by Nature Men have a boundless Liberty to act as they please , and that in such a state , to do that to another which is now called an Injury , or a piece of Injustice , would be Good ; tho' to receive it from another would be Evil : And that Men did live a good while at this rate , but in Time finding the Inconveniencies of it , they did agree upon Laws , in order to live peaceably and quietly with one another . And then that which was enacted by these Laws , was called Just , and Lawful . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . This is the Principle we see of those Atheistical Men : which tho' some of them do now and then take Care to conceal , or to express a little cautiously , yet they understand one another well enough : and so indeed may any one do them , that thinks it worth his while to consider seriously of , and to search into the Bottom of the Matter . And this is truly one of the Great Depths of Atheism and Infidelity : 'T is a Principle that when once thoroughly understood and imbibed , confirms a Man in the Disbelief of all manner of Religious Obligation . For he that hath once swallowed down this abominable Tenet , will , as some of the lately mentioned Writers discover themselves to do , believe nothing of the Deity , but that he is Almighty and Arbitrary Power , or a Blind fatal and Necessary Agent : Either a Being that makes his Will his Law , and who is not guided in his Actions or Dispensations , by the Dictates of Reason nor by any Rules of Justice and Goodness : or else one that properly speaking , hath no Ends nor Designs at all (a) ; but is without any Understanding (b) , Freedom of Will , Choice or Wisdom ; one who cannot possibly help doing as he doth , but is impelled in every thing by absolute Necessity . So that there being ( as according to these Principles there cannot be ) no Goodness in the Deity , there can be none any where : But all Actions , antecedent to Human Laws , will be Indifferent . And the Obligation that Men are under to Human Laws being only , as Hobbs saith , from Fear of Punishment ; no doubt a Man of this wicked Perswasion will stick at the Perpetration of no Villany nor Immorality , that will any way advantage himself , and which he can commit secretly and securely ; but will pursue his own Private Benefit and Interest ( the only Good he understands , and thinks himself obliged to mind ) by all possible Means and Endeavours . This therefore being the Case before us , it will very much concern us to Return a fair Answer to , and fully to Refute this Dangerous Objection against all Religion , and indeed against the Good and Welfare of all Governments , and all Civil Societies : and which I wish we had not so much reason to believe , is fixt in the Minds of too many amongst us . And in order to do this the more clearly and effectually , it will be necessary first truly to state the Point , and to dis-engage it from some Difficulties and Perplexities which our Adversaries have designedly clouded it withall . Say they whatever is the Object of any Man's Desires that he calls Good ; as also whatsoever is in any respect Beneficial and Advantageous to him . And on the other hand , that which is hurtful and prejudicial to him , and is the Object of his Hatred and Aversion , that he calls Evil , and so doubtless it is to him . Now , say they further , Since that which may be Good to one Man , or desired by him now , may be Evil to another , or may by the very same Person , be hated and shunned at another Time ; it plainly follows , that the Nature of Good and Evil , is perfectly precarious , and will be as various and changeable as the different Humours and Inclinations of Mankind can make it . And thus Mens Actions will be denominated accordingly . Every one accounting that a Good one which he likes , which promotes his Interest , and is conducible to his Advantage : And calling that an Evil one , which he disapproves of , and which is contrary to his Interest and Inclination . To all which , I say , that these Men run their Argument a great way too far , and conclude much more from it than the Nature of the thing will bear . For allowing as a first Principle that all Men desire Good , and that they cannot do otherwise ; Allowing also that Apparent or seeming Good hath the same Effect as real Good , while it is the Object of any particular Man's Desires : Nay , allowing also this Apparent Good to be a very precarious Thing , and to depend very much on the different Humours , Tempers and Inclinations of Mankind ; which is the whole Basis on which these Writers found their Argument . I say , Granting all this , it doth not come up to the Question between us , nor form any Real Objection against the natural difference between Good and Evil , and the Eternal Obligation of Morality ; for the Point in dispute is not whether such an Essential and Immutable Difference as this now spoken of , be discernible in all the Actions of Mankind ; for 't is readily allowed that there are a great many Indifferent , and which are neither good nor bad in their own Natures , but may be either , as Circumstances determine . This , I say , is not the Case ; but whether there be not some such Actions , as do plainly discover themselves to the Unprejudiced Judgment of any Rational Man , to be Good and Evil in their own Natures , antecedent to the Obligation of any Human Laws . Or in other Words , whether there be not some Actions which do carry along with them such a clear and unalterable Reasonableness and Excellency , as that they do approve themselves to be Good and Lovely to any Unprejudiced Mind , and consequently Mankind must be under an Universal and Eternal Obligation to perform them , and to avoid and shun their Contraries . As also , whether we have not all the reason in the World to believe that those Actions , which the Mind of Man can thus discover to be Morally and Essentially Good , are agreeable to the Will of God , and directed by it : And to conclude , that the Deity also acts and proceeds in all Respects according to the same Universal and Eternal Dictates of Reason , and is Just and Good , Equitable and Righteous in all his Dealings with his Creatures ; and that he exerciseth these things in the Earth . This I take to be the true state of the Case ; and this is what we Assert , and our Adversaries Deny ; and what I shall now endeavour to prove . In order to which , it must be allowed in the 1. Place , That Man is a thinking Being , and hath the Power of Reasoning and Inference . It must be allowed also , that we are capable of Knowing this , and do most evidently discover such a Power in our selves . And since all Intelligent Creatures do naturally desire to be happy , we must do so too , and consequently endeavour to obtain that Kind of Happiness which is agreeable to our Natures and Faculties ; i. e. a Happiness that shall relate to our whole Natures , and not to the Body only : Now the Happiness of any Being consisting in the free and vigorous Exercise of its Powers and Faculties , or in the Perfection of its Nature ; and the Nature of Man being Reason , the Happiness of Mankind must consist chiefly in the free and vigorous Exercise of his Reasoning Faculty ; or being in such a Condition as that we can do all things that are agreeable to , and avoid all such things as are disagreeable to it . Now all this supposed and granted , as I think none of it can be denied , it will plainly follow , that all such Actions as do Universally approve themselves to the Reason of Mankind , and such as when duly examined and considered , do constantly and uniformly tend towards , and promote the Happiness of Man , considered as to his whole Nature , and chiefly as to that part of him in which his Nature doth more properly consist , which is his Rational and Understanding Faculty : Such Actions , I say , must necessarily be said to be in their own Nature Good ; and their Contraries must be denominated Evil , after the same manner ; for whatsoever is universally Approved , is universally Good : to call a thing Good being nothing else but to declare its conducibility to that end it was designed for . Now according to our Adversary's Assertion , Men call that Good which promotes their own Advantage and Happiness , and so no doubt it ought to be esteemed ; all that they mistake in , being , that they don't understand wherein their true Happiness consists . And therefore if a Thing doth in its own Nature approve it self to the impartial Reason of Mankind , and can on due Examination manifestly appear to conduce to the Interest , Advantage and Happiness of Human Nature ; such a thing must by all Rational and thinking Men be pronounced naturally and morally Good ; and its Reverse , Evil in the same manner . And that this is the case in Reference to that which is commonly called Moral Good and Evil , will appear plain and evident when we shew , 2. That there are some Things and Actions which the Free and Unprejudiced Reason of all Mankind , cannot but acknowledge to be Comely , Lovely , and Good in their own Natures as soon as ever it considers them , and makes any Judgment about them . And this is what is apparent to the Observation of all Men to have been ipso facto done ; and the Truth of it cannot be denied : For have not all Nations in the World agreed in paying some kind of Worship and Veneration to the Deity ? Was there ever any Place where , or Time when , Obedience to Parents , Gratitude for Benefits received , Acts of Justice , Mercy , Kindness , and Good Nature , were not accounted reasonable , good and decent things ? I know some Persons have boldly told the World that 't is quite otherwise , and that there are some whole Nations so Savage and Barbarous as to have no Notion of any Deity , who have no manner of Religious Worship at all , and who have no Notion or Idea of Moral Good and Evil : But when we consider that these Accounts come originally only from a few Navigators , who probably did not stay long enough at those Places to acquaint themselves with the Language of the Natives , and who consequently could not have much Knowledge of their Notions , Opinions , and Customs ; it will be too hardy a Conclusion to inferr positively that Men pay no Worship to , nor have any Idea of a God , only because they did not see them at their Devotions . And moreover , when we have had later and more accurate Accounts of some of those Places , which do plainly disprove the former Assertions , we have good reason , I think , to suspend our assent to them . And then as to their Notions of Good and Evil , it will not follow that they account Stealth and Murder as good and comely things as Justice and Mercy , only because these Relators had some of those Acts committed on them . For commonly they themselves shew them the way , by wickedly Robbing , Imprisoning and Murdering them ; and therefore why the Poor Indians may not return some such Actions upon their Enemies and Invaders , without being supposed to be quite Ignorant of the Difference between Good and Evil , I confess , I do not see . And by what too often appears from their own Relations and Books of Travels , the Indians have not more reason to be thought Savage and Barbarous , than those that give us such an Account of them ; for by their Actions they discover as poor Notions of Morality , as 't is possible for any Men to have . But after all , suppose the Fact true , as I do really believe it is not , That there is any Nation of Men so Stupid as to be quite devoid of any Notion of a God , or of the Difference between Good and Evil : All that can be concluded from hence is , that some Men may for want of Commerce with other Parts of the World , and for want of Thinking , and cultivating and exercising their Rational Faculties , degenerate into meer brute Beasts ; and indeed , as such the Relators describe them ; according to whose Account of them , many Species of the Brute Creation discover more Understanding , and Act , if I may so speak , more rationally ; but it cannot be fairly argued from hence , that they never have had any Notion or Belief of these things ; or that their Reasons will not assent to the Truth of them hereafter , when their unhappy Prejudices may be removed , and they may become civilized by Commerce . Much less sure will this Prove , that there is no Notion of a Deity , nor of Moral Good and Evil in all the other Parts of the World , and amongst Men that can think , and do exercise their Reason and Understanding . Will not a General Rule stand its Ground tho' there be a few Exceptions against it ? Will Men take their Measures to judge of Human Nature only from the Monstrosities of it , from the worst and most stupid Parts of Mankind ? Men may as well argue that all Mankind are devoid of Arms or Hands , or are Universally Defective in any other Part of the Body , because some few are daily born so , or rather have them cut off . We see there are often Natural Defects in Mens Minds as well as their Bodies , and that some are born Fools and Idiots , as well as others Blind and Lame ; and a great many we see make themselves so by their own Fault ; But sure no one will conclude from hence , that all Mankind are Fools and Idiots , unless he be a degree worse than one himself . And yet Men may even as justly make any of these absurd Inferences , as to say , there is in the Minds of Men no Power to distinguish a Natural Difference between Good and Evil , only because there are some Stupid and Barbarous People , among whom no such thing can be discovered . For my part , I do most heartily believe , that 't is impossible for a Rational and Thinking Mind , acting as such , to be insensible of the Difference between Moral Good and Evil : I cannot Imagine that such a Person can think it a thing indifferent in its own Nature , whether he should Venerate , Love and Worship the God that made him , and from whom he derives all the Good he can possibly enjoy ; or whether he should Slight , Despise , Blaspheme or Affront him . It seems utterly impossible to me , that any thinking and considerate Man , should judge it an indifferent thing in its own Nature , whether he should honour and reverence his Father , or abuse him and cut his Throat : or that he can esteem it to be as good and decent a thing to be Ungrateful or Unjust , as it is to acknowledge and to return a Kindness , to render every one their Due , and to behave our selves towards others , as we would have them do towards us . I do not think that the Instances produced by a late Ingenious Writer , of some wild People's exposing their Sick and Aged Parents to die by the Severities of Wind and Weather , nor of others who eat their own Children , are of force to prove that there is really and naturally no difference between Good and Evil , any more than I will believe that he cited those Passages with a design to make the World think so ; for I think , allowing the truth of all these Relations , no such Inference can be thence deduced . A Practical Principle , of the Truth and Power of which a Man may be demonstratively assured , may yet be over-born in some Respects by other Opinions which Ignorance and Superstition may have set up in a Man's Mind . This Gentleman saith , p. 25. Of Human Understanding , That a Doctrine having no better Original than the Superstition of a Nurse , or the Authority of an Old Woman , may be length of time grow up to the dignity of a Principle in Religion or Morality . Now should a precarious and wicked Opinion over-rule a Man in one or two particular Cases , and carry him against the Rules of Morality , will it follow from thence that a Man doth believe those Rules of no Natural Force , and that it is an Indifferent thing whether he observe them or not ? Ought I to conclude , that because I have read of a King that Sacrificed his Son to Moloch , that therefore he believed it as good and reasonable a thing to burn his Children alive , as to preserve , take care of them , and give them a good Education ? Certainly , 't would be a fairer and more reasonable Inference , to conclude that his Reason and Natural Affection was over-power'd by his Idolatrous and Superstitious Opinion ; and that the reason why he did such a Wicked and unnatural Action was because he expected some very great Benefit for it from the Idol , or that he would Inflict some very great Judgment upon him , if he did not do it . And so in the Cases above-mentioned , one may well enough believe that those Barbarous and Inhumane Wretches that Starved their Parents and Eat their Children ; did not nor could not believe it was as good and reasonable so to do , as it would be to preserve them ; but only that they were under the Power of some Wicked Superstition , or Abominable Custom that had unhappily crept in among them ; which they thought it a greater Evil to break ( if they thought at all ) than they did to Act against their Judgment , Natural Reason , and Affection . For this way ( as he observes ▪ ) 't is easie to imagine how Men , may come to worship the Idols of their own Minds , grow fond of Notions they have been long acquainted with there , and stamp the Characters of Divinity upon Absurdities and Errors , &c. p. 26. So that I cannot see any Consequence at all , in asserting the Non-existence of Moral Good and Evil , from a few Barbarous and Ignorant Wretches doing some Actions that bear hard on the Rules of Morality : For notwithstanding that they may be lost in a great measure in some places ; yet these things , and many others that might be instanced in , do certainly carry such Self-evidence along with them ; that a free and unprejudiced Mind must needs perceive which way to determine , as soon as ever they can be proposed to it , and considered of by it . For any one in the World that doth but understand the meaning of the Terms in any of the lately mentioned Moral Propositions , will be demonstratively assured of the Truth of them : And he will see as clearly that God is to be worshipped , that Parents are to be honoured , and in a word , that we ought to do to others as we would be done unto , as he assents to the Truth of such Axioms as these : That a Thing cannot be and not be , at the same Time ; That Nothing hath no Properties ; And that the whole is greater than any one , and equal to all its Parts taken together : For the Reason why all Mankind allow these as first Principles , is because their Truth is so very Apparent and Evident , that they approve themselves to our Reason at first sight . And so , I think , do all these Great Principles in Morality ; they certainly affect impartial and considerate Minds , with as full a Conviction as any of the former can possibly do . And would no more have been denied or disputed than the others are , had they not been Rules of Practice , and did they not require something to be done , as well as to be believed . For he that rightly understands what is meant by the words God , and Worship ; will see the Necessary connexion between those Terms , or the Truth of this Proposition , God is to be worshipped , as evidently as he that knows what a Whole and a Part is , will see that the Whole must be greater than a Part. And no Proposition in Geometry can be more demonstratively clear , than these Moral ones are , to Men that are not wilfully Blind and wickedly Prejudiced against such Practical Truths . For as one hath well observed (a) , Morality may be reckoned among those Sciences that are capable of Demonstration . And that these Moral Truths have a stronger connexion one with another , and a more necessary Consequence from our Idea's , and come nearer to a perfect Demonstration than is commonly imagined ; insomuch , that as he saith in another place , They are capable of real Certainty as well as Mathematicks (b) Now if the case be so , as most certainly it is ; it will plainly follow , that Those things that do thus demonstratively approve themselves to the unprejudiced Reason of all Mankind , must be good and lovely in their own Natures , or Morally so , antecedent to the Obligation of Human Laws , Customs or Fashions of particular Countries . And in this plain Distinction between Good and Evil , which our Reason , when duly used , Impowers us thus at first sight to make , is founded that which we call Conscience : which is a kind of an Internal Sensation of Moral Good and Evil. And this Candle of the Lord , set up by himself in mens Minds , and which 't is impossible for the Breath or Power of man wholly to extinguish (a) ; is as Natural to a Rational Mind , as the Sense of Pain and Pleasure is to the Body ; for as that is given us by the Author of our Natures to preserve us from bodily Evils , and to capacitate us to enjoy such a Kind of Happiness ; so Conscience is our Guard against the Invasions of Moral or Spiritual Evils ; and will , if rightly followed , give us always so much Peace , Joy , and Satisfaction of Soul , as cannot possibly be had any other way . But again ; 2. It is most plain also , That there are some things which do Universally and Naturally tend to promote the Happiness and Welfare of Mankind , and others that do equally contribute to its Misery : And consequently on this Account we must esteem the former to be really and naturally Good things , and the latter , Evil. Now one would think , that one need not spend Time to prove that the Practice of Moral Virtue , doth Uniformly and Naturally promote the Happiness of Mankind , and that Vice and Immorality do as naturally and necessarily tend to its Misery . For doth not any one plainly perceive , that there is no Virtue , or Part of Morality , but what hath some particular Good and Advantage to Human Nature , connected with it , as all Vice and Wickedness hath the contrary ? Doth not a sincere Veneration for that Supream and Almighty Being , from whom all our Powers and Faculties are derived , and a consciousness to our selves that we are obedient to his Will , and consequently under his Protection ; doth not this , I say , bring constant Peace , Comfort and Satisfaction along with it ? and prove our greatest Support under any Troubles and Afflictions ? And on the other hand , hath not generally speaking he that is guilty of Impiety , Profaneness and Irreligion , dismal Doubts and dire Suspicions in his Mind of impending Punishments , and Misery ? Is not such a Mans whole course of Action , a continual state of War in his own Breast , and a constant Contradiction of his Reason and his Conscience ? What hath such a Person to support him , or to give him any comfort on a Sick or a Death-Bed , when the hurry and amusements of sensual Pleasure are over ; and when all the treacherous Enjoyments of this World begin to fail him , and discover themselves to be counterfeit and fictitious ? But again , is it not plain to every one , that Truth , Justice and Benevolence , do Naturally and Essentially conduce to the well being and Happiness of Mankind , to the mutual support of Society and Commerce , and to the Ease , Peace and Quiet of all Governments and Communities ? and doth it not as clearly appear on the contrary that breach of Trusts and Compacts , lying and falsifying of Mens Words , Injustice , Oppression , and Cruelty , do inevitably render that Place or Society miserable where they abound ? What an unexpressible wretchedness would Mankind be in , if Hobbs his State of Nature were in Being amongst us ? i. e. a State wherein no Man would have any Notion of Moral Virtue , but where every one should think himself to have a right to all things , and consequently be still endeavouring to obtain them ; and making it his daily business to vex , rob , ruin and destroy all who opposed his Will , and they also be doing continually the same things against Him , and against one another . A Man must be stupidly and wilfully blind before he can assert such a State as this , to be as happy and advantageous to Mankind , as where all Moral Virtues are observed and exercised : And therefore Mr. Hobbs himself is forced to allow that rational Agents would have recourse to the Enacting of Laws for the due Government and Regulation of Society . But how these Laws should ever come into Peoples Heads , that are supposed to have no manner of Notion of any distinction between Good or Evil , Just or Unjust ; and when there is in reality no such thing , is what I cannot not possibly conceive . On the contrary , I think that the Constant and Universal Support , that these Moral Virtues have always had from Human Laws , is a most demonstrative Argument that Men have always thought them Substantially and Morally Good and Excellent in themselves ; and that they do Naturally and Eternally conduce to the good of all Societies . Indeed , some things may be , and often are Enacted or Prohibited by Human Laws , that have no real nor Intrinsick Goodness , nor Natural Evil in them ; but are only Good and Evil , according to some particular Circumstances and Exigencies of Affairs . And thus God himself was pleased to appoint the Jews many Rites and Observances that had not any real or Intrinsick goodness in them , but only were necessary for the present Circumstances and Condition of that Nation . But then these are every where in Holy Writ , Post-poned to Moral Virtue (a) , declared by God himself to be of much lesser Value ; and whenever there was a Competition between them , these were to give place to those ; which were properly speaking good in their own Natures , and of Universal and Eternal Obligation ; whereas the others were only good pro & nunc . Therefore they are said by the Apostle , to be not Good , i. e. in themselves or in their own Natures ; but only by Institution . But this is not the Case as to such Actions as we have been mentioning , which are called Morally Good or Evil ; for these have been constantly and universally distinguished by Humane Laws , and have never been confounded or changed . For can any Man produce a Law that ever obtained universally against paying Adoration and Worship to the Deity ? against Mens honouring their Parents , or against their being Just , Good , Merciful , and Righteous in their Dealings with one another ? Against such things , as St. Paul tells us , there is no Law. Nor is it possible for our Adversaries to shew us , that the contrary Immoralities were ever universally thought good and lawful ; or allowed and established by any General Authority whatsoever ; and should the Reverses to Moral Virtue be enjoined as Laws , and every one commanded to be Unjust , Oppressive , and Cruel , as now he is enjoyned the contrary , any one may imagine what would be the dismal Consequences of it . 3. But again , Another Argument for the Natural distinction between Good and Evil , may be drawn from the Consideration of our Passions and Affections : For these are so framed and contrived by our Wise Creator , as to guide and direct us to Good , and to guard and preserve us from Evil by a kind of Natural Instinct , which we find in our selves frequently previous to all Reasoning and Consideration . Thus , we perceive a strange Horrour , and very ungrateful Sensations seize upon us immediately , on the sight of a Scene of Misery , or a Spectacle of Cruelty ; and as soon as ever our Ears are entertained with the doleful Relation of such Actions ; so also an Instance of great Injustice or very base Ingratitude , raises a just Indignation in us against the offending Person ; and we cannot avoid being uneasily moved and affected in such Cases . While on the contrary , a very pleasing Satisfaction of Soul arises in us , when we see , or hear of an Instance of great Kindness , Justice , Generosity , and Compassion . Now this Sympathizing of our Natural Affections with our Reason ; and their approving and disapproving the very same things that it doth , is a very convincing Argument that there is an Essential difference between Actions as to their being Good or Evil , and that we have a plain Knowledge of such a distinction . For no doubt God implanted these Passions and Affections in our Natures , and gave them this Turn which we plainly perceive they have , in order to prepare the way for our Reasons more thoroughly assuring us of the Natural Goodness and Excellence of Moral Virtue , when it comes to be Ripe , and sufficient for that End ; and in the mean time , to keep Children and Young Persons , in whom we perceive these Natural Efforts to be very strong , by a kind of Anticipation or Natural Instinct from doing such things as their Reason , freely exercised , will afterwards condemn them for . And now upon the whole , there being thus plainly proved an Essential and Natural Difference between Moral Good and Evil ; and that the Reason of all Mankind freely and impartially exercised doth agree in this Point , that Morality conduces to the Happiness , and Immorality to the Misery of Human Nature : We may very justly conclude from hence , that all other Rational Agents must judge of Good and Evil after the same manner , and plainly distinguish one from the other . And they also must Know and Understand that their Perfection and Happiness ( though they may differ in some Circumstances from us ) doth consist in Acting according to the Eternal Rules of Right Reason and Moral Virtue . For if the Case be not so , several Rational Natures all derived from the same Deity , may come to make contradictory Judgments , even when they Act according to the Great and Common Rule of their Nature . But the Principle of Right Reason , at this Rate , would be the most precarious thing imaginable , and Men could never possibly be assured that they were in the Right in any Point , or knew any thing at all . Assuredly therefore this Great Rule of Right Reason that God hath given his Creatures to govern and direct themselves by , is no such uncertain thing , is in no respect Contradictory to it self ; but must be Uniformly and Constantly the same in all Beings , that are endowed with it , when it is rightly and perfectly followed . And from hence also we cannot but conclude , that the same Eternal , Constant and Uniform Law of Right Reason and Morality that God hath given as an Universal Guide to all Rational Beings , must also be in Him in the greatest and most exquisite Perfection . And that , not only because all Perfections and Excellencies in the Creatures must necessarily be in that First Being from whom they are derived , as I have already proved ; But also , that if it were not so , God must be supposed to have given us a Rule of Action that is contrary to his own Nature , or at least vastly different from it . And that he hath contrived our Powers and Faculties so , as to deceive us in the most Material and Essential Points , and indeed hath left us no possible way of knowing the Truth of any thing whatsoever . For , If when , as I have shewn above , God hath not only fixed in our Natures , a Desire of Happiness ; but also disposed them so , that every Power Faculty and Capacity of them convinces us that the Exercise of Moral Virtue is the Way , and indeed , the only Way to make us entirely happy . If I say after all this , there be no such things as Moral Virtue and Goodness , but that all Things and Actions , both in us and the Deity , are purely and in their own Natures Indifferent ; 't is plain , Reason is the most ridiculous thing in the World , a Guide that serves to no manner of Purpose but to bewilder us in the Infinite Mazes of Errour , and to expose us to Roam and Float about in the boundless Ocean of Scepticism , where we can never find our Way certainly to any Place , nor direct our Course to the Discovery of any Truth whatsoever . But this not being to be supposed of the Deity , who contains in himself all Possible Excellence and Perfection ; it must needs be that our Reason will direct us to conclude the Deity also guided and directed in all his Proceedings by the Eternal Rules of Right Reason and Truth : and consequently that He will and doth always exercise loving Kindness , Judgment and Righteousness in the Earth ; as the Prophet here speaks . And indeed , the Hobbian Notion of a Deity guided only by Arbitrary Will Omnipotent , without any regard to Reason , Goodness , Justice , and Wisdom , is so far from attributing any Perfection to God , or as they pretend , being the Liberty and Sovereignty of the Deity ; that it really introduces the greatest Weakness and Folly , and the most Brutish Madness that can be ! for what else can be supposed to be the Result of Irresistible and Extravagant Will , pursuing the most fortuitous Caprichio's of Humour , without any Wisdom , Ends , or Designs to Regulate its Motions by ? And of this the Ancient Heathens were so sensible , that they always connected Goodness with the Idea that they had of an Omnipotent Mind's being Supream Lord over all things in the Universe ; for Mind not guided and directed by Goodness was , according to them , not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , mere Folly and Madness , and consequently no true Deity . There is a Remarkable Passage of Celsus's to this purpose , which though introduced upon another Design , yet very clearly shews the Idea that the Heathens had of the Goodness and Wisdom of the Deity . God , saith he , can't do evil things , nor will any thing contrary to Nature ( or Reason ) — for God is not the President or Governour of Irregular or Inordinate Desires ; nor of erroneous Disorder and Confusion , but of a Nature truly Just and Righteous . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Orig. contr . Cels. lib. 5. p. 240. Cantabr . Excellently to the same Purpose , is that Saying of Plotinus , The Deity doth always act according to his Nature or Essence , and that Nature or Essence discovereth Goodness and Justice in all its Operations : for indeed , if these things should not be there ( i. e. in God ) where can they else be found ? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; p. 265. Ficin . And 't is plain that the Heathens had a true Notion , that the Deity must be a Good , Just and Righteous Being ; because several of the old Atheists , as Protagoras , &c. argued against the Existence of a Deity , from the Worlds being so ill Made and Ordered as it is , and from there being so much Evil and Misery among Mankind , as they pretended to find in the World ; but now there had been no manner of force in this Argument , and it had been ridiculous to bring it , if , both the Atheistical Proposers of it , and their Antagonists , had not had a clear Notion that Goodness , Justice and Righteousness are naturally included in the Idea of a God. Accordingly Vaninus tells us , That Protagoras used to say , Si Deus non est unde igitur Bona ? si autem est , unde Mala , Amph. Aetern . Provid . p. 90. And the same thing Tully tells us also ( Lib. De Nat. Deorum ) that Diagoras used to object against a Deity . All which sufficiently proves that they were all Agreed that there was some common Standard of Good and Evil ; and that the Notion of a Deity had always these Attributes of Goodness and Justice connected with it . And if this be so , as undoubtedly it is , we shall gain one more good Argument for this Natural and Eternal Distinction between Good and Evil , and a yet much Nobler Foundation for Morality . For we cannot but think , that a God who hath Perfect Goodness , Justice and Mercy , Essential to his Nature , and who hath Created several Orders of Being in the World , to make them Happy , and in order to display his own Glory , by his Just , Kind and Gracious Dealing with them : we cannot but think , I say , that God will give to those of his Creatures , whom he hath endowed with Reason , and a Power of Liberty and Choice , such a Method of knowing his Will , ( the Way that leads to their own Happiness ) as that they shall never be Mistaken about it , but by their own gross Fault and Neglect . And also that he will make the difference between Good and Evil , and between Virtue and Vice so plain and conspicuous , that no one can miss of the Knowledge of his Duty , but by a wilful Violation of those Powers and Faculties God hath graciously implanted in his Nature . And all this we see God hath Actually done : and indeed much more ; having over and above connected very great Rewards with the Practice of Virtue and Morality . And hath either naturally planted in the Minds of Men a Notion of some future State , or else hath given our Nature such a Power , as that we may attain to such a Notion : for we find a very plain Belief and Expectation of such a State , among many of the Ancient and Modern Heathens . And over and above all this , he hath also given us a clear Revelation of his Will in the Holy Scripture , that sure Word of Prophecy and Instruction , whereby we may , if we will , gain a yet plainer Knowledge of our Duty , be more perfectly Instructed in the Method of Eternal Salvation , and find also much higher Encouragements , and much greater Helps and Assistances than we had before in the State of Nature . And all this is vouchsafed us to enforce the more effectually the Practice of Moral Virtue , and to enable us more perfectly to perform those Things , which the Universal Reason of Mankind approves as Good , Lovely and Advantageous to Human Nature . FINIS . Books Printed for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard . REmarks upon some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge , and to the Natural History of the Earth . In Octavo . And , Immorality and Pride the great Causes of Atheism . The Atheist's Objection , that we can have no Idea of God , Refuted . The Notion of a God , neither from Fear nor Policy . The Atheist's Objections , against the Immaterial Nature of God , and Incorporeal Substances , Refuted . A Refutation of the Objections against the Attributes of God in General : In Six Sermons Preach'd at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul , 1698. being the first Six of the Lecture for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By John Harris , M. A. and Fellow of the Royal Society . Dr. Payne's Discourses on several Practical Subjects . In Octavo . Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Christian Religion , in Two Parts . In Octavo . A Serious Proposal to the Ladies , in Two Parts . In Twelves . Letters concerning the Love of God , between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies , and Mr. Norris . A Treatise of the Asthma , divided into Four Parts . In the First is given a History of the Fits , and the Symptoms preceeding them . In the Second , The Cacochymia , that disposes to the Fit , and the Rarefaction of the Spirits which produces it , are Described . In the Third , The Accidental Causes of the Fit , and the Symptomatic Asthmas are Observ'd . In the Fourth , The Cure of the Asthma Fit , and the Method of Preventing it , is Proposed . To which is annex'd a Digression about the several Species of Acids distinguish'd by their Tastes : And 't is observ'd how far they were thought Convenient or Injurious in general Practice , by the Old Writers ; and most particularly in relation to the Cure of the Asthma ; By Sir John Floyer . In Octavo . A Refutation of the Atheistical Notion OF Fate , or Absolute Necessity . IN A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul , November the Seventh , 1698. BEING The Eighth of the LECTURE for that Year , Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle , Esq By JOHN HARRIS , M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY . LONDON , Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin , at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard , 1698. JEREM. ix . 24 . Let him that glorieth , glory in this , that he understandeth and knoweth me , that I am the Lord , who exercise loving kindness , judgment and righteousness in the earth : for in these things do I delight , saith the Lord. I Did , in my last Discourse , begin to Speak to the Second Particular considerable in these Words , viz. An Account of some of those Attributes which God is here said to Exercise in the Earth , and in which he Delights . On which I did not think it necessary to Discourse particularly ; but from thence took an Occasion to Remove two Great Bars to the true Knowledge of God and of his Attributes , which Sceptical and Unbelieving Men had raised in the Way . Which were These : I. That there is in reality no such Things as Moral Good or Evil : But that all Actions are in their own Nature indifferent . II. That all things are determined by absolute Fatality : And that God himself , and all Creatures whatsoever , are Necessary Agents , without having any Power of Choice , or any real Liberty in their Natures at all . The former of These I did then dispatch , plainly proving the Existence of Moral Good and Evil , and answering the Objections against it . I proceed now to speak to the latter ; which is an Objection that our Adversaries are very fond of , and do all of them , upon Occasion , have recourse to . And it is indeed a great Point gain'd if they could make it out , and will effectually destroy all manner of Religious Obligation , and all dread of Punishment for doing amiss . For as one observes on these Three things all Religion is founded : 1. That there is a God who made , presides over , and governeth all things . 2. That there are some things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in their own Natures good and just . 3. That there is also something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , something in our own Power to do , whereby we are Accountable for our Actions , and become guilty when we do amiss . But there can certainly be neither Good nor Evil in any Man's Actions , and no Rewards or Punishments can be the Consequents of them , if nothing at all be in our own Power , if whatever we act or commit , it is absolutely impossible for us to avoid acting or committing . Which yet must be the case , if , as they assert , Things are determined by absolute Fatality ; and that God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are necessary Agents , without having any Power of Choice , or any real Liberty in their Natures at all . I shall therefore at this Time , 1. Shew you that this is plainly their Assertion , from their own words . 2. I shall endeavour to shew the Groundlesness of of those Reasons on which they build their Hypothesis . And 3. from some Arguments , Establish the contrary Position of the Freedom and Liberty of Human Nature . 1. And that this is the Assertion of the Two great Atheistical Writers , is very plain , Mr. Hobbs declares himself to be of the Opinion , (a) That no Man can be free from Necessitation . That Nothing taketh beginning from it self , but from the Action of some other Immediate Agent without it self . And that therefore , when first a Man hath an Appetite or Will to something , to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will , the Cause of his Will is not the Will it self , but something else not in his own disposing . So that whereas it is out of Controversie that of Voluntary Actions the Will is the Necessary Cause , and by this which is said , the Will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not , it followeth , that Voluntary Actions have all of them Necessary Causes , and therefore are necessitated . (b) This ( saith he also ) is a certain Truth ; that there are Certain and Necessary Causes which make every Man to will what he willeth , Ib. p. 306. And then as to the Deity , I have already more than once taken notice , That Hobbs denies Him any Understanding , Sense , or Knowledge ; (c) and asserts him to be without any Ends or Designs in his Actions and Operations . Which plainly makes Him an Agent absolutely and physically Necessary ; as , indeed , follows also from the Notion of his Being Corporeal , which the same Writer every where maintains (d) . Spinoza also is very Express in this Matter , as I have already shewn (e) in some Measure . In mente ( saith he ) nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas ; sed Mens ad Hoc vel illud Volendum determinatur à Causâ , quae etiam ab aliâ , & haec iterùm ab aliâ & sic in Infinitum (f) . And in another place , Voluntas non potest vocari Causa libera , sed Tantum necessaria . (g) And yet on another Occasion , and in another Book , he hath these words , Clarè & distinctè Intelligimus , si ad Nostram naturam attendamus , nos in nostris actionibus esse liberos , & de multis deliberare propter id solum , quod volumus (a) . Which is as plain and palpable a Contradiction to what he , with the same air of Assurance , delivers in other places , as can possibly be . Mr. Hobbs also cannot be acquitted from expresly contradicting himself as to this Point of Liberty and Necessity ; for he tells us in his Reasons for his Opinion ) (b) That he that reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied . That a Free Agent is he that can do if he will , and forbear if he will. And such an Agent he allows Man to be , and saith he hath proved it too . But how he will reconcile this with his Assertion that no Man can be free from Necessitation , and that all our Actions have necessary Causes , and therefore are necessitated , I cannot imagine . As to Spinoza's Account of the Deity , in Reference to this Point , I have given a hint or two of it already . He makes God to be the same with Nature , or the Universe , to be Corporeal and an absolutely necessary Agent ; one who cannot possibly help doing as he doth ; one who hath no Power of Creation , nor doth act according to free Will (c) . But is Limited and Restrained to one constant Method of Acting by the Absolute Necessity of his Nature , or by his Infinite Power . And lest any one should misunderstand him so far , as to imagine that he means by this , that God is by the Excellency and Perfection of his Nature , in all his Operations exactly conformable to the Rules of Justice , Goodness and Right Reason ; He plainly excludes that Notion in these words ; Qui dicunt Deum omnia sub Ratione Boni agere , Hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere , quod à Deo non dependet , ad quod Deus tanquam ad Exemplar in Operando attendit , vel ad quod , tanquam ad certum scopum collimat : Quod profectò nihil aliud est quam Deum Fato subjicere (a) . Now , I think nothing can more shew the wicked Perversness of this Writer's Mind , than this Passage ; For he could not but know very well that when Divines assert the Deity to be Essentially and necessarily Good , they do not mean that Goodness is any thing Extrinsical to the Divine Nature , much less that it is something which hath no dependance upon it : but only that the Excellency and Perfection of his Nature is such , as that it is in every thing exactly conformable to Right Reason ; and therefore this was certainly a wilful Perversion of their Sense , set up on purpose to overthrow the Notion of Moral Goodness in the Deity . But how vain is it for him to tell us , that for the Deity to Act sub Ratione Boni , is for Him to be Subject to Fate , when at the same time he Himself Asserts , that God is in every respect a Necessary Agent , without any free Will , nay , without any Knowledge or Vnderstanding in his Nature at all ? This is so plain a Demonstration , that it was his chief and Primary Design to banish out of Mens Minds the Notion of Moral Goodness , that nothing can be more : and therefore tho' he was resolved to Introduce absolute Necessity into all Actions both Divine and Human ; yet it should be such an one as should leave no Umbrage for any distinction between Good and Evil , or any Foundation for Rewards and Punishments . And in this Notion of Necessity , these Writers follow Democritus , Heraclitus , Leucippus , and that Atheistical Sect ; who maintain'd that there was Nothing in all Nature but Matter and Motion . And therefore when these Modern Writers assert that there is nothing in the Universe but Body , as they do , they run Fate farther than most of the Old Heathen Patrons of Necessity did . For there was none but the Democritick Sect , that supposed Fate to have a Power over the Will of Man ; and in this particular , even they were deserted by Epicurus ; as I observe below . The Pythagoreans , Platonists , and Stoicks agreed that the Mind of Man was free . And 't is well known that the Stoicks did in this Free Power of the Will of Man , found that arrogant Assertion of theirs , That a Wise Man was in one respect more excellent than the Gods ; for they were Good by the Necessity of their Nature and could not help it , whereas Man had a Power of being otherwise , and therefore was the more commendable for being so . There was , indeed , some of the Poets , and some few of the Philosophers too , who did subject the Gods themselves to Fate or Necessity . Thus Seneca in one place saith , Necessitas & Deos alligat ; Irrevocabilis Divina pariter ac Humana Cursus vehit . Ille ipse omnium Conditor ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata , sed sequitur , semper paret , semel jussit . Which Opinion is effectually refuted and exposed by Lucian , in that Dialogue of his called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . As also by Lactantius in his First Book De falsâ Religione , Chap. 11. But this , as I doubt not but Seneca and some others understood in a softer sense than at first sight it appears to have , so was it the Doctrine of but a few ; for generally the Heathens did fully believe that Prayers and Sacrifices would alter a Man's Fortune and Circumstances for the better ; that they would appease the Anger , and gain the Favour and Blessing of the Gods , and that Their Nature was not so absolutely Fatal and Necessary , but that they could freely deal with their Creatures according as they deserved at their hands . For we find Balbus the Stoick mentioned by Cicero , telling us , That the Nature of God would not be most Powerful and Excellent , if it were Subject to the same Necessity or Nature , Quâ Coelum , maria , terraeque reguntur : Nihil Enim est praestantius Deo , Nulli igitur est Naturae Obediens & Subjectus . So that these Writers tread in the Steps of the worst , and most Atheistical of the Heathen Philosophers , and maintain a more rigid Fate , and a more irresistible Necessity than most of them did . But , 2 : I come next to shew the Groundlesness of those Reasons and Arguments on which these Men build their Hypothesis of Absolute Necessity . And first as to the Reasons of Mr. Hobbs . The Chief that he brings against the freedom of Human Actions are these , saith Mr. Hobbs , In all Deliberations and alternate Successions of Contrary Appetites , 't is the last only which we call Will ; this is immediately before the doing of any Action , or next before the doing of it become Impossible . Also , Nothing , saith he , can take beginning from it self , but must do it from the Action of some other immediate Agent without it ; if therefore a Man hath a Will to something , which he had not before : the Cause of his Willing is not the Will it self , but something else not in his own disposing . So that whereas 't is out of Controversie , that of Voluntary Actions the Will is the Necessary Cause ; and by this which is now said , the Will is also Caused by Other things whereof it disposeth not , it follows that Voluntary Actions have all of them Necessary Causes , and therefore are necessitated . Agen also , Every sufficient Cause , saith he , is a Necessary one , for if it did not produce its Effect necessarily , 't was because something was wanting to its Production , and then it was not sufficient . Now from hence it follows that whatsoever is produced , is produced Necessarily , and consequently all Voluntary Actions are Necessitated . And to define a Free Agent to be that , which when all things are present which are necessary to produce the Effect , can nevertheless not produce it , is Contradiction and Nonsense ; for 't is all one as to say the Cause may be sufficient ( i. e. ) Necessary , and yet the Effect shall not follow . This is the Substance of all Mr. Hobbs his Proof against Free Will ; in which , there are almost as many Mistakes as there are Sentences ; and from hence it plainly will appear , that either he had no clear Idea's of what he wrote about ; or else did designedly endeavour to perplex , darken and confound the Cause : For in the first place , He confounds the Power or Faculty of Willing in Man with the last act of Willing , or Determination after Deliberating . And consequently doth not distinguish between what the Schools would call Hypothetical and Absolute Necessity : which yet ought to be carefully done in the Point between us ; for an Agent may be free , and no doubt every Man is free to deliberate on , and to compare the Objects offered to his Choice , and yet not be so after he hath chosen . Then , indeed , Necessity comes in ; 't is impossible for any one to choose and not to choose , or to determine and not to determine ; and after the Election is made , no one ever supposed that a Man is free not to make it . And therefore if by the Will Mr. Hobbs means that last Act of Willing or Electing , which immediately precedes Acting , or which is next before the doing of a thing become impossible , as he expresseth himself ; he fights with his own shadow , and opposes that which no body ever denied : for no Man ever supposed Freedom and Determination to be the same thing ; but only that Man before he determined was free , whether he would determine so and so , or not . And accordingly he himself defines a voluntary Agent , to be him that hath not made an end of Deliberating (a) . Agen , 2. 'T is hard to know what he means here , by Nothing taking its beginning from it self : he is talking about Voluntary Actions , and about the freedom of Human Nature , and therefore should referr this to the Will of Man : but the Instances he afterwards produces , are of Contingent Things (b) , which are nothing at all to his purpose . But if this be spoken of the Will , what will it signifie ? I grant Nothing can take its beginning from itself ; the Will of Man took its beginning from God , and Voluntary Actions ( we say ) take their beginning from the Faculty or Power of Willing placed in our Souls : But what then ? doth it follow from thence , that those Actions we call Voluntary are Necessitated , because that they take their Original from that free Power of Election God hath placed in our Natures , and not from themselves ? I dare say , no one can see the consequence of this part of the Argument . And it will not in the least follow from hence , that the Cause of a Man's Willing , is not the Will it self ; but something else not in his own disposing : Which yet he boldly asserts . It is the Power of Willing , or that Faculty which we find in our selves , of being free ( in many Cases ) to Act or not Act , or to Act after such a particular manner , which is generally called the Will ; and this is commonly said to be free . Tho' I think ( as one hath observed ) (a) it is not so proper a way of Speaking , as to say , the Man is free . For besides that 't is not usual , nor indeed proper , to predicate one Faculty of another ; 't is hardly good sense to say the Will is free , in the manner now explain'd ; for that would be the same thing as to say , that a free Power is free ; whereas it is not the Power , but the Man that hath the Power , that is free . But however the Other way of Expression hath prevailed and doth do so , and I don't think any one is misled by it into Error ; for that which every body understands and means by saying the Will of Man is free , is , that Man hath in his Nature such a free Power , as is called his Will. Now from hence it will not follow that a Man is free whether he will Will , or not ; for he must Will someway , either to Act , or not to Act ; or to Act after such a particular manner . But it will follow , that when a Man hath made any particular Volition , or hath determined the Point whether he shall Act , or forbear to Act , he is then no longer at Liberty , as to this particular Case and Instant ; for the Determination is then actually made , and the Man no longer free not to make it . But this proves nothing at all against the Liberty or Freedom of the Mind of Man. Again , what doth Mr. Hobbs mean by the Will 's being the Necessary Cause of Voluntary Actions ? Doth he mean that the Will of Man must of Necessity act freely , and produce Actions voluntarily ; if he doth , we are agreed ; but if he means that the Will is previously necessitated in every Act of Volition to Will just as it doth , and could not possibly have willed otherwise ; this is to beg the Question , and to take for granted the great thing in Dispute ; 't is to call that out of Controversie , which is the only thing in Controversie ; which indeed , when a Man contradicts the Common Sense and Reason of Mankind , without Proof , is the best way of Proceeding . But that which looks most like an Argument for the Necessity of all Humane Actions , is this which he brings in the last place . That Cause ( saith he ) is a sufficient Cause which wanteth nothing requisite to produce its Effect , but such a Cause must also be a Necessary one ; for had it not necessarily produced its Effect , it must have been because something was wanting in it for that Purpose , and then it could not have been sufficient : So that whatever is produced , is produced necessarily ; for it could not have been at all without , a sufficient ( or necessary ) Cause ; and therefore also , all Voluntary Actions are necessitated . Now all this proves to his Purpose ( I think ) just nothing at all : He proceeds on in his former Error of confounding the Act of Willing with the Power of Willing ; and of making Hypothetical the same with absolute Necessity ; for , not now to dispute what he saith of every sufficient Cause's being a Necessary one ; allowing that when ever any Volition or Determination is made , or when ever any Voluntary Action is done , that the Will of Man was a sufficient Cause to produce that Effect ; nay , that it did at last necessarily produce it ; he can inferr nothing from hence more than this ; That when the Will hath determined or willed , 't is no longer free to Will , or Nill that particular thing at that particular Instant ; which I don't believe any Body will ever , or ever did deny . But this will not prove at all that the Will was necessitated to make that Determination à Priori , and that it could have made no other ; which yet is what he means , and ought to have clearly made out . For the same Power or Faculty of Liberty , which enabled it to make that Determination , would have been a sufficient Cause for it to have made another contrary to it , or differing from it : and then when that had been made , it would have been as necessary as the former . And therefore that Definition of a Free Agent 's being that , which when all things are present which are needful to produce the Effect , can nevertheless not produce it , ( tho' I don't think it the best ) doth not , when rightly understood , imply any Contradiction , nor is it Nonsense at all . For the meaning of it is , That he is properly Free , who hath the Power of Determination in himself ; and when all Requisites are ready , so that nothing shall extrinsecally either hinder him from , or compel him to Act , can yet choose whether he will Act or not . Thus , if a Man hath Pen , Ink and Paper , and a place to write upon , his Hand well and at Liberty , and understands how to write ; he hath all things present that are needful to produce the Effect of Writing ; yet he can nevertheless not produce that Effect ; because he can choose after all , whether he will write or no. Mr. Hobbs defines a Free Agent to be him that can do if he will , and forbear if he will , and that Liberty is the absence of all external Impediments (a) ; which if he intended any thing by it , but to palliate a bad Cause , and to amuse the Person he wrote to , is as much Nonsense and Contradiction to what he himself advances about Necessity as is possible . For how a Man can be said to Act necessarily , that hath no external Impediments to hinder him , or Causes to compel him , but is free to Act if he will or forbear if he will , is what I believe no Man can possibly conceive . Thus we see plainly , that this great Patron of Necessity hath very little to say for his Darling Notion , and that he plainly contradicts and is Inconsistent with himself . Had he indeed dared speak out , and thought it time to declare his Opinion freely , he would , no doubt , have proceeded on other Grounds in this Point , and made use of Arguments more agreeable to his Set of Principles : which being allowed him , would have demonstrated an absolute Necessity of all things whatsoever . For he was a thorough Corporealist , and maintained that there was nothing more in Nature , but Matter and Motion ; which if it were true , it is most certain , that all Things and Actions must be inevitably Fatal and Necessary ; for ( as Mr. Lock well observes ) nothing but Thought or Willing , in a Spirit , can begin Motion . The Necessity therefore in such an Hypothesis would be the true Ancient Democritick Fate , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or , as Epicurus calls it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a through Material necessity Mechanically producing all Things : or the Fate of the Naturalists , who held nothing besides Matter and Motion . But this Notion , for some Reasons best known to himself , he did not think fit to insist on , when he wrote this Tract against the Liberty of Human Nature . Tho' his Successor Spinoza , with a little Variation did ; whose Arguments we must next consider . Spinoza , as I have formerly shewed , was an Absolute Corporealist as well as Mr. Hobbs ; but finding that Cogitation could never be accounted for from Matter and Motion only , he supposes Cogitation Essential to Matter ; and as he makes but one only Substance in the World , which is the Matter of All Things , or God ; so he supposes Cogitation to be one of the Essential Attributes of this Deity , as Extension is the other . And from hence he concludes , That all things , according to the Infinite variety of their several Natures , must necessarily flow from God or the whole , and must be just what they are , and cannot be , nor could not possibly have been , any otherwise (a) . He doth indeed Stile the Deity Causa Libera , and say he is only so (b) . But the reason he assigns for it , is only because nothing can compel him to , or hinder him from doing any Thing ; but he expresly denies him to have either Understanding or Free Will (c) . And he declares oftentimes , That all things flow from the Deity by as Absolute a Necessity , as that the Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right ones . And then as to the Mind of Man , he gives this Reason why it cannot have any free Will ; Quia mens ad hoc , vel illud Volendum determinatur à Causâ , quae etiam ab alia , & haec iterum ab aliâ & sic in Infinitum (d) . The same thing also he asserts in another Place (e) , and from thence undertakes to prove also , that God cannot have any Free Will ; and withal saith , That Understanding and Will , as they are called , belong to the Nature of God , just as Motion and Rest , and other Natural Things do , which are absolutely determined to Operate just as they do , and cannot do otherwise (a) . This is the Argument of Spinoza , to prove that there is no such thing as freedom in the Nature of Man , but that he is determined in every thing by Absolute and Inevitable Necessity . And this Necessity also 't is plain according to him , is purely Physical and Mechanical . As to the Refutation of which , I think , I have already effectually removed the foundation on which it is all built , by proving that there are such Beings as Immaterial Substances , and that God himself is such an One , or a Spirit (b) . For all the Necessity Spinoza contends for , depends purely on his Notion of the Deity ; as appears sufficiently from what I have produced of his words . If therefore it be true , that God be an Immaterial Substance , a Being Distinct from Nature , or the Universe ; and the Creator and Producer of all things , ( as I think I have very clearly proved ) 't is most certain that the whole Chain of Spinoza's Argument for Necessity is broken to pieces . For the Reason he assigns for the necessary Operations of the Deity , are not the Perfections of his Nature determining him to Good and Just , Lovely and Reasonable things ; but that the Deity being Universal Nature , All things and Operations are Parts of him , and their several Ways and Manners of Acting and existing according to the necessary Laws of Motion and Mechanism , are his Understanding and Will : which Ignorant People , he saith , may perhaps take in a literal Sense , and think that God can properly Know or Will any thing ; but that in reality there is no such thing as Understanding or Free Will in God , since all things flow from Him by Inevitable Necessity . And if there be not any freedom in the Deity , that is in the whole , there can be none in Men , or in any other Beings , who are but Parts of him . If this indeed be true , that there is no other God but Nature ; then 't is easie to see that all things must be governed by absolute Fatality , and be in every respect Physically necessary ; there can then be no such thing as Contingency , or any Voluntary Actions ; and if we were sure of this , 't is indeed the greatest Ignorance and Folly in the World , to pretend to talk any thing about it . But on the other hand , if there be a Deity who is an Infinitely perfect Being , distinct from Nature : who Created all things by the Word of his Power , and for whose sole Pleasure they are and were Created , then none of those Consequences will follow ; but it will appear very reasonable to believe , that God hath still a Care and Providence over that World which he made at first : and that he delights to exercise loving Kindness , Judgment and Righteousness in the Earth ; as the Prophet here speaks : That he hath made some Creatures capable of Knowing and Vnderstanding this , and who consequently have a free Power , as in other things , so of giving Praise and Glory to so Great and Wonderful a Being , nay , and of Glorying themselves in being capacitated to attain so Excellent a Knowledge . And that Man hath such a Power or Freedom of Will , in his Nature , is what I shall now proceed in the last place plainly to prove . 1. And the first Argument I shall make use of to demonstrate this , shall be the Experience of all Mankind . And this , one would think , should be of great Weight , and turn the Scale against all the Atheistical Metaphysicks in the World ; and so , no doubt it would , were it not wicked Mens Interest to advance the contrary Notion . Now that we have a free Power of deliberating , in many Cases , which way 't is best for us to proceed ; that we can act this way or that way , according as we like best ; and that we can often forbear whether we will Act at all , or not , is a Truth so clear and manifest , that we are ( I think ) almost as certain of it as we are of our own being and Existence ; and 't is an unimaginable thing how any Man can be perswaded that he hath no such Power (a) . Indeed , one may by Sophistical words , Metaphysical Terms , and abstruse Unintelligible Banter , be perhaps a little amused and confounded for the present . But that any one should by such a Jargon be persuaded out of his Senses , his Reason , and his Experience , and continue in that Opinion , is what I do believe never yet befel any Rational and Thinking Man. When Zeno brought his silly Sophisticals Argument to prove there was no such thing as Motion ; his Antagonist thought it to no purpose to return an Answer to what plainly was contradictory to the common Sense of Mankind ; and therefore convinc'd him only , by getting up and Walking . And the very same Return will baffle and expose all the Pretended Arguments for Necessity . For 't is plain , He had a Power first whether he would have walked or not , he could have walked Five Turns , or Fifty ; he could have gone across the Room , or length-wise ; round it , or from Angle to Angle . And I dare say , no Sophistry or Metaphysicks whatever would have convinced him that none of these were in his Power , when he plainly found them all to be so ; any more than he was convinced a Body could not move out of its place , when he had seen and tried a Thousand times that it would . 'T is the same thing in reference to the Thoughts of our Minds , as it is in the Motions of our Bodies . We plainly find we have a Power in abundance of Cases , to preferr one thought before another , and to remove our Contemplation from one Notion or Idea to another : We can , in our Minds , compare and revolve over the several Objects of our Choice ; and we can oftentimes choose whether we will do this , or not ; and this Internal Freedom in Reference to our Thoughts and Idea's , we do as plainly perceive , and are as sure of , as we are that we can voluntarily move our Body or any part of it from place to place . And as I have plainly shewed you above , our Adversaries do grant and allow this when it is for their Turn . But they will say , tho' we seem to be free , and do think and perceive our selves to be so , yet in reality we are not ; and it is only our Ignorance of Things and Causes , which induces us to be of this mistaken Opinion (a) ; and the Idea of Liberty which Men have is this , that they know no Cause of their Actions ; for to say they depend on the Will , is to talk about what they do not understand , and to use words of which they have no Idea's at all . To which , I say , that I cannot but be of the Opinion that it is a good Rational way enough of Proceeding , to pronounce of things according as we do experience them to be , and to declare them to be that which we have all the Reason in the World to think and believe that they really are . And I think we may well enough own and be contented with the Charge of Ignorance here laid upon us . For the Case is thus : We think our selves free , because we plainly find and experiment our selves to be so in a Thousand Instances ; and this also these Penetrating Gentlemen sometimes , as I have shewed , do kindly allow ; and we are indeed wholly Ignorant of any Causes that do absolutely determine us to Action ; or which do necessitate us in what we do ▪ previous to that free Power which we find in our selves ; so that plainly perceiving our selves to have this free Power , and being Ignorant of any true Reason why we should believe we are mistaken in what we perceive and know , we do , indeed , ( such is our Ignorance and Weakness ) embrace the Opinion that there is a Liberty of Action in Human Nature . And this free Power or Liberty which we find in us , we not being deep Metaphysicians , call the Will ; by which we understand , as I have shewed before , not any Particular Act of Volition , but the Power or Faculty of Willing . And since we plainly perceive that in many cases we are not determined to Action by any thing without us , but do choose or refuse , act or not act , according as we please ; and being withal grosly Ignorant of any Cause these Actions have , but what we find and perceive them to have , we call our free Will the Cause of these Actions , and say they depend on it : and yet after all , do we not find out , that we talk about what we do not understand , and use words that we have no Idea of . But our Adversaries , it seems , have a quite different rellish of things , they soar in a higher and more subtle Region , they will not condescend to speak common sense in this Matter ; Tho' they plainly understand , ( as they tell us ) that they are really free as to many Actions , and can deliberate whether they will do them or not , purely because they have a free Power so to do (a) ; tho' they are satisfied that they can act if they will , or forbear if they will (b) ; yet they say this is in reality a Mistake , and that there is no such thing as freedom after all , but that all Actions are absolutely necessitated . And as for the Power or Faculty which is vulgarly called the Will ; that sometimes is one thing sometimes another , according as they think fit to name it . Sometimes 't is an Act of Volition that follows the Ultimum dictamen Intellectûs , and sometimes 't is the Understanding itself (c) . Now 't is nothing but an Idea (d) , and by and by a meer Ens Rationis (d) , or an Imaginary Cause of Action , which Ignorant Men have fansied that they have in themselves (e) . So hard is it for Men that fly so high , to have a distinct view of any thing below . But I proceed , 2. To another Argument , for the freedom of Humane Nature ; and that is , the monstrous Absurdities and Consequences of the contrary Opinion . For the Assertion that all our Actions are necessitated , it perfectly destroys the Notions of Good and Evil , Rewards and Punishments , and of all manner of Obligation both to Divine and Human Laws : and consequently is the most Destructive Principle , that can be advanced , to the Good of Society . I have already proved that there is a Natural Distinction between Actions as to Good and Evil , that this is plainly discoverable by the Light of Reason , and that all Nations in all Ages of the World have been sensible of it ; and if this be proved , ( as I think it hath been ) we ought not to desert it , only because we can't readily solve all the Difficulties about the Freedom of the Will of Man , which a Sceptical Man may raise against it ; much less ought we to embrace an Opinion that perfectly Contradicts it ; as this of absolute Necessity certainly doth . For if all things and Actions whatever are absolutely Necessary , and cannot possibly be otherwise than they are ; there can be no such thing as Good or Evil , Right or Wrong , Honourable or Base , &c. And why should any Creatures trouble themselves about paying any Veneration to the Deity , if that he could not help making them just such as they are ? and if he hath absolutely necessitated them to do just as they do ? God hath , according to these Horrid Principles , no Natural Right to any Obedience from us , as a free Agent would , who had out of his own gracious Goodness bestowed so many Gifts and Mercies upon us . This Mr. Hobbs well knew , and therefore he tells us , That there is no Obedience due to God out of Gratitude to him for Creating or Preserving us , &c. (a) but what we pay him , is founded only in his Irresistible Power . And so likewise , as to Human Laws and the Good of the Government or Commonwealth where we are placed . No Man , according to these Abominable Tenets , hath any Obligation upon him to obey Rulers , to be just and honest in his Dealings , to be loving and merciful , helpful and beneficial to his Neighbours ; but he may Rebel , Murder , Rob , and Oppress , without being Subject to any guilt at all ; and if he can but escape Punishment from the Magistrate he is safe enough , and hath no reason to be disturbed in his own Mind ; for he can't help any of all this , he is under an absolute necessity of doing what he doth , and no one ought to blame him for it . Indeed , Spinoza says , That the Government may , if they think fit , put such a Man to Death ; but not because he is Guilty and deserves it , but because he is Mischievous and Dangerous to them , and therefore is to be feared . And when one wrote to him on this Point , alledging , that if the Will were not free , All Vice would be excusable ; he Answers , Quid inde (a) ? Nam homines mali non minus timendi sunt , nec minus perniciosi , quando necessariò mali sunt . By which he plainly allows that all Wickedness is excusable , tho' it be not always tolerable , as it is not when it becomes formidable . Fear is that which according to these Men doth every thing in the World , in this Case . A Subject pays Obedience to the Laws , not because he thinks himself bound in Conscience so to do , or because it is just and reasonable ; but because he is afraid of Punishment if he do not do it . And the Magistrates Punish an Offender , not because they think he hath committed any Fault , or is Guilty of any Crime properly speaking ; but because They are afraid of Him , and under an apprehension that he is likely to do them a Mischief . And thus a Man that is guilty of all manner of Immorality , an Assassinator of Princes , a Firer of Cities , a Betrayer of his Country , a Poisoner , Coiner , a Common Robber , or the most flagitious Villain that can be imagined , is as Innocent as a Saint from any guilt of Sin he hath upon him ; for he is necessitated to do what he doth , he can't help it , any more than another Man can , that acts virtuously , as 't is called : and therefore he may and ought to have as much Peace and Satisfaction in his own Mind , and as much Respect and Honour paid him from others too , provided they are not afraid of him , as ever any Man had . But will not such a Principle as this be the most mischievous and dangerous to Mankind that can possibly be ? Doth it not open a Door to all the Wickedness that can possibly enter into the Heart of Man to commit ? And consequently ought not all Governments to be afraid , as they themselves would express it , of Men that vent such Notions as these , so plainly contradictory to , and inconsistent with the Good of Human Society ? And as this is a most pernicious , so 't is the most Impudent and Daring Opinion that ever was advanced : for it charges all Mankind in all Ages of the World , with the most gross and palpable Folly that can be : For , besides that it gives the Lye to the Experience and certain Knowledge of every Body , as I shewed before ; it renders all Laws , and Rules of Action , and all the Sanctions of them , ridiculous : it makes all Advice and Exhortation useless , and to no purpose ; all Censure , Punishment and Reproof is Vnjust and Unreasonable ; All Honours and Rewards it renders Unmerited ; And all Knowledge , Wisdom , Care and Circumspection , become by this means , the most foolish and unaccountable things in the World ; for if all things are governed by Absolute Fatality , any one may see that all these things signifie Nothing at all , but 't is plain , the Wisest Part of the World as they have been justly esteemed , are in reality the greatest Fools and most stupid Idiots that can be : for they encourage Men to act well , and discourage them from doing amiss , by Elaborate and Studied Methods , when after all , 't is impossible according to this Notion , that any one can possibly avoid doing just as he doth . Nor can I see how these wonderful Discoverers themselves , that have thus luckily found out that all Mankind are mistaken in thinking themselves Free , when they are not so ; I can't see , I say , how according to their own Notions they can be acquitted from being as Ignorant and Mistaken , and as arrant Fools as the rest of Mankind . For why do they write Books , and spin out such Elaborate Treatises as they fansie they do ? and why should they set themselves up above others , and expect Praise and Glory for their fine Thoughts and elevated Notions ? they can 't sure be so Ignorant as to expect to convince any Body , or to Proselyte any one over to their Opinion ? Can any Man help being of that Opinion he embraces ? if he can , he hath free Will , and is not necessitated to hold what he doth hold ; which destroys all they are so studiously advancing . But if he cannot alter his Opinion freely , but is absolutely necessitated to believe what he doth believe ; how ridiculous is it to pretend to Dispute or Argue in such a Case ? They will say , no doubt , that they are necessitated to write , and can't help it : But if the Government should Plead the same thing , for Punishing them for so doing ; they would , we know , make a large out-cry against Persecution , and the Infringement of that Native Liberty , that every Man hath to enjoy his own Opinion . For these Gentlemen make use of Liberty and Necessity , according as it best serves their purpose . When they commit Immoralities and Wicked Actions ; they then ought not to be punished either by God or Man , because they are necessitated to do it , and can't help it . But if a Government , judging such Notions destructive to the Good of Human Society , and contrary to the express Word of God , thinks fit to Prohibit the Propagation of them , and to Punish the Authors of them : How do these Men then Cry up the Liberty of Human Nature ? then every Man's Opinion ought to be free , no Compulsion must be used , every Man's Conscience is to be his Guide , and the like . But how ridiculously Vain is all this , according to these Principles ? Is not the Magistrate as much necessitated to Punish as they are to Offend ? and the Government to make Laws as they are to break them ? Oh by no means ! They would be free to Sin and to commit Wickedness , and then necessitated not to be Punished . They would have Men think them necessitated in all their Actions , so as to excuse them from blame , and they would have the Magistrate free to forbear Punishing them , tho' he think them never so guilty . That is , in short , they would do what they please , and no one should call them to an Account for it ; they would act like Fools , and yet be thought Wise Men ; they would proceed contrary to Reason , and yet have the Reputation of having Principles , and pursuing the Dictates of Reason and Truth : And they would build themselves a Reputation in the World by advancing Paradoxes contrary to the common Sense and Reason of Mankind : by pretending to a higher pitch of Knowledge than their Neighbours , and by calling all the rest of the World Fools and Ignorant . In a word they would say , with those in the Psalmist , We are they that ought to speak , who is Lord over us . This , I am fully perswaded , is what they aim at in all their Arguments and Objections against Religion , and particularly in the bustle that they make about this Point , of the Absolute Necessity of All Events and Actions . Which how weakly they Prove , and how contradictorily they Maintain , against the Common Sense and Experience of all Mankind , I think I have sufficiently shewn . FINIS . ADVERTISEMENT . REmarks upon some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge , and to the Natural History of the Earth . By John Harris , M. A. and Fellow of the Royal-Society . In Octavo . Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A45638-e540 (a) Pensees diverses Ecrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne à l'Occasion de la Cométe qui parut au Mois de Decembre , 1680. Rotterdam . 8 vo . (a) Vid. Jul. Caes. Vanini Amphitheatr . in Titulo & Epist. Dedicator . (b) Despicere unde queas alios , passimque videre Errare , atque viam palantes quaerere vitae . Lucr. lib. 2. (a) Vid. Great is Diana of the Ephesians . Animus tamen in supremae & vulgo Philosophantibus incognitae Philosophiae Arcanit investigandis validior factus & robustior ; ut Physico-Magicum nostrum , quod mox ex umbrâ in lucem prodibit pellegent , aequa posteritas facilè est Judicatura . Notes for div A45638-e3780 (a) Two Essays from Oxford , in the Apology . (a) Adv. Mathem . p 317 , 318 , &c. Genevae , 1621. (b) Pensees diverses à l' Occasion de la Comete , Tom. 2. §. clxxiv . p. 531. (c) Anim. Mand. p. 96. (d) Amphitheatr . D. Providentiae , p. 35. (a) Vid. Blount's Translation of the Life of Apollonius , p. 84. (b) Anima Mundi , in the Oracles of Reason , p. 54. (c) Amphitheatr . p. 151 , 334. Lugdun . 1615. (d) Blount's Translation of Philostratus's Life of Apollonius , in the Preface . (a) Blount's Anima Mundi , in Oracles of Reason , Pre● . (b) Amphitheatr . p. 124. (c) Pag. 152. Leviathan , p. 208. (c) Sextus Empiricus allows , that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a common Notion or Idea of a God , even when he dispu●es against him . Adv. Math. p. 333. (a) Hob's Leviath . p. 11. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. Vid. Sext. Empiric . adv . Mathem . p. 164. (b) Sext. Emp. (a) Hobb's Leviathan , p. 51. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Sext. Empir . adv . Ma●● . p. 17. And a little after , he asserts , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (c) Leviath . p. 11 , 190. (d) Leviath . Par. iv . c. 46. p. 374. (e) Pag. 190. (f) Adv. Mathem . p. 333. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Sext. Empir . adv . Math. pag. 150. (b) Vid. Mr. Lock 's Essay of Vnderstanding . P. IV. Ch. X. Notes for div A45638-e8080 (a) Blount's Life of Apollon . p. 19. (b) Leviath . p. 338. (a) Life of Apollon . p. 3. (b) Oracles of Reason , p. 158. (c) Blount's Life of Apollon . in the Preface , and p. 24. (a) Causa , à qua Superstitio oritur , conservatur & fovetur , metus est . Tract . Theol. Polit. in Praef. (b) Si Homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent , vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret ; nulla superstitione tenerentur : sed quoniam eò saepè angustiarum rediguntur ut consilium nullum ad ferre queant , inter spem metumque misere fluctuant , ideo animum ut plurimum , ad quidvis credendum pronissimum habent . Ibid. (c) Ea omnia quae Homines unquam vanâ Religione colucrun● , nihil praeter Phantasmata , animique tristis & timidi fuissé deliria . Ibid. (d) Ex hàc itaque Superstitionis Causâ ( sc. metu ) clarè sequitur omnes homines naturâ superstitioni esse obnoxios : quicquid dicant alii , qui putant hoc inde oriri , quod omnes mortales confusam quandam Numinis Idaeam habent . Ibid. (e) Leviath . p. 51. (f) Leviath . p. 26. 51. (a) Leviath . p. 54. (b) Caetera , quae fieri in Terris Coeloque tuentur Mortales , pavidis cùm pendent mentibu ' saepè Efficiunt Animos humiles formidine Divùm , Depressosque premunt ad Terram , propterea quòd Ignorantia Causarum conferre Deorum Cogit ad Imperium Res , & concedere Regnum : Et Quorum operum causas nullâ ratione videre Possunt , haec fieri Divino numine rentur . Lib. 6. v. 49. (c) Lib. 5. v. 1160. Nunc quae causa Deum , &c. (d) Ii qui dixerunt totam de Diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus Reipublicae causâ . (e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Plato de Legib. lib. 10. (f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Sext. Emp. adv . Math. p. 310. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) Praeterea , cui non animus formidine Divùm Contrahitur ? cui non conrepunt membra pavore Fulminis horribili cum plagâ torrida tellus Contremit , & magnum percurrunt murmura Coelum ? Non Populi Gentesque tremunt ? Regesque superbi Conripiunt Divùm perculsâ membra timore Ne quod ob admissum foedè , dictumque superbè Poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum ? Lucret. l. 5. v. 1217. (a) Vid. Archbishop Tillotson's First Sermon , p. 47. (a) Rom. 1.20 . (a) Blount's Life of Apollon . in the Preface . (a) Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra Est oculos ausus , primusque obsistere contra : Quem nec fama Deûm , nec sulmina nec minitanti Murmure compressit Coelum . — Lib. 1. v. 67. (b) — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Adv. Math. p. 314. (a) Sext. Empiric . Adv. Mathem . p. 316 , 317. (b) Vbi supra . (a) Leviathan , p. 87. (b) Ib. p. 7. (c) Ib. p. 238. (a) Pag. 36. (a) In omnium Animis Deorum Notionem natura ipsa impressit . De Nat. Deorum , lib. 1. (b) Quae Gens est , aut quod Genus Hominum , quòd non habeat sine Doctrinà , anticipationem quandam Deorum , quam appellat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Epicurus . Ib. c. 32. (c) Tuscul. Quaest. l. 1. De Legib. l. 1. (d) Vid. Epist. 117 , 118. De Benefic . 4.4 . (e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Adv. Mathem . p. 314. (f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Dis. 1. p. 5. (g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . De Coelo , l. 1. c. 3. (h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. Aristot. Metaph. l. 14. c. 8. p. 483. Paris . 1654. Notes for div A45638-e12130 (a) Joseph . Antiquit . l. 11. c. 8. (a) 1 Chron. 29.11 , 12. Job 12.9 , &c. Isa. 44.24 , &c. Acts 17.24 , 25 , &c. (b) Rev. 4.8 . Jam. 1.17 . Deut. 33.27 . (c) 2 Chron. 6.18 . Jer. 23.24 . Jer. 17.10 . & 20.12 . (a) Leviath . p. 19. (b) Leviath . p. 371.207 . (c) Leviath . p. 11. (a) Leviath . p. 17.207 . (b) Leviath . p. 208. (c) Leviath . p. 214. (d) Answer to Bishop Bramhall , p. 31 , 36. (e) Ethices Pars 2. Prop. 2. p. 42. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Sophist . p. 172. Ficin . (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Metaph. l. 1. c. 7. (c) Dr. Cudw . Intel. Syst. p. 20. (a) Praeterea nihil est quod possis dicere ab omni Corpore sejunctum , &c. Lib. 1. v. 431. (b) Adv. Math. p. 267. (a) Leviath . p. 373. (b) p. 372. (c) Leviath . p. 190. & De Cive C 15. §. 14. And in another place , he saith , Mens nihil aliud est praeterquam motus in quibusdam partibus corporis Organici . (d) Leviath . p. 207 , 208. (e) Leviath . p. 373. (a) See my Second Sermon . Essay of Human Vnderstanding , p. 143. (a) Lib. de Nat. Deorum , & Tuscul. Quaes● . lib. 1. (a) De Irà Dei , c. 11. p. 742. Oxon. Lib. 1. c. 3. (b) Plutarch de Placitis Philosoph . Lib. 1. c. 3 ▪ p. 876. * Sext. Empir . adv . Mathem . p. 309. (a) De Placit . Philos. l. 1. c. 3. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . In Polit. p. 547. Ficin . (a) Adv. M●th . p. 155. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Nat. Auscult . l. 8. c. 15. (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Lib. de Placitis Philos. 4. c. 2. p. 898. (a) De Placitis Philos. Lib. 1. c. 3. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Adv. Math. p. 32. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Arist. Metaph. l. 1. c. 3. p. 842. Paris . (b) Dr. Cudw . in his Intellectual Syst. of the Vniverse . Notes for div A45638-e16840 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , saith Anaxagoras . Vid. Diog. Laert. (a) Oracles of Reason , p. 126 , 127. (a) Observ. on Dr. Bentley's Serm. p. 6 , 7. (a) Metaph. l. 1. c. 3. (a) Arrian . Lib. 1. c. 5. (b) Lib. 1. Metaph. c. 3. (a) Dr. Cudworth , Dr. Bentley , and others . (b) Observations on Dr. Bentley's Sermon , p. 10. (a) Op. Posthum . p. 12. & 14. (a) Op. Post. p. 21.6 . 4 , 5. (b) Ib. p. 12. (c) Ib. p. 14. (d) Ib. p. 11. (a) Quando attribuimus Deo sensus , Scientiam & Intellectum , quae in nobis nihil aliud sunt quàm suscitatus à rebus externis organa prementibus animi Tumultus , non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Hobbs de Civ . c. xv . §. 14 . p. 271. The same thing he saith also , Leviath . c. 31. p. 190. (b) Omnia Inevitabili necessitate ex Dei Naturâ sequi statuo . Op. Past. p. 453. Vid. etiam , p. 24 , 18 , 26 , &c. (c) Op. Post. p. 24. (d) P. 28. (e) P. 36. (f) P. 37. Notes for div A45638-e20230 (a) Amphitheatr . Provid . Aetern . p. 9. (b) Humane Nature , p. 69. (c) Leviath . p. 374. (d) Leviath . p. 191. (e) Leviath . p. 192. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Adv. Math. p. 317. (b) Leviath . p. 190. (a) Sermon 4 th . and 5 th . (b) In my Second Sermon . (a) Ep. 95. (b) De Benef. lib. 4. (a) Leviath . p. 190. (a) Leviath . p. 24 , 63 , 64. Spinoza Oper. Posth . p. 37. (b) Leviath . p. 187. * Plato calls the Deity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the very Idea or Essence of Good. And herein he seems to have followed the Pythagoreans and Timaeus Lacrus in particular : Who asserts of Mind , according to him the first Principle of the Universe , that it is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the Nature of Good : And saith further , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that they call it God , and the Principle of the best things . Aristotle also reckons Moral Goodness among the Perfections of the Divine Nature : And Plutarch saith , 't is one of the chiefest Excellencies in the Deity ; and that on this account it is that Men love and honour Him. Hierocles in Carm. Pythagor . asserts the Deity to be Essentially Good , and not by Accidental or External Motives . Notes for div A45638-e23840 (a) Anima Mund. in Or. of Reason , p. 117. (b) Oracles of Reason , p. 89. (a) A. Bish. Tillots . Serm. Vol. 4. p. 315. (b) Op Posthum , p. 164. (c) Ibid p. 37. Vid. etiam , p. 171 , 185 , 360 , &c. (d) Leviath . p. 24. (e) Ibid. p. 63 , 64. (f) P. 73. (g) Ibid p. 79. (h) Vid. Hum. Nature , p. 38. Element . de Cive c. 1. §. 2. (a) Blount's Life of Apollonius , p. 151. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — Pyrrh . Hypot . p. 46. And again , p. 147. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (c) Vid. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. p. 450 , 451 , &c. 462 , 463 , &c. (a) Spinoz . Op. Posthum . p. 36. (b) Ostendamad Dei naturam neque Intellectum neque Voluntatem pertinere . Ibid. p. 18. Vid. Etiam , p. 29. (a) Essay of Human Understand . p. 274 , 275. (b) Pag. 284. (a) Essay of Hum. Understand . p. 276. (a) Mich. 6.8 . Deut. 10.12 . 1 Sam. 15.22 . Psal. 50.8 . Notes for div A45638-e26960 Dr. Cudworth in Preface to his Intellectual System . (a) Hobbs Tripos , p. 297. (b) Ibid. p. 312. (c) Vid. Sermon V. p. 51. Serm. VI. p. 5. (d) Vid. Serm. V. p. 49. (e) Serm. V. p. 51. (f) Spinoza Op. Posthum . p. 85. (g) p. 28. (a) Princep . Philos. Cartes . Demonstrat . p. 103. (b) Hobbs Tripos , p. 314. (c) p. 29. Op. Posthum . and p. 33 , 18. (a) Op. Posth . p. 32. (a) Tripos , p. 311. (b) Ibid. 315. (a) Mr. Lock , in his Essay of Humane Vnderstanding . (a) Tripos , p. 314. (a) Ex necessitate Divinae naturae , Infinita Infinitis modis sequi debent . Op. Posthum . p. 16 , 18. (b) p. 17. (c) p. 18. Tract . Theol. Polit. c. 4. p. 63. (d) Op. Posthum . p. 85. (e) p. 28. (a) p. 29. (b) Vid. Serm. 4 , & 5. (a) Had it not been a thing Undeniable that the Will of Man is free , and had not Epicurus , and his Follower Lucretius , very well known that it was a thing which every one could not but experience in Himself , he had certainly , as a very Learned Person observes ( Dr. Lucas Enquiry after Happiness , Vol. 1. p. 156 , 157. ) followed his Old Master Democritus , and asserted the Mind of Man to be as necessarily and fatally moved by the strokes of his Atoms , as Natural and Irrational Bodies are . But this Opinion he was forced to desert , and to assert the Liberty of the Soul of Man ; and 't was to make this out according to his Senseless Hypothesis , that he Invented that Unaccountable Oblique Motion of his Atoms ; which Lucretius calls Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum . Lib. 2. (a) Falluntur homines quod se liberos esse sutant , quae opinio in hoc solo consistit , quod suarum Actionum sint conscii , & Ignari Causarum à quibus determinantur . Haec ergo est eorum libertatis Idea quod suarum A●●ionum nullam c●gnescunt Causam . Nam quod aiunt humanas Actiones à Voluntate pendere verba sunt quorum nullam habent Ideam . Eapt . Spinoz . Op ▪ Posthum , p. 73. Vid. etiam , p. 37. (a) Spinozae Princip . Philos. Cartes Demonst. p. 103. (b) Hobbs Tripos , p. 314. (c) Spin. Op. Posth . p. 87 , 88. (d) Ibid. p. 399. (d) Ibid. p. 399. (e) p. 73. (a) Leviath . p. 187. (a) Spinoz . Op. Posthum . p. 586