obligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is
that it adds the duty of respect owed to God to the duty of fidelity
owed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more
trustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a
promissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are
other sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against
religion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in
case of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin
against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see
2246 a).

(b) The obligation, other things being equal, is less than that
produced by a vow, because the vow binds in virtue of fidelity to God,
but the oath only in virtue of respect. The obligation of fidelity
seems to be stronger, because unfaithfulness always contains
disrespect, but not vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a vow not only
the fulfillment of the promise, but the thing promised itself is
sacred, which is not true in the case of an oath. An assertory oath,
however, seems to be more binding than a vow, because it is a greater
injury to God to make Him the witness for falsehood than to break a
promise made to Him.

2261. Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The
obligation is grave, from the nature of an oath, because the virtue of
religion is preeminent among the moral virtues (see 2146). There is no
doubt that mortal sin is committed when one gives a sworn promise and
has no intention to fulfill it, for this is perjury (see 2250 b); and
also when one unjustly refuses to live up to an important engagement
made under oath, for this is irreligion and injustice in a serious
matter. The remarks on grave matter in vows (2211) apply here, but,
since the vow obliges more strictly, a somewhat greater amount is
needed for serious matter in violation of an oath.

(b) The obligation may be light on account of the smallness of the
matter involved. Even a vow, which is more binding than an oath, may be
of venial obligation in this way (see 2211). A person who makes a
promise under oath, fully intending to keep the promise, but who later
changes his mind without sufficient reason, does not show disrespect to
God, since when the oath was made he intended to abide by it, and does
not seriously injure his neighbor, since, as we suppose, the matter of
the oath is small. The sin, therefore, is one of inconstancy or levity,
and, if there is disrespect, it is slight. Thus, if a person who had
sworn to drink no more wine took a drop now and then, these
transgressions would be only venial. Some authors, however, believe
that every unfaithfulness to a promissory oath, no matter how small the
subject-matter, is a grave sin, because perjury is committed by the
breach of promise. This is commonly denied, because the meaning of a
promissory oath is that God is called on to witness the truth of a
present intention and the obligation (great or small) of a future
performance.

2262. Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.--The obligation of a
promissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or
extrinsically.

(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in
the matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in
Herod's oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has
ceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the
latter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich),
or when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates
the obligation.

(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State
or a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the
right and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father
nullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the
Church absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by
commutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow
into something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute
vows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath
is detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only
the Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary
reason (see Canon 1320).

2263. Adjuration.--Adjuration is the invocation of the name of God used
in a request or command to another person in order to move that person
to do or omit something.

(a) It is an invocation, and in this respect it is like an oath, for
both an oath and an adjuration call upon the name of God.

(b) It calls upon the name of God either explicitly (e.g., "I command
you in the name of God") or implicitly (e.g., "I beseech you for the
sake of the passion of Christ"). If command or request is made in the
name of a creature and without reference to God's attributes reflected
in them, there is not, properly speaking, an adjuration, as when one
implores a favor from another person in the name of a Patron Saint, or
of one's country, parents, friendship, etc.

(c) It is used in a command or a request, and thus it differs from
prayer, which cannot be made in the form of a command. But adjuration
may be used in prayers to God Himself or to the Saints, as is done in
obsecrations.

(d) Its purpose is to move another to an act or omission, and thus it
is different from an oath. The end of an oath is to confirm one's words
by the testimony of God; the end of an adjuration is to influence
another to a certain course through an appeal to his respect, fear or
love of God.

2264. The Species of Adjuration.--(a) Adjuration is solemn or simple
(private). The solemn adjuration is made in the name of the Church by
her ministers and in the ritual form prescribed by her, as in the
exorcisms of Baptism. The simple adjuration is made by private persons
and without ritual ceremony.

(b) Adjuration is imperative or deprecative. The imperative is given in
the form of a command to inferiors or demons, as when St. Paul writes
to the Thessalonians: "I charge you by the Lord that this epistle be
read" (I Thess., v. 27). The deprecative is given in the form of a
request made to God or to any creature not damned, as when St. Paul
writes to the Romans: "I beseech you, brethren, by the love of God that
you present your bodies a living sacrifice" (Rom., xii. 1).

2265. Qualities of Lawful Adjuration.--Adjuration is lawful and an act
of the virtue of religion, since it professes reverence for the divine
attributes in using them as the most efficacious motives of appeal.
But, like an oath, adjuration must be accompanied by qualities that
make it lawful.

(a) Thus, there must be judgment, and hence those persons are guilty of
sin who employ adjuration without necessity (e.g., those who constantly
urge the love of God and other religious motives when asking for any
favor), or without devotion (e.g., those who in anger are wont to
command "for God's sake," etc.). The sin committed does not seem grave,
since there is no great disrespect and the malice consists in taking
God's name in vain, not in insult.

(b) There must be truth, and hence an adjuration is sinful when used
for a lying cause, as when a well-to-do person pretends to be indigent
and begs that alms be given him for the love of God. The sin committed
does not seem grave, since the act to which the other person is invited
is good, and the act of adjuration itself does not ask God to testify
to the lie, but only uses His name without reason. If the deception is
mortally sinful, however, some authorities think that the adjuration
added to it is a grave sin against religion.

(c) There must be justice, and therefore an adjuration is sinful when
used to obtain something unlawful, as when one demands in the name of
God that another person tell a lie or commit murder. The adjuration is
gravely irreverent to God if the thing sought (e.g., murder) is a
mortal sin; it is lightly irreverent, according to the common opinion,
if the thing sought (e.g., a harmless lie) is only a venial sin.

2266. Persons Who May Be Adjured.--God may be adjured, but only in a
deprecative manner, as is done in the obsecrations, "through Jesus
Christ," "through Thy Passion and Death," etc. The purpose of
adjurations addressed to God is not to change the divine decrees, but
to obtain through His goodness what He intended from eternity that we
should obtain by prayer. But the same form of adjuration cannot be used
for all creatures.

(a) Thus, deprecative adjuration may be used in reference to those who
are in some way one's superiors. Hence, we may pray the Angels and
Saints to grant a prayer for the love of God, and a beggar may ask in
Our Lord's name that a wealthy man give him an alms.

(b) Imperative adjuration may be used in addressing subjects or
inferiors. Adjuration of demons must not be made in friendly words, nor
with a view to obtaining services or knowledge from them, but in words
of reproach and only as a means to end their nefarious activities.

(e) No kind of adjuration may be used in regard to irrational
creatures, since they are without knowledge sufficient for receiving a
command or a request. The adjurations of animals, the elements,
inanimate objects, etc., that are contained in the Ritual, must be
understood as deprecative adjurations addressed to God, or imperative
adjurations addressed to evil spirits, that the creatures prayed over
may be to our benefit and not to our hurt. Examples are the exorcisms
of water, salt, mice, locusts, houses, or storms.

2267. The Use of Exorcisms.--(a) As to their effect, exorcisms are of
two kinds, exorcisms in the strict sense (i.e., the expulsion of demons
from possessed persons) and exorcisms in the wide sense (i.e., the
diminution of demonic influence). Examples of the former are found in
the Gospels, where Our Lord drives out many evil spirits from afflicted
persons; examples of the latter are found in the exorcisms administered
in Baptism and in the exorcisms of salt, water and other inanimate or
irrational creatures.

(b) As to their manner, exorcisms are also of two kinds, the solemn and
the private. The former are made in the name of the Church in the
manner prescribed by the Ritual, and their administration is reserved
to clerics who have a special and express permission from the Ordinary
(Canon 1151, § 1). The latter kind may be made even by members of the
laity, and we read that certain Saints, like St. Anthony and St.
Catherine of Siena, had great power over evil spirits. It is
recommended that priests frequently use private exorcisms, at least
secretly, for persons who are vexed by temptations or scruples, and for
which they may use the form: "In the name of Jesus Christ, unholy
spirit, I command you to depart from this creature of God."

2268. The Effects of Adjurations.--(a) Adjurations addressed to one's
fellow-men upon earth impose no obligation of religion upon the persons
addressed. Hence, if a rich man turns a deaf ear to an appeal for
charity made in the name of God, he violates charity but not religion;
if a child disregards a command urged upon him for the love of God, he
violates obedience but not religion.

(b) Adjurations addressed to demons are not of infallible efficacy, at
least as to the entire effect intended, for power over the spirits of
darkness is given only in such measure as is needed for the propagation
of the Gospel. But we believe that an exorcism pronounced lawfully by
one who has the Order of Exorcist acts _ex opere operato_, at least to
restrain the wickedness of the demons: "In My name they shall cast out
demons" (Mark, xvi. 17).

2269. Praise of God.--Having discussed oaths and adjurations, in which
honor is shown the name of God, and the immediate end of which is or
may be some human advantage, we come now to the honor shown the name of
God by praise in which the immediate end is some spiritual advantage.
Praise is defined as "the declaration of another's greatness with
approval." The divine praises include the prayers of wonder, of honor,
of thanksgiving; but they differ from prayer properly so called or
petition (see 2153).

2270. Internal and External Praise of God.--(a) Internal praise is
expressed by the thoughts and affections of the soul. This is the most
important part of praise, and without it external praise loses much of
its value. Our Lord reproved the Pharisees for honoring God with their
lips, while their hearts were far from Him (Matt., xv. 8), and St. Paul
admonishes the Ephesians to sing and make melody to the Lord in their
hearts (Ephes, v, 19).

(b) External praise is expressed in words ("I will bless the Lord at
all times, His praise is always in my mouth," Psalm xxxiii. 1), or in
song ("Admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual
canticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God," Col., iii. 16), or
by music ("Praise Him with sound of trumpet, with psaltery and harp,
with timbrel and choir, with strings and organs, with high-sounding
cymbals," Psalm cl).

2271. Excellence of Praise of God.--(a) Praise Is Due to God.--His
essence and attributes are ineffable and above all praise (Ecclus.,
xliii. 33), and they must be honored by the superior acts of worship
and reverence. But the effects of His goodness shown to us should be
declared and glorified: "I will remember the tender mercies of the
Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord hath bestowed
upon us" (Is., lxiii. 7).

(b) Praise of God Is Advantageous to Man.--Internal praise lifts the
soul on high and prepares it to receive benefits from God, while
external praise helps the mind to keep its attention fixed on God,
excludes those things that are contrary to Him, and offers edification
to others. St. Augustine narrates in his _Confessions_ how profoundly
he was moved in spirit, even to tears, on hearing the hymns and
canticles of the Church.

2272. Qualities that Should Be Present in the Divine Praises.--(a)
Internally, there should be devotion. It is useful that those who
perform or assist at the praises of God understand what is said, but it
suffices for devotion that they know His greatness and goodness is
being proclaimed. The intention should be to honor God, and hence there
is no act of personal religion if in reciting or hearing God's praises
one intends only ostentation or pleasure; attention should also be
given to what is said, and hence St. Augustine says that it is a sin to
think rather of the music than of the praise of God proclaimed by the
music (see 2164 sqq.).

(b) Externally, the divine praises should be respectful to God and
helpful to recollection and devotion. Hence, the law of the Church
excludes from her services all that is of a disturbing, profane or
sinful character, such as theatrical displays, musical instruments that
distract the mind from religious thoughts, lascivious airs or those
suggestive of the dance. The Code prescribes that impure music of every
kind must be eliminated from churches (Canon 1264), and Pius X in his
Motu Proprio of 1903 lays down the rule that there must be nothing in
the services of the Church that is calculated to diminish piety, give
reasonable scandal or disgust, or offend the decorum of sacred
functions or the sacredness of the place (see also Instruction on
Sacred Art [Holy Office, 30 June, 1952], AAS 44-542). The sin committed
by misbehavior or levity during divine services depends on the
seriousness of the disrespect shown to God or the scandal given the
beholders.

2273. The Sins against Religion.--Inasmuch as religion is a moral
virtue and therefore consists in the observance of a golden mean, the
sins opposed to it are the extremes of excess or defect. (a) The sins
of excess offend, not because they offer too much worship to God (a
thing that is impossible), but because they exceed by giving worship
where it is not due or in a manner that is not due (superstition). (b)
The sins of defect offend by denying due religious reverence to God
Himself (temptation of God, perjury) or to sacred things (sacrilege,
simony).

2274. Superstition.--Superstition is false religion, or a vice that
offers improper worship to the true God or divine worship to a false
god. Improper worship of the true God is either false or superfluous.

(a) False worship is opposed to the truth of religion (e.g., Old
Testament rites which signify that Christ is still to come), or of
rites (e.g., Mass by a layman, Mass according to a form disapproved by
the Church), or of facts (e.g., fictitious revelations, ecstasies,
mysticism, miracles, relies), or of morals (e.g., human sacrifice,
praises of God to the accompaniment of lascivious words or music, etc.).

(b) Superfluous worship is offered when an external observance in no
way serves the purposes of religion (viz., the glory of God, the
elevation of the soul to Him, the repression of the passions), or is
opposed to law or common custom. The purposes of religion are not
served by actions foolish in themselves (e.g., the repeated mumbling of
meaningless sounds) or in their intent (e.g., undue emphasis given to
minor details of a religious act, such as color of the candles on the
altar, the stature of the celebrant, the hour or condition of the
weather, etc., as if weighty consequences depended on them). The chain
prayer is another example of a superstition that places all the virtue
of an act of worship in some small external circumstance. The law and
custom are not followed in such superstitions as additional crosses,
alleluias, credos, etc., made in violation of Mass rubrics, or a
devotion consisting of fasts on Sundays, or new forms of piety that
lack ecclesiastical approval. There is no superstition, however, in
modes of worship approved by the Church (such as novenas, tridua,
Gregorian Masses, and the like), for the Church recognizes no devotion
or ceremony unless it is true and useful as an expression of religion.

2275. The Sinfulness of Improper Worship of God.--(a) False worship is
from its nature a grave sin; it is seriously insulting to God because
it offers Him dishonor as honor, and it is also seriously harmful to
man because it casts discredit by its falsity on the name of religion.
(b) Superfluous worship is from its nature a venial sin, since it
contains no notable irreverence towards God and, being outlawed, does
not reflect on religion. Accidentally, however, it may be a mortal sin,
as when it is performed in such a way as to cause great scandal.

2276. Worship of False Deity.--Worship of a false deity is performed by
offering a creature an act of homage due to God alone. Hence, there are
three species of this superstition: (a) a creature is recognized as
God, when it is offered a service (such as sacrifice) that testifies to
supreme and infinite excellence (idolatry); (b) a creature is given the
credit of divine knowledge, when instruction about hidden matters which
only God could bestow is asked from it (divination), (c) a creature is
treated as the supreme ruler, when assistance which only God can grant
is sought from it (vain observance).

2277. Definition of Idolatry.--Idolatry is the supreme worship of
_latria_ offered to a creature.

(a) It is supreme worship, and hence the inferior reverence of
_hyperdulia, dulia_, or civil honor, offered respectively to the
Blessed Mother, angels, saints, superiors, etc., is not idolatry. The
external signs of worship that belong to God alone (such as sacrifice,
temples, priesthood, altars, etc.), may never be used in the veneration
of creatures; nor the signs that are common to God and creatures (such
as genuflexions, prostrations, prayers, etc.), if the intention is to
adore.

(b) Idolatry is offered, that is, by it an act of worship is intended
or is at least performed in a serious manner. Hence, it would not be
idolatry so to enact a pagan ceremony that the onlookers could
understand that no religious rite was being performed (e.g., if it were
done on the stage, or in a joking manner).

(c) Idolatry is offered to a creature, and hence the relative honor
that is shown the images of the Trinity or of Christ on account of the
persons represented by them is not idolatry. The creature to whom
idolatry is shown is either a person (e.g., an Angel, the soul of a
departed person, a living human being), or an irrational creature
(e.g., the bull Apis, a sacred plant), or an inanimate substance (e.g.,
statues or pictures, the elements, the heavenly bodies), or a
fictitious being (e.g., Jupiter and the other gods of mythology).

2278. The Kinds of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is either internal or
external. Internal idolatry has the intention to adore a creature, as
when a Satanist offers sacrifice to demons. External idolatry performs
an outward rite that signifies adoration of a creature, although there
is no will to give adoration, as when a Christian out of fear of death
reluctantly burns incense before an idol. (b) Internal idolatry is
either perfect or imperfect. Perfect idolatry includes belief in a
false god, as when an ignorant pagan prays to the sun and moon.
Imperfect idolatry is committed when, without belief in a false god,
there is the will to offer it divine worship on account of hatred of
God, wish to obtain favors from demons, or the like.

2279. The Sinfulness of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is a most grievous
crime. It entails rebellion against the majesty of God, attack on the
virtue of religion, unbelief or denial of faith, and scandal; and hence
it is forbidden in the first commandment: "Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me. Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them" (Exod., xx.
3 sqq.).

(b) Idolatry in itself and in its highest degree is the most grievous
of sins, for it includes both hatred of God (since it would deprive Him
of His unique excellence by giving His honors to creatures) and
blasphemous unbelief (since the idolater publicly professes that God is
not above all). Now, it was said above that unbelief, hatred of God and
blasphemy are the most enormous of sins (see 820, 895, 1301, 1302), and
so it follows that the worst form of idolatry is graver than other sins.

(c) Idolatry, by reason of the dispositions of the person who commits
it, may be less grievous than other sins. Thus, it is worse to hate or
deny God internally than to worship an idol externally only; it is
worse to blaspheme with great hatred and contempt than to practise
idolatry with less malice. Imperfection of the act, as in cases of
ignorance or want of consent, makes the sin venial, or no formal sin at
all.

2280. Comparison of Different Sins of Idolatry.--(a) Internal idolatry
is worse than external idolatry, because the former, though not the
latter, includes approval of the superstition committed. (b) Imperfect
idolatry is worse than perfect idolatry, if both be considered
precisely as idolatry, since the former proceeds from malice, and the
latter from greater or less ignorance. (c) External idolatry is
aggravated when its motive is more sinful or makes the act more
voluntary (e.g., it is worse to pretend sacrifice to an idol if the
motive is to ingratiate oneself with the idolaters or to spite the
Christians, than if the motive is to escape death at the hands of the
pagans).

2281. Idolatry Possible in Christian Worship.--The guilt of idolatry
may be incurred even by Christians offering worship to God. (a) Thus,
in the adoration of the Eucharist there would be idolatry, at least
material, if an unconsecrated host were exposed for veneration or given
in communion. (b) In the veneration of the Saints there would be
idolatry, if they were honored or invoked as if they possessed divine
attributes.

2282. Definition of Divination.--Divination (soothsaying,
fortune-telling) is a form of superstition in which the evil spirits
are invoked explicitly or implicitly with a view to the discovery of
what is future or occult.

(a) It is a form of superstition, because it seeks to obtain through
natural means knowledge that cannot be had except from God, or
substitutes other teachers for God.

(b) It contains the invocation of evil spirits, for the information
sought surpasses the powers of nature and, being illicit, cannot be
expected from supernatural powers that are good (such as God, the
Angels, the Saints).

(c) The invocation is explicit or implicit. There is explicit calling
on the evil spirits when one prays to the demon or makes an agreement
with him; there is implicit invocation when one does not address an
evil spirit, but does employ means for the discovery of knowledge which
are not adequate, either from their nature or from the will of God, for
the desired effect.

(d) The knowledge desired is of future or occult things, that is, of
such things as cannot be foreseen in their causes or discovered by
natural means (such as the future acts of free beings, the secret
thoughts of the heart).

2283. Distinction between the Fact and Sin of Divination.--(a) The fact
of divination--that is, the actual manifestation by evil spirits of
things humanly unknowable--is not impossible, since the demons are far
superior to man in intelligence and knowledge, and it is the teaching
of revelation that they use their powers to mislead and seduce mankind.
Their knowledge, however, does not extend to future contingencies, nor
to the secrets of hearts, and their word cannot be relied on. A case of
real communication by an evil spirit is that of the girl of Philippi
possessed by a pythonical spirit (Acts, xiv. 16-18), and some think
that the same can be said of the Witch of Endor (I Kings, xxvii. 7-25);
but no doubt there have been many instances of divination in which the
intervention of demons was only imaginary.

(b) The sin of divination is committed when one has the will to receive
occult knowledge from forbidden sources, or uses the means to obtain
knowledge from those sources, even though there be no communication or
response on the part of the spirits of evil.

2284. Forms of Explicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is
explicit invocation of the demon is of various kinds according to the
medium through which instruction is given or expected.

(a) Thus, the medium is direct if it is an external sensible appearance
representing the demon (_præstigium_) or an internal picture in the
imagination or a dream containing his answer (oneiromancy).

(b) The medium is indirect and rational when it is a human being, dead
or living. Divination through the evocation of the departed is known as
necromancy, while that which is given through living possessed persons
is called pythonism. Modern Spiritism partakes of the character of both
necromancy (since the spirits of the departed are consulted) and
pythonism (since persons supposed to be under the control of familiar
spirits act as mediums).

(c) The medium is indirect and irrational when it is some solid body
(such as iron, stone or crystal) in which figures or signs appear;
idols from which oracles are received; tables or ouija boards from
which answers are given by raps or writing; divining rods supposed to
lead the way to any hidden person or thing, etc. (geomancy); or some
liquid body (hydromancy), or air (aëromancy), or fire (pyromancy), or
the entrails of sacrificial victims or natural prodigies, such as
lightning (haruspicy). Here also may be mentioned the superstition of
ordeal by fire, boiling water, combat, etc., once used to determine the
guilt or innocence of an accused person.

2285. Forms of Implicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is only
implicit invocation of evil spirits is manifold, just as the natural
causes from which preternatural knowledge is expected are manifold.
Among the principal forms are the following:

(a) that which is made from the human mind, when clairvoyance or
clair-audience is employed. It is supposed that certain persons have
the natural gift, at least when in a trance or hypnotic state, of
perceiving what is done or said at a distance without any of the normal
means of communication, and even of reading minds. This supposed inborn
gift is sometimes called second sight or telepathy. Some authorities
hold that there is sufficient evidence for vision at a distance as a
sixth sense in certain individuals, especially among primitive peoples
and persons bound by a tie of blood or intimate friendship. Moreover,
many facts learned through telepathy seem to have been verified
sufficiently to render telepathy probable. Accordingly, to believe
telepathy or to practice it, excluding all superstition and invocation
of demons, is not illicit.

(b) divination that is made from the human body in physiognomy,
phrenology, and chiromancy. The physiognomist pretends that he is able
to discover the hidden character, latent abilities or defects, secret
thoughts, etc., by a study of the features or expression of the
countenance. The phrenologist claims that he can read the mental and
moral traits of a person from the bumps or prominences of the skull.
The chiromantist, or palmist, promises to foretell the future, read the
past, discover the present secret character and aptitudes of an
individual from an inspection of the shape, lines and configuration of
his hand and of the character of the lines and marks of his palms;

(c) divination that is made from non-human and necessary events in
astrology. This pseudo-science gives predictions about the fortunes of
an individual drawn from a study of his horoscope (i.e., the aspect of
the heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth) and of certain rules of
interpretation;

(d) divination that is made from non-human and contingent events in
augury and auspice, which divine from the voices or manner of flight of
birds; in omen or portent, which divine the future from some chance
happening (such as meeting with a red-haired woman or a hunchback, a
sneeze, etc.), in sortilege, which divines by lots or signs arbitrarily
chosen (such as the letters that appear on opening a book at random,
the numbers or figures that appear when cards are drawn or dice
thrown). Superstitions about omens are of two kinds, some happenings
being regarded as signs of good luck (e.g., to find a pin), others as
signs of bad luck (e.g., to meet a black cat, to spill the salt, to
break a mirror, to raise an umbrella in the house).

2286. The Malice of the Sin of Divination.--(a) The Theological
Species.--If there is explicit invocation of evil spirits, divination
is of its nature a mortal sin that admits of no lightness of matter,
for it gives divine worship to a creature, acts on friendly terms with
the enemy of God, and prepares one for apostasy and eternal damnation.
If there is no explicit invocation of the spirits of evil, the sin is
of its nature mortal on account of the implicit commerce with the
devil; but generally the sin will be light on account of the
dispositions of the offender (e.g., because he is ignorant, or consults
divination as a joke or from curiosity, or has no faith in it). Hence,
the faithful should be warned not to go to fortune-tellers or put faith
in dreams, but, apart from such cases as serious scandal, habitual
direction of one's life by superstition, coöperation in serious sin of
a diviner, etc., the sin will usually be venial, at least in young
people. Persons who occasionally act or omit to act in some indifferent
matter on account of dreams they have had are often excused from all
sin on account of the fear or hope which the dreams excited.

(b) The Moral Species.--All forms of divination, it is commonly held,
belong to the same species of worship of a false god (Deut., xviii.
10-12). Yet, the confessor should be told about an explicit pact with
evil spirits, if there was one, since thus he will be able to decide
the gravity of the sin and to make inquiries about other sins that
usually accompany such a pact (e.g., blasphemy, promise to serve the
devil, sacrileges, etc.).

2287. When Knowledge Is Obtained from God.--There is no sin of
divination when knowledge is obtained from God.

(a) Thus, God can communicate directly in a vision or dream, and there
are examples of this in Scripture, But generally one should not be
guided by dreams as if they were means for supernatural knowledge,
since nearly all dreams are produced by natural causes. It is not
sinful to believe that a dream of an extraordinary kind (e.g., one in
which the future is wonderfully foretold or a warning given, or which
produces great spiritual good) was sent by God.

(b) God can communicate through other human beings, and hence it is not
superstitious to put faith in the private visions or revelations that
have been recognized by the Church, or that have the marks of
genuineness required by the Church.

(c) God has sometimes communicated through the instrumentality of
irrational beings or by means of portents. Thus, Gedeon took the words
of enemy soldiers as a premonition of victory (Judges, vii. 15);
Eliezer chose a sign by which to recognize the woman who should be the
wife of Isaac (Gen, xxiv. 14); the ordeal of bitter waters was
prescribed in Numbers, v. 11 sqq.; Josue discovered the guilt of Achan
by lots (Josue, vii. 14), and St. Matthias was elected to the
Apostolate by lots (Acts, i. 23-26). But these were exceptional cases
in which men were inspired to consult God as they did, and it would be
superstitious to seek knowledge in these ways against the will of God.
Those who desire light and guidance should have recourse to the
teachers God has provided on earth and should pray to God, leaving to
Him the ways and means of His answer. Hence, the Church has declared it
unlawful, even in private, to call upon the good spirits to give
answers through automatic writing (_Collect. de Prop. Fide_, 1894), or
to interrogate the dead at spiritistic seances (AAS, 1917, IX, 268). It
is not superstitious, however, in a grave matter when there is no
ordinary means of instruction at hand, to offer a prayer to God and
then have recourse to lots to decide what course shall be followed
(Prov., xvi. 33).

2288. When Knowledge Is Obtained Through Natural Causes.--There is no
sin of divination when knowledge of the future or of hidden things is
obtained through proportionate natural causes or indications.

(a) Thus, knowledge of future happenings is naturally deducible from
their necessary causes, when these causes are known. The effect may be
predicted with certainty if the cause is so determined to one course
that its result is invariable (e.g., the revolution of the earth around
the sun always brings on the four seasons of the year); it may be
predicted with the greatest probability if the cause is so constituted
that almost always it has a certain consequence (e.g., a seed properly
planted usually grows into a tree). Hence, there is no superstition in
astronomical predictions, weather forecasts by meteorologists, tables
of life expectancy drawn up by insurance experts, etc., since these are
inferences from known scientific laws.

(b) Knowledge of hidden things is naturally deducible with more or less
certainty from the presence of their known causes, or effects, or
indications. Hence, a physician is not accused of superstition if he
reasons out the character or phase of an internal disease from the
symptoms that exhibit themselves. Moralists today generally agree that
the use of the magic wand (divining rod, dipping rod, dowser) for the
discovery of subterranean springs, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc.,
is not superstitious, although there is some difference of opinion and
uncertainty about the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that many
means of detection or discovery, supposedly scientific, are due to
misunderstanding of scientific principles or of logic; but their
authors, since they rely on natural causes, are guilty of ignorance or
quackery rather than superstition.

2289. Use of Lots.--Is it lawful to use lots in settlement of some
business, when there is no intention to seek preternatural oracle?

(a) It is lawful to do this, if there is some reason of necessity or
utility or amusement to justify the lots, and no injustice or
prohibition of law. Hence, if there is no other convenient method of
decision, one may use the drawing of straws or cards to decide how
lands or goods shall be divided between claimants, or which of several
competitors shall receive a reward or office.

(b) It is not lawful to do this, if there is a prohibition of law
(e.g., ecclesiastical elections may not be made by lot), or if there is
no necessity for the lots (e.g., it is at least foolish to use the
Gospels for deciding by lot matters that could be decided by
reflection), or if injury is done another person (e.g., to decide by
lot when the merits of two contestants are unequal, to practise
unfairness in the drawing).

2290. Vain Observance.--Vain observance is a superstition that ascribes
to certain things effects for which they have no natural or
communicated power.

(a) It ascribes the effects to natural things, but it supposes that in
some way supernatural forces, not of religion, are at work in or
through these things. Thus, just as in divination, there is in vain
observance either an express or an implied invocation of the spirits of
evil. The alchemists, who thought there was a philosopher's stone able
to transmute base metals into gold or an elixir that could greatly
prolong life, looked to natural causes, and hence to that extent seem
to be guilty of false science, rather than of superstition. Scientific
materialism, though, is a crasser form of ignorance than any
superstition that trusts in super-material powers.

(b) The things which vain observance makes use of are persons, acts,
objects, circumstances, happenings, etc. Even sacred things may be
employed as the material for vain observance, as happens when some
accidental and unnecessary circumstance of a sacred rite (e.g., the
size or color of candles) is given the credit of the sacred results.
Here again vain observance and divination are alike, since the same
means are employed by both.

(c) The effects looked for in vain observance, or the purpose had in
view, is some fact or event. It is this characteristic that
distinguishes vain observance from divination: the latter aims at
occult knowledge, the former at supranatural results. The expected fact
or event is something that surpasses the natural powers of physical or
human agencies (e.g., sensation without sense excitants, mind-reading
without external indications, scientific knowledge without study,
bodily feats without corresponding bodily powers, detection of secret
and hidden things without human means for detection), or even of the
invisible world of spirits (e.g., creation, generation of new
substances, evocation of the dead, internal motion of man's will).

(d) There is no natural power in the things used for producing the
substance or mode of the desired effects, that is, no inherent and
sufficient force or activity. Hence, vain observance is not to be
confused with scientific marvels or natural wonders whose explanation
is unknown to the general public, or which cannot be fully explained by
scientists themselves. Thus, the baffling tricks of white magic are due
to legerdemain, ventriloquism, ocular delusions, and the like; the
physiological changes (e.g., convulsions, hysteria, somnambulism,
bodily cures) produced in mesmerism, hypnotism, thought healing, etc.,
are explained by suggestion and the motor power of images excited to
produce bodily motions, passions, or changes; the mental phenomena
(e.g., hyperæsthesia, wondrous visions, increased vigor of mind) of
certain drugs such as hashish, mescal and opium, are caused by
properties of these drugs.

(e) There is no communicated power in the things employed, that is, no
instrumental virtue bestowed by a higher cause. Hence, since
Sacraments, sacramentals, and miracle-working relics have from God in a
greater or less degree an efficacy for results above nature, there is
no superstition in their proper use, But, as was noted just above,
sacred things themselves may be used superstitiously, as happens when
they are regarded as principal agents, or when, contrary to fact, they
are deemed to act infallibly or independently of any human coöperation
or disposition.

2291. Forms of Vain Observance.--Among the forms of vain observance are
the following:

(a) those by which one puts into use vain ceremonies or objects in the
expectation that they will secure certain desired effects, or puts an
exaggerated confidence in lawful rites or sacred objects;

(b) those by which one directs one's life through fortuitous and
impertinent happenings in the belief that they have the power to
influence one's fortunes favorably or adversely. This form of
superstition is like divination by omens; the difference is that in
using omens one chiefly seeks for knowledge of the future, while in
observing chance events one chiefly intends the direction of one's
conduct. Examples are found in persons who fear to make a journey on
Friday or to begin any important affair during the dark of the moon.

2292. Vain Observances from which Desired Effects Are Expected.--(a)
Useful results are sometimes expected, such as knowledge for the mind
(notorious art) or health for the body (healing observances). The
notorious art consisted in the repeating of certain formulas or the
gazing upon certain figures, prayers and fasts at times being added,
and it was supposed that these practices would obtain infused knowledge
without the necessity of labor or study. Healing observances are
remedies used for man or beast that manifestly have no natural curative
properties (e.g., a buckeye or rabbit's foot carried in the pocket to
ward off rheumatism).

(b) Wondrous results are sometimes expected, such as the power to bring
on storms, telekinesis, materialization, and levitation, through the
use of incantations, theurgic sacraments, spiritistic rites, etc. This
is known as the black art or black magic.

(c) Evil effects are sometimes expected, such as the power to blight
another by a glance (evil eye or fascination), the power to cast a
spell over another person by certain spoken words, to bring disease or
misfortune on a person by piercing or striking his effigy, to excite
impure love for a determinate person by the administration of love
philtres or charms, etc. (sorcery, witchcraft).

2293. Distinction between the Fact and the Sin of Vain Observance.--(a)
The Fact.--The demons have naturally powers over our world that surpass
those of human or physical agents, and it is not impossible for them to
produce prodigies or seeming miracles. The magicians of Egypt by
enchantments and certain secrets changed rods into serpents, etc.
(Exod., vii. 12, viii. 7); the New Testament narrates that Simon the
Magician bewitched the Samaritans by his magic (Acts, viii. 11), and it
clearly foretells the lying wonders of Satan and Antichrist (Matt.,
xxiv. 24; II Thess., ii. 9). But there are limits to the power of the
fallen spirits; for example, they cannot infuse knowledge, and
occultism has contributed nothing to the advancement of science or
civilization. Moreover, many effects that have been attributed to
demonic intervention were due to natural causes or to fraud (e.g., a
large proportion of spiritistic phenomena), or they were supposed to
exist only because the popular mind was carried away by excitement or
was bent on persecution (e.g., most of the witchcraft accusations of a
few centuries ago).

(b) The Sin.--Vain observance in which there is no express invocation
of evil spirits is common enough; even religious, educated and
practical persons are found to act on superstitious hopes or fears or
to put confidence in charms or amulets. But vain observance that
includes an express invocation of demons is a comparatively rare sin.
It is not impossible, however, that a person should come to such a pass
of despair or malice as to wish to have dealings with Satan, or should
be so carried away by curiosity, desire of wealth, power, fame, or
honor as to be willing to barter his soul in exchange for them. That
there were professional wizards from ancient times is a matter of
history, and Scripture contains severe prohibitions against dealings
with them (Levit., xix. 31, xx. 27; Deut., xviii. 10).

2294. Superstition in Religious Observances.--Superstition is sometimes
found even in religious observances. (a) Thus, there is superstition in
the observance itself when vain additions are made to an approved usage
(e.g., the addition to a prayer against sickness of gestures,
breathings, gibberish, etc., that have no significance of reverence for
God). (b) There is superstition in the manner of the observance when
one attributes the virtue of a sacred rite or object to some
unimportant circumstance (e.g., the shape of the reliquary in which a
relic is carried, the "propitious" day on which a sacramental was
received), or expects from a sacred thing an effect which it has no
power to produce (e.g., infallible certainty of salvation from the
performance of a certain devotion or the presence of a holy picture or
blessed object). It is not superstition, however, to attach
significance to circumstances that have a sacred meaning (e.g.,
holydays, figures that have a religious symbolism), or to put a
confidence in sacred things that is based on their character or
approved usage (e.g., the hope and trust that blessings will be
impetrated and salvation itself through fidelity to an authorized
devotion).

2295. Sinfulness of Vain Observance.--The malice of vain observance is
essentially the same as that of divination, for in both superstitions
the same virtue of religion is offended by the sinful cult that is
performed.

(a) Thus, there is mortal sin from the nature of the act, when vain
observance is exercised with invocation of evil spirits or with false
religious rites (for a serious injury is done to the honor due to God),
or when a vain observance is meant to bring a curse or grave misfortune
on a neighbor (for a serious injustice is willed).

(b) There is regularly only a venial sin, when a vain observance is of
a non-religious kind, consisting in foolish heed given to chance
happenings (such as a rabbit running across the road, the mention of
death, the presence of a person regarded as a Jonah), or the use of
improportionate means (e.g., to change one's place at a card table in
order to change the luck). For usually there is no irreverence in such
practices, and at the worst they are foolish and idle acts. Often there
is no sin at all, the vain observance being due to ignorance or the
wish to joke.

(c) There is no sin at all, but rather subjective virtue, in religious
practices to which on account of simplicity or invincible ignorance too
much power is attributed, as when one who is faithful to the essential
duties of religion has greater confidence in some personal devotion of
his own than in them. But superstition of this kind, though in itself
it is the least reprehensible form of superstition, may be very harmful
and disedifying.

2296. Coöperation in Divination or Other Form of Superstition.--(a)
Formal coöperation is of course never lawful (e.g., to act as the
medium or one of the deceivers at a spiritistic meeting). (b) Material
coöperation is lawful only when there is a proportionately grave
reason, no danger of sin, and no scandal. Thus, it seems that no sin is
committed by a scientist who assists at a spiritistic seance in order
to discover the frauds that are resorted to, or who makes experiments
with table turning or planchette movements in order to examine into the
theory that the phenomena are due to the action of the persons present.

2297. Doubtful Cases of Vain Observance.--Cases in which it is a matter
of doubt or dispute whether divination or vain observance is present.

(a) There is sometimes uncertainty whether an extraordinary fact is due
to natural or supranatural causes, Thus, authorities commonly take the
position, it seems, that certain phenomena of Spiritism (e.g., the
apparently automatic movement of tables on which a group of persons
rest their finger tips, the answers to questions that are rapped out by
such tables), and of mental healing (e.g., the cure of bodily ailment
by sympathy or moral influence), are accomplished through natural
powers of matter or mind. But other authorities incline to a
supranaturalistic explanation.

(b) There is also at times uncertainty whether a fact or practice has a
religious or an irreligious character. As to facts, they sometimes
appear to be so marvellous as to pass the natural, and yet it is
difficult to determine whether their source is good or evil (e.g., when
an ignorant person not noted for piety seems to have a remarkable
ability for treating and curing all kinds of diseases). As to
practices, they are sometimes susceptible of a religious or a
superstitious interpretation. Thus, one who says, "God bless us," at a
sneeze may intend a prayer against sickness; one who knocks on wood
after boasting may intend a prayer to Him who died on the wood of the
cross, lest he be punished for boasting.

2298. Licitness of Using Doubtfully Superstitious Means.--It is lawful
to use means that are only doubtfully superstitious if the following
conditions are present:

(a) internally or subjectively, there must be a good conscience about
the use of the means. The rule can be followed that what is not
certainly of a supranatural character may be regarded as natural, but
that what seems to be supranatural is not to be ascribed to God unless
it has the marks and fruits of a divine work. When lawfully using means
of a dubious character, it is advisable to make an inner protestation
that one acts from reasonable necessity, and has no wish to take part
in superstition;

(b) externally or objectively, there must be nothing in the object or
circumstances or results to make the use of the means illicit. Thus,
even though a practice be not superstitious, it may be unlawful because
of the immorality of its object or tendency (e.g., frauds used by
psychical researchers, obscene messages given by laboratory
telepathists), or of its purpose (e.g., table-rapping used as the
instrument of pretended religious revelations), or because of the evil
consequences for body or soul (e.g., devotees of the ouija board give
scandal to others and often end in insanity or suicide).

2299. Irreligiousness.--We now proceed to the four sins that offend
religion by defect, namely, temptation of God and perjury, which show
disrespect to God Himself, and sacrilege and simony, which show
disrespect to holy things (see 2273). Perjury has been treated above
(see 2249), and hence we shall consider now only the other three forms
of irreligiousness.

2300. Temptation of God.--Temptation of God is a word or deed that puts
God to the test to discover whether He possesses or will exercise some
perfection.

(a) It is a word or deed, such as a prayer whose purpose is to discover
whether God is possessed of knowledge, power or goodness, or an act of
defiance performed in order to prove that there is no God.

(b) It puts God to the test, that is, the temptation is not seductive
(since it is impossible to influence God to sin), but experimental. He
who tempts God desires that God give some proof of His attributes.

(c) It is concerned with God, hence there is no temptation of God if
one legitimately tests out the character of a human being. God Himself
tempted by trial holy men like Abraham, Job, and Tobias in order that
their virtue might be manifested and an example given to others. And of
spirits St. John says: "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits
if they be of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the
world" (I John, iv. 1).

(d) The purpose is to discover, without regard to the ordinary means of
instruction and guidance appointed by God, whether God possesses or
will exercise an attribute; that is, temptation of God is due to
unbelief or to presumption.

2301. Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.--(a) To seek a proof
of divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only
to find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in
an affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a
theologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further
illumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the
goodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine
things (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).

(b) To seek a sign of God's will or a manifestation of His perfections
is not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity,
ostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or
great utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had
spoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias
called on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III
Kings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary
means of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a
sign of God's will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for
miraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes
himself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise
be had, in the trust that God will be with him.

2302. Kinds of Temptation of God.--(a) In relation to its source,
temptation of God arises either from unbelief or from presumption. The
former, which is temptation of God in the strict sense, exists when one
disbelieves or doubts some attribute of God and seeks to put it to the
proof, as when the Israelites in the desert called into question the
providence and power of Jehovah (Exod., xvii. 7, Psalm lxxvii. 18, 19),
or when a person doubting the Real Presence asks for a miraculous sight
of Christ in the Eucharist. The latter sin, which is temptation of God
in the wide sense, is committed when a believing person asks without a
just cause for a miraculous manifestation of God's will, or powers, or
of some other thing, as when a lazy man asks that his work be done in
some miraculous way, or a rash man neglects the ordinary care of his
health, asking that God supply for his carelessness. But temptation of
God is not to be identified with the theological sin of presumption
(see 1081).

(b) In relation to its manner, temptation of God is either express or
interpretative. It is express when one intends by one's word or act to
put God to the proof in respect to knowledge, power, reliability, or
other perfection (as when the Jews demanded that Christ come down from
the Cross, if He were the Son of God) or to satisfy a vain curiosity or
boldness (as when Herod asked Christ to work some miracles for his
amusement). Temptation of God is interpretative when one does not
intend to discover God's perfections or make presumptuous requests, but
nevertheless so acts or omits to act that one's conduct is useful for
nothing except temptation of God, as when a believer rashly promises a
miracle to convince an unbeliever, a sick man refuses to use any
medical care (Ecclus., xxxviii. 4), a lecturer goes entirely unprepared
to his lecture, etc. Prayer made without the proper dispositions is a
quasi-temptation of God (Ecclus., xviii. 23), because it is
disrespectful and presumptuous; but it is not real temptation of God,
nor of its nature mortally sinful, the direct end of the act being
laziness or some other state of soul unsuitable to prayer.

2303. Causes that Exclude the Interpretative Temptation of God.--There
is no interpretative temptation of God strictly speaking if one acts
rashly or encounters danger, but does not at all expect miraculous or
special intervention from God. This happens as follows:

(a) when one is unconcerned whether evil results or not, or desires
that it may result (e.g., when a person who is tired of life seeks a
dangerous occupation for the diversion and excitement it affords, or
when a person practises abstinence from certain remedies as an act of
moderate mortification);

(b) when one does not wish the evil result, but is so stupid or rash as
to believe that an imprudent risk can be taken and evil escaped through
chance or good luck, as when a student goes up for a difficult
examination with slight preparation, trusting that only the things he
knows will be asked.

2304. Refusal of Medicine or Hygienic Care.--(a) If there is a
sufficient reason for this conduct, no sin is committed. There may be
sufficient reasons of a natural kind (e.g., that the remedies are
harmful or useless or too expensive), or of a supernatural kind (e.g.,
St. Agatha refused all medicines because God Himself was her physician,
certain Saints were divinely inspired to make no effort to remove
bodily maladies on account of the spiritual profit derived from them).

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for this conduct, it is sinful.
Thus, one sins against faith, if the reason for the conduct is
disbelief in the existence of evil (e.g., Christian Science or Eddyism
attributes sickness and pain to imagination, and says that the only
cure is "faith"); one sins by temptation of God, if the reason for the
conduct is vain expectation of miracles; one is guilty of suicide or
homicide, if the purpose is to end life, etc.

2305. The Sinfulness of Temptation of God.--(a) To doubt the
perfections of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God
in disregard of the ordinary Providence He has established is the
essence of temptation of God. It is sinful, because it includes either
unjustifiable doubt or vincible ignorance in the intellect or
presumption in the will. Hence the command given in Deuteronomy (vi.
16): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." But invincible ignorance
excuses from sin, and hence many of those who in times past resorted to
ordeals by painful or dangerous tests (e.g., walking on burning coals,
risking death in deep waters), in order that God might settle a
doubtful matter, were, on account of their good faith, guiltless of
temptation of God. The practice was condemned by the Church in the
ninth century.

(b) To doubt about the positive and unknown will of God, or to call
upon the extraordinary Providence of God (i.e., the direct intervention
of the First Cause), without disregard of the ordinary Providence
(i.e., of second causes appointed by God), is not sinful, if it is
justified by necessity. Thus, being unable to resist the nations
leagued against him, Josaphat prayed: "As we know not what to do, we
can only turn our eyes to Thee" (II Paral., xx. 12). And Our Lord
promised the disciples that, when they should be unable to prepare
their defense on account of the persecutions to which they were
subjected, the Spirit Himself would speak through them (Matt., X. 19),
and that He would enable them to do things as difficult as moving
mountains when real necessity called for it (Matt., xvii. 19). It is
not unbelief to doubt about matters pertaining to God that are really
doubtful (i.e., not His perfections, but His positive and unknown
will), and hence one does not tempt God who asks for divine guarantees
of a religion proposed as divinely revealed (see 795); it is not
presumption to ask God for a sign or proof, if God directs one to do
this (e.g., Abraham in Gen., xv. 8, was inspired to seek a sign that
the promised land would be given his posterity; Achaz in Isaias, vii.
11, was bidden for the sake of others to ask for a sign), or if, when a
sign from God seems necessary or very useful, one prays for it
prudently and on condition that the request is pleasing to God (e.g.,
the Apostles in Acts, iv. 30, prayed for signs and wonders in
confirmation of their preaching).

2306. The Malice of Temptation of God.--(a) It is a sin directly
against religion, for one shows contempt to God when one demands that
He prove His perfections, or when one takes the liberty to disregard
the ordinary means He has established and to call for others. The sin
is less, however, than that of superstition, since temptation of God
professes doubt, while superstition professes positive error.
Temptation of God offends also against other virtues, such as faith
(e.g., when one doubts the perfections of God), hope (e.g., when one
presumes that God will do all without one's coöperation), charity
(e.g., when a person exposes his own life to risk or his neighbor to
scandal in a vain confidence that the danger will be miraculously
averted).

(b) It is a mortal sin from its nature, since it offends religion. But
it may be venial on account of the imperfection of the act, as when
from weakness of faith or without reflection one asks unnecessarily for
a sign (Luke, i. 11-20). It may be venial also from the lightness of
the matter, if the temptation is interpretative, as when one presumes
on the divine aid in a slight sickness, an unimportant talk, or other
small affair.

2307. As a rule temptation of God is only a venial sin, and in an
individual case it is rarely mortal, except in the following instances:

(a) when one intends a grave offense against God, as by doubting His
goodness, demanding or attempting a miracle to satisfy curiosity;

(b) when one exposes oneself to grave peril, as by leaping from the
roof of a high building, refusing all remedies or means of preserving
health, neglecting to provide for one's sustenance, etc., in the
expectation that God will miraculously provide;

(c) when one causes grave harm to others, as when a person rashly
asking for signs exposes faith to the derision of unbelievers or
scandalizes believers.

2308. Sacrilege.--Sacrilege in the wide sense is any sin against the
virtue of religion. But in the strict sense, in which it is now taken,
it is defined as "the violation of a sacred thing."

(a) Sacrilege is against a thing, that is, against some person, place
or object dedicated to divine worship as a possession of God. Sacrilege
differs from the two previous sins of irreligiosity (namely, temptation
of God and perjury); for they are against the reverence due to God
Himself, while sacrilege is against the reverence due to things on
account of their use in the worship of God.

(b) It is against a sacred thing, that is, against the sanctity which a
thing acquires from its dedication to God (e.g., when a church or a
chalice is consecrated to divine worship, when a virgin is dedicated to
God by vow), or from the immunity or privilege conferred on it by the
Church on account of its dedication to God (e.g., the clerical
privileges of forum and of canon in Church Law). But sacrilege is
present only when a sacred thing is attacked in that special quality or
relation in which it is sacred. Hence, he who violates the chastity of
a virgin consecrated to God is guilty of sacrilege, since it is her
chastity that was vowed to God; he who strikes her is also guilty of
sacrilege, since he attacks the sacred immunity which the law confers
on her; he who calumniates her or steals from her is not guilty of
sacrilege, since her name and goods are not consecrated to divine
worship nor protected by its special sacredness in law.

(c) Sacrilege is a violation, that is, an action or omission physically
or morally injurious to the sacred character of a person, place or
thing. The difference between the injury done in sacrilege and that
done in simony is that the former injustice belongs to the class of
wrongs inflicted in involuntary commutations, such as theft or robbery
(see 1748, 1815), whereas the latter injustice pertains to the category
of wrongs perpetrated in voluntary commutations, such as buying,
selling, or lending. In both cases there is an injury to the property
or possession of God, but the difference is that in sacrilege the
parties involved are the sacrilegious person acting as aggressor
against God, in simony the parties are two men bargaining together to
buy and sell the sacred things of God.

2309. What Kind of Consecration Must Be Violated to Constitute
Sacrilege?--There are various opinions about the kind of assignment to
worship necessary for the sacredness which is injured by sacrilege.

(a) The opinion that seems to be common today holds that the assignment
must be made through some public rite or consecration on the part of
the Church. Hence, according to this view, the violation of a private
vow or resolution is not sacrilegious, but rather perfidious or
disloyal. The argument for this opinion is that the public acceptance
of the Church, which has control over divine worship, is a necessary
factor in making anything sacred to that worship; and that many
absurdities would follow from the principle that each individual has
the power to give the sacredness in question to his own person, acts or
possessions.

(b) According to a stricter opinion, no public assignment is necessary
if the consecration is a personal one; and hence the violation of even
a private vow of chastity would be sacrilegious. The argument is that
even a private vow affecting the person sets it apart as a sacred thing.

(c) According to a still stricter view, no public assignment to worship
is necessary, whether the consecration be personal or non-personal, and
hence even the violation of a vow to fast would be sacrilegious. The
argument is that anything set apart for God's honor, either publicly or
privately, becomes sacred to Him.

2310. Is Sacrilege a Special Sin?--(a) As regards its matter or subject
sacrilege may be called, though improperly, a general sin, in the sense
that many different classes of sins may be sacrilegious (e.g., murder
is sacrilegious when a sacred person is killed, lust is sacrilegious
when a person vowed to God is violated; theft is sacrilegious when
objects consecrated to divine worship are stolen, etc.).

(b) As regards its form or essence, and hence properly speaking,
sacrilege is a special sin, because there is a peculiar deformity
contained in the very nature of sacrilege that is not in other sins,
namely, the disrespect shown to God through contempt for things that
are sacred to Him. Moreover, there may be a sin of sacrilege that is
separate from other sins, such as murder, lust, and theft, for example,
when the right of asylum is violated.

2311. The Species of Sacrilege.--(a) Personal sacrilege is committed
when the sacredness of a person is violated. This happens in the first
place when bodily or real harm (e.g., gravely sinful striking, citing
before a secular tribunal, subjecting to civil duties or burdens, such
as military service) is done to a cleric; and in the second place when
a grave sin of unchastity is committed by or with a person dedicated to
God by a vow (at least by a public vow) of chastity. Sacrilege
committed through bodily or real harm is treated by canonists under the
questions of the privileges of canon (Canon 119), forum (Canon 120),
immunity (Canon 121). Sacrilegious impurity committed with a person
vowed to chastity and sacrilegious impurity committed by a person vowed
to chastity are grave sins of lust, even though they be only of thought
or desire.

(b) Local sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of a place is
injured. A place is considered sacred or religious when it possesses
sanctity as being consecrated or blessed for divine worship or for
burial of the faithful, namely, churches, public or semi-public
oratories, and consecrated cemeteries. Injury is done to the holiness
of the place by desecration or profanation. Desecration is the
performance in a sacred place of a notorious act of irreverence which
so spiritually contaminates it that the divine offices may not be
lawfully celebrated therein until the rite of reconciliation has been
performed. Canon 1172 enumerates four causes of desecration: the crime
of homicide; the injurious and serious shedding of human blood; impious
or sordid uses (e.g., if a church were turned into a brothel or
gambling den, a dump, or cattle stable), and burial of an infidel or
person excommunicated by condemnatory or declaratory sentence.
Profanation of a sacred place is a disregard for the religious respect
or immunity due to it which in some way materially contaminates it
(e.g., if a church is not kept nice and clean; if markets and fairs are
held in its precincts; if it is used for shows, plays, moving pictures,
banquets, court proceedings; if the right of asylum is violated; if the
church is broken into, seriously defaced, burned). These matters are
treated more fully in commentaries on Canons 1172 sqq.

(c) Real sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of an object is
violated. An object is sacred when it contains the Author of holiness
or confers holiness (viz., the Eucharist and the other Sacraments),
when it is naturally related to the Sacraments or sacred persons (e.g.,
the sacred vessels, images and relics of the Saints), when it is set
aside for the uses of worship (e.g., holy water and other sacramentals,
candles for the altar) or the maintenance of the Church or its
ministers (viz., movables and immovables of a parish, money left for
the support of the clergy, seminarians, etc.). Injury is done to the
holiness of an object by unworthy treatment or by unjust damage or
conversion. Examples of unworthy treatment are the following: the
invalid or sinful administration or reception of a Sacrament, parodies
of Sacred Scripture, scandalous manner of enacting sacred rites or
saying prayers, use of sacred chalices or other sacred vessels or of
blessed articles for profane purposes, use of unblessed holy articles
for sordid or ignoble purposes, handling of chalices, etc., by those
who have no right to touch sacred vessels (Canon 1306). Examples of
unjust damage or conversion are: contemptuous breaking or burning of
relics, oils, pictures used for worship; theft of moneys or goods
belonging to the Church.

2312. Special Cases Regarding Local Sacrilege.--Local sacrilege is not
committed by every sin, even though grave, that is done in a holy
place, for the character of this sacrilege is that it be such an injury
to the sacredness of the place as to make what should be hallowed seem
horrible, or contemptible, or common. Hence, there is no sacrilege in
detractions, lies, perjuries, blasphemies, or in most internal sins,
when committed in a church or cemetery. But there are two kinds of sins
which are sacrilegious profanations of holy places, namely, theft and
impurity.

(a) Theft in a holy place is certainly sacrilegious when the thing
taken is sacred (e.g., a chalice, money in the votive stands). It is
probably not sacrilegious when the thing taken is not sacred (e.g., the
pocketbook of a person kneeling in the church), and if the thing taken
was not left in the custody of the place. This matter, however, is
disputed.

(b) Impurity, if external and perfect (_voluntaria effusio seminis_),
is sacrilegious, though under the Code it does not seem to be a
desecration. The same is probably true of external but imperfect sins
(such as touches, looks, words, gestures). Internal acts of impurity
are not sacrilegious, unless they include a desire to sin externally in
a holy place.

2313. Cases Wherein There Is No Sacrilege.--In the following cases no
sacrilege is committed:

(a) when the thing violated is not sacred. There is no personal
sacrilege in an act of unchastity committed by a person privately vowed
to chastity (common opinon). While some authors teach that personal
sacrilege is committed by the violation of poverty and obedience (see
Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II, n.804, 4), it seems better
to hold the opposite opinion and restrict personal sacrilege to
violations of chastity by persons with religious vows or admitted to
the religious state. There is no local sacrilege in the profane use of
a place devoted to works of piety but not specially set apart for them
by Church authority (such as a private oratory, or a hospital conducted
by the laity), nor in the burial of infidels in an unblessed graveyard.
There is no real sacrilege in profane use of things which are not set
apart exclusively for sacred use (e.g., to use the candelabra and
candles of the altar to read by in one's room), or which have not been
made sacred (e.g., to steal money promised but not delivered to the
Church or the personal belongings of a cleric);

(b) when the thing injured is sacred, but the action or omission is not
opposed to the attribute in which it is holy, or to a law made to
ensure respect for it. Thus, a person who has the vow of chastity does
not commit sacrilege if he becomes intoxicated or uses profane
language, for he was not consecrated against those sins; a sacred place
is not sacrilegiously violated by an act not opposed to its holiness or
the respect demanded for it by the law (e.g., organ recitals or awards
for Christian Doctrine in church, sale of candles in the vestibule,
physical violence against a disturber of divine service). Sacrilege is
not done in reverently destroying an old and tattered vestment, in
respectfully handling agnus deis, relics, unused palls, and other
objects that may be touched by all.

2314. Sacredness as Aggravating Circumstance of Sin.--But a sin that is
not sacrilegious is often made worse by reason of the sacredness of
some thing with which the sin is connected. (a) Thus, the sin is
aggravated by such circumstances as person and place. In this way it is
worse for a person vowed to God to blaspheme or lie than for one who
has no vow; it is worse to carry on frivolous or calumnious
conversations in church than on the street. (b) The sin receives the
additional malice of sacrilege if the sinner expressly intends the
circumstance of time, place, etc., in order to show contempt. Thus, it
is not sacrilege to get drunk on a Sunday or holyday, unless one wishes
by the sin to show dishonor to the sacred time; it is not sacrilege to
conduct oneself with levity in church, unless one wishes by the levity
to show contempt for the place.

2315. The Malice of Sacrilege.--(a) The moral malice of sacrilege is
that of irreligiousness (see 2299). The three kinds of sacrilege
(personal, local and real) are commonly regarded as three distinct
species of sin; for, just as injuries done to a man's person, to his
immovable property, and to his movable goods are looked upon in law as
different kinds of offenses, so are injuries offered to the ministers
of God, the house of God, and the objects used in the service of God
unequal in the dishonor which they give to God before the public. More
probably there are no sub-species of these three classes of sacrilege.
Hence, in so far as the disrespect to God is concerned, there seems no
essential difference between the sin of violating and that of striking
a consecrated virgin.

(b) The theological malice of sacrilege is mortal from the nature of
the sin. Just as it is gravely insulting to a man to treat his
representatives or his home or chattels with contempt, likewise
disrespect for the things of God is disrespect for God Himself. The
seriousness of sacrilege is seen from the punishments visited on Core,
Dathan and Abiron (Num., xvi), on the sons of Heli (I Kings, ii. 17,
iv. 11), on King Balthasar (Dan., v. 2 sqq.), and on the sellers in the
temple (John, ii. 14). Sacrilege may be venial, however, on account of
the imperfection of the act (e.g., when one strikes a priest without
reflecting that he is a clergyman) or the smallness of the matter
(e.g., to quote Scripture in a decent joke, to use altar linen that is
only slightly soiled or torn, to touch the chalice without permission,
to steal a few pennies from a church).

2316. Conditions that Govern Gravity of Sacrilege.--To decide in a
concrete case whether a sacrilege is gravely or lightly sinful, one
should consider the internal state of mind of the offender and the
external character of the offense. (a) Thus, if the purpose is directly
and formally to dishonor God, the sin is grave, but, if there is some
other purpose, it may be light. (b) If the thing dishonored is more
closely related to God, or if the act of dishonor is in public
estimation more insulting, the sin is more serious. Unworthy treatment
of the Eucharist is the worst of sacrileges; ill-usage of a sacred
person is worse than disrespect for a sacred place; treading the Sacred
Species under foot is more contemptuous than an unworthy Communion, etc.

2317. Simony.--Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, the first
person in New Testament times, as far as we know, who committed this
crime. For it is written of Simon (Acts, viii. 18 sqq.) that he
attempted to buy from St. Peter the power of imposition of hands. But
the sin was not unknown in the Old Testament, as we see from the
examples of Baalam (Numb., xxii. 7), Giezi (IV Kings, v. 20 sqq.), and
Jason (II Mach., iv. 7 sqq.).

2318. Definition of Simony.--Simony is defined as "the studied will to
buy or sell for a temporal price or consideration something that is
spiritual either intrinsically or extrinsically."

(a) Simony is in the will, for it is an act of injustice pretending to
have or to receive the right of dominion over spiritual things that
belong to God alone, and injustice is a vice of the will. Hence, simony
is not an internal sin of the intellect; for, though one who practises
simony externally makes to some extent a profession of belief in the
heresy that man is the owner of spirituals and gives grounds for the
suspicion that he holds that the sale of spirituals is lawful, yet he
may know well that the things of God are priceless and still wish to
give or receive a price for them. Again, simony is not to be identified
with the external act of bargaining for spirituals; for, though the law
punishes only external or completed simony, the guilt and malice of the
sin is present even when one has the desire to traffic in spiritual
things, but makes no overtures or compact.

(b) Simony is a studied will; that is, it is an act of free and
deliberate choice selecting some form of internal or external simony as
a desirable means. Hence, it is not sufficient for the sin of simony
that there be an internal wish not fully voluntary on account of
inculpable ignorance or imperfect consent; nor, on the other hand, is
it necessary for incurring the guilt of simony that there be a mutual
pact, but it suffices that one party alone have the will to make the
pact or to obligate another party to simony.

(c) It is a wish to buy or sell, that is, to give or receive a temporal
thing in exchange for a spiritual thing. There is question here, then,
not only of the contract of sale, but of any other form of onerous
contract, such as hire, rent, loan, exchange, _do ut des_, _facio ut
facias_, etc. To be simoniacal, however, a contract need not be
fulfilled or explicitly manifested; it suffices that it be unfulfilled
or tacitly made, if the sinful intent can be gathered from the
circumstances of the case. Hence, from the present part of the
definition it follows that there is no simony in a gratuitous contract
(e.g., when one gives a gift to another hoping and expecting that the
later from gratitude will give in return something spiritual which it
is lawful to bestow from gratitude; when a poor person offers to make a
novena for benefactors who give him an alms). It is simony, however, to
make an onerous contract under the guise of a gratuitous contract, for
example: "I give you this money as a pure gift on condition that you
will not be ungrateful but will give me this spiritual favor as a pure
gift."

(d) The price or consideration in simony is some thing, action or
forbearance which in some way is of advantage to the recipient. Simony
in the strictest sense is committed when a temporal thing is offered
for a spiritual thing (e.g., money paid for a Sacrament); simony in the
wide sense is committed when, contrary to the law on simony, things
like in character are exchanged (2323 a). Thus, if the Church forbids
Mass to be exchanged for Mass, or benefice for benefice, or the office
of sacristan for that of sexton, transgressors are guilty of the second
form of simony.

(e) The matter of simony is something intrinsically or extrinsically
spiritual. In general, the spiritual is that which proceeds from God or
tends to Him as the Author or End of eternal salvation (viz., the
destiny, law, means, works, etc., proposed to us in Christian
revelation and religion). Among these things those are intrinsically
spiritual that pertain to the supernatural order on account of some
inherent character of their own (e.g., grace, Sacraments, Mass,
miracles) or some intimate union with things spiritual (e.g., benefices
attached to spiritual offices, consecration to be given a chalice);
those are extrinsically spiritual that are in themselves temporal, but
in church law are treated as spiritual for the sake of reverence to the
intrinsically spiritual (e.g., chrism in regard to the material itself
of the oil and other ingredients). If the matter of a contract is
neither intrinsically nor extrinsically spiritual, there is no simony
in buying or selling it (e.g., devotional books, household furnishings
of a rectory, personal effects of a cleric).

2319. Temporal Price in Simony.--The temporal price in simony is some
temporal good or advantage. St. Gregory the Great distinguishes three
kinds of simoniacal prices as follows:

(a) the price from the hand (_munus a manu_) is either money or things
that have a money value, such as movable or immovable property,
corporeal or incorporeal rights. It would be simony to give a benefice
in exchange for a sum of money, for a loan, for real estate;

(b) the price from the tongue (_munus a lingua_) is any kind of
patronage, such as praise, recommendation, protection, defense,
opposition to competitors, etc. It would be simony to confer a benefice
in exchange for the influence in one's favor which the recipient of the
benefice would exercise with some powerful person, for his vote in an
election, etc.;

(c) the price in service (_munus ab obsequio_) is any kind of temporal
labor or assistance given for another's benefit, such as the management
of his business or the instruction of his children. It would be simony
to grant a benefice in exchange for work done as secretary, treasurer,
or advisor.

2320. The Spiritual Thing in Simony.--The thing inherently spiritual in
simony is also of three kinds. (a) That which is spiritual from its
nature is a thing that is supernatural in itself, such as sanctifying
grace, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the power of orders or of
jurisdiction. (b) That which is supernatural from its cause is a thing
produced by a supernatural agency or power, such as health obtained
through miracle. (c) That which is supernatural from its effect is a
thing having the virtue of producing supernatural results, _ex opere
operato_, or _ex opere operantis_, or as an occasion (e.g., Sacraments,
prayers, sermons).

2321. Temporal Thing United with Spiritual.--In the two following ways
things are made spiritual in reference to simony through intimate union
with spirituals: (a) by necessary connection, when a temporal thing is
so annexed with a spiritual thing that it cannot exist without it. This
includes the things annexed consequently, and perhaps also those
annexed concomitantly and intrinsically (see 2322); (b) by contractual
connection, when a spiritual and a temporal are the partial objects of
a contract, as when in the sale of a consecrated chalice the price is
raised on account of the consecration.

2322. Temporal Thing Annexed to Spiritual.--In three ways a temporal
thing is annexed to a spiritual thing.

(a) The temporal thing is annexed antecedently if it precedes the
spiritual thing as its prepared or appointed or presupposed matter or
subject. Thus, all things that receive a consecration or blessing
(e.g., chalices, rosaries) or a property to which a right of patronage
is attached are of this kind. Relics are properly of this category,
but, since they have usually no material value, it is customary to
include them amongst spirituals.

(b) The temporal thing is annexed concomitantly if it is simultaneous
with the spiritual thing as being the action or labor that produces it.
If the union is essential and inseparable, the temporal thing is said
to be annexed intrinsically (e.g., the work performed in saying Mass,
preaching, making a sick call); if the union is not essential, the
temporal thing is said to be annexed extrinsically (e.g., the special
work performed in saying Mass, if it has to be sung, or said in a
distant church, or at a determined hour).

(c) The temporal thing is annexed consequently when it presupposes the
spiritual thing as the cause on which it depends. Thus, the revenues of
a parish are a temporal thing, but they follow on the pastoral office
which is a spiritual thing.

2323. The Various Kinds of Simony.--(a) In reference to its matter or
the law violated, simony is either against natural and divine law or
against positive ecclesiastical law. Simony against divine law consists
in the exchange for temporalities of things that are spiritual or
intimately annexed to the spiritual (see 2321), such as Sacraments,
indulgences, or jurisdiction. Simony against church law consists in an
exchange that has the appearance of simony against divine law, or that
easily leads to simony against the divine law, and is consequently
forbidden by the Church in order to safeguard religious respect for
sacred things, as when one violates the law by taking money for holy
oils. In the former kind of simony, things of different orders
(spirituals and temporals) are exchanged one for the other; in the
latter kind of simony, things of the same sort (spirituals for
spirituals, temporals for temporals, etc.) are exchanged where the law
forbids (Canon 727).

(b) In reference to its manner, or the way in which it is committed,
simony is internal or external. Internal simony is the will, without
the external agreement, to exchange spirituals for temporals; it is
purely mental if nothing external is done by reason of the internal
will; it is not purely mental if something external is done by reason
of the internal will (e.g., if the person who desires to commit simony
makes a money present to another in the hope that the latter will feel
morally bound to give something spiritual in return, or if one gives
something spiritual looking for a substantial gift of money as
compensation). External simony is an outward pact freely entered into
between two parties to exchange spirituals for temporals. It is called
purely conventional, if neither party has as yet performed his part of
the agreement; it is semi-real or mixed, if one of the parties has
executed his part; it is real if both parties have performed, at least
in part, what they agreed to. A simoniacal compact is explicit, if
expressed by clear words or signs (e.g., "I will pay $100 for your
vote"); it is tacit, if circumstances indicate the evil intention
(e.g., very unusual presents given before an election).

2324. Confidential Simony.--Simony committed in reference to benefices
is called confidential because the contract is illegal, giving no
judicial protection, and there is only the confidence or reliance on
another's word to give assurance that the agreement will be kept.
Canonists discuss at length the following contracts in which it is
committed:

(a) the contract _per accessum_ grants a benefice with the agreement
that the grantee will later resign, so that access to it may be had by
the grantor or a third party at present incapable;

(b) the contract _per ingressum_ resigns a benefice not yet taken
possession of with the understanding that the person who now enters
into possession will leave the place open for his predecessor if he
himself resigns or is promoted;

(e) the contract _per regressum_ resigns a benefice already possessed
with the understanding that it may be recovered by the person now
resigning or by a third party;

(d) the contract _per reservationem partis_ obtains a benefice for
another with the stipulation that he will pay a certain percentage of
its revenues to the person who obtains it for him or to a third party
(see Canon 1441).

2325. Simony Against Divine Law.--Simony against divine law is
committed in reference to spiritual things when a temporal price is
formally or virtually given or received for them.

(a) Thus, the temporal thing is formally set up as the price, when it
is regarded or treated as the end of the spiritual thing or action
itself (_finis operis_), one of the things exchanged being used as the
measure of value of the other. This happens when a person wills to buy
or sell a spiritual thing, either because he thinks that its value may
be expressed in terms of money or other temporal thing, or because he
judges that he should treat it as though money were its equivalent, as
when one fulfills a spiritual office and excludes every other motive
than that of lucre (Denzinger, n. 1196).

(b) The temporal thing is virtually set up as the price, when it is
intended as the sole proximate end of the agent himself (_finis
operantis_), though there is no explicit thought about values or prices
or comparisons. This happens when one gives a temporal thing and has no
other immediate personal purpose in this act than the acquisition of a
spiritual thing, or performs a pretendedly gratuitous service,
intending thereby to obligate the beneficiary to the grant of some
spiritual benefit, or bestows a "gratuitous" temporal favor as
compensation for a spiritual benefit or vice versa (Denzinger, n.
1195). This is simony, for he who explicitly intends only an exchange,
implicitly intends a price; and if it were not simony, then simony
would be almost entirely an entity of the mind, since it is a very
simple matter to will that the temporal thing exchanged shall be not
the price, but only the motive of the contract or gratuitous
compensation.

2326. The temporal thing is not made the virtual price of the spiritual
thing, if there is a lawful proximate motive (i.e., one recognized by
the Canons or legitimate custom) for giving the temporal thing and the
desire of receiving the spiritual thing is only the remote reason or
occasion of the act. For in such a case the temporal thing is given for
a lawful purpose and is not the price of a spiritual thing.

Examples: (a) If the recipient of the temporal thing has a right to it,
there is no simony. Thus, the ministers of the altar have a right to
their support (see 2186), and it is not simoniacal, when asking
spiritual things from them (e.g., the application of Mass to one's
intention, the performance of Sacraments and sacred functions), to
offer a stipend or fee; (b) if the bestower of the temporal thing gives
it freely out of pure friendship, liberality, charity, gratitude or
good will, so that it is an absolute gift, there is no simony, even
though he hopes or expects that he will receive something spiritual as
a mark of appreciation. But "a charitable or friendly gift" may easily
be palliated simony; that is, there may be a pretense of liberality to
conceal the real purpose of purchasing spirituals with temporals.

2327. Rules of Alexander III for Determining Simony.--Alexander III
gave several rules for determining whether a gift is made from
liberality or with simoniacal intent.

(a) The following are marks of simoniacal intent: the quality of the
giver (e.g., that he is poor, or in great need, or not customarily
generous), the quantity of the gift (e.g., that it corresponds with the
value of a vacant benefice, that it is surprisingly large), the time of
the gift (e.g., that it is made when the donee is not in any special
need, or when he is about to confer an office, or after hints have been
made). If a gift is bestowed in connection with a spiritual thing
received, the presumption is for simoniacal intent, unless there was a
sincere and reasonable motive for the gift.

(b) The following, on the contrary, are marks of a liberal intent: the
quality of the giver (e.g., that he is wealthy, noted for kindness and
compassion, or liberal to all, or is a relative of the donee); the
quantity of the gift (e.g., that it is small or normal in size), the
time of the gift (e.g., if it is made when necessity, festal occasion,
or the like calls for it).

2328. Simony against Divine Law in Reference to Things Annexed to
Spirituals.--(a) It is simony against divine law to buy or sell things
annexed to spirituals consequently (e.g., the revenues of a benefice)
or concomitantly and intrinsically (e.g., the ordinary labor and
fatigue connected with preaching, saying Mass); for in the former case
the temporal grows out of a spiritual and is morally one with it, while
in the latter case the temporal has no value except in so far as it is
joined with the spiritual.

(b) It is not simony against divine law to buy or sell things annexed
to spirituals antecedently (e.g., blessed candles, sacred vestments),
if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual thing, or things
annexed concomitantly and extrinsically (e.g., the extraordinary labor
and fatigue caused by saying Mass in a distant place or at a late
hour); for in both cases the temporal has its own proper value and is
not considered as inseparable from the spiritual. There is simony
against divine law, however, if the price is raised on account of the
spiritual part (e.g., if something is added for the blessing given a
candle), and simony against church law if the transaction is forbidden
as simoniacal (e.g., deductions and payments made in the act of
preferment to a benefice are contrary to Canon 1441).

2329. Conditions Necessary for Simony against Ecclesiastical Law.--(a)
There must be an exchange through some kind of onerous contract, but it
suffices that the understanding be tacit and non-executed, as was
explained above (see 2323).

(b) There must be a law of the Church which, from a motive of respect
for sacred things, forbids the exchange.

(c) The simoniacal exchange is made, whether a temporal annexed to a
spiritual is given for another temporal annexed to a spiritual (e.g.,
benefice for benefice), or a spiritual for a spiritual, or a temporal
for a temporal. Canonists enumerate the following as examples of simony
of ecclesiastical law: gifts made in connection with a competitive
examination for a parochial benefice, with ordination or grant of
certain testimonial letters (Canon 545), with erection of
confraternities; sale of blessed oil or chrism, or of the right of
patronage (Canon 1470); remuneration for collection of stipends or for
expenses of Mass (Canons 840, 1303).

2330. Certain and Uncertain Simony.--(a) Cases in which simony is
certain are the administration of Sacraments or sacramentals to the
unworthy for the sake of the fee or favors, the sale of indulgences,
taxes or charges made contrary to law (e.g., for a Mass of bination).
Other examples are given in 2323 sqq. The Church demands that certain
ministrations (e.g., Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction,
Orders) be gratis, but there may be local customs or conditions that
justify exceptions. Some moralists teach that there is no simony when a
stipend is exacted for an obligatory ministry, if the simoniacal motive
is absent.

(b) Cases in which simony is controverted are those in which a tax or
stipend in excess of what is just or lawful is exacted (e.g., a Mass
stipend higher than custom permits). Some claim there is simony,
because the excess must be for the spiritual thing; others hold that
there is no simony, but only an unjust increase in the stipend allowed
for support; others say that there is no simony in the internal forum
if the intent is not simoniacal, but that there is simony in the
external forum on account of the presumption of simoniacal intent.

2331. Doubtful Cases of Simony.--In some gifts and payments the
presence or absence of simony depends on the object for which they are
given.

(a) Thus, when they are given for omission of a spiritual act, there is
simony if the omission includes the exercise of spiritual power (e.g.,
to omit absolution is to retain sins or censures); there is no simony
if the omission is the mere exercise of free will (e.g., to omit Mass,
confession).

(b) When they are given for omission of opposition or annoyance, so
that one may be able to obtain some office or benefice, there is simony
if the temporal thing is thereby given for the benefice itself or for
the way to it (i.e., if one has no strict right to the spiritual thing,
or if the opposition is just), as when the candidate for a benefice
pays a competitor to withdraw, or pays an accuser to keep silence;
there is no simony if the temporal thing is given for freedom from
unjust vexation (i.e., if one has a strict right to the spiritual thing
and the opposition is clearly unjust, as when one who has acquired a
right to an office pays an enemy to desist from placing impediments).
The payment made by Jacob to Esau for the birthright, to which Jacob
was entitled by divine disposition, may be regarded as having had for
its end, not the paternal blessing and other spiritual rights of the
first-born, but immunity from persecution by Esau.

(e) When they are given for instruction, there is simony if the
instruction has for its direct purpose the spiritual benefit of the
disciple (e.g., catechetical instructions, sermons, spiritual
direction); there is no simony if the instruction has for its direct
purpose the improvement of the mind or the utility or advantage which
the disciple will derive from it (e.g., instruction in theology,
preparation for examinations).

(d) When they are given for admission to religious life, there is
simony if the money is paid for the religious state itself, the vows,
or other spirituals; there is no simony if the money is paid for the
temporal support of the religious institute, that it may be able to
meet its expenses.

2332. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Lawful.--(a)
There is no simony when a temporal is given on the occasion of but not
for a spiritual. This happens when there is a just title for bestowal
of the temporal, such as right of support (e.g., pastors' salaries,
Mass stipends, fees), extrinsic values in a work or object (e.g., the
special labor in saying Mass under certain conditions, and, according
to some, the special affection one has for a relic, the _lucrum
cessans_ on account of some function performed).

(b) There is no simony when something of value is given in exchange,
but not for a spiritual, nor in contravention of an anti-simony law.
This happens whether like be exchanged for like (e.g., Mass for Mass),
or a temporal for a thing associated with a spiritual as the latter's
subject (e.g., money for a rosary or cemetery plot which has been
blessed). In the former case there is no prohibition; in the latter,
the temporalities have their own distinct values which may be paid for,
if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual (see Canons 730,
1539).

2333. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Is
Sinful.--(a) Sins against God.--One who performs functions of religion
primarily and principally, as far as his personal motive (_finis
operantis_) is concerned, for the salary, stipend or fee, is not guilty
of simony, since he does not regard the temporal even virtually as the
price of the spiritual. But he does sin by indevotion, and the sin may
even be mortal (e.g., a canon goes to choir chiefly because this yields
him a living). Offenses committed in the matter of Mass stipends are
not called simony in the Code, but the penal law classes them with
offenses against religion, as may be seen from Canon 2324. Nepotism,
favoritism in giving offices, and political and dishonest maneuvers to
obtain church dignities are not in themselves simoniacal; but they are
an unworthy and scandalous treatment of sacred things.

(b) Sins against Others.--It is not simony but injustice to deny the
Sacraments to parishioners who do not contribute, to overcharge in
lawful fees, and also, according to some, to take money for the
omission of a spiritual act owed in justice (e.g., for refusal to hear
the confession of a parishioner), or to demand money as the stipend for
the performance of such a spiritual act (e.g., for hearing a
confession). It is disobedience to take money in ways forbidden (e.g.,
to take Mass stipends in the confessional, to earn money by gambling or
trading forbidden in the Canons). Again, it is not strictly simony to
put up as the stakes in a game a spiritual thing (e.g., the recitation
of the Rosary) against a temporal thing (e.g., ten dollars), for there
is no intention to value the spiritual thing by the temporal; but such
a practice is scandalous. Greed about getting or keeping money pertains
to avarice, not necessarily to simony.

2334. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but
Virtuous.--(a) Some acts done in God's honor (e.g., to purchase a
spiritual object, such as a sacred vessel or relic, from a person who
would misuse it), when the purchaser intends the prevention of
profanation. It is certainly not irreverence to a sacred thing to use
means necessary to rescue it from such irreverence.

(b) Some acts done for the good of others (e.g., to give prizes to
children who frequent the Sacraments or Sunday school, dowries to young
girls that they may be able to enter religion, free education to worthy
young men as an inducement to embrace the ecclesiastical state). In all
these cases there is no purchase of a spiritual thing, because the
temporal is a pure gift, and the spiritual is received, not by the
giver of the temporal, but by another. There is no simony in the fees
imposed for dispensations or in the alms sometimes prescribed for
indulgences; for the temporal is not a price paid for the spiritual,
but in the one case either a penance or a charge for expenses, and in
the other a spiritual good work and duty prescribed as a condition for
a spiritual benefit.

(e) Some acts done for the spiritual good of self (e.g., if one were in
danger of death and could be baptized only by a person Who demanded
money for the service, it would not be simony to pay the money, since
the price would be offered, not for the Sacrament, but for the removal
of an unjust annoyance).

2335. Theological Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony against the
divine law is a mortal sin from its nature and in every instance. No
matter how small the spiritual thing that is sold, it is priceless, and
a grave injury is done by putting a price on it. Simony is a serious
injury to God, since it usurps His place as the only Lord of spiritual
things (I Cor., iv, 1), to the spiritual things themselves, since it
estimates their worth by vile material gain (Prov., iii. 15; Acts,
viii. 20), and to the recipients, who should receive the gifts of God
freely (Matt, x, 8). Hence, St. Peter denounced Simon Magus as
deserving of perdition (Acts, viii. 20), and in law simony is spoken of
as the worst of pests, a cancer, leprosy, a scourge.

(b) Simony against ecclesiastical law is a mortal sin from its nature,
since it is forbidden as a protection to religion and under grave sin;
but in particular cases it may be only a venial sin, since the church
laws do not bind under grave sin, when the matter or the danger is not
serious, as was said in 382.

2336. Moral Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony is reducible to
real sacrilege (see 2311 c). It is treated separately for the sake of
convenience, on account of the large number of questions that pertain
to it, and also because there is reason to consider it as a distinct
species of sin (2308 c). Hence, the moral malice of simony is that of
irreligiousness.

(b) Simony of divine law and simony of ecclesiastical law, according to
the more common and likely opinion, are alike in moral malice. For
although the mere prohibition of the Church does not make a non-sacred
thing sacred, it does make the non-sacred thing unsaleable precisely
because related to things that are sacred. In other words, the motive
of the law is the protection of sacred things against the appearance or
danger of simony, and the motive of the law is the factor that
determines the moral character of precepts and prohibitions of human
law. Thus, to miss Mass on Sunday is a sin against religion, because
the Church commands in virtue of religion that Mass be heard on Sunday;
to eat meat on Friday is a sin against temperance, because the Church
forbids the use of meat on Friday in virtue of temperance. Hence, it is
not merely disobedience, but simony, to violate a law which forbids a
certain contract because of its nearness to the sale of spirituals for
temporals. Moreover, he who willfully exposes himself to the immediate
danger of some sin wills the malice of that sin.

2337. Invalidity and Penalties of Simoniacal Contracts.--(a) Every
simoniacal contract is invalid and of no force either in the external
or in the internal forum, because it sells what is unsaleable under
divine or ecclesiastical law. If the contract has to do with benefices,
offices or dignities (e.g., "You vote as I wish and I will give you
such and such favors," "You obtain for me such a dignity and I will pay
you well"), the appointment to them is rendered null and void, even
though the simoniacal act be done by a third party without the
knowledge of the beneficiary, unless it be done by that third party to
injure the beneficiary or against his protest (Canon 729). Invalidity
is also produced in case of simoniacal resignations (Canon 185),
commissions (Canon 1441), presentations (Canon 1465, § 2), and
prescription does not operate for one who holds a benefice obtained
through simony (Canon 1446).

(b) Certain simoniacal contracts subject the guilty parties to special
punishments. Thus, the penalty for simony in appointments, elections or
promotions to office and dignities is excommunication _latæ
sententiæ_ reserved simply to the Holy See, and deprivation forever of
all right of nominating, voting, presenting, and suspension (Canon
2392); the penalty for simony in elevation to Orders or in use of other
sacraments is suspicion of heresy and suspension reserved to the Holy
See (Canon 2371).

2338. When the Canonical Penalties for Simony Do Not Apply.--(a) Purely
mental simony is not subject to ecclesiastical penalties, since the
Church does not pronounce on internal acts. But this does not take away
the serious guilt in the sight of God. (b) External simony is subject
to ecclesiastical penalties, but canonists dispute about the meaning of
certain Canons, for example, whether only real simony falls under the
punishments _latæ sententiæ_, whether the penalties of Canons 729 and
2392 apply only to simony of divine law, or to simony of ecclesiastical
law as well.

2339. Influence of Simony on Spiritual Effects.--(a) On Effects of the
Power of Orders.--Sacraments administered simoniacally are valid, for
the law nullifies only the contract made about the Sacrament, not the
Sacrament itself. It seems also that in the case of sacramentals (such
as simple blessings imposed on articles) the blessing is not lost by
sale of the article, provided the price is asked only for the object
and not for the blessing. A blessed or consecrated object loses its
blessing or consecration when it is put up for public sale (Canon 1305).

(b) On Effects of the Power of Jurisdiction.--Acts of jurisdiction are
valid in spite of simony, unless there is special provision to the
contrary. Indulgences are lost _ipso facto_, if anything temporal is
taken for the indulgenced object (Canon 924). Religious profession, it
seems, is valid, even though simoniacal.

2340. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for a Spiritual
Thing.--(a) If the simoniacal contract is semi-real (that is, if the
spiritual consideration has not been received), the price must be
restored; for we have then the case of an immoral and unexecuted
contract (see 1878 d). (b) If the simoniacal contract is real (that is,
if the spiritual consideration has been received), the price should be
given back; for the case then is one of commutative justice, a temporal
price being taken for a thing (e.g., a blessing) that has no temporal
price, or for a service that one was bound to give gratis (e.g.,
parochial sermon by the pastor). But if a service was not obligatory,
it is held by some that there is no certain duty of restitution, if the
spiritual thing cannot be restored (e.g., when one received a stipend
for a Mass of bination or demanded an excessive fee for a sacred
function).

2341. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for Temporal Things
Annexed to Spirituals.--Restitution is obligatory as follows: (a) when
commutative justice is violated, as when one charges for a blessed
candle or rosary in excess of its market value or just price, or when
by fear or force one compels another to exchange a chalice for a
ciborium; (b) when law or judicial sentence imposes restitution as a
penalty for an offense, as when for money one has resigned one's
benefice in favor of another person.

2342. Circumstances of Restitution for Simony.--(a) The Time for
Restitution.--If simony is against natural law, restitution is due
before sentence; if against ecclesiastical law only, restitution is due
only after sentence.

(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Is to Be Made.--Satisfaction should
be given to the owner, or injured party (e.g., to the person who was
charged for a blessing), or, if this is impossible, to the poor or
pious causes. The revenues derived from a benefice simoniacally
obtained should be restored to the church to which the benefice
belongs, unless this is advantageous to the guilty parties, or probably
to charity, or religion, or the successor in the benefice.

(c) Excuses from Restitution.--Impossibility, condonation or the
permission of the Church, express or presumed, excuses from the duty of
restitution.

2343. Restitution of Spiritual Thing Simoniacally Received.--The
spiritual thing simoniacally received must be restored even before the
sentence of the judge (Canon 729, §1). (a) Thus, if it is a benefice,
office or dignity that was obtained or conferred through simony, it
must be resigned; nor may the guilty party keep the fruits, unless he
was in good faith and permission is given. (b) If the spiritual thing
is something other than a benefice, it should likewise be given up,
provided it is of a kind that can be restored (e.g., it is impossible
to restore a Sacrament received or a consecration given to a church)
and restitution will not cause irreverence (e.g., it would be
irreverent to restore blessed objects or relics to the seller if he
meant to profane them).




Art. 6: THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF PIETY;
THE COMMANDMENTS

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 101-122.)

2344. Having treated of religion, the chief potential part of justice,
we shall new consider the remaining subsidiary virtues of the present
group, namely, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, vindication,
friendship, liberality, equity (see 2141-2143).

2345. The Virtue of Piety.--In general, piety is the virtue that
inclines one to show due recognition of indebtedness to those from whom
one has received life and existence. There are three senses of the word:

(a) in its strictest meaning, it refers to the dutifulness owed to the
immediate or secondary causes of our being, namely, parents and country;

(b) in a derived meaning, it is applied to the religious duties owed to
God, who is our Heavenly Father and the First Author of our being.
Hence, those who are faithful to the worship of God are called pious
and the divine services are known as works of piety;

(c) in its widest meaning, piety is applied to works of mercy, since
they are most pleasing to God as a tribute of filial devotion. The
merciful man has pity (piety), because his kindness to the unfortunate
honors God more than victims or sacrifices. Hence, since God is
merciful, He Himself is sometimes called pious: "The Lord is
compassionate (_pius_) and merciful" (Ecclus., ii. 13).

2346. Definition of Piety.--Piety in the strictest sense is defined as
"a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the
duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and
sustainers of our being."

(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it
differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country
(see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love
for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of
the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.

(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion
gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our
dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold
the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the
mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other
relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one's
parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and
sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one's native land or
the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and
it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and
allies of one's country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country
should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed
to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.

(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to
parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the
second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or
otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated
only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of
parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to
fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of
the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real
injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require
more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).

(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers
of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty
owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one
is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is
obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty
is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this
nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very
like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.

2347. The Reverence Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be honored
internally by the esteem in which their parental dignity and merits
(not their personal failings) are held; externally, by the marks of
respect customarily shown to parents.

(b) Relatives should receive a lower degree of respect commensurate
with the nearness and quality of the kinship. Thus, parents should
treat their children with the consideration owed to members of the
family, and not as servants or strangers, brothers and sisters and
relatives of remoter degree should give one another that courtesy and
regard which respect for common parents or ancestors calls for. Lineal
relatives are nearer than collaterals, and elder relatives (such as
grandparents, uncles and aunts) are more entitled to respect than
younger relatives (such as grandchildren, nephews and nieces).

(e) Country should be honored, not merely by the admiration one feels
for its greatness in the past or present, but also and primarily by the
tender feeling of veneration one has for the land that has given one
birth, nurture and education. Even though a country be poor and humble,
it should be patriotically revered (Ps. cxxxvi). External
manifestations of piety towards country are the honors given its flag
and symbols, marks of appreciation of its citizenship (Acts, xxi. 39),
and efforts to promote its true glory at home and abroad.

2348. The Assistance Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be helped
in their needs, spiritual or temporal. If they are sick, they should be
visited; if they are poor, they should be assisted; if they are in need
of the Sacraments or prayers or suffrages, these spiritual means should
be provided. But a son is not bound to pay the debts of his deceased
father who left him nothing, since the debt was a personal one.

(b) Relatives should also be assisted in their needs, especially if the
necessity is urgent and the relationship close (as in the case of
brothers and sisters). But this duty is not as strict as that owed to
parents, and, if the relationship is distant, there is no special
obligation of piety.

(c) Country is helped by the aid given to fellow-countrymen who are in
moral, mental or corporal need. The noblest patriots are those who
devote their lives, labors or substance to the promotion of religion,
education and contentment among their people, to the correction of real
evils that threaten decay or disaster to the national life, and to the
preservation of those special ideals and institutions that constitute
what is characteristic and best in the nation.

2349. Sins against Piety.--(a) By Excess.--Exaggerated respect for
relatives or country is a sin, since it is not according to order or
reason. Thus, while children should not dishonor their parents under
the pretext of religion (Matt., xv. 3-9), neither should they be more
devoted to their parents than to God (Luke, xiv. 26; Matt., viii. 22),
nor neglect God's call when their parents do not need them (Matt., iv.
22). Thus also, patriotism should not degenerate into patriolatry, in
which country is enshrined as a god, all-perfect and all-powerful, nor
into jingoism or chauvinism, with their boastfulness or contempt for
other nations and their disregard for international justice or charity.

(b) By Defect.--Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised
on account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by
word (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or
contemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by
signs (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule
them), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by
omissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or
to give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one's country is felt
when one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the
principles of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a
class, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and
that country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle
of Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with
love of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the
individual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one
speaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or
prestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section,
party, personal ambition, or greed, etc.

2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.--(a) The moral malice is distinct
from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt
owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of
wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and
matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity
among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother
are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to
honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the
circumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance
that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth
cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though
an aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of
impiety.

(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin's nature,
since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special
commandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account
of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or
speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of
the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother
slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes
his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their
parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation
regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only
lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents
may generally be presumed when there is amendment.

2351. The Virtue of Reverence.--This virtue is known in Latin as
_observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it
carefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their
commands. It is defined as "a moral virtue which inclines one to render
to persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that
is due their authority."

(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the
direction of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it
renders to others what is due them.

(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position,
that is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men
distinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that
make them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person
who receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who
shows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some
reverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself),
or that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one
who receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank
and merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the
superiority which each has to many others).

(c) The reason for reverence is the authority vested in these persons,
that is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher
dignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to
direct a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a
distinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of
veneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his
father piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his
life, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to
his end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and
reverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the
nation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence,
as regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when assistance is
given the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).

(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony
given to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior.
Honor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or
the means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show
honor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person
honored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in
jurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors,
but not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not
enforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.

(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission
to law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This
tribute of reverence is paid only to one's own ruling superior, since
others have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.

2352. Species of Honor.--(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which
is shown to all and by all (e.g., God honors the Saints, and Tobias and
Mardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of
homage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or
servants to their superiors or masters.

(b) As to modes, there is honor in general and praise, which is a
special form of honor; Praise is given in speech or writing; honor is
shown not only by words, but also by deeds (e.g., by salutations,
prostrations) and things (e.g., by monuments, presents, banquets,
titles).

(c) As to motives, there is civil honor (i.e., the respect shown to the
temporal authority of rulers, teachers, employers, etc.), religious
honor (i.e., the respect shown to the spiritual authority of the Pope,
bishops, priests, etc.), and supernatural honor (i.e., the respect
given to the virtue of holy men). This last honor is known as _dulia_
(service) when offered to the Saints who reign with Christ in heaven,
as _hyperdulia_ (superior service) when offered to the Mother of God.

2353. Obligation of Showing Honor to Deserving Excellence.--(a) Common
honor should be given to all who are not irrevocably evil and
malignant, that is, it should be shown to all creatures, the damned
excepted. For, as was said above, there is no one who is not possessed
of superiority in some respect, and it is even reasonable to believe
that the most unpromising person is better than oneself in some quality
or other. Hence, the Scriptures admonish us to honor all (I Peter, ii.
17), to be beforehand in giving honor to one another (Rom., xii. 10),
and humbly to believe that others are superior (Phil., ii. 3). But in
bestowing honor, while one should have at least in general an honorable
opinion of others, the duty of external honor does not oblige at all
times or in all circumstances; and the same kind of honor is not to be
given by or to all persons. Those who show the ordinary signs of
charity (as they should) in greetings, salutations, courtesies, and the
like, comply sufficiently with the duty of common honor.

(b) Special honor should be given all those who have a right to it:
"Tribute to whom tribute is due, honor to whom honor is due" (Rom.,
xiii. 7). Thus, rulers and prelates should be given the respect due
their station, even though personally they are wicked, for in the honor
given their rank reverence is shown to God, whose ministers they are,
and to the community which they represent. There is a moral, though not
a legal, obligation to honor men distinguished for holiness for their
own sakes since, while honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue, it
is a distinguished mark of recognition, and for the sake of others,
since virtue in honor is like a lamp placed upon a stand and shining
for many (Matt., v. 15).

2354. Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.--(a) There is no
strict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels,
Saints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for
salvation to adore God. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy
persons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it
would not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he
would also deny to God's friends and heroes the honors they deserve
(Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious
helps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least
venially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there
would be sin--and perhaps even grave sin, _per accidens_--if the
neglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.

(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the
veneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother
of God belongs _hyperdulia_, to the Saints of God _dulia_; to holy
persons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and
conformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the titles of Venerable,
Blessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be
performed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and
only by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to
pray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the
souls in Purgatory; but it would be superstitious to give to the damned
or false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.

2355. Obedience.--Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which
inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one's
superior, because it is a command and obligatory.

(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or
unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience
(which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these
lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note
also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in
this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command,
while the virtue includes also internal submission.

(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in
the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship
yield to what the other desires.

(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept
imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of
obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has
not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment,
not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a
son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has
received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission
according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the
second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.

(d) It obeys precisely because the superior's will has been expressed
as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other
acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience
which is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general
virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God,
there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of
honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak
is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply
because it is law and as such should be kept.

2356. Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.--There are two kinds
of power that confer moral authority to impose a command--the power of
jurisdiction and dominative power.

(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect
society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to
impose laws.

(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society,
which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only.
This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body
composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are
necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the
parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her
husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the
employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience
becomes subject to the superior).

2357. Degrees of Obedience.--Ascetical authors distinguish three
degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with
exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness
in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external
submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith
of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself
to the superior's judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not
clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).

2358. Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.--(a) Obedience,
as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on
account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes
joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep
the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if
actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as
homage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as
when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to
try a subject's obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has
been commanded is an act of obedience only).

(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it
belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God
Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among
those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things,
obedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence,
inasmuch as it contemns for God's sake the noblest human good, one's
own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the
body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to
religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law,
religion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship
performed without devotion or without regard for God's will are not to
be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and
the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that
obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that
internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship.
Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues
and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).

2359. Comparison of Acts of Obedience.--(a) All acts of obedience are
of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of
laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on
account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be
the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands
and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the
Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.

(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for
circumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add
to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by
performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey
by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something
hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing
obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and
may be performed with less willingness.

2360. The Duty of Obedience.--Since obedience is obligatory because a
superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on
the extent of the superior's authority.

(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is
Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: "Let us do all that
the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient" (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is
not bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since
God wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the
creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it
is not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those
whom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish
that which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be
lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to
perform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances
(Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God
commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret
the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle
wrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him,
but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred
to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of
virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.

(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful
authority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he
who resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience
the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the
superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given
him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2,
3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful
superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii.
1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).

2361. When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.--Obedience to a human
superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the
superior has no authority to command.

(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is
clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore
unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin,
even a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29;
Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands
something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own
superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in
judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a
command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.

(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command
exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no
control. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the
soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these
things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or
bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these
matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to
believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to
external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature
of the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to
observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is
concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot
take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on
Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and
things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its
nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command
spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot
command for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the
powers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs
rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no
superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally
impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise
heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a
command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable
motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be
a sin to disregard it.

2362. Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.--If a
superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter
is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is
even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he
would not have authority. Such cases are the following:

(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is
held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body
(e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose
virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the
conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be
ordered so to do;

(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great
evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that
is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).

2363. Internal Actions and Human Superiors.--Internal actions in
themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle
says: "Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make
manifest the counsels of the heart" (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways
these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.

(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts
themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and
acts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he
may pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may
pass on them and prescribe them.

(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so
far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its
goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or
pronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This
question was treated above in 426.

2364. Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.--(a) The vow obliges a
religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according
to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no
obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not
authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered
religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless
otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or
constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is
obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225,
2237).

(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave
matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The
intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other
circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the
imposition of a grave precept.

2365. Sins against Obedience.--Since obedience is a moral virtue and
therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it
avoids.

(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience,
for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It
is found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission,
as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey.
Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to
religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should
think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.

(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command.
This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect--the former
because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and
the latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to
(see 1711 sqq.).

2366. Definition of Disobedience.--Disobedience is the transgression of
the lawful command of a superior.

(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to
perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or
omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no
disobedience if fulfillment is impossible--for example, if a subject
who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive
the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to
give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or
regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt
to observe them.

(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is
morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not
disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or
steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest
blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).

(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence,
it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests
made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory
(e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband
picked out for her by her parents).

(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is
opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher
superior prevails (288 sqq.).

2367. The Kinds of Disobedience.--(a) By reason of the subject,
disobedience is either material or formal, according as the
transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against
some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself.
Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a
transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is
called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special
sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in
order not to submit.

(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for
the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor
despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in
disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the
authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the
precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or
envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If
contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it
extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.

2368. It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if
the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions,
or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his
view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and
law.

2369. Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.--(a) From its
nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to
charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of
God demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His
representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2;
Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins
of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days
(II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).

(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes
only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his
superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.

(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a
venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God,
and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if
one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a
protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not
serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the
contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of
anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor
regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed
against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth
commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the
former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.

2370. Moral Species of Disobedience.--(a) In formal disobedience, if
the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely,
that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the
lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third
commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience
only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out
of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed
by parents or teachers).

(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of
some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as
when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but
if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is
but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between
meals against the command given by his mother.

2371. Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.--One act of
formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:

(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it
is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to
disobey a higher than a lower superior;

(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the
intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious
to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God
always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more
serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the
lawgiver has more at heart.

2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.--(a)
Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than
sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true
when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God,
for, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against God is more
serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins
against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a
less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the
other theft.

(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than
contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of
greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God
than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in
contempt than to disregard his precept.

2373. The Virtue of Gratitude.--Religion, piety, reverence and
obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the
virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice
on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as "a
moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to
repay with gladness the favors one has received."

(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good
useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus,
gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the
commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony)
or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get
rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents
made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are
due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed),
though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives,
even when it is not a favor.

(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The
former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of
benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter
consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and
gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).

2374. Two Kinds of Gratitude.--(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the
recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from
religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to
God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause
of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or
guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense,
gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from
those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and
follows in order after reverence.

2375. Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for
the gift of repentance?

(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has
been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, _per se_ and
other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin
than to be rescued from it.

(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has
received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is
more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.

2376. Circumstances of Gratitude.--(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be
Shown.--Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind
remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible
(e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings
with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less
benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or
only with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed
chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened
if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is
wealthy or famous).

(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.--Every person who is favored
should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his
benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it
beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither
is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some
extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his
benefactors.

(c) The Time for Gratitude.--Internal gratitude should be immediate,
and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received;
but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced
or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.

(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.--If the favor was bestowed by reason
of a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the
benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or
liberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that
prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes
more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and
willingness and disinterestedness.

[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.--It is suitable that one repay
benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is
possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of
what was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will
counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass
the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can
at least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.

2377. The Sins against Gratitude.--(a) Since gratitude is a moral
virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is
grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by
ingratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it
is more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive
thanks.

(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal.
Formal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the
benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for
him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against
the benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor
without contempt for him or his favor.

(c) As to its mode, formal ingratitude is also twofold, that by
omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of
the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of
thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with
affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem.,
xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in
contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.

2378. The Moral Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Material ingratitude is
not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed
against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is
an act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor
is an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an
aggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we
owe thanks than to harm others.

(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a
special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one
to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special
classes of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).

2379. The Theological Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Formal ingratitude
from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity,
which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on
account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter.
Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be
mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.

(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of
the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one
gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a
valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin
is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a
benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.

2380. Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?--(a) If the
favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the
ingratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that
the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his
improvement (Luke, vi. 35).

(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made
worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.

2381. The Virtue of Vengeance.--Just as gratitude returns good for
evil, so does vengeance (_vindicatio_) return evil for evil, that is,
the evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as "a
moral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the
punishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or
private justice."

(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to
those who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses.
The duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and
pertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of
commutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to
justice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the
equality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of
the person who has been injured.

(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the
infliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already
committed an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with
lawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past
but present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the
virtue of vengeance.

(c) Vengeance uses only lawful means; that is, it seeks redress or
reparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and
follows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private
revenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the "unwritten law," etc.,
which are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively
excusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also
exercised by those who desire that justice may be done against
malefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as
are not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friendship).
Parents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and
chastise their children.

(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the
vindication of the right order of society or the compensation or
satisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one
to desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another
virtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one's act
pertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to
secure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of
legal justice; if one seeks the honor of God, the act is one of
religion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the
wish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a
criminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not
the vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred,
cruelty or other like passion, sins grievously and perhaps makes
himself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is
to be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).

2382. The Morality of Vengeance.--(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it
pertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just
and is approved by God (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special
virtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves
man to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive
ends (see 2381). It is closely related to fortitude and zeal, which
prepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of God and man,
inspires indignation against injustice, while fortitude removes the
fear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally,
however, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful,
as when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more
heavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).

(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury
to a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of God or of
the Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who
maltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired
writers pray God to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, xxxiv, lxviii,
cviii, lxxviii, cxxxvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12),
and Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an
injury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego
punishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this
course is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see
1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal
wrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of
God; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of
such evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss
of such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party,
edification, and greater claim on God's forgiveness of self. Hence,
vengeance is called "a little virtue," since it is so often the less
perfect way.

2383. Excess and Defect.--Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence
should be characterized by moderation as to all its circumstances. It
should avoid the extremes of excess and defect.

(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the
quantity of the punishment offends human rights or surpasses the
measure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to
associate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an
offender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human
being as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement
in a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is
unfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose
rigor far surpasses the degree of offense. There is excess even in
medicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for
a lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good
quality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.

(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or
allows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to
offenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense.
Scripture condemns this lenity when it declares that the parent who
spares the rod spoils the child (Prov., xiii. 24). In weighing the
gravity of a delinquency account should be taken of the fault itself,
of the injury done and the scandal given. In the fault consideration
must be had of the objective element (i.e., the nature and importance
of the law violated), of the subjective element (i.e., the age,
instruction, education, sex, and state of mind of the offender), of the
circumstances (e.g., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the
frequency). See Canon 2218.

2384. Circumstances of Punitive Justice.--(a) Punishments that May Be
Used.--Punishment is virtuous only in so far as it restrains from evil
those who cannot be restrained by love of virtue, but only by fear of
penalty. Hence, penalties should consist in the deprivation of goods
that are more prized than the satisfactions obtained through
delinquencies. Both divine and human laws, therefore, have established
as punishments the loss of a bodily good (e.g., by death, flogging,
imprisonment) or of an external good (e.g., by exile, fine, infamy),
the chief inducements to crime being found in bodily or external
things. The extreme penalty of death should be reserved for extreme
cases, and the other penalties should be suited to the crime, so as to
remove the incentive or means (e.g., dishonesty should be punished by
loss of goods, calumny by infamy, lust by pain, etc.).

(b) Persons Who May Be Punished.--Punishment again is virtuous only
because it pertains to justice and rights the inequality caused by sin.
Accordingly, no one should be punished unless he has sinned or
voluntarily transgressed. It is unlawful to punish the innocent for the
guilty, or to punish an innocent person in order to keep him from
future sins. It should be noted, however, that God inflicts temporal
evils on the just for the sake of spiritual goods (e.g., that they may
not become attached to this world, may have opportunities of merit, and
may give good example); that one person may be punished for the sin of
another when he associates himself with or approves of that sin, as
when careless parents have bad children or careless subjects bad rulers
(Job, xxxiv. 30; Exod, xx. 5); that for a sufficient reason an innocent
person may be deprived of a good for which he is unfitted (e.g.,
ordination when one is irregular by defect) or to which he has no
personal or absolute claim (e.g., the family property when it is lost
to the children because the father is fined).

2385. The Virtue of Truthfulness.--Having treated the virtues of
gratitude and vengeance, which deal with moral obligations caused by an
act of the one owed, we now pass on to truthfulness, which is a moral
obligation arising from the acts of the one owing in which he
communicates with others. For he who speaks, writes, or otherwise
manifests his mind to others puts himself under a duty of not
deceiving. Truthfulness or veracity is defined as "a moral virtue that
inclines one duly and faithfully to express what is in one's mind."

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a good habit, and so it differs from
truth, which is the object of intellectual habits. Thus, the First
Truth or God is the object of faith. Truthfulness is not the object of
a virtue, but it is a virtue.

(b) It is a moral virtue. It deals with external things (viz., the
words or signs by which we express our thoughts), and so it is not a
theological virtue; moreover, though the knowledge of truth belongs to
the intellect, the right manifestation of truth depends on a good will,
and so truthfulness is not an intellectual virtue: the truthful man may
be unlearned, but he loves honesty.

(c) It regulates the expression of the mind, that is, the words,
writing, gestures, conduct, and other external signs, so as to make
them conformable to the mind which they stand for. Truthfulness deals
with internal things (e.g., when the speaker says that he has good
health or is well disposed towards another) and with external things as
they appear to the speaker (e.g., when he says that he is certain or
believes that a report is accurate).

(d) It is a faithful expression of what is in the mind or belief.
Hence, one may be truthful while making statements contrary to fact, or
untruthful while making statements agreeable to facts, for truthfulness
is sincerity, not correctness.

(e) It is a due expression of one's mind or belief; that is, it is
given when and where and as it should he given. A person who speaks out
his mind on all occasions, with no regard for results, is not a liar,
but he is at least imprudent, and he cannot be said to possess the
virtue of truthfulness, for every virtue is prudent. Examples of this
are persons who unnecessarily indulge self-praise by telling their true
virtues or perfections (Prov., xxvii. 2), or who vaingloriously or
otherwise foolishly publish their true sins or imperfections (Is. iii.
9).

2386. The Excellence of Truthfulness.--(a) Truthfulness is a virtue,
since it makes right use of language and other signs by employing them
for the truth, and also serves society, which rests on the trust that
men have in the words and promises of their fellow-men. St. Paul
admonishes the Ephesians (iv. 25) that each one speak the truth to his
neighbor, since all are members of the other.

(b) It is a moral virtue, preserving moderation in conversations and
other interchanges of thought. This virtue sees that facts are neither
exaggerated nor understated, that truth is not manifested when it
should be concealed, nor concealed when it should be spoken.

(c) It is a special virtue, for, while the other moral virtues regulate
actions and external things, none of them except truthfulness regulates
those objects precisely in their character of media or instruments for
signifying and conveying thoughts, opinions, and decisions. And since a
great part of human life is occupied in conference or correspondence
with others, truthfulness is one of the most useful of the virtues and
one whose exercise is most frequently called for.

(d) It is a virtue annexed to justice. On the one hand, it is like
justice, since it pays a debt which one social being owes another of
speaking the truth; on the other hand, it falls short of justice, since
the debt is moral, not legal. This is said of truthfulness in ordinary
intercourse, for in judicial process and in contracts there is also a
legal obligation of justice to tell the truth.

2387. Sincerity and Fidelity.--Two virtues that pertain to truthfulness
are sincerity and fidelity.

(a) Sincerity (simplicity) is the virtue of one who is consistent with
himself, avoiding duplicity and double dealing of every kind, such as
lies, equivocations, sophistries, specious excuses, quibbles, dishonest
shifts, distractions, concealments, and the like.

(b) Fidelity (loyalty) is the virtue of one who fulfills promises that
are obligatory only in virtue of his word freely given. It differs from
constancy, which is concerned not with promises but resolutions, and
from virtues concerned with promises that are obligatory in virtue of
legal debt, such as contracts, promissory oaths (see 1692, 1749, 1753,
1888). Fidelity makes an honest man's word as good as his bond, and it
is therefore one of the most appreciated of virtues (Matt., xxv. 21;
Psalm xiv). Horace calls it the sister of justice.

2388. Vices Opposed to Truthfulness.--(a) By defect one sins against
truth through lying and breach of promise; (b) by excess one sins
against truthfulness in violation of secret or other unjustifiable
disclosures.

2389. Lying.--A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what
is not true.

(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign
consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by
language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by
expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).

(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is
found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of
mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.

(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the
intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice
of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious
person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie.
Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear
understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his
efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who
do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or
inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of
indirect lying.

(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the
pretense that what is not in one's mind is in one's mind. Just as
truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the
disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely
false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as
a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give
support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to
throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.

2390. Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.--A
word that sufficiently expresses one's idea is not a lie or a
deception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener
or is conveyed by its mere letter.

(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of
the listener, does not make one's words untruthful, any more than it
makes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given
attention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded
obscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would
be harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.

(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its
wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or
circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words.
Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words
spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as "your most
obedient servant", statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g.,
when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to
discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or
of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of
disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in
argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak
according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v.
18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to
B: "Have you seen your father?" meaning, "Do you know where he is?" and
B replies: "I have not seen him," meaning "I do not know where he is."
Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one
another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are
not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example,
scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.

2391. Divisions of Lies.--(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its
nature as a departure from the speaker's mind, every lie is either an
exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which
tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not
believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain,
exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful
what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are
of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former
being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its
immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or
to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit
(e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard
the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there
is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only
suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior
purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for
evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to
its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a
statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes
does not deceive the auditors.

2392. Classification of Lies.--Every lie is harmful from its nature,
since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of
society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil,
and hence we have the following classes of lies.

(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to
please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies
include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and
descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by
one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way
(e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors
have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken
seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are
told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may
receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to
good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a
despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his
spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various
statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi.
2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).

(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to
indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying
(lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person
(pernicious lies).

2393. Motives for Lying.--The motives for lying are not always simple,
and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several
motives of different character.

(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence.
It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of
another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when
the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g.,
when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).

(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may
affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius
calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of
Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the
truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards
Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.

2394. Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.--(a) Lies of
exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in
both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to
overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration
is worse.

(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the
harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is
that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and
the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that
harms in temporal things only.

(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good
intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious
are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than
jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are
not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a
less evil to lie in order to save a man's life than to lie in order to
take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the
shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it
is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie
in order to prevent a financial loss.

2395. Sinfulness of All Lies.--But though lies are unequal in
sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are
called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest
good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does
not justify the means.

(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs
given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an
unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly
relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the
proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have
regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and
even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called
liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7;
Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and
St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point:
"Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor,
for we are members one of another." The Fathers and the theologians are
generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death,
excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could
approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith
in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who
helps to deceive us even in a small matter.

(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be
only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one's mind
is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is
not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be
denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not
regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose
and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and
as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial;
but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one
lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render
them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of
untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.

2396. When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.--Lies are sometimes free from
all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or
uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great
difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of
certain defectives who seem to be born liars).

2397. Pernicious Lies.--Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their
nature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the
lightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth
only, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the
liar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and
hated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for
its father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps.
v. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone
(Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:

(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary
to sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins
gravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if
in a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct),
venially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong
chapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or
the like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the
public by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a
witness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant
matters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other
injures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight
importance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the
confession, or the testimony is under oath;

(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to
injure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not
opposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are
found in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden
others.

2398. Concealment of the Truth.--Truthfulness is offended not only by
the declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also
by the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the
mind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.

(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse
to silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is
lawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there
is an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by
newspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their
questions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about
his business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades
their questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar
questions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.

(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply
in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If
the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him
in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific
terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence
or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is
obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental
reservation.

2399. Mental Reservation.--Mental reservation is an act of the mind by
which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they
do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification
of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external
modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.

(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal
modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural
sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them)
nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from
their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person
who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who
struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was
the club which hit Balbus directly.

(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification
can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural
sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different
meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the
words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius
accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks
that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck
Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows
nothing about the matter.

2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.--(a) Strict mental reservation
is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn.
1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs
words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his
mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess;
secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily
escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to
Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but
the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).

(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that
forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its
use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an
answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions
parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be
inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications,
when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can
testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary
knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by
concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is
necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether
spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end
compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused.
Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a
departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which
pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth
from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37).
Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it
were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are
discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.

(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient
reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of
state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the
prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the
prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the
prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being
the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not
use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should
not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be
employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The
reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double
result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation
is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and
causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because
the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural
signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their
accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by
the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a
truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener
or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own
heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury
to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest
means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets.
Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or
insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared
(John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the
daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other
cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV
Kings, vi. 19).

2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?--There is general
agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following
cases:

(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth
from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about
secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to
disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and
secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the
facts. The answer, "I do not know" or "No," in these cases simply
means: "I have no personal or communicable knowledge." In war time a
government has the right to censor the news in order to keep
information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it
obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a
clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a
slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a
gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);

(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold
the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right
to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a
person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he
is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a
person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently
grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which
means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).

2402. Ambiguous Answers.--Are ambiguous answers which are not given
according to the questioner's mind, and for which there are no
reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?

(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its
ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly
speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the
speaker's mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation
or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying.
The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of
events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite
sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.

(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is
contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express
the speaker's mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically
or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is
good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or
other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good
and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the
question propounded referred to moral goodness.

2403. Simulation or Pretence.--A special form of untruthfulness is
simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify
the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.

(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an
accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being
untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678
sqq.).

(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and
things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct
at variance with one's ideas is simulation. One may act without any
thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps
sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done
with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not
to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops
of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.;
David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11.
sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth
from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally
recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems,
ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and
concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.

(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who
is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is
well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one
who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form
of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does
not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation
if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at
Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but
He meant not to stop without an invitation.

2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.--(a) In general, simulation is a
sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the
few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their
nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more
indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy
to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie.
Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or
false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no
intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to
wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state,
and not necessarily his personal moral character.

(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable;
for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of
applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks
of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our
Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees ("Blind guides, whited
sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers," Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.),
and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas
("Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?" Luke, xxii. 48).
Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were
better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).

2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.--(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is
the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This
sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external
pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly
denounced in Scripture.

(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in
mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a
double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for
example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal
sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should
be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one's sin
by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize
others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).

(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense assumes the appearance of a high
degree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person
of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or
to pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This
sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of
some motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no
hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really
has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not
good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.

2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.--Two forms of lying
about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.

(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends
to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one's
means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or
tries by bluff to make one's defects seem perfections. This sin is
mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech.,
xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such
as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.

(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as
when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an
excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to
him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad
quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor
accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is
usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid
offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some
circumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or
seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed
braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to
acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25;
Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).

2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.--It remains to speak of the
vices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the
former, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889;
see also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask
the question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?

(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no
legal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the
promise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of
untruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker
show themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square
with his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his
plighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial
sin, though there are often circumstances (such as damage done) that
make it mortal.

(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on
account of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to
keep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects
referred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning
(e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the
force it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of
right on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the
promise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g.,
he no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he
promised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become
unlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been
foreseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his
right if the sole or principal reason that dictated the promise has
ceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the
promisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by
his own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).

2408. Definition of a Secret.--A secret is a matter (e.g., an
invention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a
crime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so
few that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists
distinguish the following kinds of secrets:

(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without
causing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will
harm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is
called natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the
secret and not from any promise or contract.

(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but
only after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no
difference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or
from some other source;

(c) an entrusted or committed secret, which is one that a person
promised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise
here is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is
one that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications
between two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers,
priests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of
their position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is
given in express terms, as when A says to B: "I have a matter of great
importance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep
it secret"; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.

2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.--A secret is the property of
its owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret
(such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor
or at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an
evil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not
be made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no
more lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right
to property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so
there are three kinds of injuries to a secret.

(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or
force or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by
secretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in
order to learn a secret).

(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of
a secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the
owner's rights.

(c) The right of disposition is injured by those who reveal a secret
which they were obliged not to reveal.

2410. Prying Into Others' Secrets.--To seek to discover the secrets of
others is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:

(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question
about a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed,
one has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or
private good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy.
But it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from
others natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to
steal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his
own;

(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has
a right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate
another in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to
resort to lies or simulation or immorality.

2411. Reading Another's Letters or Papers.--When is it lawful to read
the letters or other papers of another person?

(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to
anyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are
written on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left
open and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or
one left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is
secret. If a letter or manuscript has been torn up by its owner and
thrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem
lawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for,
though the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has
indicated his will to keep the contents secret.

(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret
as regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the
writer to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such
permission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or
lawful custom gives the superior of an institution the right to inspect
the correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted
matter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing
conscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors
(see Canon 611).

(c) It is also lawful to read the writings of others that are meant to
be secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a
case the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from
the knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has
the right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is
necessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools
may examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should
respect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets;
private individuals have the natural right, as a measure of
self-defense, to read another's letter, when there is a prudent reason
for thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to
themselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).

2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.--One is said to use
the knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one's conduct by
the knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or
omit. Is this use of a secret lawful?

(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful
(see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised
secret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted
secret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional
person, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated
will not be used against one's interests or without one's consent, and
hence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work
for a client that the latter's business was not prosperous, he gave
word of this to one of the client's creditors.

(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is
nevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make
money from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get
knowledge of another's information and plans through reading his
letters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or
if it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is
uneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to
take away one's trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has
learned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).

(c) If there was no promise to avoid use and no harm will be done by
use, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to
raise the price on one's property when one accidentally learns through
overhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher
price), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to
assist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need
of one's charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by
use of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could
be sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has
discovered by one's own industry some important truth in an art or
science which another had previously discovered but had neglected to
make his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that
another person is one's enemy and has to be watched and avoided.

2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of
Another.--(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin
is mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity.
Injury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is
violation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by
the greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or
displeasure caused.

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the
sin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person's
letters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally
sure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an
unimportant secret without permission.

2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.--(a) The natural secret
obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity
and justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become
venial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or
harm is caused.

(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as
a rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity
alone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407),
is not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when
the promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under
grave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.

(c) The entrusted secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for there is
a duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of
the rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The
violator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for
contract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in
officials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or
assistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on
account of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a
serious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if
the person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this
and no other damage will result (see 2065).

2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.--(a) The promised
secret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in
the previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_
than the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed
to in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the
former. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a
secret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided
without necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory
than a secret one has given one's word of honor to keep; a professional
secret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far
more important than any secret of private individuals. The most
inviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its
violation is always a sacrilege.

2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.--(a) If there
has been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not
necessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted
under compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful,
it does not seem necessary to keep the secret.

(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to
be silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a
certain space of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become
public, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged,
or in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret,
provided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is
done by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the
secret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he
is not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls
for the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many
make exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the
contrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard
the secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety
of the republic were involved.

2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.--(a) If a secret
cannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be
kept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to
public safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good
and a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as
the escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious
evils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or
treason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it
known at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior
has no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind,
and this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection
extended to professional communications.

(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good
of the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted
and an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept,
for charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the
owner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its
revelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion
that the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public
good then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the
secret), but this is denied by others. Example: Titus knows that Balbus
is about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the
marriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to
the pastor.

(c) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good
of a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret),
distinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not
done by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is
done the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in
confidence that Sempronius has made an invention which will supersede
an invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known
to the latter, for Sempronius has done no injury to Claudius). If,
however, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when
the secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity
requires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if
this has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the
harm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired
to murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the
murder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending
warning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor
knows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and
pretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man
to make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should
give notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the
laws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.

2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the
secret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for
which an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?

(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent
party (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him),
natural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the
true state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of
damage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the
true culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other
way of saving the innocent person.

(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which
the innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring
the latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept,
since the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and
therefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968).
But others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to
accuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him;
for the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of
the innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict
and unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the
innocent person (see 288).

2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party.
If the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not
obliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the
inviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the
acceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave
hardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to
warn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself
by making known the truth.

2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.--Is
it lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against
the interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by
stealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized
inspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this
question, but to us the following seems the best:

(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because
the owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of
the public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person),
or the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he
cannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the
owner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a
case there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of
lawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force
is excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is
sinful and induces the duty of restitution, nor is there any right to
make such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself
(e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);

(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is
in the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a
person's most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original
injury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least
an unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or
proportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler
methods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the
detective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of
blackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same class
as thieves and are bound to restitution; their sin is _per se_ mortal,
for secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would
be seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using
secrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged
communications or state secrets) were permissible.

2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.--These two virtues,
though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most
useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness)
is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters
properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.

(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is,
in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and
consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than
mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary
proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman,
according to Cardinal Newman ("Idea of a University," Discourse viii,
10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to
make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is
considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions
or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome,
makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when
compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is
indulgent towards opponents.

(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it
observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances,
suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and
observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official,
business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are
times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to
display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the
sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).

(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the
ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and
therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each
one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the
displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less
than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special
benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than
polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly
in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to
its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by
friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied
by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse
compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or
little affection.

(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation
of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under
temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of
games _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation,
urbanity, or pleasantness.

2422. Offices of Affability.--All, and especially the clergy, should
practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all
men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his
advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God
(I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the
negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the
avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the
positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the
appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a
gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.

2423. The Sins against Affability.--(a) Adulation is the vice of those
who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the
complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or
extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors
for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by
exaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as
by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is
not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but
circumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when
one compliments another's sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the
person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the
flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to
adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display
of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.

(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners,
not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant
and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready
to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in
visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence.
Surliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it
is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not
necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer
is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5).
Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or
laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at
table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can
be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that
seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.

2424. Liberality.--Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of
riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one's own goods
upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.

(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and
esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least
improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion.
Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These
virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in
need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity
and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who
are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does
not prize external things excessively.

(b) It inclines one to bestow one's own possessions, or freely to
communicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice,
since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to
others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination,
even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being
less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.

(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of
magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise
of the greatest moment.

(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is
needed to make one use money freely for one's own needs or comfort.

(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there
is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed
unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc.
Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal
affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income,
with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality
which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of
luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).

2425. The Importance of Liberality.--(a) Liberality is not the greatest
virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the
passions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in
reference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which
serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is
less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for
liberality has to do directly with temporals.

(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes
one to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one
an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28).
According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first
bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of
generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and
charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence
(see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God
and man.

2426. Vice of Avarice.--The vice which is opposed to liberality by
defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as
distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or
delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as
lands or money.

(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.--This sin is _per se_ venial, since
it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself
indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for
money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations
for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to
religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not
concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are
not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and
carnal vices.

(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.--In regard to deformity, avarice
is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the
good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the
vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is
opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that
avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard
to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less
valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the
vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things,
which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and
of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is
rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of
avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons
avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own
necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by
an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a
willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the
most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to
part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake
of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness).
In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that
causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice
is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other
sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most
prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure
the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for
the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii.
14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and
restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse
to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv.
26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.),
and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of
the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own
soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and
one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx.
15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence
or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).

2427. Vice of Prodigality.--The vice opposed to liberality by excess in
giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal
things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.

(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the
miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as
the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is
careless about earning or saving.

(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the
prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not
call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should
not give.

2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.--(a) From its nature it is venial.
The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who
is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not
grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he
deprives himself are of the lowest kind.

(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on
account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to
seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which
makes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave
need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity,
as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).

2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.--(a) They are associable,
for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in
different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money
away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to
obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice.
Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed
from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to
cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the
vice of old age.

2430. The Virtue of Equity.--The virtues that have been so far treated
in the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have
the status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list
of virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to
general (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see
above, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).

2431. Definition of Equity.--In law, equity is any court system of
extraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as
declared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and
procedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures
where these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the
United States courts of equity are those that take care of defined
special cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common law
courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, §348). But as here taken equity is
a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which pertains
to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity which belongs
to legal justice (legal equity).

(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist
unnecessarily on one's strict or legal rights when to do so will be
unpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an
employer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition
to the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of time
to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity and
justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of justice,
since it is really identical with the virtue of affability or
friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of
justice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.

(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond
the common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the
law by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is
said to be deficient here when its application in a particular case
would be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common
good or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the
prohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this
way and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law,
according to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the
depositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be
unsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good
law lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view
of what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are
couched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver
himself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).

2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.--(a) It is a distinct virtue,
since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of
special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds
the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the
lawgiver's intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver's
words.

(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is
contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs
from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in
Articles 5 and 6.

(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or
legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned
with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is
grave (see 1721).

(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two
parts--good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of
morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment
(_gnome_), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary
run--so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to
usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles
(viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where
the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a
madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to
commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but
equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and
one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city,
the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity
would command one to transgress it.

(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal
justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is
the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common
good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all
times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in
extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.

2433. The Complements of Justice.--To each of the various virtues
correspond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits
of the Holy Ghost, and Beatitudes (see 159).

(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice,
piety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the
completion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of
justice. This Gift is defined as "an infused habit that renders the
soul well disposed towards God as its kind Father, and makes it quickly
responsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial
affection towards God." As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly
fathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: "You
have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba,
Father" (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors God as Lord, piety as Father;
filial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a
child tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes
the soul rejoice and be glad in the things of God, in the Saints, the
Scriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.

(b) The Beatitudes assigned here are the fourth (Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which
agrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they
shall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who
finds his love and joy in God as Father will be compassionate to the
suffering creatures of God. Like justice, both of these Beatitudes are
exercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).

(c) The Fruits that seem most appropriate here are good will and
kindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services
for others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163);
like piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same
heavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it
pays what is due to God as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps
with pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally
perfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one
to see in God one's Father and in man the child of God; even that which
is not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for
justice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy
found in the very difficulty itself.

2434. The Commandments of Justice.--The various precepts regarding
justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the
fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals
or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the
first three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties
owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man
has to his equals or to all fellowmen.

2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their
purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which
consists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and
they therefore outline first the service that is owed to God
(Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to
man (Commandments of the Second Table).

(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the
edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render
to God the things that are God's. We must avoid, therefore, the excess
of superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the
defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy
God in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou
keep holy the Sabbath Day).

(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to
those to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country,
superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions
against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the
harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one
person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor's
external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external
incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness
against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts
or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of
those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility
(Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt
not covet thy neighbor's wife) they afford.

2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue.
Rather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are
contained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent.
Moreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present
work, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can
be drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience,
however, we give here a list of references, showing the passages of
this Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are
explained.

(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superstition (2274 sqq.)
for the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the
perceptive part.

(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the
prohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the
preceptive part.

(c) For the Third Commandment as to its natural precept, read on the
virtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on
positive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the
Church (see 2575 sqq.).

(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence,
obedience and gratitude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under
charity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular
states.

(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily
injury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on
charity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).

(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on
restitution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).

(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive
justice (1745 sqq.), on restitution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to
property (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).

(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.),
on unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).

(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230
sqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).




Art. 7: THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 123-140.)

2437. The Virtue of Fortitude.--This virtue ranks next after justice
and before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness
since it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice
is next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs;
the other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of
passion, fortitude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason,
and temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of
reason's enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fortitude is nobler than
temperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more
difficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain
from pleasure.

2438. Fortitude in General.--Fortitude (etymologically, strength,
vigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person
unshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.

(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the
requisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue.
Thus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they
do not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit
makes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered
them over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice
is severely punished, or from passion, because they are beside
themselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.

(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand
attack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so constituted
physically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect
them strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them
(adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or
predisposition for moral courage.

(c) Fortitude is also the name of a general virtue or rather of a
general condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no
virtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue
(i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to
temperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be
said to possess the virtue of temperance.

(d) Finally, fortitude is the name of a special virtue which confers
vigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and
pains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fortitude
that we now speak.

2439. Definition of Fortitude.--Fortitude is defined as "a virtue which
in the face of the greatest evils moderates the passions of fear and
confidence within the bounds dictated by right reason."

(a) The primary object of fortitude is the passions, or motions of the
sensuous appetite through which the appetite is attracted or repelled
by an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or
disagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fortitude and
temperance with passions (see 1709).

(b) The passions that chiefly fall within the scope of fortitude are
fear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which
deals with the passions of pleasure. Fortitude has to do with that
which is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is
agreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of
an external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling
of self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.

(c) The function of fortitude is to moderate fear and confidence, or to
keep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The passions in
themselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and
hence without fortitude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.

(d) Fortitude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even
when death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of
terrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we
do not ascribe fortitude to a man who is not brave except in reference
to things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having
a tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear
springs, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the
kinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fortitude in the strictest
sense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or
its equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to
fortitude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal
evils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to
some other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g.,
liberality regulates the fear of losing money).

(e) The motive of fortitude is conformity with right reason. The
courageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to
virtue and has for his last aim God and true beatitude. Fortitude is
exercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end
of the work (_finis operis_), or at least the end of the agent (_finis
operantis_), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous
when it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of
country) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending
for justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of
the brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue's
sake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friendship,
goes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary,
fortitude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue
(e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or shipwreck of a person
who had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the
daring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk
ignoble death with bravado is not a virtue.

2440. The Two Acts of Fortitude.--(a) The moderation of fear is
followed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the
case of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially
designated "fortitude." It is not accurate to speak of it as passive
resistance or passive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is
performed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and
self-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles
or make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing,
then, as stoical indifference or apathy.

(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circumstances call
for it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part
of valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to
be called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids
nor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a
nobler act of fortitude than brave attack; for endurance struggles
against superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its
fight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of
power, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is
quick and passing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous
in attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are noble, and
each is necessary at its proper time.

2441. The Excellence of Fortitude.--(a) Its Rank.--Fortitude is one of
the four principal or cardinal virtues. A principal virtue is one that
exercises in the most difficult circumstances one of the four qualities
that every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for
every virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rectitude (since a
virtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation
(since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and
discretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction).
Now, just as rectitude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in
dealing with others, and moderation in governing the appetites, and
discretion in ruling one's own actions, so firmness is most difficult
in the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice,
temperance, and prudence must also be associated fortitude as one of
the chief of all virtues. These four principal virtues are also called
cardinal virtues (from _cardo_, a hinge), because the whole moral life
of man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively
rare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly
called on to exercise fortitude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal
enmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).

(b) Its Utility.--Fortitude has a certain general utility, for it is
found to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are
admired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable
only in certain matters (Aristotle). Fortitude is like a strong tower,
or like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are
continual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job,
vii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the
temptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue.
Without fortitude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven
is captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who
fight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).

2442. Martyrdom.--As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727),
so martyrdom is the chief act of fortitude, and in a sense the most
perfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as "the voluntary
acceptance for the sake of God of a violent death inflicted out of
hatred of virtue." Martyrdom belongs to fortitude which produces it, to
love of God which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which
attracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other
acts, since fortitude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for
which martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself.
But in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.

(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and "greater love than
this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John,
xv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of God.

(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the
invisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more
efficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii.
4; II Cor., iv. 11).

2443. Kinds of Martyrdom.--The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely
or less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of
martyrdom:

(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one
dies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy),
Martyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and
hence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr.
Improper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as
when a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or
in defense of natural truths about God but without a religious motive;

(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of
martyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as
in the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for
infants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of
water (Matt., x. 39);

(c) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of God (theological martyrdom)
is either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish
to die for God, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act,
but it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the
trial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for
justice's sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that
lacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme
self-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the
essential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has
also the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete
martyrdom);

(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical
martyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect
martyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove
their existence and character.

2444. Conditions for Martyrdom.--Since martyrdom is a virtue and the
supreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:

(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because
the martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of
faith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chastity) or a human good
(e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one's country) is defended
for the sake of God;

(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not
necessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of
virtue as the motive of persecution, or that he pronounce or execute
the sentence of death himself;

(c) the martyr must accept martyrdom willingly (actual or virtual
intention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from
guilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or
at least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from
vainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a
condition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a
condition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the
former opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war
cannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second
opinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;

(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either
instant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation,
death by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other
hardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured,
mutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors
of the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some
believe that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence
that those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking,
martyrs; but others--and with better reason, it seems--deny this. Those
who are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while
attending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by
themselves (e.g., the Circumcellions who thought to win martyrdom by
suicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia,
see 1856).

2445. Practical Questions about Martyrdom.--(a) The Desire of
Martyrdom.--A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom
if the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii.
16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom
is not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a
desire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii.
21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.

(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to offer
oneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion
of committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons
of public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.).
Exceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be
overcome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of
God or the peace of the faithful.

(c) Provocation of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to bring on a
persecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally
this will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are
exceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils
(Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of
persecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to
reprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii.
15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).

(d) Flight from Martyrdom.--Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes
obligatory, sometimes optional, according to circumstances, as was
explained in 1005, 1006.

2446. Sins Opposed to Fortitude.--(a) Number.--The vices opposed to
fortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear
and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other
circumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he
should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears
the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect);
he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who
exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who
does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who
does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not,
is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of
a good result).

(b) Malice.--These sins _per se_ are venial, since excess or defect in
emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious
disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if
from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger
(e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or
mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or
vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity
and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.

2447. The Parts of Fortitude.--As has been said above, the parts of a
virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very
specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no
room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree
(e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death
than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for
the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers
(i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack,
requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and
despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes
one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of
fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul he not
thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul
be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued
opposition).

(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as
exercised in reference to minor dangers.

2448. Greatness of Soul.--Greatness of soul or nobility (Latin,
_magnanimitas_) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after
excellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors
themselves with moderation.

(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher
manifestations of every virtue--the things that are more difficult and
that befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity,
great labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fortitude, for
both virtues are exercised in difficult circumstances.

(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at
their true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher
honors (i.e., good repute before God and godly men), knowing that these
are solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors
(i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are
frail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of
soul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue
here differs from fortitude, since fortitude is concerned with dangers,
which are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors
which are pleasant.

2449. Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.--Greatness of
soul and humility are different, but not contrary.

(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great
things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed
by God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the
profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things,
they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in
generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are
familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they
are also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of
themselves they are weak and sinful.

(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower
things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the
gifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble
character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places
or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is
not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in
manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much
given either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person
despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the
good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to
himself.

2450. Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.--The vices opposed
to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or
honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to
do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This
happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities,
taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or
exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar
persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or
influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal
sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its
effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to
teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to
enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in
good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or
an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of
soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is
a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the
neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary,
seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man
longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account
of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in
temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he
will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or
they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who
loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the
synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by
men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25).
This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not _per
se_ mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously
sinful (e.g., if one's whole life is but a mad chase for preferments)
or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is
ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted
dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not
ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269).
The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575
sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded,
and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man.
The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for
which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for
virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who
fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good
looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or
who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g.,
those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity,
like ambition, is _per se_ only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on
account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that
are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes
one boast of one's crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others,
or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain
about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the
capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that
chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in
consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to
action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors
bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks
unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not
inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are
the publication by word or deed of one's own true or pretended exploits
(boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities
designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in
pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of
intellect which make one hold obstinately to one's views
(stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others
(discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention),
sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

2451. Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.--The sin opposed to
greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul),
which does not desire great things when one should desire them.

(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul,
springs from a lazy ignorance of one's own ability and worth and from a
false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could
be done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled
from the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the
fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.).
Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for
humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence,
whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is
reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated
with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is
commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility
by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they
would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held
out against God's charge to them.

(b) Pusillanimity is _per se_ a venial sin (see 2450), but it may
become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is
so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting
abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one
away from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed
to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it
springs from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great
deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to
inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a
fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense
of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit
(Col., iii. 21).

2452. Greatness of Deed.--Greatness of deed is the execution of the
great things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.

(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of noble
performance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity
in the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of
magnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums
from his purse in behalf of the worship of God (e.g., in building
churches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in
founding schools, in endowing educational institutions, hospitals,
etc.). This virtue resembles fortitude by the grandeur of its
accomplishment; it falls short of fortitude, since it deals not with
sacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Mæcenases and the
generous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of
humanity, for without them the best things would often languish for
want of support.

(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and
vulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great
scale, and prefers to ruin a noble work rather than make the proper
outlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by
using cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for
ostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is
liberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs
or comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g.,
charitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as
when his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or
when his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and
waste in order to make a display of wealth. _Per se_, these sins are
venial, but they may be mortal on account of circumstances. Munificence
is the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this
virtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to
great enterprises according to their means.

2453. Patience.--Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation
so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion
neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor
produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs
from the following:

(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness,
the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while
that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils,
especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;

(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of
death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever
nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;

(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues
is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good
which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is
an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a
desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in
good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are
included under patience.

2454. The Greatness of Patience.--(a) Its Rank.--Patience is less than
the theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice,
which perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fortitude and
temperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness;
for the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser
impediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other
hand, patience is a part of fortitude--a potential part, because it
does not connote the supreme heroism of fortitude, and an integral
part, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity
which patience imparts.

(b) Its Necessity.--Patience is a most useful virtue. Without it one
cannot long continue in the way of virtue on account of the many trials
man encounters (Heb., x. 36), whereas with it the enemies of other
virtues are destroyed; and hence it is called the root and guardian of
virtue (cfr. Rom., v. 3, 4; James, i. 2-4; Luke, xxi. 19). But there
are degrees of patience: the lowest is equanimity, which offends God
neither in thought, word nor deed even though sorely tried (Job, ii.
7-10); a higher degree is submission, which prefers adversity to
prosperity (Ps. cxviii. 71); the highest degree is joyful resignation,
which smiles at grief and rejoices in tribulation (II Cor., xii. 10,
vii. 4).

2455. The Vices Opposed to Patience.--(a) The sin of deficiency in
sorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved
neither by one's own nor by others' misfortunes. This is not a virtue,
but an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man
as a feeling as well as a reasoning being.

(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively
under afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining
and rebellious spirit (Prov.. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity
and impatience are _per se_ venial sins, but they become mortal _per
accidens_ on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man
gives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man
blasphemes (see 2450, 2451).

2456. Steadfastness.--Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to
the goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the
length of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue
of persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition
which a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but
goes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has
been arrived at.

(a) The Virtue.--Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence
of both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the
inferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the
peril of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or
opposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one
little to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful
conclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke,
ix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with
it the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9,
10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with
exhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim.,
iii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but
final perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).

(b) The Opposite Vices.--Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the
vice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The
effeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good,
surrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or
by taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person
continues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to
discontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept
the dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These
sins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an
effeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous
occasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the
remainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.

2457. The Complements of Fortitude.--We shall now speak of the Gift,
the Beatitude, and the Fruits that correspond to fortitude (see 159 and
2433).

(a) The Gift of Fortitude is an infused habit which makes the
appetitive powers readily responsive to the encouragement of the Holy
Spirit and filled with a courage that is more than human. Thus, the
Gift of Fortitude supplies for what is wanting in the virtue of
fortitude. The virtue is regulated by the rules and measure of human
prudence, but the Gift is inspired by the presence and command of the
Holy Spirit Himself (Ps. xliii. 4, xvii. 2, 3); the virtue strengthens
the soul, but the Gift supports even the weakness of the flesh, for the
Spirit helpeth our infirmity (Rom., viii. 26; cfr. Luke, xxii. 43); the
virtue aids one against the perils of death, but the Gift strengthens
in difficulties both of life and death, reinforcing not only courage
but also the allied virtues, greatness of soul, munificence, patience
and perseverance, for we can do all things in Him that strengthens us
(Phil., iv. 13); the virtue gives firm resolution to adhere to the
right in spite of death itself, but the Gift adds the unshaken
confidence that one shall surmount every difficulty and win the crown
of victory (Rom., viii. 31 sqq.).

(b) The Beatitude which is the special exercise of the Gift of
Fortitude is the eighth: "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for
justice's sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt, v 10). The
Gift of Fortitude makes the persecuted feel a great confidence and
security in the midst of the struggle, and this is a foretaste of the
copious, exceeding and eternal reward that follows this Gift (Gen., xv.
1; Rom., viii. 18; II Cor., iv. 17; Ps. xciii. 19; II Cor., i, 1).
Others assign to this Gift the Beatitudes of the meek and of those who
hunger and thirst for holiness.

(c) The Fruits that are most appropriate here are patience in bearing
evil and longsuffering in awaiting or performing good; for these are
acts that add a finish of maturity to fortitude (see 2447, 2454, 2456),
and in their most excellent state (see 2454) the performance of them is
no longer bitter but sweet.

2458. The Commandments of Fortitude.--(a) Fortitude itself is commanded
both in the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament are found
precepts of bravery in bodily warfare, as in Deut. xx. 3: "Hear, 0
Israel, you join battle this day against your enemies. Let not your
heart be dismayed, be not afraid, do not give back, fear ye them not."
The New Law commands courage before spiritual foes; "Your adversary the
devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom
resist ye strong in faith" (I Peter, v. 8); "Resist the devil and he
will fly from you" (James, iv. 7); "Fight the good fight" (I Tim., vi.
12). It also commands fortitude in the presence of corporal dangers:
"Fear not them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul" (Matt., x.
28).

(b) The annexed virtues are counselled when (as is the case with
greatness of soul and munificence) they incline to the excellent and
superabundant; they are commanded when (as in the case of patience and
perseverance) they are necessitated by normal conditions of earthly
existence. Greatness of soul is recommended in the invitations to be
perfect (Matt., v. 48), to love God more ardently (see 1560) and to
follow the counsels (see 364 sqq.), and in the praise bestowed on the
excellent virtue of Noe (Gen., vi. 9), of John the Baptist (Matt., xi.
11), and of Mary Magdalene (Luke x. 42). Munificence is recommended in
the eulogies of Solomon (Ecclus., xlvii. 20), of Magdalene (Mark, xiv.
9) and of Joseph of Arimathea (Luke, xxiii. 50 ff.). Patience is
commanded in Luke, xxi. 19 (In patience possess your souls), and in
Rom., xxii. 12 (Be patient in tribulation); perseverance in Ecclus.,
ii. 4 (In sorrow endure), in Matt., x. 22 (He that perseveres to the
end shall be saved), in I Cor., xv. 58 (Be steadfast and unmovable) and
in Heb. xxi. 7 (Persevere under discipline).

2459. Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues.--(a)
The precepts of fortitude are negative or prohibitory, and therefore it
is obligatory at all times to omit what they forbid (see 371). It is
never lawful to be timorous, insensible, cowardly, or foolhardy--to do
anything intrinsically wrong, even to escape death (see 317, 318). But
it is not necessary to sacrifice life for the fulfillment of an
affirmative precept, unless injury to God or the common safety, or an
extreme spiritual loss to self will otherwise result (see 317, 818,
361).

(b) The precepts of patience and perseverance are also negative, and
hence it is never lawful to be guilty of stolidity, impatience,
effeminacy or stubbornness. But since patience and perseverance are not
so difficult as fortitude, they have also affirmative precepts. These
latter laws oblige always, but not for every occasion (see 371). Thus,
one must be always willing to exercise patience, but one who is spared
trials has not the occasion to exercise the virtue. Patience itself
never ceases to be a virtue, but there is a pseudo-patience which
consists in toleration of evils that should not be tolerated, and which
is not a virtue but a kind of supineness or spinelessness that pertains
to effeminacy rather than to patience.

2460. Subjects of Fortitude.--(a) Laws have universal extension, and
hence it would not be true to say that active fortitude is a masculine,
passive fortitude or patience a feminine virtue. But greater courage is
expected in some than in others on account of greater strength (e.g.,
the adult, the physically well) or greater necessity (as in soldiers,
policemen, firemen, pastors, physicians, rulers).

(b) The counsel of munificence, however, is only for the rich as
regards exercise, since others have not the means wherewith to exercise
this virtue.




Art. 8: THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 141-170.)

2461. Definition of Temperance.--Temperance is a moral virtue which
regulates according to reason the gratification of the lower pleasures
and desires of sense.

(a) It moderates pleasure and desire, and in consequence also the
sadness caused by the absence of pleasure. Just as a special virtue
(fortitude) is needed to check the strongest of the repelled emotions
(fear of death), so likewise a special virtue (temperance) is necessary
to bridle the most vehement of the attracted emotions (pleasure and
desire).

(b) It moderates sensible pleasure, that is, satisfactions derived from
the use of the external senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, and
touch. Spiritual pleasures, which are derived from the loftier powers
of intellect, will and imagination (e.g., from the study of theology,
the reading of classical literature, the meeting of mother and child or
of friend and friend), have no opposition to reason, except
accidentally when a still higher activity which should be exercised is
impeded by them. Some of these (such as the pleasures of the intellect)
may be called purely spiritual, since they make little or no impression
on the sensible appetite; others, on the contrary (such as the
pleasures of the will), may be called mixed pleasures, since at times
they vehemently excite the sensitive appetite and powerfully affect the
body (e.g., mothers have been known to die of joy at the return of a
child who was thought to be dead).

(c) Temperance moderates the lower sensible pleasures, that is, the
satisfactions caused primarily by touch and taste, and secondarily by
other senses, in the activities necessary for preservation of the
individual (eating and drinking) and of the race (sexual intercourse).
These passions are called the lower, animal, or carnal pleasures, since
they are common to man and beast, and are strongly rebellious against
reason. The special virtue of temperance is necessary, then, to make
man follow reason, not Bacchus or Venus. The higher sensible pleasures,
on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of
any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a
perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the
enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant
roses, or downy or velvety cloth). The esthete or the connoisseur
obtains from these agreeable sensations a pleasure unknown to the
animals, and one that is not from its nature refractory to reason nor
seductive to carnal excess. Hence, these higher sensual pleasures are
not gross, but refined; they should be moderated by prudence, but they
are not so dangerous as to demand a special virtue, like temperance,
for their regulation. Neither should we class with carnal pleasures the
joys of physical well-being, such as the refreshment of sleep, the
exhilaration of a sea bath or of a massage, the comfort of a balmy
breeze, the ease of strength, or the relaxation of exercise.

2462. The Rule of Moderation.--The rule of moderation which temperance
imposes on the carnal appetites is this: "Indulge only as necessity
requires and duty allows." For pleasure is a means whose end is some
reasonable need of life, and it is therefore a perversion to make
pleasure an end by indulging it apart from need and duty (see 85). But
necessity is to be understood broadly, so as to include not only the
essentials, but also the conveniences of life (e.g., seasonings and
desserts with food).

(a) As to venereal pleasures, then, the rule means that they should not
be used outside matrimony, nor in matrimony except for the procreation
of children and the other lawful ends of marriage.

(b) As to the pleasures of the table, they should not be indulged
except for the benefit of mind and body, and in such manner, quantity,
quality, etc., as this purpose requires. But one may regulate one's
food or drink by the higher purpose of mortification, and partake of
less than the body demands here and now.

2463. The Excellence of Temperance.--(a) Temperance is among the four
principal or cardinal virtues. It keeps in order one of the passions
that is most natural and most necessary for the present life, and among
the virtues it excels in the quality of moderation, since it chastens
the inclination that is hardest to hold within bounds, and guards the
senses, the gateways of the soul (see 2441). "Wisdom teaches
temperance, prudence, justice and fortitude, than which there is
nothing more useful in life" (Wis., viii. 7).

(b) In its nature temperance is not the chief but the least of the
moral virtues. For justice and bravery are of greater service to the
common welfare, and the good of the multitude, as Aristotle remarks, is
more divine than the good of the individual. But in accidental respects
temperance has a superiority; for it is more tender and graceful than
fortitude, more arduous than justice, and there is perhaps no other
virtue whose exercise is so constantly called for.

2464. The Vices Opposed to Temperance.--(a) The vice of deficiency has
been called insensibility, and consists in an unreasonable dislike of
the inferior sensible pleasures, which makes one unwilling to use them
when and as reason commands. Thus, the Stoics and Manichees believed
that material joys are intrinsically evil, and there have been
fanatical advocates of teetotalism (e.g., the Aquarians) and of purity
(e.g., the Puritans who would not permit a man to kiss his wife on
Sunday, the prudish and censorious who fear or suspect evil without
reason, the Pharisees who think they are defiled if a sinner speaks to
them, the misogynists who disapprove of marriage). The sin is venial
_per se_, since it does not submit to passion; but it may be mortal on
account of some circumstance, as when the marriage debt is unjustly
refused or necessary nourishment is not taken. This vice is rarer than
its opposite, and it must not be confused with austerity, which for the
sake of a spiritual good foregoes some lawful but unnecessary sensible
enjoyment.

(b) The vice of excess is immoderation, which includes gluttony and
impurity. This is the most disgraceful of sins, because the most
unworthy of a rational being; it enslaves man to pleasures of which the
lower animals are capable; unlike other vices, it contains in itself
nothing of intelligence, industry, generosity, and nothing that would
at all liken it to virtue. The lowest depths of degradation are reached
when immoderation is brutish even in its manner, as when one is
gluttonous of human flesh or desirous of sodomitic pleasure.
Immoderation is called by Aristotle a "childish sin," because, as a
child is eager for pleasures and will follow them unduly unless
instructed and trained, so also an immoderate person thinks only of his
appetite, and will go from bad to worse unless he accepts the
discipline of reason. But the child is excusable, while the immoderate
man should know better. Immoderation is worse than timidity; for, while
the former seeks selfish delight and acts with willing unrestraint, the
latter seeks self-preservation and is under some external menace.

2465. The Parts of Temperance.--(a) The subjective parts or species of
temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue.
These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the
virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those
associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of
temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink;
the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act
(copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts
(kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for
the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and
avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy)
and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement).
Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a
disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a
preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and
is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things
disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an
attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a
habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful
to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues.
They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in
moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is
moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory
appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of
moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than
ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will
agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion
of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of
moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in
order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second
group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four:
humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of
excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty
of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body
and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

2466. Abstemiousness.--Abstemiousness is a virtue that moderates
according to reason the desire and enjoyment of the pleasures of the
table.

(a) It is a special virtue, because the appetite it curbs is very
powerful, and on account of the body's need of nourishment is often
tempted.

(b) It moderates by avoiding both defect and excess in meals as to
time, place, quantity, quality, etc. There is not, then, one standard
amount of food for all, since the needs and duties of all are not the
same, and hence he who takes more or less than is normal or usual
cannot from that alone be accused of being unabstemious. Neither is the
mean for an individual so rigidly fixed as not to permit some latitude
within certain limits. It should be noted here too that abstemiousness
is not the same thing as abstinence. Thus, a person who is immoderately
abstinent, denying himself the food necessary for life or for duty or
for optional works better than his abstinence, is not abstemious, since
he is not guided by prudence or obligation.

(c) It moderates according to reason; that is, it decides what is
proper for an individual, not merely from the viewpoint of bodily
health, vigor, and longevity, as is done by the arts of medicine and
hygiene, but also and chiefly from the viewpoints of higher goods, such
as mental power, control of passion, austerity.

(d) It moderates the pleasures of the table, that is, the desire for
and actual enjoyment of food and non-intoxicating beverages. Moderation
in intoxicants is the special virtue of sobriety, which will be
discussed later. Hence, a person who drinks too much ginger ale or
water, tea or coffee, sins against abstemiousness; he who drinks too
much whisky, beer, or wine sins against sobriety.

2467. Degrees of Abstemiousness.--(a) The lower degree practises
temperance, taking sufficient food and drink for the preservation, not
only of life and health, but also of the very pink of physical
condition, yet so as to avoid all excess.

(b) The higher degree practises austerity, taking less than is
necessary for the best condition, or strength or comfort of the body,
but sufficient for life and health. The austere person eats less than
he could reasonably take, but not less than his health and work demand.
The subtraction he makes in his food will more likely benefit his
health in the long run and promote longevity, for, in the wise words of
old Galen, "abstemiousness is the best medicine." But even though this
austerity be slightly detrimental to health, or may slightly abbreviate
life, it is still lawful, since the higher goods of the mind and of
virtue may always be secured at such reasonable sacrifice of corporal
goods (see 1164 sqq., 1561 sqq.).

2468. Austerity.--The two chief forms of austerity in food and drink
are fasting and abstinence.

(a) Nature.--The natural fast is the omission of all eating and
drinking, or the omission to receive into the stomach anything whatever
that has the nature of food, drink or medicine. The moral fast is the
omission to take a certain quantity of food that could be taken without
intemperance. Abstinence is the omission to take a certain quality of
food, such as meat or eggs.

(b) Kinds.--Fast and abstinence are in respect to duration either
perpetual (e.g., the abstinence from meat of the Carthusians) or
temporary (e.g., the abstinence for Fridays and other appointed days of
the faithful generally); either voluntary (e.g., a fast which one
assumes under private vow) or obligatory (e.g., the fasts and
abstinences prescribed in the general or particular laws of the
Church). The ecclesiastical fast and abstinence will be spoken of later
when we treat of the precepts of the Church and Holy Communion.

2469. The Excellence of Fasting and Abstinence.--(a)
Lawfulness.--Fasting and abstinence are acts of virtue, for they subdue
the unruly flesh, fit the mind for divine contemplation (Dan, x. 3
sqq.), satisfy for sins (Joel, ii. 12), and add weight to prayers
(Tob., xii. 8; Judith, iv. 11; Matt., xvii. 20). The greatest men of
the Old and New Testaments practised fasting--Moses, Samson, Elias,
John the Baptist, and St. Paul. Our Lord Himself fasted forty days and
forty nights (Matt, iv. 2). St. Paul, therefore, numbers fasting with
other virtues: "In fastings, in knowledge, in chastity" (II Cor., vi.
5). Examples of abstinence are Daniel avoiding meat (Dan, i. 8 sqq.)
and Eleazar who died rather than eat forbidden swine flesh (II Mach.,
vi. 18 sqq.). Abstention from solid or liquid nourishment is not a
virtue, however, if practised from purely indifferent or evil motives,
for example, merely in order to recover health through diet, or to
train for an athletic contest, or to preserve shape and beauty, or to
commit suicide, or to simulate virtue, or to profess false doctrines or
if carried to extremes. The forty-day fasts of Moses, Elias and of Our
Lord are for our admiration, but very few are able to imitate these
examples.

(b) Obligation.--Fasting and abstinence in general are obligatory under
natural law, because without them certain necessary ends cannot be
obtained. They are remedies for past sins and preservatives against
future sins; and, as sin is the common state of man (James, iii. 2;
Gal., v. 17), it would be presumptuous to neglect these antidotes.
Under the positive law fasting and abstinence have been prescribed in
detail, and this was necessary since it is the duty of the Church to
determine the time, manner and other circumstances of natural duties of
religion which the natural law itself has not determined.

2470. The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness.--(a) The sin of deficiency in
the matter of food is self-starvation. This is the sin of those who are
martyrs to fashion, who in order to have a frail figure follow a diet
(e.g., denying oneself all substantial food to reduce obesity) that
undermines their constitutions and leaves them a prey to disease. It is
also the sin of those who from unwise zeal for rigorous fasting deprive
themselves of the necessaries of life, or eat what their stomachs rebel
against. This sin does not differ from suicide or bodily injury treated
above (see 1566 sqq., 1857 sqq.). "It is the same thing to kill
yourself by slow degrees as to kill yourself in a moment. And he who
kills himself by fasting is like one who offers God a sacrifice from
stolen property" (St. Jerome).

(b) The sin of excess in food is gluttony. There is no sin in desiring
food or in taking food with satisfaction, for the Author of nature has
willed that such an essential act as eating should be pleasurable, and
it is a fact that digestion and health suffer when food is taken
without appetite or a peaceful frame of mind. But the glutton goes to
excess by the inordinate and unreasonable enjoyment he takes in feeding
himself.

2471. Ways of Committing Gluttony.--There are many ways of committing
gluttony, but they can all be reduced to two heads.

(a) Gluttony in food is excess in the substance, quantity, or quality
of the things eaten. The gourmet is extremely fastidious about the
substance of his food; he must have the most dainty or costly or rare
viands, and nothing else will satisfy him. Cannibalism seems to be
lawful in extreme necessity, but it is not lawful to kill human beings
in order to eat them. The gorger or gourmand may not be particular
about the kind of food that is given him, but he desires a large
quantity, more than is good for him. The epicure is too hard to please
as to quality; even when there is no festal occasion, he must have a
great variety of foods and they must be most carefully prepared, so
that he may get the utmost joy of the palate. We should not class among
gluttons, however, those who require special foods or special cooking
for a good reason, as when health or hard work forces one to observe a
strict diet.

(b) Gluttony in eating is excess as to the time or manner of taking
food. There is excess about the time when a person is over-eager about
the dinner bell, eats before or oftener than he should, or lingers too
long at table. There is excess about the manner when a person eats
greedily, hurriedly, or selfishly, rushing at his food like a tiger,
bolting it like a dog, or depriving others like a pig.

2472. The Sinfulness of Gluttony.--(a) Gluttony is a mortal sin when it
is so serious as to turn man away from his end itself, making him
prefer his appetite to God. Thus, those sin gravely who are such high
livers that they are unable to pay their debts, to the serious
detriment of creditors; or who gormandize so much that they can do
little work and have to spend most of their time in exercising or
taking cures; or whose heavy eating is the occasion of serious sins of
anger, impurity, or neglect of religious or other duties. To all these
apply the words of St. Paul (Phil., iii. 19): "Whose god is their
belly." To eat until one vomits seems to be a mortal sin, if the vomit
is caused by the enormous quantity of food consumed, for such an act
seems to be gravely opposed to reason; but there is no grave sin if the
vomit is due to the quality of the food or the weakness of the stomach.

(b) Gluttony in itself is a venial sin since it is a disorder about the
means, and not a turning away from the end. This happens when one is
inordinately fond of gastronomic joys, but is not prepared to sacrifice
grave duties for their sakes. Thus, a person who gives too much
indulgence to a sweet tooth, or who likes to stuff himself now and
then, but who doesn't disable himself or give scandal by his weakness,
sins venially.

2473. Gluttony as a Capital Sin.--(a) The first condition of a capital
sin is that it be one of the main sources of evil attraction. This
condition is verified of gluttony, for all seek happiness, and gluttony
contains one of the ingredients of happiness, namely, pleasure in an
unusual degree. Among all sensual delights those of the palate and
stomach are admitted to be, along with those of sexual love, the most
intense. The first of the three temptations with which Satan assailed
Christ was that of gluttony (Matt., iv. 1-4).

(b) The second condition of a capital vice is that it be the final or
motive cause of a large crop of sins. This condition is also verified
in gluttony, since the greedy man is so in love with his pet vice that
in order to pamper it he is ready to suffer various kinds of evils
which he should not permit. Evils of soul that are caused by gluttony
are: heaviness in the mind, for an overloaded stomach unfits the mind
to reflect on higher things or to consider the duty of moderation in
rejoicing, in words or in acts (Ecclus., ii. 3); absurd mirth in the
will, a feeling of security and gladness and unrestraint, for the
glutton thinks only of his present contentment and does not consider
the evils of his sin; loquacity in word, for his mental faculties being
dulled and his will hilarious the glutton gives free rein to his
tongue, often sinning by detraction, betrayal of secrets, contumely,
and blasphemy (Prov., X. 19); levity in act, for the glutton wishes to
give vent to his animal spirits, and he does so by unbecoming jokes and
clownishness. Evils of body due to gluttony are dirtiness and disease:
the glutton is often filthy in his manner of eating, his breath is
fetid, he is much occupied with natural necessities, excretion and
exgurgitation, and he suffers from gout or indigestion or one of the
numerous other maladies that are the price of overindulgence.

2474. Sobriety.--Sobriety in its strictest sense is a virtue that keeps
one to the moderation of temperance in the liking for intoxicating
liquors and in their use.

(a) Thus, sobriety is concerned with intoxicants, that is, with
substances that produce a poisonous effect upon the nerves and brain.
It is, therefore, a different virtue from abstemiousness, since it has
to subdue a vice far more alluring and deleterious than gluttony.
Alcohol has the same effect as a narcotic drug, for it benumbs both
mind and body, sometimes to the point of insensibility, so that those
who are under its influence are unable to think, speak or regulate
their movements properly; but it gives a feeling of exhilaration and
elevation and leaves behind it an insatiable craving, so that those who
have once taken too much are very likely to repeat the act. Habitual
intoxication breaks down both morals and health, and the toper goes to
a disgraceful and early grave.

(b) Sobriety is concerned with liquors, that is, with beverages and
medicines. But secondarily it also controls the appetite for narcotics,
such as opium, chloroform, tobacco, and the desire to inhale strong
liquors or vapors or gases which may produce intoxication.

2475. Obligation to Practise Sobriety.--Sobriety should be cultivated
by all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.

(a) Thus, on account of the greater physical evils of insobriety in
their regard, the virtue should be especially cultivated by the young,
the old, women, and persons of sedentary life. Young people are greatly
harmed by too much alcohol, because it stunts their growth and affects
them more seriously in mind and body than adults. The old have not the
strength to throw off the poison of too much stimulation and are
accordingly more injured. Women, being more excitable than men, are
more easily affected by strong drink, and hence among the ancient
Romans females abstained from wine. Finally, those who lead a sedentary
or indoor life do not so easily get the poison out of their systems,
and they feel the evil effects more than those who live out of doors or
who engage in manual work. But there is no constitution, however iron
it may be, that is not conquered in the end by alcoholism.

(b) On account of the greater spiritual ills that result from their
insobriety, the virtue of soberness is more imperative in certain
individuals. Thus, there are some who do greater spiritual harm to
themselves by intoxication, for example, the young, whose passions are
more easily inflamed, and females, who are more readily taken advantage
of; and hence St. Paul recommends sobriety to women and young men
particularly (I Tim., iii. 11; Tit., ii. 6). There are also some who do
greater harm to others by intoxication, such as those who should
instruct others (Tit., ii. 2), or who should give good example (I
Tim., iii. 2), or who are rulers over the people (Prov., xxxi. 4).

2476. The Sins against Sobriety.--(a) The sin of excess may be called,
for want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who
condemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically
evil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the
devil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when
the use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow
only water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a
man die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).

(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a
voluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the
consumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin
(active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from
drunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active
drunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both
voluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere
state of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is
lacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or
forgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it
seems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not
merely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination
of spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence,
a person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he
drink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he
takes too much.

2477. Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.--(a) Involuntary
Drunkenness.--This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact
(e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had
no reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that
his stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk
because he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is
lack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not
want it).

(b) Excusable Drunkenness.--This occurs according to most theologians
when there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil
of intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of
life (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious
disease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of
severe suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very
painful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave
case of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one
may bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives
(such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason
why we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which
may be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if
other remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to
excuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as
intrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also
give that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to
kill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But
all agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such
as escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor
by the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable
means (e.g., worry about one's troubles, an unpleasant meeting or
conversation).

2478. The Morality of Total Abstinence.--(a) Obligation.--_Per se_,
there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of
intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and
drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of
intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is
found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an
excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water
into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of
the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not
sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the
Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36),
recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23),
and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt.,
xv. 2).

But, _per accidens_, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a
greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good
be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one's health
or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them)
or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal,
Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through
drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the
most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection
to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that
particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by
impartial study.

(b) Lawfulness.--_Per se_, it is also permissible to abstain freely
from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order
the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence
calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example.
But, _per accidens_, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the
celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who
cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits.
Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson
(Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist
(Luke, i. 15).

2479. Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) The sin of perfect or
complete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so
far that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean
that one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to
walk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the
mental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains
enough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street
or ascend the stairs safely, or to find one's own quarters without
help). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated
person no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates
evils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs
down a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot
remember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.

(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary
excess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in
mind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is
physically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink,
who staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows
that he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel,
etc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate
the evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a
toper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse
to go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.

2480. Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) Perfect drunkenness is a
mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral
judgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious
crimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil
oneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and
to make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a
human being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must
put away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and
that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The
opinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now
obsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless
it lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly
rejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its
nature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to
make himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by
artificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does
not sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish
person must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or
scandal.

(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not
considerable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a
slightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine
or beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and
talkativeness, there is no sin.

Accidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of
circumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great
scandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to
inflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness
is constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his
business, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in
consequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin
when one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the
habit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram
of whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more
harmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals,
especially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.

2481. Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is not the worst of
sins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they
offend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good.
Many sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a
greater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life
than to suspend the use of reason.

(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see
2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime,
insanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to
religion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the
appetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things,
for effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong
drink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for
drunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and
has most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled
stomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart,
nerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and
brings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards
squander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate
parents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.

2482. Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While
Intoxicated.--(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable,
he is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen;
for then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one
who is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme,
betray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them
while drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk.
Under similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is
responsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a
business appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to
restitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused
way, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.

(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins
that ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen,
the drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins.
Hence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps
after getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if
the thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became
drunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some
realization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least
venially guilty of profanity and scandal.

(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused
entirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in
case of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization of
the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon
2201, §3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse for
a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson,
_Elements of Law_, §§471, 525, 531).

2483. Material Coöperation in the Sin of Drunkenness--(a) If there is
no grave reason for the coöperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is
not a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of
strong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good
fellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another
round of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents
or others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty
of scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction;
those who supply others with drink in order that these may become
drunkards are guilty of formal coöperation.

(b) If there is a grave reason for coöperation, it is not illicit (1515
sqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get
sinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater
evil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).

2484. Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be
guiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?

(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness,
like impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the
end does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to
induce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to
intoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).

(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself
for a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to
intoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about
to blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible
or even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to
make him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and
could escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to
make them drunk.

2485. Licit Use of Narcotics.--There are a great many substances that
produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors,
namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform,
ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given
above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to
make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just
reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when
having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to
relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of
the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (_The Pope Speaks_, Summer,
1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the
use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions
submitted to him for consideration were the following:

1) Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to
accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in
certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of
serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with
the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and
does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may
licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted
in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior
purification.

2) Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to
make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The
Pope responded; "Yes--provided that no other means exist, and if, in
the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out
of other moral and religious duties." The duties referred to include
settling important business, making a will, or going to confession.
(Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist
in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without
rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed,
which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the
patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the
licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: "if
the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons
clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the
permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the
treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents
to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally
permissible."

3) Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be
accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that "every
form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in
order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one
presumes to dispose directly of life . . . If between the narcotics and
the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed
either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of
things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be
attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the
administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the
relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is
lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable
proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the
one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is
important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does
not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means.
Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the
limits which are actually necessary."

2486. The Virtue of Purity.--As abstemiousness and sobriety preside
over the pleasures of the self-preservative instinct, so purity governs
those that pertain to the species-preservative instinct. Purity is an
inclusive name for the virtues of chastity and decency or pudicity, and
its office is to regulate proximately the internal movements of the
soul (thoughts and desires) and remotely the external words and acts
that have to do with sexual delights.

(a) Chastity in its strictest sense is a virtue that moderates or
chastens through reason venereal pleasure, chiefly as to its principal
or consummated act (i.e., intercourse, semination) or as to its
principal bodily centers (i.e., the genital organs). Hence, there is a
twofold chastity, conjugal and celibate: conjugal chastity abstains
from unnatural pleasure, and uses the natural reasonably in marriage;
celibate chastity abstains from all venereal pleasure, as being
unlawful in the single state.

(b) Decency (_pudicitia_) in its strictest sense is a virtue that
moderates by the sense of shame venereal pleasure chiefly in its
secondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations,
touches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as
being an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and
accompaniment. The conjugal act, though lawful, occasions a feeling of
shame, and the same is true of the non-consummated acts; but decency is
especially concerned with these latter, because they are usually more
openly performed than the consummated act. Decency means, then, that
manifestations of carnal desire should be conducted with a sense that
this desire arises from a lower and rebellious passion, removed in
itself farthest from reason, and not more suited for unrestrained
expression or public exhibition than other lower animal acts. The sense
of shame and decency is a protection to the virtue of the unmarried and
the married, restraining the former from the unlawful and holding the
latter to moderation in the use of the lawful.

2487. Chastity and decency are not separate virtues; rather decency is
a circumstance of chastity. (a) Thus, chastity moderates also the
secondary acts, for reason must chastise the pleasure that is taken in
these acts, if this passion is to be kept in due bounds, (b) Decency
moderates also the primary act, for in the use of marriage there should
be nothing unworthy, nothing to bring a blush of confusion.

2488. Virginity.--The highest form of chastity is virginity, which is a
purity unblemished that retains the bloom of its original innocence.
Conjugal chastity uses venereal pleasures moderately and virtuously;
virginity abstains from them entirely and virtuously. Virginity is
threefold.

(a) Virginity of body is freedom from corruption in the genitals, which
means that a male has never had sexual intercourse, that the hymen of a
female is inviolate. This physical purity belongs to the virtue of
virginity accidentally, seeing that it is the result or indication of
the virtue; but it does not belong to the virtue essentially, since
virtue is in the soul, not in the body. Hence, one may be virginal in
body without the virtue of virginity (e.g., a new-born infant), or vice
versa (e.g., a woman vowed to virginity who has been raped).

(b) Virginity of the lower part of the soul (the passions) is freedom
from venereal pleasure voluntarily experienced. Primarily, this refers
to pleasure in consummated acts, secondarily to pleasure in
non-consummated acts and internal acts of thought and desire. This kind
of purity belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, since sexual
pleasures are the material element or subject-matter of virginity,
whose office it is to exclude all indulgence of them. Hence, a person
who has had even one voluntary experience of these satisfactions,
lawful or gravely unlawful, has lost virginity permanently, though the
virtue of chastity may remain or may be recovered. For virginity cannot
continue when its subject-matter has been removed. It should be noted
that involuntary pleasures, as in nocturnal pollution or in rape or in
passive spermic discharges, are not detrimental to the virtue of
virginity.

(c) Virginity of the higher part of the soul (the mind) is the
intention to abstain from every venereal act in the future. This purity
of soul also belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, being its
formal element, since acts of the sensitive appetites are made moral
and virtuous only from the direction and influence of reason and will.
Hence, one who has had no experience of voluntary carnal pleasure, but
who intends to marry and use its rights or to act unchastely, has not
in the first case the virtue of virginity, or in the second case the
virtue of chastity.

2489. Loss of Virginity.--Physical or bodily virginity once lost can
never be recovered, for this virginity means that a certain bodily
action or passion has not occurred, whereas the loss means that such
action or passion has occurred. Of course, a miracle could restore
bodily integrity. But a more important question is this: is moral
virginity, or the virtue of virginity, also irrecoverable?

(a) If the virtue has been lost as to its chief material element, it
cannot be recovered. This material element (i.e., the absence of all
voluntary seminal experience) cannot be restored, for even God cannot
make what has been experienced a non-actuality. However, it should be
noted once for all that loss of virginity does not necessarily imply
loss of conjugal chastity, and that lost chastity may be recovered by
repentance.

(b) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element, and the
intention not to abstain was unlawful and naturally, though not
actually, productive of semination (e.g., copulation of a completely
aspermatic adult, or internal and intense libidinous sin from which
accidentally pollution does not result), it seems that the virtue
cannot be recovered. For in these cases the sinner wills, at least
indirectly, the loss of the chief material element of virginity, and it
seems repugnant to reason to ascribe the glory of virginity to one who
has sinned in this way. Non expedit regulariter monere poenitentes de
eorum virginitate irreparabiliter amissa, sed præstat quærentibus
respondere omnia peccata remitti de quibus contritio habeatur.

(c) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element and the
intention not to abstain was lawful (e.g., a maid not under vow decided
to marry and have children, but changed her mind and decided to remain
single), or was unlawful but neither naturally nor actually productive
of semination (e.g., external unchastity of a child incapable through
impuberty of emissions, or internal and only mildly exciting
unchastity of an adult), the virtue may be recovered, certainly in the
first case and probably also in the second case. For the matter of
virginity is certainly not taken away by the mere intention to have
lawful venereal pleasure, nor probably even by pleasures that do not
tend to semination. Recovery of virginity is made in the one case by
the retractation of contrary intention and in the other case by
repentance and renewal of good purpose.

2490. Conditions Necessary for the Virtue of Virginity.--(a) As to its
manner, it seems more probable that this purpose must be expressed as a
vow. The reason for this according to some is that virginity is a
special virtue only because of the sacred character which religion
gives it, and according to others also because of the unshakable
renunciation which is conferred by a vow. But it is also held as
probable that unvowed virginity may be called a lesser degree of the
special virtue of virginity, At least, it is a higher degree of the
virtue of chastity.

(b) As to its motive, virginity must be justified by an extrinsic
reason. Chastity is justified by its own end, which is reasonable
moderation. Virginity, on the contrary, is not self-justificatory,
since in itself it is unfruitful and without advantage. Hence, it is
not praiseworthy unless it serves some higher good than that of
propagation, such as a good of the mind (e.g., Plato remained single
for the sake of philosophy) or of the will (e.g., the New Testament
recommends virginity for the sake of greater devotion to the things of
God). Virginity that results from mere contempt for sensible pleasure
would be an excess, and continence embraced merely to escape the
burdens of marriage and to lead an easy, self-indulgent, irresponsible
life would be selfishness; but virginity followed from an ideal of
self-sacrifice which reason approves observes the golden mean (see Pius
XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954).

2491. The Excellence of Virginity.-(a) Virginity has the highest rank
among the various forms of chastity. Every kind of chastity
(pre-nuptial, conjugal, vidual) is of great importance, because to this
virtue is entrusted the right propagation of the entire race and the
moral and physical health of the individual in the most insistent of
passions. The material reproduction of the race is indeed a more urgent
need than virginity, since without it the human species would die out;
and if there were danger of race extinction, it would be more
imperative to marry than to remain continent. But if we confine our
attention to the ordinary course of things and compare virginity and
non-virginal chastity from the viewpoint of nobility, it must be said
virginity is more valuable both to the community and to the individual
than the other kinds of chastity. It is more valuable to the community,
since the example of its excellence is a protection to public morals,
and its permanence gives the opportunity for a more general and ready
service of society. It is more valuable to the individual, since to be
occupied with the things of God is better than to be engrossed in the
things of the world, and the unmarried have the opportunity to devote
more time with less distraction to higher things. Scripture affirms the
superiority of virginity to marriage by its teaching (e.g., Our Lord in
Matt., xix. 12, counsels virginity; St. Paul in I Cor., vii. 7 sqq.,
says that it is the better and more blessed state), by its examples
(Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, St. John the Baptist, St. John the
Evangelist, and in the Old Dispensation Josue, Elias, Eliseus,
Jeremias), and by its promised rewards (Apoc., xiv. 4). A popular
philosophy of materialism today makes repressed sex-urges responsible
for hysteria and other emotional disturbances, but experience proves
that continence benefits both psychical and physical health.

(b) Virginity does not rank first among all the virtues. The
theological virtues surpass it, being its goal; martyrdom and religious
obedience are greater, because they sacrifice the superior goods of
life and of the will. It may happen, then, that a person in the married
state or a penitent (Luke, vii. 36 sqq.) is personally more holy than
one dedicated to continence; a married person or penitent may surpass a
virgin in faith, hope and charity, and may be therefore, simply
speaking, more perfect.

2492. The Sin of Impurity.--This sin, which is also known as lust, is
an inordinate desire of sexual pleasure.

(a) Its object is sexual pleasure, that is, the sense of physical
enjoyment in the bodily organs or of psychical satisfaction in the
lower appetites of the soul derived from acts related to generation.
Hence, we should distinguish impurity from sensuality (which is an
inordinate attachment to esthetic pleasure or other higher
sense-pleasure), from luxury (which is an excessive desire of health
and comfort), and from the vice called curiosity (which is an
over-fondness for intellectual delights, see 2461). But it should be
noted that sensual pleasure easily leads to venereal delight, and that
intellectual curiosity about sex matters is dangerous, and hence this
sensuality and curiosity may be, and frequently are, a temptation to
impurity (see below on Temptations to Impurity).

(b) Impurity is in desire, for the passions in themselves are
indifferent (see 121), and they become sinful only when their abuse is
consented to by the will.

(c) Impurity is inordinate; that is, it takes pleasure against lhe
dictate of reason. This happens when sexual gratifications are indulged
by the unmarried, or by the married in unnatural ways. It is a
perversion and a sin to cheat the stomach in order to gratify the
palate, because God willed that the pleasure of eating should serve the
nourishment of the body, or, as the proverb has it, because man does
not live to eat, but eats to live. Now, sex pleasure has been ordained
by God as an inducement to perform an act which has for its purpose the
propagation and education of children, duties that cannot be rightly
attended to except in the married state. Hence, those who seek venereal
pleasure outside of matrimony, or outside the way intended by nature,
act unreasonably, for they sacrifice the end for the means. Instinct
guides the animal aright in these matters, but man is a nobler creature
and must guide himself by religion and reason.

2493. Kinds of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is consummated when the act is
continued to its natural conclusion and complete venereal satisfaction
is had. This occurs in semination, which is the termination of the
process set up by the impure thought and desire and the realization of
its full pleasure. Semination occurs either in the process of coition,
or in extracoitional issues known as "pollution." Equivalent to
semination, morally speaking, are other emissions or secretions that
accompany complete or almost complete gratification, but in which the
fluid is not prolific (e.g., the urethral emissions in boys who have
not attained puberty or in eunuchs, the vaginal flow in women, urethral
distillations). Consummated impurity is either natural (that is,
suitable for reproduction, the end intended by nature), as in
fornication or adultery, or unnatural (that is, not suited for
reproduction), as in sodomy or pollution.

(b) Impurity is non-consummated when not carried to its natural
conclusion of complete satisfaction and semination. There are two
classes of the non-consummated sins, namely, the internal (as in
thoughts and desires) and the external or lewdness (as in words, looks,
kisses). This happens without carnal commotion (e.g., when a frigid old
man thinks with mental pleasure only on the wild deeds of his youth),
or with carnal commotion, that is, with an excitement and stimulation
in the genital organs that prepares the way for semination.

2494. Gravity of the Sin of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is a mortal sin,
because it is a disorder that affects a good of the highest importance
(viz, the propagation of the race), and brings in its train public and
private, moral and physical, evils of the most serious kind. Man has no
more right to degrade his body by lust than he has to kill it by
suicide, for God is the absolute Lord over the body and He severely
forbids impurity of every kind. Those who do the works of the flesh,
whether according to nature (e.g., fornicators and adulterers) or
against nature (e.g., sodomites) or by unconsummated sin (e.g., the
unclean, the impure), shall not obtain the kingdom of God (Gal., v. 19;
I Cor., vi. 9 sqq.), nor have any inheritance with Christ (Eph., v. 5).

(b) Impurity is not the worst of sins, because sins against God (e.g.,
hatred of God, sacrilege) are more heinous than sins against created
goods, and sins of malice are more inexcusable than sins of passion or
frailty. But carnal sins are peculiarly disgraceful on account of their
animality (see 2464 b, 224), and in a Christian they are a kind of
profanation, since his body has been given to Christ in Baptism and the
other Sacraments (I Cor., vi. 11-19).

(c) Impurity is one of the seven capital vices. The capital sins have a
preeminence in evil, as the cardinal virtues have a superiority in
good. The preeminence in evil is due, first, to some special
attractiveness of a vice that makes it an end for the commission of
other sins, which are used as means to it or are incurred for its sake;
or, secondly, to a power and influence that is so strong as to hurry
those under its sway into various kinds of sin. Now, impurity is a
moral disease that ravages every part of the soul, its deadly effects
appearing in the reason, the will and external speech; for the more one
subjects oneself to the dominion of passion, the less fitted does one
become for the higher and nobler things of life; and the more ignoble
the inner life, the more vulgar, cheap and degrading will be the
conversation.

Hence, the Fathers trace back to impurity the following sins of
imprudence in the mind: wrong apprehension, about the end or purpose of
life, and precipitancy in deliberation, thoughtlessness in decision,
inconstancy in direction, in reference to the means to the end (see
1693 sqq.). They also trace to impurity the following sins in the will:
as to the end, voluptuarism (which subordinates all to fleshly
pleasure) and hatred of God (which abhors the Supreme Lawgiver who
forbids and punishes lust); as to the means, love of the present and
horror of the future life (since the carnal man revels in bodily
pleasures and dreads the thought of death and judgment). Finally, they
trace the following sins of the tongue to the vice of impurity: the
subject of the lewd man's talk is filthy, for out of the heart the
mouth speaketh (Matt., xii. 34), the expression itself is foolish,
since passion clouds his mind, the origin of his talk is emptiness of
mind which shows itself in frivolous words, and his purpose is
unsuitable amusement, which leads to farcical or vulgar jokes.

2495. Evil Fruits of Impurity.--In addition to these moral
consequences, impurity is also prolific of many other evil fruits.

(a) Thus, for the sinner himself it is like a cruel goad that
constantly annoys him and takes away his peace (St. Ambrose), like a
sword that kills the nobler instincts (St. Gregory the Great), like a
descent from human dignity to a condition below the beasts (St.
Eusebius of Caesarea).

(b) For society it is disastrous in many ways, since it propagates
dread mental and physical diseases, disrupts the peace of families,
brings disgrace and destitution on innocent children, eats away
fortunes and leads up to innumerable crimes of injustice and violence.

2496. Is Impurity Ever a Venial Sin?--(a) By reason of the imperfection
of the act, impurity is venial when there is no sufficient deliberation
or consent. Invincible ignorance in reference to the sixth commandment
itself sometimes happens, especially in reference to internal sins of
thought, to external sins of pollution if the person is young, and to
other external sins when there is some complication of circumstances
(e.g., kissing and other intimacy by engaged persons, onanism when
married persons are poor or the woman sickly); and more frequently
there is invincible ignorance about details of the sixth commandment
(e.g., about the precise theological or moral malice of what is known
to he sinful).

(b) By reason of the matter, impurity according to the common teaching
is always mortal if directly willed, but sometimes venial if only
indirectly willed. Impurity is directly willed when one posits an act
intending to obtain from it unlawful venereal delectation, or perceives
that such delectation is already present and consents to it. No matter
how brief this voluntary assent, no matter how slight the commotion of
the animal nature, no matter how far from the consummated is the impure
act in question, there is always a serious injury done to a great good
or at least (exception is made for the case of married persons) the
proximate danger of such injury, and hence mortal sin (see 260). That
even slight yielding to impurity is a serious peril is the teaching of
Scripture (which declares that lust has killed even the strongest,
Prov., vii. 26), of the Church (which condemns the opinion that
libidinous kisses are not dangerous, see Denzinger, Enchiridion, n.
1140), of theology (which reminds us that by original sin reason has
been darkened, the will enfeebled and the passions strengthened), and
of experience (which shows that those who expose themselves to
passion's flame will be burnt). A small spark of fire is not trivial in
the vicinity of a powder magazine, a minute flaw in a machine is not
unimportant if it may bring on disaster, a first step is not safe if it
is made on a slippery downward declivity.

(c) Impurity is indirectly willed when deliberately and without
sufficient reason one posits an act which is not venereal pleasure
(whether the act be good, such as a prayer made with great sensible
fervor, or bad, such as gluttony, or indifferent, such as reading a
book, looking at a picture, taking a bath), but which produces foreseen
venereal pleasure (consummated or non-consummated) that one neither
intends nor directly consents to. Impurity thus indirectly willed is
sinful, because the pleasure is foreseen and permitted without
sufficient reason (see 102), or in other words because one exposes
oneself to danger of internal defilement (consent), or external
pollution without justification (see 260). Indirect impurity is mortal
when there is proximate danger of grave sin in the act done, that is,
when the posited act _per se_ or from its nature strongly incites the
agent to sexual passion, as when one gazes long and fixedly at obscene
pictures, knowing that always or nearly always this arouses impure
emotions. The sin is venial when there is only remote danger of grave
sin. This happens when the posited act is not of a venereal kind (an
unnecessary conversation on indifferent topics) or is only mildly
exciting (e.g., a passing glance at an obscene object), or when the
agent himself is not greatly affected by it (e.g., when an old man, or
one who is of very cold disposition, or an artist whose only thought is
the esthetic excellence, carefully studies a picture of the nude).

2497. Temptations to Impurity.--Before treating the various kinds of
impurity, we shall speak briefly of temptations that occasion this sin
and of the duties of the person tempted.

(a) External temptation comes from the devil or the world, and the duty
of struggling against it has been treated elsewhere (see 252, 1455
sqq., 1495 sqq.). Thus, he who finds that certain persons, places or
things are for him a temptation to impurity must be guided by the
principles given for occasions of sin (263 sqq.); he who finds that
another wishes to seduce him into impurity must refuse all internal
consent (see 254 sqq.), and must also resist violence when there is
hope of success, or when this is necessary to avoid giving scandal or
yielding consent (see on self-defense, 1841).

(b) Internal temptation comes from the flesh. It consists in inchoative
disturbances or excitements of the organs or fluids that serve
generation (e.g., erections, clitoral movements). Sometimes it is
produced involuntarily, without any intention or consent of the will,
by physiological states (e.g., conditions of the blood, nerves, etc.,
due solely to the weather, to disease, to aphrodisiac properties of
ailment, to clothing, or position) or by psychical states (e.g.,
spontaneous images or appetites of the soul mentioned in 129), and in
these cases the temptation is manifestly free from all sin. St. Pius V
condemned the teaching of Baius that those who suffer motions of
concupiscence against their will are transgressors of the command:
"Thou shalt not covet" (see Denziger, Enchiridion, nn. 1050, 1051,
1075). Sometimes the temptation is directly voluntary, as when the
passion is deliberately awakened for the purpose of sin, and then there
is grave guilt (see 2496 b). Sometimes the temptation is indirectly
voluntary, as when with the foresight of the passion but without desire
of it an action is performed that arouses it. In this last case, if
there is a just reason for the excitatory action (e.g., a physician
sees and hears things that are calculated to be a temptation, but his
reason is the exercise of his profession), no sin is committed; but if
there is no just reason for the action (e.g., a person reads an erotic
book, and curiosity is his only motive), sin is committed, and its
gravity depends on the amount of danger to which one exposes oneself
(see 2496 c).

2498. Resistance to Internal Temptations.--The fight against internal
temptations is of various kinds.

(a) By reason of its subject, the conflict is chiefly in the will, to
which it belongs to give or withhold consent; secondarily, in the other
powers of the soul and the body, which under command from the will
perform acts designed to overcome temptation.

(b) By reason of its manner, the conflict is either removal of the
temptation (i.e., cessation from an act which produces the temptation)
or resistance, passive or active. Passive resistance is the suspension
of activity relative to the temptation till it ends of itself, as when
internally the will neither consents nor dissents, or externally
nothing is done for or against the temptation. Active resistance is
positive opposition offered to temptation. It is made in two ways:
first, by way of flight, as when internally the mind turns away to
other thoughts (e.g., absorbing studies, meditation on the passion of
Christ), or the will devotes itself to other subjects of resolve (e.g.,
acts of love of God or of purity), or externally the body is removed or
freed from conditions that excite temptation; secondly, by way of
attack, as when internally the mind turns against the temptation (e.g.,
thinking of its dangers, calling on God to drive it away), or the will
rejects the temptation (e.g., by despising it, by expressing dislike,
disapproval and unwillingness, by firmly resolving not to yield, by
deciding on measures against the passion), or when externally the body
is subjected to pain or mortification.

(c) By reason of its circumstances, resistance to temptation is either
prolonged, as when the act by which the will resists is of considerable
duration or is renewed at frequent intervals, or is brief, as when the
act of rejection is momentary and is not repeated.

2499. What Opposition to Temptation Is Sufficient?--Opposition to
temptations of the flesh must be sufficient to remove the temptation,
when the temptation is due to the continuance of one's own sinful or
unjustified act; for one is obliged to cease from sin or the
unreasonable. This happens (a) when the temptation is directly
voluntary--for example, one who wished to experience temptation and
therefore reads a very seductive book must give over this reading; or
(b) when the temptation is not directly voluntary and is without
sufficient reason--for example, one who experiences carnal temptation
due to a book which he reads from idle curiosity must desist from the
book. But one is not bound to omit or interrupt necessary or useful
acts, such as rest and sleep, prayer and charity; consent should be
denied the evil, but the good should be continued.

2500. Insufficient, Harmful and Unnecessary Opposition.--In other cases
opposition to temptations of the flesh must be such as is sufficient to
keep one from consent, that is, to protect one against the proximate
danger of sin.

(a) Hence, that resistance is insufficient which does not strengthen
the will. It seems that passive will-resistance is of this kind, since
it is most difficult for the will to remain inactive in the presence of
carnal stimulation or motions of the sensible appetites without being
moved by the evil suggestion. In external resistance, however, passive
opposition suffices when it alone is feasible, as when temptation grows
out of necessary work, or rest that cannot be discontinued or
interrupted by active resistance, provided the will registers
internally its displeasure or disapproval; but external passivity is
not permissible when the will needs the help of external resistance, as
in the case of vehement and prolonged temptations.

(b) That resistance is harmful which strengthens the temptation. Hence,
resistance by direct attack or by formal rejection is oftentimes to be
omitted in favor of resistance by flight or by contempt; for it is a
common teaching of the Fathers and Doctors confirmed by experience that
dwelling on reasons and means of repelling passion often adds to its
strength, and that resolving mightily and expressly to crush a weak and
passing temptation often serves only to give it a longer life. It is
better to brush a mosquito away than to risk one's neck by chasing it
up and down stairs.

(c) That resistance is unnecessary which demands a physical or moral
impossibility. Thus, a prolonged act of resistance or one repeated at
intervals of a few minutes, or a resistance that includes extreme
corporal austerities, is not required in ordinary cases at least. When
a temptation is unusually vehement or is due to one's own fault, there
should be proportionately greater resistance to offset the greater
danger; but when a temptation is only moderately dangerous, it suffices
to reject it firmly but briefly and to repeat this when there arises a
new crisis or danger and the renewal of resistance is useful.

2501. Weapons against Carnal Temptations.--The most powerful weapons
against carnal temptations are spiritual ones, and of these the most
necessary is grace, which should be asked in prayer (Wis., viii. 21),
especially through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary (see
Pius XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954). But corporal means,
chiefly of a preventive kind, should not be neglected.

(a) Physical measures are the observance of what are now often spoken
of as sex hygiene for normal and sex therapeutics for abnormal cases.
Special health rules whose observance conduces to good morals are
especially the cultivation of habits of bodily cleanliness, of hard
mental and physical work, of vigorous exercise and the avoidance of
unhealthful habits (such as constipation, drug or spirit stimulation),
unsuitable clothing or sleeping conditions. Surgical or medical
treatment for structural abnormalities or for mental or bodily diseases
that react unfavorably on sex life requires the service of a
conscientious and competent physician.

(b) Religious measures are various forms of corporal mortification,
such as custody of the eyes and other senses, deprivation in food
(fasting and abstinence) and sleep (vigils, night watches), afflictive
penances through the use of hairshirts, painful girdles, scourges or
disciplines. But austerities must be suited to the health, age,
condition, duties and other circumstances of the person who practises
them, and should not be used without the consent of one's confessor or
spiritual director.

2502. Sinfulness of Negligence in Resisting Temptations.--It is sinful
not to struggle against temptation, since he who in no way resists, not
even passively, surrenders or yields to sin. Hence, the Church
condemned the quietistic indifference to temptation of Molinos
(Denzinger, nn. 1237, 1257, 1267). It is also sinful to resist, but
only insufficiently, as regards promptness, vigor, manner, etc.

(a) The Theological Malice.--It is mortally or venially sinful to be
negligent against temptation, according to the greatness or smallness
of the danger to which the negligence exposes one (see 256-262). Thus,
it is not a serious sin to omit all resistance to a weak and dying
temptation, or to neglect from indolence or other venial fault all
external resistance when the danger is made remote by the internal
displeasure or resolution; but it is a serious sin to trifle with any
very attractive temptation or to put off resistance until a progressing
temptation has grown formidable and made self-control difficult, and
this is true even though consent is not finally given to the impure
suggestion.

(b) The Moral Malice.--Negligences in reference to carnal temptations
do not differ specifically but only in degree, according to the
approach the stimuli make towards complete lust. Even when there is an
object (e.g., fornication, adultery) before the mind, the difference in
species of the object, it seems, does not induce a difference in
species of the sin, since the sin is the general one of carelessness in
presence of temptation. Hence, it suffices to confess that one has been
remiss in banishing impure emotions or thoughts.

2503. Applications.--(a) The principles here given in reference to
emotions of the sensible appetite and rebellions of the flesh should be
applied to other involuntary acts in the imagination, reason and will
(see 129). Thus, thoughts or images of impure scenes that pass through
the mind should be treated in the same way as temptations of the flesh.

(b) The principles here given about the person who suffers temptation
should also be applied to the person who causes temptation. Since it is
a mortal sin to commit impurity, it is also a mortal sin to solicit
impurity; since it is a mortal sin of lust to make oneself drunk in
order to experience carnal emotions, it is also a mortal sin of lust to
make another person drunk that he may become likewise inflamed; since
it is a mortal sin to expose oneself to extreme danger by reading a
pornographic work, it is also a mortal sin to wish to expose another to
a like danger. And this is true even though the temptation is
unsuccessful. Physicians who minimize the wrong of masturbation, or who
counsel fornication to young men on the absurd plea that continence is
unhealthy or productive of impotency, share in the guilt of pollution
or fornication which they counsel; and young persons who seek to win
the sinful love of others by nourishing their hair, painting their
faces, exposing their bodies, etc., have the guilt, if not the gain, of
seduction.

2504. Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity.--These include all those
preparatory sins in which unlawful sex pleasure is not carried to
completion by coition or pollution. We shall speak first of the
internal sins of thought, delight, and desire (see 232 sqq.), and next
of the external sins of unlawful looks, words, kisses, and embraces.

2505. Impure Thoughts.--Impure thoughts (_delectatio morosa_) are
representations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects
in which deliberate pleasure is taken.

(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of
things absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present.
Thus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction
with will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds
with objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.

(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one
intends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving
their presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or
does not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts,
which are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are
thought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a
lodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not
sinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it
endures (see 2497 b).

(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought
of fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or
by another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the
pleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of
medicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual
knowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or
willingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for
him to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner
of the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature
of a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).

2506. The Malice of Impure Thoughts.--(a) The Theological
Malice.--Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately
rejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of
it. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also
when there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the
danger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when
there is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary
or gravely dangerous (see 2496).

(b) The Moral Malice.--Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as
the representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome
guest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of
the mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it
follows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case
with different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin
(e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental
fornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental
adultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not
specifically different--as is the case with different non-consummated
sins of lewdness--do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to
think pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful
touch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that
special malices of the object from which the mind can prescind--viz.,
those which in the external act do not change the species or do not
explain the venereal pleasure--and from which it does prescind, are not
incurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married
and a relative, if the thought that she is married or one's relative is
not pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental
adultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut
regulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis
morosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter
species morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel
inutilis, vel etiam ratione materiæ perieulosa. Ad hæc quum casus
crebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum
poenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quæ vix cognosci possunt.
Sufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum
voluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus
internus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon
888, §2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment,
Holy Office, May 16, 1943.

2507. Impure Rejoicing.--Impure rejoicing is a deliberate pleasure of
the mind yielded to the recollection of a past sin of impurity. Hence,
this sin of rejoicing is committed when one thinks with approval of a
fornication of former days, but the sin of rejoicing is not committed
when one confines one's pleasure to some good consequence of a
fornication (e.g., the excellent child that was born), or to a lawful
pleasure of the past, as when a widower thinks without present carnal
commotion or danger of his former married life. The circumstances are
more readily willed here than in impure thoughts, for here the mind is
picturing an actual, not an imaginary case of sin, and the mental
representation will therefore be more distinct; nevertheless, in the
case of impure rejoicing the moral sub-species--at times even the
distinction between impure rejoicing and impure thoughts--is usually
not perceived. The principles of the previous paragraph apply to impure
rejoicing.

2508. Impure Desires.--Impure desire is a deliberate intention to
commit impurity in the future.

(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which
consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same
thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that
he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only
that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as
a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances
that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were
lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both
he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these
velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of
danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will
consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to
fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take
away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were
it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to
practise fornication).

(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure
desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual,
mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or
what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but
without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future
married relationship).

2509. Malice of Impure Desires.--Impure desires are mortal sins and
have the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in
mind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in
performing impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a
woman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his
heart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins
of impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to
impure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills
external performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it
is mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from
actual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional
investigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral
impossibility.

2510. Lewdness.--After the internal sins follow the external sins of
lewdness or indecency (_impudicitia_). These may be defined as
"external acts which are performed from or with deliberate venereal
pleasure that is not consummated, and which are not directed to the
conjugal act."

(a) They are external acts of the body, such as the looks of the eye,
the speech of the tongue, kisses of the lips, touches, fondling,
embraces, pressure of the hand, etc. Those also are guilty of lewdness
who permit themselves to be petted, kissed or otherwise impurely
handled, unless it is morally impossible to resist, as when a woman who
gives no internal consent cannot defend herself against a forced kiss
without being killed, or cannot without great scandal refuse to shake
hands with one whose motive is impure love. Lewdness (e.g., an impure
look) may also be directed to one's own person, or to an animal, or to
an artificial object, such as a statue or book.

(b) They are performed from or with pleasure; that is, passion either
causes or accompanies the impure look or other act. These
non-consummated acts are indifferent in themselves and may be licitly
performed for a just cause; they become sinful by reason of the evil
passion that animates them. The carnal motive appears either from the
end of the act (e.g., an indecent kiss naturally tends to impurity or
grave danger thereof, no matter what good purpose the kisser may have),
or from the end of the one acting (e.g., a decent kiss becomes an
impure act if the one who kisses is moved by carnal desire). Hence,
there is no sin of lewdness when one of the acts now considered is
performed becomingly as to externals and innocently as to the internal
motive and quality (e.g., from a sense of duty, not from pleasure).

(c) The pleasure intended or consented to is venereal; that is, such as
is consummated in copulation or pollution. Hence, there is no sin of
lewdness when the acts in question are performed becomingly and with
and for pleasure of a spiritual kind (as when members of a family give
one another the customary kiss or embrace of affection), or of a merely
sensual kind (e.g., when a nurse kisses the tender skin of an infant).
On the distinction of intellectual, sensual and venereal pleasures see
above (2461).

(d) The external act is not consummated by copulation or pollution.
These are often its result but they are a different degree of sin, and
lewdness is committed even without them (see 2486).

(e) Lewdness is an action not directed to the conjugal act. Coition
itself is lawful in the married state, and this legitimatizes all the
preparatory or accessory endearments. Hence, the rule as to married
persons is that venereal kisses and other such acts are lawful when
given with a view to the exercise of the lawful marriage act and kept
within the bounds of decency and moderation; that they are sinful,
gravely or lightly according to the case, when unbecoming or
immoderate; that they are venially sinful, on account of the inordinate
use of a thing lawful in itself (85 a), when only pleasure is intended;
that they are mortally sinful, when they tend to pollution, whether
solitary or not solitary, for then they are acts of lewdness. The
rights and duties during courtship and engagement will be treated below
in Question III.

2511. Cases Wherein No Sin Is Committed.--Since lewdness proceeds from
or is accompanied by culpable venereal pleasure, it does not exist in
the following cases:

(a) in children who have not attained puberty and the capacity for sex
pleasure, and hence there is no sin by reason of proximate danger in
looks or touches exercised by them, which would be gravely sinful in
those who have reached the age of puberty. These children may, however,
sin against modesty or obedience, at least venially. They should be
trained from their earliest years to reserve and decency, and it is a
most serious sin to scandalize their innocence. The question of sex
instruction for the young will be dealt with in the Question on the
Duties of Particular States. If an adult person were as unmoved as a
child by the stimulus of passion, such a one would incur no personal
guilt of lewdness by kissing and the like acts, but such an adult
person is very rare;

(b) in adult persons when a dangerous act is exercised by them, without
consent or proximate danger, and with a sufficient reason for the
exercise. Thus, a student of literature may read an erotic story from
the classics, if he is proof against the danger and intends only
improvement in style, though for the young such books should be
expurgated; a professor of medicine or moral theology may discourse
prudently to his students on venereal diseases or sins; an artist may
use naked models in painting, if and as far as this is necessary; farm
hands may attend to the service of female by male animals; looks and
touches that would otherwise be immodest are lawful for proportionate
reasons of utility, as in bathing oneself, in performing the services
of nurse or physician for others, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).

2512. Conditions Governing Propriety of External Acts.--The
becomingness of the external acts spoken of in 2510 b includes two
conditions.

(a) On the side of its object, the act must not be directed
unnecessarily to the parts of the body that are shameful and private
(i.e., the genitals and immediately adjacent parts). It is customary to
distinguish the remaining or non-shameful parts of the body into
becoming, which are uncovered (e.g., face, hands, feet), and less
becoming, which are covered (e.g., legs, breast, back). But as to less
decent parts much depends on local usage. For example, at a bathing
beach it is not unbecoming to appear in a mixed crowd with uncovered
legs or arms, and in very warm countries it is not improper to go about
in public with less clothing than is worn in colder climates.

(b) On the side of its subject, the act must be performed with
moderation and respect for reasonable custom. Thus, columbine
(popularly called "French") kissing and the ardent or prolonged
embraces known as "necking" or "petting" are admittedly indecent, even
when not accompanied by sexual excitement. Oral abuse committed by or
with either sex is indecent both as to the object, i.e., the part of
the body involved, and as to the subject, i.e., the mode of action. It
is the filthiest form of lewdness and is usually joined with pollution
(irrumation).

2513. Morality of Kissing and Similar Acts.--(a) _Per se_, or from
their nature, these acts are indifferent, since they can be employed,
not only for evil (Job, xxxi. 27; Luke, xxii. 48), but also for good,
as we see from the examples of the kiss of peace (I Thess., v. 26), the
kiss of fraternal greeting (Gen., xxvii. 26, 27), and the kiss of
respectful homage (Luke, vii. 38, 45).

(b) _Per accidens_, or from their circumstances, these acts are often
venially or mortally sinful against purity or against some other
virtue, or against both. Thus, justice is offended by injuries or
violence (e.g., stolen kisses, unhygienic kisses that transmit venereal
or other disease); charity is offended by scandal given the object of
affection or the onlookers (e.g., kisses given by way of greeting to a
member of the opposite sex by an ecclesiastic or religious, kisses
forced upon children by grown-ups and which are harmful to the youthful
sense of modest reserve); purity itself is offended by familiarities
which, though not impure in themselves, constitute a peril for the
virtue of one or both parties, as is true especially in demonstrations
of sensual affection or pleasure. But even though there be some carnal
commotion, it is not unlawful to give with a pure intention the decent
salutation customary in one's country (e.g., to shake hands with a
lady, to kiss one's stepmother or sister-in-law).

2514. Morality of Sensual Gratification.--Sensual gratification, or the
pleasure experienced from the perfection in the sensible order of some
object, is indifferent and lawful in itself (see 2461, 2492). When it
is aroused by objects not venereally exciting (e.g., the beauty of the
heavens or scenery, the harmony of music, the tender softness of the
rose), it does not tempt to impurity; but when it is aroused by objects
that are venereally exciting (e.g., the beautiful face or eyes or sweet
voice or soft skin of a person much admired), it approaches so closely
to the confines of venereal gratification as to seem almost the same
thing. Hence arises the question; is deliberate sensual gratification
about objects sexually exciting always a mortal sin?

(a) Many theologians answer in the affirmative, and give as their
reason that in the state of fallen nature there is no one who can be
assured that such gratification is not for him or her a proximate
occasion of pollution, or of what is morally the same thing, of
inchoate pollution. This opinion does not include gratifications not
deliberately sought or yielded to, nor those in which experience has
shown that the venereal attraction of the object, at least for the
subject concerned, is nil or practically nil (e.g., sensual kisses of
an infant by a nurse.)

(b) Other theologians dissent from the rigorous view, and argue that,
since sensual and venereal attraction are really distinct, there is
always the possibility of intending the former and excluding consent to
the latter.

(c) To the present authors it seems that there is room for a middle way
between these two extreme views. As was said above (2497), it is
sometimes sinful and sometimes not sinful to encounter temptation,
according to the intention and reason one has, and a temptation willed
unjustifiably but only indirectly is a grave or a light sin according
to the great or small danger that is risked. Now, it seems that certain
forms of sensual gratification (e.g., those derived from beautiful but
modest music or paintings) have only a very slight sexual allurement
for even the passionate; whereas other forms (e.g., those derived from
the warm kiss or caress of a handsome adult person of the opposite sex)
are vehemently alluring. Hence, if sensual pleasure of the first kind
is sought inordinately, or if it is dangerous to purity, there is a
venial sin; if sensual pleasure of the second kind is sought, there is
very likely mortal sin.

2515. The Theological Species of the Sin of Lewdness.--(a) _Per se_, or
from its nature, this sin is mortal, even though the external act
(kiss, etc.) be decent (see 2512) and of the briefest duration; for
lewdness is consent to unlawful venereal pleasure, which from the
nature of the case is a serious matter, tending either to illicit
copulation or to pollution (see 2496). Hence, even a shake of the hand
made with lustful intent is a mortal sin. If the guilt of adultery is
found even in libidinous thoughts (Deut., v. 21) and glances (Matt., v.
28), much more is it found in lewd kisses, embraces, and conversations.
Scripture strongly condemns every form of lewdness: impure speech
("Uncleanness let it not so much as be named among you, or obscenity,
or foolish talking," Eph., v. 3, 4), impure reading ("Evil
communications corrupt good morals," I Cor., xv. 33), impure looks
("Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already
committed adultery with her in his heart," Matt., v, 28), impure kisses
and other touches ("It is good for a man not to touch a woman, but for
fear of fornication let every man have his own wife," I Cor., vii. 1).

(b) _Per accidens_, this sin may be venial as follows: first, on
account of the imperfection of deliberation, as when a person under the
influence of liquor, drugs or sleep acts with only a partial
realization of what he is doing, especially if the lewd offense has not
occurred before; secondly, on account of the lightness of the matter,
when the lewd act is indirectly voluntary and the danger remote (see
2496), as when slight danger is risked in gratifying the sensual desire
to gaze at a famous painting, or in yielding to an impulse of
curiosity, levity, or playfulness, to indulge in suitable recreations
or even unnecessary conversations in which occur glances or touches
that arouse some small degree of sexual emotion. Were mortal guilt of
impurity incurred in these instances, very few could remain free from
it unless there was a general retirement into isolation. But even in
the _per accidens_ cases there may be other mortal sins (e.g., that of
drunkenness or of scandal).

2516. A large proportion of the sins of lewdness are only indirectly
voluntary, and hence they are mortal or venial according to the amount
of danger to which one exposes oneself. No ironclad rules, however, can
be given to determine universally what things are gravely and what
slightly dangerous, since the force and direction of concupiscence are
not the same in all persons. Some persons are oversexed or passionate,
others are undersexed or cold; some have normal, others abnormal
inclinations (e.g., homosexuality, sadism, masochism, sexual fetishism)
in matters venereal. Hypersexuality and abnormal sexuality are not in
themselves sinful, but are manifestations of that inordinate
concupiscence that is the effect of original sin and, if yielded to,
becomes the cause of actual sin. Proximately they may be due to
disease. But since these subjective differences do exist, what we shall
set down in the following paragraphs about gravity and lightness of
danger is to be understood of the average or normal person and in the
abstract, for it is impossible to consider every individual case.

2517. Circumstances That Increase or Lessen the Danger of Sin.--(a) The
Person Acting.--There is less danger before and after than during
puberty, less for an invalid than for a person full of health, less for
an inhabitant of a cold region than for a dweller in the tropics, less
for one habituated to suppress venereal passion (e.g., a bachelor) than
for one who has been accustomed to indulge it (e.g., a widower), less
in some cases for the married who can lawfully enjoy sexual intercourse
than for the single who cannot. Familiarity also can give a certain
amount of immunity (e.g., where naked bathing or naked statuary in
public places is according to custom, the natives are less disturbed by
these things than outsiders). Those who know (without self-deception)
from their experience that certain things excite them very little do
not run grave danger in encountering such things.

(b) The Person or Being Who Is the Object of the Act.--There is less
allurement in an animal than in a human, less in a small than in a
large animal, less in a representation than in the original, less in
young children than in adults, less in one's own person or sex than in
another person or the opposite sex, less in an elderly or homely person
than in one who is young and attractive.

(c) The Sense Used.--Hearing (and, for a similar reason, reading) is
less dangerous than sight, for hearing is nearer to the immanent
activities of thought and desire, while sight has more of an emanant
character (e.g., to hear or read about an obscene act is farther
removed from it, and hence less seductive, than to see it in picture or
reality). Sight in turn is less dangerous than touch, for sight is a
more elevated and less material kind of perception, being exercised by
a cognitional, not by a physical contact with its object, as is the
case with touch (e.g., to behold others embrace is not so moving as to
give or receive an embrace). Thus, impure touches (kisses, embraces,
handling) are the most dangerous form of lewdness.

(d) The Sense-Object Acted Upon.--The degree of danger corresponds with
the approach made to the act of generation (e.g., smutty stories are
worse when they deal with consummated than with non-consummated acts)
or to the genitals (e.g., impure touches are worse when directed to the
organs of reproduction than to the non-shameful regions).

(e) The Manner.--There is greater danger when the act is prolonged than
when it is momentary, when it is ardent than when it is calm (e.g., a
passing glance or peep at an obscene picture is not as dangerous as a
leisurely inspection, a loose linking of arms not as dangerous as a
hug). The more exposed the object of attraction and the more secluded
the parties themselves, the greater the danger (e.g., love-making
between parties who are not fully clothed or who are alone in the dark
or in a closed and curtained room is more dangerous than love-making
between those who are properly dressed and seated among a crowd of
people).

2518. Cases Wherein the Danger of Sin Is Grave or Slight.--A physician
must know the difference between mortal and non-mortal diseases, and
likewise a priest must know the distinction between various kinds of
spiritual leprosies. But when certain cases are listed as less
dangerous, this does not mean that they are not dangerous at all and
that no account should be taken of them. Especially in the matter of
impurity should the warning of Scripture be remembered: "He that
contemneth small things shall fall by little and little" (Ecclus., xix.
1). With this in mind, we now subjoin some examples of grave and slight
danger for cases in which a lewd act is indirectly voluntary, but is
prompted only by curiosity, joke, levity or other such insufficient
reason.

(a) Speech.--Dirty or suggestive stories, conversations, songs, music,
or radio entertainments are a grave danger when the persons present are
very impressionable (e.g., on account of age or character), or if the
topic is utterly vile (e.g., descriptions of filthy or unnatural sex
acts), or if the manner is very seductive (e.g., the terms used are
unfit for polite society, or the story is very detailed, or sin is
boasted about, or the conversation is prolonged). On the other hand,
the danger is light when the persons present are of mature age and not
strongly inclined to impurity, especially if the topic and the language
are not very disgusting; but there may be serious sin on account of
circumstances, as when the speaker or approving listener is a person
from whom good example is expected. Obscene talk is generally not a
serious sin when the persons are husband and wife, or a group of
married men or of married women; on the contrary, it is generally a
serious matter when the persons are a group of young people of the same
sex, more serious when they are a mixed group, and still more serious
when they are a boy and a girl or a young man and a young woman. The
fact that those of the younger generation often do not admit this, does
not change its abiding truth.

(b) Reading.--The remarks made on speech apply also to reading, which
is a kind of silent speech. A noteworthy difference between the two in
the present matter, however, is that reading is often more dangerous
than conversation, since it is usually more protracted. Love letters
and romances were once the chief temptation in this line, but today
they seem mild in comparison with the supply of pornography that is
easily accessible to all (e.,g., the magazines and papers that pander to
depraved tastes, the stories and pseudo-scientific books that corrupt
the youth of every land). Even without grave danger to self, one may
still be guilty of grave sin in reading obscene books on account of the
coöperation with the vendors of immorality, or the scandal, or the
disobedience thereby shown to the Church (see 1455 sqq., 1529, 1530).

(c) Looks.--There is generally no danger in a look at the full nudity
of a small infant, or at the less becoming parts of a person of the
same sex; there is generally only slight danger when the object is the
privates of self or of another of the same sex, or the coition of
animals, unless the gaze be fixed, prolonged and the object near; there
is grave danger in beholding a completely non-infant naked person of
the opposite sex, or the coition or other grave external sex acts of
human beings (unless the glance be brief or not attentive), or even at
times the less becoming parts of the opposite sex, if the look is very
intent and continuous. Representations of the bodily parts or acts just
mentioned (pictures, drawings, diagrams, etc.) have generally the same
dangers as the originals, though the allurement in itself is less
vivid; circumstances may even make the representations equally or more
dangerous (e.g., on account of a thin veil of concealment in paintings
or sculpture that only increases the attraction; or on account of the
suggestive music, the voluptuous dance, the crowd atmosphere that
accompanies an immoral scene on the stage or screen). The saying of
Oscar Wilde that esthetics are above ethics is opposed both to morality
(since all conduct should be guided by reason) and to art (for the
highest beauty is that of virtue and the spirit and purity).

(d) Touches.--Kisses are seriously dangerous to purity when warmly or
lingeringly exchanged between adults of different sex who are attracted
to one another as male and female; in other cases, kisses, if impressed
on decent parts of the body and in a decent manner, may be only
slightly dangerous. Holding or grasping between such adults is also a
serious danger when it is vehement (e.g., the tight squeeze or hug of
certain dances) or long (e.g., the repeated or hour-long fondling of
love-makers); it is of slight or no danger in other cases, as in the
customary handclasp of greeting, Handling or feeling, if passing,
hurried or light, is generally not dangerous, when it has to do with
the becoming parts of another person, or with the less becoming parts
of a person of the same sex, or with personal private parts; it is only
slightly dangerous, under the same conditions, in reference to the
verenda of animals or small infants; it is gravely dangerous when
directed to the privates of another person who has passed infancy, or
to the less becoming parts of a person of opposite sex, or to the
breasts of a woman, unless it be entirely casual, passing, or light.
Tactile contact made under the clothing is of course more dangerous
than that which is external.

2519. The Moral Species of Lewdness.--(a) Theoretically, it is more
probable that the imperfect sins of impurity do not differ from the
perfect sins to which they tend; for the natural circumstances or
antecedents of an act have really the same morality as the act itself
(see 2486). In the physical order, the fetus, the infant, and the child
do not differ essentially from the full-grown man; and likewise, in the
moral order, the thought, the purpose and the external beginning do not
differ essentially from completed murder, even though for some reason
the act be not finished. Hence, immodest words, reading, looks and
touches belong to fornication, or adultery, or incest, or sodomy,
according to their tendency (e.g., to read an immodest love story with
another man's wife and to kiss her is incipient adultery, and, if the
guilty person has a vow of chastity, it is also sacrilege). But the
species is taken only from the object, not from the purely accidental
circumstances, such as the elicitive faculty (e.g., an immodest look at
another does not differ essentially from an immodest touch) or the
intensity (e.g., incomplete pleasure in touches by one who has not
attained puberty does not differ essentially, according to some, from
the completed pleasure of which he is capable). Moreover, it seems
that, in regard to looks if not as regards touch, abstraction (see
2506) is easily made by the guilty person from various circumstances;
for example, one who looks immodestly on a person consecrated to God,
may be thinking only of his unlawful love for a person of the other
sex, and so may be guilty of incipient fornication, but not of
sacrilege, or he may be thinking, without any affection for the other
person, only of his own pleasure, and so may perhaps be guilty only of
incipient pollution. A less probable opinion makes lewdness a species
of sin distinct from pollution and the other consummated sins.

(b) Practically, penitents should confess that their sin was indecent
and not completed lust (such as pollution), and they should also
confess whether the lewdness was committed by speech, reading, looks,
kisses, embraces, or touches; and also the object of the sin, whether
male or female, whether married or single, relative or non-relative,
etc. Otherwise, since few penitents know how to distinguish the moral
species of sins, there will be great danger of incomplete confessions;
and, moreover, the additional sins usually committed in cases of
lewdness (e.g., scandals, injustices, and bad company keeping) will not
be disclosed. If a consummated sin of fornication, pollution, etc.,
followed the indecency, this consummated sin should be confessed
distinctly. Similarly, those who expose, incite or tempt others to
impure thoughts or to lewdness in word, reading, looks, kisses or
touches, should confess the kind of sin they intended (see 1497), even
though their purpose failed, whether it was incipient fornication,
sacrilege, sodomy, etc. But some authors admit a generic confession (in
which the penitent merely states that he sinned mortally or venially,
as the case was, by indecency), if the lewdness was solitary, or was
committed with another but certainly without scandal or lustful desire
of the other person.

2520. The Consummated Sins of Impurity.--There are in all seven species
of completed acts of impurity. (a) Thus, some sins of impurity are
against reason because they do not observe the ends of sexual
intercourse. These ends are, first, the begetting of children (to which
is opposed unnatural impurity), and, secondly, the rearing of children
(to which is opposed fornication).

(b) Other sins of impurity are against reason because they violate a
right of the person with whom intercourse is had (incest), or of a
third party to whom that person belongs. If the third party is injured
in conjugal rights, there is adultery; if in parental rights, there is
defloration or rape, according as the injury is done without or with
force; if in religious rights, there is sacrilege. This second category
of sins is classed under impurity rather than under injustice, because
the purpose of the guilty person and his act belong to venereal sin.

2521. Comparative Malice of the Sins of Consummated Lust.--(a) In the
abuse of an act, the worst evil is the disregard of what nature itself
determines as the fundamentals upon which all else depends, just as in
speculative matters the worst error is that which goes astray about
first principles. Now, the prime dictates of nature as to sexual
intercourse are that it serve the race and the family. Hence, the sin
of unnatural lust (which injures the race by defeating its propagation)
and the sin of incest (which injures the family by offending piety) are
the worst of carnal vices.

(b) In the abuse of an act a lesser evil is that which observes the
natural fundamentals, but disregards what right reason teaches about
things secondary, in the manner of performing the act. But reason
requires that in sexual intercourse the rights of the individual be
respected. A most serious violation of individual right is adultery,
which usurps the right of intercourse belonging to another; next in
gravity is rape, which violently seizes for lust a person under the
care of another or undefiled; next is defloration, which trespasses on
the right of guardianship, or removes bodily virginity, but without
violence; last among these sins is fornication, which is an injury done
not to the living, but to the unborn.

2522. Multiplication of Sins of Lust.--The various kinds of lust may be
combined in one and the same act, as when unnatural vice (e.g., sodomy)
is practised with a relative (incest). Sacrilege, of course, aggravates
every other kind of carnal sin, and thus there is sacrilegious sodomy,
sacrilegious adultery, sacrilegious incest, etc.

2523. Fornication.--Fornication is the copulation of an unmarried man
with an unmarried woman who is not a virgin.

(a) It is copulation, or sexual intercourse suited for generation of
children. Thus, it differs from lewdness, which consists in
unconsummated acts, and from sodomitic intercourse, which is
consummated but unsuited for generation. Onanism is an aggravating
circumstance of fornication, or rather a new sin of unnatural
intercourse. (b) It is committed by unmarried persons, and thus it
differs from adultery. (c) It is committed with a woman, and is thus
distinguished from sodomy. (d) It is committed with a woman who is not
a virgin, and thus differs from defloration.

2524. Sinfulness of Fornication.--It is of faith that fornication is a
mortal sin.

(a) Thus, it is gravely forbidden by the divine positive law. Hence,
whores and whoremongers are an abomination to the Lord (Deut., xxiii.
17); fornicators are worthy of death (Rom., i. 29-32), they shall not
enter the kingdom of God (Gal., V. 19-21; Eph., v. 5; Heb., xiii. 4;
Apoc., xxi. 8). The Fathers teach that fornication is a grave crime
(St. Fulgentius), and that it brings condemnation on the guilty person
(St. Chrysostom). The declarations of the Church on the evil of this
sin are found in the Council of Vienne and in the censures of Alexander
VII and Innocent XI (Denzinger, nn. 477, 1125, 1198).

(b) Fornication is gravely forbidden by the natural law. For it is
seriously against reason to cause an injury to the entire life of
another human being; but fornication does this very thing by depriving
the unborn child of its natural rights to legitimacy, to the protection
of both parents, and to education in the home circle. True, in some
cases there may be no prospect of a child, or there may be provision
for its proper rearing; but these cases are the exception, since
fornication from its nature tends to the neglect of the child, and the
morality of acts must be judged, not by the exceptional and accidental,
but by the usual and natural. Those who commit fornication are thinking
of their own pleasure rather than of duty, and will generally shirk the
difficult burdens of parenthood. Society also would be gravely wounded
if unmarried intercourse were at any time lawful. Hence, St. Paul
reproves the pagans, though ignorant of Scripture, for their sins of
fornication (I Cor., vi. 9-11; Eph., v. 1-6), since reason itself
should have taught them the unlawfulness of this practice. It seems,
though, that invincible ignorance of the wrong of fornication is
possible among very rude or barbarous people, since the injury to the
neighbor does not show itself so clearly in this sin as in many others.

2525. Fornication Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is less serious
than those that offend a divine good (e.g., unbelief, despair, hatred
of God, irreligion), or human life (e.g., abortion), or the human goods
of those already in being (e.g., adultery). (b) It is more serious than
sins that offend only an external good (e.g., theft), or that are
opposed only to decency in the marriage state (e.g., unbecoming kisses
of husband and wife).

2526. Circumstances of Fornication.--(a) Circumstances that aggravate
the malice are the condition of the person with whom the sin is
committed (e.g., that the female is a widow, or the employee of the
man, or his ward, or a minor).

(b) Circumstances that add a new malice to fornication are of various
kinds. Thus, previous circumstances are the distinct desires of the sin
entertained beforehand, the solicitation and scandal of the other party
or parties with whom the sin was committed; concomitant circumstances
are the quality of the persons (e.g., fornication is sacrilegious if
one of the parties is consecrated to God, and also, according to some,
if one party is a Christian and the other an infidel; it is unjust if
one of the couple is betrothed to a third party), or the quality of the
act itself (e.g., if it is performed onanistically, though pollution
may be excused if it results accidentally from the good purpose to
discontinue the sinful act); subsequent circumstances are injury done
to the partner in sin (e.g., by refusal to pay the support or
restitution due) or to the offspring (e.g., by exposure, abortion,
neglect).

Whether the fornication of an engaged person with a third party is a
distinct species of sin is disputed. (a) According to some, it is a
distinct species, or at least a form of adultery on account of the
infidelity. (b) According to others, it is a distinct species if the
guilty party is the woman, but not if it is the man, for the infidelity
of the former is a far more serious matter than the infidelity of the
latter. (c) According to still others, it is never a distinct species,
since engagement to marry is a dissoluble agreement and the injury to
the contract is therefore not a notable one. In this last opinion the
manner of the sin is an aggravating circumstance, not a distinct
species that has to be declared in confession.

2527. Forms of Fornication.--There are three special forms of
fornication, which are all the same essentially, but which differ
accidentally in malice or in results.

(a) Thus, ordinary fornication is that which is committed with a woman
who is neither a harlot nor a concubine. This sin is in itself the
least grave of the three, since it is not so harmful as whoremongering,
nor so enduring as concubinage. Ordinary fornication also has its
degrees of bad and worse: thus, engaged persons who sin together
habitually are worse than those who sin only occasionally, and
circumstances such as artificial onanism and abortion add to the guilt.

(b) Whoremongering is fornication committed with a harlot, that is,
with a woman who makes a business of illicit intercourse and hires
herself out for pay to all comers. Rarely does a harlot choose her life
from passion or love, but is dragged in by white slavers, or enters
from poverty, or after disgrace, or the like. This sin is worse than
ordinary fornication from the viewpoint of propagation, since few
harlots become mothers. But its most dire consequences are visited on
the guilty persons themselves and on society: for the life of a
prostitute is a most degrading slavery; to her patrons she communicates
the most terrible diseases, which are then carried to innocent wives
and children, and to the innocent she often becomes a cause of ruin,
seeking her trade in the streets and public places. Today, according to
reliable newspaper reports, many men and women have become rich in the
terrible business known as the white-slave traffic. This horrible abuse
has grown into a vast international machine which is efficiently
organized, and which profits not only from prostitution, but from many
other kinds of crime. The patrons of brothels, therefore, coöperate
with the crying injustice that is often done the fallen woman, and with
the criminals who destroy souls and bodies for their own advantage.

(c) Free love is fornication committed with one's concubine, that is,
with a woman who is not a public harlot but who has contracted with one
man for habitual sexual intercourse as if they were man and wife.
According to reports, this is quite common in Europe, where lawful
marriage is very often preceded by free unions. The trial marriage
advocated by some in this country, in which paramours agree to live
together as husband and wife for a certain term of years or at
pleasure, also falls under the category of concubinage. This sin is
worse than mere whoremongering in one respect, namely, that it includes
the purpose to continue in the state of sin, at least for a certain
length of time. Moreover, there is often the public scandal and
contempt for public opinion which other kinds of fornication may be
free from. One who practises concubinage is living in a proximate
occasion of sin, and hence he cannot be absolved unless he dismisses
the concubine, if they cohabit, or agrees to keep away from her, if
they do not cohabit.

2528. The State and Places of Prostitution.--It is clear that civil
government has no right to support or provide places of prostitution,
or to give permission for its practice, since fornication is
intrinsically evil. But what should be said of toleration or license
given to prostitutes by the public authority?

(a) Theoretically, the civil power has the right to give toleration or
license; for, if the common welfare will suffer from a greater evil
unless a lesser evil is suffered to go on, the lesser evil should be
endured, and it is certain that there are greater evils than
prostitution (such as rape and unnatural crimes of lust).

(b) Practically, the question is open to dispute. Older moralists held
that toleration was actually more beneficial to the common good than
suppression. But under the conditions of the present time many
moralists think it is a mistake to give any recognition to prostitutes,
and much less to houses of prostitution. Even in large cities, where
alone the license could be beneficial, the purposes of toleration are
not fulfilled; for the moral evil seems to be greater, since an
appearance of legality is given to prostitution, its practice is
facilitated, its habitats become dens of every kind of iniquity, and
the purpose of segregation is not realized; the physical evils also are
not lessened, but perhaps increased, for even with medical inspection
of prostitutes, syphilis and gonorrhea cannot be prevented.

2529. Defloration and Rape.--Defloration and rape are distinct species
of lust, for each of them in its very concept includes a special and
notable deformity not found in other species of impurity.

(a) Defloration is unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman who is virginal
in body (1488 a). It has the special deformity of depriving the woman
of the physical integrity that is most highly prized among all the
unmarried of her sex, or at least of her own self-respect, and of
setting her on the way to become a strumpet rather than an honorable
wife or spinster. Some authors do not consider defloration a special
sin unless it is done by violence, or unless injury is done the
parental right over the virgin; and even the authors who consider
unforced defloration a special sin hold that the new or additional
malice in it is slight and venial, and therefore not a necessary matter
of confession. The first sin of fornication by a male is not a special
sin, because the consequences are not so serious for the man as for the
woman, but of course seduction is always a special sin, whether the
injured party be male or female.

(b) Rape is physical or moral coercion (i.e., force or fear) employed
against any person (male or female, married or single, pure or
corrupt), or against his or her guardians, to compel him or her to an
act of lust. It has the special deformity of inflicting bodily injury
on the person ravished. The sin of rape should not be confused with the
canonical crime of rape, which consists in abduction, and which is an
impediment to marriage (Canon 1074); nor with seduction, as when an
innocent person is deceived into believing that an act of impurity is
lawful, or is tricked into sin by false promises of marriage.
Equivalent to rape is the carnal knowledge of a person drugged,
hypnotized, or otherwise unconscious, or the seduction of an infant. A
person who is ravished is obliged to deny all consent internally, and
to resist or make outcry when this is possible (see 2497 a).

2530. Adultery.--Adultery is also a distinct species of lust.--(a)
Definition.--Adultery is sexual intercourse with the husband or wife of
another. If the sin is committed only in desire, there is mental
adultery; if the paramours allow themselves unlawful familiarities
without intercourse, or if a married person is guilty of solitary lust,
there is imperfect adultery.

(b) Sinfulness of Adultery.--Adultery is a grave sin, since it is an
act of impurity and is expressly forbidden in the sixth commandment
(Exod., xx. 14), and is classed among the sins that exclude from the
kingdom of heaven (I Cor., vi. 9, 10). It is a special sin, because it
is a violation of the faith pledged in the contract and Sacrament of
Matrimony, and an injury to the right of one's spouse and of the
conjugal state (Matt., xix. 5; Rom., vii. 3; I Cor., vii. 39). Even
though a husband gives his wife permission to commit adultery or vice
versa, the injustice remains, for though the individual is not formally
injured, the married state is injured, since no married person has the
right to give a permission opposed to the sacredness of the marriage
vows (Denzinger, n. 1200).

(c) Degrees of Malice.--There are three degrees of malice in adultery.
The first is that in which a married man sins with a single woman; the
second that in which a married woman sins with a single man; the third
that in which a married man sins with another man's wife. The second is
worse than the first, on account of its consequences (e.g., sterility,
uncertainty of paternity, rearing of an illegitimate child in the
family); the third is worse than the second, because in addition to the
consequences just mentioned, it contains a double injustice (viz.,
unfaithfulness to an innocent wife and unfaithfulness to an innocent
husband), and it multiplies the sin. If an adulterer's husband or wife
is also unfaithful, the injustice is lessened, but not removed; for not
merely the two married persons are to be considered, but also the
children, the family, society, and God; and the wrong done by one of
the parties does not take away the right to fidelity pledged absolutely
to all of these in marriage.

(d) Effects.--The party whose marriage rights have been injured by
adultery was permitted under some former civil codes to kill a wife
taken in adultery. But such laws were against justice and charity:
against justice since no guilty person should be put to death unheard,
and no injured person should be judge and accuser in his own case;
against charity, since by such summary vengeance the adulteress would
be sent to death in the midst of sin and without opportunity for
repentance. The remedies of Canon Law for the innocent spouse will be
noted below (2542).

2531. Incest.--Incest is impurity committed with a person related to
one within the degrees in which marriage is forbidden.

(a) It is impurity, internal or external. Internal desires are mental
incest, while external unconsummated (e.g., kisses) or consummated
(e.g., intercourse) acts are actual incest.

(b) It is committed with a relative, that is, with a person, male or
female, who is near to one by the tie of common ancestry (blood
relationship, kinship, consanguinity), or of marriage to one's kin
(marriage relationship, affinity), or of sacramental administration
(spiritual relationship), or of adoption (legal relationship). Alias
species cognationis non pertinent ad incestum, sed novam aliquam
malitiam possunt tribuere; v.g., si partes sunt parochus et parochiana,
confessarius et poenitens, habetur scandalum, seductio.

(c) The relationship is within the canonical degrees. Thus, marriage
between blood relatives is forbidden in all degrees of the direct line
(e.g., as to all female ancestry and posterity of a man) and in the
first three degrees of the collateral line, which includes, for a man,
his sisters, nieces, grandnieces, aunts, first and second cousins,
grand aunts and their daughters and granddaughters. Marriage between
those who are relatives-in-law is forbidden in all degrees of the
direct line (e.g., as to wife's mother, daughter, etc.) and in the
first two degrees of the collateral line (e.g., wife's sister, first
cousin, aunt or niece). Spiritual relationship which is impedient of
marriage exists between a person baptized and his baptizer, and also
between the god-child and the god-parent in baptism. Legal relationship
exists between the adopter and the adopted, when and as the civil law
makes it a bar to marriage.

(d) Incest is committed within the forbidden degrees, and hence if a
dispensation from an impediment of relationship had been granted to
parties about to marry, a sin between them would not be incestuous.

2532. Incest as a Distinct Species of Sin.--(a) There is a specific
distinction between incest and other forms of lust, since incest
violates not only purity, but also the piety and respect due each other
by those who are so closely related as to be unable to contract a
lawful marriage. Nature itself abhors this sin; for, apart from the
exceptional cases in which a dispensation is given, even lawful
marriage with near relatives would be an incentive to many sins before
marriage and would prevent the widening circle of friendships between
mankind which marriage with non-relatives produces, and would cause a
physical and mental enfeeblement of the race. In Scripture incest is
spoken of with peculiar horror as a nefarious deed deserving of death
(Lev., xx. 11 sqq.), and as an act unworthy even of pagans (I Cor., v.
1 sqq.).

(b) There are three distinct sub-species of incest, namely, natural
incest (between kin by blood or marriage), spiritual incest (between
the baptized and his baptizer or god-parent), and legal incest (between
persons who are kin in virtue of 8, marriage-impeding adoption). The
first violates piety due to natural origin, the second that due to
spiritual origin, and the third that due to legal origin. And in each
species the nearer the relationship, the greater the sin (e.g., incest
with a sister-in-law is less than that with a sister, incest with a
sister is less than that with a mother).

2533. Carnal Sacrilege.--Carnal sacrilege is the violation by an act of
impurity of the sacredness of a person, place or thing.

(a) It is a violation of sacredness, and thus it is a special sin,
adding irreligion to lust (see 2308 sqq.).

(b) It is an act of impurity, internal or external, consummated or
non-consummated. The impurity, however, must be so related to that
which is sacred as to treat its sanctity with injury or contempt
(formal disrespect), and there is no sacrilege if the impurity is
associated with something holy in such a way as not to show any notable
irreverence (material disrespect).

(c) Its first species is personal sacrilege, and it is committed by a
sacred person (see 2309) when he is impure internally or externally, or
by a non-sacred person when in desire or act he commits impurity with a
sacred person. If two sacred persons sin together, there is a double
sacrilege, which multiplies the sin.

(d) Its second species is local sacrilege, and is committed when an
impure act is done in a sacred place (2311) in such a way as to show
formal disrespect. Hence, consummated acts done in a church are
sacrilegious, and the same is probably true of non-consummated acts, at
least if they are of an enormous kind (e.g., a lascivious dance), and
even of internal desires to sin in the sacred place. But impure
thoughts or passing glances of prurient curiosity in a church are not
sacrilegious.

(e) Its third species is real sacrilege, and it occurs when impurity is
committed in such a way as to show formal disrespect to a sacred object
(2311). Hence, there is sacrilege of this kind when one commits
impurity immediately after Communion, or when one uses the Sacrament of
Penance as a means to solicit impurity. But the fact that a person
commits impurity while wearing a scapular is not sacrilegious, unless
contempt for the scapular was intended.

2534. Unnatural Lust.--Worst among the sins of impurity, as such, are
crimes of unnatural lust, for they exercise the sexual act, not only
illicitly, but also in a manner that defeats its purpose of
reproduction. In some non-venereal respects, however, natural sins of
impurity may be worse than the unnatural; for example, adultery is
worse as regards injustice, sacrilegious lust as regards irreligion,
etc. There are four distinct species of unnatural impurities--
pollution, unnatural coition, sodomy, bestiality (see Denzinger, n.
1124).

(a) For procreation nature requires copulation, and hence pollution is
unnatural, for it exercises semination without copulation, either alone
(self-abuse, solitary vice, masturbation) or with another (softness).

(b) For procreation nature requires proper copulation, that is, one
that will permit of a fertile union between the two life elements, the
sperma and the ovum. Hence, unnatural coition does not comply with this
necessity, for it does not employ the proper organ of sexual union,
substituting rectal for vaginal intercourse, or else by some form of
natural or artificial onanism it frustrates the act of its destined
conclusion. This sin is worse than pollution, since pollution omits to
use intercourse, whereas unnatural coition positively abuses it.

(c) For procreation nature requires heterosexual intercourse, a
condition disregarded by sodomy, which is the lustful commerce of male
with male (pederasty, uranism), or of female with female (tribadism,
sapphism, Lesbian love). This sin is worse than unnatural coition, for
it is a greater perversity to neglect one of the two needed life
elements than to neglect the right process for their union (see Gen.,
xix. 24, 25; Lev., xx. 13; Rom., i. 26, 27),

(d) Finally, for procreation nature requires homogeneous intercourse, a
law violated by bestiality, which is coition of a human being, male or
female, with a brute animal. This is the worst of unnatural impurities,
since it sins against the most fundamental condition for the sexual
act, namely, that the participants be of the same nature (see Lev., xx.
15, 16). Similar to bestiality is the crime of necrophilism
(intercourse with a corpse).

2535. Pollution.--Pollution is the voluntary emission of semen apart
from coition.

(a) It is an emission, that is an external discharge. The internal
secretion in the so-called female semination is also included by many
under the head of pollution. The carnal motions spoken of in 2497 b are
a preparation for pollution.

(b) It is a discharge of semen, that is, of the male fluid that
fertilizes the female ovum. But equivalent pollution, from the moral
viewpoint, is found in the discharge of certain non-prolific fluids
that are accessory to generation or that produce in their movement a
venereal satisfaction, such as the vaginal fluid in females (female
semination), the urethral fluid in males capable or incapable of
procreation (distillation). There is no pollution, however, in natural
discharges such as menstruation and urination.

(c) It is apart from coition, and thus it differs from other
consummated sins. But pollution may be committed either alone (solitary
vice), or with another, and in the latter case it pertains reductively
to adultery, fornication, sodomy, etc., as the case may be.

(d) It is voluntary directly or indirectly: directly, when one intends
it as an end (e.g., for the sake of the pleasure) or as a means (e.g.,
as a relief from temptation or bodily itching, to obtain a specimen of
semen for medical diagnosis); indirectly, when one unjustifiably does
something from which one foresees that pollution will result. In all
these cases pollution is formal or sinful, and it is not to be confused
with material or natural pollution, which is a discharge of semen or
distillation that is involuntary or unimputable.

2536. Cases of Material or Non-Sinful Pollution.--(a) Involuntary
pollution is passive or active. The former happens even when one is
awake. It is evoked by such slight causes as physical movement and
exertion, and is unaccompanied by pleasure; when habitual, it is a
disease due to organic debility The latter happens during sleep, and
may be caused by a superfluity of fluid. It is accompanied by pleasure
and often by libidinous dreams. It is a means used by nature to relieve
the system, and is therefore healthful and beneficial, unless the
discharges are too frequent (e.g., nightly). There is no obligation of
repressing the continuance of a pollution that began involuntarily
during sleep, since it may be regarded as an act of nature; but consent
must be withheld (2498 sqq.). Moreover, if merely natural pollution be
considered, not as to its venereal gratification but solely as to its
good effects (e.g., that it ends a temptation, that it benefits the
mind or the health), there is no sin in rejoicing at its accomplishment
or in desiring its fulfillment, provided nothing is done to produce it
and the intention is good; for then the object of the will is
indifferent and the end is good.

(b) Unimputable pollution is caused by a lawful act from which one
foresees that pollution will ensue, there being no proximate danger of
consent to sin, and the pollution being only permitted, and that for a
proportionately grave reason.

2537. Unimputable Pollution.--In reference to unimputable pollution the
following distinctions should be noted:

(a) the danger risked by an act may be either of formal pollution
(i.e., with consent to sin) or of material pollution (i.e., without
consent to sin);

(b) the danger of pollution is either proximate or remote, the former
being that from which pollution naturally and usually results and the
latter that from which it does not naturally or usually result.
Remotely dangerous are acts of a non-venereal kind, such as horseback
riding, gymnastics, drinking alcoholic beverages, and also acts of a
sexual kind that are only mildly exciting, such as conversations or
books that are slightly "off color" when the parties are of mature age
(see 2517, 2518). Proximately dangerous are acts of a venereal kind
that notably inflame passion, such as warm and lingering kisses between
persons of opposite sexes (see 2517, 2518);

(c) the reason for running the danger of pollution is either grave,
serious, or slight. A grave reason is real necessity (e.g., the removal
of disease or pain or of a very painful or troublesome itch due to the
blood or disease) or great utility (e.g., the preservation of health,
cleanliness of body); a serious reason is an important convenience of
soul or body (e.g., the exercise of common politeness, the enjoyment of
reasonable comfort); a slight reason is one in which none of the
mentioned motives is found (e.g., the satisfaction of an idle
curiosity, the removal of a trifling irritation or itch).

2538. Proximate and Remote Occasions of Pollution.--It is never lawful
to expose oneself to the immediate danger of sin, for he who loves the
danger loves the sin (see 258, 260); but if one uses means to make the
danger remote, one may lawfully encounter it for a good reason (see
258, 260, 261). It is lawful to permit an evil effect when there is
sufficient justification according to the principle of double effect
(see 103 sqq.).

(a) Hence, if there is proximate danger of formal pollution (that is,
of consent to sin), no reason excuses an act even of a non-sexual kind,
such as horseback riding. But if the act is necessary, the danger must
be made remote by the use of special means, such as prayer, firm
resolves, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).

(b) If there is proximate danger of material pollution, a grave reason
suffices (e.g., the care of patients by physicians and nurses,
assistance of bathers by attendants, warm soporific drinks taken for
the sake of sleep).

(c) If there is remote danger of material pollution, a serious reason
suffices (e.g., customary salutations of the country, physical
exercises, moderate comfort in posture, seasoning in food.). A slight
reason may excuse at times from mortal sin (e.g., unnecessary curiosity
about the sciences of anatomy or sexology).

2539. The Theological Malice of Sinful Pollution.--(a) From its nature
pollution is a mortal sin, because it is an act of impurity (1494) and
a perversion of nature (2534). Moreover, its consequences are most
injurious to society (it tends to self-indulgence and the avoidance of
the burdens of marriage) and to the individual (when habitual, it
weakens mental and will power and often brings on a breakdown of bodily
vigor especially among young people), In Scripture it is represented as
gravely illicit (I Cor., vi. 10; Gal., v. 19; Eph., v. 3). Hence,
pollution is always a mortal sin when directly willed (e.g., when
practised deliberately in order to be rid of a temptation or of bodily
irritation or itch certainly due to superfluity of semen or to
passion), and also when indirectly willed if there is proximate danger
of consent to sin (e.g., when one who has always committed formal
pollution in certain company goes into that company without necessity,
or without use of means to prevent a fall) or grave danger of pollution
and no sufficient reason for permitting it (e.g., undue familiarities
from which nocturnal pollution is foreseen as most probable).

(b) From the imperfection of the internal act, pollution is sometimes
only a venial sin. This happens in case of invincible ignorance (e.g.,
young children who do not understand the evil of masturbation, students
who have been taught by instructors or physical directors that it is
necessary for health or that it is unsanitary but not sinful), or of
incomplete consent (e.g., when the person is only half awake and does
not ordinarily desire pollution, when he is a psychopathic and not
fully responsible for his acts).

(c) From the lightness of the matter pollution is venial when willed
indirectly and permitted without sufficient reason, if there is only
slight danger of it from the nature of the action performed (see 2496).
Examples are the reading for pastime of love stories before falling
asleep with the prevision that this may possibly bring on pollution
during sleep.

2540. If the action productive of pollution is gravely illicit, as
being seriously opposed to chastity (e.g., lewdness) or to some other
virtue (e.g., extreme intemperance in drugs or alcohol), is one thereby
guilty of the grave sin of pollution?

(a) If the case be considered in the abstract, the answer is in the
negative. For if the action in question is only remotely dangerous as
regards pollution (e.g., an action of a non-venereal kind such as
intemperance does not necessarily tend to impurity, an act of a
venereal kind that is momentary, such as a desire, does not strongly
affect the passions), the sin is only venial in so far as pollution is
concerned (see 2517, 2518).

(b) If the case be considered in the concrete, the answer is in the
affirmative as a rule when there is question of a habit. For generally
those who act habitually in this way yield consent to the pollution as
well as to the sin that precedes. Authorities note, however, that he
who repents of the cause of pollution before the pollution results is
not guilty of the actual pollution.

2541. The Moral Species of Sinful Pollution.--(a) The general species
of pollution is distinct from other consummated sins of impurity, since
it is unnatural, and this in a special way (see 2534, and Denzinger, n.
1124), But some authors regard equivalent pollution (see 2493, 2535) as
not a consummated sin, since it is without true semination, and hence
according to them it may be confessed simply as impure pleasure (see
2519 b).

(b) The particular species of pollution is derived from circumstances
that give it a new essential malice. If it is solitary, and committed
by one who is under no bond of marriage or vow, and accompanied by no
thought or desire except in reference to self or self-gratification
(autoerotism, narcissism), there is the single sin of pollution. But
there are other sins if it is committed by one under special obligation
(i.e., adultery or sacrilege), or if committed with another person
(e.g., seduction, coöperation, rape), or if committed with impure
thoughts or desires about others (e.g., mental adultery, fornication,
sodomy, bestiality). The manner in which pollution is performed (e.g.,
whether coöperative pollution is active or passive, by irrumation or
concubitus or touch, with or without an instrument) is _per se_ an
accidental circumstance. According to some authors, coöperative
pollution brought on by touch alone is not diversified in species, if
there is no special affection for the other person, but only the desire
of carnal gratification, and hence it may be declared simply as
pollution from touch.

2542. Penalties for Immorality Decreed in Canons 2357-2359.--(a) Laymen
who are guilty of certain offenses against the sixth commandment become
infamous on conviction and are excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical
acts. In case of adultery, the injured spouse may obtain a separation,
temporary or perpetual, from the offending spouse (Canon 1129). (b)
Clerics in minor orders are subject to special punishments, and may
even be dismissed from the clerical state. (c) Clerics in major orders
are subject to penalties named in law (e.g., suspension, infamy,
deposition) for graver crimes such as concubinage, adultery, and to
penalties decreed by the lawful superior for other delinquencies.

2543. The Potential Parts of Temperance.--The appetites of pleasure are
the most difficult to restrain, and there is need of a perfect virtue
like temperance to rule over them and keep them within the bounds of
reason. The analogous or potential virtues of temperance are that one
which is able to check, though it does not tame, the animal appetites
(continency), and those that preside and rule over the less violent
appetites for vengeance, exercise of authority, superior excellence,
knowledge, amusement and display (meekness, etc.). See above, 2465 c.

2544. Continence.--(a) Its Nature.--This quality, as here taken, is the
state of one who has not gained mastery over the passions sufficient to
keep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is
firmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral
virtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appetites. The
temperate man has already subdued his passions, and hence he is less
disturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their
onsets.

(b) Its Relation to Temperance.--Greater difficulty increases merit, if
it is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a
man of sickly constitution or one who suffers great opposition deserves
more credit for his work than a man of vigorous constitution or one who
enjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to
the absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard
because he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds
it easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving
than continence, for it controls passion with greater ease simply
because it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower
appetite to the dictates of reason.

(c) Its Opposite.--The vice opposed to continence is incontinence,
which does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of
passion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the
lower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a passing
indisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For passion comes
and goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a
sinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a
second nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their
desires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful
than incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but
on the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the
greater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself
from wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the
soul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be
unconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul
and demands a more unwearied vigilance.

2545. Meekness.--Meekness or mildness is the virtue that moderates
anger.

(a) It is a virtue, since it consists in moderation according to right
reason. Our Lord proclaims it blessed (Matt., v. 4). and St. Paul
numbers it among the Fruits of the Spirit (Gal., v. 23). Illustrious
models of mildness are Joseph (Gen., l. 20), Moses (Num., xii. 3),
David (I Kings, xxiv), Christ (Luke, xv; John, i. 29, viii. 11), St.
Paul (Acts, xx. 31).

(b) Its office is moderation, and hence in its manner, though not in
its matter, it is like temperance. It follows the middle way between
the extremes of sinful indignation and sinful indulgence.

(c) Its matter is the passion of anger, that is, the sensitive appetite
that inclines one to avenge an evil by punishing its author. Like other
passions (121), anger is indifferent in itself, but it is made good or
evil by its reasonableness or unreasonableness. The meek man is angry
at times, but only when and where and as he should be (Ps. iv. 5); his
anger is not a blind impulse, but a righteous zeal that attacks a wrong
only after reason has shown that this is the proper course.

2546. Anger.--Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its
matter or its manner.

(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance)
when it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is
innocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not
followed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred,
etc).

(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement
felt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not
sinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord
against the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias
against the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage
at nothings or trifles is sinful.

2547. Gravity of the Sin of Anger.--(a) If anger is sinful on account
of its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity
and justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of hell
fire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of
imperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those
who do not agree with one's opinions) or the lightness of the matter
(e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a
word of reproof would have sufficed).

(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its
nature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent passion is not a serious
disorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of
circumstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and
swears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his
position, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence
of his paroxysm.

2548. Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?--(a) As to its
matter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil
under the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it
intends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is
injurious to another, or as it is a means to one's own temporal and
external good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than
concupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure,
whereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.

(b) As to its manner, anger surpasses the vices mentioned in certain of
its violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a
scene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is
flushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he
pounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.

2549. Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.--(a) It has a certain
preeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is
sweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner
is powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.

(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces
indignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks
upon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self,
which fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to
anger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy
(Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind
of injury.

2550. Sinful Indulgence.--Sinful indulgence, which is opposed to
meekness by excess, is often a mortal sin on account of the grave harm
it inflicts upon the common welfare and the protection it affords to
crime. Thus, Heli was seriously reproved and punished because he winked
at grave disorders, or at least was too easy-going in his corrections
(I Kings, ii, iii).

2551. Clemency.--Clemency is a virtue that inclines one, from a spirit
of kindness and moderation, to be as easy in inflicting punishments as
the claims of justice will allow.

(a) Clemency is a virtue, because it is reasonable, does good to
others, and makes the doer good. It is beneficial to public as well as
private interest: "Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is
strengthened by clemency" (Prov., xx. 28).

(b) It inclines one to be easy, that is, to temper or relax the
severity of the law. Thus, it differs from the virtues of legal justice
and of charitable forgiveness, the former of which, when necessary,
insists on the full rigor of the law (see 2381 sqq.), whereas the
latter, when permissible, grants an enemy a full pardon (see 1198).

(c) Its matter is punishment, that is, the external evil of
chastisement visited on wrongdoers. Hence, it differs from meekness,
which deals with the internal emotion of anger, and from mercy, which
deals with external goods bestowed upon the suffering.

(d) It is easy only in so far as the claims of justice will allow; that
is, it acts from a sense of responsibility to the rights and claims of
the common good and of all the interests involved, and decides
according to an impartial and enlightened judgment that circumstances
of person, deed, cause, etc., call for a departure from the strict
requirements of law or custom. Clemency is not the same thing, then, as
arbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.

(e) It is moved in the first place by kindness to the offender, and
thus it differs both from the virtue of equity (which acts from the
sense of higher justice) and from the vices of favoritism, extortion,
and cowardice (which extend forbearance only to friends or to those who
offer bribes or who bring pressure to bear).

(f) It is moved secondly by a spirit of moderation. Many persons are
spoiled by authority: feeling their own importance, they desire to
exercise their powers to the limit and to keep others down as much as
possible. The clement man, on the contrary, keeps his poise and uses
his authority with moderation. Meekness should be practised by all, but
clemency is the proper virtue of superiors.

2552. The Vices Opposed to Clemency.--(a) The extreme of defect is
cruelty, which is a hardness of heart, not moved by the sufferings of
others, that disposes one to inflict excessive punishments. The worst
form of cruelty is savagery, which takes inhuman delight in the
sufferings of others and inflicts pain without regard for guilt or
innocence.

(b) The extreme of excess is undue leniency, which spares the rod when
it should be used. There are times when severity is necessary, as when
a crime was malicious and cold-blooded, when an offender is stubborn
and irreformable, and when mildness will harm the public welfare or
invite the sinner to repeat his offense. In such cases it would be
unwise and harmful to mitigate the sentence which wise statutes or
customs provide for the offense.

2553. Humility.--Humility is the virtue that makes one modest in the
desire of greatness.

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a moral excellence and a voluntary
disposition. Hence, it is not the same as physical humility (e.g., the
humble or lowly circumstances in which a person was born) or as
involuntary humility (e.g., the humiliation which comes upon those who
exalt themselves).

(b) It is concerned with greatness, that is, with the higher things
that pertain to greatness of soul (see 2448 sqq.). There is no
opposition between these two virtues, for greatness of soul makes one
set such a value upon the gifts one has received from God as to aspire
to the betterment for which they prepare one, while humility makes one
realize one's own shortcomings so sincerely that it keeps one from the
desire of those excellences for which one is unsuited.

(c) It is modest; that is, it regulates according to the standard of
reason the passion for greatness, so that one may avoid the extremes of
pride and of abjectness or littleness of soul (see 2465 c).

2554. The Three Acts of Humility.--(a) Its regulatory act is in the
intellect, and consists in the knowledge and acknowledgment of one's
infirmity and inferiority, not only in comparison with God, but also in
comparison with men.

(b) Its essential act is in the appetite and consists in a regulation
of the hope for greatness so that, recognizing one's limitations, one
does not strive for that for which one is unfitted. Higher degrees of
humility are those which do not desire honor, or which are pained by
it, or which desire dishonor.

(c) Its expressive act is in the external conduct. St. Benedict says
that the humble person avoids singularity in deed, is sparing in his
words and not given to loudness, and bears himself modestly, not
staring about or laughing immoderately. But there is also a false
humility, which is only in externals, and this is really proud
hypocrisy (Ecclus., xix. 23).

2555. Two Requirements of Humility.--Humility is chiefly an abasement
of self before God (Gen., xviii. 27), and it is not opposed to truth or
to good order. Hence, the two following rules on the lowering of self
before fellow-creatures:

(a) in the internal act, humility requires that each one acknowledge
his neighbor as his better, if comparison is made between what the
former has from himself and what the latter has from God (Phil., ii. 3;
Osee, xiii. 9). But it is not against humility to believe that one has
more of divine grace or less of human imperfection than another, if
there are good reasons for the belief (Eph., iii. 5; Gal., ii. 15);

(b) in the external act, humility requires that one show proper signs
of respect to one's betters. But of persons who are in authority St.
Augustine says that, while before God they should prostrate themselves
at the feet of all, before man they should not so demean themselves to
inferiors as to detract from their dignity or authority. Like the other
virtues, humility must be guided in its manifestations by prudence as
to place, time, and other circumstances.

2556. The Excellence of Humility.--(a) Humility is inferior to the
theological virtues, which tend immediately to the end itself, and also
to the intellectual virtues and legal justice, which rightly dispose
mind and will about the means to that end. Humility and the remaining
virtues incline one to follow the direction of mind and will, but with
this difference that, while humility makes one ready for submission in
all that is right, temperance, fortitude and the rest prepare one for
submission only in some one or other particular matter. To these latter
virtues, then, humility is superior.

(b) Humility is the groundwork of the spiritual edifice negatively or
indirectly; for, since God resists the proud and gives grace to the
humble (James, iv. 6), the obstacles to the other virtues are removed
by humility. But it is faith which positively and directly places the
cornerstone of the spiritual life, for faith is the first approach
towards God: "He who would come to God must believe" (Heb., xi. 6).

2557. Pride.--Pride is an inordinate desire of one's own personal
excellence.

(a) It is a desire, for the object of pride is that which is pleasing
and yet not easy of attainment.

(b) The desire is concerned with excellence, that is, with a high
degree of some perfection (such as virtue, knowledge, beauty, fame,
honor) or with superiority to others in perfection.

(c) The excellence sought is personal; that is, the object of pride is
self as exalted on high or raised above others. Ambition seeks
greatness in honors and dignities, presumption greatness in
accomplishment, and vanity greatness in reputation and glory; pride,
from which these other vices spring, seeks the greatness of the ego or
of those things with which the ego is identified, such as one's own
children, one's own family, or one's own race.

(d) The desire is inordinate, either as to the matter, when one desires
an excellence or superiority of which one is unworthy (e.g., equality
with Our Lord), or as to the manner, when one expressly desires to have
excellence or superiority without due subjection (e.g., to possess
one's virtue without dependence on God or from one's own unaided
merits). In the former case pride is opposed to greatness of soul, in
the latter case to humility. The contempt which is proper to pride is a
disdain for subjection, and the contempt which belongs to disobedience
is a disgust for a precept; but pride naturally leads to contempt for
law and for God and the neighbor (see 2367).

2558. The Acts of Pride.--(a) In his intellect, the proud man has an
exaggerated opinion of his own worth, and this causes his inordinate
desire of praise and exaltation. But pride may also be the cause of
conceited ideas, for those who are too much in admiration of themselves
often come to think that they are really as great as they wish to be.

(b) The will of the proud man worships his own greatness, and longs for
its recognition and glorification by others.

(c) In his external words and works, the proud man betrays himself by
boasting, self-glorification, self-justification, by his haughty
appearance and gestures and luxurious style, by arrogance, insolence,
perfidy, disregard of the rights and feelings of others, etc.

2559. The Sinfulness of Pride.--(a) Complete pride, which turns away
from God because it considers subjection detrimental to one's own
excellence, is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is a manifest
rebellion against the Supreme Being (Ecclus., x. 14). Such was the
pride of Lucifer, but it is rare in human beings. Complete pride may be
venial from the imperfection of the act, when it is only a
semideliberate wish.

(b) Incomplete pride, which turns inordinately to the love of created
excellence but without disaffection to superiors, is in itself a venial
sin, for there is no serious disorder in the excess of an otherwise
indifferent passion. But circumstances may make this pride mortal
(e.g., when it is productive of serious harm to others).

2560. Pride Compared with Other Sins.--(a) Gravity.--Complete pride is
less than hatred of God, for the former has as its object personal
excellence, the latter separation from God. But after hatred of God
complete pride is worse disloyalty than any other mortal sin; it
separates from God directly, since it abjures allegiance to the Supreme
Being, while other sins separate from God only indirectly, since they
offend, not from contempt, but from ignorance, or passion or excessive
desire.

(b) Origin.--Pride was the first sin, because by it the angels and our
first parents fell, the angels desiring likeness to God in beatitude,
Adam and Eve likeness in knowledge (Ecclus., x. 15; Prov., xviii. 11;
Tob., iv. 14).

(c) Influence.--Pride is called the queen and mother of the seven
capital vices--namely, vainglory (2450), gluttony (2473), lust (2494),
avarice (2426), sloth (1322), envy (1342), and anger (2549)--not in the
sense that every sin is the result of pride (for many persons sin from
ignorance, passion, etc.), but in the sense that the inordinate desire
of personal excellence is a motive that can impel one to any kind of
sin, just as covetousness offers a means that is useful for every
temporal end (I Tim., vi. 10). Pride is also most dangerous, since it
steals away the reward of virtue itself (Matt., vi. 2); and, as
humility is the first step towards heaven, pride is the first step
towards hell.

2561. Abjection.--The other extreme of pride is abjection. (a) As a
turning away from these higher things to which one should aspire, this
sin is the same as littleness of soul, and it is opposed to greatness
of soul (see 2451). (b) As a turning to lower things or to a submission
to others which is unreasonable, this vice is directly opposed to
humility. Examples are persons of knowledge who waste their time on
menial labor when they should be more usefully employed in other
pursuits, or who permit themselves to be corrected and guided by the
errors and false principles of the ignorant.

2562. Studiousness.--Studiousness (_studiositas_) is the virtue that
makes one modest in the desire of knowledge.

(a) Its object is the desire of knowledge; for man is gifted with
powers of sensation and understanding, and nature inclines him to
desire the exercise of these powers to see, hear, picture, apprehend,
judge, reason, etc.

(b) Its function is to make one modest in this desire (see 2465 c);
that is, it regulates the inclination of nature according to reason, so
that one may avoid both excess and defect in the pursuit of knowledge.
On the one hand, the soul has the urge to discover and learn, but just
as bodily hunger leads to gluttony, if not restrained, so does mental
hunger become a vice (curiosity), if it is not moderated. On the other
hand, the body has a disinclination for the labor, weariness and
hardship which study demands, and, if this reluctance is not overcome,
one becomes guilty of the sin of negligence or ignorance (see 904,
1326, 1671).

(c) Its character, therefore, is that of a virtue, since it holds a
natural appetite within moderation, avoiding the extremes of excess and
defect, and keeping custody over senses and mind. This virtue is
praised in Prov., xxvii. 11: "Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart
joyful"; and in I Tim., iv. 13: "Attend to reading." Essentially, it is
a potential part of temperance, for its chief characteristic is
moderation of an eager desire; but secondarily, it belongs to
fortitude, for great courage, persistence, and self-sacrifice are
necessary for a student.

2563. The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.--(a) The vice of excess is
called curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on
account of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of
others because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to
satisfy impure desire) or on account of its circumstances (e.g., a
curiosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or
more important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a
curiosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of God,
Ecclus., iii. 22).

(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is
a voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as
when a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and
negligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry
into the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind
their own business well).

2564. The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.--(a) Curiosity in
itself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy
oneself with things superfluous. But circumstances sometimes make it
mortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is
curious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on
unbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others
sacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it
serious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to
blacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal
as when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers,
etc., in order to get information.

(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty
of knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and
thereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a
mortal sin.

2565. Modesty.--Modesty should control not only the internal passions
for excellence and learning, but also the external movements of the
body (modesty of bearing) and the external use of corporal things
(modesty of living). (a) Thus, modesty of bearing moderates the bodily
actions, both in serious things (modest behavior) and in things playful
(modest relaxation).

(b) Modesty of living makes one temperate in the use of the externals
that serve life (modesty in style) and of the clothing one wears
(modesty in dress).

2566. Modest Behavior or Decorum.--(a) The Virtue.--The movements and
gestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they
are indications of one's own character and disposition, and because
they express one's disposition towards those with whom one lives.
Hence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that
they be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one's sex, age, position,
etc.) and to one's neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social
usage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum
employs both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act
(2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of
others (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and
society is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus
(xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man's
looks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be
nothing offensive to others in one's movements; and Aristotle mentions
among the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and
dignified in demeanor.

(b) The Opposite Vices.--Modest behavior is offended by various vices
of excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and
affectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration
for others by flattery and rudeness.

2567. Modest Relaxation.--(a) The Virtue.--Just as the body fatigued by
manual labor demands the refreshment of sleep and the recuperation
afforded by vacations or by intermissions of work, so also the mind
cannot be healthy or active unless from time to time it is relieved by
some kind of amusement or diversion. The desire for recreation is,
therefore, one of the chief inclinations of man, and there is special
need of its temperate management by right reason. The person who
prudently provides for pastimes and pleasures as a part of his life has
the virtue which Aristotle called eutrapelia (good wit, urbanity), and
which St. Thomas named gaiety or pleasantness.

(b) The Sin of Excess.--Relaxation is excessive in various ways.
Sometimes the entertainment itself is improper (e.g., obscene comedies,
scandalous dances, unjust games of chance). Sometimes the disposition
of the person himself is sinful (e.g., those who make recreation the
chief occupation of life, Wis., xv. 12; those who recreate only for
pleasure, or who enjoy themselves uproariously). Sometimes the
circumstances make an amusement unsuitable, such as the person (e.g.,
when a man of dignity belittles himself by acting as clown, when a
female takes part in sports unsuited to her sex), or the time (e.g.,
when the hours that should be given to divine services, or to study or
other Work, are spent in golfing or fishing; when Good Friday or a day
of bereavement or penance is chosen for a ball or picnic), or the place
(eg, when a church is used for sports or farces), or the quality (e.g.,
when the Scriptures or other sacred things are caricatured or
parodied), or the quantity (e.g., when one spends so much on theatres,
automobiles, trips and other enjoyments that one has nothing left for
duties of justice, charity or religion; when health is injured by
violent games).

(b) The Sin of Defect.--Those persons offend here who deprive
themselves of necessary relaxation (e.g., misers who fear to take a
holiday or go on an outing lest they lose some money), or who interfere
with the recreation of others (e.g., killjoys who wish to see others
miserable, fanatics who believe that all fun is of the devil). Those
who have little sense of humor or who suffer much may be excused to
some extent if they never laugh, but at least they should try to look
pleasant at times, or at least not frown on innocent happiness.

2568. Gravity of the Sins Opposed to Moderate Enjoyment.--(a) The
Absolute Gravity.--The sins just mentioned are mortal or venial
according to the character of what is done and the circumstances. Thus,
it is a mortal sin to find recreation in wild revelry and debauchery,
or to drive one's children to the devil by forbidding them necessary
diversion; it is a venial sin to spend a little too much time at the
card table or to work rather too hard.

(b) The Comparative Gravity.--It is worse to relax too much than too
little, for amusement is not taken for its own sake, but is
subordinated to serious things. Just as it is more senseless to take
too much salt or other relish in food than to take too little, because
the salt is secondary, so it is more foolish to play too much than too
little.

2569. Modesty in Style of Living and Dress.-(a) The Virtue.--External
goods, such as dwellings and clothing, are necessary for body and soul,
as a protection to health and decency; others, such as furnishings,
decorations, ornaments, cars, radios, entertainments for guests, etc.,
are useful for convenience, beauty and the maintenance of one's
station. But one may be immoderate in the use of these goods, and hence
there is need of a virtue to regulate their use, so that it may
truthfully be in keeping with one's position and be not offensive to
others.

(b) The Sin of Excess.--This is committed when one's style is
extravagant according to the standards of the community, or when like
Dives, clothed in purple and fine linen, one aims only at display or
sensual gratification, or when one is too much preoccupied with
externals (e.g., when too much time is spent before the mirror or too
much money at the dressmaker's). Dignitaries and the ministers of the
altar are not guilty of excess in the pomp and splendor which the
Church sanctions, since the honor is intended for their station and the
divine worship they perform.

(c) The Sin of Defect.--This is committed when one's mode of life is
not up to the reasonable standard of one's community, especially if
this is due to negligence or itch for notoriety or disregard for
decency. Examples are those who through carelessness go about unwashed
or unshaven, who keep their quarters in a filthy and disorderly state,
or who wear their clothing untidily; also females who dress in male
attire, nudists who appear undressed in public places, and cynics who
scorn the conventions of refined society. It is not sinful, however,
but a virtuous act of temperance, to wear simpler and poorer garments
from the spirit of mortification and humility (Heb., xi. 37). The
clergy and religious, since they should be models of the penitential
spirit, are to be praised, therefore, when they give an example of
plainness and simplicity in personal style and dress.

2570. Morality of Self-Beautification.--Is it wrong to beautify oneself
in order to improve one's looks or to win admiration?

(a) In itself there is no harm, especially for females, in using means
to improve one's looks, such as remedies for deformities, facial
paints, powders and cosmetics, hair waves and dyes, and the like. But
accidentally there could be sin (e.g., deception). A poor man would be
a deceiver if he lived in great style to make a woman believe he was
wealthy, and likewise a woman would be a deceiver if she used an
artificial beauty to deceive a man about her age (see 2404).

(b) In itself also it is not sinful to desire that others approve one's
appearance and dress. Thus, a wife should strive to be attractive to
her husband (I Cor., vii. 34), and modest ornamentation may be used to
win a suitor (I Tim., ii. 9). It is mortally sinful, however, to attire
oneself with the purpose or in a manner to arouse carnal temptation or
to awaken sinful desire in others--for example, if one wishes to
capture the sex love of others without marriage (Prov., vii. 10); it is
venially sinful to groom oneself well from mere vanity, that is, from a
silly ambition to be regarded as handsome and fashionable. By a Decree
of the Sacred Congregation of the Council (January 12, 1930),
parish-priests, parents, and teachers are admonished to oppose indecent
female dress; and it is ordered that women and girls improperly dressed
shall be excluded from Communion or even from church, and special
services and sermons on decency are prescribed for December 8 of each
year (see 1456, 1457).

2571. Complements of the Virtue of Temperance.--(a) The Gift of the
Holy Ghost that perfects temperance is fear of the Lord. The virtue of
temperance makes one abstain from unlawful pleasures because to do so
is reasonable; fear of the Lord inclines one to the same abstinence
from reverence. The Gift of Fear looks first to the greatness of the
Heavenly Father, before whom the nations are as a drop in the bucket
and are counted as the smallest grain of the balance and the islands as
but a little dust (Is., xl. 15); and in this respect it represses
presumption and serves the virtue of hope (see 1041 sqq.). But
secondarily it looks to the insignificance of every delight that is
apart from God, and sees that these inferior joys are passing, insipid
and bitter, like dust blown away by the wind, like a thin froth
dispersed by the storm, like smoke scattered by the breeze (Wis., v.
15), like a sweet poison that turns to gall and destroys (Job, xx. 12
sqq.); and in this respect fear of God sustains temperance, which must
regulate the cravings of the flesh and lower appetites. Fear of God,
then, makes one fly from those things which chiefly allure one to
offend Him, and hence the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 120) prays: "Pierce
Thou my flesh with Thy fear."

(b) The Beatitude that corresponds to the present Gift is the second:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Those who
have the fear of God perceive the true nature of illicit joys and the
evil end that awaits those who chase after them. They prefer, then, to
be sorrowful, that is, to deprive themselves of every wicked pleasure
and love for the sake of the love of God in this life and the enjoyment
of God in the life to come: "Your sorrow shall be changed into joy"
(John, xx. 16).

(c) The fruits of fear of the Lord are modesty, continency and
chastity. Like a good tree that produces a rich harvest of delightful
fruits, filial reverence for God brings forth acts of virtue that have
in them a delicious savor more enjoyable and more lasting than the
fruits of the flesh. These goodly and pleasant fruits of the spirit of
fear of God are modesty in words, deeds and external things, continency
of the single and chastity of the married in thoughts and desires.

2572. The Commandments of Temperance.--(a) Negative Precepts.--In the
Decalogue the vices of intemperance that are most directly opposed to
the love of God and the neighbor (I Tim., i. 5) are expressly
forbidden, namely, adultery in act and adultery in desire. Elsewhere
other sins are forbidden. Thus, drunkenness ("Drunkards shall not
possess the kingdom," I Cor., vi. 10), every kind of lust ("The works
of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury . . .
those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom," Gal., v. 19,
21), anger ("Let all bitterness and anger and indignation be put away
from you," Eph., iv. 31), pride ("God resisteth the proud," James, iv.
6), etc.

(b) Affirmative Precepts.--The positive modes of observing temperance
(i.e., rules on fasting) are not prescribed in the Decalogue. For the
law confines itself to general principles that, are of universal
application, whereas the manner of practising fasts and abstinences has
to be suited to conditions of time and place. Hence, it pertains to the
Church to settle by her legislation the details of mortification in
eating and drinking, so that they may be suited to the ever-changing
conditions of human life (2469).




Question III

THE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN

2573. The theological and moral virtues treated in the previous
Question are obligatory upon all states and conditions, for all men
have the same supernatural destiny, and all alike are bound to govern
their acts and their passions by the rule of reason. But not all have
the same calling or office, or consequently the same particular ends to
be striven for or the same special means to be used; wherefore, there
are moral duties proper to particular classes and particular ways of
life. Those special obligations, however, do not constitute new
virtues, but are applications of the seven general virtues to the
states of man diversified in reference to the acts and habits of the
soul. The diversities now spoken of may be reduced to the three
mentioned by St. Paul (I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.), namely, diversities of
graces (i.e., some are gifted to edify the Church in marvellous ways by
knowledge, speech or miracles), diversities of operations (i.e., some
are called to the life of contemplation, others to active life), and
diversities of ministries (i.e., there are various stations, ranks,
occupations, both in ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical life). The
higher graces and ways of the spiritual life of man are treated in
works of ascetical and mystical theology, and we shall confine
ourselves here to two subjects: (a) the duties of men as members of the
Church, that is, the general duties of the faithful and the special
duties of clerics and religious; (b) the duties of men as members of
domestic and civil society.

Before proceeding any further, a word is in order regarding the role of
the laity in the Church.

"We desire that all who claim the Church as their mother should
seriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and those who
have consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but the other
members as well of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, have the
obligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding and
increase of this Body" (Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis_).

The Catholic layman, long a silent partner in the Church's apostolate,
has assumed a more active part in recent years. His role, his
apostolate, his milieu, his special claims to divine graces, his
spiritual prerogatives--all have been made subjects of theological
investigation particularly by European writers. Controversy,
uncertainty, at times even error have characterized their efforts as
they grope their way in a new area of theology. Their efforts
ultimately will lead to the elaboration of a developed theology of the
laity, an extremely important and equally necessary body of knowledge,
for "the laity are in the front line of the Church's life; through them
the Church is the vital principle of human society. Accordingly they
especially must have an ever clearer consciousness not only of
belonging to the Church, but of being the Church . . . " (Pius XII,
_Allocution to the Sacred College, AAS_, 38-149).[1]

[1] To detail the advances made in this new area of theology would
demand a volume for itself. We shall have to be content with indicating
a select bibliography of the outstanding works available.

Francis M. Keating, S.J., "Theology of the Laity," _Proceedings of the
Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1956, pp. 196 ff.; Ives M. J.
Congar, O.P., _Jalons pour une theologie du laïcat_, (Paris, Cerf,
1953); translated as _Lay People in the Church_, (The Newman Press,
Westminster, Md., 1957); G. Philips, _Le role du laïcat dans l'Eglise,
(Casterman, Tournai-Paris, 1954); translated as _The Role of the Laity
in the Church_. (Mercier, Cork, 1955); Karl Rahner, "The Apostolate of
Laymen," _Theology Digest_, (Spring 1957), pp. 73 ff.; Jacques
Leclercq, "Can a Layman be a Saint?" _Theology Digest_, (Winter 1956),
pp. 3 ff. (This same issue contains a select bibliography on
spirituality of the laity, p. 8.); Paul Dabin, S.J., _Le sacerdoce
royal des fidéles dans les livres saints_, (Blond et Gay, 1941); _Le
sacerdoce royal des fidéles dans la tradition ancienne et moderne_,
(Les Editions Universelles, Brussels, 1950): Gustave Weigel, S.J., "The
Body of Christ and the City of God," _Social Order_, (Vol. 5, 1955, p.
275 ff.).




Art. 1: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH

2574. The General Duties of the Faithful.--The Church has the power to
make laws which will promote the common good of the whole body and the
individual good of the members (see 418). Chief among the laws that
bind the faithful in general are the six known as the Precepts of the
Church, namely, the laws on the observance of Sundays and holydays, on
fasting and abstinence, on yearly confession, on Easter Communion, on
the support of pastors, and on marriage.

2575. The First Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that on
Sundays and holydays of obligation Mass be heard and servile and other
like works be omitted (Canons 1247-1249) by the subjects of church laws
(427 sqq.).

(a) This precept is of natural and divine law as to its purpose and
substance, for reason teaches and the Third Commandment of the
Decalogue prescribes that man set aside some time for the external
worship of God, and avoid those things that distract him from worship
(Catechism of the Council of Trent, pp. 396 sqq,). Hence, even
non-Catholics, though they do not sin by missing Mass (429, 430), are
guilty of sin if they do not from time to time worship God externally.

(b) This precept is of ecclesiastical law only as to its details (i.e.,
the time set apart and the manner of worship and sanctification
decreed). The Old Testament Law observed the Sabbath or last day of the
Week in memory of the creation of the World, and it abstained most
rigorously from work on the Sabbath, because there was a divine
prohibition and because this rest was a figure of things to come. But
in the New Law the ceremonial precepts of Judaism no longer have force,
and the Christian precepts substituted for them were not instituted by
Christ Himself but arose from the custom of the Church. During the
lifetime of the Apostles themselves Sunday (or the first day of the
week) came to be venerated as the Lord's Day in memory of the
Resurrection, which completed the work of Redemption (Acts, ii. 46,
iii. 1, v. 12, xxi. 26); and from early times various special holydays
were appointed and made days of obligatory worship, as had been the
case with certain feasts in the Old Testament. As early as the third
and fourth centuries laws were made confirming the primitive customs of
assisting at Mass and resting on Sundays and holydays.

2576. The Affirmative and Negative Parts of the First Precept.--The
first precept of the Church has two parts, an affirmative (preceptive)
part which commands the hearing of Mass, and a negative (prohibitive)
part which forbids the doing of servile works. The law is therefore
most salutary and simple, requiring that one take part in the greatest
act of worship, the sacrifice which is a commemoration of Christ, and
that one rest from the labors and cares of the week and be spiritually
refreshed. In reference to the Mass, the precept requires that Mass
itself be heard, and that it be an entire Mass and the same Mass.

(a) Thus, Mass itself must be heard, and hence one does not satisfy the
Sunday obligation by attending other services that precede (e.g., the
Asperges, blessing of palm), accompany (e.g., sermon), or follow (e.g.,
Vespers, Benediction) the celebration of Mass. Neither does this
precept oblige one to attend other services on Sunday, although it is
most suitable to do this, also to make internal acts of faith, hope and
charity, and to read pious books and perform works of charity, and it
is sometimes necessary as a natural obligation to attend the sermon or
catechetical instruction (see 914 sqq.).

(b) A whole Mass must be heard, that is, all the ceremonies from the
prayers at the foot of the altar until the blessing at the end, and it
is irreverent to leave church without necessity before the priest has
left the altar. He who can assist at only the essential and integral
parts of the sacrifice (i.e., from the Consecration to the Communion),
is obliged to so much; but he who arrives after the Consecration and
cannot hear another Mass is not obliged according to one opinion to
remain for the present Mass, since the Consecration, the essential
part, is already past.

(c) The same Mass must be heard, and hence one cannot satisfy the
obligation by hearing the first half of one Mass being said on one
altar and the second half of another Mass being said simultaneously on
another altar (see Denzinger, n. 1203), nor by hearing the Consecration
in one Mass and the Communion in a previous or subsequent Mass, thus
dividing the sacrifice. But if one may have heard from the Consecration
to the end in one Mass, one may hear the omitted pre-Consecration
parts, it seems, in another Mass that follows, and one should do this
if possible.

2577. How Mass Must Be Heard.--In reference to the person who hears
Mass, the positive part of the precept calls for external assistance
and internal devotion.

(a) Thus, the external or bodily assistance must be such that one can
be said to take part in the divine worship. This happens when one is
physically present, that is, when one is in the same building or place
as the celebrant and can either see or hear him, or is morally present,
that is, not in the same building but able to see or hear him naturally
(e.g., by looking from the window of a neighboring house), or is unable
to see or hear him but joined with the congregation (e.g., those who
are outside the closed doors of the church but who can follow the bells
and choir to some extent, those who are inside with the congregation
but behind a pillar that shuts off the view). In a field Mass
amplifiers can carry the voice far out to the edge of a vast crowd. But
there does not seem to be a sufficient moral presence when Mass is
"seen" by television or "heard" over the radio, since in these cases
one is not present to the consecrated species or united to the
worshippers.

(b) Internal or mental assistance requires the actual or virtual
intention of the will to perform what the Church requires (see 2165),
and the attention of the mind, external according to some, internal
according to others (see 2166 sqq.). Thus, he who goes to church merely
to hear the music or look at the pictures does not hear Mass for lack
of intention; he who sleeps soundly all through the service does not
hear Mass for lack of attention. One who knows what is going on before
him, but whose thoughts are not on any religious matter, complies with
the precept of the Church according to some, but he sins by irreverence
and voluntary distraction. It suffices during Mass to think either on
the Mass itself (which is the best attention), or to think on other
pious subjects (e.g., to make an examination of conscience, to say the
Rosary). Certain actions (e.g., those that are related to the Mass,
such as ringing the bell, taking up the collection, playing the organ)
do not exclude external attention, but others certainly exclude it
(e.g., writing a letter), and others are doubtful (e.g., going to
Confession).

2578. Time and Place of Mass.--In reference to circumstances, the
precept requires that Mass be heard at the proper place and the proper
time.

(a) Place.--The precept may be complied with by attending Mass in any
Catholic rite (Latin, Greek, etc.), and it makes no difference whether
Mass is celebrated in the open air, in a church, or in a public or
semi-public oratory (Canon 1249). But private chapels are for the
benefit of the grantee alone.

(b) Time.--The precept must be complied with on the feast itself, that
is, during the period of twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight.
Sunday Mass cannot be anticipated on Saturday or put off till Monday.
Likewise servile works are unlawful from midnight to midnight.

2579. Servile Works.--The prohibitory part of the precept is concerned
with servile works, that is, labor of a kind that tends to make one
unfit for devotion or that shows disrespect for the sacredness of the
day, even though the labor be done gratis, or for recreation, or out of
devotion. Hence, the law forbids:

(a) works given to the service of the devil, that is, sins that deprive
one of holiness, such as riotous recreations, gambling, drunkenness,
reading improper matter, and attendance at evil movie performances. But
these works are opposed to the end, not to the text, of the law; and
hence the circumstance of time aggravates their malice but does not
give them a new species (see 2314);

(b) works given to the service of the body (servile works properly so
called) or to the service of external goods (forensic and commercial
works). Servile works in the strict sense cause bodily fatigue and are
taken up with material things, and hence they distract the mind from
religious thoughts. Such are manual labors (e.g., plowing, digging,
housecleaning) and mechanical or industrial labors (e.g., printing,
building, plastering, shoemaking). Forensic and commercial labors
(e.g., arguing in court, auctioneering) are also of a very worldly kind
and unsuitable for the quiet and recollection of Sundays and holydays.

2580. The prohibitory part of the Sunday precept does not affect works
which are no impediment to devotion and which cast no dishonor on the
day. Such are:

(a) works devoted immediately to the service of God. The purpose of the
law is to allow leisure for these works, and hence manifestly their
performance is not forbidden. Such works are saying Mass, preaching,
administering the Sacraments, singing in church, and visiting the poor
and sick (John, vii. 23; Matt., xii. 5). But works that are only
remotely related to divine worship (e.g., cleaning the church, painting
the altar, repairing the vestments, decorating the shrines) should not
be done on Sunday without necessity;

(b) works devoted to the service of the mind (liberal works). These
works are of a more elevated kind, do not require great bodily
exertion, and are not looked upon as unsuitable to the Sabbath. Such
are intellectual works (e.g., teaching, reading, writing, studying),
artistic works (e.g., playing the organ, singing, drawing, painting a
picture, embroidering), and works of recreation (moderate sports or
diversions such as baseball, tennis, and chess).

2581. Other Kinds of Works and Sunday Observance.--(a) Common works are
those that stand between the liberal and the servile, since they are
exercised equally by mind and body, such as walking, riding, hunting,
and fishing that is not very laborious. These are lawful.

(b) Doubtful works are those that are now non-servile, now servile,
according to the manner in which they are conducted, such as the work
of painters, sculptors, typists, seamstresses, and photographers. Thus,
it is a liberal work to paint a portrait, a servile work to paint the
walls of a house. In settling the character of various kinds of work,
one must be guided by the prudent opinion of one's locality, and in
case of doubt and need must seek a dispensation. (For a history of the
theology of servile works see Franz X. Pettirsch, S.J., "A Theology of
Sunday Rest," _Theology Digest_, Vol. VI, no. 2, Spring 1958, pp. 114
ff.; for a survey of modern studies on the problem see _Proceedings of
the Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1957).

2582. Is it lawful without necessity to hire the servile work of
non-Catholics on Sunday, if these persons are not thereby impeded from
the natural duty of worshipping God and no scandal is given? (a) If the
non-Catholics are infidels and not bound by church laws, this is
lawful. The same would be true of those who lack the use of reason (see
427 sqq.). (b) If the non-Catholics are heretics, it is not lawful in
the case given to make them work on Sunday.

2583. Obligation of First Precept.--The first precept of the Church
obliges under pain of grave sin, because it determines a necessary act
of religion (2148), and experience shows that where the Sabbath is
neglected the social, spiritual and physical interests of man are
seriously harmed (see Denzinger, n. 1202). There is always hope for
Catholics who attend Mass, whereas those who miss Mass soon become
Catholics only in name. But since neglect of worship may be only
slightly disrespectful, and since the end of the precept may be
substantially obtained without complete fulfillment, a transgression
may be only venial by reason of lightness of matter.

(a) Preceptive Part.--Grave matter is a part of the Mass that is
notable on account of dignity (i.e., the essential and integral parts
of the Mass, for example, the Consecration and Communion), or on
account of its duration (i.e., a third of the whole Mass, e.g., from
the beginning to the Offertory inclusively, from the beginning to the
Gospel and from the Communion to the end, from the Preface to the
Consecration, from the Consecration to the Agnus Dei, etc.). Hence, he
who is culpably absent or asleep during a notable part of the Mass sins
gravely, but he who is absent or asleep during an inconsiderable part
of the Mass (e.g., one who arrives just at the Offertory or who leaves
after the Communion) sins venially, unless he is so disposed that he
does not care how much he misses.

(b) Prohibitive Part.--Grave matter is labor that is notable on account
of its quality (e.g., forensic proceedings even for a brief space on
Sunday would be a serious distraction and scandal), or its quantity
(e.g., two and a half hours given to very exhausting manual work, such
as digging a ditch, three hours given to less arduous labor, such as
sowing). He who commands ten laborers to work an hour each on Sunday
coöperates in ten venial sins (see 219), but he may be guilty of mortal
sin on account of scandal.

2584. Excuses from Observance of First Precept.--These reasons may be
reduced to two classes, namely, external reasons (i.e., a dispensation
or a lawful custom) and internal reasons (i.e., one's own inability or
necessity).

(a) External Reasons.--Dispensations may be given under certain
conditions by local Ordinaries, by parish-priests, and by superiors of
exempt clerical institutes (Canon 1245). Custom in certain places
excuses from Mass for a month women who have just given birth to a
child or who have lost their husband by death, and also--from the Mass
in which their banns are to be proclaimed--those women who are about to
marry. Custom further permits necessary labors, such as cooking,
ordinary housecleaning, barbering, the work of railroad and garage men,
etc.

(b) Internal Reasons.--Impossibility or serious inconvenience excuses
from hearing Mass (e.g., those who have to walk an hour's journey to
church or ride a two hours' journey, regarding which, in terms of
distance travelled, it has been suggested that the figures should be
more than three miles each way if one must walk, more than thirty miles
if a car is available and the roads are good; those who will suffer
great detriment to health, honor, fortune, etc., if they go; those who
are kept away by duties of charity or employment or office that cannot
be omitted). Necessity or duty to others permits one to work on Sunday
at least to some extent (e.g., those who must labor on a Sunday in
order to live, or to keep out of serious trouble, or to perform
services or works of charity that cannot easily be done at another
time). To avoid self-deception the faithful should consult their pastor
or other prudent person if there is doubt about the sufficiency of the
excuse.

2585. Though the Church does not impose excessive Sabbatarianism,
neither does she admit laxity in the important matter of the Lord's Day.

(a) Hence, not every reason excuses from the church precept. Thus,
those are guilty who unnecessarily place themselves in the
impossibility of observing the law (e.g., by moving to a place where
there is no church, by taking a position that requires work all Sunday
morning, by starting on a vacation or auto trip to a churchless
region), or whose excuses are frivolous (e.g., those who stay away from
Mass because they dislike the priest, or who work on Sunday merely to
keep busy).

(b) Reasons that excuse from part of the ecclesiastical precept do not
excuse from all of it. Thus, those who are unable to hear Mass are not
thereby justified in doing servile work, those who can hear the
essential part of Mass (Consecration and Communion), but not the other
parts, should hear the essential part; those who can hear Mass only on
one Sunday a year are not excused on that Sunday.

(c) Reasons that excuse from the ecclesiastical precept do not excuse
from the divine precept (see 2575) of worshipping God. Hence, those who
are really obliged to work every Sunday should sanctify the Lord's Day
by whatever private prayer or devotion they can substitute. Some
authors very rightly believe that those who can never go to Mass on
Sunday are held by divine law to hear Mass on weekdays three or four
times a year at least, when this is possible (see 2148, 2180).

2586. The Second Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that on
all Fridays of the year and certain other specified days (unless they
fall on a holyday outside of Lent) every baptized person who has
completed the age of seven and has attained the use of reason shall
abstain from eating flesh meat and from drinking the broth or soup made
from flesh meat (Canons 1250-1254).

(a) Under the name flesh are included all land and warm-blooded animals
(i.e., mammals and birds). The law does not include aquatic animals
(i.e., fishes, clams, oysters and other shellfish, lobsters, shrimps,
crabs and other crustaceans), nor cold-blooded animals (i.e., reptiles,
snails and amphibians, such as frogs, tortoises). Some authors include
under aquatic animals otters, beavers, seals, walruses, loons, and
coots, though generally the birds are regarded as flesh. In doubt
whether a food is fish or flesh, it may be judged to be fish, for in
doubts laws are to be interpreted benignly.

(b) Under the name meat are included all the parts of an animal (i.e.,
its flesh, blood, marrow, brains, lard, meat extracts, mince-pie,
pepsin) but not its fruit (e.g., eggs, milk, and things made from milk,
such as butter, cheese).

(c) Under the name broth is included any liquid made from the juice of
meat, such as beef tea, chicken broth, mutton soup, gravy, etc. But the
law does not forbid condiments made from animal fats (e.g., margarin).

2587. Obligation of the Second Precept of the Church.--(a) Origin of
the Obligation.--In substance this precept is of the natural law, but
in details (time, manner, etc.) it is of ecclesiastical law (2468 b)
and has come down from customs that began in the first ages of
Christianity. The church regulation on abstinence is most wise and
moderate: the foods forbidden are those whose deprivation is a
mortification to most persons, and at the same time a great benefit to
spiritual and bodily health; the times appointed are few but
appropriate (viz., days of sorrow, special prayer, penance,
preparation, such as Fridays, Ember Days, Lent, vigils), and they are
so distributed as to sanctify by mortification each week and each
season of the year. True, no food is evil in itself (Matt., xv. 11; I
Cor., viii, 8; I Tim., iv. 3; Col., ii. 16), but just as the physician
can forbid certain foods to his patient for the sake of temporal good,
so for the sake of spiritual good God forbade to Adam the fruit of one
tree and to the Jews the flesh of certain animals; and the Church from
the days of the Apostles (Acts, xv. 29) has exercised the same right.

(b) Gravity of the Obligation.--The abstinence required by the Second
Precept is a grave duty, because the Church makes it the necessary act
of the necessary virtue of abstemiousness and a serious duty of
obedience. But not every transgression is a serious injury to the
spirit of this law, and hence some sins against it are venial. Grave
matter is such a quantity of forbidden food as gives considerable
nourishment, and hence for practical purposes the rule may be given
that flesh meat which weighs two ounces (or, according to others, what
would be the size of a walnut or of a small hen's egg) is grave matter.
Some hold for a more liberal interpretation when the food is not
strictly flesh meat, and believe that liquid from meat is not grave
matter at any time, or at least when it weighs less than four ounces.
Vegetables cooked or seasoned with meat or meat juice are also
considered light matter. He who eats meat twice on a Friday or other
abstinence day commits two sins, just as he who works twice on a Sunday
or holyday commits two sins. It is commonly held that many venial sins
against abstinence committed on the same day coalesce to form grave
matter, but on account of the separation between the eatings a larger
amount is necessary for grave matter.

(c) Exceptions to the Obligation.--Those are not bound to observe a day
of abstinence who have been exempted by indult (Canon 1253), who have
been dispensed by the Ordinary, pastor or superior (Canon 1245), or who
are excused on account of real impossibility (e.g., the poor, the sick,
those obliged to perform very hard work, those who are morally forced
to eat meat but not as a sign of contempt of the law). Persons
dispensed from abstinence may not eat meat oftener than once a day on
fast days, unless they have a special grant. The faithful should be
guided by the Lenten regulations of their dioceses, and in doubt they
should consult their pastors.

2588. The Obligation of Fasting.--The Second Precept also commands that
on the weekdays of Lent and certain other specified days (holydays
outside Lent excepted) every baptized person between the ages of
twenty-one years completed and sixty years begun shall eat not more
than one full meal a day (Canon 1251).

(a) The law speaks of eating, that is, of solid food, and hence the
Lenten and other similar fasts are not broken by liquids which are
beverages rather than foods, or which are used to allay thirst, or
carry food or assist digestion, and not chiefly to nourish (e.g.,
water, teas, coffee, light cocoa, wine, beer, lemonade, fruit juice).
Likewise, sirups taken as medicines are not considered foods, even
though they contain nourishment, unless one drinks a large quantity for
its food content. Light ices may be considered drink, but ice-cream is
food. On the contrary, liquids that are chiefly nourishing are regarded
as food (e.g., soup, oil, honey). Finally, some liquors vary between
food and drink, according to their richness or weakness, their great or
small quantity. Thus, hot chocolate as made in the United States
contains only a small amount of solid and may be considered as a drink,
but as made in Europe it is stronger and rather food than drink.

(b) The law admits as an indulgence on fast days, in addition to the
one meal, a small breakfast in the morning and a light collation to be
taken either around noon (lunch) or in the evening (supper). The
quality and quantity of these two repasts are left to local custom. The
Uniform Norm for Fast and Abstinence in the United States adopted by
the Hierarchy, Nov. 14, 1951, establishes the following norm for these
two meatless meals. They are to be "sufficient to maintain strength,
may be taken according to each one's needs; but together they should
not equal another full meal." This norm, called the relative standard,
was adopted by many Bishops of the United States, beginning with Lent
of 1952. Thus, the amount of food is dependent to some degree on a
person's own needs and appetite. The relative standard is distinguished
from the absolute norm which allows about two ounces for the morning
collation and eight ounces for the evening.

(c) The law permits one to eat but once in the day (exception being
made for breakfast and collation), but it places no limits as to the
quality of the food at the principal meal (unless the day be also a day
of abstinence, when meat is forbidden), or as to its quantity, though
temperance bids one to eat at all times in moderation. On fast days,
therefore, one may not eat between meals, nor so divide or prolong the
dinner that it really becomes several meals. A notable interruption
(two or three hours) made without good reason divides a dinner into two
meals, and over two hours of uninterrupted eating, under ordinary
circumstances, seems to be more than the one full meal which the law
allows.

2589. The Obligation of the Precept of Fasting.--(a) Origin.--The
natural law commands fasting in general, since without some kind of
austerity above common temperance certain desirable ends (such as
atonement for past transgressions, conquest of unruly passions, and
elevation of the soul) cannot be attained; and as these ends are
necessary it is also necessary to use the means as far as one needs
them. The particularization of this natural law has been made by the
positive law of the Church, and with such wisdom as to promote the good
of both soul and body. The times appointed are most appropriate (e.g.,
the season when the Passion is commemorated, Luke, v. 35); the duration
of the long fast is modelled on that of Christ (Matt., iv. 1); the
curtailment of food required is not only beneficial (as an exercise of
self-control and a rest and change to the metabolism), but is moderate,
since it permits sufficient food for the day, and even in the fast of
Lent the Sundays occur to give a respite.

(b) Gravity.--The precept of fasting is grave, both from the purpose of
the law (see 2469), and from the express declaration of the lawgiver
(Denzinger, n. 1123). But the spirit of the precept is not notably
deviated from by every transgression, and hence even in reference to
matter there are minor or venial violations; and moreover the precept
is probably (unlike that of abstinence) an indivisible one, since it
consists in the limitation to one meal, and hence it cannot be violated
more than once a day. Grave matter, when the absolute norm is used,
seems to be about four ounces added to the collations or taken between
meals, either all at once or at different times during the day
(Denzinger, n.1129), But if the relative norm is used, a greater
quantity is needed to establish grave matter, e.g., one fourth of a
full meal. But he who has broken his fast (e.g., by a second full meal)
does not break it again by a third or fourth full meal on the same day,
for after the second full meal the fast has become impossible for that
day. He who accidentally takes too much at breakfast can still keep the
fast by proportionately diminishing his evening repast.

(c) Exceptions.--Physical or moral impossibility excuses from the fast,
and gives the right to eat meat as often as moderation allows on days
that are not meatless days. The chief persons who labor under
impossibility are those who are too weak to fast (e.g., the sick, the
convalescent, pregnant and nursing mothers, the nervous), those who are
too poor to get one square meal a day (e.g., street beggars who have
nothing may eat as often as they are given an alms, if it does not buy
them a dinner), and those who cannot do their necessary or customary
hard work if they fast. Hard work is such as is exercised for many
hours continuously, or for a less time if it is very intense, and which
is greatly fatiguing to the mind (e.g., daily teaching, lecturing,
studying, hearing confessions, preaching, etc.) or to the body (e.g.,
heavy manual labor, the difficult jobs in offices or stores, work that
requires one to be on one's feet for hours at a time, necessary
journeys made under hardship). The confessor or physician can decide
about cases of impossibility that are not manifest, but dispensation
should be had from the pastor (Canon 1245). Those who are dispensed
from the ecclesiastical fast or abstinence should remember that they
are not dispensed from the natural law of temperance, and they should
practise some abstemiousness according to their ability (e.g., by
self-denial in alcoholic beverages, tobacco, sweets, etc., or
mortification in the quantity or quality of food).

2590. The Third Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that all
the faithful, male and female, who have reached the age of discretion
go to confession at least once a year (Canon 906).

(a) The subject of this precept is every baptized person who has
entered the Church through valid Baptism and who has the use of reason,
which begins usually at the age of seven. Infants are incapable of
committing sin, and the unbaptized are incapable of receiving the
Sacrament of Penance.

(b) The matter of the precept is a good sacramental confession of the
grave sins not yet confessed, made with the purpose of obtaining
absolution to any duly authorized priest. Hence, those who have only
venial sins on their conscience are not bound according to the common
opinion by this precept, and, on the other hand, those who make a
sacrilegious or voluntarily null confession do not fulfill the law
(Denzinger, n. 1114; Code, Canon 907). It seems that one who, after a
confession of venial sins at Easter, falls into grave sin is not bound
from this precept to confess again before the end of the year.

(c) The time for fulfillment of the precept is once during the year.
The law leaves one free to confess on any day during the twelvemonth,
and to count the year either civilly (i.e., from January 1 to December
31), or ecclesiastically (e.g., from Easter time to Easter time, as is
commonly done), or from the date of the last confession. The limit is
set, however, not to terminate but to insist upon obligation, and hence
it seems that he who has not made his 1957 confession must make it as
soon as possible in 1958, but the 1957 confession made in 1958 will
satisfy for the 1958 obligation also (see 468 sqq.).

2591. The Obligation of the Third Precept.--(a) Origin.--From divine
law sacramental confession is necessary for all who have fallen into
serious sin after Baptism, since Christ has given His Church the keys
of heaven and appointed His bishops and priests the physicians and
judges to cure and pardon (Matt., xviii. 18; John, xx. 23). But Our
Lord did not fix the frequency of confession, and it is this which the
present precept determines. The law of annual confession goes back to
the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).

(b) Gravity.--The precept of annual confession obliges under pain of
mortal sin, for its purpose is of vital importance and the Church has
always regarded it as a grave obligation. The purpose of the law is to
ensure the use of the Sacrament instituted by Christ for forgiveness
and to keep sinners from delaying their repentance too long. If a good
business man takes stock of his assets and liabilities at least once a
year, and those who are careful of their health have medical attention
or examination at least yearly, it is most reasonable that the faithful
should settle their spiritual accounts and attend to the well-being of
their souls within an equal period of time. In the early centuries when
fervor was greater and conditions different, no general church law on
the frequency of confession was needed; but there is no doubt that the
Lateran Decree met well the need that began after the change from the
early penitential discipline, The penalties for violation of this
precept were excommunication and exclusion from ecclesiastical burial,
and, though they are not enforced today, they show the intention of the
Church to impose a grave duty.

2592. The Fourth Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that all
the faithful, male and female, who have attained the use of reason, go
to Holy Communion at least once a year, and that during Easter time
(Canon 859).

(a) The subjects of this precept are the same as those of the previous
precept, and consequently children of seven years or thereabout, who
are able to understand, must make the Easter duty.

(b) The matter of the precept is a worthy Communion (Viaticum or
ordinary Communion) received in any parish, but preferably in one's own
parish. Persons living in community (e.g., religious, soldiers, college
boarders) may make the Easter duty in their own chapels, strangers and
vagi in any church or chapel, and priests in the place where they say
Mass.

(c) The time of the precept is the Paschal Season (i.e., from Palm
Sunday to Low Sunday, but in the United States, by privilege, from the
First Sunday of Lent to Trinity Sunday). The Easter time may be
prolonged for an individual by his pastor or confessor for a just
reason. The year within which the Easter duty is to be made begins, it
seems, with the opening of one Paschal Season and ends with the opening
of the Paschal Season of the following calendar year. Since the law
requires that the Easter duty be made, not only within the Paschal
Season, but also once a year, it follows that he who neglects Communion
during the Easter period is still bound by the law to go to Communion
before the opening of the next Paschal Season, but probably he is not
bound to go at the first opportunity. As a rule, we believe those who
do not make their Easter duty during a year are guilty of but one sin,
since they do not think of distinct violations.

2593. The Obligation of the Fourth Precept.--(a) Origin.--There is a
divine precept of receiving Communion some time during life, since Our
Lord willed the Eucharist to be the necessary nourishment of the soul's
journey (John, vi. 54) and the perpetual memorial of Himself (I Cor.,
xi. 24). The Church in the present precept has prescribed both the
frequency and the time for complying with the will of Christ. Since the
Eucharist is a daily bread, the law does not permit it to be abstained
from by anyone beyond a year; and, since the Paschal Season brings the
anniversary of Christ's sacrifice and of the institution of the Blessed
Sacrament, it is the time most fitly chosen for the obligatory
Communion.

(b) Gravity.--The precept obliges under pain of grave sin, for it
determines a law given by Our Lord Himself and regulates the minimum in
the use of the Eucharist, the greatest of the Sacraments and the end of
all the others. The doctrine of theologians is that it is a grave sin
to delay culpably the Easter Communion for even a day beyond the
Paschal Season as prescribed.

2594. The Fifth and Sixth Precepts of the Church.--The Fifth Precept
commands the proper maintenance of the clergy by the laity. The manner
of giving the support is left to the special statutes and customs of
each country (Canons 1496, 1502). This ecclesiastical law is but a
determination of the natural law of justice and religion, and also of
the divine law; for even in the Old Testament the Levites were
supported by the people. The duty is, therefore, grave (see 2185 sqq.).
Respect and obedience in spiritual matters are owed the clergy, and it
is sinful to usurp their functions (see 2351, 2355 sqq., and Canons
119, 683, 1931, 166).

The Sixth Precept commands the proper solemnization of marriage and
prohibits the solemn blessing of marriages at stated times. Canon 1108,
§2 specifies these times as "from the first Sunday of Advent until the
day of the Nativity of Our Lord inclusive, and from Ash Wednesday until
Easter Sunday inclusive." It is to be noted that the forbidden time
excludes only the solemn blessing, and even this may be permitted by
the Ordinary for just cause, subject to liturgical laws (Canon 1108,
§3).

2595. Two Other Important General Laws of the Church.--(a) The
prohibition of wicked and dangerous writings (Canons 1384 sqq.) is
based on the natural law, which requires one to avoid what is
proximately dangerous to faith or morals. This subject is treated above
in 1456, 849 sqq., 1529.

(b) The prohibition of the cremation of corpses (Canon 1203) is not
based on natural law or on any dogma, as though the burning of dead
bodies were intrinsically evil or repugnant to our faith in immortality
and resurrection. On the contrary, in exceptional cases (e.g., in time
of war or epidemic) cremation is permitted, if a real public necessity
requires it. The reasons for the anti-cremation law are: the tradition
of the Old and New Testaments (Gen., iii, 19; I Cor., xv. 42), and
especially the example of Christ whose body was consigned to the tomb;
the association of burial throughout the history of the Church with
sacred rites and the doctrine of the future life, and the contrary
association of cremation both in times past and today with paganism and
despair; the sacred dignity of the human body (Gen., i. 25; I Cor.,
iii. 16, vi. 5), and the feeling of affection for parents, relatives,
friends, which is outraged when their bodies are consigned to the
furnace. The practical arguments offered for cremation are chiefly
hygienic and economic; but it is certain that proper burial at sea or
in the grave is no menace to public health, and is not more expensive
or difficult than cremation. A most serious objection to cremation is
that it makes exhumation impossible, and is therefore a means of
concealing murder by poison. It is not lawful for a Catholic to
coöperate (except materially in case of necessity) with cremation, or
to belong to any society that promotes the incineration of corpses; it
is not lawful for a priest to give the last Sacraments or funeral rites
to those who ordered the cremation of their bodies.

2596. The Special Duties of Clerics.--From the duties of Catholics in
general we pass now to the special duties of clerics; for the clergy,
on account of their position as the salt of the earth and the light of
the world (Matt., v. 16), are bound to a greater internal and external
holiness and edification than the laity. The word "cleric" is
understood in a wide or in a strict sense. In the wide sense, a cleric
is any Christian specially set apart for the service of God, whether by
ordination or religious profession (e.g., lay brothers, nuns); in the
strict sense, a cleric (clergyman) is one who has been admitted to
Orders, or at least to their preparation through tonsure (Canon 108).

(a) Duties Before Entering the Clerical State.--The person who would
enter the clerical state must have a vocation and a right intention. As
to the latter, since the clerical state has for its ends the glory of
God and the salvation of souls, it would be a serious sin to choose it
principally for temporal ends, such as wealth, dignity or pleasure; but
it is not a sin to desire secondarily and moderately the necessary
support of the clerical state (I Cor., ix, 3).

(b) Duties After Entering the Clerical State.--The privileges of
clerics are treated in canonical works. Here we speak only of duties.
The obligations of a cleric are of two kinds--the positive, such as
celibacy, and the negative, such as the avoidance of unbecoming
amusements or occupations.

2597. Vocation to the Clerical State.--(a) Internal Vocation.--No one
should enter the religious or clerical state unless called thereto by
God (John, xv. 16; Acts, xiii. 2; Heb., v. 4, 5; I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.).
The foundation of the entire religious, priestly and apostolic life,
namely divine vocation, consists of two essential elements, the one
divine, the other ecclesiastical. As to the first element, God's call
to embrace the priestly or religious life must be considered so
necessary that in its absence the foundation upon which the whole
structure is to rest is absent (Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_). The
signs of a divine call do not necessarily or even ordinarily include a
feeling of inspiration or invitation from the Holy Spirit, but it
suffices that one may have a liking, a right intention, and fitness
(physical, mental, moral) for the life; for, where God gives a call, He
gives the means to fulfill the duties. Thus, those who will not be able
to say Mass, or who cannot master Latin or theology, or who cannot
observe celibacy, or who are vicious (e.g., mischief-makers, drunkards)
or unspiritual (e.g., the lazy, those who dislike exercises of piety),
do not show the signs of a priestly vocation.

(b) External Vocation.--No one should be admitted to the religious life
or to Orders unless he has given sufficient signs of a call from God.
Thus, a Bishop would sin most gravely and be a sharer in the sins of
others if he conferred Major Orders on anyone about whose unworthiness
he was morally certain on positive grounds (Canon 973); nor may a
Religious Superior receive to profession any novice about whom he is
doubtful (Canon 571). Scarcity of vocations is no excuse for laxity,
since it is better to have a few creditable clerics than a multitude of
unworthy ones (Benedict XIV). What St. Paul said of deacons ("Let these
first be proved, and so let them minister, having no crime," I Tim.,
iii. 10), is therefore to be applied to all candidates for the clerical
life. A vocation is tested by the years of probation which the church
law provides for seminarians, novices and other aspirants to the
ecclesiastical state. No cleric has a right to ordination before he
receives the free call from a bishop, but on the other hand it is
criminal to prevent a suitable candidate from embracing the clerical
state (Canon 971). "By a divine vocation to the religious and clerical
state a person undertakes publicly to lead a life of holiness in the
Church, a visible and hierarchical society, and to exercise this
hierarchical ministry. Such a person, therefore, ought to be
authoritatively tested, approved and directed by the hierarchical
rulers to whom God has entrusted the administration of the Church"
(Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_).

2598. Sinfulness of Disregarding Vocation.--(a) He who enters the
clerical state, not knowing that he has a vocation, is guilty of sin,
as is clear from the previous paragraph. According to some, anyone who
receives Major Orders, even with serious doubt about his vocation,
commits a mortal sin, since he inflicts a serious injury on the rights
of God, the Church, himself and his neighbor. According to others, the
sin is only venial when one enters the clerical state conscious of the
absence of vocation, but determined with the help of God to live up to
all the duties; for, though the act is rash, there is good will and
good intention, and grace will not be wanting.

(b) He who refuses to enter the clerical state, though knowing for
certain that he has a vocation, is also guilty of sin, for only
negligence or improper motives such as laziness, sensuality, or too
great love of liberty can produce such reluctance. The sin is grave or
light according to the circumstances. There is grave sin, if the
resistance to the call constitutes serious disobedience, pride or
uncharitableness (e.g., if there were a great scarcity of priests and
the bishop commanded a worthy layman to take Orders); there is venial
sin in other cases when the rejection is only dissent to an invitation
and exposes neither self nor other to grave peril of losing salvation.
Finally, if the signs of vocation do not produce certainty, there may
be no sin at all, but rather virtue, in refusal to ascend to the
clerical state, for no one is bound to take up grave obligations when
uncertain of his duties, and many holy persons from humility or fear of
unworthiness have decided, against the advice or invitation of others,
not to become clerics.

2599. The Positive Duties of Clerics.--(a) Duties to God.--All clerics
are held to frequent reception of the Sacrament of Penance, to daily
devotions (i.e., mental prayer, visit to the Blessed Sacrament, a third
part of the Rosary, examen), and to triennial spiritual retreats
(Canons 125, 126). Moreover, clerics in Sacred Orders, benefice
holders, and solemnly professed religious bound to the choir are
obliged to the daily recitation of the Canonical Hours, each one
according to his own rite and calendar (Canons 135, 213 sqq., 1475,
610). This obligation is grave, because its purpose is the important
one of consecrating each hour of the day by the public prayer of the
Church according to the usage that goes back to the earliest centuries.
But the choral obligation of simply professed religious is light,
unless the choir is impossible without their presence.

(b) Duties to Superiors.--Clerics are especially obliged to show
respect to their Ordinaries and to give them the obedience promised in
ordination (Canon 127).

(c) Duties to the Clerical State.--Clerics are required to cultivate
their minds by sacred and sound studies, and to this end examinations
and conferences are also prescribed (Canons 129-131); to keep
themselves pure in soul and body by the observance of celibate chastity
(Canons 132, 133); to conduct themselves in externals (dwelling, dress,
etc.) in a manner befitting their position (Canons 134, 136). The
clerical garb in this country is the cassock or habit in the house and
church, and dark clothes and the Roman collar, or other distinctive
sign for priests and brothers elsewhere. The dress of the clergy should
avoid the extremes of dudishness and slovenliness (Second Council of
Baltimore, 148; Third Council, 77). The duty of wearing clerical dress
at least away from home and regularly is of serious importance, since
its purpose is the honor of the clerical state and the protection of
its members. It is also forbidden to clerics to cultivate their hair
(e.g., to grow long locks, to use curling irons, to oil or perfume
their head in dandyish fashion), since this is unbecoming in the
followers of a thorn-crowned Leader. The use of the beard is a thing
indifferent in itself, and hence it is forbidden in some places
(generally in the Latin Church) and required in others (as in the
Orient), according to tradition and local usage.

2600. The Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) Matter.--A cleric is
gravely obliged to recite the Office according to his own rite and in
the language of his rite, and not to make any notable change in the
Office prescribed by the Ordo, either as to quantity (e.g., by omission
of a Little Hour or of parts equally long) or as to quality (e.g., by
substitution of a minor office for that of one of the great
solemnities.) The omission of the Vespers of Holy Saturday, of
Pretiosa, or of the Rogation Litanies seems to be only a venial sin,
because in the first two cases the prayer is short, while in the third
case the precept seems to be _sub levi_. There is also lightness of
matter in the omission of an inconsiderable part of the day's Office,
or in the substitution without good reason of an equal part for a
prescribed part.

(b) Manner.--Since the Office is a prayer, of a public and daily kind,
it must be said: mentally, that is, there must be at least virtual
intention (which is present from the fact that one takes up the
Breviary to fulfill the obligation) and at least external attention
(see 2166 sqq.); vocally, that is, the words must be consciously formed
by the lips, mouth, or tongue, but it is not necessary that they be
audible, unless two or more are saying the Office together; within the
limits of the day, that is, Matins and Lauds may be anticipated from 2
p.m. of the previous day, but the whole Office must be finished before
midnight of the current day. These are substantial requisites and bind
_sub gravi_, but there may be only venial sin when they are deviated
from inconsiderably. Next, since the Office has a continuity of
thought, an order of precedence among its hours and their subdivisions,
and a special dignity, it must be said uninterruptedly (i.e., without
break between the parts of an hour), in order (i.e., according to the
succession of Matins, Lauds, Prime, etc.), with external respect as to
place and posture (i.e., he who is bound to choral Office should say it
in choir and with the rubrical postures, while he who is bound only to
private Office should say it in church or some other becoming place,
and should observe the rubrical or at least a respectful posture).
These are accidental requisites and bind _sub levi_. For a good reason
one may interrupt the Office even for a notable part of the day (e.g.,
one may discontinue in the midst of a Psalm to pay a duty of politeness
or to attend to business), and for convenience one may invert the order
of hours or of parts of hours, or may say the evening hours in the
morning.

2601. Excuses from the Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) For
Substitution.--A sufficient reason makes it permissible to substitute
another office not notably different in quantity or quality, as when
one lacks a new office, or has greater devotion for another office.
When substitution has been made unintentionally, the following rules
may be observed, though the last two are not admitted by all: office
counts for office, (e.g., he who through mistake has said the office of
another day may let that office stand for today's office, but should
add enough to make up for any notable shortness in the office said);
hour does not count for hour (e.g., he who through mistake said Tierce
twice cannot count the second Tierce for Sext); an error should be
corrected when noticed (e.g., he who notices at Sext that he is not
saying the right office should change from Sext); an error is not
corrected by another error (e.g., he who said today's office yesterday
should not say yesterday's office today).

(b) For Omission.--The causes that excuse, in whole or in part, from
recitation of the Office are physical inability (e.g., loss of the
breviary, blindness of one who does not know the hours by heart,
sickness or convalescence which makes the recitation a grave hardship),
moral impossibility (e.g., when an urgent duty of charity or justice so
takes up one's time that one cannot get in all the Office), just
dispensation or commutation given by the Pope or, for temporary
release, by the Ordinary.

2602. The Precept of Clerical Celibacy.--(a) Origin.--This law is not
divine but ecclesiastical, since it arose, not from any command of
Christ, but from a custom of the Church that goes back to the first
centuries. Nevertheless, celibacy of the clergy is an imitation of
Christ and the Apostles, a following of the counsel given by the Lord,
an honor to the sacrifice of the altar, and an example that single
chastity is possible. Moreover, by means of it the priest is freed from
domestic relations and better enabled to minister as the father,
pastor, confessor and counsellor of his people. The celibate is
unencumbered by family responsibilities and expenses, and is therefore
better able to respond to difficult and dangerous tasks, such as
mission work in pagan lands and ministrations to the dying in fire,
wreck, or plague, The Church does not denounce or condemn the married
clergy of non-Catholic bodies; on the contrary, she permits to some
extent a married clergy among the Oriental Catholics, who for many
centuries have been accustomed to a married priesthood. But the law of
celibacy for the Catholic clergy has not only proved itself more
suitable for their work, but it has also justified itself by the
general fidelity with which it has been observed and the attachment to
it of clergy and laity alike.

(b) Obligation.--The law commands chastity as a grave duty of religion
(Canon 132); it forbids the contract or use of marriage (Canon 1072).
It forbids, where there is danger to chastity or scandal, cohabitation
and companionship with women (Canon 133). Cohabitation refers to
dwelling in the same house, even though it be only during the day, and
the woman be a servant; companionship refers to visits, conversations,
signs of friendship, and the like. The danger to good name or virtue
depends on circumstances, such as age, beauty, levity, and privacy of
association; and the law presumes that a relationship is suspicious
unless a woman is a near relative by blood or by marriage (i.e., in the
first or second degree), or is mature in age (about forty years old)
and proved in virtue and of good repute.

2603. Negative Duties of Clerics.--The negative duties of clerics are
the avoidance of certain acts, occupations, or amusements forbidden as
worldly, undignified, dangerous, distracting or scandalous (I Thess.,
v. 22; II Tim., ii. 4).

(a) Forbidden Acts.--A cleric may not go surety without permission,
lest he or his church be involved in scandalous embarrassments (Canon
137); nor engage in trade, lest he be distracted from his spiritual
duties and exposed to the danger or suspicion of injustice or greed
(Canon 142; for penalty attached see Decree of the Sacred Congregation
of the Council, AAS, 42-33D).

(b) Forbidden Occupations.--These include, first, employments and
pursuits unbecoming to clerics (such as those of butcher, actor,
innkeeper); next, those that are incompatible with the ministry (such
as the practice for profit of the medical profession, public
magistracies, government jobs, civil court functions, legislative
offices, Canon 139); finally, those that are contrary to the mildness
that should distinguish clerics (viz, the occupation of fighting man or
soldier, Canon 141; see also Canon 984 on executioners). But exceptions
may be made for a just cause.

(c) Forbidden Amusements.--Clerics should not take part in undignified
diversions or cruel sports, such as the hunting of big game with great
uproar of dogs and guns (Canon 138) or in gambling, and they should not
enter saloons or similar places (Canon 138). Clerics are also forbidden
to assist at unbecoming shows, performances, dances, or at any
theatrical entertainment where their presence gives scandal (Canon
140). To gamble much (say, several times a week and for a considerable
time at each game) is considered a serious matter; but it is not sinful
to indulge in a game of chance now and then, if the stakes are moderate
and there is no scandal.

2604. The Prohibition against Trading.--(a) Meaning.--Trading as here
understood is purely gainful merchandizing (i.e., buying an article at
a lower price in order to sell it unchanged at a higher price) or
industrial merchandizing (i.e., buying an article in order to sell it
at a profit after it has been changed by hired labor). Hence, there is
no canonical trading in commerce which lacks one of the conditions
mentioned, for example, if one buys goods for one's household or
community and, on discovering that a superfluity has been purchased,
sells at a profit what is left over (see 2134, 2135). Trading includes
not only a business conducted personally or for personal profit, but
also one conducted through agents or for the benefit of others, such as
the poor or pious causes.

(b) Obligation.--The violation of this law is grave in itself, but a
serious sin demands on the part of the subject that there be real
trading (i.e., a number of acts morally united and proceeding from a
purpose to continue in lucrative merchandizing), and on the side of the
object that there be a large amount involved. Hence, it would be venial
to engage in lucrative trading with a large profit once, and with a
small profit twice or thrice.

(c) Excuses.--Necessity (e.g., if a cleric needs the money to live or
to maintain his state, or if a business has fallen to him by
inheritance and cannot be given up without loss) justifies trading, if
there is permission.

2605. Is It Lawful for Clerics to Purchase and Sell Stocks and
Bonds?--(a) If this conduct has the character of gambling or trading
for profit, it is forbidden by Canon 138 or 142, as the case may be,
and is gravely or venially sinful according to the circumstances. Thus,
pure speculation or mere betting on the market is a game of chance, and
the frequent purchase of stocks with the thought of quick sales and
huge profits from sudden changes of the market is lucrative trading.

(b) If the gambling or trading element is absent, the conduct in
question is not forbidden by Canon Law. It is generally admitted that
bond investments are permissible, since they are only a loan of one's
money at interest. There are two views about stock dealings: the
stricter view regards them as always containing the character of
forbidden trading (since all the notes of strict negotiation are found
in them), or at least as being a game of chance; the milder view, which
is common, holds that they are no more an affair of chance than many
other business undertakings, and that there is no strict negotiation,
if the stockholder is not a member or director of the corporation,
since the buying and selling is done neither directly nor indirectly by
him. Buying of stocks, then, may be nothing more than a prudent
investment of money in a deserving enterprise with the hope of a
reasonable return, and selling out the stocks at a large profit may be
nothing more than the disposal of superfluous goods which it would be
inconvenient to retain. It must be remembered, though, that it is
unlawful to coöperate with a company whose purpose is evil or suspect,
or to have part in frauds, or to give disedification.

2606. Special Duties of Clerical Superiors from Divine Law.--(a) As
individuals, they should strive to be personally more perfect than
their subjects, for they are supposed to give an example in faith,
religion, zeal, labor, and self-denial, "being made a pattern of the
flock from the heart" (I Peter, v. 3).

(b) As rulers, they must have the virtues of good superiors, such as
legal justice or firm devotion to the common good, distributive justice
or avoidance of partiality and prejudice, prudence or knowledge of how
to direct men and means successfully to the glory of God and the
salvation of souls, and commutative justice or respect for the rights
of subjects.

(c) As pastors, they must avoid the qualities of the wolf and of the
hireling, and cultivate those of the good shepherd, being kind and
amiable to Catholic and non-Catholic, and practising the spiritual and
corporal works of mercy.

2607. Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of
Souls.--(a) Bishops have grave obligations of residing in their see or
diocese (Canon 338), of attending to the instruction of their flock
(Canons 1327, 336), of applying the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 339), of
making a diocesan report (Canon 340), of confirming and of ordaining
worthy candidates (Canon 785), of visiting their dioceses (Canon 343),
of making the _ad limina_ visit (Canons 340, 342), and of calling a
diocesan synod at least every tenth year (Canon 356).

(b) Pastors must reside generally in their parish (Canon 465), and, if
lawfully absent, they must make provision for the sick calls and other
spiritual necessities of their flocks. They must preach the word of God
on Sundays and holydays, and it would be a serious matter to neglect
this duty for a considerable time (e.g., a whole month) without good
reason (Canon 1344). It is also a serious obligation to attend to the
necessary catechetical instruction of young and old (Canons 1330,
1332), to apply the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 466), and to administer
the Sacraments (at least Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction) to those in
grave spiritual need (see 1167). Pastors are also obliged to know their
flock, to visit the sick and dying, to correct abuses, to see that the
customary administration of the Sacraments and the usual church
functions are attended to, to watch over the schooling of the children,
and to direct the temporalities and attend to the reports and records
of the parish. The duties of chaplains of hospitals, institutions,
soldiers, etc., are similar to those of pastors, but in particular
cases the former are subject to special prescriptions or to local usage
or to rules made by the Ordinary.

(c) Assistant pastors are subject in the care of souls to the
instruction and direction of the parish-priest. Their particular duties
are known from the diocesan statutes, the letters of the Ordinary, and
the commission of the pastor. Regularly, they are bound to reside in
the parish rectory and to assist the pastor or supply for him in all
the parish work, the Mass _pro populo_ excepted (Canon 476).

2608. The Duty of Charity to the Poor.--(a) According to Canon Law all
beneficed clergy (Cardinals excepted) must give all the superfluous
fruits of their benefice to charitable or pious causes (Canon 1473).
But it is an extremely strict view which holds that all the secular
clergy are beneficed.

(b) According to the divine law of charity (see 1226, 1252) even the
unbeneficed clergy have the duty of giving alms from their surplus
wealth. Thus, it would be unmerciful if a clergyman spent on himself
all the fortune he had inherited from his relatives without thought of
the poor; it would be often a source of scandal if a priest enriched
his relatives with money received in ministerial ways, but left nothing
to pious causes.

2609. Canon 1473 on the Disposition of Superfluous Wealth by Beneficed
Clergy.--(a) The Money to be Spent.--The Canon does not refer to the
property of the Church (i.e., the foundation or endowment of the
benefice), for of this the beneficed clergyman is only the
administrator, and he would be unjust if he alienated its funds to
other purposes; nor does it refer to the clergyman's own property, such
as goods received by inheritance or other profane title
(_patrimonialia_), or by title of personal ministerial service, such as
stipends and fees (_quasi-patrimonialia_). It refers, then, to the
revenues of the benefice (e.g., the bishop's or pastor's salary) and to
the amount that is left over after the deduction of all reasonable and
customary expenses that have been made, or could have been made for
decent personal support.

(b) The Use of Surplus Money.--The alms should be given to any pious or
charitable cause, such as the promotion of divine worship, the
assistance of needy missions, the spiritual or corporal works of mercy.
The cleric is free to bestow his gift either during his lifetime (which
is better) or to leave it in his will.

2610. The Obligation of Canon 1473.--(a) The obligation is most
probably not one of justice, since the holder of the benefice owns the
superfluous fruits, but one of obedience to the Church. Some authors
also consider this precept as binding in virtue of religion and
charity, and regard its violation as a sacrilege or sin against
charity. The holder of the benefice is not held to restitution,
however, since neglect of the precept is not an injustice. As to his
successors through gift inter vivos or testament, they are not bound to
give the superfluities as an alms, since the church precept was for the
cleric himself. Successors to an intestate should observe the wishes of
the deceased, but, if the character of the goods they inherit is
doubtful, they may usually be left in good faith.

(b) The obligation is grave, since it is commanded as an act of
religion, or at least as an act of obedience in a very important
matter. From the time of the Apostles it was customary to distribute to
the poor what was left over of the goods of the Church, and the clergy
were regarded as the fathers and protectors of the needy. Again, since
the goods of a benefice originated in gifts offered to God Himself, it
is most becoming that their superfluities be devoted to the causes most
pleasing to God. Grave matter would be three times the amount required
in theft, because a violation of this precept is not the taking of what
is not one's own, but the using in a forbidden way of what is one's own.

2611. The Special Duties of Religious.--The particular obligations of
religious are declared in the proper rules of the various institutes,
just as the particular obligations of the secular clergy are set forth
in the statutes of local synods and councils. We shall outline here
only the general obligations of religious, to which they are held by
the common law of the Church.

(a) By reason of his profession, a religious is obliged to strive after
the perfection of charity (see 1560, 367) through the religious life,
that is, by means of the rules and constitutions of his own institute
(Canon 593). All religious, superiors and subjects, are bound to
observe their laws, but _per se_ these laws oblige under penalty, not
under sin (see 570). _Per accidens_, however, the transgression of rule
or constitutions may be sinful, as when the matter belongs also to
divine or church law or to the observance of a vow, or when the
transgression includes contempt, scandal, or demoralization of
discipline.

(b) By reason of the vows, a religious is obliged to follow the three
evangelical counsels (see 2191 sqq.) and any other vows of his
institute according to his rule (e.g., poverty is a renunciation of
even community possession in some rules and of individual possession in
others). The vows oblige _per se_ under grave sin, on account of the
duty of religion (see 2209) and the intention of the religious to bind
himself gravely; but there may be venial sin on account of imperfection
of act or lightness of matter.

2612. The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows.--(a) Poverty is a
renunciation of the independent use of external corporal goods, such as
money and lands and chattels (simple vow), or also of the radical
dominion (see 1697) or right of ownership of such goods (solemn vow).
Grave matter in the unjust violation of poverty seems to be the same as
in other acts of unjust damage or acquisition, and hence in thefts from
outsiders a less amount is grave matter, in domestic thefts from the
monastery a greater sum is required (see 1900, 1903). Grave matter in
the violation of poverty that is not unjust (e.g., in use of money
without permission) seems to be the same as absolutely grave matter for
thefts, unless the constitutions rule otherwise; but grave matter here
does not coalesce from many small violations. The virtue, but not the
vow, of poverty is offended by purely internal acts (e.g., attachment
to wealth), and there is no offense at all in dominion over spirituals
(such as fame, good reputation) which are not renounced by the vow of
poverty, and in certain acts of disposition (e.,g., acceptance of
deposit, distribution of alms) or proprietorship (e.g., of manuscripts)
permitted by rule.

(b) Chastity is a renunciation of all venereal pleasure, internal and
external, lawful and unlawful. Grave matter is the same as for the
virtue of chastity, but the vow could be violated without the violation
of the virtue (e.g., in the use of marriage by one simply professed).
For the protection of this vow the Church has made the law of cloister,
which forbids under certain conditions the entrance of outsiders into a
religious house or the egress of the religious (Canons 547, 598,
600-604, 679, 2342).

(c) Obedience is the renunciation of one's own will with the duty of
submission to commands of a Superior given according to the rules and
constitutions. There is grave matter against the vow if one disobeys in
an important matter imposed by the Superior in the name of obedience
and according to the rite prescribed by the rule or constitutions (see
2364). The virtue, but not the vow, is offended by internal
insubordination (see 2357); neither virtue nor vow is offended when a
Superior commands what is above the rule (e.g., the accomplishment of
the impossible, heroic acts that do not pertain to the nature of the
institute), or against the rule, unless he has power to dispense, or
probably what is beneath the rule (such as things manifestly ridiculous
and useless). Since obedience is vowed to the precepts of the Superior,
the vow is not broken by transgression of points of the rule not
expressly included under the vow, nor by transgressions of the general
precepts of God and the Church.




Art. 2: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY

2613. The Duties of Husbands and Wives.--Conjugal obligations may be
classed under three heads according to the three ends of marriage.

(a) Thus, the first blessing of marriage is offspring, and this imposes
upon parents the obligation of providing for their children and of
training them in mind and will (see 2630 sqq.).

(b) The second blessing of marriage is fidelity to the engagement made
by husband and wife to deliver to each other exclusive power over their
bodies for procreation (conjugal debt) and to love each other with a
special but pure affection: "The wife hath not power of her own body,
but the husband; and in like manner the husband hath not power of his
own body but the wife" (I Cor., vii. 4); "Husbands, love your wives as
Christ also loved the Church" (Eph., v. 25). Conjugal love admits no
rivals; the husband must prefer his wife to every other woman, and the
wife likewise must think more of her husband than of any other man (see
1179).

(c) The third blessing of marriage is the Sacrament or the unbreakable
bond of marriage: "The Lord commanded that the wife depart not from the
husband, and if she depart that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled
to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife" (I Cor.,
vii. 10). This imposes the duties of a permanent domestic society in
which the spouses dwell together permanently and each has certain
special functions of assistance to the other.

2614. The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.--(a) The duty is one
of justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the
parties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter
of their pact.

(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the
most momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the
propagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is
productive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and
the disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the
request is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without
danger of incontinence.

2615. Absence of Obligation.--The obligation of paying the conjugal
debt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has
been lost or when the request is unreasonable.

(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has
broken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the
innocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account
of insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.

(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g.,
when it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to
health, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion
or other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly,
when it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).

2616. Suspension of Obligation.--The obligation of granting and the
right of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage
is discovered to be null or uncertain.

(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary
until the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of
fornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical
impediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave
inconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the
dispensation cannot be obtained at once.

(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not
necessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination
has yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts
that have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one
party doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done
the other.

2617. Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?--(a)
_Per se_, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to
enjoy one's right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife
were free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to
consummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married
people to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from
marriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of
mortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of
chastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the
husband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is often an obligation of requesting
intercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage
often leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).

2618. The Morality of Venereal Acts of Marriage.--(a) Non-consummated
Acts.--These acts, whether internal or external, are lawful _per se_
when they are used only as accessories to the act of marriage or as
means to foster or preserve conjugal love, for the acts are meant by
God to serve the purposes mentioned (2510). But _per accidens_ there
may be venial sin, on account of inordinateness in the motive (i.e.,
when only pleasure is intended), or in the manner (i.e., when due
decency is not observed). There is mortal sin when these acts are not
referred to the lawful conjugal act, but either directly or indirectly
to pollution, namely, when there is foreseen proximate danger of
pollution and the acts are either solitary or coöperative but performed
without sufficient reason (such as expressions of special affection),
for pollution is gravely sinful in the married, as well as in the
single state (see 2539 sqq.).

(b) Natural Consummated Act.--This act in itself is not only lawful,
but meritorious, because it exercises such virtues as obedience (Gen.,
i. 28), justice (I Cor., vii. 3 sqq.), and love of the common good and
religion (Tob., viii. 9). Since marriage intercourse has for its ends
not only reproduction, but also the expression of mutual love and the
allaying of concupiscence, it is lawful even when conception is
impossible or less probable, as when the parties are sterile, or the
woman is pregnant, or during the so-called agenesic period, or at the
time of lactation. It is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act when
one excludes every motive except that of pleasure (Denziger, n. 1159);
and there may be even mortal sin on account of circumstances, such as
place (e.g., scandal to others present), manner (e.g., external
immoderation, internal desire of another person), evil consequences
(e.g., when one of the parties has a contagious or veneral disease,
when abortion will likely result, etc.).

(c) Unnatural Consummated Acts.--Pollution is mortally sinful (2535
sqq.), and is worse in married than in single persons, as being an
injury to the faith pledged in marriage; and hence it is not lawful to
practise it even for the purpose of artificial fecundation. Rectal
copulation is also gravely sinful, being unnatural lust (see 2534) and
a violation of conjugal faith. The usual forms of unnatural vaginal
coition, which are very much practised today, are contraceptive in
purpose, and are of two general kinds in the procedure--the
physiological or preventive, which uses instruments to keep the semen
from the uterus (such as sponges or pessaries for the female, condoms
or protectors for the male), or which employs douches or syringes to
remove semen from the vagina, or uses chemicals to devitalize it.

2619. Nota.--(a) Non habetur onanismus, nec peccatum, si copula
abrumpitur, ex necessitate (v.g., ad vitandum scandalum persona
inopinate supervenientis), vel ex utilitate, mutuo dato consensu et
periculo pollutionis excluso; nam seminatio extra vas, aut involuntaria
est, aut nulla.

(b) Non habetur contraceptio nec peccatum, sed potius actus honestus,
si, ob defectum physicum viri vel mulieris, naturæ adjuvetur mediis
artificialibus ut copula fiat, vel ut semen introducatur in uterum; nam
fini matrimonii non obstat, sed obsecundat iste modus agendi.

(c) Artificial Insemination. The subject-matter of the latter part of
the preceding paragraph is distinguished from several unlawful
practices considered by moralists under the heading of artificial
insemination. Pope Pius XII on several occasions has given a clear,
accurate and complete statement of Catholic teaching on the subject. We
append here his texts:

1) The practice of artificial insemination, when it refers to man,
cannot be considered, either exclusively or principally, from the
biological and medical point of view, ignoring the moral and legal one.

Artificial insemination, outside of marriage, must be condemned as
essentially and strictly immoral.

Natural law and divine positive law establish, in fact, that the
procreation of a new life cannot but be the fruit of marriage. Only
marriage safeguards the dignity of the spouses (principally of the wife
in the present case) and their personal good. It alone provides for the
well-being and education of the child.

It follows that no divergence of opinion among Catholics is admitted on
the condemnation of artificial insemination outside of marriage. The
child conceived in those conditions would be, by that very fact,
illegitimate.

Artificial insemination produced in a marriage by the active element of
a third party is equally immoral and consequently to be condemned
without appeal.

Only the spouses have a reciprocal right upon each other's body to
generate a new life: an exclusive, inalienable right, which cannot be
ceded. And so it must be, even out of consideration for the child. On
whoever gives life to a small being, nature imposes, by the very
strength of that tie, the duty to keep and educate it. But no ties of
origin, no moral or legal bonds of conjugal procreation, exist between
the legitimate husband and the child who is the fruit of the active
element of a third party (even if the husband has given his consent).

As far as the legitimacy of artificial insemination in marriage is
concerned, it suffices, for the moment, to recall these principles of
natural law: the simple fact that the result desired is obtained by
this means does not justify the use of the means itself; nor does the
desire of the husband and wife, in itself perfectly legitimate, to have
a child, suffice to establish the legitimacy of resorting to the
artificial insemination which would satisfy this desire.

It would be erroneous, therefore, to think that the possibility of
resorting to this means might render valid a marriage between persons
unable to contract it because of the _impedimentum impotentiae_.

On the other hand, it is superfluous to mention that the active element
can never be obtained legitimately by means of acts against nature.

Although new methods cannot be ruled out a priori for the sole reason
of their novelty, nonetheless, as far as artificial impregnation is
concerned, extreme caution is not enough; it must be absolutely
excluded. Saying this does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain
artificial means destined only to facilitate the natural act, or to
assure the accomplishment of the end of the natural act regularly
performed.

Let it never be forgotten that only the procreation of a new life
according to the will and the designs of the Creator brings with it, to
a marvelous degree of perfection, the accomplishment of the proposed
ends. It is at the same time in conformity with corporeal and spiritual
nature and the dignity of the married couple, as well as with the
healthy, normal development of the child (Address to Physicians, Sept.
29, 1949, _Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi, pp. 221 ff).

2) We also believe that it is of capital importance for you, gentlemen,
not to neglect this perspective when you consider the methods of
artificial fecundation. The means by which one tends toward the
production of a new life take on an essential human significance
inseparable from the desired end and susceptible of causing grave harm
to this very end if these means are not conformable to reality and to
the laws inscribed in the nature of beings.

We have been asked to give some directives on this point also. On the
subject of the experiments in artificial human fecundation "in vitro,"
let it suffice for Us to observe that they must be rejected as immoral
and absolutely illicit. With regard to the various moral problems which
are posed by artificial fecundation, in the ordinary meaning of the
expression, or "artificial insemination," We have already expressed Our
thought in a discourse addressed to physicians on September 29, 1949
(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi. pp. 221 ff.). For the details We
refer you to what We said then and We confine Ourself here to repeating
the concluding judgment given there: "With regard to artificial
fecundation, not only is there reason to be extremely reserved, but it
must be absolutely rejected. In speaking thus, one is not necessarily
forbidding the use of certain artificial means destined solely to
facilitate the natural act or to achieve the attainment of the natural
act normally performed." But since artificial fecundation is being more
and more widely used, and in order to correct some erroneous opinions
which are being spread concerning what We have taught, We have the
following to add:

Artificial fecundation exceeds the limits of the right which spouses
have acquired by the matrimonial contract, namely, that of fully
exercising their natural sexual capacity in the natural accomplishment
of the marital act. The contract in question does not confer on them a
right to artificial fecundation, for such a right is not in any way
expressed in the right to the natural conjugal act and cannot be
deduced from it. Still less can one derive it from the right to the
"child," the primary "end" of marriage. The matrimonial contract does
not give this right, because it has for its object not the "child," but
the "natural acts" which are capable of engendering a new life and are
destined to this end. It must likewise be said that artificial
fecundation violates the natural law and is contrary to justice and
morality [1] (_Marriage and Parenthood_, May 19, 1956). See _The Pope
Speaks_, Vol, III, No. 2, Autumn of 1956, pp. 194 ff.

[1] The Holy Father here spoke for several minutes in Latin as follows:

Alia nunc occurrit quaestio, ad quam pertractandam magis addecet
latinam linguam adhibere.

Quemadmodum rationalis animus noster artificiali inseminationi
adversatur, ita eadem ethica ratio, a qua agendi normo sumenda est,
pariter vetat, quominus humanum semen, peritorum examini subiciendum,
masturbatiouis ope procuretur.

Hanc agendi rationem attigimus Nostra quoque allocutione coram
Urologiae doctoribus coetum participantibus, die VIII mensis Octobris
anno MDCCCCLIII prolata, in qua haec habuimus, verba: "Du reste le
St-Office a décidé déjà le 2 août 1929 (_Acta Ap. Sedis_, vol. XXI a.
1929, p. 490, II) qu'une "'masturbatio directe procurata ut obtineatur
sperma' n'est pas licite, ceci quel que soit le but de l'examen"
(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_ vol. XV, pag. 378). Cum vero Nobis allatum
sit, pravam huiusmodi consuetudinem pluribus in locis invalescere,
opportunum ducimus nunc etiam, quae tunc monuimus, commemorare atque
iterum inculcare.

Si actus huiusmodi ad explendam libidinem ponantur, eos vel ipse
naturalis hominis sensus sua sponte respuit, ac multo magis mentis
iudicium, quotiescumque rem mature recteque considerat. Iidem actus
tamen tunc quoque respuendi sunt, cum graves rationes eos a culpa
eximere videntur, uti sunt: remedia iis praestanda qui nimia nervorum
intentione vel abnormibus animi spasmis laborant; medicis peragenda,
ope microscopii, spermatis inspectio, quod venerei vel alius generis
morbi bacteriis infectum sit; diversarum partium examen, ex quibus
semen ordinarie constat, ut vitalium spermatis elementorum praesentia,
numerus, quantitus, forma, vis, habitus aliaque id genus dignoscuntur.

Eiusmodi procuratio humani seminis, per masturbationem effecta, ad
nihil aliud directe spectat, nisi ad naturalem in homine generandi
facultatem plene exercendam; quod quidem plenum exercitium, extra
conjugalem copulam peractum, secum fert directum et indebite usurpatum
eiusdem facultatis usum. In hoc eiusmodi indebito facultatis usu
proprie sita est intrinseca regulae morum violatio. Haudquaquam enim
homo ius ullum exercendi facultatem sexualem iam inde habet, quod
facultatem eandem a natura recepit. Homini nempe (secus ac in ceteris
animantibus rationis expertibus contingit) ius et potestas utendi atque
exercendi eandem facultatem tantummodo in nuptiis valide initis
tribuitut, atque in iure matrimoniali continetur, quod ipsis nuptiis
traditur et acceptatur. Inde elucet hominem, ob solam hanc causam quod
facultatem sexualem a natura recepit, non habere nisi potentiam et ius
ad matrimonium ineundum. Hoc ius tamen, ad objectum et ambitum quod
attinet, naturae lege, non hominum voluntate discribitur; vi huius
legis naturae, homini non competit ius et potestas ad plenum facultatis
sexualis exercitium, directe intentum, nisi cum coniugalem copulam
exercet ad normam a natura ipsa imperatam atque definitam. Extra hunc
naturalem actum, ne in ipso quidem matrimonio ius datur ad sexuali hac
facultate plene fruendum. Hi sunt limites, quibus ius, de quo diximus,
eiusque exercitium a natura circumscribuntur. Ex eo quod plenum
sexualis facultatis exercitium hoc absolute copulae coniugalis limite
circumscribitur, eadem facultas intrinsece apta efficitur ad plenum
matrimonii naturalem finem assequendum (qui non modo est generatio, sed
etiam prolis educatio), atque eius exercitum cum dicto fine colligatur.
Quae cum ita sint, masturbatio omnino est extra memoratam pleni
facultatis sexualis exercitii naturalem habilitatem, ideoque etiam
extra eius colligationem cum fine a natura ordinato; quamobrem eadem
omni iuris titulo caret atque naturae et ethices legibus contraria est,
etiamsi inservire intendat utilitati per se iustae nec improbandae.

Quae hactenus dicta sunt de intrinseca malitia cuiuslibet pleni usus
potentiae generandi extra naturalem coniugalem copulam, valent eodem
modo cum agitur de matrimonio iunctis vel de matrimonio solutis, sive
plenum exercitium apparatus genitalis fit a viro sive a muliere, sive
ab utraque parte simul agente; sive fit tactibus manualibus sive
coniugalis copulae interruptione; haec enim semper est actus naturae
contrarius atque intrinsece malus.

2620. Contraception.--Contraception in all its forms (onanism,
condonism, vaginal irrigation, spermatocide) is a grave crime.

(a) It is an Injury to God.--Marriage was instituted by God to
propagate the human race (Gen., i. 27, 28) and to bless homes with
children (Ps., cxxvi, cxxvii), and He has made it a sacred institution
and a Sacrament. Contraception defeats the ends of marriage and
degrades it to the level of a mere instrument of carnal gratification.
The hatred of God for this sin appears in general from the horror with
which Scripture speaks of unnatural lust, and in particular from the
case of Onan, whose sin is called detestable and whom God slew in
punishment (Gen., xxxviii. 10).

(b) It is an Injury to Society.--The perpetuation of the human race is
endangered as soon as marriage is abused as to its natural end. Hence,
after the crime of homicide which destroys human life already in
existence, contraception seems to rank next in enormity, since it
prevents human life from coming into existence. This vice spreads moral
degeneracy and decay from the home itself, and is rightly called
race-suicide, since it depopulates and destroys the nation by the act
of its own people.

(c) It is an Injury to the Family.--The happiness and success of the
home depend chiefly on the respect which its members have one for the
other and on the cultivation of the sturdy virtues that strengthen
character. The husband and wife who practise onanism or other similar
carnal vices cannot have the mutual respect they should have; the wife
is deprived of the treasure of her modesty and is treated as a
prostitute rather than as an honored wife and mother, and the husband
is brutalized by the removal of the natural restraint to his sex
passion. Such self-indulgent persons will either selfishly neglect the
one or two children they may have, or will spoil them for life by the
luxury and laziness in which they are reared.

(d) It is an Injury to the Individual.--As concerns the body, there is
a perversion of the sex act from its definite use and specific end, and
hence contraception has been described as "reciprocal masturbation." As
regards the soul, its higher goods of will and intellect are
subordinated by the contraceptionist to the delight of passion, the
lower impulses are greatly strengthened and self-control made more and
more difficult, and the spiritual objectives that should prompt a
rational creature are sacrificed for the passing gratification that
moves the beasts.

2621. Some Arguments of Neo-Malthusians and Other Advocates of
Contraception.--(a) Necessity for the Individual.--"This practice is
demanded by comfort (e.g., in order to have a good and easy time, to
have more opportunity for pleasures and occupations outside the home,
to preserve form and beauty, to escape the troubles of child-bearing
and child-rearing), or by utility (e.g., in order that suffering wives
be freed from the slavery of excessive child-bearing, in order that
children receive more attention and care than is possible in large
families)." This argument from comfort is unworthy of any but a pagan
or materialist, for the end of existence is something higher than
pleasure or escape from all hardship. But even if happiness alone be
considered, the childless home is not the most cheerful, and it often
happens that parents who have sinfully limited their parenthood will
lose an only child and be left sterile and desolate. The argument from
utility proves only that sometimes (not often) it is inadvisable for a
couple to have any or many children, but it does not prove that family
limitation through means forbidden by the laws of God and of nature is
permissible. The normal woman is not harmed but helped by
child-bearing, whereas onanism and other unnatural vices are fearfully
damaging both to mental and physical health. Experience too shows that
mothers of five or more children live longer, and that children from
large families are very often superior in qualities and achievements
and stand a better chance in life. Exceptions only emphasize the rule.

(b) Necessity for the Family.--"Large families are impossible to many
persons because the high cost of children today (expenses for clothing,
food, medical care, schooling, etc.) is beyond their means." The
inability to support many children is often due to extravagance or to
insufficient wages, and the remedy lies in prudent economy or in
improvement of the economic condition of workers, not in the abuse of
marriage. The weakness of the objection is shown from the fact that
race-suicide is more common among the well-to-do than among the poorer
classes. However, in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large
family, limitation of children is a duty, but not by means of the sin
of contraception or onanism.

(c) Necessity for the Community.--"The cause of unemployment,
destitution, famine and war is the overpopulation of the world.
Moreover, if the poorer classes would practise contraception and the
better-to-do classes have larger families, the standard of living of
the former would be raised, the culture of the latter would be
preserved, and the quality of the whole race be greatly improved." The
resources of the earth are easily adequate to support many times the
present population, and the misfortunes referred to are due, not to the
number of people who inhabit the earth, but to accident or to human
greed or imprudence. The eugenic argument is a vain dream, for the
history of nations and modern facts show that the ideal of race
improvement makes little appeal when the easier way of indulgence has
been learned. As said above, it is the wealthy and educated classes who
have the fewest children.

(d) Necessity of a Moral Kind.--"Contraception is a useful control of
nature similar to that employed by physicians, surgeons and other
scientists; it is not a contradiction of nature, since it preserves the
end of the sexual faculty in expressing physical love. The motives of
those who use it are not necessarily carnal, but may be of a very
Christian kind (e.g., the need of limitation of family in order the
better to practise one's vocation, or in order to spare one's wife, or
to keep her from abortion), and they may sincerely believe it to be
lawful." Contraception does not control, but defeats nature, by
voluntarily frustrating the primary end which nature has in view, and,
if permitted, it logically leads to every kind of sensual indulgence.
The motives or conscience of those who use it cannot change its
character, for the end does not justify the means and a wrong
conscience does not change the law. Those who have not been spoiled or
misled by contraceptive propaganda or advice, instinctively regard
artificial birth-control as well as onanism with disgust.

2622. Is Birth-Control Ever Lawful?--(a) If this refers to an end
(viz., the limitation of the number of children or the spacing of their
arrival), it is not unlawful in itself (see 2617); and it is sometimes
a duty, as when the wife is in very poor health or the family is unable
to take care of more. But in view of the decline and deterioration in
populations today, it seems that couples who are able to bring up
children well should consider it a duty to the common welfare to have
at least four children, and it should be easy for many to have at least
a dozen children. The example of those married persons of means who are
unable to have a number of children of their own, but who adopt or
raise orphaned little ones, is very commendable.

(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is
lawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital
relations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical
means to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot
restrain themselves is really an insult to God`s grace and is
contradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be
ashamed to admit that he is the slave of passion, and the fact that God
commands chastity and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and
single state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, sexual
abstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right
means are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other
and higher things.

Continence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions
make the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not
commanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the
more meritorious and praiseworthy: "It is wronging men and women of our
times to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many
reasons--perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in
the service of injustice--heroism is exercised to a degree and to an
extent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why.
then, should this heroism, if the circumstances really demand it, stop
at the borders established by the passions and inclinations of nature?
The answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is
incapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on
his own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from
God, will remain miserably disillusioned" (Pope Pius XII, _Allocution
to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives_, Oct. 29, 1951).

Another lawful means of family limitation is "periodic continence" or
"rhythm," the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting
intercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural
sterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the
impression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the
Church, that it constitutes a form of "Catholic Birth-Control." This is
not completely true.

All theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile
period is not _per se_ illicit. The act is performed in the natural
way; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the
secondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of
temptation, have been fostered. "If the carrying out of this theory
means nothing more than that the couple can make use of their
matrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is
nothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in
any way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural
consequences" (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).

"If, however, there is further question--that is, of permitting the
conjugal act on those days exclusively--then the conduct of the married
couple must be examined more closely" (ibid).

The following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:

1) A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely
the use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial
consent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not
morally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not
violated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born
despite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic,
economic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When
present, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration
of the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4)
The married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the
positive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly,
to make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason
to withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very
meaning of conjugal life (ibid.).

Pope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1)
Rhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due
safeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason,
the practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly
confirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the
common agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of
injustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.

Since the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country asserts
that the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their
marital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding
under pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the
couples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of
married life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does
not consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile
periods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods
precisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should
have made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the
practice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit
periodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against
the procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but
against the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The
couple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6)
from 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse
during a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not constitute
numerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single
will act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of
illicit abstention during the fertile periods.

Since the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of
the sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a
mortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds
the greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case
of continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent
use of marital rights during the sterile period.

Diversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a
serious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g.,
unjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would constitute a
serious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would
not accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or
more children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without
excusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most
theologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to
determine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the
conservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory
regard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in
such a way;

a) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit
provided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;

b) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a
serious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception
would be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the
common good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to
the secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this
opinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places
the gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five
years. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the _Conference Bulletin of
the Archdiocese of New York_, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)

On the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the
practice constitutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of
circumstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.

The present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls
for caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily
recommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of
June 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: "Married couples who
use their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be
disturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question,
cautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain
to dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism."

As to the theological censure to be attached to "rhythm," it is not
approved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently
grave reasons. "Instead of being freely taught and commended, it is
rather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin"
(Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, _Conference
Bulletin of Archdiocese of New York_, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).

2623. Coöperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.--(a)
Coöperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem
ipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor quæ suis quæremoniis de
molestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanisticum, vel quae
nec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice
congrediendi, vel quæ active adjuvat abruptionem copulæ, vel quae
interne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).

(b) Coöperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu
fundato rixarum, molestæ cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam
actio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque
causa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515
sqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus
diu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii cum periculo
incontinentiæ, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam cum
tanto incommodo.

(c) Coöperatio mere materialis ad contraceptionem, non videtur
possibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala
(1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec passive se
habere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin
autem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis,
eam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa
(2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_,
June, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)

2624. Recapitulatio de Licitis et Illicitis in Conjugio.--(a) Illicita
graviter sunt extra matrimonium facta, v.g., moechia, mollities
solitaria, alienæ conjugis concupiscentia; sed probabiliter actus
imperfecti et solitarii in proprium corpus exerciti leve non excedunt,
citra periculum pollutionis, siquidem in delectationem veneream quæ in
conjugio licita est natura sua ordinentur, sicque minus indecentes
fiant.

(b) Illicita graviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed contra finem,
i.e., naturæ matrimonii seu generationi prolis repugnantia, ut sunt
pollutio mutua, onanismus, impudicitia quæ non in copulam sed in
pollutionem tendit.

(c) Illicita leviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed præter finem,
i.e., qum generationi nec prosunt, nec obsunt, sed in circumstantiis
aliquam prae se ferunt inordinationem (e.g., copula ob solam voluptatem
habita), imprudentiam (e.g., copula tempore parum apto habita),
immoderantiam (e.g., impudicitia pudori nociva, situs innaturalis, ut
si stent vel vir succubet, ex levitate electus).

(d) Licita sunt intra matrimonium facta, quæ tum ex parte objecti
(scil., quia actus ordinatur ad finem matrimonii), tum ex parte
circumstantiarum (scil., quia debito tempore, loco, modo, etc., ut
prudentia exigit, exercentur) rationi rectae concordant. Unde non
peccant conjuges sibi licita concupiscendo vel de iis gaudendo. Immo
mulier onanistæ licite coöperata non est peccati arguenda si gavisa sit
de ipsa copula vel de bonis ejus effectibus, vel (saltem quando
probabile videtur se semen excipisse) si ad completam voluptatem se
excitaverit.

2625. Regulae pro Confessariis.--(a) Interrogationes.--Si nulla ratio
est suspicandi copulam modo innaturali exerceri, præstat ut plurimum de
circumstantiis (v.g., de motivo copulæ) non quærere, ne conjuges tædio
afficiantur vel bona fide inutiliter priventur. Si tamen fundata
suspicio est abusum matrimonii celari, hac de re confessarius inquirere
debet, sed prudenter, ne scandalo sit poenitentibus verbis indiscretis.

(b) Monitiones.--Si deprehenditur poenitentem onanistam esse, per se
severe reprehendendus est (quod de viro praesertim dicitur) nec
absolvendus nisi signa contritionis prius dederit; per accidens autem,
si datur ignorantia invincibilis et monitio nullatenus profutura
prævidetur, poenitens in bona fide relinquatur.

2626. Marriage as a Sacrament.--The third benefit of marriage is that
of the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical
union, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union of
Christ and the Church: "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in
Christ and the Church" (Eph., v. 32).

(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with
his wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded
by the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is
wrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of
time, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home--or vice versa.
Grave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the
husband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a
considerable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife
with him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons
suffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of
adultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is
serious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).

(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is
superior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man excels
in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical
strength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how
small, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home.
But obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head
of the house--for example, the choice of the place of residence, the
management of the family income, the discipline of the children, but
not in the wife's personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics,
her property)--and only in commands that do not exceed his authority,
for he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no claim
to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover, since
the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually excels
as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager and is
naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on
important family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual
consent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the
many things in which she is more competent than himself.

(c) Christ gave Himself for the Church (Eph., v. 25), and so also the
husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and
temporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of
the family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should
take care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the
training of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness of
the husband's salary often compels the wife to work outside her home.
Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited to their
sex, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of
motherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife
by one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least
uncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually
under the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to
use the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to
provide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.

2627. The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.--We shall speak first of
the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties
which engagement imposes.

(a) _Per se_, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for
the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social
duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must
take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating
is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier, or
farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that these
offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another.
Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the
common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married
life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the
wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage
or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account of
public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated by
race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to marry in
order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered slackers
who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation is
threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who
will not assist a community threatened with extinction from within?
Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to
live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9).
In case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured
girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should
be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the
girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).

2628. The Duties Imposed by Engagement to Marry.--(a) Before
Engagement.--Courtship is lawful for those who intend to marry, for
without it the mutual knowledge which is requisite for a prudent choice
is impossible. But courtship should be employed, not as a period of
pleasure and extravagance, but as an opportunity for learning the
suitability of the parties, one for the other, and their desirability
in virtue, religion, sanity, intelligence, health, wealth, position,
love of children, sobriety, steadiness, etc. Visits are lawful during
courtship, but not the same familiarity as is permissible after
engagement. The time of wooing should not be protracted, and as a rule
after a year the parties should either become engaged or decide they
are not well matched.

(b) At the Time of the Engagement.--The parties are gravely bound to
make known to each other all personal defects which cannot be concealed
without serious injustice, such as the lack of virginity or other
quality which one party makes a _conditio sine qua non_, or the
presence of a diriment impediment or of a very harmful or displeasing
characteristic (such as venereal disease, sterility, disgrace, race,
the fact that one is a widow, etc.). There is no duty of justice to
manifest defects whose concealment will not be detrimental (such as
poverty, lowly origin), but there may be a duty of charity to reveal
them, as when their concealment now will lead to an unhappy marriage.
As to fornication, the man is not obliged to confess it, unless perhaps
when he has an illegitimate child; nor the woman, unless she is
actually pregnant, or cannot keep the matter hidden afterwards and can
make it known without serious harm to herself (see Self-defamation,
1577; cfr. 1978, 2132). But those who have been guilty of these
mistakes should undergo a test on the question of physical health.

(c) During the Engagement.--Fidelity requires that an engaged person be
true to the other party, avoid paying court to a third person (see
2526), and give the signs of affection that are usual between engaged
persons. The relationship between the engaged parties does not give
them the right to what is intrinsically evil (e.g., voluntary
pollution, proximate danger of consent to sin, continuance in a
familiarity which is a proximate occasion of sin), or to what is lawful
only to married persons (e.g., intercourse and the liberties pertinent
to it). But it does give them the right to manifest their affection by
acts indifferent in themselves (e.g., visits which are not private, too
frequent, or too prolonged; the decent kisses usual between betrothed
lovers on meeting and parting), even though unintentionally pollution
may follow (2538). Persons who intend to marry soon should acquaint
themselves before marriage and from reliable sources with the
fundamental physiological facts of sex, so as to avoid the mistakes
which often wreck conjugal happiness, beginning with the honeymoon
itself; they should have some money or the prospect of being able to
support themselves, and the woman should know how to take care of a
home.

(d) At the End of the Engagement.--A formal promise to marry (Canon
1017) imposes the duty of marriage within a reasonable time (i.e., at
the appointed date, or, if no date was fixed, at the time when one of
the parties reasonably requests it), unless the engagement be broken
(e.g., by mutual consent, by a circumstance that makes marriage
impossible, such as marriage to a third party or choice of the clerical
state; or unnecessary, such as the fulfillment of a resolutory
condition, supervening impediment, Papal dispensation given for a just
cause); or unless one of the parties has a right not to keep the
engagement on account of a notable change in the circumstances, or a
breach of faith, or opposition of parents that will make the marriage
inadvisable, etc. The obligation to marry is one of justice, and is
grave when the contract was bilateral; it is one of fidelity or
justice, and grave or light according to the intention of the promisor,
when the contract was unilateral (see 1888). There is no action to
enforce an engagement, for forced marriages are unwise (Canon 1017, n.
3); and in practice confessors and pastors should not insist on
fulfillment of the promise. But damages can be sued for, and the
confessor should deny absolution to one who refuses to make just
restitution in a case of breach of promise (see 1803). An informal
promise to marry (i.e., one invalid naturally or positively) produces
no obligation to marry in either forum (see 454); but it does produce a
duty of restitution in breach of promise, if there was force, fraud, or
deceit.

2629. Conditions for the Signs of Affection between Engaged
Persons.--(a) Objectively, these signs must be suited to the condition
of merely engaged, not of married persons. Brief and modest kisses are
proper for lovers, but greater intimacy, such as long and lone
conversations in secluded spots, are wrong.

The chaster the relations between the betrothed, the less occasion for
future regrets and recriminations. "Petting" purchases a cheap physical
thrill or excitement at the cost of present moral danger for two
persons, of the degradation of love to its lowest expression, and of
loss of self-respect, with the probable risk of a future ill-fated
marital career ending speedily in disillusionment and divorce. It is
essentially selfish and unwise.

(b) Subjectively, the signs of affection must not be a proximate
occasion of sin; nor may they be accompanied by consent to sin, or be
used for the sake of venereal pleasure. Joy at the thought of future
marriage intercourse and sensual pleasure in present kisses (2514) are
in themselves not sinful, but in practice they are as a rule gravely
dangerous. _Motiones carnales, quales sunt erectiones, signa sunt
delectationis venereae quando conjuguntur eum pollutione vel proxime
præviis ad eam; sunt signa delectationis mere sensualis, quando amorem
sensibilem sequuntur ex motu sanguinis, quin in resolutionem seminis ex
se tendant_ (2497 b).

2630. The Duties of Parents and Children.--In addition to the duties
that belong to all superiors and subjects (see 2635 sqq.) there are
special obligations incumbent on parents and children by reason of the
special relationship between them. The duties of the parents are of two
kinds.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Parents should give their children special love
and special signs of affection, as the order of charity requires (see
1158 sqq.). Hence, those parents sin grievously who hate or curse their
children, even the illegitimate or wayward, or who drive the children
from home by unkindness.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Parents should, as far as they are able, give
their children the honor and help that belongs to members of the family
(see 2346 sqq.), though illegitimate children have not the right to
dwell in the home of the legitimate children or to share in the family
inheritance (see 1803 b). The help owed to children is spiritual and
material, and the obligation, which is natural and divine, is most
grave (Canon 1113). Spiritual help includes religious and moral
training and example (see 867 sqq.); material help includes food,
clothing, lodging, medical care, means to learn a necessary trade, art
or profession or to enter marriage or take up a suitable state in life,
protection and defense. Parents are bound to help their children, at
least in necessities, as long as the latter are in need. Sins are
committed also against the unborn (e.g., when the pregnant mother does
not take care of her health, or when she is ill-treated by her husband)
and young infants (e.g., when the child is unnecessarily suckled by
strangers and thus exposed to danger, or is placed in a foundling
asylum or other institution because the parents are unwilling to be
bothered). On the other hand, those parents sin through excess who
spoil or "sissify" their children by luxury and idleness, or who are
too indulgent to give needed correction and even moderate chastisement.

2631. Compensation of Children.--A child, even though subject to
parental authority, seems to have a right to compensation for
extraordinary services given his parents, and also to at least a fair
commission for gains made in the course of extraordinary services for
which he is receiving no compensation. In their wills, after satisfying
just debts and expenses, parents should leave their offspring who need
it enough to maintain their state in life.

2632. Sex Education of Children.--(a) Necessity.--Some moralists
believe that sex education of the young should be indirect. They hold
that it is dangerous to speak of venereal matters to the young; that
silence itself is to them a lesson of modesty; that the practice of
piety and mortification, along with parental watchfulness, will keep
them pure; that sufficient knowledge will come at the proper time as
God will provide. Others reject this theory as opposed to the tradition
of the Church as well as to experience. The defenders of direct sexual
education point to the evil of silence: the bad habits contracted and
grown strong before their sinfulness is understood, or the scruples and
misery into which ignorance will plunge young people entering the
crisis of puberty, the false and corrupt ideas with which unavoidably
the minds of the innocent will be indoctrinated by immoral companions
or physicians, the loss of confidence in parents who have refused
important knowledge and advice, and the ruin of innocent lives by
seducers which a timely word of warning would have prevented. Hence,
there is an invincible ignorance which cannot be removed without direct
education, and which is more harmful at least to well-reared children
than any evil that may be caused by the education.

(b) Preparation for Direct Education.--Training for purity should be
directed both to will and intellect, for knowledge without character is
powerless against temptation. Children should be trained from the
beginning morally (i.e., they should be kept as far as possible from
sources of contamination; should be taught to have implicit confidence
in parents and to bring to them their questions and difficulties;
should be trained to practise continual mortification and restraint and
to struggle against evil tendencies until the habit of self-control
becomes a second nature) and religiously (i.e., to use prayer, the
Sacraments and other means of grace until they are well formed in
piety). This previous moral education and religious conviction will
stand on guard as a protection against the suggestions of indulgence
which initiation into sex matters may suggest.

(c) The Subject-Matter of Sex Education.--The fundamentals of sex
instruction include such points as the diversity of sex, its origin
from God and its dignity, the beginning of life in plants and animals,
the organs of reproduction, the functions of maternity and paternity,
the grave reasons that demand sexual morality, respect for womankind,
the great sinfulness of masturbation and fornication, the meaning of
puberty and its accompaniments in male and female, the possibility and
healthfulness of continence, the moral dangers of the world and the
social diseases to be guarded against, and the hygienic aids to
chastity.

(d) The Method of Instruction.--It is clear that not all the details
just mentioned can be imparted at one time, for young children would
not understand or there would be scandal of little ones; but, while
fiction and exaggeration should be avoided, a strictly scientific and
technical instruction is not necessary or generally advisable. It is
clear also that parents, and especially mothers, are naturally suited
for the delicate task of early guardians of chastity, though the later
instruction should be supplemented in catechism class, sermon, school,
and an individual advice given in confession. It would be impossible in
brief space to outline sufficiently a program of sex instruction, but
parents and persons who are about to marry should read, study and apply
some of the excellent books prepared for their guidance.

2633. Duties of Children.--The duties of children to their parents can
also be classed under those of charity and piety.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Children owe their parents a special internal
and external love (see 1176 sqq.). Those children sin gravely who hate
their parents or wish them serious evil, or who treat them with great
unkindness or neglect, or bring them great sorrow or worry, or who
never visit or write to them.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Children must respect and assist their parents
(see 2347, 2348). It is a serious sin to have contempt for one's
parents, or to show them serious dishonor in words (e.g., by injurious
or mocking names), in signs (e.g., by laughing at them, mimicking
them), in deeds (e.g., by striking them, speaking against them), in
omission (e.g., by refusing to acknowledge them or show them the usual
marks of courtesy). It is not disrespect, however, for a child to
dislike or protest against evils done by his parents. The assistance
owed to parents is both spiritual and corporal, and children sin when
they neglect the religious welfare of their parents (e.g., by not
respectfully admonishing them when the parents do not lead a good life,
by not obtaining for them the Sacraments, prayers and suffrages they
need), or deny them bodily aid (e.g., by refusing them help or comfort
when they are poor, persecuted, or suffering). Children who live at
home with their parents should contribute from their earnings or
individual property to the maintenance of the home, unless the parents
do not need this pay and do not wish it. See Catechism of the Council
of Trent, on the Fourth Commandment (pages 408 sqq.).

2634. Duties of Near Relatives.--There are similar duties of charity
and piety between other near relatives, for example, between brothers
and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren uncles and aunts and their
nephews and nieces, and between first cousins. The obligation seems, to
some authors, to be a grave one as far as the second degree of kinship,
but is light in the other degrees. The relationship and duty to kin by
marriage is not so strong.

2635. The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of
Superiors.--Superiors both in domestic and civil society need
especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special
duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).

(a) Prudence.--If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision
and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether
of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the
prudent servant who is placed over his master's household (Matt., xxiv.
45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community
(Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and
magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent
knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what
constitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should
be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common
sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of
large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a
great multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or
unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will
safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and
prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).

(b) Justice.--In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common
good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice
and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided
by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every
form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously
enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their
subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but
approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive,
ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to
pleasure and display.

2636. Duties of Subjects.--The general duties of subjects to superiors
are chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).

(a) Honor.--Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of
authority, which is derived from God, not on account of their personal
character, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even
in a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or
courtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word,
manner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the
personal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from
office if he is unfit or less fit.

(b) Obedience.--Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they
strictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their
authority (see 375 sqq.). Unemancipated children are obliged to obey
their parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely,
in what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties,
avoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the
hours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received).
But parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are
children under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life,
for this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior
cannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to
force a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry
a certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are
reasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his
support, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the
person selected for wife will disgrace the family.

2637. Taxes.--Citizens owe the government particularly the tribute of
taxation, and in war that of military service. Taxes are contributions
exacted by the public authority from subjects for the purpose of
defraying public expenses or promoting the public welfare.

(a) Thus, they are contributions, and hence a tax is not to be confused
with a payment (e.g., fares for passage on government railroads), or
with a fine (e.g., pecuniary penalty for evasion of customs).

(b) They are exacted from subjects (i.e., from citizens), who are
subject on account of their persons as being members of the State, and
from aliens, who are subject on account of their goods, as receiving
privileges of residence, commerce, passage, etc.

2638. Kinds of Taxes.--There are many kinds of taxes, but they can all
be reduced to two general categories.

(a) Direct taxes are those collected from the person on whom the burden
is ultimately to fall. Examples are poll or personal taxes and property
taxes (such as those on general property, incomes or inheritances), for
these charges remain an expense of the taxpayer himself.

(b) Indirect taxes are those collected from a person other than the one
on whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are duties imposed
on outsiders (such as customs or tariffs, duties raised for revenues,
protection, etc.), external revenue taxes imposed on certain acts (such
as the manufacture or sale of commodities) or occupations (e.g.,
licenses for trades, sports, etc.). In these the charge falls
immediately on the taxpayer, but ultimately on a consumer.

2639. Just Taxes.--Tax laws, like other laws, must be just; that is,
they must be made by lawful authority and must promote the common good
(see 285). The common good requires that taxes be not imposed except
for just reasons, and that there be a fair distribution of the burden.

(a) Just reasons are those of public utility or necessity. A tax would
be unjust, if it were levied for unjust or unnecessary purposes.

(b) Fair distribution requires that citizens be assessed according to
their ability to pay (sacrifices for the public good, special benefits
from the use of a tax fund, etc.).

2640. Obligation to Pay Taxes.--The obligation in conscience of just
tax laws is admitted by all Catholic authorities.

(a) The teaching of Scripture is quite clear, since Our Lord, in answer
to the question whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar,
replied: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's" (Matt., xxii.
17-21); and St. Paul teaches: "Be subject of necessity, not only for
wrath, but also for conscience' sake. Render therefore to all men their
due, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom" (Rom.,
xiii. 5, 6).

(b) Reason too shows the need of obligation in conscience, for, unless
these laws oblige thus, the common good will suffer through lack of
money needed for public purposes, and some individuals will be unjustly
burdened and others unjustly favored.

2641. Quality of the Obligation.--There are various opinions about the
quality of the obligation in conscience of taxation laws.

(a) Thus, according to one opinion they oblige in conscience and under
sin, that is, as preceptive laws (see 561 sqq.). For the natural law
and justice require that the members of society contribute the
necessaries to the social body organized for their benefit, or that the
people live up to their implicit contract with their government by
giving compensation for the services they receive.

(b) According to another opinion tax laws oblige in conscience only
under penalty, that is, as penal laws. The arguments for this view are,
first, the sufficiency of the penal obligation (i.e., the heavy fines
imposed) for the attainment of the laws' purpose, and, secondly, the
common opinion of citizens that they commit no sin by merely evading
payment of taxes. Furthermore, it is added that, if these laws were
preceptive, conscientious citizens would be under a great disadvantage,
for they would be placed in the dilemma of either acting against their
conscience and committing sin or of paying more than their due on
account of the neglect of tax dues by citizens who are not
conscientious.

(c) According to a third opinion distinction has to be made between
different cases. Thus, some held that laws on direct taxes are
preceptive and laws on indirect taxes merely penal, while others say
that the kind of obligation depends on the will of the lawgiver, and
that tax laws that are preceptive in one country may be only penal in
another. If tax laws are merely penal, there is no obligation of
restitution, but there is an obligation of payment and of penalty after
sentence.

2642. Obedience to Tax Laws.--Obedience to just laws is owed either
from legal justice alone, or also from commutative justice with the
burden of restitution. There are various opinions about the case of tax
laws.

(a) According to the traditional opinion, the obligation is one of
commutative justice, because there is an implicit contract between the
government and the people, in virtue of which the former is bound to
provide for the safety of the people at home and abroad and to secure
those things that are necessary for the common welfare (such as roads,
postal service, etc.), while the latter are bound in return to pay the
expenses of the government.

(b) According to a recent opinion, the obligation is one of legal
justice only, because the imposition of taxes is an exercise of
authority by the government, and taxes themselves have the character of
a tribute from the part to the whole rather than of a wage or payment.
Hence, though he who evades taxes is not held to restitution, he sins
against justice, and sins gravely if the matter is considerable.

(c) According to other opinions, tax laws oblige sometimes from legal,
sometimes from commutative justice. Thus, some admit that in feudal
times there was a contract between the governed and the ruler, and
therefore an obligation of commutative justice to give services and
taxes; but in modern times they say there is no such contract, and the
duties of ruler and subjects rest on natural law and legal justice, not
on any compact. Others again distinguish between the obligation before
the quota has been determined, which is the duty of legal justice to
declare properly the value of one's property, and the obligation after
assessment, which is a duty of commutative justice to pay just tax
bills.

2643. The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.--(a) There is a
grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in
public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the
community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals
depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on
the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote
coöperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at
least with public unconcern about public matters--for example, those
who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote.
A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution),
but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble,
ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has
exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is
a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.

(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either
a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to
which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The
obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact
that the common weal is everybody's business and responsibility,
especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by
abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound _ex
officio_ to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held
to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and
perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of
restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general
election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence,
and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of
their representatives.

2644. Manner of Voting.--(a) Object.--It is not necessary to vote for
the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by
character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives
indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community
well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath
beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the
person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In
minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the
candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as
President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party
principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. _Per
accidens_, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is
necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is
much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy
candidates are included.

(b) Purpose.--The end which the voter should have in mind is the good
of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely
or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one's own
race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or
escape enmity.

(c) Circumstances.--The voter must avoid all that is contrary to
natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes)
or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a
period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as
registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The
opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that
helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for
ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.

2645. Obligation to Seek Office.--A worthy man should run for office in
the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy
(e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and
there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave
impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private
affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).

2646. Duties of Employers and Employees.--Between employers and their
domestic servants or workingmen there are general mutual duties as
between superiors and subjects, and special mutual duties as between
parties to an explicit and implicit contract. Of these latter duties we
shall now speak.

2647. Duties of Employers.--(a) Justice.--The labor assigned must not
be excessive (e.g., unduly perilous, exhausting, protracted) or
injurious (e.g., harmful to religion or morals, an unreasonable
impediment to marriage, to cultural opportunity or amusement); the wage
paid must be just (i.e., one that will enable the worker to support
himself and his family in reasonable comfort) and equitable (i.e., one
that rewards special merit and service by pensions or additional
compensation); the terms of the contract must be observed (e.g.,
arbitrary lowering of wages or dismissal are unjust).

(b) Charity.--Liberality should be shown by preference to employees,
since they have a special claim on the employ good will. The employer
should consider that he is responsible for the spiritual betterment and
material improvement of his workers, and should have them in mind when
making contributions to religious, educational or special causes, so
that his own employees will benefit in particular by his gifts to these
worthy causes. Trade schools and insurance against sickness and
unemployment are especially deserving of his assistance.

2648. Duties of Employees.--(a) Justice.--Workers are bound to give a
fair return in quantity and quality of labor for the pay they receive,
and to be loyal to their employer as regards his person, reputation,
and property. Hence, it is unjust to loaf or come late or leave early,
to turn out work too slowly or of an inferior grade, to damage
machinery or property, to waste food or provisions, to act as a
household spy or informer, to try to extort what is not due. (For a
consideration of the worker's obligation to join unions see "Catholics
in Labor Unions" by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _American
Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXVI, no. 6 June, 1947, pp. 422 ff.)

(b) Charity.--Workers should be willing even at the expense of some
right or of some slight loss to help an employer who is in grave
necessity; for example, it would be uncharitable for farm hands to stop
work promptly on time when this will cause a serious damage to the
farmer's crop, or for a cook to leave on her free day when her mistress
is very sick and will be left alone.

2649. Labor Disputes between Employers and Employees.--(a) In
themselves these disputes are indifferent, as they are a species of
industrial war (see 1380 sqq.) or of industrial self-defense (1826
sqq.). If the end, the means and the circumstances are not against
right reason, the disputes are lawful or even laudable.

(b) In the concrete, the strike is labor's chief means for enforcing
demands. Since organized labor seeks to equalize the bargaining power
between employer and employee, the way to counteract refusal to pay
fairly is by a concerted refusal to work, i.e., a strike. A strike may
be defined as an organized cessation from work by a group of workers to
obtain advantages from an employer. Since an organized strike is a kind
of war, moral theologians apply the principles of a just war to
determine concretely the morality of a strike.

1) There must be a just reason for the strike. Too little pay, too long
hours, brutal treatment, unsafe or unsanitary conditions constitute
genuine grievances for what may be called a defensive strike, which
presupposes injustice in the part of the employer. On the other hand an
ameliorative strike does not presuppose an employer's injustice, but
consists essentially in the worker's attempt to better conditions,
e.g., a better salary, shorter working hours, etc. Such a strike seems
to be unlawful if it violates a just work contract in effect at the
time of the strike. If no such contract has been made, the ameliorative
strike can be lawful, granting a proportionately grave cause; but it is
never given unqualified approval owing to the fact that such a strike
involves many and grave losses both material and moral to the workers,
employer, and community. (See Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiæ Moralis_ II,
n.556.)

2) The strike must be the last means. Owing to the fact that a strike
is a kind of warfare, all other peaceful means should be tried, e.g.,
arbitration, governmental inquiry boards, injunctions, fact-finding
boards etc. The moral principle involved is; if an evil is avoidable
but not avoided, it cannot be considered as merely incidental to a good
end.

3) The strike would be called by proper authority. The decision to
strike should be made by the men themselves freely and Without
intimidation. Organized labor must have the backing of a responsible
union in its strike, for this is the channel of bargaining or
arbitration that the employer must use, and it should be used by the
workers also. Accordingly, "wildcat" strikes are unlawful unless the
unions have ceased to represent the men and have been repudiated by
them.

4) The benefits expected from the strike must compensate for the evils
inseparable from it. In this matter not only the worker's personal
gains are to be considered, but also the welfare of others, namely the
employers and the public. Thus, in a long-drawn-out strike the economic
advantage gained in a small salary increase for the worker can never be
proportionate to the financial losses inflicted on the workers
themselves in loss of income, on the employers, and particularly on a
community which suffers the loss of purchasing power of a number of its
members. Many strikes in which the products or services of the workers
are necessary to the public (transportation, food distribution, etc.)
seem to be more a strike against the community than against an
employer; and the harm inflicted on the innocent public is not
incidental as it must be in order to be justified. Only extraordinarily
grave reasons can justify such strikes.

5) The means employed must be just. The common means are work stoppage,
persuasion of other workers to keep the work stopped until the demands
are met, and picketing in a peaceful manner. Sabotage and violence
against an employer's person or property constitute unjust means.
"Scabs," or professional strike-breakers, may be prevented from
depriving the workers of their jobs to which the workers keep their
rights; but violence in defense of this right seems illicit, unless
violence is begun by the strike-breakers and the workers are forced to
defend themselves.

(c) Kinds of Strike. Thus far the analysis has been concerned with a
direct strike. Other kinds of strike demand special consideration.

1) Slow-down strike. Since it does not involve cessation from work, but
simply a reduction in production or services while the worker is
receiving full pay under contract, the strike seems to be immoral. The
striker is not giving the work paid for.

2) Sit-down strikes. Some authors justify these strikes by analogy with
an act of self-defense in which the person attacked seizes the weapon
from the attacker. The analogy seems defective since the place of work
is hardly a weapon. This strike seems to be immoral since it involves
an unjust invasion of property rights by way of excluding an owner from
the use of his property.

3) Sympathy strikes. There is a great diversity of opinion in this kind
of strike. A moderate view distinguishes between strikes of several
groups against the same employer and one or several groups against
different and unassociated employers. The first kind seems justified,
for it is directed against the same unjust employer, and the workers
are coöperators to defend the rights of one group against him. In the
second case of striking against different employers, the "sympathizers"
are striking against a just employer and are violating their work
contract which binds in commutative justice. Hence this type of strike
seems to be essentially unjust.

(d) The lockout is the employer's strike. Unwilling to grant the
worker's demand, the employer shuts down his plant, thus terminating
employment of both strikers and non-strikers. The same conditions and
restrictions that apply to the strike are applicable to lockouts. That
the lockout itself is not unjust, but at least morally indifferent,
appears to be evident in this, that as workers are not bound to submit
to injustice, neither is the employer. He cannot be expected to pay
wages when essential employers have quit or stalled production.

(e) A boycott is a mass refusal to patronize a certain business with
the effort to persuade others to join in the refusal. Historically it
has been used by labor to gain support from the public against an
employer or by elements of the public itself to protest some evil
practice of a business establishment, e.g., Legion of Decency boycotts
of indecent pictures, NODL boycotts of literature, etc. In itself, a
boycott is not immoral, since no one is obliged to trade in one place
in preference to another and may refuse to trade with persons who are
unjust or otherwise immoral. There seems to be no reason also to
prevent a person from lawfully persuading others to follow his cause.
The principles of a just strike are applicable to the justification of
boycotts, and the conditions of a sympathy strike are to be applied to
secondary boycotts, i.e., against other firms doing business with a
boycotted firm. These other firms are not themselves unjust and should
not be made to suffer for the injustice of another. Hence, a very grave
cause, co-operation in injustice, for example would be necessary to
bring pressure against them.

2650. Is There Any Obligation of Giving Employment?--(a) The State
certainly has an obligation in legal justice of offering opportunities
of work to those who cannot find it, if the public welfare is
compromised by widespread unemployment. Even if only one worker were
without work through no fault of his own, the duty of helping him would
seem to devolve on the State, since the laborer has a right to work and
the State has the duty of promoting the temporal welfare of its
subjects when they are unable to provide for themselves.

(b) Employers have a duty of commutative justice to give work to men
with whom they have made a contract of labor and not to keep work from
men unfairly; hence, arbitrary dismissal or blacklisting is a crime
against justice. They should also try to secure other employment for
good workers whom they are unable to keep, so as to tide over for the
men the slack seasons when some have to be laid off. Industry,
organized labor and individuals should interest themselves practically
in private movements and plans to remedy unemployment situations, for
these are matters that should not be left entirely to the State and
charity. Employment and honest wages are in the long run to the
advantage of employers as well as of employees, and are therefore good
business as well as good morals.

2651. Duties of Certain Professions.--(a) Judges and Lawyers.--The
duties of men of the law were discussed already in 1940 sqq. Clients on
their part owe their lawyers fair treatment and just compensation for
services, while those who have part in a judicial process must give
respect to the judge and other officials of the court and due obedience
to their directions.

(b) Teachers and Students.--Teachers must make themselves proficient in
their matter and in the art of pedagogy; must take care that their
teaching is accurate and beneficial; must be steady, punctual, orderly;
must give no example or advice but what is good; must be neither too
lenient nor too exacting; must preserve discipline in their classes by
correcting, punishing, or expelling as need requires; must be just,
neither petting nor bullying, and must award honors and averages
according to merit. There may be grave harm and sin in denying
important academic degrees (such as S.T.M., S.T.D., J.D.C., M.D.) to
the worthy or in conferring them on the unworthy. Students on their
part owe to their teachers respect and obedience in class matters, to
their parents and themselves diligence in study, and to their school
avoidance of cheating and of disorderly conduct. In athletics they
should not aim at winning for winning's sake, or playing for playing's
sake, but at the true goal of a sound mind in a sound body. In the
selection of preferred studies they should remember that nothing worth
while is won without hard work, and that the true objectives of
learning are not mere utility, or gain or diversion, but the culture of
mind and of spirit.

(c) Physicians, Surgeons, Nurses, and Druggists.--These persons must
have sufficient knowledge and skill, and must keep up with the progress
of medical science; they must not deny their services or delay to come
when there is urgent need; they must give a case diligence
proportionate to its seriousness; they must consult in case of doubt,
follow the safer opinions, and use the more likely remedies. In his
relations with his patient a doctor must be chaste (e.g., avoiding
immoral advice or operations, unnecessary psychoanalytic conversations,
or bodily exposures); loyal to the confidences received; honest and
charitable, not prescribing useless remedies, or overcharging, or
refusing service to the poor; mindful of the religious needs of his
patients, being not too ready to exempt them from church duties nor
slow to remind them when they should send for the priest. Patients on
their part should honor the physician, call him in need, obey his
directions, and properly compensate him for his services. What is here
said of physicians and surgeons is true also of nurses in their duties
and capacities. Pharmacists are bound to exercise great care in filling
prescriptions; they should not cooperate with abortion or contraception
by selling medicines, instruments or appliances to be used for those
purposes; they should not sell drugs, dopes, poisons, liquors, etc.,
forbidden by law.




Question IV

THE SACRAMENTS

2652. In the three Questions that preceded we spoke of the means by
which man is sanctified and is enabled to secure supernatural rewards
through the merits of his own works; for the virtues make their
possessor as well as his acts morally righteous, while through God's
grace the good deeds done for His sake entitle the doer to the crown of
eternal life. In the present Question we pass on to consider certain
means by which God is honored by man and man is sanctified through the
application to his soul of the merits and passion of Christ; for the
Sacraments were instituted by Christ both as external acts of religion
(2175, 2244) and as most powerful agencies to begin, restore, and
increase the life of holiness.

2653. It should be observed, first, that the present work is concerned
with Moral Theology; and, secondly, that it must be confined within the
limited number of pages which a two-volume production of convenient
size necessitates. Hence the reader will understand why in the Question
now beginning we speak only of man's duties in reference to the
Sacraments, and omit other points that do not so strictly pertain to
Moral. (a) Thus, the nature, institution, number and effects of the
Sacraments belong to Dogma, which the authors hope to treat later in a
similar work. (b) The administration of the Sacraments, their rites,
rubrics, ceremonies are set forth in ritual books and works on liturgy.
(c) The legal rights of ministers, canonical requirements on
registration, penal and processual legislation in reference to the
Sacraments, and like juridical questions are treated fully in
commentaries on pertinent sections of the Code.




Art. 1: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL; THE SACRAMENTALS

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 60-65.)

2654. Nature of a Sacrament.--In the New Law a Sacrament is an outward
sign instituted permanently by Christ to signify and convey grace.

(a) The internal cause or essence of a Sacrament is the outward sign,
which has two parts. The indeterminate part or matter is a visible
object (e.g., the water of Baptism, the chrism of Confirmation, the
bread and wine of the Eucharist, the oil of Extreme Unction, the
imposition of hands in Orders) or a perceptible act that looks to
another act for its perfectionment (e.g., the confession, etc., of the
penitent in penance; the giving of oneself as spouse in Matrimony).
The determining part, or form, is either the sacred formula spoken over
the material element (e.g., in Baptism the words "I baptize thee,
etc.") or an act that completes another act (e.g., the acceptance of
another as spouse in Matrimony). As the matter must be visible or
otherwise sense-perceptible, so the form must be audible or at least
(in Matrimony) equivalently audible; for a Sacrament is a sensible
sign. The words are audible when they are heard or are capable of being
heard at least by the minister.

(b) The external efficient cause or instituter of the Sacraments is
Christ, the founder of the New Testament religion and the productive
and meritorious author of grace as our God and Saviour.

(c) The external final cause or purpose of the Sacraments is to
symbolize outwardly by their rite and to work inwardly by their
instrumental virtue the application of Christ's redemption in the soul
of properly disposed recipients. It is the nature of Baptism and
Penance (Sacraments of the Dead) to produce first grace or forgiveness,
of the others to produce second grace or increase of holiness
(Sacraments of the Living). Furthermore, three of the Sacraments
(Baptism, Confirmation, Orders) have a second effect, since they sign
the soul with the indelible character of member or soldier or minister
of Christ, and hence these Sacraments cannot be repeated.

2655. Rules on the Invalid Use of the Matter and Form of the
Sacraments.--(a) Since the matter and form are essential constituents
without which the Sacraments are not had, it is sacrilegious to
invalidate a Sacrament by substantial changes in either of these parts.
The matter is changed substantially when it is so modified as currently
to be considered and called something different from the element
appointed by Christ. Thus, wine is unfit for the Eucharist if corrupted
into vinegar, or made unsuitable as a drink (e.g., probably as long as
it remains frozen), or notably adulterated (e.g., when it is mixed half
and half with water). The form is changed substantially when it is so
modified that to a listener it no longer conveys the sense intended by
Christ. This happens when the changed form does not express the chief
ideas of the correct form, as when it does not determine who is the
minister of Penance (e.g., "You are absolved"), or who is the subject
of Baptism (e.g., "Ego baptizo in nomine, etc."), or what is the effect
of the Eucharist (e.g., "Hoc non est corpus meum," "Hoc est corpus,"
"Hic meum est corpus"), or the action of the minister of Penance (e.g.,
"Ego abluo te a peccatis"), or the profession in Baptism of faith in
the Trinity (e.g., "Ego te baptizo, Amen").

(b) Since the matter and form are parts of a single composite sign, it
is sacrilegious to invalidate a Sacrament by substantial separations,
which destroy the continuity or unity of signification. There is a
substantial separation within the form when such long intervals occur
between the pronunciation of its syllables or words that it is not in
common estimation a united sentence or proposition; for example, if the
celebrant says, "Hoc est cor-," then sneezes two or three times, and
(instead of repeating the words) concludes "-pus meum," or says "Hoc
est corpus" and after an interruption of several minutes (instead of
repeating) finishes with: "meum." There is substantial separation
between the matter and form, if the former is applied by one minister
and the latter is spoken by another, although the form declares that
the matter is applied by the speaker of the form: for example, if Titus
pours the water while Claudius says: "I baptize thee, etc." Even when
the same minister applies both matter and form, there is a substantial
separation between these parts when the form is not spoken at the same
time or for the same time that the matter is posited, and thereby, from
the special character of the Sacrament, leaves the signification of the
sacramental matter unsettled. This happens when the form is spoken too
long before or too long after the presence or application of the
matter, or when the form is limited by a future condition which will
not be verified during the continuance of the matter (see 2668).

2656. Simultaneity of Matter and Form.--The simultaneity of matter and
form which validity requires must be either moral or physical according
to the character of the Sacrament.

(a) There is physical simultaneity when matter and form are present in
the same instants of time. This kind of union is demanded in the
Eucharist, for it has the character of a transubstantiation of bread
and Wine present at the moments the words of consecration are said over
them. There would be no Sacrament if the bread were absent even during
a part of the consecration.

(b) There is a moral simultaneity like to the physical
contemporaneousness when the matter and form are partly present in the
same instants of time, and perhaps also (as some hold) when one follows
the other with such close succession that not more than a Pater or Ave
could be said between them. This kind of union is the maximum in
Penance and Matrimony, for absolution must follow after confession, and
conjugal acceptance must follow after conjugal offer. It suffices in
Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders; for these four
Sacraments do not consecrate the matter (and hence some little
separation is allowed), but they do signify in the present tense the
bestowal of grace through the application of the matter (and hence any
separation must be of the slightest).

(c) There is a purely moral simultaneity when the form follows the
matter after a somewhat considerable interval of time has elapsed, but
with a connection between the two based on human usage which carries
the matter on in human estimation over to the time the form is
employed. This suffices in Penance and Matrimony. Penance has the
character of a judicial process, whose unity is not destroyed by some
little delay between the discussion and the sentence; and hence it
seems that absolution could be given validly an hour after confession.
Matrimony has the character of a contract, whose unity is preserved
even in spite of a long interval between the date of consent of the
first party and the date of consent of the second party.

2657. Lawfulness of Moral Simultaneity in the Sacraments Other than the
Eucharist.--(a) In Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders,
it would seem on account of the danger of nullity to be a serious sin
to exclude all physical simultaneity between matter and form (e.g., to
pour all the water and then to begin the words: "I baptize thee, etc.,"
or vice versa). In practice the Rubrics should be followed.

(b) In Penance and Matrimony it is more or less sinful to make
needless, though not invalidating, delays. In ordinary practice the
confessor should absolve as soon as the confession has been heard and
the penance accepted, and the bride should express her consent
immediately after the bridegroom has expressed his.

2658. Accidental Changes or Separations as to Matter and Form.--(a)
These administrations are not invalid, for they preserve the essence of
the elements or the sense of the words appointed by Christ. Examples of
accidental change of matter are baptismal water to which a relatively
very small quantity of wine has been added, or wine for the Eucharist
to which a relatively trifling amount of water has been added. The form
is accidentally modified if translated into the vernacular or rendered
by synonymous words (e.g., "Ego abluo te, etc."), or if an unimportant
word (e.g., "enim") is added or subtracted, or if the words are
transposed or partially repeated or unintentionally mispronounced
without detriment to sense (e.g., "Hoc est meum corpus," "Hoc, hoc,
est, est, etc.," "Hoc est copus meum"). There is accidental separation
when slight pauses are made between words, or when an interval not
destructive of the sense falls between the use of the matter and the
use of the form (see 2655, 2656).

(b) These administrations are unlawful and from their nature mortally
sinful, since they are transgressions of a precept of the Church meant
to safeguard respect for the Sacraments of Christ, and they are
therefore opposed to the virtue of religion (2147). But the sin may be
venial by reason of lightness of matter (e.g., omission of the word
"enim"), or of imperfection of the act. Scandal, danger of invalidity,
contempt, and bad intention would make even a small change a serious
sin. In practice the rule to follow is to observe exactly the
prescribed matter and form and entire rite, to pronounce the words
clearly and slowly, to repeat the form when any involuntary
interruption happens between its essential parts, and to unite the
matter and form as closely as possible.

2659. Substantial Changes or Separations.--Substantial changes or
separations _a fortiori_ are grave sins. They offend against religion
(since they make a mockery of the sacred signs appointed by Christ),
against obedience (since they disregard a most serious precept of the
Church), against charity (since they deprive the recipient of
sacramental grace), and against justice (at least when the minister is
bound _ex officio_ to confer the Sacrament, since there is then a
quasi-contract with the recipient to administer the Sacrament
correctly).

2660. Doubtful Matter.--It is sometimes probable but not certain that
an element suffices for the matter of a Sacrament (e.g., coffee or tea
for Baptism, chrism for Extreme Unction). Hence the question: "Is it
lawful to use probable matter in the administration of a Sacrament?"

(a) If certain matter cannot be had and the Sacrament is urgently
necessary or very useful, probable matter may be used. For the
Sacraments were instituted by Christ to benefit man ("The Sacraments
are for men"), and hence it is not irreverent to give to one in need a
probably valid Sacrament when a certainly valid Sacrament is
impossible. Thus, a dying infant may and should be baptized with
coffee, if no pure water can be procured in time; the last anointing
may be conferred with chrism, if the oil of the sick cannot be had
before a dying man will have expired.

(b) If certain matter can be had, or if the Sacrament is not urgently
necessary or useful, probable matter may not be used without grave sin;
for there is then no reason of necessity to justify the risk to which
the Sacrament and perhaps also the recipient are exposed, Thus, it is
not lawful to baptize with coffee when pure water can be secured, or to
confirm with chrism not blessed by a bishop a dying man who had just
received the last Sacraments, even though other chrism is unobtainable
(see 661, 678, 711, and Denziger, n. 1151).

2661. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Means (see 360, 786,
2156)?--(a) Those Sacraments have a necessity of means without which
sanctifying grace and salvation cannot be had. Hence the necessity for
individuals of Baptism (without which there is no regeneration), of
Penance (without which there is no reconciliation), of the Eucharist's
effect (without which there is no incorporation with Christ), and for
the Church the necessity of Orders (without which there are no
ministers and dispensers of grace, Prov., xi, 14).

(b) Those Sacraments have no necessity of means without which
sanctifying grace and salvation can be had; but they have a necessity
of convenience, inasmuch as they perfect grace already had and make
salvation more easy. In this sense, then, Confirmation and Extreme
Unction may be called necessary for the individual, since the former
perfects the grace of Baptism and the latter the grace of Penance; and
Matrimony may be called necessary for the Church, since it perfects
with a sacramental grace the propagation of the children of the Church.

2662. Reception of Sacraments _in re_ or _in voto_.--The Sacraments
that have a necessity of means must be received either in themselves
(_in re_) or in desire (_in voto_).

(a) Thus, Baptism _in re_ is necessary for all infants (John, iii. 5),
Baptism _in re_ or _in voto_ for all adults (John, xiv. 21-23). Baptism
of desire consists in an act of perfect charity or contrition made by
an unbaptized person, which includes the will to do all that God has
commanded, and consequently at least an implicit or virtual desire of
Baptism of water. As is proved in Dogmatic Theology, Baptism may be
supplied for, as regards grace, by martyrdom in an infant and by
martyrdom joined with attrition in an adult.

(b) Penance _in re_ or _in voto_ is necessary for all who have
committed grave sin after Baptism. The desire of the Sacrament is an
act of perfect charity or contrition, which includes at least
implicitly the wish to receive absolution. Martyrdom joined with
attrition also suffices.

(c) The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not a necessary means for anyone,
either _in re_ or _in voto_; for the essential grace of justification
can be obtained through Baptism and Penance. But the proper result
(_res_) of the Eucharist, which consists in incorporation with Christ,
perseverance, and life eternal, is a necessary means _in voto_, tacitly
or interpretatively; for Baptism, as was said, is absolutely necessary
for salvation, and Baptism itself is a tacit or interpretative desire
of the result of the Eucharist, inasmuch as Baptism is but a means to
that result and the beginning of its accomplishment.

2663. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Precept?--An act is said to
fall under precept _per se_, when it is directly commanded in a law
that mentions it specifically; it is said to fall under precept _per
accidens_, when it becomes obligatory in virtue of a law that does not
command it directly or specifically (cfr. 935, 1099, 1602).

(a) There is a divine precept obliging _per se_ and _sub gravi_ in
reference to Baptism ("Preach the Gospel to all nations, baptizing
them, etc.," Matt., xxviii. 19), Penance ("Whose sins you shall
forgive, they are forgiven them, etc.", John, xx. 23), and the
Eucharist ("Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, you shall not
have life in you," John, vi. 54). According to some authorities there
is also a divine precept obliging at least _sub levi_ to receive
Confirmation ("He commanded them to await the promise of the Father,"
Acts, i. 4) and Extreme Unction ("Is there any man sick among you? Let
him bring in the priests of the Church," James, v. 14).

(b) There is a divine precept obliging _per accidens_ and _sub gravi_
in reference to Confirmation and Extreme Unction, when they cannot be
omitted without peril to salvation, scandal to neighbors, or other such
inconvenience which one is seriously bound to prevent. Similarly, there
might be a _per accidens_ obligation of receiving Matrimony or Orders
(see 2627).

(c) There are ecclesiastical precepts determining the circumstances of
the reception of Penance and the Eucharist (see 2590-2593) and
prescribing Confirmation for candidates to Orders (Canon 974).
Moreover, the Code reminds us that no one may lawfully neglect
Confirmation when he has an opportunity to receive it (Canon 787), and
likewise that it is not lawful to neglect Extreme Unction (Canon 944).

2664. Twofold Ministry of the Sacraments.--(a) The ministry of
production (_confectio_) is the application of form to matter that
makes the Sacrament (e.g., the consecration of bread and wine); (b) the
ministry of bestowal (_administratio_) is the application of the
Sacrament to the human recipient (e.g., the Communion). The Eucharist
is a permanent object, whereas Baptism and the rest are transitory
actions. Hence it is that in the Eucharist, but not in the other
Sacraments, the two ministries are separated, and hence it is also that
the Eucharist may be validly given or validly received by those who
cannot validly consecrate.

2665. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Performance of a
Sacrament.--(a) The Person of the Minister.--As the minister represents
Christ, only those may perform a Sacrament to whom Christ has given
authority. Hence, ordinarily only mortals and human beings--not the
Angels or departed Saints--can administer a Sacrament. Further, as the
ministry of a Sacrament may include an act of power and authority,
there are various ranks of ministers. Thus, the ministry of Matrimony
supposes no power or orders or spiritual authority, and the ministers
are the parties themselves; that of Solemn Baptism, Eucharist, Penance,
and Extreme Unction supposes orders and lower authority, and the
minister is the priest; that of Confirmation and Orders supposes higher
authority, and the minister is the bishop.

(b) The Acts of the Minister.--As the minister acts as Christ's
responsible agent to whose wise discretion the dispensation of the
Sacraments is committed, he must have at least the external attention
of mind sufficient to perform all that the rite demands and the
internal intention of will sufficient to make his ministry an act that
is human, sacred, and definitely symbolical of the sacramental effects.

2666. The Necessary Intention.--The intention or purpose of the
minister therefore must have the following qualities:

(a) objectively, there must be an intention of doing what the Church
does (i.e., of performing a sacred rite instituted by Christ, for the
minister acts in the name and authority of Christ). Hence a mock
sacrament--or even, more probably, a purely external performance with
no purpose to enact a sacred rite--does not suffice. But, on the other
hand, an unbeliever can administer validly if he really intends to do
what Christians do or what Christ commanded to be done. The intention
not to do what the Church does was the chief cause of the nullity of
Anglican Orders;

(b) subjectively, the intention must be at least virtual, so as to
ensure a deliberate act. An actual intention is not necessary, because
it is often impossible on account of its difficulty; while an habitual
intention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the act so
as to make it human (see 2165). The interpretative intention (i.e., a
purpose that never existed, but that would presumably have existed, had
attention been given the matter) is with greater reason insufficient;

(c) modally, the intention must be such as to make precise the
character of the action as a special sacred rite; for just as the
matter awaits the form or word to receive the imprint of a sacred
significance, so do the ceremonial words themselves look to the
internal purpose of the minister for their fixed meaning. Hence, the
Sacrament is invalid if the minister's purpose is indeterminate (e.g.,
if a priest wills to consecrate ten undesignated hosts out of the
hundred contained in a ciborium, or to absolve one undesignated person
of a multitude); or if the purpose is self-exclusive (e.g., if a
bridegroom has two mutually incompatible intentions, namely, to marry
the bride and also to marry her only for a time); or if the purpose is
left in suspense (e.g., if a priest makes his absolution depend on
future restitution or any other non-existent condition, and most
probably also if the minister makes the Sacrament depend on the
recipient's predestination or other such condition known only to God).

2667. Rules on Plurality of Intentions.--(a) When opposite intentions
are simultaneous, if one of them is predominant in the minister's will
and not insociable with the Sacrament, that one prevails and the
Sacrament is valid; otherwise the Sacrament is null. (b) When opposite
intentions are successive, the later prevails over the earlier, unless
the earlier was stronger and meant to endure in spite of other
intentions, and it has not been recalled expressly by the will.

2668. Requisites for Use of Conditional Intention.--(a) The use must be
valid or non-suspensive (2666 e), and hence (Matrimony excepted on
account of its special character as a contract) the minister may not
confer a Sacrament under a condition _de futuro_. But conditions _de
præsenti_ (e.g., "I absolve you, if you are repentant") or _de
præterito_ (e.g., "I baptize you, if you have not received Baptism")
are valid.

(b) The use of a conditional intention must be lawful, or justified by
a sufficient reason. Normally the minister should intend absolutely to
give a Sacrament, as the forms of the Sacraments are unconditional. But
if the absolute intention would be disrespectful, because there is
doubt whether all the requisites for the Sacrament are present, while
on the other hand denial of the Sacrament would be harmful because the
subject needs it, both disrespect to the Sacrament and harm to the
subject are avoided by conditional administration. The doubt spoken of
may refer to the recipient (e.g., whether he is living or otherwise
capable, whether he is contrite or otherwise disposed) or to the
Sacrament (e.g., whether it has been received or received validly,
whether the form has been rightly spoken, whether the present matter is
valid).

(c) The use of the conditional intention must be legal according to the
rules prescribed by the Church. Thus, according to the Ritual the
conditional intention in Baptism and Extreme Unction ("_Si non es
baptizatus_," "_Si vivis_") must be expressed vocally. Moreover,
conditional marriages are not permitted as a rule except there be a
grave reason and the bishop consents.

2669. Lawful Administration of Sacraments.--Lawful administration of a
Sacrament demands, in addition to the conditions for validity
(2665-2668), that the minister and his ministry be worthy, for even in
the Old Law it was strictly commanded that holy things be treated in a
holy manner (Isa., lii. 11; Lev., xxi. xxii). Hence, a person who
fulfilled the conditions for validity but who lacked one or other of
the qualities mentioned below would perform and confer a true
Sacrament, but he would sin more or less seriously on account of the
unworthy administration, unless good faith excused him.

(a) The Minister's Worthiness before God.--The state of grace is
required in consecrated ministers when they minister solemnly and _ex
officio_ in performing a Sacrament; for they act then as
representatives of Christ, who is holy, and exercise most sacred
functions which He appointed as means of holiness and which they were
ordained to perform holily. The sin of unworthiness is a grave
sacrilege. It seems there is _per se_ no grave sin, if the minister is
not consecrated (e.g., in lay Baptism), or if the ministry is not _ex
officio_ (e.g., in a Baptism of necessity given by a priest but without
the solemn ceremonies), or if a Sacrament is not made or performed
(e.g., when confession is heard but absolution not given, when
Communion is administered, when the Blessed Sacrament is carried). It
is generally admitted that there is no grave sin even in a solemn and
official performance of a Sacrament, if the Sacrament is urgently
necessary and the state of grace cannot be recovered in time; also in
the exercise of a function which is not itself a Sacrament (e.g., to be
official witness at a marriage or deacon at Mass, to preach, bless,
give Minor Orders, chant or say the Office). When the state of grace is
necessary for his ministry, one who is in sin must to the best of his
ability recover that state by going to confession or at least by making
an act of contrition.

(b) The Minister's Worthiness Before the Church.--Since the Church is
the custodian of the Sacraments, these cannot be lawfully performed or
administered by those who are under her censure or who have not
received her license. The excommunicated and the irregular sin gravely
if they administer Sacraments, unless the faithful lawfully request
administration from them (see 2683). Only priests are licensed to act
as ministers of Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction and the Eucharist,
and the pastor of a place is the authorized minister for that
territory; but in case of need even the laity may administer Baptism, a
priest other than the pastor may give the Last Sacraments, and the sick
may confess to any confessor with due faculties.

(c) Worthiness of the Ministration.--Internally the ministry should be
devout and attentive; for, if private worship should be religiously
made, much more the worship contained in the Sacraments (see 2150,
2244). Voluntary distractions, however, do not seem to be gravely
sinful, unless the validity of the rite is imperilled by them.
Externally the ministry should be dignified and rubrical. Canon 733
requires that each one observe the accidental ceremonies of his own
Rite and liturgical books. Since ceremonies were instituted by the
Church from the earliest ages and are prescribed in virtue of religion
(Catechism of the Council of Trent, page 152), it is sinful to neglect
them unless a rubric is merely directive or optional, such as the rules
before and after Mass. The preceptive rubrics oblige _sub gravi_ as to
notable matter (e.g., the anointing in Baptism), _sub levi_ as to
inconsiderable matter (e.g., words, bows, crosses, etc. of minor
importance); but one may be excused from guilt, or grave guilt, on
account of imperfection of act (e.g., inadvertence caused by external
distractions) or impossibility (e.g., ceremonies curtailed because of
approaching death, scandal or wonder of the people). The Roman Ritual
(Title I, n. 10) advises the explanation of the ceremonies for the
benefit of those who assist at the administration of the Sacraments,
and recommends the Catechism of the Council of Trent for this purpose.

2670. Multiplication of Sins of Unworthy Administration.--How many sins
are committed by the minister when Sacraments are unworthily
administered to many recipients at one time, as when several children
are baptized together, or a large gathering of penitents are heard one
after the other, etc.?

(a) According to the strict view, there are as many distinct sins as
there are distinct administrations, for each Sacrament is separate from
the other. But in case of Communion, since the separate Communions are
parts of the one Eucharistic banquet, there is but one sin, mortal or
venial, according to the view taken of an administration that is not
also performance of a Sacrament.

(b) According to the mild view, there is but one sin, since sins are
not multiplied numerically when they form morally but one act on
account of the unity given them by the purpose of the agent and the
circumstances.

2671. Requirements for a Valid Sacrament in Reference to the
Recipient.--(a) The Person of the Recipient.--Since the Sacraments were
instituted as means of salvation, they can be given only to those who
are still wayfarers in the present mortal existence, and hence a
Sacrament administered to a brute animal or a corpse would be invalid,
or, in the case of Communion, would not be received sacramentally. As
Baptism is the preparation for the other Sacraments, but need not
presuppose personal sinfulness, its subject is any and every unbaptized
person, infant or adult, male or female. The other six Sacraments
presuppose Baptism, and only those who have been initiated into the
Church by Baptism can receive them validly. As to these six Sacraments
only males are capable of Orders, which is for the rulers of the
Church; only adults are capable of Penance, Extreme Unction and
Matrimony, which suppose personal sin or personal contract. Further,
the impotent and impeded are incapable of Matrimony, and those who are
not in danger of death from sickness are incapable of Extreme Unction.
Finally, those who have been baptized, confirmed, or ordained, cannot
be rebaptized, reconfirmed, or reordained, since these three Sacraments
can be given but once; he who is married cannot marry again while his
wife lives and the bond endures; he who has been anointed cannot be
reanointed during the same danger.

(b) The Acts of the Recipient.--If the recipient is an infant, no
disposition on his part is necessary, since he does not understand. If
the recipient is an adult, it is necessary in the performance of every
Sacrament (on the Eucharist see 2664) that he have some intention or
willingness to receive the Sacrament, since Christ does not wish to
confer benefits or impose certain grave burdens on those who are
unwilling. A forced Sacrament to which the subject yielded no internal
consent would be a null Sacrament. Further, since an essential part
(namely, the matter, or according to others a _conditio sine qua non_)
of Penance is the faith and repentance of the recipient, these
dispositions are necessary in that Sacrament.

2672. Qualities of the Recipient's Intention.--(a) Objectively, the
recipient should intend to receive what the Church confers, and hence
intentions that are not serious, or are mistaken or external (e.g.,
Baptism received for the sake of rehearsal, or in the belief that it is
a profane ablution, or accepted as a pure formality), do not seem
sufficient (see 2666).

(b) Subjectively.--The recipient must positively will the Sacrament,
for it seems that the so-called neutral intention--in which the subject
neither consents nor dissents internally, but is passive and
indifferent, and acquiesces externally only to please another--is not a
true desire. But the strength or influence of the recipient's intention
need not be so great as the minister's, since the role of the minister
is to perform the rite, that of the subject only to receive the rite
(see 2665).

2673. When a Virtual Intention Is Necessary.--It is generally agreed,
therefore, that while the interpretative intention does not suffice,
the actual intention and even, for the most part, the virtual intention
are not necessary. But about the virtual intention the following should
be noted; (a) a virtual and explicit intention is necessary in
Matrimony if a party be considered, not precisely as recipient, but as
minister of the Sacrament (see 2666) and as maker of the contract (see
1883); (b) a virtual and at least implicit intention is necessary in
Penance, if a penitent is considered precisely as positing the
requisite matter or condition of the Sacrament, since this consists in
repentance, and repentance includes either an express or an implied
desire of sacramental absolution.

2674. When an Habitual Intention Suffices.--The habitual intention is
found in those who are not conscious (see 2165), but it suffices for
the reception of a Sacrament, since the recipient does not affect the
Sacrament, and it is enough that he had the good will to accept it and
has not retracted that will.

(a) An habitual and explicit intention suffices for the three
Sacraments that impose special obligations, namely, Baptism, Orders,
and Matrimony. Hence, he who has asked for Baptism is validly baptized
after he becomes delirious; he who has asked for Orders is validly
ordained even when unconscious; he who has sent his consent to a
marriage by proxy receives the Sacrament during his sleep, if the other
party's consent closing the contract is given at that time.

(b) An habitual and implicit intention included in a particular will to
do a good act on which the Sacrament follows in natural course,
suffices for the other three Sacraments which do not impose special
obligations. Hence, a person who purposed to live as a Catholic is
validly confirmed while unconscious; a person who intended to die as a
Catholic is validly absolved and anointed, as far as intention is
concerned, at the moment of death, even though he be out of his mind.
Further, if an unbaptized person has resolved to become a Catholic but
has no knowledge of Baptism itself, he is validly baptized in virtue of
his implicit desire, even though he be unconscious.

(c) An habitual and implicit intention included in a general will to do
all that is necessary for salvation or a good life is taught by some
authors, and is by them considered sufficient for Baptism, since it is
the most necessary Sacrament, and the Sacraments are for men. An
unbaptized person of good will who has supernatural contrition or
charity is justified through Baptism of desire, but if he has only
supernatural attrition the Sacrament itself is necessary for him.
Hence, in case of urgent need conditional Baptism should be given a
dying and unconscious infidel who was well disposed; but, as the
intention is not certain, the Baptism should be repeated in case of
recovery. The same principle is extended by some moralists to the
administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to schismatics and
heretics who are in danger of death.

2675. Requirements for Lawful or Fruitful Reception of a Sacrament by
an Adult.--(a) Worthiness of the Recipient from Divine Law.--The two
Sacraments of the Dead, Baptism and Penance, were intended by Christ to
be means of forgiveness to the repentant, and hence they require at
least that the recipient believe himself attrite. The five Sacraments
of the Living were meant by Christ to strengthen grace and life already
had, and consequently he who approaches them must have no serious fault
on his conscience. Conscious unworthiness is a sacrilege, and only
extreme necessity can excuse reception in such a state (e.g., when a
sinner takes Communion to save the Host from profanation).

(b) Worthiness from Church Law.--The recipient must be free from church
censures (Canon 2260) or impediments, and must possess the preparation
or qualification which the church law prescribes (e.g., a certain age
is required for Confirmation; the Eucharist must be received fasting;
the candidate for Orders must be approved, etc.).

(c) Worthiness of Reception.--The Sacraments should be received
devoutly, with proper preparation, attention, and thanksgiving. In the
case of the Eucharist, though intention is not necessary for validity,
it is required for a sacramental or fruitful Communion; an habitual and
implicit intention suffices for the Viaticum (and Easter Communion), an
habitual explicit intention for Communion of devotion.

2676. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Give Them?--(a) A
pastor is obliged to give a Sacrament to one of his own subjects who
reasonably requests it, and to do so willingly, freely (Canon 736),
and, if he has no substitute, in person; for a spiritual shepherd has a
grave duty of justice and charity to feed his flock. A request is not
reasonable, however, if compliance will put the pastor to an
inconvenience greater than that which the parishioner will suffer from
a refusal, for example, when Baptisms, Confessions, or Communions are
needlessly asked for outside the appointed hours, or when sick calls
that can be attended during the day are sent in at night. The
Sacraments necessary for salvation (Baptism and Penance) should be
given even at the risk of life, if the subject is in grave need and
there is assured hope of success (see 1167), and doubtless this should
be applied also to Extreme Unction or even the Viaticum.

(b) One who is not a pastor is obliged from charity to give the
Sacraments to those who reasonably ask. He would be obliged even to
risk his life to save a soul, if there were no one else to administer a
necessary Sacrament to a person in extreme spiritual peril who could be
saved by his ministry.

2677. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Deny Them?--(a)
He must always deny them to those who are incapable, for otherwise he
insults the Sacrament. Under no circumstances, then, may a priest
baptize one who is already baptized, or absolve one who is unrepentant;
and he may not assist at the attempted marriage of a divorcee.
Likewise, as is manifest, he must always deny the Sacraments to those
who ask for them out of hatred or contempt for religion, for to grant
them in such circumstances would be an act intrinsically evil.

(b) He must deny them, as a rule, to those who to his knowledge are
certainly unworthy (e.g., on account of lack of requisite instruction
or moral disposition); otherwise, he casts pearls before swine,
coöperates in the sacrilege of others, and scandalizes the people.
Hence, a public sinner--that is, one whose unworthiness is notorious
(see 2053)--should not be given the Sacraments publicly, until he has
repaired the scandal he gave; and no unworthy person, even though he be
a hidden sinner whose guilt is known only to the minister, should be
given a Sacrament in private until he has shown signs of repentance.
Generally the minister is bound to assure himself beforehand of the
good disposition of the one who asks for a Sacrament, though in case of
Communion this is often impossible, and it suffices to presume that all
who approach the altar becomingly are in the state of grace.

2678. Administration to Unworthy Persons.--Since material coöperation
with sin is lawful for a sufficient reason (see 1515 sqq.), one may
administer a Sacrament to an unworthy person when refusal would cause a
greater evil than ministration. This happens in the following cases:

(a) when refusal will necessitate a more wicked sacrilege (viz., injury
to a Sacrament by the minister himself). This case occurs when the
minister knows the subject's unworthiness only from the latter's
sacramental confession, and hence cannot exclude him without violation
of the seal;

(b) when the refusal will bring on more widespread evils (viz.,
discouragement of the use of the Sacraments). This happens when the
subject who asks the Sacrament is not publicly known as a sinner, but
his request is public, so that a refusal will amount to a defamation of
him by the minister. If priests had the right to inflict public
disgrace on those who approached the Sacraments, it is easily seen what
grave scandals and disorders would follow, and that a ready excuse
would present itself for personal spite and neglect of religion. Our
Lord administered Communion to Judas rather than betray his secret
guilt to the other Apostles.

2679. Is the fear of bodily harm or of death a sufficient reason for
administering a Sacrament to an unworthy person? (a) If a greater evil
will be caused by bestowal of the Sacrament, it should not be bestowed.
This happens when the Sacrament is asked out of hatred or contempt of
religion, and when great scandal will result if the priest yields. (b)
If a greater evil will be caused by refusal of the Sacrament, it should
not be refused. Examples are those of the previous paragraph. The mere
private good of the minister is not preferable to the good of the
Sacrament.

2680. Simulation and Dissimulation of a Sacrament?--Is it lawful in
case of difficulty to give a Sacrament only in appearance? (a) If this
means simulation of a Sacrament, or the use of its externals in such a
way as to make it null (i.e., by withholding internal intention or
using invalid matter or form), the answer is in the negative; for
simulation is always an acted lie (see 2403, 2404), and when applied to
Sacraments it produces a sacrilegious mutilation and also, in the case
of the Eucharist (e.g., when an unconsecrated host is given to a
communicant), an occasion of idolatry. (b) If this means dissimulation
of a Sacrament, or the use of some nonsacramental act to conceal the
denial of a Sacrament, the answer is in the affirmative, for it is
lawful to keep from others knowledge to which they have no right. Thus,
a priest who wishes to conceal from onlookers that he has refused
absolution to a penitent, can lawfully say a prayer and make a sign of
the cross over this person.

2681. Administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to Heretics and
Schismatics.--(a) Regularly this is unlawful, even though these persons
are in good faith and ask for the Sacraments. They must first renounce
their errors and become reconciled with the Church (Canon 731).

(b) Exceptionally, according to some moralists, this is lawful when
there is extreme need. Hence, according to this view a priest may
secretly give conditional absolution to an unconscious heretic or
schismatic in danger of death who has given signs of repentance; he may
absolve and anoint a dying heretic or schismatic, even though
conscious, if this person appears to be in good faith and repentant and
willing to do all that God requires of him. But the priest should first
try to convert the dying person, if this is possible and the latter's
good faith will not be disturbed; and he must also avoid giving scandal.

2682. Repetition of a Sacrament on Account of Invalid
Administration.--(a) This is unlawful when the fear of invalidity is
groundless and foolish; for it is seriously disrespectful to a
Sacrament and disedifying to others to repeat the rite without reason.
But scrupulous persons are sometimes free of grave sin, since they mean
well in repeating and are not accountable for their fears.

(b) This is lawful but not obligatory when there is a prudent misgiving
about a useful Sacrament (Confirmation, Matrimony, anointing of one who
is conscious); also when there is a slight reason of law or fact for
fear about a necessary or more important Sacrament (Baptism, Orders,
absolution of a dying person, anointing of an unconscious person,
consecration of the Eucharist). For the Sacraments are for men. But if
only a small loss or an unlikely loss will be caused by their
non-repetition, the duty of repeating them cannot be insisted on.

(c) This is gravely obligatory when there is a prudent fear about a
necessary or more important Sacrament; it is gravely or lightly
obligatory (to be determined in each case) when there is a well-founded
fear about a useful Sacrament, if charity, justice or religion calls
for repetition and the inconvenience will not be too great. In
Matrimony the alternate methods of convalidation or sanation may be
used as the case demands. Again, the Sacraments are for men, and hence,
if man will likely be subjected to a notable loss by the minister's
neglect of repetition, the duty of repetition is clear.

2683. Reception of a Sacrament from an Unworthy Minister.--May a
Sacrament be received from a minister who, to one's certain knowledge,
cannot give it without sin on account of unworthiness (such as a state
of sin or censure)?

(a) _Per se_, this is unlawful, for it is coöperation with sacrilege
and is often attended by scandal and danger of perversion to self.

(b) _Per accidens_, this is lawful, for material coöperation is
justified when a proportionately grave reason exists (1515 sqq.).
Moreover, often the minister can put himself in the state of grace
before he gives the Sacrament, or can be excused from sacrilege on
account of the necessity. The less the irreverence or danger of
scandal, the less need be the reason for asking or taking a Sacrament
from an unworthy person. If the minister is a sinner or is under
ordinary suspension or other censure, a serious reason of spiritual
advantage suffices (e.g., the opportunity to make the Easter duty); if
the minister is under sentence (Canon 2261 n. 3), only danger of death
suffices; if the minister is a heretic or schismatic, only extreme need
suffices, and the danger of scandal and perversion must be avoided.

2684. Sacramentals.--The sacramentals are the sacred things (e.g.,
rosaries, scapulars, agnus deis) and actions (e.g., consecrations,
blessings, exorcisms) used by the Church in imitation of the Sacraments
to obtain through her intercession blessings chiefly of a spiritual
sort (Canon 1144).

(a) Necessity.--Our Lord gave to the Church the power of instituting
sacramentals, and certain of those used by the Church are but
developments of the blessings and exorcisms that He used. Some of the
sacramentals are commanded by the Church (viz, those that are used in
the administration of the Sacraments or in other sacred services);
others are recommended, but not commanded.

(b) Use.--The virtue of religion requires that the sacramentals be
administered, received and treated with devotion and respect, the
extremes of irreligion and superstition being avoided (see 2244). The
laws of the Church on the ministers, recipients, and rites of the
sacramentals are treated in works on Canon Law and liturgy.




Art. 2: BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 66-83.)

2685. The general duties of the ministers and recipients of the
Sacraments have been outlined in the previous Article. The principles
therein given are the basis of the special duties that pertain to each
of the seven Sacraments. In this and the remaining Articles, therefore,
it will suffice to apply without explaining anew the rules already
given and to add the special details proper to each Sacrament.

2686. The Sacrament of Baptism.--The first and most essential Sacrament
is Baptism (Greek, washing), which may be defined: "The Sacrament of
regeneration by water in the word" (Catechism of the Council of Trent,
page 163). The internal grace of the Sacrament is expressed by
regeneration, the external sign by water and the word.

(a) The effect of Baptism is regeneration, for it cleanses from sin and
penalty, and makes him who was a child of wrath to be a child of God
and a co-heir of Christ. Baptism also christens, since it seals one
with the indelible character of Christian, or member of the Church. As
all are under the original curse by birth from Adam, so all who would
inherit blessing are in need of this new birth through Christ (see
2661): "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he
cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John, iii. 5).

(b) The material element (remote matter) of Baptism is water, that is,
any and every form of liquid which in common estimation is pure and
unchanged water (e.g., water taken from the ocean, from streams,
fountains, or wells; water melted from snow, ice or hail; water
gathered from steam, dew, or mist; chemical and mineral water). But
animal and plant fluids, though they contain water, are looked upon as
distinct substances, and hence Baptism cannot be administered with
milk, blood, spittle, sweat, oil, flower or fruit juices (e.g., wine,
cider), or extracts of barks or roots. Doubtful matter are liquids
that, while in large part composed of water, seem to be generally
regarded as not water (e.g., thin soup, tea or coffee, light beer); and
hence only in necessity can these be lawfully used for Baptism.

(c) The formal element of Baptism is the word or the formula appointed
by Christ. In the Latin Church the words are: "I baptize thee in the
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," Almost
every word in this form is necessary for the sense given by Christ, and
hence almost any omission makes it necessary, or at least lawful, to
repeat Baptism (see 2655, 2682). The declaration of the form demands
that the application of the water (proximate matter) be made in the
manner of an ablution (i.e., by sprinkling, pouring or immersion). If
sprinkling or pouring is used, the body of the recipient (i.e., the
skin of his head) must be washed (i.e., the water must touch the head
and flow thereon) by the baptizer (i.e., the person who pronounces the
words must pour or sprinkle the water). But in case of necessity one
may use the opinion that Baptism is valid when the water touches only
the hair or some part distinct from the head, or even the afterbirth of
a fetus.

2687. Solemn and Private Baptism.--Though in essentials Baptism is but
one, it is distinguished in reference to accidental ceremony into
solemn and private.

(a) Solemn Baptism is that which is administered with all the rites
prescribed by the Liturgy. It requires consecrated water, sponsors and
special ceremonies; its minister is a clergyman (ordinarily the
parish-priest or Ordinary, extraordinarily a delegated deacon); its
place is the baptistery or church. In the Baptism of adults even
greater solemnity may be used, for there is a special rite of
administration, and the Church recommends that this Baptism be
performed when possible by the Ordinary, or at least in cathedral
churches, and on the vigil of Easter or Pentecost.

(b) Private Baptism is given in danger of death, or when an adult
convert is rebaptized conditionally (Canon 759). It requires only true
and natural water, though the water should be as clean and decent as
possible, and baptismal or blessed water is preferable; generally the
simple form without other rite suffices; sponsors are not necessary,
unless they can be had without difficulty, but if possible at least one
or two witnesses should be present; the Baptism may be given in the
private home or the hospital or other place where the candidate is
staying; anyone who has the use of reason and is able to perform the
rite may act as minister. When several persons suitable to minister
private Baptism are present, the order of preference to be followed is:
priest, deacon, subdeacon, cleric, layman, woman; but a woman should be
preferred to a man if modesty calls for this, or if the woman is better
acquainted with the manner of baptizing. It is considered a serious sin
needlessly to prefer a non-priest to a worthy priest, a non-Catholic to
a Catholic, an outsider to the parish-priest. If possible, parents
should not baptize their own children, since it is more becoming that
the spiritual parent and the carnal parent be different persons.

2688. Duties of Parish-Priests as to Baptism.--(a) Before
Baptism.--Baptismal water should be blessed, added to or renewed, as
the ritual regulations of one's place require; the faithful should be
frequently admonished in sermons of the serious duty of having their
infants baptized as soon as possible (Canon 770); the people should
also be told (especially midwives, physicians and surgeons) how lay
Baptism is to be given validly (Canon 743).

(b) At the Time of Baptism.--Converts preparing for Baptism should be
well instructed in the principal religious truths (viz, those contained
in the Creed), and precepts (viz., the laws of the Decalogue and of the
Church, see 914 sqq.), and prayers (viz, the Our Father, the acts of
faith, hope, charity, and contrition); and they should learn the nature
and effects of Baptism. The parish-priest may delegate a deacon to
baptize solemnly in his place, if there is a sufficient reason, as when
he himself is impeded by sickness, absence, or occupation (Canon 741).

(c) After Baptism.--The pastor in virtue of his office has the
responsibility of attending to the registration of baptisms in the
proper book (Canon 777). The registration should be made without
delay--that is, before the sponsors have departed, or immediately after
the ceremony, or at least on the same day, if possible; the entry
should be made accurately and legibly. The duty of keeping proper
baptismal records is considered grave, since important evils would
follow on their neglect.

2689. Duties of Parents and Guardians in Reference to Baptism.--(a) As
to Administration of Baptism.--Parents are obliged under grave sin not
to expose their children to the loss of salvation by undue delay of
Baptism (see 2344, 2630). If there is danger of death, a child must be
baptized at once; if there is no immediate danger of death, the child
must nevertheless, on account of the absolute necessity of Baptism, be
baptized as soon as possible. Some moralists consider a needless delay
gravely sinful if it exceeds three or four days; others, if it exceeds
ten or eleven days. Since infants can be baptized in the womb, a mother
is not obliged to undergo the Caesarean operation to ensure Baptism;
but she may permit the operation for the sake of a more certain
Baptism, unless her obligations to husband or other children will
suffer on account of the danger to her life. If a mother dies in
pregnancy, the fetus should be extracted and baptized. The duty here
rests with the relatives and the physician (Canon 746).

(b) As to Details of Baptism.--Parents should choose suitable names for
their children, avoiding such as are obscene, ridiculous, or impious.
It is advisable that the name of a Saint or of of some other person
distinguished for holiness be chosen, for this will be of a spiritual
advantage to the child and an edification to others. Parents have the
right to appoint the sponsors of their infant children, and should
choose only those who are canonically admissible. If Baptism has been
administered at home, the parents should, if the child survives, bring
it as soon as possible to the church for conditional Baptism, or for
the baptismal ceremonies (Canons 759, 760).

2690. Sponsors.--From early times the Church has required in Baptism
the use of sponsors, and the reasons for this usage will appear from
the duties of these god-parents. The present law (Canons 762 sqq.)
retains the ancient tradition, and prescribes as a serious duty that in
Solemn Baptism (even of adults, whenever possible) there shall be at
least one sponsor (male or female), and that not more than two be used,
one a male and the other a female.

(a) Requirements for Validity--Since the sponsor takes obligations, he
must have the use of reason and give consent to the office; since he is
charged with the duty of spiritual guidance, he must be baptized and
not be a member of a heretical or schismatic sect; since he exercises
an office of honor, he must not be under the displeasure of the Church
by sentence of excommunication or the like; since he is to act as
spiritual father, he must not be the parent or spouse of the baptized;
since he is to stand for the baptized person, he must be designated by
the latter or his parents or by the minister. The sponsor must also
indicate (in person or by proxy) his acceptance of the care of the
baptized person by physically touching him at the moment of Baptism
(either by holding the infant over the font, or by placing a hand on
the candidate), or immediately after the Baptism (by raising from the
waters or receiving from the hands of the minister the one who has been
immersed, or by taking from the font one who has been baptized by
pouring). Non-Catholics, therefore, may not be sponsors, but to avoid
great offense or other serious evil they may sometimes be admitted as
witnesses or honorary sponsors (see 956 sqq.).

(b) Requirements for Lawfulness.--The sponsor should have reached his
fourteenth year (unless the minister sees fit for a just cause to admit
a younger person), and should know the rudiments of faith; he must be a
person of respectability among Catholics, and hence one who is
notorious on account of certain penalties or on account of crime or of
membership in the Freemasons is not acceptable; he must be free to act
as sponsor, and hence religious and clerics in Major Orders must have
permission of the superior qualified in each instance to grant this
permission.

2691. Duties of Sponsors.--(a) They are obliged to look upon their
spiritual children as their perpetual charges, to see to their
Christian education and to the fulfillment of the baptismal promises
for which they stood surety (Canon 769).

(b) These obligations are grave, since the matter is grave; but, as the
care of children falls principally upon the parents, it is only when
the parents neglect their duty that the sponsors are held to do what
they can for the instruction and correction of their god-children
(Catechism of Council of Trent, page 175).

2692. Duties of Adult Recipients of Baptism or of Those Who Have the
Use of Reason.--(a) Before Baptism.--An unbaptized person who has faith
and who sees the necessity of Baptism, is gravely obliged to ask for
Baptism at once, if he is in danger of death, or as soon as he
conveniently can, if he is not in danger of death; for since Baptism is
the divinely appointed means of entering the Church and of sharing in
its privileges, he who would delay it unduly would disobey an important
command of God and would be seriously neglectful of his own salvation.
For a sufficient reason, however (e.g., for the sake of instruction or
probation, or to avoid persecution), Baptism may be delayed even for
years; but the catechumen should then make at once an act of contrition
or charity so as to obtain the benefit of Baptism of desire. Converts
should prepare for Baptism by taking a course of instructions, or, when
there is danger of death, a summary instruction (791 sqq.).

(b) At Baptism.--The internal dispositions include, besides intention,
faith and repentance: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be
saved" (Mark, xvi. 16); "Do penance and be baptized" (Acts, ii. 38).
There must be an explicit faith in the four chief mysteries (see 789).
In this country converts who are being baptized conditionally make an
abjuration and profession of faith before Baptism, and go to confession
and receive conditional absolution after Baptism. The Code recommends
that those who are well receive Baptism fasting; and that, unless grave
reason excuses, the neophyte assist at Mass and receive Communion after
his Baptism (Canon 753).

(c) After Baptism.--Since Baptism makes one a member of the Church,
those who receive it are subject to church laws. The promises made in
Baptism are not strictly vows, but an engagement of loyalty to the
faith and the commandments (see 2191).

2693. Duties of the Minister of Baptism.--(a) In Reference to the
Parents.--If the parents insist on giving an unsuitable name to their
child, the pastor should silently add a suitable name of some Saint
chosen by himself, and should inscribe both names in the register
(Canon 761). A child of non-Catholic parents should not be baptized by
Catholics, unless this can be done without injury to the natural right
of the parents of training their own children and without danger to the
future perseverance of the child. Hence these children, if infants,
should not be baptized against the will of their parents unless they
are in danger of death and can be baptized without too great
inconvenience; but if a child is able to judge for himself, or if there
is no parental opposition (at least not of both parents), and there are
good reasons to believe that the child will be brought up as a
Catholic, he may be baptized (Canons 750, 751).

(b) In Reference to the Sponsors.--If a sponsor cannot be admitted, the
pastor must use great kindness and prudence, so as not to give offense.
If a non-Catholic has been appointed as sponsor, the difficulty may
sometimes be overcome by naming a sacristan or servant as sponsor and
permitting the non-Catholic to act as witness.

(c) In Reference to the Capacity of the Recipient.--The minister must
give the Sacrament only to those who are capable. Hence, he cannot
baptize what is not human (e.g., uterine growths which do not pertain
to a fetus), or not living (e.g., a stillborn infant), or not
unbaptized (e.g., a convert or an infant about whose valid Baptism
there is no reasonable doubt). Speculatively there is some difficulty
about Baptism of unborn fetuses, of abortive fetuses, and of
monstrosities (e.g., an infant with two heads or two hearts). For, as
to the first, it seems that the physically unborn are incapable of
spiritual rebirth; as to the second, it seems that the soul of an
undeveloped fetus may be sub-human; and, as to the third, it may be
doubtful whether a monstrosity is one individual or several
individuals. Practically, however, one should proceed on the principle
that the Sacraments are for men, and give the benefit of a doubt to the
infants by conditional Baptism. Intra-uterine Baptism should not be
used except in case of urgent necessity, and it is then permissible to
employ a mixture of one part of chloride of mercury with two parts of
water to avoid infection. Midwives, nurses, mothers, and physicians
should be especially careful to baptize abortive fetuses, and should
know how this can be done (see Commentaries on Canons 746-748).

(d) In Reference to the Willingness of the Recipient.--An infant is not
required to will the Sacrament, and hence the perpetually insane, who
are unable to distinguish between right and wrong, may be baptized
without any desire on their part. But an adult must intend to be
baptized (see 2671 b). Hence, the minister must inquire about the
wishes of an adult candidate, If an unbaptized person is now out of his
mind (insane, afflicted with lethargy or sleeping sickness, delirious),
but formerly had the use of reason, he is classed with adults, and his
intention has to be considered. He should not be baptized, therefore,
until he comes to himself, unless there is danger of death and signs of
a desire to receive Baptism were given before (Canons 745, 754).

(e) In Reference to the Worthiness of the Recipient.--The minister
should remind the candidate of the duty of attrition. If the person who
asks for Baptism wishes to retain certain habits (e.g., superstition,
concubinage, or unlawful business) which cannot be reconciled with
Christianity, he cannot be regarded as suited for Baptism. But in
danger of death good faith should not be uselessly disturbed.

(f) In Reference to the Pastor.--Solemn Baptism either in or out of
one's territory may not be given without permission from the proper
pastor who has jurisdiction (Canons 738-740). And a minister who is not
the pastor of the baptized person must send notice of the Baptism to
the pastor, as soon as possible, if the latter was not present (Canon
778).

(g) In Reference to Himself and the Sacrament.--The minister should
inform himself, if necessary, about the existence or validity of a
previous Baptism, and he should observe the ceremonies, essential and
accidental, of his Rite. Foundlings should be baptized conditionally,
unless it is certain that they have been already baptized validly
(Canon 749). The internal dispositions of intention and state of grace
are necessary, while for baptism of adults fasting is advisable (Canon
753).

2694. The Sacrament of Confirmation.--Next to Baptism, not in necessity
or dignity but in likeness and in time, is Confirmation; for
Confirmation completes the work begun in Baptism, and it is also
frequently received immediately or next after Baptism. It may be
defined as "the Sacrament in which through the anointing with chrism
and the prayer of the bishop a baptized person is perfected and
strengthened in the grace received and signed indelibly with the
character of soldier of Jesus Christ."

(a) The element of the Sacrament (remote matter) is chrism, that is, a
mixture of olive oil and balsam specially blessed by the bishop and
applied (proximate matter) by an anointing and the imposition of hands
on the forehead of the recipient. The law of the Church requires that
the chrism be new (i.e., made at the last previous consecration of
oils), and that the anointing be made with the right thumb in the form
of a cross.

(b) The form of Confirmation in the Latin Church is as follows: "I sign
thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of
salvation in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost."

2695. The Minister of Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The ordinary
minister of this Sacrament is only the bishop; but a priest may act as
extraordinary minister, either from the common law (viz., Cardinals,
Abbots, etc.), or from special indult (Canon 782). The bishop may
confirm outsiders in his own diocese, unless their own Ordinary
forbids, and with permission he may confirm outside his diocese (Canon
783). Since January 1, 1947, by force of the decree of the Congregation
of the Discipline of the Sacraments (_Spiritus Sanctus_) the following
were established as extraordinary ministers within the limits of their
territories and for subjects in danger of death.

1) "pastors having their own territories, therefore excluding personal
and family pastors, unless they have also their own territory." Under
this heading are included secular and religious pastors. It is to be
noted that, since national parishes in the United States are assigned a
definite territory, pastors of such parishes enjoy the privilege of
this decree. Pastors of Negro and Indian parishes, even if they are
considered to be personal pastors, may be included, for the
jurisdiction is both personal and territorial. Military chaplains can
not confirm in virtue of this decree.

2) "the vicars spoken of in Canon 471, and also parochial
administrators (_vicarii oeconomi_)." The first group are canonically
innominate and authors adopt various titles for the personages
involved. However, the reference is always to the priests placed in
actual charge of _cura animarum_ in parishes which have been fully
incorporated. The second group mentioned are the _vicarii oeconomi_,
priests appointed canonically as administrators of vacant parishes (see
Canons 472, n.1; 473,1). All other vicars lack the power, namely, the
Diocesan Administrator (_vicarius capitularis_), Vicar General,
_Vicarius Substitutus_ (priest who takes place of absent pastor),
_Vicarius Adjutor_ (assists a disabled pastor), _Vicarius Cooperator_
(curate), those who according to Canon 472, n.2, take temporary charge
of a vacant parish prior to appointment of a true administrator,
chaplains of schools, hospitals, and other charitable institutions (by
rescript of Nov. 18, 1948, the faculty was extended also to chaplains
of maternity hospitals and foundling homes in the United States, and
this faculty is renewable), the seminary rector, religious superiors
even in exempt communities.

3) "priests to whom is entrusted exclusively and permanently within a
definite territory, and with a definite church, the complete care of
souls together with the rights and duties of pastors." Such territorial
arrangements are not common in the United States. The reference may be
to priests established as quasi-pastors in Canon 216, §3 (hence pastors
in missionary territory and prefectures), episcopal delegates to the
territories later to be erected as parishes or to maintain the status
of a perpetual vicarage. Perhaps the reference is only to special
arrangements made by particular diocesan laws.

(b) Duties.--The ordinary minister of this Sacrament should confer it
when his subjects reasonably request it, and the Ordinary should see
that the Sacrament is administered to his people, if possible, at least
every five years (Canon 785). It would be unreasonable, however, to
expect a bishop to go to every sick or dying person who desires
Confirmation, as the Sacrament is not necessary for salvation and the
task would be morally impossible, The Sacrament should be performed
validly, worthily, and rubrically. When Confirmation is given, fasting
is of counsel, not of precept. The use of a sponsor in Confirmation
seems to be a grave obligation, when possible. A recipient can have but
one sponsor, and a sponsor can act for only one or two confirmandi,
unless it appear to the minister that there is sufficient reason to
have a sponsor act for more (Canon 794). The pastor of the recipient,
if he is unaware of the Confirmation, should be notified as soon as
possible (Canon 799).

(c) Various prescriptions, some of them subjects of special study, are
attendant upon the grant of power to confirm to pastors and "equivalent
pastors." The major ones are summarily stated here. The pastor obtains
this power when he acquires the office. It lasts as long as he holds
office. The exercise of his power becomes unlawful if he falls under
censure; in certain cases it may then even be invalid. Theologians
disagree as to the precise nature of the power, whether it be of
orders, of jurisdiction, of both, an intrinsic or extrinsic
modification of orders, etc. The common opinion holds that it is solely
a power of orders. Hence, Canon 209 may not be safely used here, and an
ordinary assistant who attempts to confirm would not fall under any
irregularity; a pastor, however, might, by misuse of his power, be not
only deprived of it, but be placed under an irregularity. Use of the
power is not dependent on the permission of the local Ordinary. It may
be necessary to inquire however, whether the bishop wishes to confirm
in particular cases. Episcopal instructions on this matter must be
complied with.

(d) Subjects of the Extraordinary Minister. The decree, _Spiritus
Sanctus_, in its second rule lays down a condition for the valid
administration of Confirmation by the extraordinary minister and
determines the proper subject. The new faculty is strictly personal
(hence it may not be delegated to others) and strictly territorial
(hence the administration must take place within the confines of the
minister's district and therein extends even to exempt places). The
recipient must be "in real danger of death because of a serious illness
from which it is foreseen that he will die."

Before treating the illness established as a condition for validity,
other conditions of the subject must be considered. The decree
describes the proper recipient as _fidelis_ in two places. The question
has been discussed whether this limits the subjects to Catholics and
excludes validly baptized Protestants. Authors are not agreed. Perhaps,
since the extraordinary minister can act only within the powers given
him in the decree, he would have to interpret _fidelis_ as extending
solely to Catholics. On May 1, 1948, the Congregation for the Oriental
Church issued a grant of powers to the Latin extraordinary ministers to
confer Confirmation under the same conditions to Catholics of the
Oriental rite who live under the jurisdiction of a Latin Ordinary, who
are in the territory of the Latin pastor and whose rite has no
established parish or mission in the locality. (This grant of power was
previously impossible by virtue of Canon 782, §4.) In emergency cases
there would be no need to await the arrival of the proper pastor. Since
Ruthenian Catholics are not under the Latin Ordinaries in this country,
it seems that the decree might not extend to them. The point is
disputed, but it would be imprudent to act on the opinion that the
Ruthenians are included until the question is officially settled. The
recipient need not be a permanent resident in the territory by reason
of domicile or quasi-domicile; physical presence suffices.

The final condition of dangerous sickness is similar to the one in
Extreme Unction; it must arise from an intrinsic cause, not from an
extrinsic cause. and includes not only sickness, but also wounds and
accident cases. The decree speaks of the subject in "_vero mortis
periculo_." Some thought that the wording distinguished the sickness
from mere "_periculo" mortis_, and hence must be certain, not doubtful
or probable. In response to the Cardinal of Palermo, on March 6, 1947,
the Congregation of the Sacraments favored the opinion that the norms
for "_urgente mortis periculo_" (Canons 1043, 1044, 1046) are
applicable. As a rule of thumb, many authors propose: if the sickness
permits the administration of Extreme Unction, it also justifies the
giving of Confirmation in accordance with the terms of the decree.

2696. The Recipient of Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The subject
of this Sacrament is only a baptized person, and in adults intention is
necessary. The general custom in the Latin Church is not to confirm
before the seventh year, or thereabout, has been attained; but the
Sacrament may be given even earlier, if an infant is in danger of
death, or if there seems to the minister to be a just and grave reason
for confirming one under seven years of age (Canon 788). Those who have
the use of reason should not be admitted to Confirmation without
previous instruction on the nature of the Sacrament and the
requirements for its proper reception.

(b) Duties.--There is an obligation to receive this Sacrament when one
has the opportunity (Canon 787); but apart from scandal, contempt, or
danger to salvation the obligation seems light. Hence, if a person
advanced in years is ashamed to receive Confirmation with the children,
he should be advised but not reproved; nor should he be denied
absolution as if he were certainly guilty of serious fault. The
recipient should be in the state of grace, and it is advisable that he
go to confession beforehand if he have serious sin on his conscience.
Though not necessary, it is more suitable that the recipient be
fasting. A new name may be taken in Confirmation, and it is proper that
those whose baptismal name is unsuitable should either have it changed
at this time or add the name of a Saint. Those who are being confirmed
should be present for the entire ceremony (Canon 789).

2697. The Sponsors in Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The
requirements for validity are, _mutatis mutandis_, practically the same
as for baptismal sponsorship. Thus, the sponsor must be designated by
the parents or the candidate, or, in default of them, by the pastor or
minister; he must not be the parent or spouse of the confirmandus; he
must physically touch the confirmandus at the moment of Confirmation.
Further, it is required that the sponsor be already confirmed himself.
The requirements for licitness are the same as for Baptism, and
moreover, as a rule, the sponsor at Confirmation should be of the same
sex as the recipient and be different from the baptismal sponsor
(Canons 795, 796).

(b) Duties.--The godfather at Confirmation contracts a lifelong
spiritual relationship with his godchild (which does not constitute a
matrimonial impediment). The latter should have a special place in his
prayers according to the order of charity, and, if necessity arises,
should receive his protection and assistance in spiritual matters
(Canon 797).

2698. Duties of the Pastor in Reference to Confirmation.--(a) The
pastor should instruct his people on the nature and advantages of
Confirmation and should see to it that they receive the Sacrament in
due time (Canon 787). He should also instruct his parishioners about
the terms of _Spiritus Sanctus_. His power as extraordinary minister
imposes an obligation _per se_ grave to use it when the cases arise;
excusing causes, however, are possible, and neglect in a single case
would be only venial. At appointed times each year he should hold a
continuous course of instructions over a period of several days in
order to prepare the classes of children for the proper reception of
Confirmation (Canon 1300).

(b) The pastor should see that the Confirmations of his parishioners
are entered in a special book of record, and should also note in the
baptismal register the fact of Confirmation (Canons 798, 470, n. 2).

2699. The Sacrament of the Eucharist.--This is the chief Sacrament,
for, while the other Sacraments produce the grace or the grace and the
character of Christ, this one contains Christ Himself; and, while the
other Sacraments are means that prepare man to consecrate or to receive
the Eucharist or at least symbolize it, the Eucharist is the end of
them all. The Eucharist may be defined as follows: "The body and blood
of our Lord Jesus Christ present through the words of consecration
under the appearances of bread and wine to be offered to God and to be
received by man." Thus, we may distinguish various aspects of the
Eucharist.

(a) It is a sacrifice, since the Mass is the supreme act of worship and
is one with the sacrifice of the cross (see 2178 sqq.).

(b) It is a permanent Sacrament, since unlike the other Sacraments it
does not consist in the passing application of a sacred sign to a
recipient, but in the abiding presence of a thing absolutely sacred
contained under sensible forms.

(c) It may be considered in its passing phases of beginning, in which
it is consecrated by the priest (performance of the Sacrament), and
termination, in which it is received by the communicant (application,
dispensation of the Sacrament).

2700. The Matter and Form of the Eucharist.--Since the essence of a
Sacrament is found in the outward sign, it is commonly held that the
Sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the species of bread and wine as
signifying the body and blood of the Saviour, which is really, truly
and substantially contained under them.

(a) The matter of the first consecration is that which Christ used,
namely, bread. The bread must be true bread in the strict and usual
Scriptural sense of the word. Hence, for validity it is necessary that
it be made from wheat flour (bread made from beans, peas or other
legumes, bread made from non-wheaten cereals such as corn, oats, and
probably also rye and barley, is not valid matter); that the flour be
mixed with water (bread made from a notable quantity, i.e., about
one-third of other liquid, such as milk, oil, wine, is invalid matter);
further, that the mixture be sufficiently baked (dough or half-baked
cakes are invalid matter). The bread must be entire and not
substantially adulterated or changed; hence, bread from which all the
gluten has been abstracted, bread to which a notable amount of foreign
substance (such as sugar or non-wheaten flour) has been added, bread so
old that it has corrupted, cannot be consecrated. Accidental qualities
do not affect validity, and hence any kind of wheat may be used (hard,
soft, red, or white). But the church law strictly requires that a
priest observe the tradition of his own Church (i.e., among Latins the
bread must be unleavened and the host round), and that all consecrated
matter be new (i.e., not baked more than fourteen days, or, according
to others, twenty or forty days), clean, and unbroken. The small
particles for the laity should be about one inch in diameter, the large
hosts about two or three inches; and all altar breads should be of
moderate thickness.

(b) The matter of the second consecration is likewise that appointed by
Christ at the Last Supper, namely, wine. Only wine strictly so called
according to Scriptural and common usage is valid matter. Hence, the
Eucharistic wine must be made from grapes, and consequently cherry
wine, currant wine, peach wine, blackberry wine, cider, wild grape
wine, artificial wine, etc., are insufficient; the grapes must be ripe,
and verjuice is therefore invalid matter. The wine must also be entire,
unadulterated, and uncorrupted; and hence wine from which all the
alcohol has been removed, brandy or cognac (i.e., spirits distilled
from wine), wine to which a notable quantity of water, tartaric acid,
sugar, alcohol or other substance has been added, and wine which has
become vinegar, are not fit matter for the Sacrament. Accidental
qualities are of no importance to validity, and hence the wine may be
red or white, dry or sweet; it may be made either from ripe or dry
grapes (raisin wine); and the Church permits the fortification of weak
wine by a process of heating that does not prevent fermentation, or by
the addition when fermentation has begun to subside of grape or wine
alcohol on condition that the final alcoholic strength does not exceed
12%, or in some cases, if the wine possessed so much, 17% or 18%. But
the church law strictly requires for licit matter that wine be
fermented, though must or new wine is permissible in case of necessity,
if it have about 5% alcohol; that it be neither souring nor frozen, nor
mixed with substances added for the sake of aroma, color or sweetness,
nor with water poured in before Mass. The tradition and law of the
Church, based on the example of Christ, make it a grave obligation that
a few drops of water be added to the wine at the altar, but, if the
water equals a third part of the wine, the matter becomes of doubtful
sufficiency.

(c) The form is contained essentially in the words of consecration used
by Christ at the institution of the Eucharist, namely, "_Hoc est corpus
meum_" over the bread, and "_Hic est calix sanguinis mei_" over the
wine. But a grave precept of the Church requires that all the other
principal words of the consecration be pronounced (i.e., the "_novi et
aeterni testamenti_, etc.," the "_Hæc quotiescumque_, etc.," the "_Qui
pridie_," the "_Simili modo_"). The omission of the particle "_enim_"
would be only venially sinful.

2701. The Minister of Consecration.--(a) Qualifications.--Every priest
and only a priest can consecrate validly, for only to the Apostles and
their successors in the priesthood were spoken the words of Christ: "Do
this in commemoration of Me." But only those priests can consecrate
lawfully who have the faculty of celebrating Mass (see 2709).

(b) Duties as regards Valid Consecration.--Internally, there must be
the intention (actual or virtual) of acting in the name of Christ, and
of effecting what the words of consecration signify; and hence a merely
narrative recitation of the form is insufficient. This actual or
virtual intention must also determine the individual matter to be
consecrated, and hence a host placed on the corporal is not consecrated
if the priest neither saw it nor took it up for consecration. Small
crumbs in the ciborium and small drops of wine on the inner side of the
chalice are consecrated, unless excluded by the priest's intention; but
drops of wine on the outside of the chalice should be considered
unconsecrated, since it is unlawful to consecrate what is not contained
in the chalice.

Externally, bread and wine must be physically present to the priest,
that is, so within his reach or range that according to human usage
they can be correctly designated by the demonstrative pronoun "this"
used in the form. Accordingly, they must be near the minister; how near
cannot be mathematically defined, and authors variously assign about
ten, twenty, thirty, forty and fifty paces as the extreme limit. Again,
the bread and wine must not be separated from the minister by any
dividing partition, such as a wall, or the altar, or perhaps even the
closed door of the tabernacle, though a closed container (such as a
covered ciborium or chalice) would not put the matter away from the
minister's presence. Finally, they must not be behind the minister's
back, and, even if they are before him but hidden (e.g., hosts under
the corporal or chalice), the consecration is doubtful.

(c) Duties as regards Lawful Consecration.--Internally, there must be
the state of grace, which the divine law prescribes, Further, one who
is conscious of grave sin certainly committed and certainly unconfessed
(unless inculpably omitted in confession) must go to confession
beforehand, unless there be need to celebrate at once (e.g., because
otherwise there will be no parochial Mass on a day of precept, or
because grave scandal or defamation will result, or a dying person will
be deprived of the Viaticum) and confession is impossible (i.e., there
is no confessor present who has jurisdiction, or who can be resorted to
without a serious inconvenience extrinsic to confession, and moreover
it is very difficult on account of distance, health, weather, or other
like reasons to go elsewhere to confession). Under these circumstances,
he may make an act of perfect contrition and then proceed to celebrate.
But one who has consecrated without confession because of such
necessity must go to confession as soon as possible--i.e., within three
days, or, if circumstances so require, earlier than that (e.g., if a
confessor can be had the same day, but not again for a week) or later
(e.g., if a confessor cannot be had for a week). These rules about
confession are of grave obligation, from Church law at least (Canon
807). On account of disrespect, it seems that grave sin is committed
when the celebrant is voluntarily and advertently distracted during
consecration, but he should not repeat the form unless it is certain or
very probable that something essential has been omitted. Externally,
consecration must be made only during Mass, both species must be
consecrated, a larger quantity must not be consecrated than can be
conveniently used, the matter at the moment of consecration must rest
on the corporal and above the stone of the altar, and a ciborium must
be uncovered while its bread is being consecrated.

2702. Inadvertent Neglect of Grave Liturgical Precept.--Is the
consecration valid when the minister inadvertently neglects some grave
liturgical precept as to the matter or manner of consecration?

(a) Some authors reply in the negative, because they feel that no
priest has the will to consecrate in a way forbidden by the Church
under pain of grave sin. According to this opinion, then, if
accidentally no water were placed in the chalice, or if the chalice
were unconsecrated, or if the ciborium were left off the corporal, the
consecration would be invalid.

(b) Other authors distinguish as follows: if the celebrant intended not
to consecrate with a material breach of grave liturgical prescription,
the consecration would be null; if the celebrant had only the intention
to consecrate all valid matter before him, the consecration would be
valid. This latter intention, it seems, should be formed by all priests
once for all, since it ensures the validity of their consecrations and
is not sinful, as it does not aim to violate the rubrics, but only to
provide for exceptional cases when a rubric is unintentionally violated.

2703. The Minister of Communion.--(a) Qualifications.--The ordinary
minister of Communion is a priest, the extraordinary minister a deacon.
Pastors and other priests to whose custody the Blessed Sacrament is
entrusted have the right to give Communion, and others also who have
express or presumed permission. The celebrant of Mass may give
Communion during his Mass, and, if Mass is private, just before and
just after it. A sick priest who is unable to say Mass may communicate
himself, at least when there is no other minister at hand; and even a
layman may, in the absence of a major cleric, give himself the
Viaticum, or consume the Host to save it from profanation (Canons
845-850).

(b) Duties.--Internally, the minister is bound _sub levi_ to be in the
state of grace, and _sub gravi_ to be free from censures (such as
suspension) which forbid him the exercise of the ministry. Externally,
he must observe the church laws on the manner, time and place for
distribution of the Sacrament (Canons 851, 852, 867-869), and also the
liturgical rules for Communion during and outside of Mass, for
Communion of the sick and the dying, and for the avoidance of defects
in giving Communion (Rituale Rom., Tit. IV; Missale Rom., de defectibus
Missae).

2704. The Recipient of the Eucharist.--(a) Those Who May Receive
Communion.--According to divine law, every living person who has
received Baptism of water is capable of receiving the Eucharist,
infants and the insane not excluded. Ecclesiastical law requires other
conditions, which are justified by considerations of respect for the
Blessed Sacrament or other good reason. Communion may not be given,
first, to those who have not the use of reason (i.e., to infants and
the perpetually insane), nor to those who are unable to understand the
essential truths of religion and morality (i.e., to those who have
always been deaf and dumb or blind, and who are uninstructed); for, on
the one hand, the Sacrament is not necessary for these persons, and, on
the other hand, there is great danger of irreverence if it be given
them. Secondly, Communion may not be given to those who cannot receive
without grave peril of unbecoming treatment of the Sacrament, as in the
case of those who cough or vomit continually or frequently, or of those
who are delirious, or unconscious, or insane, But if the danger is
certainly slight (e.g., if the person can swallow an unconsecrated host
without spitting it out), Communion may be given, at least the Viaticum
or Easter Communion. Next those persons are denied Communion who cannot
receive without scandal (e.g., those who are infamous, such as
prostitutes or defamers, persons intoxicated or insufficiently
dressed). Finally, no one may receive Communion who has already
received it that day, lest the Sacrament become common and be taken
without due preparation; but exception is made when it is necessary to
communicate a second time in order to comply with the divine law of
receiving Viaticum or of saving the Host from profanation (Canons
853-858).

(b) Those Who Must Receive Communion.--There is a divine precept that
adults receive the Eucharist worthily (John, vi. 54). It obliges _per
se_, when one is certainly or almost certainly in proximate danger of
death, unless one has recently (that is, according to some, within a
week's time) received Communion; for this Sacrament is the wayfarer's
provision for his journey to eternity. It obliges also now and then
during life, since the Eucharist is man's spiritual nourishment for the
journey of life. It obliges _per accidens_, when Communion is necessary
to avoid grave sin, for charity to self obliges one to use the means
without which serious spiritual harm cannot be escaped. The church law
determines the details for the fulfillment of the divine precept. All
the faithful who have reached the age of reason, even though they be
under seven years, must fulfill the yearly Easter duty (see 2592,
2593). In reference to First Communion, the Church requires that
children who are not in danger of death must have a mental and moral
fitness, consisting in a knowledge of the chief mysteries of faith and
a devotion towards the Eucharist such as is possible at their time of
life. In reference to the last Communion, or Viaticum, the Code
declares that it is obligatory, no matter what be the cause of the
danger of death; it reminds us that the duty should not be put off too
long; it recommends that the Viaticum be administered even to those who
had communicated the same day before the danger of death arose, and
that it be given on distinct days during the danger. For children who
are in danger of death it suffices that they are able to distinguish
the Eucharist from ordinary food and to adore it reverently (Canons
859-865, 854).

2705. Dispositions for Worthy Communion.--(a) Dispositions of
Soul.--The divine law requires the state of grace (I Cor., xi. 27
sqq.), and probably also the previous sacramental confession which the
Church prescribes _sub gravi_ for one who is conscious of serious sin
not yet remitted through absolution. But he is excused from the duty of
previous confession who cannot omit Communion now (e.g., because while
at the rails he remembers a grave sin and cannot leave without being
disgraced) and who is unable to go to confession (see 2701 c). The
recipient must also have a knowledge of the Sacrament suited to his
mental capacity, and he must desire it, at least habitually. Since the
Sacraments are fruitful in proportion to the coöperation given them,
and since the presence and visit of Christ deserves honor and
recognition, Communion should be received devoutly, and should be
preceded by a preparation and followed by a thanksgiving (Canons 856,
731). The faithful may receive in any Rite, but their own Rite is
advised for Easter Communion and strongly urged for the Viaticum (Canon
866).

(b) Dispositions of Body.--The communicant must observe the Eucharistic
fast and must conduct himself with external reverence.

By ecclesiastical law a person is bound to the fasting from midnight to
receive the Holy Eucharist lawfully (Canons 808, 858). Despite the
changes made by the Apostolic Constitution, _Christus Dominus_ (Jan.
16, 1953) and the _Motu Proprio, "Sacram Communionem_" (Mar. 19, 1957),
priests and the faithful who are able to do so are exhorted to observe
this venerable and ancient form of Eucharistic fast before Mass or Holy
Communion. The legislation of these two papal documents, intended to
increase devotion to the Blessed Sacrament by fostering frequent
Communion, decrees:

1) that natural water does not break the fast;

2) that the period for observing the Eucharist fast before Mass, at
whatever hour it may be said (morning, afternoon, midnight), is three
hours from solid food and alcoholic beverages, and one hour from
non-alcoholic beverages. The priest who is to celebrate computes his
time from the beginning of Mass; the faithful, from the time of
Communion;

3) that the sick, although not confined to bed, may consume
non-alcoholic beverages and real and appropriate medicines, liquid or
solid, without any restriction of time.

The Eucharistic fast is based on primitive tradition and is enjoined by
the Church as a grave obligation that admits of no lightness of matter.
The fast is violated by the smallest portion of food or alcoholic
drink. Food is any solid which the physician considers digestible or
alterable by the stomach, and hence the fast is not broken if wood,
string, paper, hairs or fingernails are swallowed. But the food or
drink must be eaten or drunk, that is, it must come from outside the
mouth and be taken into the stomach in the way of consumption, and
hence the fast is not broken by what comes from within the mouth (e.g.,
blood from the gums, food remaining in the teeth from the previous day)
or by what is taken into the stomach in the way of saliva (e.g., the
accidental remnants of a mouth wash or of a throat gargle, or spray, or
of a chew of tobacco or gum, when one has spit out the contents as much
as possible), or in the way of breathing (e.g., snuff, tobacco smoke
inhaled, an insect or a raindrop blown into the mouth). A solid, like a
caramel, however, which is dissolved in the mouth before it is
swallowed, can not be considered as a liquid. The liquid of the _Sacram
Communionem_ must be a liquid before it enters the mouth. (See "Some
Further Elucidations on Sacram Communionem" by Cardinal Ottaviani,
_American Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXXXXVII, No, 2, August 1957, p.
74.)

The reasons that excuse from the Eucharist fast, in regard to solids or
alcoholic beverages, in lay Communion, are, in case of the well, the
good of the Sacrament (i.e., its preservation from profanation), or the
good of self (e.g., avoidance of serious disgrace, as when one who is
at the altar rail remembers only then that he is not fasting); in the
case of the ill, the danger of death (the Viaticum may be received even
daily after nourishment). The salt taken in Baptism does not break the
fast, and one who has a papal indult, which is granted for sufficient
reasons, may receive Communion when not fasting.

External reverence means that one should approach Communion with
cleanliness of body, respectability of dress, and modesty of behavior.
No one is unfitted for Communion because of inculpable unsightliness
(e.g., a sick man who has irremovable scars or deformities, a poor man
who cannot afford any but the simplest garb, a crippled person whose
gait is awkward). But unwashed hands and face, dirty mouth or teeth,
worn or torn dress, and the like, which one avoids elsewhere as
unsuited for human company, should be avoided when receiving the
Eucharist. Women immodestly dressed should be refused Communion, if
otherwise scandal will result (Canon 858).

2706. Frequent Communion.--What dispositions are required for frequent
Communion (i.e., Communion made several times a week) and daily
communion?

(a) The necessary dispositions are the same as for rare Communion,
namely, the state of grace and a right intention. Right intention means
positively that one have in view the ends that Christ intended when He
instituted the Sacrament, namely, that by means of Communion one may
please Him, may be more closely united to Him, and may receive a remedy
for one's defects and infirmities. Those who receive devoutly have
these purposes at least implicitly, which suffices; but it would be a
serious sin wilfully to exclude all these ends. Right intention means
negatively that one must not frequent Communion merely from routine, or
from vanity, or from purely human motives, such as pecuniary profit or
advantage. If the true ends are not excluded, these improper motives do
not exceed a venial sin.

(b) Useful, but not necessary, dispositions are freedom from venial
sins, especially such as are deliberate, and freedom from affection for
venial sins.

2707. Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors in Reference to
Communion.--(a) Parents.--The obligation of the Easter duty for boys
under fourteen and for girls under twelve rests morally and juridically
upon the consciences of those who are charged with their care, namely,
parents, guardians, pastors, and confessors (see 2630, 2631). The
parents are the best judges of the mental development, moral
disposition and instruction of their children, and therefore of their
fitness for First Communion (Canons 860, 854, n. 4).

(b) Confessors.--The decision or counsel about the fitness of children
for First Communion, of penitents for frequent or daily Communion,
about the frequency of the Viaticum, is left by the Church to the
prudence of the confessor (Canons 860, 863, 864, 858, n.2).

(c) Pastors.--The Code prescribes that pastors be especially zealous in
the matter of holding Lenten classes for the instruction of children in
order that they may receive their First Communion worthily; it vests in
the pastor the duty of seeing that no child approaches First Communion
who has not the use of reason or proper dispositions, as well as of
seeing that those children who are fit receive Communion without delay;
it also requires that he provide for the fuller instruction in
Christian doctrine of children who have made their First Communion
(Canons 1330, 854, n. 5, 1331). Pastors should recommend to their
people the practices of frequent Communion and of worthy Communion at
every Mass they hear, and should take care that the dying receive the
Viaticum while they are in possession of their mental faculties (Canons
863, 865). On the duty of administering Communion see 2676.

2708. Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament.--Having considered the
duties owed to the consecration and communion of the Eucharist, we
shall conclude by mentioning those that are owed to the Sacrament in
its permanency or to Christ dwelling in the tabernacle.

(a) The Duty of Custody.--The Blessed Sacrament must be reserved in
cathedral, abbatial, parochial, and religious churches; and it may be
reserved with due permission of the Ordinary in collegiate churches and
in certain public oratories; but there must be someone in charge, and
it is not allowed to reserve the Eucharist in private homes or to carry
it about when travelling. Churches which have the Blessed Sacrament
should be open at least a few hours daily to the faithful. It is not
lawful to reserve the Sacrament habitually on more than one altar of
the church, and that altar should be the one that is most honorable or
most suited for worship, and it should be suitably decorated. The
tabernacle should be as precious as possible and be carefully guarded,
and the Hosts should be reserved inside in a solid pyx or ciborium.
Before the tabernacle should burn day and night a sanctuary lamp fed by
olive or other oil (Canons 1265-1271).

(b) The Duty of Renewal of the Hosts.--The consecrated species kept for
Communion and adoration should be frequently renewed, lest they be
corrupted. It would be a serious sin of irreverence to neglect this
duty for over one or two months, or even for a shorter time if the
danger of corruption is great on account of local conditions, such as
dampness (Canon 1272).

(c) The Duty of Worship.--Pastors and others in charge of religious
instruction should encourage devotion to the Eucharist, and especially
the practice of assistance at Mass even on weekdays and of visits to
the Blessed Sacrament. Benediction may be given frequently, and at
least once a year there should be held in every parish church the
Devotion of the Forty Hours, or at least some more solemn exposition of
the Blessed Sacrament for a number of hours (Canons 1273-1275).

2709. The Sacrifice of the Mass.--In the Eucharist is contained not
only a Sacrament which confers the grace of spiritual nutrition on its
recipients, but also a sacrifice which offers to God Christ's oblation
as an act of adoration, thanksgiving, satisfaction and intercession. It
is this sacrifice--which is one with the sacrifice of the cross, though
offered unbloodily--that is known as the Mass. The chief persons who
have duties in reference to the Mass are the celebrant and the
assistants.

(a) The celebrant is the priest, who acts in the name and person of
Christ. To say Mass validly one must have the power of Orders conferred
in the presbyterate or priesthood, and must intend to consecrate (see
2701 b); to say Mass licitly one must be free from impediments which
debar from Mass, such as suspension or irregularity. Strange priests
who wish to say Mass are required to present a celebret or testimonial
letter to the rector of the church (Canon 804), without prejudice,
however, to their right to say Mass once or twice when they present
themselves in clerical garb and sign the visiting priest's book.

(b) The assistants are all those who hear Mass. Their duties were
already explained in the question on the first precept of the Church
(2576 sqq.). We shall confine ourselves here, therefore, to the duties
of the celebrant.

2710. The Obligation of Saying Mass.--(a) The Obligation by reason of
Orders or Priesthood.--Divine law imposes on priests as a body a grave
obligation of celebrating Mass with such frequency that the memory of
Christ's passion be kept alive, which is the purpose of the priesthood,
according to the words: "Do this in commemoration of Me." Divine law
also imposes on each individual priest the obligation of saying Mass at
frequent intervals (i.e., at least, it would seem, on the greater
feasts and at dates not more than six months apart); for a priest is
ordained primarily to give glory to God and to impart blessings to man
by the Sacrifice of the Mass (Heb., v. 1). It seems, therefore, that a
priest receives grace in vain or neglects the sacrifice (II Cor., vi.
1, II Mach., iv. 14) if he omits Mass on the most solemn occasions of
the year when nearly all the faithful are accustomed to receive
Communion, or if he omits it for such a notable period as more than six
months. It seems that the sin is _per se_ venial, as being opposed to
fervor rather than to charity; but it may be mortal _per accidens_, as
when serious scandal is given. There is no sin, however, if a priest
has no opportunity to celebrate, or is lawfully impeded (e.g., on
account of humility, scrupulosity, illness, or censure). The law of the
Church recalls this obligation in Canon 805, and calls on bishops and
religious superiors to exhort their subjects to say Mass at least on
all Sundays and holydays. Daily Mass is quite customary today, and
there might be serious scandal if without reason Mass were said only
exceptionally.

(b) The Obligation by Reason of Special Offices or Duties.--Pastors are
bound to say or provide Mass for their people on days of obligation as
a duty of justice, and it seems on other days also as a duty of charity
if there is a great need or demand and no reasonable impediment. There
is an obligation of justice to celebrate Mass, if one has contracted to
do so; an obligation of fidelity, if one has freely promised; an
obligation of religion, if one has vowed; an obligation of obedience,
if one has been lawfully commanded by one's superior.

2711. Dispositions for the Celebration of Mass.--(a) Dispositions of
Soul.--The celebrant must be in the state of grace, and must go to
confession before Mass if he has a serious sin on his conscience (see
2701 c). He must have the intention and attention which the validity of
the consecration requires (2701 b), and the reverence and devotion
which is due the prayers of the Mass (2153 sqq.), Voluntary and fully
deliberate distractions entertained for a considerable time during the
Canon seem to be seriously sinful. It is most suitable, though
apparently not commanded by the Church, that Matins and Lauds be said
before Mass. There is, however, a duty of religion and of charity to
self to make a suitable preparation and thanksgiving; but negligence
here is a light sin, unless there be contempt or serious scandal.
Fifteen minutes or a half-hour is recommended by ascetical writers, and
the prayers may be taken from those given in the Breviary and Missal,
Internal prayer, however, is more important than external recitation
(Canon 810).

(b) Dispositions of Body.--The Eucharistic or natural fast is of grave
obligation for the celebration of Mass (Canon 808). The only excuses
are necessity according to divine law or exemption by ecclesiastical
law. Necessity occurs when one must complete the sacrifice (e.g., when
after the Communion the priest notices that he consecrated one species
invalidly), or must avoid scandal (e.g., when a priest remembers after
going to the altar that he is not fasting), or must consecrate for the
Viaticum (e.g., when there is no consecrated host for a dying person).
Since the law is ecclesiastical, the Church could dispense for a grave
reason (e.g., to enable a sickly priest to say Masses on Sunday at
widely separated points of his missions). It is clear that the
celebration of Mass calls for cleanness of body, suitableness of dress,
neatness and rubrical correctness of vestments (Canon 811). The
omission of a principal vestment (i.e., blessed alb, stole or chasuble)
is a serious sin, except in grave necessity; the omission of minor
vestments (e.g., amice) is a venial sin, unless there is a just reason.
The color of the day is not gravely obligatory, except by reason of
scandal, and a good reason makes it lawful to use another color.

2712. Gravity of Regulations Concerning Circumstances of Mass.--Serious
disrespect or serious scandal is caused by disregard of important
regulations concerning the circumstances of the Mass. Hence, the
following rules oblige under grave sin, though exceptions are permitted
for cases of grave or very grave necessity.

(a) The Time of Mass.--Mass may not be said on Good Friday, nor private
Masses on Holy Thursday and Holy Saturday. Only one Mass may be said a
day, except on Christmas Day and All Souls' Day, and on other days when
there is reason for bination or trination allowed by the Church.
Ordinarily the hour for beginning Mass should not be earlier than one
hour before dawn (i.e., in the latitude of New York from about 1:27
a.m. to 5:00 a.m., according to the season), nor later than one hour
after noon. But the time is to be understood morally, and it is not a
grave sin in being earlier or later than the times fixed, unless there
is a difference of an entire hour (e.g., if one began Mass at 2:00
p.m.) and not just excuse or dispensation. The Holy See has extended to
local Ordinaries the power to permit the daily celebration of Mass
after noon, if the spiritual good of a considerable number of the
faithful demands it (_Sacram Communionem_). The Holy See has also
granted permission to Ordinaries to allow the celebration of an evening
Mass on Palm Sunday accompanied by the blessing of palms and
procession. On Holy Thursday the Mass of the Lord's Supper must be
celebrated at the most convenient hour, but not before 4:00 p.m. and
not after 9:00 p.m.; Ordinaries may grant permission for one or even
two low Masses (besides the principal Mass) to be celebrated in
churches and public oratories, and for one in semi-public oratories
within the same hours, 4:00-9:00 p.m. The proper hour for the Easter
Vigil is that which permits the Mass of the Easter Vigil to be started
around midnight. Permission may be granted to conduct the vigil at a
time not before sunset (Dispositions and Regulations concerning the
Holy Week Liturgy, Feb. 1, 1957, Sacred Congregation of Rites). One
Christmas may be said at midnight. It is a serious sin to say Mass in
less than a quarter of an hour, and a private Mass should not be
prolonged beyond a half-hour.

(b) Place.--Mass may not be celebrated regularly except in a church or
oratory that is at least blessed and is not polluted, execrated or
interdicted. It must be said on an altar, and it would be a serious
sin, except in grave or very grave necessity, to celebrate without at
least one altar cloth or one lighted wax candle, or without a rubrical
chalice, paten, or corporal (Canons 822, 823).

(c) Rites.--The principal rubrics of the Mass are gravely obligatory,
for example, to use an acolyte unless excused by dispensation or
necessity, to say each prayer of the Canon, and each part outside the
Canon that occurs in every Mass (e.g., the prayers at the foot of the
altar, the Gospel), to perform the main liturgical actions (e.g., the
Offertory, the breaking of the host, the purification of the chalice).
The secondary rubrics oblige under venial sin (see Canons 803, 812-819).

2713. Is it Lawful to Discontinue a Mass?--(a) To terminate Mass before
the end has been reached is unlawful unless there be a serious reason;
otherwise, disrespect is shown the Holy Sacrifice. A grave reason
(e.g., sudden sickness) suffices if Mass be discontinued before the
Consecration; a most grave reason (i.e., danger of death or of
profanation of the Sacrament) if Mass be discontinued between the
Consecration and the Communion. But a Mass that is broken off after the
Consecration and before the Communion must be completed by the
celebrant or another, at least if this can be done within an hour from
the time of cessation; else the sacrifice is mutilated.

(b) To interrupt Mass is also unlawful without serious cause. Thus, a
grave reason excuses an interruption outside the Canon, for example, to
preach a sermon after the Gospel or Communion; but only a very grave
reason excuses an interruption during the Canon, for example, a sick
call to give a necessary Sacrament (Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction,
or Viaticum) to a dying person.

2714. Application of the Mass.--All the faithful, especially those who
are present and also the celebrant himself, benefit by the Mass, but
there is a special fruit reserved to those for whose intention the Mass
is offered by the priest; for the Mass is a sacrifice of intercession,
propitiation, and satisfaction, and since the priest acts in the person
of Christ he may apply its benefits specially to some particular person
or persons. In the following cases the celebrant is bound to make this
application of the ministerial fruit of the Mass.

(a) In virtue of their office, pastors are seriously obliged to say
Mass for their flocks. There is a natural obligation on account of the
relationship between the pastor and the people, and there is also a
divine obligation, inasmuch as the priest is appointed to offer gifts
and sacrifices for sin (Heb., v, 1). The details of this duty, as to
the time, place and person, are prescribed in Canons 306, 339, 466.
There is a grave duty of saying for the people the number of Masses
which the Church orders; but the non-observance of the circumstances is
not a mortal sin, unless it happens frequently and without reason.

(b) In virtue of justice, a priest who has received a stipend is bound
to apply the Mass for the intention of the donor, and to observe the
conditions of the agreement (i.e., the time, place, and kind of Mass
specified by the donor). The duty of application is a grave one,
because the loss inflicted on the donor by non-application of the Mass
to his intention is serious; the duty of observance of the accidental
conditions, however, is not generally grave, but it becomes grave if
its neglect inflicts serious harm (e.g., if the donor makes the date of
the Mass a _conditio sine qua non_, or if the Mass must be said at once
on account of an urgent and immediate necessity). Restitution is
obligatory if the Mass is not applied, or if essential conditions are
not complied with; it is obligatory _sub gravi_, if the stipend equals
what is relatively grave matter in theft.

(c) In virtue of obedience, subjects are held to apply Masses for the
intention of their prelates, secular or religious, though bishops are
counselled to exact this most rarely. The obligation is grave or light
according to the intention of the superior, but if the application is
also due in justice to the giver of the stipend, there is a serious
duty.

(d) In virtue of religion or fidelity, there is an obligation of
application when a priest has vowed this to God, or freely promised it
to man. The duty is grave or light according to the intention of the
vower or promisor (see 2210, 2407). But if there is an onerous promise
(e.g., in a society of priests whose members agree to say Mass for
fellow-members who have died), the duty is one of justice. One Mass
satisfies several free promises, if distinct Masses were not promised.

2715. Duties of the Priest as to the Application of Mass.--(a) For Whom
May Mass Be Applied?--Mass may be offered for all objects not
forbidden. From the divine law it is forbidden to offer Mass for those
who are incapable of receiving its benefits (e.g., the demons, infants
who died without Baptism, the Saints), or for intentions that are
displeasing to God (e.g., for success in evil). From the ecclesiastical
law certain restrictions are made on the application of Mass in order
to safeguard reverence and prevent scandal. Thus, Mass may be said only
privately (that is, without publicity or special liturgical solemnity)
and prudently (that is, with avoidance of scandal, for example, by the
declaration that Mass is said for the faithful departed with the
purpose of aiding also a departed unbeliever, if this is pleasing to
God) for the living and dead outside the Church, such as infidels,
heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated. Moreover, for a
_vitandus_ Mass may be applied only when the intention is his
conversion (Canon 809).

(b) How Mass Must Be Applied.--The intention must be formed by the
priest, since he represents Christ. But since his application does not
produce but only bestows the fruits, it suffices that his applicatory
intention be habitual and implicit, as when the celebrant has forgotten
the intention formed before Mass, or applies according to the mind of
his superior. The person or purpose to which Mass is applied must be at
least implicitly determined, and the application must be made at least
before the second consecration. If there are two conflicting
intentions, the stronger prevails (2667), and, if it is doubtful which
one was stronger, Mass should be next offered for the intention which
God knows was not satisfied. It is unlawful to apply Mass by
anticipation for the next person who will offer a stipend.

2716. Mass Stipends.--It is not unlawful to receive a stipend for the
application of Mass, but irreligion, injustice, avarice, scandal and
disobedience must be avoided. (a) Irreligion is committed if the
stipend is offered or taken as the price of the Mass, or if Mass is
said only because of the stipend, or is requested only for the sake of
human favor (see 2333); (b) injustice is committed, if an excessive
stipend is exacted; (c) avarice is committed when one is over-anxious
about large stipends; (d) scandal is given when there is commercialism
or the appearance of it in dealing with stipends; (e) disobedience is
incurred when the laws of the Church on the amount of a stipend, the
number of stipends that may be taken, their distribution, satisfaction,
etc., are violated (see Canons 824-844). It is forbidden to require two
stipends for one Mass, or one stipend for mere celebration and another
for application.




Art. 3: REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 84-90; Supplement, qq. 1-33.)

2717. Penance is the name both of a virtue and of a Sacrament of the
New Law. The virtue was at all times necessary; the Sacrament is
necessary since its institution by Christ. Having considered in the
previous Article how the spiritual life is begotten, matured and
preserved through the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and
Eucharist, we shall consider in the present Article how spiritual death
and infirmity are overcome by the remedies of Penance and Extreme
Unction. But first we shall speak of the virtue of penance or
repentance which is a requisite for the fruitful reception of the
Sacrament of Penance and of its complement, Extreme Unction.

2718. The Virtue of Repentance.--This virtue is a gift of God and a
permanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man
coöperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a
sinner is converted through consideration of God's goodness or of the
rewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful
delights are first deterred from them by the thought of God's justice,
and amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least
virtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and
usually they follow one another in that process in the order here
given. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart:
"Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted" (Lament, v.
21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to
God must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow
servile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to
God, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of
mercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its
own sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of
reverence.

2719. Repentance.--Repentance may be defined as "a moral virtue that
inclines the will of one who is subject to sin to grieve over it and to
make reparation to God for the injury it does to His rights."

(a) Thus, repentance has its remote subject in one who is subject to
sin, that is, in a person who has sinned or who is able to sin. Hence,
it is not in Christ, who is impeccable, nor in the holy Angels, whose
wills are fixed in good; but it is found in the Saints, inasmuch as
their former sin is displeasing to them and their former contrition and
satisfaction pleasing.

(b) The proximate subject of repentance is the will, for its acts of
regret, resolution, and reparation belong to the higher appetitive
faculty, Hence, repentance does not consist in emotional sorrow, and it
does not need to be sensibly felt or joined with tears.

(c) The formal object or motive of repentance is reparation to Goal for
the injury done Him by one's own personal sin. Sin may be considered as
opposed to the divine goodness, and in this respect it is detested by
charity; or as opposed to the good of man himself, and so hope detests
it; or as opposed to the moral goodness of some particular virtue, and
in this respect it is hated by that virtue, as temperance shuns
intemperance; or as opposed to the right which belongs to God, the Last
End, that all actions be done for Him, and in this respect sin is
considered by repentance. One may regret original sin or sins done by
others, but one is not properly said to repent of them.

(d) The material object or subject-matter of repentance is the acts by
which reparation is made to God, namely, grief over sin and its
accompaniments, hatred of moral wickedness in the present, regrets for
the past, and good resolutions for the future. Thus, repentance differs
from religion, for religion looks upon God as Lord and Benefactor and
offers Him worship, while repentance considers Him as the Last End who
has been offended and offers Him satisfaction. The difference between
filial fear and repentance is seen in this, that the former falls back
upon its own littleness, whereas the latter throws itself at the feet
of God.

2720. The Character of Repentance.--(a) It is a virtue, since it is
commanded ("Do penance," Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates
according to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the
extreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.

(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by
which reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those
acts within the bounds of moderation.

(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to
another's right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there
is not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose
power the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative
justice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;

2721. The Excellence of Repentance.--(a) Its Dignity.--Repentance ranks
below other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man,
repentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the
supposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain
preëminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in
justification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for
justification come before those virtues.

(b) Its Necessity.--In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is
remitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: "Unless
you do penance, you shall all likewise perish" (Luke, xiii. 5). This is
reasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by
his own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial
sin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and
must be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection
of the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover,
since one should be restored to God's friendship before being restored
to His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail,
unless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance
need not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his
sins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is,
an act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the
latter is not expressly taken into consideration.

2722. Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?--(a) It is
necessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation
cannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent
to his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable
way in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a
precept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury,
make reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be
converted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law
prescribes annual confession.

2723. How Soon Does the Precept of Repentance Oblige?--(a) It obliges
at once (i.e., without any delay), when there is immediate necessity
for it. This happens _per se_, when one is in grave danger of death,
for at that moment one is bound to prepare immediately to meet God,
which supposes repentance. It happens _per accidens_, when by reason of
some urgent precept distinct from that of repentance one is obligated
here and now to rid oneself of sin (e.g., when one is called on to
administer a Sacrament and must have a pure conscience, or when one is
gravely tempted and will surely fall unless one repents of the past).

(b) It obliges soon (i.e., without any unreasonable delay), when there
is no immediate necessity. It is not a new sin to put off repentance
until tomorrow or next week in such a case; for the commandment of
repentance, being affirmative, does not bind for each instant, but only
for a reasonable time. But the common opinion is that a new sin is
committed when repentance is delayed for a considerable time, since
this exposes the sinner to further sins, impenitence, and damnation.
Practically, it seems that those who comply with the church law of
yearly confession commit no sin of unrepentance, though some consider
it a mortal sin to delay repentance beyond a month.

2724. Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.--(a) When one
mortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same
time. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his
separation from God, and this means that he grieves over each
individual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from
God, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry
for another.

(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also
forgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to
heaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the
examples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of
Moses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii.
13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a
just Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even
for sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of
Magdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.

2725. The Fruits of Repentance.--(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous,
is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room
for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always
ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is
refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even
impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).

(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His
gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is
destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins
after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.

(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin
and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii.
12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not
recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and
freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part,
which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid
all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not
necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with
the greater or less excellence of repentance.

2726. Forgiveness of Sin through the Use of the Sacraments.--(a) Mortal
sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself (_ex
opere operato_) and immediately; that is, the Sacraments either _per
se_ or _per accidens_ (according as they are Sacraments of the Dead or
Sacraments of the Living) produce in the soul first grace or
justification, which is the opposite of mortal sin.

(b) Venial sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite
itself but not immediately; that is, the Sacraments produce directly
either first or second grace, and indirectly through this grace they
may awaken fervor, which is the opposite of venial sin. The
sacramentals, on the contrary, remit venial sins, not in virtue of the
rite itself but in virtue of the intercession of the Church attached to
the rite (_ex opere operantis Ecclesiæ_); for the prayers of the Church
are acceptable to God and can obtain from Him a grace of repentance
that will remove venial sin.

2727. The Sacrament of Penance.--For those who lose grace after Baptism
the Sacrament of Penance is necessary as a part of repentance and a
means of forgiveness. This Sacrament may be defined as "a Sacrament of
the New Law instituted by Christ in the form of a judicial process, in
which, through the absolution of the priest, sins committed after
Baptism are forgiven to penitents who confess them with sorrow."

(a) The remote matter of this Sacrament is the personal sins committed
after Baptism, for Baptism washes away all sins committed before its
reception. Of this remote matter, some is necessary (i.e., sins that
must be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins not yet declared
or directly absolved in confession; some is free (i.e., sins that may,
but need not be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins already
forgiven in confession, and post-baptismal venial sins, whether already
remitted or not (Canon 902). Imperfections which are not sins, or whose
sinfulness is doubtful, are not sufficient matter for absolution; and
if they alone are confessed, absolution may not be given, unless there
is necessity, and then it may be granted conditionally (see 185, 186).

(b) The proximate matter of this Sacrament, according to the view
commonly held, is the three acts of the penitent--contrition in the
heart, confession in words, and satisfaction in work. Contrition must
exist actually, but the other two acts in case of necessity need not
exist actually, but are included implicitly in the act of contrition.

(c) The form of the Sacrament is contained in the words of absolution
spoken by the priest. Certainly the words, "_Ego te absolvo a peccatis
tuis_," are sufficient for validity. But lawfulness requires that one
use the entire form and the other accompanying prayers as given in
one's approved Ritual. In case of necessity, as in shipwreck or sudden
danger of death, an abbreviated form is permitted. Absolution must be
spoken or vocal, for the Church has never recognized absolution by
signs or in writing. It must be given to one who is present, that is,
one who is in the same place and not too far away to hear and be heard.
Those who are in different rooms that do not open on each other are not
in the same place; those who are more than twenty feet apart are too
far away for presence, according to the common opinion; but in great
need a more liberal view may be followed, and even absolution by
speaking tube or telephone may be resorted to.

(d) The subject of the Sacrament of Penance is every baptized person
who has committed venial or mortal sin after Baptism. If there is doubt
about the Baptism or about the sin, absolution may be given
conditionally. Besides the conditions given for the Sacraments in
general, the recipient of Penance must exercise the three acts of
contrition, confession and satisfaction. The first is essential in
every case, and the second when possible; and without the third the
Sacrament is not integral or complete.

2728. Probabilism in Administration of the Sacrament.--In the
administration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance it is lawful
to follow opinions that are truly probable except in the following
cases: (a) when the validity of the Sacrament is at stake (678), unless
there is a case of emergency (679). Hence, as the law of material
integrity pertains to the lawful, not to the valid use of Penance, one
may use probable opinions in its regard (see 2740); (b) when the seal
of the Sacrament is involved, lest confession become odious.

2729. Contrition.--The first act of the penitent is contrition. It is
defined by the Council of Trent as a sorrow and hatred for sin
committed, with a resolution of sinning no more and a desire of doing
what is necessary for the proper reception of the Sacrament of Penance.

(a) Thus, it presupposes a hatred of personal past transgressions, for
one grieves only about that which displeases one, and the acts of the
will begin with likes and dislikes.

(b) It consists essentially in sorrow or affliction of spirit, for
contrition, being the chief act of repentance, looks to reparation to
God for the injury done Him, and it therefore punishes the sinner by
sadness for his misdeeds.

(c) It includes as a property or consequence the resolution to avoid
future sin and to do what God requires for forgiveness; for no one is
sincerely sorry for the past unless this sorrow makes him decide not to
repeat the offense, and makes him desire to fulfill the conditions that
God lays down for reconciliation.

2730. The Two Kinds of Contrition.--(a) Perfect contrition is that
which is caused by charity, or the love of benevolence or of friendship
(1109, 1110) towards God. This love is had, whether the object of one's
affection is the divine being or persons, the divine and infinite
perfections, or a single attribute; for all of these are really God
Himself. This contrition justifies the sinner at once, for it includes
charity and the will (at least implicit) to do what God wishes, and God
takes up His abode with those who love Him (John, xiv. 23). Perfect
contrition is necessary, both as a means and as a divine precept,
whenever the duty of repentance or of the Sacrament of Penance obliges
with a like necessity, and there is no opportunity of receiving the
Sacrament; for it is then the only way of recovering grace.

(b) Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is contrition caused by a
supernatural motive inferior to that of charity, i.e., by a less
perfect motive suggested by faith that leads one to grieve over sin
committed, for example, the heinousness of sin in itself, its eternal
punishment by God (i.e., the pain of loss or the pain of sense), or its
temporal punishment by God in this life or in Purgatory. This
contrition does not justify the sinner without the Sacrament, for it
does not rectify or retract the disorder introduced by sin as far as
lies within the sinner's power (that is, _ex opere operantis_). By his
sin the sinner preferred the creature to God; by his attrition he does
not go so far as to prefer God positively to every created good, else
his contrition would be perfect. But attrition suffices for
justification of the sinner with the Sacrament of Penance, for it
includes the essentials of contrition in general, and thus removes the
impediments to the activity of the Sacrament (that is, the production
of grace _ex opere operato_). The same holds good also of the
sufficient disposition for Baptism, and more probably of that for the
Sacraments of the Living received in good faith by one who is not in
grace.

2731. Is Attrition Based Solely on Fear of Punishment Laudable?--(a)
Fear of the world is sinful, because it offends God to escape evil
(1044); slavish fear of God is sinful also, because it makes self the
last end, avoiding sin solely because of the harm it will bring on self
(1053). Sorrow for sin caused by slavish fear is not attrition, and is
not laudable.

(b) Servile fear of God in itself is good and supernatural (1050), and
the sorrow for sin or attrition based on such fear is also good; and if
it includes a resolution of amendment, it suffices for justification
with the Sacraments. The end (i.e., to escape punishment) is good
(Matt., x. 28); the means (i.e., sorrow for sin) is good; and the use
of the means for the end is good, for desertion of sin is the way to
escape unhappiness (Luke, iii. 7, 8). Nor is it wrong to make a nobler
good (such as avoidance of sin) a means to a lesser good (such as
escape from punishment) when the lesser good is not made the last end,
but only the immediate end, of the greater good. Thus, when we pray for
temporal goods, we make a spiritual thing a means to a material end,
but the Last End of the prayer is God Himself. Servile fear, unlike
slavish fear (_timor serviliter servilis_), does not make self the last
end (Denzinger, 818, 1146, 1525).

2732. Attrition in the Sacrament of Penance.--Must attrition based on
fear of punishment be joined with love of God to justify in the
Sacrament?

(a) Some form of love is required, for all contrition is detestation of
sin, and sin is not hated unless its opposite is loved. Hence, just as
attrition must be accompanied by faith and hope, so it must also be
accompanied by some form of love of God (2718).

(b) Disinterested love is not required. This is certain as regards love
of friendship, for even the smallest degree of that love is charity and
justifies even without the Sacrament (1112, 2730). This is commonly
held in reference to love of benevolence, which seems practically to be
always united with love of friendship or charity. A love that inclines
to God for His own sake but that does not predominate over other loves
is held by some to be necessary, but it is difficult to understand such
a love or to see its possibility.

(c) Interested love (the love of concupiscence or of hope) is therefore
necessary. The common opinion today seems to be that it also suffices,
and that it need be only virtual or implicit. In other words, the
prevalent view is that every attrition prompted by fear of punishment
contains an initial love of God which suffices to turn the sinner to
God and to remove any obstacle to the action of the Sacrament. For "the
fear of God is the beginning of His love" (Ecclus., xxv. 16), the hope
of pardon is a beginning of love of the Author of pardon and justice,
the resolve to amend is an inclination to keep the great command of
love of God (1556).

2733. The Conditions for Valid Contrition and Attrition.--(a) It must
be internal, for contrition is an act of repentance and must be in the
heart. Merely pretended sorrow, and sorrow which one mistakenly thinks
one has, are insufficient.

(b) It must be supernatural, for contrition is a disposition for the
reception of the supernatural habit of grace. Sorrow for sin induced by
natural motives, such as the punishments inflicted by human agencies,
if these are not viewed in the light of faith, is not sufficient.

(c) It must be universal, that is, there must be sorrow for all mortal
sins not yet forgiven, for it is impossible to be really sorry for one
serious sin while retaining affection for another. But it is not
necessary to repent of all venial sins before one is forgiven (see
2724).

(d) It must be sovereign, that is, if the contrition is perfect, God
must be loved above every other good; if it is imperfect, sin must be
hated above every evil that could lead to sin. If the sinner does not
detest his dishonesty more than the privation he will suffer by being
honest, he is not really contrite. It is, however, not necessary that
contrition be sensibly felt, or be of supreme intensity, or that its
act be of long duration; and it is rash to call to mind the kinds of
evils or torments one would prefer to suffer rather than commit sin
(see 1556).

2734. Valid and Fruitful Reception of the Sacrament.--Some theologians,
distinguishing between contrition as matter of the Sacrament and
contrition as a disposition of the penitent, hold that it is possible
to have a valid but unfruitful reception of the Sacrament, and that
revival of its grace is possible. They explain thus:

(a) the contrition required for the matter and the validity of the
Sacrament must be such as can be known with moral certainty by the
confessor from external indications, and hence it suffices for validity
that the sorrow be true and sincere and supernatural;

(b) the contrition required for the disposition of the penitent and the
fruitfulness of the Sacrament must be such as excludes all affection
for every grave sin and includes the resolution to avoid all mortal sin
in the future, and hence it is required for fruitfulness that sorrow be
also universal and sovereign. (This opinion has very few, if any at
all, adherents among modern theologians. It is retained here solely as
a matter of record.)

2735. Properties of Contrition.--Since contrition belongs to the matter
of Penance, it must have the properties of sacramental matter (2655
sqq.).

(a) Thus, the matter must be sensible, and hence contrition must be
shown in some external way, as by a sorrowful confession, devout
request for absolution, or, in the case of those who are unconscious,
by a call for a priest or the practices or prayers of a Christian life.

(b) The matter must be united with the form, and hence contrition must
be elicited at the moment of absolution, or a short time before (not
more than a few hours before, according to some, or even a few days
before, according to others). But if a penitent recalls immediately
after absolution a forgotten mortal sin, and is then absolved from it
also, more probably he is not obliged to renew his act of contrition,
because the act just made virtually continues; in practice, however, he
might be told to make another act of contrition and a new penance or
the same penance may be imposed before the second absolution. Moreover,
for absolution when one is unconscious and in danger of death, since an
habitual intention suffices (2674), it seems that contrition made long
ago, but not retracted, is sufficient.

(c) The matter must have at least a moral unity of its own parts, and
hence the contrition must in some way be directed to the confession;
that is, either before or during or after the act of contrition there
must be an intention to confess with the sorrow for sin contained in
that act of contrition, or to apply that sorrow to the confession just
made. Otherwise it does not appear that one has the purpose to make a
sacramental confession. But there is no practical difficulty, as every
act of contrition contains implicitly the will to confess, or every
sincere confession includes the will to use the contrition one has
exercised or will exercise.

2736. Resolution of Amendment.--The resolution of amendment which true
contrition calls for is at least implicit in the hatred of sin, but it
is advisable that the penitent expressly resolve to avoid sin in the
future. This determination should have the following qualities:

(a) it should be firm, that is, the penitent should make up his mind
not to relapse into deliberate sin. Yet, it is not necessary that he
feel certain of his perseverance, and his resolve does not cease to be
firm, if he foresees that he will fall again, provided he is decided to
do the best he can;

(b) it should be efficacious, that is, the penitent must decide to use
suitable means to fulfill his good intentions as to reparation for
scandal, calumny, and injustice, as to the avoidance of sinful
occasions, etc.;

(c) it should be universal, that is, the penitent must resolve at least
generically to avoid each and every grave sin in the future. If only
free matter (2727) is confessed, the penitent may direct his resolution
of amendment to all past mortal sins confessed, or to one of the
present venial sins declared, or he may resolve to do better in
reference to a certain class of sins (e.g., deliberate sins, faults of
speech), or he may resolve to diminish the frequency of his venial sins.

2737. Confession.--The second act of the penitent is confession, that
is, the declaration of one's sins made to a duly authorized priest with
the purpose of obtaining absolution. Confession is obligatory both from
divine and ecclesiastical law.

(a) According to divine law, the forgiveness of grave post-baptismal
sins is subject to the power of the keys, which is exercised in the
form of a judgment and requires confession (Matt., xviii, 18; John, xx.
23). This law obliges _per se_ in danger of death, and occasionally
during life; _per accidens_, when one in sin intends to receive
Communion, when one is unable without confession to recover the
necessary state of grace or overcome a serious temptation or bad habit.

(b) According to church law, the faithful must go to confession once a
year (2590), and confession is also prescribed at times for those who
wish to receive Communion (2705) or celebrate Mass (2701 c, 2711).

2738. The Qualities of Confession.--(a) Confession is an act of virtue
and should have the conditions of a virtue; that is, it should be
discreet (e.g., the penitent should not reveal the names or sins of
others), willing, and pure in motive (e.g., the penitent should not
confess for temporal ends, such as the good opinion of the confessor),
and courageous (i.e., the penitent should not be deterred by shame).

(b) Confession is an act of penitence, and, as penitence includes
hatred and regret for sin and abasement of self, confession should not
be boastful, jocular or proud, but shamefaced, sorrowful and humble.

(c) Confession is essentially a declaration of fact, and hence it
should avoid the defects that make a declaration valueless or
imperfect, namely, falsehood, obscurity, digression, or concealment.
Confession, then, should be truthful, clear, to the point, and entire.

(d) Confession belongs to the Sacrament of Penance, which is the forum
of conscience, and hence the penitent accuses himself, submits to the
judgment of the father confessor, and is heard in secret. Public
confession is valid but not obligatory. Hence, one who does not speak
the language of the confessor is not bound to use an interpreter.
Regularly confession should be vocal, but for grave reasons (e.g., if
the penitent is dumb, or the confessor is deaf, or there is danger of
being heard by those nearby) it may be made by signs or in writing. In
case of a written confession the penitent should declare orally, if
possible, that the writing contains his confession (see Canon 903).

2739. Is it a Grave Sin to Lie to the Confessor?--(a) There is a grave
sin when the lie deceives the confessor about necessary matter (e.g.,
when a circumstance changing the theological species of a sin is
denied), or about free matter which is the only sin confessed (e.g.,
when a penitent lyingly accuses himself of only one sin and that a
venial one), or about free matter which the confessor asks about and
needs to know (e.g., about habits or occasions of sin). He who falsely
accuses himself of a grave sin, or who exaggerates the number of his
grave sins, _per se_ sins mortally; but he is excused if he is ignorant
or is under a momentary excitement or delusion. Not only is there grave
sin in the cited cases, but the confession is made invalid by the
defect in essential matter which the lie produces; for the confessor
does not understand the true state of the penitent's soul.

(b) There is mortal sin when the lie deceives the confessor about
matter that is impertinent to the confession, but is grave in itself,
as when the penitent seriously calumniates a neighbor to the priest. In
this case the confession is made invalid by the want of disposition on
the part of the penitent.

(c) There is light sin when the lie deceives the confessor about free
matter which is not the only sin confessed, or which the confessor does
not need to know in order substantially to pass judgment and give
direction; also when the lie is not serious and is impertinent to the
confession. In these cases the Sacrament is not made invalid, for the
insincerity does not change the confessor's decision.

2740. Integral Confession.--The completeness or integrity of confession
is twofold.

(a) Material completeness consists in the declaration of all mortal
sins committed and not yet confessed and absolved. This kind of
completeness is sometimes impossible, and therefore unnecessary. For
completeness is obligatory in virtue of a positive law of Christ, and
positive laws do not bind in case of impossibility (361).

(b) Formal completeness consists in the declaration of all the mortal
sins which here and now, all things considered, one can and should
mention. This kind of completeness is necessary for a valid and
fruitful confession, because the law of Christ calls for a complete
confession, as far as possible, and formal completeness is possible.
Since he who is obliged by a law is also obliged to use the means to
keep the law, those who are going to confession should examine their
consciences beforehand, unless this is impossible or unnecessary. The
time and diligence to be given this examination depends on the person
and his circumstances; but all should be careful about it, while
avoiding scrupulosity, and should also remember that contrition is even
more important than confession.

2741. Manner of Confession.--Completeness of confession as regards
mortal sins extends to the following points:

(a) the theological and the lowest moral species of a sin (197 sqq.)
must be given, for otherwise the confessor does not understand the case
before him. He who has committed a mortal theft does not satisfy by
confessing a venial theft; he who is guilty of the specific sin of
calumny does not satisfy by the generic accusation of sins of the
tongue. But impossibility excuses, as when the penitent has only a
general recollection about a sin;

(b) the number of the sins must be given exactly or, if this is
impossible, approximately. He who unintentionally exaggerates the
number or tells a sin of which he is not guilty, is not bound to
correct this, but he who unintentionally lowers the number to a notable
extent should tell in his next confession what was omitted (see 202
sqq.);

(c) the circumstances that change the species of a sin must be
declared, for example, the fact that the person who was scandalized was
one's subject, that the person who was treated disrespectfully was
one's superior, that the amount stolen was large (see 72);

(d) the external act that completed an internal sin must be declared,
and hence he who committed impurity does not confess properly by saying
that he gave consent to impure desires (see 89-93).

2742. Disputed Cases.--(a) Circumstances that Notably Aggravate a Sin
without Changing Its Species.--For the obligation of confessing these
circumstances, it is argued that, if the confessor does not know them,
he is unable to guide the penitent properly. Against obligation, it is
argued that the species of the sin gives the confessor sufficient
knowledge, and that the obligation of confessing aggravating
circumstances would make the burden too heavy for the penitent. But all
admit that _per accidens_ there may be a duty of confessing a
circumstance of this kind, as when it makes a sin reserved, or consists
in an occasion of sin or evil habit, or when it produces a great change
in reference to satisfaction (e.g., the theft of $10,000 is quite
different from the theft of $1000).

(b) As to the Imputable External Effects of a Sin.--One opinion is that
these must be confessed, since they are willed in their cause (96,
102); another opinion is that they need not be confessed since they are
not sins, but results that followed on a sin; a third opinion answers
that they must be confessed if the evil will was not retracted before
they happened, but otherwise not. All agree, however, that the sinner
in this case should confess that he sinned with foresight of the
consequence, and that he should confess the consequence itself if there
is attached to it something that should be known to the confessor
(e.g., censure, irregularity, etc.).

(c) Sins Whose Commission, or Gravity, or Remission is Uncertain.--If
the uncertainty is about the fact or gravity of the sin, there is no
obligation to confess the sin, even though its commission or its
gravity be probable; for the obligation cannot be proved. But if it is
certain that grave sin has been committed and uncertain whether the sin
has been confessed, a mere doubt or suspicion in favor of confession
does not exempt from obligation; a probable opinion in favor of
confession excuses according to Probabilism, but it does not excuse
according to Equiprobabilism, unless the doubt is about a confession
made long ago by one who was careful in making his confessions, or
unless there is question of a scrupulous person (655 sqq., 708, 709).

2743. When Material Integrity Is Not Necessary.--Material integrity is
not due because of real impossibility in the following cases:

(a) when there is physical impossibility, as when one is at the point
of death and too weak to make confession, or is deaf and dumb, or
cannot speak the confessor's language correctly, or cannot finish
confession on account of shipwreck or other great peril;

(b) when there is moral impossibility, as when material integrity
cannot be had except at the expense of a great temporal or spiritual
evil distinct from the inconvenience intrinsic to the confession
itself, and there is some serious reason that makes it necessary to go
to confession here and now (e.g., the desire of not remaining long in
the state of sin). Examples are: great spiritual harm, as when a
penitent is scrupulous; great temporal harm, as when the penitent has
to flee to escape assassination. Some affirm, while others deny, the
duty of mentioning a sin that will defame an accomplice with the
confessor, and in practice it seems the duty cannot be insisted on
(cfr. 2065).

2744. Completion or Repetition of Past Incomplete Confessions.--(a)
Completion of past confessions must be made when they lacked material
integrity, if the impossibility has ceased.

(b) Particular repetition is necessary when a confession lacked formal
integrity or other essential; that is, if a sin was unlawfully
concealed or unrepented of in confession, the sacrilege must be
confessed and the previous confession made over, since it was invalid.
But if the new confession is made to the same confessor and he has a
general remembrance of it, the new confession may be made summarily.

(c) General repetition is necessary when several past confessions were
certainly invalid on account of lack of formal integrity or other
defect. Thus, he who has made bad confessions for three months must
make a general confession of that period of time. General confession is
advisable when there is a prudent doubt about the worth of past
confessions; it is permissible when it will help a penitent to be more
contrite and lead a better life; it is not lawful when it will do harm,
as when a scrupulous penitent will be harrowed and maddened by the
thought of his past sins.

2745. Satisfaction.--The third act of the penitent is satisfaction,
which is defined as "a compensation for the injury done to God by sin,
appointed by God's minister in the Sacrament of Penance and accepted
and performed by the penitent."

(a) This act is a compensation or payment made to God as an act of
reparation and justice.

(b) The compensation is appointed by the confessor, for its chief
purpose is restoration of friendship between God and the sinner, and
hence equality is not sought, but the good will to do what God's
minister imposes.

(c) The compensation is accepted and performed. This is required for
the completeness, not for the essence, of the Sacrament. He who is
really contrite desires to satisfy, he who confesses offers to satisfy;
and hence, if for any reason he does not actually satisfy, his
satisfaction of desire suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, but
his omission to perform the satisfaction makes the Sacrament incomplete.

2746. The Effects of Actual Satisfaction.--(a) There is a remissive
effect, consisting in the _ex opere operato_ release of a portion or of
all the temporal punishment due to sin forgiven.

(b) There is a medicinal effect, consisting in the appreciation of the
evil of sin, the caution and vigilance against future relapse, and the
removal of evil tendencies, which the penitential works inculcate and
promote.

2747. The Conditions for Effective Satisfaction.--(a) For validity
(that is, for discharge of the obligation) the penitent must perform
the penance as to essentials in the way prescribed by the confessor,
and he must perform it personally, unless the confessor permits or
enjoins fulfillment by proxy (Canon 887). A penance performed during
the actual commission of or with actual affection for sin, is not a
satisfaction, but a new offense.

(b) For fruitfulness it is necessary that the penitent be in the state
of grace when he fulfills the penance, for the works of His enemies are
not supernaturally pleasing to God. Or, more exactly, a penance done in
the state of sin, but without affection for sin and under the influence
of actual grace, has no strict right either of justice or of friendship
to divine acceptance; but it seems fitting that such penance be
accepted by the divine liberality in part satisfaction for sins
forgiven.

2748. The Obligation of Accepting and Performing a Penance.--(a) _Per
se_, the obligation is grave, since the penance belongs to the
integrity of the Sacrament, and hence its refusal or neglect is an
injury to a sacred thing. (b) _Per accidens_, the obligation may be
light, and this is held to be the case when the penance was imposed for
free matter, or when the satisfaction prescribed is a light work (such
as one or two Hail Marys). A penitent is not bound to accept an
unreasonable penance, and he may seek a commutation if such a penance
is imposed. As a rule, negligence about the circumstances of a penance
(e.g., the time, or posture) is not a grave sin, but exceptionally it
may be serious (e.g., if one delays a gravely obligatory penance six
months, or so long as to be in danger of forgetting it; if one omits to
say a prayer on bended knees when this was chiefly intended by the
confessor).

2749. Causes That Excuse from a Penance Imposed.--(a) Commutation.--If
there is a just reason (e.g., the over-severity of the penance), the
penitent may have his penance changed to something lighter. The
confessor who imposed the penance may be asked to change it, even
probably after and outside of confession, and after a long time, and
though he does not remember the confession. Another confessor may
lessen the penance, but only in confession and after he has heard at
least a summary repetition of the sins for which the penance was given.

(b) Cessation.--There is no obligation to fulfill a penance in case of
impossibility, whether physical (e.g., if the penitent is dying and can
neither say the prayers ordered nor ask for a commutation), or moral
(e.g., if the penitent has forgotten the penance and cannot
conveniently ask the confessor about it).

2750. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Absolution.--(a) The
divine law requires the power of Orders, for only priests were
appointed by Christ as the ministers of Penance, (b) The natural law
requires the power of jurisdiction, since the Sacrament of Penance is
exercised in the form of a judicial process, which supposes authority
to judge. (c) The law of the Church requires the approval of the
Bishop, or his decision that the priest is a fit person to hear
confessions. Approbation is always given along with jurisdiction.

2751. Power of Jurisdiction.--The power of jurisdiction is so necessary
that without it absolution is null.

(a) Jurisdiction in general is treated in Canons 872 sqq. of the Code.
Ordinary jurisdiction is had by the Pope for the whole Church, and by
Ordinaries, parish-priests, exempt religious superiors, etc., for their
own subjects. Delegated jurisdiction comes from the law itself in favor
of penitents who are dying (Canon 882), or who are making a sea voyage
(Canon 883), a privilege extended recently also to those who are making
air journeys, or who are outside their domicile (Canon 881), etc.;
while delegated jurisdiction from man is had by those priests who have
obtained faculties orally or in writing from the competent superior
(Canon 879).

(b) Jurisdiction in special cases is treated in Canons 874, 875, 876,
519 sqq. Religious women living in community should have for each house
one ordinary confessor and one extraordinary confessor who comes four
times a year. Further, the bishop should appoint supplementary
confessors to whom the Religious may freely make their confessions, and
special confessors for individual Sisters when spiritual progress is
aided by such an arrangement.

2752. When the Church Supplies Jurisdiction.--In certain cases the
Church, for the good of souls, supplies jurisdiction for the time being
to priests who lack it:

(a) in case of common error, that is, when all or many of the faithful
in a place think that a priest has jurisdiction, as when he is seated
in the confessional of a public church hearing or waiting to hear those
who are going to confession. The common error is not of law, but of
fact;

(b) in case of uncertainty of law (e.g., whether a certain sin is
reserved) or of fact (e.g., whether the confessor's jurisdiction has
expired) about the confessor's jurisdiction, if the confessor has a
positive or probable reason in favor of his right to absolve. The
Church supplies jurisdiction in the absolution of a reserved censure
whose reservation was not known to the priest, unless it be _ab homine_
or most specially reserved to the Holy See (Canon 2247, n. 3);

(c) in case of danger of death, when full jurisdiction is granted to
every priest (Canon 882).

2753. Limitation of jurisdiction.--(a) Reserved Sins or Cases.--For the
sake of discipline and the good of souls the absolution of certain more
atrocious or pernicious crimes is reserved to higher superiors, namely,
to the Pope or the Ordinary. Reservation is not incurred in a case
reserved on account of censure, if the penitent's act was not gravely
imputable; nor probably in a case reserved for its own sake (unless the
reserving authority willed otherwise), if the penitent was ignorant
(though not crassly or supinely) of the reservation (Canon 2229). To
fall under reservation, a sin must be mortal, consummated (i.e.. not
merely attempted) certain and formal (i.e., perpetrated with knowledge
of the special malice that caused reservation). Reservation ceases when
confession is made by the sick who are unable to leave the house or by
those who are about to be married; when the Superior has refused the
request for faculties to absolve a reserved case, or the confessor
prudently decides that the request for faculties cannot be made without
grave detriment to the penitent or danger to the seal; when confession
is made outside the territory of the Superior who reserves the sin
(Canon 900).

(b) Reserved Persons.--Those who have not special faculties cannot
validly hear the confessions of nuns (Canon 876), for the director of
consciences of these Religious should be endowed with special virtue,
knowledge and prudence. Religious Superiors, novice-masters, and
rectors of seminaries or colleges should not act habitually as
confessors of their subjects (Canons 518, n. 2, 891), lest the
distinction between the internal and the external forum be forgotten.
Finally, to prevent abuse of the Sacrament and occasions of relapse, a
confessor cannot validly absolve his accomplice in a sin against the
Sixth Commandment, consummated or unconsummated, or from the sin of
complicity itself, as necessary matter of the Sacrament, if the sin was
on both sides external, certain, and both internally and externally
grave (Canons 884, 2367).

2754. Absolution from Reserved Cases.--(a) In danger of death, any
priest can absolve every reserved sin and censure, but, should the
penitent recover, there is a duty in certain specified cases of having
recourse to the lawful superior (Canons 882, 2252). The latter Canon
specifies two cases in which recourse is necessary after the person
recovers, namely, a censure _ab homine_ and one most specially reserved
to the Holy See. A third case has been added by the Sacred
Penitentiary, namely, when a priest who has attempted marriage and is
unable to separate asks for absolution from the censure of Canon 2388,
§1, in danger of death.

(b) In urgent cases, namely, if censures _latae sententiae_ cannot be
observed externally without grave danger of scandal or infamy, or if it
is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for such
time as may be necessary in order that the competent superior may
provide, then any confessor can, in the sacramental forum, absolve from
these censures, no matter how they are reserved, imposing, under pain
of falling back into the censure, the obligation of having recourse
within a month (at least by letter and through the confessor, if it can
be done without grave inconvenience), without mentioning the name, to
the Sacred Penitentiary or to a Bishop or other superior who has the
faculty. The confessor imposes also the obligation of fulfilling his
injunctions (Canon 2254, §1). It is to be noted:

1) the circumstances constituting an urgent case are the two specified
in the Canon: the difficulty of observing the censure; the hardship of
remaining in sin,

2) the object of the absolution is all censures _latae sententiae_,
however reserved, with one exception, namely, the censure incurred
under Canon 2388, §1, the case of a priest who, after an attempted
marriage, is unable to separate. No absolution as an urgent case under
this Canon can be given. The censure _latae sententiae_ for false
denunciation can be absolved under this Canon only if the conditions of
Canon 2363 have been fulfilled (actual formal retraction and
reparation; imposition of a grave and long penance; and the sin itself
remains reserved _ratione sui_ to the Holy See).

3) Sufficient extrinsic authority is available to make safe in practice
the extension of the grant of power of this Canon to censures _ab
homine_ which are _ferendae sententiae_.

4) Sections 2 and 3 of this Canon indicate the right of the penitent to
go afterwards to a privileged confessor without making the recourse to
the superior enjoined upon him or observing the _mandata_ from the
superior in case he has already made recourse, and the procedure to be
followed when recourse is morally impossible.

(c) Outside of necessity, only those can absolve who have ordinary or
delegated faculties. The law itself grants to pastors the power to
absolve during the whole of paschal time from all sins which the
Ordinary has reserved to himself, and missionaries have the same power
during the time they are giving a mission (Canon 899, n. 3). This does
not apply to censures nor to cases reserved to the Ordinary by the
Apostolic See or by law, such as the excommunication _latae sententiae_
which Canon 2350 declares against the procurers of abortion.

2755. Absolution Given by One Not Possessed of Jurisdiction.--(a)
Effect.--Absolution of mortal sins given without jurisdiction is
invalid; and of venial sins, is unlawful and probably invalid. In some
cases, however, the Church supplies jurisdiction, as was said above
(2752).

(b) Guilt.--There is no sin if the absolution is given in good faith,
as when a confessor is inculpably ignorant of a reservation. If
absolution is given in bad faith and the confessor knows that the
Church does not supply, there is a grave sin on account of the
irreverence to the Sacrament and the harm to the penitent. If the
confessor knows that he lacks jurisdiction, but that the Church
supplies on account of common error, it seems that no sin is committed
if there is a good reason for giving absolution (e.g., the absence of
other priests); but otherwise there is mortal or venial sin according
to circumstances.

(c) Penalty.--He who with presumption hears confessions without
jurisdiction or absolves from a reserved case for which he has no
faculties, incurs in the former case _ipso facto_ suspension from the
power of Orders, and in the latter case _ipso facto_ suspension from
hearing confessions (Canon 2366).

2756. Duties of the Confessor before Confession.--(a) Fitness to Hear
Confessions.--The confessor should have sufficient knowledge to be able
readily to solve the usual cases and to work out or find the solution
of the more difficult cases; sufficient prudence to be able to apply
his knowledge well and to avoid what is dangerous or suspicious;
sufficient goodness to be sincerely desirous of the spiritual advantage
of the penitent, and to be patient in hearing him and firm in
correcting him.

(b) Willingness to H ear Confessions.-The confessor is obliged either
from justice or charity (2676) to hear the confessions of those who
reasonably request it. He should observe the rules of the Ritual and of
the Code as to the manner and place of confession (Canons 908-910).

2757. Duties of the Confessor as Judge in Hearing the Case.--(a) Since
confession should be entire, the confessor is gravely bound to question
the penitent, when there is reason to think that the confession is not
entire. With pious and well-instructed persons, of course, there is no
need of questioning, and, since the duty of integrity rests primarily
on the penitent, the confessor's negligence may be regarded as venial
when he is burdened by a great multitude of confessions.

(b) Since confession must not be made onerous or harmful to penitents,
the confessor is bound to be very discreet in the questions he asks,
and to follow the rule that it is far better to say too little than to
say too much. He must avoid any word or remark that might teach sin to
the young or scandalize the old; he must be very reserved when speaking
of matters that pertain to the Sixth Commandment, and, if there is need
to question about them, should begin with very general queries. Neither
directly nor indirectly may he inquire the name of an accomplice of the
penitent (Canon 888); but he is allowed to investigate matters which he
has a right to know, even though the accomplice thereby becomes known
to him. If the common good requires that a complaint be lodged against
the accomplice, the confessor may oblige the penitent to make this
complaint to the proper superior; but it is seldom advisable that the
confessor agree to perform this duty himself, and then he should
require that the penitent speak to him about the affair outside of
confession, if this can be done (see 1287).

(c) Since the penitent acts as the accuser in confession, he should be
believed both for and against himself. But should it happen that the
confessor knows for certain that his penitent is lying, his procedure
will depend on the source of his knowledge. If the knowledge is not of
sacramental origin but comes from the confessor's own reliable
experience (e.g., because he saw the penitent commit a sin and is sure
that the silence about the sin is not due to forgetfulness, ignorance
or previous confession of it), he should try to induce the penitent to
confess, and, if the latter refuses, should deny absolution. If the
confessor is morally certain on account of the word of a third person
that the penitent is now concealing a sin, it seems to some authorities
that absolution may be either granted or refused, to others that it
must be refused. Finally, if the confessor's knowledge comes from a
previous sacramental confession or other obligatory secret, he is held
to respect the secret; he may not ask any questions which he would not
have asked otherwise, and, if the penitent will not confess, he must
either grant absolution, as some hold, or dissimulate its denial, as
others think.

2758. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Deciding about the Case.--(a)
The confessor should pass judgment on the past state of the penitent's
soul as declared to him, but defect or mistake here would not make the
Sacrament null. The objective malice of the sins (i.e., their
theological and moral malice) will be recognized by the priest from his
knowledge of theology, and the subjective malice from the declarations
or replies of the penitent. At times the confessor will have to rest
satisfied with the decision that the sin or its character is uncertain.

(b) The confessor should pass judgment on the present dispositions of
the penitent, or the sincerity of his sorrow and resolution; but it
suffices that the judgment be probable, and there be no strong
suspicion against it. The penitent's devout confession, or his promise
of amendment, the trouble he took to make his confession, etc., are
indexes of good faith, just as boastful confession, disregard for
former promises, and unwillingness or carelessness about coming to
confession are signs of bad faith.

2759. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Passing Sentence.--(a) The Duty
of Binding.--The confessor must impose upon the penitent such duties as
are necessitated by the essence of the Sacrament (e.g., there is no
true contrition without willingness to make due restitution,
reparation, or satisfaction, and to avoid sinful occasions and to
struggle against bad habits), or such penalties as are required for its
integrity (i.e., the priest must impose a suitable penance). To
safeguard morals, the law of the Church gravely obliges a confessor to
require his penitent _sub gravi_ to denounce another confessor
certainly guilty of the crime of solicitation, unless there be a grave
reason that excuses the penitent; and, if the penitent refuses,
absolution must be denied. On the details of this law and on the
penalties for solicitation, refusal to denounce, and false accusation,
see Commentaries on Canons 904, 2368 and 2363 of the Code.

(b) The Duty of Loosing.--The confessor is bound _sub gravi_ to give
absolution at once to one who is properly disposed, for there is a
tacit contract between the penitent and the confessor that absolution
will be granted if the penitent is worthy; the penitent puts himself to
considerable trouble to obtain forgiveness, and he is deprived of a
great good if absolution is refused (Canon 886). If only free matter is
confessed, it is a venial sin now and then to deny absolution without
reason, but no sin to deny it for a good reason if the penitent
consents.

(c) The Duty of Retaining.--The confessor should always refuse
absolution to those who are certainly not contrite and in whom he
cannot awaken true repentance, for absolution would be of no benefit to
such persons and would make the confessor an encourager of sin.
Likewise, absolution should be denied those who are incapable (e.g.,
those who have not as yet committed sin or who confess only
imperfections). If there is doubt about the fitness or capacity of the
penitent, absolution should generally be delayed; but it may be granted
conditionally for a serious reason (e.g., if the penitent is in a state
of sin and cannot return to confession for a long time), and it should
be granted conditionally for a very serious reason (e.g., if the
penitent will probably not return, or if he is confessing in
preparation for marriage).

2760. Penitents to Whom Absolution Should Be Denied.--There are three
classes of penitents especially to whom absolution should be frequently
denied on account of their lack of repentance:

(a) those who refuse to abandon a proximate and voluntary occasion of
grave sin, for these are impenitent and unworthy of absolution. But
absolution may be given those who promise to abandon a proximate and
voluntary occasion, or to use the proper means of safety if they are in
a proximate and necessary occasion of sin (see 263 sqq.);

(b) those who have contracted the habit of some grave sin, if they are
unwilling to use the proper means to overcome it; but if they seriously
promise to use means prescribed by the confessor, they should be
considered as well disposed. A sin is habitual when it is committed
often--that is, for an external sin about five times a month, and for
an internal sin about five times a week-and when the sinner acts for
the proper motive of the vice, e.g., in injustice for disorder, in
intemperance for pleasure of the sense, in sins against charity out of
hatred, etc. But consideration should be taken also of the character of
the person (i.e., a weak-willed person is enslaved by habit more
readily than a strong-willed person) and of the vice (i.e., an alluring
sin like impurity becomes a habit more quickly than other sins);

(c) those backsliders or recidivists who have confessed the same grave
sin in three or four previous confessions and have relapsed into it
again without any improvement. These persons should be absolved if they
are sincere now and give some special indication as proof of sincerity
(e.g., some effort made to conquer their habit); otherwise (except in
great necessity, when they may be given the benefit of the doubt and be
granted conditional absolution) they should not be absolved but should
be put off kindly for a short space, since there is no reason to
believe that the present sorrow is any better than that of the past.

2761. The Sacramental Penance.--(a) Obligation.--The confessor is bound
to impose a penance in order to provide for the integrity of the
Sacrament and the good of the penitent. Exceptions to this rule are the
cases when the penitent cannot perform any penance, as when he is at
the point of death, and when the penitent after the imposition of a
penance and absolution remembers new and necessary matter. It is at
least a venial sin to delay the giving of a penance till after the
absolution, and it is a grave sin to give no penance at all, unless (as
some hold) only a light penance was due.

(b) Quantity.--The amount of the penance should be suited as a
punishment to the degree of the penitent's guilt, that is, a heavier
penance should be given for necessary matter and a lighter penance for
free matter. The penance should also take into consideration the moral
malice and the frequency of the sins. Works that the Church may order
under pain of serious sin suffice for necessary matter (such as a Mass,
a fast, five decades of the Rosary, or the Litany of the Saints). Light
penances are the _De Profundis_, the Litany of St. Joseph, five Paters
and five Aves. For a sufficient reason (e.g., the sickness of the
penitent, the probability that a grave penance will keep him from
future confession, the fact that his sorrow is very great or that he
has gained a plenary indulgence, the performance of satisfaction for
him by the confessor himself) the quantity of a penance may be
lessened. A grave penance may be lightened by joining it with some duty
already owed (e.g., by requiring the penitent to say the Rosary while
hearing Sunday Mass, by obliging him to hear Mass on Sunday and also to
say a few prayers after the Mass).

(c) Quality.--The character of the penance should make it suitable as a
remedy for the spiritual disease of the penitent; that is, as far as
possible he should be required to perform works that tend to correct
his chief failings. Thus, for those who are uncharitable or avaricious
an alms or other work of mercy is a good penance; for those who are
given to pleasures of sense, a fast or other corporal austerity; for
those who are lax or irreligious, a prayer, a visit to the Blessed
Sacrament, a meditation, or frequentation of the Sacraments. Ordinarily
it suffices to impose prayers as penances, since prayer is a universal
remedy. Penances unsuitable to the penitent (e.g., fasts for one who
needs nourishment on account of labors), those that are too difficult
(e.g., perpetual or long-continued practices), those that are harmful
(e.g., penances that will bring the penitent into suspicion or
ridicule), must be avoided.

2762. The Duties of the Confessor as Spiritual Physician.--(a) General
Remedies.--The confessor should give much attention to the study of
moral and ascetical works, so as to be able to suggest suitable means
to his penitents for overcoming their spiritual infirmities and
avoiding future relapses. Thus, if a penitent desires to know or ought
to be told how to struggle against anger, drunkenness or impurity, the
confessor should know how to advise him and what measures to recommend
to him.

(b) Special Remedies.--Certain classes of penitents need special
attention. Thus, the tempted and afflicted should be told the means of
fighting temptation and sadness; the scrupulous should be forbidden to
examine their consciences too carefully, or to accuse themselves
minutely, or to spend too much time at devotions; the sick and the
dying should be encouraged to dispose themselves well and to put aside
thoughts of fear and discouragement; pious persons often need
assistance when they suffer temptations to tepidity or spiritual
desolation. The careless, lazy, malicious, and hardened should be
reproved, but sternness should not be unmingled with kindness, lest the
penitent be driven away from his duty altogether.

2763. The Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide.--(a)
Instruction.--The confessor should teach children and other ignorant
persons if he finds that they do not know truths necessary to be known
for a fruitful reception of the Sacrament--that is, the mysteries of
faith that must be believed explicitly and the dispositions for
receiving absolution (924). He should instruct about duties when this
will be for the penitent's good--that is, when the penitent falsely
believes something to be sinful which is not sinful, or to be gravely
sinful that is only lightly sinful, or when the penitent's ignorance of
an obligation is gravely culpable, or when he is invincibly ignorant
but will be kept from a sin without graver evil if he is instructed
now. If an instruction will probably do no good, a confessor should not
instruct an invincibly ignorant penitent about his duties, unless
silence will be productive of greater evils than instruction. Thus, if
the confessor foresees that the penitent will only be put in bad faith
if he is told about a duty of restitution, it would be useless and
wrong to speak to him about it; but if he should foresee that, if he
does not speak, the penitent will do worse things with great injury or
scandal to others, it would be necessary to instruct him.

(b) Direction.--In spiritual matters a confessor should be willing and
able to counsel and advise, for example, about the choice of a state of
life (marriage, clerical state, religious life), about voluntary rules
or practices (vows, austerities), and about the performance of duties
(e.g., training of children). For advice on temporal matters a priest
should either direct his penitents to lawyers, physicians or other
professional advisers, or, if he can give prudent direction himself
(e.g., on artistic, educational, or business questions), he should
preferably discuss the matter elsewhere than in the confessional.

2764. The Duties of the Confessor After Confession.--(a) _Per se_, or
by reason of his office itself, the confessor is held to guard
inviolate the secret of the confessional--that is, he may not disclose,
or use to the penitent's disadvantage, any information received from
sacramental confession. This duty is a grave one imposed by natural law
(since there is a quasi-contract that the confessor will treat the
penitent's confession as confidential), by divine law (since Christ, in
willing that confession be used, implicitly willed that it be so
conducted as not to become a thing odious, scandalous and harmful), and
by church law (for Canons 889, 890, 1757, 2369 strictly forbid
revelations or use of sacramental knowledge and decree severe penalties
against transgressors). Since God wipes out from remembrance the sins
He has pardoned, the confessor, being God's representative, must treat
what he has heard as not known to him. The obligation of the seal is so
strict that no one may dispense from it, that neither Probabilism nor
epieikeia may be applied to it, and that no exception is allowed unless
the penitent himself freely, unmistakably and for a serious reason
gives permission for it to the confessor.

(b) _Per accidens_, or by reason of a mistake committed by him (e.g.,
absolution mistakenly refused or invalidly given, erroneous notion
about the gravity of a sin imparted or not corrected, restitution
imposed where not due or not imposed where due), a confessor is held to
see that the mistake is corrected and that the penitent or a third
party is spared or rescued from the harm which will follow from the
mistake. The obligation is one of justice in those cases where there is
a violation of implicit agreement (e.g., absolution unreasonably
withheld), or damage positively and culpably caused (e.g., erroneous
advice about the gravity of a sin or about the duty of restitution); it
is one of charity in other cases where the confessor can without undue
inconvenience assist the spiritual or temporal need of the penitent or
of another (e.g., penitent's misunderstanding about his duty of
restitution which the confessor failed to clear up). The duty of
repairing mistakes is grave when there is grave damage (e.g., invalid
absolution of mortal sins) and grave guilt was contracted by the
mistake (e.g., if the invalidity was voluntary) or will be contracted
by refusal to prevent the consequences of the mistake (e.g., if the
invalidity has been discovered, and one knows that the penitent will
die unabsolved, if one does not rectify the error). The duty is light
if there is light damage (e.g., invalid absolution of free matter, or
of necessary matter confessed by a person who will go to the Sacraments
soon again), or light culpability (e.g., failure to question about the
species or number of sins, or to impose a penance, when the failure is
due to distraction or forgetfulness).

2765. Manner of Repairing Defects Made in Hearing a Confession.--(a)
The Reparation to be Made.--If the penitent has been deprived of
absolution, he should be absolved; if he has been wrongly instructed,
he should be set right; if temporal loss has been caused, temporal
restitution should be made.

(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Should Be Made.--The injured person
should be compensated. Hence if restitution was mistakenly imposed on
the penitent and he cannot recover his property, the confessor should
reimburse him; if the penitent was mistakenly excused from restitution,
payment is due the third party who loses by the advice.

(e) The Manner of Making Reparation.--If possible, the reparation
should be made in the penitent's next confession, as this is less
troublesome to all concerned. But if the confessor has wrongly
instructed the penitent in an important matter, he is bound more
probably (after obtaining the penitent's permission to speak about
confession matter) to retract, even outside of the confessional, if
this can be done without scandal or other serious evil, which would be
rare.

2766. Excuses from the Duty of Repairing Mistakes.--(a) Physical
Impossibility.--If the confessor does not know who the penitent is or
cannot find him, there is nothing to do but to repent over the mistake
and to pray for the penitent that God may provide for him.

(b) Moral Impossibility.--Grave inconvenience excuses, unless the
confessor has been seriously at fault against justice (e.g., by
omitting absolution, by giving incorrect instruction in an important
matter, by neglecting to warn against an occasion of serious sin, by
wrongly advising on restitution of a large sum), or the salvation of a
soul is at stake, as when an unabsolved penitent is dying (see 1797
sqq.)

2767. The Obligation of the Seal of Confession.--(a) Its
Subject.--Primarily the duty of the seal obliges the confessor,
secondarily all others to whom the matter of sacramental confession in
any way becomes known, such as bystanders, interpreters, or those who
have spied into a confession. The penitent on his part is bound to keep
as a natural secret the words of the confessor which the latter would
rightly wish to be kept confidential (e.g., it would not be fair to
excuse oneself in making necessary corrections, by saying that one was
acting under advice of one's confessor, especially since the confessor
cannot defend himself).

(b) Its Object.--Primarily, the seal extends to all sins confessed,
whether they be light or grave, private or public; and a confessor may
not confirm from his knowledge as confessor what he also knows from
other knowledge. Secondarily, it extends to all that is declared for a
fuller explanation of the sins, such as circumstances, purpose,
occasion, coöperation, and to all those things whose revelation would
endanger the seal or make the Sacrament odious, such as the denial of
absolution, the penance given, the insincerity, impatience or
scrupulosity shown in confessing, the fact that a confession was long
or a general review. Other matters not generally known and which the
penitent reasonably wishes to be confidential (e.g., the fact that he
made his confession, his natural defects of illegitimacy or deafness)
should be kept as natural secrets. But there is no duty of sacramental
or natural silence about matters which the confessor knows from other
sources and which he is free to mention (e.g., facts learned from a
non-sacramental confession made to the priest and others with a view to
its use, or from the confessor's own perception of a theft committed by
the penitent in the act of confession).

2768. Sins against the Seal of Confession.--(a) Direct violation
happens if a confessor declares, either to the penitent himself or to
another, matter protected by the seal, and with such clearness that
both the penitent and his sin can be recognized. This occurs even
though no names are mentioned, or the penitent is unknown to the
listeners, or is no longer living, or when the listeners do not
perceive that sacramental knowledge is being used. The sin is grave,
and, since the injury to religion and the public is always serious, it
admits of no lightness of matter. The penalty is excommunication most
specially reserved to the Pope (Canon 2369).

(b) Indirect violation happens if a confessor so speaks or acts as to
create a danger of direct violation (e.g., if he speaks so loud in the
confessional that those outside can hear, or if he is suspiciously
silent when the penitent is being commended, or if he warns the parents
of a penitent to be specially watchful of him, or if he refuses to hear
a confession because he knows from a previous confession that the
person is very scrupulous, or if he shows less confidence or regard for
the penitent). The sin admits of lightness of matter, since the danger
of direct violation may be remote; but if there is grave culpability,
suspension or even severer penalties may be inflicted (Canons 2369,
2368).

(c) Unlawful use of sacramental knowledge happens if there is no direct
or indirect violation of the seal, but the confessor's conduct is such
as to make confession distasteful either to the penitent or to others,
as when a superior is guided in giving his vote or directing his
subject by information gathered from confession. This is forbidden in
Canon 890.

(d) Apparent violation of the seal happens if there is really no direct
or indirect violation of the seal, or unlawful use of confessional
knowledge, but a priest's language is calculated to arouse a reasonable
suspicion that some such sin is being committed (e.g., if a preacher or
retreat master or writer of moral cases uses illustrations from
confessions heard by him which will excite distrust in his own or other
penitents). Serious scandal and defamation may also be caused by public
statements unfavorable to the morals of a certain city or community or
class.

2769. Special Abuses.--Two abuses to which confession is especially
exposed are defamation and impurity, and hence the law of the Church
provides special safeguards against these dangers (see 2753, 2757,
2759).

(a) Defamation.--The fame of third parties is protected by the law
which forbids the confessor to inquire about the penitent's accomplice,
the fame of the penitent by the law of the sacramental seal, and the
fame of the confessor by the law which subjects those who bring a false
accusation of solicitation against a confessor to excommunication
specially reserved to the Pope, to retractation, reparation, and severe
penance (Canons 888, n. 2, 889 sqq., 2363).

(b) Impurity.--The danger that a confessor will be tempted to
solicitation by his knowledge of the frailty of a penitent is provided
for by the law which severely commands formal denunciation of those
guilty of solicitation (Canon 904); the danger that a penitent may be
induced to yield to solicitation by a promise to absolve the sin is met
by the law which invalidates absolution of an accomplice (Canon 884).

2770. Absolutio Complicis.--Absolutio complicis in peccato turpi
invalida est praeterquam in mortis periculo (Canon 884).

(a) Objectum legis est peccatum turpe, i.e., quodvis peccatum contra
sextum, consummatum vel non consummatum, colloquiis, aspectibus vel
factis patratum. Necesse est autem quod peccatum sit utrinque certum
(quoad factum et jus), externum, et grave (qua internum et qua
externum). Unde non agitur de peccatis contra alias virtutes, neque de
peccatis luxuriæ mere internis vel levibus.

(b) Subjectum de quo in lege est complex seu socius immediatus et
formalis in ipso actu peccati; et sic non sufficit ad complicitatem
cooperatio etiam proxima (1507), nec peccatum mere materiale, quale fit
ab amente, dormiente, ebrio, infante, renitente. Non requiritur tamen
quod compar sit puber vel alius sexus, neque quod confessarius tempore
complicitatis jam inter clericos adscriptus sit.

2771. Effectus Legis de Absolutione Complicis.--(a) Quoad
Absalutionem.--Invalida et illicita est absolutio directa peccati
nondum remissi si extra periculum mortis datur. Est valida sed
illicita: absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis
data, quando alius sacerdos confessionem recipere potest; necnon
absolutio indirecta peccati nondum remissi, extra periculum mortis
data, quando poenitens bona fide peccatum reticet. Est valida et licita
absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis vel in
gravissima necessitate (utputa urgente præcepto ecclesiastico et divino
confessionis et communionis annuae) data, quando alius sacerdos aut
nullimode aut nonnisi cum gravi incommodo (scil. infamiæ, scandali,
periculi confessionis sacrilegæ) haberi potest; necnon absolutio
directa peccati jam remissi, etiam extra hoc periculum et hanc
necessitatem facta. Non una tamen est sententia auctorum in
interpretandis dubiis hujus legis, nec omnes conveniunt cum placitis
hic positis, nam de dubiis alii strictius, alii mitius judicant.

(b) Quoad Censuram.--Excommunicatio specialissime reservata S. Sedi
ipso facto incurritur a confessario qui illicite absolvit vel fingit
absolvere, sive directe, sive (quando poenitens ad tacendum inductus
est a confessario ipso) indirecte. Censura non incurritur igitur si
confessio tantum auditur, si poenitens propria sponte peccatum reticet,
si sacerdos dubitat num poenitens complex sit (Canon 2367).

2772. Sacerdos reus delicti sollicitationis in confessione intra mensem
denuntiandus est a poenitente loci Ordinario vel S.C.S. Officii (Canon
904).

(a) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio, etiam inefficax,
poenitentis eujuscumque ut actum quemcumque gravem contra castitatem
committat. Provocatio fit vel per verba (e.g., declarationes amoris,
invitationes, laudes), per facta (e.g., dona), per sermones (e.g.,
colloquia de turpibus a poenitente confessis), per tractatus (scil.
colloquia de re turpi agenda), per consensum internum-externum
sollicitationi poenitentis datum.

(b) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio quæ ordinem habet ad
confessionem, i.e., quæ fit tempore factae confessionis (i.e., inter,
immediate ante, immediate post confessionem), vel tempore confessionis
faciendæ (i.e., occasione confessionis petitæ a poenitente, prætextu
confessionis falso allegatæ a confessario, in loco confessionis cum
confessionis simulatione).

2773. Confessarius debet, graviter onerata ejus conscientia, de onere
denuntiationis poenitentem monere.

(a) Obligatio confessarii gravis est. Sed antequam moneat, serio
consideret utrum poenitens persona fide digna sit, utrum certo constet
de facto, de turpitudine, de gravitate, de ordine ad confessionem,
utrum detur causa excusans (e.g., mors sollicitantis; probabiliter,
ejus plena emendatio per plures annos manifestata; grave damnum
poenitentis quoad vitam, famam, fortunam, nisi gravius damnum simul
immineat bono communi). Si de delicto sollicitationis et de obligatione
poenitentis nullum dubium est, confessarius moneat, etiamsi poenitens
in bona fide sit et prævideatur certo non obtemperaturus, mortis
periculo autem excepto. Si poenitens irrationabiliter renuat
denuntiare, absolvi non potest, sed confessarius de casu consulere
debet Ordinarium.

(b) Obligatio poenitentis etiam gravis est. Denuntiatio facienda est
intra mensem a cognita obligatione., Ordinario sollicitantis, vel loci
delicti, vel poenitentis, personaliter et judicialiter. Poenitens qui
nec comparere nec scribere potest, interea excusatur; sed ille qui
justa causa exemptionis carens scienter omittit denuntiare intra
terminum unius mensis incurrit in excommunicationem latæ sententiæ
nemini reservatum, non absolvendus nisi postquam obligationi
satisfecerit aut se satisfacturum serio promiserit (Canon 2368, n. 2).
Confessarius non tenetur in se suscipere onus denuntiationis, nisi
secus gravissimum damnum bono publico inferretur.

2774. The Sacrament of Extreme Unction.--As Confirmation perfects
Baptism by bringing to maturity the new life of grace, so Extreme
Unction perfects Penance by strengthening against the spiritual
debility that remains after sin itself has been wiped away.
Confirmation makes ready for the battle of life, Extreme Unction
assists during the struggle of death. The fifth Sacrament is defined:
"A Sacrament of the New Law in which through the anointing with oil and
the prayer of the priest adult persons who are in danger of death
receive health of soul, and also at times health of body."

(a) The remote matter or element of the Sacrament is oil (James, v, 14,
15). For validity it is required that this be olive oil, blessed by a
bishop or by a priest having special papal delegation, with the special
blessing for the oil of the sick (O. I.); for lawfulness, _sub gravi_
that it be oil blessed the previous Holy Thursday (Canon 734), _sub
levi_ at least that it be blessed by the bishop of the diocese, or, in
case of vacancy, by the neighboring bishop. In necessity the old oils
may be lawfully used, while chrism and the oil of the catechumens may
be used as doubtful matter. Unblessed oils and oils blessed by an
unauthorized priest do not suffice for validity.

(b) The proximate matter is the anointing of the sick man with blessed
oil. In urgent necessity it suffices to anoint one sense, or rather the
forehead; in other cases the various senses should be anointed in the
order given in the Ritual. Each anointing of a double sense should
begin with the right organ (e.g., the right eye) and should be given
with the right thumb in the form of a cross. If one organ is missing
(e.g., a hand amputated), the anointing should be made, if possible,
near to its place (e.g., on the wrist); if there is danger of
contagion, the anointing may be made by means of an instrument, such as
a brush or small stick. The anointing of the reins should always be
omitted and the anointing of the feet may be omitted for any good
reason, such as inconvenience to the dying person.

(c) The form of the Sacrament is the prayer used by the priest. In the
Latin Church the ordinary form is contained in the words: "_Per istam
sanctam unctionem_, etc. By this holy anointing and His most tender
mercy may the Lord forgive thee whatever sin thou hast committed by
sight (by hearing, by smell, by taste and speech, by touch, by thy
steps). Amen." The extraordinary rite for use when there is not time to
give all the anointings is bestowed on the forehead in the words: "Per
istam sanctam unctionem et suam piissimam misericordiam indulgeat tibi
Dominus quidquid deliquisti. Amen." The essential words of the form
are: "Per istam unctionem indulgeat tibi Dominus quidquid deliquisti,"
because they express the intercession and the effect of the rite. It
would probably be a grave sin to omit the reference to the senses in
the ordinary form, as that seems to be a notable part of the form; but
it would be a light sin, apart from contempt or scandal, to omit an
unimportant word such as "Amen." If there is doubt about the
recipient's capacity (i.e., whether he has reached the use of reason,
whether he is in danger of death, whether he is already dead, whether
he is impenitent and unwilling to receive the Sacrament), the form
should be conditional. The condition should be "_si es capax_," not
"_si es dispositus_," even in the last-mentioned case. For the
Sacrament is given validly even to one who is not well disposed (i.e.,
who lacks repentance) and there is thus the possibility, when validity
is not made dependent on the condition of good disposition, that
sacramental fruitfulness will follow later when impenitence, the
obstacle to the Sacrament's activity, shall have been removed.

(d) The recipient of the Sacrament is a Catholic who after attaining
the use of reason has come into the danger of death through sickness or
old age. No one is capable of receiving this Sacrament unless he is
baptized, for Baptism is the gateway of the Sacraments (2671); unless
he has reached the use of reason, for the Sacrament is a remedy against
personal sin and supposes that the recipient can or formerly could
distinguish between right and wrong; unless he is in danger of death
through the infirmity of disease or of decrepitude, for St. James
teaches that the anointing is for those who are enfeebled by illness
dangerous unto death. Hence Extreme Unction cannot be administered
validly to the unbaptized, to young children who have not come to the
use of reason, to the perpetually insane, to those who are sick but not
in danger of death, to those who are in danger of death but not sick
(e.g., a strong man going to the gallows or to battle). But the
Sacrament may be administered to children who have not yet made their
first confession, if they are capable of sin, and to the insane who
once had the use of reason. The danger of death need not be immediate,
and hence Extreme Unction may be given when the disease is mortal but
the patient will last for several months or even a year, as in
tuberculosis. Illness includes not only chronic sickness, but also
fatal disorders caused by wounds, accidents, poison. The rule about the
old is that those who have reached sixty years and show some signs of
approaching death, such as great feebleness or fainting spells, even
though they have no special malady, may be anointed; for their old age
itself is a disease.

(e) The minister of Extreme Unction is the priest, since St. James
directs that the presbyters (i.e., the priests) of the Church be called
to anoint the sick. Extreme Unction, unlike Penance, is not exercised
in the form of a judicial process, and hence the power of Orders
suffices for its valid administration, and any priest, even one who
lacks jurisdiction, gives it validly. But for lawful administration
church law prescribes that the minister regularly be the ecclesiastical
superior or spiritual director (i.e., the pastor for his parish, the
head of a clerical religious institute for his house, the parish-priest
or chaplain for a lay religious body, the confessor for nuns), and that
the minister extraordinarily (i.e., in necessity) be any other priest
who has permission, or reasonably presumed permission.

(f) The effects of Extreme Unction are _per se_ an increase of
sanctifying grace, since this is a Sacrament of the Living; _per
accidens_ (i.e., when the recipient is not in the state of grace, but
is in good faith and has attrition) the forgiveness of sins and first
grace. Extreme Unction produces first grace more surely than does
absolution, if the penitent is unconscious, since it does not call for
any external manifestation of contrition; hence the importance of
anointing those who are dying but unconscious. The special benefit of
Extreme Unction is immediate preparation of the soul for entrance to
heaven, though restoration of the health of the body is sometimes
vouchsafed when this is for the spiritual good of the sick person.
Venial sins and the remains of past sins (i.e., the debility left by
them) are removed and the soul is strengthened with confidence as to
things past and future and with peace and resignation as to present
suffering. Since the Sacrament is given for the period of danger of
death, it cannot be repeated during the same danger; but should the
patient recover and relapse into a distinct danger through the same or
another sickness, there arises a new need and the Sacrament may then be
repeated.

2775. Special Duties.--In addition to the duties that are common in all
the Sacraments, the following duties should be noted in reference to
Extreme Unction.

(a) The Recipient.--_Per se_, Extreme Unction is not necessary as a
means to salvation, for sanctifying grace may be had or recovered
without it; but _per accidens_ it would be necessary as a means, if a
dying person were in mortal sin and could not recover grace except
through it. He who omits Extreme Unction unwillingly or for a good
reason (e.g., because he is well prepared for death and cannot get a
priest without very grave inconvenience) does not sin. He who omits the
Sacrament voluntarily and without good reason, is guilty of grave sin
if he acts from contempt, or gives scandal, or exposes himself to
eternal damnation; but if there is no contempt, scandal or danger to
salvation, sin is indeed committed by the neglect at such a crisis of
so important a spiritual aid, but only venial sin, since there is no
grave precept to receive this Sacrament. The recipient of Extreme
Unction should be in the state of grace; and hence, if he has mortal
sin on his conscience, he must beforehand make an act of contrition or
receive absolution with attrition, or, if neither is possible, he must
make an act of attrition. The custom of the Church calls for confession
before Extreme Unction, and divine law commands confession if one is in
mortal sin and in danger of death.

(b) The Minister.--The pastor is gravely bound in justice to give or
have given the Sacrament of Extreme Unction to all his subjects who
reasonably request it; other priests not charged with the spiritual
care of the dying person are held in charity to anoint him, if he has
not received the last rites and cannot otherwise be anointed. It is
clear that sick calls should be attended to promptly, and it would be a
serious matter to delay so long as to put the sick person in danger of
dying without Extreme Unction or of receiving it when he had become
unconscious and could not dispose himself properly. If the person has
been pronounced dead before the priest's arrival, he should
nevertheless be absolved and anointed conditionally if the last breath
was not long before; because physicians teach that death takes
possession gradually, life lingering in the body for some time after
its external signs have ceased, for about a half hour when the end has
come after long illness, for one or two hours when death is sudden or
accidental. The ceremonies are obligatory under pain of sin, and it is
considered a serious matter to neglect the more notable parts, that is,
without reason to omit all or nearly all the prayers, or to give the
Sacrament without any sacred vestment.

(c) The Pastor.--The oil of the sick should be kept in a neat and
properly decorated place, and should be contained in a vessel of silver
or white metal. Only in exceptional cases is it lawful to keep it in
the rectory (Canon 946). The Catechism of the Council of Trent (page
307) declares that Extreme Unction should form a subject of frequent
instruction. It is important to exhort the people not to delay in
sending for the priest till the sick person has become insensible, nor
to omit to send for him in case of sudden death, since, as already
said, life remains for some time in the body after apparent death.

(d) The People.--All those who are responsible for the good of the
dying person, such as members of the family, physicians, nurses,
relatives, friends, or neighbors, should beware of deceiving him about
his condition and his need of preparation for death; on the contrary,
they should see to it as far as they can, that he receives the last
Sacraments in good time and while he has the full use of his senses,
when the spiritual benefit and the comfort of mind will be of greater
assistance and the bodily cure more likely.




Art. 4: HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY

(_Summa Theologica_, Supplement, qq. 34-68.)

2776. The first five Sacraments arc necessary for the spiritual welfare
of individuals, the remaining two, which are the subject of this
Article, are needful, not for each person, but for the Church as a
body. A member of the Church may save his soul though he remains
outside the priesthood and the married state, but the spiritual good of
the Church itself requires both Orders and Matrimony. Without Orders
the Church would be deprived of her rulers, teachers and ministers of
divine things; without Matrimony the family would lack that sacramental
protection which is so important for the Christian home and the right
rearing of members of society.

2777. The Sacrament of Orders.--The spiritual office and power of a
member of the clergy is called Orders on account of the order or rank
of superiority which it gives in the Church. The rite or Sacrament by
which an Order is conferred is strictly called Ordination, and hence it
is more correct to speak of the Sacrament of Ordination than of the
Sacrament of Orders. Ordination may be defined as "a Sacrament of the
New Law in which a member of the clergy receives spiritual power in
reference to the Eucharist and the grace to exercise properly the
duties of his office."

(a) Orders is conferred only on a member of the clergy. Just as Baptism
is preceded by catechumenate and Matrimony by espousals or engagement,
so is Ordination preceded by tonsure, a ceremony instituted by the
Church whereby a man is separated from the laity and enrolled among
clerics with a view to prepare him for Holy Orders. The candidate for
tonsure must be a male who has received Baptism and Confirmation (_sub
levi_), and who has begun his course of theology; he sins if he
approaches without a divine vocation or with the purpose not to go on
for the priesthood. The privileges of clerics are those of forum and
canon, and they are capable of receiving Orders, jurisdiction and
benefice (Canons 108 sqq). In the reception of tonsure the cleric is
admonished to make his life agree with the garb which he then assumes,
or, in other words, to cultivate the special virtues of his state (see
2596 sqq.).

(b) Ordination confers spiritual power in reference to the Eucharist,
the Sacrament of Sacraments. Just as the sacred vessels of the altar
receive a permanent consecration, so likewise the ministers of the
altar are set apart by Ordination, which confers upon them an indelible
character with the power to exercise higher or lower offices in
reference to the supreme Sacrament and the sole Sacrifice of the New
Law. Hence, an Order once conferred is eternal and the Ordination
cannot be repeated.

(c) Ordination confers grace, which is _per se_ second grace, or an
increase of holiness. The special feature of the grace of Orders is its
suitability for the duties of the person ordained, for, where God
imposes a special obligation, He confers also a special grace. It is
clear that the duties of the ordained in reference to the real Body of
Christ (i.e., duties as to the Eucharist and divine worship) and the
mystical Body of Christ (i.e., duties to the faithful who receive the
Eucharist and the other Sacraments) call for a high degree of virtue
and a life edifying to all. Hence the need of a special grace in
Ordination.

2778. Distinction of the Orders.--The following distinctions of the
orders or ranks of the clergy should be noted:

(a) an Order is either sacramental or non-sacramental, according as it
was instituted by Christ Himself or by the Church. It is the teaching
of St. Thomas that all of the Orders are sacramental in character, but
there is not the same degree of certainty in each case. As to the
priesthood, there is the certainty of defined dogma; as to the
diaconate (and also episcopal consecration according to many) there is
theological certainty, but no definition of faith; as to the
subdiaconate, and the lower Orders, there is probability;

(b) an Order is Major (sacred) or Minor (non-sacred) according as its
functions are concerned with consecrated or non-consecrated matter in
the celebration of the Eucharist. The Major Orders, therefore, are the
priesthood (whose office is to consecrate the Body and Blood of
Christ), diaconate (whose office is to dispense Communion to the
faithful), and sub-diaconate (whose office is to prepare the bread and
wine of the sacrifice in the consecrated vessels, that is, the chalice
and paten). The Minor Orders are those that prepare the matter of the
Eucharist in non-consecrated vessels (acolythate), or that dispose the
people for the Eucharist by freeing them from the impediments of
demonic influence (exorcistate) or of ignorance (lectorate), or that
exclude unbelievers from participation in the sacred rites
(portership). To the Sacred Orders, on account of their closer approach
to the Eucharist, are annexed the duties of celibacy and of the Divine
Office.

2779. The Hierarchy of Orders and Jurisdiction.--The Orders of the
clergy may be considered, not only in reference to power over the real
Body of Christ (i.e., the Eucharist), but also in reference to power
over the mystical Body of Christ (i.e., the Church). Those who have
power over the members of the Church belong to the hierarchy, and this
is understood in two senses:

(a) the hierarchy of Orders is composed of those who receive in
Ordination a permanent superiority over others in reference to the
worship of God and the sanctification of souls by the ministry of the
Sacraments. From divine institution this hierarchy is composed of the
three ranks of bishops, priests, and deacons; and from ecclesiastical
institution of the lower clergy in Orders. Thus, the deacon is able to
baptize and administer Communion as extraordinary minister; the priest
is the ordinary minister of Baptism and the Eucharist, and only a
priest can act as minister of Penance and Extreme Unction; the bishop
is the minister, not only of the Sacraments mentioned, but also of
Confirmation and Orders;

(b) the hierarchy of jurisdiction is composed of those members of the
Church who receive in their accepted election or canonical commission a
power over the faithful which can be lost or resigned, and which
relates to the instruction and government of subjects in matters of
faith and morals. From divine law this hierarchy is composed of the
Supreme Pontificate and the subordinate Episcopate; from ecclesiastical
law there are other ranks of authority, such as those of parish-priest,
prelate, abbot, archbishop, primate, patriarch and cardinal.

2780. The Matter and Form of the Various Orders in the Latin
Church.--(a) In the Minor Orders the matter consists in the bestowal of
the symbols of office, and the form in the words of ordination that
accompany this bestowal. The porter is ordained when he touches with
his right hand the keys of the church which the bishop presents to him
with the words: "Conduct yourself as one who must give an accounting
for the things that are under those keys", the reader, when he touches
the lectionary (i.e., Missal, Breviary, Bible) offered him by the
bishop with the form: "Receive this book and announce well the Word of
God, knowing that, if you perform your office faithfully and usefully,
you shall receive a portion with those who from the beginning have been
good ministers of God's word"; the exorcist, when he touches the book
of exorcisms (e.g., the Ritual, Pontifical or Missal) presented to him
with the words: "Receive and commit to memory and have power to impose
hands on the possessed, whether baptized or catechumens", the acolyte,
when he touches the symbols of his office (i.e., first the candle and
candlestick, next the empty cruet), while the words are said: "Receive
this candlestick and candle and know that you are deputed to light the
lamps of the church, in the name of the Lord"; "Receive this cruet to
furnish the wine and water for the Eucharist of the blood of Christ, in
the name of the Lord." "Amen" should be added by the acolyte after each
form.

(b) In the subdiaconate, ordination is given when the candidate touches
the empty chalice and the paten (the Bishop saying: "See what a
ministry is committed to you; I admonish you, therefore, so to conduct
yourselves that you may be pleasing to God") and the Book of Epistles,
such as Missal or Bible (the Bishop saying: "Receive the Book of
Epistles and have power to read them in the holy Church of God, both
for the living and for the dead. In the name of the Father, and of the
Son, and of the Holy Ghost").

(c) Pope Pius XII in an official decree, an Apostolic Constitution of
Nov. 30, 1947 (see AAS, 40-5), determined the essential elements of
ordination to diaconate, priesthood and episcopate. Formerly this had
been a matter of discussion among theologians. In the diaconate
ordination is given by the single imposition of the hands of the Bishop
that occurs in the rite with the words of the "Preface," of which these
are the essential: "Send into him, We ask, O Lord, the Holy Spirit, by
which he shall be strengthened by the gift of Thy sevenfold grace for
the faithful performance of the work of the ministry."

(d) The matter of the priesthood is the first imposition of hands of
the Bishop which is made in silence. The form consists in the words of
the "Preface" of which these are the essential and required for
validity: "Give, we ask Thee, omnipotent Father, to this Thy servant
the dignity of the priesthood . . ."

(e) In episcopal consecration the matter is the imposition of the
hands of the consecrating Bishop; the form is the "Preface," the
essential words being: "Fill out in Thy priest the fullness of the
ministry . . . "

It is a disputed matter whether the episcopacy is a distinct Order from
the priesthood or simply an extension of it. The common opinion favors
the negative side and consequently maintains that the consecration of a
Bishop is not sacramental. Accordingly, the supreme Order of Priesthood
includes the simple priests or presbyters and the high priests or
bishops. The episcopacy confers no new power in reference to the
Eucharist, but it extends the character of the priesthood to new powers
in reference to Christ's Mystical Body, the Church.

2781. The Minister of Ordination.--(a) For validity it is necessary
that the minister be a consecrated bishop; but the Orders of
ecclesiastical institution (i.e., subdiaconate and Minor Orders) may be
given by a priest authorized by law, or by special indult of the
Apostolic See. Thus, Cardinals, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic, and
Abbots have the power of conferring tonsure and Minor Orders from Canon
239.

(b) For lawfulness it is necessary that the consecrator of a bishop be
the Pope or a bishop designated by him; that the ordainer to other
ranks of the clergy be the proper bishop of the candidate (i.e., the
bishop of his place of origin and residence or of his place of
domicile), or a delegated bishop (i.e., the bishop who has received
dimissorial letters from the proper bishop or religious superior). See
Canons 951-967.

2782. The Special Duties of the Minister.-(a) As to the ordinandus, the
ordaining prelate must be morally certain from positive arguments that
the candidate is suitable according to the Canons; otherwise he would
be guilty of a very grievous sin and would expose himself to the danger
of sharing in the sins of others (I Tim., v. 22; Canon 973, n. 3).

(b) As to the ordination, the minister is bound to observe the law on
time and place, and to follow carefully and exactly the ceremonies of
his own Rite. If anything essential is omitted, it has to be supplied,
absolutely or conditionally, according as there is certain or only
doubtful lack. The omission of an accidental but notable ceremony
(e.g., the anointing of hands) would be seriously culpable (Canons
1002-1009).

2783. The Recipient of Orders.--(a) For validity it is necessary that
the recipient be of the male sex, for the divine law has reserved
sacerdotal and ministerial functions to men, and the church law has
properly followed this example in regard to the Orders that are of
church institution; the recipient must be baptized, for without Baptism
one has no capacity for other Sacraments; if he is an adult, he must
have at least an habitual intention freely formed of receiving the
Order to which he is raised.

(b) For lawfulness it is not sufficient that the recipient be in the
state of grace, since Ordination is not merely a personal matter, but
also a matter of great consequence to the whole Church. The recipient
of Orders takes his place among the representatives and ministers of
the Church, and therefore he should have the special qualities that fit
him for his dignity and office. Intellectually, the ordinandus must be
competent in theological and profane knowledge, and must have made a
satisfactory course of studies (Canons 972, 1364 sqq., 589-591).
According to the Code, first tonsure should not be given before the
study of theology has begun, Minor Orders may be given during the first
and second years of theology, subdeaconship only towards the end of the
third year, deaconship only after the beginning of the fourth year, and
priesthood only after the first half of the fourth year (Canon 976).
Morally, the ordinandus should be of commendable life and have the
internal and external excellence which is supposed by the Order he is
to receive. Virtues to which the Pontifical especially exhorts clerics
at their ordination are love and labor given to the Church and the
things of God's house (porter), devotion to the Scriptures and sacred
study (lector), conquest of passion (exorcist), the light of good
example and the self-sacrifice of good works (acolyte), temperance,
vigilance, prayerfulness (subdeacon), liberality to the poor, chastity,
fortitude, zeal for preaching the word of God (deacon), elderliness in
dignity, leadership in virtue, and justice in stewardship (priesthood).
No one should be admitted to a Sacred Order who is unable to overcome a
serious habit of sin (especially _in materia turpi_), even though
secret; and if there is doubt about amendment, a test during a suitable
period of time should be made.

2784. Canonical Requirements for Ordination.--(a) Positive requirements
are: proper age (that is, the twenty-first, twenty-second, and
twenty-fourth years completed are necessary for subdeaconship,
deaconship, priesthood, respectively); Confirmation should have been
received before Ordination, for it is suitable that those who are to
strengthen others in the faith should have the character of soldier of
Christ; promotion from Order to Order should be from lower to higher in
proper succession, that fitness may be shown in lesser offices before
the greater are received; an interval must elapse between certain
Orders, which will give to clerics the opportunity to exercise the
powers they have received (e.g., between acolythate and subdiaconate a
year, between subdiaconate and diaconate three months); the candidate
for sacred ordination must have a title or some canonical means of
support (i.e., for secular clergy the title of benefice, or patrimony
or ministerial service; for religious the title of profession, common
life, etc.). The law allows certain dispensations from some of these
requirements (Canons 974 sqq.).

(b) Negative requirements are freedom from certain disabilities
introduced by the Church for the sake of the honor and dignity of the
sacred ministry. Some of these disqualifications are of their nature
permanent, and they are removed only by dispensation or by disposition
of the law (e.g., in certain cases by cessation of the cause, or by
baptism, or by religious profession), and these are known as
irregularities; other disqualifications, which are of their nature
temporary and cease with lapse of time or changes in circumstances, are
known as simple impediments. The effect of disqualification is to make
it unlawful to receive an Order, or to exercise an Order already
received. Irregularities are produced either by deficiency or by
delinquency, but the cause in either case must be certain; and, in case
of delinquency, it must be a personal sin committed after Baptism,
which is mortal, external, and consummated in act. The irregularities
from defect are: illegitimate birth; mental imperfection (such as
epilepsy, insanity, possession); bodily imperfection that makes one
unsuited for the service of the altar, on account of mutilation (e.g.,
those who have lost hand or foot, or thumb or index finger), or of
unsoundness (e.g., the blind, the deaf, the dumb, cripples,
paralytics), or of very noticeable deformity that excites ridicule or
horror (e.g., dwarfs, giants, noseless persons, those who are
hunchbacked); successive bigamy, that is, the fact that one has been
twice validly married, for St. Paul ruled that a cleric should be a man
of not more than one wife (I Tim., iii. 2, 12; Tit., i. 5, 6); infamy
of law, that is, the commission of certain crimes which the law
declares infamous _ipso facto_ or after sentence (such as profanation
of the Eucharist or of graves, violence done to the Pope or a Cardinal,
duelling, simultaneous bigamy, and certain sexual sins); participation
in capital punishment by pronouncing (i.e., as judge or juryman) or
executing the sentence of death. The irregularities from delinquency
are: apostasy, heresy, schism; reception of Baptism from a
non-Catholic; attempt at adulterous or sacrilegious marriage; voluntary
homicide, coöperation in an abortion, mutilation of self or of another,
attempt to commit suicide; unlawful exercise of medicine or surgery by
a cleric with fatal results; unlawful exercise of the powers of Major
Orders by a cleric or layman. The simple impediments are found in the
following: in those who may be weak in faith, namely, persons whose
parents are non-Catholics, or who are themselves converts (I Tim., iii.
6); in those who are prevented by other occupations, namely, persons
held by marriage, business forbidden to clerics, slavery, military
service (II Tim., ii. 4); in those who are actually in bad repute
before the community on account of misconduct (I Tim., iii. 7). See
Canons 983-991.

2785. Duties of Ordinandi According to Canon Law.--(a) Before
Ordination.--Application to the bishop must be made beforehand at an
opportune time, and testimonials of Baptism, Confirmation, Orders
already received, certificates of good character and studies, and
letters from superiors testifying to freedom from impediments and
general fitness must be presented. The candidate must undergo a special
examination and make a spiritual retreat before the day of his
ordination. The profession of faith is made before subdeaconship.

(b) During Ordination.--All the ceremonies should be observed, and
especially the physical touching of the instruments (chalice and paten,
etc.), which seems to be essential in Minor Orders and the
Subdiaconate. In the imposition of the hands in the other Major Orders,
the head of the subject should be touched physically, although even
moral touch is sufficient for validity of the Sacrament (Pius XII,
Apostolic Constitution already cited). The law requires that the
recipients of Major Orders receive Communion, and the obligations seems
to be grave for the new priests, since they celebrate with the bishop.

(c) After Ordination.--The nocturn (three Psalms and their antiphons)
which the ordaining prelate imposes on the newly ordained subdeacons
and deacons should be taken from the first nocturn of the day, whether
it be feria, feast or Sunday, unless the bishop appoints otherwise. The
three Masses of the Holy Ghost, Blessed Virgin, and for the dead,
imposed on the newly ordained priests, need not be applied for the
bishop's intention, and a stipend may be taken when they are said; but
it is fitting that they be applied in thanksgiving and for the benefit
of the bishop as well as of the whole Church on earth and in Purgatory.
These prayers and Masses do not seem to oblige under sin, though some
hold them to bind _sub gravi_. On the life duties of the clergy, see
above (2596 sqq.).

2786. Registration of Ordinations.--As in the case of marriage,
ordinations should be registered in a special book and notice of them
(if subdiaconate was received) should be sent to the pastor of the
parish of Baptism. A certificate of ordination is also to be given to
the cleric ordained (Canons 1010, 1011).

2787. The Sacrament of Matrimony.--Marriage in general is defined as
"the conjugal union of man and woman, contracted between two qualified
persons, which obliges them to one another for life."

(a) The word union may be taken actively for the passing act of
internal and external consent, and then it refers to marriage in its
state of becoming, as it is a contract and (among Christians) a
Sacrament; or it may be taken, as it were passively, for the bond that
results from the mutual consent pledged by the parties, and then it
refers to marriage as a permanent state of life.

(b) The marriage union is conjugal; that is, its end is the procreation
and rearing of children, or the making of a family, and it therefore
gives the right to the natural acts of generation. A contract which has
other ends (e.g., a business agreement of labor or of partnership), or
which excludes procreation (e.g., an agreement of onanistic
concubinage), is not a marriage.

(c) Marriage is between qualified persons, for certain individuals are
excluded by natural, divine or human law from making a valid contract
of marriage.

(d) Marriage is between two, one man and one woman. This unity of
marriage is its first property, resulting from its nature as a
relationship intended primarily for the propagation of the race and its
proper upbringing, and secondarily for the peace and contentment of the
married couple, their mutual assistance to one another, and their
protection against carnal temptations (299). For polyandry is opposed
to both these ends, and therefore to natural law, while polygamy does
not accord well with the secondary ends of matrimony and is forbidden
for all by the law of Christ ("They shall be two in one flesh," Matt.,
xix. 3 sqq.). On the permission of polygamy in the later Old Testament
ages, see 303, 311.

(e) Marriage obliges the parties to one another for life. This
indissolubility of marriage is its second property, and also follows
from the natural ends of marriage. For the right propagation of the
human race is a matter that concerns not merely the married couple or
human society, but also God Himself, who is matrimony's immediate
author and lawgiver, and God has decreed that marriage be unbreakable
except in the few instances allowed by Himself: "What God hath joined
together let no man put asunder" (Matt., xix. 6). Since the good of
marriage is inferior to the good of faith, the divine law permits a
dissolution of the bond in the case known as the Pauline Privilege (I
Cor., vii. 12-15); similarly, in a very few instances where there is a
serious good more important than the preservation of the bond (the
faith of a convert from infidelity, the observance of the counsel of
chastity, the public welfare), and where the bond itself has not the
strength of sacramentality (i.e., in a non-Christian marriage), or has
not been consummated in a Christian marriage, the divine law authorizes
the Church, the representative of God, to decree a dissolution (see
363, 314). Not only are these cases few, but the conditions are strict
(see Canons 1120-1127), and hence these exceptions are no menace to the
ends of marriage. But once consummation has been added to consent in a
Christian marriage, thereby perfecting the natural contract and
extending the sacramental signification from the mystical and severable
union of Christ with the soul by grace to the physical and perpetual
union of Christ with the Church by the Incarnation, the indissolubility
becomes complete and admits of no exception. The bill of divorce under
the Mosaic Law seems to have been a true and complete dissolution of
the marriage tie, but there is good reason to think that it was a
toleration of the Jewish civil code, not a permission given by God. The
valid marriages of infidels as such are not subject to the judgment of
the Church; and the civil authority has no power to dissolve them (even
when they are childless), otherwise individuals and the family and the
State will suffer, as experience proves.

2788. Distinctions.--(a) In reference to validity, marriage may be true
(i.e., validly contracted), or presumed (i.e., taken by the law to be
validly contracted on account of some fact, as when the validity of a
marriage was not attacked during the lifetime of the parties), putative
(i.e., really invalid, but contracted in good faith by at least one of
the spouses and not yet known by both to be certainly null), attempted
(i.e., contracted invalidly in bad faith, at least one of the parties
being aware of an invalidating impediment).

(b) In reference to perfection, marriage is legitimate (when it is
validly contracted between non-baptized persons), ratified or
sacramental (when it is celebrated between baptized persons),
consummated (when the consent given in the contract is subsequently
completed by the conjugal act). It seems that marriage lawfully
contracted between a baptized and a non-baptized person is not ratified
or sacramental, for, as the consent must be mutual, so should the
Sacrament be mutual. But a marriage free from substantial defects is
always a Sacrament, even though the contractants do not wish this, when
it is contracted between Christians, whether they be Catholics or
non-Catholics; and a marriage contracted between non-Christians becomes
a Sacrament on the Baptism of the parties.

(c) In reference to its manner, marriage may be clandestine (i.e., not
celebrated before the pastor and two witnesses), or secret (i.e.,
celebrated before the pastor and two witnesses pledged to secrecy, and
without the publicity the Church ordinarily requires), public (i.e.,
celebrated before pastor and witnesses and with publicity such as
announcement to the people and registration in the usual marriage
book). The secret marriage is also known as a marriage of conscience
(Canons 1104-1107).

(d) In reference to the law under which it is performed, marriage is
either canonical or civil. A purely civil marriage between Catholics is
invalid, as far as the bond is concerned, since their contract, as
being a Sacrament, is subject to the Church. But the civil marriage, as
far as the purely civil consequences are concerned, is a lawful
ceremony, and is obligatory if required by law. A morganatic marriage
is made between two persons of unequal condition (e.g., between a king
and a plebeian woman) on condition that the inferior spouse and progeny
shall not share entirely in the titles and property of the superior
spouse.

2789. The Elements of the Contract of Marriage.--(a) The subject-matter
of the contract is the conjugal right or the lawful power of exercising
with the other party acts suitable for generation.

(b) The ends of the contract are, primarily, the good of the race and
of the children, and secondarily the good of the couple through mutual
assistance and protection in spiritual and temporal matters. To these
general ends may be added others which a particular person has in view,
such as dignity, wealth, honor, lawful pleasure.

(c) The essence of the contract is the consent, for every pact consists
in mutual agreement. But if marriage be regarded as a permanent state,
its essence is the bond of union, and consent is the efficient cause
productive of the bond. Marriage consent must have the qualities
(internal, external, mutual, free) that are necessary in every
contract, as explained in 1883.

2790. Requirements for Valid Marriage Consent.--(a) Internal
Consent.--If both or one of the parties internally and positively wills
to exclude marriage, or the right to the conjugal act, or an essential
property of marriage, the contract is null, since there is no purpose
to contract a real marriage. Similarly, if both or one of the parties
negatively (or by lack of all intention) excludes consent, there is no
marriage. It should be noted that he who intends to get a divorce later
on does not intend a permanent union or marriage, whereas he who
intends to be unfaithful or to practise onanism may nevertheless intend
to oblige himself to the duties of fidelity and of the lawful use of
marriage, and therefore to a true marriage. Fictitious consent, unless
a serious reason excuses (e.g., when one is forced under grave fear to
marry, when one becomes aware of a diriment impediment at the altar and
cannot retire without great scandal), is a mortal sin, as being a lie
in a very important matter and an injustice. If the other party was
deceived, the party guilty of feigned consent is bound to make
reparation for the damage done, and, unless the marriage has become
impossible or inadvisable, the means of reparation should be a genuine
consent revalidating the marriage. This is especially true when there
is a conflict between the internal and the external forums on account
of the inability to establish juridically the nullity of the invalid
marriage.

(b) External Consent.--Both as contract and as Sacrament, matrimony
requires some sensible manifestation of the internal consent. Since the
contract of marriage between Christians falls under the jurisdiction of
the Church, the manner of expressing the consent is regulated by Canon
Law. The solemnities required for valid and lawful marriage will be
treated below in 2826, 2827.

(c) Mutual Consent.--Both parties must agree to the marriage, since no
one is obliged by a contract without his consent. But mutuality does
not imply simultaneity, for, if the previous consent given by one party
continues, the subsequent consent given by the other is joined to it
and the consent becomes mutual.

(d) Free Consent.--If every contract must be deliberate and voluntary,
this is especially true in the case of marriage, since it entails very
heavy duties and its obligations are lifelong (cfr. 2195). In marriage
there must be full and perfect consent, though it is not necessary that
one think expressly on the essentials of the contract when assenting to
it.

2791. Defects in Consent.--Consent supposes sufficient knowledge, and
hence it may be vitiated by a defect as to knowledge.

(a) Mental Derangement.--Those who are not in possession of their
mental faculties cannot marry, whether the derangement be habitual
(e.g., idiots, the completely insane, monomaniacs on the subject of
marriage) or actual (e.g., infants, those who are completely drunk or
doped, the hypnotized or delirious, somnambulists). But defectives who
are not unbalanced all the time or on all subjects, may be able now and
then to realize the meaning of marriage and to give deliberate consent,
though the presumption is against them. Those whose mentality is of a
low grade, but who are able to judge and reason correctly (e.g., stupid
persons, the deaf and dumb, or blind), and those who have some little
fanaticism or eccentricity are not excluded; otherwise very few of
either sex could marry.

(b) Ignorance.--Substantial ignorance, or the absence of knowledge
about the essentials of marriage (viz., that it is a permanent
association of man and woman for the purpose of raising children of
their own), makes the contract null, for one does not consent to what
one does not know. Accidental ignorance, on the contrary, does not
nullify, for he who understands the main facts about marriage can
intend to contract it as others do, even though he does not know its
details or secondary features. Ignorance invalidates marriage,
therefore, if one of the parties does not know that marriage is meant
for the procreation of children or that children are procreated by
carnal intercourse; but it does not invalidate if the parties are
ignorant about physiology or scientific explanations. Substantial
ignorance in persons of marriageable age (especially young women) is
not uncommon even in these days, but it is not presumed after puberty
(Canon 1082, §2).

(c) Error.--Error which excludes consent to the essential object of the
contract nullifies, and hence a substantial error about the person with
whom one is contracting makes marriage of no effect (e.g., if Titus
thinks he is marrying Claudia, but is really marrying her twin sister,
Sempronia; if Balbus intends to marry Caia only on condition that she
is a virgin and she is not a virgin; if Julius intends to marry the
woman who is present solely as differentiated by a personal or
individual characteristic which he mistakenly believes her to have,
such as seniority among her sisters). Error which does not prevent
essential consent does not nullify the contract. Hence, a mere
accidental error about the other party (e.g., Titus marries Claudia,
thinking she is rich, whereas she is poor, and he would never have
married her had he known her poverty) does not make marriage null,
though the Church makes the marriage of no effect when a slave is
married in the belief that he or she is free (Canon 1083, §2, n, 2). A
mere speculative error about the properties of marriage (e.g., if one
believes that marriage may be lawfully dissolved for adultery) or about
the validity of one's own marriage (e.g., if the bride erroneously
believes that the marriage she is contracting is null) does not deprive
the contract of its force, if there is really a purpose to marry as
best one may; for such an error does not act upon the will or take away
consent.

2792. Forced Consent.--Consent also supposes self-determination, and
hence in certain cases force or fear makes a marriage null and unlawful.

(a) Effect on Validity.--Coercion nullifies marriage from natural law,
when overpowering physical might extorts an external assent, or when
moral violence so terrifies as to unsettle the reason; from church law
at least, when being grave, external and unjustly caused, it compels
one to marry in order to escape the evil it inflicts or threatens. In
other cases fear does not void marriage, even though it be the cause of
the contract, as when the fear is slight, or when it is induced by
shipwreck or by the fear of sin, or when a seducer marries only because
he is threatened with prosecution unless he marries the girl whom he
seduced.

(b) Effect on Lawfulness.--He who by intimidation impels another to
marry, sins gravely if the fear is unjust and grave, or unjust and
productive of serious evils; he sins venially if the fear, though
unjust, is light and not productive of serious evils; he sins not at
all; if the fear is justly caused, unless he offends charity by his
manner of acting; revengeful spirit, etc. He who marries knowing that
the other party is forced into the contract, is guilty of serious
injustice; and he who marries unwillingly, but with the purpose to live
as if he were validly married, sins gravely by his will to live in
impurity.

2793. Conditional Consent.--Conditional consent is that in which the
agreement to marriage is made dependent on some fact or event.

(a) A condition makes marriage invalid if it neutralizes consent (e.g.,
if the condition is _de praesenti_ but unfulfilled; if it is _de
futuro_ and against the substance of marriage; if it is impossible but
seriously added); it suspends marriage if it is _de futuro_, possible,
and not against the substance of marriage; it neither nullifies nor
suspends if it is _de præsenti_ or _de præterito_ and fulfilled. In law
the presumption is that _de futuro_ necessary or impossible conditions
and shameful conditions are not serious, or are modes rather than
conditions (see 1886), and of course in the external forum invalidity
on account of a condition has to be proved. Conditions against the
substance of marriage are such as deny essential conjugal rights or
duties (i.e., the right to have conjugal intercourse, the duty of
fidelity to the consort, of loyalty to the bond); but they should not
be confused with the purpose to violate marriage engagements, or with a
resolution, or a vow, or a pact in the form of a mode, not to make use
of the right to conjugal intercourse.

(b) A condition added to marriage consent is gravely sinful, unless
there is a very urgent reason for it; otherwise most serious evils
would result. Moreover, there is responsibility in justice for culpable
damages, as when one party gives consent conditionally without the
knowledge or against the will of the other party. A suspensive
condition (e.g., "if my parents will consent") is regularly unlawful
without the bishop's permission, and marriage rights may not be used in
a marriage dependent on a condition whose fulfillment is not known to
the parties. It is unlawful to make a vow or promise of chastity in the
married life unless there is moral certainty that it will be kept.

2794. The Elements of Marriage as a Sacrament.--(a) The matter and form
of marriage are found in the contract, for the Sacrament is the natural
pact elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign productive of grace. The
remote matter is, therefore, the bodies of the spouses, or the bodily
rights which they give one another (I Cor., vii. 4). Since the
indeterminate part of a contract is the offer or bestowal, and the
determinate part the approval, the proximate matter of Matrimony is
found in the grant of mutual conjugal rights externally manifested, and
the form in the acceptance of that right externally manifested.

(b) The ministers and the recipients of Matrimony are the parties
themselves, since it is they alone who make and receive the contract.
In order to be a recipient of the Sacrament it is necessary that a
person be baptized and be free from all natural, divine and human
impediments that make one incapable of the contract of marriage.

(c) The effects of Matrimony are _per se_ second grace, which increases
sanctity and is of help especially for the due performance throughout
life of the duties of the conjugal state and for domestic blessedness
and happiness.

2795. Duties in Connection with Marriage.--The duties in reference to
marriage as a permanent state of life were treated already in 2613
sqq., and we shall consider here only the duties that have to do with
marriage as a contract and a Sacrament. These duties can be arranged
under three heads: (a) before marriage, there are obligations in
reference to the preparation for marriage, which consists remotely in
engagement or espousals, and proximately in compliance with duties owed
to divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law (e.g., license from the State,
establishment of freedom to marry, proclamation of banns,
dispensations, confession); (b) during marriage, in addition to the
common obligations of intention and a state of grace, there are special
duties in reference to the external form or rite of marriage; (c) after
marriage, there is a duty of making canonical records and of validating
defective marriages.

2796. Betrothal or Engagement.--Engagement is a promise of their future
marriage made by competent persons.

(a) It is a promise, either unilateral or bilateral, the latter being
espousals or betrothal in the strict sense of the word (1749). Like
every promise, engagement is not binding unless it be made with
requisite deliberation and freedom from force and fear. But a valid
engagement to marry has not the same strength, either from divine or
from human law, as a contract of marriage, and hence fraud or light
fear unjustly produced and which induces one to become engaged leaves
the engagement rescindable at the will of the innocent party. Canon Law
requires certain formalities for a valid engagement, and without them
there is no obligation in either forum. The law is that the contract of
betrothal be in writing, and be signed by the parties and also by the
pastor or local Ordinary or two witnesses, and that, if one or both of
the parties be unable to write, this be noted in the document and an
extra witness be added (Canon 1017).

(b) It is a promise made by competent persons. Hence, there is no valid
engagement if a party is incapable either naturally (e.g., one who has
not the use of reason) or canonically (e.g., one who has not attained
the age of seven years). It is against good morals to be engaged to two
persons at the same time, with the understanding that one will marry
the second after the expected death of the first; and much more is it
immoral for a married person to become engaged to marry another, the
marriage to take place after the death of the present consort. Some
canonists hold that engagements are not valid before the age of
puberty, on account of the lack of sufficient discretion.

(c) It is a promise of future marriage, that is, a contract to marry,
not a contract of marriage. A nuptial engagement is invalid if the
marriage promised is invalid or unlawful, for no one can bind himself
to sin. An invalid marriage is promised if there is a diriment and not
dispensable impediment in the way, or if in spite of a removable
impediment the engagement is unconditional, unless the mind of the
parties is to marry after the impediment has ceased. The Church seems
to regard as null an engagement made on the condition that the Pope
will dispense an impediment. An unlawful marriage is promised when the
parties cannot marry without sin (e.g., when the marriage will bring
great sorrow or disgrace on parents), or when they promise to marry in
a sinful way (e.g., with the understanding that they will abuse
marriage). But an unlawful promise of a lawful marriage is not
necessarily invalid, and hence an engagement dependent on an immoral
condition not opposed to the substance of marriage would become
obligatory on fulfillment of the condition (see 1878 d, 1886).

2797. It should be noted that the former diriment and impedient
impediments produced by espousals are no longer in force, and even a
valid engagement gives no right to an action for the celebration of
marriage.

2798. Is an Engagement Necessary before Marriage?--(a) An engagement is
not strictly necessary. Neither the validity nor the lawfulness of
marriage depends on espousals, for there is no law that requires this.
Hence, if for a reasonable cause a man and woman married without any
previous binding pledge on either side, the marriage would be good and
lawful. The formal engagements of Canon Law are not common in this
country, but an informal engagement usually precedes matrimony.

(b) Engagement is most suitable and useful. Men are accustomed to fit
themselves by long and serious study for the business of a profession
or calling, and to enter into preliminary agreements about contracts of
major importance (as in contracts to sell), and certainly marriage, a
contract and vocation that binds until death and upon which the
spiritual and temporal welfare of society and individuals rests, is
among the most momentous of human agreements. The special advantage of
engagement is that it affords a means of preventing hasty and
ill-advised unions, of discovering impediments, of securing the consent
of parents, and of preparing oneself in knowledge and virtue for the
duties of the married state. If engagements were regarded and treated
as a period of training for serious and sacred duties, not as a time
for frivolity or enjoyment, there would be fewer divorces and less talk
about trial marriages. On the duties of engaged persons to one another,
see 2628, 2629.

2799. Duties to Parents or Guardians in Reference to Marriage.--(a)
There is, _per se_, a duty of consulting with one's parents about one's
marriage; for he who marries without their knowledge, generally exposes
himself to the danger of making a serious mistake, and moreover as a
rule the interests of parents themselves are bound up intimately with
the marriages of their children. Hence, unless a very serious reason
excuses, he who marries without advising with his parents sins
grievously by his rashness or want of filial affection. The same is
true, if a child wilfully disregards the wishes of his parents by
stubbornly marrying when for a good reason they disapprove. If their
opposition is imperative and emphatic, or if they are grief-stricken at
thought of the imprudent marriage, the sin is serious; but if their
opposition is mild and the match not a very bad one, the sin is venial.
The consent or counsel of parents is not necessary for validity,
however, since it is not they who are getting married, and no law makes
their consent or counsel an essential part of the compact. _Per
accidens_, their consent or counsel is not even necessary for
lawfulness, as when the children live far away from their parents, or
when marriage has to be contracted without delay, or when the parents
are unreasonable in their opposition.

(b) There is, _per se_, no duty of obeying one's parents in the matter
of marriage: first, because marriage supposes choice, admiration, and
love, and these do not submit to dictation, even from parents; next,
because in things that pertain to nature, such as self-preservation and
procreation, children are not subject to their parents; finally,
because the authority of parents does not extend to the whole lifetime
of their children and marriage is a lifelong union. Hence, parents may
not compel their children to marry or to remain single; they may not
make the match for their children against the latters' will, they may
not force a child to marry a person whom he or she detests, they may
not veto a marriage that does not appeal to them if the son or daughter
has good reasons for it. Those parents sin, then, who refuse their
blessing to a marriage out of selfishness, and those parents sin
gravely who force their children into loveless unions and so make them
unhappy in this world and endanger their salvation for the world to
come. _Per accidens_, there is a duty of obeying parents in reference
to marriage when one is obliged even apart from their command to do
what they prescribe, when the marriage which they forbid is also
forbidden by law (e.g., if the child is needed at home to support his
indigent parents, if the mate selected will bring disgrace upon the
family and the match can easily be broken off), or when the marriage
which they require is also demanded by duty (e.g., if a son will surely
enter upon a wild and reckless life unless he marries). See above,
2228, 2627, 2633, 2636, 2347, 2348, 2361 sqq.

2800. Duties of Parents in Reference to Marriage.--(a) If there is
question of the marriage of a child, parents should guide themselves by
the rule of St. Paul: "Let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord"
(I Cor., vii. 39). Undue pressure should be avoided, but bad marriages
should be opposed, and parents should assist their children to marry
well. (b) If there is question of a parent's second marriage, the
children's interests should be considered in making the choice of the
step-father or step-mother, and, if the children are grown up, they
should be consulted, or at least they should not be unreasonably
saddened or harmed by the new marriage.

2801. Obstacles to Marriage.--Since marriage is a most important
contract and a Sacrament, it is necessary to ascertain beforehand with
moral certainty that there is no obstacle to its valid and lawful
celebration. This imposes duties on the pastor, the couple themselves,
and the faithful who know them.

(a) The pastor in virtue of his office is gravely obliged to make
inquiries about the competency and fitness of the prospective husband
and wife, and even in a death-bed marriage the obligation does not
cease. Church law prescribes the method of inquiry, which should
include an examination and instruction of the couple and a publication
of the marriage. Of course, there is an obligation of confidential
secrecy.

(b) The couple are bound to present themselves to the pastor within a
reasonable time before the marriage in order to make these
arrangements, and should bring with them the necessary papers (for
example, their baptismal certificates, license to marry, testimonials).
They are gravely obliged to make known either to the pastor or to the
confessor any impediment, even though it be of a secret and culpable
nature, in order that their marriage may be valid and lawful, unless
they wish to give up the marriage or seek a dispensation in some other
way.

(c) The people who know of an impediment to a marriage are bound under
pain of mortal sin to make it known in time to the pastor or Ordinary;
for the natural and divine laws, as well as the law of the Church, hold
one to speak when this will prevent irreverence to the Sacrament of
Matrimony, sin and other serious evils to the neighbor. The obligation
ceases, however, when the revelation is either impossible or useless.
Cases of impossibility are those in which revelation will cause great
spiritual harm (e.g., public scandal), or great temporal harm of a
public kind (e.g., violation of professional secret), or a great
temporal harm of a private kind (e.g., persecution), unless a more
serious evil will result from concealment. Revelation is useless when
the marriage can be stopped or made legal in some other way (e.g., by
persuading the couple to break their engagement or get a dispensation),
or when one foresees that the revelation will have no effect.

2802. Duties of the Pastor in the Examination of Engaged Persons.--(a)
He should question both the man and the woman separately and prudently
about their freedom to marry, even though he is certain that there are
no impediments. He should inquire especially whether there has been a
previous marriage, and should also ask specifically about any
impediment that seems likely. About impediments of a defamatory kind he
should not interrogate before others, leaving that matter if necessary
to his doctrinal instruction or to the confessor. (b) He should ask
both of them, and especially the woman, whether they have decided on
marriage freely, without force or pressure from any person. But
children who live with their parents should be asked whether or not
they have obtained their parents' consent to the proposed marriage.

2803. Special Proofs of Freedom to Marry.--(a) Proof of Baptism.--A
baptismal certificate should be presented by the parties (if baptized
in another parish), even by one who is a baptized non-Catholic. If a
certificate cannot be had, other proofs are necessary. In danger of
death, the sworn testimony of the parties suffices; outside danger of
death, the testimony of a reliable witness, or of the person himself,
if he can remember his Baptism, or, it seems, a certificate of
Confirmation or First Communion will do. If Baptism cannot be proved
and there is a prudent doubt, it should be administered conditionally.

(b) Proof of Single State.--If it is manifest that a previous civil
marriage was null and was dissolved by divorce, the proof of the facts
suffices. If the husband or wife of a previous marriage has died, but
the pastor has no personal knowledge of this, positive proof of the
decease in the form of a public document or of sworn testimony of two
or at least one reliable witness is necessary, and if the pastor cannot
obtain these he must have recourse to the Ordinary.

2804. Matrimonial Impediments.--(a) Definition.--An impediment is a
circumstance directly affecting the contract of marriage and rendering
it illicit or invalid. Thus, an impediment differs from an unfitness
that refers immediately to marriage as a sacred rite or Sacrament (such
as lack of proper intention or a state of mortal sin), or that does not
directly affect the parties (such as forbidden time).

(b) Division.--In reference to effects, an impediment is either
impedient (i.e., one that forbids marriage under pain of grave sin but
does not render it null and void) or diriment (i.e., one that not only
forbids marriage, but also makes it null and void).

2805. Sinfulness of Marrying with an Impediment.--(a) If the impediment
is certain, grave sin is committed; for deception and disobedience are
committed in a grave and sacred matter, and, if the impediment is
diriment, the marriage contract is made null. Great necessity, however,
would sometimes excuse.

(b) If the impediment is uncertain, no sin is committed when the
impediment is one of ecclesiastical law and the doubt is one of law,
for in such a case the legislator removes the obligation (Canon 15);
nor when the impediment is impotency (Canon 1068), in view of the fact
that the general law of propagation of the race leaves a natural
presumption against impotency, which can be overcome only by a certain
impediment. It would be an intolerable hardship if marriage were made
impossible by a doubt where proof is so difficult. There is a serious
sin, however, in other cases, because one is either exposing the
Sacrament to nullity or is refusing, contrary to a serious command of
the Church, to seek a dispensation.

2806. The Impedient or Prohibitive Impediments (Canons 1058-1066).--(a)
Vow.--The following simple vows make marriage illicit: the vow of
virginity, that of perfect chastity, the vow not to marry, the vow to
receive Sacred Orders, the vow to enter religious life, the simple vows
of religion. A vow to abstain from the use of marriage is not against
the substance of marriage, but it is difficult to keep in the married
state; the vows to enter religion, or take Sacred Orders, or not to
wed, are incompatible with marriage. Hence, the Church forbids one who
has these vows to marry, unless the vow be first dispensed. Those who
marry while bound by one of these vows sin gravely, and are held to
keep the vow if this is possible or the other party's rights do not
prevent.

(b) Legal Relationship.--In those countries where relationship from
adoption makes marriage illicit, there is also an impedient impediment
of Canon Law. The Church wishes, in so far as possible, to preserve
harmony between her own law and that of the State. Hence, she includes
in her Code the civil law regulations that forbid marriage to certain
persons on account of the intimate relation that exists between them
through civil law adoption. The law of some European (e.g., France,
Germany, Switzerland) and South American countries have a prohibitive
impediment of adoption, but in the United States, the British Empire,
and many other countries adoption is no such hindrance to marriage.

(c) Mixed Religion.--Marriage between two baptized persons, one a
Catholic and the other a member of an heretical or schismatical sect,
is severely forbidden by the Church. Mixed marriages in themselves are
opposed to divine and natural law, inasmuch as they offer an occasion
for communication in false worship and a danger of perversion; and
hence they have been disapproved from the very beginning of the Church
(II John, X. 11; I Cor., v. 10; Tit., iii. 10). But the divine
prohibition ceases if appropriate measures are used to safeguard the
faith of the Catholic and the children, and the Church will grant a
dispensation, though reluctantly and only for just and grave causes.

2807. Duties in Reference to Mixed Marriages.--(a) The Pastor.--A
dispensation should not be sought unless there is first a sufficient
reason, all things considered, and generally the reason should be the
public good (such as the relative fewness of Catholics in a district,
hope of conversion of the non-Catholic, avoidance of scandal).
Secondly, there must be guarantees given by the non-Catholic that the
faith of the Catholic will not be interfered with, and both parties
must promise that all the children will receive Catholic and no other
baptism and education. Finally, these promises must be such as to
produce moral certainty of fulfillment, and as a rule it should be
required that they be given in writing. After the marriage has been
celebrated the pastor is held both in charity and in justice to do what
he can to have the promises faithfully lived up to.

(b) The Parties.--Neither before nor after the marriage in the Catholic
Church is it lawful to have any non-Catholic religious ceremony (see
956 sqq.); and if the pastor knows that this has been done or will be
done, he may not assist at the marriage without permission from the
Ordinary, which is granted for a most grave reason (scandal being
avoided). After the marriage the parties are bound in justice to keep
the promises made, and the Catholic is held in charity to seek
prudently, by good example and advice, to convert the non-Catholic.

2808. Marriages with Bad Catholics.--(a) If the bad Catholic is
unworthy in the matter of faith, because he has notoriously given up
the Church (even though he has not joined any other religion), or
because he is a member of a forbidden society, there is a danger of
perversion. In such a case the pastor may not assist at the marriage
unless the Ordinary decides that there is a sufficient reason, that the
danger of perversion is made remote, and that the Catholic education of
the children is provided for.

(b) If the bad Catholic is unworthy in the matter of morals, because he
is a public sinner (e.g., one who neglects the Easter duty), or
notoriously under censure and therefore a person to whom the Sacraments
must be denied, the pastor is confronted with the law that one may not
coöperate formally, even by assistance, in the profanation of a
Sacrament. As the guilt of the unworthy person is public in these
cases, there must be public reparation before the marriage can be
sanctioned by the presence of the Church's representative. The
reparation is to be made either by the sinner going to confession or by
the censured person obtaining absolution. But since the priest's
presence can be only a material coöperation, it may be permitted by the
Ordinary for a grave reason when the unworthy person refuses to comply
with the conditions.

2809. Other Obstacles to Marriage.--Other obstacles which forbid
marriage, though they are not strictly canonical impediments, are the
following:

(a) valid engagement gravely forbids marriage with a third party. This
is a natural obstacle which results from the very nature of a binding
promise;

(b) special prohibition of the Church at times gravely forbids a
particular marriage, as when the Holy See in granting a dispensation
for a present marriage forbids a future marriage. If an irritant clause
is added, the prohibition has the force of a diriment impediment. The
Ordinary also may forbid a particular marriage for a time, as when
there is suspicion of a secret impediment, or when great damage will
likely ensue from a marriage. This prohibition is for a special case or
time or person, and thus it differs from the impediments of the law;

(c) closed times (Lent and Advent) are the seasons when, on account of
the penitential and mournful character of the liturgy then in use, the
solemn blessing of marriage is not regularly permitted. This is not
really an impediment, since marriage itself may be contracted at any
time of the year, according to the general law.

2810. Diriment Impediments to Marriage.--The diriment or nullifying
impediments to marriage are personal incapacities in a person which
render him or her incapable, from divine or ecclesiastical law, of
contracting marriage with anyone (absolute impediments), or of
contracting marriage with a certain individual (relative impediments).

2811. The absolute diriment impediments are the following: (a) those
that are due to a personal defect making one unable to promise with
sufficient discretion (impediment of age) or to perform what is
promised (impediment of impotency); (b) those that are due to a
voluntary act which consecrates one to God with the obligation of
perpetual celibacy (the impediments of Orders and vows).

2812. The relative impediments are the following: (a) that one which is
due to an obligation to one's present husband or wife (the impediment
of bond); (b) that one which is due to too great a difference between
two parties (impediment of disparity of cult); those that are due to
too close a kinship between two parties, whether natural (impediments
of consanguinity and affinity) or like to the natural (impediments of
public decency, spiritual kinship, legal kinship); (d) those that are
due to a relationship caused by a crime that makes it unsuitable for
two parties to marry. If one party is perpetrator and the other the
victim, there is the impediment of abduction; if the two parties are
accomplices, there is the impediment of crime.

2813. The Impediment of Age.--(a) Nature.--This impediment exists in
males who have not completed their sixteenth year, and in females who
have not completed their fourteenth year. These ages are set by the
general law, because all parts of the world have to be considered and
sufficient discretion may be presumed at those ages everywhere. But
substantial ignorance even after those years invalidates consent, and
moreover, in colder countries where development is slower, marriage is
generally inadvisable before the parties are 18 and 16 respectively.
The marriageable ages according to the statute law in most of our
States are 18 and 16 with parental consent, and 21 and 18 without it.

(b) Effect.--This impediment is of ecclesiastical law in so far as the
precise determination of age is concerned, but of natural law in so far
as the use of reason is demanded. Hence, the Church may dispense, and
hence also the impediment as ecclesiastical does not bind the
unbaptized, even when being underaged they marry Christians.

2814. The Impediment of Impotency.--(a) Nature.--Impotency is the
inability to exercise the sexual act in a way suitable for procreation.
The requisites for this act are _immissio membri virilis in vaginam
mulieris cum seminis effusione_, and hence those are impotent who lack
sexual organs (such as the emasculated or spayed), or who on account of
psychical or physical abnormalities are unable to have complete
intercourse (e.g., anaphrodisiacs, some hermaphrodites, those who
suffer from hypospadias, vaginism, etc.). Sterility, or the mere
inability to procreate from sexual intercourse (as in old persons), is
not the same thing as impotency, and is not an impediment to marriage.
Authorities are not agreed whether or not the operations of male
vasectomy and evariotomy produce impotency or sterility. But many
regard the former operation as unlawful except for a most grave cause
(such as the saving of life), since it takes away a power given by
nature for the benefit of society, exposes the individual to very
serious temptations, and opens the way to terrible abuses.

(b) Effect.--Impotency anterior to marriage and perpetual, whether in
the man or in the woman, whether known to the other party or not, voids
marriage from the law of nature itself, and hence is not dispensable.
But impotency that arises after marriage or that is only temporary does
not invalidate, and impotency that is relative (i.e., in reference to
one person only) does not nullify marriage except in reference to a
determinate person. In justice to the other spouse, married persons who
have an easily curable impotency should have this defect removed.

2815. The Impediments of Orders and Vows.--(a) Orders.--Those who are
in Sacred Orders (priesthood, deaconship and, in the Latin Church,
subdeaconship) cannot marry validly. The impediment is decreed by
ecclesiastical law alone, and hence the Church has the power to
dispense. One who was ordained through compulsion or in ignorance of
the duty of celibacy, is permitted to marry, if he does not wish to
ratify his ordination; but he then loses all right to exercise his
Order (2235).

(b) Vows.--Professed religious with solemn vows or simple vows that
annul marriage cannot marry validly. It is more probable that this
impediment, in so far as solemn vows are concerned, is of divine right;
but the Pope, as the Vicar of Christ, is able to dispense (see 2194,
2234, 2235, 1787 e).

2816. The Impediment of Bond.--(a) A person who is already validly
married cannot marry again until the bond of the existing marriage is
removed by the death of the other spouse or by dissolution. An
exception is the case of the Pauline Privilege; but even then the bond
of the first marriage remains till the second is contracted (see 2787
e).

(b) This impediment is of natural and divine law, and it binds all men,
the unbaptized as well as the baptized. No dispensation can be granted
from the impediment as long as it continues; and moreover those who
would contract a second marriage must offer proof that the bond of the
first marriage was non-existent, or that it has ceased. Nullity of a
previous marriage must be established by canonical process (Canons 1986
sqq.); dissolution of an unconsummated marriage through vow or Papal
dispensation is proved sufficiently by an authentic document; cessation
of bond through death of consort must be demonstrated with moral
certainty, if it is not manifest (see 2803). The procedure to be
observed in cases of the Pauline Privilege is explained by commentaries
on Canons 1120 sqq. of the Code.

2817. The Impediment of Disparity of Cult.--(a) A marriage of a
Catholic (i.e., of a person baptized in or converted to the Catholic
Church) with an unbaptized person is null and void. This impediment
bars the marriage of a professed ex-Catholic with an infidel, but not
the marriage of a non-Catholic with an infidel; and by infidel is
understood here not only a non-Christian (such as a Jew), but also a
Christian unbaptized or invalidly baptized. A person accidentally
baptized by a Catholic is not considered a Catholic if born of
heretical or schismatical parents and reared by them in their sect.

(b) This impediment as prohibitive is of divine ordinance, for the same
reasons as in the case of mixed marriages (see 2806 c): "Bear not the
yoke with unbelievers" (II Cor., vi. 14). But neither natural nor
divine law nullifies such a marriage with unbelievers; for the
substantial ends of marriage (i.e., procreation and education of
children) can be had even in such unions, and very holy personages have
contracted marriage even with pagans (e.g., Jacob with the daughters of
Laban, Joseph with the daughter of Putiphar, Moses with the daughter of
Jethro, Esther with Assuerus, St. Cecilia with Valerian, St. Monica
with Patricius, St. Clotilda with Clovis, etc.). The Church, however,
has made disparity of cult a diriment impediment on account of the
special danger, and it grants no dispensation unless the precautions
decreed for mixed marriages be observed (see 824, 2807).

2818. The Impediments of Kinship.--(a) Consanguinity.--Marriage is null
when contracted between blood relatives, that is, persons descended
from one another or from one common ancestor within certain limits. In
the direct line consanguinity invalidates marriage between all
ascendants and descendants, legitimate or natural, that is, between a
man and all his female ancestry (mother, grandmother, etc.) and
posterity (daughter, etc.), and between a woman and all her male
ancestors and posterity. In the collateral line it invalidates to the
third degree inclusively, that is, between a man and a woman whose
parents are related as first cousins or even more closely. The degree
of consanguinity between this man and woman is first, second or third,
according as one, two or three generations separate them (i.e., both or
the one farthest removed) from the nearest ancestor of both (see Canons
96 and 1076). Consanguinity is multiplied when two parties are
descended from several common stocks. This impediment is of the natural
law as regards the first, and probably all the other degrees of the
direct line; for reverence due to parents forbids one to marry them.
Marriage between brother and sister is not opposed to the absolute or
primary law of nature, but to the relative or secondary law (see 303);
for natural inclination teaches that it is unbecoming for members of
the same family to intermarry, and further the children of their unions
are very apt to be weakly or defective. In other degrees consanguinity
is an impediment of church law only, and may be dispensed for a good
reason, but a more serious reason is necessary for nearer relationship.

(b) Affinity.--Marriage is null when contracted between
relatives-in-law, or those who are kin by valid, even though
unconsummated, marriage. But the impediment exists only between the
husband and his wife's blood relatives, and vice versa. In the direct
line it includes all degrees; in the collateral line it extends to the
second degree inclusive. Hence, a widower is impeded from marrying all
the lineal relatives of his deceased wife (her mother, grandmother,
daughter, granddaughter, etc.), and the following of her collateral
relatives: her sisters, her aunts, her nieces, her first cousins.
Affinity is multiplied by multiplication of the consanguinity on which
it is based (e.g., when a woman is doubly related to one's deceased
wife), and by successive marriages (e.g., when a woman is the sister of
a man's two deceased wives). The impediment of affinity is justified by
moral reasons--by the mutual reverence that should exist between those
who are closely related by marriage, by the dangers to which their
relationship would be exposed if they were able to marry, and by the
good of society, which is promoted when marriage is not confined within
to narrow a circle. But the impediment is entirely ecclesiastical, for
the Church can dispense in all degrees, and the relationship is only an
imperfect copy of consanguinity.

(c) Public Decency.--This impediment, also known as quasi-affinity,
arises from an invalid, even though unconsummated, marriage, and from
public or notorious concubinage; and it annuls marriage in the first
and second degrees of the direct line between the man and the blood
relatives of the woman, and vice versa. The reason for the impediment
is the unbecomingness of marriage with the near relatives (i.e., the
mother, daughter, grandmother, granddaughter of the woman, and the
father, son, grandfather, grandson of the man) of a person with whom
one has lived in putative marriage or concubinage. The impediment is
less strict than that of affinity, and is of ecclesiastical law only.

(d) Spiritual Relationship.--This impediment nullifies marriage between
a baptized person and the person who baptized him or her or who stood
for him or her in Baptism. The minister and the sponsor contract a
relationship of spiritual parenthood to the baptized person, since
Baptism is a supernatural birth and the godparents are charged with the
religious welfare of the godchild. Reasons of respect and of intimate
relationship make marriage between such persons unbecoming, and hence
the Church from early times has ruled against it,

(e) Legal Relationship.--Persons who in civil law are unable to marry
one another on account of the relationship arising from legal adoption
are also barred from marriage in Canon Law. The relations between an
adopted person and the members of the family into which he is adopted
are so close that human lawmakers have often felt it necessary to
declare adoption an impediment to marriage.

2819. Matrimonial Impediments Produced through Misdeeds.--(a)
Abduction.--There can be no valid marriage between a man who holds a
woman under restraint in order to compel her to marry him, if she has
been abducted by him or is violently detained by him in her residence
or elsewhere. If the woman who has been carried away or who is held
against her will marries unwillingly, the marriage is invalid according
to natural law; if she marries willingly, the marriage is invalid from
church law. Hence the impediment of abduction is of positive law only
and does not oblige infidels (see Canon 1064).

(b) Crime.--There can be no valid marriage between the following: those
who during a legitimate marriage have consummated adultery together and
have mutually promised future marriage or have attempted marriage, even
though only civilly (Canon 1075); those who during the same lawful
marriage have consummated adultery together, and of whom one has
committed conjugicide; those who have coöperated physically or morally,
even though they are not adulterers, to murder the spouse of one of
them. The purpose of this impediment is to safeguard the fidelity and
rights of married persons, and to punish those who resort to adultery
or murder in the hope of a new marriage. The impediment is
ecclesiastical and does not affect infidels.

2820. Duties of the Pastor After the Inquiry about Impediments.--(a)
Dispensation.--If the pastor finds an impediment of natural or divine
law (e.g., the bond of an existing marriage), or an impediment which is
never dispensed (e.g., consanguinity in the first degree of the
collateral line, notorious conjugicide, when there is no danger of
death), he cannot proceed with the marriage. If he discovers another
impediment, he must inquire whether or not there is sufficient reason
for dispensation. For the impediments of occult crime, disparity of
cult outside of mission countries, age, Sacred Orders and religious
profession (also for neglecting the form of marriage), a grave reason
is necessary to permit marriage; but for the remaining impediments, a
less grave reason is required. The usual or grave reasons for
dispensation include the public good (e.g., peace between peoples,
prevention of serious litigations), a great private good (e.g., a
suitable marriage offered to a woman who on account of age or locality
can hardly find another such chance), great spiritual good (e.g.,
prevention of a mixed or civil marriage or great scandal, termination
of open concubinage), great temporal good (e.g., means to support the
family of a poor widow); but other and lesser reasons sometimes
suffice, as when the woman is illegitimate, an orphan, deflowered,
sickly, or homely, or the man needs someone to take care of him or of
his small children from a previous marriage, or when the marriage has
already been announced or will be of great advantage to the parents of
one of the parties. In case of urgent necessity or of danger of death,
the pastor and also the confessor or priest who assists at the marriage
are empowered to grant certain dispensations; in other cases
dispensation can be granted only by the local Ordinary or by the Holy
See. The petition for a dispensation must state the facts truthfully,
but must conceal the identity of the petitioner when the impediment is
occult. In executing a dispensation one must observe the conditions
laid down by the superior who granted it (see commentaries on Canons
1043 sqq.).

(b) Publication.--Even though it is morally certain that there is no
impediment, the banns of marriage should be proclaimed beforehand and
in the place where the parties have their domicile or quasi-domicile
(or residence, if they are _vagi_), and also, if necessary, in other
places where they have lived. This is a grave duty, since its purpose
is to ensure the validity and lawfulness of marriages. If it is morally
certain that there is no impediment, the Ordinary may dispense for a
good reason (see commentaries on Canons 1022 sqq.).

2821. After the Examination and Proclamation.--(a) If it is certain
that there is an impediment, the procedure will be that given in 2820
a; (b) if it is doubtful whether there is a diriment impediment, the
matter should be investigated more fully, but without defamation of the
parties, and if the doubt remains, the question should he submitted to
the Ordinary (see above, 2805 b); (c) if no impediment, certain or
doubtful, has been discovered, the pastor should approve the parties
for marriage.

2822. Duties of the Pastor as Regards the Religious Instruction of the
Engaged Couple.--(a) The pastor should require those who are not
confirmed to receive Confirmation before their marriage, if they can do
this without serious inconvenience.

(b) He should instruct the parties in the essentials of Christian
doctrine, if they are ignorant in these matters (see 920 sqq.), and he
should point out to them the nature of marriage as a contract and as a
Sacrament, its purposes and properties, the grace it confers and the
conjugal and parental duties it imposes, the necessity of preparing for
the Sacrament and of receiving it in the state of grace. He should also
speak about the impediments, so that the couple may understand the
disqualifications for a valid and lawful marriage; but this should be
done prudently, so as not to shock the innocent or to help others to
evade the law. But ignorance of the Catechism is not strictly an
impediment; and if the parties are unwilling to take instruction, they
should be married without it. In a mixed marriage it is often very
useful to give the non-Catholic a short course in Catholic teaching,
and all couples who are preparing for marriage would do well to read
some of the good works prepared especially for the use of engaged or
newly married people. The Code requires of pastors that in their
sermons they instruct the people on marriage and exhort them to avoid
mixed marriages and marriages with the unworthy (Canons 1018, 1064,
1065).

2823. The Pastor and the Duties of Engaged Couple.--The pastor should
also inquire about duties owed by the couple to others.

(a) Duties to Parents.--He should seriously admonish minors subject to
parental authority not to marry without the knowledge or against the
reasonable wishes of their parents. If the parents are opposed to the
marriage, the pastor should decide from the circumstances whether the
opposition is justified or not; if one parent only is unwilling, the
wishes of the father _per se_ have preference over those of the mother,
as he is the head of the family. If the engaged couple will not heed
the pastor, he is seriously bound to refuse to marry them until the
case has been presented to the Ordinary for decision (Canon 1034).

(b) Duties to Civil Law.--The State has no power over the Sacrament of
Matrimony, its bond, or its inseparable temporal effects (such as the
rights and duties of spouses, legitimacy of children and the like), but
it is competent in reference to merely civil effects and conditions,
which are temporal circumstances separable from the substance of
marriage. Hence, those who are getting married should comply with civil
formalities that do not trespass on church rights, such as registration
or marriage license.

2824. Opposition of Parents to Marriage.--In deciding whether the
parental opposition to a marriage is reasonable or not, the pastor
should take into consideration both the motives for the opposition and
the reasons in favor of the marriage.

(a) The motives for the opposition are reasonable, if the parents
object because of the undesirability of one of the couple, or their
incompatibility, or the evil consequences that will follow the
marriage. A person is undesirable on account of defects of soul (e.g.,
an atheist, a drunkard, a libertine, a man or woman of ill-fame, a
cruel man, an ill-tempered woman), or of body (e.g., a person who is
deformed, or malodorous, or afflicted with syphilis or other serious
disease), or of mind (e.g., a half-witted person), or of economical
ability (e.g., a man who is a gambler or spendthrift, or who is unable
to earn a living; a woman who is loaded with debts or who cannot take
care of a home). There is incompatibility when the ages of the couple
or their rank in life, their race, their education, their tastes, or
their dispositions are utterly different. There are evil consequences
when scandals, hatreds, disgrace, or loss of temporal goods will ensue.

(b) The reason for the marriage, however, may suffice to prevail over
the parental objections. Thus, if the strong disapproval of relatives
is the only reason against a marriage and its abandonment will make the
couple unhappy for life, charity does not oblige to such a sacrifice.
And the temporal advantage of a family should not be preferred to the
spiritual benefit, if their son who is wild wishes to marry a poor girl
who has a good influence over him rather than a wealthy girl whom he
does not admire.

2825. Religious Duties before Marriage.--(a) Confession.--A public
sinner (e.g., one who has been living in concubinage) is obliged to go
to confession before marriage in order to repair his scandal. A sinner
whose guilt is not public must repent before receiving the Sacrament of
Matrimony, since it is a Sacrament of the Living and supposes the state
of grace; but an act of contrition strictly suffices. It is
recommended, however, that all persons go to confession as a
preparation and that they make a general confession. The confessor
should be told of any occult or incriminating impediment that was not
disclosed to the pastor, and it is therefore advisable that the
confession precede the ceremony by several days, so as to allow time
for possible dispensations.

(b) Communion.--It is better that Communion be received on the day of
one's marriage, but, if this is not convenient, it may be received
several days before or several days after. There is no command as to
this, but the Church's counsel is most earnest.

2826. The Celebration of Marriage.--(a) Requisites for Validity.--In
order to be valid, a Catholic's marriage must be celebrated in the
presence of the parish-priest or Ordinary, or of a priest delegated by
either, and of at least two witnesses. There are two exceptions to this
law, namely, in danger of death when the priest cannot be had and in
the case of inability to appear before a priest within a month. This
law is most suitable, since marriage is not a mere profane contract,
but a Sacrament subject to the Church; the law is also necessary, since
secret or clandestine marriages would be impossible of proof, and
society and the family would be seriously harmed if they were permitted
except in very extraordinary cases.

(b) Requisites for Lawfulness.--The pastor assists lawfully at a
marriage if he has assured himself of the freedom of the parties to
marry and of his own right to assist officially at their marriage. The
pastor has the right to witness a marriage when the parties are his
subjects by reason of their location in his parish, or when he has
permission from their pastor or Ordinary to assist at the nuptials.
When the bride is from one parish and the groom from another, the rule
is that the marriage should be held before the bride's pastor (Canons
1094 sqq.)

2827. The Rite of Marriage.--(a) The essential rite consists in the
words of consent spoken by the bride and groom. The assisting priest
asks for this consent, and then (except in a mixed marriage) blesses
the newly married pair and the ring. Marriage by sign language or
through an interpreter or proxy is not lawful without special
permission, and marriage by letter is not recognized (Canons 1088 sqq.).

(b) The accidental rite is the nuptial blessing bestowed during the
Nuptial Mass that follows on the marriage. This is omitted in mixed
marriages, and also as a rule during Advent and Lent. The place for
marriage is regularly in the parish church, if it is a Catholic
marriage, but outside the church if it is a mixed marriage (see Canons
1100 sqq.). The Ordinary may dispense from the requirements of place
(Canon 1109).

2828. Coöperation in an Unworthy Marriage.--(a) The Priest.--The
clergyman acts as the official representative of the Church, and hence
only a serious reason will permit his assistance when the unworthiness
of one of the parties is known to him in an extra-confessional way. A
serious reason would be a threat of bodily harm to the priest or great
spiritual detriment to the parties, such as their continuance in the
state of sin. A more serious reason is required if one of the parties
is an _excommunicatus vitandus_. Finally, at times only passive
assistance is permitted, as in certain mixed marriages in which the
non-Catholic refuses to give guarantees, but there is greater danger of
perversion without than with the assistance (see 2677 sqq.).

(b) The Spouses.--The bride and groom are the ministers as well as the
recipients of Matrimony, and hence, if one of the parties knows that
the other is not in the state of grace, there is an administration of a
Sacrament to an unworthy recipient. But only charity would bid one to
deny the Sacrament to that other party, if one could not induce him to
dispose himself, and charity does not oblige with great inconvenience.
Hence the worthy party, if he or she has a suitable reason for
marrying, does not sin by reason of the other party's unworthiness.

(c) The Witnesses.--The coöperation of the witnesses is less than that
of the priest and of the worthy party, and hence only in an
extraordinary case do the witnesses sin by assisting at a marriage
contracted before the Church. They may presume that all is well, if the
pastor has agreed to the marriage; and even though they are certain
that the bride or groom is in mortal sin, the fear of incurring
displeasure or harm will ordinarily excuse the best man or bridesmaid
from all sin, or at least from grave sin.

2829. Registration of Marriages.--The Code requires that marriages be
recorded in the matrimonial and baptismal registers, and that
notification be sent to the pastors of the parishes where the bride and
the groom were baptized. This duty seems to be grave, since its end is
to provide for stable conditions and secure proof of freedom to marry.
The entries should be made without delay (i.e., within three days at
least), lest they be overlooked or be made incorrectly (Canon 1103).

2830. When an Impediment Is Discovered after Marriage.--A diriment
impediment or other invalidating defect is sometimes discovered after
the celebration of marriage. There are various solutions of this
difficulty.

(a) If the marriage can be validated (or made valid), this should be
done. The manner of simple validation of marriages null on account of
diriment impediment, defective consent or lack of form, is declared in
Canons 1133-1137.

(b) If the marriage cannot be validated simply, it may be made valid in
certain cases by the special validation known as a _sanatio in radice_.
This supposes that a consent naturally sufficient, but juridically
insufficient, was given, and that a renewal of consent cannot be
obtained (see Canons 1138-1141).

(c) If marriage cannot be validated in any way (as in the case of an
indispensable impediment), the parties should be separated, or
permitted to live together as brother and sister, or left in good
faith. Thus, if the nullity of the marriage is public, the parties
should be separated after a declaration of nullity; if the nullity is
secret and unprovable, the parties may be permitted to live together as
brother and sister, if they know the marriage is null, but are not
exposed to the danger of incontinence; if the parties are in good faith
about their marriage and it is foreseen that serious evils would result
were they told the truth (such as bad faith, or misfortunes for the
children), they may be left as they are.

2831. The Lawfulness of Divorce and Separation.--(a) Complete divorce,
or dissolution of the bond with the right to remarry during the
lifetime of the other spouse, is never lawful, except in the cases
mentioned in 2787 e. Moreover, the civil lawgiver has no right ever to
dissolve the marriage tie, for the marriage bond of Christians is
sacramental and not subject to the State, while the marriage bond of
non-Christians is indissoluble by human authority. On the death of one
spouse, however, the survivor is free to marry again, though chaste
widowhood is more honorable.

(b) Incomplete divorce, or separation from bed and board, is allowed
permanently to the innocent spouse in case of adultery, and temporarily
when there are other good reasons. Thus, if one of the parties becomes
an apostate, or gives non-Catholic education to the children, or leads
a criminal or disgraceful life, or makes common life too hard by his
cruelty, or endangers the other party in soul or body, the innocent
spouse may separate after appealing to the Ordinary, or may depart on
his or her own authority, if the facts are certain and there is danger
in delay (Canons 1118 sqq.). With permission one may even seek a civil
divorce, if it is a separation only, in order to be free as regards
civil effects of marriage (1950).




APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS
(Holy Office, 17 Apr., 1943)
[placed at end of Volume I, after section 1625, in print edition]

Seeing that delays and omissions in denouncing the books frequently
occur, and that many of the faithful are in a state of deplorable
ignorance regarding the denunciation and prohibition of harmful books,
the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office deems it appropriate
to call to mind the principal provisions of the sacred canons on this
subject; for it is beyond doubt that bad or harmful writings expose
purity of faith, integrity of morals, and the very salvation of souls
to the greatest dangers.

Certainly the Holy See cannot by itself, with adequate care and in due
time, prohibit the numberless writings against faith and morals which,
especially in our time, are being published almost daily in various
languages all over the world. Hence it is necessary that the Ordinaries
of places, whose business it is to preserve sound and orthodox doctrine
and to protect good morals (C, 343, §1), should, either personally or
through suitable priests, be watchful as to the books which are
published or sold in their territory (C. 1397, §4), and forbid to their
subjects those which they judge should be condemned (C. 1395, §1). The
right and duty to forbid books for just cause belongs also to an Abbot
of an independent monastery and to the Superior General of a clerical
exempt Institute acting with his Chapter or Council; nay, in case of
urgency, it belongs also to the other Major Superiors with their proper
Council, it being understood, however, that these must as soon as
possible report the matter to the Superior General (C. 1395, §3).
Nevertheless, books which require a more expert scrutiny, or in regard
to which, for salutary results, the judgment of the supreme authority
seems to be required, should be referred by the Ordinaries to the
judgment of the Holy See (C. 1397, §5).

It is, of course, the duty of all the faithful, and especially of
clerics, to denounce pernicious books to the proper authority; but this
duty is especially incumbent on clerics who have some ecclesiastical
dignity, such as the Legates of the Holy See and the Ordinaries of
places, and on those who are eminent in doctrine, as for example the
Rectors and Professors of Catholic Universities.

The denunciation is to be made either to this Congregation of the Holy
Office or to the Ordinary of the place, giving by all means the reason
why it is thought the book should be forbidden. The persons to whom
such a report is made have a strict duty to keep secret the names of
those who make it (C. 1397, §1, 2, 3).

Finally, Ordinaries of places and others who have the care of souls
should duly inform the faithful of the following:

a) The prohibition of books has the effect that, unless due permission
is obtained, the forbidden book may not be published, nor republished
(without making the corrections and obtaining due approbation), nor
read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor
in any way communicated to other persons (C. 1398, §1, 2);

b) Books condemned by the Holy See are considered as forbidden
everywhere and in whatever language they may be translated (C. 1396);

c) The positive ecclesiastical law forbids not only those books which
are individually condemned by a special decree of the Holy See and
placed on the Index of Forbidden Books, or which are proscribed by
particular Councils or Ordinaries for their subjects, but also the
books which are forbidden by the common law itself, that is, in virtue
of the rules contained in Canon 1399, which forbids in a general manner
nearly all books which are bad and harmful in themselves;

d) The natural law forbids the reading of any book which
occasions proximate spiritual danger, since it forbids anyone to
place himself in danger of losing the true faith or good morals;
accordingly, permission to use forbidden books, from whomsoever
it be obtained, in no way exempts from this prohibition of the
natural law (C. 1405, §1).




APPENDIX II

The "Ecumenical Movement"
[placed at end of Volume I, after the preceding Appendix, in print
edition]

On December 20, 1949 the Holy Office issued an instruction on the
"Ecumenical Movement" addressed to all local Ordinaries. In its
prefatory remarks the Instruction insisted upon the Church's intense
interest to attain to the full and perfect unity of the Church. It
noted as an occasion of joy the desire of many separated from the
Church to return to the unity of Christ's fold, a good intention,
indeed, which, however, in being put into practice has not been
regulated by right principles. Accordingly the Holy Office prescribed
that local Ordinaries maintain due vigilance over the associations
seeking Church Unity, that they designate well-qualified priests to pay
close attention to everything which concerns the "Movement," and that
they supervise publications on this matter by Catholics or by
non-Catholics, in as far as these are published, or read, or sold by
Catholics. The manner and method of proceeding in this work is to be
regulated by the Ordinaries, who are cautioned to prevent the growth of
indifference to Catholic truth and fallacious hopes of unity based upon
false or impossible foundations. With regard to mixed assemblies of
Catholics and non-Catholics, when there seems to be hope of spreading
knowledge of Catholic doctrine, the Ordinary is instructed to designate
well-qualified priests, to explain and defend the Church's teaching.
Special permission, however, must be obtained from Ecclesiastical
Authority if Catholic laymen are to attend. Where no hope of good
results exists, the meetings are to be ended or gradually suppressed.

The following specific instructions are given for the conduct of
"Ecumenical meetings."

All the aforesaid conferences and meetings, public and non-public,
large and small, which are called for the purpose of affording an
opportunity for the Catholic and the non-Catholic party, for the sake
of discussion, to treat of matters of faith and morals, each presenting
on even terms the doctrine of his own faith, are subject to the
prescriptions of the Church which were recalled to mind in the
_Monitum, "Cum compertum_" of this Congregation under date of 5 June,
1948. Hence, mixed congresses are not absolutely forbidden; but they
are not to be held without the previous permission of the competent
Ecclesiastical Authority. The _Monitum_, however, does not apply to
catechetical instructions, even when given to many together, nor to
conferences in which Catholic doctrine is explained to non-Catholics
who are prospective converts, even though the opportunity is afforded
for the non-Catholics to explain also the doctrine of their church so
that they may understand clearly and thoroughly in what respect it
agrees with the Catholic doctrine and in what it differs therefrom.

Neither does the said _Monitum_ apply to those mixed meetings of
Catholics and non-Catholics in which the discussion does not turn upon
faith and morals, but upon ways and means of defending the fundamental
principles of the natural law or of the Christian religion against the
enemies of God who are now leagued together, or where the question is
how to restore social order, or other topics of that nature. Even in
these meetings, as is evident, Catholics may not approve or concede
anything which is in conflict with divine revelation or with the
doctrine of the Church even on social questions.

As to local conferences and conventions which are within the scope of
the _Monitum_ as above explained, the Ordinaries of places are given,
for three years from the publication of this Instruction, the faculty
of granting the required previous permission of the Holy See on the
following conditions:

1. That _communicatio in sacris_ be entirely avoided;

2, That the presentations of the matter be duly inspected and directed;

3. That at the close of each year a report be made to this Supreme
Sacred Congregation, stating where such meetings were held and what
experience was gathered from them.

4. As regards the colloquies of theologians above mentioned, the same
faculty for the same length of time is granted to the Ordinary of the
place where such colloquies are held, or to the Ordinary delegated for
this work by the common consent of the other Ordinaries, under the same
conditions as above, but with the further requirement that the report
to this Sacred Congregation state also what questions were treated, who
were present, and who the speakers were for either side.

As for the interdiocesan conferences and congresses, either national or
international, the previous permission of the Holy See, special for
each case, is always required; and, in the petition asking for it, must
also be stated what are the questions to be treated and who the
speakers are to be. And it is not allowed, before this permission has
been obtained, to begin the external preparation of such meetings or to
collaborate with non-Catholics who begin such preparation.

5. Although in all these meetings and conferences any communication
whatsoever in worship must be avoided, yet the recitation in common of
the Lord's Prayer or of some prayer approved by the Catholic Church, is
not forbidden for opening or closing the said meetings.

6. Although each Ordinary has the right and duty to conduct, promote,
and preside over this work in his own diocese, yet the coöperation of
several Bishops will be appropriate or even necessary in establishing
offices and works to observe, study, and control this work as a whole.
Accordingly it will rest with the Ordinaries themselves to confer
together and consider how a proper uniformity of action and
coordination can be obtained.

7. Religious Superiors are bound to watch and to see to it that their
subjects adhere strictly and faithfully to the prescriptions laid down
by the Holy See or by the local Ordinaries in this matter.

In order that so noble a work as the "union" of all Christians in one
true faith and Church may daily grow into a more conspicuous part of
the entire care of souls, and that the whole Catholic people may more
earnestly implore this "union" from Almighty God, it will certainly be
of assistance that in some appropriate way, for example through
Pastoral Letters, the faithful be instructed regarding these questions
and projects, the prescriptions of the Church in the matter, and the
reasons on which they are based. All, especially priests and religious,
should be exhorted and warmly encouraged to be zealous by their prayers
and sacrifices to ripen and promote this work, and all should be
reminded that nothing more effectively paves the way for the erring to
find the truth and to embrace the Church than the faith of Catholics,
when it is confirmed by the example of upright living.




INDEX TO VOLUMES I-II

The numbers refer to the sections in the text. Nos. 1-1625 are
contained in Volume I [of the print edition].

Abjectedness, definition, 2561.

Abnormal Mental States, as obstacles to voluntariness of acts, 40, 55;
effect on voluntariness of acts, 55.

Abortion, canonical penalties for, 1851 a.

Absolute Standard, in grave matter, 1899.

Abstemiousness, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition,
2466; degrees of abstemiousness, 2467 a; austerity, 2468; excellence of
fasting and abstinence, 2469 a; sins opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.
See also Gluttony; Sobriety.

Abstinence, excellence of, 2469 a.

Abstinence, Total, see Sobriety.

Accession, title to private ownership, 1872 a; principles of accession,
1874.

Accusation, Judicial, obligation, 1966; when a malefactor is bound to
accuse himself, 1968; ethical conditions for lawful accusation or
denunciation, 1969; persons who may not act as accusers, 1970; judicial
accusation and fraternal correction, 1972; unjust accusation, 1973;
cessation of duty of accusation, 1794. See also Complaint.

Accused, see Defendant.

Act, Virtuous, intrinsic and extrinsic modes of performing, 1554;
essential and ideal modes, 1555.

Acts, Human, 22-62; definition, 23; knowledge requisite for, 24;
ignorance renders them involuntary, 28; effect of error, forgetfulness
and inadvertence on, 32-33; consent requisite for, 34; free and
necessary, 35 a; perfectly and imperfectly voluntary, 35 b; voluntary
absolutely and under a certain aspect, 35 c; voluntary in themselves or
directly and in their cause or indirectly, 35 d; voluntary, approvingly
and permissively, 36; omissions, 37-39; obstacles which destroy or
lessen voluntariness, 40 sqq.; voluntary acts either elicited or
commanded by the will, 56-62; intellectual, 61-62; sensible, 61-62;
external corporal, 61-62; morality of, 63 sqq.; acts forbidden to
clerics, 2603 a.

Acts, Meritorious, 106 sqq.

Acts, Moral, 63 sqq.; good, 76-78; bad, 79-80; indifferent, 82 sqq.;
morality of external act, 89 sqq.; morality of act indirectly willed,
94-95; morality of consequences of act, 96, imputability, 97 sqq,;
imputability in cases of double result, 103 sqq.; acts that are
objectively efficaciously and subjectively unjust, 1763 a, b, c. See
also Acts, Meritorious.

Acts of Charity, see Charity.

Acts of Faith, see Faith.

Acts of Hope, see Hope.

Acts, Voluntary, 35-39. See also Acts, Human.

Adjuration, definition, 2263; species of adjuration, 2264; solemn or
simple adjuration, 2264 a; imperative or deprecative adjuration, 2264
b; qualities of lawful adjuration, 2265; persons who may be adjured,
2266; use of exorcisms, 2267; effects of adjurations, 2268.

Adoration, see Religion.

Adornment, when lascivious, 1456 b.

Adulation, sin against affability, 2423 a.

Adultery, definition, 2530; sinfulness of adultery, 2530 b; degrees of
malice, 2530 c.

Advertence, full and partial, 174 sqq., 153, 196.

Advisor, implicit, 1779 c.

Aeromancy, form of divination, 2284 G.

Affability, virtue of, 2143 b; definition, 2421; offices of affability,
2422; sins against affability, 2423.

Affectation, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Afflictions, Medicinal, as remedies against sin, 283.

_Agapæ_, in Early Church, 2185 a.

Age of Reason, Puberty and Majority, 433.

Agency, 1749 a.

Aggression, Unjust, 1831.

Albigensianism, 822 c.

Almsgiving, external effect of charity, 1210; definition, 1216; manner
of giving, 1217; forms of almsgiving, 1218; seven corporal works of
mercy, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222; comparison of corporal and
spiritual alms, 1224; duty of almsgiving, 1226 sqq.; three classes of
needy persons distinguished, 1233; three degrees of corporal need,
1236; rules on giving alms, 1237; gravity of the obligation, 1238;
refusal of alms and restitution, 1240; alms from ill-gotten goods, 1241
sqq.; almsgiving from the goods of another, 1244-1246; order of charity
in almsgiving, 1247; amount to be given, 1249, 1253; employment as
alms, 1249 b; when alms are excessive, 1250; clerics and almsgiving,
1252; time for almsgiving, 1255; manner, 1256; public charity cannot
take the place of almsgiving, 1257.

Alphonsus Liguori, Saint, preference for Equiprobabilism, 696, 697,
698; on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to his personal
knowledge, 1951 c.

Ambiguous Answers, lawfulness of, 2402.

Ambition, as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness of soul,
2450 b.

Amendment, Resolution of, 2736.

American Law on Bankruptcy, 1788.

Amusements, forbidden to Clerics, 2603 c.

Anarchists, condemned by Church, 947 b.

Anger, 269; immediate cause of fighting, 1431; a  cause of contumely,
2017 c; definition, 2546; gravity of the sin of anger, 2547; anger
compared with hatred and envy, 2548; one of the seven capital vices,
2549.

Annuities, 1749 b.

Anti-Nationalism, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Anti-Tutiorism, 672 b.

Apology, as reparation for contumely, 2023 b; manner of apologizing,
2024.

Apostasy, definition, 835; comparative gravity of sins of apostasy,
837; objectively speaking, no reason can justify apostasy, 838;
apostasy to non-Catholic and anti-Catholic sects, 839.

Appeal, right of accused, 1982.

Appetites, Sensible, 46.

Appetites, Sensitive, as subject of sin, 231.

Appetites, Spiritual, 46.

Arianism, 822 c.

Art, intellectual virtue, 146 b; one of the two practical virtues of
intellect, 1627 a.

Assent, External and Internal, 760 a, b; objects, 761 d.

Assistant Priest, special duties of, 2607 c.

Astrology, a form of divination, 2285 c.

Astuteness, a form of evil prudence, 1651 a.

Attrition, see Contrition.

Augury, a form of divination, 2285 d.

Auspice, a form of divination, 2285 d.

Austerity, nature and kinds, 2468.

Authority, can supply indirect certitude, 652; kind necessary to make
opinion solidly probable, 707.

Avarice, 269; opposed to liberality, 2426; comparison of avarice and
prodigality, 2429.

Backbiting, see Defamation.

Bailments, 1749.

Bankruptcy in American Law, 1788.

Baptism, Sacrament of, faith necessary for adult candidate, 791; the
most necessary Sacrament, 2686; effect is regeneration, 2686 a;
material element of Baptism, 2686 b; formal element, 2686 c; Solemn
Baptism, 2637 a; Private Baptism, 2687 b; duties of pastors, 2688;
duties of parents and guardians, 2689; sponsors required by Church from
very early times, 2690; requirements for validity and lawfulness of
sponsors, 2690 a, b; duties of sponsors, 2691; duties of adult
recipients of Baptism, 2692; duties of minister of Baptism, 2693.

Barter, 1749 c.

Beatitudes, 159 c, 164, 1662; rewards promised, 165; Third, 811; First,
1058; Seventh, 1619; Sixth, 1662; Fourth and Fifth, 2433; Eighth, 2457;
Second, 2571.

Beneficence, external effect of charity, 1211 sqq.; regulated by the
order of charity, 1213-15; sins against, 1444 sqq. See Scandal;
Obscenity; Seduction; Coöperation.

Benefices, Ecclesiastical, 1758; institution of benefices, 2185 h.

Bestiality, form of impurity, 2534 d.

Betrothal, duties of persons engaged to marry, 2627; duties imposed by
engagement to marry, 2628; courtship, 2628; duty to manifest defects,
2628 b; fidelity during the engagement, 2628 c; right to manifest
affection, 2628 c; formal promise to marry imposes duty of marriage
within a reasonable time, 2628 d; breaking of engagement, 2628 d; duty
of restitution in breach of promise, 2628 d; signs of affection between
engaged persons, 2629.

Bills, unjust refusal to pay, 1794.

Birth-Control, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Bishop, interpreter of diocesan laws, 486; special duties, 2607 a.

Blackstone, on purely penal character of civil laws, 570 b.

Blasphemy, Sin of, 887 sqq.; heretical and non-heretical, 889;
interpreting cases of doubtful blasphemy, 894; sinfulness of blasphemy,
895; the greatest sin against faith, 895 b; species of blasphemy, 897;
circumstances which aggravate, 897 d; blasphemies against the Three
Divine Persons, 898; despair and presumption as blasphemy, 899 a; sin
against Holy Ghost, 900; state of malicious sin, 901; remedies against
blasphemy, 902; absolution, 903.

Blessed Sacrament, Confraternities of, 955 a.

Bluntness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Bonaventure, Saint, on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to
his personal knowledge, 1951 c.

Bond, definition of, 1886 a.

Bonds, purchase by clerics, 2605 e.

Books, when obscene, 1456 e; forbidden, see Writings, Forbidden.

Booty, obligation to make restitution, 1414.

Borrowing, Sinful, 1879 b.

Brahmanism, 822 a.

Breach of Promise, damages resultant on, 1888 a.

Bribery, Judicial, see Judge.

Broth, use forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.

Buddhism, 822 a.

Buying and Selling, 1749 b.

Calumny, definition, 2030 e; worst kind of defamation, 2032 d. See also
Defamation.

Candidates for Public Office, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.

Capital Vices, Seven, 269 sqq.

Carbonari, forbidden by Church, 947 h.

Cardinal Virtues, 150. See also Prudence; Justice; Fortitude;
Temperance.

Carelessness, caused by sloth, 1324, 1326 c, 1327.

Casuistic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.

Catholic Daughters of America, 955 b.

Caution, integral part of prudence, 108 b.

Celibacy, origin and obligation, 2602 a.

Censorship, Government, not desirable, 1458 e.

Censures, by the Church, 761 c.

Ceremonial Law, see Law, Mosaic.

Certainty, of knowledge, 1630; certainty of practical truth, 1630.

Certitude, necessary for prudence, 1630.

Certitude of Conscience, necessity, 641-642; kinds, 643 sqq.;
metaphysical, physical and moral, 644 sqq.; speculative and practical,
647; demonstrative and probable, 649; direct and indirect, 651;
principle of authority and reflex principles supply indirect certitude,
652.

Charity, theological virtue of, 151; compared with faith and hope, 157;
remains in the blessed, 158; Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; definition,
1105; charity and natural love, 1106 sqq.; true friendship with God,
1112; uncreated and created charity, 1113-1114; excellence of, 1115;
charity and beatific vision, 1116; production of charity, 1121; origin,
1122; may be increased, 1124; perfect charity, 1129; three degrees,
1130; decline of charity, 1131; loss of, 1132; object of, 1133; love of
creatures not always charity, 1134; sinful, natural and supernatural
self-love, 1136; friendship and charity, 1137-1141; love of neighbor,
1139; charity for sinners, 1142-1147; for enemies, 1148 sqq.; common
signs of charity, 1154; refusal of greeting a lack of charity, 1157;
general order of charity, 1158; character of love of God, 1160 sqq.;
sacrifice of spiritual goods for neighbor's sake, 1163; love of the
body, 1164; order of charity between neighbors, 1171 sqq.; order of
charity between relations, 1176 sqq.; acts of, 1183 sqq.; exercise of
act, 1184; internal effects of charity, 1103; joy, 1194; peace, 1195
sqq.; reconciliation with God effected by charity, 1196; what
reconciliation with enemies demands, 1198; manner and time of seeking
reconciliation, 1202 sqq.; external effects of charity, 1210;
beneficence (q.v.), 1211; almsgiving (q.v.), 1216; fraternal correction
(q.v.), 1258 sqq.; hate (q.v.), 1295 sqq.; sins against peace, 1347
sqq.; opposition between schism and charity, 1371; schism greatest sin
against neighbor, 1372; duty of owner towards one in dire need, 1925 a.

Charity, Commandments of, in Old Testament, 1547 a; in New Testament,
1547 b; precepts of secondary acts of charity, 1551; prohibitions of
uncharitableness, 1552; commandment of love of God, 1553 sqq.; modes of
performing act of love of God, 1554-1555; must be subjectively and
objectively great, 1556; actual and habitual, 1557; degrees of
perfection of this act, 1560; commandment of love of self, 1561;
pursuit of supernatural, intellectual and corporal goods, 1563-1564;
care of the mind, 1564; commandment of love of neighbor, 1579 sqq.;
conditions, 1582; fulfillment of the commandments of charity, 1585
sqq.; various ways of fulfillment, 1586; external acts must be
accompanied by internal love, 1588; internal act must be explicit,
1589; proper intention, 1590; obligation is universal, 1592; times when
the precepts of charity oblige, 1593 sqq.; ignorance as excuse for
omission, 1596; cases when love of neighbor must be explicit, 1603;
necessity of habit of charity, 1604; order of charity is also
commanded, 1606.

Chastity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; subjective part of temperance,
2465 a; definition of chastity, 2486; fruit of Fear of the Lord, 2571
c; vow and virtue of chastity, 2612 b.

Chauvinism, sin against piety, 2349 a.

Children, compensation of, 2631; sex education of children, 2632;
duties of children, charity and piety, 2633; special love of parents,
2633 a; respect and assistance owed to parents, 2633 b.

Chiromancy, form of divination, 2285 b.

Christian Doctrine, Confraternities of, 955 a.

Christian Science, 823 b; refusal of medicine or hygienic care, 2304.

Circumspection, 1638 b.

Clairvoyance, form of divination, 2285 a.

Clemency, definition, 2551; vices opposed to clemency, 2552 a.

Clergy, duty of charity to the poor, 2608 a; disposition of superfluous
wealth by beneficed clergy, 2609 a. See also Clerics.

Clerics, special duties of, 2596; duties before entering clerical
state, 2596 a; duties after entering clerical state, 2596 b; internal
vocation, 2597 a; external vocation, 2597 b; sinfulness of disregarding
vocation, 2598 a; positive duties of clerics, 2599 a; obligation of
Divine Office, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of Divine Office,
2601 a; precept of clerical celibacy, 2602 a; negative duties of
clerics, 2603; forbidden acts, 2603 a; forbidden occupations, 2603 b;
forbidden amusements, 2603 c; prohibition against trading, 2604 a;
clerics and purchase and sale of stocks and bonds, 2605 a; duties of
clerical superiors, 2606 a; special duties of those who have care of
souls, 2607 a.

Clients, duties to lawyers, 2651 b.

Coercion, as obstacle to consent, 40; effect on voluntariness of acts,
52.

Coition, Unnatural, form of impurity, 2534 b.

Commandments, natural and supernatural, 330; of faith, 913 sqq.; hope,
1092 sqq.; charity, 1547 sqq.; prudence, 1657; justice, 2434-2436;
fortitude, 2458-2460; temperance, 2572.

Commandments, Ten, 2436 sqq.

_Commodatum_, 1749 a.

Communication, Dangerous, 882 sqq.; civil and religious communication,
882; when non-religious communication is sinful, 883; when religious
communication is sinful, 884; communication in worship, 956 sqq.;
private and public, 956; participation of non-Catholics in Catholic
worship, 957-958; restriction of this participation, 959; performance
of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, 960.

Communion, Holy, minister, 2703; recipient of the Eucharist, 2704;
persons who may receive Communion, 2704 a; persons who must receive
Communion, 2704 b; requirements in candidates for First Communion, 2704
b; dispositions for worthy Communion, 2705; confession, preparation and
thanksgiving, 2705 a; Rite in which Communion may be received, 2705 a;
dispositions of body (Eucharistic fast and external reverence), 2705 b;
necessary dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 a; useful
dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 b; duties of parents, pastors
and confessors in reference to Communion, 2707. See also Eucharist,
Holy.

Commutations, involuntary, 1748 a; voluntary, 1748 b.

Commutative Justice, see Justice.

Compensation, various kinds of, 1927; lawfulness of occult
compensation, 1928; unlawful occult compensation and restitution, 1929;
conditions required by commutative justice for occult compensation,
1930; occult compensation in doubt of law, 1931 b; where there is
strict right to compensation, 1932; where there is no right to
compensation, 1933; compensation of children and employees, 1934;
conditions required by legal justice for occult compensation, 1935;
conditions required by charity for occult compensation, 1936;
lawfulness of open compensation, 1937.

Compensationism, 731 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.

Complaint, duty of making complaint about private wrongs, 1967; persons
in whose favor one may denounce a private wrong, 1971. See also
Accusation, Judicial.

Complicity, see Coöperation.

Concupiscible Passions, 118-119. See also Passions.

Condemnations, of error by the Church, 761 b.

Condign Merit, see Merit.

Condiments, not forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.

Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.

Confessors, duties of, regarding obligation of restitution, 1760; need
of prudence, 1650 a. See also Penance, Sacrament of.

Confirmation, Sacrament of, 2694; remote and proximate matter, 2694 a;
form, 2694 b; minister of Confirmation, 2695; recipient of
Confirmation, 2696; sponsors in Confirmation, 2697; qualifications and
duties of sponsors, 2697 a, b; duties of pastor in reference to
Confirmation, 2698.

Confucianism, 822 a.

Congruous Merit, see Merit.

Conscience, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 575; variously divided,
576; true or false, 577; good (right) or bad (wrong), 578 a; certain or
uncertain, 578 b; obligation of, 580; authority not unlimited, 581; no
autonomous morality, 581 a; when conscience must be followed, 582;
erroneous and doubtful conscience, 585; results of following erroneous
conscience, 588; results of disobeying erroneous conscience, 589-591; a
good conscience, 593 sqq.; antecedent and consequent conscience, 594;
vigilant, tender and timorous conscience, 595; scrupulous conscience,
596; lax conscience, 596 sqq.; malicious or non-malicious laxity
(reprobate or weak conscience), 598; partial or entire laxity, 599-600;
Pharisaic conscience, 600; inculpable and culpable laxity, 601; causes
of a lax conscience, 601; dangers of lax conscience, 602; rules
regarding sins due to lax conscience, 603-604; opinion as state of
conscience, 662 sqq.; remedies for lax conscience, 605; scrupulous
differs from strict (tender) conscience, 607 a; scrupulous conscience
differs from scrupulosity, 607 b; rules regarding scrupulous conscience
and sins, 608; dangers of scrupulous conscience, 609; perplexed
conscience, 611 sqq.; directions of St. Alphonsus regarding perplexed
conscience, 612; scrupulosity, 614 sqq.; distinct from scrupulous
conscience, 614 a; from a tender conscience, 614 b; from anxious,
doubtful or guilty conscience, 614 c; chief subjects of scruples, 615;
signs of scrupulosity, 616; internal causes of scrupulous conscience,
617; external causes, 618; sometimes tolerated by God, 619; dangers of
scrupulosity, 620; rules for the scrupulous, 621; qualities necessary
for successful direction of scrupulous, 625; scrupulous and past
confessions, 626; scrupulous and present confessions, 627; scrupulous
and performance of duties, 628; scrupulous and commission of sin, 630;
remedies for scruples, 632 sqq.; signs of a good conscience, 638;
certain conscience, 640 sqq.; kinds of certitude, 643 sqq.; uncertain
conscience, 654-655; doubt and suspicion, 656; presumption, 658; reflex
principles to settle doubts, 657 sqq.; opinion, 662 sqq.; accusing or
excusing, 668 a; forbidding or permitting, 668 b; the moral systems,
672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 676 sqq.; Laxism, 680 sqq.; Probabiliorism, 683
sqq.; Equiprobabilism, 688 sqq.; Probabilism, 701 sqq.;
Compensationism, 731 sqq.; respective merits and use of the rival
systems of conscience, 740 sqq.; use by confessors, 741.

Conscience, Systems of, see Systems, Moral, and Conscience.

Consent, act of will, 59; consent of the will, condition of mortal sin,
178, 184, 196; obstacles to, see Obstacles to Consent; qualities
necessary for valid consent, 1883; defects that invalidate consent,
1884.

Consolations, Spiritual, differ from devotion, 2151 b.

Contention, definition, 1355; sinfulness, 1357; causes, 1362.

Continence, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; nature of, 2544.

Continency, fruit of Fear of the the Lord, 163, 2571 c.

Contraception, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Contract, forms of, 1749; gratuitous contracts, 1749 a; contract as
title to private ownership, 1892 b; elements of contract, 1877;
subject-matter of contract, 1878; when contracts are immoral, 1878 a;
sinful contracts, 1879; qualities necessary for valid consent, 1833;
defects that invalidate consent, 1884; when fear invalidates consent to
contract, 1884 c; form of contract, 1885; accidentals of a contract,
1886; conditions added to contract, 1886 c; modes of contract, 1886 d;
obligation of entering into contract, 1887 a; obligation of valid
contract, 1888; quality of obligation in onerous and gratuitous
contracts, 1588 a; quantity of obligation in onerous and gratuitous
contracts, 1888 b; objects of obligation of contract, 1888 d;
obligation of quasi-contract, 1888 d; cessation of obligation, 1889;
unilateral and bilateral contracts, 1749 a; onerous contracts, 1749 b,
c; subsidiary contracts, 1749 d; immoral contracts, 1878 d; sinful
contracts, 1879; illegal contracts, 1880; unenforceable contracts, 1880
a; voidable contracts, 1880 c; contracts _ipso facto_ void, 1880 d;
qualities necessary in the parties contractant, 1881; legal privileges
of minors in connection with contracts, 1882; principles obligatory in
all forms of contracts, 2137; gratuitous contracts, 2137 a; onerous
contracts, 2137 b; aleatory contracts, 2137 c; fraudulent contracts,
2138.

Contractor's Agreement, 1749 b.

Contrition, the first act of the penitent, 2729; perfect contrition,
2730 a; imperfect contrition or attrition, 2730 b; attrition based
solely on fear of punishment, 2731; servile fear of God, 2731 b;
slavish fear, 2731 b; attrition in the Sacrament of Penance, 2732;
disinterested love not required in Penance, 2732 b; interested love
necessary in Penance, 2732 e; conditions for valid contrition and
attrition, 2733; internal sorrow; 2733 a; supernatural sorrow, 2733 b;
universal sorrow, 2733 c; sovereign sorrow, 2733 d; properties of
contrition, 2735.

Contumely, definition, 2010; various forms of, 2012; manner of
confessing contumely in Sacrament of Penance, 2013; sinfuless of
contumely, 2014; gravity of matter in contumely, 2015; causes of
contumely, 2017; duty of bearing with contumely, 2018; reasons for
resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019; duty of one who answers
contumely or detraction, 2020; duty of restitution for contumely, 2021;
what kind of reparation should be made, 2023; method of apologizing for
contumely, 2024; cessation of obligation of restitution, 2026; the
differences between defamation and contumely, 2029.

Coöperation, and restitution, 1775; positive coöperators in injury,
1779; negative coöperators, 1780; distinction between coöperators as
equal or unequal causes of injury, 1782; coöperation in suicide, 1855;
coöperation in defamation, 2076 sqq.; coöperation in sinful oaths,
2252; coöperation in divination or other form of superstition, 2296;
coöperation in the sin of drunkenness, 2483 a; coöperation and
restitution, see Restitution. See also Coöperation in Sin.

Coöperation in Religious Activities, 976 sqq.; immediate and mediate,
976 sqq.; lawfulness of material coöperation, 978; most usual cases of
coöperation, 980; contributions to false worship, 981; building of
houses of false worship, 983-984; preparing for non-Catholic services,
985-986; resemblance to scandal, 1460 b.

Coöperation in Sin, definition, 1506; how it differs from complicity,
1507; formal or material, 1508 a; positive or negative, 1508 b;
occasional or effective, 1509 a; immediate or mediate, 1509 b;
indispensable or not indispensable, 1509 c; unjust or unlawful, 1510;
explicit or implicit, 1511; proximate or remote, 1512; sinfulness,
1513; lawfulness of material coöperation, 1515; gravity of reasons
necessary for coöperation, 1520 sqq.; lawfulness of immediate
coöperation, 1526; special cases, 1528; formal coöperation with evil
reading matter, 1529; with evil dances or plays, 1531; material
coöperation with evil dances or plays, 1532; coöperation by manufacture
of sinful objects, 1533 sqq.; coöperation in supplying food and drink,
1537-1539; in renting houses, rooms, etc., 1540-1541; lawful and
unlawful coöperation of employees, 1542; duties of confessors,
1545-1546.

Correction, Fraternal, definition, 1258; distinct from judicial
correction and censure of vice, 1258 a, e; includes prevention of sin,
1258 d; duty, 1259-1261, 1282, 1284; when advisable and inadvisable,
1262-1263; doubtful cases, 1264; sin committed by omission or delay,
1265-1266; when person not a superior should make correction, 1267;
obligation of inquiring into suspected wrongdoing, 1269; private spying
uncharitable, 1269 c; faults that call for correction, 1270 sqq.;
correction of vincibly and invincibly ignorant, 1273 sqq.; past sins do
not demand correction, 1276; persons to be corrected, 1277; correction
of superior, 1278; persons to administer correction, 1279; persons
excused from duty, 1283; manner of correction, 1285-1291; secret and
public corrections, 1286; obligation of reporting an occult sin, 1287;
duties of superior when subject is reported for fraternal correction,
1292-1293; obligations for private individuals summarized, 1294.

Council of Trent, Catechism of the, points about which explicit faith
is required, 765.

Counsel, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a.

Counsels of New Testament, 7, 364 sqq.; the three chief, 368;
superiority of, 366.

Counterclaim, definition, 1927 a.

Courage, inferior to justice, 1716 a.

Courtship, see Betrothal.

Cowardice, caused by sloth, 1324; sin against fortitude, 2446 b.

Creditors, order of preference among, 1787.

Credulity, 847.

Creed, knowledge of necessary, 920.

Creeds, summarize formulas of Christian teaching, 767; what articles
deal with, 767; Apostles', Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; Summary
of teaching of Apostles' Creed, 770 sqq.

Cremation, societies for the promotion of, forbidden by Code, 946 b;
cremation of corpses, 2595 b.

Criticism, when sinful, 2038; when injustice is committed by
professional critics, 2075.

Cruelty, vice opposed to clemency, 2552 a.

Culpability, see Guilt.

Cunning, 1651 a.

Curiosity, compared with impurity, 2492 a.

Cursing, definition, 2111; when cursing is not sinful, 2112; sinfulness
of cursing, 2113; gravity of sin of cursing, 2114; circumstances that
change moral species of cursing, 2115; numerical multiplication in sins
of cursing, 2116; cursing of evil, 2117; unlawful cursing of an
irrational creature, 2119.

Custom, effect on law, 391 sqq.; kinds of, 392. See also Customs in
Canon Law.

Customs in Canon Law, 506 sqq.; may interpret, abrogate or introduce
law, 506; kinds of, 507; origin of, 508 a; legal force of, 508 b; time
required for acquisition of legal force, 511; cessation of, 513.

_Damnum_, definition, 1724 b.

Dances, when obscene, 1456 d; evil, formal coöperation with, 1531;
evil, material coöperation with, 1532.

Danger, of formal sin, 675 a, 678; of material sin, 675 b.

Dangerous Reading, see Reading, Dangerous.

Debates on Religion, generally inexpedient, 998.

Debt, moral and legal debt, 1692, 2141-43; moral degrees of, 2143.

Debt, Conjugal, 2614-17.

Decalogue, invincible ignorance of generally impossible, 321; Laws of
the First and Second Tables, 338; the precepts contained in the
Decalogue, 2436.

Deceit, form of lying, 2391 b.

Decency, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition of decency,
2486 b.

Decision, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 b.

Defamation, definition, 2028; self-defamation, 2028 e; different forms
of defamation, 2030; differences between defamation and contumely,
2029; implicit and explicit defamation, 2030 b; direct and indirect
defamation, 2030 d; examples of indirect defamation, 2031; examples of
direct defamation, 2032; defamation by innuendo, 2033 a; defamation by
plain speech, 2033 b; sinfulness of detraction, 2036; right to true and
false reputation, 2037; sinfulness of gossip or criticism about real
and known defects, 2038; moral species of defamation, 2039; species of
sins of defamation, 2040; numerical multiplication of defamations,
2041; theological species of defamation, 2042; harm done by defamation,
2043; comparison of defamation with other injuries against neighbor,
2044; rule for determining seriousness of defamation, 2046; harm done
by reason of defects revealed, 2047; revelation of secret faults, 2048;
harm done by reason of person defamed, 2049; meaning of the expression
"infamous in a certain place," 2051 sqq.; revelation about a person
juridically in disrepute elsewhere, 2054; revelation about a person
actually in disrepute elsewhere, 2055; notoriety in a closed community,
2057; revelation about a person formerly in disrepute, 2058; when the
name of person defamed is not given, 2059; defamation of deceased and
legal persons, 2060; harm done by reason of person of defamer, 2061;
defamation at second hand, 2062; harm done by reason of listeners,
2063; detraction to one discreet person, 2065; belittling a person to
himself, 2066; disclosing matters detrimental to third party, 2067;
rights that have precedence over false reputation, 2068; unlawful
attack on another's false reputation, 2069; conditions that justify
revelation of another's defects, 2070; revelations about public
officials or candidates for public office, 2071; revelations about
historical personages, 2072; revelations about persons who figure in
news of day, 2074; injustice in professional critics, 2075; coöperation
in defamation, 2076; direct consent to defamation, 2077; persons who
listen to defamation from curiosity, 2078; sinfulness of indirect
consent to defamation, 2079; guilt of superior who consents to
defamation, 2080; circumstances which lessen guilt of indirect consent,
2082; inaction in face of defamation, 2083; ways of opposing defamation
made in one's presence, 2084; restitution for defamation, 2085; gravity
of obligation of restitution, 2086; conditions which entail duty of
restitution, 2087; coöperators and restitution, 2088; circumstances of
restitution, 2089; persons by whom restitution must be made, 2089,
2090; persons to whom restitution must be made, 2001; responsibility of
defamer for spread of defamation, 2092; first way of making
restitution, 2093; other methods of making restitution, 2094; legal
reparation for defamation, 2095; time when restitution for defamation
is to be made, 2096; cessation of duty of restitution, 2097; excuses
from restitution, 2098 sqq.; right of defamed person to condone injury,
2101. See also Derision; Tale-Bearing; Reputation.

Defects, Natural, of fallen man, 283.

Defendant, definition, 1975; duties of defendant in civil cases, 1976;
duties in criminal cases, 1977; duty of accused to plead guilty, 1978;
rights and duties of accused in conducting own defense, 1980; rights
and duties of accused who has been found guilty, 1982.

Defense of Self, see Self-Defense.

Definitions of the Church, solemn and ordinary, 761 b; by the Church,
761 c.

Defloration, definition, 2529.

Deism, 847 b.

Deliberation, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 a.

Delight, 119.

Demerit, definition, 107.

Demon, The, 284.

Denunciation, see Accusation, Judicial; Complaint.

Deposit, 1749 a.

Derision, definition, 2106; distinction between derision and jesting,
2107; sinfulness of derision, 2109.

Desire, 119; sinful, 237 sqq.

Desires, Evil, 232, 240 sqq.

Desires, Impure, see Impurity.

Despair, definition, 1061; despondency, 1062; pusillanimity and
spiritual sloth, 1064; despair of unbelief, 1065; signs indicating
despair, 1057; malice of despair, 1068; despair compared with other
sins, 1070; causes of despair, 1071; remedies for, 1074; caused by
sloth, 1324.

Detraction, reasons for resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019;
duty of one who answers contumely or detraction, 2020; definition, 2030
c. See also Defamation.

Devotion, definition of, 2150; differs from emotion, 2151 e; from
spiritual consolations, 2151 b; external and internal cause of
devotion, 2152.

Devotions, different forms of, 2151 c.

Discord, 1347 sqq.; definition, 1348; sinfulness of intentional and
unintentional, 1350-1351; origin, 1354; prohibition against, 1552.

Disobedience, see Obedience.

Dispensation from Law, 401; who may be dispensed? 403.

Dispensations, in the strict or wide sense, 309, 524 sqq.; differ from
privileges, 524; persons who can grant dispensations, 525-530; manner
of seeking, 531; how invalidated, 533; when dispensation is refused,
534; interpretation of faculty of dispensing, 536-537; cessation of,
537-541.

See also Matrimony, Sacrament of; Vows.

Distractions, see Prayer.

Distributive Justice, see Justice.

Divination, see Religion, Sins against.

Divining Rods, and divination, 2284 c.

Divorce, books in favor of divorce forbidden, 855 b. See also
Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Docility, integral part of prudence, 1637 b.

Doctors, as source of Moral Theology, 10.

Domicile, true and quasi-domicile, 436.

Double Result, effect on imputability of acts, 103 sqq.

Doubt, 655 sqq.; positive or negative, 655; as state of conscience, 656
sqq.; reflex principles for solution of doubt, 657 sqq.; cases of
negative doubt to be settled in favor of obligation, 661; negative
doubt of law, 709 a; of fact, 709 b-c; rash doubts, 1743; supervening
doubt of possessor in doubtful faith, 1776; antecedent doubt of
possessor in doubtful faith, 1777.

Doubt, Sin of, 840 sqq.; methodical and real, 840-841; involuntary,
indeliberate, unwelcome and ignorant, 842; negative, 844; positive,
845; passing and permanent, 846.

Dress, when lascivious, 1456 b; modesty in, 2569 a.

Druggists, duties of, 2651 c.

Drunkenness, sin against sobriety, 2476 b; passive drunkenness, 2477 a;
degrees of the sin of drunkenness, 2479 a; malice of the sin, 2480 a;
drunkenness compared with other sins, 2481 a; responsibility of
drunkard for sins committed while intoxicated, 2482 a; coöperation in
the sin of drunkenness, 2483.

Duelling, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1435;
morality of, 1436; fallacy of arguments for, 1437; penalties against,
1438.

Dulia, species of reverence, 2325 c; obligation of religious cult of
dulia, 2354.

Duties, with regard to habits, 140; of man, 744 sqq.

Easter Communion, obligation of, 2592 sqq.

Eastern Star, among societies forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Education, neglect a sin against self, 1565.

Effects of Omissions, may be directly and indirectly voluntary, 38-39.

Egoism, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Election, act of will, 59.

Embezzlement, definition, 1893 a.

Emotion, differs from devotion, 2151 a.

Employees, duties in justice and charity, 2648. See also Employers.

Employers, duties in justice and charity, 2647; duties of, 2648; labor
disputes, 2649; obligation of giving employment, 2650.

Emulation, distinct from envy, 1331 a, 1339; when it is a sin, 1332.

Enemies, charity towards, 1148; general and special love of, 1151.

Enfeeblement, definition, 1866 c.

Engagement to Marry, see Betrothal.

Enjoyment, see Relaxation.

Envy, 269; sin against charity, 1328 sqq.; definition, 1328; objects
of, 1329; subjects of, 1330; distinct from emulation, fear and
indignation, 1331; lawful and unlawful emulation, 1332; lawful and
unlawful jealousy, 1333; lawful and unlawful grief at another's
prosperity, 1334-1337; envy by nature a mortal sin, 1338; degrees of
gravity, 1341; one of capital vices, 1342; how preeminent among sins,
1344; useful considerations and practices against envy, 1345-1346; as
origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; prohibition
against, 1552.

Epieikeia, 358; in human laws, 385, 411 sqq.; definition, 412; limits
on use, 414 sqq.; use in determining obligation of ecclesiastical laws,
503; a. subjective part of justice, 2144. See also Equity.

Equiprobabilism 688 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.

Equity, subjective part of justice, 2430; greatness of legal equity,
2432; definition of equity, 2431.

Error, resembles ignorance, 32; practical and speculative, effect on
gravity of sin, 249; may diminish theological guilt, 1764 b.

Escape from Prison, when licit, 1982 b.

Espousals, see Betrothal.

Ethics, and Moral Theology, 2.

Eucharist, Holy, 2699; the chief Sacrament of the Church, 2699; matter
and form of the Eucharist, 2700; qualities of the bread, 2700 a;
qualities of the wine, 2700 b; grave precept of Church regarding the
form, 2700 c; minister of consecration, 2701; duties of minister as
regards valid consecration, 2701 b; confession as preparation for
consecration, 2701 c; effect on consecration of inadvertent neglect of
grave liturgical precept, 2702; reservation of the Blessed Sacrament,
2708; duty of custody, 2708 a; duty of renewal of hosts, 2708 b; duty
of worship, 2708 c; visits to the Blessed Sacrament, 2708 c; Forty
Hours' Devotion, 2708 c. See also Communion, Holy; Mass, Sacrifice of
the.

Eugenical Sterilization, 1869 c.

Euthanasia, definition, 2485.

Eutrapelia, virtue, 2421 e, 2567.

Exaggeration, form of defamation, 2032 c.

Executioners, become irregular by
Canon Law, 1825.

Exorcisms, use of, 2267.

Extreme Unction, see Unction, Extreme.

Faith, Theological Virtue of, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 151;
compared with charity, 157; ceases in the blessed, 158; excellence,
747; utility, 748-749; meaning, 750; St. Paul's definition, 751; St.
Chrysostom's definition, 751 a; St. Thomas' definition, 751 b;
definition by Vatican Council, 798; material and formal objects, 754;
divine and Catholic faith, 755; divine and ecclesiastical faith, 756;
private revelations, 757; human faith, 758 d; external and internal
assent, 760; solemn and ordinary definitions of Church, 761 b;
condemnations of error, 761 b; definitions and censures, 761 c;
religious assent, 761 d; explicit and implicit, 763 sqq.; obligation of
explicit faith, 928; points about which explicit faith is required by
Catechism of Council of Trent, 765; faith is necessary for salvation,
766; formulas summarized in Creeds, 767; increase in articles of faith,
768; Apostles/ Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; summary of teaching
of Apostles' Creed, 770 sqq.; internal and external acts of faith, 782
sqq.; supernatural and natural truths to which assent must be given,
784; act of faith necessary, 785 sqq.; what must be believed with
implicit and explicit faith, 786; mysteries that must be believed, 787
sqq., 918, 920; substantial and scientific knowledge of mysteries, 790;
faith necessary for absolution, 792; merit of the act of faith; assent
of credibility, 795 a; preambles of faith, 795 b; habit of faith, 797;
properties of faith, 799; living and dead faith, 800; persons who have
or had faith, 801; persons who have not faith, 802; how faith must be
supreme, 803 a; faith must be universal but not necessarily explicit,
803 b; growth and decline of faith, 804-805; cause of faith, 806;
effects, 807; internal and external dangers to, 848; dangerous reading,
849 sqq.; dullness of understanding as sin, 912; blindness of mind as
sin, 912; Commandments of, 913 sqq.; commandment of knowledge, 914;
means of communicating knowledge, 915; degree of knowledge necessary,
919; knowledge of Creed, Decalogue, virtues, Sacraments, duties of
one's state, Lord's Prayer, 920; means for retention of knowledge, 922;
memorizing of Catechism, 923; commandment of internal acts of faith,
925; primary and secondary truths of revelation, 927; obligation of
affirmative commandment, 929; when and how often act of faith should be
made, 933-935; formal and virtual act of faith, 936; commandment of
external profession, 938 sqq.; denial of faith, 939; ways of denying
faith, 941; commandment of external profession, 987 sqq.; divine
precept of profession, 989; secret, private and public profession, 992
sqq,; obligation to give instruction on matters of faith and morals,
1001; ecclesiastical precept of profession, 1003; flight to avoid
profession, 1005; when concealment of one's faith is lawful, 1007; sins
of unbelief, see Unbelief, Sin of. See also Unbelief; Heresy; Apostasy;
Doubt; Credulity; Rationalism.

Fame, see Reputation.

Fare, travelling without paying, 1907.

Fasting, excellence of, 2409 a. See also Abstemiousness.

Favoritism, sinfulness declared by Revelation, 1805; sinfulness
declared by reason, 1806; gravity of sin of favoritism, 1807;
favoritism in spiritual matters, 1809; favoritism in secular matters,
1812; favoritism in marks of esteem or honor, 1813; favoritism in
judges, umpires, arbitrators and the like, 1814 a.

Fear, as obstacle to consent, 40, 44; acts done with and through fear,
43; two moral species (fear of the world and of God), 1043; habitual
and actual fear, 1044; worldly fear as sin, 1045; servile and filial
fear of God, 1048 sqq.; initial and perfected fear, 1055; divine
commandments concerning fear, 1103; compared with envy, 1331 b, 1339.

Fear of the Lord, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; perfects hope, 1041;
distinct from other kinds of fear, 1042; corresponds to First Beatitude
and Fruits of modesty, continency and chastity, 1058; complement of
temperance, 2571 a.

Fecundation, Artificial, 2618 c.

Fees, in connection with administration of sacred rites, 2185 b.

Feigning of Defects, form of lying, 2406 b.

Fenians, Society forbidden by Church, 947 b.

Fidelity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163. See also Truthfulness.

Fighting, definition, 1428; kinds, 1429; sinfulness, 1430; causes,
1431; hatred as cause of fighting, 1432; frequent occasions, 1433; evil
consequences, 1434.

First-Fruits, and tithes, 2185 b.

Fitness, the right standard for distributive justice, 1804 c.

Flattery, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Flesh Meat, 2586 sqq.

Foolhardiness, sin against fortitude, 2466 b.

Foolishness, sin of, opposed to Gift of Wisdom, 1621; description of
sin, 1624; causes, 1625; cause of contumely, 2017 b.

Foresight, 1638 b.

Forgetfulness, resembles ignorance, 32.

Form, Sacramental, see Sacrament. Formal Sin, 248.

Fornication, definition, 2543; sinfulness of fornication, 2534;
fornication compared with other sins, 2525 a; circumstances of
fornication, 2526 a; fornication of engaged person, 2526 b; forms of
fornication, 2527; the State and places of prostitution, 2528.

Fortitude, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; Gift of the Holy Ghost,
160 b; rank among moral virtues, 2437; definition of fortitude, 2439;
two acts of fortitude, 2440; excellence, 2441; sins opposed to
fortitude, 2446; integral and potential parts of fortitude, 2447;
differs from patience, 2453 b; complements of fortitude, 2457; Gift of
Fortitude, 2457 a; fortitude and the Eighth Beatitude, 2457 b;
fortitude and the Fruits of Patience and Longsuffering, 2457 c;
commandments of fortitude, 2458; subjects of fortitude, 2460. See also
Martyrdom.

Franchise, Electoral, see Voting.

Fraternal Correction, see Correction, fraternal.

Fraud, invalidates consent of contract, 1884 b; injustice in voluntary
commutations, 2121; definition of fraud, 2122; two kinds of injustice
in sales, 2123; injustice regarding price, 2124; criteria of a just
price, 2125; obligation of observing prices settled by law or custom,
2126; when market price may be disregarded without injustice, 2127;
unjust sales based on ignorance of real value, 2129; obligation of
restitution on account of unjust price, 2130; injustice regarding thing
sold, 2131; defects in the thing sold, 2132.

Free Love, definition, 2527 c.

Freemasonry, 823 b; books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; Society
forbidden by Code, 947 a.

Friday Abstinence, 2586 c.

Friendship, 1110; friendship of utility, pleasure and virtue, 1111;
five marks of true friendship, 1137; human friendship not a distinct
virtue, 1140; virtue of friendship, 2143 b.

Fruition, as act of will, 58.

Fruits of the Holy Ghost, 159 b; twelve in number, 163, 811, 1058,
1619, 1662, 2433, 2457, 2571.

Gambling, sinful, 1879 d; gambling forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.

Geomancy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Gift, sinful, 1879 a; when are free gifts to judges permissible? 1945 d.

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 159 a; intellectual, 160 a; appetitive, 159,
160, 160 b; Understanding and Knowledge, 808-810; Fear of the Lord,
1041-1057; Wisdom, 1609 sqq.; Counsel, 1662; Piety, 2433; Fortitude,
2457; Fear of the Lord, 2571.

Gluttony, 269; sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 b; ways of
committing gluttony, 2471; sinfulness of gluttony, 2472 a; gluttony as
capital sin, 2473 11.

Gnome, part of judgment, 2432 d.

Gnosticism, 822 c.

Gnostics, 823 b.

God, belief in His existence and providence necessary for salvation,
787.

Golden Mean, in virtues, 153-154.

Good, Common. 285 c.

Goods, external, not last end of man, 20; of the body, not last end of
man, 20; of the soul, not last end of man, 20; when temporal goods
should be surrendered to avoid scandal, 1483.

Goods, Abandoned, when they may be occupied, 1873 e; when vacant goods
may be occupied, 1873 f.

Good Templars, Independent Order of, forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Good Will, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.

Gossip, sinfulness of, 2038.

Grace, 284.

Gratitude, virtue of, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2373; two kinds of
gratitude, 2374; circumstances of gratitude, 2376; sins against
gratitude, 2377; moral species of ingratitude, 2378; theological
species of ingratitude, 2379; is it right to confer favors on the
ungrateful? 2380.

Grave Matter, absolute and relative standards, 1899; opinions on the
amounts that are grave matter, 1900 a.

Greatness of Deed, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of
virtue, 2452.

Greatness of Soul, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of
virtue, 2448; greatness of soul and humility, 2449; vices opposed to,
2450 sqq.

Grief, at another's prosperity, when lawful and unlawful, 1334-1337.

Guaranty, 1749 d.

Guilt, formal guilt, 248; material guilt, 248; causes that remove or
diminish theological guilt, 1764 a.

Habits, as obstacle to voluntariness of acts, 40, 53; definition, 53;
antecedent and consequent, 53; in general, 132 sqq.; definition, 133;
entitative and operative, 134 a; good and evil, 134 b; infused and
acquired, 134 c, 135-136; strengthening and weakening of, 137 sqq.;
exercise great influence on morality, 140; our duties regarding, 141.
See also Virtue; Vice.

Half-Truths, form of lying, 2030 c.

Haruspicy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Hate, 119 (see also Passions, concupiscible); sin against charity,
1295; definition and kinds, 1296; hatred of God, 1297; interpretative
and formal hatred, 1299, 1315; hatred of God as a special sin, 1300;
gravity of this sin, 1301; degrees of malice, 1303; hatred of
creatures, 1304; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to self
or others? 1308; wish for death or spiritual evil, 1310-1311; gravity
of sin of hatred of neighbor, 1312; comparison with other sins, 1313;
hatred not a capital vice, 1314; species of sin, 1317; manner of
confessing sin, 1318-1319; as cause of fighting, 1432; prohibition
against, 1552.

Health, Injury to, a form of injustice, 1871.

Heresy, 822 c, 826 sqq.; as a sin and canonical crime, 827; positive
and negative, 828 a; internal and external, 828 b; occult and public,
828 c; material and formal, 828 d, 829-830; sinfulness of, 831;
circumstances that modify guilt, 832; penalties, 833; books in favor
of, forbidden, 855 b; heresy compared with schism, 1370.

Hibernians, Ancient Order of, 955 b.

Hire of Labor, form of onerous contract, 1 749 b.

Historical Personages, lawfulness of revelations about, 2072.

Holy Ghost, Fruits of, see Fruits of the Holy Ghost.

Holy Ghost, Gifts of, see Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Homicide, definition, 1816; when homicide is lawful, 1819; unlawful
killing of offenders, 1823; lawfulness of tyrannicide, 1824 a; homicide
in self-defense, 1826; killing of the innocent, 1844 sqq.;
unintentional killing of the innocent, 1847; destruction of the unborn,
1848 sqq.; canonical penalties for, 1851 a; accidental homicide, 1862;
moral and legal guilt of homicide, 1865. See also Punishment, Capital,
1820.

Honor, definition, 2010 b; persons who are deserving of honor, 2011;
species of honor, 2352; obligation of showing honor, 2353; honor due to
superiors, 2636 a.

Honors, Pursuit of, sometimes demanded by charity to self, 1574.

Hope, Theological Virtue of, 151, 157, 158, 1009 sqq.; definition,
1009-1012; supernatural and natural hope, 1013; animated and inanimated
hope, 1016; disinterested and interested hope, 1017 b, 1033; object of,
1018; excellence of, 1027; comparison with faith, 1029; with charity,
1030; pseudo-hope (egotistical, Epicurean, and utilitarian), 1032; hope
overcomes spiritual discouragement and aridity, 1034; means for growth
in hope, 1035; subject of hope, 1036; certainty of, 1040; perfected by
Fear of the Lord (q.v.), 1041; sins against hope, 1059 sqq.; despair
(q.v.), 1061 sqq.; spiritual desolations, 1064; pusillanimity and
spiritual sloth, 1064; presumption (q.v.), 1075 sqq,; commandments of
hope, 1092; acts of hope obligatory, 1093; unlawful to surrender
beatitude, 1094; when the commandment of hope obliges, 1095 sqq.

Horror, 119. See also Passions, concupiscible.

Houses of Study, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.

Human Acts, see Acts, Human.

Humanitarianism, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Humility, greatness of soul and humility, 2449; potential part of
temperance, 2465 c; definition, 2553; the three acts of humility, 2554
a; two requirements of humility, 2555; excellence of humility, 2556 a.

Hunting, forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.

Husbands, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Hussism, 822 c.

Hydromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Hyperdulia, species of reverence, 2352 c.

Hypocrisy, form of lying, 2391 b; sinfulness of hypocrisy, 2405.

Iconoclasm, 822 c.

Idleness, 1326 e.

Idolatry, see Religion, Sins against.

Ignorance, various kinds, 24 sqq.; concomitant, consequent and
antecedent, 26, 29; vincible and invincible, 27, 30; influence on
voluntariness of acts, 28; effect on sin, 249; sins of ignorance, see
Ignorance, Sin of; invincible, in relation to Natural Law, 320; of
Christian Law, possibility of, 356; confessors should examine penitents
who show signs of ignorance, 924.

Ignorance, Sin of, 250 b, 904 sqq,; culpable ignorance as distinct sin,
907. See also Ignorance.

Images, when obscene, 1456 a.

Immoderation, vice opposed to temperance, 2464 b.

Immorality, see Impurity.

Impatience, vice opposed to patience, 2455 b.

Impediments, simple impediments to reception of Holy Orders, 2784 b;
matrimonial impediments, 2804 sqq.

Imperfections, Moral, 185; when they become sin, 186.

Impossibility, Physical, 361 a; moral, 361 b.

Impurity, definition, 2492; sensuality, luxury and curiosity, 2492 n;
kinds of impurity, 2493 a; gravity of sin, 2494 a; one of the capital
vices, 2494 c; evil fruits of impurity, 2495; when venial and mortal,
2496 a; when directly willed, 2496 b; when indirectly willed, 2496 c;
temptations to impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations,
2498; what opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient,
harmful and unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal
temptations, 2501; sinfulness of negligence in resisting temptations,
2502; non-consummated sins of impurity, 2504; impure thoughts, 2505;
malice of impure thoughts, 2506 a; impure rejoicing, 2507; impure
desires, 2508; malice of impure desires, 2509; sins of lewdness, 2510;
consummated sins of impurity, 2520; comparative malice of the sins of
consummated lust, 2521 a; multiplication of sins of lust, 2522;
fornication, 2523; incest, 2532; carnal sacrilege, 2533; unnatural
lust, 2534; pollution, 2535; non-sinful pollution, 2536; unimputable
pollution, 2537; proximate and remote occasions of pollution, 2538;
theological malice of sinful pollution, 2539; moral species of sinful
pollution, 2541; canonical penalties for immorality, 2542. See also
Lewdness; Fornication.

Imputability of Acts, 97 sqq.

Inadvertence, resembles ignorance, 32.

Incest, definition, 2531.

Inconvenience, degrees of, 1520.

Index of Forbidden Books, 862 c.

Indifferentism, 823 a.

Indignation, differs from envy, 1331 c, 1339.

Indolence, 1326 d.

Infamy, 2051 sqq.

Infidelity, 822 ff.

Ingratitude, see Gratitude.

Inhabitant, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.

Inheritance, title of private ownership, 1872 b.

Inhibition, of passions, 131.

_Injuria_, definition, 1724 b.

Injuries, Bodily, a form of injustice, 1866.

Injustice, definition, 1719; species of legal and particular injustice,
1720; theological species of legal and particular injustice, 1721; when
injury to private or public right is mortal sin, 1722 a, b; moral
species of injustice, 1723; profitable and unprofitable injustice, 1724
c; when injury is no injustice, 1725; internal injustice, 1726;
distributive injustice alone does not oblige to restitution, 1754;
coöperators in injustice and restitution, 1778 sqq.; mandator of act of
injustice, 1779 a; advisor of act of injustice, 1779 b; protector in
act of injustice, 1779 d; consenter in act of injustice, 1779 e;
partaker in injustice, 1779 f; sin of injustice, 1866 s; judicial
injustice, 1939; principal sins of verbal injustice, 2009.

Injustice in Buying and Selling, see Fraud.

Innocent, unintentional killing of, 1847.

Insensibility, sin against fortitude, 2446 b; vice opposed to
temperance, 2464.

Insurance, 1749 c.

Intellect, art and prudence the two practical virtues of, 1627.

Intention, as act of will, 58. See also Prayer.

Internationalism, False, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Interpretation, of law, 315 sqq.; verbal or emendatory, 315; by private
or public authority, 316; of ecclesiastical laws, 483 sqq.; rules for
doctrinal interpretation, 485.

Invocation, of a demon, 2284; invocation of spirits, see Religion, Sins
against.

Irascible Passions, 118, 120.

Irregularities, as disqualifications for reception of Holy Orders, 2784
b.

Irreligiousness, see Religion, Sins against.

Jail-breaking, and restitution, 1983.

Jealousy, lawful and unlawful, 1333.

Jesting, distinction between derision and jesting, 2107.

Jingoism, sin against piety, 2349 a.

Joy, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; sinful, 237; as effect of charity,
1193-1194.

Judaism, 822 b.

Judaizers, 823 b.

Judge, office of, 1940; qualifications, 1943; conduct, 1944; accepting
gifts from litigants, 1945; obligation to restore bribes, etc., 1946;
duties during a trial, 1947; duties on conclusion of a trial, 1948;
obligation in connection with a law manifestly unjust, 1949; Catholic
judge and degrees of divorce, 1950; obligation when evidence is
contrary to his personal knowledge, 1951; when judge is unjust cause of
damaging evidence, 1952; obligation in doubtful criminal cases, 1955;
obligation in doubtful civil cases, 1956; standard by which he should
weigh evidence, 1958; when a judge is bound to restitution, 1962; when
he is not bound to restitution, 1963; right to question prisoner about
his guilt, 1979; judges who pass death sentence become irregular by
Canon Law, 1825. See also Witness.

Judgment, virtue of, 1727; public and private judgment, 1727 a; three
conditions of righteous judgment, 1729-1731; necessary quality of
lawful oath, 2249 e.

Judgment, Rash, 1731 b; sinfulness of rash judgment, 1734; rules on
perfect advertence to rashness of judgment, 1736; rules on
insufficiency of reasons for unfavorable judgments, 1737; rules on
gravity of matter in rash judgments, 1738; moral species of the sin of
rash judgment, 1739; chief reasons for rash conclusions about character
of others, 1742; rash doubts, 1743.

Judgments, Moral, 672 sqq.; the safer and more likely, 673.

Jurisdiction, of a judge, 1942.

Justice, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; precedence over charity,
291 b; compared with other virtues, 1714; private justice, 1715 b;
legal justice, 1715 a; justice superior to courage, 1716 a; superior to
liberality, 1716 b; regarded by some as inferior to virtue of religion
and mercy, 1718 a, b; justice demands proper motives in those who seek
or pass judgment, 1728 a; legal justice distinct from distributive and
commutative, 1745 a; distributive justice, 1745 b; commutative justice,
1745 c; resemblance between distributive and commutative justice, 1746;
special differences between distributive and commutative justice, 1747;
commutations of commutative justice, 1748; equality sought by
commutative justice, 1750; distributive justice and violation of
individual rights, 1755; commutative justice and violation of
individual rights, 1756; vice opposed to distributive justice, 1804;
distributive injustice frequently accompanied by commutative injustice,
1808; vices against commutative justice, 1815; legal justice, classes
of courts, 1941; jurisdiction of 9, judge, 1942; quasi-integral parts
of justice, 2139; potential parts of justice, 2141; degrees of moral
debt, 2143; necessary qualities of lawful oath, 2249 c; complements of
justice, 2433; Beatitudes that correspond to justice, 2433 b; Fruits of
the Holy Ghost that correspond to justice, 2433 c; commandments of
justice, 2434; justice, a duty of superior, 2635 b. See also Equity;
Restitution.

Killing, of animals, 1818 a; of human beings, see Homicide.

Kindness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.

Kinsfolk, order of charity between, 1176 sqq.

Kissing, morality of kissing and similar acts, 2513.

Knights of Columbus, 955 b.

Knights of Pythias, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Knowledge, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a; given to perfect theological
virtues, 808.

Lands, how they may be occupied, 1873 b.

Larceny, definition of, 1893 b; petit and grand larceny, 1893 b.

Last End of Man, existence of, 19; nature of, 20; how attained, 21.

Latitudinarianism, 823 a.

Law, 284 sqq.; definition, 285; eternal, natural and positive divine,
286; collision of laws, 288; precedence, 289 sqq,; basis of all laws,
293; customs may interpret, abrogate or introduce law, 506.

Law, Christian, comparison with Mosaic Law, 346 sqq.; as regards their
aims, 347; as regards their precepts, 348; as regards their difficulty
of observance, 349; as regards external and internal works, 350-351;
moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts of New Testament, 352; duration
of, 354; subjects of, 355; ignorance of, 356; dispensation from, 357;
interpretation of, 358-359; when observance of law is impossible,
360-361; Counsels of (q.v.), 364 sqq.; the three chief Counsels, 369.
See also Law, Mosaic.

Law, Civil, 542 sqq.; persons in whom legislative authority is vested,
543; acceptance by people not necessary for obligation of law in
itself, 544; obligation of laws made by one without authority, 545;
subject-matter, 546; relation to natural law, 547; relation to divine
and ecclesiastical law, 548; and human rights and liberties, 549;
persons subject to, 550; obligation of, 551; when penalty is incurred
before sentence, 552; special kinds, 557 sqq.; laws that determine
ownership, 557; irritant or voiding laws, 558; four kinds of laws with
reference to penalty, 561; moral obligation, 561 sqq. See also Laws,
Human.

Law, Ecclesiastical, precedence over civil, 290, 418 sqq.; charter of,
418; character of, 419; general law of Church, 420; effects of Code on
liturgical and disciplinary laws and customs, 421; rules governing
interpretation of Code, 422; lawgivers in Church, 423-429;
subject-matter of Church Law, 425; kinds of acts governed by Church
Law, 426; persons bound by general laws, 427 sqq.; persons bound by
particular laws, 435; promulgation, 447; acceptance of, 448; irritant
laws, 450 sqq.; effects of ignorance, force or fear on acts irritated
by law, 456; when an irritant law ceases to bind, 457; obligation of
law based on presumption of common danger, 460; obligation of law based
on presumption of particular fact, 461; personal, minute, partial and
simultaneous fulfillment of laws, 462 sqq.; time of fulfillment, 468
sqq.; unwilling fulfillment, 476; intention required in fulfillment,
477 sqq.; virtuous dispositions in fulfillment, 480 sqq.;
interpretation of, 483; cessation of obligation, 487; exemption from,
488; ignorance and impossibility as excuses for non-observance, 489
sqq.; cessation of, 500 sqq.; use of epieikeia in determining
obligation, 503.

Law, Eternal, The, basis of all laws, 293.

Law, Mosaic, began with promise to Abraham, 332 a; promulgation, 332 b;
excellence, 333; subjects of, 334; duration of obligation, 335;
precepts, ceremonies and judgments, 336 sqq.; ceremonial laws, 340;
sacred times and places, sacraments and customs, 340; four periods of
ceremonial law, 342; four kinds of judgments or judicial laws, 343-345;
comparison with Christian Law, 346 sqq.

Law, Natural, precedence over positive, 289; definition, 295; relation
to other laws, 296; division, 297; common and proper, 297 b; primary
and secondary, 298; first principle and secondary principles, 300 a;
precepts (axiomatic and inferred, general and particular), 300-301;
necessary and contingent laws, 302; absolute and relative laws, 303;
properties of, 305; of universal obligation, 306; unchangeable, 307
sqq,; possibility of dispensation from, 309, 314 sqq.; possibility of
modification, 313; when observance is physically or morally impossible,
317-318; promulgated by light of reason, 319; ineradicable from human
heart, 324; wrong applications of, 326.

Law, Positive Divine, definition, 328; necessity, 328 c; differs from
Natural Law in certain respects, 329; natural and supernatural
commandments, 330; division of, 331; in state of original innocence,
331 a; in law of nature, 331 b; Mosaic Law, 332 sqq.; Christian Law,
346 sqq.

Lawgivers, in the Church, 423-424.

Laws, Administration of, see Judge.

Laws, Ceremonial, of Old Testament, 340 sqq., See also Law. Mosaic.

Laws, Ecclesiastical, in a wide sense, 514 sqq.; precepts, 519;
rescripts, 520; privileges, 521-523; dispensations, 524.

Laws, Human, 370 sqq.; definition, 370; divisions, 371; qualities, 372;
should not prescribe what is too difficult, 372; obligation, 375;
necessity, 375; when unjust, 376; obedience to unjust laws not
obligatory, 377; degrees of obligation, 373 sqq.; interpretation,
385-386; epieikeia, 385; those subject to law, 387-388; change of, 389;
constitutional law, 390; effects of custom on law, 391; dispensation
from, 401 sqq. See also Law, Civil.

Laws of New Testament, 7.

Laws of the First and Second Tables, 338. See also Decalogue.

Lawyer, general duties, 1995; qualifications, 1996; duties in
introducing case, 1997, obligation in charity towards persons in
distress, 1998-99; duty when cause is unjust, 2000; duties when justice
of cause is doubtful, 2001; duty when he discovers case is really
unjust, 2003; duties towards client, 2004; duties toward other parties,
2005; concealment of truth in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness of
introducing false or corrupted documents, 2007; when bound to
restitution, 2008.

Laxism, see Systems, Moral.

Laziness, as distinct from sloth, 1326; various forms, 1326 a-e.

Lease, 1749 b.

Leniency, Undue, vice, 2552 b.

Lenten Fast, 2588.

Lesbian Love, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Lewdness, definition, 2510; propriety of external acts, 2512; morality
of kissing and similar acts, 2513; morality of sensual gratification,
2514; theological species of the sin of lewdness, 2515; circumstances
that increase or lessen the danger of sin, 2517; cases wherein the
danger of sin is grave or slight, 2518; lewd books, 2518 b; lewdness in
speech, 2518 a; in reading, 2518 b; in looks, 2518 c; in touches, 2518
d; moral species of lewdness, 2519 a.

Libel, definition, 2030 d.

Liberality, inferior to justice, 1716 b; virtue of liberality, 2143 b;
definition of virtue, 2424; importance of liberality, 2425. See also
Avarice; Prodigality.

Lies, see Lying.

Lipstick, morality of use, 2570.

Liquids, may or may not break fast, 2588.

Loans, 1749 a; loan at interest, 1749 b.

Longsuffering, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.

Looting, forbidden by modern international law, 1415.

Loss, definition, 1724 b.

Lots, Use of, when lawful, 2289.

Lottery, when lawful, 1879 e.

Love, definition, 119; root of all appetites of soul, 1106; effects,
1107; degrees, 1108; love of desire and love of benevolence, 1109; love
of creatures not always charity, 1134; kinds of self-love (q.v.), 1136;
obligatory, 1608 a; of supererogation, 1608 b.

Love of God, see Charity.

Love of Neighbor, see Neighbor, Love of.

Love of Self, see Self-Love.

Lukewarmness, 1327.

Lust, 269. See also Impurity.

Luxury, compared with impurity, 2492 a; modesty in luxury, 2569 a.

Lying, definition, 2389; misunderstanding a form of lying, 2390 a;
misinterpretation a form of lying, 2390 b; divisions of lies, 2391;
hypocrisy, 2391 b; simulation, 2301 b; misrepresentation and deceit,
2391 b; classification of lies, 2392; lies of inclination, 2392 b;
pernicious lies, 2392 b; motives for lying 2393; jocose lie, 2392 a;
officious lie, 2392 a; comparison of gravity of various lies, 2394;
sinfulness of all lies, 2395; when lying entails no formal sin, 2396;
pernicious lies, 2397; concealment of the truth, 2398; mental
reservation, 2399; morality of strict mental reservation, 2400;
morality of broad mental reservation, 2400 b; when broad mental
reservation is lawful, 2401; ambiguous answers, 2402; simulation or
pretence, 2403; sinfulness of simulation, 2404.

Macedonianism, 822 c.

Magnanimity, see Greatness of Soul.

Majority, Age of, 433.

Malefactor, when bound to accuse himself, 1968.

Malice, sins of, 250 e; caused by sloth, 1324.

_Mandatum_, 1749 a.

Manicheans, 823 b.

Manicheism, 822 c.

Marriage, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Marriage, Trial, definition, 2527 c.

Marriages, Dangerous, 875; canonical consequences, 879; prenuptial
guarantees, 880; remedies against mixed and dangerous marriages, 881.

Martyrdom, definition, 2442; kinds of martyrdom, 2443; conditions for
martyrdom, 2444; practical questions about martyrdom, 2445.

Mass, Sacrifice of the, 2709; obligation of saying Mass, 2710;
dispositions for the celebration of Mass, 2711; confession before Mass,
2711 a; distractions during the Canon, 2711 b; preparation and
thanksgiving before Mass, 2711 a; Eucharistic or natural fast, 2711 b;
rubrical vestments, 2711 b; time of Mass, 2712 a; place, 2712 b; rites,
2712 c; when it is lawful to discontinue Mass, 2713; application of the
Mass, 2714; obligation of pastors to say Mass for flocks, 2714 a;
obligation of Mass stipends, 2714 b; persons for whom Mass may be
applied, 2715; how Mass must be applied, 2715 b; lawfulness of Mass
stipends, 2716.

Masturbation, form of impurity, 2534 a.

Material Sin, 248.

Matrimony, Sacrament of, first blessing of marriage (offspring), 2613
a; second blessing of marriage (fidelity), 2613 b; third blessing of
marriage (sacrament), 2613 c; obligation of paying the conjugal debt,
2614; absence of obligation, 2615; suspension of obligation, 2616;
obligation of requesting conjugal intercourse, 2617; morality of
venereal acts of marriage, 2618; unnatural consummated acts, 2618 c;
artificial fecundation, 2618 c; rectal copulation, 2618 c;
contraception, 2620; contraception an injury to God, 2620 a; an injury
to society, 2620 b; an injury to the family, 2620 c; an injury to the
individual, 2620 d; arguments of Neo-Malthusians and other advocates of
contraception, 2621; is birth-control ever lawful? 2622; _coöperatio
uxoris ad onanismum vel contraceptionem_, 2623; _recapitulatio de
licitis et illicitis in conjugio_, 2624; marriage as a Sacrament, 2626;
reasons that justify separation, 2626 a; husband superior to wife in
authority, 2626 b; husband has duty of providing for wife, 2626 c; no
obligation for individual to marry, 2627 a; unity of marriage its first
property, 2787 d; indissolubility of marriage its second property, 2787
e; Pauline Privilege, 2787 e; dissolution, 2787 e; divorce under Mosaic
Law, 2787 e; marriages of infidels, 2787 e; true, presumed, putative
and attempted marriage, 2788 a; legitimate, ratified, consummated
marriage, 2788 b; clandestine, secret, public marriage, 2788 c;
marriage of conscience, 2788 c; marriage is canonical or civil, 2788 d;
elements of contract of marriage, 2789 a; ends of contract, 2789 b;
essence of contract is the consent, 2789 c; valid consent, 2790;
defects in consent, 2791; mental derangement as defect, 2791 a;
ignorance as defect, 2791 b; error as defect, 2791 c; effect of forced
consent on validity, 2792 a; effect of forced consent on lawfulness,
2792 b; conditional consent, 2793; elements of marriage as Sacrament,
2794; ministers and recipients of Matrimony, 2794 b; effects of
Matrimony, 2794 c; duties in connection with marriage, 2795; obligation
of betrothal or engagement, 2796; is engagement necessary before
marriage? 2798; duties to parents or guardians in reference to
marriage, 2799; duties of parents in reference to marriage, 2800;
obstacles to marriage, 2801; duty to make known impediment to marriage,
2801 c; duties of pastor in examination of engaged persons, 2802;
special proofs of freedom to marry, 2803; proof of Baptism, 2803 a;
proof of single state, 2803 b; matrimonial impediments, 2804;
sinfulness of marrying with an impediment, 2805; impedient or
prohibitive impediments, 2806; vow as impediment, 2806 a; impediment of
legal relationship, 2806 b; impediment of mixed religion, 2806 e;
duties of pastor and parties in connection with mixed marriages, 2807;
valid engagement forbids marriage with third party, 2809 a; special
prohibition of particular marriage by the Church, 2809 b; closed times,
2809 e; diriment impediments to marriage, 2810; absolute diriment
impediments, 2811; impediment of age, 2813; impediment of impotency,
2814; impediment of bond, 2816; impediment of difference of religion,
2817; impediment of kinship, 2818; consanguinity, 2818 a; affinity,
2818 b; public decency, 2818 c; spiritual relationship, 2818 d; legal
relationship, 2818 e; matrimonial impediments produced through
misdeeds, 2819; impediment of abduction, 2819 a; impediment of crime,
2819 b; duties of pastor after inquiry about impediments, 2820;
dispensation, 2820 a; publications of banns of marriage, 2820 b; duties
of pastor after examination and proclamation, 2821; duties of pastor as
regards religious instruction of engaged couple, 2822; pastor and
duties of engaged couple, 2823; pastor's duties to parents, 2823 a;
pastor's duties to civil law, 2823 b; opposition of parents to
marriage, 2824; religious duties of parties before marriage, 2825;
confession, 2825 a; Communion, 2825 b; celebration of marriage, 2826;
requisites for validity, 2826 a; requisites for lawfulness, 2826 b;
rite of Matrimony, 2827; Nuptial Blessing and Nuptial Mass, 2827 b;
coöperation in unworthy marriage, 2828; registration of marriages,
2829; when impediment is discovered after marriage, 2830; lawfulness of
divorce and separation, 2831. See also Betrothal.

Matter of Sin, grave, 171-172; light, 182.

Matter, Sacramental, see Sacrament.

Meanness, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.

Medicinal Afflictions, as remedies against sin, 283.

Meekness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; potential part of temperance,
2465 c; definition, 2545.

Memory, 1637 a.

Mental Derangement, removes theological guilt, 1764 a.

Mercy, result of charity, 1193; definition, 1193 c; natural and
supernatural, 1205; causes of unmerciful spirit, 1206; mercy compared
with other moral virtues, 1207; compared with charity, 1208;
obligation, 1209; seven corporal works of mercy, 1221; seven spiritual
works, 1222-1223; regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717 b.

Merit, definition, 107; human and divine, 108; natural and
supernatural, 109; condign and congruous, 110; the right standard for
distributive justice, 1804 c.

Merits, former merits recovered by repentance, 2725 c.

Methods in Moral Theology, Casuistic, Positive and Scholastic, 13.

Minors, legal privileges in connection with contracts, 1882.

Misrepresentation, form of lying, 2391 b.

Moderation, see Temperance.

Modernism, 822 c, 841 b.

Modesty, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; of bearing and living potential
part of temperance, 2465 e; definition of modesty, 2565; modest
behavior or decorum, 2566 a; vices opposed to modesty, 2566 b; modesty
in style of living and dress, 2569 a; morality of self-beautification,
2570; fruit of the Fear of the Lord, 2571 c.

Mohammedanism, 822 a.

Monophysitism, 822 c.

Morality, definition, 64; constitutive norm, 65; manifestative norm,
67; perceptive norm, 68; three species of, 69; three sources, the
object, circumstances, and end, 70 sqq.; moral value of passions, 121
sqq.; important influence of habits on, 140.

Moral Science, office of, 1631 b.

Moral Systems, see Systems, Moral.

Moral Theology, objects, 4; medium, 4; sources, 6; use of natural
reason, philosophy and natural sciences in, 11-12; Positive, Scholastic
and Casuistic Methods, 13; history of, 15; Patristic Period, 15 a;
Medieval Period, 15 b; Modern, 15 c; division and order of parts, 17;
General and Special, 18.

Mormonism, 823 b.

Mortgage, 1749 d.

Motions of the Soul, First and Second, 129.

Motives of Sin, 268 sqq.

Munificence, virtue, 2452 e.

Murder, see Homicide.

Murmuring, definition and sinfulness of, 2120.

Mutilation, definition, 1866 a; when lawful, 1867.

_Mutuum_, definition, 1749 a.

Mysteries, that must be believed, 787 sqq., 918, 920; substantial and
scientific knowledge of, 790.

Narcotics, licit use, 2485.

Naturalism, 847 b.

Necessity, Spiritual, degrees of, 1165.

Necessity, Temporal, degrees of, 1236; extreme necessity justifies
conversion of others' property, 1921 a.

Necromancy, form of divination, 2284 b.

Necrophilism, form of impurity, 2534 d.

Negligence, 1326 a.

_Negotiorum gestio_, definition, 1749 a.

Neighbor, Love of, three kinds, 1139 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods
or bodily welfare for neighbor's sake, 1163 sqq.; order of charity
between neighbors, 1171 sqq. See Charity; Friendship; Emulation;
Jealousy; Hate; Correction, Fraternal.

Neo-Malthusians, arguments in favor of contraception, 2821.

Nestorianism, 822 c.

New Testament, ordinances, 7; counsels, 7; laws, 7; temporary
regulations, 7; law of, see Law, Christian.

Nihilists, society forbidden by Church, 947 b.

Non-Catholics, participation in Catholic rites, 957 sqq.

Non-Combatants, treatment during war, 1412.

Nurses, duties of, 2651 c.

Oaths, moral effects of accidentals added to contracts, 1886 b;
definition of an oath, 2245; assertory or promissory oaths, 2246 a;
comminatory or confirmatory oaths, 2246 a; contestatory or execratory
oaths, 2246 b; explicit or implicit oaths, 2246 b; solemn or simple,
judicial or extrajudicial oaths, 2246 d; moral difference between
various kinds of oaths, 2247; lawfulness of oaths, 2248; necessary
qualities of a lawful oath, 2249; sinful oaths, 2250; incautious oath,
2250 a; perjured oaths, 2250 b; wicked oaths, 2250 c; mental
reservation in oaths, 2251; coöperation in sinful oaths, 2252; sinful
oaths demanded or accepted by private persons, 2253; fictitious oaths,
2254; expressions confused with oaths; obligation imposed by promissory
oath, 2256; obligation imposed by negative oath, 2257; obligation of
oath is personal, 2258; interpretation of promissory oath, 2259; kind
of obligation produced by a valid promissory oath, 2260; cessation of
obligation of promissory oath, 2262. See also Adjuration.

Obedience, definition of virtue, 2355; power of jurisdiction and
dominative power, 2356; degrees of obedience, 2357; comparison of
obedience with other virtues, 2358; comparison of acts of obedience,
2359; duty of obedience, 2360; when obedience is not lawful or
obligatory, 2361; internal actions and human superiors, 2363;
obligation of vow of obedience, 2364; sins against obedience, 2365;
definition of disobedience, 2366; kinds of disobedience, 2367;
theological sinfulness of formal disobedience, 2369; moral species of
disobedience, 2370; circumstances that aggravate formal disobedience,
2371; comparison of formal disobedience with other sins, 2372; vow and
virtue of obedience, 2612 c; obedience due to superiors, 2636 b.

Objects, Sinful, formal coöperation by manufacture of, 1533; material
coöperation, 1534 sqq.

Obscenity, definition, 1455; internal and external, 1455 a-b; general
rules for determining what is obscene, 1456; persons who give scandal
through obscenity, 1458; government suppression of obscenity aim of
League of Nations, 1458 e.

Obstacles to Consent, 40 sqq.; fear, 41; ignorance, 40, 24 sqq.

Occasions of Sin, 263 sqq.

Occult Heresy, 828 c.

Occult Sin, 1287.

Occupation, title to private ownership, 1872 a; chief ways of
occupation, 1873; when occupation of others' goods is lawful, 1921 sqq.
See also Theft.

Occupations, forbidden to clerics, 2603 b.

Odd Fellows, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Offerings, act of religion, 2183.

Office, Divine, distractions during, 2174; obligation of matter and
manner, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of the Divine Office, 2601
a.

Officials, Public, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.

Offset, definition of, 1927 a. Old Testament, moral precepts still
binding, 7; ceremonial laws no longer obligatory, 7.

Omen, form of divination, 2285 d.

Omissions, voluntary, 37; effect of may be voluntary, 38.

Oneiromancy, form of divination, 2284 a.

Opinion, as state of conscience, 662 sqq.

Ordeal by Fire, sin against religion, 2284 c.

Order of Charity, 1158; between neighbors, 1171 sqq.; in almsgiving, 1247.

Orders, Holy, Sacrament of, 2777; distinction of the Orders, 2778;
Major and Minor Orders, 2778 b; hierarchy of Orders, 2779 a; hierarchy
of jurisdiction, 2779 b; matter and form of the various Orders in the
Latin Church, 2780; episcopal consecration, 2780 a; minister of
ordination, 2781; special duties of minister, 2782; recipient of
Orders, 2783; conditions for validity of reception, 2783 a; conditions
for lawfulness of reception, 2783 b; canonical requirements for
ordination, 2784; irregularities, 2784 b; simple impediments, 2784 b;
irregularities from defect or delinquency, 2784 b; duties of ordinandi
according to Canon Law, 2785 a; registration of ordinations, 2786;
ordination of acolyte, 2780 a; ordination of exorcist, 2780 a;
ordination of porter, 2780 a; ordination of reader, 2780 a; ordination
of subdeacon, 2780 b; ordination of deacon, 2780 c; ordination of
priest, 2780 d.

Ordinances, of the New Testament, 7.

Orientals, 822 c.

Original Sin, 272 sqq.

Ouija Boards, form of divination, 2284 c.

Ownership, Private, allowed by natural and divine law, 1872; chief
titles to private ownership, 1872.

Pacifism, Extreme, not inculcated by Christ, 1381.

Pain, of loss, 281 a; of sense, 281 b.

_Palpo_, definition, 1779 e.

Pan-Christianism, 823 b.

Parents, duties of charity and piety, 2630; compensation of children,
2631; sex education of children, 2632.

Participation of Catholics in Non-Catholic Services, 961; active and
passive participation, 962-973; things wherein communication is
possible; 963; simulated active assistance, 965; cases of communication
in false worship, 967 sqq.; cases where a communication in another
Catholic Rite is allowed, 970; participation in non-sacramental rites,
971; participation in religious places, times and objects, 972.

Partnership, 1749 b.

Passion, as obstacle to consent, 40, 45; antecedent, makes act less
free, 48; consequent, does not affect voluntariness of acts, 49; when
it removes or diminishes theological guilt, 1764 a.

Passions, definition, 45, 116 sqq.; definition, 117; concupiscible,
118-119; irascible, 118, 120; moral value of, 121 sqq.; physical,
mental and moral dangers of, 126; antecedent or involuntary (first
motions of the soul), 129; consequent or voluntary (second motions of
the soul), 129; inhibition of, 131; important influence of habits on,
140.

Pastor, duty to give Sacraments, 2676 a; duties in reference to
Baptism, 2688; to Confirmation, 2698; to Communion, 2707 c; to worship,
2708 c; to celebration of Mass, 2710 b; to application of Mass _pro
populo_, 2714 a; jurisdiction for confession, 2751 a; on reserved
cases, 2754 b; duty to hear confessions, 2756 b; to give Extreme
Unction, 2775 c; rank among the clergy, 2779 b; duties in reference to
marriage, 2802, 2807, 2808, 2820 sqq., 2826, 2829.

Pathological States, see Abnormal Mental States.

Patience, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; act of fortitude, 2447 b;
definition, 2453; patience differs from temperance, 2453 a; differs
from longsuffering and constancy, 2453 c; greatness of patience, 2454;
vices opposed to patience, 2455; virtue of steadfastness, 2456.

Patriolatry, sin against piety, 2349 a.

Patriotism, very like to religion, 2346 d.

Pawn, 1749 d.

Pawning, unjustifiable, 1879 g.

Peace, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; as effect of charity, 1195 sqq.;
reconciliation with God, 1196; reconciliation with enemies, 1196;
reconciliation with enemies demanded by charity, 1198; what duty of
reconciliation demands, 1199; what this duty necessitates, 1199 sqq.;
person who should make the first advances, 1202; manner and time of
seeking reconciliation, 1203-04; sins against peace, 1347 sqq. See
Discord; Contention; Schism; War; Fighting; Duelling; Sedition.

Pederasty, kind of impurity, 2534 c.

Pelagianism, 822 c.

Penance, Sacrament of, 2727; remote matter, 2727 a; proximate matter,
2727 b; form of, 2727 c; subject of, 2727 d; Probabilism in
administration of Sacrament, 2728; contrition the first act of the
penitent, 2729; valid and fruitful reception of the Sacrament of
Penance, 2734; resolution of amendment, 2736; confession, second act of
penitent, 2737; qualities of confession, 2738; gravity of lying to
confessor, 2739; integral confession, 2740; material and formal
completeness, 2740 a, b; moral species of sin must be confessed, 2741
a; number of sins must be given, 2741 b; circumstances that change the
species must be declared, 2741 c; external act that completed an
internal sin must be declared, 2741 d; circumstances that notably
aggravate a sin without changing its species, 2742 a; external effects
of a sin must be confessed, 2742 b; uncertain sins must be confessed,
2742 c; when material integrity is not necessary, 2743; completion or
repetition of past incomplete Confessions, 2744; when a general
Confession should be made, 2744 c; satisfaction, the third act of the
penitent, 2745; effects of actual satisfaction, 2746; conditions for
effective satisfaction, 2747; obligation of accepting and performing a
penance, 2748; causes that excuse from a penance imposed, 2749;
requirements in the minister for valid absolution, 2750; power of
jurisdiction, 2751; when the Church supplies jurisdiction (cases of
common error and of uncertainty of law or fact), 2752; limitation of
jurisdiction, 2753; reserved sins, 2753 a; reserved persons, 2753 b;
absolution from reserved cases, 2754; absolution given by one not
possessed of jurisdiction, 2755; duties of confessor before confession,
2756; duties of confessor as judge in hearing the case, 2757; duties of
confessor in deciding about cases, 2758; duties of confessor in passing
sentence, 2759; penitents to whom absolution should be denied, 2760;
backsliders (recidivists), 2760 c; obligation, quality and quantity of
sacramental penance, 2761; duties of the confessor as spiritual
physician, 2762; duties of the confessor as teacher and guide, 2763;
spiritual direction, 2764 b; duties of the confessor after confession,
2764; Probabilism or epieikeia may not be applied to sacramental seal,
2764 a; attitude of confessor to tempted and afflicted, 2762 b;
attitude to scrupulous, 2762 b; treatment of sick and dying, 2762 b;
attitude towards the pious, 2762 b; attitude towards the hardened
sinner, 2762 b; manner of repairing defects made in hearing a
confession, 2765; excuses from duty of repairing mistakes, 2766;
obligation of seal of confession, 2767; sins against the seal of
confession, 2768; special abuses to which confession is exposed, 2769;
danger of defamation, 2769 a; danger of impurity, 2769 b; _absolutio
complicis_, 2770; _effectus legis de absolutione complicis_, 2771;
_sollicitatio in confessione_, 2772; _denuntiatio sollicitantis_, 2773.

Perception, 1637 b.

Pessimism, defective judgment, 1731 f.

Philanthropy, as distinguished from almsgiving, 1219.

Philosophy, use in Moral Theology. 11, 12.

Phrenology, form of divination, 2285 b.

Physicians, duties of, 2651 c.

Physiognomy, divination by, 2285 b.

Pictures, when obscene, 1456 a.

Piety, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; a potential part of justice, 2142
b; various senses of, 2345; definition of virtue of piety, 2346;
reverence required by piety, 2347; assistance required by piety, 2348;
sins against piety, 2349; malice of sins against piety, 2350; Gift of
Piety directed to Our Father in Heaven, 2433 a.

Plants, when they may be occupied, 1873 b.

Plays, when obscene, 1456 c; formal coöperation with evil plays, 1531;
material coöperation with, 1532.

Pleasures, Sensible, and temperance, 2461 b.

Pleasures, Spiritual, and temperance, 2461 b.

Pledge, 1749 d.

Pollution, see Impurity.

Pope, authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical laws, 486; three ways
of rejecting papal decisions, 1369.

Positive Method, in Moral Theology, 13.

Possessors, Unlawful, three kinds of, 1770 sqq.; obligations in
reference to the property and its fruits, 1771 sqq.

Poverty, vow and virtue, 2612 a.

Power of Jurisdiction, and dominative power, 2356.

Practicality, 1645.

Praise of God, 2269; internal and external praise of God, 2270;
excellence of praise of God, 2271; qualities that should be present in
the divine praises, 2272.

Prayer, definition, 2153; the psychology of prayer, 2154; the necessity
of prayer, 2155; a duty for all adults, 2156; times and frequency of
prayer, 2157; corollaries about prayer and confession, 2158; to whom
prayer may be offered, 2159; persons for whom prayer is offered, 2160;
things that may be prayed for, 2161; qualities of prayer, 2162;
confidence requisite for successful prayer, 2163; attention and
intention in prayer, 2164; actual, virtual and habitual intention in
prayer, 2165 a, b, c; internal or external, verbal or superficial,
literal, spiritual, perfect or imperfect attention in prayer, 2166;
acts that exclude external attention, 2167; when external attention is
sufficient, 2168; kind of internal attention required in prayer, 2169;
distractions in prayer, 2170; voluntary and involuntary distractions,
2171; sinfulness of distraction in prayer, 2172; distractions during
Divine Office, 2174.

Precepts, axiomatic and inferred, 300; general and particular, 301;
ecclesiastical, 515-519.

Precepts of the Church, First derived from natural and divine as well
as ecclesiastical law, 2575 a; affirmative and negative parts of First
Precept, 2576; how Mass must be heard, 2577; external and bodily
assistance, 2577 a; internal or mental assistance requires actual or
virtual intention of will, 2577 b; the necessary attention, 2577 b;
time and place of Mass, 2578; servile works, 2579; forensic and
commercial labors forbidden, 2579 b; liberal works tolerated, 2580 b;
definition of common works, 2581 a; doubtful works, 2581 b; lawfulness
of hiring non-Catholics to do servile work, 2582; obligation of First
Precept, 2583; excuses from observance of First Precept, 2584; scope of
Second Precept, 2586; definition of flesh meat, 2586 a; broth and
condiments, 2586 c; obligation of Second Precept, 2587 21; exceptions
to the obligation, 2587 c; the obligation of fasting, 2588 sqq.; scope
of Third Precept, 2590; subject and matter of Third Precept, 2590 a;
time for fulfillment of Third Precept, 2590; origin and gravity of
Third Precept, 2591; scope of Fourth Precept, 2592; origin and gravity
of Fourth Precept, 2593 a; Fifth Precept, 2594; Sixth Precept of the
Church, 2594.

Prescription, title to private ownership, 1872 b; conditions for valid
prescription, 1875; may terminate the obligation of contract, 1889 b.

Presumption, sin of, 1075 sqq.; definition, 1078; objects of, 1079;
comparison with temptation of God and blasphemous hope, 1081; malice
of, 1082; gravity compared with other sins, 1083; presumption and
unbelief, 1084; presumption takes away virtue of hope, 1085; causes of,
1091; vice against greatness of soul, 2450 a.

Presumption of a Pact, 652.

Pretence, see Simulation.

Price, just and unjust, see Fraud.

Pride, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; cause of
contumely, 2017 a; definition of pride, 2557; acts of pride, 2558 a;
sinfulness of pride, 2559 a; pride compared with other sins, 2560 n;
pride mother of the seven capital sins, 2560 c.

Principles, first and secondary, 300 a; reflex, see Reflex Principles.

Prison, escape from, lawfulness, 1982 b.

Prisoners, treatment during war, 1412, 1417.

Privilege, Pauline, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Privileges, 521 sqq.; definition, 521; wide and strict interpretation
of, 522; obligation to accept and use, 523.

Probabiliorism, see Systems, Moral.

Probability, intrinsic signs of, 665 a; extrinsic signs of, 665 b;
kinds of, 703; of law, 711 a; of fact, 711 b, 712.

Probabilism, see Systems, Moral.

Prodigality, a vice opposed to liberality, 2427; sinfulness, 2428;
comparison of avarice and prodigality, 2429.

Promotion of Undeserving Candidates, 1758.

Profession of Faith, commandment of, 938 sqq. See Faith.

Propensities, Natural, effect on voluntariness of acts, 54.

Property, Private, chief ways in which it may be occupied, 1873; when
lost property may be occupied, 1873 d; conversion of property against
the wishes of owner, 1891 b; conversion of property, 1891.

Propriety, integral part of temperance, 2405 b; propriety of external
acts, 2512.

Protestantism, 822 e.

Providence, 1638 b.

Prudence, 146, 150; ranked first among cardinal virtues, 1626;
definition of prudence, 1627; one of the two practical virtues of
intellect, 1627 a; inferior to the Gift of Wisdom, 1627 b; objects of
act of prudence, 1628 a; prudence concerned with application of truths
and first principles of morality to contingent and particular cases,
1628 b; formal object of prudence, 1629 a; material object, 1629 a;
prudence needs certitude, 1630; relation of prudence to the other moral
virtues, 1631 a; prudence rules the inferior virtues and serves the
superior, 1632; prudence and the intellectual virtues, 1632 a; prudence
and the theological virtues, 1632 b; the exercise of prudence, 1633;
the three acts of prudence, deliberation, decision, direction, 1633;
qualities of prudence, 1634; moral, integral, subjective, potestative
parts of prudence, 1635, 1636; integral parts of prudence, 1637;
prudence knows how to reason correctly, 1638 a; subjective parts of
prudence, 1639; individual prudence, 1639 a, 1644 a; social prudence,
1639 b; political prudence, 1640 a, 1644 c, 1648; domestic prudence,
1640 b, 1644 b, 1650; governmental prudence, 1642 a; military prudence,
1642 b, 1644 d; utility of prudence for society, 1643; potential parts
of prudence, 1646; persons who possess prudence, 1648; evil prudence,
1651 a; imperfect prudence, 1651; indifferent prudence, 1651 b; good
prudence, 1651 c; infused prudence, 1654 a; prudence in young people,
1655 a; formed habit of prudence, 1655 a; prudence a duty of superior,
2635 a; formative prudence, 1655 b.

Puberty, Age of, 433.

Punishment, eternal and temporal, 280.

Punishment, Capital, lawfulness of, 1820; when it should not be
imposed, 1821; unlawful killing of offenders, 1823 a.

Punishments, Bodily, 1870.

Punitive Sterilization, 1869 b.

Purity, Virtue of, 2486; definition, 2486; definition of chastity, 2486
a; definition of decency, 2486 b. See also Virginity; Impurity.

Purpose, Wrong, may make venial sin mortal, 191; or mortal venial, 195.

Pusillanimity, 1084; as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness
of soul, 2451 a.

Pyromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Pythian Sisters, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Pythonism, form of divination, 2284 b.

Quickness, 1637 b.

Rancor, caused by sloth, 1324.

Rape, 2529.

Rash Opinion, 1733. See also Judgment, Rash.

Rationalism, 847.

Reason, Age of, 433.

Reason, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 11; as subject of sin, 231.

Reading, Dangerous, 849 sqq.; forbidden by natural and ecclesiastical
law, 850.

Rebeccas, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Rebellion, not schism, 1364.

Recoupment, definition of, 1927 a.

Reflex Principles, for solution of doubts, 657 sqq.; may supply
indirect certitude, 652 b.

_Regulæ pro confessariis de licitis et illicitis, in conjugio_, 2625.

Relationships, various kinds, 1175.

Relatives, order of charity among, 1176 sqq.; duties of near, 2634.

Relaxation, as virtue, 2567 a, b; sins opposed to moderate enjoyment,
2568 a.

Religion, Virtue of, regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717 a; a
potential part of justice, 2142 a; definition of the virtue, 2145;
religion as a moral virtue, 2146; superiority of religion as a virtue,
2147; necessity of the acts of religion, 2148; internal acts of
religion, 2149; definition of devotion, 2150; external and internal
causes of devotion, 2152; external acts of religion, 2175; definition
of adoration, 2176; difference between _latria_ and _hyperdulia_ and
_dulia_, 2671 b; difference between _latria_ and civil homage, 2176 b;
unity and variety of adoration, 2177; definition of sacrifice, 2178;
essentials of sacrifice, 2179; obligation of sacrifice, 2180;
exemptions from sacrifice based on the natural law, 2181; sacrifice
compared with the other acts of religion, 2182; goods unsuitable as
offerings to God, 2184; contributions to religion, 2185; obligation of
contributing to the support of the clergy, 2186; quality of the
obligation of contributing to the Church, 2188; priest's attitude
towards persons refusing to contribute, 2189; those to whom religious
contributions are due, 2190; external acts of religion in honor of God,
2244.

Religion, Sins against, 2273; superstition, 2274; false worship, 2274
a; superfluous worship, 2274 b; sinfulness of improper worship of God,
2275; worship of false deity, 2276; definition of idolatry, 2277; kinds
of idolatry, 2278; sinfulness of idolatry, 2279; comparison of
different sins of idolatry, 2280; idolatry possible in Christian
worship, 2281; definition of divination, 2282; distinction between the
fact and sin of divination, 2283; forms of explicit invocation, 2284;
forms of implicit invocation, 2285; malice of the sin of divination,
2286; when knowledge is obtained from God, 2287; when knowledge is
obtained through natural causes, 2288; use of lots, 2289; vain
observance, 2290; forms of vain observance, 2291; distinction between
fact and sin of vain observance, 2293; superstition in religious
observances, 2294; sinfulness of vain observance, 2295; coöperation in
divination or other form of superstition, 2296; doubtful cases of vain
observance, 2297; licitness of using doubtfully superstitious means,
2298; irreligiousness, 2299; temptation of God, 2300; cases wherein
there is no temptation of God, 2301; kinds of temptation of God, 2302;
causes that exclude the interpretative temptation of God, 2303; refusal
of medicine or hygienic care, 2304; sinfulness of temptation of God,
2305; malice of temptation of God, 2306. See also Sacrilege; Simony.

Religious, special duties of, 2611; perfection of charity, 2611 a;
evangelical counsels, 2611 b; obligation of the three principal vows,
2612 a.

Remorse of Conscience, penalty of sin, 279.

Repentance, Virtue of, 2718; character of repentance, 2720; excellence,
2721; dignity, 2721 a; necessity, 2721 b; repentance as a means and as
a precept, 2722; accompaniments of repentance, 2724; fruits of, 2725;
restores infused virtues and former merits, 2725 c; removes every sin,
2725 a.

Reproach, definition, 2012 b.

Reprisals, in war, 1417.

Reputation, when charity requires one to seek good reputation, 1575;
when sacrifice of reputation is lawful and unlawful, 1576; when
self-detraction is lawful, 1577; definition of good, true, false,
ordinary and extraordinary reputation, 2034 a-c; right to good
reputation, 2035; right to true and false reputation, 2037; meaning of
the expression "infamous in a certain place," 2051; rights that have
precedence over a false reputation, 2068; unlawful attack on another's
false reputation, 2069; conditions that justify revelation of another's
defects, 2070; revelations about public officials or candidates for
public office, 2071. See also Defamation.

Rescripts, 520.

Reservation, strict and broad mental reservation in an oath, 2251. See
also Lying.

Resident, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.

Restitution, distinct from payment, restoration and satisfaction, 1751;
difference between satisfaction and restitution, 1752; when restitution
is due, 1753; confessor's duties regarding the obligation of
restitution, 1760; roots of restitution, 1762; when unjust damage
obliges to restitution, 1763; restitution for damages that are only
venially sinful but seriously harmful, 1765; for damages only
juridically culpable, 1766; for careless discharge of fiduciary duties,
1768; restitution when culpability seems doubtful, 1769; coöperators
and restitution, 1778; circumstances of restitution, 1781; restitution
_in solidum_ or _pro rata_, 1783; order of restitution among
coöperators, 1784; person to whom restitution must be made, 1786;
creditors with right _in re_ have preference over creditors with right
_ad rem_, 1787; "thing" to be restored, 1789; "amount" of restitution
in certain cases, 1790; "manner" of making restitution, 1791; second
restitution, 1792; "time" when restitution must be made, 1793; unjust
refusal to make restitution, 1794; "place" where restitution must be
made, 1795, 1796; causes that excuse temporarily from restitution,
1797; causes that excuse permanently from restitution, 1798; excuse
from restitution on account of doubtfulness of obligation, 1800;
restitution for frustration of another's good, 1802 a; restitution for
injury done to goods of fortune, 1802 b; restitution for injury done to
goods of body or personal goods, 1802 c; restitution for unjust
homicide or mutilation, 1803; restitution for fornication or adultery,
1803 b; restitution for injuries of soul, 1803 c; restitution for
occupied goods, 1922; restitution of bribes, etc., 1946 c; restitution
for jail-breaking, 1983; obligation of witness to make restitution,
1992; when a lawyer is bound to restitution, 2008; restitution for
contumely, 2021 sqq.; cessation of obligation of restitution for
contumely, 2026; restitution for defamation, 2085 sqq.; restitution of
temporal price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of
temporal price received for temporal things annexed to spirituals,
2341; circumstances of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of
spiritual thing simoniacally received, 2343; restitution necessitated
by breach of promise to marry, 2628 d; restitution for theft. See also
Compensation.

Restraint, definition, 1866 d.

Revelations, private, 757.

Reverence, potential part of justice, 2142 c; definition of virtue,
2351; species of honor, 2352; obligation of religious cult of _dulia_,
2354.

Revilement, definition, 2012 b.

Rights, precedence in case of collision, 292.

Robbery, comparison with theft, 1892 a; kinds of theft and robbery,
1893 a; what constitutes grave matter in robbery, 1896. See also Theft;
Injustice.

Rubrics, directive and preceptive, in administration of the Sacraments,
2669 c.

Rudeness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Sacraments, of Old Testament, 339; denial of Christian Sacraments in
cases of scandal, 1493; nature of Sacrament, 2654; outward sign, 2654
a; instituter of Sacraments, 2654 b; purpose of Sacraments, 2654 c;
Sacraments of the Dead and of the Living, 2654 c; indelible character
of some Sacraments, 2654 c; matter and form of the Sacraments, 2655;
substantial changes in matter or form, 2655 a; substantial separations
of matter and form, 2655 b; simultaneity of matter and form, 2656;
accidental changes or separations of matter and form, 2658; substantial
changes or separations, 2659; doubtful matter, 2660; Sacraments that
have a necessity of means, 2661; reception of Sacraments _in re_ or _in
voto_, 2662; Sacraments that have a necessity of precept, 2663; twofold
ministry of the Sacraments (production and bestowal), 2664;
requirements in the minister for valid performance of Sacrament, 2665;
necessary intention, 2666; virtual, actual, habitual and interpretative
intention, 2666 b; rules on plurality of intentions, 2667; requisites
for use of conditional intention, 2668; lawful administration of
Sacraments, 2669; minister's worthiness before God, 2669 a; minister's
worthiness before Church, 2669 b; worthiness of ministration, 2669 c;
directive and preceptive rubrics, 2669 c; explanation of ceremonies
advised, 2669 c; multiplication of sins by unworthy administration,
2670; requirements for valid Sacrament in recipient, 2671; qualities of
recipient's intention, 2672; neutral intention, 2672 b; when virtual
intention is necessary, 2673; when habitual and explicit intention
suffices, 2674 b; when habitual and implicit intention suffices, 2674
b; requirements for lawful or fruitful reception of Sacrament by adult,
2675; obligation of minister to confer Sacraments, 2676; obligation of
pastor to confer Sacraments, 2676 a; when minister is bound to deny
them, 2677; administration to unworthy persons, 2678; simulation and
dissimulation of Sacrament, 2680; administration of Penance and Extreme
Unction to heretics and schismatics, 2681; repetition of Sacrament on
account of invalid administration, 2682; reception of Sacrament from
unworthy minister, 2683; forgiveness of sin through use of Sacraments,
2726.

Sacrament, Blessed, see Eucharist, Holy.

Sacramentals, definition, 2684; necessity and use, 2684 a, b.

Sacrifice, see Religion, Virtue of.

Sacrilege, definition, 2308; violation of what kind of consecration
involves sacrilege? 2309; is sacrilege a special sin? 2310; species of
sacrilege, 2311; personal sacrilege, 2311 a; local sacrilege, 2311 b;
desecration, a form of sacrilege, 2311 b; profanation, a form of
sacrilege, 2311 b; real sacrilege, 2311 c; special cases regarding
local sacrilege, 2312; cases wherein there is no sacrilege, 2313;
sacredness as aggravating circumstance of sin, 2314; malice of
sacrilege, 2315; conditions that govern gravity of sacrilege, 2316;
carnal sacrilege, 2533; personal sacrilege, 2533 c; local sacrilege,
2533 d; real sacrilege, 2533 e.

Sadness, concupiscible passion, 119.

Sapphism, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Satisfaction, for sin, 283. See also Penance, Sacrament of.

Scandal, various uses of word, 1445-46; definition, 1447; causes of,
1448; directly intentional (diabolical) and indirectly intentional,
1450; active and passive, 1453; acts that give scandal, 1454; obscenity
(q.v.), 1455 sqq.; results of scandal, 1459; scandal resembles
solicitation and complicity, 1460; persons apt to be scandalized, 1461;
scandal given and scandal taken, 1464; Pharisaic scandal and "scandal
of little ones," 1464 b; sinfulness, 1465; is scandal a distinct
species of sin? 1466; how scandal should be confessed, 1467;
responsibility of scandalizer for injuries to third parties, 1470-71;
gravity of sin, 1472; is any person immune from scandal? 1475; duty of
avoiding, 1477; scandal of the weak forbidden by the natural law, 1479;
surrender of temporal goods to avoid scandal, 1483; surrender of Church
goods to avoid scandal, 1486-87; duty of repairing scandal, 1488; ways
of repairing, 1489; public and private scandal, 1490 a; ordinary and
extraordinary, 1490 b; denial of Sacraments in cases of scandal, 1493;
prohibition against, 1552.

Schism, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1364;
principal schismatic movements, 1365; directly and indirectly voluntary
schism, 1366; schism committed in two ways, 1368; three ways of
rejecting decisions of Pope, 1369; schism compared with heresy, 1370;
opposition between schism and charity, 1371; greatest sin against
neighbor, 1372 a; not so serious as unbelief, 1372 b; formal and
material schism, 1373.

Schismatics, spiritual powers of, 1374.

Scholastic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.

Schools, Dangerous, 867 sqq.; sectarian and neutral, 867; absolution of
parents of children attending, 872; Catholic teachers in non-Catholic
schools, 874.

Sciences, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 12.

Scripture, as Source of Moral Theology, 7.

Scrupulous, see Conscience.

Seal of Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.

Second Sight, 2285 a.

Secret, violation of (infidelity), 2407; definition of a secret, 2408;
natural, promised, entrusted or committed secret, 2408; sinfulness of
violating secret, 2409; prying into others' secrets, 2410; reading
another's letters or papers, 2411; lawfulness of utilizing knowledge of
secret, 2412; sin committed by stealing or unduly using secret of
another, 2413; obligation of keeping secret, 2414; comparison of
secrets as regards binding force, 2415; cases wherein it is not
necessary to keep secret, 2416; cases wherein it is not lawful to keep
secret, 2417; lawfulness of revealing secret learned by stealth or
force, 2420.

Sedition, definition, 1440; distinct species of sin, 1441; resistance
to tyrannical government not sinful, 1443.

Seduction, 1495 sqq.; definition, 1496; malice, 1497; differs from mere
permission to sin, 1500; sinful request, 1501; advice to commit evil,
1502; prearrangement of circumstances that lead to sin, 1504.

Self-Abuse, form of impurity, 2534 a.

Self-Beautification, morality of, 2570.

Self-Defamation, sin opposed to charity, 2028 e.

Self-Defense, Right of, 1826; conditions for exercise of this right,
1826 a; self-defense must be moderate, 1833; when it is obligatory,
1836; when it is not obligatory, 1837; defense of neighbor's life
against unjust aggressor, 1838; defense of material goods against
unjust aggressor, 1840; defense of bodily purity against an unjust
aggressor, 1841; defense of bodily integrity against an unjust
aggrossor, 1842; defense of honor or reputation, 1843.

Self-Depreciation, form of lying, 2406.

Self-Glorification, form of lying, 2406.

Self-Love, commandment of, 1561; understood in many senses, 1561;
sinful, natural and supernatural, 1136; charity demands an elicited
supernatural self-love, 1562; demands pursuit of all goods necessary
for attainment of happiness, 1563; care of the mind, 1564; neglect of
education sinful, 1565; care of the body and health, 1566; care as to
food and drink, 1567; fresh air, rest, physical exercise, 1568-1573;
pursuit of honors and good name, 1574-1575; when self-detraction is
lawful, 1577; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to self?
1308.

Self-Starvation, sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.

Seminaries, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.

Sensuality, 232, 117 sqq.; compared with impurity, 2492 a.

Sentence, Judicial, when it may be resisted, 1982 c; moral obligation
when this is certainly just, 1959; moral obligation when this is
certainly unjust, 1960.

Separation, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Servility, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Set-off, definition, 1927 a.

Shamefacedness, integral part of temperance, 2465 b.

Shintoism, 822 a.

Simony, origin of name, 2317; definition, 2318; temporal price in
simony, 2319; spiritual thing in simony, 2320; temporal thing united
with spiritual, 2321; temporal thing annexed to spiritual, 2322;
various kinds of simony, 2323; confidential simony, 2324; simony
against divine law, 2325; rules of Alexander III for determining
simony, 2327; simony against divine law in reference to things annexed
to spirituals, 2328; simony against ecclesiastical law, 2329; certain
and uncertain simony, 2330; doubtful cases of simony, 2331; cases in
which transaction is not simoniacal, 2332; theological malice of
simony; 2335; moral malice of simony, 2336; invalidity and penalties of
simoniacal contracts, 2337; canonical penalties for simony, 2338;
influence of simony on spiritual effects, 2339; restitution of temporal
price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of temporal price
received for temporal things annexed to spirituals, 2341; circumstances
of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of spiritual thing
simoniacally received, 2343.

Simulation, form of lying, 2391 b; definition, 2403; sinfulness of
simulation, 2404. See also Hypocrisy.

Sin, definition, 167; spiritual and carnal, 168 a, 224 sqq.; against
God, neighbor or self, 168 h; mortal and venial, 168 c, 169; of
commission or omission, 168 d; stages of (heart, mouth, work), 168 e;
by excess or defect, 168 f; original and actual, 168 g; when matter of
sin is grave, 171-172; advertence and consent conditions of mortal sin,
174 sqq.; mortal, condition of, 169 sqq.; venial, definition, 180;
conditions, 181 sqq.; when imperfections become a sin, 186; when venial
sin becomes mortal, 187-189; coalescence of, 189; multiplication of,
190; possible effect of wrong purpose, circumstances and harm foreseen,
191 sqq,; when mortal sin becomes venial, 194 sqq,; causes of sin, 246;
effect of ignorance, passion and malice on, 249; external causes of,
252; distinct from temptation, 253; proximate and remote danger of,
258; possibility of, 259; guilt of one who exposes himself to sin,
2150; occasions of (proximate or remote, necessary or free, present or
absent), 263 sqq.; motives of, 268 sqq.; results and penalties of, 272
sqq.; original and actual, 272 sqq.; stain of, 276; every sin removed
by repentance, 2725 a; forgiveness of sin through the use of the
Sacraments, 2726. See also Sins.

Sincerity, see Truthfulness.

Sinners, charity for, 1142; association with, 1145; friendship with,
1146.

Sins, theological and moral species, 197; specific distinction, 198;
numerical multiplication, 197, 202 sqq.; rules of numerical
distinction, 207 sqq.; comparison of, 220; sins against God, 227;
against creatures, 228; subjects of (sensitive appetites, reason,
will), 230 sqq,; sins of sensuality, 232; sins of thought, 233 sqq.;
sins of desire, 237 sqq.; material (or objective) and formal (or
subjective), 248; sins of weakness, ignorance and malice, 250. See also
Sin.

Slander, definition, 2030 d. See also Defamation.

Sloth, 269; spiritual, 1064, capital sin, 1320 sqq.; definition, 1320;
sinfulness, 1321; qualities of sin, 1322; sins that spring from sloth,
1324; conquest of sloth, 1325; prohibition against, 1552.

Sluggishness, sin opposed to diligence, 1326 b.

Sobriety, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition, 2474;
obligation to practise sobriety, 2475; sins against sobriety, 2476 a;
morality of total abstinence, 2478 a; licit use of narcotics, 2485. See
also Drunkenness.

Societies, Forbidden, 945 sqq.; forbidden by Code, 946; absolution of
members, 949.

Sodomy, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Softness, 2534 a.

Solicitation, resemblance to scandal, 1460 a. See Seduction.

Sons of Temperance, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Soul, First and Second Motions of the, 129.

Sortilege, form of divination, 2285 d.

Speculation, Sinful, 1879 f.

Spiritism, 823 b; sin against religion, 2284 b.

Sponsors, see Baptism, Sacrament of; Confirmation, Sacrament of.

Stain of Sin, 276.

State of Life, Duties of, knowledge of obligatory, 920.

Statesmanship, 1642 a, 1649 a.

States of Man, Four Historical, 331.

Steadfastness, act of fortitude, 2447 b.

Sterilization, morality of, 1869 a.

Stiffness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Stipends, Mass, institution of, 2185 b. See also Mass, Sacrifice of the.

Stocks, purchase by clerics, 2605 a.

Stocks and Bonds, 1749 b.

Stolidity, vice opposed to patience, 2455.

Stranger, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 439-446.

Students, duties of, 2651 b.

Studiosity, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; definition of
studiousness, 2562; vices opposed to studiousness, 2563 a; malice of
the sins against studiousness, 2564 a; negligence, a sin against
studiousness, 2564 b.

Subjects, duties to domestic and civil superiors, 2636.

Suffrage, Power of, 1649 b. See also Voting.

Suicide, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; voluntary and
involuntary, direct and indirect, 1852 a; sinfulness of suicide, 1854;
coöperation in suicide, 1855; authorization to commit suicide, 1856;
when indirect suicide is lawful, 1857, 1858; when indirect suicide is
unlawful, 1859; is it suicidal to refuse s necessary surgical
operation? 1860; canonical penalties for suicide, 1861 a.

Sunday, Sanctification of, see Precepts of the Church.

Superfluities, from which alms must be given, 1227-1229.

Superior, Clerical, duties of, 2606 a; special duties to flock, 2607 a.

Superiors, Domestic and Civil, duties of, 2635. See also Employers;
Subjects.

Superstition, see Religion, Sins against.

Surety, 1749 d.

Surgeons, duties of, 2651 c.

Surliness, sin against affability, 2423 b.

Syncretism, 823 b.

Synesis, part of judgment, 2432 d.

Synteresis, and Moral Theology, 2; directs the moral virtues, 1631 a.

Systems, Moral, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 672 a, 676 sqq.; Anti-tutiorism,
672 b; condemned by Church, 676; Laxism, 680 sqq.; condemned by Church,
681; Probabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilisrn, 688; Probabilism, 701
sqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; practical conclusions, 739; respective
merits and use of the rival systems, 740; use by confessors, 741.

Tale-Bearing, definition, 2103; sinfulness, 2104; circumstances which
affect the species of tale-bearing, 2105.

Taoism, 822 a.

Taunting, form of contumely, definition, 2012 b.

Taxes, definition, 2637; kinds of taxes, 2638; just taxes, 2639;
obligation to pay taxes, 2640 sqq.; obedience to tax laws, 2642.

Teachers, duties of, 2651 b.

Telepathy, and the virtue of religion, 2285 a.

Temperance, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; differs from patience,
2453 a; definition of temperance, 2461; temperance and sensible
pleasures, 2461 b; temperance and spiritual pleasures, 2461 b; rule of
moderation, 2462; excellence of temperance, 2463; vices opposed to
temperance, 2464; subjective parts of temperance, 2465 a; potential
parts of temperance, 2465 c; integral parts of temperance, 2465 b;
sobriety, 2476 sqq.; continence, 2544; incontinence, 2544 c; sinful
indulgence, 2550; complements of the virtue of temperance, 2571 a;
commandments of temperance, 2572 a.

Temptation, not a sin, 253; implicit or explicit, internal or external,
direct or indirect, virtual or actual resistance to, 255; rules
regarding resistance to, 256; exterior and interior temptations to
impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations, 2498; what
opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient, harmful and
unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal temptations, 2501;
negligence in resisting temptations, 2508.

Temptation of God, see Religion, Sins against.

Tepidity, consequence of sloth, 1327.

Testament, New, see New Testament.

Testament, Old, see Old Testament.

Testimony, see Witness.

Theft, sin of injustice, 1872; definition of theft, 1890; plagiarism is
form of theft, 1890 c; copyright infringement, a form of theft, 1890 c;
kidnapping, a form of theft, 1890 c; comparison of theft and robbery,
1892 a; kinds of theft, 1893 a; sinfulness of theft, 1894 a; grave
matter in theft of sacred objects, 1901; grave matter in domestic
theft, 1903 a; theft by wife or minor child, 1904 a; theft by
employees, 1905 a; theft of things about whose loss owner is less
concerned, 1906 a; travelling without paying fare, 1907; when small
thefts amount to grave matter, 1908 sqq.; moral connection between
repeated acts of theft, 1912; interval of time between acts of theft,
1913; theft from joint owners, 1917; restitution in cases of theft,
1918 a; cases of doubt as to grave matter, 1919 a; occult compensation,
1920 b; when conversion of others' property is permissible, 1920;
conditions for lawful occupation of others' goods, 1921 a; restitution
for occupied goods, 1922; occupation in case of merely grave necessity,
1923; occupation of large sum by one in dire need, 1924 a; lawfulness
of receiving support from thief, 1926; compensation for theft, see
Compensation; condonation of domestic thefts, 1799.

Theologians, as source of Moral Theology, 10.

Theological Virtues, 151; golden mean in, 154 c; rank among virtues,
156. See Faith, Hope and Charity.

Theology, Ascetical and Mystical, 2573.

Theology, Moral, definition, 1; relation to Dogmatic Theology, 3.

Theosophical Societies, forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Theosophy, 823 b.

Third Orders, Secular, 955 a.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint, as source of Moral Theology, 10; arrangement of
Moral Theology, 17; opinion on obligation of judge when evidence is
contrary to his personal knowledge, 1951 c.

Thought, Sins of, 233 sqq.

Thoughts, Impure, see Impurity.

Thoughts, Sinful, 234.

Timidity, sin against fortitude, 2446 b.

Trading, definition, 2134; morality of trading in the strict sense,
2135; trading forbidden to clerics, 2604 a.

Tradition, 8; divine, Apostolic, ecclesiastical, 9.

Treasure Trove, when it may be occupied, 1873 c.

Tribadism, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Truth, necessary quality of lawful oath, 2249 b. See also Truthfulness;
Lying.

Truthfulness, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2385; excellence, 2386;
sincerity and fidelity, 2387; vices opposed to truthfulness, 2388. See
also Lying.

Truths, Natural and Supernatural, to which assent must be given, 784.

Tutiorism, see Systems, Moral.

Tyrannicide, lawfulness of, 1824 a.

Unbelief, Sin of, negative and positive, 813; ordinary and apostasy,
814; direct and indirect, 815-816; non-assent, 817; dissent (private
and contrary unbelief), 818; infidelity, 822 a; order of gravity in
unbelief, 824; dangers which lead to external expression of unbelief,
944 sqq. See also Heresy; Apostasy.

Unction, Extreme, Sacrament of, 2774; remote matter, 2774 a; proximate
matter, 2774 b; form, 2774 c; recipient, 2774 d; minister, 2774 e;
effects of, 2774 f; special duties of recipient, 2775 a; special duties
of minister, 2775 b; special duties of pastor, 2775 c; special duties
of faithful, 2775 d.

Understanding, integral part of prudence, 1637 a.

Understanding, Gift of, 160 a; given to perfect theological virtues,
808.

Unity of the Church, threefold, 1367.

Uranism, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Use, act of will, 59.

Usury, definition, 2136.

_Vagus_, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.

Vainglory, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362.

Vanity, vice against greatness of soul, 2450 c.

Vengeance, definition, 2381; morality of vengeance, 2382; excess and
defect in vengeance, 2383; circumstances of vengeance, 2384.

Viaticum, see Communion, Holy.

Vice, definition, 167; and sin, see Sin.

Vices, Capital, Seven, 269 sqq.

Vindication, virtue, 2143 a. See also Vengeance.

Violence, invalidates consent to contract, 1884 d. See also Coercion.

Virginity, definition, 2488; loss of virginity, 2489; conditions
necessary for virtue of virginity, 2490 a; excellence of virginity,
2491 a.

Virtue, subjective parts, 1639 h, 1745; integral parts, 1637, 2139;
potential parts, 1646, 2141; parts, 1635, 1636, 2447, 2465.

Virtues, definition, 142; division, 143; practical intellectual,
146-148; moral, definition, 149; four cardinal virtues, 150;
theological, 151; three causes of virtues (nature, practice and
infusion), 152; inchoative and perfected, 152; properties of, 153;
golden mean in, 154 b; rank among virtues, 156-157; in the blessed,
158; complements of, 159; properties of seven infused virtues, 745;
order of theological virtues, 746; priority of a virtue in duration, by
nature, and in excellence, 1028. See also Faith; Hope; Charity;
Cardinal Virtues; Act, virtuous.

Vision, Beatific, relation to charity, 1116.

Vocation, internal, 2597; external, 2597 b; vocation to the clerical
state, 2597 a; sinfulness of disregarding vocation, 2598 a.

Volksverein, 955 b.

Voting, duty of exercising the electoral franchise, 2643; manner of
voting, 2644; obligation to seek office, 2645.

Vow, definition, 2191; personal, real and mixed vows, 2192; singular
and common vows, 2192 b; temporary and perpetual vows, 2192 c; absolute
and conditional vows, 2192 d; penal and non-penal vows, 2192 d;
explicit and implicit vows, 2192 e; determinate and disjunctive vows,
2192 e; private and public vows, 2192 f; simple and solemn vows, 2192
f; vows in Canon Law, 2193; distinction between solemn and simple vows,
2194; knowledge and deliberation necessary for valid vow, 2195; freedom
of will necessary for valid vow, 2196; cases in which fear does not
invalidate vow, 2197; vows of doubtful validity, 2198; intention
necessary for valid vow, 2199; matter of vow, 2200; vows that promise
something necessary, 2201; when fulfillment of vow is only partly
possible, 2202; vows that promise something displeasing to God, 2203;
vows that promise something indifferent, 2205; meaning of better good
in vow, 2206; vows invalidated by promise of lesser good, 2207; when
one has taken two opposite vows, 2208; obligation of vow, 2209; gravity
of obligation, 2210; rules for determining what is important matter in
vow, 2211; coalescence of light into grave matter in vow, 2212; delay
in fulfilling vow, 2214; time when vow obliges, 2213; person obliged to
fulfill a vow, 2215; manner of fulfilling vow, 2216; obligation of
certain kinds of vows, 2217; interpretation of doubtful vows, 2218;
advantages of vows to vowers, 2220; when good vow may be sinful, 2221;
merit of fulfilling vow that one regrets, 2222; persons who can make
vow, 2223; dependence of vower on will of another, 2224; validity of
vows made by subjects, 2225; cessation of vows, 2226; annulment of
vows, 2228; reason necessary for annulment of vow, 2229; differences
between direct and indirect annulment of vow, 2230; dispensation of
vow, 2231; reasons sufficient for dispensation, 2232; sinfulness of
unnecessary dispensation, 2233; persons who have power of dispensation,
2234; dispensation from religious vow of chastity, 2235; dispensation
from vow made for benefit of third party, 2236; commutation of vows,
2238; good works that may be substituted for vows, 2239; persons who
have authority to commute vow, 2240; cause required for commutation of
vow, 2241; reversion to original vow, 2242; duties of confessors in
reference to private vows, 2243; obligation of vow of obedience, 2364;
religious vows, obligation of the three principal vows, 2612 a.

Vulgarity, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.

Wagers, Sinful, 1879 c.

Waldensianism, 822 c.

War, definition, 1376; just and unjust, 1377; offensive and defensive,
1378; not against law of God, 1380; nor against law of nature, 1383;
three conditions for lawfulness, 1384; who may declare war? 1385; what
is just cause of war? 1386; sufficient causes, 1389 sqq.; insufficient
causes, 1393; when justice of cause is doubtful, 1394; can there be
justice on both sides? 1396; duties before beginning war, 1398-99;
duties during war, 1401 sqq.; lawful means of warfare, 1403; acts of
war and sacred times, 1405; and sacred places, 1406; and sacred
persons, 1407; combatants, non-combatants and neutrals, 1408; killing
or wounding of combatants, 1409; of non-combatants, 1410; punishment of
military crimes, 1411; imprisonment and restraint of enemy subjects,
1412; destruction and seizure of property, 1413; booty and looting,
1414-1415; lawfulness of stratagems, 1416; of reprisals, 1417; duties
of victor, 1418; rights, 1419; obligation of victor whose cause was
unjust, 1420-21; indemnities, 1422; guarantees for future, 1424;
punishment for crimes committed during war, 1425; preparation for
future wars, 1426; preparation for peace, 1427.

Weakness, Sins of, 250 a.

Whispering, form of defamation, 2103 sqq.

Whoremongering, definition, 2526 b.

Wicliffism, 822 c.

Will, acts elicited or commanded by, 56-62; three acts of, 58; consent
of, condition of mortal sin, 174, 184, 196; as subject of sin, 231.

Will (Testament), definition, 1876; defects of a will, 1876.

Wisdom, intellectual virtue, 157 c.

Wisdom, Gift of, 160 a; corresponds with and serves charity, 1609;
nature of Gift, 1610; object of, 1610 d; in its cause, Wisdom belongs
to the will, 1611 a; in its essence, to the intellect, 1611 b; Wisdom
is both speculative and practical, 1612; practical uses of, 1613;
likeness to the other Gifts, 1614 a; difference from, 1614 b; persons
who possess Wisdom, 1615; differs from the "word of wisdom," 1616 b;
varying degrees, 1617; exercise of Gift, 1618; corresponds to Seventh
Beatitude, 1619 a; and to certain Fruits, 1619 b; direction given by
Wisdom to human actions, 1620; sins opposed to Wisdom, 1621; false
wisdom, 1623.

Wish, as act of will, 58.

Witness, reliability of, 1984; obligation of freely appearing as
witness, 1985; obligation of appearing under lawful citation, 1986;
obligation to answer truthfully, 1987; witness and concealment of
facts, 1993; payment of witnesses, 1994; matters regarding which
witness should not testify, 1988; sinfulness of false testimony, 1990;
obligation of witness to make restitution, 1992; concealment of truth
in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness of introducing false or corrupted
documents, 2007.

Wives, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

"Word of Wisdom," 1616 b.

Words, Unjust, see Injustice.

Works of Mercy, seven corporal, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222.

Worship, False, communication in, 956 sqq.; coöperation in, 976 sqq.;
contributions to, 981; building of houses of false worship, 983. See
also Religion, Sins against.

Wounding, definition, 1866 b.

Writings, Forbidden, 861; when use allowed, 862; permission to read,
865; censures incurred through use, 866; formal coöperation with, 1529.
See Books and Reading, Dangerous.

Y.M.C.A., Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Young Men's Institute. 955 b.

Zoroastrianism, 822 a.