A discourse concerning infallibility in religion written by Sir Kenelme Digby to the Lord George Digby, eldest sonne of the Earle of Bristol. Digby, Kenelm, Sir, 1603-1665. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A35974 of text R8320 in the English Short Title Catalog (Wing D1431). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 219 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 119 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A35974 Wing D1431 ESTC R8320 11904068 ocm 11904068 50632 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A35974) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 50632) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 25:13) A discourse concerning infallibility in religion written by Sir Kenelme Digby to the Lord George Digby, eldest sonne of the Earle of Bristol. Digby, Kenelm, Sir, 1603-1665. Bristol, George Digby, Earl of, 1612-1677. 229, [4] p. By Peter Targa ..., Printed att [sic] Paris : 1652. Reproduction of original in British Library. eng Faith -- Early works to 1800. A35974 R8320 (Wing D1431). civilwar no A discovrse, concerning infallibility in religion. Written by Sir Kenelme Digby, to the Lord George Digby, eldest sonne of the Earle of Bris Digby, Kenelm, Sir 1652 42228 213 0 0 0 0 0 50 D The rate of 50 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the D category of texts with between 35 and 100 defects per 10,000 words. 2000-00 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2001-12 Aptara Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2002-01 TCP Staff (Michigan) Sampled and proofread 2002-01 TCP Staff (Michigan) Text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-02 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion A DISCOVRSE , CONCERNING INFALLIBILITY IN RELIGION . WRITTEN BY SIR KENELME DIGBY , TO THE LORD GEORGE DIGBY , ELDEST SONNE OF THE EARLE OF BRISTOL . Printed att Paris by PETER TARGA , Printer of the Archbishoppricke . M.DC.LII . — Nihil dulcius est , bonè quàm in●●nita tenere , Edita doctrinâ sapientum templa se●●ena : Despicere vnde queas alios , passimque videre Errare , atque viam pa●●n●●eis quaerere vit●● . LVCRET . MY LORD , I come now to pay your●● lordship the debt I haue owed you euer since our long discourse in one of the sideChappels of S. Germanes church ; when we spent most part of the afternoone in examining and weighing , which of the seuerall Religions that att present haue course in the world , a prudent man should rationally venture his soule vpon . It seemed to me that it was not a small ●●●●pe I had aduanced in obtaining your assent to the Catholike , when your lordship acknowledged great defects of seuerall kindes , in all others , and that ours , was adorned with more comelinesse and Maiesty , was maintained with more orderlynesse and prudence , was propped with more powerfull meanes to preserue vnity among the professors , and in the generall course of it was replenished with more efficacious motiues to incite men to the loue of God , then any of the others . But withall , you professed that there were some particulars of so harddigestion in it , as you could not winne of your selfe to yield your assent vnto them ; Nor were persuade●● that the authority from whence we receiue our faith was infallible , but that in all those particulars it had varyed and swarued from what in the beginning was taught by Christ and had bin preached throughout the world by his Apostles . What I replyed hereunto , seemed to your lordship out of the ordinary tracke of those who now adayes vse to handle controuersies . And it is but iust , that to so sublime a witt as yours is , arguments of a higher straine should be offered then such as are pressed to vulgar capacities . For as the ordinary sort of mankinde , haue their vnderstanding satisfyed with barely looking vpon God in quality of a Iudge , that punisheth or rewardeth according as men haue obeyed or transgressed his lawes : so is the enquiry of what they are to do or beleeue , at an end , when those vnto whose conduct Gods prouidence hath committed them , do pronounce his decrees to them in a legislatiue way . But so piercing a iudgement as yours that knoweth there is an orderly and naturall connexion betweene all causes and their effects , and that suspecteth , not God Almighty of hauing bound mankinde to a meere arbitrary law for the bare shewing of his authority and the exercising of their obedience ; will not be appayed , without hauing some scantling of the Why ; aswell as of the What , you are to do and to beleeue . Should we therefore apprehend their lott to be the worse , that are endowed with the eminentest talents ; since so much labor and paines is necessary to the quieting of their doubts ; when as simple people acquiesce so easily to what they are plainely taught ? Nothing lesse . For though it is true , the difficulty be great in ouercoming their strong resistance : yet , that once done , the vigorous progresse they afterwardes make , recompenseth to the full the precedent paines in wrestling with their reluctant imaginations and their opposing reasons . Whereas new stormes are easily raised by any crosse wind that shall blow vpon the others flexible nature . S. Augustines long irresolutenesse , his anxious seeking of truth , and his difficult rendring him selfe vnto it , was followed and crowned with admirable perfection in his owne particular , and with vnspeakable aduantages to the Church of God in generall : so as he is the onely saint in heauen after S. Paul , that hath the day of his conuersion celebrated in the Church . Hence is it that I am not one of those who wonder that your lordship is so long before you come into the fould that encloseth and secureth vs . You were not whom I take you to be , if you should yield vp your weapons before you were fully conuinced ; or be conuinced before you haue searched into the bottome of the question . To putt you into the way of receiuing an entire happy defeate in this conflict , I tooke the freedome to represent vnto you such considerations as had bin heretofore most preualent with me , when I had great vnquietnesse in beleeuing what I was taught till my reason was conuinced that I should do vnreasonably if I gaue not my assent thereunto . Not that I am so vaine as to thinke that my proper poore stocke can furnish ought that you already abound not more plentifully with . But it hath bin my good fortune ; ( that is to say , Gods Grace hath bin so mercifull to me ; ) that I haue mett with a knowing and iudicious guide , to leade me through this darke and intricate labyrinth . What I had formerly deriued from him for my owne satisfaction in this matter , I tendered to you for yours . And wherein I fell short●● by deliuering you but a lame coppy ( according to my meane skill ) of so excellent an originall , I referred you either to his learned writinges or to his fuller conuersation . For your lordship knoweth , he beareth you so great respect , that vpon any least intimation from you , he would purposely make a iorney to you from any remote place to do you seruice . In the meane time , I endeauoured to take a suruay as well as I could of the whole race that Man runneth ; from the first moment of his being produced a reasonnable creature , to the last periode of his iorney , when he is settled for euer in a state of permanency . For in such a subiect , the symmetry of the whole , and the due cohoerence of the partes , are of great weight with prudent and solide men . This can not be completely nor orderly done , without first settling firmely the fundamentall principle , That Mans soule is immortall and incorruptible , and suruiueth aeternally after the death of te body . In the next place , I applyed my selfe to shew , how the different courses of liuing in this world , do begett in the future , different conditions of happinesse or misery , each of them exceeding , beyond all conceiuable pr●●portion , the goods or euils of this life . Then , vpon consideration of the difficulty , or rather impossibility , for mankinde to arriue to the assured knowledge of those pathes which are necessary for him to walke in to bring him to Beatitude , that so his steppes might be steady and bold ones ; I concluded , that since God would have dealed more hardly with mankinde then with all other creatures besides , if to euery one of them he had assigned due and proportionable meanes to bring them to the vtmost periode of their nature , and should haue left onely him in the darke among ineuitable precipes ; It was certaine he had bequeathed to him a science or art whereby to gouerne himselfe and steere his course so as to be able to arriue safely into his wished hauen , and to that end which he was created for . And lastly , I vrged , that since the men who liue in ages after his who taught them this science ( which we call Religion ) can not be conceiued to receiue it immediatly from hismouth ; They would fall backe to an ince●●itude and distressed condition equall to the former , if he had not settled as infallible a meanes to conuey entirely to them this science , as in it selfe it is an infallible guide so bring them to Beatitude . And thence I proceeded to ●●stablish that rule wich keepeth vs Catholikes in vnity among our selues , and in security that wee are in the right way . This was the scope of our conference then : which comprising so many , so weighty , and so difficult pointes , that a few houres conuersation was too scanty a time to discusse them as they ought to be ; I promised to giue your lordship in writing a summary collection of some of the most important reflections I had made vpon them . The doing whereof , is the subiect of the following discourse . THE FIRST CHAPTER Of mistaken demonstrations . IN this course that I haue proposed to my selfe , my first endeauour must be to prooue , that the soule of man is immortall ; neither dying when the body dyeth ; nor being liable to corruption or destruction after it is seuered from the body , either through defectible principles in it selfe , or by the violence of any outward agent working vpon it . I conceiue I haue fully performed this in a former treatise , that I haue written vpon this subiect . But I may resonably apprehend that the length of that , and the heape of various arguments cumulated there one vpon another , may not obtaine from a ●●person so full of great employments as your lordship is , that discussion which belongeth to euery one of them in particular , to be secure of the consequence drawne out of them ; which requireth greater leisure , then your actiue and solicitous charges do allow you : And therefore I will here select some few of the chiefe of those which that treatise aboundeth with ; And will endeauour to make them as plaine as I can , that the discerning of the demonstration which I conceiue is contained in them , may not oblige you to labouring meditation , and Metaphysicall abstractions ( in which no man can fly with a stronger wing then you , when your leisure can allow you the time and quiett of minde that is necessary for such entertainements ) But may be obuious to you vpon such present reflection as the multitude of your present affaires can afford you . My ayme , and hope , is to prooue this truth fully and euidently : That is to say , to make a firme demonstration of it ; against which no solide opposition can be produced to weaken it ; and by which a iuditious and subtile vnderstanding shall be fully appayed and quieted . To know when that is done , it will not be amisse ( before we enter into the substance of the question ) to consider in short , the nature of a true demonstration ; that so we may be sure not to be deceiued by seeming proofes : which how many or how plausible soeuer , can but persuade opinion ; neuer force assurance . Some there haue beene , who haue thought that a multitude of reasons , may haue the force to proue and conuince that , which no one of them single , can reach to do . As particularly in our present case ; they produce for the soules immortality , numerous testimonies of great men , both such as haue beene eminent in naturall knowledge , and such as are estimed for supernaturall illuminations ; and to these , they adde their owne morall and naturall considerations : for example ; that , since it can not be doubted but that God is both wise and iust , and consequently will reward or punish euery man according as he hath deserued or demerited ; and yet we see that such lottes do not alwayes betyde men in this life ; It followeth , that there must be an other life after this here , wherein men shall reape the haruest they haue sowne vpon the earth . Againe ; That , seing all creatures who haue soules do moue themselues ; and that no inanimate creature , can do so ; It followeth , that the soule is the vertue and principle by which an animal is mooued . But if the soule can make an other thing mooue it selfe , it cannot be doubted but that she hath in her selfe the power of mouing her owne selfe . Now , life consisting in a thing 's mouing it selfe , it is cleare that what can do so , hath within it selfe without the helpe of ought else , a principle of liuing ; and consequently is not subiect to dying . Afterall these , and many more suche plausible arguments , they conclude , that howbeit neuer a one of them alone can be accounted a demonstration , yet all of them in bulke haue the strength to conuince and quiett a rationall man . I wil not here examine what force they may haue ouer the vnderstanding of a morall prudent person , who in debates before him vseth to inquire no further then whether side is the more grauely and the more learnedly disputed : But most certaine it is , that if they come before a subtile Metaphysitian or a cunning Logitian , they will fall mainely short . Fo●● when such a one shall haue rigorously discussed each particular argument , and shall haue found euery one of them to be deficient in some regard or other ; he will conclude , that no more then many nothinges can euer be multiplyed so as to make somethings ; no otherwise can neuer so many apparent proofes ( which being but such , are in truth no proofes ) euer arriue to constitute one reall proofe . Others there are , who fixing themselues vpon some one argument , do not consider in it the materiall nature of it ; That is to say , what connexion the medium on which they build their proofe , hath with the effect or proposition that they conclude out of it : but onely , whither their argument be difficult to be solued , or no . As for example ; a person of great eminency and reputation for learning , did vse to putt the following argument to proue that it was possible for Infinite to haue an actuall and reall being : Namely . There is no inconuenience that God almighty should produce att one instant as many Angels as he can produce in that instant . Suppose then that he doth so . Which if he do , the multitude of them wil be greater then any determinate number whatsoeuer ; and consequently , that multitude will be infinite . Therefore an infinite multitude is not impossible . This argument hath perplexed many great wits and learned men : But if we looke strictly vpon it , we may obserue how it it is not formed out of the notion of the subiect in question ( that is , of infinite ) but , out of the quality of God almighty and the Logicall notion of Possibility : And so , may be a hard argument , but not a demonstration , And will appeare to be a fallacy , if one reflecteth that the notion of infinity may agree to a thing in potentia , but not to a thing in Act : And therefore it can not be supposed that God hath done or will do all that he can do . According to which course , if in this question of the soules immortality , they frame a subtile argument out of what is common to all formes , or out of the nature common to all soules ; and withall discerne not how it may be vntyed ; They presently persuade themselues they haue demonstrated what they intended . Nay , though their discourse be drawne but out of the Logicall notions of contraries , of antecedents , and consequents , or out of some parity betweene the subiect they treate of and some other they compare it to ; they ●●traight flatter themselues with a conceit that they are arriued to science in that point . Not considering , that to know , requireth that one be absolutly certaine that his proofe be a firme demonstration ; and not onely , that it be such an implicated Gordian knotte , as that neither he himselfe nor any others he hath yet mett with , are able to vntie it ; but that truly and really , of its owne nature , it be impossible to be vntyed and solued . And ordinarly , they who ground their discourse vpon common and remote propositions ( as for example , they who vse Lullies art ) do vnwarily slide ouer some vnsound steppe betweene the axiome they rely on , and the conclusion they would inferre , which they see not . Whence it happeneth , that such manner of arguing , rather serueth for ostentation , then to acquire true knowledge . And as for such Logicall termes as we haue aboue mentioned ; it seldome happeneth but that they are lyable to some aequiuocation or other ; which quite enerueth the force of any proofe deriued from them . Both these sortes of persons do erre in assenting too lightly to an apparent proofe , and in taking that for a demonstration which in effect is none . But a third sort there is , who faile on the contrary side ; by conceiuing that a demonstration is neuer made , as long as any thing can be vrged against the Conclusion prooued by it . This ariseth from a great deficiency both of witt and of Iudgement . Of iudgement ; because they are not able to discerne the euidence of a discourse in it selfe , but are faine to looke into externall accidents to frame their opinion of it . And of witt ; in that they obserue not how the force and subtility of mans witt is so great , as to speake ( and that , most ingeniously too ) in opposition of such thinges as are most manifest . Zeno , euen whiles he walked with him that he disputed with , would be thought haue to demonstrated that it was impossible any thing could be moued in the world from one place to another . Anaxagoras was as peremptory that snow was blacke . We find ingenious Orations and whole bookes , whose scopes are to extoll the greatest defects and blemishes of nature , as baldnesse , lamenesse , blindnesse , vnreasonablenesse , and the like . What can be more euident then that 2. and 2. do make 4 ? yet Aristotle telleth vs , that 2. and 2. are are two distinct numbers ; and that 4. is but one number ; and consequently , that 2. and 2. are not 4. And to conclude , the Academikes or sceptikes haue laboured with much industry to take away all certainty . He were a weake man that would retaine his assent from an euident conclusion as long as subtile or cauilling disputants do catch att ought to oppose against it . But a iudicious person , when he seeth a solide demonstration vpon any subiect , is not att all shaken by any thorny difficulties that acute sophisters endeauour to implicate him in ; which though att the first sight they may a while perplexe him ; yet he is sure that with orderly reflection and due attention to euery ioint and progresse of their arguments , they are to be vnfolded and displayed , and the inconsequence of them to be made appeare . THE SECOND CHAPTER . Of the trew nature of demonstration . THat then which importeth vs mainely not to erre in , is in iduging when a perfect demonstration is produced . The trew nature of such a proofe requireth , that it make the reader or the hearer see euidently that the conclusion is directly so as the demonstrator auoucheth it to be , and that it is impossible it should be otherwise . Neither haue we reason to suspect that this can not be performed aswell in other sciences as in Geometry ; Seeing that there are definitions in all sciences as well as in it ; and that the termes of these definitions are linked together : And therefore it is obuious , that one conclusion maybe euidently and demonstratiuely drawne out of another . This can not happen in a scientificall discourse , vnlesse that which is taken to proone , be either the cause or the effect of that which is proued . But if there be any failure in either of these , then the demonstration can not be a perfect one . And though in substance it should not be deficient ; yet att the least it would be superproportioned on one side , and not according to the strict rules of art ; which requireth that euery truth be proued by his proper cause . As for example ; if Rationality , of its owne nature , and out of the force of Rationality , be the cause of immortality ; It followeth euidently that whatsoeuer is Rationall is immortall . And contrariwi●●e ; if Immortality , precisely by being such , do make the subiect vnto which it belongeth , to be Rationall ; It followheth that nothing can be immortall but it must also be Rationall . So that if either of these be so , he who considereth these two termes , seeth clearely that of necessity●● both of them must belong to what subiect soeuer he findeth either of them to reside in ; And why it is so ; and that it is impossible it should be otherwise . But if a third thing or terme , be cause of both ; or be the cause of the one and be caused by the other ; then the demonstration is mediate , and as it were a double one : As , if immateriality be the adaequate cause both of rationality and of immortality ; it is euident that whatsoeuer is rationall is immortall . But where the one side is superproportioned ; the proofe , though in substance it be true , yet is it not a proper and a perfect one . As for example ; if one should proue any thing to belong to a man because he is a sensible creature ; the effect , though it be in him , yet is it not peculiar to him , but common to all irrationall animals as well as to him . Such were the considerations that I had when I composed the two treatises out of which I concluded the immortality of Mans soule . For in them , this is the scope of my discourse : Corporeity and mortality , are adaequate to one another ; the first as cause , the second as effect : But a Rationall soule , is not corporeall : Therefore , not mortall . The subsumption I made euident , by shewing , that all operations whatsoeuer among bodyes , are performed by the disposure of grosse and subtile , or of dense and rare , partes ; and that what can not be effected by such , is not the operation of a body . For , the nature of a body ( in as much as it is a body ) is nothing else but to be a thing capable of diuision ; or , that hath a possibility of being made many ( which amounteth to as much , as to be lyable to destruction ; since the diuision of the partes that do essentially compose any thing , is the destruction of it . ) And the origidall difference of bodies , is , that some are more subiect to such diuision , that is are more easily diuided ; others with greater difficulty ; which resulteth meerely out of the partes being grosser or subtiler . So that , seeing the very essence of a body is , to be a collection of such partes ; It is euident that what can not be performed by such partes , is beyond the orbe of sole and meere bodies , and cannot be atchieued by them . It is trew , that in all the first treatise , which is of the nature of Bodies , I haue neither established nor made any mention of this Principle ; but haue reserued it to the second , where I make vse of what is settled in the former to discouer the nature of the soule : And the reason why I haue done so , is , because the slight mocke-Philosophy of this Age , not reaching to comprehend the true difference betweene a body and a spirit , easily swalloweth spirituall qualities in bodies , and as familiarly attributeth corporeall proprieties to spirits : And therefore I was obliged to runne briefely ouer the nature of all bodies , and to shew how all their operations ( euen the most refined ones , and that sauour most of a spirituall nature ) may be performed by the meere disposition of grosse and subtile partes ; there by to preuent the obiections that might be made me from such corporeall actions as vulgar Philosophy dispatcheth like spirituall ones . And I thought is not sufficient for a iuditious readers satisfaction , to do this onely by bare casting a composition in the ayre ; as Monsieur des Cartes & some others haue very ingeniously attempted to do : but I haue endeauoured to strengthen the proofes rising from the force of discourse , by accompanying them with such further obseruations as do clearely euince that whither or no I hitt right on all the particular lines that I trace out for the performance of those actions , yet it can not be doubted but that their causes are comprised vnder those heads I haue there established ; and that the wayes by which they are brought to effect , are not vnlike , ( if not the very same ) to those that I haue pitched vpon . This being the ●●orke of the first treatise ; The second looketh into the operations of a rationall soule ; And hauing discouered their nature , it sheweth that they can not be performed by the meere disposition and ordering of grosse and subtile partes of quantity or of a body ; and by consequence , that they proceede from an immateriall and spir●●tuall substance . Now here , vse is made of the former principle : for , it being made euident , that nothing but corporeity and diuisibility is the cause of corruption , and of subiecting the thinges where they reside to the seruitude of Mortality ; it followeth indefectibly , that the spirituall substance which we call a soule , can not be mortall and corruptible . This is the whole scope and discourse of that booke : out of which , for the reasons I haue already touched , I will here select onely three of the proofes contained in the latter treatise , to shew that our soule is a spirit , voyde of all quantity and materiality . THE THIRD CHAPTER . The Immateriality of the soule proved out of the Nature of vniuersall termes or Pr●●posi●●ions . THE first of them is drawne out of the nature of vniuersall termes or Propositions . Logicians do define an Vniuersall terme or Notion , To be that , which being the same , may be aff●●rmed of many . Metaphysicians define it to be , Somewhat that is the same in many . But to speake more familiarly to common sense , we may say , That it is , somewhat which is any of m●●ny . For when we say , Peter is a man , Iohn is a man , and Paul is a man ; If Peter and man be not the same thing , the saying is false : And the like is of euery one of the other two ; to witt , if Iohn , or Paul , be not a man . Againe ; seeing that one man is not two men ; If when I say , Peter is a man , the thing which I say of Peter were the same thing which is Iohn ; Such my saying would also be false ; for , Peter would be Peter and Iohn too , by being the man which is both Peter and Iohn . The notion therefore of Man , which is truly reported both of Peter and of Iohn ; is not both Peter and Iohn ; but either Peter or Iohn . And this is that which we call an vniuersall . This being hitherto euident , the demonstration proceedeth thus : We see that the thing which we call Peter or Iohn ; doth gett , by being in the soule , to be a thing that is either Peter or Iohn : But this condition or quality , to be either this or that , or to be a thing that is either this or that ; can not be had or gotten by the nature of a body , or by the disposition of subtile and grosse partes : Therefore , the soule●● in , and by which , it getteth this condition ; is of a different nature from Bodies . If here any one should answere me , that howsoeuer our wordes may seeme vnto him who shall sticke and criticise vpon them , to import that there is a notion in our minde , when we speake them , correspondent to those wordes ; which notion is no one of the subiects it is affirmed of , and yet is common to them all : Neuerthelesse , if he looke carefully into his minde , he shall finde that in truth there is no nature of Vniuersality there . For if he examine what picture he hath in his braine when he reflecteth vpon the notion of a man which he calleth an Vniversall ; he shall finde there the image of some particular and determinate man ; and no such thing as a man in common . To such a person as should say thus , I might reply , that to endeauour satisfying him with a long discourse , might seeme as ill placed paines as if I should go about to proue with learned arguments , that there are such bodies in the world as men call fire , water , earth , and the like . For euery mans senses of seeing and feeling , that are not depraued and corrupted , do assure him that they are , and that he continually is conuersant with them . In like manner , it is as euident to euery man who hath common sense and reason , and who reflecteth vpon what passeth in his vnderstanding when he speaketh suc●● propositions , or considereth such termes , as we haue euen now insisted vpon ; That indeed there is an Vniuersality in them . And therefore , if he be so vnhappy and short sighted , as not to discerne in his owne minde , that which common and continuall experience enforceth euery rationall man who looketh into the nature of vnderstanding and discourse , to owne and confesse ; he should , in speculations of this nature , content himselfe with belieuing the multitudes of others who are capable of iudging of them ( as blind men , ought to relye vpon those whose eyes are not vitiated , in matter of colours ) and not hazard his actions and his aeternall wellfare ( which dependeth of his actions in this life ) vpon his owne soddaine and slight conceit , in a matter whereof he hath no skill : As they do , who to iustify the strength of their wittes , will not onely speake and argue , but also liue , as though they belieued there where no life for the soule after the bodies death . But to be more indulgent to him then so ; I shall desire him to examine his instance , and to consider , that as when a square ( for example ) or a triangle delineated vpon paper , is proposed vnto a Mathematician to looke vpon , there by to discusse some Geometricall proposition ; though that square or triangle there drawne , be a particular determinate one , so and so formed , of such and such precise dimentions in each line and angle , and the like : yet the figure that is in his head , abstracteth from all those particular circumstances that accompanye either of these vpon the paper , and agreeth to any square or to any triangle imaginable , be their lines neuer so long or short , or drawne with red inke or with blacke , &c. In the same manner , that corporeall figure of a man which appeareth to our reflexion and resideth in our fantasy , is not the notion of a man that we here meane and speake of . But it is euident to any one who shall looke heedefully into his vnderstanding , that from the particular picture of some one man which his fantasy representeth to him , his vnderstanding hath gathered and framed a large notion of man in generall , which is applicable and indifferent to euery particular indiuidualll man . As is euident , if we looke into our owne meaning and intention , and consider what will satisfy vs ; as when ( for example ) I stand in neede of some one of my seruants to do some thing about me and therefore do call or ring a bell for some of them to come to me ; which soeuer of those that wayte without , cometh in , my turne is serued and I am satisfyed . In like manner , if a tenant is to pay me ten pounds ; It is allone to me , whither he bringeth it in halfe crownes or in shillinges or in six pences . And therefore it is euident that my intention aymeth no further then att a common notion ; and that I know so much . Now , my intention being regulated by my apprehension preceding it ; it is cleare that my apprehension is also of the like nature ; that is to say , it is indifferent and common to any one in particular . It may be further obiected , That from the apprehending of a thing which is indifferent to many , it can not be deduced that the apprehending nature is not corporeall but spirituall : for when we looke vpon an obiect a farre off , before we can distinguish enow particulars of it , we are irresolute what it is ; whither ( for example ) it be a horse , or an Oxe : And yet no man will inferre out of such indifferency that the eye in which it is , is a spirit and not a body . To this I answere , that the supposition is a false one ; there is no such indifferency in the eye as is intimated : all that is there , is precisely determinate : For , the whole obiect , and euery part of it , concurreth to the making of the picture in the eye ; and consequently there must needes be in the eye a representation of the whole and of euery minute part of it ; which is , a complete determination of it . Whence it appeareth , that the indetermination we haue of the obiect , is seated meerely in the vnderstanding ; which iudgeth it but imperfectly , by reason of the weake though entire picture that the obiect hath imprinted in the eye . And accordingly , a painter that were to draw that obiect att that distance , must comprise it within such lines as the eye receiueth from it . But that which in this case is indistinct and indifferent , is our knowledge , which resideth in our minde . For , it not being able to determine by the figure that the eye sendeth to the fantasy , whither it be of an Oxe or of a horse ; remaineth suspended , with an indifferency to attribute it either to the one or to the other . It may be further vrged ; that such indifferency of our soules thoughts , is no argument of her being a spirit : for if it were , spirituall substances would be accompanyed with such indifferency : the contrary whereof●● is euident ; seeing that no Angell ( for example ) can be either Michael or Gabriell ; but is precisely such a one determinate Angell , distinguished from all others . To this I answere , that I do not vrge such indifferency as a condition propper to spirits . For , in truth , they are more determined then bodies , by reason of their indiuisibility . The which is seene in these very notions ; that are more determined then the bodies from whence they are drawne , merely because they are in a spirituall subiect . But by this indifferency in the vnderstanding , springing from a determinate obiect ; and by such transformation there , of corporeall natures , to a quite different manner of being then they are in themselues ; I gather a different nature ( that is , a spiriturll one ) in the subiect where they are thus transformed . For , that bodies can be in our minde ( as they are when we thinke of them ) notwithstanding such indifferency ( which accordeth not with their na●●ure ) is an euident freeing of the minde from corporeall bondes . Now , that such a nature as this , of indifferency to distinct and different thinges ; can neither be in it selfe corporeall , nor be represented by bodies or by subtile and grosse partes variously disposed ; is so euident that it were a vaine labour to go about to prooue it . The meere casting of our eyes vpon materiall thinges , conuinceth it , without needing further discourse . We can not conceiue a chaire , a knife , a house , a metall , a plant , an animall , or any visible thing what soeuer , to be in it selfe without an actual termination . No Statue , no picture , no manufacture , nor ought in the world ( excepting intellectuall expressions ) can be imagined to bee , without its being con●●ined in all determination to such other bodies as comprise , enuiron , & besett it . Whosoeuer can doubt of this , is incapable of any euidence . And consequently , where we see an abstraction from all determination , and such an indifferency as we speake of ; we may securely conclude , that the subiect where it is made and where it resideth , and whence it hath it , is not of kinne to bodies , but is immateriall and spirituall . THE IV. CHAPTER . The Immateriality of the soule , proued out of the Natvre of Vnderstanding . THE second proofe of our soule 's immateriality and spirituality , I deriue from her manner of operation when she vnderstandeth any thing . That which she then doth , is to compare the thing by her vnderstood , with some other ; and by the relation or respect that is betweene them , she knoweth the nature of that thing which she so considereth or compareth . So that we may conclude the particular prerogatiue of a soule is , to haue or rather to be , a power of comparing one thing to another . And in truth , if we looke well into the matter , we shall perceiue that the notion which we frame of her vnder this consideration , compriseth all her whole negotiation . For , when the notion of Existence or Beeing is once imprinted in the soule , all others what soeuer are nothing else but respects to Beeing . Thus , when we consider what that is which we call a thing ; we find , it is that which hath Being ; or which can haue Being . The Quantity of a thing , is , what respect a determinate thing hath to the Being of the world ; which in plainer termes is , how much such a thing taketh vp of the extension that stretcheth out or that belongeth to the great bulke of what is corporeall . The Quality of a thing is , what relation or respect it hath to other thinges that are of its owne nature and line . The other seuen Praedicaments , or Classes of notions , are manifestly comparatiue betwixt diuers thinges considered together : All which I haue so fully explicated in the second part of my discourse of the Immortality of the soule , and is in it selfe so plaine ; that I will not enlarge my selfe further vpon it here , where for your sake I am as succinct as I can ; referring you to that , if you should desire further explication of this matter . Now these tenne rankes , or rather generall heads , of notions , comprising all the thinges and creatures that are or may be in the world ; and they being all of them comparatiue , and nothing but respects of one thing to an other : And all the working of our soule , being grounded vpon her notions : It followeth euidently , that all her notions being comparisons and respects , her nature must necessarly be the power of comparing or of making respects . Which how plaine soeuer it be in these notions of her first operation or of single apprehensions ; It is yet clearer in her second operation of deeming , iudging , or knowing . For , this is nothing else but a comparing of one notion to an other , and of compounding them together : As when we say , the wall is white , or aman is a reasonnable creature , we looke vpon the notions that we haue of the extremes , and consider what respect they haue to one an other ; and do find that they are vnited and identifyed betweene themselues by the force of Beeing . The very same that we find of this second operation of our soule , belongeth to her third ; which is but a multiplication of her second : for , discourse is noething else but a double or a treble composition ; which being taken in pieces , euery one of them is a Iudgement●● or enunciation : and consepuently , the worke of comparing which is performed in a Iudgement , is but multiplyed or repareaed in a discourse From these three operations of the soule , do spring her affections within her selfe , and her proceeding to action without her . For , according to the apprehensions she maketh of thinges , and to the Iudgements that she formeth of them by comparing some of those notions among themselues , and to the consequences she draweth out of a further composition of iudgements ; she is affected with a liking or with a dislike of them : and accordingly , proceedeth to action for the acquiring or repelling of them . Beyond this , our soule neither doth nor can do any thing . All her whole negotiation is comprised within these limits . And in all this , there appearing nothing but a power of comparing and of referring one thing to an other , It is most euident that the nature of comparisons and of respects must necessarily be the nature of a soule , And that she is nothing else but a thing or a power of making Respects . Lett vs then in the next place consider what a respect is . Hath it any dimensions ? do any colors make it visible ? doth any figure or shape belong to it ? doth it take vp any place ? Or is it measured by time ? All these thinges do necessarily accompany a body : And whatsoeuer is a body , is affected by euery one of them . But a respect , we find hath neither length nor breadth , nor is white or red or greene , nor is square or round , hath no dependance of time , and is so farre from taking vp place or filling of roome , that vnlesse both the termes which we consider as respectiue to one another , be indiuisibly together , there is no nature of respect betweene them . Thus , in the respect of Likenesse ; if you leaue out one of the termes on which the comparison is grounded , likenesse vanisheth ; it is lost . This square which resembleth that other square , or this white wall which in being white is like to that other white wall ; if you lay a side the other square and the other white wall , likenesse is gone , and there remaineth nothing but a square figure , or a white wall . None of the Qualities or properties which inseparably accompany bodies , haue any thing to do with this notion , to be like . It is euery way indiuisible . If we aske our senses , they will tell vs , that it is neither white nor blacke , nor hott nor cold , nor smooth nor rugged , nor sweete nor sower , nor of any other qualification that they are capable of discerning . And when we turne to our inward Iudgement , we shall find that all these thinges and what soeuer can affect our senses , are Respects . So that howeuer our senses haue cognition of obiects by a materiall participation of them , our minde knoweth nothing but by respects , nor can acquire any knowledge but by them ; and therefore , to be able to know any thing , she presently turneth it into respects ; And by doing thus , she is capable of knowing all thinges . For , respects do not hinder one an other . Bodies do exclude other bodies , from the place they possesse and fill . But respects , are so farre from shouldering out one an other , that they rather inferre and draw in one an another . And hence it is , that nothing can escape the knowledge of a soule , if she were not clogged by her body . Now , to make vse of what we haue here explicated of the soules working by respects ; and of the nature of a respect ; let vs returne to our Principle , that what soeuer is done among bodies , is performed by the disposition of grosse and subtile partes ; and examine , what disposition or ordering of such partes , can make a respect . Wee see well , that the thinges which are compared and are respectiue to one an other , haue partes . The wall that is like to an other wall , hath partes : And that other wall to which this is like , hath also partes : But all that which their partes can effect about each of them , is but to make them be white , It is not they that make their likenesse . What new partes must there be added , or how must these that are already there be placed and ranked , to make the walles like ? My eye seeth each of them to be white , and my hand feeleth each of them to be rough : yet neither my eye nor my hand determineth them to be like . But my vnderstanding , which neither toucheth nor seeth them ; yet by comparing the one of them to the other ; findeth them to be like , which their generation did not make them to be . So strange and so different from the nature of bodies is the nature of the soule . ●● I will not be so prodigall of your lordships time , or so abuse your patience , as to apply my selfe here to answere a slight obiection that may be made from the petty apprehensions of some moderne Philosophers of the schooles , who conceire , that as well grosse bodies as the sub●●iler soule are stored with respects ; and consequently , that according to what I haue said , those bodies should be immateriall , and spirits : which being euident that they are not , the soules being stored with like respects , can not be an argument of her immateriality . Thus , when they explicate the nature of grauity ( for example ) they tell vs , it is a quality whose nature is to haue a respect to the center of the world : When they teach vs what the power of seeing in an eye is ; they tell vs as grauely as if they bettered our knowledge much , That it is a quality , whose nature is to haue a respect to the animals action of seeing . When they explicate what it is to be in a place , they tell vs it is an entity in the thing placed ; whose nature is to be a respect to the thing ( or to the nothing , if you please ; when they will haue it be in Spatio imaginario ) that is called Place . And the like empty imaginations , by which they confound the common notions of thinges , making all Praedicaments to be relations , and affixing to them a surname of Transcendentall . For , such discourses are so wretched and so pittifull ones , that I thinke a neglect is fitter for them here , then in disputing against them to loose time , which should be better spent : Especially to your lordship , whose sharpe eyes wi●●l at the first sight looke through the inanity and vacuity of them . THE V. CHAPTER . The Immateriality of the soule , proued out of her manner of knowing obiects without her . THe third proofe of our soules spirituality , I deduce from her manner of knowing the obiects that are out of her . For the better explication of this point , I will make vse of a corporeall example ; which howbeit it falleth farre short of the wonderfull operation of the soule in this particular , yet it will conduce much to the illustration of it . Be pleased to reduce into your remembrance ( my Lord ) how you and I comming one morning into a faire ladyes chamber , ( I am sure you will not haue forgotten , not be to seeke , whom I meane ) we surprised her so attentiue vpon her looking glasse , as if she had bin discoursing with the faire image that she contemplated there . She was so pleased with gazing vpon that beautifull resemblance which her selfe made , as for a while she scarce tooke notice of our being att each hand of her : by which meanes we enjoied aswell as she , the same pleasing sight ; till her ciuility making her turne from it towardes vs , bereaued vs of that picture , which our eyes must haue bin loosers to haue changed for any other obiect but the originall that shee then shewed vs . And euen then , looking vpon her face , how louely soeuer it was ; our eyes could discerne no aduantage it had , of the faire picture in the glasse ; so exactly was it drawne . Now if we aske the vulgar Philosophers of the schooles , how this so liuely and so like representation of this ladyes face was made in the glasse they will tell vs , that the superficies or out side of that cristalline body , was imbued , or as it were tincted and dyed into the very substance of it , with a certaine representatiue quality , whose nature is to make it be like vnto the obiect or imbuing beauty opposed before it ; in such sort , and as truly , as the quality of whitenesse maketh a wall white , or as quantity maketh a body become great . Now , because likenesse is defined , to be an imperfect vnity betweene two obiects that are like one an other ( for , likenesse is euer accompanyed with some vnlikenesse ; else , they would be no longer like , but the same ) we may safely say , that as farre as the looking glasse agreeth by its likenesse , without any disagreement , to the obiect that it is like vnto ; so farre , the glasse is the very obiect it selfe . Hitherto , I haue borrowed the assistance of the ordinary explication how Images are formed in looking glasses : which how erroneous soeuer it may be in them ; yet being translated to our mindes , it will find there the truth which was from thence wrongly translated to bodies . For , euen they as well as we , do vse to say ( as Aristotle teacheth vs ) that th●● soule ●●s its obiects ; that is , she is all thinges , by knowledge . For , knowlege is not made in the soule by addition of seuerall new entities , that ioyned to her do become the partes of a new compound : But must necessarily be a true impression made in her ; that is , herselfe new stamped ; And is as truly the very same thing with the soule it selfe , as the figure left by a seale , is the very waxe it selfe , ( newly modifyed ) in which it is impressed . And therefore it cannot be denyed but that the soule is truly the obiect she vnderstandeth , as farre forth as the obiect is by her truly understood . And accordingly , we see that a person who hath a right vnderstanding of any thing , doth make vse of that thing in such sort as is fitting and agreable to the nature of it ; applying to it what is requisite to be applyed , and remoouing from it what is fitt to be remoued : so taking the knowledge which he hath of the nature of that thing ( that is , the thing it selfe , as farre forth as he hath right knowledge of it ) for a principle by which to operate ; that is , for his instrument , or for a part of his power of working . Now , because this instrument , this principle this knowledge , by which ●●he soule worketh when shee hath occasion to vse it , is truely and really the knowing thing it selfe ( that is , the soule ) it is cleare , that by such knowledge the knowing thing is truely the thing knowne ; and the thing knowne , is truely a part of the knowing thing . If barely thus much , would suffice , without any further addition , to denominate or affixe the attribute of kn●●wing vnto a thing wherein we find this performed ; we might with reason esteeme a looking glasse , or any material sense of an animal ( which in like manner receiueth materiall impression from an outward obiect ) to know , or to be a knowing thing . But when we procede a degree further , and examine what more then this is in a soule when shee knoweth any thing , we shall find that whereas the first is nothing else but that a likenesse of an outward obiect is in the glasse or sence which receiueth it ; A man , when he hath knowledge of an obiect , doth know , besides the likenesse of the obiect within him , that the thing he knoweth is without him . For example ; one who heareth a bell ring ; knoweth , that the bell is not onely within himselfe by the cognition he hath of it ; but also , that it is out of him too ; to witt , in the steeple by its proper Essence & existence . This further addition then , to the bells being within him , that the bell hath a proper Essence and Existence in nature ( that is ; that the bell is , or is a thing ) is that which belongeth to knowledge ; and denominateth the man in whom it passeth , with the attribute of kn●●wing , or of being a knower . And this is not in the looking glasse . For although it is true , that the outward obiect is in the looking glasse , as farre forth as it is not vnlike to its picture there , or as it is the same with it , and that the obiect without , smiteth and impresseth this likenesse in the glasse : Yet all this , amounteth not , to make the looking glasse equall to a man in point of kowledge ; for this regard , that the obiect 's being out of the looking glasse , is not in the glasse ; whereas , the bell's being in the steeple , is in him that hath the bell in him by hearing it ring . And the like to this , is in the senses of beastes : who hauing within them no vnderstanding , vnto which the obiect may penetrate , their senses do serue them but like burning glasses , that multiplying by their vertue the force of light , refracting through them , do sett on fire some thing behind them : for the senses of the beast strengthening and encreasing the action of the obiect that striketh vpon them , do sett on working those more inward gimmals which nature hath prepared within them for the conseruation and good of that liuing creature . Now the vse we are to make of this discourse , is , to examine whither this oddes which a knowing soule hath ouer a representing looking glasse , can be reduced to the disposition and ordering of grosse and subtile partes ; which is all the way & course by which materiall effects are wrought . And in steed of that , euen nature her selfe presently suggesteth vnto vs , that for nothing is more impossible then for the same bodie to be att the same time in two different places . But in our case there is yet a greater impossibility then that , to be performed by meere bodies : for it is not onely implyed that the body of the bell which is in the steeple , be in the braine of him that heareth it ring ; but also that its very being in the steeple , be att the same time in the hearer . Which is a farre more vncouth matter then the former ( though that be impossible too ) t●● be wrought by bodies . For , if its being in the steeple do include tha●● it is not corporeally in the soule ; then , its being in the soule dot●● bring along with it that it is no●● corporeally in her ; and consequently , that in her it hath not a corporeall existence . Now if any Archimedes or Archytas or subtile Ingenieur , can designe such an order 〈◊〉 materiall Phantasmes in the braine●● or such a dance of animall spirits , a●● meerely by them to make this b●● thus in the knower ; I will acknowledge , that the part of him where●● by he knoweth , ( that is , his soule ) is materiall and a body . But because●● that is all together impossible , i●● can not be doubted but that shee is a●● immateriall & a spirituall substance●● If any man shall obiect against me , that this knowing of an obiect to be without the knower , att the same time that by his senses it i●● brought into him ; is no particular prerogatiue of a man : but is common to all beastes with him ; vho we see moue themselues to or from the obiects that they see or heare , in the same manner as a man doth ; And yet for all that , their soules are not immateriall : I shall not make difficulty to answere , that if this could be proued to me , I would conclude their soules to be immateriall , and consequently immortall , as well as mens . But the truth is ; they mistake much in making such iudgement of beastes actions : they pronounce too soddainly , without examining as they ought from what principles such actions procede : they are carried away by the outward likenesse of gestures and behauiours betweene beastes and men , not considering how the one are determined vnresistably to what they do , by the outward obiects working vpon them ; and that the others do determine themselues by their owne election : All which I haue att large explicated in my often mentioned booke , where I treate of the operations of beastes . Lett them call to minde how many and how strange thinges we heare of , made with such a ressemblance of life that the beholder an scarce doubt of their being liuing creatures vnlesse he were warned of it before hand ; and yet , they are nothing but dead pieces of wood , iron , leather , feathers , and the like artificially composed ; and the springes within them , wound vp , and then lett loose . As Archytas his doue , and Regiomontanus his like curiosities were ; some of which euen imitated exactly humane voyce and wordes . As also is deliuered to vs by antiquity , of Memnon's statue , that gaue Oracles when the morning sunne first shined vpon his eyes ; his priestes hauing in the night time ordered the engines within , in such sort that such soundes and wordes should breake out of his mouth att the appearing of the sunne . The like of which Monsieur des Carres was confident he could haue produced : and I belieue that Cornelius Dreble would haue performed the like if he had bin sert about it , aswell as he composed his organes that when the sunne shined vpon them played such songes as he had contriued within them . And the inuentions of statues mouing themselues in diuers postures and progressions are now a dayes so ordinary , that they may begett a credence of seuerall stories of the antients which haue hithetto passed for fabulous tales ; as when they tell vs that Vulcan and Daedalus made Statues to behaue them selues like liuing persons ; And that Hiarchas called men out the walles to wayte vpon Apollonius Tyaneus , and the like . And when he hath reflected vpon these thinges , lett him consider , how infinitely the Architect of nature and of all creatures , surpasseth the subtilest ingenieurs ; And he will see that such manner of arguing , carrieth no force along with it . THE VI . CHAPTER . That the soule hath a Being and proprieties of her owne : And consequently , is Immortall . And of the nature and extent of the knowledge of a separated soule . THus , hauing gathered from these three proprieties of knowledge ( which whe haue shewed , are impossible to be performed by meere corporeall motions , or by the sole disposition of grosse and subtile partes ) that the source of knowledge in man is of an immateriall and spirituall nature : It followeth that she hath an Existence or Being of her owne , and proprieties agreable to such a nature : and consequently , that she is a spirituall substance . For it can not besayed , that she is an accident ; seing that all accidents imply a substance , of ●● nature proportionable to them , for them to depend on . And therefore , if she were an accident , since we haue proued her to be of such a nature as can not depend of bodies , ●●here must , be in man some other spirituall substance whose accident ●●he were . Which no man will obiect , seeing there is no pretence att all for any other spirit●●all substance to be in man besides his soule ; And that the reason why any person denyeth her to be so , is because they would not acknowledge any thing in Man to be immateriall and other then meere body . Seeing ●●hen that the ●●oule is a spirituall substance , and hath an Existence belonging to her selfe , of her owne nature and straine ; that is , a spirituall one : It is euident that her continuance dependeth not of the body , that in this life is her copar●●ener ; but that her Existence still remaineth with her , after the bodies death : which in familiar language , signifyeth that she is and suruiu●●th after the body is fallen from her ; and that its death , is her birth ; and the breaking downe of those clay walles , is the freeing of her from prison , and the setting her att liberty : since by that meanes , she enjoyeth fully and solely her owne Existence , without being clogged and pestered with a grosse yoke fellow that will haue a share of it whiles they are together . Neither can it be surmised that any outward agent can , by working vpon her after this her birth out of the body , make her cease to be : since by being a spirituall ( that is an indiuisible ) substance , she is not lyable to any of those operations or locall motions , or diuisions that change and destroy bodies ; or is in danger of meeting with any other substance that is of a contrary nature to hers . Besides which , there is no meanes in nature that wee know of , to bring any substance to its end . Which I conceiue is sufficient for this discourse ; wherein your lordship will expect no more , then that I proue the soule to suruiue the bodies death , and to be in condition like that of Intelligences or Angels : And therefore I will not troble you here with such Metaphysicall proofes , as to make them cleare would require large explication and the laying of Principles a great way off : As for example , that ( since Nature repugneth against annihilation ) there can be no change in a thing that affordeth not matter to be susceptible of a new forme . Or , that where Existence is once ioyned immediately to a subsistent forme without matter , there is nothing can seuer them . But peraduenture some may conceiue I haue not giuen full ●●atisfaction in this poinct , vnlesse I answere the famous argument wherewith Pomponatius hath perplexed euen the learnedest men that were of his time , and haue bin euer since . For their sakes therefore , I will samne vp in short what he vrgeth against the soules continuance after the bodies death ; and in as succinct a manner , giue my solution to his difficulty . To this effect then he seemeth to say . Euery thing that nature maketh , is designed by her for some proper and peculiar action or operation . For it would argue her ( that is to say , God , the author of of Nature ) of imprudence , if she should bring forth into the world , an idle and vselesse thing , that where to do nothing , and consequently were to serue for nothing . Now , the proper operation of Mans soule , is to vnderstand : phich action of vnderstanding , is werformed by the soules considering the fantasmes that reside in the braine ; and without such fantasmes , she can not acquire knowledge of any thing . But , after the bodies death , there remaine no fantasmes for her to speculate ; they being materiall impressions from corporeall obiects ; and consequently , following the lotte of the materiall part of man that compriseth and harboureth them . Therefore it followeth , that if she should ●●e seuered from the body and suruiue it , she would haue no operation ; but haue a ranke among substances for no purpose and to no end . For auoyding of which inconuenience , there is no other remedy , but to allow her Beeing a cessation aswell as the Bodyes , when Nature hath putt ●●o periode to all that ●●he is able to do or is fitt for , by taking from her the meanes by which onely she was able to worke . This is the summe of his obiection . For the clearing of which , we may consider , that an agent may be conceiued to haue two sortes of operations ; the one transient into the subiect it worketh vpon ; the other immanent in it selfe . The first driueth to the performing of some effect ; which being compassed , the action ceaseth . As when an Artificer maketh some thing , or a Traueller goeth to any place ; as soone as the one hath finished his engine , or the other is arriued to his iorneys end , their working and their motion do cease . But an action immanent in the agent , continueth working though the cause be taken a way which did sett it on foote . As when a burning coale shineth or gloweth , though the fire be out , and the blowing ceased that kindled it : and as a bell hummeth , after the clapper or hammer hath done striking it . Many such conditions of actions we may obserue in Nature , which the latines do expresse by Neuter verbes , as A●●der●● , splendere , furere , aegrot●●re , insanire , and the like : all which do import a kind of exercise or actuall Existence within the subiect of what they signify , without relating to any extrinsecall cause . The which , though they come verry short of the acts of our soule ; yet of all corporeall expressions they come nearest to them : There being in our soule , a kind of vitall reflection in its proper acts ; which being nothing but the very Existence of the soule it selfe , doth comprehend and aequalise as much as in nature is performed by an agent and a patient and their working . In this manner it is , that the soule after her separation from the body , continueth to vnderstand obiects , though the fantasmes that att the first serued her to acquire her knowledge , be taken from her . And euen whiles she was in the body , the speculating of fantasmes was not all the businesse that belonged to her : for though it is true , the doing of that , was necessary for her to be able to store her selfe with any thing : Yet she transferred the notions of thinges from those fantasmes into her owne spirituall store house ; and did , euen her owne very selfe , become ●●he thinges which she vnderstood ; as we haue already explicated . So that she was built vp of the knowledges that she thus acquired by spiritualising of obiects and by conuerting them into her owne very substance . And that speculation of fantasmes which is attributed to her in the body , is rather a passion then an action : for the doing of that worke , is the soules receiuing impression from those fantasmes . The retaining of which , is her knowing . And this knowing , must necessarily remaine alwayes with her ; since it is nothing else but she her selfe so moulded and so impressed . That is , her owne Bein●● : which because it is a spirituall one and superior to corporeall ones , doth resume in it selfe the two natures of Essence , and of Operation that in bodies are separated : And so is , both her Being an her worke . And consequently she knoweth and vnderstandeth ( which is her proper operation ) when she is seuered from the body and hath no more fantasmes to worke by . But it is a kind of standing or fixed state of knowing ( if so I may say ) and immanent in her selfe ; ( as the shining or glowing of a fire coale , seemeth to vs to be ) not att all accompanyed kith motion , as is her gaining of wnowledge in this life . Which will be better vnderstood , if we consider how her first obiect , is Being ; and that her first operation , or vnderstanding , is to be Being , ( as , whose essence is nothing else but a capacity of knowlege , or of a new manner of being Being ) and that all the rest of her vnderstandinges , are nothing else but to know other things to be ; or , for her to be the Being of other thinges : that is , to identify them with her selfe by this imbibition of Being , that sinketh the obiects into her . And therefore , when a soule is once completly become all thinges ( that is , that she knoweth all thinges ) which she becometh it the very instant of her separation , and indeede , by her separation from the body ; It is euident , she needeth no further action to gaine any thing or to better her selfe . For she hath then all that she is capable of hauing●● and is att the periode she was made for . And consequently , Pomponatius his argument is of no force , since after the bodies death the soule may continue that operation ( of knowing ) which she is made for : And no●● onely continue it , but haue it infinitly exalted and refined ouer what it was in the body . By my answere to this obiection , I am led to obserue how a separated soule must necessarily retaine knowledge of whatsoeuer she knew in the body . For , since her knowledge of any thing is her very Being the thing she knoweth ; It followeth , that as long as she conserueth her owne Being , the knowledge of that thing must remaine with her . But doth her knowledge reste here ? Hath she acquired by this second birth , no addition to the stocke she had bin toylesomely traffiking for in this life ? A child in his mothers wombe , hath no other cognition then such a dull and limited one as his sense of touching or feeling could afford him ; but as soone as he is borne into this worldes light , he receiueth impressions by his eyes of the colors , figures , magnitudes , and other qualities , of all kindes of bodies that enuiron him : And shall a soule , borne into that bright day of intellectuall light , see then no more then she saw here in her darke prison ? She shall certainely . And not onely see more , but see so much more , that it euen dazeleth our eyes to looke vpon the excesse of her seing . Lett vs proceede by steppes ; and consider how the ordering of a few notions , begetteth new knowledges and conclusions , that he who was imbued with those notions neuer dreamed of , till he had marshalled and ranked them in such order . And by new ordering and weauing those new conclusions among themselues and with his former notions , he further acquireth new knowledges . Which the more numerous they grow , the higher and larger is their multiplication ; like numbers , which by euery addition of a new figure , do encrease their valewes tenne folde . Thus , sciences do grow , from a few plaine obuious principles to the vastenesse we admire , So , the science of Mathematikes , by enterweauing a few axiomes and definitions , sprooteth out , into an vnbelieuable progeny of subtility and variety . Likewise , the science of Metaphysikes , by ordering such notions as occurre to euery man of common sense runneth ouer the whole machine and extent of all that is : And not content with the whole world of bodies , and of what is measured by time , soareth with a bold wing and piercing eye into a new world of Intellectuall inhabitants ; where finding them settled by their nature in a state of aeternity , she perceiueth time that deuoureth all thinges beneath their orbe , flide weakely vnder them into an abysse of nothing ; without being able to giue the least attainte to their sublimed nature . All this is done , meerely by orderly disposing those notions that by our senses we acquire . And if these , in a man ( whose grosse allay of a body , so cloggeth and benummeth the vigour of his subtile inhabitant ) do grow vp to so incredidible a bulke and height ; what will their extent be in a separated soule , that is all actiuity ? Her nature , is , to be an orderer , or rather , to be an order it selfe : for whatsoeuer procedeth from her , is orderly : which it would not be , if order were not first in her . Order then being in her , it must be her nature ; since all is nature and substance , in that thing which is indiuisible . It is cleare then that whatsoeuer is ordered by an agent whose nature is order , it must needes be ordered to the vtmost aduantage that by ordering it is capable of . And consequently , seeing that new knowledge springeth out of the well ordering of precedent notions ; It followeth , that whatsoeuer is knowable out of those notions and principles , is fully knowne by a separated soule . But when we consider the connexion that all thinges haue , one with an other , ( seeing that all the thinges in the world , are but like linkes of a chaine , forged by an all knowing Architect ; who doth all his workes , by the rules of perfect order and , wisedome ) we can not doubt , but that a separated soule , by ordering those knowledges she hath acquired in the body , and by reflecting vpon them with her vnlimited actiuity and energy ( she being then entirely a pure Act ) must needes attaine to the knowledge of all that is . And if we examine wherein this connexion consisteth●● as it is in our soule ; we shall find that it is placed in this , that the thing which hath one notion , is the same which hath an other . Whereby we find that the first notion we haue of any thing , doth by the nature of our vnderstanding comprehend all other notions ; and that it can not be perfectly vnderstood , vnlesse all others be knowne . Wherefore , we may conclude , that a separated soule , doth either comprehend no one thing , or else that shee must needes comprehend all thinges . As for example ; If she know her selfe , she knoweth that she was the forme of a body ; & not onely of a body in generall , but of one , so composed , so rempered , so formed , and all other particulars belonging to the body that she is separated frō . From hence she gathereth , that this compound of soule and body , must necessarily haue a father and a mother ; and by the indiuiduall proprieties of her body , she inferreth the indiduall proprieties of her father and of her mother . Whose being such , requireth further such and such other causes and circumstances whereon they depend . And euery one of them , require such and such others that haue caused them . And so proceeding on from one to an other , she discouereth not onely the first , but also all the causes that haue relation to one another : Which in effect , is the complexe of the whole world ; since all thinges in it , haue ( one way or an other ) relation to one an other , either neerer or further off : As Maister White hath ingeniously and solidely shewed in the first of his dialogues of the world . And this is the methode of acquiring all sciences , by the vertue of syllogismes . And this vast extent of knowledge , will be the firmer and the stronger in her , out of this regard , that euery one of her knowledges will adde a confirmation and a verifying to euery particular that she knoweth . For all thinges in nature , hauing a perfect connexion with one an other ; whosoeuer knoweth truly the nature of any thing , knoweth also the nature of all that hath reference to it , either as cause or as effect , or by any other regard that linketh them together . And thus , euery one of her multitude or rather infinity of knowledges , riueteth faster each other of them : euery one of them affording her a new reason , why that is so ; like stones in an arch , where euery stone is not onely a support to it selfe , but also to all and to euery one of the other stones that compose the arch . So that euery knowledge of hers , hath a superproportion in a manner infinite , beyond any thing she knew in the body . And according to the strength of her knowledge , is the strength of her other actions , as , of desiring or louing any thing that her knowledge informeth her to be good : since they proceede immediatly from knowledge ; and are more or lesse vehement , according as her knowledge decyphereth them more or lesse abounding with the nature of good . Nor can she be deceiued by any appearance of truth , that may plant an Error in her , insteed of a true Iudgement : which is euident , not onely out of what we haue euen now said , that euery one of her knowledges maketh good euery particular one in her ; but also more immediatly out of this , that it is impossible for Contradictory Iudgements to dwell together in the soule ; since one of them , is engrafted in her , or rather is identifyed with her , by the nature of Beeing ; and the other , must consequently be excluded from her , by not being ; ( as euen in in this life , we can not iudge any thing , att the same time , to be and not to be : ) And therefore , since all that she knew in this world , remaineth with her in the next ; and that out of the perfect ordering of that , she deduceth the knowledge of all thinges else , and so enioyeth the fulnesse of science in her ; and that all shee knoweth , is alwayes present to her , as being in truth her owne indiuisible nature , substance , and Being ; it followeth , that no falshood ( which is a contradiction of some truth incorporated , as I may say , into her substance ) can haue admittance to her beliefe : And if any were mistakingly harboured by her during her abode in the body ( which hindered her from completely ordering her notions , and from deducing true consequences from them ) this her new condition of abundant light , soone discouereth and cancelleth it . THE VII . CHAPTER . The answere to an obiection . BVT if error , mistaking , or falsehood , can not harbour in a separated soule ; And that the fullnesse of knowledge , be the periode and perfection of her nature ; It may att the first sight appeare impossible , that any soule should faile of being happy . For , seeing that a Rationall creatures desiring of any thing , dependeth of the Iudgement that he maketh of such a thinges being good for him : It ●●ould seeme , that there is great Error in his knowledge , and much mistaking in his Iudgement , when he setteth his hart vpon desiring and longing after that which is most hurtfull and pernitious to him . To answere this obiection , I must entreate your lordship to looke into the nature of the will : Which though in substance●●it be the same with the vnderstanding ( that is , the soule her selfe , according as she is ready to proceede to action ) yet as it is the origine of the soules desires , and the impellent of her to action , It requireth a particular consideration . We may then determine the will in a Rationall creature , to be a mastering and conquering Iudgement or resolution , that fixeth peremptorily vpon what is to be done . For it is cleare , that it is nothing else but a Mans immediate disposition to worke , or to do some thing : And he is allwayes ready to proceede to action , and doth proceede thereto ( vnlesse he be hindred ) as soone as his vnderstanding iudgeth and telleth him what is best to be done . Next , be pleased to consider how we find oftentimes by experience , that after we haue iudged and determined by our reason and vnderstanding , what is best and fittest for vs to do ; there reseth in our brestes , a certaine materiall motion or tyde of spirits , that beateth vs off from that resolution , and disposeth vs an other way . If it happen that this inundation of spirits do chance to ebbe backe againe , and leaue the channell free for the calmer waters of reason to haue their course in ; we returne to our former temper and Iudgement . But if a new flood of them do breake in vpon it , too strong for it to resist ; then they carry the mans resolution to their side . And according to the violence and repetition of their strokes that beate him off from his first Iudgement , the resolution that is made by them is strong and vigourous . For as ourvery Being , and all our knowledges , in this world ; are made by materiall actions : So , more , and stronger knowledges and Iudgements , are made by more and by stronger materiall actions . And therefore , if these currents and tydes of materiall spirits , haue the force to make in a man strong impressions and iudgements of the good they propose , and by a continued long beating vpon his vnderstanding do in manner confine it to what they propose ; they will in the end , as it were blinde our reason , and make vs thinke onely , or at●●least chiefly , of the good and aduantage that they suggest . They will sinke into the bottome of our soule , and settle there , the apprehensions of what they recommend . And in comparison of those Apprehensions , they will weake●● the truth we see , making it a appeare to vs like a dreame , or a thing in the ayre , that concerneth vs not●● Which in this case , I may compare ( not improperly ) to oyle swimming vpon some heauier liquo●● in a caske . For , that remaineth att the toppe , without motion or actiuity ; whiles the water beneath , runneth precipitously out att the spigot into the vessels that are sett to receiue it . In like manner , here , truth remaineth without all efficacy ; whiles the contrary iudgements , do flow impetuously into action . Now , when a man thus tempered cometh to dye , and that so his compound cometh to be resolued into body and soule ; It is euident , that in his soule , there must remaine a great inequality , betweene that Iudgement of hers which concerneth the materiall good , and ●●er other which concerneth the true good : And , that although the ●●ur●●ent of materiall spirits which was ●●ont to foment this Iudgement , be now gone , yet the effect of their stroakes ( that very same effect which remained in her , when soeuer she had truce from their actuall assaultes ) remaineth after death in the separated soule ; and if it be the stronger , will of it selfe still presse her on to the same materiall good , that the spirits which begott it , recommended to her . For by the stroke of death , the soule looseth nothing of what she had purchased in the body : But all that she had or rather that she was there , is enlarged and heighthened by this second birth of hers ; And she becometh such a thing , as the precedent moulding of her settled her in a capacity to proue ; like as the seuerall parcels of warme mudde vpon the bankes of Nilus , do become such various liuing creatures , by the last action of the enliuening sunne working vpon them , as by their precede●●t dispositions and circumstances they were designed to be . Adde to this , that there is no formall opposition betweene two such Iudgements in a man . Lett the one of them be ( for example ) that it is good for him to go to a feast , to satisfy and please his appetite ; The other , that it is better for him to go to the Church to pray : And it is euident that the truth of this latter , doth not contradict the truth of the other ; but both of them are consistent together . If then he dyeth with his soule fraught with these two Iudgements ; death will leaue them both in his soule ; each of them stretched out , ●●n such sort as belongeth to a separated soule ; but still , in such proportion as it found them in her , ●●hen it came to deliuer her out of her body . So that , if it found them ●●n such a proportion that the Iudgement of good in going to a feast , did clearely ouerbeare the Iudgement of good in going to the Church ; the desire of feasting in the next : world , will likewise ouerbeare in ●●er the desire of that good , for the obtaining whereof she was to go to ●●he Church to pray . And although ●●ll the circumstances and possibility of going to a feast , be taken ●●way , with the taking away of the body ; yet , the desire of feasting ( which dependeth not of considerations to be made in the next world , but onely of those which were made in the body ) remaineth as fresh and as quicke as it was when the Man settled his last Iudgement and resolution in this world . Nor doth it import , that a separated soule hath no tast to be pleased with meate or with drinke . For , as all her desires were framed in the body ; so , are they such , as belong to a whole complete man , and not to a naked soule . And therefore , she desireth to be built vp againe an entire man , and to wallow againe in such sensuall pleasures as then prouayled with her . To which I may adde , that although a separated soule haue not a tast to relish meate , yet she hath a will to wish for it . And this will , is now to her , of a like nature , as to vs in this world , the wish of Bea●●i●●de ; which dependeth of no other consideration , nor is referred to any furthe●● End ; But is of it selfe the last End ; as being desired for its owne sake ; and not vnder the reglement , or to serue for obtaining of any thing else , more desired then it . Nor doth it prei●●dice what I haue here determined ; to consider , that a separated soule , is a pure spirit , deliuered from that impugner of Reason , her flesh , which vsed to draw her from her greater good . For we must not vnderstand●● her being a pure spirit , to signify her being a●● vntainted spirit : for she is wholy defiled by her habitation in the body . But she is called pure , by negation of conjunction to any body : which hindereth not , but that she may haue in her substance , the spirituall effects and contaminations of a corrupted body . For whiles she and her body were but one thing ( both of them subsisting by one Existence ) the agents that wrought vpon her body , did build and qualify her according to what she was to be when she was to be seuered from her body , and to Exist by her selfe . Now if these agents were peruerse ones , they hammered out such effects in her as made her become a spirituall monster of many heads , ( which are , the reluctant and incompossible Principles that raigne in her ) each of them drawing and tearing her a different way from the rest ; as in the next Chapter I shall more amply declare . And although she erreth not in prosecuting her iudgements and desires , supposing the principles from whence they spring ; which are now naturall to her : yet all her operations , flowing out of those : principles , are strangely defectiue , vgly , and monstruous . And the reason why her Iudgements and affections in this state of separation , are naturall to her and vnalterable ; whereas before they were but accidentall ; is this : Whilest she was in the body , there was no thought or Iudgement so deepely settled in her , but ( by reason of her bodies subiection to externe agents ) might be weakened by the much importunity of other thoughts occurring to her and pressing vpon her ; and by litle and litle , might be worne away and forgotten : And therefore her nature , that was thus flexible and changeable in her Iudgements and desires , resided purely in the common inclination to Good in abstract or in generall ; the which was common to all kindes of desires ; and so , onely the desire of Good in generall , was naturall to her : All particular desires , being but accidentall to her ; and such , as might be remoued by extrinsecall causes and agents . But when all this subiection of her to such agents by meanes of her body , shall be remooued by death ; and that no causes shall afterwardes be able to worke vpon her ; and that she herselfe shall be nothing else but a Being or a substance left out of these impressions , the stamping of which is now att an end ; Those desires which formerly were but accidentall , are now become naturall to her . And whatsoeuer she loueth for it selfe , remaineth settled and riuetted in her , as a supreme principle ; ouer which none other hath any authority or preualence ; and against which , nothing can be vrged to infeeble it . And in the meane time , all other iudgements and desires that are lesse preualent then these , do keepe their inferior rankes and beings , ( without loosing ought of the clearenesse of euidence that accompanyeth them ) vntill an other change do come by the reioyning of her bodie to her . By all which discourse it appeareth , how a separated soule that is badly and vnequally built vp ; is free from error and falshood in her Iudgements ; though her misseplaced affections and the improportioned composure of her will , do make her neglect her true good , for inferior and vnworthy goods . THE VIII . CHAPTER . Of the Misery of a disordered soule after it is separated from the body . HAuing cleared ( as I conceiue ) this great difficulty ; I shall apply my selfe to explicate in the best manner I am able , the different states , that the different courses and manners of liuing in this world , do settle a separated soule in . These may be comprised vnder two generall heads . For ; there being in man two principles from which all his operations do spring ; Reason and sense ; his soule and his body ; It is evident that according as either of these swayeth and hath strongest influence into his actions , his course of life is to receiue its denomination . I will begin with taking a short suruay of a soule torne from the body of a man that spent his life in the pursuite and in the enioying of sensuall obiects . It is already concluded , that all the Iudgements and desires which a man contracteth in this life , do remaine in the sepated soule , in the same proportion and excesse ouer one an other , as they were here . It hath bin also shewed that notwithstanding such a soules desiring a particular and inferior good , more strongly then she doth an vniuersall and superior one : yet is she not carried by error or mistaking , to preferre the inferior good before the superiour ; but seeth clearely the difference that in truth is betweene them ; and that the superior good , is of its owne nature , preferable to the other ; though , by reason of the temper she is in , she preferreth for her enioyment the other meaner good . Next , lett vs consider the great vehemence wherewith the desires of a separated foule are accompanyed . Examples dayly occurre to vs , of the great earnestnesse wherewith passionate men desire and prosecute the obiects that their hartes are sett vpon : In such sort , that neither difficulties , nor dangers , can diuert them from them . And yet , the greatest and violentest of these , is not comparable to the least and weakest desire of a separated soule . In her , there is nothing that can retard any operation that she is about : as in bodies there is ; vnto whom , motion belongeth not but as they are moued by an other thing ; and therefore , all that appertaineth to them in regard of motion , is in a manner resistance to it , or a repugnant yielding to what is too stong for them : and consequently , succession of time , and conueniency of place , and a mastering power in the agent that worketh vpon them , are required to all corporeall motions and operations . But a separated soule , being ( as we haue formerly shewed ) an indiuisible substance , and not measured by time , nor comprehended by place ; and withall , her selfe being the principle of her owne operations ( which are nothing else , but her very being what she is ) It followeth that whatsoeuer she doth or desireth , is , with the whole energy of her Nature ; who●●e force and actiuity beareth such proportion to the strength of the greatest and most powerfull body that is , as all time doth to an instant , or as the whole extent of quantity doth to a point ; seeing , that her actiuity ( were she to worke ) reacheth to all place , and to the whole masse of corporeall magnitude , in an indiuisible of time . Now , lett vs apply these three considerations , to such a soule as we haue proposed for our first suruay . Her wearing out her time in the body , with continuall conuersation among sensuall obiects ; and through the loue of them , her neglect of rationall and intellectuall goods ; will haue caused , that after death , her affections to them , will preuaile ouer these latter . Such affections , can not be conceiued to be , but of one , or but of two , or but of a few , of those materiall obiects ; but of many , and of different natures . For the puddles of flesh and blood , hauing this property , that full draughtes of them do begett a satiety and loathing in in the persons that feede greedily vpon them ; their ouerburthened stomakes do seeke to please themselues by variety ; and do hope to find fresher and quicker delight in some new obiect . Thus , they trauell and wander as farre as they can , in this labirinth of vanity : One pleasure still succeeding an other : Their thoughtes sometimes bent vpon richesse , otherwhiles vpon power ; as often vpon honor and estimation from others ; sometimes vpon reuenge ; and peraduenture continually , vpon the meaner obiects that in their seuerall kindes do affect their grosser senses . All this variety of affections , that requireth succession of time to be contracted and enioyed in the body , will reside together all att once in the separated soule ; or rather , she her selfe will be all of them . Many of them , will be incompatible with one an other : yet she mustendure them all ; & endure euery one of their drawing her a different way : like those vnhappy monsters that some historians tell vs of , which being composed of two , or of more , different animals , vnited together by some part of their bodies common to them all , they are att continuall debate among themselues , one of them desiring to carry their whole loade one way , or to busy themselues about one thing , the other contesting against that . But the incompossible affections of such a soule , are yet more lamentable then can be represented by the sad conflict of such monsters : for , these latter , are not in the same indiuisible place : they are but neere one an other ; and they are not alwayes in opposition , and att warres , betweene themselues : whereas , the soules vnhappy desires , do constitute and build vp her very substance ; which being indiuisible , they lye alwayes together in the same indiuisible restlesse bed : like snarling dogges , like angry vipers , and poysonous serpents , perpetually biting and tearing one an other . Nor can any of them be layed a sleepe , for one single moment of time : They are continually awake , continually raging , and continually deuouring one an other : and consequently , continually deuouring thebowels of that wretched soule that harboureth them . Who in the middest of this torment and misery , seeth clearely that it can neuer haue end , as longas she hath being ; she being now , no longer subiect to mutation : & that therefore she must remaine thus , for all aeternity . But this tearing her in pieces by incompossible desires , is but part of the torment she sustayneth : She is so vnhappy , as to be incapable of enioying any one of those obiects she so extremely thirsteth after . None of them can follow her into that region , where she now dwelleth ; nor hath the meanes or instruments to conuerse with them , were it possible ( as it is not ) that they could approch her and offer themselues to her . Consider now how great an anguish endureth that man , who hauing passionatly sett his hart vpon some beloued obiect , is hindered from enioying it . The proportion of his sorrow , will be according to the proportion of his desire , and to the actiuity of his nature . We see , how much the griefe of a quicke and smart person , exceedeth the griefe of a dull and heauy one : and particularly when it is for the priuation of the obiect that he prised most . We haue dayly examples , of men , that dye for such losses . How strangely excessiue then must the sorrow be of a separated soule , that wanteth what she so vehemently desireth , and that she is sure she shall neuer attaine to enioy ? How great this sorrow and anguish is , we can not comprehend , because we can not comprehend the actiuity of a separated soule . But we shall discouer enough to strike vs with amazemēt & horror att the sight of it , if we reflect , how sorrow & paine worketh vpon a man in this life . It is euident , that euen in corporeall paines , it is not the body that feeleth that which tormenteth him . For if the mind be strongly fixed vpon some other thought , so as not to attend unto what passeth in the body , or that by outward agents is wrought vpon it , ( as happeneth in Extasies , and in like vehement applications of the minde an other way ) the man feeleth neither goute , nor stone , nor the incision of any of hislimbes , nor the violent action of fire feering or burning any of his sensiblest partes . It is the soule then that feeleth all such paine ; and the body , with its senses , serueth but as the channell or conduite to carry it to her . Much more is it out of all question , that the sorrowes of the minde , reside onely there . It followeth then , that since onely the soule is susceptible of torment ; a separated soule , must necessarily be lyable thereunto , in an infinite excesse beyond what an embodied one is capable of . Now consider , how all the euill that can arriue to her , is , her being crossed in her affections , and her being depriued of what she desireth and tendeth vnto with greater actituity and pressure , then that wherewith the weight of the whole world would fall backe to its place and center , if after being remooued from it by a maistering force , it were soddainly lett att liberty to returne whither its grauity would carry it . And from hence we may conclude what a state of violence , and of suffering contradiction to her nature , must such a soule necessarily be in ? It is euident , that all the torments inuented and inflicted by such Tyrants as haue bin most ingenious in cruelty ; or caused by the violentest and sharpest diseases ; are but shaddowes to what such a soule endureth . To heighten yet more the anguish she sustaineth ; she looketh with an enuious eye vpon the excessiue happinesse that other soules enioy , who spent their time in storing themselues with such true goods as now do settle them in such a delightfull state : shee seeth how easy it had bin for her to haue made her selfe one of that happy number : and how foolishly she tooke more paines to render her selfe thus miserable , then they haue done to attaine Beatitude : since the ones course , was a calme smooth progresse in the high way that nature herselfe traced out to them , and to all men else that haue the good fortune to discerne it : and the others , was a continuall toylesome wandring in the rugged and stony by-pathes , full of bryars and thornes , where ineuitable precipices surrounded them on euery hand . And she seeth that the thinges for which shee tooke all this paines , and for which she now endureth so much , and lost so much ; were most vnworthy and most contemptible pleasures ; not deseruing the name of pleasures , euen whiles they were enioyed in their greatest height ; that she is ashamed , and hath horror , to thinke of : And yet , so wretchedly vnhappy she is , that she can not choose but preferre them infinitly aboue those true goods , which att the same time she seeth do in reality and in solide estimation more infinitely surpasse them ; And which therefore she can not forbeare louing and desiring with a most vehement earnestnesse , though not so much as the mastering affections that tyrannise ouer her . And consequently she is most vnhappy , vpon that score too ; since her misplaced affections , haue rendered her incapable of enioying any pleasure in them . How miserable must we conclude such a soule to be , though she remained in this state for neuer so short a while ? But when we consider , how she is to remaine in this condition for all aeternity ; that nothing can neuer happen to comfort her , or to asswage her torments , much lesse to lay them a sleepe for one small moment of time ; that she is certaine they will dure for euer all in a heape , and each single by it selfe , corroding her bowels with the same raging violence ; what distresse , what horror , what despaire must she be in ? If the looking vpon eternity with our faint eyes , and the taking such a poore scantling of it as we are able , by adding of the greatest numbers we can comprehend in our fansies to others as great as they ; then , multiplying them betweene themselues , and with their productes , till we haue wearyed out our selues , and exhausted the rules of Arithmetike and Algebra , in counting millions of yeares that it is to endure : And yet after all , we find that we haue not attained to so much as a shadow of that all comprising , neuer ending , eternity : so that we grow giddy with seeking to summe vp such an endlesse account : What should we conceiue will be the sense , the horror , and the despaire , of such a soule ; who by the superiority of her nature hath now full knowledge , in its most horride semblance , of that dreadfull eternity , whose bare shaddow ( or scarce so much ) striketh vs into such an amazement and affright ? By this little ( very little , in respect of what this subiect requireth ) Your Lordship will conceiue , what apprehension I make of the state of a separated soule built vp of improportionable and vnequall iudgements , by hauing in this life entertained her selfe totally or chiefely with materiall obiects , and settled her mastering affections on them . THE IX . CHAPTER . Of the Beatitude of a well ordered soule , after its separation from the body . IT is now time that veturne ouer the leafe , and take a view of an other soule , that in this life hath cultiuated her knowledges and affections to the best aduantage ; and hath employed her selfe , about intellectuall and re●●ll goods ; and hath contracted a loue of them ; and in comparison of them , neglecteth the other muddy ones that belong to flesh and blood . It is euident out of what I haue formerly said , that the affections of such a soule , when she shall be out of the body , will be wholly bent vpon intellectuall goods ; as , knowledge , and truth ; and that if she enioy them , she will be contented and happy . That she shall enioy them , is already concluded ; when we shewed , how euery separated soule , is endowed with fulnesse of knowledge , and shall vnderstand and know all that is knowable in nature ; which importeth , All that is , that euer was , and that euer shall be : And that she shall know all this , truly without any admixture of falsehood or error . But what degree of happinesse she shall be in by such knodwledge , is that which we are to inquire into : In doing whereof , we shall be faine to take ou●● measures , by discoursing comparatiuely of her delightes , to such as do delight a soule in this life ; since such a soule is so noble a creature , and so aboue our reach , that we are not able to iudge positiuely of her by looking singly . on her selfe , in her owne nature . How great the pleasures of sense are , is but too easie to apprehend . Mankinde is continually too conuersant with them , to be ignorant of them . And so powerfull they are , that we dayly see men of excellentest partes , sacrifice their whole liues to the purchasing and enioying of them . But if we compare them with the pleasures of the minde , euen in this world ; we shall find that in respect of them , they are flatt , meane , brutall , and inconsiderable . We see dayly examples of persons , that hauing bin deepest immersed in those , ( and therefore can not be suspected , to want the skill of gusting them ) as soone as they haue come to relish the superior delightes that are afforded by Intellectual goods ( for euery tast is not presently fitted for them ; being depraued by preoccupation of the others ) they grow to despise the entertainements and obiects that formerly were the Idols of their affections ; and do acknowledge , that one houre of contemplation of some noble truth , outweigheth in the scale of pleasure , yeares of such delightes as belong to sense . But I must not content myselfe , with producing examples or authorities , to your Lordship : Such arguments are to be vsed onely to those that can not penetrate into the natures and causes of thinges . You will expect from me , that I should lay the groundes , why Intellectuall pleasures , do , of their owne nature , affect a man more then corporeall ones . This is easily and presently done , if we but consider what it is in Man that is affected with pleasure : euen with sensuall pleasure . And as before , in point of paine ; so here , vpon the same principles , we shall finde , that it is not the body , but the soule , that is affected with pleasure , and that the body and senses , do but serue to conuey the outward obiects or motions , to the tribunall of the minde ; who onely sauoureth and embraceth them vnder the notion of delightfull . If she be distraught an other way , with some strong thought that carrieth her from the present obiects and company ; be the man att other times neuer so much affected with musike , ( for example ) or with pictures and statues , or with parfumes , or with pleasant wines , or with like entertainements of the senses : All these may beate att their dores ; and yet he be so farre from being then delighted with them , that he will not so much as haue taken notice of them . If then it be the soule onely that tasteth pleasure , she onely being capable of cognition and able to make reflexion , ( which are necessary circumstances to the enioying of pleasure ) It followeth necessarily that in a well composed man , those delights must affect him most , that are most agreable and proportionable to that part of him by which he is delighted . He who feeleth not this truth experimentally within himselfe , may be said to haue the complexion of his soule spoyled ; like those ill gouerned maydes , who by feeding on trash of bad nourishement , do gett the greene sickenesse ; and then do loath meates of wholesome iuices . For , the truth is ( though it fall not within the compasse of this discourse ) that humane nature hath bin corrupted in its very source ; like a child that sucketh contagion from an infected nurse ; and is deliuered ouer , to ill affections , and to ignorance of what is good for it . Now , the proper businesse of the soule , is the enriching her selfe with knowledge ; and her satisfaction and contentement , is the contemplation of truth . If the doing that , in the lowest and meanest subiect of knowledge , ( qnantity , which is but the accident and attendant of bodyes ; out of the consideration of which , Geometry hath its birth ) and whose verities haue no reall existence in nature ; but may seeme in respect of solide substances , to be but fine cobbewebbes spunne in the ayre ; If that ( I say ) do oftentimes carry men of strongest partes and iudgement by the delight and pleasure they find therein , to the neglect of all sensuall pleasures , and euen of their life it selfe ; How great may we thinke must the delight be of him that should haue the solide knowledge of whole Nature it selfe , and of all her reall and numerous progeny ? If the contemplation of a few lines , Angles , and figures , whose Existence is no were considerable but in the braine and fansy of him that playeth with them ( for they are but like sport and exercise to the minde , to gett her an appetite to meate of solider nourishement ) can carry away with the delightfullnesse of it such a man as Archimedes ( one of the greatest wits that euer were ) so farre , as rather to part with his life , then with so pleasing a thought : What pleasure must there be in considering the whole machine of the Vniuerse , and of all the bodies that are contained in it ? to behold the beautifull proportion and symmetry , that is in euery part of it ? the admirable connexion , that is betweene each one of them ? the nature of euery one in particular ? and the long chaine of causes and effects , that runneth trough them all , and comprehendeth them all ? But when from hence , we raise our selues aboue all this , and discouer a new world ( infinitely greater then all this ) of pure intellectuall creatures ; that haue no allay of quantity or of bodilinesse ; that are not measured by time ; that are not comprised in place ; that are stored with infinite knowledge ; and that enioy all possible blisse and happinesse , all at once ; And that this all att once , shall be stretched out to a neuer ending Eternity : what wordes can expresse , how this thought mu●● needes affect him that penetrater●● duely into it ? But , when to all this he addeth , that these are not bar●● truths which are onely pleasant t●● looke vpon , and do not concern●● him in his owne particular : but tha●● indeed , whiles he contemplateth their nature , he informeth himselfe of his owne : And that he doth not study this mappe , like a scholler that is learning Geography ; but like an Emperor , an Alexander , that is prouiding to make himselfe master of the whole region he seeth there abridged before him ( for to such a state , his soule will arriue , when she shall be out of the body ) What soule-rauishing pleasure can we conceiue he then enioyeth ? How litle must he sett by all the fond toyes that vulgar people busy themselues about ? And how contemptible and base must he iudge all those pleasures that affect the senses , in respect of this that now filleth , swelleth , and enlargeth his soule ? Yet all this is but a shaddow ; nay it is not so much ; it is nothing ; in respect of the pleasure of a separated soule that during her habitation in the body , cultiuated these thoughtes : Which we shall the better discerne , ●f we examine the differences that are betweene the cognitions , from whence spring the pleasures , of an embodyed , and of a separated soule . When a man knoweth any thing , his soule speculateth the fantasmes that are in his braine ; and by reflexion vpon his knowledge , he is delighted with it : and the more present he maketh it to himselfe by close reflection , the more is his delight : But the knowledge of a separated soule , is alwayes essentially present to her ; it is her very selfe ; her owne very Essence & substance : which can not choose but affect her more vigourously and liuely , then what is but knocking att her dore . Next , a man can thinke of but one single thing att a time ; and att that present , be delighted with that onely : which is , because his soule not being able to worke whiles i●● is in the body , but by meanes of the fantasmes in the braine ; and they being materiall obiects , and residing in a materiall place ; the on●● of them shouldereth out his fellowes , whenfoeuer he cometh to the narrow window by which he is to shew himselfe , and to giue an account of himselfe , to the soule . But a separated soule , shall in the same indiuisible of time , reflect vpon all , and euery least circumstance that she knoweth ; which is , all that she gained knowledge of during her whole abode in the body ; and all that can be deduced out of that : which ( as I haue formerly shewed ) is all that is , or euer was , in the world , or euer shall or can be . And she shall haue perfect knowledge , not onely of euery one in particular ; and of all the causes , effects , conformities , contrarieties , and such other circumstances as immediatly belong to euery one of them : But shall also see the connexion that euery one hath with euery one : how the seuerall linkes of this admirable chaine that containeth all that is in the world , from highest to lowest , are so fitted to one an other , that if any one of them were but broken or in disorder , all would fall in pieces ; and withall , are made with such powerfull art , that euery one of them is a support and a strengthning to all the rest : So that the whole empire of nature must be destroyed , before there can be the least failing in any of the meanest of them . In the third place , lett vs consider how an embodyed soules knowledge is but a kind of passion or impression from outward obiects ; and in all her operations , is dulled by her heauy and resistent copartner : But a separated soule , is a pure actiuity ; a subsistent forme ; no potentiality or resistance belonging to it : So that nothing among bodies , can expresse the nature and manner of its working . It were too litle , farre , to say that her operations are like the soddainenesse of the sunnes illuminating the whole hemisphere , or like the quicke violence of lightening , when in the twinkle of an eye it reacheth from East to West , and teareth vast trees 〈◊〉 by the rootes , and ouerturneth solidest buildinges : for betweene such , and the weake creeping of a snaile , there is some proportion ; but betweene the other , none att all . In the fourth place , lett vs consider how the pleasures of this life consist in succession . When one part of them is , the other partes of it are not . Or rather , no part of them is present . For you can not assigne , not so much as with your thought , any present moment ; but whiles you are thinking of it , it vanisheth . If the Now which you would pitch vpon , be more then an indiuisible instant , part of it is past , and the other part not yet come : what you graspe art , to stay it from sliding by you , is such an indiuisible as may be called nothing ; and yet that nothing , whiles you are but thinking Here it is , is flowne as much out of your reach as the first houre the world was created in . On the other side ; the pleasures of a separated soule , are stretched out as farreias Eternity extendeth it selfe ; by an vninterrupted succession , of continuall enioying without any diuisibility , or subsequent or precedent partes , of its durance : And do comprehend all sucession , all time , ( were it multiplyed by the sandes of the sea , vpon millions of yeares ; and infinitely beyond all that ) not in one permanent and standing Now , of actuall comprehension of them by Existence ( which belongeth onely to God ) but in an assurance and euident certainty , that her present happy cōdition is lyable to no change , to no vicissitude , to no diminution , to no ebbing and flowing . The pleasures that would require millions of yeares to tast them all ( and infinitely more ) are here by a strange Alchymy distilled and exalted into a quintessence of one minute , which minute is fixed for euer from fleeting , is permanent , can neuer fade , or the pleasures of it relent in the least degree . And in the last place , let vs consider how great an allay to all the pleasures of this life , is , the casuality of them●● the thought that they may betaken from him who enioyeth them , or he from them ; and , that griefes and sorrowes may succeede to the happiest humane condition that can be imagined ; is enough to sower it all . But a separated soule is secure that she can neuer haue her state changed . She knoweth , that for all aeternity , it will euer be the fame . Her pleasure being the result of her knowledge , she seeth clearely that there are but three gates by which any change can come in vpon it : And if all these be safely barred & fenced , she is out of danger or any mutation . These three , are ; either her selfe , who is the knower ; or the obiects , which she knoweth ; or the knowledge , that she hath of them . As for her selfe ; her Indiuisibility , and her immateriality , do exempt her , both from any inward principles of fayling within her selfe , and from the power of any outward Agents working to her preiudice . And therefore , on that side , she is immutable . As for the obiects she knoweth ; there can arriue no change in them , in regard of her : for though some of them be subiect to the empire of time , and consequently are alwayes in a fleeting and changing condition ; yet , those changes she is aware of ; they are all present to her : so that if they did not change according to the law setled for their change , which she is fully acquinted with ; there would be a change in them , in respect of her . Lastly ; her knowledge , can admitt no change ; since nothing of what she knoweth , can euer be lost by her ; it being all as indefectible as her selfe ; and indeed , her very selfe ●● Neyther can she purchase any new knowledge to contradict or weaken what she already knoweth ; since she already knoweth all that is knowable . And thus it is euident , that her pleasure , being built vpon these indefectible and vnchangeable foundations , is immutable , and will last in the same height for all 〈◊〉 : And of this , she is most certaine ; and consequently enioyeth her happinesse with all security . Lett vs now summe vp the account we ha●●e bin making of a happy soules ioyes ; and we shall finde the product ●●o great as will amaze vs . We haue found , how the pleasure of the soule , consi●●teth in knowledge ; or , at least , is a result of knowledge . And to preuent , that sensuall men may not thinke ●●his to be but a dull and flatt pleasure , in respect of the poinant ones that the body seemeth to be 〈◊〉 of , we haue shewed , how euen all corporeall pleasures , are no otherwise pleasures then as they affect the soule ; and that it is onely shee , who is delighted with them : And that her ●●ne proper and immediate pleasure , doth affect her , euen in this life , without comparison more then those turbulent ones which come to her by the conduites of her senses , after that custome and due perception of them hath once rendered them familiar to her , and hath restored her to the gouernement of that Common wealth which her vassals had gotten possession of in her minority , and whiles ( as I may say ) she was in her cradle and not yet awake . We haue found , that this pleasing knowledge is not onely , of one , or of a few obiects ; ( like those of men ; who whiles they are intent vpon the delightes of one obiect , can not relish those of an other ) but of the whole machine of the Vniuerse ; all , that Gods hand mayde , nature , euer did , will , or can make ; gouerner , and conserue ; and how , when , and why , she performeth all her workes : Not onely in all the vast world of matter , ( whereof we in this life ; conuerse with , and haue knowledge of , but the least parcels ) But also in the much vaster Region of spirits ; who , besides the neere infinity of their number , haue yet this aduantage ouer corporeal●● thinges , that the meanest and lowest of all that innumerable multitude , is in entire world within himselfe , infinitely greater richer more beautifull and excellent then all the whole vast world of bodies ; And hath infinitely more power to worke what he will vpon it all , and vpon euery part of it , att once , ( when the doing so , should agree with the rules of his wisedome ) then the strongest Gyant that fiction euer built vp , can be imagined to haue in respect of mouing a slender straw or downy feather , or of crushing a litle bubble vpon the water . We haue also found that this vnfatho●●able sea of knowledge , is alwayes in a high flood of a spring ●●ide on euery coast ; not sometimes ebbing on one shore , whiles it floweth on 〈◊〉 other ; but alwayes swelling and ouling euery where ouer all bankes that might hemme it in ; and enioy●●ng all her seuerall knowledges , and the delightes of them , all att ●●nce ; as intent to euery one of them a particular , as to any one of them whatsoeuer : Which are so farre from breeding a confusion , that euen one of that incomprehensible multitude , strenghtheneth and heighteneth euery other of them ; and i●● againe strengthened and ; heightened by it ; and each , maketh the other be more tasted and better relished . Which tast in her , is not a cold or flatt one , dulled and blunted with too much feeding vpon her delightes ( as happeneth to corporeall ones , who loose their smartenesse , either by the too great actiuity of the obiects working vpon them , as when too great a light blindeth ones eyes ; or by being too much glutted with them , as when one surfetteth with delightfull mea●●es ; and the like ) but is all actiuity a kind of perpetuall growing in appetite ; a continuall effusion of itselfe with violent transport vpon this All and euery least parcell o●● it , that so delighteth it . And ye●● this effusion is not as vpon a pleasant obiect art some distance from i●●selfe ; as when a man looketh vpon a faire picture or fairer originall , that delighteth him : Nor yet att lesse distance , as when pleasant wine or meare slideth ouer the pala●●e that is affected with them , and doth mingle some litle atomes of their bodies with it : Nor as when more delightfull motions make a change in the sensiblest partes of a mans body , to begett in him a higher straine of pleasure then all the former ; then which , it may seeme that nothing can be neerer . But it is farre more intime to the soule then all this : It is she her selfe : All this pleasure of hers , is engrafted vpon her owne very Being : ●●t is a perpetuall effusion of her who●●e selfe , vpon her whole selfe : she needeth no reflexion vpon it to make it present to her ( as all pleasures of the body do , to make them perceiued & relished ) or rather , she is in a continuall most strict reflexion vpon it , as hauing it most intimely and substantially present to her ; for it is purely she her very selfe : And therefore she is in a perpetuall , vninterrupted , chewing , relishing , and enioying , with a most quicke sense , hungry appetite , and incomprehensible actiuity , of all and of euery one of these her wonderfull delightes . Which it is not enough to say she enioyeth all att once ; meaning onely that she enioyeth the pleasure of euery one of them att the same time : But because her enioying is without succession ; It fareth with her , as with wine , for example ; the actiuity and vertue of a whole tonne whereof is drawne into a small measure of aether●●all spirit : or as with the diffused sunne beames ; which being reduced to one point , do there become burning ; whereas in their extension , they were but warme : So in her the whole ●●asse and dilatation of delight which we may fansi●● would take vp innumerable millions of yeares to runne ouer , is extracted into one Minute ; into a perpetuall N●●w ; And the vertue ( as I may say ) which required to be diffused through all that vast space , is sublimed into this narrow , roome : and yet againe this narrow roome , or the concentrated vertue of it , is multiplyed so as to be all of it in euery moment of such a vast succession : As if after the extraction of the spirit , it were , multiplyed to fill againe the whole vessel with such : or after the burning glasses exposition to the sunne , euery line of light reflected from it or refracted through it , should become as hott and burning , as that single one which maketh the toppe of the Cone that terminateth the sunnes rayes . Now then , after we haue multiplyed such excesses , such burning pointes of pleasure , by euery one of the seuerall innumerable pleasures she enioyeth thus all att once , and that she is effused vpon with the whole actiuity of her Nature ( which is all sence , all fire ) What will be the product and totall of such immense particulars ? The vast number of atomes of sand , that Archimedes hath so wittily sett downe , and shewed was sufficient to fill vp all the space betweene our earth and the heauen ; would not expresse this foote of our account ; No not though it were neuer so often multiplyed within it selfe . For those multiplications would still begett but terminated numbers ; whereas this , is beyond all number , as she is aboue all time , by being aboue and beyond all quantity . Lastly , when for a crowne and full completing of all this immense delight and hapinesse , we shall consider , that the state she is in , admitteth no lessening or change ; that she is secure she can neuer loose any smallest parcell of it , nor be interrupted in the full and vigourous fruition of it ; but that it will last euer the same , for all aeternity ; and beas it were still beginning , and still fresh ; Your Lordship ( I belieue ) will not expect from me any further reflection vpon this dazeling subiect . I will therefore put an end to my course and weake expressions , that fall infinitly short of what I feele within me , when , in silence and in quiet , I contemplate the ioyes and blisse of a separated soule , departed out of her body , after due cultiuating her selfe there , by such a course of life , as Reason ( could we but discerne and follow her directions ) prescribeth to euery man : The deuiating from whose rules , begetteth such an vnhappy state as on the other side of this medall , I haue endeauoured to engraue . Both which , I haue sheved to be vnchangeable , as long as the soules that enioy them do remaine naked and seuered from their bodies . But what alteration they may be capable of , if euer they come to be clothed againe by their bodies , and to be reunited to them ; ( by whose mediation onely , new impressions may be made vpon a soule ) belongeth to another place to consider . THE X. CHAPTER . That the complete Beatitude of a separated soule consisteth in the sight of God . MAy I not seeme vnto your Lordship to haue amplifyed & exaggerated beyond possibility of truth , the states either of weale or of 〈◊〉 , belonging to a separated soule ? If it happen , that any besides your selfe , do reade this discourse ( especially if they be not inured to rigourous proofes , and to Metaphysicall speculations ) I can not expect , but that they should looke vpon the immense happinesse or misery , I haue in it allotted to the share of a separated soule , as an vnbelieuable Paradoxe . And they that should be most fauourable to me , will be apt to suspect ( according to their looser manner of iudging morall affaires ; which endure not such peremptory decisions , and so remote inferences heaped one vpon an other ) that howeuer there seemeth to be a pretty connexion in all I haue said , and an appearance of a sequele betweene the principles I haue taken , and the conclusions I haue deduced out of them ; Yet , that I haue driuen them too farre ; and that in so perplexed and long a discourse , there may easily haue slided in some litle errors or aequiuocations in sundry iointes of it , which in the last conclusion may haue caused an enormous mistake , though euery one of them in particular were almost an imperceptible one : And therefore , that these are rather pretty dreames , hanging handsomely together , of a much thinking and melancholike man ; then reall and solide truths . And att best , they will looke admiringly vpon them , as vpon vnconceiuable expressions ; without being att all moued and affected by them . But whatsoeuer others may thinke , who like vnto ill husbandes do looke but vpon the totall sommes of the accountes their Stewardes bring them in , without examining the particulars from whence they grow ; I am sure your Lordship will exactly weigh the reasons , vpon which I ground this bold and far , re-reaching conclusion ; And when you haue done so , I doubt not but you will find in it the same fault that I do ; namely , that my expressions arriue not to sett out the reall vastnesse of the thing I speake of . To the reasons I haue brought , I could haue added many more in confirmation of this great truth , for , the arguments I haue produced , are but a few , and that first occurred in the heate of writing , among the many that I might haue employed , if I would haue aymed att making a large and complete treatise vpon this subiect . But my ayme , is , onely to giue your Lordship hintes of the chiefe pointes that I ●●ould recommend to your consideration , as relying more vpon what your o●●ne strong discourse will suggest vnto you vpon such important considerations , after your thoughtes are once wakened to attend to them ; then vpon any thing I should be able to say . I pretend but to spring the game for you : And then , if you like what riseth , you will fly it home . If an Apologie for the faintnesse of my expressions , was euer needfull ; certainly it is now most necessary , for what I shall say in this Chapter : Where I labour vnder such a Weight of matter , that I want language to expresse but a bare shaddow of it . Yet I must not do as the great painter did , who hauing expressed as much passion as he could in the lookes of the by-standers att Iphigenia's Sacrifice , drew a veyle ouer her fathers face ; because he found his art too weake , to describe so great a sorrow as his ; And so left it to the spectators thoughts , to conceiue what a one that might be . For if I say nothing more then I haue done , of a separated soules blisse or woe : It may seeme that I haue no apprehension or suspition of any thing , beyond what I haue already layed groundes for . And on the other side , if I should go about to delineate scrupulously that which is the title of this Chapter ; I should , not onely misse of displaying to your Lordship the redundant light that shineth in this next region ; but strike my selfe blind with looking too fixedly vpon it . I will then go●● a middle way , And say enough to make you see , how that meruailous exuberance of good or bad I haue shewed doth betyde a separated soule , is nothing , ( not neere so much as an Atome to the whole world ) in respect of what will be her lotte in order to the seeing 〈◊〉 God Almighty : And yet , not engulfe my selfe farre in this 〈◊〉 ocean , that hath no shore on any side . It is euident , out of what ha●● beene already sayed ; that , seeing this life is short , our acts in it meane , and our science in it very limited and narrow : And that on the contrary side , the next life is aeternall , a soules acts in it wonderfull high , and her science immense : The great and finall happinesse of man , is not to be expected in this life , but in the next . It is euident also , that our hapinesse being to be respited till the next life , where we shall haue no senses to reape pleasures by●● it can not consist in sensuall pleasures : And consequently , that it must consist in the operations of the soule ; which are nothing but knowledge , & what resulteth out of that . Now , all knowledge , is either of effects , or of causes . Of the first kind , is all that knowledge of a separated soule which we haue bin hitherto discour●●ing of : for , all the obiects of it , are ●●omprised vnder the generall head of Creatures . The knowledge of ●●heir Creator , can not be doubted ●●o be as much superior to that , as the nature and excellency of such a cause , is superior to the effect that proceedeth from it . And considering the dignity of so Almighty and infinite a cause , as God , the Creator of all thinges ; a naturall man may reasonably question whither a separated soule ( who is but a particular and limited creature ) be capable of arriuing to see ( that is , to know ) this all comprehending and infinitely all exceeding cause . He may soone be resolued of his doubt , if he reflect vpon the course of nature in wafting man kinde to his long home : for doing so , he will see how this life is a perpetuall progresse in bettering , ( or , designed to the bettering ) of the soule 's knowledge in the next life ; as being the end of humane nature , and the onely thing that can giue it rest and satisfaction . He will also see , that as in the next life there is an infinite encrease of knowledge : so must there be also , an infinite encrease of the desire to see the cause of those infinite effects which we shall then see & admire ; Experience telling vs , that a cleare and lightsome vnderstanding , is euer vnquiett and thirsting to see the cause of the effect he taketh content in ; And reason likewise abetting it , by shewing how it is impossible to see an effect perfectly , if one pierce not into the cause of it ; for vnlesse he do so , he would not know why the effect is . So that it is euident , the whole course of nature , driueth to promote and aduance in vs the desire of seeing the Vniuersall cause of the infinite effects that a separated soule shall see . And consequently , the desire of seeing God our creatour , is planted and engrafted in man by the intention of nature . What is so ; is impossible to be frustraneous , and totally without effect ; but of necessity will be fulfilled in some . For , Nature , is nothing else , but the rules that the infinite wisedome and goodnesse of God hath alotted to all creatures . And it would not agree with those attributes , to prescribe any of them a periode , vnto which none of their kinde should euer arriue . Well may those he planteth in the Sphere of contigency , miscarry in sundry indiuiduals ; since it is the nature of contingency , that some should miscarry , whiles others arriue to their periode . But if all should miscarry , and none succeede ; it would no longer be contingency , but impossibility : and it might be concluded , that nature were vnduely moulded ; and the meanes to bring it to its end , vnwisely ordered . And in our case , we might adde , malice and cruelty , to the imprudence : since , by the course of our nature , we should be brought ineuitably to an eternity of misery , by causing in vs a most vehement and most actife desire of knowing and seeing that which we must neuer attaine to see . And the best men , that haue most cultiuated their soules according to the prescriptions of nature , would drinke deepest 〈◊〉 this bitter cuppe of gall and misery . Therefore , we may settle it for a firme and certaine truth , that some soules shall arriue to see , ( that is , to know ) God , the Vniuersall cause of all thinges ; as already I haue proued , that all soules shall arriue to know all thinges else . Lett vs now compare these two knowledges , one with an other ; and examine which of them is the greater and the more excellent . We are sure that God is an vnderstanding : And consequently , he knoweth what he is to do , before he doth it . Whence followeth , that he being the cause and maker of all creatures , he vnderstandeth and knoweth them all . Therefore , he that should haue that great register displayed to him to reade the contents of it , would find all creatures comprehended in it . And to know them there , is so much nobler , then to know them in themselues ; by how much nobler and excellenter , they must necessarily be in that great vnity and identity which they haue in him , then in their owne multiplicity and dispersion . Vnto which we may adde , the infinite excesse of thinges , which he could , but neuer will , make ; ouer those he hath or shall haue made . And then we can not doubt , but that the knowledge of God , must be farre beyond the knowledge of all creatures . But when besides this knowing of all creatures in God , we shall putt into the scale to it the knowledge of God in his owne nature and Essence ; the other scale wherein is the knowledge of creatures in themselues , will not onely become light beyond all proportion , but will vanish out of sight ; like a candle , that though it giue light enough to make a whole chamber luminous in the night , dissappeareth ( euen whiles it burneth ) if you sett it in the beames of the noone day sunne . They who vnderstand Metaphysikes , will contemplate how the nature of Existence , is of a pitch incomparably aboue that of Essence . For Essences are but possibilities ; dead notions ; till Existence come to enliuen and to actuate them . After which they are still defectible . For they carry alwayes with them a capacity of being diuided from their Existence ; which if it happen , they presently fall backe to their inuisible Chaos . But Existence can neuer fade . The nature of it , is , to Be ; and consequently , to exclude not Beeing . It dwelleth in so high a region , as nothing can arriue thither , but whom It eleuateth vp to it selfe . Here , God hath his habitation . But I correct my selfe : this is improperly said ; as though God , had his place among other thinges , likewise ranked there . He endureth no companion . He filleth the whole region . All of it belongeth to him singly . He alone possesseth it all . And therefore it followeth , that a ●●oule raised vp to the knowledge and sight of him , must needes be infinitely more noble and more Excellent , then an other that hath but the Essences of thinges drawne into her by the knowledge of them . If then , these two knowledges , that of God , and that of creatures , could not agree together ; but , that to acquire the one , the other must be deserted ; There can be no doubt , but that the knowledge of creatures , ought to be abandonned for the sight of him . For it is euident , that the happinesse which a soule must necessarily enioy by seeing of him ; is as much beyond that happinesse which we haue formerly described , resulting out of the vast knowledge which a soule hath in the next life ; as that knowledge , exceedeth the tryfling knowledge mankinde enioyeth in this world . But this is not the case . These knowledges are not incompossible . For it is the nature of knowledge , to be so farre from ones hindering an other ; that there is none , but of its nature , induceth and perfecteth some other knowledge . And accordingly , the knowledge of Almighty God encreaseth the knowledge of creatures ; shewing vs why they are ; and solidating their knowledge , vpon the vnshakable foundation of Gods knowledge . And consequently , the more that a soule shall know God ; the more firme and the more strong will be the knowledge she shall haue of creatures . Neuerthelesse , when we consider that God is an obiect , whose admirablenesse is aequall to his owne vnderstanding : that is , exceeding ours , beyond what it possible to be conceiued : we must conclude , that when a created vnderstanding enioyeth the knowledge and sight of him , it can not choose but be so employed and taken vp by that sight , as not withstanding the vehement desire which we haue shewed it hath to see it , yet it hath not desire enough to cleaue and apply it selfe to that obiect : much lesse , hath it any left for other thinges , but meerely as it is carried on by the sight of God . And consequently , it mattereth not to a soule that seeth God , whither she see any thing else or no : but she is entirely contented and ouerwhelmed with the greatnesse of that fundamentall sight . And although she knoweth and estimeth to the full the true worth of the sight of other thinges : Yet she is so drowned and absorbed in the sight of God ( which so infinitely exceedeth the other ) that she is no more affected with it , then a man would be with the hauing of that which is but a pure medium to helpe him to compasse some end or good he desireth for its owne sake . As for example ; when a sicke man drinketh a potion to recouer his health ; if the physike be such as hath no plesantnesse , ( but rather the contrary ) in its tast ; he valueth it not att all for its owne sake , but onely as it is a meanes to procure him health . And so , the soule that seeth God , accepteth of the sight of all creatures , as a meere consequent and appendix to the sight of God . Thus we see clearely , that in this composition of these two knowledges ; the whole of both , is comprised in that which is the principall ; And by it , is all the pleasure , and in it , all the good of them both . And consequently ; God and the sight of him , is the true blisse of man ; the sole end for which he was created ; the periode whereunto nature driueth , in all her course concerning him ; and which once attained , he is quiett , entirely contented , and can wish for no more . On the contrary side ; If a separated soule do faile of the sight of God , she cannot choose but know , that all this we haue declared is true ; And the euidence of it , will be confirmed to her by all the immense knowledge she shall haue in the next world : And consequently , she must needes be vnspeakably ●●rtured by this vnhappy losse ; and , ●●s it were , gnash her teeth and gnaw her owne bowels , for remorse , shame , and indignation . And thus , the misery or happinesse of a separated soule ; by the interuening of God into the account , cometh to be raised and swelled aboue what in the last Chapter I declared of them , as much as what is infinite exceedeth the least parcell of Quantity ; AEternity , time ; selfe-Existence , defectible natures ; And in a word , God , creatures . I am persuaded that after all this , your Lordship will not censure me of being niggardly in allowing pleasure or paine to soules in the next world . Yet seeing that the composition of man , includeth a body , aswell as a soule : I conceiue you will not be displeased , if I adde a word or two concerning the pleasures of sense , which will belong to a happy soule : the contrary whereof , will be the lotte of an vnhappy one ; And therefore what I shall say of the one , will require but turning ouer the leafe to referre it to the other . It is very true , a separated soule is eapable of no other pleasure , then such as belongeth to a soule : Yet if we looke well into the matter , we shall finde , that this pleasure of the soule compriseth also all the pleasures of the senses . For this end , your Lordship may please to remember , how I haue formerly shewed that in the sensuall pleasures which a man enioyeth in this life , it is not his senses that are affected with them . For , all pleasure dependeth of knowledge : And therefore , wheresoeuer we meete with expressions or semblances of pleasure , that are not accompanyed with knowledge ; we may truly say , they are but like such expressions and imitations of life , as cunning artificers bring to passe by wheeles and engines enclosed in a boxe , whereby the statue of a man , of a beast , of a bird , of a fish , or of a fly , is made to imitate the naturall motion of the creature it tepresenteth . But our senses are not endewed with knowledge , as hath beene explicated : Therefore the pleasure which they conuey vnto vs , can not reside in them ; but belongeth onely to that part of vs , where knowledge is ; that is , to our soule : And in truth is nothing else but the very pleasure of knowledge . Hence it followeth , that since in the next life we haue all knowledge ; and consequently all knowledge gotten by sense ; we must haue there , also all pleasure of sense . So that we shall haue there by our naturall knowledge , all pleasure , both of sense and of vnderstanding . Now , because the sight of God comprehendeth in it selfe , all pleasure of vnderstanding ; it followeth , that in it alone is comprised all pleasure of sense , and of vnderstanding , together with that pleasure which is proper to the sight of God . Which in summe , is a collection of all good , in an act that of its owne nature is vnperishable . And so it is euident , the sight of God , is , true and complete hapinesse ; including in it selfe , all that a man can desire ; without feare of euer loosing it : And therefore , perfectly quieteth the minde that enioyeth it , for all AEternity . I have said vnperishable ; not onely , as the soule her selfe and her acts , are naturaly vnchangeable : but , out of the speciality and propriety of this very act of seeing God . For , God of his owne Nature , actuating all thinges that haue Potentiality to him ; and the soule , being by Loue a potentiality to God ; It followeth , that as long as she loueth him , he can not forbeare the actuating of her ; which is , the being her Blisse . And on the other side ; his actuating of her , being her seeing that he is all her good ; she can not cease from louing him , as long as he doth not cease from actuating her . So that , his actuation , being necessitated by her louing him ; and her louing him , being necessitated by his actuating of her ; the conjunction is made vnseparable , by the very Essences of the two partes . Besides this , if we consider how diuines teach vs , that our beatificall vision is made by the immediate conjunof God Almighty his Essence to our vnderstanding ; and that by consequence , his being vnderstood by him selfe , becometh the Being of our soule as it vnderstandeth him : And , that his being vnderstood by himselfe , is his very AEternity : We shall find , that Eternity it selfe , is the duration of our soule , as she is the vnderstanding or seeing of him . Now , if Eternity be the duration of our blisse ; who can question whither it be vnperishable , or no ? See ( My Lord ) what a pitch we are arriued vnto , to participate the very God-head it selfe , in its owne Eternity ! Is not what the Apostle hath told vs , perfectly true , Quod , oc●●lus non vidit , ne●● aur●● andiuit , nec in cor hominis ascendit , quae praeparauit Deus ijs qui diligunt ilum ? THE XI . CHAPTER . That there is a certaine methode and way to bring mankind to Beatitude . And of the necessity of knowing it . WHat hath beene hither to said ; bauing euinced the Immortality of the soule ; and pointed att the pleasures of a happy one when she is out of the body , together with the miseries of an vnhappy one ; and glanced in grosse , att the different wayes which leade to these so different states ; And settled this great Principle , That Beatitude is not to be looked for in this world , but in the next : It can not be doubted , but that when an vnderstanding man shall haue well considered all this , his heart will be sett on fire to learne which is the straight , and beaten way , that may leade him with security to so great a good , intended him by God and Nature . For he can not choose but see , that no good of this world can be paragoned to that blisse ; as also , that no action is worth the doing , that is not aymed att purchasing that hoped and desired Beatitude . But when to this he shall adde ; that although he trauell not by designe in the opposite way , but that meerely through heedelessenesse or ignorance he do walke out of the vight way ; all such by-steppes do swarue his soule from her true good ; and as farre as they aduance him not , so farre they preiudice him : He will then conclude , that the methode and course of arriuing to this supreme and sole good ; is not onely the worthiest , the noblest , and the vsefullest art he can study : But that in very deed , all others are but fond and vaine misse-spendings of time ; And that this onely , is the businesse he is to employ himselfe a bout , with all his industry and application . He will be afraid of being ill directed : and will be solicitous to meete with a cleare and distinct rule that may instruct him how to treade boldly in euery steppe he is to make : And therefore will not be content with discerning in grosse , that the entertaining of his thoughts and affections with Intellectuall goods , will make him happy ; and that his settling them vpon sensuall ones , will bring him to a contrary condition : But seeing that these generals do branch out into numerous particulars , euery one of which requireth a particular diffection , and proper motiues and inducements to embrase or auoyde them ; He will be anxious and serupulous in seeking out the greatest certitude and infallibility that man's nature and the course of second causes can afford him , to be right in this pointe . In the meane time , during such his attentiue and earnest inquiry , he will haue the comfort of being secure that there is such an art : And that it is not like the specious vndertakinges ( for example ) of those who pretend to an vniuersall science , or Matrice tongue , whereby one may learne all others in very short time ; which haue no subsistance , but in credulous persons ayry fansies . For he who is able to weigh in his thoughts the progresse of Gods prouidence in his wayes to compasse his desired Endes vpon this world ; can not doubt but that he must haue framed stronger engines to bring about the saluation of mankinde , then for any other designe that he hath sett on foote within our reach and kenning : not onely , as being the noblest end of all others ; but euen that , vnto which the whole course of nature tendeth , and for which all this world that we conuerse with is made . And therefore he will conclude , that the security of obtaining the true meanes to gaine Beatitude , must be as great ( if not greater ) then the security of mens liuing peaceably and happily together vnder the reglement of ciuill and politicke constitutions , or what other security soeuer is in the gouernement of man's life . And consequently , if he compare the certitude belonging to the science which is to bring mankinde to Beatitude , with the certitude of such knowledges or rules as gouerne the arts that are vsuall among men , ( as Agriculture , Military discipline , the art of Nauigation , and all sortes of handicraftes and trades ) he will looke for att the least as great in this science , if not greater . But all these sortes of men , being taught by continuall experience , that when they worke according tho the rules of their art , the effect succeedeth to their wish ; are so secure in their seuerall wayes , that they can not admitt any doubt of the certainty and truth of their rules . Wee haue reason therefore to expect in this art of gouerning our actions in order to Beatitude , att the least such a security as may aequalise the security springing from experience that is in trades and manufactures . And this is by so much the more necessary , by how much the subiect of this art , hath greater difficulties then the subiects of others arts . First , because this is both speculatiue and practicall ; whereas others are onely practicall . In others , euery man desireth to do well : In this , for the most part , passions and interests make men desire not to do well . In others , no man doubteth of his rules ; and all his labour is onely to apply them rightly : But in this art , there is difficulty , aswell to vnderstand and belieue the principles of it ; as to apply them to our life when we know them . In other arts , a Master or teacher is readily mett with , and the manner to acquire them is obuious : But in this , a maine difficulty is the seeking and discerning of a right teacher . Lastly , other arts containe but some one part of a mans action and life ; But this , comprehendeth all our whole life ; and principally , the highest partes of it . I may therefore conclude , that the art of comming to Beatitude ( which we call Religion ) is the highest , the amplest , and the necessariest of all Artes whatsoeuer . The highest ; because the scope of it is to gaine Beatitude : which is our chiefe End ; and vpon which , all that is otherwise pleasing to vs ought to depend . The amplest ; because in the vse and application of it , it extendeth to all our actions . And the most necessary ; because if he be not instructed in it , he will infallibly miscary and perish . For as a man that is no Architect or Musician , and hath not learned how to build a house or to play a lesson on the lute ; though he will not be blamed for his ignorance in those arts , ( which happily is not through his owne default ; but by some impossibility of getting instructions in them ) yet if the one goe to build himselfe an habitation , or the other to touch a lute , they will not effect what they ayme att : But the disordely machine of stones and timber of the first's imitation of a house , will fall vpon his head ; and the seconds inconcerted strokes and stoppes , will annoy his owne and his hearers eares . In like manner , if a man haue not the true knowledge of liuing so as to attaine Beatitude ; Although he be not blamed for incredulity , if it were neuer duely proposed vnto him ; yet he shall faile of obtaining the blisse that followeth out of a well ordered life , and shall inherit in the next world all those tormentes and miseries which I haue expressed and shewed to be the effects and sequele of a disordered life in this . And therefore , no excuse serueth a man's turne for his ignorance in this art : which is so absolutely necessary , that without it ( be the cause what it will ) he is lost and ruined for euer . THE XII . CHAPTER . How the methode and science of attaining to Beatitude ( which is true Religion ) is to be learned . And that it is not come into the world by humane reason or inuention . THE art then of well liuing , or Religion , being a certaine and a diffu●●ed science , reaching to euery action of a man's life , as is deliuered ; Our next inquiry must be ; how to compasse the knowledge of it . It is euident that there can be but two wayes to arriue vnto it ; namely ; Either by ones owne Inuention , or else by an others instruction : There being no third way of acquiring any science . For , a man cometh vnto it , either by driuing of consequences out of knowledges that are euident as soone as they are proposed ( such like as are the Axiomes , vpon which Mathematicians do build their demonstrations ) And this is the course of Inuention : or else , he must be beholding to some other man who knoweth that science , for instructing him in it . And from such a one , he may deriue his knowledge in two different manners : The first , when he that is posseded of a truth , doth so explicate it and all belonging to it , that att the last the learner seeth the truth it selfe , and comprehendeth all the reasons of it , as fully as his instructour doth ; And so , though he be beholding to him for begetting such science in him ; yet now he hath no longer neede of him , but is as strong in it as he . And the gaining of knowledge in this manner , may be conceiued to sauour in some sort of Inuention , as well as of discipline . But the second , belongeth purely to discipline ; As when the learner arriueth no higher then barely to vnderstand what his teacher sayth ; and att the furthest , to haue some morall likely hood that it is true ; but att the head , relyeth vpon his teacher , as one who he is certainly persuaded can neither be ignorant of the truth he deliuereth , nor can lye and deceiue his disciple . For if either of these faile , the disciple can haue no certainty or rationall confidence of the t●●uth deliuered him : And then consequently , in our present case of Religion , he will want that quiet , that security , & that content of hart , which accompanyeth ones belieuing that he is in the right way of obtaining the happinesse he aymeth att . Now to apply vnto the knowledge of Religion , these two wayes of attaining any science , Inuention and discipline : I will begin with examining whither it may reasonably be hoped , that humane Inuention could discouer it , or no . Some may thinke the negatiue ; because in the mysteries of it there are no lines of demonstration ; that is , no such connexion of them vnto principles euident to vs by nature , that out of them any man , be he neuer so knowing , or euen an Angell , could deduce them . To discusse this in particular , were to enter vpon all the seuerall mysteries of our faith ; and shew , how they either are , or are not , connexed with reason : which , besides that it were two long a worke for my designed breuity , would be too heauy a burthen for my weake shoulders ; who am not so vaine as to pretend to any more of diuinity then what is necessary for euery rationall man to settle him in a right course ; which amounteth to no more , then to the finding of a certain and infallible guide to carry him safely to the end of this important iorney ; But if your Lordship desire to satisfy your selfe herein , giue me leaue referre you to Maister Whites . Dialogues ( vnder the name of Rushworth ) of the Iudgement of common sense in choice of Religion , and to the same author's sacred Institutions newly come a broad into●● the world ; in which learned workes you will find abundanr content . That therefore which I shall note vpon this occasion , is , That howeuer there may be in the mysteries themselues , sufficient groundes to build demonstrations vpon ; yet in regard of vs , there is no hope that we should be able to penetrate into them , without hauing first learned them otherwise . For our Nature is so encumbred with materiall fantasmes ; and all that we speake , or thinke , is deliuered in such aequinocall wordes ; and aboue all , most men are so blinded by passions and so byassed by interests ; and they ●●eete with so litle to helpe them in this designe ; that very few ( and they neither , not till towards the end of their life ) can be expected to make any progresse in so high an attempt . And therefore we may conclude , it is impossible , by inuention to reach the amplitude of those mysteries which are necessary to be knowne , to bring mankinde to Beatitude ; the doing whereof , is the scope of that art or science which we call Religion . Vnto which determination , drawne out of mature considering of the causes , no small corroboration is added by experience , shewing vs effectiuely how litle mankinde had aduanced herein during the long space of 4. or 5 , thousand yeares , that nature had continued from the beginning of the world , till our Sauiours coming to teach it vs completely . For if we looke vpon what the learned Grecians deliuered to their Roman Masters , att the time when the ouergrowne wealth of Rome was proposed vnto them to fire their wittes to find out what Beatitude was ( which was the learnedest age , the most abounding with great men , and the last , in which their studies were employed on that subiect ; and in a great measure sharpened by the opposition of Christianity , then beginning to grow into the world ) we shall finde that their attempts neuer reached with any steadinesse beyond this life . For although some of them discoursed that the soule was Immortall ; Yet they held it rather as a plausible opinion , then as a solide truth whereon men should ground their actions , and should gouerne their liues here by it . As your Lordship ( if you be desirous to satisfy your selfe in this particular ) may find in Lucretius , Tully , Seneca , Epitectus , Antoninus the Emperor , and seuerall others of that straine ; who prescribing remedies against the feare of death , and making exhortations to vertue in this life ; do neuer extend their motiues to any good obtainable in the next life . Which your Lordship may see proued att large in Lactantius ; who purposely maketh it his taske to do so . For of those Philosofers who guessed furthest into the state of the future world , none were euer able to ftame any scantling of the diuersity of the soules treatement there , otherwise then by Gods arbitrary distributing of reward , or inflicting of punishement : which way belongeth clearely to beliefe , and not to science . So that , as farre as history can informe vs , Man's nature and witt did neuer attaine to the first principle of well liuing ; which consisteth in considering what condition soules be in , after they are out of the body : so farre were they from hauing discouered true motiues to ballance our passions , and to sett vs in an euen way betweene the allurements of this world and the hopes of the next . And this is the good that we expect from Religion : whose scope is to raise and enflame the soules that are a wake , and to rouse those that are a sleepe in the dalliance of this world , to the esteeme and relishing of the happinesse they may enioy in the next . THE XIII . CHAPTER . That religion hath not bin introduced into the world by one mans teaching an other . Nor by Angels instructing of men . But hath bin taught by God . And that Christian Religion is the true one . IT can not then be expected that Religion should be iutroduced among men by inuention or strength of witt . It remaineth that it must be by discipline and by teaching . Whereof , seeing there are diuers kindes , or rather diuers kindes of teachers ; our next enquiry shall be , att whose handes we are to looke for it . Our first position shall exclude one man's teaching an other . For , suppose that some one man should haue beaten out by long study the true way of attaining to happinesse ( which neuerthelesse , out of the former discourse seemeth vnlikely , if not impossible ) the way for him to deriue it to others , must be , either by demonstrating it to them by reason , or by winning their beliefe to it because he assureth them of it . But , demonstration , in a matter so high and so difficult , can not be communicated to many : very few being capable of the strength of such a proofe , in much lower and easier subiects . It can not then be deriued to the people by any other meanes then by their relying vpon him that should positiuely tell them what they are to belieue . But vpon him , they could not relye : for he being but a man they can not be assured whither what he sayth be true or false : either , because he might be deceiued himselfe , and so deliuer them a falshood for a truth : Or else , because there might be considerations for him to propose it to them for true , although in his owne hart●●lie knew or doubted it to be false : As for example , either his owne particular profit , or glory , might preuaile with him to do so ; or he might deceiue them for their benefit ; keeping them by that meanes vnder good lawes , and to an obedience that should make them liue happily in this world . And from the suspition of this latter , euen the best man that can be imagined ( so he be no more but a man ) can not be free . For , if he want power to introduce among men that which he iudgeth best for them ; it may be doubted that he ayme●●h att bringing about his designes by art and cunning ; according to the old parable , of sowing the foxes skinne to the lyons to make it reach . Now if all these difficulties happen in the case of one man's propagating to the multitude this science of Religion , which he is supposed to haue beaten out by his owne industry & learning : They would be no whitte lesse , but rather more , when such 〈◊〉 and demonstrators should be many . And without their being many , it can not be conceiued how the generality of mankinde that is spread so wyde in place , an of so long durance in time , can be imbued with it . Adde to this , the much that halfe learned men , and halfe wittes , would obiect against Religion proposed by such as pretend to relye on it because they haue demonstration for it ; which would be farre more plausible to the vulgar of mankinde , then all that can be said to solue those obiections ; considering the profoundenesse and subtility that can not chose but be in such a demonstration , and the vngraspablenesse of the very Nature , and Essence of a separated soule , which is the necessary entrance into it : So that such men would giue ouer their inquiry and attention , before euer they aduance so farre as to weigh the reasons whither or no a soule can be without a body ; because they can not conceiue what such a soule is : And yet this is the hinge & fundamentall pointe of all Religion . So that it can not be expected , that if there were no more efficacious meanes then this to persuade mankinde ; they should by vertue of this onely , dis-seise their harfs from the goods of this world ( to which the course of our nature gleweth them strongly ) and settle them vpon vnconceiuable ones in an other world ; from whence they haue not experience of any soule that hath come to assure them thereof , and to informe them what kind of inhabitants they shall become there , when they arriue to the possession of those goods . We may then from this discourse conclude , that for prudent men to receiue Religion in the way of beliefe , they will expect to haue it built vpon a stronger rocke then humane credit . The next stoppe aboue the degree of men , is the Sphere of spirits or of Angels . Among whom , seeing there be good ones , and bad ones ; lett vs begin with considering what we may expect in this case att the handes of these latter : And lett vs suppose them to conuerse with men , by giuing them Oracles ; as auncient stories do record of Apollo att Delphos , or of Iupiter Hammon in Lybia , and the like . Can any thing they shall declare and reach , be a sufficient ground of beliefe ? Surely , if euer any such Oracle were animated with its ambitious soule ( as is pretended ) it is not reasonable to expect that the spirit of lying should alwayes speake truth . And if he do not ; one single lye , taketh away the credit of all the Religion that he should haue founded . For , if he can , and sometimes do , lye : Whence may it be certaine that he doth not lye , when he deliuereth such vnknowable thinges as those which concerne the state of the other world ? And consequently , if mankinde had no better security then this , the greate●● and highest designe of nature , woul●● be loosely gimalled , and more ●●●terring then euery meane trade . But lett vs consider what security we may haue from good spirits . If such should denounce Religion to vs ; it must be either in their owne names , that they would speake ; or it must be in Gods , as his Ambassadors . If in their owne names , what confidence can he to whom they speake , haue , that they may not be aswell of the tribe of lying spirits , as of the blessed Angels ? If he aske them , whither there be not such deceiuing ones , who were once their companions , and of the same nature as they ; and are since become wicked and malitious ; they will acknowledge there are , And then , what infallible markes can he haue to secure him , that these he conferreth with , may not be such , though they stile themselues Angels of light ? And their very speaking in their owne names , may iustly render them suspected : for , if they were such as they pretend to be ; that is , out of danger of falling ( as their mates haue done ) by hauing perpetuall sight of the aeternall verity ; then , their very being such , would reasonably make a man expect that what they deliuer him of that verity and of the way to arriue to it , should rather be a message from him that maketh them so stable and indefectible , then an instruction proceeding from their owne single impulse . And after all , if he do beleeue them to be of the happy sort , and for that cause do giue credit to what they say ; it is in effect vpon the score of him that enlighteneth and strengtheneth them , that he beleeueth them ; And the speaking of such , is rather from him , then from themselues . We may therefore conclude , that there neuer was , nor euer could , or can be , any true Religion among Gentiles or Idolaters , or amōg any who do not professe their beliefe hath its source from the true omnipotent God , the selfe-verity , and the spring-bonity . Nor can they pretend to such certainty of rules for bringing them to Beatitude , as experience sheweth accompanieth the rules of all trades and manufactures . All these then being excluded from all pretence to true Religion ; and all created instructors , appearing of too meane credit to settle it in the world ; It remaineth onely that we haue recourse to God alone for this supreme blessing ; And that we inquire what lawes and ordinances he hath giuen mankinde , to gouerne and direct them vntill the end of the world , that they may attaine to Beatitude . And we find no markes in story of any , that with likelihood we may pitch vpon , besides those tree memorable lawes which haue succeeded one an other : to witt , The law of Nature ; the written one ; and the last , giuen by Christ . The first of these , can not be admitted now to any plea ; the succession of it being so interrupted , that no body can claime the inheritance of that faith , Nor doth any body know the feuerall contents and articles of it , further then as some few of them may be supposed to be included in the written law ; and by the succession of them who professe the written law , deriued in them and in Cristians to our dayes . The Iewes can as litle pretend that the law which God giue them by Moses , is the religion whereby the whole bulke of mankinde in all ages is to be saued . The uery nature and essence of it , and all the maine circumstances that accompany it , do contradict that clayme . For it is manifestly limited to selected persons , to a determined time , and to a narrow place . Nor is it a good obiection , that some Proselytes of other nations were allowed to be adioyned to the seed of Abraham , in participation of rites and sacrifices : For such an adiunction could not reach to whole nations ; but contrariwise , some were expressely forbidden by name . And so , their law , was not a law for mankind ; but onely for the family of Abraham . Besides , God himselfe determined the land in which it should be practised : So as , sacrifice could not be lawfully made , nor altars erected , in the way of their profession , in any country but their owne : Which conuinceth that it was neuer intended for the saluation of mankinde , whose numerous progeny is dispersed ouer the face of the whole earth . And it is cleare that their Messias was promised them att the end of the raigne of Dauids house , and before their dispersion into the whole world : both which can not be denyed to haue bin long since performed : And consequently , it was a temporary Religion , and not designed to last till the worlds end ; which is a necessary propriety of that Religion , whereby all nations ( that is , all mankinde ) in all ages , are to obtaine Beatitude . It remaineth then , that Christian Religion must necessarily be the law that God hath designed for the saluation of all men , att all times , and in all places . Yet because Mahomet pretendeth as well as Christians , that his law is deriued from God ; it will not be amisse to examine his clayme in a word or two . First , there is a great disparity betweene the Christians and the Turkes law , in this ; that Mahomet pretendeth not to be himselfe God , as Christ doth ; Nor that he had his law immediately from God ; but that it was sent him by an Angell . Next , he alloweth Christ to haue bin a Prophet ; and yet taxeth him of lying for hauing giuen himselfe out to be God . By doing which , he maketh his owne doctrine rely but vpon a fallible authority . For since he obiecteth lying to Christ , whom he alloweth to be a Prophett : What security can one haue , that he who pretendeth not to be more , lyeth not as well as he ? Againe ; Christians pretend a publicity of infinite miracles done by Christ , attesting his God-head and the truth of his doctrine : Mahomet and his sectators , none ; or att least , such as by their owne confession are but obscure ones . Lastly ; the abominations of Mahomets law , against both reason and nature ; and a totall submitting of the soule by it to bodily obiects ; do euidently conuince , that the obseruing it is not a promoting and perfecting of Nature towardes the great end of Beatitude , deduced in some of the former chapters ; but a strong and maine alienation from it : and consequently , a peruersion of humane nature , and a carrying of mankinde to eternall disgustes , miseries , and torments . THE XIV . CHAPTER . How Christes doctrine hath bin conueyed purely and entirely to succeeding ages . That puritanes and Protestants can not lay clayme vnto it . IT is then onely the law of Christ , that can pretend with reason to the glorious title of a doctrine , able to bring a man securely to his desired hapinesse . Let vs then examine in the next place , if all they who giue themselues out to be Christians , do deserue that name , and in reallity and effect be such . No man will doubt , were he Iew on infidell , but that if Christ were God ( as Christians do professe and belieue ) he was both able and willing to deliuer vnto his flocke the truth so necessary for them . Which once granted , it presently appeareth , that Photinians , Arrians and all such pretended Christians as denyed Christ's being true God , had no Religion ; they bringing downe the certainty of faith , to an authority vnder God ; that is , to a fallible one , as I haue already shewed ; and consequently , subiect to falsity ; and therefore not to be relyed vpon . For , Christ spoke not an others dictates , as Moses did ; nor in his difficulties , had recourse to God , as to his lord or Master : but spoke as a master , and wrought as a Lord ; as one , from , and of , himselfe : and who when he prayed to his father , did it for our example , not for his owne necessity ; addressing himselfe vnto him , by the ●●ame of father , not of master . But setting a side all such blasphemours , as persons no wayes considerable ; lett vs looke backe vpon the maxime we haue formerly sett downe ; to witt , That he who li●●eth not well , that is , who doth 〈◊〉 actually treade in the way which ●●eadeth to Beatitude , shall not be happy ; how excusable soeuer he be for not knowing the way or law : And then we shall straight discouer , that it is not sufficient for any man to say , he hath Christ's doctrine , and is willing to follow it ; vnlesse he be certainly assured that he haue it . Nor can he be sure that he hath it , vnlesse he haue some infallible meanes whereby to discerne it from false and pretended doctrines . This infallible meanes , can be none other , but the infallibility of the authority and conueyance , by which this doctrine cometh to him . If Christ , whom he beleeueth to be God , did speake himselfe immediatly to him ; he would require no more : But seeing he is departed many ages since , from conuersing with mankinde ; we must inquire what infallible conueyance of his doctrine to vs , we may rely vpon . It is cleare , there can be but two wayes to performe that worke ; the one , by writing ; the other , by being handed downe from generation to generation ; by the mouths of them who first and immediately receiued it from Christ , and taught it to those that they conuersed with ; who againe preached it all ouer the world ; and they who learned it of them , taught it att their turne to those who succeeded them ; and so from generation to generation , and from age to age , is come downe to our present age . The vniuersality which ( euen in the very beginning , and whiles the doctrine was fresh in their memories that had it from its source ) requiring a great time to the forgetting and extetminating of it euery whe●●e , it may be conceiued to haue ●●in conserued pure and entire all this while , in some great part of the world . Third way , there is none : vnlesse peraduenture we make a subdiuision of writinges ; distingui●●ing betveene such as came from ●●he pennes of those teachers who ●●eceiued what they write , immedia●●ly from Christ ; and whose wordes 〈◊〉 authenticall and law●● And such other writinges , as being composed by authors in succeeding age●● , do informe vs what the Church hath held in all times . This sort of writers , may seeme to partake of both wayes : Of the first , as being writers : And of the second , as farre forth as they are in a manner a part of the handes through which Christe's doctrine hath bin conueyed vnto vs . These two wayes may seeme to haue bin shared betweene the french Caluinistes ( among vs , called Puritans or Presbyterians ) and the English Protestantes or common prayer men : But in reality , they haue them not . For , the Puritane , as soone as he hath highly and peremptorily pronounced , that nothing but scripture must be Iudge of Religion ; and that the word of God , pure and alone , must gouerne ; he presently maketh you a Catalogue of articles , which you must hold , if you will not be excommunicated and cost out of his Church . And howeuer he may pretend that he de●●iueth these articles out of scripture : yet , the wordes of them not being in the Scripture , he can not deny but that they are his owne collections and interpretations : So that if he misse in interpreting Gods written word ; the sense , aswell as the wordes , will be his , and not the Scriptures . Now the Protestant ; seeing the vnreasonablenesse of this proceeding , that a particular man or company should oblige all men to receiue his interpretation of Scripture ; thinketh to take a more plausible course , by pretending to explicate Scripture by the fathers ; especially , by the fathe●●s of the primitiue ages . But this seemeth to me more irrationall then the puritanes proceeding . For , first , he goeth against his owne principle , by appealing to the fathers after hauing pr●●tested against all humane authority , 〈◊〉 fallible . Secondly , he maketh himselfe iudge which of the fathers ●●re to be receiued ; and when ; and ●●hat of them to be reiected ; and how to be vnderstood : And so draweth the question , from the sole booke of Scripture , to the infinite volumes of fathers . And lastly ; that he may serue himselfe of the fathers manner of expressions , iointly with his owne conceits and opinions ; ( so to boulster out his fancyes with the semblance of their authority ) he confoundeth his owne language with their manner of speaking ; and neither vnderstandeth himselfe , nor ( much lesse ) can make an other man vnderstand what he sayth . Like those commentors of Aristotle and S. Thomas ; who not being bold enough to deny their authority , which hath taken so deepe rootes in all the schooles of Christendome ; do render their doctrine , and themselues , vnintelligible , by their wrested and confused interpretations . Yet I deny not , but that a right Protestant , is in many pointes neerer truth then the Presbyterian●● For , his reading of the fathers , and his allowing them some kind of estimation ; can not choose but worke some good effect in his minde . But that which I complaine of him for , is , that the rule he pretendeth , ( as he vseth it ) is more intricate then the Presbyterians ; and his discourse , is more ambigous and confused , by his counterfeiting to hold with the fathers , when in truth he renounceth them . THE XV . CHAPTER . A further consideration , of the insufficiency and vnreasonablenesse , of the late Protestants proceeding , in point of Religion . TRVLY it seemeth to me so euident , that neither of these haue any rule of Christianity ; as I haue oftentimes wondered when I haue heard some men ( in other thinges , appearing to be prudent ) say in earnest that they beleeue they haue one , and grow warme in their maintaining so much . For , there being but two channels whereby Christes doctrine can descend to vs ; writting ; and deliuering from hand to hand ; How can they pretend to Christianity , who accept of neither of these ? As for tradition by handes ; they clearely defy it . And as for Scripture ; If they take that for their rule , why do they binde men to opinions that can not be decided out of Scripture , but remaine still disputable after all is said that can be vrged from thence ? Well may they , in pursuance of their owne rule quarrell att such as shall deny any point that is cleare and euident in Scripture : But to anathematise , and punish ( when they haue the power ) those that produce out of Scripture as faire proofes for their opinions , as any thing they are able to bring against them ; seemeth to me a great iniustice . Certainly , nothing can be more-euident , then , that in all the points which haue bin disputed , out of Scripture alone , betweene Catholikes and them , now almost an 100. yeares ; the textes produced by them , haue not att all inclined the ballance on their side ; but rather ( if I may'be allowed to giue my verdict , in a case where I am in●●ere●●ed ) it hath weighed notably on our side . And therefore , lett them pretend what they will ; it is cleare , that Scripture is not their rule . As for the Protestantes pretending to the authority of the fathers in interpreting Scripture , the case is yet more cleare , if more may be . For , they sticke not to say vpon euery occasion , that the fathers erred ; and that they might erre , both in common and in particular . So that , theirs is but like a cobwebbe lawne lining : ( of no substance or solidity ) to the Nettelike cloke , wherewith the Presbyterians do endeauour to hide their foule play , when they recede from the rule which themselues propose ; and is looked through att the first casting of ones eyes vpon it : And in this regard , both their cases are the very same . And to speake plainely ; the rule common to both these , and to all others , who proposing Scripture for their rule , do afterwardes prefixe particular opinions to their Church ; neither is , nor can be any other , then a heady pride and wilfulnesse , to bind all other men to their , not knowledge , but guessing . Now if such guessing , can be iudged a sufficient meanes , for themselues and others , to be assured of those thinges , without the doing whereof mankinde must be eternally miserable ; these men may pretend to Christianity : But for my part , I can entertaine but a very meane estime of it . I know , ●●euerall of them are held for learned men : And that , not onely in their owne opinions , but by many others besides : How iustly they deserue that title , will appeare if we consider , what true learning and knowledge in any science , is . I take it , to be an assurance of the nature of the thinges that are treated of in that science . Such , Mathematicians haue in their profession ; such , the masters of all the artes that belong to mans life . Such , Philosophers haue , ( or should pretend to haue ; though some , vnworthy the name of Philosophers , do content themselues with probable opinions ) and much more , deuines ought to haue such assurāce of what concerneth their profession ; seeing , that any mistake therein , exposeth men to eternall ruine and misery . Now the learning of these men that would passe for so great deuines , wherein doth it consist ? They pretend to no other , then to know that hath bin said by others . Which others , are God and men ; to witt , what hath bin sayd by God in Scripture , and by men in their bookes . If they rightly vnderstood all this , they might with reason ha●●e a good conceipt of themselues . But let vs examine how they behaue themselues , in their proceeding with both these . As for Scriptures , I haue already touched how their penetrating into the sense of them , is but a meere guessing : Yet were it something , if they could make it appeare that they guesse fairely . I will allow them so much , if they can shew how any of their deuines in any one question , hath faithfully paralleled the places of Scripture vsed to be brought on each side ; and hath fairely compared and weighed them in the ballance , one against the other , and hath giuen each of them their full weight ; and then hath pronounced an orderly sentence , in this sort ; that by reason of plurality of places , propriety of wordes , efficacity of texts , and the like , the aduantage falleth to this side , rather then to that . If they should pretend they are able to do this ( which I am sure they neuer haue as yet performed ) I would entreate them to shew me a learned logike of wordes , out of which they had extracted the rules whereby the sense of wordes may be pondered ; and whereby one may be certaine when their sense is demonstratiuely knowne , and when but probably ; and by what weights , one probability appeareth greater then an other ; And after all this paines , I would tell them ( and they can not deny it ) that as long as both senses are probable , the lesse probable may peraduenture be the true one : And so , all their labour is lost . But lett vs examine , if their learning be any greater in humane writers . The depth of it is , to boggle att any darke place of History , or of fathers ; and by it , persuade such men as are not conuersant in antiquity , to frame a iudgement coutrary to the publicke practise of the Church of those ages . As for example ; what can be more publicke and notorious , then the succession and authority of Bishops ; then the being of Monkes and Nunnes ; then the principality of the Bishop of Rome ; then the practise of the Masse , Sacrements , and ceremonies ; then the custome of praying for the dead ; then the vse of Crosses and of pictures ? And euen for all these , they make it their labour ( and for which they pretend the title of subtile and deepe schollers ) to persuade you , out of some not fully declared sentence of a father , speaking vpon the by , that there were no such thinges as these in antiquity . Yet had our contryman more sincerity then this ; who in his translation of S. Augustines confessions , professeth plainely , that he had left out many thinges , because S. Augustine had erred in them . So the Centurists , and Luther , and Caluin , and all Nouellists , whiles there remained any ingenuity among them , confessed that the opinions which they reiected , were auncient errors of the fathers . But now , all their learning consisteth in belying of antiquity , and in pinning a false maske vpon the venerable face of it . How then can men deserue the name of learned , who take not the course to know any thing att all ? Neuerthelesse , they must passe for great deuines ; when peraduenture they are all together ignorant , what diuinity is . Diuinity signifyeth a science , that followeth out of faith or out of the discipline of saluation ; in such sort as Euclides Elements do follow out of the definitious and axiomes , which he hath prefixed as groundes for his bookes , and that he hath supposed before them . In like manner , faith must be supposed to diuinity . But in s●●eed of doing so , these men who terme themselues deuines , do spend all their paines and employe all their schollership , in opposing the receiued tenets of faith . So that they are such eminent deuines , as he would be a Geometrician , who in steed of studying throughly Euclides Elements , should neuer goe beyond the first leafe ; but should busy himselfe many yeares , and write great volumes , to proue that his definitions are ill contriued , and that this axiomes are false . And yet must such seely aequiuocation , so pusse them vp , and persuade their followers they are so great Clerkes , that all Antiquity , all the latter and present ages , and common sense it selfe , must be deserted to adhere to these learned Masters . Whereas those who are truly deuines , are beyond common Christians , and do begin their science and employment att the height of those notions which belong to common Christians : Whiles these , whom the Protes●●ants terme deuines , do neuer attaine to the knowledge that the simplest Christians are imbued with , by relying vpon tradition and vpon the authority of the Church . But enough of this : since it seemeth that God himselfe hath taken it to his taske to ruine them wheresoeuer they appeared to haue power . THE XVI . CHAPTER . The Socinians and the Independents , excluded from hauing the true doctrine of Christ . THESE two , being reiected from holding the rule of Scripture ; ( whatsoeuer they may pretend : ) there remaine yet two other families who lay clayme to that rule ; namely , the Independents , and the Socinians . Their difference , I take to be this : That the Independent acknowledgeth the booke we call the Bible , to be truly the word of God ; and accordingly , maketh it his precise study to know what is sayd in this booke . All that no lest findeth there , he holdeth for most certaine and holy . He bindeth others no further , then to acknowledge the letter ; and to draw the best meaning out of it , that of themselues they are able . He accompteth all who do so , to be of his religion and communion , if they agree thereunto . If they will not communicate with him , he presseth them not : but if they will , he refuseth them not . The Socinian his difference from the Independent , I take to be this : That he iudgeth the Bible to be the wisest and most authenticall booke that euer was written ; such a one , as no other humane writting can contest with it ; yet not such a one , as no ●●ippe or error might fall into it ; euen in matters of importance , and concerning our saluation : And therefore , that where reason is absolutely against it , he may seaue it ; though for ciuility sake , he will rather choose to putt a wrong glosse vpon it , then plainely refuse it . Further , he thinketh it not fitting to no lest anyman , who beareth the like respect to Scripture , and proceedeth modestly in his actions . Now it is cleare , that both of these do sticke to the rule that they propose to themselues , for attaining the science of Beatitude : And therefore their deficiency , is such as humane nature is lyable vnto ; It being incident to all men , to faile in their discourse , when it is long . Whereas Protestants and Puritans do in the same breath contradict themselues , and renounce the Principle which they lay for the first foundation of their receding from that Church they were borne in , and of their erecting a new one . This proceeding , no man can excuse from barbarous impudence , and irrationality ; or admitt them among the pretenders to religion , vpon the score of Scripture ; which att euery turne , they change into their owne fancy . But as I can not but prayse the other two for going consequently , and for sticking to their rule and principle ; and so esteeme them to be rationall men and such as deserue to be discoursed with : So withall , I can not allow that they haue ( properly speaking ) a religion among them , or such a rule as they may securely rely vpon for the saluation of their soules : Especially the Socinian ; according to the explication that I haue here made of his tenets : which whither it agree , or not , to all those who passe vnder the name of Socinians , I dispute not ; as not leuelling my arguments against Persons but against opinions . Against these then that I haue related , I thus frame my oppositiō . If it be true ( as I haue already declared ) that ignorance of the way to Beatitude , will hinder v●● from euer arriuing to it ; And that it importeth not , whither it be by our owne default , or no , that we are ignorāt of it ; ( for be it vpon what score you will ; and be wee as inculpable as you will suppose ; still , the missing of the way , will bring vs to a wrong periode and end of our iorney ; where we shall be plunged in infinite and eternall miseries : ) It followeth that it concerneth vs mainely , to prouide that we haue more security in this point , then in any other art or trade whatsoeuer that belongeth to our well being in this life . Now whither the Socinian haue such security or no , in the rule he relyeth vpon to bring him to Beatitude , is that which we are to examine . It can not be pretended that Scripture is his rule : for , seeing he supposeth Scripture to be fallible , and that vpon all occasions he correcteth it by his discourse ; it is not Scripture , but his discourse , and his reasoning , that is his true and supreme rule : which is the cause that they , or some of their party , did denominate themselues Sanarations , from right reason . Now , seeing that his discourse , is not confirmed by sensible and reall effects abetting it ; ( as for example , by miracles , wrought to take away all doubts or scrupules against it ; or by the returne of soules from the other world , to assure vs by their experience that we may safely rely vpon such a rule , as hauing brought them to Beatitude ) It can not be denyed , but that it hath no other strength , then that which it comprehendeth within it selfe & carrieth in its owne bowels . And this strength , ought , to be no lesse then certainty and vnanswerablenesse , if he intend that it shall settle all doubts and quiett all scruples in this affaire ; where it importeth euery man to be cautious , inquisiti●●e , doubtfull , and scrupulous to the vtmost . For if his discourse be any degree vnder certaine , it is but probable : And euery point that is but probable , the contrary of it may peraduenture be true : And consequently , all bare probable pointes , are either false , or el●●e not knowne to be true ; which is no better then false , to a man that can not be satisfyed with lesse then an infallible rule to rely on . And therefore , the Socinian can not satisfy a reasonable man , nor doth he giue a good account of himselfe , vnlesse he professe to demonstrate his assertions . And not onely those assertions , wherein he contradicteth Scripture ; but also those , wherein he agreeth with it . For , seeing that Script●●re hath with him no further authority , then of being probable ; all that he gathereth there , can haue no more●● force then of being likewise probable ; and consequently , to make it infallible , he must support and Corroborate it with a demonstration . But what I haue already sayd about demonstration in this subiect , will coole our hopes in expecting any att the Socinians handes : Neither do they ( as farre as I ha●●e vnderstood ) pretend there vnto . There remaineth then , onely the Independents rule of attaining to Beatitude , to be discussed . Whose proceeding is certainely more allo●●ble , more iudicious , and more pious , then all the others that we haue hitherto looked vpon . For , he resolueth his beliefe and groundeth ●●his actions , wholy vpon him that can neither be deceiued himselfe , nor deceiue others . In this matter , he is not content with any lesse authority●● then Gods wor●● What he findeth not in Scripture , belongeth not to his Creede . Infine , he giueth Scripture its true valew ; and he sticketh firmely to it , as his rule . But if all this may not suffice , vnlesse he haue security of his tenets out of Scripture ; I doubt he will haue a hard taske to proue them sufficient for saluation . For , omitting that he must be assured of the texts of Scripture which he maketh vse of ; that those very wordes which belong to his purpose , are in the originall , that the translation he readeth , is not discrepant from the originall , in as much as concerneth his text ( both which are impossible to be knowne by ordinary Sti●●klers in controuersie ) I am persuaded it is much harder to demonstrate out of wordes the way to Beatitude , then out of naturall principles ; if not wholy impossible . Th●● which , though I will not here dispute , ( it being largely handled b●● others ; and particulary by Maist●● Rushwor●● in his second Dialogue yet I will craue leaue to represent vnto your Lordship how the preiudice of continuall experience , for now att the least 1600. years , is strong against the Independents vndertaking . We know well , how during all this tract of time , there hath still bin great disputing out of Scripture against sundry most important propositions ; diuers of them directly impugning our Sauiour him●●elfe and his dignity and Godhead ; for the settling whereof in mens beliefes , it appeareth that a great part of the Scripture was written : And yet peraduenture , neuer a one of them was euer conuinced and beaten downe by Scripture , or by any other meanes then by Tradition and by the title of possession of the contrary Doctrine . And shall not the consideration of this successe after so many attempts , make vs very doubtfull and afraid , that nothing can be conuinced out of ●●ole Scripture ? I haue heard some , ●●ho haue employed their studies to be exact in the controuersy about Scriptures being the rule of faith , challenge others that haue pretended to haue greatest skill and insight in Scripture , to conuince out of it alone that there was but one God ( a point wherein all Christians agree ) and t●●ey could neuer receiue satisfaction in it . The Ecclesiasticall stories informe vs , how the Arrians defended their denying of our Sauiours d●●uinity , by pregnant texts of Scripture ; and could not be conuinced , otherwise then by Tradition : And how it fared in like manner with sundry others . The very nature of wordes ; so subiect to diuerses senses and vnderstandinges : The length of the Bible ; whereby all sortes of metaphores and improper manners of speaking do occurre in it : And th●● reiterating of the same speech , diuersly , in diuers occasions : Do render it mainely suspitious , that it is impossible to make a demonstration for proofe and explication of the true meaning of any passage in it , which great wittes haue engaged themselues in explicating a contrary way . And therefore , before a man can rationally rely vpon Scripture for a sufficient rule to bring him to Beatitude ; he must be satisfyed and conuinced , that there is a meanes , whereby he may certainely know what is the sense of Scripture ; and how he may compasse this meanes . For otherwise ; all that he draweth our of Scripture , is vncertaine ; And no lesse vncertaine it is , whither what he hath drawne , be enough ; or whither more be not necessary : And in a word , he remaineth on all handes in perpetuall inc●●titude . THE XVII . CHAPTER . That Tradition is the onely meanes of conueying Christes doctrine to succeeding ages . OF the two wayes of conueying Christes doctrine to Mankinde in all ages ( the first of which , is by writing ; and that ●●e haue bin hitherto reflecting vpon ) there remaineth onely the latter ( which is by handing it from one to an other ) to be considered . A doctrine so conueyed , implying thereby that it hath beene in all ages ; that is to say , in the vniuersality of time ; belongeth onely to Catholikes , to lay clayme vnto it ; and onely they who do so , may properly be stiled Catholikes . Neither can it be obiected , that the Greekes may pretend it in such pointes of faith as they differ in from those that liue in communion with the Roman See . Well may they , in matters of custome : But these are of such a nature , as they may haue bin different in seuerall places , euen att the very origine of them ; without any inconueniency att all : And consequently , in different places , there may haue continued different practises , euer since the Apostles time . But lett vs examine more particularly what aduantages or prerogatiues , this way of transmitting Christe's doctrine from hand to hand vntill our dayes , hath ouer the retriuing it in Scripture . First , we shall find that it hath the prerogatiue of Possession ; All aduersaries hauing found the Catholike Church ( out of which they broke ) in a quiett credulity that her doctrine was so descended from the Apostles . Next , it hath the prerogatiue of all the approbation and commendation that our fathers could giue it ; by themselues , by their lawes , by their rewardes and punishements , and by whatsoeuer else they could inuent for the continuation of it . It hath a high straine of testification , aboue all that is to be found in our titles to land , inheritances , legacies , bargaines , and all other morall transactions and concernements whatsoeuer . It hath the testimony of all our aduersaries , to haue continued for a thousand yeares , euen in those pointes wherein they dissent from vs : but in all others wherein they agree with vs , they allow our continuance from the very origine of Christianity . So as it can not be doubted , euen by our Aduersaries confession , but that this way is capable of bringing downe truths vnto us vncorrupted . But aboue all , it hath the euidence or its fidelity in conueying to posterity the doctrine of Saluation , by the connexion of one age to an other , Out of this maxime : That it is impossible , all fathers through out the whole world , should conspir●● to deceiue their Children , in so important an affaire . For , this Maxime doth so connect the knowledge of euery century , to what was knowne in the century immediately preceding it ; that it is impossible for any error to creepe in betweene them . And the maxime it selfe ; is as euident as any that belongeth to Mathematikes : And so much more cleare then any of those , as perpetuall dayly practise ; beateth vs into the knowledge and continuall view of it . For , as no man could doubt but that the braines of that person were crased , who conuersing with marchants vpon the Exchange in London , and hearing them speake dayly of Paris , and of moneyes they remitt hither , and of letters they receiue from thence ; Should neuerthelesse thinke confidently there were no such towne as Paris , because he was neuer there himselfe : So , much more , ●●ould he be held for a mad man , that liuing in England , and conuersing with all forces of people , reading their bookes of all kindes , hearing their sermons , considering their lawes and the change of some particular ones in matter of Religion , and innumerable other particulars , which speake manifestly how Catholike Religion had course in England before Henry the VIII . changed it ; should neuerthelesse deny it , because he liued not in the time when that Religion was publikely professed . For in this case , the number of wittnesses is farre greater then in the other . Now , when a motiue of humane prudence is so preualent a one , as to brand him with want of common sense , who shoud not assent to what it induceth ; It is a manifest signe of a conquering & axiomaticall euidence in the proposition that he should so deny . And consequently by this discourse , ( applying it to euery age since Christ's planting of his Church ) the descent of Christian or Catholike Religion from Christ is as euident as any Geometrical demonstration whatsoeuer . One great prerogatiue more , I must not omitt , that Tradition hath aboue Scripture : which is , that Scripture is deliuered in precise and determinate wordes ; whose sense , is not vnderstood : But Tradition , is deliuered in almost as many seuerall expressions , as there be seuerall persons that deliuer it . So that , in Tradition , the sense is constant , though the wordes be vncertaine : Whereas in a truth deliuered by writting ; though the wordes be agreed vpon , yet the meaning of them is disputed of . And therefore , seeing it is the meaning that we are to gouerne our actions by ; and , that wordes ; without meaning , are of no weight ; ●●t is euident , that Tradition is a rule , And that Scripture is none . But why do I troble your Lordship with such scrupulous balancing of these rules one against the other ; since by my discourse in excluding ●●ll former pretended rules , it ap●●eareth euidently , that if Tradition ●●e not the light which God hath hung out to his Church , whereby to know true doctrine from false ; when he sent his Apostles to preach , and promised he would be with them ( that is , with their preaching , or with their successours in preaching ) vntill the end of the world : We may truly conclude , there is no light or certainty to guide his Church by . Which is as much to say , as ; that when he had built the world for men ; and had fitted them with all thinges , requisite for their naturall and ciuill life in this world ; he failed and mistooke in the maine and chief end for which he had contriued all the rest . THE XVIII . CHAPTER . Against the opinion of some deuines that place Tradition in the consent of fathers that haue written in their seuerall ages : and against some other opinions of particular deuines . As also against Naturalists and Socinians . I am not ignorant , that among vs , there are some deuines , who as they acknowledge Tradition to be the rule of faith ( for without doing so , they could not be stiled Catholikes ) so , they place Tradition in the consent or fathers through all ages . But I conceiue I shall not wrong them , if I say that in doing thus they consider onely themselues , and not the Church ; which is composed of all sortes and of all degrees , of persons ; simple and wise ; learned and vnlearned . For no man is so weake , as not to see , that it were a wilder arrant , to send the commonalty of Christians , to the multitude of Fathers for their faith ; then to remitt them to the Scriptures . It can not be doubted , but that the rule of faith , must be somewhat within the peoples kenning . All sortes of persons are capable of discerning whither , or no , they are in the publike communion of those who professe they haue receiued their doctrine by a continued sequele of teachers succeeding one an other : But , for studying of fathers , or Scripture ; the vniuersality of mankinde , wanted for the most part capacity , talents , and leisure . And no small difficulty will be added to this taske , by our aduersaries endeauouring all they can , to cast a mist before mens eyes and to obscure what of it selfe is mo●● cleare . I take therefore the conse●● of fathers , to be a confirmation an●● a testimony to learned men , of th●● Tradition that is deliuered by handes : but not to be the substance of Tradition : which of its nature might haue bin ( if so God had pleased ) and would haue maintained its vnshaken & inuincible force , though there had bin neither writinges of fathers , nor Scripture . Others , seeme to thinke , that some points of faith are knowne by Tradition ( or , as they call it by the vnwritten word ) to witt , those whereof they find not sufficient proofe in Scripture : but that for the maine ones , we are to haue recourse to Scripture . Now for these , I admire att the loosenesse of their discourse ; when they allow Tradition to giue assurance of those pointes which are the outmost , and which can not be knowne without the former ; and yet will not haue the former to be knowne by the same Tradition . And therefore I imagine it is but a mistake in their deliuering themselues ; and that their meaning is , that all pointes are knowne by Tradition●● but some , not onely by tradition , but by Scripture too . And it is euident , that all they who referre vnto Tradition , the knowing that Scripture is the word of God , and that this booke is the Canon of Scripture ; must needes relate all certainty of faith , to Tradition ; euen of what they thinke they demonstrate out of Scripture . Other deuines there be , who adde to Tradition , some power of reuealing new verities to the Church . But euen they themselues do confesse that the knowing that there is such a power , must rely finally vpon Tradition . And then , seeing it is a point not fully resolued of among our selues ; I conceiue it is not fitt to presse it vpon those who haue yet reluctance in digesting so much as is resolued of , and is euidently true . The reason why I haue mentioned these opinions of some particular deuines ; is , because I desire that your Lordship should see that the way wherein we walke , is not onely a plaine and a smooth one ; but an easy one to be found out : which it would not appeare vnto you to be , if you should be obliged to what these men would impose . By my exceptions against which , as well as out of what I haue formerly established ; I conceiue I may safely conclude , That all Catholikes , do take Tra●●ition , for the last rule , into which the certainty of all particular articles of faith , is to be resolued . Now , were my taske performed ; & Tradition sett in the throne of commanding Christian beliefe : Did not the Naturalist and the Socinian , with iointe forces , endeauour to possesse Reason , of that chaire : Alleaging , how Reason is the nature of man ; the sole power in him , that can giue consent to any thing proposed vnto him ; And therefore , in spight of all I haue said , must be Queene and commanderesse both of his beliefe and of his actions . But when they obiect this to me , they do not consider , how I haue beene all this while labouring to do in effect that which they require . For , what hath all my discourse leuelled att , but to shew , that reason obligeth vs to ground our beliefe vpon Tradition ? So that I professe Tradition hath no force to command beliefe , vnlesse Reason tell vs so much ; and as it were deliuer vs vp to Tradition . Reason telleth vs , it is fitt to belieue a knowing teacher or directour , in a matter wherein ones selfe is ignorant . She telleth vs , that she herselfe hath not principles and meanes , without beleeuing some teacher , to giue vs certaine information of the state of our soule in the next world , and of the wayes in this whereby Beatitude is to be obtained . She telleth vs , that Tradition hath deriued this knowledge from a Master who was well assured of it ; and that she containeth within her selfe , a strength of infallibility , to reach vs without mistake what she learned of him . And So ; Reason concludeth , that we must barken to Tradition , and follow that rule . Else she renounceth vs , and protesteth we goe against her sentiments ; that is , we do vnreasonably . Will not this satisfy any man that professeth to follow the conduct of Reason ? Yet I will say more : Lett either Naturalist , or Socinian , produce true Reason ( that is , demonstration ) against any thing that is attested by Tradition ; and I will graunt him , we ought to leaue Tradition and follow reason . But , if reason could do that , i●● would not assert and maintaine the Infallibility of Tradition . It is not therefore true reason , but defectiue and Topicall essayes , and flashes of witt , which these men produce , and vpon which they rely : that is , vpon a broken reede ; whose splinters ( as the Scripture telleth vs ) will gore them that leane vpon it . Yet is it not my intention , by this discourse to persuade your Lordship that it is impossible , since the mysteries of Christian faith haue been reuealed , to reach by the helpe of faith vnto the demonstration of reuealed truths ; so as , nature be first duely vnderstood . I know , the wordes in which our faith is deliuered , ought to be explicated by naturall definitions . I am sure , that by the knowledge we haue of God by naturall sciences ( as , that he is a spirit ; that he is immutable ; and the like ) we come to know , that many wordes and expressions deliuered of him in Scripture , are to be vnderstood as spoken Metaphorically : And the like of angels , and all spirituall substances . I know that Man's freewill , is a naturall thing ; and that by Philosophy and Looking into our selues , we may come to vnderstand what it is ; and that out of the right or wrong explication of it , great and noble truths may be discouered ; and , as great and foule errors incurred . I know , that termes , once rightly vnderstood , must of necessity haue connexion among themselues ; and that we do not loose our vnderstanding , as soone as we apply it to faith ; And therefore , may make legitimate consequences out of faith and naturall principles ioyned together . I know , the doing of this , is expected from Deuines ; is commended to them by S. Paul ; the example of it is giuen them by the fathers ; is professed by the Princes of our schoolemen ; and , that consequently , there can not be a greater irrationality , then for a Diuine to say there can be no demonstration in Diuinity . Which were , in effect , to stile himselfe a professour of Diuinity ; and att the same time to professe there is no such science as Diuinity . For , whatsoeuer is deliuered as Diuinity , and is neither demonstration , nor the way to it ; is , not onely idle garrulity ; but profane and temerarious contamination of our holy Christian faith . But my Lord , I perceiue my weake boate is sliding apace , before I am aware , into a sea too rough and too dangerous for me to steere a steady course in . It is time for me to take in my sailes , and to lett fall an anchor . I pretend not to learning : much lesse to be knowing in Diuinity . The various courses in the world that my seuerall employments and fortunes haue cast me vpon , haue not allowed me time nor meanes to store my minde as I would with knowledge and solide litterature . If I haue acquired any thinne sprinkling in any of the partes of naturall learning , I owe it to my misfortunes , and to the reuolutions of my country causing them ; that haue condemned me to such a manner of liuing , as if I should not conuerse with bookes , and employ my time in some study , it would become burthen some and in supportable to me . And then , since my study is chiefly for my entertainement ; you may easily conceiue that my application of it , hath bin vpon such subiects as I haue beene most willing to be informed of . To see whither the Immortality of the soule may be demonstrated by reason , or no , hath bin a maine one among them : And then , hauing found satisfaction therein ; and by following of my principles , hauing discouered a new world in that region where she liueth , when the body is dead ; and meeting there such amazing considerations of weale or woe , resulting out of the guidance of ones life and actions in this world , as would rouse the sleepiest person aliue to be very solicitous what course he taketh here ; I do not deny , but that it hath made me more inquisitiue , then peraduenture , I should otherwise haue bin , into what rule and guide may secure a man in his iorney thither . For without such liuely stirrers vp , it is not vnlikely but that I might haue contented my selfe with walking dully and implicitely in the way that my birth and education had sett me in . Thus , My lord , I haue gleaned so much of Philosophy , and haue cast an eye so farre into Diuinity , as I haue iudged necessary for my owne priuate vse . In these few sheetes , you haue an essay of the litle I know in either . If it may proue as vsefull to you , as I conceiue it hath done to me ; I were much too blame , if I did not impart it to you , vnto whom I haue long since giuen an equall share and power with my selfe , in all that is mine . For besides your excellent partes in all kindes , ( as well the more gentle and the winning ones , as the strong ones ) that make you highly esteemed and honored by all those who know you ; your particular kindenesse and frendship to me , requireth a particular returne of affection from me . I can not expresse it better , then by confidently imparting to you , my priuatest thoughts ; which as they are the pleasingest I euer had ; so seeme they to me , the vsefullest . Such as they are , you haue them here . You will not deny them a welcome , for his sake , who truly loueth you , and is , MY LORD , Your most affectionate kynsman and most humble and most obedient seruant KENELME DIGBY THE APPROBATION OF the Doctors of Diuinity of the Faculty of Paris . THIS small , but learned treatise , entitled , A discourse concerning Infallibility in Religion ; full of sublime & Christian truths , expressed euen beyond the expectation of what humane language could afford ; doth clearely shew how Grace is engrafted vpon Nature , that is , how the Diuine & reuealed tenets of our Catholike Church , are framed to heighten , as most connaturall to , the light of reason ; whereby to raise our soules to a more celestiall straine of loue & piety , then euer pure nature could haue attained vnto . To say , it containe's nothing , in relation to faith not Catholique ; In reference to manners , not Christian ; were to discount from the worke 's desert●● It being an euident conuiction o●● the euer inuiolable & permanent subsistence of them both in the vniuersally vnited Roman Church : Demonstrating withall , the false foundations of the Presbyterian consistory of the Socinian ratiocination , of the Independents priua●● Spirit , & of the erroneous , or rather no grounds or principles of the late particular English Protestant Schismaticall Synagogue . Lett it then bee sett vpon a candlesticke by publike print , & giue light to all it's readers ; that it's bright flames may loudly speake it's Authour's vnspeakeable worth & learning . And ●●ee Doctours of Diuinitie of the Faculty of Paris , by signing here vnto , neede onely say , it needed not our ●●approba●●ion . Paris the 28. Novemb. 1652. H. HOLDEN . E. TIREL . THE Printer entreateth those who shall take the paines to reade this discourse , that they will be pleased ( before they do so ) to correct some errors , in the manner as is intimated hereafter . Others of lesse importance ( as , the mistake sometimes of a letter in a word ; or the putting two wordes so neere together as if they were but one ; or some failing in Orthography , or somme misse-pointing ) that will not perplexe the sense , to any easy reflection ; he submitteth to their courtesy to pardon . Which he doubteth not but they will be fauoubly induced to do , when they shall consider that the composer and the corrector of the presse for this piece , are Strangers to the tongue it is written in : and that they wrought not vpon the originall ; but vpon such a coppy , as hauing descended by seuerall transcriptions , and passed through sundry handes , fell in the end casually into mine : who durst not aduenture to haue recourse to the Author for his assistance herein , least he should haue hindered the publishing ( as hitherto he hath done ) of what is so much desired and sought after by all those who haue heard of it . Page . 2. line . 4. palanteis . p. 9. l. 6. the . p. 10. l. 3. precipices . p. 20. l. 16. to haue . p. 27. l. 10. it . p. 43. l. 17. repeated . p. 66. l. 17. which . l. 18. performed . p. 69. l. 1. on . p. 71. l. 4. with . l. 5. knowledge . p. 105. l. 3. euer . p. 145. l. 15. is . p. 147. l. 26. tortured . p. 164. l. 9. too . l. 22. leaue to referre . p. 172. l. 5. and . p. 178. l. 8. God did giue . p. 215. l. 12. writing .