33585	----	generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) The Battle of Gettysburg How General Meade Turned the Army of the Potomac over to Lieutenant Haskell See Page 10 PUBLISHED BY THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE ASSOCIATION BOWERS PRINTING COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PA. REPLY OF THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE ASSOCIATION TO THE FOOLISH and ABSURD NARRATIVE OF Lieutenant FRANK A. HASKELL WHICH APPEARS TO BE ENDORSED BY THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION COMMANDRY OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION COMPLIMENTS OF THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE ASSOCIATION MARCH, 1910 HEADQUARTERS, PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE ASSOCIATION, S. W. COR. FIFTH AND CHESTNUT STREETS, PHILADELPHIA, PA. At the stated meeting of the Survivors of the Philadelphia Brigade, Second Brigade, Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, held at the above place, Tuesday evening, September 7, 1909, letters were read from Gen. Alexander S. Webb, who commanded the Philadelphia Brigade at the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 2 and 3, 1863, requesting the consideration of the Brigade Association to the most astounding misstatements made by First Lieut. Frank Aretas Haskell, 6th Wisconsin Infantry, in a paper said to have been written by him under date of July 16, 1863, two weeks after the Battle of Gettysburg had been fought and addressed to his brother, who printed it for private circulation about fifteen years afterward. The letters of Gen. Webb were accompanied by a volume of 94 pages, containing the most absurd statements as to the action of the Philadelphia Brigade at the Battle of Gettysburg, which, upon being read, led to the unanimous adoption of the following preamble and resolution: "WHEREAS, in the 'Narrative of the Battle of Gettysburg,' by Lieut. Frank A. Haskell, First Lieut. 6th Wisconsin Infantry, and an aide upon the staff of Gen. John Gibbon, said to have been written within a few days after the battle, and reprinted in 1898 as a part of the history of the Class of 1854, Dartmouth College, and republished in 1908 under the auspices of the Massachusetts Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, the Philadelphia Brigade has been recklessly, and shamelessly, and grossly misrepresented; therefore, with the view of correcting these wilfull misstatements, it is "RESOLVED, That a committee consisting of the officers of the Philadelphia Brigade Association, together with two comrades from each of the four regiments of the Brigade, be appointed to carefully consider the matter, and, if deemed advisable by the committee, to publicly enter its protest against the malicious statements 'reprinted in 1898 as a part of the history of the Class of 1854 of Dartmouth College,' and again republished by the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts in 1908, with a degree of recklessness and disregard for truth unparalleled in any publication relating to the Civil War; statements so false and malevolent as to be wholly unworthy of a class of Dartmouth College, or of a Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the United States; of the name of Capt. Daniel Hall, of General Howard's staff--who prepared the story for publication--or of 'Chas. Hunt, Captain U. S. V., Committee on Publication.'" The committee named under this resolution consists of these Comrades: Wm. G. Mason, Commander; John Quinton, Vice-Commander; Chas. W. Devitt, Quartermaster; John W. Frazier, Adjutant; John E. Reilly, Wm. S. Stockton, Joseph MacCarroll and James Thompson, Trustees, and Edward Thompson and James Duffy, 69th; John W. Dampman and Edward P. McMahon, 71st; John Reed and Thos. J. Longacre, 72d; Wm. H. Neiler and Thos. Thompson, 106th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers. An examination by the Philadelphia Brigade Association of the records relating to the "Narrative" written by Lieut. Haskell, discloses these facts: First--That Lieut. Haskell entered the service in July, 1861, as First Lieutenant of the 6th Wisconsin Infantry, and in June, 1862, became an Aide-de-Camp upon the Staff of Brigadier General John Gibbon, and was serving as such at the time he wrote his "Narrative" of the Battle of Gettysburg. On February 9, 1864, Haskell was commissioned Colonel of the 36th Wisconsin Regiment, which at his request was assigned to the First Brigade, Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the Potomac. The Division was commanded by Gen. Gibbon, Gen. Hancock commanding the Corps. In the advance of Gibbon's Division at the Battle of Cold Harbor, against a strongly intrenched position, Col. Henry McKeen, who commanded the First Brigade, was killed. Colonel Haskell succeeded to the command, and he, too, fell mortally wounded under the heavy artillery and musketry fire, against which his Brigade advanced. Haskell's record as a soldier of the Civil War is, therefore, an enviable one; but as a writer of events of the war he was absurd, reckless and unreliable. Second--The manuscript alleged to have been prepared by Lieut. Haskell, as stated by him, "At the Headquarters, second Corps D'Armee, Army of the Potomac, near Harper's Ferry, July 16, 1863," was sent to his brother, who printed it about fifteen years later in a pamphlet of 72 pages for private circulation. Third--The book was reprinted in 1898 as part of the History of the Class of 1854, Dartmouth College, in honor of Colonel Haskell's memory, but with certain omissions that severely reflected upon the Eleventh Corps, Gen. Sickles and President Lincoln, which are explained in a foot-note by Capt. Daniel Hall, a classmate of Haskell's, who was an Aide upon the Staff of Gen. O. O. Howard, and who prepared the Haskell story for republication. Fourth--The pamphlet published in 1878, by Haskell's family for private circulation, contained 72 pages; the costly volume published in 1908, under the auspices of the Commandery of Massachusetts, Loyal Legion of the United States, prepared by Captain Daniel Hall, an Aide upon the Staff of Gen. Howard, Commander of the Eleventh Corps, with the official endorsement of "Chas. Hunt, Captain, U. S. V., Committee on Publication" is a book of 94 pages; therefore, apparently containing much more matter than was originally published by the Haskell family in 1878. The charge of cowardice on the part of the Philadelphia Brigade, purported to have been made by Lieut. Haskell, is printed on pages 60, 61 and 62 of the volume published by the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, and is in part as follows: "Unable to find my General, I gave up hunting as useless--I was convinced General Gibbon could not be on the field; I left him mounted; I could have easily found him now had he so remained, but now, save myself, there was not a mounted officer near the engaged lines--and was riding towards the right of the Second Division, with purpose to stop there, as the most eligible position to watch the further progress of the battle, then to be ready to take part, according to my own notions, wherever and whenever occasion presented. The conflict was tremendous, but I had seen no wavering in all our line. Wondering how long the rebel ranks, deep though they were, could stand our sheltered volleys, I had come near my destination, when--great heavens! were my senses mad?--the larger portion of Webb's Brigade--my God, it was true--there by the group of trees and the angles of the wall, was breaking from the cover of the works, and without orders or reason, with no hand uplifted to check them, was falling back, a fear-stricken flock of confusion. The fate of Gettysburg hung upon a spider's single thread. A great magnificent passion came on me at the instant; not one that overpowers and confounds, but one that blanches the face and sublimes every sense and faculty. My sword that had always hung idle by my side, the sign of rank only, in every battle, I drew, bright and gleaming, the symbol of command. Was not that a fit occasion and those fugitives the men on whom to try the temper of the Solingen steel? All rules and proprieties were forgotten, all considerations of person and danger and safety despised; for as I met the tide of those rabbits, the damned red flags of the rebellion began to thicken and flaunt along the wall they had just deserted, and one was already waving over the guns of the dead Cushing. I ordered those men to 'halt,' and 'face about,' and 'fire,' and they heard my voice and gathered my meaning, and obeyed my commands. On some unpatriotic backs, of those not quick of comprehension, the flat of my sabre fell, not lightly; and at its touch their love of country returned, and with a look at me as if I were the destroying angel, as I might have become theirs, they again faced the enemy. General Webb soon came to my assistance. He was on foot, but he was active, and did all that one could do to repair the breach or to avert its calamity." Colonels O'Kane and Tschudy, of the 69th, were killed in action; Baxter, of the 72d, wounded and carried off the field; Morehead and his 106th Regiment had been sent by Gibbon to the support of Howard's Corps, thereby materially weakening the Brigade; Col. R. Penn Smith, of the 71st, and Lieut. Col. Theo. Hesser, of the 72d, were with their commands--which they never left--encouraging their men to even greater deeds of heroism; Webb is yet living and in a supplemental paper to this Reply will state specifically where the Commander of the Brigade and his Adjutant were and what they did. While Haskell has long been dead--killed in action at Cold Harbor, in 1864, and it seems cruel to speak harshly of the dead, yet duty to the living, and to the honored dead of the Philadelphia Brigade compels reply. The unreliability of Lieut. Haskell as a writer of military matters was equaled only by the egotism of the youthful Lieutenant. Thus this reckless First Lieutenant wrote of General Howard and General Doubleday, and thus he maligned the brave men of the Eleventh Corps: "The two divisions of the Eleventh Corps commanded, by Generals Schurz and Barlow, making but feeble opposition to the advancing enemy, soon began to fall back. Back in disorganized masses they fled into the town, hotly pursued, and in lanes, in barns, in yards and cellars, throwing away their arms, they sought to hide like rabbits, and were captured unresisting by hundreds. "I suppose our losses during the first day would exceed five thousand, of whom a large number were prisoners. Such usually is the kind of loss sustained by the Eleventh Corps." (Haskell narrative, page 6.) The actual loss of the Eleventh Corps was 153 officers and 2,138 men killed and wounded, and 62 officers and 1,448 men captured and missing, a total of 3,801, thereby attesting that at least 2,291 brave men of the Eleventh Corps did not "hide like rabbits," but that they fell like heroes facing the enemy. And thus of General Doubleday as to his action during Pickett's Charge on the afternoon of the third day: "Doubleday on the left was too far off, and too slow. On another occasion I had begged him to send his idle regiments to support another line, battling with thrice its numbers, and the 'Old Sumter Hero' had declined." (Haskell narrative, page 62.) If Haskell, or any other first lieutenant, would dare to have had the impudence to direct a Major General, and he a graduate of West Point, a soldier of distinction in the Mexican War, and placed in command of the First Corps upon the death of Gen. Reynolds, is it not more than likely, indeed, does it not seem certain that such a presumptuous lieutenant would have been sent back to his command under guard, if not committed to the guard house? And did not Capt. Daniel Hall, an Aide upon General Howard's Staff, who prepared the Haskell "Narrative" for republication; and the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, Commandery of Massachusetts, in publishing the Haskell "Narrative" become responsible for the Haskell slander upon Generals Howard and Doubleday, and the brave men of the gallant Eleventh Corps, and of the Philadelphia Brigade? The egotism and recklessness of Haskell are in evidence upon almost every page of his book. On page 39 he says: "I heard General Meade express dissatisfaction at General Geary for making his attack. I heard General Meade say that he sent an order to have the fight stopped, but I believe the order was not given to Geary until after the repulse of the enemy." Is it not clear that if such an order had been sent and obeyed, the enemy would not have been repulsed? Is it anywhere upon record that General Meade sent such an order? On page 82 of the Haskell "Narrative" of the Battle of Gettysburg appears this silly statement: "About six o'clock on the afternoon of the third of July, my duties done upon the field, I quitted it to go to the General (meaning Gibbon). My brave horse Dick--poor creature! his good conduct in the battle that afternoon had been complimented by a brigadier--was a sight to see. He was literally covered with blood. Struck repeatedly, his right thigh had been ripped open in a ghastly manner by a piece of shell, and three bullets were lodged deep in his body, and from his wounds the blood oozed and ran down his sides and legs, and with the sweat formed a bloody foam. To Dick belongs the honor of first mounting that stormy crest before the enemy, not forty yards away, whose bullets smote him, and of being the only horse there during the heat of that battle." Haskell might, with equal truth and egotism, have written: "To Dick and his rider belong the honor of meeting and repulsing Pickett's Division," and who can say that it would not have been accorded equally as generous consideration by the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, and the History Commission of Wisconsin, as was given to all the other nonsense he wrote of the Battle of Gettysburg. It has been said of Pickett's Virginians, that accustomed to handling a gun, or rifle, from boyhood, any one of them could kill a jay bird at a distance of 150 yards, but not one of Pickett's Division of 4,000 Veterans could kill that horse or that first lieutenant, and they the only horse and man in sight, and not forty yards away, parading between Hancock's Corps of the Union Army and Longstreet's Corps of the Confederate Army. Oh! Veterans of Pickett's Division, you who killed or wounded 491 of our Comrades of the Philadelphia Brigade from the time you began one of the most desperate charges ever recorded in the history of wars, starting from Seminary Ridge, one mile distant from the Bloody Angle, until you reached the culminating point where the intrepid Armistead fell mortally wounded within the lines of the Philadelphia Brigade. You who made such slaughter in OUR RANKS AT LONG RANGE could not kill First Lieutenant Frank Aretas Haskell, or his horse, and they not forty yards distant from your firing line, and he "the one solitary horseman between the Second Division of Hancock's Corps and Pickett's Division of Longstreet's Corps." And the Military Order, Loyal Legion, Commandery of Massachusetts, and the History Commission of Wisconsin, as late as the year 1908 in expensive publications confirm the Haskell "Narrative" of his wild "Buffalo Bill" ride between the Union and Confederate lines, and depicting your skill as marksmen, with a horse and officer as the inviting target not forty yards distant--defying the bullets of the most skillful marksmen of the Confederate Army. Is there a veteran soldier of the Civil War, or even a thoughtful man in the United States, who believes this part of Haskell's Narrative "of riding between the lines the one solitary horseman, and he not forty yards distant from the enemy?" Do Captains Daniel Hall and Charles Hunt, the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, and Wisconsin History Commission, themselves endorsing it, really believe it? It was on the third day that "Dick" was plugged with enough of Confederate lead to have warranted Haskell in organizing a Company to mine the lead in "Dick's" dead body. His horse "Billy" was pumped just as full of lead on the second day, as this absurd statement on page 37 attests: "And my horse can hardly move. What can be the reason? I know that he has been touched by two of their bullets today, but not to wound or lame him to speak of. I foolishly spurred my horse again. No use--he would only walk. I dismounted; I could not lead him along. So, out of temper, I rode him to headquarters, which I reached at last. With a light I found what was the matter with 'Billy.' A bullet had entered his chest just in front of my left leg as I was mounted, and the blood was running down all his side and leg, and the air from his lungs came out of the bullet hole. I rode him at the Second Bull Run, and at the First and Second Fredericksburg, and at Antietam after brave 'Joe' was killed, but I shall never mount him again. 'Billy's' battles are over." Just one more instance of the scores of the colossal vanity of Haskell. It tells how General Meade turned the command of the Army of the Potomac over to the youthful First Lieutenant of Infantry--Frank Aretas Haskell. It is to be found on pages 69 and 70 of the Haskell "Narrative." The battle had ended, and the Napoleon of Gettysburg, while patting himself on the back, was planting data in his mind for printing in his "Narrative," and thus Paul planted, and the Apollos of Massachusetts and Wisconsin watered. "Would to heaven Generals Hancock and Gibbon could have stood where I did, and have looked upon that field. But they are both severely wounded and have been carried from the field. One person did come, and he was no less than Major-General Meade, who rode up accompanied alone by his son--an escort not large for a commander of such an army. As he arrived near me he asked, 'How is it going here?' I answered, 'I believe, General, the army is repulsed.' With a touch of incredulity he further asked, 'What! IS THE ASSAULT ENTIRELY REPULSED?' I replied, 'It is, sir.' And then his right hand moved as if he would have caught off his hat and waved it, but instead he waved his hand and said, 'Hurrah!' He asked where Hancock and Gibbon were, but before I had time to answer that I did not know, he resumed, 'No matter, I will give my orders to You, and YOU will see them executed.' He then gave directions that the troops should be reformed as soon as practicable, and kept in their places, as the enemy might be mad enough to attack again, adding, 'IF THE ENEMY DOES ATTACK, CHARGE HIM IN THE FLANKS AND SWEEP HIM FROM THE FIELD--do you understand?' The General then, a gratified man, galloped in the direction of his headquarters." Of course, General Meade rode back to his headquarters a gratified man. Had he not just received the information from First Lieutenant Haskell that the enemy had been "entirely repulsed?" and had not Meade issued an order to this Wellington of Lee's Waterloo to sweep the enemy from the field, if he were mad enough to renew the attack, by charging him on the flanks? General Meade's order to Haskell was so sedately humorous as to leave us in doubt as to whether the First Lieutenant and his horse alone were to charge the enemy's flanks, or for Lieutenant Napoleon Wellington Haskell to order the First, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to charge his left flank, and the Third, Fifth and Sixth Corps his right flank, while Haskell and Dick swept his centre from the field. And this is the "narrative" that a Loyal Legion and a History Commission feel honored in publishing. If the object was to prove that they were just as vainglorious as Haskell, has not this fact been fully established by their published books? Vaccinated by the Haskell virus of vanity and venom, the buffoonery of Haskell has been transmitted by a Military Order of the Loyal Legion, and the History Commission of a great State, to their admiring friends and the public. Like Haskell, "A great, magnificent passion came on them that seemingly sublimed every sense and faculty--when, great heavens! their senses mad," the Battle of Gettysburg, by Frank Aretas Haskell, First Lieutenant, Sixth Wisconsin Infantry, was "published under the auspices of the Commandery of the State of Massachusetts, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, and the Wisconsin History Commission." General Roy Stone, of Pennsylvania, commanded the Second Brigade, Third Division, First Corps, at Gettysburg. Upon receiving serious wounds he was carried from the field, and Colonel Langhorne Wister, of Philadelphia, commanding the 150th Pennsylvania Regiment, succeeded to the command of the Brigade, and the Lieutenant-Colonel took command of the Regiment, and soon after was shot in the leg, remaining in command until his right arm was shattered. Carried into an adjacent barn, used temporarily as a hospital, the flow of blood was stopped by a tourniquet, and the arm bandaged--occupying about thirty minutes--after which he returned to his regiment and assumed command, maintaining the line held by it until the excruciating pain and faintness from shock and loss of blood compelled him to retire. The next day his arm was amputated at the shoulder. For that--perhaps--unprecedented instance of heroism at Gettysburg the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 150th Pennsylvania was awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor; he was promoted for bravery on the field of battle, and this is what he, General Henry S. Huidekoper, of Philadelphia, a member of the Loyal Legion, Commandery of Pennsylvania, says of Haskell's book: "In the first print much of what Haskell said was suppressed, and we cannot but regret that any of it was made public, for, from a historical standpoint, the story is inaccurate and misleading, and from an ethical standpoint it is indecent, venomous, scandalous and vainglorious." And this is the "narrative" that the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, and the History Commission of Wisconsin, have recently published in attractive and costly form, giving the same wide circulation, unmindful of the fact that thereby they are inflicting irreparable injury to both the living and the heroic dead. THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE. Colonel Chas. H. Banes, late President of the Market Street National Bank, was a typical soldier of the Civil War; he was a leading member of the Baptist Church in Philadelphia, and was as devout as a Christian as he was heroic as a Volunteer Soldier. In 1876 Colonel Banes published an interesting volume, entitled, "History of the Philadelphia Brigade." No man was as competent as he to write such a history, inasmuch as he had long been the Adjutant of the Brigade and in possession of all its records. In his preface to that book Colonel Banes says: "The four regiments of the Brigade were composed chiefly of Volunteers from the city of Philadelphia, and for that reason might properly be called the Philadelphia Brigade. It consisted of the 69th, 71st, 72d, and 106th Regiments of Pennsylvania Volunteers. The command had from the first enrollment until the muster out 350 field, staff and line officers, and over 6,000 non-commissioned officers and privates. The officers and men of the regiments were equal in courage, endurance and discipline to the best commands of the army, and their soldierly bearing on the march and in battle helped to make the history of the Army of the Potomac." As to the charge of cowardice against a Brigade that lost 3,533 in killed, wounded, deaths from other causes, and missing, made under the auspices of Dartmouth College, and the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Commandery of Massachusetts, is so positive, so indecent, so scandalous, so brutal, and so absolutely false, the Philadelphia Brigade, in formulating a reply to these malicious and infamous violations of facts, has deemed it proper to submit, as briefly as possible, extracts from Colonel Banes' "History of the Philadelphia Brigade," about what the Old Brigade did from the time it received the order to move from Falmouth, Va., until it met and turned backward the charge of Pickett's Division at the "Bloody Angle" of Gettysburg, on the afternoon of July 3, 1863. BANES VERSUS HASKELL. That "History of the Philadelphia Brigade," by Colonel Chas. H. Banes, which records with absolute truthfulness the part taken by the Philadelphia Brigade from Ball's Bluff to Appomattox, was written with the calm deliberation and adherence to facts characteristic of the man who stood foremost among his fellow citizens of Pennsylvania for business integrity, Christian rectitude, and American manhood and honor, and sensitive in the highest degree of his honor, and herewith is what that manly man, comrade and companion, Colonel Chas. H. Banes, Adjutant of the Philadelphia Brigade, records in his history regarding the battle at the Bloody Angle of Gettysburg, and the march from Falmouth immediately preceding that great battle: "On Sunday, June 14th, our Division was ordered to move at very short notice. At about midnight the Second Division, the last of the Army, moved from Falmouth, obstructing the roads behind the column. At noon, June 15th, the command reached Stafford Court House, where it halted two hours; then resuming the march bivouacked at night five miles from Dumfries. The day was very hot, the roads were filled with dust, and the march of 28 miles was so oppressive that a number of the men fell from sunstroke and exhaustion. "At about two A. M., on the 16th, the Brigade started from Dumfries, where we halted a few hours. After taking up the march through Wolf Run Shoals, Occoquan Creek, we camped for the night on a fine farm belonging to an old bachelor named Steele, who was very anxious that we should raise money to pay for the damage to his crops. He did not succeed, his uninvited guests being ragged and penniless. On the 17th we reached Sangster's Station, Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Here the Corps formed in line of battle, facing towards Bull Run. "After maneuvering and countermarching the command started on the 20th through Bull Run and Gainesville to Thoroughfare Gap, where we arrived at midnight. The last part of the march was very severe, and in the darkness men frequently stumbled over rocks, and into ditches. "The Second Corps remained at this place guarding the pass until the morning of June 25th. Two miles below this point there was a less frequented road, but one easy of access, which was effectually blocked up for some time to come by a detachment from the Brigade, who were furnished with axes, with which trees were felled in large numbers and thrown across the road. "After leaving Thoroughfare Gap the Division was assailed by a battery while marching through Hay Market. Before this was silenced a few of the command were killed and wounded. Passing through Cub Run the column crossed the Potomac at Edward's Ferry at eleven o'clock on the night of June 26th. "The next day the march was continued beyond Barnestown, Maryland; and on the 28th our Corps arrived two miles from Frederick, where the Brigade was ordered to establish a picket covering the right of the Corps near the Monocacy. "On the day of our arrival at this point General Hooker, at his own request, was relieved from command, and Major-General George G. Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, was designated as Commander-in-Chief in his stead. There were other changes made of subordinate commanders at the same time. Among these was the assignment of Brigadier-General Alexander S. Webb to command the Second Brigade as successor to Brigadier-General Owen. "General Webb, although an officer of note in the regular service, was unknown to the majority of the command, but his force of character and personal gallantry soon won the regard of the Brigade to as great an extent as that obtained by any of his predecessors. "The advance of the Second Corps was begun early on the morning of June 29th, and, with but few halts, it was continued throughout the day. After tramping through the stifling dust under a burning sun, in heavy marching order, a distance of more than 31 miles, Uniontown was reached, where the troops remained during the 30th. On July 1st the advance was again resumed until a point four miles from Gettysburg was reached, where a halt was made." Thus it was the Philadelphia Brigade reached Gettysburg, after marching about 170 miles from Falmouth to Gettysburg, in mid-summer, under a blazing sun, with dust ankle-deep, as the rear guard of the Army of the Potomac, obstructing roads while on the march, silencing batteries of the enemy, performing picket duty, and doing the rear-guard work for a great army, and when on the march making from 20 to 30 miles a day--on June 29th marching more than 31 miles--and on July 1st marching from Uniontown, 20 miles distant, to within four miles of Gettysburg. On the morning of July 2d, at early dawn, marched a distance of four miles, placed in position at Cemetery Ridge, and taking part in the second day's battle, as herewith further described by Colonel Banes: "On July 2d, at early dawn, the Corps was moved to the front and placed in position along Cemetery Ridge, connecting on its right with the left of Howard's Corps; while the Third Corps, under Sickles, was ordered to connect on the left and extend to Round Top. "The Philadelphia Brigade, before taking its place in line, was massed on the edge of a wood, near the Taneytown Road, and a field return was made by the adjutant of each regiment. Out of the entire number present for duty when General Webb assumed command at Frederick, there were but 13 men absent without leave; and some of these, who had given out on the march, rejoined their comrades before the action. "By order of General Gibbon, commanding the Division, the Philadelphia Brigade was put in position at six and a half o'clock A. M. on the 2d, on Granite Ridge, on the right of the Division, its right resting on Cushing's Battery A, Fourth United States Artillery, and its left on Battery B, First Rhode Island Artillery, Lieutenant Brown commanding. The 69th Regiment was placed behind a fence, a little in advance of the ridge, the remaining three regiments of the Brigade under cover of the hill in the rear. "Immediately after assuming this position, a detail, ordered from each regiment, was advanced as skirmishers beyond the Emmettsburg Road and parallel with the Confederate line of battle on Seminary Ridge. This disposition was scarcely completed before the enemy opened with sharpshooters and artillery. "A few hundred yards in front of our line of battle and towards the left, a farm house and buildings were located. To prevent these affording cover to the enemy, they were occupied by the Brigade pioneers, with orders to destroy them upon a signal from General Webb. During the fight of Sickles the Brigade skirmishers were engaged for an hour with those of the enemy, both parties suffering losses, but neither giving ground. This contest was in full view of the entire Corps, and the manly bearing of their comrades was a matter of pride to the men of the Philadelphia Brigade. That portion of the field lying between Granite and Seminary Ridge being an open plain without trees or shelter, the contests of our skirmishers were literally a series of duels fought with rifles at an easy range. "'The enemy made the assault on the 2d at about six and a half P. M. Their line of battle advanced beyond one gun of Brown's Battery, receiving at that point the fire of the 69th, of the 71st, advanced to the support of the 69th, of the 72d and of the 106th, which had previously been moved to the left by command of General Hancock. Colonel Baxter at this time was wounded. The enemy maneuvred and fell back, pursued by the 106th, 72d and part of the 71st. The 72d and 106th followed them to the Emmettsburg Road, capturing and sending to the rear about 250 prisoners, among whom were one colonel, five captains and fifteen lieutenants.'" "The assault, thus officially reported by Webb, was executed with much celerity, and when the column of the enemy burst forth from the woods on Seminary Ridge, it seemed but a few moments before the Emmettsburg Road was crossed, and our skirmishers driven like leaves before the wind. As the Confederates advanced, Brown's Battery, with the exception of one gun, was withdrawn to the rear of the 69th. Over this piece there was a fierce struggle, but the fire of the Brigade was terribly severe, causing the enemy to hesitate and then fall back. Those of the Confederates in the lead threw down their guns and cried out with an oath: 'Get us out of this; it is too hot here.' "And now a countercharge was made by the Philadelphia Brigade, along with those of other Brigades; the assaulting column was rolled back almost as quickly as it had advanced. The skirmish line was reformed on its old connection, and shortly after, night coming on, the fight on our portion of the line was over for the 2d of July. "The pioneers in their exposed position were made prisoners by the enemy, and the guard left by the captors remained at the farm house with their charge, intending to move to the rear as soon as the heavy firing was over. This decision was fortunate for our detail, but unfortunate for the enemy, as the advance of Webb's regiments swept by the improvised guard house and changed the relation of its occupants. "The 106th Regiment was ordered to report to General Howard, who placed it on the right of the Baltimore Pike, near Rickett's Battery, where it remained until the close of the battle. This regiment was highly complimented by General Howard. "On the morning of July 3d the 69th Regiment occupied the same line at the fence in front of the clump of trees on the ridge that it held the day before, while the 71st was deployed and connected with its right. One wing of the 71st was stationed at the fence, while the other was behind a stone wall to the right and rear. The 72d was held in reserve, forming a second line to the left of Brown's Battery, and in the rear of Colonel Hall's Third Brigade. "After the contest at Culp's Hill there was a momentary pause in the operations of both armies. This unusual calm was only broken by an occasional gun, or the discharge of a sharpshooter's rifle. About one o'clock, when the men were wondering what the next movement would be in this great battle, a single Whitworth gun was fired from the extreme left of Seminary Ridge, a distance of three miles. The bolt just reached the right of our Brigade. Then at intervals along the entire line solitary shots were fired, as if intended for signal guns of preparation. These were quickly followed by others, and in a few moments there burst forth from the whole Confederate line a most terrific fire of artillery. One hundred and twenty guns concentrated their fire on that portion of Meade's position held by the Second Division, Second Corps. Shell, round shot, Whitworth bolts, and spherical case were flying over and exploding about us at the same time. Almost every second ten of these missiles were in the air; each, as it went speeding on its message of death, indicating its form by a peculiar sound. The shrieking of shells, or the heavy thud of round shot, were easily distinguished from the rotary whizzing of the Whitworth bolt. "When these agents of destruction commenced their horrid work, no portion of the line, from the front to a point far in the rear of the Taneytown Road, afforded any protection against their fury. Men who had been struck while serving the guns and were limping towards the hospital, were frequently wounded again before they had gone a hundred yards. "In spite of the ghastly forms of mangled men and horses, and in spite of the dismantled guns, exploding limbers, and other scenes of horror, produced by Lee's attack, the guns of Meade roared back their defiance; while the infantry, powerless for the moment, rested on their arms awaiting the bayonet charge they knew was sure to follow. "Webb reports: 'By a quarter to three o'clock the enemy had silenced the Rhode Island Battery, all the guns but one of Cushing's Battery, and had plainly shown, by his concentration of fire on this and the Third Brigade, that an important assault was to be expected. I had sent, at two P. M., the Adjutant-General of the Brigade for two batteries to replace Cushing's and Brown's. Just before the assault, Captain Wheeler's First New York Artillery had got into position on the left in the place occupied by the Rhode Island Battery, which had retired with the loss of all its officers but one.' "When the New York Battery arrived and went into action, Lieutenant Cushing had but one of his guns left, and it was served by men of the 71st Regiment. The Lieutenant had been struck by a fragment of shell, but stood by his piece as calmly as if on parade, and as the Confederate infantry commenced to emerge from the woods opposite, Cushing quietly said, 'Webb, I will give them one shot more; good-bye.' The gun was loaded by the California men, and run down to the fence near the 69th, and at the moment of the last discharge, just as the enemy reached the line, the brave Cushing fell mortally wounded. "At three o'clock the enemy's line of battle left the woods in our front, moved in perfect order across the Emmettsburg Road, formed in the hollow of our immediate front several lines of battle under a fire of spherical case-shot from Wheeler's Battery and Cushing's gun, and advanced for the assault. "The Union batteries increased their fire as rapidly as possible, but this did not for a moment delay the determined advance. The rude gaps torn by the shells and case-shot were closed as quickly as they were made. As new batteries opened, the additional fire created no confusion in the ranks of the enemy; its only apparent effect was to mark the pathway over the mile of advance with the dead and dying. None who saw this magnificent charge of Pickett's column, composed of thousands of brave men, could refrain from admiring its grandeur. As they approached the rail fence their formation was irregular, and near the front and centre were crowded together the regimental colors of the entire division; the scene strangely illustrated the divine words, 'Terrible as an army with banners.' "Now our men close up their ranks and await the struggle. The Seventy-second, by direction of Webb, is double-quicked from its position on the left and fills the gap on the ridge where Cushing's Battery had been in action. Just at this moment Pickett's men reach the line occupied by the Sixty-ninth and the left companies of the Seventy-first. General Armistead, commanding the leading brigade, composed principally of Virginians, in advance of his men, swinging his hat on his sword, cries out, 'Boys, give them the cold steel!' Just then the white trefoil on the caps of our men is recognized, and Armistead's men exclaim, 'The Army of the Potomac! Do they call these militia?' "The final effort for success now commences. The advance companies of the Seventy-first are literally crowded out of their places by the enemy, and, with one company of the Sixty-ninth, they form with the remainder of Colonel Smith's command at the stone fence. At the same instant Colonel Hall's Third Brigade and the regiments of the First under Devereaux and other officers, as if by instinct, rush to Webb's assistance, while Colonel Stannard moves two regiments of the Vermont Brigade to strike the attacking column in the flank. "And now is the moment when the battle rages most furiously. Armistead, with a hundred and fifty of his Virginians, is inside our lines; only a few paces from our Brigade Commander, they look each other in the face. The artillery of the enemy ceases to fire, and the gunners of their batteries are plainly seen standing on their caissons to view the result, hoping for success, while Pettigrew's Division, failing to support Pickett, halts as if terrified at the scene. This is the soldiers' part of the fight; tactics and alignments are thrown to one side. No effort is made to preserve a formation. Union men are intermingled with the enemy, and in some cases surrounded by them, but refusing to surrender. Rifles, bayonets and clubbed muskets are freely used, and men on both sides rapidly fall. "This struggle lasts but a few moments, when the enemy in the front throw down their arms, and rushing through the line of the Seventy-second, hasten to the rear as prisoners without a guard, while others of the column who might have escaped, unwilling to risk a retreat over the path by which they came, surrendered. The battle is over, the last attack of Lee at Gettysburg is repulsed, and the highest wave of the Rebellion has reached its farthest limit, ever after to recede. "General Armistead, who was in the Confederate front, fell mortally wounded, close to the colors of the Seventy-second. One of the men of that regiment, who was near him, asked permission of the writer (Col. Chas. H. Banes, Adjutant Philadelphia Brigade), to carry him out of the battle, saying, 'He has called for help as THE SON OF A WIDOW, an order was given to take him to an ambulance, and when his revolver was removed from his belt, it was seen that he had obeyed his own command, 'to give them the cold steel,' as no shot had been fired from it. "At the close of Gen. Webb's official report he states, 'The Brigade captured nearly one thousand prisoners and six battle flags, and picked up fourteen hundred stand of arms and nine hundred sets of accoutrements. The loss was forty-three officers and four hundred and fifty-two men, and only forty-seven were missing. The conduct of this Brigade was most satisfactory.'" * * * * * Compare the calm, temperate, lucid, truthful and dignified statement of Colonel Banes, who, as the Adjutant of the Philadelphia (Webb's) Brigade, was more familiar with its every movement than any officer or private soldier could possibly be; a statement prepared with deliberation by a man of mature years, and ripened judgment, with that of the raving, distracted, ridiculous utterances of the youthful Lieut. Haskell, in his book said to have been hastily written within two weeks after the battle, written between his hours of duty, while on the march from Gettysburg back to Harper's Ferry, written by him while not yet fully recovered from the delirium of excitement that overcame him in the exalted position he claims to have assumed, that of Supersedeas Commander of the Army of the Potomac to annihilate the Confederate Army, in the event of its renewing the attack. It was the author Haskell who asked this question of Lieut. Haskell: "Great heavens! were my senses mad?--the larger portion of Webb's Brigade--my God! it is true, was breaking from the cover of the works, without order or reason, with no hand uplifted to check them, was falling back a fear-stricken flock of confusion. A GREAT, MAGNIFICENT PASSION OVERCAME ME as I met the tide of these rabbits," and a lot more of such incoherent, disconnected trash, from the young Lieutenant so OVERCOME WITH A MAGNIFICENT PASSION that the aberration of mind which followed while writing that narrative was inevitable. Col. Banes says, "This struggle lasted but a few moments, when the enemy in front threw down their arms, and, rushing through the lines of the Seventy-second hastened to the rear as prisoners without a guard." It was these men of Pickett's Division hastening to the rear whom Haskell met, if ever he met any one fleeing to the rear on that occasion; but "Great heavens! his senses were mad." A "Magnificent Passion" overcame him. He was in a delirium of vainglory, and he mistook the defeated Veterans of Pickett's Division, seeking shelter from impending death, for the victorious Veterans of the Philadelphia Brigade, and the Military Order, Loyal Legion, Commandery of Massachusetts, and the History Commission of Wisconsin, also apparently overcome with a "Magnificent Passion" for book publishing, reprinted his "Narrative" to the world, as their adopted waif and heir. * * * * * It has been asked, what could have been Haskell's object in so perverting the facts of history relative to the Battle of Gettysburg? Gen. Henry S. Hindekoper, of Philadelphia, who won high renown in the battle, aptly answers the question in the statement made by him, wherein he said of Haskell's "Narrative," that "from a historical standpoint it is inaccurate and misleading, and from an ethical standpoint it is indecent, venemous, scandalous and VAINGLORIOUS." After describing the first day's fight as minutely as though he had observed it all from the cupola of the Seminary Building on Seminary Ridge, Haskell thus seeks to acquit himself from all misstatements by saying: "Of the events of the first day of July I do not speak from personal knowledge." At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 1st, Haskell was at Taneytown, 13 miles distant from Gettysburg, and between 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening the Second Corps was halted four miles south of Gettysburg, where it, and Lieut. Haskell, biouvacked for the night; therefore--except detracting from officers and men who rendered heroic service--no glory came to Haskell on the first day. He "did not see what he thought he saw." At early dawn on July 2d Hancock's Corps was moved forward about four miles, and at 6.30 A. M. was placed in position on Cemetery Ridge. The Third Division (Hayes), on the right, connecting with the left of Howard's Eleventh Corps; the First Division (Caldwell's), on the left, connecting with the right of Sickles, Third Corps, and the Second Division (Gibbon), in the centre, and Haskell started in early on the second day to catch fame, and thus, according to his own "Narrative," he succeeded: "A bullet entered the chest of my horse, 'Billy,' just in front of my left leg; a kick from a hitched horse in the dark that would likely have broken my ankle if it had not been for a very thick boot, but which did break my temper, and a bullet from a sharp shooter that hissed by my cheek so close that I felt the movement of the air distinctly." And thus the "Narrative" recites as to the third and last day of the battle: "I had been struck upon the thigh by a bullet which I think must have glanced and partially spent its force upon my saddle. It had pierced the thick cloth of my trousers, and two thicknesses of underclothing, but had not broken the skin, leaving me with an enormous bruise, that for a time benumbed the entire leg. At the time of receiving it, I heard the thump, and noticed it, and the hole in the cloth into which I thrust my finger, and I experienced a feeling of relief when I found that my leg was not pierced." We shudder when we think what might have happened to that leg, if the bullet, when it saw Haskell, had not so kindly glanced and spent its force on his saddle before piercing the thick cloth of his breeches, and the two thicknesses of his underclothing. The second and third days brought scant renown to such an ambitious officer as First Lieut. Haskell, but immortal fame is very chary with her favors. She tries a man long, and she tries him hard, before wreathing his brow with the laurel of victory, and fitting him for a niche in the Temple of Fame. Haskell realized all this at the close of the battle on this afternoon of July third, and he evidently concluded to create a niche for himself in the holy of holies by a page or two of romance in his "Narrative," and so he planned it all out. Haskell knew--none better than he--that the Philadelphia Brigade met and repulsed the brunt of the charge of Pickett's Division, but he would immortalize himself as a hero by recording in his "Narrative," that the Brigade broke from the "Bloody Angle" without orders or reason, with no uplifted hand of Webb, or Banes, or Dennis O'Kane, or Martin Tschudy, or R. Penn Smith, or Theodore Hesser to check them; that he, Haskell, met them, "a tide of rabbits," and ordered them to halt, to about face, and to fire, and hearing his voice they obeyed his command, and he led them back to glorious victory, and that he--as the one solitary horseman between the lines, only 40 yards from the enemy--repulsed Longstreet's Corps, and thereby, therein and thereon ended the great conflict at Gettysburg. It was such a ridiculous page of fiction that if Haskell had survived the vicissitudes of war, he would have eliminated it, and if he died before the close of the Civil War--as he did--he would trust to luck; he trusted aright, for a Loyal Legion concluded to continue the fiction, thereby placing its laurel on Haskell's brow, crowning HIM the Hero of Gettysburg; and a State History Commission concluded to fill a niche in the Temple of the Immortals with the name and fame of First Lieutenant Frank Aretas Haskell, but not until fifty years after the fiction had been written, when few were left to refute that romance of the most vainglorious soldier of the Civil War. AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE. The total number of officers and men present for duty of the Philadelphia Brigade, at the Battle of Gettysburg, was 1,573, and the total loss was 491, given in detail, as to regiments in the annexed tables: NUMBER PRESENT FOR DUTY +---------------+----------+------+-------+ | REGIMENTS | OFFICERS | MEN | TOTAL | +---------------+----------+------+-------+ | General Staff | 4 | -- | 4 | | 69th | 22 | 312 | 344 | | 71st | 27 | 366 | 393 | | 72nd | 26 | 447 | 473 | | 106th | 30 | 313 | 343 | | Brigade Band | -- | 16 | 16 | +---------------+----------+------+-------+ | Totals | 119 | 1454 | 1573 | +---------------+----------+------+-------+ LOSS OF PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE AND SECOND CORPS AT GETTYSBURG. -------+----------------+----------------+----------------+-------- | | | Captured or | No. | No. of Killed | No. of Wounded | Missing | Totals of +----------+-----+----------+-----+----------+-----+-------- Regt. | Officers | Men | Officers | Men | Officers | Men | -------+----------+-----+----------+-----+----------+-----+-------- 69th | 4 | 36 | 8 | 72 | 2 | 15 | 137 71st | 2 | 19 | 3 | 55 | 3 | 16 | 98 72nd | 2 | 42 | 7 | 139 | -- | 2 | 192 106th | 1 | 8 | 9 | 45 | -- | 1 | 64 -------+----------+-----+----------+-----+----------+-----+-------- Totals | 9 | 105 | 27 | 211 | 5 | 34 | 491 -------+----------+-----+----------+-----+----------+-----+-------- TOTAL LOSS SECOND CORPS. ---------------+-----------------+----------------+------- | | Captured or | No. of Killed | No. of Wounded | Missing | Total ---------+-----+----------+------+----------+-----+------- Officers | Men | Officers | Men | Officers | Men | ---------+-----+----------+------+----------+-----+------- 66 | 731 | 270 | 2923 | 13 | 365 | 4369 ---------+-----+----------+------+----------+-----+------- The following table, furnished by our beloved Comrade, Sylvester Byrne, was the last letter the Philadelphia Brigade Association ever received from that noble soul--that Comrade who loved his Regiment and Brigade with ardent and unfaltering affection. To the very last he was faithful to and watchful of his Command. The statement was furnished for the purpose of correcting some errors relative to the actual losses of the Philadelphia Brigade. The table is printed just as it was given by Comrade Byrne, and is regarded as his sacred contribution to the Brigade's reply to Haskell's charge of cowardice: TABLE SHOWING THE LOSSES OF THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE FROM 1861 TO 1865. +--------+--------+---------+---------+---------+--------------+-------+ | | | | | Died of | Died of | | | Regt. | Killed | Wounded | Missing | Disease | Other Causes | Total | +--------+--------+---------+---------+---------+--------------+-------+ | 69th | 178 | 346 | 185 | 91 | 15 | 815 | | 71st | 140 | 396 | 330 | 91 | 6 | 963 | | 72nd | 195 | 558 | 165 | 60 | 10 | 988 | | 106th | 99 | 416 | 157 | 81 | 14 | 767 | +--------+--------+---------+---------+---------+--------------+-------+ | Totals | 612 | 1716 | 837 | 323 | 45 | 3533 | +--------+--------+---------+---------+---------+--------------+-------+ The total loss in killed, wounded and missing of the Philadelphia Brigade at Gettysburg was over 32 per cent., about one soldier slain to every three engaged in the battle. Call you this "running like rabbits?" The total loss of the Philadelphia Brigade during the Civil War was 3,533, of which number 545 were killed, wounded and missing at Antietam, the remaining loss of nearly three thousand was sustained in the 45 engagements in which the Brigade took part, and yet with the evidence of this loss, furnished by the United States Government and easily accessible to all, and on file in the library of the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, that Order appears to stand sponsor for a "Narrative" which falsely proclaimed to the world that the brave men of the Philadelphia Brigade "ran like rabbits" from Pickett's Division at Gettysburg. What more need be said to convince this Military Order of the Loyal Legion that from the beginning to the end, the Philadelphia Brigade was just as loyal, just as brave, just as heroic, as they, our comrades, and with this statement of facts the Association of Survivors of the Philadelphia Brigade calls upon the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, Commandery of Massachusetts, and the History Commission of Wisconsin, to retract the statement made in the volumes published by them during the year 1908, as to cowardice. In meeting and repulsing the charge of Pickett's Division at the Bloody Angle of Gettysburg, the High Water Mark of the Civil War, the Philadelphia Brigade gained imperishable fame that will live in history as long as our country will exist as a nation, and that renown is so irrevocably fixed in the annals of the War that it can never be impaired while time itself shall last. Since the foregoing reply was formulated, to the charge of cowardice made under the auspices of the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, the Philadelphia Brigade Association has received a book of 185 pages, entitled "The Battle of Gettysburg, by Frank Aretas Haskell, Wisconsin History Commission, Reprint No. 1," an edition of 2,500 copies, printed under authority of the State of Wisconsin. In printing this book these words appear in the preface: "The Wisconsin History Commission has, in accordance with its fixed policy, reverted to the original edition, which is here presented entire, exactly as first printed." And this is what that "History Commission" records on pages 9 and 10 regarding the Eleventh Corps: "Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon the enemy, now in overwhelming force, resumed the battle with spirit. The portion of the Eleventh Corps making but feeble opposition to the advancing enemy, soon began to fall back. Back in disorganized masses they fled into the town, hotly pursued, and in lanes, in barns, in yards and cellars, throwing away their arms, they sought to hide like rabbits, and were captured, unresisting, by hundreds." The Loyal Legion of Massachusetts hadn't the courage to print that paragraph in their book. These regiments formed the Eleventh Corps at Gettysburg: 17th Conn., 82d Ill., 33d Mass., 41st, 45th, 54th, 58th, 68th, 75th, 119th, 134th, 136th, 154th and 157th New York; 27th, 73d, 74th and 153d Penna.; 25th, 55th, 61st, 73d, 75th, 82d and 107th Ohio, and 26th Wisconsin. How do the Survivors of these Regiments regard the statement of the History Commission of Wisconsin, that "they sought to hide like rabbits?" and that the loss usually sustained by the Eleventh Corps was in prisoners? And this is how the great State of Wisconsin, through its History Commission, maligns General Sickles and President Lincoln, who put upon General Sickles' shoulders the stars of a Major-General. (Pages 40 and 41.) The Loyal Legion of Massachusetts eliminated the slander against Gen. Sickles and President Lincoln. "General Sickles commenced to advance his whole corps, from the general line, straight to the front, with a view to occupy the second ridge, along and near the road. What his purpose could have been is past conjecture. It was not ordered by General Meade, as I heard him say, and he disapproved as soon as it was made known to him. Generals Hancock and Gibbon, as they saw the move in progress, criticised its propriety sharply, as I know, and foretold quite accurately what would be the result. I suppose the truth probably is that General Sickles supposed he was doing for the best; but he was neither born nor bred a soldier. But one can scarcely tell what may have been the motives of such a man, a politician, and some other things, exclusive of the BARTON KEY affair, a man after show and notoriety, and newspaper fame, and the adulation of the mob, there is a grave responsibility on those in whose hands are the lives of ten thousand men; AND ON THOSE WHO PUT STARS ON MEN'S SHOULDERS, TOO! Bah! I kindle when I see some things I have to see. "It is understood in the Army that the President thanked the slayer of Barton Key for SAVING THE DAY at Gettysburg. Does the country know any better than the President that Meade, Hancock and Gibbon were entitled to some little share of such credit?" It is inconceivable that the great State of Wisconsin would in any way lend herself to the dissemination of what is not only untrustworthy, but absolutely scandalous, malevolent and false information, except it was done in ignorance of facts. It is still more inconceivable that the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, soldiers themselves, would act as sponsors or in any way help, aid or assist in depriving fellow soldiers of the honors fairly and bravely won in a battle where their loss was 491 of a total of less than 1,500 men, except they had given no heed to the statements before publication. We believe that the State of Wisconsin and the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts can do no less as American citizens and soldiers than to promptly disclaim all responsibility for the statements set forth in Lieut. Haskell's book. For however good Haskell's record as a soldier is, yet the fact must clearly appear to every intelligent mind that a man who would speak falsely of his superior officers and even go so far--at least in one case (Sickles)--as to bring to life out of the long dead past, a sad, sad epoch, which was no fault of his--displays in such writing a spirit unworthy of any American; and his self laudation of what he did--would cause anyone who was ever on a field of battle to use one of Haskell's expressions, "Bah." A refusal to make this public disclaimer we feel would place both the State of Wisconsin and Loyal Legion of Massachusetts in a position which, to say it very mildly, would be the reverse of creditable, and put them in the attitude of sharing the ridicule and contempt which the narrative of Lieutenant Haskell deserves. NOTES, CORRESPONDENCE AND REMARKS. NOTE NO. 1. This letter from General Alex. S. Webb is made a part of this paper: NEW YORK MONUMENTS COMMISSION BATTLE FIELDS OF GETTYSBURG AND CHATANOOGA RIVERDALE-ON-HUDSON NEW YORK. September 7, 1909. My dear Frazier: I could not find your address, but I had Dampman's, and wrote to him to try and obtain action on Haskell's book which is now circulated by the thousands to take from our Brigade and its Commander all the glory and reputation we acquired at the Bloody Angle of Gettysburg. So make it certain that our answer to the Massachusetts Commandery be strong and clear. What Haskell wrote he wrote in ignorance. He paraded with the stragglers and prisoners behind a fighting Brigade and thought he was leading a Division. Now, Frazier, let this denial of Haskell's claim be strong and yet courteous. He is dead. Gibbon is dead. Hancock dead. What a time to proclaim this falsehood. Sincerely yours, (Signed) ALEX. S. WEBB, Brevet Maj. General, U. S. A. NOTE NO. 2. WHAT LINCOLN SAID. It was Abraham Lincoln who said at the dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg: "But in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here." And yet the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, Commandery of Massachusetts, and the Wisconsin History Commission, in so far as they authorized, or are responsible for the publication of the Haskell "Narrative" of the Battle of Gettysburg, are surely, surely doing what they can to detract from what the living and the dead did there. NOTE NO. 3. FOR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. A typewritten copy of this reply of the Philadelphia Brigade Association, before being placed in the hands of the printer, was sent to the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, Commandery of Massachusetts; to the Wisconsin History Commission, and to the Governor of Wisconsin, asking if they had any explanation to make as to the statements contained in Haskell's "Narrative," advising them that we would gladly give it in our printed book. As yet no reply has been received from the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts, and for this grave discourtesy we are at a loss to account, unless it be that after consideration the facts submitted did not warrant them in defending the position in which they were placed, and to acknowledge themselves in error would, to some extent, at least, stultify themselves. The Governor of Wisconsin, who is an ex-officio member of the Wisconsin History Commission, writes under date of February 24, 1910, scarcely referring at all to the matter under consideration, i. e., the conduct of the Philadelphia Brigade in the Battle of Gettysburg. He does, however, say that the purpose of the Commission is to publish such material as from considerations of rarity or general excellence it is deemed desirable to disseminate. Haskell's book certainly comes under one of these classes. We do not believe that among any writings of either Union men or Confederates in all the United States, such a rare book as Haskell's can be found. The Governor of Wisconsin says that Haskell in his story to his brother puts down in his letter "what he saw, or thought he saw." It would seem that comment on this is useless. That history should be what the writer "saw, OR THOUGHT HE SAW," is at least novel. Chas. E. Estabrook, a Comrade of the Grand Army, and its representative on the Wisconsin History Commission, and its chairman, under date of February 17, 1910, while writing a somewhat lengthy letter, neglects, also, to write of the matter under consideration, but says, among other things: "The subject of the criticism of the Eleventh Corps, by Haskell, in his account of Gettysburg, was considered by me, and I contemplated writing notes, OR GIVING THE LATER, AND WHAT I THINK THE MORE ACCURATE VIEW. I, however, concluded, in view of the rule which we adopted, to have the other and later account of the Battle of Gettysburg prepared by a Wisconsin man, from the Wisconsin point of view, and some months ago asked a staff officer, who served in that Corps, to write an account of the Eleventh Corps at Gettysburg, which he consented to do. This will be published as soon as practicable after the same is delivered to the Commission." It would seem from this that Chairman Estabrook, Past Department Commander, of Wisconsin, Grand Army of the Republic, does not believe the statement made by Haskell in his "Narrative," and that it is necessary to have another book published to state truthfully what the Eleventh Corps did. It would seem that it is also needless to make any comment on the position taken by Comrade Estabrook, Chairman of the Wisconsin History Commission. It is to be hoped that this staff officer's book will be written from the stand-point of what he saw, and not from what he thought he saw. THE HISTORY COMMISSION'S VIEW. Reuben G. Thwaites, Secretary and Editor of the Wisconsin History Commission, speaking for the Commission, writes thus: "OPINIONS, OR ERRORS OF FACT, on the part of the respective authors represented, both in original narratives and in reprints issued by the Commission HAVE NOT, NOR WILL THEY BE MODIFIED BY THE LATTER. For all statements of whatever character, the author alone is responsible. "Could any plainer statement than the foregoing be phrased in the English language, to indicate that this Commission certainly does not endorse whatever criticisms may have contemporaneously been offered by Lieutenant Haskell?" As the question has been asked us we reply: As Haskell has been dead for more than 45 years, and the foul slanders were made public by the Wisconsin History Commission in November, 1908, defaming President Lincoln, Generals Sickles, Howard, Doubleday, Barlow, Schurz, Geary, Webb, Banes and other officers, and thousands of brave soldiers, it certainly does look to the Comrades of the Philadelphia Brigade as though the Wisconsin History fully endorsed everything that Haskell wrote. Just how the Corps, Brigade and Regimental Associations, Grand Army Posts, Loyal Legion Commanderies, public libraries, the newspaper press, and others to whom this "Reply" will be sent will regard the actions of the Wisconsin Commission and the Massachusetts Loyal Legion has yet to be determined. Writing further, Secretary and Editor Thwaites says: "If Haskell's account was worth reprinting at all (and we thought it well worth doing), the only course open to us, as historians, was to present it just as it was originally issued, and not in the emasculated form adopted by the Dartmouth editor, and the Massachusetts Loyal Legion; changes of such character in a contemporary document are unwarranted, and utterly ruin it as historical material." As this seems to be a question of ethics between history makers, it is up to the Dartmouth editor, and the Massachusetts Loyal Legion to satisfy the Wisconsin Commission why the unwarranted emasculation was made of the Haskell "Narrative." The Wisconsin History Commission concludes its letter of explanation and excuse to the Philadelphia Brigade Association in these words: "In reprinting various other rare Wisconsin Civil War material, as we intend to do, it may happen that the original authors thus selected for treatment have criticised certain commands; it certainly would not tend to smooth the path of the Commission if each such command was thereupon to pass condemnatory resolutions. WE shall certainly hope to be spared such treatment." In reprinting the Haskell "Narrative" the Wisconsin History Commission invited the criticism it justly deserves, and must expect to receive; and in their reprints in the future, if it permits their authors to criticise other commands--as they intend to do--They cannot escape the condemnatory resolutions they hope to be spared. The Man of Nazareth said: Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete, withal it shall be measured to you again. LETTER FROM MAJOR ROBERTS. The following letter, under date of May 15, 1877, was written by Major Samuel Roberts, of the 72d Regiment, Pa. Vols., to a Comrade and friend: "Webb's Brigade was composed of the 69th, 71st, 72d and 106th Pennsylvania Regiments; the 106th Regiment had been sent to the right to reinforce Gen. Howard, leaving the other three Regiments of the Brigade to receive the shock of Pickett's advance. "The Brigade was not entrenched, nor driven back and rallied by Webb. The left wing of the 71st Regiment fell back a few yards; the 69th maintained their position, as did the right wing of the 71st. The 72d, which held a position to the left, and a short distance to the rear of the Brigade, moved by the right flank about one hundred yards, and came to a front about sixty yards in front of Armistead's Confederate Brigade. Armistead fell only a few yards in front of the 72d Regiment. "With the exception of a slight change of position of the left wing of the 71st Regiment, the Brigade not only held its position, but advanced and captured several colors, and the prisoners taken exceeded in number what was left of the Brigade, which lost nearly fifty per cent. in killed and wounded--the killed and wounded of the 72d was over fifty per cent. "Cushing's Battery, which was attached to the Brigade, was served until men were not left sufficient to work the guns. Cushing obtained volunteers from the Brigade, who served the guns until Cushing was killed. "Webb's Brigade, called the Philadelphia Brigade, was originally commanded by Col. E. D. Baker, who was killed at Ball's Bluff. It was the Second Brigade, Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, and forms the prominent feature in Rothermel's painting of the Battle of Gettysburg." NOTE NO. 5. GETTYSBURG BATTLE FIELD DISPATCHES. From official dispatches sent from Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, to the War Department, during the progress of the third day's fighting, which were given out to the Associated Press about midnight, being held back until assured that the Union Army was victorious. "Gettysburg, July 3d, 3 P. M.--A great attack is now being made on our left center by a powerful column of Rebels. We can see them advancing in hosts. Their lines are half a mile in length. They have to march a mile before they can strike a line. All of our artillery has now opened on them and we can see them falling by hundreds. In a few minutes they will strike our line, and the fight will be at close quarters." "Gettysburg, July 3d, 4.30 P. M.--We have won a great victory. The fight is over and the Rebel lines hurled back in wild disorder. Longstreet's whole Corps seems to have been swept away, from our fire. The field is covered with Rebel dead. Wild cheers ring out from every part of our lines. Thousands of Rebel prisoners are being brought in. Sheaves of battle flags and thousands of small arms are being gathered in by our men. The rejoicing among our men is indescribable." "Gettysburg, July 3d, 5 P. M.--Our victory is more complete than we could dare hope for. An immense column of the enemy, at least 20,000 strong, attacked our left center and were utterly destroyed by our fire. The column consisted of Longstreet's Corps, and but few of them are left. Nearly all were either killed, wounded, or are now prisoners in our hands. I hear that Hancock, Gibbon and Webb are severely wounded. The Philadelphia Brigade is almost destroyed. They met the most violent rush of the enemy and lost terribly. Col. O'Kane, of the 69th, is killed, and there is hardly a field officer left in the Brigade." "Gettysburg, July 3d, 10 P. M.--Our victory grows more complete as we get time to realize its magnitude. It looks as though nearly all of Longstreet's Corps had been destroyed. The field in front of the Second Corps, where the brunt of the attack fell, is covered with Rebel dead. In front of the Philadelphia Brigade they lie in great piles. Hundreds of Rebel officers are among the fallen. Gen. Armistead, of Pickett's Division, fell within our lines. He was shot through the body and is now dying. The Rebel Generals Garnet and Kemper, fell in front of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers. All the field officers of the former Regiment are killed. The slaughter on both sides has indeed been frightful. Our men are busy gathering in the wounded, many of whom must die during the night for want of proper attention." NOTE NO. 6. LETTER FROM AN INTIMATE FRIEND OF LIEUTENANT HASKELL. Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 19, 1910. "I am in receipt of your favor and note what you say about the extract from the book published by the Wisconsin History Commission relative to the description of the Battle of Gettysburg, by Col. Haskell. It confirms what I stated in my letter to the "Public Ledger" in September last. My daughter, who resides in Milwaukee, has sent me a copy of the book that you mention. I knew Col. Haskell intimately and was confident from the intimation that I possessed that had Col. Haskell lived to see the end of the Civil War he would have modified his description of the battle, as compared to that shown in the publication made by the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts. Yours very truly, W. YATES SELLECK." Mr. Selleck was the military agent at Washington for the State of Wisconsin. The remains of Col. Haskell were forwarded to Mr. Selleck, at Washington, D. C., who sent them by express, on June 7, 1864, to Haskell's mother, at Portage City, Wisconsin. In Mr. Selleck's letter to the "Public Ledger" of Philadelphia, under date of September 21, 1909, he said: "I was intimately acquainted with Haskell and had several conversations with him after the Battle of Gettysburg in regard to that battle, and I have good reason for stating that had Haskell lived until the close of the War the criticisms contained in his diary would not have been made public." NOTE NO. 7. THE CONCLUDING NOTE. What amusing history makers the Companions of the Loyal Legion of Massachusetts and the Comrades of the Wisconsin History Commission are. The State of Wisconsin enacted a law creating a History Commission, and straightway it begins printing very costly books, which they claim to be "histories of great battles of the Civil War," one of which "histories" the Governor of Wisconsin sententiously says: "Is what the author saw, OR THOUGHT HE SAW"; and because of its inaccuracy the chairman of that History Commission contemplated correcting by himself, "writing notes giving the more accurate view," but instead engaged a staff officer, who really saw what he thought he saw, to write a book correcting the inaccuracies that Chairman and Comrade Estabrook himself contemplated doing; and in the meantime the Secretary and Editor of the Commission "intends reprinting other rare Wisconsin Civil War material," regardless of the supremely ridiculous opinions or errors of facts of the authors, thereby continuing to hold the State of Wisconsin responsible for the ridicule and expense that attach to such so-called histories, one of which a distinguished officer of the Civil War pithily characterizes as "inaccurate, misleading, indecent, venomous, scandalous and vainglorious." * * * * * CAPT. EDWARD THOMPSON, 69th. CAPT. JOHN D. ROGERS, 71st. JOHN W. DAMPMAN, 71st. THOS. H. EATON, 72d. FRANK WEIBLE, 72d. WM. H. NEILER, 106th. JAMES THOMPSON, 106th. Committee on Publication. Transcriber's Notes: The following misprints have been corrected: "Haskell'" corrected to "Haskell's" (page 3) "nitche" corrected to "niche" (page 26) "criticims" corrected to "criticisms" (page 41) Other than the corrections listed above, inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the original. 
55627	----	[Illustration: _Page 93_ "EMMELINE," HE SAID GENTLY, "DO YOU SUPPOSE YOU COULD HELP ME?"] EMMELINE BY Elsie Singmaster _With Illustrations_ [Illustration] BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY The Riverside Press Cambridge COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY PERRY MASON COMPANY COPYRIGHT, 1916, BY ELSIE SINGMASTER LEWARS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED TO Miss Annie Wallace Horner IS DEDICATED THIS LITTLE STORY OF HER NATIVE TOWN CONTENTS I. THE SOUND OF BUGLES 1 II. EMMELINE AND THE SCHMIDTS TAKE A JOURNEY 27 III. EMMELINE MEETS THE ENEMIES OF HER COUNTRY 53 IV. THE SECOND DAY OF BATTLE 80 V. PRIVATE CHRISTY SAYS FAREWELL 103 VI. THE TERROR PAST 130 ILLUSTRATIONS "EMMELINE," HE SAID GENTLY, "DO YOU SUPPOSE YOU COULD HELP ME?" (page 93) _Frontispiece_ "I AM IN GREAT TROUBLE, EMMELINE" 32 EMMELINE WATCHED HIM GO 128 "YES," ANSWERED MRS. WILLING. "BERTHA IS ASLEEP UPSTAIRS" 150 _Reproduced by courtesy of "The Youth's Companion" from drawings by B. J. Rosenmeyer_ EMMELINE CHAPTER I THE SOUND OF BUGLES For an hour at least Emmeline lay quietly curled up on the rear seat of the Willing surrey. This vehicle was very old and low and broad; it had been built in the days when people made long journeys in carriages and liked to have them comfortable. At present the surrey was not in motion, but in repose in the Willing wagon shed. Tranquillity was not characteristic of Emmeline. She was by nature a jumping jack. Although she was fifteen years old and very desirous of appearing much older, she had put few of the ways of childhood behind her. This June day was hot, and Emmeline had been active since early morning. She had risen at six o'clock, eaten her breakfast, fed the chickens, washed the dishes, and picked the last of the red raspberries; then, while she sat by Sister Bertha's bed, she had raveled enough lint to fill a pint measure. After taking Sister Bertha her tray, she had gone downstairs to eat her own dinner hungrily. While she waited on Sister Bertha, or when she heard the neighbors talk about Sister Bertha, Emmeline's face was a blank mask. Of her sister--or, rather, her sister-in-law--Emmeline was deeply ashamed. Sister Bertha was, alas! a rebel. She had come from the South before the war had broken out to teach school in a village near Gettysburg; there young Henry Willing had seen her and had loved her, and nearly a year ago had married her. It was an act not hard to understand after you had seen Bertha. But it was war time, and between the two, in the opinion of Emmeline, there should have been undying hatred instead of love. Henry had already enlisted, and had gone away in his beautiful blue uniform to join his regiment. He cherished the comfortable conviction that his mother's home was still his, and thither he had brought his bride. To Emmeline the act was subversive of all order; it was contrary to the traditions of the world. Henry was, moreover, hers; he did not belong to this pale, dark-eyed creature to whom she had to carry trays. To Emmeline's mother, Henry's marriage had brought great care. Soon after Bertha had come to the old home she had been taken ill with a slow fever, and had lain for weeks helpless in her bed. After a while she had got better, and had been able to walk to the window and to look out across the green fields toward the south, where two small hills lifted rounded heads above the undulating fields. "One is called Big Round Top and one Little Round Top," Emmeline had explained in a rare moment of confidence. "There are queer rocks on Big Round Top. One is shaped like George Washington's head, hat and all, and there are two tremendous elephants, and there is Devil's Den. I climbed through Devil's Den once when we went for a picnic. When we go to grandfather's you can see it. At grandfather's there is a new calf, and there is Willoughby Run, where I go fishing. I--" At that point, Emmeline, reminding herself that she was holding commerce with an enemy of her country, had stopped. Emmeline's mother bore cheerfully the addition to her family. Bertha was Henry's--that was reason enough; she was helpless, and she was, besides, a very lovable person. Mrs Willing had begun bravely to make quilts for Henry's setting up in housekeeping, and even poor Bertha had tried to lift a needle in her slim, white fingers. Bertha could pick lint, but she did not succeed in sewing. Now for two weeks she had lain once more quiet and pale in her bed. Her improvement had been inspired by Henry's letters; at the coming of one she had sat up; at the coming of the second she had walked to the window. Suddenly, alas! letters had ceased to arrive, and poor Bertha rose no more. The neighbors--Mrs. Schmidt across the street, Mrs. Bannon next door--were certain that Bertha could rise if she would. Mrs. Schmidt undertook to condole with Mrs. Willing upon the difficulties of her situation. In that Mrs. Schmidt was unwise. Mrs. Schmidt's husband was a sutler in the army; and she had a great fear of his enemies. "Ach, I pity you!" she cried in her German way. "She is strange to you and a rebel to it yet!" Mrs. Willing's eyes flashed. She was a stout, able person with a great deal of common sense. "She is my daughter-in-law, Mrs. Schmidt," she answered sharply. Mrs. Schmidt said no more to Mrs. Willing, but to Mrs. Bannon and to Emmeline she continued to express her pity for Mrs. Willing. Emmeline made no consenting answer, but her heart was meanly pleased. Now, lying in the old carriage, Emmeline dreamed. She had a favorite vision, in which she saw herself an army nurse, bringing comfort to hundreds of wounded Union soldiers. At the end of a long career she became engaged to a young Union general. Of course she realized that there was little chance of such dreams coming true. The war could hardly last until she was old enough to be engaged, or wise enough to be a nurse. Indeed, as a practical nurse, she had already failed. Long and irksome were the hours she spent by Sister Bertha's bed--that fact was plain even to the poor invalid herself. It is impossible to tell to what length Emmeline's dreaming might not have gone this hot, sleepy afternoon. But Emmeline heard, or thought she heard, a sound, and to her, dreaming was far less interesting than doing. She sprang up, tossed back the long braids of her hair, and climbed down out of the carriage. Here she shook herself thoroughly awake, and thus prepared for active life, ran out into the hot sunshine. Standing still in the garden, Emmeline cocked her head. She had been certain that she heard shouting. Gettysburg, which was near the border, had often prepared itself for the arrival of the enemy, but now almost all the inhabitants except Emmeline had relinquished that fear. Emmeline still expected a battle. She went out by the side of the house and looked up and down the street, which lay bare and hot and quiet. She could hear her mother's voice as she talked in a low tone to Bertha; across the street the Schmidt baby whimpered. Emmeline, who loved babies, often took charge of the Schmidt baby. Emmeline listened for a long minute, but heard nothing more. She shook one braid to the front of her shoulder, braided it tighter, and shook it back; then she examined the other, which proved to be still securely fastened. Emmeline had long, thick hair and sparkling eyes. Her dress of blue and white striped calico was made with a skirt as full as a ruffle; her active legs were clothed in pantalets to match her dress; her arms and neck were bare, according to the fashion of '63. Having smoothed down her dress, Emmeline sauntered across the street, and went to the kitchen door of the Schmidt house. She realized uneasily that Bertha was crying and that her mother was trying to comfort her. "I'll take the baby down the street, Mrs. Schmidt," Emmeline offered. "I have to go to the store." "Thanks to you," answered Mrs. Schmidt, whose dinner dishes were still on the table. "With these six, indeed, I don't know what to do, Emmy." Emmeline took the baby with the condescending air of perfect capability to perfect incapability. She would never, she said to herself, suffer her house or her children to get into the condition in which Mrs. Schmidt's house and children were. When she had washed the baby's face and smoothed his hair, he stopped crying at once, and with a beaming smile settled himself into his little cart. Then, with "Get ups!" and with prancings, Emmeline took him through the gate and down the quiet street. At the corner she stopped to look up the hill toward the seminary building and out toward the college. Now that the boys had formed a company and had gone to war, the town and Emmeline were denied even the excitement of their presence. Emmeline traveled more and more slowly. The air was hot and heavy. She had seen nothing that day of her bosom friend, Eliza Batterson; perhaps if she waited, Eliza might appear. Her other boon companion, Jessie Mullin, had long since been sent away from Gettysburg to visit friends in the country to the north, so much did her parents fear an invasion. Emmeline prayed that no such ignominious experience would be hers. Presently old black Tom, who sold peanuts on the streets of Gettysburg, stopped to inquire about Henry; and then Mrs. Peter, the ever-curious, asked about Bertha. To black Tom, Emmeline gave gracious response; to Mrs. Peter, Emmeline returned an answer so short and sharp as to be impertinent. Mrs. Bannon and Mrs. Schmidt were neighbors, and had a right to discuss Bertha; Mrs. Peter had none. When Mrs. Peter had gone, Emmeline remembered uneasily that Bertha had been crying, and that there was constantly a strained, anxious look in her mother's eyes. But Henry would come back; there would probably be a letter from him in the evening mail. Not for an instant would Emmeline admit to her mind the possibility of anything else. Presently Emmeline yawned. She could hear now unmistakably the sound of voices, but it was only the laughter of the pupils of the Young Ladies' Academy. Next year Emmeline would enter the academy; there was at present, however, between her and those young ladies a gulf as wide as the Atlantic. She nodded to them, and then took the handle of the baby cart and proceeded on her way to the village store. But Emmeline did not reach the village store, neither then nor for a long time thereafter. She heard a new sound, and looked up. Men and women were running past her; the courthouse bell gave a single startling peal; she heard the clatter of galloping hoofs. "What's the matter?" cried Emmeline to a passer-by. "What in the world is the matter?" "The rebels are coming! You can see them from the corner!" "I don't believe it!" cried Emmeline, with a throbbing heart. Emmeline thought of the Schmidt baby. He was heavy, and could not be dragged, cart and all, through crowds; he would be an annoying encumbrance to a girl who liked to be in the forefront of everything. It was certainly not true that the rebels were coming; but something was coming, and Emmeline wished to be at hand to see. If she hurried up this alley and down that back street, she could reach her own yard and then the front street. She could leave the Schmidt baby, fast asleep by now, on the side porch of her house, or could thrust him, cart and all, into the kitchen. Planning as she ran, Emmeline hurried down the alley and the back street, and at last reached her own garden. Leaving the baby in the kitchen, she came through the side yard to the gate. There she halted, with quaking knees. It was not the rebels that had come, but some strange, tanned, half-clad creatures; they marched in good order, and looked steadily from their hollow eyes at astonished Gettysburg, which crowded, half fearful, at corners, and hung, curious, from windows. Many of the soldiers were barefooted; others wore shoes from which the soles had fallen; some had tied the soles to their shoes with strips of soiled and blackened rags. Emmeline stared with open mouth. Half in fun and half in earnest, the strangers began to jeer at their amazed and paralyzed audience:-- "We're not a parade, Yankees!" "We've come to eat you up!" One of them caught sight of Emmeline, with her ruffled dress, staring eyes, and open mouth. "Hello, sissy!" he called. "Look out that when you close your mouth you don't bite your tongue off!" Emmeline did not realize the full measure of the insult, for as he spoke, she had caught sight of a flag that hitherto she had beheld only in pictures--a flag that she scorned and despised. She mounted at once to a higher bar on her mother's gate. "'Oh, say can you see, by the dawn's early light,'" sang Emmeline. "'What so--'" Suddenly she felt some one seize her. She struggled, and cried, "Let me go! Let me go, I tell you!" Then she realized that the hand on her shoulder was a familiar one. "Emmeline," commanded her mother, "be still!" "He insulted me! He's a rebel!" "Emmeline," commanded Mrs. Willing again, "be still!" Then from her mother's lips came an incredible order: "Go and fill the water pail, and bring it here with a dipper." "Mother!" gasped Emmeline. "Are we going to give them water?" "Go, Emmeline!" "They are the enemies of my country!" "Go!" said Emmeline's mother. When Mrs. Willing spoke in that tone, even Henry, who was a man, moved swiftly. Emmeline looked up into her mother's face, but her mother was not looking down at her. Her eyes were turned toward the street, toward that apparently unending line of weariness and raggedness and burning eyes. She saw only the men's hunger, their thirst, their need. When Emmeline returned, her mother told her to put the pail under the tree at the edge of the pavement; as she stood there waiting, with her mother's hand on her shoulder, her eyes flamed and her heart fumed. But no soldier stopped to drink. "Go offer them water, Emmeline." "Mother!" protested Emmeline again. Emmeline went and filled the dipper and stood holding it out; but no soldier left the line, although the lips of many were almost black. Some looked in Emmeline's direction, some passed grimly without a glance. "They will not drink it, mother!" cried Emmeline. "You don't end our lives that way, sissy!" jeered a passing voice. Emmeline dropped the dipper and fled back to her mother's side. Her mother had covered her face with her hands and stood shivering. Emmeline, watching her, was for the moment awed. For the first time something of the heavy horror of war penetrated her young heart. "We are not really going to have a battle, mother!" Mrs. Willing shook her head. "They have come for money and supplies." "Will they get them?" "Not here, dear. We haven't them." "Where will they get them?" "At York, perhaps," her mother replied. "May I go down to the square now, mother?" With the passing of the soldiers, the feeling of horror had passed also. Emmeline felt secure here in her own quiet village. "Why, no, of course not!" In Mrs. Willing's eyes was still that anxious, strained expression. "Where is your baby? Take him to his mother and come right back." With a heavy heart Emmeline went to obey. She said to herself that she never could see anything; she remembered all the pleasures that had been denied her in her short life,--the political meetings and funerals she had been forbidden to attend, the parties for which she was thought too youthful,--and she felt sadly aggrieved. There was nothing to do in this dreary town. Even picnics had ceased, and home itself, devoted to the care of Sister Bertha, was home no more. The afternoon passed, and Emmeline was sadly aware of the stir down the street. Presently, after burning a few cars on a siding, the troops went on their way. Saturday brought no excitement to brighten Emmeline's dull lot. On Sunday, when a body of Union soldiers rode through the town, Emmeline was, alas! in church. Once or twice troopers galloped through the streets, and people whispered that soldiers were riding about the fields with maps. Gettysburg was once more alert and frightened. On Tuesday, Emmeline, sitting by the bedside of Bertha with her patchwork in her hands, heard a thrilling sound--a bugle blast. Forgetting Bertha, and dropping her patchwork and workbasket, she flew to the window and stood entranced. Fate was again directing affairs in Emmeline's way. A great body of soldiers was coming down the street. They were all mounted soldiers--dusty, tanned, and weather-beaten, but well clad and well fed. Above them floated a banner that Emmeline knew,--stripes of crimson and of white, with white stars on a blue ground, like the stars of heaven,--Emmeline's flag, Henry's flag. For almost a minute Emmeline held herself in check; then a black-slippered foot went over the window sill, and a blue-and-white-pantaletted leg followed. Sitting on the sill, she raised her voice in song. "'Glory, glory, hallelujah!'" sang Emmeline, beginning with the chorus. "'Glory, glory, hallelujah!'" This time no one grasped Emmeline; there was no one near enough to grasp her. The soldiers cheered her, and waved to her, and saluted her. With her red cheeks, and her long braids, and her ruffled dress, she was a quaint and lovely figure. After a long time her mother called to her, and she clambered back into the room. The troops had passed, but huzzas still filled the air. Out through the town the soldiers went, and camped on Seminary Ridge. To her keen disappointment Emmeline was not permitted to visit the camp, but from her room that night she could see the camp-fires glitter. It seemed to her that her heart would burst with excitement. What would she see to-morrow? A battle? But such good fortune could not last. When Emmeline opened her eyes the next morning, she found her mother by her bed. Mrs. Willing looked as if she had not slept. "Get up, Emmeline," said she. To Emmeline's dismay, she saw a little satchel in her mother's hand. Emmeline's mind was quick. "You are not--you are not going to send me _away_, mother!" "You are to go out to grandfather's for a little visit." "O _mother_!" wailed Emmeline. "Yes, Emmeline. Get up and dress. Mrs. Schmidt is going to her brother's, and you are to ride with her." Mrs. Willing was firm. "Is there to be a battle?" "We do not know." Mrs. Willing turned away. "O mother!" wailed Emmeline a second time. But no "O mother!" availed. Slowly, with a bitter heart, poor Emmeline gloomily but obediently put on her striped dress. CHAPTER II EMMELINE AND THE SCHMIDTS TAKE A JOURNEY Mrs. Schmidt's brother lived on a lane that branched from the Emmitsburg Road, a mile beyond the road that led to the farm of Grandfather Willing. If Emmeline had not had to travel in Mrs. Schmidt's company, she would have been spared some of the ignominy of her departure. Not only was she going away from all excitement, all possibility of distinguishing herself, but she was journeying in Mrs. Schmidt's outrageous cart. She was accustomed to associate with the Schmidts, not as an equal, but as a superior. While she was dressing, she could see lame Mr. Bannon and Mrs. Schmidt putting the Schmidts' ancient horse between the shafts of the springless wagon. Into that wagon they had thrust already a feather bed, numerous chairs, a few of the six young Schmidts, and a quacking duck in a coop. Wildly Mrs. Schmidt flew about, frantically she commanded. "Get the boondles, Mary! Sally, get the tarpet sack!" Thus did Mrs. Schmidt's tongue trip in its haste. "Hurry yourself, Peter!" Emmeline wept as she braided her hair. "O mother!" she wailed again. But her mother was not at hand to hear. With swift steps Mrs. Willing went about the house, now waiting on Bertha, now packing a luncheon for Emmeline. In the lower hall Emmeline burst once more into tears. Across the street the pyramid on the Schmidt wagon was growing higher and higher. Mrs. Schmidt evidently expected the utter destruction of Gettysburg. Several soldiers had come to her aid. They helped to stow her goods on the wagon; they teased her with all sorts of predictions, to which she could reply only with a feeble "Ach!" "If the rebs get you, they'll eat you, lady!" "Ach!" cried Mrs. Schmidt. "Yes, sir! Now, Johnny, give me your hand and climb up here. Whoa, there!" The soldier leaped frantically to the drooping and motionless head of Whitey. "Ach!" cried Mrs. Schmidt. "I am a poor, poor woman!" "Some of the rebs are looking for sweethearts, missis." To that Mrs. Schmidt was not even able to say "Ach." She tried to explain that she was married, that she considered such a remark insulting; but before she could make her meaning plain, the soldiers had hoisted her aboard and had put the reins into her hands. Then a bright light flashed in the eyes of Mrs. Schmidt. "Ach, Emmy, you are going with!" To her mother Emmeline cast one more piteous glance. "O mother," begged Emmeline earnestly, "do not make me go!" Mrs. Willing turned from the soldier with whom she had been talking and looked down upon Emmeline. It was evident that her glance rested upon the most precious creature in the world. Her tears had fallen into the satchel that she had packed for Emmeline. It was with an anxious heart that she was sending her away. The soldier had answered her questions kindly, and had advised her to get the sick person away also; but it was impossible to get Bertha away. Then, said the soldier, she should be moved to the cellar as soon as the shooting began. Mrs. Willing, in a voice too low for Emmeline to hear, said something to the soldier, to which he answered, "God help her, lady!" Emmeline's mother was not able to suppress a groan. "O mother," said Emmeline again, "do let me stay here!" For answer, Emmeline's mother led her across the street and helped her to climb into the wagon. "I am in great trouble, Emmeline," said she earnestly, "and this is the way you can help me. Go and take care of Mrs. Schmidt and the baby. Grandfather will bring you back as soon as it is safe. Pray for us all, Emmeline." Awed by her mother's expression, Emmeline tried to gulp down her tears. As the wagon gave a preparatory jerk before getting under way, she lifted the Schmidt baby from Mrs. Schmidt's knee to her own, and was rewarded by a little brightening of her mother's face. Mrs. Schmidt chirruped to her horse, and they were finally off. Few persons except the soldiers noticed them, for each house along the street had its own anxiety. Other horses were being harnessed, other families stood about in fright. Once a group of soldiers rode toward Emmeline and her friends. Their warlike appearance terrified Mrs. Schmidt. [Illustration: "I AM IN GREAT TROUBLE, EMMELINE"] "Now we will be killed at last!" she cried. "We will be nothing of the kind," answered Emmeline. "Please try to drive straight, Mrs. Schmidt." As the soldiers passed, they advised Mrs. Schmidt in a friendly way to tie her children in, at which Mrs. Schmidt at once began to crane her neck backward to count her offspring. The soldiers seemed as gay as if they were on a journey of pleasure. Riding from house to house, they rapped on the doors with their swords; their petted horses sometimes put their noses in at the windows. The soldiers ordered people to stay in their cellars. If only Emmeline could stay in a cellar--an adventure in itself unspeakably delightful. "Ach, Emmy," cried Mrs. Schmidt, "will we ever get to your gran'pop and my brother?" "I hope not," answered Emmeline, at which cryptic remark Mrs. Schmidt sank into silent gloom. Just before they reached the Evergreen Cemetery, with its tall pine trees, Mrs. Schmidt turned old Whitey aside, and drove into a country road that ran between pleasant fields. Some were cultivated, and others were carpeted with daisies; on all the fences wild roses bloomed. It was now eight o'clock, and the July sun shone hotter and hotter. Mrs. Schmidt panted, and grew red in the face, and tried to fan herself with her old sunbonnet. At any other time Emmeline would have enjoyed the excursion. Before her, but still several miles away, the two Round Tops rose against the hazy horizon. The Emmitsburg Road which they traveled lay between two long ridges of varying height, named Cemetery Ridge and Seminary Ridge. Presently they would turn to the west, and cross Seminary Ridge. Beyond it, about half a mile, lay Emmeline's grandfather's farm, where she was always welcomed with great joy, and where there was good fishing, and a little calf, and a litter of new kittens, and the companionship of a venturesome girl, Ellen Watson by name, from the next farm. But Emmeline did not want to go to Round Top, and she did not care to see the kittens and the calf; she wanted to stay in Gettysburg. Eliza Batterson would stay, and would have a hundred boastful things to tell her. It was bitterly disappointing to be sent away. If Bertha had not been there to be taken care of she might have stayed. She agreed with Mrs. Bannon that Bertha could rise if she would. The little Schmidts made no sound on the journey. Terrified by their mother's fright, they huddled in their various uncomfortable positions in the body of the wagon. Once Emmeline, hearing a gentle whimper, looked round, and saw that a chair had fallen upon Betsy, and that she looked out from between the rungs as if from a cage. Scrambling back to rescue her, Emmeline observed a long line of wagons like their own coming from Gettysburg. Giving the sleeping Carl to his mother, Emmeline now took the reins herself, and in the pleasure of managing old Whitey forgot that she was an aggrieved and disappointed person. She clucked sharply to him and switched him with the reins. When all methods of hurrying his lagging gait proved futile, she proposed that she and the older children should walk, and thus relieve him for a while of their weight. Only Mrs. Schmidt remained in the cart, with Carl in her arms. "We are emigrants," said Emmeline, forgetting her disappointment for a moment. "We are emigrants marching o'er the plains. We--" Then Emmeline stopped, and all the little Schmidts stopped, and old Whitey lifted his head. "What is that noise over there, say?" asked Mrs. Schmidt. "Listen!" commanded Emmeline. "What is that noise?" demanded Mrs. Schmidt in a louder tone. "Listen!" commanded Emmeline more sharply. Old Whitey lifted his head a little higher. Away to the north, beyond the seminary building, toward the dim line of blue hills on the horizon, there was a sharp crack! crack! crack! "Somebody is gunning," said Mrs. Schmidt with conviction. "I wonder what they are gunning?" "They are shooting men!" cried Emmeline excitedly. "Our soldiers are shooting down the rebels! I--" A deeper, heavier sound crashed upon the air and interrupted Emmeline's sentence. The first great boom of cannon lengthened into a rumble--long, low, echoing, ominous. Whitey shivered and gave a strange snort; with a cry, Mrs. Schmidt seized the reins in both hands. But Whitey would not advance. "Get in by me, Emmy!" cried Mrs. Schmidt. "Children, get in! Emmy, get in!" Emmeline helped the numerous little Schmidts into the wagon, and then, climbing in after them, took the reins from Mrs. Schmidt. She assured herself that there was nothing to be afraid of. The shooting, loud as it sounded, was far away. "We will hurry, Mrs. Schmidt. We will soon be there. Get up, Whitey! Get up, I say!" With strange, jerky motions, Whitey started; but Whitey's efforts were exerted more in an upward than a forward direction. He pranced, if the word can be used to describe a motion so stiff; he tossed his head, he snorted again. His progress became even slower than before. The heat seemed to grow each moment more intense, but the travelers did not dare to stop in the shade. To the north there now appeared puffs of white smoke and flashes of light. The roar became continuous; before one rolling echo was more than well begun, another hollow boom had started other echoes. Mrs. Schmidt grew pale and the baby began to cry. Emmeline became impatient with the Schmidts, impatient with the dancing horse, impatient with the rough road. They had come now to a region which had recently been drenched with heavy rains. The wheels sank deep into the mud. Several times the travelers had to dismount while Whitey pulled the wagon out of a hole. Still the booming grew heavier and the white clouds thicker; but they were far away--far beyond the seminary building. Emmeline and her party gazed so intently in the direction of the sound that they neglected to look ahead. At a sudden turn in the road, Emmeline gave a cry and pulled at Whitey's reins, although Whitey had already stopped, paralyzed. The road before them was no longer open; it was filled from fence to fence with marching troops. To Emmeline they numbered millions. Whitey snorted again; Mrs. Schmidt and her children almost ceased to breathe. To Emmeline it seemed that she and Mrs. Schmidt and the children and the duck faced the combined armies of the world. The approaching troops made no amused comments, as the soldiers in Gettysburg had done. They were marching swiftly; some one shouted to the travelers to get out of the way, and Mrs. Schmidt tugged first at the right rein and then at the left, thinking that if Whitey would not go in one direction, he might in the other. But vainly she tugged, and vainly she adjured her steed with weeping and with strange German exclamations. At last Emmeline had to lead him to the roadside. A corps of soldiers marched past, tramping with even, hasty step; caissons rattled by; great cannon rumbled along; huge wagons drawn by mules lumbered through the mud. On and on marched the thousands of men, with eyes fixed before them, as those deeper, wilder eyes of the enemy had been. Emmeline shrank behind the broad body of Mrs. Schmidt. These were Emmeline's own soldiers, but they seemed grim and terrible. Surely they could whip all the other soldiers in the world! When they were almost past, Emmeline thought of Henry, and looked after them in dismay. Then she realized that, even if Henry had been among them, he could not have spoken to her. She suddenly began to long for the shelter of her grandfather's house. When the corps had passed, Whitey was with difficulty restored to the road--a horrible road, in which the ruts were now much deeper and the stones more protruding. At a snail's pace he crept. Stragglers following the soldiers passed constantly--here a man leading a string of lame horses, there a man in charge of a line of ambulances or a damaged cannon. These stragglers were not so set upon advancing that they did not have a word for Mrs. Schmidt and her children and her duck. Finally, when the sun was almost directly overhead, Whitey stopped at the entrance of the byroad on which the elder Willings lived. Mrs. Schmidt must drive on another half mile, and then leave the Emmitsburg Road in the opposite direction. She wept at parting from Emmeline, and the children wept, and Emmeline kissed the sleeping baby. The road was now clear; the house of Emmeline's grandparents was in sight, half a mile away. Carrying her little satchel, Emmeline started to run. She was hungry, for she had forgotten to eat the luncheon her mother had put up for her, and she was anxious to tell her grandparents, who always listened to her with close attention, of the condition of affairs in Gettysburg. The booming sound had ceased; the battle was certainly over. Perhaps this afternoon her grandfather would drive into Gettysburg with her. That would be glorious indeed! She opened the gate at the foot of the lane, and then, swinging it shut behind her with a slam, waved her hand toward the porch. Her grandmother knew that slam; it always brought her hurrying out to greet her darling. Emmeline hastened toward the house. "Hello!" she called eagerly. "Where are you?" When no one answered, she called a little louder:-- "Grandmother!" Still there was no response. Emmeline stopped in the grassy lane, startled. "Grandmother!" she called again. Still there was no answer. Emmeline approached the door with hesitation. Here the dog and the cat usually met her; but now no friendly animals were to be seen. Moreover, the shutters were closed and there were no familiar crocks sunning themselves on the fence. "Grandmother!" called Emmeline again, as she put her hand on the latch. "Grandmother, where are you?" The latch did not yield. The door was locked! Emmeline shook it, pressed her body against it, and called again. It seemed to her suddenly that everything was mysteriously still, that the woods beyond the house were strangely dark, and that the sky was very far above her. "Where are you?" she called. When no answer came, she ran down the slope to the barn. The horse and the old-fashioned buggy were gone. Returning to the house, Emmeline sat down on the bench beside the door and thought. "They are over at the Watsons'," she said aloud, with great relief. "They drove over for something. They will soon be back again." At that moment Emmeline remembered her luncheon. When she had eaten the last crumb, she felt better. She rose and started across the fields to the Watsons'. But there only deaf Grandmother Watson was at home. She had seen nothing of Emmeline's grandparents, and had evidently heard no unusual sound. Emmeline started back across the fields. It seemed to her much later than it was. Surely they would have to come back before night! The cows would have to be milked, the chickens fed. Probably they would be back by now! Then on a rising bit of land, Emmeline stood still. The Emmitsburg Road was again filled with troops. Apparently all the armies of the world were once more gathered there; but these were new troops, marching in the same direction as the others had gone. She could distinguish the mounted officers, the box-like caissons, the great cannon, all moving swiftly. Across the fields drifted urgent cries. With trembling, Emmeline ran on. But the farmhouse was still deserted. Again Emmeline tried the door. There was a window above the shed into which she could climb, but she was afraid to enter alone. Again she heard the booming of cannon. It grew heavier, more ominous. Perhaps her grandparents had gone to the Hollingers', to the south. She could reach the Hollingers' by a circuitous route through the fields. Again she set forth. She was now too tired to walk rapidly, and her journey consumed almost an hour. But the Hollinger house was also deserted. Too frightened to cry, Emmeline started back once more to her grandfather's farm. She was footsore and exhausted by the heat; she gasped with weariness. The heavy roaring sound of the cannon filled the air and deafened her. She remembered those fixed, staring eyes of the soldiers who had marched by. Suddenly fear of the enemy oppressed her. She remembered stories she had heard about the cruelty in prisons, about the burning of houses, the torturing of women and children. She thought with aching heart of her mother and her home. How patiently she would sit by Bertha's bed, how obedient she would be! Again she started to run. If the cows were at home in the stable or the pasture, then her grandparents must surely return. But Emmeline remembered that she had seen nothing of the cows either in the stable or in the pasture! Down near the woodland the chickens had been busily scratching, but there had been no other sound or sign of animal life on the place. Perhaps the cows were down near Willoughby Run. In this great heat they would naturally have sought the shade and the cooling waters of the stream. They must surely be there! The path lay partly in the thick woodland above the farmhouse. Coming out of it, with the farmhouse and garden immediately before her, Emmeline gave a cry of joy. The house was no longer deserted; there was a man on the porch; there was some one opening the doors of the barn. "Grandfather!" called Emmeline. "Where have you been?" Then Emmeline stood still. So did the man on the porch. So did other men down by the lane, by the gate, in the road. They were strangers, and there were scores of them, multitudes of them. They were soldiers in worn uniforms. Of soldiers, as soldiers, Emmeline was not afraid; but the color of these soldiers' uniforms was gray! CHAPTER III EMMELINE MEETS THE ENEMIES OF HER COUNTRY It seemed to Emmeline, as she stood at the outlet of the wood road, that an hour passed before any one spoke or moved. She herself was too much confused to speak. How had these men come up so quietly? Porch and dooryard and fields were thronged. The ridge that cut off Gettysburg from her view, the road down which she had run after she had left Mrs. Schmidt,--they, too, were filled with men, and horses, caissons, cannon, and huge wagons. And the soldiers were clad, not in friendly blue, but in hateful gray. Only in Emmeline's immediate neighborhood was silence. Beyond, men were shouting, horses were neighing, and wheels were creaking. Yonder, a body of troops advanced to the music of a fife; here a bugler was playing. Men were laying fires with little piles of sticks; men were going to Willoughby Run for water; men were leading horses down to drink. The throng seemed to be thickening every moment. One man, tall and lean and brown, lifted his hand from the latch of Grandfather Willing's door and came to the edge of the porch. He had only one arm; under his coat were the bandages that still bound a recent wound. He had quiet gray eyes, which smiled at Emmeline. He and his friends could have been to Emmeline no more startling an apparition than she was to them. The dust of travel had soiled somewhat her blue-and-white dress and her white stockings, but she seemed to the soldiers immaculate and fairy-like. Some exclaimed sharply; into the eyes of others came a sudden smarting and burning. In their minds they saw far away other little girls with dark braids and ruffled dresses. But Emmeline did not see their tears; these were her enemies. The tall man with the kindly face crossed the dooryard and approached Emmeline. "Well, sissy," he drawled, "and who may you be?" A variety of emotions almost suffocated Emmeline. Uppermost was hatred of that particular form of address. "I am Emmeline Willing," said she, with dignity. Men left their piles of sticks and crowded to the fence; others, who were going on errands, made a détour in order to come a little nearer to the group. "And who," drawled the tall man, "who may Emmyline Willing be?" Emmeline saw the thickening crowd and remembered the dull roar that had ceased only a little while ago. She grew pale, but she answered bravely:-- "I am the granddaughter of the owner of this place." "So-o-o! And where may the owner of this place be?" "He has gone away." Emmeline's courage was failing. She felt the cooler air of evening and saw the shadows lengthening as the sun sank behind the woodland. "My grandfather would not wish you to be here. You ought to go away." "Now, sissy," drawled the tall man, in a distressed voice, "don't cry!" "I am not crying," protested Emmeline, in spite of good evidence to the contrary. "I want you to go away!" "Well, sissy,"--the tall man seemed actually to be considering Emmeline's command,--"we couldn't very well do that." "You will have to!" cried Emmeline. "Our soldiers are here by the million! They will make you go!" The tall man made no answer to Emmeline's assertion. "You come here to the porch, sissy. Nobody's going to hurt a leetle gal." "I am going home," announced Emmeline. "I am going home to my mother. The battle is over." In spite of her brave words, Emmeline moved a little nearer to the porch. "Isn't the battle over?" she said. "Not exactly," said the tall soldier. As he mounted the porch, the others moved away. Busy men could not stand forever looking at a little girl in a striped dress. The tall soldier laid his hand on the latch. "Sissy, do you know any way to get this door open short of breaking it in?" "You can't get in!" cried Emmeline. "It isn't your house! You--" "Look here," interrupted a rough voice, "get this door open! Stop your crying and keep out of the way!" The new comer set his shoulder against the door. The old latch held for an instant, and then, as the soldier gave another sharper thrust, the hasp tore from the wood. Emmeline grew still paler. From the porch she could see farther over the country; on hills and fields men were still marching, horses were still being led or driven, cannon and caissons were rumbling along. The soldier who had burst open the door was now in Grandmother Willing's kitchen. He threw wide the shutters, and rattled the lids of the stove, and opened the doors of the cupboard. Once more little Emmeline protested furiously:-- "You can't touch those things!" The soldier lifted a handful of kindling from the box by the stove, and heaping it into the fire box, lighted it. "Can you bake?" he demanded rudely. Emmeline did not answer. Could she bake? She had been taught here in this very kitchen, she had mixed her dough in that very bowl on the table, and had set her rising in that old-fashioned bread trough in the pantry. Would she bake? Never while breath was in her body! Men were now crowding in at the door; an army wagon had stopped at the gate, and rough soldiers were bringing in great coffee-pots and cans. One of them brought Grandmother Willing's hens and roosters, headless, plucked, ready for the pot. Emmeline backed farther and farther into the corner, speechless and tearful. "If I were you, I'd go upstairs, sissy," the tall man said. "Set at the window and look out. There'll be a lot going on that you can see." Blindly Emmeline turned to obey. Crying bitterly, she climbed to her own little room, and there sat down on a chair by the window. Where were those thousands of blue-coated soldiers? Why did they permit this great army to camp on these hills, to occupy her grandfather's house, and his fields, and the other fields round about? The enemy were now chopping down trees and tearing down fences; they had already ruined her grandfather's wheat and killed her grandmother's chickens. Why did not the blue-coated soldiers come and drive them away? At the sound of galloping hoofs, Emmeline looked out of the window. She saw that a man on horseback had stopped at the gate and was talking with the tall soldier. His voice rose exultantly:-- "We drove 'em like sheep through the town! We have thousands of prisoners! To-morrow we'll settle them!" "There's a leetle gal here," the tall soldier answered in his slow way. "She came to see her gran'paw, but he had gone. She lives in Gettysburg." "She'll be safer here than in Gettysburg. Tell her to stay indoors. There'll be hotter work to-morrow." "So they say!" drawled the tall soldier. Presently the aroma of chickens boiling in the pot began to spread through the house. It seemed to spread to an amazing distance, for from all directions men came crowding into Grandmother Willing's kitchen. The surly cook swore at them and at the stove, whereupon a drawling voice reminded him that there was "a leetle gal" within hearing. The cook's tones sank to a rumble. But Emmeline paid no heed to the loud voices of the hungry men; she did not even smell the delicious odor of the cooking chickens. She heard only those dreadful, exultant words from the lips of the mounted soldier:-- "'We drove 'em like sheep through the town! We have thousands of prisoners! To-morrow we'll settle them!'" So that was why no Northern troops had come to her rescue and the rescue of her grandfather's house! Emmeline ceased to cry; alarm and terror dried her tears. She thought of her mother and of Bertha. She recalled the deep earnestness of her mother's eyes. Had there been fighting in quiet, peaceful Gettysburg? Emmeline had picked lint for padding, had wound muslin strips for bandaging, and had seen Gettysburg soldiers who had returned with a leg or an arm missing; but of actual battle Emmeline had no clear idea. She had thought of bugle blasts, of banners flying, of loud, inspiring commands; beyond that her imagination had failed. Now for the first time it became clear to her that actual danger of death threatened those whom she loved. Where was her mother? Had Bertha been taken into the cellar as the soldier advised? Vague recollections of the details of Bertha's illness came to her, scraps of conversation between her mother and Bertha that she had heard as she passed the door of the sick room. A vague, half-formed suspicion flashed into her mind. At this moment Emmeline began suddenly to grow up. But the first speech of her adult life was childish. "I must go home!" she cried, as she sprang from her chair. She ran down the steps and out to the porch. Dankness had come; soldiers lay about on the grass, and the murmur of their voices spread in all directions. The moon was rising; in its first oblique rays all things looked queer and distorted. There were many sounds: the click of pickaxes against stones, the crash of trees that were being felled, the hoarse shouts of officers giving orders. Emmeline rushed to the side of the tall soldier, who was sitting on the steps. "I must go home!" she declared again. "I _must_ go home!" "Now you're just frightened," the tall soldier said. "There ain't no reason for you to be skeered. No harm'll come to you. We ain't wild beasts, sissy." "I must see my mother!" "You'll see her soon, sissy." "My sister-in-law is sick and my brother is away." Emmeline forgot for an instant that this was an enemy of her country. "We haven't heard from him for weeks. He's in the reserves; he--" Remembering the character of her audience, Emmeline paused. Then she added, "I _must_ go home!" The tall soldier changed the subject. "I've got a leetle gal like you; Bessie is her name--Bessie Christy. I haven't seen her for two years." "Why not?" asked Emmeline, curious in spite of herself. "On account of war. Now, Emmyline, 'tisn't every leetle gal can watch the sappers at work before a battle. They're the folks that build the breastworks. Look at them up there! You might see great things if you watched, 'stead of crying. You might see General Lee ride by." "I hate him!" "Now, sissy!" "I hate you all!" Private Christy looked at Emmeline for a moment with a smile on his lips. "I'll explain the army to you, Emmyline," said he. "It's a wonderful thing, an army. If you begin at the top, there's the commander-in-chief, and next below him--" Private Christy went on and on in his pleasant, drawling voice. The duty of a private was this, he explained, the duty of a sutler was that. Presently Emmeline asked him what he did. Her voice was no longer sharp; it was soft and drowsy and gentle. After a long time, when Private Christy said, "I have my work, too, Emmyline," without saying what that work was, Emmeline did not hear. Feeling a light touch on his arm, Private Christy looked down and beheld Emmeline's head resting upon it. "Well, I vum!" said he softly. For a long time Private Christy sat still; presently slow tears rolled down his tanned cheeks. He called to one of the men:-- "Say, you, Mallon!" The soldier approached. "Well, I'll be switched!" he said. "You take her upstairs, Mallon." It may have been that Mallon, too, had a "leetle gal" at home; at any rate, he seemed to know how to lift a sleeping person of Emmeline's size. "The pore leetle gal!" said one-armed Christy, as he led the way. "I'm sick of this war!" answered Private Mallon soberly. Through the hot kitchen, where the cook had ceased his work, up the narrow stairs, they carried Emmeline to her room, and there, without waking her, laid her gently upon her bed. "Couldn't she be got out of this?" asked Private Mallon. Private Christy shook his head. "Not nohow," said he. Private Mallon returned to his sleep on the grass, Private Christy to his seat on the porch steps. Far away to the west there was a sudden, indefinable suggestion of a great body of men marching. Private Christy heard it and shook his head; Private Mallon nudged his neighbor. "More coming," he said, and turned on his side. All about on the daisies of the field lay the great carpet of sleeping men. Everyone got some sleep that night. Those who dug pits in which to lie half hidden on the morrow, or who threw up semi-circular walls of earth or timber to shelter the great cannon, gave pick and shovel after a while to others, roused from sleep, and threw themselves down near where they had been working. Later in the night Private Christy lay down on the porch floor and slept heavily and comfortably. Meanwhile to the rear of the great army pressed on another great army, which, being assigned its place, lay down also. The time between sunset and sunrise in early July is short enough even for those who are not exhausted by long marches. On the ridge, officers riding back and forth in the bright moonlight marked positions and looked speculatively across at that other parallel ridge, which takes its name from the Evergreen Cemetery near one end. Far to the north, where the heavy cannonading had been, ambulances traveled the fields, guided by a whimper or a groan of pain. The greatest general of all, whom Private Christy had promised Emmeline she might see, rode about on his white horse studying the victory won, planning fresh victory for to-morrow. Thus, rapidly enough, the night waned. When the sun rose on July 2, the thousands of soldiers in gray stirred and woke. In the Willing kitchen the surly cook began to bake his miserable biscuit; on the porch Private Christy rose and yawned, and persuaded the cook to give him place on the stove for his coffee-pot. All about in the fields and woods the thousands rose and prepared their simple breakfast. Emmeline slept and slept. Five o'clock yesterday had found her awake and dressed; but to-day five o'clock passed, then six, then seven, then eight. Along the lines of battle all was peace; it was almost as quiet as on any other summer morning. Cannon were moved without noise under cover of the woodland, as if each great army wished to hide from the other. Emmeline, waking, lay still and stretched out her arms. Where was she? Why was she still dressed? How had she got to bed? She sat up and looked out of the window. Then it was not a dream, after all! Round her were still the thousands of Confederate soldiers; below her on the porch she heard Private Christy's voice. "'Bout time to begin, ain't it?" he queried. A voice answered that it had been time long ago. Emmeline saw the sun high in the sky; she smoothed her dress and braided her hair, and ran down the steps. There was no battle; it was the middle of the morning, and still there was no battle. Surely she could go home! In the kitchen the surly cook gave her one of his soggy biscuits. It was nine o'clock, according to the stubby hands of Grandmother Willing's clock, which ticked on the mantel-shelf. Emmeline's tall friend was on the porch. "Good-morning, Emmyline!" said he cheerfully. Emmeline's war code, which she remembered clearly this morning, did not permit her to say good-morning to the enemy. "There is no battle," she announced. "I want to go home." "Oh, but you can't do that!" "I must!" Emmeline looked about her. Still all was peaceful. "Just up that road! I walked almost all the way yesterday." Private Christy shook his head. "No, Emmyline. 'Twouldn't do." "You are an enemy of my country!" cried Emmeline. "You have no right to keep me! I am going home!" When Emmeline reached the gate, Private Christy called to her. "Come back, sissy!" he said. Emmeline obeyed, weeping. "Aren't you afraid that there biscuit'll p'isen you?" he asked. "Seems to me if I was a woman and could bake, I couldn't swallow that biscuit. You wouldn't bake me a real biscuit, I suppose?" "No," answered Emmeline with decision, "I wouldn't." "Well," drawled the quiet voice, "you don't have to." Emmeline, standing with one foot on the step of the porch, considered. She had taken one bite of the biscuit. Although she was wretchedly hungry, she could eat no more. "Will you let me go if I bake you some?" Emmeline asked. "I'll see," answered Private Christy. The cook had left his stove, and Emmeline went to work with the familiar utensils--the yellow bowl, the wooden spoon. When the biscuits were in the oven, she looked up to find the doorway crowded with soldiers; some of them were bandaged like Private Christy; all of them were thin and deeply tanned. "Are you going to give we-all some of them real biscuit?" asked an eager voice. Emmeline's face flushed crimson; the position of almsgiver to her enemy was not altogether unhappy. "I'll see," she answered. When one pan was taken from the oven, Emmeline had another ready and then another and another. Emmeline grew warmer and warmer and her cheeks rosier and rosier. "Now," said Emmeline, "you can watch that last pan. I am going home." "But I haven't had any!" cried Private Christy. "Nobody here knows anything about watching and turning 'em! Oh, please, sissy, bake me a pan!" Private Christy brought in fresh fuel for the fire. A half-hour passed, another half-hour. "Now," said Emmeline, "I am going." Private Christy made no answer. The hungry crowd in the yard had faded away; the very atmosphere seemed charged with suspense. Emmeline looked out of the door. Was the army still here? The army was still here; but the army was formed, massed. It was like a great animal, alive, awake, crouching for a spring. Then Emmeline screamed, and whirled round on the step. Near at hand--almost, it seemed to her, in the very house itself--the cannon roared. CHAPTER IV THE SECOND DAY OF BATTLE At the sound of the cannon shot, Private Christy, still sitting calmly on the step, looked up. "No call to be--" Another roar cut short Private Christy's speech. Emmeline fled into the kitchen, and Christy rose and followed her. "No call to be skeered, sissy," he said, speaking loudly into her ear. "The shooting ain't _here_." Emmeline covered her ears with her hands. Another fearful detonation shook the old farmhouse to its foundations. The windows trembled in their frames, the floor seemed to rock. Emmeline sank into a chair by the kitchen table, hid her face in her arms, and screamed hysterically. "Sissy," cried Private Christy, "stop it! Don't ye dare to cry like that!" Private Christy's face was drawn. "It's an awful thing to have to hear a woman cry like that! Listen to me! The shooting ain't this way; it's that way. Them guns is half a mile off and pointing the other way. Noise can't hurt ye, don't ye know that? You've got to get used to it, for it's going to last some time. Do you hear me?" Private Christy bent his head until it was near Emmeline's. "You're the only one among all these thousands that's safe, sissy. Now stop it!" Emmeline checked her sobs. "I can't stand it!" she cried. "But you've got to stand it. Now dry your tears. You can sit here, or you can go down cellar, or up attic under the eaves, or you can come out on the porch and sit with me. It ain't everyone can watch troops going into battle. I wish _I_ could hold a gun again!" he added, with longing in his voice. Thus admonished and encouraged, Emmeline rose slowly and dried her tears. Private Christy put his hand on her shoulder, and they returned to the porch. There was little confusion to be seen. The long morning's work had put all in readiness for the engagement. Round the farmhouse regiments waited in line. Other troops had moved from their posts farther to the south, across the ridge, and down into the valley between the ridge and the two Round Tops. In that direction, and hidden from the farmhouse, were the cannon from which issued the thunderous roar. Now the sharp crack of musketry and confused shouts and yells accompanied the deep boom of the cannon. Clouds of white smoke, growing thicker every moment, rose from the valley. Near the farmhouse, regiments waited motionless beneath their banners. Officers were already in the saddle; men stood at attention. It was as if the great commotion were no concern of theirs. But suddenly a quiver passed through them. Swords flashed in the air, commands were shouted, bugles blew; to the music of fife and drum the troops mounted the slope toward the ridge. "There they go!" cried Private Christy. "That's my company, and they're goin' without me!" The troops topped the ridge and vanished under the white, thick blanket of smoke. As if fresh fuel had been added to a great flame, the smoke thickened, the cannonading grew heavier, the crack! crack! of musketry more incessant. Emmeline stood with her arms clasped round the pillar of the porch. With each great detonation she grasped the pillar more tightly, as if she feared that the waves of sound might wash her away. Sometimes she closed her eyes and drew in deep breaths of air. Between her gasps of fright she stared, awed and fascinated. She saw the last troops cross the hill and the smoke clouds thicken. Presently she saw black missiles hurtle through the air and bright flashes from beyond the hill divide the low-lying cloud. Suddenly she screamed. A dark object, passing over the ridge with a shrill, whistling sound, had plunged into Grandfather Willing's potato patch. Private Christy took Emmeline by the arm and led her round the corner of the house. "Nothing but a stray shot, sissy; but if I was you, I believe I'd stay here. Nothing can hurt you through these stone walls." He led her to a seat on the grass close to the west wall of the house. There she sat dazed. Sometimes she blinked; sometimes she smoothed absently the wrinkled, soiled fabric of her blue and white dress; otherwise she did not move. She could not think or reason; she could only listen. Private Christy went back to his seat on the porch. Presently he returned and smiled at Emmeline, and then went into the house. There in the hot kitchen, working slowly with his single hand, he made a fresh fire, and set upon the stove Grandmother Willing's washboiler and filled it with water. Then he went upstairs and looked round. Emmeline vaguely wondered again what his business was as a member of the army. Thus far he had done nothing. Still Emmeline sat on the grassy bank by the house. Before her was the sloping field leading to Willoughby Run. Down that field she had often raced. Under the trees by the side of the stream horses were tethered, and near by were hundreds of wagons. The sun was getting low. Emmeline rose stiffly. It seemed to her that the roar of cannon had grown a little less thunderous. She would go round the house and out to Private Christy. Private Christy, although an enemy, was comforting. As night drew near, her longing for home grew keener, but she had begun to realize that she could not return now. Emmeline did not find Private Christy on the porch; he was apparently running away from her. She saw his long legs carrying him up the slope; presently he broke into a run. He was not going into the battle; he was meeting those who were returning. That is, he was meeting a few--those who, although wounded, could still drag themselves along. They had left behind them thousands of their comrades, who could not join even such a halting, pitiful procession as theirs. Hundreds who had started with the procession had fallen by the way. In the forefront of the straggling line was Private Mallon, who had carried Emmeline up to bed. His arm hung limp and his hair was clotted with blood; he fell heavily against Private Christy as they met. Again Emmeline's arm encircled the porch pillar. In some dim, long-past existence Emmeline had dreamed of binding wounds, of smoothing fevered brows, of lifting her voice in song for the comfort of the suffering! Now Emmeline wished that the earth would open and swallow her. While she stood with her arm clasping the pillar, Private Christy and Private Mallon entered the gate. Private Christy's work was now before him; for this task had he remained with the army, while in Georgia his little Bessie grew beyond his recollection. "Leetle Emmyline," he shouted, "you get some warm water in a basin and some old cloths, will you, Emmyline?" Emmeline grew paler and paler; the first shocking sight of wounds seemed to paralyze her. Private Mallon, tottering in upon the arm of his comrade, fixed apologetic, tortured eyes upon her. "It ain't no place for a leetle gal!" he muttered. Then Emmeline took another great step toward womanhood. "I will try," she said, weeping. When she had filled her basin with water, and had gathered the worn fragments of homespun linen that Grandmother Willing had laid away for emergencies, she took them with trembling hands into the parlor. Other wounded, blackened forms had crept in and had lain themselves down on the parlor carpet--the treasured carpet that was the pride of Grandmother Willing's life. "Put wood in the stove, Emmyline," commanded Private Christy cheerfully, "and bring more of these rags. You'll make a fine nurse, Emmyline!" As she turned to obey, Emmeline glanced out of the door. Creeping and crawling, the procession continued to arrive. They came through the gate one by one; they crossed the yard and the porch. A man fell heavily on the steps, and involuntarily Emmeline took her enemy by the arm and helped him up. "I'm looking for Christy," he said in a dazed voice. Private Christy and his work were evidently well known. "I am to keep the boiler filled," repeated Emmeline, as she went back to the kitchen. "I am to bring warm water and towels and cloths. I am not to cry or scream. I am not to cry or scream!" Into the house still came the wounded, into Grandmother Willing's parlor, and into Grandmother Willing's sitting-room, and up the stairs into the bedchambers, and out to the kitchen. "Keep the kitchen clear!" commanded Private Christy. "Keep the room above clear! Nobody in there!" Some one answered roughly that the room above was to be filled. Private Christy's voice did not always drawl; he raised it now so that it could be heard above the slackening crash of musketry:-- "There's a leetle gal in this house, gentlemen. That is her room above the kitchen." "A little girl!" repeated a weary voice somewhere. "I'd like to see a little girl!" Moving about deftly, Private Christy helped this man to lie down and that one to find a more comfortable position. He seemed like a mother getting her brood together for the night; they looked up to him like children who found in him their only hope. "Emmyline," he said gently, when she brought him the things for which he had asked, "do you suppose you could help me?" "I could try," said Emmeline. Private Christy passed her the end of one of the long strips of cloth. "There, Emmyline, you take that and wind it round and round." With a gasp, Emmeline obeyed; together she and Private Christy bound the wounded arm of Private Mallon. The sun had vanished behind the woodland and the fleecy clouds above were golden; the cooler air of evening had begun to breathe through the old farmhouse. The sound of firing near by had ceased entirely. The battle was surely over; surely, thought Emmeline, these men would go away and Gettysburg could have peace. Perhaps she could still go home to-night! There were many wagons standing idle down by Willoughby Run; perhaps one could be spared to take her. If she could only go home and see her mother she would ask for nothing more in the world. Perhaps Henry had come back. If Henry were wounded like these men, her mother could not take care of him and Bertha, too. She _must_ go home. Then Emmeline gave a great cry. Deliverance had come! She sprang to the window and began to call to some one outside. Private Christy, who was on his knees near the window, turned and looked out quickly. "They are Union soldiers!" cried Emmeline. "We have won! They will take me home! Here I am! Here I am!" She waved her arms as she called. Private Christy looked down at the company of blue-coated soldiers. He saw what Emmeline did not see: that their progress was directed and hastened by soldiers in gray who carried muskets. "They are prisoners, Emmyline." "Prisoners!" cried Emmeline. "Yes, sissy." "Didn't we win?" "Not exactly, Emmyline." "What will they do with them?" "They'll take 'em down to that woods and guard 'em." Leaning suddenly out of the window, Emmeline began to scream. Among the prisoners was a slender soldier to whom she called. "There is my brother! Henry, Henry, dear, dear Henry! Here I am, Henry, here I am!" "Be quiet, sissy!" commanded Private Christy. Emmeline stepped across a soldier on the floor, and then across another. In frantic excitement she sought the door. Private Christy caught and held her. "Where are you going, Emmyline?" he asked. "I'm going to my brother." "You don't know if it was your brother. It was too dark to see." "It was my brother! I'm going to find him!" "No, Emmyline." "What will they do to him?" "Nothing." "I haven't seen him for months and months. He is my only brother. He had a bandage round his head. Oh, please, please let me go!" "No," said Private Christy. "Come, Emmyline, I need you." Emmeline went back to her work, and her tears dropped on the face of the soldier by whom she knelt. "It's too bad, sissy," said he weakly. "I wish I could help you." Emmeline gulped back her tears. It was Henry; of that she was certain. Where had they taken him? Was he lying wounded, bleeding, alone? But Emmeline had mercifully no time for speculation. She continued to help with the bandaging and to run up and down the stairs. About the house confusion thickened. Troops returned, powder-blackened, exhausted, famished. Many of the soldiers bound up their own wounds, or let their comrades perform that service for them. From the dark fields rose again the aroma of boiling coffee and frying bacon. The troops in the fields near at hand seemed to have moved closer together, but Emmeline did not understand the significance of the maneuver. Every few minutes she went to the window and strained her eyes into the dusk. Even in the brightening moonlight her gaze could not penetrate into the woodland where the prisoners had vanished. Presently, when she turned from the window with a sob, Private Christy was looking down upon her. "Emmyline," said he, in his pleasant drawl, "how about them biscuit?" "I could bake some!" answered Emmeline, suddenly realizing that perhaps hunger was one of the causes of her own misery. "Biscuits, boys!" cried one pale soldier to another. "She's going to bake biscuits!" Feeble cheers answered. "You won't go out of the kitchen, will you, sissy?" "No," Emmeline promised, and went wearily down the stairs. The joy with which her first batch of biscuits was received roused her once more. There were many who could not eat, and who called only for water. As the time passed, those cries grew louder and more frequent. Presently, lantern in hand, a doctor entered and made his way from patient to patient. His clothes had dark stains upon them, and in the dim light he looked white and worn; he moved quickly from one patient to the next, as if other work awaited him. Several quiet forms he turned over, and those were presently taken away. Emmeline baked her biscuits and spread them with apple butter from her grandmother's crocks, and carried them from room to room. There were by this time dark stains also on her striped dress. Private Christy, saying a word here, changing a position there, moved about the house like a great gray ghost. A little later, when Private Christy found his assistant asleep by the kitchen table, he took her last pans from the oven and sat down opposite her. The night was quiet, and again there came to the ear of the listener the strange, half-defined suggestion of men marching. Private Christy ate quickly; once he interrupted his feast to go upstairs in answer to a groan. His return woke Emmeline, who lifted her head from the table and looked at him sleepily from blinking, dark-rimmed eyes. "We've got 'em all fixed up pretty comfortable," said Private Christy softly, as if he and Emmeline had succeeded in some common task. "Now, Emmyline, it's time for you to go to bed." "Is the battle over?" asked Emmeline. "No, sissy." Emmeline's mouth quivered. "Do men like to fight?" she asked, blinking drowsily. "Like to fight?" repeated Private Christy. "Like to fight, Emmyline? Like layin' up there with arms and legs ruined? Like livin' their days without half a body? Of course they don't like it!" "Will there be more wounds to-morrow?" asked Emmeline stupidly. "Where there's fighting, there's wounds." "Will it last after to-morrow?" "God help us, no!" said Private Christy. CHAPTER V PRIVATE CHRISTY SAYS FAREWELL On the morning of July 3, Emmeline got up earlier than she had on the morning of July 2. Disturbed by dreams and oppressed by the heat, she had slept restlessly. She had waked once in the night, and had gone to the window to look down upon the woods into which the Union prisoners had vanished. There, except for the stamping of restless horses, all was quiet; but beyond, toward the west, there was incessant movement. Fresh troops were arriving and were settling down for a few hours of heavy sleep. Emmeline could hear Private Christy making his rounds in the farmhouse. Now he was in the kitchen; now he brought fresh water from the pump; now he spoke soothingly to one of his comrades. When Emmeline woke again, daylight had come, and the great host was already astir. Men laughed; even in this house of pain the soldiers were merry. Downstairs Private Christy had built a fire in the stove; Emmeline could hear the crackling flames. Stiff and sore, she rose, and, after braiding her long hair and contemplating the stained untidiness of her limp ruffles, she went down the steps. She was very tired; her mouth drooped and her eyelids seemed to have weights upon them. Downstairs the wounded soldiers were trying to sit up; some even tried to stand. One man proclaimed his intention of joining his company as soon as he had eaten. Almost immediately, as if in answer to his boasting, his knees gave way and he sank to the floor. Private Christy greeted Emmeline cheerfully:-- "Here's hot coffee for you. You look a leetle droopy. Drink this and you'll feel like a two-year-old." Choking back her tears, which seemed to flow without any excuse, Emmeline took the cup of coffee and sat down. She lifted the cup to her lips, and then put it back into the saucer. "I hear a noise!" she cried. "They are shooting again!" "That's way off," answered Private Christy. "That's miles off." "It's near Gettysburg!" Emmeline now wept outright. "I have so many troubles I can't count them all. My mother is in danger and my brother is a prisoner--I am sure it was my brother! Perhaps my home is destroyed!" "Oh, no, sissy!" "Can I go down to the woods to find my brother?" "I ain't in charge of that woods, Emmyline." "Will they take him away?" "I don't know." "You don't know anything!" stormed Emmeline. Private Christy's gray eyes twinkled. It was much better to hear Emmeline storm than to have to watch her cry. Again Emmeline made biscuit and spread apple butter and carried her tray about the house; again she brought water and bathed hot faces. There was nothing else for her to do. If she cast a longing glance toward the woodland, Private Christy was beside her with his "Now, Emmyline!" In the middle of the morning Private Christy called her to the door and pointed to the ridge. "Can you see up there some mounted officers?" "Yes." "Do you see the white horse?" "Yes." "That's General Lee, Emmyline." Private Christy spoke in a solemn tone. "That's something for you to remember all your life." "I'd rather see General Meade," said Emmeline defiantly. "But you don't mind lookin' at my general," answered Private Christy good-naturedly. Presently there began again another general movement of the troops about Grandfather Willing's house. They marched forward toward the ridge and passed over it, and disappeared into the valley where yesterday the cannon had roared. Now, except for the distant rumble, there was no sound. "Where have they gone?" asked Emmeline. "Over there," Private Christy replied noncommittally. "What are they doing?" "Just waiting. Now, Emmyline, you get some water for them poor souls upstairs. I have an errand to do." When Emmeline was out of sight, Private Christy went down across the fields to the woodland and looked about. On the far side near the open land were the Union prisoners, well guarded. Many of them were wounded, and lay about on the ground or sat propped against the trees. In their direction Private Christy made his way. War brought about strange meetings. It was improbable but not impossible that the little girl's brother was among the prisoners. "Goin' to pull out?" he asked a guard. "No orders yet. I think we move with the army." "Got a man here by the name of Willing?" "I don't know their names." "Can I ask?" "No." "Well, you find out for me, will you, Sam? His leetle sister's up here, and she thought she saw him. I suppose she couldn't come down and talk to him?" "No, she couldn't." Until eleven o'clock the distant roar continued; then followed complete silence; but the silence did not rest the ear or ease the heart. The heavy, hot atmosphere was weighted with mystery. Emmeline, moving about nervously, asked a hundred questions of Private Christy. The wounded soldiers dragged themselves to windows; from there they could see nothing except the scattered remnants of the command, the trampled fields, the ridge with its bristling cannon and its barricades. From the troops who had gone over the hill, nothing had been heard; it seemed as if they had been swallowed up. Emmeline made biscuit and coffee, and went to the front door and then to the attic window, and looked first toward Gettysburg and then toward Willoughby Run. She grew more and more nervous and excited. "If it is not over, I don't understand why they don't begin! If it is over, I don't see why I cannot go home! I don't see why I have to be kept here! I don't--" Two clear, distinct shots ended the mysterious silence. Emmeline lifted her head like a startled rabbit. It seemed that no matter how much cannonading she had heard, she could never grow accustomed to the hideous sound. Those two clear shots were answered by all the thunders of heaven. From the ridge that Emmeline watched sped forth the fiery charge. She saw the puff of white smoke, the blinding flash, heard the great detonation. From the opposite ridge came back an equally furious answer. Then thunder and roar and blast filled the world. Again, as yesterday, Emmeline screamed, and then at once was silent. There was no use in screaming when Private Christy across the room could not hear her, when, indeed, she could not hear herself! For hours to come Emmeline forgot her home, her mother, Sister Bertha, Henry. The terrible sound dulled her senses and paralyzed her mind. Standing at the kitchen table, she could look through the hall and out of the front door. There, framed as in a picture, she saw a strange sight. A dark missile descended upon the ridge. That was no chance, stray shot, as yesterday's missile had been; it was well aimed, and it struck its mark--a caisson filled with explosives. At once caisson, horses, men, were lifted into the air. Then, a little distance away, another caisson was struck. Soon yesterday's sad spectacle was repeated. Once more the procession of wounded crept down the slope. From the ridge to the farmhouse, and to all other farmhouses and places of refuge,--and few and scattered they were,--proceeded the wounded. No longer was the Willing farmhouse the refuge of those only who were able to walk. Thither hastened the lumbering ambulances; thither stretchers were carried; thither the wounded, supporting each other, crept inch by inch. Emmeline watched them come; Private Christy ran to help them in. In distraction Emmeline began once more to heat water and to make coffee and biscuit. That she could do! It was well that she had had yesterday's experience before to-day's! Wounds from fragments of shell are worse than wounds from bullets; the advancing throng, alas! were wounded as terribly as they could be wounded and still live. For some, Private Christy did nothing except to help them to lie down and to cover them with one of Grandmother Willing's blankets. A doctor and a nurse, who had been assigned to the Willing house, tried to do the work of twenty doctors and nurses. They put Emmeline to work. They gave her hard and terrible tasks, but she accomplished them bravely, receiving an immediate reward in many blessings from those she tended. She wrote down addresses and messages, and comforted the men as best she could, and wept. "It will make them take it easier, little girl, if you write them about me." "Perhaps you would go to see them sometime, when the war is over." It was amazing to hear how many had daughters or little sisters like Emmeline. As she listened to one after the other, and tried to fix their requests in her mind, her dark eyes grew wider and her face paler. Still the two hundred cannon roared. That sound unnerved even the hardened soldier and the general trained by long experience in battles, who began to ask themselves whether human spirit could endure more. The like of that sound the world had till then never heard. In mid-afternoon came peace. As suddenly as it had begun, it seemed to Emmeline, the thunder stopped. Emmeline burst into tears, and then, not knowing that she had cried, went on with her work. "It is over," Emmeline assured herself. "Now it is certainly over." But Emmeline knew nothing of the tactics of war. There were still those thousands of infantry who had marched over the hill and who had as yet given no account of themselves. Where were they? They still had work to do. A few minutes they waited, until the last echo had died away, and then, in magnificent array, they marched forward across the fields to the opposite ridge, marched straight in the face of the enemy's cannon, which they supposed had run short of ammunition. Of those brave thousands, few returned whole across the wide fields; many did not return at all. Emmeline, watching them in the morning, had thought them wonderful; but Emmeline could not judge how glorious they were. Now they would march no more. If Emmeline had listened, she could have heard, borne upon the wind, rapturous shouts from that opposite ridge; but she heard only the broken words and gasps of the men about her. Private Christy heard with haggard, white face; the generals heard--those who survived. The greatest general of all, whom Emmeline had watched upon his white horse, listened with a breaking heart. Gradually the clouds of smoke lifted, gradually the odor of smoke was carried away. The sun set in a stormy sky, and once more the air cooled. The battle was over; upon the wide field peace descended, but it was the peace of death and woe. From Round Top to Gettysburg and far beyond lay strewn those who a few hours before had moved in strength and pride. Gettysburg, hearing the result of the battle, breathed a long sigh of great relief. Citizens appeared from the places where they had taken shelter; women and children came out upon the streets again, and stared at house walls torn by shells and at barricades thrown across streets. At Emmeline Willing's house men and women and children gazed in awe. The house had been strangely protected; it stood among its fellows unharmed. There, to Emmeline's Sister Bertha, had been sent a little child. There Bertha herself lay sleeping in the bed to which she had been restored. One by one men and women and children tiptoed into the kitchen to behold with their own eyes the little baby lying in his cradle. Mrs. Willing moved quietly about her house and attended to her charges. All the cruelty and horror of war weighed upon Mrs. Willing. No word had come from her boy. And where was Emmeline, her darling, her little girl, whom she had un-wittingly sent into greater danger? Where were the elder Willings? Meanwhile Emmeline worked on. She had ceased to be partisan; she asked no question either about victory or defeat. As night advanced, a great uneasiness seemed to spread. Troops were moved, trees were felled, and new breastworks erected. Emmeline's room was occupied now; a young officer lay upon the bed, and less important patients upon the floor. With his single arm, Private Christy continued to accomplish wonders. "You are my other arm, Emmyline," he said in his drawling voice. "You mustn't forget me, Emmyline." Emmeline looked up, startled. "Are you going away?" "We can't stay here." "What shall I do, then?" "Without _me_? Are you going to miss _me_?" said Private Christy in astonishment. "Why, you will go home, Emmyline." "Home!" repeated Emmeline, as if the word were strange. That night Emmeline slept on a chair by the kitchen table. Private Christy, who did not sleep at all, put a folded coat under her head and stood for a moment smoothing her dark hair; then he went on with his sad work. Once or twice the moon showed for an instant, only to vanish; the sights upon which it looked were best shrouded in darkness. When morning dawned, troops were still massing behind the protecting breastworks. As soon as it was light, Private Christy made his way down the slope to Willoughby Run, and addressed himself once more to the soldier who guarded the prisoners:-- "Any orders?" "Orders to be ready to move." "Did you find Willing?" "He's the man with his head tied up, there by the tree." "Where's the colonel?" "Over yonder." Private Christy saluted the colonel and stood waiting. The colonel had a map spread out on his knee; on it he was tracing with his finger the path to the west which had been laid out for him. It was evident from the colonel's eyes that he, too, had passed a sleepless night. Presently he looked up at Private Christy, and with a nod gave him permission to speak. "There's a prisoner in the woods, sir, by the name of Willing. This is his grandfather's place, and his leetle sister's up there in the house. She's worked bakin' and nursin' till she's almost dead on her feet. She's a sweet leetle gal, sir. Could you leave her brother here? She's far from home and alone." The colonel looked absently at Private Christy. Private Christy seldom asked favors; moreover, if it had not been for his self-assigned work, Private Christy might long ago have been at his home in Georgia. "I'll see, Christy," he said, and returned to his map. Six o'clock passed, seven o'clock, eight o'clock, and now the great wounded army seemed to breathe deeply and to turn a little and to think about rising. It was beaten, sore, but it could not pause here. It was still in the country of its enemy; it must be up and away lest worse harm befall it. Opposite lay the victor, who, although wounded also, was better furnished with the munitions of war. The beaten army must set forth on the weary way by which it had come. All the forenoon men were marching. From the woods near by, wagons, rough, springless and uncovered, drawn by thin, jaded horses, approached over the fields to the doors of farmhouses and barns. Into them were lifted the wounded from the houses and from the open fields. They were not lifted carefully; there was not time to be careful. Across the fields toward the west to the nearest road the wagons went and took their places in the great line. The skies lowered more and more, and presently from the east a chilling wind began to blow. Standing in the doorway, Emmeline felt it on her bare arms and neck, and shivered. When a wagon stopped at Grandfather Willing's door and the bearers entered, Emmeline went weeping to bid farewell to these her enemies. Private Christy had lifted his knapsack to his shoulder and had taken in his hand a staff, as if he were preparing for a long journey. The officer in charge of the wagon ordered all men who were wounded only in the arms or head or shoulders to walk beside it; others were lifted in upon the board floors of the wagon; others were left where they lay. Emmeline clung to Private Christy's hand. "Why don't they take them, too?" she asked. "They're too sick, Emmyline." "What will become of them?" "I don't know, Emmyline. You give 'em water." "Are you really going away from me?" "I've got to go, Emmyline!" said Private Christy. "Marchin' orders are marchin' orders. You stay here in the house, mind! You write to me sometime, and when the war is over you've got to get acquainted with my Bessie." "Does this end the war?" asked Emmeline. "I don't know, sissy, but I'm afraid not. Emmyline, would you"--Private Christy blushed like a boy--"would you give me a kiss?" "I will give you a dozen!" cried Emmeline. Then, beside the lumbering wagon, Private Christy marched away. A soldier leaned on his arm before he left the porch; before he had left the gate he had given his staff to another. Bereft, Emmeline watched him go. Once he turned and nodded his head to her, and then marched on. Private Christy looked up at the lowering sky. In a moment he felt on his cheek the first drop of the advancing torrent. Then the heavens opened on the great generals and the marching soldiers and the wounded in their open wagons. Emmeline stood upon the step until the tall, gray figure with his wagon and his wounded had vanished in the mist. She was drenched, but she dared not go inside. She guessed why those sufferers had been left behind! And night was coming and all the world would be dark and dreadful. Emmeline could hear the ticking of Grandmother Willing's clock on the kitchen shelf and the sound of deep, anguished breathing. Then she heard footsteps, and turned in fright. Not one of those sick men could even raise his head--who was it who came upon her so stealthily and suddenly? Through the kitchen approached a tall figure in a blue suit, with a bandaged head. Private Christy had not left his "arm" without protection. "Henry!" cried Emmeline. "Little Emmeline!" said Henry. [Illustration: EMMELINE WATCHED HIM GO] Into the outstretched arms flew Emmeline. "I knew it was you! Oh, Henry, Henry, Henry!" CHAPTER VI THE TERROR PAST Although Emmeline Willing's grandparents were well on in years, they were young in spirit. They liked to make excursions in their old-fashioned buggy pulled by their faithful Dandy. They had not intentionally deserted their home on the eve of battle. Grandmother Willing would have been as little likely to fly from excitement as Emmeline. A few days before the battle Grandfather and Grandmother Willing had gone on a visit to their daughter Sally, who lived on an isolated farm to the west. Grandmother Willing had taken Tiger, the cat, with her in a basket, and Rover had trotted beneath the buggy. Before they had started they had driven their two cows, Molly and Betsy, over to the Hollingers', who had promised to care for them. When the enemy had approached, the Hollingers had fled, driving their own cattle and Molly and Betsy before them. Early on the morning of July 1 the two elder Willings bade their daughter farewell, and with no thought of what awaited them, started to return home. When Emmeline and Mrs. Schmidt were startled by the first crack of musketry, Grandfather and Grandmother Willing were even more amazed and frightened as they approached from the other direction. Suddenly soldiers appeared--it seemed to Mrs. Willing--from the ground itself, and sprang to Dandy's bridle. The soldiers turned the horse and the buggy sharply round, and Dandy dashed for the shelter of the stable he had recently left. "A battle, after all!" cried Grandfather Willing, his ruddy face paling. "A battle in Gettysburg!" Grandmother Willing said nothing for a long time. She grasped Tiger's basket tightly with one hand and with the other clutched the side of the carriage. Tears ran down her cheeks and she drew long, gasping breaths. "A battle in Gettysburg!" she repeated at last. "Mary is there, and Emmeline is there, and that poor young woman of Henry's is there! Like as not poor Henry is dead. What shall we do?" "There is only one thing we can do, mother; that is go back to Sally's. The town will be protected." "I want to go home!" sobbed Grandmother Willing, much as Emmeline had sobbed. "They might get out as far as our house, and they might do damage." "The fighting is three miles from our house, mother." When they reached their daughter's farm, Sally came running to meet them. "Oh, I have been so worried about you! Get down, mother. Come in. Oh, this dreadful noise! Look, father!" Old Mr. Willing's eyes followed her pointing finger. On the main road, a few rods from the farmhouse, thousands of soldiers were marching rapidly toward Gettysburg. Their line extended back for at least a mile. From the porch and windows of the farmhouse terrified faces watched them. Grandmother Willing wept again. "Perhaps our dear Henry is among them!" "Henry, mother! Why, these are the rebels!" "Oh, dear, Oh, dear!" wailed Grandmother Willing. "What shall we do?" "We will do two things, mother," answered Grandfather Willing solemnly. "We will wait and we will pray." A hill shut out from the farmhouse a view of the first day's battlefield. When Grandfather Willing and his son-in-law proposed to make their way to higher ground, such a loud outcry rose from the women and children that they abandoned the plan. Gathering the family about him, Grandfather Willing prayed that the engagement might be short and victorious for the arms of righteousness. When toward evening the noise of battle ceased, grandfather hoped that his prayers had been answered. On Wednesday morning Grandmother Willing rose early from her bed. Toward the southwest she could see the Round Tops; before her the plain was clear and beautiful. Her heart rejoiced. "Look, father, now we can go home!" Grandfather Willing came to the window and looked out. He saw the clear, beautiful plain, but he saw also another and a startling sight. From the west approached fresh troops. The main road, where it left the woodland, was crowded. Rapidly the throng drew near; officers shouted, drivers urged their horses, wagons rattled. "Is there going to be _more_?" asked Grandmother Willing. All morning the family in the farmhouse watched the road and the distant plain. The troops vanished from sight as they approached Gettysburg. When by noon there had been no further sound of shooting, Grandmother Willing suggested that they start. "We can surely go now, father!" Just then a boy came from a farm a mile across the fields with news that made Grandmother Willing change her mind. There had been yesterday, he said, a terrible battle; Gettysburg was now in the possession of the Confederates. Troops were gathering from all directions; there was going to be worse fighting before the day was over. It was not until late afternoon that the firing on the second day began. Then it was that Emmeline, in her grandmother's kitchen, had first screamed and whirled round and that Private Christy had told her to be still. To the watchers at the farmhouse on the hillside the time passed more slowly than it did to Emmeline. From the upper windows they could see the clouds of smoke, and could tell exactly where the cannon stood; it was clear to the Willings that the battle raged near their house. On Friday, the third day of battle, Grandmother Willing made no request to be taken home. She woke to the sound of cannon, dull and distant; she listened with blanched face until noon. At one o'clock, when it began once more in its final and most terrible fury, Grandmother Willing covered her ears, so that she might hear less and pray more. From hundreds of terrified hearts in Gettysburg and round Gettysburg rose petitions for relief from the torture of the sound. When silence finally came, the family on the hillside did not dare to rejoice, but waited fearfully for another roar. But no roar came. Twilight faded to dusk, dusk to night, and silence persisted. From the direction of Gettysburg came no sound. If troops moved on the Cashtown Road, the Willing family did not know. They slept heavily and woke later than was their custom. When they rose, the bright sun of other mornings was not shining. The day was cloudy, the air heavy. In the direction of Gettysburg all was dim and hazy. "And now," said Grandmother Willing, "we can go home." Grandfather was as patient as Private Christy. He shook his head with a gentle "No, mother." Between them and home lay thousands of troops; until they departed silence signified nothing. All the morning the clouds thickened and the air grew heavier. At noon horsemen, riding toward the west, appeared on the main road. At the first crossroad they turned toward the south. They rode slowly, with bent heads, on tired horses. Presently wagons followed. Then to the ears of the little family on the hillside there rose from that unending line of rough ambulances a strange sound. The women and children could not understand it, but their cheeks grew still whiter and tears gathered in their eyes. "What is it?" they cried. "What can it be?" "The wounded are being taken away," explained Grandfather Willing solemnly. "Hark how the drivers hurry the horses! They are afraid! They are retreating! Thank God! Thank God!" The storm drove the Willings indoors, but the sound followed them. Through the long afternoon, through the long night, the Willings heard those wailing cries and those anguished commands to hasten. When Sunday morning dawned, those cries were startling other farmhouses and villages miles away. They never faded entirely from the recollection of those who heard them. Soon the boy from the next farmhouse crossed the fields again. The battle was over, the Northern arms were victorious, Gettysburg was safe. "Now," said Grandmother Willing, "I want to go home." Grandfather Willing pondered. He had been studying a route that he thought they could safely follow. He knew all the byroads and all the farmers' lanes across the fields. "You stay here, mother. I wish you would stay here." Grandmother Willing gave her husband one look, and then lifted her cat, Tiger, into his basket. * * * * * In the mysterious dusky light of the Willing farmhouse, Emmeline and her brother Henry had stood for a long moment in one another's arms. They dared not accept with too much enthusiasm this sudden joy. The rain was beating on the roof and the windows. The delirious mutterings of the other inhabitants of the house had died away. "O Emmeline!" said Henry again. "Little Emmeline, is it you?" "Yes," said Emmeline, with a long sigh, "it is." "How are they at home?" "Mother is well, but Sister Bertha is sick." "When did you come out here?" "On Tuesday." "Where,"--Henry looked about, startled,--"where are grandfather and grandmother?" "I imagine they went to Aunt Sally's." "And you have been here _alone_!" "No." Emmeline laughed feebly. "No, not alone." Henry started again. Over his sister's shoulder he saw a man lying on the floor in the parlor. "There are wounded men in this house!" "Oh, yes!" said Emmeline. "You have been taking care of these men!" "I gave them water and biscuit, and I talked to them." Henry went a step nearer the parlor door. "That man is--is dead, Emmeline! And you've been here alone!" "I wasn't alone," protested Emmeline. Between her and yesterday, even between her and this morning, there was falling a haze, gray and concealing as the low-lying clouds outside. She began to weep. "There was some one here to take care of me. I have been safe all the time. And he is gone away forever!" Henry looked into the parlor and the sitting-room, and then went upstairs. Emmeline heard him exclaim. When he came down again, he went to the kitchen door and looked out. The trampled fields were already sodden. At the foot of the garden was a trench, begun for a well and abandoned. It was not deep, but it was deep enough. There, shrouded in Grandmother Willing's comforters, were laid those who in this house had given their lives for their convictions. One of the Watson boys, coming to see how his neighbors had fared, saved Emmeline a share in the last sad ceremony of battle. Presently night fell upon the little farmhouse. Henry and Emmeline slept side by side on Grandmother Willing's kitchen floor. Often Henry rose and went about the house to minister to the wounded in Grandmother Willing's beds. When he returned, he laid a protecting arm across his little sister and so fell asleep once more. The mystery of his release was now clear to him. The humanity of the act, the helplessness of his enemy, combined to create in his heart a bitter hatred of war, a hatred felt by all who had anything to do with that sad battlefield. The broadening light of Sunday morning wakened brother and sister. Across the wide valley between the two battle lines, great wagons were traveling swiftly. For friend and foe alike doctors and nurses of the victorious army had begun their work of mercy. To the door of the Willing farmhouse came at noon an ambulance. Some houses the attendants had found deserted except for their suffering guests. In others were women who had performed incredible and uncounted deeds of mercy. Each house had its epic of heroism and danger and sorrow. A charm seemed to have been laid upon these heroic ministers; it was as if an angel standing before them had protected them in their ways. Of them all, only one had perished. In the Willing house there was little for doctors or nurses to do. The house was orderly once more; the surviving soldiers asked feebly about the result of the battle, and when they heard, turned their faces away even from Emmeline. The homeward journey of Grandmother and Grandfather Willing ended in the middle of Sunday afternoon. It had been much more round-about than Grandfather Willing had planned, more awful than he had dreamed. As they drew near the scene of battle and beheld on every side its sad destruction, their hearts failed them utterly. Where was Mary? How was poor Bertha? Where was Emmeline, Emmeline who was forever getting into mischief of some kind? Above all, where was Henry? Grandmother Willing was thinking of him as they drew near the farmhouse. Then looking up, she saw him standing on the porch, and behind him, in the doorway, Emmeline. Grandmother Willing made no motion to alight from the wagon. She sat still with Tiger on her lap. "How did _you_ get here?" she asked in a trembling voice. "We have been here all the time," said Emmeline. There came into the eyes of Emmeline a sudden sparkle. What a tale she had to tell Eliza Batterson! Grandmother Willing allowed herself to be helped out of the carriage. She came rapidly through the gate and across the dooryard, which was now trampled into a muddy slough. From the doorway she could see into her parlor with its stained carpet. She looked from it to the stains of the same color on her granddaughter's dress. In spite of all that Grandmother Willing had seen, she did not yet realize the full meaning of a battle. "Has blood been shed here?" she asked in an awed tone. With an arm round her, Henry said, "Yes, grandmother." Grandmother Willing's gaze still rested upon Emmeline. "Did you see this?" she demanded, as if Emmeline were to blame for having got herself once more into mischief. "Were you in the battle, Emmeline?" "Yes." "Did you have wounded rebels here?" "Yes. There are some upstairs now!" cried Emmeline. "In my house!" exclaimed Grandmother Willing. "In my beds!" Grandmother Willing's youthfulness was apparent in the speed with which she started up the stairs. "I'll 'rebel' them!" Those below waited. They could trust her to do nothing violent. "Oh, you poor, poor souls!" cried Grandmother Willing abovestairs. An ambulance driver who was making a journey to Gettysburg now offered to take Henry and Emmeline home. Henry must join his company as soon as possible, and the best way to find them was to go to Gettysburg, where he could doubtless get information about their position. He was heavily oppressed by anxiety and alarm, and could hardly wait until the driver received his orders to start. [Illustration: _Page 154_ "YES," ANSWERED MRS. WILLING. "BERTHA IS ASLEEP UPSTAIRS"] Along the wooded ridge the ambulance traveled; Henry sat in the seat with the driver, Emmeline in the body of the wagon. There was no road; they made their way round shattered cannon, wrecked caissons, and far sadder remnants of the great battle. They passed close by the seminary building, where the Union soldiers had first camped. It was five o'clock on Sunday afternoon, the most peaceful hour of the week; but Gettysburg's streets were thronged with soldiers, mounted and on foot. Citizens were on their doorsteps. This Sunday was a day not of rest, but of rejoicing. Suddenly Emmeline saw twinkling in the breeze before her a bit of color, and her pale cheeks flushed. From windows and doorposts floated once more Gettysburg's flag--the stars of white on a field of blue, the stripes of red and white. Unobserved, Henry and Emmeline passed down the street. In the back of the wagon, Emmeline could not be seen, and as for Henry--no one looked twice at a Union soldier with a bandaged head. No one noticed them, in fact, until Mr. Bannon, who was sitting on his porch with his pipe, saw them; he lifted his arms with a shout and hurried forward in his lame way to greet them. He shouted some wild sentence at them, but they could not wait to be greeted by lame Mr. Bannon. Hand in hand they went along the house and to the kitchen porch. There, at the open door, they paused. "Well, mother," said Henry. Mrs. Willing did not move. She was sitting by the opposite window shelling peas that had been planted, it seemed to her, a generation ago. She sat with a half-opened pod between her fingers and looked at her children. Mrs. Schmidt's brother, driving into town an hour ago from his farm beyond the battlefield, had reported the safety of his sister and her brood, but had brought no news of Emmeline. Mrs. Willing could not at first quite believe that here, in flesh and blood, were the two children who lay so heavily upon her heart. "Is Bertha safe, mother?" asked Henry. Still Henry and Emmeline did not move, and Mrs. Willing did not rise to meet them. "Yes," answered Mrs. Willing. "Bertha is asleep upstairs." "Is--" began Henry, and then he repeated that single meaningless word. "Is--" Now Emmeline had begun to move. She pursued, however, a strange course. She took a step toward her mother, then a step toward the corner of the room, then a step toward her mother, then another away from her mother. Mrs. Willing rose; the peas and their pods rolled in all directions. "Mother!" cried Emmeline. "Mother! Mother!" The first exclamation shocked Mrs. Willing. It was hoarse, and in its sharp tones was all the misery through which Emmeline had lived. The second "Mother!" expressed pure astonishment and nothing else. But in the third was all Emmeline's youth restored. Henry had seen the object toward which his sister's erratic steps were turned and had finished his sentence, "Is it mine, mother?" He now took his mother into his arms and put his head on her shoulder as if he himself were not a very long way from the cradle in which his son reposed. But for Emmeline, tears were past. She knelt upon the floor, enchanted, enslaved, a happy servitor of the sister who, sleeping in her quiet bed, knew nothing of the new joy that awaited her. "O mother!" cried Emmeline. "It _is_ a baby!" THE END TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: Text in italics is surrounded with underscores: _italics_. Inconsistencies in spelling, hyphenation, and punctuation have been standardized. 
33121	----	generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG [Illustration: FRANK ARETAS HASKELL] WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION: REPRINTS, NO. 1 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG BY FRANK ARETAS HASKELL AIDE-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL JOHN GIBBON, AND COLONEL OF THIRTY-SIXTH WISCONSIN INFANTRY WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION NOVEMBER, 1908 TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED COPIES PRINTED DEMOCRAT PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTER CONTENTS PAGE WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION ix PREFACE. _The Editor_ xi THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. _Frank Aretas Haskell_ 1 ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE PORTRAIT OF AUTHOR, while Colonel of Thirty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry _Frontispiece_ MAP OF BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, JULY 2 58 MAP OF BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, JULY 3 130 WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION (Organized under the provisions of Chapter 298, Laws of 1905, as amended by Chapter 378, Laws of 1907) JAMES O. DAVIDSON _Governor of Wisconsin_ FREDERICK J. TURNER _Professor of American History in the University of Wisconsin_ REUBEN G. THWAITES _Secretary of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin_ HENRY E. LEGLER _Secretary of the Wisconsin Library Commission_ CHARLES E. ESTABROOK _Representing Department of Wisconsin, Grand Army of the Republic_ _Chairman_, COMMISSIONER ESTABROOK _Secretary and Editor_, COMMISSIONER THWAITES _Committee on Publications_, COMMISSIONERS LEGLER, THWAITES, AND TURNER PREFACE Frank Aretas Haskell was born at Tunbridge, Vermont, the son of Aretas and Ann (Folson) Haskell, on the 13th of July, 1828. Graduating from Dartmouth College with distinguished honors, in the class of 1854, the young man came to Madison in the autumn of that year, and entered the law firm of Orton, Atwood & Orton. His career in this profession was increasingly successful, until in 1861 it was interrupted by the outbreak of the War of Secession. Commissioned on June 20 of that year as First Lieutenant of Company I of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry of the Iron Brigade, he served as Adjutant of his regiment until April 14, 1862. Contemporaneous accounts state that "much of the excellent discipline for which this regiment was distinguished, was due to his soldierly efforts during its organization." He was called from the adjutancy of the Sixth to be aide-de-camp to General John Gibbon, when the latter assumed command of the Iron Brigade, and remained in such service until (February 9, 1864) he was promoted to be Colonel of the Thirty-sixth Wisconsin. While aide to General Gibbon he was temporarily on the staffs of several other generals, including Edwin V. Sumner and G. K. Warren, and won wide repute as a soldier of unusual ability and courage. With the Iron Brigade, he participated in the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, taking part in reconnoissances at Orange Court House and Stephensburg, in skirmishes at Rappahannock Station and Sulphur Springs, and in the battles of Gainesville, Second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. Reporting upon the battle of December 13, 1862, at Fredericksburg, General Gibbon alluded to his favorite aide as being "constantly on the field, conveying orders and giving directions amid the heaviest fire." Writing of Gettysburg, which is herein so graphically depicted by Haskell, General Francis A. Walker, in his _History of the Second Army Corps_,[1] refers to our author as one who was "bravest of the brave, riding mounted through an interval between the Union battalions, and calling upon the troops to go forward." He further says: "Colonel Frank A. Haskell, of Wisconsin, had been known for his intelligence and courage, for his generosity of character and his exquisite culture, long before the third day of Gettysburg, when, acting as aide to General Gibbon, he rode mounted between the two lines, then swaying backward and forward under each other's fire, calling upon the men of the Second Division to follow him, and setting an example of valor and self devotion never forgotten by any man of the thousands who witnessed it." General Winfield S. Hancock, officially reporting upon the battle, thus alluded to Haskell's deed: "I desire particularly to refer to the services of a gallant young officer, First Lieutenant F. A. Haskell, aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Gibbon, who, at a critical period of the battle, when the contending forces were but 50 or 60 yards apart, believing that an example was necessary, and ready to sacrifice his life, rode between the contending lines with a view of giving encouragement to ours and leading it forward, he being at the moment the only mounted officer in a similar position. He was slightly wounded and his horse was shot in several places." General Gibbon's report said: "I desire to call particular attention to the manner in which several of the subordinate reports mention the services of my gallant aide, Lieutenant F. A. Haskell, Sixth Wisconsin, and to add my testimony of his valuable services. This young officer has been through many battles, and distinguished himself alike in all by his conspicuous coolness and bravery, and in this one was slightly wounded, but refused to quit the field. It has always been a source of regret to me that our military system offers no plan for rewarding his merit and services as they deserve." In later years, the General again publicly alluded to Haskell's heroic conduct on this field: "There was a young man on my staff who had been in every battle with me and who did more than any other one man to repulse Pickett's assault at Gettysburg and he did the part of a general there." General William Harrow spoke of Haskell as having "greatly distinguished himself by his constant exertion in the most exposed places." Colonel Norman J. Hall, of the Michigan Seventh Infantry, and then commanding the Third Brigade, thus referred to the incident: "I cannot omit speaking in the highest terms of the magnificent conduct of Lieutenant Haskell, of General Gibbon's staff, in bringing forward regiments and in nerving the troops to their work by word and fearless example." Upon receiving his appointment as Colonel of the Thirty-sixth Wisconsin, Haskell returned at once to this State, and recruited and organized the regiment for the field. Although his commission was dated from February 9, he was not mustered into service as Colonel until March 23. The regiment, which had been assigned to the First Brigade, Second Division of the Second Army Corps, left Madison May 10, and seven days later was acting as reserve during the battle at Spottsylvania. Its experiences thenceforth were of the most active character. The command went into action at Cold Harbor, Virginia, early in the morning of June 3. The official account of what followed, is contained in the report of the State Adjutant General:[2] "The whole line advanced upon the enemy by brigades, in column closed in mass by regiments, the Thirty-sixth being in rear of the brigade. On advancing about three-fourths of a mile across an open field, under a heavy artillery fire, and when within about twenty-five rods of the rebel works, partially protected by the brow of a low hill, the Thirty-sixth was found in the advance, leading the brigade. During the advance, Colonel McKeen, commanding the brigade, was killed, when the command devolved upon Colonel Haskell. After a moment's rest, Colonel Haskell, by command of General Gibbon, ordered the brigade forward. The men rose to obey, and were met by a shower of bullets, when the other parts of the line halted. Colonel Haskell surveyed the situation for a moment, as if irresolute; he finally gave the order, 'Lie down, men,' which was at once obeyed. An instant afterwards, he was struck in the head by a rebel bullet, and instantly killed. Thus fell one of Wisconsin's most gallant soldiers, a thorough disciplinarian, and an accomplished scholar." Colonel Clement E. Warner, then a Captain in the Thirty-sixth, but later its Major and Lieutenant-Colonel, has left us this report of the battle of Cold Harbor, so far as concerns Colonel Haskell's participation and death:[3] "Frank A. Haskell was in every respect an ideal soldier, according to the highest and best definition of that term. I think he was by education, experience, association, natural ability, and temperament fully as competent to handle a Division as a Regiment, and in many respects the higher would seem the more appropriate position for him. "He rejoined the Army of the Potomac with his regiment, the Thirty-sixth Wisconsin, about the middle of May, 1864, at Spottsylvania. The two armies were joined in a death struggle, which was destined to continue almost uninterruptedly until one was effectually wiped from the face of the earth. June 3 at Cold Harbor, our army was massed by division and in that formation projected upon the fortifications of the enemy. Their line of works was really the outer line of the defenses of Richmond, and were perfectly constructed for defense, and manned by General Lee's army, which when protected by works had thus far been able to successfully withstand General Grant's continuous attacks. "With the general advance our Division moved at daylight for nearly two miles over undulating land, part of the time subject to the fire of the enemy and occasionally protected from it by slight depressions in the land. We moved forward as rapidly as possible, and in thirty minutes were in the immediate presence of the enemy's line, and subjected to as murderous a fire as met Pickett's men at the celebrated charge at Gettysburg. "Colonel Haskell, who was so largely instrumental in saving the day at Gettysburg, now finds his position exactly reversed from what it was on that memorable occasion. Now his men were charging and the enemy on the defense, protected by their works. He was standing nearly in front of the remnant of the Second Division which had thus far pressed forward through the murderous fire, and apparently seeing the hopelessness of further advance, and willing to save this remnant of his men, gave the order, 'Lie down, men,' which was the last order he ever gave. It was promptly obeyed. For an instant it seemed that he was the only man standing, and only for an instant, for as he stood surveying the havoc around him, and glanced toward the enemy's line, he was seen to throw up his arms and sink to the earth, his forehead pierced by a rebel ball. And this was the last of Frank Haskell's consciousness. He had fearlessly and freely given his young life for his country. Nearly fifteen thousand companions joined him in the sacrifice on that fateful morning, the greatest loss of any single charge in the war." In his own report of the battle, General Hancock said: "General Tyler was wounded and taken from the field and the lamented McKeen,[4] after pushing his command as far as his example could urge it, was killed. The gallant Haskell succeeded to the command, but was carried from the field mortally wounded, while making renewed efforts to carry the enemy's works." In a field order, dated September 28, 1864, he further declared, "At Cold Harbor the Colonel of the Thirty-sixth Wisconsin, as gallant a soldier as ever lived, fell dead on the field." General Gibbon, on receiving the sad news of the Colonel's death, cried, "My God! I have lost my best friend, and one of the best soldiers in the Army of the Potomac has fallen!" The late Hon. A. J. Turner, editor of the Portage _State Register_, who was well acquainted with Colonel Haskell, said of him:[5] "While commanding a brigade in the assault upon the enemy's lines at the battle of the Chickahominy, near Richmond, Virginia, on the morning of Friday, the 3d of June, he was struck in the right temple by a Rebel sharpshooter's bullet, and died in about three hours. His body was taken in charge by his young and faithful Orderly, John N. Ford, who, though himself wounded in the head and left arm, persevered through all difficulties and brought it home to Portage where, attended by a great concourse of people, it was buried in Silver Lake cemetery, June 12, 1864." Feeling tributes to his memory were rendered by the Dane County Bar Association, and the Common Council of the City of Madison. This story of the Battle of Gettysburg was written by Lieutenant Haskell to his brother, H. M. Haskell of Portage, not long after the contest. It was not intended for publication; but its great merit was at once recognized, and it was offered to Mr. Turner for insertion in his weekly paper. It was, however, too long a document for such purpose. About fifteen years later, it was published in a pamphlet of 72 pages, without even a title-page, for private circulation only. The account was widely read by military experts, and received much praise for both its literary and its professional merit. The pamphlet having become rare, for the edition was small, was reprinted in 1898 as part of the history of Dartmouth's Class of 1854. Certain omissions and changes were, however, made therein by its editor, Captain Daniel Hall, who was an aide on General Howard's staff; the reason assigned being, that the account was written so soon after the battle that "although surprisingly accurate in minute details," the author was not fully informed relative to one or two facts which to him seemed to reflect on General Sickles. Captain Hall assumed that were Colonel Haskell now living, he would have justified these omissions. In March, 1908, the Dartmouth College version was reprinted by the Commandery of Massachusetts, Military Order of the Loyal Legion, under the editorship of Captain Charles Hunt. In deciding to inaugurate its own series of Reprints with Colonel Haskell's brilliant paper, the Wisconsin History Commission has, in accordance with its fixed policy, reverted to the original edition, which is here presented entire, exactly as first printed. Whatever might have been the author's later judgment, in the event of his surviving the war, the Commission does not feel warranted in disturbing this original text in the slightest degree--the present being an unexpurgated reprint of a rare and valuable narrative written by a soldier in whose memory Wisconsin feels especial pride. Opinions or errors of fact on the part of the respective authors represented both in Original Narratives and in Reprints issued by the Commission, have not nor will they be modified by the latter. For all statements, of whatever character, the author alone is responsible. The Commissioners are grateful to Mrs. W. G. Clough, public librarian of Portage, for the loan of that institution's rare copy of the original, for the purpose of this reprint. R. G. T. WISCONSIN HISTORICAL LIBRARY December, 1908 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG[6] The Great battle of Gettysburg is now an event of the past. The composition and strength of the armies, their leaders, the strategy, the tactics, the result, of that field are to-day by the side of those of Waterloo--matters of history. A few days ago these things were otherwise. This great event did not so "cast its shadow before," as to moderate the hot sunshine that streamed upon our preceding march, or to relieve our minds of all apprehension of the result of the second great Rebel invasion of the soil North of the Potomac. No, not many days since, at times we were filled with fears and forebodings. The people of the country, I suppose, shared the anxieties of the army, somewhat in common with us, but they could not have felt them as keenly as we did. We were upon the immediate theatre of events, as they occurred from day to day, and were of them. We were the army whose province it should be to meet this invasion and repel it; on us was the immediate responsibility for results, most momentous for good or ill, as yet in the future. And so in addition to the solicitude of all good patriots, we felt that our own honor as men and as an army, as well as the safety of the Capitol and the country, were at stake. And what if that invasion should be successful, and in the coming battle, the Army of the Potomac should be overpowered? Would it not be? When our army was much larger than at present--had rested all winter--and, nearly perfect in all its departments and arrangements, was the most splendid army this continent ever saw, only a part of the Rebel force, which it now had to contend with, had defeated it--its leader, rather--at Chancellorsville! Now the Rebel had his whole force assembled, he was flushed with recent victory, was arrogant in his career of unopposed invasion, at a favorable season of the year. His daring plans, made by no unskilled head, to transfer the war from his own to his enemies' ground, were being successful. He had gone a day's march from his front before Hooker moved, or was aware of his departure. Then, I believe, the army in general, both officers and men, had no confidence in Hooker, in either his honesty or ability. Did they not charge him personally, with the defeat at Chancellorsville? Were they not still burning with indignation against him for that disgrace? And now, again under his leadership, they were marching against the enemy! And they knew of nothing, short of the providence of God, that could, or would, remove him. For many reasons, during the marches prior to the battle, we were anxious, and at times heavy at heart. But the Army of the Potomac was no band of school girls. They were not the men likely to be crushed or utterly discouraged by any new circumstances in which they might find themselves placed. They had lost some battles, they had gained some. They knew what defeat was, and what was victory. But here is the greatest praise that I can bestow upon them, or upon any army: With the elation of victory, or the depression of defeat, amidst the hardest toils of the campaign, under unwelcome leadership, at all times, and under all circumstances, they were a reliable army still. The Army of the Potomac would do as it was told, always. Well clothed, and well fed--there never could be any ground for complaint on these heads--but a mighty work was before them. Onward they moved--night and day were blended--over many a weary mile, through dust, and through mud, in the broiling sunshine, in the flooding rain, over steeps, through defiles, across rivers, over last year's battle fields, where the skeletons of our dead brethren, by hundreds, lay bare and bleaching, weary, without sleep for days, tormented with the newspapers, and their rumors, that the enemy was in Philadelphia, in Baltimore, in all places where he was not, yet these men could still be relied upon, I believe, when the day of conflict should come. "_Haec olim meminisse juvabit._" We did not then know this. I mention them now, that you may see that in those times we had several matters to think about, and to do, that were not as pleasant as sleeping upon a bank of violets in the shade. In moving from near Falmouth, Va., the army was formed in several columns, and took several roads. The Second Corps, the rear of the whole, was the last to move, and left Falmouth at daybreak, on the 15th of June, and pursued its march through Aquia, Dumfries, Wolf Run Shoales, Centerville, Gainesville, Thoroughfare Gap--this last we left on the 25th, marching back to Haymarket, where we had a skirmish with the cavalry and horse artillery of the enemy--Gum Spring, crossing the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, thence through Poolesville, Frederick, Liberty, and Union Town. We marched from near Frederick to Union Town, a distance of thirty-two miles, from eight o'clock A. M. to nine P. M., on the 28th, and I think this is the longest march, accomplished in so short a time, by a corps during the war. On the 28th, while we were near this latter place, we breathed a full breath of joy, and of hope. The Providence of God had been with us--we ought not to have doubted it--General Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac. Not a favorable time, one would be apt to suppose, to change the General of a large army, on the eve of battle, the result of which might be to destroy the Government and country! But it should have been done long before. At all events, any change could not have been for the worse, and the Administration, therefore, hazarded little, in making it now. From this moment my own mind was easy concerning results. I now felt that we had a clear-headed, honest soldier, to command the army, who would do his best always--that there would be no repetition of Chancellorsville. Meade was not as much known in the Army as many of the other corps commanders, but the officers who knew, all thought highly of him, a man of great modesty, with none of those qualities which are noisy and assuming, and hankering for cheap newspaper fame, not at all of the "_gallant_" Sickles stamp. I happened to know much of General Meade--he and General Gibbon had always been very intimate, and I had seen much of him--I think my own notions concerning General Meade at this time, were shared quite generally by the army; at all events, all who knew him shared them. By this time, by reports that were not mere rumors, we began to hear frequently of the enemy, and of his proximity. His cavalry was all about us, making little raids here and there, capturing now and then a few of our wagons, and stealing a good many horses, but doing us really the least amount possible of harm, for we were not by these means impeded at all, and his cavalry gave no information at all to Lee, that he could rely upon, of the movements of the Army of the Potomac. The Infantry of the enemy was at this time in the neighborhood of Hagerstown, Chambersburg, and some had been at Gettysburg, possibly were there now. Gettysburg was a point of strategic importance, a great many roads, some ten or twelve at least concentrating there, so the army could easily converge to, or, should a further march be necessary, diverge from this point. General Meade, therefore, resolved to try to seize Gettysburg, and accordingly gave the necessary orders for the concentration of his different columns there. Under the new auspices the army brightened, and moved on with a more elastic step towards the yet undefined field of conflict. The 1st Corps, General Reynolds, already having the advance, was ordered to push forward rapidly, and take and hold the town, if he could. The rest of the Army would assemble to his support. Buford's Cavalry co-operated with this corps, and on the morning of the 1st of July found the enemy near Gettysburg and to the West, and promptly engaged him. The First Corps having bivouaced the night before, South of the town, came up rapidly to Buford's support, and immediately a sharp battle was opened with the advance of the enemy. The first Division Gen. Wadsworth was the first of the infantry to become engaged, but the other two, commanded respectively by Generals Robinson and Doubleday, were close at hand, and forming the line of battle to the West and North-west of the town, at a mean distance of about a mile away, the battle continued for some hours, with various success, which was on the whole with us until near noon. At this time a lull occurred, which was occupied, by both sides, in supervising and re-establishing the hastily formed lines of the morning. New Divisions of the enemy were constantly arriving and taking up positions, for this purpose marching in upon the various roads that terminate at the town, from the West and North. The position of the First Corps was then becoming perilous in the extreme, but it was improved a little before noon by the arrival upon the field of two Divisions of the Eleventh Corps (Gen Howard), these Divisions commanded respectively by Generals Schurz and Barlow, who by order posted their commands to the right of the First Corps, with their right retired, forming an angle with the line of the First Corps. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon the enemy, now in overwhelming force, resumed the battle, with spirit. The portion of the Eleventh Corps making but feeble opposition to the advancing enemy, soon began to fall back. Back in disorganized masses they fled into the town, hotly pursued, and in lanes, in barns, in yards and cellars, throwing away their arms, they sought to hide like rabbits, and were there captured, unresisting, by hundreds. The First Corps, deprived of this support, if support it could be called, outflanked upon either hand, and engaged in front, was compelled to yield the field. Making its last stand upon what is called "Seminary Ridge," not far from the town, it fell back in considerable confusion, through the South-west part of the town, making brave resistance, however, but with considerable loss. The enemy did not see fit to follow, or to attempt to, further than the town, and so the fight of the 1st of July closed here. I suppose our losses during the day would exceed four thousand, of whom a large number were prisoners. Such usually is the kind of loss sustained by the Eleventh Corps. You will remember that the old "Iron Brigade" is in the First Corps, and consequently shared this fight, and I hear their conduct praised on all hands. In the 2nd Wis., Col. Fairchild lost his left arm; Lieut. Col. Stevens, was mortally wounded, and Major Mansfield was wounded; Lieut. Col. Callis, of the 7th Wis., and Lieut. Col. Dudley, of the 19th Ind., were badly, dangerously, wounded, the latter by the loss of his right leg above the knee. I saw "_John Burns_," the only citizen of Gettysburg who fought in the battle, and I asked him what troops he fought with. He said: "O, I pitched in with them Wisconsin fellers." I asked what sort of men they were, and he answered: "They fit terribly. The Rebs couldn't make anything of them fellers." And so the brave compliment the brave. This man was touched by three bullets from the enemy, but not seriously wounded. But the loss of the enemy to-day was severe also, probably in killed and wounded, as heavy as our own, but not so great in prisoners. Of these latter the "Iron Brigade" captured almost an entire Mississippi Brigade, however. Of the events so far, of the 1st of July, I do not speak from personal knowledge. I shall now tell my introduction to these events. At eleven o'clock A. M., on that day, the Second Corps was halted at Taneytown, which is thirteen miles from Gettysburg, South, and there awaiting orders, the men were allowed to make coffee and rest. At between one and two o'clock in the afternoon, a message was brought to Gen. Gibbon, requiring his immediate presence at the headquarters of Gen. Hancock, who commanded the Corps. I went with Gen. Gibbon, and we rode at a rapid gallop, to Gen. Hancock. At Gen. Hancock's headquarters the following was learned: The First Corps had met the enemy at Gettysburg, and had possession of the town. Gen. Reynolds was badly, it was feared mortally wounded; the fight of the First Corps still continued. By Gen. Meade's order, Gen. Hancock was to hurry forward and take command upon the field, of all troops there, or which should arrive there. The Eleventh Corps was near Gettysburg when the messenger who told of the fight left there, and the Third Corps was marching up, by order, on the Emmetsburg Road--Gen. Gibbon--he was not the ranking officer of the Second Corps after Hancock--was ordered to assume the command of the Second Corps. All this was sudden, and for that reason at least, exciting; but there were other elements in this information, that aroused our profoundest interest. The great battle that we had so anxiously looked for during so many days, had at length opened, and it was a relief, in some sense, to have these accidents of time and place established. What would be the result? Might not the enemy fall upon and destroy the First Corps before succor could arrive? Gen. Hancock, with his personal staff, at about two o'clock P. M., galloped off towards Gettysburg; Gen. Gibbon took his place in command of the Corps, appointing me his acting Assistant Adjutant General. The Second Corps took arms at once, and moved rapidly towards the field. It was not long before we began to hear the dull booming of the guns, and as we advanced, from many an eminence or opening among the trees, we could look out upon the white battery smoke, puffing up from the distant field of blood, and drifting up to the clouds. At these sights and sounds, the men looked more serious than before and were more silent, but they marched faster, and straggled less. At about five o'clock P. M., as we were riding along at the head of the column, we met an ambulance, accompanied by two or three mounted officers--we knew them to be staff officers of Gen. Reynolds--their faces told plainly enough what load the vehicle carried--it was the dead body of Gen. Reynolds. Very early in the action, while seeing personally to the formation of his lines under fire, he was shot through the head by a musket or rifle bullet, and killed almost instantly. His death at this time affected us much, for he was one of the _soldier_ Generals of the army, a man whose soul was in his country's work, which he did with a soldier's high honor and fidelity. I remember seeing him often at the first battle of Fredericksburg--he then commanded the First Corps--and while Meade's and Gibbon's Divisions were assaulting the enemy's works, he was the very beau ideal of the gallant general. Mounted upon a superb black horse, with his head thrown back and his great black eyes flashing fire, he was every where upon the field, seeing all things and giving commands in person. He died as many a friend, and many a foe to the country have died in this war. Just as the dusk of evening fell, from Gen. Meade, the Second Corps had orders to halt, where the head of the column then was, and to go into position for the night. The Second Division (Gibbon's) was accordingly put in position, upon the left of the (Taneytown) road, its left near the South-eastern base of "Round Top"--of which mountain more anon--and the right near the road; the Third Division was posted upon the right of the road, abreast of the Second; and the first Division in the rear of these two--all facing towards Gettysburg. Arms were stacked, and the men lay down to sleep, alas! many of them their last but the great final sleep upon the earth. Late in the afternoon as we came near the field, from some slightly wounded men we met, and occasional stragglers from the scene of operations in front, we got many rumors, and much disjointed information of battle, of lakes of blood, of rout and panic and undescribable disaster, from all of which the narrators were just fortunate enough to have barely escaped, the sole survivors. These stragglers are always terrible liars! About nine o'clock in the evening, while I was yet engaged in showing the troops their positions, I met Gen. Hancock, then on his way from the front, to Gen. Meade, who was back toward Taneytown; and he, for the purpose of having me advise Gen. Gibbon, for his information, gave me quite a detailed account of the situation of matters at Gettysburg, and of what had transpired subsequently to his arrival. He had arrived and assumed command there, just when the troops of the First and Eleventh Corps, after their repulse, were coming in confusion through the town. Hancock is just the man for such an emergency as this. Upon horseback I think he was the most magnificent looking General in the whole Army of the Potomac at that time. With a large, well shaped person, always dressed with elegance, even upon that field of confusion, he would look as if he was "monarch of all he surveyed," and few of his subjects would dare to question his right to command, or do aught else but to obey. His quick eye, in a flash, saw what was to be done, and his voice and his royal right hand at once commenced to do it. Gen. Howard had put one of his Divisions--Steinwehr--with some batteries, in position, upon a commanding eminence, at the "Cemetery," which, as a reserve, had not participated in the fight of the day, and this Division was now of course steady. Around this Division the fugitives were stopped, and the shattered Brigades and Regiments, as they returned, were formed upon either flank, and faced toward the enemy again. A show of order at least, speedily came from chaos--the rout was at an end--the First and Eleventh Corps were in line of battle again--not very systematically formed perhaps--in a splendid position, and in a condition to offer resistance, should the enemy be willing to try them. These formations were all accomplished long before night. Then some considerable portion of the Third Corps--Gen. Sickles--came up by the Emmetsburg road, and was formed to the left of the Taneytown road, on an extension of the line that I have mentioned; and all the Twelfth Corps--Gen. Slocum--arriving before night, the Divisions were put in position, to the right of the troops already there, to the East of the Baltimore Pike. The enemy was in the town, and behind it, and to the East and West, and appeared to be in strong force, and was jubilant over his day's success. Such was the posture of affairs as evening came on of the first of July. Gen. Hancock was hopeful, and in the best of spirits; and from him I also learned that the reason for halting the Second Corps in its present position, was that it was not then known where, in the coming fight, the line of battle would be formed, up near the town, where the troops then were, or further back, towards Taneytown. He would give his views upon this subject to Gen. Meade, which were in favor of the line near the town--the one that was subsequently adopted--and Gen. Meade would determine. The night before a great pitched battle would not ordinarily, I suppose, be a time for much sleep for Generals and their staff officers. We needed it enough, but there was work to be done. This war makes strange confusion of night and day! I did not sleep at all that night. It would, perhaps, be expected, on the eve of such great events, that one should have some peculiar sort of feelings, something extraordinary, some great arousing and excitement of the sensibilities and faculties, commensurate with the event itself; this certainly would be very poetical and pretty, but so far as I was concerned, and I think I can speak for the army in this matter, there was nothing of the kind. Men who had volunteered to fight the battles of the country, had met the enemy in many battles, and had been constantly before them, as had the Army of the Potomac, were too old soldiers, and long ago too well had weighed chances and probabilities, to be so disturbed now. No, I believe, the army slept soundly that night, and well, and I am glad the men did, for they needed it. At midnight Gen. Meade and staff rode by Gen. Gibbon's Head Quarters, on their way to the field; and in conversation with Gen. Gibbon, Gen. Meade announced that he had decided to assemble the whole army before Gettysburg, and offer the enemy battle there. The Second Corps would move at the earliest daylight, to take up its position. At three o'clock, A. M., of the second of July, the sleepy soldiers of the Corps were aroused; before six the Corps was up to the field, and halted temporarily by the side of the Taneytown road, upon which it had marched, while some movements of the other troops were being made, to enable it to take position in the order of battle. The morning was thick and sultry, the sky overcast with low, vapory clouds. As we approached all was astir upon the crests near the Cemetery, and the work of preparation was speedily going on. Men looked like giants there in the mist, and the guns of the frowning batteries so big, that it was a relief to know that they were our friends. Without a topographical map, some description of the ground and location is necessary to a clear understanding of the battle. With the sketch I have rudely drawn, without scale or compass, I hope you may understand my description. The line of battle as it was established, on the evening of the first, and morning of the second of July was in the form of the letter "U," the troops facing outwards. And the "Cemetery," which is at the point of the sharpest curvature of the line, being due South of the town of Gettysburg. "Round Top," the extreme left of the line, is a small, woody, rocky elevation, a very little West of South of the town, and nearly two miles from it. The sides of this are in places very steep, and its rocky summit is almost inaccessible. A short distance North of this is a smaller elevation called "Little Round Top." On the very top of "Little Round Top," we had heavy rifled guns in position during the battle. Near the right of the line is a small, woody eminence, named "Culp's Hill." Three roads come up to the town from the South, which near the town are quite straight, and at the town the external ones unite, forming an angle of about sixty, or more degrees. Of these, the farthest to the East is the "Baltimore Pike," which passes by the East entrance to the Cemetery; the farthest to the West is the "Emmetsburg road," which is wholly outside of our line of battle, but near the Cemetery, is within a hundred yards of it; the "Taneytown road" is between these, running nearly due North and South, by the Eastern base of "Round Top," by the Western side of the Cemetery, and uniting with the Emmetsburg road between the Cemetery and the town. High ground near the Cemetery, is named "Cemetery Ridge." The Eleventh Corps--Gen. Howard--was posted at the Cemetery, some of its batteries and troops, actually among the graves and monuments, which they used for shelter from the enemy's fire, its left resting upon the Taneytown road, extending thence to the East, crossing the Baltimore Pike, and thence bending backwards towards the South-east; on the right of the Eleventh came the First Corps, now, since the death of Gen. Reynolds, commanded by Gen. Newton, formed in a line curving still more towards the South. The troops of these two Corps, were re-formed on the morning of the second, in order that each might be by itself, and to correct some things not done well during the hasty formations here the day before. To the right of the First Corps, and on an extension of the same line, along the crest and down the South-eastern slope of Culp's Hill, was posted the Twelfth Corps--Gen. Slocum--its right, which was the extreme right of the line of the army, resting near a small stream called "Rock Run." No changes, that I am aware of, occurred in the formation of this Corps, on the morning of the Second. The Second Corps, after the brief halt that I have mentioned, moved up and took position, its right resting upon the Taneytown road, at the left of the Eleventh Corps, and extending the line thence, nearly a half mile, almost due South, towards Round Top, with its Divisions in the following order, from right to left: The Third, Gen. Alex Hays; the Second (Gibbon's), Gen. Harrow, (temporarily); the First, Gen. Caldwell. The formation was in line by brigade in column, the brigade being in column by regiment, with forty paces interval between regimental lines, the Second and Third Divisions having each one, and the First Division, two brigades--there were four brigades in the First--similarly formed, in reserve, one hundred and fifty paces in the rear of the line of their respective Divisions. That is, the line of the Corps, exclusive of its reserves, was the length of six regiments, deployed, and the intervals between them, some of which were left wide for the posting of the batteries, and consisted of four common deployed lines, each of two ranks of men, and a little more than one-third over in reserve. The five batteries, in all twenty-eight guns, were posted as follows: Woodruff's regular, six twelve-pound Napoleon's, brass, between the two brigades, in line of the Third Division; Arnold's "A" first R. I., six three-inch Parrotts, rifled, and Cushing's Regular, four three-inch Ordnance, rifled, between the Third and Second Division; Hazard's, (commanded during the battle by Lieut. Brown,) "B" first R. I., and Rhorty's N. G. each, six twelve-pound Napoleon's, brass, between the Second and First Division. I have been thus specific in the description of the posting and formation of the Second Corps, because they were works that I assisted to perform; and also that the other Corps were similarly posted, with reference to the strength of the lines, and the intermixing of infantry and artillery. From this, you may get a notion of the whole. The Third Corps--Gen. Sickles--the remainder of it arriving upon the field this morning, was posted upon the left of the Second extending the line still in the direction of Round Top, with its left resting near "Little Round Top." The left of the Third Corps was the extreme left of the line of battle, until changes occurred, which will be mentioned in the proper place. The Fifth Corps--Gen. Sykes--coming on the Baltimore Pike about this time, was massed there, near the line of battle, and held in reserve until some time in the afternoon, when it changed position, as I shall describe. I cannot give a detailed account of the cavalry, for I saw but little of it. It was posted near the wings, and watched the roads and the movements of the enemy upon the flanks of the army, but further than this participated but little in the battle. Some of it was also used for guarding the trains, which were far to the rear. The artillery reserve, which consisted of a good many batteries, were posted between the Baltimore Pike and the Taneytown road, on very nearly the center of a direct line passing through the extremities of the wings. Thus it could be readily sent to any part of the line. The Sixth Corps--Gen. Sedgwick--did not arrive upon the field until some time in the afternoon, but it was now not very far away, and was coming up rapidly on the Baltimore Pike. No fears were entertained that "Uncle John," as his men call Gen. Sedgwick, would not be in the right place at the right time. These dispositions were all made early, I think before eight o'clock in the morning. Skirmishers were posted well out all around the line, and all put in readiness for battle. The enemy did not yet demonstrate himself. With a look at the ground now, I think you may understand the movements of the battle. From Round Top, by the line of battle, round to the extreme right, I suppose is about three miles. From this same eminence to the Cemetery, extends a long ridge or hill--more resembling a great wave than a hill, however--with its crest, which was the line of battle, quite direct, between the points mentioned. To the West of this, that is towards the enemy, the ground falls away by a very gradual descent, across the Emmetsburg road, and then rises again, forming another ridge, nearly parallel to the first, but inferior in altitude, and something over a thousand yards away. A belt of woods extends partly along this second ridge, and partly farther to the West, at distances of from one thousand to thirteen hundred yards away from our line. Between these ridges, and along their slopes, that is, in front of the Second and Third Corps, the ground is cultivated, and is covered with fields of wheat, now nearly ripe, with grass and pastures, with some peach orchards, with fields of waving corn, and some farm houses, and their out buildings along the Emmetsburg road. There are very few places within the limits mentioned where troops and guns could move concealed. There are some oaks of considerable growth, along the position of the right of the Second Corps, a group of small trees, sassafras and oak, in front of the right of the Second Division of this Corps also; and considerable woods immediately in front of the left of the Third Corps, and also to the West of, and near Round Top. At the Cemetery, where is Cemetery Ridge, to which the line of the Eleventh Corps conforms, is the highest point in our line, except Round Top. From this the ground falls quite abruptly to the town, the nearest point of which is some five hundred yards away from the line, and is cultivated, and checkered with stone fences. The same is the character of the ground occupied by, and in front of the left of the First Corps, which is also on a part of Cemetery Ridge. The right of this Corps, and the whole of the Twelfth, are along Culp's Hill, and in woods, and the ground is very rocky, and in places in front precipitous--a most admirable position for defense from an attack in front, where, on account of the woods, no artillery could be used with effect by the enemy. Then these last three mentioned Corps had, by taking rails, by appropriating stone fences, by felling trees, and digging the earth, during the night of the first of July, made for themselves excellent breast works, which were a very good thing indeed. The position of the First and Twelfth Corps was admirably strong, therefore. Within the line of battle is an irregular basin, somewhat woody and rocky in places, but presenting few obstacles to the moving of troops and guns, from place to place along the lines, and also affording the advantage that all such movements, by reason of the surrounding crests, were out of view of the enemy. On the whole this was an admirable position to fight a defensive battle, good enough, I thought, when I saw it first, and better I believe than could be found elsewhere in a circle of many miles. Evils, sometimes at least, are blessings in disguise, for the repulse of our forces, and the death of Reynolds, on the first of July, with the opportune arrival of Hancock to arrest the tide of fugitives and fix it on these heights, gave us this position--perhaps the position gave us the victory. On arriving upon the field, Gen. Meade established his headquarters at a shabby little farm house on the left of the Taneytown road, the house nearest the line, and a little more than five hundred yards in the rear of what became the center of the position of the Second Corps, a point where he could communicate readily and rapidly with all parts of the army. The advantages of the position, briefly, were these: the flanks were quite well protected by the natural defences there, Round Top up the left, and a rocky, steep, untraversable ground up the right. Our line was more elevated than that of the enemy, consequently our artillery had a greater range and power than theirs. On account of the convexity of our line, every part of the line could be reinforced by troops having to move a shorter distance than if the line were straight; further, for the same reason, the line of the enemy must be concave, and, consequently, longer, and with an equal force, thinner, and so weaker than ours. Upon those parts of our line which were wooded, neither we nor the enemy could use artillery; but they were so strong by nature, aided by art, as to be readily defended by a small, against a very large, body of infantry. When the line was open, it had the advantage of having open country in front, consequently, the enemy here could not surprise, as we were on a crest, which besides the other advantages that I have mentioned, had this: the enemy must advance to the attack up an ascent, and must therefore move slower, and be, before coming upon us, longer under our fire, as well as more exhausted. These, and some other things, rendered our position admirable--for a defensive battle. So, before a great battle, was ranged the Army of the Potomac. The day wore on, the weather still sultry, and the sky overcast, with a mizzling effort at rain. When the audience has all assembled, time seems long until the curtain rises; so to-day. "Will there be a battle to-day?" "Shall we attack the Rebel?" "Will he attack us?" These and similar questions, later in the morning, were thought or asked a million times. Meanwhile, on our part, all was put in the last state of readiness for battle. Surgeons were busy riding about selecting eligible places for Hospitals, and hunting streams, and springs, and wells. Ambulances, and ambulance men, were brought up near the lines, and stretchers gotten ready for use. Who of us could tell but that he would be the first to need them? The Provost Guards were busy driving up all stragglers, and causing them to join their regiments. Ammunition wagons were driven to suitable places, and pack mules bearing boxes of cartridges; and the commands were informed where they might be found. Officers were sent to see that the men had each his hundred rounds of ammunition. Generals and their Staffs were riding here and there among their commands to see that all was right. A staff officer, or an orderly might be seen galloping furiously in the transmission of some order or message.--All, all was ready--and yet the sound of no gun had disturbed the air or ear to-day. And so the men stacked their arms--in long bristling rows they stood along the crests--and were at ease. Some men of the Second and Third Corps pulled down the rail fences near and piled them up for breastworks in their front. Some loitered, some went to sleep upon the ground, some, a single man, carrying twenty canteens slung over his shoulder, went for water. Some made them a fire and boiled a dipper of coffee. Some with knees cocked up, enjoyed the soldier's peculiar solace, a pipe of tobacco. Some were mirthful and chatty, and some were serious and silent. Leaving them thus--I suppose of all arms and grades there were about a hundred thousand of them somewhere about that field--each to pass the hour according to his duty or his humor, let us look to the enemy. Here let me state that according to the best information that I could get, I think a fair estimate of the Rebel force engaged in this battle would be a little upwards of a hundred thousand men of all arms. Of course we can't now know, but there are reasonable data for this estimate. At all events there was no great disparity of numbers in the two opposing armies. We thought the enemy to be somewhat more numerous than we, and he probably was. But if ninety-five men should fight with a hundred and five, the latter would not always be victors--and slight numerical differences are of much less consequence in great bodies of men. Skillful generalship and good fighting are the jewels of war. These concurring are difficult to overcome; and these, not numbers, must determine this battle. During all the morning--and of the night, too--the skirmishers of the enemy had been confronting those of the Eleventh, First and Twelfth Corps. At the time of the fight of the First, he was seen in heavy force North of the town--he was believed to be now in the same neighborhood, in full force. But from the woody character of the country, and thereby the careful concealment of troops, which the Rebel is always sure to effect, during the early part of the morning almost nothing was actually seen by us of the invaders of the North. About nine o'clock in the morning, I should think, our glasses began to reveal them at the West and North-west of the town, a mile and a half away from our lines. They were moving towards our left, but the woods of Seminary Ridge so concealed them that we could not make out much of their movements. About this time some rifled guns in the Cemetery, at the left of the Eleventh Corps, opened fire--almost the first shots of any kind this morning--and when it was found they were firing at a Rebel line of skirmishers merely, that were advancing upon the left of that, and the right of the Second Corps, the officer in charge of the guns was ordered to cease firing, and was rebuked for having fired at all. These skirmishers soon engaged those at the right of the Second Corps, who stood their ground and were reinforced to make the line entirely secure. The Rebel skirmish line kept extending further and further to their right--toward our left. They would dash up close upon ours and sometimes drive them back a short distance, in turn to be repulsed themselves--and so they continued to do until their right was opposite the extreme left of the Third Corps. By these means they had ascertained the position and extent of our lines--but their own masses were still out of view. From the time that the firing commenced, as I have mentioned, it was kept up, among the skirmishers, until quite noon, often briskly; but with no definite results further than those mentioned, and with no considerable show of infantry on the part of the enemy to support. There was a farm house and outbuildings in front of the Third Division of the Second Corps, at which the skirmishers of the enemy had made a dash, and dislodged ours posted there, and from there their sharp shooters began to annoy our line of skirmishers and even the main line, with their long range rifles. I was up to the line, and a bullet from one of the rascals hid there, hissed by my cheek so close that I felt the movement of the air distinctly. And so I was not at all displeased when I saw one of our regiments go down and attack and capture the house and buildings and several prisoners, after a spirited little fight, and, by Gen. Hays' order, burn the buildings to the ground. About noon the Signal Corps, from the top of Little Round Top, with their powerful glasses, and the cavalry at the extreme left, began to report the enemy in heavy force, making disposition of battle, to the West of Round Top, and opposite to the left of the Third Corps. Some few prisoners had been captured, some deserters from the enemy had come in, and from all sources, by this time, we had much important and reliable information of the enemy--of his disposition and apparent purposes. The Rebel infantry consisted of three Army Corps, each consisting of three Divisions, Longstreet, Ewell--the same whose leg Gibbons' shell knocked off at Gainesville on the 28th of August last year--and A. P. Hill, each in the Rebel service having the rank of Lieutenant General, were the commanders of these Corps. Longstreet's Division commanders were Hood, McLaws, and Pickett; Ewell's were Rhodes, Early and Johnson, and Hill's were Pender, Heth and Anderson. Stewart and Fitzhugh Lee commanded Divisions of the Rebel cavalry. The rank of these Division commands, I believe, was that of Major General. The Rebels had about as much artillery as we did; but we never have thought much of this arm in the hands of our adversaries. They have courage enough, but not the skill to handle it well. They generally fire far too high, and the ammunition is usually of a very inferior quality. And, of late, we have begun to despise the enemies' cavalry too. It used to have enterprise and dash, but in the late cavalry contests ours have always been victor; and so now we think about all this _chivalry_ is fit for is to steal a few of our mules occasionally, and their negro drivers. This army of the rebel infantry, however, is good--to deny this is useless. I never had any desire to--and if one should count up, it would possibly be found that they have gained more victories over us, than we have over them, and they will now, doubtless, fight well, even desperately. And it is not horses or cannon that will determine the result of this confronting of the two armies, but the men with the muskets must do it--the infantry must do the sharp work. So we watched all this posting of forces as closely as possible, for it was a matter of vital interest to us, and all information relating to it was hurried to the commander of the army. The Rebel line of battle was concave, bending around our own, with the extremities of the wings opposite to, or a little outside of ours. Longstreet's Corps was upon their right; Hill's in the center. These two Rebel Corps occupied the second or inferior ridge to the West of our position, as I have mentioned, with Hill's left bending towards, and resting near the town, and Ewell's was upon their left, his troops being in, and to the East of the town. This last Corps confronted our Twelfth, First, and the right of the Eleventh Corps. When I have said that ours was a good _defensive_ position, this is equivalant to saying that that of the enemy was not a good _offensive_ one; for these are relative terms, and cannot be both predicated of the respective positions of the two armies at the same time. The reasons that this was not a good offensive position, are the same already stated in favor of ours for defense. Excepting, occasionally, for a brief time, during some movement of troops, as when advancing to attack, their men and guns were kept constantly and carefully, by woods and inequalities of ground, out of our view. Noon is past, one o'clock is past, and, save the skirmishing, that I have mentioned, and an occasional shot from our guns, at something or other, the nature of which the ones who fired it were ignorant, there was no fight yet. Our arms were still stacked, and the men were at ease. As I looked upon those interminable rows of muskets along the crests, and saw how cool and good spirited the men were, who were lounging about on the ground among them, I could not, and did not, have any fears as to the result of the battle. The storm was near, and we all knew it well enough by this time, which was to rain death upon these crests and down their slopes, and yet the men who could not, and would not escape it, were as calm and cheerful, generally, as if nothing unusual were about to happen. You see, these men were veterans, and had been in such places so often that they were accustomed to them. But I was well pleased with the tone of the men to-day--I could almost see the fore-shadowing of victory upon their faces, I thought. And I thought, too, as I had seen the mighty preparations go on to completion for this great conflict--the marshaling of these two hundred thousand men and the guns of the hosts, that now but a narrow valley divided, that to have been in such a battle, and to survive on the side of the victors, would be glorious. Oh, the world is most unchristian yet! Somewhat after one o'clock P. M.--the skirmish firing had nearly ceased now--a movement of the Third Corps occurred, which I shall describe. I cannot conjecture the reason of this movement. From the position of the Third Corps, as I have mentioned, to the second ridge West, the distance is about a thousand yards, and there the Emmetsburg road runs near the crest of the ridge. Gen. Sickles commenced to advance his whole Corps, from the general line, straight to the front, with a view to occupy this second ridge, along, and near the road. What his purpose could have been is past conjecture. It was not ordered by Gen. Meade, as I heard him say, and he disapproved of it as soon as it was made known to him. Generals Hancock and Gibbon, as they saw the move in progress, criticized its propriety sharply, as I know, and foretold quite accurately what would be the result. I suppose the truth probably is that General Sickles supposed he was doing for the best; but he was neither born nor bred a soldier. But one can scarcely tell what may have been the motives of such a man--a politician, and some other things, exclusive of the _Barton Key_ affair--a man after show and notoriety, and newspaper fame, and the adulation of the mob! O, there is a grave responsibility on those in whose hands are the lives of ten thousand men; and on those who put stars upon men's shoulders, too! Bah! I kindle when I see some things that I have to see. But this move of the Third Corps was an important one--it developed the battle--the results of the move to the Corps itself we shall see. O, if this Corps had kept its strong position upon the crest, and supported by the rest of the army, had waited for the attack of the enemy! It was magnificent to see those ten or twelve thousand men--they were good men--with their batteries, and some squadrons of cavalry upon the left flank, all in battle order, in several lines, with flags streaming, sweep steadily down the slope, across the valley, and up the next ascent, toward their destined position! From our position we could see it all. In advance Sickles pushed forward his heavy line of skirmishers, who drove back those of the enemy, across the Emmetsburg road, and thus cleared the way for the main body. The Third Corps now became the absorbing object of interest of all eyes. The Second Corps took arms, and the 1st Division of this Corps was ordered to be in readiness to support the Third Corps, should circumstances render support necessary. As the Third Corps was the extreme left of our line, as it advanced, if the enemy was assembling to the West of Round Top with a view to turn our left, as we had heard, there would be nothing between the left flank of the Corps and the enemy, and the enemy would be square upon its flank by the time it had attained the road. So when this advance line came near the Emmetsburg road, and we saw the squadrons of cavalry mentioned, come dashing back from their position as flankers, and the smoke of some guns, and we heard the reports away to Sickles left, anxiety became an element in our interest in these movements. The enemy opened slowly at first, and from long range; but he was square upon Sickles' left flank. General Caldwell was ordered at once to put his Division--the 1st of the Second Corps, as mentioned--in motion, and to take post in the woods at the left slope of Round Top, in such a manner as to resist the enemy should he attempt to come around Sickles left and gain his rear. The Division moved as ordered, and disappeared from view in the woods, towards the point indicated at between two and three o'clock P. M., and the reserve brigade--the First, Col. Heath temporarily commanding--of the Second Division, was therefore moved up and occupied the position vacated by the Third Division. About the same time the Fifth Corps could be seen marching by the flank from its position on the Baltimore Pike, and in the opening of the woods heading for the same locality where the 1st Division of the Second Corps had gone. The Sixth Corps had now come up and was halted upon the Baltimore Pike. So the plot thickened. As the enemy opened upon Sickles with his batteries, some five or six in all, I suppose, firing slowly, Sickles with as many replied, and with much more spirit. The artillery fire became quite animated, soon; but the enemy was forced to withdraw his guns farther and farther away, and ours advanced upon him. It was not long before the cannonade ceased altogether, the enemy having retired out of range, and Sickles, having temporarily halted his command, pending this, moved forward again to the position he desired, or nearly that. It was now about five o'clock, and we shall soon see what Sickles gained by his move. First we hear more artillery firing upon Sickles' left--the enemy seems to be opening again, and as we watch the Rebel batteries seem to be advancing there. The cannonade is soon opened again, and with great spirit upon both sides. The enemy's batteries press those of Sickles, and pound the shot upon them, and this time they in turn begin to retire to position nearer the infantry. The enemy seem to be fearfully in earnest this time. And what is more ominous than the thunder or the shot of his advancing guns, this time, in the intervals between his batteries, far to Sickles' left, appear the long lines and the columns of the Rebel infantry, now unmistakably moving out to the attack. The position of the Third Corps becomes at once one of great peril, and it is probable that its commander by this time began to realize his true situation. All was astir now on our crest. Generals and their Staffs were galloping hither and thither--the men were all in their places, and you might have heard the rattle of ten thousand ramrods as they drove home and "thugged" upon the little globes and cones of lead. As the enemy was advancing upon Sickles' flank, he commenced a change, or at least a partial one, of front, by swinging back his left and throwing forward his right, in order that his lines might be parallel to those of his adversary, his batteries meantime doing what they could to check the enemy's advance; but this movement was not completely executed before new Rebel batteries opened upon Sickles' right flank--his former front--and in the same quarter appeared the Rebel infantry also. Now came the dreadful battle picture, of which we for a time could be but spectators. Upon the front and right flank of Sickles came sweeping the infantry of Longstreet and Hill. Hitherto there had been skirmishing and artillery practice--now the battle began; for amid the heavier smoke and larger tongues of flame of the batteries, now began to appear the countless flashes, and the long fiery sheets of the muskets, and the rattle of the volleys, mingled with the thunder of the guns. We see the long gray lines come sweeping down upon Sickles' front, and mix with the battle smoke; now the same colors emerge from the bushes and orchards upon his right, and envelope his flank in the confusion of the conflict. O, the din and the roar, and these thirty thousand Rebel wolf cries! What a hell is there down that valley! These ten or twelve thousand men of the Third Corps fight well, but it soon becomes apparent that they must be swept from the field, or perish there where they are doing so well, so thick and overwhelming a storm of Rebel fire involves them. It was fearful to see, but these men, such as ever escape, must come from that conflict as best they can. To move down and support them with other troops is out of the question, for this would be to do as Sickles did, to relinquish a good position, and advance to a bad one. There is no other alternative--the Third Corps must fight itself out of its position of destruction! What was it ever put there for? In the meantime some other dispositions must be made to meet the enemy, in the event that Sickles is overpowered. With this Corps out of the way, the enemy would be in a position to advance upon the line of the Second Corps, not in a line parallel with its front, but they would come obliquely from the left. To meet this contingency the left of the Second Division of the Second Corps is thrown back slightly, and two Regiments, the 15th Mass., Col. Ward, and the 82nd N. Y., Lieut. Col. Horton, are advanced down to the Emmetsburg road, to a favorable position nearer us than the fight has yet come, and some new batteries from the artillery reserve are posted upon the crest near the left of the Second Corps. This was all Gen. Gibbon could do. Other dispositions were made or were now being made upon the field, which I shall mention presently. The enemy is still giving Sickles fierce battle--or rather the Third Corps, for Sickles has been borne from the field minus one of his legs, and Gen. Birney now commands--and we of the Second Corps, a thousand yards away, with our guns and men are, and must be, still idle spectators of the fight. The Rebel, as anticipated, tries to gain the left of the Third Corps, and for this purpose is now moving into the woods at the west of Round Top. We knew what he would find there. No sooner had the enemy gotten a considerable force into the woods mentioned, in the attempted execution of his purpose, than the roar of the conflict was heard there also. The Fifth Corps and the First Division of the Second were there at the right time, and promptly engaged him; and there, too, the battle soon became general and obstinate. Now the roar of battle has become twice the volume that it was before, and its range extends over more than twice the space. The Third Corps has been pressed back considerably, and the wounded are streaming to the rear by hundreds, but still the battle there goes on, with no considerable abatement on our part. The field of actual conflict extends now from a point to the front of the left of the Second Corps, away down to the front of Round Top, and the fight rages with the greatest fury. The fire of artillery and infantry and the yells of the Rebels fill the air with a mixture of hideous sounds. When the First Division of the Second Corps first engaged the enemy, for a time it was pressed back somewhat, but under the able and judicious management of Gen. Caldwell, and the support of the Fifth Corps, it speedily ceased to retrograde, and stood its ground; and then there followed a time, after the Fifth Corps became well engaged, when from appearances we hoped the troops already engaged would be able to check entirely, or repulse the further assault of the enemy. But fresh bodies of the Rebels continued to advance out of the woods to the front of the position of the Third Corps, and to swell the numbers of the assailants of this already hard pressed command. The men there begin to show signs of exhaustion--their ammunition must be nearly expended--they have now been fighting more than an hour, and against greatly superior numbers. From the sound of the firing at the extreme left, and the place where the smoke rises above the tree tops there, we know that the Fifth Corps is still steady, and holding its own there; and as we see the Sixth Corps now marching and near at hand to that point, we have no fears for the left--we have more apparent reason to fear for ourselves. The Third Corps is being overpowered--here and there its lines begin to break--the men begin to pour back to the rear in confusion--the enemy are close upon them and among them--organization is lost to a great degree--guns and caissons are abandoned and in the hands of the enemy--the Third Corps, after a heroic but unfortunate fight, is being literally swept from the field. That Corps gone, what is there between the Second Corps, and these yelling masses of the enemy? Do you not think that by this time we began to feel a personal interest in this fight? We did indeed. We had been mere observers--the time was at hand when we must be actors in this drama. Up to this hour Gen. Gibbon had been in command of the Second Corps, since yesterday, but Gen. Hancock, relieved of his duties elsewhere, now assumed command. Five or six hundred yards away the Third Corps was making its last opposition; and the enemy was hotly pressing his advantages there, and throwing in fresh troops whose line extended still more along our front, when Generals Hancock and Gibbon rode along the lines of their troops; and at once cheer after cheer--not Rebel, mongrel cries, but genuine cheers--rang out all along the line, above the roar of battle, for "Hancock" and "Gibbon," and "our Generals." These were good. Had you heard their voices, you would have known these men would fight. Just at this time we saw another thing that made us glad:--we looked to our rear, and there, and all up the hillside which was the rear of the Third Corps before it went forward, were rapidly advancing large bodies of men from the extreme right of our line of battle, coming to the support of the part now so hotly pressed. There was the whole Twelfth Corps, with the exception of about one brigade, that is, the larger portion of the Divisions of Gens. Williams and Geary; the Third Division of the First Corps, Gen. Doubleday; and some other brigades from the same Corps--and some of them were moving at the double quick. They formed lines of battle at the foot of the Taneytown road, and when the broken fragments of the Third Corps were swarming by them towards the rear, without halting or wavering they came sweeping up, and with glorious old cheers, under fire, took their places on the crest in line of battle to the left of the Second Corps. Now Sickles' blunder is repaired. Now, Rebel chief, hurl forward your howling lines and columns! Yell out your loudest and your last, for many of your best will never yell, or wave the spurious flag again! The battle still rages all along the left, where the Fifth Corps is, and the West slope of Round Top is the scene of the conflict; and nearer us there was but short abatement, as the last of the Third Corps retired from the field, for the enemy is flushed with his success. He has been throwing forward brigade after brigade, and Division after Division, since the battle began, and his advancing line now extends almost as far to our right as the right of the Second Division of the Second Corps. The whole slope in our front is full of them; and in various formation, in line, in column, and in masses which are neither, with yells and thick volleys, they are rushing towards our crest. The Third Corps is out of the way. Now we are in for it. The battery men are ready by their loaded guns. All along the crest is ready. Now Arnold and Brown--now Cushing, and Woodruff, and Rhorty!--you three shall survive to-day! They drew the cords that moved the friction primers, and gun after gun, along the batteries, in rapid succession, leaped where it stood and bellowed its canister upon the enemy. The enemy still advance. The infantry open fire--first the two advance regiments, the 15th Mass. and the 82d N. Y.--then here and there throughout the length of the long line, at the points where the enemy comes nearest, and soon the whole crest, artillery and infantry, is one continued sheet of fire. From Round Top to near the Cemetery stretches an uninterrupted field of conflict. There is a great army upon each side, now hotly engaged. To see the fight, while it went on in the valley below us, was terrible,--what must it be now, when we are in it, and it is all around us, in all its fury? All senses for the time are dead but the one of sight. The roar of the discharges and the yells of the enemy all pass unheeded; but the impassioned soul is all eyes, and sees all things, that the smoke does not hide. How madly the battery men are driving home the double charges of canister in those broad-mouthed Napoleons, whose fire seems almost to reach the enemy. How rapidly these long, blue-coated lines of infantry deliver their file fire down the slope. But there is no faltering--the men stand nobly to their work. Men are dropping dead or wounded on all sides, by scores and by hundreds, and the poor mutilated creatures, some with an arm dangling, some with a leg broken by a bullet, are limping and crawling towards the rear. They make no sound of complaint or pain, but are as silent as if dumb and mute. A sublime heroism seems to pervade all, and the intuition that to lose that crest, all is lost. How our officers, in the work of cheering on and directing the men, are falling. We have heard that Gen. Zook and Col. Cross, in the First Division of our Corps, are mortally wounded--they both commanded brigades,--now near us Col. Ward of the 15th Mass.--he lost a leg at Balls Bluff--and Lieut. Col. Horton of the 82d N. Y., are mortally struck while trying to hold their commands, which are being forced back; Col. Revere, 20th Mass., grandson of old Paul Revere, of the Revolution, is killed, Lieut. Col. Max Thoman, commanding 59th N. Y., is mortally wounded, and a host of others that I cannot name. These were of Gibbon's Division. Lieut. Brown is wounded among his guns--his position is a hundred yards in advance of the main line--the enemy is upon his battery, and he escapes, but leaves three of his six guns in the hands of the enemy. The fire all along our crest is terrific, and it is a wonder how anything human could have stood before it, and yet the madness of the enemy drove them on, clear up to the muzzle of the guns, clear up to the lines of our infantry--but the lines stood right in their places. Gen. Hancock and his Aides rode up to Gibbon's Division, under the smoke. Gen. Gibbon, with myself, was near, and there was a flag dimly visible, coming towards us from the direction of the enemy. "Here, what are these men falling back for?" said Hancock. The flag was no more than fifty yards away, but it was the head of a Rebel column, which at once opened fire with a volley. Lieut. Miller, Gen. Hancock's Aide, fell, twice struck, but the General was unharmed, and he told the 1st Minn., which was near, to drive these people away. That splendid regiment, the less than three hundred that are left out of fifteen hundred that it has had, swings around upon the enemy, gives them a volley in their faces, and advances upon them with the bayonet. The Rebels fled in confusion, but Col. Colville, Lieut. Col. Adams and Major Downie, are all badly, dangerously wounded, and many of the other officers and men will never fight again. More than two-thirds fell. Such fighting as this cannot last long. It is now near sundown, and the battle has gone on wonderfully long already. But if you will stop to notice it, a change has occurred. The Rebel cry has ceased, and the men of the Union begin to shout there, under the smoke, and their lines to advance. See, the Rebels are breaking! They are in confusion in all our front! The wave has rolled upon the rock, and the rock has smashed it. Let us shout, too! First upon their extreme left the Rebels broke, where they had almost pierced our lines; thence the repulse extended rapidly to their right. They hung longest about Round Top, where the Fifth Corps punished them, but in a space of time incredibly short, after they first gave signs of weakness, the whole force of the Rebel assault along the whole line, in spite of waving red flags, and yells, and the entreaties of officers, and the pride of the chivalry, fled like chaff before the whirlwind, back down the slope, over the valley, across the Emmetsburg road, shattered, without organization in utter confusion, fugitive into the woods, and victory was with the arms of the Republic. The great Rebel assault, the greatest ever made upon this continent, has been made and signally repulsed, and upon this part of the field the fight of to-day is now soon over. Pursuit was made as rapidly and as far as practicable, but owing to the proximity of night, and the long distance which would have to be gone over before any of the enemy, where they would be likely to halt, could be overtaken, further success was not attainable to-day. Where the Rebel rout first commenced, a large number of prisoners, some thousands at least, were captured; almost all their dead, and such of their wounded as could not themselves get to the rear, were within our lines; several of their flags were gathered up, and a good many thousand muskets, some nine or ten guns and some caissons lost by the Third Corps, and the three of Brown's battery--these last were in Rebel hands but a few minutes--were all safe now with us, the enemy having had no time to take them off. Not less, I estimate, than twenty thousand men were killed or wounded in this fight. Our own losses must have been nearly half this number,--about four thousand in the Third Corps, fully two thousand in the Second, and I think two thousand in the Fifth, and I think the losses of the First, Twelfth, and a little more than a brigade of the Sixth--all of that Corps which was actually engaged--would reach nearly two thousand more. Of course it will never be possible to know the numbers upon either side who fell in this particular part of the general battle, but from the position of the enemy and his numbers, and the appearance of the field, his loss must have been as heavy, or as I think much heavier than our own, and my estimates are probably short of the actual loss. [Illustration: Battle of Gettysburg--Final attack, July 2 (Compiled by C. E. Estabrook)] The fight done, the sudden revulsions of sense and feeling follow, which more or less characterize all similar occasions. How strange the stillness seems! The whole air roared with the conflict but a moment since--now all is silent; not a gunshot sound is heard, and the silence comes distinctly, almost painfully to the senses. And the sun purples the clouds in the West, and the sultry evening steals on as if there had been no battle, and the furious shout and the cannon's roar had never shaken the earth. And how look these fields? We may see them before dark--the ripening grain, the luxuriant corn, the orchards, the grassy meadows, and in their midst the rural cottage of brick or wood. They were beautiful this morning. They are desolate now--trampled by the countless feet of the combatants, plowed and scored by the shot and shell, the orchards splintered, the fences prostrate, the harvest trodden in the mud. And more dreadful than the sight of all this, thickly strewn over all their length and breadth, are the habiliments of the soldiers, the knapsacks cast aside in the stress of the fight, or after the fatal lead had struck; haversacks, yawning with the rations the owner will never call for; canteens of cedar of the Rebel men of Jackson, and of cloth-covered tin of the men of the Union; blankets and trowsers, and coats and caps, and some are blue and some are gray; muskets and ramrods, and bayonets, and swords, and scabbards and belts, some bent and cut by the shot or shell; broken wheels, exploded caissons, and limber-boxes, and dismantled guns, and all these are sprinkled with blood; horses, some dead, a mangled heap of carnage, some alive, with a leg shot clear off, or other frightful wounds, appealing to you with almost more than brute gaze as you pass; and last, but not least numerous, many thousands of men--and there was no rebellion here now--the men of South Carolina were quiet by the side of those of Massachusetts, some composed, with upturned faces, sleeping the last sleep, some mutilated and frightful, some wretched, fallen, bathed in blood, survivors still and unwilling witnesses of the rage of Gettysburg. And yet with all this before them, as darkness came on, and the dispositions were made and the outposts thrown out for the night, the Army of the Potomac was quite mad with joy. No more light-hearted guests ever graced a banquet, than were these men as they boiled their coffee and munched their soldiers' supper to-night. Is it strange? Otherwise they would not have been soldiers. And such sights as all these will be certain to be seen as long as war lasts in the world, and when war is done, then is the end and the days of the millenium are at hand. The ambulances commenced their work as soon as the battle opened--the twinkling lanterns through the night, and the sun of to-morrow saw them still with the same work unfinished. I wish that I could write, that with the coming on of darkness, ended the fight of to-day, but such was not the case. The armies have fought enough to-day, and ought to sleep to-night, one would think, but not so thought the Rebel. Let us see what he gained by his opinion. When the troops, including those of the Twelfth Corps had been withdrawn from the extreme right of our line, in the afternoon, to support the left, as I have mentioned, thereby, of course, weakening that part of the line so left, the Rebel Ewell, either becoming aware of the fact, or because he thought he could carry our right at all events, late in the afternoon commenced an assault upon that part of our line. His battle had been going on there simultaneously with the fight on the left, but not with any great degree of obstinacy on his part. He had advanced his men through the woods, and in front of the formidable position lately held by the Twelfth Corps cautiously, and to his surprise, I have no doubt, found our strong defenses upon the extreme right, entirely abandoned. These he at once took possession of, and simultaneously made an attack upon our right flank, which was now near the summit of Culp's hill, and upon the front of that part of the line. That small portion of the Twelfth Corps, which had been left there, and some of the Eleventh Corps, sent to their assistance, did what they could to check the Rebels; but the Eleventh Corps men were getting shot at there, and they did not want to stay. Matters began to have a bad look in that part of the field. A portion of the First Division of the First Corps, was sent there for support--the 6th Wisconsin, among others, and this improved matters--but still, as we had but a small number of men there, all told, the enemy with their great numbers, were having too much prospect of success, and it seems that, probably emboldened by this, Ewell had resolved upon a night attack upon that wing of the army, and was making his dispositions accordingly. The enemy had not at sundown, actually carried any part of our rifle pits there, save the ones abandoned, but he was getting troops assembled upon our flank, and altogether, with our weakness there, at that time, matters did not look as we would like to have them. Such was then the posture of affairs, when the fight upon our left, that I have described, was done. Under such circumstances it is not strange that the Twelfth Corps, as soon as its work was done upon the left, was quickly ordered back to the right, to its old position. There it arrived in good time; not soon enough, of course, to avoid the mortification of finding the enemy in the possession of a part of the works the men had labored so hard to construct, but in ample time before dark to put the men well in the pits we already held, and to take up a strong defensible position, at right angles to, and in rear of the main line, in order to resist these flanking dispositions of the enemy. The army was secure again. The men in the works would be steady against all attacks in front, as long as they knew that their flank was safe. Until between ten and eleven o'clock at night, the woods upon the right, resounded with the discharges of musketry. Shortly after or about dark, the enemy made a dash upon the right of the Eleventh Corps. They crept up the windings of a valley, not in a very heavy force, but from the peculiar mode in which this Corps does outpost duty, quite unperceived in the dark until they were close upon the main line. It is said, I do not know it to be true, that they spiked two guns of one of the Eleventh Corps' batteries, and that the battery men had to drive them off with their sabres and rammers, and that there was some fearful "Dutch" swearing on the occasion, "_donner wetter_" among other similar impious oaths, having been freely used. The enemy here were finally repulsed by the assistance of Col. Correll's brigade of the Third Division of the Second Corps, and the 106th Pa., from the Second Division of the same Corps, was by Gen. Howard's request sent there to do outpost duty. It seems to have been a matter of utter madness and folly on the part of the enemy to have continued their night attack, as they did upon the right. Our men were securely covered by ample works and even in most places a log was placed a few inches above the top of the main breastwork, as a protection to the heads of the men as they thrust out their pieces beneath it to fire. Yet in the darkness the enemy would rush up, clambering over rocks and among trees, even to the front of the works, but only to leave their riddled bodies there upon the ground or to be swiftly repulsed headlong into the woods again. In the darkness the enemy would climb trees close to the works, and endeavor to shoot our men by the light of the flashes. When discovered, a thousand bullets would whistle after them in the dark, and some would hit, and then the Rebel would make up his mind to come down. Our loss was light, almost nothing in this fight--the next morning the enemy's dead were thick all along this part of the line. Near eleven o'clock the enemy, wearied with his disastrous work, desisted, and thereafter until morning, not a shot was heard in all the armies. So much for the battle. There is another thing that I wish to mention, of the matters of the 2d of July. After evening came on, and from reports received, all was known to be going satisfactorily upon the right, Gen. Meade summoned his Corps Commanders to his Headquarters for consultation. A consultation is held upon matters of vast moment to the country, and that poor little farm-house is honored with more distinguished guests than it ever had before, or than it will ever have again, probably. Do you expect to see a degree of ceremony, and severe military aspect characterize this meeting, in accordance with strict military rules, and commensurate with the moment of the matters of their deliberation? Name it "Major General Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, with his Corps Generals, holding a Council of War, upon the field of Gettysburg," and it would sound pretty well,--and that was what it was; and you might make a picture of it and hang it up by the side of "Napoleon and his Marshals," and "Washington and his Generals," maybe, at some future time. But for the artist to draw his picture from, I will tell how this council appeared. Meade, Sedgwick, Slocum, Howard, Hancock, Sykes, Newton, Pleasanton--commander of the cavalry--and Gibbon, were the Generals present. Hancock, now that Sickles is wounded, has charge of the Third Corps, and Gibbon again has the Second. Meade is a tall spare man, with full beard, which with his hair, originally brown, is quite thickly sprinkled with gray--has a Romanish face, very large nose, and a white, large forehead, prominent and wide over the eyes, which are full and large, and quick in their movements, and he wears spectacles. His _fibres_ are all of the long and sinewy kind. His habitual personal appearance is quite careless, and it would be rather difficult to make him look well dressed. Sedgwick is quite a heavy man, short, thick-set and muscular, with florid complexion, dark, calm, straight-looking eyes, with full, heavyish features, which, with his eyes, have plenty of animation when he is aroused. He has a magnificent profile, well cut, with the nose and forehead forming almost a straight line, curly, short, chestnut hair and full beard, cut short, with a little gray in it. He dresses carelessly, but can look magnificently when he is well dressed. Like Meade, he looks and is, honest and modest. You might see at once, why his men, because they love him, call him "Uncle John," not to his face, of course, but among themselves. Slocum is small, rather spare, with black, straight hair and beard, which latter is unshaven and thin, large, full, quick, black eyes, white skin, sharp nose, wide cheek bones, and hollow cheeks and small chin. His movements are quick and angular, and he dresses with a sufficient degree of elegance. Howard is medium in size, has nothing marked about him, is the youngest of them all, I think--has lost an arm in the war, has straight brown hair and beard, shaves his short upper lip, over which his nose slants down, dim blue eyes, and on the whole, appears a very pleasant, affable, well dressed little gentleman. Hancock is the tallest and most shapely, and in many respects is the best looking officer of them all. His hair is very light brown, straight and moist, and always looks well, his beard is of the same color, of which he wears the moustache and a tuft upon the chin; complexion ruddy, features neither large nor small, but well cut, with full jaw and chin, compressed mouth, straight nose, full, deep blue eyes, and a very mobile, emotional countenance. He always dresses remarkably well, and his manner is dignified, gentlemanly and commanding. I think if he were in citizens clothes, and should give commands in the army to those who did not know him, he would be likely to be obeyed at once, and without any question as to his right to command. Sykes is a small, rather thin man, well dressed and gentlemanly, brown hair and beard, which he wears full, with a red, pinched, rough-looking skin, feeble blue eyes, long nose, with the general air of one who is weary and a little ill-natured. Newton is a well-sized, shapely, muscular, well dressed man, with brown hair, with a very ruddy, clean-shaved, full face, blue eyes, blunt, round features, walks very erect, curbs in his chin, and has somewhat of that smart sort of swagger that people are apt to suppose characterizes soldiers. Pleasonton is quite a nice little dandy, with brown hair and beard, a straw hat with a little jockey rim, which he cocks upon one side of his head, with an unsteady eye, that looks slyly at you and then dodges. Gibbon, the youngest of them all, save Howard, is about the same size as Slocum, Howard, Sykes and Pleasonton, and there are none of these who will weigh one hundred and fifty pounds. He is compactly made, neither spare nor corpulent, with ruddy complexion, chestnut brown hair, with a clean-shaved face, except his moustache, which is decidedly reddish in color, medium-sized, well-shaped head, sharp, moderately-jutting brow, deep blue, calm eyes, sharp, slightly aquiline nose, compressed mouth, full jaws and chin, with an air of calm firmness in his manner. He always looks well dressed. I suppose Howard is about thirty-five and Meade about forty-five years of age; the rest are between these ages, but not many under forty. As they come to the council now, there is the appearance of fatigue about them, which is not customary, but is only due to the hard labors of the past few days. They all wear clothes of dark blue, some have top boots and some not, and except the two-starred straps upon the shoulders of all save Gibbon, who has but one star, there was scarcely a piece of regulation uniform about them all. They wore their swords, of various patterns, but no sashes, the Army hat, but with the crown pinched into all sorts of shapes and the rim slouched down and shorn of all its ornaments but the gilt band--except Sykes who wore a blue cap, and Pleasonton with his straw hat with broad black band. Then the mean little room where they met,--its only furniture consisted of a large, wide bed in one corner, a small pine table in the center, upon which was a wooden pail of water, with a tin cup for drinking, and a candle, stuck to the table by putting the end in tallow melted down from the wick, and five or six straight-backed rush-bottomed chairs. The Generals came in--some sat, some kept walking or standing, two lounged upon the bed, some were constantly smoking cigars. And thus disposed, they deliberated whether the army should fall back from its present position to one in rear which it was said was stronger, should attack the enemy on the morrow, wherever he could be found, or should stand there upon the horse-shoe crest, still on the defensive, and await the further movements of the enemy. The latter proposition was unanimously agreed to. Their heads were sound. The Army of the Potomac would just halt right there, and allow the Rebel to come up and smash his head against it, to any reasonable extent he desired, as he had to-day. After some two hours the council dissolved, and the officers went their several ways. Night, sultry and starless, droned on, and it was almost midnight that I found myself peering my way from the line of the Second Corps, back down to the General's Headquarters, which were an ambulance in the rear, in a little peach orchard. All was silent now but the sound of the ambulances, as they were bringing off the wounded, and you could hear them rattle here and there about the field, and see their lanterns. I am weary and sleepy, almost to such an extent as not to be able to sit on my horse. And my horse can hardly move--the spur will not start him--what can be the reason? I know that he has been touched by two or three bullets to-day, but not to wound or lame him to speak of. Then, in riding by a horse that is hitched, in the dark, I got kicked; had I not a very thick boot, the blow would have been likely to have broken my ankle--it did break my temper as it was--and, as if it would cure matters, I foolishly spurred my horse again. No use, he would but walk. I dismounted; I could not lead him along at all, so out of temper I rode at the slowest possible walk to the Headquarters, which I reached at last. General Hancock and Gibbon were asleep in the ambulance. With a light I found what was the matter with "Billy." A bullet had entered his chest just in front of my left leg, as I was mounted, and the blood was running down all his side and leg, and the air from his lungs came out of the bullet-hole. I begged his pardon mentally for my cruelty in spurring him, and should have done so in words if he could have understood me. Kind treatment as is due to the wounded he could understand, and he had it. Poor Billy! He and I were first under fire together, and I rode him at the second Bull Run and the first and second Fredericksburg, and at Antietam after brave "Joe" was killed; but I shall never mount him again--Billy's battles are over. "George, make my bed here upon the ground by the side of this ambulance. Pull off my sabre and my boots--that will do!" Was ever princely couch or softest down so soft as those rough blankets, there upon the unroofed sod? At midnight they received me for four hours delicious, dreamless oblivion of weariness and of battle. So to me ended the Second of July. At four o'clock on the morning of the Third, I was awakened by Gen. Gibbon's pulling me by the foot and saying: "Come, don't you hear that?" I sprang up to my feet. Where was I? A moment and my dead senses and memory were alive again, and the sound of brisk firing of musketry to the front and right of the Second Corps, and over at the extreme right of our line, where we heard it last in the night, brought all back to my memory. We surely were on the field of battle, and there were palpable evidences to my reason that to-day was to be another of blood. Oh! for a moment the thought of it was sickening to every sense and feeling! But the motion of my horse as I galloped over the crest a few minutes later, and the serene splendor of the morning now breaking through rifted clouds and spreading over the landscape, soon reassured me. Come day of battle! Up Rebel hosts, and thunder with your arms! We are all ready to do and to die for the Republic! I found a sharp skirmish going on in front of the right of the Second Corps, between our outposts and those of the enemy, but save this--and none of the enemy but his outposts were in sight--all was quiet in that part of the field. On the extreme right of the line the sound of musketry was quite heavy; and this I learned was brought on by the attack of the Second Division, Twelfth Corps, Gen. Geary, upon the enemy in order to drive him out of our works which he had sneaked into yesterday, as I have mentioned. The attack was made at the earliest moment in the morning when it was light enough to discern objects to fire at. The enemy could not use the works, but was confronting Geary in woods, and had the cover of many rocks and trees, so the fight was an irregular one, now breaking out and swelling to a vigorous fight, now subsiding to a few scattering shots; and so it continued by turns until the morning was well advanced, when the enemy was finally wholly repulsed and driven from the pits, and the right of our line was again re-established in the place it first occupied. The heaviest losses the Twelfth Corps sustained in all the battle, occurred during this attack, and they were here quite severe. I heard Gen. Meade express dissatisfaction at Gen. Geary for making this attack, as a thing not ordered and not necessary, as the works of ours were of no intrinsic importance, and had not been captured from us by a fight, and Geary's position was just as good as they, where he was during the night. And I heard Gen. Meade say that he sent an order to have the fight stopped; but I believe the order was not communicated to Geary until after the repulse of the enemy. Late in the forenoon the enemy again tried to carry our right by storm. We heard that old Rebel Ewell had sworn an oath that he would break our right. He had Stonewall Jackson's Corps, and possibly imagined himself another Stonewall, but he certainly _hankered_ after the right of our line--and so up through the woods, and over the rocks, and up the steeps he sent his storming parties--our men could see them now in the day time. But all the Rebel's efforts were fruitless, save in one thing, slaughter to his own men. These assaults were made with great spirit and determination, but as the enemy would come up, our men lying behind their secure defenses would just singe them with the blaze of their muskets, and riddle them, as a hail-storm the tender blades of corn. The Rebel oath was not kept, any more than his former one to support the Constitution of the United States. The Rebel loss was very heavy indeed, here, ours but trifling. I regret that I cannot give more of the details of this fighting upon the right--it was so determined upon the part of the enemy, both last night and this morning--so successful to us. About all that I actually saw of it during its progress, was the smoke, and I heard the discharges. My information is derived from officers who were personally in it. Some of our heavier artillery assisted our infantry in this by firing, with the piece elevated, far from the rear, over the heads of our men, at a distance from the enemy of two miles, I suppose. Of course they could have done no great damage. It was nearly eleven o'clock that the battle in this part of the field subsided, not to be again renewed. All the morning we felt no apprehension for this part of the line, for we knew its strength, and that our troops engaged, the Twelfth Corps and the First Division, Wadsworth's, of the First, could be trusted. For the sake of telling one thing at a time, I have anticipated events somewhat, in writing of this fight upon the right. I shall now go back to the starting point, four o'clock this morning, and, as other events occurred during the day, second to none in the battle in importance, which I think I saw as much of as any man living, I will tell you something of them, and what I saw, and how the time moved on. The outpost skirmish that I have mentioned, soon subsided. I suppose it was the natural escape of the wrath which the men had, during the night, hoarded up against each other, and which, as soon as they could see in the morning, they could no longer contain, but must let it off through their musket barrels, at their adversaries. At the commencement of the war such firing would have awaked the whole army and roused it to its feet and to arms; not so now. The men upon the crest lay snoring in their blankets, even though some of the enemy's bullets dropped among them, as if bullets were as harmless as the drops of dew around them. As the sun arose to-day, the clouds became broken, and we had once more glimpses of sky, and fits of sunshine--a rarity, to cheer us. From the crest, save to the right of the Second Corps, no enemy, not even his outposts could be discovered, along all the position where he so thronged upon the Third Corps yesterday. All was silent there--the wounded horses were limping about the field; the ravages of the conflict were still fearfully visible--the scattered arms and the ground thickly dotted with the dead--but no hostile foe. The men were roused early, in order that the morning meal might be out of the way in time for whatever should occur. Then ensued the hum of an army, not in ranks, chatting in low tones, and running about and jostling among each other, rolling and packing their blankets and tents. They looked like an army of rag-gatherers, while shaking these very useful articles of the soldier's outfit, for you must know that rain and mud in conjunction have not had the effect to make them clean, and the wear and tear of service have not left them entirely whole. But one could not have told by the appearance of the men, that they were in battle yesterday, and were likely to be again to-day. They packed their knapsacks, boiled their coffee and munched their hard bread, just as usual--just like old soldiers who know what campaigning is; and their talk is far more concerning their present employment--some joke or drollery--than concerning what they saw or did yesterday. As early as practicable the lines all along the left are revised and reformed, this having been rendered necessary by yesterday's battle, and also by what is anticipated to-day. It is the opinion of many of our Generals that the Rebel will not give us battle to-day--that he had enough yesterday--that he will be heading towards the Potomac at the earliest practicable moment, if he has not already done so; but the better, and controlling judgment is, that he will make another grand effort to pierce or turn our lines--that he will either mass and attack the left again, as yesterday, or direct his operations against the left of our center, the position of the Second Corps, and try to sever our line. I infer that Gen. Meade was of the opinion that the attack to-day would be upon the left--this from the disposition he ordered, I know that Gen. Hancock anticipated the attack upon the center. The dispositions to-day upon the left are as follows: The Second and Third Divisions of the Second Corps are in the position of yesterday; then on the left come Doubleday's--the Third Division and Col. Stannard's brigade of the First Corps; then Colwell's--the First Division of the Second Corps; then the Third Corps, temporarily under the command of Hancock, since Sickles' wound. The Third Corps is upon the same ground in part, and on the identical line where it first formed yesterday morning, and where, had it stayed instead of moving out to the front, we should have many more men to-day, and should not have been upon the brink of disaster yesterday. On the left of the Third Corps is the Fifth Corps, with a short front and deep line; then comes the Sixth Corps, all but one brigade, which is sent over to the Twelfth. The Sixth, a splendid Corps, almost intact in the fight of yesterday, is the extreme left of our line, which terminates to the south of Round Top, and runs along its western base, in the woods, and thence to the Cemetery. This Corps is burning to pay off the old scores made on the 4th of May, there back of Fredericksburg. Note well the position of the Second and Third Divisions of the Second Corps--it will become important. There are nearly six thousand men and officers in these two Divisions here upon the field--the losses were quite heavy yesterday, some regiments are detached to other parts of the field--so all told there are less than six thousand men now in the two Divisions, who occupy a line of about a thousand yards. The most of the way along this line upon the crest was a stone fence, constructed of small, rough stones, a good deal of the way badly pulled down, but the men had improved it and patched it with rails from the neighboring fences, and with earth, so as to render it in many places a very passable breastwork against musketry and flying fragments of shells. These works are so low as to compel the men to kneel or lie down generally to obtain cover. Near the right of the Second Division, and just by the little group of trees that I have mentioned there, this stone fence made a right angle, and extended thence to the front, about twenty or thirty yards, where with another less than a right angle it followed along the crest again. The lines were conformed to these breastworks and to the nature of the ground upon the crest, so as to occupy the most favorable places, to be covered, and still be able to deliver effective fire upon the enemy should he come there. In some places a second line was so posted as to be able to deliver its fire over the heads of the first line behind the works; but such formation was not practicable all of the way. But all the force of these two divisions was in line, in position, without reserves, and in such a manner that every man of them could have fired his piece at the same instant. The division flags, that of the Second Division, being a white trefoil upon a square blue field, and of the Third Division a blue trefoil upon a white rectangular field, waved behind the divisions at the points where the Generals of Division were supposed to be; the brigade flags, similar to these but with a triangular field, were behind the brigades; and the national flags of the regiments were in the lines of their regiments. To the left of the Second Division, and advanced something over a hundred yards, were posted a part of Stannard's Brigade two regiments or more, behind a small bush-crowned crest that ran in a direction oblique to the general line. These were well covered by the crest, and wholly concealed by the bushes, so that an advancing enemy would be close upon them before they could be seen. Other troops of Doubleday's Division were strongly posted in rear of these in the general line. I could not help wishing all the morning that this line of the two divisions of the Second Corps was stronger; it was so far as numbers constitute strength, the weakest part of our whole line of battle. What if, I thought, the enemy should make an assault here to-day, with two or three heavy lines--a great overwhelming mass; would he not sweep through that thin six thousand? But I was not General Meade, who alone had power to send other troops there; and he was satisfied with that part of the line as it was. He was early on horseback this morning, and rode along the whole line, looking to it himself, and with glass in hand sweeping the woods and fields in the direction of the enemy, to see if aught of him could be discovered. His manner was calm and serious, but earnest. There was no arrogance of hope, or timidity of fear discernible in his face; but you would have supposed he would do his duty conscientiously and well, and would be willing to abide the result. You would have seen this in his face. He was well pleased with the left of the line to-day, it was so strong with good troops. He had no apprehension for the right where the fight now was going on, on account of the admirable position of our forces there. He was not of the opinion that the enemy would attack the center, our artillery had such sweep there, and this was not the favorite point of attack with the Rebel. Besides, should he attack the center, the General thought he could reinforce it in good season. I heard Gen. Meade speak of these matters to Hancock and some others, at about nine o'clock in the morning, while they were up by the line, near the Second Corps. No further changes of importance except those mentioned, were made in the disposition of the troops this morning, except to replace some of the batteries that were disabled yesterday by others from the artillery reserve, and to brace up the lines well with guns wherever there were eligible places, from the same source. The line is all in good order again, and we are ready for general battle. Save the operations upon the right, the enemy so far as we could see, was very quiet all the morning. Occasionally the outposts would fire a little, and then cease. Movements would be discovered which would indicate the attempt on the part of the enemy to post a battery. Our Parrotts would send a few shells to the spot, then silence would follow. At one of these times a painful accident happened to us, this morning. First Lieut. Henry Ropes, 20th Mass., in Gen. Gibbon's Division, a most estimable gentleman and officer, intelligent, educated, refined, one of the noble souls that came to the country's defense, while lying at his post with his regiment, in front of one of the Batteries, which fired over the Infantry, was instantly killed by a badly made shell, which, or some portion of it, fell but a few yards in front of the muzzle of the gun. The same accident killed or wounded several others. The loss of Ropes would have pained us at any time, and in any manner; in this manner his death was doubly painful. Between ten and eleven o'clock, over in a peach orchard in front of the position of Sickles yesterday, some little show of the enemy's infantry was discovered; a few shells scattered the gray-backs; they again appeared, and it becoming apparent that they were only posting a skirmish line, no further molestation was offered them. A little after this some of the enemy's flags could be discerned over near the same quarter, above the top and behind a small crest of a ridge. There seemed to be two or three of them--possibly they were guidons--and they moved too fast to be carried on foot. Possibly, we thought, the enemy is posting some batteries there. We knew in about two hours from this time better about the matter. Eleven o'clock came. The noise of battle has ceased upon the right; not a sound of a gun or musket can be heard on all the field; the sky is bright, with only the white fleecy clouds floating over from the West. The July sun streams down its fire upon the bright iron of the muskets in stacks upon the crest, and the dazzling brass of the Napoleons. The army lolls and longs for the shade, of which some get a hand's breadth, from a shelter tent stuck upon a ramrod. The silence and sultriness of a July noon are supreme. Now it so happened that just about this time of day a very original and interesting thought occurred to Gen. Gibbon and several of his staff; that it would be a very good thing, and a very good time, to have something to eat. When I announce to you that I had not tasted a mouthful of food since yesterday noon, and that all I had had to drink since that time, but the most miserable muddy warm water, was a little drink of whiskey that Major Biddle, General Meade's aide-de-camp, gave me last evening, and a cup of strong coffee that I gulped down as I was first mounting this morning, and further, that, save the four or five hours in the night, there was scarcely a moment since that time but that I was in the saddle, you may have some notion of the reason of my assent to this extraordinary proposition. Nor will I mention the doubts I had as to the feasibility of the execution of this very novel proposal, except to say that I knew this morning that our larder was low; not to put too fine a point upon it, that we had nothing but some potatoes and sugar and coffee in the world. And I may as well say here, that of such, in scant proportion, would have been our repast, had it not been for the riding of miles by two persons, one an officer, to procure supplies; and they only succeeded in getting some few chickens, some butter, and one huge loaf of bread, which last was bought of a soldier, because he had grown faint in carrying it, and was afterwards rescued with much difficulty and after a long race from a four-footed hog, which had got hold of and had actually eaten a part of it. "There is a divinity," etc. Suffice it, this very ingenious and unheard of contemplated proceeding, first announced by the General, was accepted and at once undertaken by his staff. Of the absolute quality of what we had to eat, I could not pretend to judge, but I think an unprejudiced person would have said of the bread that it was good; so of the potatoes before they were boiled. Of the chickens he would have questioned their age, but they were large and in good _running_ order. The toast was good, and the butter. There were those who, when coffee was given them, called for tea, and vice versa, and were so ungracious as to suggest that the water that was used in both might have come from near a barn. Of course it did not. We all came down to the little peach orchard where we had stayed last night, and, wonderful to see and tell, ever mindful of our needs, had it all ready, had our faithful John. There was an enormous pan of stewed chickens, and the potatoes, and toast, all hot, and the bread and the butter, and tea and coffee. There was satisfaction derived from just naming them all over. We called John an angel, and he snickered and said he "knowed" we'd come. General Hancock is of course invited to partake, and without delay we commence operations. Stools are not very numerous, two in all, and these the two Generals have by common consent. Our table was the top of a mess chest. By this the Generals sat. The rest of us sat upon the ground, cross-legged, like the picture of a smoking Turk, and held our plates upon our laps. How delicious was the stewed chicken. I had a cucumber pickle in my saddle bags, the last of a lunch left there two or three days ago, which George brought, and I had half of it. We were just well at it when General Meade rode down to us from the line, accompanied by one of his staff, and by General Gibbon's invitation, they dismounted and joined us. For the General commanding the Army of the Potomac George, by an effort worthy of the person and the occasion, finds an empty cracker box for a seat. The staff officer must sit upon the ground with the rest of us. Soon Generals Newton and Pleasonton, each with an aide, arrive. By an almost superhuman effort a roll of blankets is found, which, upon a pinch, is long enough to seat these Generals both, and room is made for them. The aides sit with us. And, fortunate to relate, there was enough cooked for us all, and from General Meade to the youngest second lieutenant we all had a most hearty and well relished dinner. Of the "past" we were "secure." The Generals ate, and after, lighted cigars, and under the flickering shade of a very small tree, discoursed of the incidents of yesterday's battle and of the probabilities of to-day. General Newton humorously spoke of General Gibbon as "this young North Carolinian," and how he was becoming arrogant and above his position, because he commanded a corps. General Gibbon retorted by saying that General Newton had not been long enough in such a command, only since yesterday, to enable him to judge of such things. General Meade still thought that the enemy would attack his left again to-day towards evening; but he was ready for them. General Hancock thought that the attack would be upon the position of the Second Corps. It was mentioned that General Hancock would again assume command of the Second Corps from that time, so that General Gibbon would again return to the Second Division. General Meade spoke of the Provost Guards, that they were good men, and that it would be better to-day to have them in the works than to stop stragglers and skulkers, as these latter would be good for but little even in the works; and so he gave the order that all the Provost Guards should at once temporarily rejoin their regiments. Then General Gibbon called up Captain Farrel, First Minnesota, who commanded the provost guard of his division, and directed him for that day to join the regiment. "Very well, sir," said the Captain, as he touched his hat and turned away. He was a quiet, excellent gentleman and thorough soldier. I knew him well and esteemed him. I never saw him again. He was killed in two or three hours from that time, and over half of his splendid company were either killed or wounded. And so the time passed on, each General now and then dispatching some order or message by an officer or orderly, until about half-past twelve, when all the Generals, one by one, first General Meade, rode off their several ways, and General Gibbon and his staff alone remained. We dozed in the heat, and lolled upon the ground, with half open eyes. Our horses were hitched to the trees munching some oats. A great lull rests upon all the field. Time was heavy, and for want of something better to do, I yawned, and looked at my watch. It was five minutes before one o'clock. I returned my watch to its pocket, and thought possibly that I might go to sleep, and stretched myself upon the ground accordingly. _Ex uno disce omnes._ My attitude and purpose were those of the General and the rest of the staff. What sound was that? There was no mistaking it. The distinct sharp sound of one of the enemy's guns, square over to the front, caused us to open our eyes and turn them in that direction, when we saw directly above the crest the smoke of the bursting shell, and heard its noise. In an instant, before a word was spoken, as if that was the signal gun for general work, loud, startling, booming, the report of gun after gun in rapid succession smote our ears and their shells plunged down and exploded all around us. We sprang to our feet. In briefest time the whole Rebel line to the West was pouring out its thunder and its iron upon our devoted crest. The wildest confusion for a few moments obtained sway among us. The shells came bursting all about. The servants ran terror-stricken for dear life and disappeared. The horses, hitched to the trees or held by the slack hands of orderlies, neighed out in fright, and broke away and plunged riderless through the fields. The General at the first had snatched his sword, and started on foot for the front. I called for my horse; nobody responded. I found him tied to a tree, near by, eating oats, with an air of the greatest composure, which under the circumstances, even then struck me as exceedingly ridiculous. He alone, of all beasts or men near was cool. I am not sure but that I learned a lesson then from a horse. Anxious alone for his oats, while I put on the bridle and adjusted the halter, he delayed me by keeping his head down, so I had time to see one of the horses of our mess wagon struck and torn by a shell. The pair plunge--the driver has lost the reins--horses, driver and wagon go into a heap by a tree. Two mules close at hand, packed with boxes of ammunition, are knocked all to pieces by a shell. General Gibbon's groom has just mounted his horse and is starting to take the General's horse to him, when the flying iron meets him and tears open his breast. He drops dead and the horses gallop away. No more than a minute since the first shot was fired, and I am mounted and riding after the General. The mighty din that now rises to heaven and shakes the earth is not all of it the voice of the rebellion; for our guns, the guardian lions of the crest, quick to awake when danger comes, have opened their fiery jaws and begun to roar--the great hoarse roar of battle. I overtake the General half way up to the line. Before we reach the crest his horse is brought by an orderly. Leaving our horses just behind a sharp declivity of the ridge, on foot we go up among the batteries. How the long streams of fire spout from the guns, how the rifled shells hiss, how the smoke deepens and rolls. But where is the infantry? Has it vanished in smoke? Is this a nightmare or a juggler's devilish trick? All too real. The men of the infantry have seized their arms, and behind their works, behind every rock, in every ditch, wherever there is any shelter, they hug the ground, silent, quiet, unterrified, little harmed. The enemy's guns now in action are in position at their front of the woods along the second ridge that I have before mentioned and towards their right, behind a small crest in the open field, where we saw the flags this morning. Their line is some two miles long, concave on the side towards us, and their range is from one thousand to eighteen hundred yards. A hundred and twenty-five rebel guns, we estimate, are now active, firing twenty-four pound, twenty, twelve and ten-pound projectiles, solid shot and shells, spherical, conical, spiral. The enemy's fire is chiefly concentrated upon the position of the Second Corps. From the Cemetery to Round Top, with over a hundred guns, and to all parts of the enemy's line, our batteries reply, of twenty and ten-pound Parrotts, ten-pound rifled ordnance, and twelve-pound Napoleons, using projectiles as various in shape and name as those of the enemy. Captain Hazard commanding the artillery brigade of the Second Corps was vigilant among the batteries of his command, and they were all doing well. All was going on satisfactorily. We had nothing to do, therefore, but to be observers of the grand spectacle of battle. Captain Wessels, Judge Advocate of the Division, now joined us, and we sat down behind the crest, close to the left of Cushing's Battery, to bide our time, to see, to be ready to act when the time should come, which might be at any moment. Who can describe such a conflict as is raging around us? To say that it was like a summer storm, with the crash of thunder, the glare of lightning, the shrieking of the wind, and the clatter of hailstones, would be weak. The thunder and lightning of these two hundred and fifty guns and their shells, whose smoke darkens the sky, are incessant, all pervading, in the air above our heads, on the ground at our feet, remote, near, deafening, ear-piercing, astounding; and these hailstones are massy iron, charged with exploding fire. And there is little of human interest in a storm; it is an absorbing element of this. You may see flame and smoke, and hurrying men, and human passion at a great conflagration; but they are all earthly and nothing more. These guns are great infuriate demons, not of the earth, whose mouths blaze with smoky tongues of living fire, and whose murky breath, sulphur-laden, rolls around them and along the ground, the smoke of Hades. These grimy men, rushing, shouting, their souls in frenzy, plying the dusky globes and the igniting spark, are in their league, and but their willing ministers. We thought that at the second Bull Run, at the Antietam and at Fredericksburg on the 11th of December, we had heard heavy cannonading; they were but holiday salutes compared with this. Besides the great ceaseless roar of the guns, which was but the background of the others, a million various minor sounds engaged the ear. The projectiles shriek long and sharp. They hiss, they scream, they growl, they sputter; all sounds of life and rage; and each has its different note, and all are discordant. Was ever such a chorus of sound before? We note the effect of the enemies' fire among the batteries and along the crest. We see the solid shot strike axle, or pole, or wheel, and the tough iron and heart of oak snap and fly like straws. The great oaks there by Woodruff's guns heave down their massy branches with a crash, as if the lightning smote them. The shells swoop down among the battery horses standing there apart. A half a dozen horses start, they tumble, their legs stiffen, their vitals and blood smear the ground. And these shot and shells have no respect for men either. We see the poor fellows hobbling back from the crest, or unable to do so, pale and weak, lying on the ground with the mangled stump of an arm or leg, dripping their life-blood away; or with a cheek torn open, or a shoulder mashed. And many, alas! hear not the roar as they stretch upon the ground with upturned faces and open eyes, though a shell should burst at their very ears. Their ears and their bodies this instant are only mud. We saw them but a moment since there among the flame, with brawny arms and muscles of iron wielding the rammer and pushing home the cannon's plethoric load. Strange freaks these round shot play! We saw a man coming up from the rear with his full knapsack on, and some canteens of water held by the straps in his hands. He was walking slowly and with apparent unconcern, though the iron hailed around him. A shot struck the knapsack, and it, and its contents flew thirty yards in every direction, the knapsack disappearing like an egg, thrown spitefully against a rock. The soldier stopped and turned about in puzzled surprise, put up one hand to his back to assure himself that the knapsack was not there, and then walked slowly on again unharmed, with not even his coat torn. Near us was a man crouching behind a small disintegrated stone, which was about the size of a common water bucket. He was bent up, with his face to the ground, in the attitude of a Pagan worshipper before his idol. It looked so absurd to see him thus, that I went and said to him, "Do not lie there like a toad. Why not go to your regiment and be a man?" He turned up his face with a stupid, terrified look upon me, and then without a word turned his nose again to the ground. An orderly that was with me at the time, told me a few moments later, that a shot struck the stone, smashing it in a thousand fragments, but did not touch the man, though his head was not six inches from the stone. All the projectiles that came near us were not so harmless. Not ten yards away from us a shell burst among some small bushes, where sat three or four orderlies holding horses. Two of the men and one horse were killed. Only a few yards off a shell exploded over an open limber box in Cushing's battery, and at the same instant, another shell over a neighboring box. In both the boxes the ammunition blew up with an explosion that shook the ground, throwing fire and splinters and shells far into the air and all around, and destroying several men. We watched the shells bursting in the air, as they came hissing in all directions. Their flash was a bright gleam of lightning radiating from a point, giving place in the thousandth part of a second to a small, white, puffy cloud, like a fleece of the lightest, whitest wool. These clouds were very numerous. We could not often see the shell before it burst; but sometimes, as we faced towards the enemy, and looked above our heads, the approach would be heralded by a prolonged hiss, which always seemed to me to be a line of something tangible, terminating in a black globe, distinct to the eye, as the sound had been to the ear. The shell would seem to stop, and hang suspended in the air an instant, and then vanish in fire and smoke and noise. We saw the missiles tear and plow the ground. All in rear of the crest for a thousand yards, as well as among the batteries, was the field of their blind fury. Ambulances, passing down the Taneytown road with wounded men, were struck. The hospitals near this road were riddled. The house which was General Meade's headquarters was shot through several times, and a great many horses of officers and orderlies were lying dead around it. Riderless horses, galloping madly through the fields, were brought up, or down rather, by these invisible horse-tamers, and they would not run any more. Mules with ammunition, pigs wallowing about, cows in the pastures, whatever was animate or inanimate, in all this broad range, were no exception to their blind havoc. The percussion shells would strike, and thunder, and scatter the earth and their whistling fragments; the Whitworth bolts would pound and ricochet, and bowl far away sputtering, with the sound of a mass of hot iron plunged in water; and the great solid shot would smite the unresisting ground with a sounding "thud," as the strong boxer crashes his iron fist into the jaws of his unguarded adversary. Such were some of the sights and sounds of this great iron battle of missiles. Our artillerymen upon the crest budged not an inch, nor intermitted, but, though caisson and limber were smashed, and guns dismantled, and men and horses killed, there amidst smoke and sweat, they gave back, without grudge, or loss of time in the sending, in kind whatever the enemy sent, globe, and cone, and bolt, hollow or solid, an iron greeting to the rebellion, the compliments of the wrathful Republic. An hour has droned its flight since first the war began. There is no sign of weariness or abatement on either side. So long it seemed, that the din and crashing around began to appear the normal condition of nature there, and fighting man's element. The General proposed to go among the men and over to the front of the batteries, so at about two o'clock he and I started. We went along the lines of the infantry as they lay there flat upon the earth, a little to the front of the batteries. They were suffering little, and were quiet and cool. How glad we were that the enemy were no better gunners, and that they cut the shell fuses too long. To the question asked the men, "What do you think of this?" the replies would be, "O, this is bully," "We are getting to like it," "O, we don't mind this." And so they lay under the heaviest cannonade that ever shook the continent, and among them a thousand times more jokes than heads were cracked. We went down in front of the line some two hundred yards, and as the smoke had a tendency to settle upon a higher plain than where we were, we could see near the ground distinctly all over the fields, as well back to the crest where were our own guns as to the opposite ridge where were those of the enemy. No infantry was in sight, save the skirmishers, and they stood silent and motionless--a row of gray posts through the field on one side confronted by another of blue. Under the grateful shade of some elm trees, where we could see much of the field, we made seats of the ground and sat down. Here all the more repulsive features of the fight were unseen, by reason of the smoke. Man had arranged the scenes, and for a time had taken part in the great drama; but at last, as the plot thickened, conscious of his littleness and inadequacy to the mighty part, he had stepped aside and given place to more powerful actors. So it seemed; for we could see no men about the batteries. On either crest we could see the great flaky streams of fire, and they seemed numberless, of the opposing guns, and their white banks of swift, convolving smoke; but the sound of the discharges was drowned in the universal ocean of sound. Over all the valley the smoke, a sulphury arch, stretched its lurid span; and through it always, shrieking on their unseen courses, thickly flew a myriad iron deaths. With our grim horizon on all sides round toothed thick with battery flame, under that dissonant canopy of warring shells, we sat and heard in silence. What other expression had we that was not mean, for such an awful universe of battle? A shell struck our breastwork of rails up in sight of us, and a moment afterwards we saw the men bearing some of their wounded companions away from the same spot; and directly two men came from there down toward where we were and sought to get shelter in an excavation near by, where many dead horses, killed in yesterday's fight, had been thrown. General Gibbon said to these men, more in a tone of kindly expostulation than of command: "My men, do not leave your ranks to try to get shelter here. All these matters are in the hands of God, and nothing that you can do will make you safer in one place than in another." The men went quietly back to the line at once. The General then said to me: "I am not a member of any church, but I have always had a strong religious feeling; and so in all these battles I have always believed that I was in the hands of God, and that I should be unharmed or not, according to his will. For this reason, I think it is, I am always ready to go where duty calls, no matter how great the danger." Half-past two o'clock, an hour and a half since the commencement, and still the cannonade did not in the least abate; but soon thereafter some signs of weariness and a little slacking of fire began to be apparent upon both sides. First we saw Brown's battery retire from the line, too feeble for further battle. Its position was a little to the front of the line. Its commander was wounded, and many of its men were so, or worse; some of its guns had been disabled, many of its horses killed; its ammunition was nearly expended. Other batteries in similar case had been withdrawn before to be replaced by fresh ones, and some were withdrawn afterwards. Soon after the battery named had gone the General and I started to return, passing towards the left of the division, and crossing the ground where the guns had stood. The stricken horses were numerous, and the dead and wounded men lay about, and as we passed these latter, their low, piteous call for water would invariably come to us, if they had yet any voice left. I found canteens of water near--no difficult matter where a battle has been--and held them to livid lips, and even in the faintness of death the eagerness to drink told of their terrible torture of thirst. But we must pass on. Our infantry was still unshaken, and in all the cannonade suffered very little. The batteries had been handled much more severely. I am unable to give any figures. A great number of horses had been killed, in some batteries more than half of all. Guns had been dismounted. A great many caissons, limbers and carriages had been destroyed, and usually from ten to twenty-five men to each battery had been struck, at least along our part of the crest. Altogether the fire of the enemy had injured us much, both in the modes that I have stated, and also by exhausting our ammunition and fouling our guns, so as to render our batteries unfit for further immediate use. The scenes that met our eyes on all hands among the batteries were fearful. All things must end, and the great cannonade was no exception to the general law of earth. In the number of guns active at one time, and in the duration and rapidity of their fire, this artillery engagement, up to this time, must stand alone and pre-eminent in this war. It has not been often, or many times, surpassed in the battles of the world. Two hundred and fifty guns, at least, rapidly fired for two mortal hours. Cipher out the number of tons of gunpowder and iron that made these two hours hideous. Of the injury of our fire upon the enemy, except the facts that ours was the superior position, if not better served and constructed artillery, and that the enemy's artillery hereafter during the battle was almost silent, we know little. Of course, during the fight we often saw the enemy's caissons explode, and the trees rent by our shot crashing about his ears, but we can from these alone infer but little of general results. At three o'clock almost precisely the last shot hummed, and bounded and fell, and the cannonade was over. The purpose of General Lee in all this fire of his guns--we know it now, we did not at the time so well--was to disable our artillery and break up our infantry upon the position of the Second Corps, so as to render them less an impediment to the sweep of his own brigades and divisions over our crest and through our lines. He probably supposed our infantry was massed behind the crest and the batteries; and hence his fire was so high, and his fuses to the shells were cut so long, too long. The Rebel General failed in some of his plans in this behalf, as many generals have failed before and will again. The artillery fight over, men began to breathe more freely, and to ask, What next, I wonder? The battery men were among their guns, some leaning to rest and wipe the sweat from their sooty faces, some were handling ammunition boxes and replenishing those that were empty. Some batteries from the artillery reserve were moving up to take the places of the disabled ones; the smoke was clearing from the crests. There was a pause between acts, with the curtain down, soon to rise upon the great final act, and catastrophe of Gettysburg. We have passed by the left of the Second Division, coming from the First; when we crossed the crest the enemy was not in sight, and all was still--we walked slowly along in the rear of the troops, by the ridge cut off now from a view of the enemy in his position, and were returning to the spot where we had left our horses. General Gibbon had just said that he inclined to the belief that the enemy was falling back, and that the cannonade was only one of his noisy modes of covering the movement. I said that I thought that fifteen minutes would show that, by all his bowling, the Rebel did not mean retreat. We were near our horses when we noticed Brigadier General Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army, near Woodruff's Battery, swiftly moving about on horseback, and apparently in a rapid manner giving some orders about the guns. Thought we, what could this mean? In a moment afterwards we met Captain Wessels and the orderlies who had our horses; they were on foot leading the horses. Captain Wessels was pale, and he said, excited: "General, they say the enemy's infantry is advancing." We sprang into our saddles, a score of bounds brought us upon the all-seeing crest. To say that men grew pale and held their breath at what we and they there saw, would not be true. Might not six thousand men be brave and without shade of fear, and yet, before a hostile eighteen thousand, armed, and not five minutes' march away, turn ashy white? None on that crest now need be told that _the enemy is advancing_. Every eye could see his legions, an overwhelming resistless tide of an ocean of armed men sweeping upon us! Regiment after regiment and brigade after brigade move from the woods and rapidly take their places in the lines forming the assault. Pickett's proud division, with some additional troops, hold their right; Pettigrew's (Worth's) their left. The first line at short interval is followed by a second, and that a third succeeds; and columns between support the lines. More than half a mile their front extends; more than a thousand yards the dull gray masses deploy, man touching man, rank pressing rank, and line supporting line. The red flags wave, their horsemen gallop up and down; the arms of eighteen thousand men, barrel and bayonet, gleam in the sun, a sloping forest of flashing steel. Right on they move, as with one soul, in perfect order, without impediment of ditch, or wall or stream, over ridge and slope, through orchard and meadow, and cornfield, magnificent, grim, irresistible. All was orderly and still upon our crest; no noise and no confusion. The men had little need of commands, for the survivors of a dozen battles knew well enough what this array in front portended, and, already in their places, they would be prepared to act when the right time should come. The click of the locks as each man raised the hammer to feel with his fingers that the cap was on the nipple; the sharp jar as a musket touched a stone upon the wall when thrust in aiming over it, and the clicking of the iron axles as the guns were rolled up by hand a little further to the front, were quite all the sounds that could be heard. Cap-boxes were slid around to the front of the body; cartridge boxes opened, officers opened their pistol-holsters. Such preparations, little more was needed. The trefoil flags, colors of the brigades and divisions moved to their places in rear; but along the lines in front the grand old ensign that first waved in battle at Saratoga in 1777, and which these people coming would rob of half its stars, stood up, and the west wind kissed it as the sergeants sloped its lance towards the enemy. I believe that not one above whom it then waved but blessed his God that he was loyal to it, and whose heart did not swell with pride towards it, as the emblem of the Republic before that treason's flaunting rag in front. General Gibbon rode down the lines, cool and calm, and in an unimpassioned voice he said to the men, "Do not hurry, men, and fire too fast, let them come up close before you fire, and then aim low and steadily." The coolness of their General was reflected in the faces of his men. Five minutes has elapsed since first the enemy have emerged from the woods--no great space of time surely, if measured by the usual standard by which men estimate duration--but it was long enough for us to note and weigh some of the elements of mighty moment that surrounded us; the disparity of numbers between the assailants and the assailed; that few as were our numbers we could not be supported or reinforced until support would not be needed or would be too late; that upon the ability of the two trefoil divisions to hold the crest and repel the assault depended not only their own safety or destruction, but also the honor of the Army of the Potomac and defeat or victory at Gettysburg. Should these advancing men pierce our line and become the entering wedge, driven home, that would sever our army asunder, what hope would there be afterwards, and where the blood-earned fruits of yesterday? It was long enough for the Rebel storm to drift across more than half the space that had at first separated it from us. None, or all, of these considerations either depressed or elevated us. They might have done the former, had we been timid; the latter had we been confident and vain. But, we were there waiting, and ready to do our duty--that done, results could not dishonor us. Our skirmishers open a spattering fire along the front, and, fighting, retire upon the main line--the first drops, the heralds of the storm, sounding on our windows. Then the thunders of our guns, first Arnold's then Cushing's and Woodruff's and the rest, shake and reverberate again through the air, and their sounding shells smite the enemy. The General said I had better go and tell General Meade of this advance. To gallop to General Meade's headquarters, to learn there that he had changed them to another part of the field, to dispatch to him by the Signal Corps in General Gibbon's name the message, "The enemy is advancing his infantry in force upon my front," and to be again upon the crest, were but the work of a minute. All our available guns are now active, and from the fire of shells, as the range grows shorter and shorter, they change to shrapnel, and from shrapnel to canister; but in spite of shells, and shrapnel and canister, without wavering or halt, the hardy lines of the enemy continue to move on. The Rebel guns make no reply to ours, and no charging shout rings out to-day, as is the Rebel wont; but the courage of these silent men amid our shots seems not to need the stimulus of other noise. The enemy's right flank sweeps near Stannard's bushy crest, and his concealed Vermonters rake it with a well-delivered fire of musketry. The gray lines do not halt or reply, but withdrawing a little from that extreme, they still move on. And so across all that broad open ground they have come, nearer and nearer, nearly half the way, with our guns bellowing in their faces, until now a hundred yards, no more, divide our ready left from their advancing right. The eager men there are impatient to begin. Let them. First, Harrow's breastworks flame; then Hall's; then Webb's. As if our bullets were the fire coals that touched off their muskets, the enemy in front halts, and his countless level barrels blaze back upon us. The Second Division is struggling in battle. The rattling storm soon spreads to the right, and the blue trefoils are vieing with the white. All along each hostile front, a thousand yards, with narrowest space between, the volleys blaze and roll; as thick the sound as when a summer hail-storm pelts the city roofs; as thick the fire as when the incessant lightning fringes a summer cloud. When the Rebel infantry had opened fire our batteries soon became silent, and this without their fault, for they were foul by long previous use. They were the targets of the concentrated Rebel bullets, and some of them had expended all their canister. But they were not silent before Rhorty was killed, Woodruff had fallen mortally wounded, and Cushing, firing almost his last canister, had dropped dead among his guns shot through the head by a bullet. The conflict is left to the infantry alone. Unable to find my general when I had returned to the crest after transmitting his message to General Meade, and while riding in the search having witnessed the development of the fight, from the first fire upon the left by the main lines until all of the two divisions were furiously engaged, I gave up hunting as useless--I was convinced General Gibbon could not be on the field; I left him mounted; I could easily have found him now had he so remained--but now, save myself, there was not a mounted officer near the engaged lines--and was riding towards the right of the Second Division, with purpose to stop there, as the most eligible position to watch the further progress of the battle, there to be ready to take part according to my own notions whenever and wherever occasion was presented. The conflict was tremendous, but I had seen no wavering in all our line. Wondering how long the Rebel ranks, deep though they were, could stand our sheltered volleys, I had come near my destination, when--great heaven! were my senses mad? The larger portion of Webb's brigade--my God, it was true--there by the group of trees and the angles of the wall, was breaking from the cover of their works, and, without orders or reason, with no hand lifted to check them, was falling back, a fear-stricken flock of confusion! The fate of Gettysburg hung upon a spider's single thread! A great magnificent passion came on me at the instant, not one that overpowers and confounds, but one that blanches the face and sublimes every sense and faculty. My sword, that had always hung idle by my side, the sign of rank only in every battle, I drew, bright and gleaming, the symbol of command. Was not that a fit occasion, and these fugitives the men on whom to try the temper of the Solinzen steel? All rules and proprieties were forgotten; all considerations of person, and danger and safety despised; for, as I met the tide of these rabbits, the damned red flags of the rebellion began to thicken and flaunt along the wall they had just deserted, and one was already waving over one of the guns of the dead Cushing. I ordered these men to "halt," and "face about" and "fire," and they heard my voice and gathered my meaning, and obeyed my commands. On some unpatriotic backs of those not quick of comprehension, the flat of my sabre fell not lightly, and at its touch their love of country returned, and, with a look at me as if I were the destroying angel, as I might have become theirs, they again faced the enemy. General Webb soon came to my assistance. He was on foot, but he was active, and did all that one could do to repair the breach, or to avert its calamity. The men that had fallen back, facing the enemy, soon regained confidence in themselves, and became steady. This portion of the wall was lost to us, and the enemy had gained the cover of the reverse side, where he now stormed with fire. But Webb's men, with their bodies in part protected by the abruptness of the crest, now sent back in the enemies' faces as fierce a storm. Some scores of venturesome Rebels, that in their first push at the wall had dared to cross at the further angle, and those that had desecrated Cushing's guns, were promptly shot down, and speedy death met him who should raise his body to cross it again. At this point little could be seen of the enemy, by reason of his cover and the smoke, except the flash of his muskets and his waving flags. These red flags were accumulating at the wall every moment, and they maddened us as the same color does the bull. Webb's men are falling fast, and he is among them to direct and encourage; but, however well they may now do, with that walled enemy in front, with more than a dozen flags to Webb's three, it soon becomes apparent that in not many minutes they will be overpowered, or that there will be none alive for the enemy to overpower. Webb, has but three regiments, all small, the 69th, 71st and 72d Pennsylvania--the 106th Pennsylvania, except two companies, is not here to-day--and he must have speedy assistance, or this crest will be lost. Oh, where is Gibbon? where is Hancock?--some general--anybody with the power and the will to support that wasting, melting line? No general came, and no succor! I thought of Hayes upon the right, but from the smoke and war along his front, it was evident that he had enough upon his hands, if he stayed the in-rolling tide of the Rebels there. Doubleday upon the left was too far off and too slow, and on another occasion I had begged him to send his idle regiments to support another line battling with thrice its numbers, and this "Old Sumpter Hero" had declined. As a last resort I resolved to see if Hall and Harrow could not send some of their commands to reinforce Webb. I galloped to the left in the execution of my purpose, and as I attained the rear of Hall's line, from the nature of the ground and the position of the enemy it was easy to discover the reason and the manner of this gathering of Rebel flags in front of Webb. The enemy, emboldened by his success in gaining our line by the group of trees and the angle of the wall, was concentrating all his right against and was further pressing that point. There was the stress of his assault; there would he drive his fiery wedge to split our line. In front of Harrow's and Hall's Brigades he had been able to advance no nearer than when he first halted to deliver fire, and these commands had not yielded an inch. To effect the concentration before Webb, the enemy would march the regiment on his extreme right of each of his lines by the left flank to the rear of the troops, still halted and facing to the front, and so continuing to draw in his right, when they were all massed in the position desired, he would again face them to the front, and advance to the storming. This was the way he made the wall before Webb's line blaze red with his battle flags, and such was the purpose there of his thick-crowding battalions. Not a moment must be lost. Colonel Hall I found just in rear of his line, sword in hand, cool, vigilant, noting all that passed and directing the battle of his brigade. The fire was constantly diminishing now in his front, in the manner and by the movement of the enemy that I have mentioned, drifting to the right. "How is it going?" Colonel Hall asked me, as I rode up. "Well, but Webb is hotly pressed and must have support, or he will be overpowered. Can you assist him?" "Yes." "You cannot be too quick." "I will move my brigade at once." "Good." He gave the order, and in briefest time I saw five friendly colors hurrying to the aid of the imperilled three; and each color represented true, battle-tried men, that had not turned back from Rebel fire that day nor yesterday, though their ranks were sadly thinned, to Webb's brigade, pressed back as it had been from the wall, the distance was not great from Hall's right. The regiments marched by the right flank. Col. Hall superintended the movement in person. Col. Devereux coolly commanded the 19th Massachusetts. His major, Rice, had already been wounded and carried off. Lieut. Col. Macy, of the 20th Mass., had just had his left hand shot off, and so Capt. Abbott gallantly led over this fine regiment. The 42d New York followed their excellent Colonel Mallon. Lieut. Col. Steele, 7th Mich., had just been killed, and his regiment, and the handful of the 59th N. Y., followed their colors. The movement, as it did, attracting the enemy's fire, and executed in haste, as it must be, was difficult; but in reasonable time, and in order that is serviceable, if not regular, Hall's men are fighting gallantly side by side with Webb's before the all important point. I did not stop to see all this movement of Hall's, but from him I went at once further to the left, to the 1st brigade. Gen'l Harrow I did not see, but his fighting men would answer my purpose as well. The 19th Me., the 15th Mass., the 32d N. Y. and the shattered old thunderbolt, the 1st Minn.--poor Farrell was dying then upon the ground where he had fallen,--all men that I could find I took over to the right at the _double quick_. As we were moving to, and near the other brigade of the division, from my position on horseback I could see that the enemy's right, under Hall's fire, was beginning to stagger and to break. "See," I said to the men, "See the _chivalry_! See the gray-backs run!" The men saw, and as they swept to their places by the side of Hall and opened fire, they roared, and this in a manner that said more plainly than words--for the deaf could have seen it in their faces, and the blind could have heard it in their voices--_the crest is safe_! The whole Division concentrated, and changes of position, and new phases, as well on our part as on that of the enemy, having as indicated occurred, for the purpose of showing the exact present posture of affairs, some further description is necessary. Before the 2d Division the enemy is massed, the main bulk of his force covered by the ground that slopes to his rear, with his front at the stone wall. Between his front and us extends the very apex of the crest. All there are left of the White Trefoil Division--yesterday morning there were three thousand eight hundred, this morning there were less than three thousand--at this moment there are somewhat over two thousand;--twelve regiments in three brigades are below or behind the crest, in such a position that by the exposure of the head and upper part of the body above the crest they can deliver their fire in the enemy's faces along the top of the wall. By reason of the disorganization incidental in Webb's brigade to his men's having broken and fallen back, as mentioned, in the two other brigades to their rapid and difficult change of position under fire, and in all the division in part to severe and continuous battle, formation of companies and regiments in regular ranks is lost; but commands, companies, regiments and brigades are blended and intermixed--an irregular extended mass--men enough, if in order, to form a line of four or five ranks along the whole front of the division. The twelve flags of the regiments wave defiantly at intervals along the front; at the stone wall, at unequal distances from ours of forty, fifty or sixty yards, stream nearly double this number of the battle flags of the enemy. These changes accomplished on either side, and the concentration complete, although no cessation or abatement in the general din of conflict since the commencement had at any time been appreciable, now it was as if a new battle, deadlier, stormier than before, had sprung from the body of the old--a young Phoenix of combat, whose eyes stream lightning, shaking his arrowy wings over the yet glowing ashes of his progenitor. The jostling, swaying lines on either side boil, and roar, and dash their flamy spray, two hostile billows of a fiery ocean. Thick flashes stream from the wall, thick volleys answer from the crest. No threats or expostulation now, only example and encouragement. All depths of passion are stirred, and all combatives fire, down to their deep foundations. Individuality is drowned in a sea of clamor, and timid men, breathing the breath of the multitude, are brave. The frequent dead and wounded lie where they stagger and fall--there is no humanity for them now, and none can be spared to care for them. The men do not cheer or shout; they growl, and over that uneasy sea, heard with the roar of musketry, sweeps the muttered thunder of a storm of growls. Webb, Hall, Devereux, Mallon, Abbott among the men where all are heroes, are doing deeds of note. Now the loyal wave rolls up as if it would overleap its barrier, the crest. Pistols flash with the muskets. My "Forward to the wall" is answered by the Rebel counter-command, "Steady, men!" and the wave swings back. Again it surges, and again it sinks. These men of Pennsylvania, on the soil of their own homesteads, the first and only to flee the wall, must be the first to storm it. "Major--, _lead_ your men over the crest, they will follow." "By the tactics I understand my place is in rear of the men." "Your pardon, sir; I see _your_ place is in rear of the men. I thought you were fit to lead." "Capt. Sapler, come on with your men." "Let me first stop this fire in the rear, or we shall be hit by our own men." "Never mind the fire in the rear; let us take care of this in front first." "Sergeant, forward with your color. Let the Rebels see it close to their eyes once before they die." The color sergeant of the 72d Pa., grasping the stump of the severed lance in both his hands, waved the flag above his head and rushed towards the wall. "Will you see your color storm the wall alone?" One man only starts to follow. Almost half way to the wall, down go color bearer and color to the ground--the gallant sergeant is dead. The line springs--the crest of the solid ground with a great roar, heaves forward its maddened load, men, arms, smoke, fire, a fighting mass. It rolls to the wall--flash meets flash, the wall is crossed--a moment ensues of thrusts, yells, blows, shots, and undistinguishable conflict, followed by a shout universal that makes the welkin ring again, and the last and bloodiest fight of the great battle of Gettysburg is ended and won. Many things cannot be described by pen or pencil--such a fight is one. Some hints and incidents may be given, but a description or picture never. From what is told the imagination may for itself construct the scene; otherwise he who never saw can have no adequate idea of what such a battle is. When the vortex of battle passion had subsided, hopes, fears, rage, joy, of which the maddest and the noisiest was the last, and we were calm enough to look about us, we saw that, as with us, the fight with the Third Division was ended, and that in that division was a repetition of the scenes immediately about us. In that moment the judgment almost refused to credit the senses. Are these abject wretches about us, whom our men are now disarming and driving together in flocks, the jaunty men of Pickett's Division, whose steady lines and flashing arms but a few moment's since came sweeping up the slope to destroy us? Are these red cloths that our men toss about in derision the "fiery Southern crosses," thrice ardent, the battle flags of the rebellion that waved defiance at the wall? We know, but so sudden has been the transition, we yet can scarce believe. [Illustration: Battle of Gettysburg--Final attack, July 3 (Compiled by C E. Estabrook)] Just as the fight was over, and the first outburst of victory had a little subsided, when all in front of the crest was noise and confusion--prisoners being collected, small parties in pursuit of them far down into the fields, flags waving, officers giving quick, sharp commands to their men--I stood apart for a few moments upon the crest, by that group of trees which ought to be historic forever, a spectator of the thrilling scene around. Some few musket shots were still heard in the Third Division; and the enemy's guns, almost silent since the advance of his infantry until the moment of his defeat, were dropping a few sullen shells among friend and foe upon the crest. Rebellion fosters such humanity. Near me, saddest sight of the many of such a field and not in keeping with all this noise, were mingled alone the thick dead of Maine and Minnesota, and Michigan and Massachusetts, and the Empire and Keystone States, who, not yet cold, with the blood still oozing from their death-wounds, had given their lives to the country upon that stormy field. So mingled upon that crest let their honored graves be. Look with me about us. These dead have been avenged already. Where the long lines of the enemy's thousands so proudly advanced, see how thick the silent men of gray are scattered. It is not an hour since these legions were sweeping along so grandly; now sixteen hundred of that fiery mass are strewn among the trampled grass, dead as the clods they load; more than seven thousand, probably eight thousand, are wounded, some there with the dead, in our hands, some fugitive far towards the woods, among them Generals Pettigrew, Garnett, Kemper and Armstead, the last three mortally, and the last one in our hands. "Tell General Hancock," he said to Lieutenant Mitchell, Hancock's aide-de-camp, to whom he handed his watch, "that I know I did my country a great wrong when I took up arms against her, for which I am sorry, but for which I cannot live to atone." Four thousand, not wounded, are prisoners of war. More in number of the captured than the captors. Our men are still "gathering them in." Some hold up their hands or a handkerchief in sign of submission; some have hugged the ground to escape our bullets and so are taken; few made resistance after the first moment of our crossing the wall; some yield submissively with good grace, some with grim, dogged aspect, showing that but for the other alternative they could not submit to this. Colonels, and all less grades of officers, in the usual proportion are among them, and all are being stripped of their arms. Such of them as escaped wounds and capture are fleeing routed and panic stricken, and disappearing in the woods. Small arms, more thousands than we can count, are in our hands, scattered over the field. And these defiant battle-flags, some inscribed with "First Manassas," the numerous battles of the Peninsula, "Second Manassas," "South Mountain," "Sharpsburg," (our Antietam), "Fredericksburg," "Chancellorsville," and many more names, our men have, and are showing about, _over thirty of them_. Such was really the closing scene of the grand drama of Gettysburg. After repeated assaults upon the right and the left, where, and in all of which repulse had been his only success, this persistent and presuming enemy forms his chosen troops, the flower of his army, for a grand assault upon our center. The manner and result of such assault have been told--a loss to the enemy of from twelve thousand to fourteen thousand, killed, wounded and prisoners, and of over thirty battle-flags. This was accomplished by not over six thousand men, with a loss on our part of not over two thousand five hundred killed and wounded. Would to Heaven General Hancock and Gibbon could have stood there where I did, and have looked upon that field! It would have done two men, to whom the country owes much, good to have been with their men in that moment of victory--to have seen the result of those dispositions which they had made, and of that splendid fighting which men schooled by their discipline, had executed. But they are both severely wounded and have been carried from the field. One person did come then that I was glad to see there, and that was no less than Major General Meade, whom the Army of the Potomac was fortunate enough to have at that time to command it. See how a great General looked upon the field, and what he said and did at the moment, and when he learned of his great victory. To appreciate the incident I give, it should be borne in mind that one coming up from the rear of the line, as did General Meade, could have seen very little of our own men, who had now crossed the crest, and although he could have heard the noise, he could not have told its occasion, or by whom made, until he had actually attained the crest. One who did not know results, so coming, would have been quite as likely to have supposed that our line there had been carried and captured by the enemy--so many gray Rebels were on the crest--as to have discovered the real truth. Such mistake was really made by one of our officers, as I shall relate. General Meade rode up, accompanied alone by his son, who is his aide-de-camp, an escort, if select, not large for a commander of such an army. The principal horseman was no bedizened hero of some holiday review, but he was a plain man, dressed in a serviceable summer suit of dark blue cloth, without badge or ornament, save the shoulder-straps of his grade, and a light, straight sword of a General or General staff officer. He wore heavy, high-top boots and buff gauntlets, and his soft black felt hat was slouched down over his eyes. His face was very white, not pale, and the lines were marked and earnest and full of care. As he arrived near me, coming up the hill, he asked, in a sharp, eager voice: "How is it going here?" "I believe, General, the enemy's attack is repulsed," I answered. Still approaching, and a new light began to come in his face, of gratified surprise, with a touch of incredulity, of which his voice was also the medium, he further asked: "_What! Is the assault already repulsed?_" his voice quicker and more eager than before. "It is, sir," I replied. By this time he was on the crest, and when his eye had for an instant swept over the field, taking in just a glance of the whole--the masses of prisoners, the numerous captured flags which the men were derisively flaunting about, the fugitives of the routed enemy, disappearing with the speed of terror in the woods--partly at what I had told him, partly at what he saw, he said, impressively, and his face lighted: "Thank God." And then his right hand moved as if it would have caught off his hat and waved it; but this gesture he suppressed, and instead he waved his hand, and said "Hurrah!" The son, with more youth in his blood and less rank upon his shoulders, snatched off his cap, and roared out his three "hurrahs" right heartily. The General then surveyed the field, some minutes, in silence. He at length asked who was in command--he had heard that Hancock and Gibbon were wounded--and I told him that General Caldwell was the senior officer of the Corps and General Harrow of the Division. He asked where they were, but before I had time to answer that I did not know, he resumed: "No matter; I will give my orders to you and you will see them executed." He then gave direction that the troops should be reformed as soon as practicable, and kept in their places, as the enemy might be mad enough to attack again. He also gave directions concerning the posting of some reinforcements which he said would soon be there, adding: "If the enemy does attack, charge him in the flank and sweep him from the field; do you understand." The General then, a gratified man, galloped in the direction of his headquarters. Then the work of the field went on. First, the prisoners were collected and sent to the rear. "There go the men," the Rebels were heard to say, by some of our surgeons who were in Gettysburg, at the time Pickett's Division marched out to take position--"There go the men that will go through your d--d Yankee lines, for you," A good many of them did "go through our lines for us," but in a very different way from the one they intended--not impetuous victors, sweeping away our thin lines with ball and bayonet, but crestfallen captives, without arms, guarded by the true bayonets of the Union, with the cheers of their conquerors ringing in their ears. There was a grim truth after all in this Rebel remark. Collected, the prisoners began their dreary march, a miserable, melancholy stream of dirty gray, to pour over the crest to our rear. Many of the officers were well dressed, fine, proud gentlemen, such men as it would be a pleasure to meet, when the war is over. I had no desire to exult over them, and pity and sympathy were the general feelings of us all upon the occasion. The cheering of our men, and the unceremonious handling of the captured flags was probably not gratifying to the prisoners, but not intended for taunt or insult to the men; they could take no exception to such practices. When the prisoners were turned to the rear and were crossing the crest, Lieut. Col. Morgan, General Hancock's Chief of Staff, was conducting a battery from the artillery reserve, towards the Second Corps. As he saw the men in gray coming over the hill, he said to the officer in command of the battery: "See up there! The enemy has carried the crest. See them come pouring over! The old Second Corps is gone, and you had better get your battery away from here as quickly as possible, or it will be captured." The officer was actually giving the order to his men to move back, when close observation discovered that the gray-backs that were coming had no arms, and then the truth flashed upon the minds of the observers. The same mistake was made by others. In view of the results of that day--the successes of the arms of the country, would not the people of the whole country, standing there upon the crest with General Meade, have said, with him: "Thank God?" I have no knowledge and little notion of how long a time elapsed from the moment the fire of the infantry commenced, until the enemy was entirely repulsed, in this his grand assault. I judge, from the amount of fighting and the changes of position that occurred, that probably the fight was of nearly an hour's duration, but I cannot tell, and I have seen none who knew. The time seemed but a very few minutes, when the battle was over. When the prisoners were cleared away and order was again established upon our crest, where the conflict had impaired it, until between five and six o'clock, I remained upon the field, directing some troops to their position, in conformity to the orders of General Meade. The enemy appeared no more in front of the Second Corps; but while I was engaged as I have mentioned, farther to our left some considerable force of the enemy moved out and made show of attack. Our artillery, now in good order again, in due time opened fire, and the shells scattered the "Butternuts," as clubs do the gray snow-birds of winter, before they came within range of our infantry. This, save unimportant outpost firing, was the last of the battle. Of the pursuit of the enemy and the movements of the army subsequent to the battle, until the crossing of the Potomac by Lee and the closing of the campaign, it is not my purpose to write. Suffice it that on the night of the 3d of July the enemy withdrew his left, Ewell's Corps, from our front, and on the morning of the 4th we again occupied the village of Gettysburg, and on that national day victory was proclaimed to the country; that floods of rain on that day prevented army movements of any considerable magnitude, the day being passed by our army in position upon the field, in burying our dead, and some of those of the enemy, and in making the movements already indicated; that on the 5th the pursuit of the enemy was commenced--his dead were buried by us--and the corps of our army, upon various roads, moved from the battlefield. With a statement of some of the results of the battle, as to losses and captures, and of what I saw in riding over the field, when the enemy was gone, my account is done. Our own losses in killed, wounded and missing I estimate at _twenty-three thousand_. Of the "missing" the larger proportion were prisoners, lost on the 1st of July. Our loss in prisoners, not wounded, probably was _four thousand_. The losses were distributed among the different army corps about as follows: In the Second Corps, which sustained the heaviest loss of any corps, a little over _four thousand five hundred_, of whom the missing were a mere nominal number; in the First Corps a little over _four thousand_, of whom a great many were missing; in the Third Corps _four thousand_, of whom some were missing; in the Eleventh Corps nearly _four thousand_, of whom the most were missing; and the rest of the loss, to make the aggregate mentioned, was shared by the Fifth, Sixth and Twelfth Corps and the cavalry. Among these the missing were few; and the losses of the Sixth Corps and of the cavalry were light. I do not think the official reports will show my estimate of our losses to be far from correct, for I have taken great pains to question staff officers upon the subject, and have learned approximate numbers from them. We lost no gun or flag that I have heard of in all the battle. Some small arms, I suppose, were lost on the 1st of July. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded and prisoners I estimate at _forty thousand_, and from the following data and for the following reasons: So far as I can learn we took _ten thousand_ prisoners, who were not wounded--many more than these were captured, but several thousands of them were wounded. I have so far as practicable ascertained the number of dead the enemy left upon the field, approximately, by getting the reports of different burying parties. I think his dead upon the field were _five thousand_, almost all of whom, save those killed on the first of July, were buried by us--the enemy not having them in their possession. In looking at a great number of tables of killed and wounded in battles I have found that the proportion of the killed to the wounded is as _one_ to _five_, or more than five, rarely less than five. So with the killed at the number stated, _twenty-five thousand_ mentioned. I think _fourteen thousand_ of the enemy, wounded and unwounded, fell into our hands. Great numbers of his small arms, two or three guns, and forty or more--was there ever such bannered harvest?--of his regimental battle-flags, were captured by us. Some day possibly we may learn the enemy's loss, but I doubt if he will ever tell truly how many flags he did not take home with him. I have great confidence however in my estimates, for they have been carefully made, and after much inquiry, and with no desire or motive to overestimate the enemy's loss. The magnitude of the armies engaged, the number of the casualties, the object sought by the Rebel, the result, will all contribute to give Gettysburg a place among the great historic battles of the world. That General Meade's concentration was rapid--over thirty miles a day was marched by some of the Corps--that his position was skillfully selected and his dispositions good; that he fought the battle hard and well; that his victory was brilliant and complete, I think all should admit. I cannot but regard it as highly fortunate to us and commendable in General Meade, that the enemy was allowed the initiative, the offensive, in the main battle; that it was much better to allow the Rebel, for his own destruction, to come up and smash his lines and columns upon the defensive solidity of our position, than it would have been to hunt him, for the same purpose, in the woods, or to unearth him from his rifle-pits. In this manner our losses were lighter, and his heavier, than if the case had been reversed. And whatever the books may say of troops fighting the better who make the attack, I am satisfied that in this war, Americans, the Rebels, as well as ourselves, are best on the defensive. The proposition is deducible from the battles of the war, I think, and my own observation confirms it. But men there are who think that nothing was gained or done well in this battle, because some other general did not have the command, or because any portion of the army of the enemy was permitted to escape capture or destruction. As if one army of a hundred thousand men could encounter another of the same number of as good troops and annihilate it! Military men do not claim or expect this; but the McClellan destroyers do, the doughty knights of purchasable newspaper quills; the formidable warriors from the brothels of politics, men of much warlike experience against honesty and honor, of profound attainments in ignorance, who have the maxims of Napoleon, whose spirit they as little understand as they do most things, to quote, to prove all things; but who, unfortunately, have much influence in the country and with the Government, and so over the army. It is very pleasant for these people, no doubt, at safe distances from guns, in the enjoyment of a lucrative office, or of a fraudulently obtained government contract, surrounded by the luxuries of their own firesides, where mud and flooding storms, and utter weariness never penetrate, to discourse of battles and how campaigns should be conducted and armies of the enemy destroyed. But it should be enough, perhaps, to say that men here, or elsewhere, who have knowledge enough of military affairs to entitle them to express an opinion on such matters, and accurate information enough to realize the nature and the means of this desired destruction of Lee's army before it crossed the Potomac into Virginia, will be most likely to vindicate the Pennsylvania campaign of Gen. Meade, and to see that he accomplished all that could have been reasonably expected of any general of any army. Complaint has been, and is, made specially against Meade, that he did not attack Lee near Williamsport before he had time to withdraw across the river. These were the facts concerning this matter: The 13th of July was the earliest day when such an attack, if practicable at all, could have been made. The time before this, since the battle, had been spent in moving the army from the vicinity of the field, finding something of the enemy and concentrating before him. On that day the army was concentrated and in order of battle near the turnpike that leads from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, Md., the right resting at or near the latter place, the left near Jones' crossroads, some six miles in the direction of Sharpsburg, and in the following order from left to right: the 12th corps, the 2d, the 5th, the 6th, the 1st, the 11th; the 3d being in reserve behind the 2d. The mean distance to the Potomac was some six miles, and the enemy was between Meade and the river. The Potomac, swelled by the recent rain, was boiling and swift and deep, a magnificent place to have drowned all the Rebel crew. I have not the least doubt but that Gen. Meade would have liked to drown them all, if he could, but they were unwilling to be drowned, and would fight first. To drive them into the river then, they must be routed. Gen. Meade, I believe, favored an attack upon the enemy at that time, and he summoned his corps commanders to a council upon the subject. The 1st corps was represented by William Hayes, the 3d by French, the 5th by Sykes, the 6th by Sedgwick, the 11th by Howard, the 12th by Slocum, and the Cavalry by Pleasanton. Of the eight generals there, Wadsworth, Howard and Pleasanton were in favor of immediate attack, and five, Hayes, French, Sykes, Sedgwick and Slocum were not in favor of attack until better information was obtained of the position and situation of the enemy. Of the _pros_ Wadsworth only temporarily represented the 1st corps in the brief absence of Newton, who, had a battle occurred, would have commanded. Pleasanton, with his horses, would have been a spectator only, and Howard, with the _brilliant 11th corps_, would have been trusted nowhere but a safe distance from the enemy--not by Gen. Howard's fault, however, for he is a good and brave man. Such was the position of those who felt sanguinarily inclined. Of the _cons_ were all of the fighting generals of the fighting corps, save the 1st. This, then, was the feeling of these generals--all who would have had no responsibility or part in all probability, _hankered_ for a fight--those who would have had both part and responsibility, did not. The attack was not made. At daylight on the morning of the 14th, strong reconnoissances from the 12th, 2d and 5th corps were the means of discovering that between the enemy, except a thousand or fifteen hundred of his rear guard, who fell into our hands, and the Army of the Potomac, rolled the rapid, unbridged river. The Rebel General, Pettigrew, was here killed. The enemy had constructed bridges, had crossed during all the preceding night, but so close were our cavalry and infantry upon him in the morning, that the bridges were destroyed before his rear guard had all crossed. Among the considerations influencing these generals against the propriety of attack at that time, were probably the following: The army was wearied and worn down by four weeks of constant forced marching or battle, in the midst of heat, mud and drenching showers, burdened with arms, accoutrements, blankets, sixty to a hundred cartridges, and five to eight days' rations. What such weariness means few save soldiers know. Since the battle the army had been constantly diminished by sickness or prostration and by more straggling than I ever saw before. Poor fellows--they could not help it. The men were near the point when further efficient physical exertion was quite impossible. Even the sound of the skirmishing, which was almost constant, and the excitement of impending battle, had no effect to arouse for an hour the exhibition of their wonted former vigor. The enemy's loss in battle, it is true, had been far heavier than ours; but his army was less weary than ours, for in a given time since the first of the campaign, it had marched far less and with lighter loads. These Rebels are accustomed to hunger and nakedness, customs to which our men do not take readily. And the enemy had straggled less, for the men were going away from battle and towards home, and for them to straggle was to go into captivity, whose end they could not conjecture. The enemy was somewhere in position in a ridgy, wooded country, abounding in strong defensive positions, his main bodies concealed, protected by rifle-pits and epaulements, acting strictly on the defensive. His dispositions, his position even, with any considerable degree of accuracy was unknown, nor could they be known except by reconnoisances in such force, and carried to such extent, as would have constituted them attacks liable to bring on at any moment a general engagement, and at places where we were least prepared and least likely to be successful. To have had a battle there then, Gen. Meade would have had to attack a cunning enemy in the dark, where surprises, undiscovered rifle-pits and batteries, and unseen bodies of men might have met his forces at every point. With his not greatly superior numbers, under such circumstances had Gen. Meade attacked, would he have been victorious? The vote of these generals at the council shows their opinion--my own is that he would have been repulsed with heavy loss with little damage to the enemy. Such a result might have satisfied the bloody politicians better than the end of the campaign as it was; but I think the country did not need that sacrifice of the Army of the Potomac at that time--that enough odor of sacrifice came up to its nostrils from the 1st Fredericksburg field, to stop their snuffing for some time. I felt the probability of defeat strongly at the time, when we all supposed that a conflict would certainly ensue; for always before a battle--at least it so happens to me--some dim presentiment of results, some unaccountable fore-shadowing pervades the army. I never knew the result to prove it untrue, which rests with the weight of a conviction. Whether such shadows are cause or consequence, I shall not pretend to determine; but when, as they often are, they are general, I think they should not be wholly disregarded by the commander. I believe the Army of the Potomac is always willing, often eager, to fight the enemy, whenever, as it thinks, there is a fair chance for victory; that it always will fight, let come victory or defeat whenever it is ordered so to do. Of course the army, both officers and men, had very great disappointment and very great sorrow that the Rebels _escaped_--so it was called--across the river; the disappointment was genuine, at least to the extent that disappointment is like surprise; but the sorrow to judge by looks, tones and actions, rather than by words, was not of that deep, sable character for which there is no balm. Would it be an imputation upon the courage or patriotism of this army if it was not rampant for fight at this particular time and under the existing circumstances? Had the enemy stayed upon the left bank of the Potomac twelve hours longer, there would have been a great battle there near Williamsport on the 14th of July. After such digression, if such it is, I return to Gettysburg. As good generalship is claimed for Gen. Meade in the battle, so was the conduct of his subordinate commanders good. I know, and have heard, of no bad conduct or blundering on the part of any officer, save that of Sickles, on the 2d of July, and that was so gross, and came so near being the cause of irreparable disaster that I cannot discuss it with moderation. I hope the man may never return to the Army of the Potomac, or elsewhere, to a position where his incapacity, or something worse, may bring fruitless destruction to thousands again. The conduct of officers and men was good. The 11th corps behaved badly; but I have yet to learn the occasion when, in the opinion of any save their own officers and themselves, the men of this corps have behaved well on the march or before the enemy, either under Siegel or any other commander. With this exception, and some minor cases of very little consequence in the general result, our troops whenever and wherever the enemy came, stood against them storms of impassable fire. Such was the infantry, such the artillery--the cavalry did less but it did all that was required. The enemy, too, showed a determination and valor worthy of a better cause. Their conduct in this battle even makes me proud of them as Americans. They would have been victorious over any but the best of soldiers. Lee and his generals presumed too much upon some past successes, and did not estimate how much they were due on their part to position, as at Fredericksburg, or on our part to bad generalship, as at the 2d Bull Run and Chancellorsville. The fight of the 1st of July we do not, of course, claim as a victory; but even that probably would have resulted differently had Reynolds not been struck. The success of the enemy in the battle ended with the 1st of July. The Rebels were joyous and jubilant--so said our men in their hands, and the citizens of Gettysburg--at their achievements on that day. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville were remembered by them. They saw victory already won, or only to be snatched from the streaming coat-tails of the 11th corps, or the "_raw Pennsylvania militia_" as they thought they were, when they saw them run; and already the spires of Baltimore and the dome of the National Capitol were forecast upon their glad vision--only two or three days march away through the beautiful valleys of Pennsylvania and "_my_" Maryland. Was there ever anything so fine before? How splendid it would be to enjoy the poultry and the fruit, the meats, the cakes, the beds, the clothing, the _Whiskey_, without price in this rich land of the Yankee! It would, indeed! But on the 2d of July something of a change came over the spirit of these dreams. They were surprised at results and talked less and thought more as they prepared supper that night. After the fight of the 3d they talked only of the means of their own safety from destruction. Pickett's splendid division had been almost annihilated, they said, and they talked not of how many were lost, but of who had escaped. They talked of these "Yanks" that had _clubs_ on their flags and caps, the trefoils of the 2d corps that are like _clubs_ in cards. The battle of Gettysburg is distinguished in this war, not only as by far the greatest and severest conflict that has occurred, but for some other things that I may mention. The fight of the 2d of July, on the left, which was almost a separate and complete battle, is, so far as I know, alone in the following particulars: the numbers of men actually engaged at one time, and the enormous losses that occurred in killed and wounded in the space of about two hours. If the truth could be obtained, it would probably show a much larger number of casualties in this than my estimate in a former part of these sheets. Few battles of the war that have had so many casualties altogether as those of the two hours on the 2d of July. The 3d of July is distinguished. Then occurred the "great cannonade"--so we call it, and so it would be called in any war, and in almost any battle. And besides this, the main operations that followed have few parallels in history, none in this war, of the magnitude and magnificence of the assault, single and simultaneous, the disparity of the numbers engaged, and the brilliancy, completeness and overwhelming character of the result in favor of the side numerically the weaker. I think I have not, in giving the results of this encounter, overestimated the numbers or the losses of the enemy. We learned on all hands, by prisoners and by the newspapers, that over two divisions moved up to the assault--Pickett's and Pettigrew's--that this was the first engagement of Pickett's in the battle, and the first of Pettigrew's save a light participation on the 1st of July. The Rebel divisions usually number nine or ten thousand, or did at that time, as we understood. Then I have seen something of troops and think I can estimate their numbers somewhat. The number of the Rebels killed here I have estimated in this way: the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps buried the Rebel dead in their own front, and where they fought upon their own grounds, by count they buried over _one thousand eight hundred_. I think no more than about _two hundred_ of these were killed on the 2d of July in front of the 2d division, and the rest must have fallen upon the 3d. My estimates that depend upon this contingency may be erroneous, but to no great extent. The rest of the particulars of the assault, our own losses and our captures, I know are approximately accurate. Yet the whole sounds like romance, a grand stage piece of blood. Of all the corps d'armie, for hard fighting, severe losses and brilliant results, the palm should be, as by the army it is, awarded to the "_Old Second_." It did more fighting than any other corps, inflicted severer losses upon the enemy in killed and wounded, and sustained a heavier like loss, and captured more flags than all the rest of the army, and almost as many prisoners as the rest of the army. The loss of the 2d corps in killed and wounded in this battle--there is no other test of hard fighting--was almost as great as that of all Gen. Grant's forces in the battle that preceded and in the siege of Vicksburg. Three-eighths of the whole corps were killed and wounded. Why does the Western Army suppose that the Army of the Potomac does not fight? Was ever a more absurd supposition? The Army of the Potomac is grand! Give it good leadership--let it alone--and it will not fail to accomplish all that reasonable men desire. Of Gibbon's white trefoil division, if I am not cautious, I shall speak too enthusiastically. This division has been accustomed to distinguished leadership. Sumner, Sedgwick and Howard have honored, and been honored by, its command. It was repulsed under Sedgwick at Antietam and under Howard at Fredericksburg; it was victorious under Gibbon at the 2d Fredericksburg and at Gettysburg. At Gettysburg its loss in killed and wounded was over _one thousand seven hundred_, near one-half of all engaged; it captured _seventeen_ battle-flags and _two thousand three hundred_ prisoners. Its bullets hailed on Pickett's division, and killed or mortally wounded four Rebel generals, _Barksdale_ on the 2d of July, with the three on the 3d, _Armstead_, _Garnett_ and _Kemper_. In losses in killed and wounded, and in captures from the enemy of prisoners and flags, it stood pre-eminent among all the divisions at Gettysburg. Under such generals as Hancock and Gibbon brilliant results may be expected. Will the country remember them? It is understood in the army that the President thanked the slayer of Barton Key for _saving the day_ at Gettysburg. Does the country know any better than the President that Meade, Hancock and Gibbon were entitled to some little share of such credit? At about six o'clock on the afternoon of the 3d of July, my duties done upon the field, I quitted it to go to the General. My brave horse _Dick_--poor creature, his good conduct in the battle that afternoon had been complimented by a Brigadier--was a sight to see. He was literally covered with blood. Struck repeatedly, his right thigh had been ripped open in a ghastly manner by a piece of shell, and three bullets were lodged deep in his body, and from his wounds the blood oozed and ran down his sides and legs and with the sweat formed a bloody foam. Dick's was no mean part in that battle. Good conduct in men under such circumstances as he was placed in might result from a sense of duty--his was the result of his bravery. Most horses would have been unmanageable with the flash and roar of arms about and the shouting. Dick was utterly cool, and would have obeyed the rein had it been a straw. To Dick belongs the honor of first mounting that stormy crest before the enemy, not forty yards away, whose bullets smote him, and of being the only horse there during the heat of the battle. Even the enemy noticed Dick, and one of their reports of the battle mentions the "_solitary horseman_" who rallied our wavering line. He enabled me to do twelve times as much as I could have done on foot. It would not be dignified for an officer on foot to run; it is entirely so, mounted, to gallop. I do not approve of officers dismounting in battle, which is the time of all when they most need to be mounted, for thereby they have so much greater facilities for being everywhere present. Most officers, however, in close action, dismount. Dick deserves well of his country, and one day should have a horse-monument. If there be "_ut sapientibus placit_," and equine elysium, I will send to Charon the brass coin, the fee for Dick's passage over, and on the other side of the Styx in those shadowy clover-fields he may nibble the blossoms forever. I had been struck upon the thigh by a bullet which I think must have glanced and partially spent its force upon my saddle. It had pierced the thick cloth of my trowsers and two thicknesses of underclothing, but had not broken the skin, leaving me with an enormous bruise that for a time benumbed the entire leg. At the time of receiving it, I heard the thump, and noticed it and the hole in the cloth into which I thrust my finger, and I experienced a feeling of relief I am sure, when I found that my leg was not pierced. I think when I dismounted my horse after that fight that I was no very comely specimen of humanity. Drenched with sweat, the white of battle, by the reaction, now turned to burning red. I felt like a boiled man; and had it not been for the exhiliration at results I should have been miserable. This kept me up, however, and having found a man to transfer the saddle from poor Dick, who was now disposed to lie down by loss of blood and exhaustion, to another horse, I hobbled on among the hospitals in search of Gen. Gibbon. The skulkers were about, and they were as loud as any in their rejoicings at the victory, and I took a malicious pleasure as I went along and met them, in taunting the _sneaks_ with their cowardice and telling them--it was not true--that Gen. Meade had just given the order to the Provost Guard to arrest and shoot all men they could find away from their regiments who could not prove a good account of themselves. To find the General was no easy matter. I inquired for both Generals Hancock and Gibbon--I knew well enough that they would be together--and for the hospitals of the 2d corps. My search was attended with many incidents that were provokingly humorous. The stupidity of most men is amazing. I would ask of a man I met, "Do you know, sir, where the 2d corps hospitals are?" "The 12th corps hospital is there!" Then I would ask sharply, "Did you understand me to ask for the 12th corps hospital?" "No!" "Then why tell me what I do not ask or care to know?" Then stupidity would stare or mutter about the ingratitude of some people for kindness. Did I ask for the Generals I was looking for, they would announce the interesting fact, in reply, that they had seen some other generals. Some were sure that Gen. Hancock or Gibbon was dead. They had seen his dead body. This was a falsehood, and they knew it. Then it was Gen. Longstreet. This was also, as they knew, a falsehood. Oh, sorrowful was the sight to see so many wounded! The whole neighborhood in rear of the field became one vast hospital of miles in extent. Some could walk to the hospitals; such as could not were taken upon stretchers from the places where they fell to selected points and thence the ambulance bore them, a miserable load, to their destination. Many were brought to the building, along the Taneytown road, and too badly wounded to be carried further, died and were buried there, Union and Rebel soldiers together. At every house, and barn, and shed the wounded were; by many a cooling brook, or many a shady slope or grassy glade, the red flags beckoned them to their tented asylums, and there they gathered, in numbers a great army, a mutilated, bruised mass of humanity. Men with gray hair and furrowed cheeks and soft-lipped, beardless boys were there, for these bullets have made no distinction between age and youth. Every conceivable wound that iron and lead can make, blunt or sharp, bullet, ball and shell, piercing, bruising, tearing, was there; sometimes so light that a bandage and cold water would restore the soldier to the ranks again; sometimes so severe that the poor victim in his hopeless pain, remedy-less save by the only panacea for all mortal suffering, invoked that. The men are generally cheerful, and even those with frightful wounds, often are talking with animated faces of nothing but the battle and the victory. But some are downcast, their faces distorted with pain. Some have undergone the surgeon's work; some, like men at a ticket office, await impatiently their turn to have an arm or a leg cut off. Some walk about with an arm in a sling; some sit idly upon the ground; some lie at full length upon a little straw, or a blanket, with their brawny, now blood-stained, limbs bare, and you may see where the minie bullet has struck or the shell has torn. From a small round hole upon many a manly breast, the red blood trickles, but the pallid cheek, the hard-drawn breath and dim closed eyes tell how near the source of life it has gone. The surgeons, with coats off and sleeves rolled up, and the hospital attendants with green bands upon their caps, are about their work; and their faces and clothes are spattered with blood; and though they look weary and tired, their work goes systematically and steadily on. How much and how long they have worked, the piles of legs, arms, feet, hands, and fingers about partially tell. Such sounds are heard sometimes--you would not have heard them upon the field--as convince that bodies, bones, sinews and muscles are not made of insensible stone. Near by appear a row of small fresh mounds, placed side by side. They were not there day before yesterday. They will become more numerous every day. Such things I saw as I rode along. At last I found the Generals. Gen. Gibbon was sitting on a chair that had been borrowed somewhere, with his wounded shoulder bare, and an attendant was bathing it with cold water. Gen. Hancock was near by in an ambulance. They were at the tents of the Second Corps hospitals, which were on Rock Run. As I approached Gen. Gibbon, when he saw me, he began to hurrah and wave his right hand. He had heard the result. I said: "O, General, long and well may you wave"--and he shook me warmly by the hand. Gen. Gibbon was struck by a bullet in the left shoulder, which had passed from the front through the flesh and out behind, fracturing the shoulder blade and inflicting a severe but not dangerous wound. He thinks he was the mark of a sharpshooter of the enemy hid in the bushes, near where he and I had sat so long during the cannonade; and he was wounded and taken off the field before the fire of the main lines of infantry had commenced, he being at the time he was hit near the left of his division. Gen. Hancock was struck a little later near the same part of the field by a bullet, piercing and almost going through his thigh, without touching the bone, however. His wound was severe, also. He was carried back out of range, but before he would be carried off the field, he lay upon the ground in sight of the crest, where he could see something of the fight, until he knew what would be the result. And then, at Gen. Gibbon's request, I had to tell him and a large voluntary crowd of the wounded who pressed around now, for the wounds they showed not rebuked for closing up to the Generals, the story of the fight. I was nothing loth; and I must say though I used sometimes before the war to make speeches, that I never had so enthusiastic an audience before. Cries of "good," "glorious," frequently interrupted me, and the storming of the wall was applauded by enthusiastic tears and the waving of battered, bloody hands. By the custom of the service the General had the right to have me along with him, while away with his wound; but duty and inclination attracted me still to the field, and I obtained the General's consent to stay. Accompanying Gen. Gibbon to Westminster, the nearest point to which railroad trains then ran, and seeing him transferred from an ambulance to the cars for Baltimore on the 4th, the next day I returned to the field to his division, since his wounding in the command of Gen. Harrow. On the 6th of July, while my bullet bruise was yet too inflamed and sensitive for me to be good for much in the way of duty--the division was then halted for the day some four miles from the field on the Baltimore turnpike--I could not repress the desire or omit the opportunity to see again where the battle had been. With the right stirrup strap shortened in a manner to favor the bruised leg, I could ride my horse at a walk without serious discomfort. It seemed very strange upon approaching the horse-shoe crest again, not to see it covered with the thousands of troops and horses and guns, but they were all gone--the armies, to my seeming, had vanished--and on that lovely summer morning the stillness and silence of death pervaded the localities where so recently the shouts and the cannon had thundered. The recent rains had washed out many an unsightly spot, and smoothed many a harrowed trace of the conflict; but one still needed no guide save the eyes, to follow the track of that storm, which the storms of heaven were powerless soon to entirely efface. The spade and shovel, so far as a little earth for the human bodies would render their task done, had completed their work--a great labor, that. But still might see under some concealing bush, or sheltering rock, what had once been a man, and the thousands of stricken horses still lay scattered as they had died. The scattered small arms and the accoutrements had been collected and carried away, almost all that were of any value; but great numbers of bent and splintered muskets, rent knapsacks and haversacks, bruised canteens, shreds of caps, coats, trowsers, of blue or gray cloth, worthless belts and cartridge boxes, torn blankets, ammunition boxes, broken wheels, smashed limbers, shattered gun carriages, parts of harness, of all that men or horses wear or use in battle, were scattered broadcast over miles of the field. From these one could tell where the fight had been hottest. The rifle-pits and epaulements and the trampled grass told where the lines had stood, and the batteries--the former being thicker where the enemy had been than those of our own construction. No soldier was to be seen, but numbers of civilians and boys, and some girls even, were curiously loitering about the field, and their faces showed not sadness or horror, but only staring wonder or smirking curiosity. They looked for mementoes of the battle to keep, they said; but their furtive attempts to conceal an uninjured musket or an untorn blanket--they had been told that all property left here belonged to the Government--showed that the love of gain was an ingredient at least of their motive for coming here. Of course there was not the slightest objection to their taking anything they could find now; but their manner of doing it was the objectionable thing. I could now understand why soldiers had been asked a dollar for a small strip of old linen to bind their own wound, and not be compelled to go off to the hospitals. Never elsewhere upon any field have I seen such abundant evidences of a terrific fire of cannon and musketry as upon this. Along the enemy's position, where our shells and shot had struck during the cannonade of the third, the trees had cast their trunks and branches as if they had been icicles shaken by a blast. And graves of the Rebel's making, and dead horses and scattered accoutrements, showed that other things besides trees had been struck by our projectiles. I must say that, having seen the work of their guns upon the same occasion, I was gratified to see these things. Along the slope of Culp's Hill, in front of the position of the 12th, and the 1st Division of the 1st Corps, the trees were almost literally peeled, from the ground up some fifteen or twenty feet, so thick upon them were the scars the bullets had made. Upon a single tree, not over a foot and a half in diameter, I actually counted as many as two hundred and fifty bullet marks. The ground was covered by the little twigs that had been cut off by the hailstorm of lead. Such were the evidences of the storm under which Ewell's bold Rebels assaulted our breastworks on the night of the 2d and the morning of the 3d of July. And those works looked formidable, zig-zaging along these rocky crests, even now when not a musket was behind them. What madness on the part of the enemy to have attacked them! All along through these bullet-stormed woods were interspersed little patches of fresh earth, raised a foot or so above the surrounding ground. Some were very near the front of the works; and near by, upon a tree whose bark had been smoothed by an axe, written in red chalk would be the words, not in fine handwriting, "75 Rebels buried here." "54 Rebs. there." And so on. Such was the burial and such the epitaph of many of those famous men, once led by the mighty Stonewall Jackson. Oh, this damned rebellion will make brutes of us all, if it is not soon quelled! Our own men were buried in graves, not trenches; and upon a piece of board, or stave of a barrel, or bit of cracker box, placed at the head, were neatly cut or penciled the name and regiment of the one buried in such. This practice was general, but of course there must be some exceptions, for sometimes the cannon's load had not left enough of a man to recognize or name. The reasons here for the more careful interment of our own dead than such as was given to the dead of the enemy are obvious and I think satisfactory. Our own dead were usually buried not long after they fell, and without any general order to that effect. It was a work that the men's hearts were in as soon as the fight was over and opportunity offered, to hunt out their dead companions, to make them a grave in some convenient spot, and decently composed with their blankets wrapped about them, to cover them tenderly with earth and mark their resting place. Such burials were not without as scalding tears as ever fell upon the face of coffined mortality. The dead of the enemy could not be buried until after the close of the whole battle. The army was about to move--some of it was already upon the march, before such burial commenced. Tools, save those carried by the pioneers, were many miles away with the train, and the burying parties were required to make all haste in their work, in order to be ready to move with their regiments. To make long shallow trenches, to collect the Rebel dead, often hundreds in one place, and to cover them hastily with a little earth, without name, number, or mark, save the shallow mound above them--their names of course they did not know--was the best that could be done. I should have been glad to have seen more formal burial, even of these men of the rebellion, both because hostilities should cease with death, and of the respect I have for them as my brave, though deluded, countrymen. I found fault with such burial at the time, though I knew that the best was done that could be under the circumstances; but it may perhaps soften somewhat the rising feelings upon this subject, of any who may be disposed to share mine, to remember that under similar circumstances--had the issue of the battle been reversed--our own dead would have had no burial at all, at the hands of the enemy, but, stripped of their clothing, their naked bodies would have been left to rot, and their bones to whiten upon the top of the ground where they fell. Plenty of such examples of Rebel magnanimity are not wanting, and one occurred on this field, too. Our dead that fell into the hands of the enemy on the 1st of July had been plundered of all their clothing, but they were left unburied until our own men buried them after the Rebels had retreated at the end of the battle. All was bustle and noise in the little town of Gettysburg as I entered it on my tour of the field. From the afternoon of the 1st to the morning of the 4th of July, the enemy was in possession. Very many of the inhabitants had, upon the first approach of the enemy, or upon the retirement of our troops, fled their homes and the town not to return until after the battle. Now the town was a hospital where gray and blue mingled in about equal proportion. The public buildings, the courthouse, the churches and many private dwellings were full of wounded. There had been in some of the streets a good deal of fighting, and bullets had thickly spattered the fences and walls, and shells had riddled the houses from side to side. And the Rebels had done their work of pillage there, too, in spite of the smooth-sounding general order of the Rebel commander enjoining a sacred regard for private property--the order was really good and would sound marvelously well abroad or in history. All stores of drugs and medicines, of clothing, tin-ware and all groceries had been rifled and emptied without pay or offer of recompense. Libraries, public and private, had been entered and the books scattered about the yards or destroyed. Great numbers of private dwellings had been entered and occupied without ceremony and whatever was liked had been appropriated or wantonly destroyed. Furniture had been smashed and beds ripped open, and apparently unlicensed pillage had reigned. Citizens and women who had remained had been kindly relieved of their money, their jewelry and their watches--all this by the high-toned chivalry, the army of the magnanimous Lee! Put these things by the side of the acts of the "vandal Yankees" in Virginia, and then let mad Rebeldom prate of honor! But the people, the women and children that had fled, were returning, or had returned to their homes--such homes--and amid the general havoc were restoring as they could order to the desecrated firesides. And the faces of them all plainly told that, with all they had lost and bad as was the condition of all things they found, they were better pleased with such homes than with wandering houseless in the fields with the Rebels there. All had treasures of incidents of the battle and of the occupation of the enemy--wonderful sights, escapes, witnessed encounters, wounds, the marvelous passage of shells or bullets which, upon the asking, or even without, they were willing to share with the stranger. I heard of no more than one or two cases of any personal injury received by any of the inhabitants. One woman was said to have been killed while at her wash-tub, sometime during the battle; but probably by a stray bullet coming a very long distance from our own men. For the next hundred years Gettysburg will be rich in legends and traditions of the battle. I rode through the Cemetery on "Cemetery Hill." How these quiet sleepers must have been astounded in their graves when the twenty pound Parrott guns thundered above them and the solid shot crushed their gravestones! The flowers, roses and creeping vines that pious hands had planted to bloom and shed their odors over the ashes of dead ones gone, were trampled upon the ground and black with the cannon's soot. A dead horse lay by the marble shaft, and over it the marble finger pointed to the sky. The marble lamb that had slept its white sleep on the grave of a child, now lies blackened upon a broken gun-carriage. Such are the incongruities and jumblings of battle. I looked away to _the group of trees_--the Rebel gunners know what ones I mean, and so do the survivors of Pickett's division--and a strange fascination led me thither. How thick are the marks of battle as I approach--the graves of the men of the 3d division of the 2d corps; the splintered oaks, the scattered horses--seventy-one dead horses were on a spot some fifty yards square near the position of Woodruff's battery, and where he fell. I stood solitary upon the crest by "_the trees_" where, less than three days ago, I had stood before; but now how changed is all the eye beholds. Do these thick mounds cover the fiery hearts that in the battle rage swept the crest and stormed the wall? I read their names--them, alas, I do not know--but I see the regiments marked on their frail monuments--"20th Mass. Vols.," "69 P. V.," "1st Minn. Vols.," and the rest--they are all represented, and as they fought commingled here. So I am not alone. These, my brethren of the fight, are with me. Sleep, noble brave! The foe shall not desecrate your sleep. Yonder thick trenches will hold them. As long as patriotism is a virtue, and treason a crime your deeds have made this crest, your resting place, hallowed ground! But I have seen and said enough of this battle. The unfortunate wounding of my General so early in the action of the 3d of July, leaving important duties which, in the unreasoning excitement of the moment I in part assumed, enabled me to do for the successful issue, something which under other circumstances would not have fallen to my rank or place. Deploring the occasion for taking away from the division in that moment of its need its soldierly, appropriate head, so cool, so clear, I am yet glad, as that was to be, that his example and his tuition have not been entirely in vain to me, and that my impulses then prompted me to do somewhat as he might have done had he been on the field. The encomiums of officers, so numerous and some of so high rank, generously accorded me for my conduct upon that occasion--I am not without vanity--were gratifying. My position as a staff officer gave me an opportunity to see much, perhaps as much as any one person, of that conflict. My observations were not so particular as if I had been attached to a smaller command; not so general as may have been those of a staff officer to the General commanding the army; but of such as they were, my heart was there, and I could do no less than to write something of them, in the intervals between marches and during the subsequent repose of the army at the close of the campaign. I have put somewhat upon these pages--I make no apology for the egotism, if such there is, of this account--it is not designed to be a history, but simply _my account_ of the battle. It should not be assumed, if I have told of some occurrences, that there were not other important ones. I would not have it supposed that I have attempted to do full justice to the good conduct of the fallen, or the survivors of the 1st and 12th Corps. Others must tell of them. I did not see their work. A full account of _the battle as it was_ will never, can never be made. Who could sketch the changes, the constant shifting of the bloody panorama? It is not possible. The official reports may give results as to losses, with statements of attacks and repulses; they may also note the means by which results were attained, which is a statement of the number and kind of the forces employed, but the connection between means and results, the mode, the battle proper, these reports touch lightly. Two prominent reasons at least exist which go far to account for the general inadequacy of these official reports, or to account for their giving no true idea of what they assume to describe--the literary infirmity of the reporters and their not seeing themselves and their commands as others would have seen them. And factions, and parties, and politics, the curses of this Republic, are already putting in their unreasonable demands for the foremost honors of the field. "Gen. Hooker won Gettysburg." How? Not with the army in person or by infinitesimal influence--leaving it almost four days before the battle when both armies were scattered and fifty miles apart! Was ever claim so absurd? Hooker, and he alone, won the result at Chancellorsville. "Gen. Howard won Gettysburg!" "Sickles saved the day!" Just Heaven, save the poor Army of the Potomac from its friends! It has more to dread and less to hope from them than from the red bannered hosts of the rebellion. The states prefer each her claim for the sole brunt and winning of the fight. "Pennsylvania won it!" "New York won it!" "Did not Old Greece, or some tribe from about the sources of the Nile win it?" For modern Greeks--from Cork--and African Hannibals were there. Those intermingled graves along the crest bearing the names of every loyal state, save one or two, should admonish these geese to cease to cackle. One of the armies of the country won the battle, and that army supposes that Gen. Meade led it upon that occasion. If it be not one of the lessons that this war teaches, that we have a country paramount and supreme over faction, and party, and state, then was the blood of fifty thousand citizens shed on this field in vain. For the reasons mentioned, of this battle, greater than that of Waterloo, a history, just, comprehensive, complete will never be written. By-and-by, out of the chaos of trash and falsehood that the newspapers hold, out of the disjointed mass of reports, out of the traditions and tales that come down from the field, some eye that never saw the battle will select, and some pen will write what will be named _the history_. With that the world will be and, if we are alive, we must be, content. Already, as I rode down from the heights, nature's mysterious loom was at work, joining and weaving on her ceaseless web the shells had broken there. Another spring shall green these trampled slopes, and flowers, planted by unseen hands, shall bloom upon these graves; another autumn and the yellow harvest shall ripen there--all not in less, but in higher perfection for this poured out blood. In another decade of years, in another century, or age, we hope that the Union, by the same means, may repose in a securer peace and bloom in a higher civilization. Then what matter if it lame Tradition glean on this field and hand down her garbled sheaf--if deft story with furtive fingers plait her ballad wreaths, deeds of her heroes here? or if stately history fill as she list her arbitrary tablet, the sounding record of this fight? Tradition, story, history--all will not efface the true, grand epic of Gettysburg. FRANK A. HASKELL. _To H. M. Haskell._ Footnotes: [1] _History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac_ (New York, 1886), pp. 512, 513. [2] _Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Wisconsin for 1865_ (Madison, 1866), pp. 510, 511. [3] Columbus (Wis.) _Democrat_, May 27, 1895. [4] Colonel Harvey Boyd McKeen, of Pennsylvania, commander of the Third Brigade. [5] Columbus (Wis.) _Democrat_, May 27, 1895. [6] Upon the Portage Public Library's copy of the original pamphlet edition, Hon. A. J. Turner wrote the following explanatory note: "The within description of the 'The Battle of Gettysburg' was written by Colonel Frank A. Haskell who was on the staff of General John Gibbon, to his brother at Portage, Wisconsin. It was submitted to me soon after, in the _State Register_ office, but its great length rendered its publication in our columns quite impossible. The article was written from the 'Head Quarters of the Army of the Potomac,' but bore no date, although it was during the same month as the battle, and was written by Colonel Haskell in the intervals of the march, and was a private letter without design of publication--A. J. TURNER." Transcriber's Notes: Passages in italics are indicated by _italics_. The following misprints have been corrected: "attiude" corrected to "attitude" (page 101) "altogther" corrected to "altogether" (page 157) "divison" corrected to "division" (page 179) Other than the corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation usage have been retained. 
20762	----	CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG _CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.--VI._ CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG BY ABNER DOUBLEDAY BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U.S.A., AND LATE MAJOR-GENERAL U.S.V.; COMMANDING THE FIRST CORPS AT GETTYSBURG. NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 743 AND 745 BROADWAY 1882 COPYRIGHT BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1882 TROW'S PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY 210-213 _East 12th Street_ NEW YORK PREFACE. In writing ths narrative, which relates to the decisive campaign which freed the Northern States from invasion, it may not be out of place to state what facilities I have had for observation in the fulfilment of so important a task. I can only say that I was, to a considerable extent, an actor in the scenes I describe, and knew the principal leaders on both sides, in consequence of my association with them at West Point, and, subsequently, in the regular army. Indeed, several of them, including Stonewall Jackson and A. P. Hill, were, prior to the war, officers in the regiment to which I belonged. As commander of the Defences of Washington in the spring of 1862, I was, owing to the nature of my duties, brought into intimate relations with the statesmen who controlled the Government at the time, and became well acquainted with President Lincoln. I was present, too, after the Battle of Gettysburg, at a very interesting Cabinet Council, in which the pursuit of Lee was fully discussed; so that, in one way and another, I have had better opportunities to judge of men and measures than usually fall to the lot of others who have written on the same subject. I have always felt it to be the duty of every one who held a prominent position in the great war to give to posterity the benefit of his personal recollections; for no dry official statement can ever convey an adequate idea to those who come after us of the sufferings and sacrifices through which the country has passed. Thousands of men--the flower of our Northern youth--have gone down to their graves unheralded and unknown, and their achievements and devotion to the cause have already been forgotten. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us, who were their comrades in the field, to do all in our power to preserve their deeds from oblivion. And yet it is no easy task to relate contemporaneous events. Whoever attempts it must be prepared for severe criticism and the exhibition of much personal feeling. Some of this may be avoided, it is true, by writing a colorless history, praising everybody, and attributing all disasters to dispensations of Providence, for which no one is to blame. I cannot, however, consent to fulfill my allotted task in this way, for the great lessons of the war are too valuable to be ignored or misstated. It is not my desire to assail any of the patriotic men who were engaged in the contest, but each of us is responsible for our actions in this world, and for the consequences which flow from them; and where great disasters have occurred, it is due both to the living and the dead that the causes and circumstances be justly and properly stated. Richelieu once exclaimed, upon giving away a high appointment: "Now I have made one ingrate and a thousand enemies." Every one who writes the history of the Great Rebellion will often have occasion to reiterate the statement: For the military critic must necessarily describe facts which imply praise or censure. Those who have contributed to great successes think much more might have been said on the subject, and those who have caused reverses and defeats are bitter in their denunciations. Nevertheless, the history of the war should be written before the facts have faded from the memory of living men, and have become mere matters of tradition. In a narrative of this kind, resting upon a great number of voluminous details, I cannot hope to have wholly escaped error, and wherever I have misconceived or misstated a fact, it will give me pleasure to correct the record. A. D. NEW YORK, January, 1882. CONTENTS. LIST OF MAPS CHANCELLORSVILLE CHAPTER I. THE OPENING OF 1863--HOOKER'S PLANS CHAPTER II. FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY CHAPTER III. THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY CHAPTER IV. THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS CHAPTER V. JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED CHAPTER VI. SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK--ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS CHAPTER VII. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY CHAPTER VIII. MAY FOURTH--ATTACK ON SEDGWICK'S FORCE CHAPTER IX. PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT CHAPTER X. BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD) GETTYSBURG CHAPTER I. THE INVASION OF THE NORTH CHAPTER II. HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE-- ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE CHAPTER III. STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLAN CHAPTER IV. THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863 CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT CHAPTER VII. GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE OFFICERS APPENDIX A APPENDIX B INDEX LIST OF MAPS. FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA OPERATIONS ON THE FIRST OF MAY, 1863 JACKSON'S ATTACK ON HOWARD, MAY 1 BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY SEDGWICK'S POSITION FROM THE POTOMAC TO HARRISBURG DIAGRAMS OF POSITIONS IN THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG: I. II. III. IV. GETTYSBURG: FINAL ATTACK OF THE FIRST DAY AND BATTLE OF THE SECOND DAY DIAGRAM OF THE ATTACK ON SICKLES AND SYKES CHANCELLORSVILLE. CHANCELLORSVILLE. CHAPTER I. THE OPENING OF 1863.--HOOKER'S PLANS. After the great disaster of Fredericksburg, General Burnside, the Commander of the Union Army, was superseded by Major-General Joseph Hooker, a graduate of West Point, who having formerly held a high position on the staff of General Gideon J. Pillow in the war with Mexico, was supposed to be well acquainted with military operations on a large scale. He had subsequently left the army, and had been engaged in civil pursuits for several years. He was a man of fine presence, of great personal magnetism, and had the reputation of being one of our most efficient and successful corps commanders. When the campaign of Chancellorsville commenced, the Army of the Potomac was posted on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, among the Stafford hills, in a position which was considered almost impregnable. It rested upon the Potomac River, and as all of its supplies came by water, they were not subject to delay or interruption of any kind; nor were they endangered by the movements of the enemy. At the period referred to, General Hooker had under him a force of about 124,500 men of all arms, 11,500 of which were cavalry. On the opposite side of the river, the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Robert E. Lee, numbered, according to their official reports, about sixty-two thousand men, three thousand of which were cavalry;* but the difference was amply compensated by the wide river in front of the enemy, and the fact that every available point and ford was well fortified and guarded. General Thomas J. Jackson, commonly called Stonewall Jackson, held the line below Hamilton's crossing to Port Royal. Two out of four divisions of Longstreet's corps were absent. The fourth, under Major-General Lafayette McLaws, was posted from Hamilton's crossing to Banks' Ford. Still farther up and beyond the front of either army, the crossing-places were watched by the rebel cavalry under Major- General J. E. B. Stuart, supported by the Third Division of Longstreet's corps, that of Anderson. [* Napoleon says 100,000 men on the rolls are only equivalent to about 80,000 muskets in action. It is doubtful if Hooker had over 113,000 men for actual combat. Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Forbes, Assistant Adjutant General, who has had access to the records, after a careful estimate, places the number as follows. First Corps, 16,000; Second Corps, 16,000; Third Corps, 18,000; Fifth Corps, 15,000; Sixth Corps, 22,000; Eleventh Corps, 15,000; Twelfth Corps, 11,000; total infantry and artillery, 113,000; Pleasanton's cavalry, 1,500; total effective force, 114,500. He estimates Lee's army at 62,000, which the Confederate authorities, Hotchkiss and Allan, place as follows: Anderson's and McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's Corps, 17,000; Jackson's Corps, 33,500; Stuart's Cavalry, 2,700; Artillery, 5,000; add 4,000 on engineer, hospital duty, etc. This estimate is exclusive of Stoneman's force.] Both armies had spent the winter in much needed rest, after the toilsome and exhausting marches and bloody battles which terminated Lee's first invasion of Maryland. The discipline of our army was excellent, and it would have been hard to find a finer body of men, or better fighting material than that assembled on this occasion, in readiness to open the spring campaign. Hooker was justly popular with his troops. They had confidence in his ability as a general, and he had gained their good will by anticipating their wants, and by generously grating furloughs to those who were pining from home- sickness; trusting that old associations and the honor of the men would induce them to rejoin their colors when the leaves of absence had expired. In this way he almost stopped the desertion which had been so prevalent under Burnside. Only one portion of the army was dissatisfied; the position recently occupied by General Franz Sigel, the favorite commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given to General O. O. Howard. The numerous Germans in that corps were discontented at the change. They cared little for Howard's reputation as the Havelock of the army; an appellation he had gained from his zeal as a Congregationalist. They felt, when their countryman Sigel was deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their nationality, and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always accompanies the personal influence of a popular leader. The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action, and it was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of service of the nine months' and two years' men had drawn to a close. Hooker's plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have been successful. The rebels occupied a long line and could not be strong everywhere. He resolved to make a pretence of crossing with three corps, under Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg, while the remaining four corps under Major-General Slocum made a detour and crossed twenty-seven miles above at Kelly's Ford. The latter were then to march down the river against the left flank of the rebel army and re-open Banks' Ford; thus re-uniting the two wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. When this was accomplished it was proposed to give battle in the open country near the ford, the position there being a commanding one and taking the whole line of rebel works on the heights of Fredericksburg in reverse. Owing to his great preponderance of force, Hooker had little reason to doubt that the result would be favorable to our arms. To carry out this plan and make it a complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary to leave Gibbon's division of Couch's corps behind, for as his encampment at Falmouth was in full view of the Confederate forces on the opposite side, to withdraw it would have been to notify them that some unusual movement was going on. So far the idea was simply to crush the opposing army, but Hooker's plan went farther and involved the capture of Lee's entire force. To accomplish this he directed Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock, and sweep down upon Lee's communications with Richmond, breaking up railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting supplies of all kinds. As the rebel commissariat found great difficulty in keeping more than four days' rations on hand at a time, Stoneman's raid would almost necessarily force Lee to fall back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg. One column under Averell was to attack Culpeper and Gordonsville, the other under Buford to move to Louisa Court House, and thence to the Fredericksburg Railroad. Both columns were to unite behind the Pamunkey, and in case our army was successful Stoneman was directed to plant his force behind some river in an advantageous position on Lee's line of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army until Hooker could again assail it and compel it to surrender. A brave programme! Let us see how it was carried out. It was an essential part of Hooker's project that the cavalry should begin operations two weeks before the infantry. If they did their work thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat would give us all the moral effect of a victory. The rebel cavalry at the time being reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed that Stoneman would encounter any serious resistance. He accordingly started on April 13th to carry out his instructions, but another rain storm, which made the river unfordable, and very bad roads, detained him until the 28th. It has been suggested that he might have crossed higher up, but cavalry officers who were there, tell me that every ravine had become an impassable river. Hooker became impatient and refused to wait any longer; so when the water subsided, all--infantry, artillery, and cavalry--were sent over together. The result was that the battle was ended before Stoneman got fairly to work, and his operations had little or no effect in obstructing Lee's movements. To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been made at both ends of the line. On April 21st a small infantry force was sent to threaten Kelly's Ford. On the same day, I went with part of my division down the river to Port Conway, opposite Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, made a pretence of crossing in pontoons, and built fires in every direction at night, to give the impression of a large force. On the 24th General Wadsworth went on an expedition to the same place, and two regiments under Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan, crossed over in boats, and returned. Those movements caused Jackson to strengthen his force in that quarter. On the 27th, the storm having abated, Meade's corps (the Fifth), Howard's corps (the Eleventh), and Slocum's corps (the Twelfth), the whole being under the command of General Slocum, left camp for Kelly's Ford, each accompanied by three batteries. A detachment was thrown over, in boats, on the evening of the 28th, which dispersed the picket guard; and by the next morning the entire force was across the river and on their way to the Rapidan, the Fifth Corps taking the direction of Elley's Ford and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps that of Germania Ford. Stoneman's cavalry crossed at the same time with the others, and moved to Culpeper, where he halted for a time to reorganize his force, and get rid of surplus horses, baggage, etc., which were sent to the rear. The next day Averell kept on to Rapidan Station with 4,000 sabres, to engage W. H. F. Lee's rebel brigade, so that it could not interfere with the operations of the main body, which moved southeast across Morton's Ford and Raccoon Ford to Louisa Court House, where the work of destruction was to begin. Stoneman's further movements will be related hereafter. One small brigade of three regiments with two batteries was placed under the command of General Pleasonton and directed to report to General Slocum, to precede the infantry on the different roads. Stuart, who commanded two brigades of rebel cavalry, under Fitz Hugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and whose duty it was to watch these upper fords, received news of the crossing at 9 P.M., on the 28th. The turning column reached Chancellorsville with but little opposition, as both Lee and Stuart thought it was making for Gordonsville and the Virginia Central Railroad. In consequence of this miscalculation, Stuart planted himself at Brandy Station. When he found that he was out of position and that it was too late to prevent the crossing at Germania Ford, he made a circuit with Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade to get between Slocum and Lee, and sent W. H. F. Lee's brigade to impede Stoneman's operations. The passage of Germania Ford turned Elley's Ford and United States Ford, and Mahone's and Posey's brigades, who were on guard there, retreated on Chancellorsville, where Anderson had come up with Wright's brigade too late to prevent the crossing. By 6 P.M. on the 30th, Hooker found himself in command of four corps at Chancellorsville, with another--that of Sickles--near at hand. Anderson fell back to Tabernacle Church as our troops advanced, and began to fortify a line there. Stuart sent Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade, which was very much exhausted, to Todd's Tavern for the night, while he started with a small escort, to explain the situation to General Lee at Fredericksburg. On the road, not far from Spottsylvania, he came unexpectedly upon one of Pleasonton's regiments, the 6th New York Cavalry, numbering about 200 men, which was returning from a reconnoissance it had made in that direction. He avoided the encounter and sent back to Todd's Tavern, at first for a regiment, but subsequently for the entire brigade. When there reinforcements came up a furious cavalry contest took place, with charges and counter-charges, and hand to hand combats. It was not without an element of romance, in that lonely spot, far from either army, under the resplendent light of the full moon; recalling, in the words of a Southern chronicler, some scene of knightly glory. Our troops were surrounded, but cut their way out with the loss of their gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, who led them in the charge. Meanwhile the other portion of the contemplated movement had also been going forward. On the 28th, the Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick, and the First Corps, under Reynolds, were moved down near the river, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, and bivouacked there in a pouring rain. As it was possible that the two corps might be attacked when they reached the other side, the Third Corps, under Sickles, was posted in the rear as a reserve. The next day two bridges were laid down at Franklin's old crossing for the Sixth Corps, and two more a mile below for the First Corps. Men in rifle-pits on the other side impeded the placing of the pontoons for a while, but detachments sent over in boats stormed their intrenchments, and drove them out. Brooks' division of the Sixth Corps and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps then crossed and threw up _tête du ponts_. The enemy made no other opposition than a vigorous shelling by their guns on the heights, which did but little damage. A considerable number of these missiles were aimed at my division and at that of General J. C. Robinson, which were held in reserve on the north side of the river; but as our men were pretty well sheltered, there were but few casualties. It soon became evident that the enemy would not attack the bridge heads, they being well guarded by artillery on the north bank, so Sickles' corps was detached on the 30th and ordered to Chancellorsville. Sedgwick used the remainder of his men to great advantage by marching them back and forth among the hills in such a way as to lead Lee to suppose that a very large force confronted him. As, however, Sedgwick did not advance, and more accurate reports were furnished by Stuart in relation to what had taken place up the river, Lee saw, on the night of the 30th, that the movement in front of Fredericksburg was a feint, and his real antagonist was at Chancellorsville. He had previously ordered Jackson's corps up from Moss Creek and now advanced with the main body of his army to meet Hooker, leaving Early's division of Jackson's corps and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps to hold the heights of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick. Jackson, who was always prompt, started at midnight, and at 8 A.M. the next day stood by the side of Anderson at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division had already arrived, having preceded him by a few hours. The error in the movement thus far made is plain. It is a maxim in war that a single hour's delay, when an enemy is strengthening his position or when reinforcements are coming up, will frequently cost the lives of a thousand men. In the present instance it was simply suicidal for Hooker to delay action until Anderson had fortified his lines and Lee had come forward with the main body to join him. Hooker should have pressed on immediately to seize the objective. Banks' Ford was almost within his grasp, and only a portion of Anderson's division barred the way. The possession of that ford would have brought Sedgwick twelve miles nearer to him, and would have forced Lee to fight at a great disadvantage both as to position and numbers. Hooker knew from a captured despatch which Pleasonton placed in his hands, that Lee was still in Fredericksburg on the 30th, uncertain how to act; for he did not know the strength of Sedgwick's column, and feared that the main attack might come from that direction. The four corps at Chancellorsville amounted to about forty-six thousand men; and 18,000 more were close at hand under Sickles. The troops had made but a short march, and were comparatively fresh. Four miles further on lay the great prize for which Hooker was contending. He had only to put out his hand to reach it, but he delayed action all that long night and until eleven o'clock of the next morning. When he did make the effort the line he was about to occupy was well fortified and held by all but one division and one brigade of Lee's army. CHAPTER II. FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY. There are two excellent roads leading from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg--one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more broken, as it passed over several ravines. There was still a third road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at Banks' Ford. On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four columns. Slocum's corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on the right. Sykes' division of Meade's corps, followed by Hancock's division of Couch's corps, went by the turnpike in the centre. The remainder of Meade's corps--Griffin's division, followed by that of Humphreys--took the river road. Lastly, French's division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn off and march to Todd's Tavern. Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton's cavalry, which, in fact, had been close to Anderson's pickets all the morning. Before these troops started, Sickles' corps arrived, after a short march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out to Dowdall's Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor's house. Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry. Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle Church, and his left covering Banks' Ford. It did not seem to occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a tendency to break up every organization that tried to pass through them into mere crowds of men without order or alignment. Under these circumstances concert of action became exceedingly difficult, and when attempts were made to communicate orders off the roads, aids wandered hopelessly through the woods, struggling in the thick undergrowth, without being able to find any one. It was worse then fighting in a dense fog.* The enemy, of course, were also impeded in their movements, but they had the advantage of being better acquainted with the country, and in case they were beaten they had a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to fall back upon. The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right angles, offered excellent defensive positions for them. [* One brigade of Griffin's division was out all night trying to find its way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army until 4 A.M. Wilcox's brigade, which came the next day from Banks' Ford to reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.] McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes, who had now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which, in spite of their gallantry--for they rode up and fired in the faces of the enemy--were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry of Mahone's brigade. Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the fortifying which Anderson had commenced, and according to his invariable custom to find and fight his enemy as soon as possible, had moved forward; so that the two armies encountered each other about two and half miles from Chancellorsville. Sykes indeed, met the advance of McLaws' division only a mile out, and drove it back steadily a mile farther, when it was reinforced by Anderson's division, and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division. Anderson gave Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in getting in on his flanks; for, owing to the divergence of the roads, neither Slocum on the right nor Meade's two divisions on the left were abreast with him. He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a regiment deployed as skirmishers, but did not succeed. As the enemy were gaining the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to the front and took his place. Slocum now formed on the right, with his left resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which commanded the country around. Altogether the general line was a good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery could move and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the thickets. The reserves could have struggled through those in the rear, and have filled the gaps, so that there is no reason to suppose our forces could have not continued to advance, or at all events have held the position, which, from its elevation and the other advantages I have stated, was an important one, especially as the column on the river road was in sight of Banks' Ford, which it could have seized and held, or have struck the right flank of the enemy with great effect. The troops had come out to obtain possession of Banks' Ford, and all the surplus artillery was waiting there. To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry out his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on the morale of the army. It would have been time enough to fall back in case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the engineers with their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles' corps, could easily have laid out a strong line in the rear for the troops to fall back upon. General Warren, the Chief Engineer on Hooker's staff, thought the commanding ridge with the open space in front, upon which Hancock was posted, a very advantageous position for the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to abandon it until he (Warren) had conferred with Hooker. After the order came to retire, Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it was peremptorily refused. Hooker soon afterward changed his mind and countermanded his first order, but it was then too late; our troops had left the ridge and the enemy were in possession of it. There was too much vacillation at headquarters. Slocum, who was pressing the enemy back, was very much vexed when he received the order, but obeyed it, and retreated without being molested. It is true, Wright's brigade had formed on his right, but the advance of the Eleventh Corps would have taken that in flank, so that the prospect was generally good at this time for an advance. The column on the river road also retired without interference. As Couch had waited to hear from Hooker, Hancock's right flank became somewhat exposed by the delay, but he fell back without serious loss. French also, who had started for Todd's Tavern, returned. He encountered the enemy, but was ordered in and did not engage them. That portion of the country around Chancellorsville within the Union lines on the morning of May 2d, may, with some exceptions, be described as a plain, covered by dense thickets, with open spaces in the vicinity of the houses, varied by the high ground at Talley's on the west and by the hills of Fairview and Hazel Grove on the south, and terminating in a deep ravine near the river. Our general line was separated from that of the enemy by small streams, which principally ran through ravines, forming obstacles useful for defensive purposes. This was the case on the east and south, but on the west, where Howard's line terminated, there was nothing but the usual thickets to impede the enemy's approach. As the narrative proceeds, the position of the Confederate army, who held the broken ground on the other side of those ravines, will be more particularly described. After all, a defensive battle in such a country is not a bad thing, for where there are axes and timber it is easy to fortify and hard to force the line; always provided that free communications are kept open to the central reserve and from one part of the line to another. It must be confessed that the concealment of the thickets is also favorable to the initiative, as it enables the attacking party to mass his troops against the weak parts without being observed. Hooker probably thought if Lee assailed a superior force in an intrenched position he would certainly be beaten; and if he did not attack he would soon be forced to fall back on his depots near Richmond for food and ammunition. In either case the prestige would remain with the Union general. The rebels followed up our army closely, and it is quite possible that a sudden attack, when it was heaped up around Chancellorsville, might have been disastrous to us. Gradually, under the skilful guidance of Captain Payne of the Engineers, who had made himself well acquainted with the country, the different corps took the positions they had occupied on the previous night, and order came out of chaos. The line, as thus established, covered all the roads which passed through Chancellorsville. The left, held by Meade's corps, rested on the Rappahannock, near Scott's Dam; the line was then continued in a southerly direction by Couch's corps, facing east, French's division being extended to a point near to and east of Chancellorsville, with Hancock's division of the same corps holding an outpost still further to the east. Next came the Twelfth Corps under Slocum, facing south, and then, at some distance to the west, in echelon to the rear along the Plank Road, Howard's corps was posted. The Third Corps under Sickles was kept in reserve, back of the mansion. The next morning two brigades and two batteries of Birney's division were interposed between Slocum and Howard, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out in front. The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry picketed the roads and kept the enemy in sight. The thickets which surrounded this position were almost impenetrable, so that an advance against the enemy's lines became exceedingly difficult and manoeuvring nearly impracticable, nor was this the only defect. Batteries could be established on the high ground to the east, which commanded the front facing in that direction, while our own artillery had but little scope; and last, but most important of all, the right of Howard's corps as "in the air," that is, rested on no obstacle. Hooker was sensible that this flank was weak, and sent Graham's brigade of Sickles' corps with a battery to strengthen it; but Howard took umbrage at this, as a reflection on the bravery of his troops or his own want of skill, and told Graham that he did not need his services; that he felt so secure in his position that he would send his compliments to the whole rebel army if they lay in front of him, and invite them to attack him. As Hooker had just acquiesced in the appointment of Howard to be Commander of the Eleventh Corps, he disliked to show a want of confidence in him at the very beginning of his career, and therefore yielded to his wishes and ordered the reinforcements to return and report to Sickles again. Chancellorsville being a great center of communication with the plank road and turnpike heading east and west, and less important roads to the south, and southeast, Hooker desired above all things to retain it; for if it should once fall into the hands of the enemy, our army would be unable to move in any direction except to the rear. General Lee formed his line with Wickham's and Owens' regiments of cavalry on his right, opposite Meade's corps, supported by Perry's brigade of Anderson's division; Jackson's line stretched from the Plank Road around toward the Furnace. Before night set in, Wright and Stuart attacked an outlying part of Slocum's corps and drove it in on the main body. They then brought up some artillery and opened fire against Slocum's position on the crest of the hill. Failing to make any impression they soon retired and all was quiet once more. The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock's front with considerable effect. They also enfiladed Geary's division of Slocum's corps, and became very annoying, but Knap's battery of the Twelfth Corps replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent. As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain where our troops were posted. When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction, for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as much as possible. The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from encouraging. He had examined the position of the Union army carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre and left it was unassailable. Let any man with a musket on his shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen, etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork, and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such obstacles. Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so that the line might be considered as almost impregnable. Before giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there was not a vulnerable point there. CHAPTER III. THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY. At dawn of day General Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his reconnoissance. He said the right flank of Howard's corps was defenceless and easily assailable. Jackson at once asked permission to take his own corps--about 26,000 muskets--make a detour through the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly upon the weak point referred to by Stuart. It was a startling proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven back to Fredericksburg or crushed. If the Eleventh Corps had prepared for Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified, with redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber and sheltered by breastworks, with the artillery at the angles, crossing its fire in front, Jackson's corps would have been powerless to advance, and could have been held as in a vise, while Lee, one- half of his force being absent, would have found himself helpless against the combined attack of our other corps, which could have assailed him in front and on each flank. There was, therefore, great risk in attempting such a manoeuvre, for nothing short of utter blindness on the part of the Union commanders could make it successful. Still, something had to be done, for inaction would result in a retreat, and in the present instance, if the worst came to the worst, Jackson could fall back on Gordonsville, and Lee toward the Virginia Central Railroad, where they could reunite their columns by rail, before Hooker could march across the country and prevent the junction. Jackson received the required permission, and started off at once by a secluded road, keeping Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of cavalry between his column and the Union army to shield his march from observation. At 2 A.M., Hooker sent orders for the First Corps, under Reynolds, to which I belonged, to take up its bridges and join him by way of United States Ford, and by 9 A.M. we were on our way. The first sound of battle came from some guns posted on the eminence from which Hancock had retreated the day before. A battery there opened fire on the army trains which had been parked in the open plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove them pell mell to the rear. At dawn Hooker rode around, accompanied by Sickles, to inspect his lines. He approved the position generally, but upon Sickles' recommendation he threw in a division of the Third Corps between the Eleventh and Twelfth, as he thought the interval too great there. As soon as Jackson was en route, Lee began to demonstrate against our centre and left, to make Hooker believe the main attack was to be there, and to prevent him from observing the turning column in its progress toward the right. A vigorous cannonade began against Meade, and a musketry fire was opened on Couch and Slocum; the heaviest attack being on Hancock's position, which was in advance of the main line. In spite of every precaution, Jackson's column as it moved southward was seen to pass over a bare hill about a mile and a half from Birney's front, and its numbers were pretty accurately estimated. General Birney at once reported this important fact at General Hooker's headquarters. It is always pleasant to think your adversary is beaten, and Hooker thought at first Jackson might be retreating on Gordonsville. It was evident enough that he was either doing that or making a circuit to attack Howard. To provide for the latter contingency the following order was issued: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC CHANCELLORSVILLE, Va., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M. MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD: I am directed by the Major-General Commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the General's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach. (Signed) JAMES H. VAN ALLEN, _Brigadier-General and Aide-de-camp_. For what subsequently occurred Hooker was doubtless highly censurable, but it was not unreasonable for him to suppose, after giving these orders to a corps commander, that they would be carried out, and that minor combats far out on the roads would precede and give ample notice of Jackson's approach in time to reinforce that part of the line. When the enemy were observed, Sickles went out with Clark's battery and an infantry support to shell their train. This had the effect of driving them off of that road on to another which led in the same direction, but was less exposed, as it went through the woods. A second reconnoissance was sent to see if the movement continued. Sickles then obtained Hooker's consent to start out with two divisions to attack Jackson's corps in flank and cut if off from the main body. Sickles started on this mission at 1 P.M. with Birney's division, preceded by Randolph's battery. As Jackson might turn on him with his whole force, Whipple's division of his own corps reinforced his left, and Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps his right. He was greatly delayed by the swamps and the necessity of building bridges, but finally crossed Lewis Creek and reached the road upon which Jackson was marching. He soon after, by the efforts of Berdan's sharpshooters, surrounded and captured the 23d Georgia regiment, which had been left to watch the approaches from our lines. Information obtained from prisoners showed the Jackson could not be retreating, and that his object was to strike a blow somewhere. Birney's advance, and the capture of the 23d Georgia were met by corresponding movements on the part of the enemy. A rebel battery was established on the high ground at the Welford House, which checked Birney's progress until it was silenced by Livingston's battery, which was brought forward for that purpose. Pleansonton's cavalry was now sent to the Foundry as an additional reinforcement. Sickles' intention was to cut Jackson off entirely from McLaws' and Anderson's divisions, and then to attack the latter in flank, a plan which promised good results. In the mean time Pleasonton's cavalry was sent forward to follow up Jackson's movement. Sickles requested permission to attack McLaws, but Hooker again became irresolute; so this large Union force was detained at the Furnace without a definite object, and the works it had occupied were vacant. While Sickles was not allowed to strike the flank, Slocum's two divisions under Geary and Williams were sent to push back the fortified front of the enemy in the woods; a much more difficult operation. Geary attacked on the plank road, but made no serious impression, and returned. Williams struck further to the south, but was checked by part of Anderson's division. A combined attack against Lee's front and left flank, undertaken with spirit earlier in the day, would in all probability have driven him off toward Fredericksburg and have widened the distance between his force and that of Jackson; but now the latter was close at hand and it was too late to attempt it. As the time came for the turning column to make its appearance on Howard's right, a fierce attack was again made against Hancock with infantry and artillery, to distract Hooker's attention from the real point at issue. Pleasonton, after dismounting one regiment and sending it into the woods to reconnoitre, finding his cavalry were of no use in such a country, and that Jackson was getting farther and father away, rode leisurely back, at Sickles' suggestion, to Hazel Grove, which was an open space of considerable elevation to the right of the Twelfth Corps. As he drew near, the roar of battle burst upon his ears from the right of the line and a scene of horror and confusion presented itself, presaging the rout of the entire army if some immediate measures were not taken to stem the tide of disaster. CHAPTER IV. THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. Notwithstanding Hooker's order of 9.30 A.M. calling Howard's attention to the weakness of his right flank, and the probability that Jackson was marching to attack it, no precautions were taken against the impending danger. The simple establishing of a front of two regiments toward the west when half his command would hardly have been sufficient, unless protected by works of some kind, was perfectly idle as a barrier against the torrent about to overwhelm the Eleventh Corps. So far as I can ascertain, only two companies were thrown out on picket, and they were unsupported by grand guards, so that they did not detain the enemy a moment, and the rebels and our pickets all came in together. Great stress has been laid upon the fact that Howard did have a reserve force--Barlow's brigade of 2,500 men--facing west, which Hooker withdrew to reinforce Sickles; but is not shown that Howard made any remonstrance or attached any great importance to its removal. Even if it had remained, as there were not strong intrenchments in front of it, it is not probable that it would have been able to resist Jackson's entire corps for any length of time. There was no reason other than Howard's utter want of appreciation of the gravity of the situation to prevent him from forming a strong line of defence to protect his right flank. If made with felled timber in front and redoubts on the flanks, Jackson could not have overleaped it, or even attacked it without heavy loss. If he stopped to do so, Sickles' corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps, with the reserve forces under Berry and French, would soon have confronted him. If he had attempted to keep on farther down to attack the United States Ford, he would have met the First Corps there, and would have permanently severed all connection between himself and Lee, besides endangering his line of retreat. The apathy and indifference Howard manifested in relation to Jackson's approach can only be explained in the supposition that he really believed that Jackson had fled to Gordonsville, and that the demonstrations on his front and right proceeded merely from Stuart's cavalry; and yet why any one should suppose that Lee would part with half his army, and send it away to Gordonsville where there was no enemy and nothing to be done, is more than I can imagine. Jackson was celebrated for making these turning movements; besides, it was easy, by questioning prisoners, to verify the fact that he had no surplus trains with him. Nothing, in short, but ammunition wagons, and ambulances for the wounded; a sure indication that his movement meant fight and not retreat. From 10 A.M., when Hooker's order was received, to 6 P.M., when the assault came, there was ample time for Howard to form an impregnable line. His division commanders did not share his indifference. General Schurz pointed out to him that his flank was in the air, but he seemed perfectly satisfied with his line as it was, and not at all desirous of changing it in any particular. Schurz, of his own volition, without the knowledge of his chief, posted three regiments in close column of division, and formed them in the same direction as the two regiments and two guns which were expected to keep Jackson back, but the shock, when it came, was so sudden that these columns did not have time to deploy. Devens, having two reserve regiments, also faced them that way, of his own accord, behind the other two, but having no encouragement to form line in that direction it is probable both generals hesitated to do so. Jackson, having debouched from the country road into the plank road, was separated from Lee by nearly six miles of pathless forest. He kept on until he reached the turnpike, and then halted his command in order that he might reconnoitre and form line of battle. He went up on a high hill and personally examined the position of the Eleventh Corps. Finding that it was still open to attack, and that no preparations had been made to receive him, he formed Rodes' and Colston's divisions two hundred yards apart, perpendicular to the plank road, with the road in the centre, and with Hill's division both on the plank road and turnpike as a support to the other two. Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry was left on the plank road to menace Howard from that direction. It will be seen by a glance at the map that his lines overlapped that of the Eleventh Corps for a long distance, both in front and rear. The first notice our troops had of his approach did not come from our pickets--for their retreat and his advance were almost simultaneous--but from the deer, rabbits, and other wild animals of the forest, driven from their coverts by his advance. It is always convenient to have a scape-goat in case of disaster, and the German element in the Eleventh Corps have been fiercely censured and their name became a byword for giving way on this occasion. It is full time justice should be done by calling attention to the position of that corps. I assert that when a force is not deployed, but is struck suddenly and violently on its flank, resistance in _impracticable_. Not Napoleon's Old Guard, not the best and bravest troops that ever existed, could hold together in such a case, for the first men assailed are--to use a homely but expressive word-- driven into a _huddle_; and a huddle cannot fight, for it has no front and no organization. Under such circumstances, the men have but a choice of two evils, either to stay where they are and be slaughtered, without the power of defending themselves, or to run; and the only sensible thing for them to do is to run and rally on some other organization. The attempt to change front and meet this attack _on such short notice_ would have been hopeless enough, drawn up as Howard's men were, even if they had been all in line with arms in their hands; but it is a beautiful commentary on the vigilance displayed, that in many cases the muskets were stacked, and the men lounging about some playing cards, others cooking their supper, intermingled with the pack-mules and beef cattle they were unloading. It will be remembered that in the order previously quoted, Howard was directed _"to advance his pickets for the purpose of observation,"_ in order _that he might have ample time for preparation._ The object of this injunction is plain enough. It was to make sufficient resistance to Jackson's advance to delay it, and not only give time for the Eleventh Corps to form, but enable Hooker to send his reserves to that part of the line. The pickets, therefore, should have been far out and strongly backed with a large force which would take advantage of every accident of ground to delay the rebel column as long as possible. Howard seemed to have no curiosity himself, as he sent out no parties; but Sickles and Pleasonton had their spies and detachments on the watch, and these came in constantly with the information, which was duly transmitted to Howard, that Jackson was actually coming. Schurz also became uneasy and sent out parties to reconnoitre. General Noble, at that time Colonel of the Seventeenth Connecticut Infantry, two companies of whose regiment were on the picket line there, writes as follows: "The disaster resulted from Howard's and Devens' utter disregard and inattention under warnings that came in from the front and flank all through the day. Horseman after horseman rode into my post and was sent to headquarters with the information that the enemy were heavily marching along our front and proceeding to our right; and last of all an officer reported the rebels massing for attack. Howard scouted the report and insulted the informants, charging them with telling a story that was the offspring of their imaginations or their fears." If this be true, there has been but one similar case in our annals, and that was the massacre of the garrison of Fort Sims, by the savages, in 1813, near Mobile, Alabama; soon after a negro had been severely flogged by the commanding officer for reporting that he had seen Indians lurking around the post. Adjutant Wilkenson, of the same regiment, confirms General Noble's statement and says, "Why a stronger force was not sent out as skirmishers and the left of our line changed to front the foe is more than I am able to understand." General Schimmelpfennig, commanding a brigade of Schurz's division, says he sent out a reconnoissance and reported the hostile movements fully two hours before the enemy charged. The Germans were bitterly denounced for this catastrophe, I think very unjustly, for in the first place less than one-half the Eleventh Corps were Germans, and in the second place the troops that did form line and temporarily stop Jackson's advance were Germans; principally Colonel Adolph Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's division, aided by a few regiments of Schurz's division, who gave a volley or two. Buschbeck held a weak intrenched line perpendicular to the plank road for three-quarters of an hor, with artillery on the right, losing one-third of his force. His enemy then folded around his flanks and took him in reverse, when further resistance became hopeless and his men retreated in good order to the rear of Sickles' line at Hazel Grove where they supported the artillery and offered to lead a bayonet charge, if the official reports are to be believed. Warren says he took charge of some batteries of the Eleventh Corps and formed them in line across the Plank Road without any infantry support whatever. In reference to this surprise, Couch remarks that no troops could have stood under such circumstances, and I fully agree with him. An officer of the Eleventh Corps who was present informed General Wainwright, formerly Colonel of the 76th New York, that he was playing cards in the ditch, and the first notice he had of the enemy was seeing them looking down upon him from the parapet above. As for Devens, who was nearest the enemy, it is quite probable that any attempt by him to change front to the west previous to the attack would have been looked upon by Howard as a reflection upon his own generalship and would have been met with disfavor, if not with a positive reprimand. The only semblance of precaution taken, therefore, was the throwing out two regiments to face Jackson's advance. Devens could not disgarnish his main line without Howard's permission, and it is not fair, therefore, to hold him responsible for the disaster. As it was, he was severely wounded in attempting to rally his men. The only pickets thrown out appear to have been _two companies of the 17th Connecticut Infantry._ Just as Jackson was about to attack, a furious assault was made at the other end of the line, where Meade was posted. This was repulsed but it served to distract Hooker's attention from the real point of danger on the right. It would seem from all accounts that nothing could vanquish Howard's incredulity. He appeared to take so little interest in Jackson's approach that when Captain George E. Farmer, one of Pleasonton's staff, reported to him that he had found a rebel battery posted directly on the flank of the Eleventh Corps, he was, to use his own language, _"courteously received, but Howard did not seem to believe there was any force of the enemy in his immediate front."_ Sickles and Pleasonton were doing all they could to ascertain Jackson's position, for at this time a small detachment of the Third Corps were making a reconnoissance on the Orange Court House Plank Road, and Rodes states that our cavalry was met there and skirmished with Stuart's advance. Farmer said _he saw no Union pickets,_ but noticed on his return that Howard's men were away from their arms, which were stacked, and that they were playing cards, etc., utterly unsuspicious of danger and unprepared for a contest. Notwithstanding the reports of Jackson's movement from spies and scouts, Howard ordered no change in his lines. An attempt has been made to hold Colonel Farmer responsible for this surprise, on the ground that he should have charged the battery and brought in some prisoners, who would give full information; but there had been warnings enough, and prisoners enough, and as Colonel Farmer had but forty men, he would have had to dismount half of them to make the assault, and with part of his force holding the horses, he could only have used about twenty men in the attack, which is rather too few to capture guns supported by an army. Besides, Farmer was sent out by General Pleasonton with specific instructions, and was not obliged to recognize the authority of other officers who desired him to make a Don Quixote of himself to no purpose. If the two wings of the rebel army had been kept apart, the small force left under Lee could easily have been crushed, or driven off toward Richmond. The commander of the Eleventh Corps, however, far from making any new works, did not man those he had, but left his own lines and went with Barlow's brigade to see what Sickles was doing. The subsequent investigation of this sad business by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was very much of a farce, and necessarily unreliable; for so long as both Hooker and Howard were left in high command, it was absurd to suppose their subordinates would testify against them. Any officer that did so would have soon found his military career brought to a close. Howard was in one or two instances mildly censured for not keeping a better lookout, but as a general thing the whole blame was thrown on the Germans. Hooker himself attributed the trouble to the fact that Howard did not follow up Jackson's movements, and allowed his men to stray from their arms. A great French military writer has said, "It is permissible for an officer to be defeated; but never to be surprised." It is, of course, only fair to hear what Howard himself has to say in relation to this matter. He writes in his official report of the battle as follows: "Now as to the cause of the disaster to my corps. "_First_.--Though constantly threatened, and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to move a large force, whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnoissances, nor scouts ascertained. "He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my right. "_Second_.--By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire, regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position. "_Third_.--The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had previously located in reserve, and in _echelon_ with Colonel Von Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank." The first proposition implies that Howard did not know Jackson intended to attack his right, and therefore did not prepare for him in that direction, but as his front was well fortified, and his flank unprotected, it was plainly his duty to strengthen the weak part of his line. To suppose that Jackson would run a great risk, and spend an entire day in making this long circuit for the purpose of assailing his enemy in front, is hardly reasonable; for he could have swung his line around against it at once, had he desired to do so. The fierce rush of the rebels, who came in almost simultaneously with the pickets, first struck General Von Gilsa's two small regiments and the two guns in the road, the only force that actually fronted them in line. Von Gilsa galloped at once to Howard's Headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern to ask for immediate reinforcements. He was told, "he must hold his post with the men he had, and trust to God;" information which was received by the irate German with objurgations that were not at all of an orthodox character. Devens' division, thus taken in flank, was driven back upon Schurz's division, and the being unable to form, was heaped up after some resistance on Steinwehr's division, in the uttermost confusion and disorder. Steinwehr had only Buschbeck's brigade with him; the other--that of Barlow--having been sent out to reinforce Sickles; but he formed line promptly, behind a weak intrenchment, which had been thrown across the road, and with the aid of his artillery kept Jackson at bay for three-quarters of an hour. Howard exerted himself bravely then, and did all he could to rally the fugitives; but Rodes' division, which attacked him, was soon reinforced by that of Colston, and the two together folded around his flanks, took his line in reverse, and finally carried the position with a rush; and then Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through the flying crowd, who were streaming in wild disorder to the rear past Hooker's headquarters. And now, with the right of our line all gone, with a yawning gap where Sickles' corps and Williams' division had previously been posted, with Lee thundering against the centre and left, and Jackson taking all our defences in reverse, his first line being close on Chancellorsville itself, it seemed as if the total rout of the army was inevitable. Just before this attack, Hooker had decided to interpose more force between the wings of the rebel army, in order to permanently dissever Jackson from the main body. If Sickles had been allowed to attack the left flank of the enemy opposite the Furnace, as he requested permission to do earlier in the afternoon, this co-operative movement could hardly have failed to produce great results; afterward it was too late to attempt it. As already stated, Williams' division struck Anderson in front on Birney's left, and Geary attacked McLaws across the Plank Road to the right of Hancock. Geary found the enemy strongly posted, and as he made no progress, returned to his works. When the rout of the Eleventh Corps took place, Williams also hastened back, but was fired upon by Jackson's troops, who now occupied the intrenchments he had left. Sickles thinks if this had not occurred several regiments of the enemy would have been cut off from the main body. CHAPTER V. JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED. The constantly increasing uproar, and the wild rush of fugitives past the Chancellorsville House, told Hooker what had occurred, and roused him to convulsive life. His staff charged on the flying crowd, but failed to stop them, and it became necessary to form a line of fresh troops speedily, as Jackson was sweeping everything before him. It was not easy to find an adequate force for this emergency. The whole line was now actively engaged, Slocum being attacked on the south, and Couch and Meade on the east. Fortunately, Berry's division was held in reserve, and was available. They were true and tried men, and went forward at once to the rescue. Berry was directed to form across the Plank Road, drive the rebels back, and retake the lost intrenchments; an order easy to give, but very difficult to execute. The most he could do, under the circumstances, was to form his line in the valley opposite Fairview, and hold his position there, the enemy already having possession of the higher ground beyond. Before Berry went out, Warren had stopped several of the Eleventh Corps batteries, and had formed them across the Plank Road, behind the position of the infantry. Winslow's Battery D, of the 1st New York, and Dimick's Battery H, of the 1st United States, were already there, with Hooker in person, having anticipated the movement. These guns were very destructive, and were the principal agent in checking the enemy. As soon as they had formed in line, Warren gave orders to Colonel Best, Chief of Artillery to the Twelfth Corps, to post more batteries on the eminence called Fairview, to the rear and left of the others. Few persons appreciate the steadiness and courage required, when all around is in flight and confusion, for a force to advance steadily to the post of danger in front and meet the exulting enemy. Such men are heroes, and far more worthy of honor than those who fight in the full blaze of successful warfare. The thickets being unfavorable to cavalry, Sickles had sent Pleasonton back to Hazel Grove with two mounted regiments, the 8th and 17th Pennsylvania and Martin's battery, while the 6th New York was scouting the woods on his right, dismounted. Upon reaching the open space which he had left when he went to the front, Pleasonton found the place full of the debris of the combat--men, horses, caissons, ambulances--all hurrying furiously to the rear. To close the way he charged on the flying mass, at Sickles' suggestion, who had ridden in advance of his troops, which were still behind at the Furnace. Sickles ordered Pleasonton to take command of the artillery, and the latter took charge of twenty-two guns, consisting of his own and the Third Corps batteries. The latter had already been rallied and formed in line by Captain J. F. Huntington, of the Ohio battery. As senior officer present he assumed command of the Third Corps artillery. Unfortunately there was not time to load or aim, for the rebels were close at hand, and their triumphant yells were heard as they took possession of the works which Buschbeck had so gallantly defended. This advantageous position, which was on an eminence overlooking Chancellorsville and the Plank Road, and which was really the key of the battle-field, was about to be lost. There was but one way to delay Jackson, some force must be sacrificed, and Pleasonton ordered Major Peter Keenan, commanding the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, to charge the ten thousand men in front with his four hundred. Keenan saw in a moment that if he threw his little force into that seething mass of infantry, horses and men would go down on all sides, and few would be left to tell the tale. A sad smile lit up his noble countenance as he said, _"General, I will do it."_ Thus, at thirty-four years of age, he laid down his life, literally impaled on the bayonets of the enemy, saving the army from capture and his country from the unutterable degradation of slave-holding rule in the Northern States. The service rendered on that occasion is worthy to be recorded in history with the sacrifices of Arthur Winckelried in Switzerland, and the Chevalier d'Assas in France.* [* Major J. R. Carpenter, one of the officers who headed this charge, asserts that Keenan made it without orders, his only instructions being to report to General Howard to assist in rallying the Eleventh Corps. Pleasonton's testimony, however, is positive on the subject, and is supported by that of his aide, Colonel Clifford Thompson. Perhaps Carpenter did not hear all the conversation that passed between Pleasonton and Keenan.] A large part of his command were lost, but the short interval thus gained was of priceless value. Pleasonton was enabled to clear a space in front of him, and twenty-two guns, loaded with double canister, were brought to bear upon the enemy. They came bursting over the parapet they had just taken with loud and continuous yells, and formed line of battle within three hundred yards. All his guns fired into their masses at once. The discharge seemed fairly to blow them back over the works from which they had just emerged. Their artillery, under Colonel Crutchfield, which had been brought up, was almost annihilated by the fire of the battery on the Plank Road. This gave time to reload the guns. The enemy rallied and opened a furious musketry fire from the woods against Pleasonton and Berry. Both stood firm, and then came two charges in succession which reached almost to the muzzles of Pleasonton's guns, which were only supported by two small regiments of cavalry--the 6th New York, and a new and untried regiment, the 17th Pennsylvania. The whole did not amount to over 1,000 men. Archer's brigade, on Jackson's left, which had not been stayed by Keenan's charge, gained the woods and the Plank Road, and opened a severe enfilading fire. Huntington changed front with his own battery and repelled the assault. The 110th Pennsylvania regiment, of Whipple's division, arrived in time to strengthen the cavalry support, and many of the Eleventh Corps men fell into line also. The last charge of the enemy was baffled by the opportune arrival of Birney's and Whipple's divisions, and Barlow's brigade. By this time, too (about 9 P.M.), Hays' brigade of French's corps had been posted on the right, in rear and oblique to Berry's second line. The latter had greatly strengthened his position with log breastworks, etc. Captain Best, of the 4th United States Artillery, in the meantime had exerted himself to collect forty or fifty guns belonging to the Twelfth, Third, and some he had stopped from the Eleventh Corps, and had arranged them at Fairview, to fire over the heads of Berry's troops into the thicket where the enemy were posted and along the Plank Road. Hooker was so disheartened at the unexpected success of the enemy, that when the first shock came he sent word to Sickles to save his command if he could. There is little doubt that at one time he thought of retreating and leaving the Third Corps to its fate; for when the enemy charged there was an awful gap in our lines; Birney's, Whipple's, and Williams' divisions and Barlow's brigade were all absent. Fortunately Jackson was unable to press his advantage. The ardor of the charge, the darkness, the thickets and the abattis in which his forces became entangled, caused Rodes' and Colston's divisions to be all intermingled, creating such disorder and confusion that military organization was suspended, and orders could neither be communicated nor obeyed. Jackson therefore halted his men in the edge of the woods, about a mile and a half from Chancellorsville, posted two brigades on the two roads that came in from the south, and sent for Hill's division, which was in rear and which had not been engaged, to take the front, while the other two divisions fell back to the open space at Dowdall's Tavern to reform their lines. Pending this movement he rode out on the Plank Road with part of his staff and a few orderlies to reconnoitre, cautioning his pickets not to fire at him on his return. When he came back new men had been posted, and his approach was mistaken for the advance of Pleasonton's cavalry. His own troops fired into him with fatal effect. Nearly all his escort were killed or wounded and he received three balls, which shattered both arms. His horse ran toward the Union lines, and although he succeeded in turning him back, he was dashed against the trees and nearly unhorsed. He reached the Confederate lines about the time our artillery again opened up on the Plank Road with a fire that swept everything from its front. Several of his attendants were killed and others wounded. The rebels found the utmost difficulty in keeping their men in line under this tremendous fire. Sentries had to be posted, and great precautions taken to prevent the troops from giving way. General Pender recognized Jackson as he was carried past, and complained of the demoralizing effect of this cannonade, but Jackson replied sharply and sternly, "You must hold your ground, General Pender." He was removed to the Wilderness Tavern, and as General Lee was in some fear that Averell's cavalry, then at Elley's Ford, would make a dash and capture him, he was sent on to Guiney's Station, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, where he died on the 10th of May. Whether the rebels killed him, or whether some of his wounds came from our own troops, the 1st Massachusetts or 73d New York, who were firing heavily in that direction, is a matter of some doubt. While leaning over him and expressing his sympathy, A. P. Hill was also wounded by the fire from a section of Dimick's battery, posted in advance in the Plank Road,* and the command of his corps was assigned at his request to the cavalry general, J. E. B. Stuart. When our artillery fire ceased, Hill's troops took position in front of the others. [* Young Dimick was the son of a distinguished general of the regular army. Though wounded on this occasion he refused to leave the field. The next day he again sought the post of danger and was mortally wounded while holding the Plank Road.] CHAPTER VI. SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK.--ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS. Sickles, with his ten thousand men heaped up at Hazel Grove, was still cut off from the main body and could only communicate with Hooker's headquarters by means of bypaths and at great risk. The last orders he received, at 5 P.M., had been to attack Jackson's right flank and check his advance. He determined to do this and force his way back, and with the co-operation of Williams' and Berry's divisions, retake the Plank Road with the bayonet. Ward's brigade was posted in the front line and Hayman's and Graham's brigades a hundred yards in rear. A special column, under Colonel Egan of the 40th New York, was formed on the extreme left. The muskets were uncapped and at midnight the command moved silently against the enemy, and in spite of a terrific outburst of musketry and artillery from the open space at Dowdall's, the Plank Road and the works which Buschbeck had defended were regained. Berry at once moved forward his line to hold them. Many guns and caissons taken from Howard's corps, and Whipple's ammunition train of pack mules were also recovered. The confusion into which the enemy were thrown by this assault against their right, enabled Berry to easily repulse the attack on him, and he continued to hold the position. The result of this brilliant movement was the reoccupation of a great part of the works Howard had lost, and the capture of two guns and three caissons from the enemy. It is said that in this conflict some of Sickles' men, in consequence of the thickets and confusion, finding themselves surrounded, surrendered as they supposed to the enemy, but to their delight found themselves in Berry's division, among their old comrades. Soon after this fight was over Mott's brigade of the Third Corps, which had been on duty at the Ford, rejoined the main body. Both sides now rested on their arms and prepared to renew the struggle at daylight. Hooker, in view of a possible defeat, directed his engineer officers to lay out a new and stronger line, to cover his bridges, to which he could retreat in case of necessity. At sunset the First Corps went into bivouac on the south side of United States Ford, about four miles and a half from Chancellorsville. The men were glad enough to rest after their tedious march on a hot day, loaded down with eight days' rations. General Reynolds left me temporarily in charge of the corps, while he rode on to confer with Hooker. We heard afar off the roar of the battle caused by Jackson's attack, and saw the evening sky reddened with the fires of combat, but knowing Hooker had a large force, we felt no anxiety as to the result, and took it for granted that we would not be wanted until the next day. I was preparing a piece of india- rubber cloth as a couch when I saw one of Reynolds' aids, Captain Wadsworth, coming down the road at full speed. He brought the startling news that the Eleventh Corps had fled, and if we did not go forward at once, the army would be hopelessly defeated. We were soon on the road, somewhat oppressed by the news, but not dismayed. We marched through the thickening twilight of the woods amid a silence at first only broken by the plaintive song of the whip-poor- will, until the full moon rose in all its splendor. As we proceeded we came upon crowds of Eleventh Corps fugitives still hastening to the rear. They seemed to be wholly disheartened. We halted for a time, in order that our position in line of battle might be selected, and then moved on. As we approached the field a midnight battle commenced, and the shells seemed to burst in sparkles in the trees above our heads, but not near enough to reach us. It was Sickles fighting his way home again. When we came nearer and filed to the right to take position on the Elley's Ford road, the men struck up John Brown's song, and gave the chorus with a will. Their cheerful demeanor and proud bearing renewed the confidence of the army, who felt that the arrival of Reynolds' corps, with its historic record, was no ordinary reinforcement. We were now on the extreme right of the other forces, on the Elley's Ford road, with the right flank thrown back behind Hunting Creek. Hooker was very much discouraged by the rout of the Eleventh Corps. An occurrence of this kind always has a tendency to demoralize an army and render it less trustworthy; for the real strength of an armed force is much more in _opinion_ than it is in _numbers_. A small body of men, if made to believe the enemy are giving way, will do and dare anything; but when they think the struggle is hopeless, they will not resist even a weak attack, for each thinks he is to be sacrificed to save the rest. Hence Hooker did not feel the same reliance on his men as he did before the disaster. He determined, nevertheless, to continue the battle, but contract his lines by bringing them nearer to Chancellorsville. The real key of the battle-field now was the eminence at Hazel Grove. So long as we held it the enemy could not advance without presenting his right flank to our batteries. If he obtained possession of it he could plant guns which would enfilade Slocum's line and fire directly into our forces below. Birney's division at this time was posted in advance of Best's guns on the left, Berry was on the right, with Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps behind Birney, and Whipple's division in rear of Berry. The position of Hazel Grove commanded Chancellorsville, where all the roads met, and which it was vital to Hooker to hold. For if he lost that, he could not advance in any direction, and only his line of retreat to the Ford would remain open to him. Pleasonton spent the night in fortifying this hill, and placed forty guns in position there; but it was of no avail, for it was outside of the new line Sickles was directed to occupy at daylight, and Hooker was not aware of its importance. A request was sent to the latter to obtain his consent to hold it, but he was asleep, and the staff- officer in charge, who had had no experience whatever in military matters, positively refused to awaken him until daylight, and then it was too late, for that was the time set for the troops to fall back to the new line. At 9 P.M., Hooker sent an order to Sedgwick, who was supposed to be at Falmouth and to have 26,000 men, to throw bridges over, cross, drive away Early's 9,000, who held the heights of Fredericksburg, and then to come forward on the Plank Road, and be ready at daylight on the 3d to take Lee's force in reverse, while Hooker attacked it in front. This order was given under the impression that Sedgwick had not crossed with his main body, but only with Howe's division, whereas he was at the bridge heads, three miles below Fredericksburg, on the south side of the river. Hooker probably forgot that he had ordered a demonstration to be made against the Bowling Green road on the 1st, and that Sedgwick went over to make it. CHAPTER VII. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY. The Eleventh Corps were now sent to the extreme left of the line to reorganize. There they were sheltered behind the strong works thrown up by Humphrey's division, and were not so liable to be attacked. The new line laid out by Hooker's order was on a low ridge perpendicular to the Plank Road, and opposite and at right angles to the right of Slocum's front. It was strongly supported by the artillery of the Third, Twelfth, and part of the Eleventh Corps, massed under Captain Best on the heights at Fairview, in the rear and to the left. Sickles was ordered to fall back to it at dawn of day, Birney to lead the way, and Whipple (Graham's brigade) to bring up the rear. The Plank Road ran through the centre of the position, Birney being on the left and Berry on the right, with Whipple's division on a short line in rear, as a reserve. French's division of Couch's corps was posted on Berry's right, the other division (that of Hancock) remained between Mott Run and Chancellorsville. When the movement began, Birney's division, on the left of Whipple's, occupied the high ground at Hazel Grove, facing the Plank Road, Graham's brigade being on the extreme left. This was a very aggressive position, since it took every column that advanced against Sickles' new line directly in flank, and therefore it was indispensable for the rebel commander to capture Hazel Grove before he advanced against the main body of the Third Corps, which held the Plank Road. This hill was not quite so high as that at Fairview, but our artillery on it had great range, and the post should have been maintained at all hazards. The cavalry who had so ably defended it fell back, in obedience to orders, to the Chancellorsville House, to support the batteries in that vicinity, and I think one regiment was sent to report to Sedgwick. Whipple commenced the movement by sending off his artillery and that of Birney. Graham's brigade was the rear guard. Its retreat was covered by the fire of Huntington's battery on the right. The moment the enemy saw that Graham was retiring, Archer's brigade of A. P. Hill's division charged, attained the top of the hill, and succeeded in capturing four guns. Elated by his success, Archer pressed forward against Huntington's battery, but was rudely repulsed; for Sickles opened on him also with a battery from Fairview. He managed to hold the four guns until Doles' brigade of Rodes' division came to his aid. The two took the hill, for Whipple had no instructions to defend it. He retired in perfect order to the new position assigned him. Huntington's battery, supported by two regiments sent out by Sickles, covered the retreat, but suffered considerable loss in doing so, as one regiment was withdrawn and the other gave way. Ward's brigade was then sent to the right and Hayman's brigade held in reserve. Stuart, who was now in command of Jackson's corps, saw at a glance the immense importance of this capture, and did not delay a moment in crowning the hill with thirty pieces of artillery, which soon began to play with fatal effect upon our troops below; upon Chancellorsville; and upon the crest occupied by Slocum, which it enfiladed, and as McLaws' batteries also enfiladed Slocum's line from the opposite side, it seems almost miraculous that he was able to hold it at all. Simultaneously with the attack against Hazel Grove came a fierce onslaught on that part of Sickles' line to the left of the road, accompanied by fierce yells and cries of _"Remember Jackson!"_ a watch-word which it was supposed would excite the rebels to strenuous efforts to avenge the fatal wound of their great leader. It was handsomely met and driven back by Mott's brigade, which had come up from the Ford, and now held the front on that part of the line. A brilliant counter-charge by the 5th and 7th New Jersey captured many prisoners and colors. Sickles' men fought with great determination, but being assailed by infantry in front and battered almost in flank by the artillery posted at Hazel Grove, the line was manifestly untenable. After an obstinate contest the men fell back to the second line, which was but partially fortified, and soon after to the third line, which was more strongly intrenched, and which they held to the close of the fight. McGowan's, Lane's, and Heth's brigades of A. P. Hill's division charged resolutely over this line also; but they suffered heavily from Best's guns at Fairview, and were driven back by Colonel Franklin's and Colonel Bowman's brigades of Whipple's division, which made an effective counter-charge. Whipple's other brigade, that of Graham, had been sent to relieve one of Slocum's brigades on the left of the line, which was out of ammunition. It held its position there for two hours. While this attack was taking place on the left of the road, Pender's and Thomas' brigades, also of Hill's division, charged over the works on the right; but when the others retreated they were left without support and were compelled to retire also. They reformed, however; tried it again, and once more succeeded in holding temporary possession of part of the line, but were soon driven out again. French's division of Couch's corps was now brought up, and Carroll's brigade struck the rebels on the left, and doubled them back on the centre, capturing a great many prisoners and confusing and rendering abortive Hill's attack in front. Hill sent for his reserves to come up, and three rebel brigades were thrown against Carroll, who was supported by the remainder of French's division and a brigade from Humphrey's division of Meade's corps, and French's flank movement was checked. Then another front attack was organized by the enemy, under cover of their artillery at Hazel Grove, and Nicholls', Iverson's, and O'Neill's brigades charged over everything, even up to Best's batteries at Fairview, which they captured; but our men rallied, and drove them headlong down the hill, back to the first line Sickles had occupied at daylight. It was a combat of giants; a tremendous struggle between patriotism on the one hand and vengeance on the other. French now tried to follow up this advantage by again pressing against the Confederate left, but it was reinforced by still another brigade, and he could make no progress. The struggle increased in violence. The rebels were determined to break through our lines, and our men were equally determined not to give way. Well might De Trobriand style it "a mad and desperate battle." Mahone said afterward: "The Federals fought like devils at Chancellorsville." Again Rodes' and Hill's divisions renewed the attempt and were temporarily successful, and again was the bleeding remnant of their forces flung back in disorder. Doles' and Ramseur's brigades of Rodes' division, managed to pass up the ravine to the right of Slocum's works and gain his right and rear, but were unsupported there, and Doles was driven out by a concentrated artillery and musketry fire. Ramseur, who now found himself directly on Sickles' left flank, succeeded in holding on until the old Stonewall brigade under Paxton came to his aid, and then they carried Fairview again, only to be driven out as the others had been. The battle had now lasted several hours, and the troops engaged, as well as the artillery, were almost out of ammunition. There should have been some staff officer specially charged with this subject, but there seemed to be no one who could give orders in relation to it. The last line of our works was finally taken by the enemy, who having succeeded in driving off the 3d Maryland of the Twelfth Corps, on Berry's left, entered near the road and enfiladed the line to the right and left. Sickles sent Ward's brigade to take the place of the 3d Maryland, but it did not reach the position assigned it in time, the enemy being already in possession. In attempting to remedy this disaster, Berry was killed, and his successor, General Mott, was wounded. The command then devolved upon general Revere, who, probably considering further contest hopeless, led his men out of the action without authority--an offence for which he was subsequently tried and dismissed the service. As the cannon cartridges gave out, the enemy brought up numerous batteries, under Colonel Carter, in close proximity to Fairview, and soon overcame all resistance in that direction, driving the troops and guns from the plain. Anderson now made a junction with Stuart, and their combined efforts drove the Third Corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps back, leaving only Geary and Hancock to maintain the struggle. Geary was without support, but he still fought on. He faced two regiments west at right angles to his original line, and by the aid of his artillery held on for an hour longer; his right brigade facing south, west, and north. The Third Corps left their last position at Chancellorsville slowly and sullenly. Hayman's brigade, not far from the Chancellorsville House, finding the enemy a good deal disorganized, and coming forward in a languid and inefficient manner, turned--by Sickles' direction--and charged, capturing several hundred prisoners and several colors, and relieving Graham, who was now holding on with the bayonet, from a most perilous flank attack, enabling him to withdraw in good order. Sickles himself was soon after injured by a spent shot of piece of shell, which struck his waist-belt. His corps and French's division had lost 5,000 out of 22,000. Our front gradually melted away and passed to the new line in rear through Humphrey's division of the Fifth Corps, which was posted about half a mile north of the Chancellorsville House in the edge of the thicket, to cover the retreat. At last only indomitable Hancock remained, fighting McLaws with his front line, and keeping back Stuart and Anderson with his rear line. The enemy, Jackson's Corps, showed little disposition to follow up their success. The fact is, these veterans were about fought out, and became almost inert. They did not, at the last, even press Hancock, who was still strong in artillery, and he withdrew his main body in good order, losing however, the 27th Connecticut regiment, which was posted at the apex of his line on the south, and was not brought back in time, in consequence of the failure of a subordinate officer to carry out his orders. Before Hancock left, his line was taken in reverse, and he was obliged to throw back part of his force to the left to resist Anderson, who was trying to force the passage of Mott Run. The line in that direction was firmly held by Colonel Miles of the 61st New York, who was shot through the body while encouraging his men to defend the position. Stuart's command had lost 7,500 in his attack, and it could hardly have resisted a fresh force if it had been thrown in. General William Hays, of the Second Corps, who was taken prisoner, says they were worn out, and Rodes admits in his report that Jackson's veterans clung to their intrenchments, and that Ramseur and others who passed them, urged them to go forward in vain. Before the close of the action Hooker was importuned for reinforcements, but to no avail. Perhaps he intended to send them, for about this time he rushed out and made a passionate appeal to Geary's men to charge and retake the works they had lost; promising to aid them by throwing in a heavy force on the enemy's left flank. At this appeal the exhausted troops put their caps on their bayonets, waved them aloft, and with loud cheers charged on the rebels and drove them out once more; but sixty guns opened upon them at close range with terrible effect; the promised reinforcements did not come; they were surrounded with ever increasing enemies, and forced to give up everything and retreat. Stuart and Anderson then formed their lines on the south of and parallel to the Plank Road, facing north, and began to fortify the position. Had they been disposed to follow up the retreat closely they would have been unable to do so, for now a new and terrible barrier intervened; the woods on each side of the Plank Road had been set on fire by the artillery and the wounded and dying were burning in the flames without a possibility of rescuing them. Let us draw a veil over this scene, for it is pitiful to dwell upon it. There was no further change in Stuart's line until the close of the battle; but Anderson's division was soon after detached against Sedgwick. The new line taken up by the Union Army was a semi-ellipse, with the left resting on the Rappahannock and the right on the Rapidan. Its centre was at Bullock's House, about three-fourths of a mile north of Chancellorsville. The approaches were well guarded with artillery, and the line partially intrenched. The enemy did not assail it. They made a reconnoissance in the afternoon, but Weed's artillery at the apex of the line was too strongly posted to be forced, and Lee soon found other employment for his troops, for Sedgwick was approaching to attack his rear. In the history of lost empires we almost invariably find that the cause of their final overthrow on the battle-field may be traced to the violation of one military principle, which is that _the attempt to overpower a central force of converging columns, is almost always fatal to the assailants_, for a force in the centre, by the virtue of its position, has nearly double the strength of one on the circumference. Yet his is the first mistake made by every tyro in generalship. A strong blow can be given by a sledge- hammer, but if we divide it into twenty small hammers, the blows will necessarily be scattering and uncertain. Let us suppose an army holds the junction of six roads. It seems theoretically possible that different detachments encircling it, by all attacking at the same time, must confuse and overpower it; but in practice the idea is rarely realized, for no two routes are precisely alike, the columns never move simultaneously, and therefore never arrive at the same time. Some of this is due to the character of the commanders. One man is full of dash, and goes forward at once; another is timid, or at least over-cautious, and advances slowly; a third stops to recall some outlying detachments, or to make elaborate preparations. The result is, the outer army has lost its strength and is always beaten in detail. One portion is sure to be defeated before the others arrive. We shall have occasion to refer to this principle again in reference to the battle of Gettysburg. The history of our own war shows that an attack against the front and rear of a force is not necessarily fatal. Baird's division at Chickamauga defended itself successfully against an assault of this kind, and Hancock faced his division both ways at Chancellorsville and repelled every attempt to force his position. But Hooker thought otherwise. He felt certain that if Sedgwick assailed Lee in rear, while he advanced in front, the Confederate army was doomed. When the time came, however, to carry out this programme, if we may use a homely simile borrowed from General De Peyster, Hooker did not hold up his end of the log, and the whole weight fell upon Sedgwick. About this time a pillar of the Chancellorsville House was struck by a cannon-ball, and Hooker, who was leaning against it at the moment, was prostrated and severely injured. He revived in a few minutes, mounted his horse and rode to the rear, but it was some time before he turned over the command to Couch, who was second in rank. After this stroke he suffered a great deal from paroxysms of pain, and was manifestly unfit to give orders, although he soon resumed the command. The historian almost refuses to chronicle the startling fact that 37,000 men were kept out of the fight, most of whom had not fired a shot, and all of whom were eager to go in. The whole of the First Corps and three-fourths of the Fifth Corps had not been engaged. These, with 5,000 of the Eleventh Corps, who desired to retrieve the disaster of the previous day and were ready to advance, made a new army, which had it been used against Stuart's tired men would necessarily have driven them off the field; for there were but 26,000 of them when the fight commenced. To make the matter worse, a large part of this force--the First and Fifth Corps--stood with arms in their hands, as spectators, almost directly on the left flank of the enemy; so that their mere advance would have swept everything before it. Hancock, too, says that his men were fresh enough to go forward again. Couch succeeded to the command after Hooker was wounded, and made dispositions for the final stand around the Chancellorsville House, where the battle lasted some time longer, and where a battery of the Fifth Corps was sacrificed to cover the retreat of the troops. He did not, however, take the responsibility of renewing the contest with fresh troops, perhaps deterred by the fact that Anderson's and McLaws' divisions had now effected a junction with Stuart's corps; so that the chances were somewhat less favorable than they would have been had Sickles and French had been reinforced before the junction took place. He says, at the close of the action, that fifty guns posted to the right and front of the Chancellorsville House would have swept the enemy away. I think Hooker was beset with the idea of keeping back a large portion of his force to be used in case of emergency. It appears from a statement made by General Alexander S. Webb, who had made a daring personal reconnoissance of the enemy's movement, that he was present when Meade--acting on his (Webb's) representations, and speaking for himself and Reynolds--asked Hooker's permission to let the First and Fifth Corps take part in the battle. It is fair, however, to state that Hooker, having been injured and in great pain, was hardly accountable for his want of decision at this time. Indeed, General Tremaine, who was a colonel on Sickles' staff, says that Hooker did intend to use his reserve force as soon as the enemy were utterly exhausted. President Lincoln seems to have had a presentiment of what would occur, for his parting words to Hooker and Couch were, to use all the troops and not keep any back. I have stated that both Meade and Reynolds wished to put their corps in at the vital point, but were not allowed to do so. General Tremaine also states that, subsequently, when Hooker was suffering a paroxysm of pain, he was the bearer of a communication to him requesting reinforcements, which Hooker directed to be handed to General Meade, who was present, for his action. Meade would not take the responsibility thus offered him at so late a period in the action, though strongly urged to do so both by Tremaine and Colonel Dahlgren, without the express order of General Hooker, or the sanction of General Couch, who was his superior officer, and who was absent. Perhaps he was afraid that Hooker might resume the command at any moment and leave him to shoulder the responsibility of any disaster that might occur, without giving him the credit in case of success. Still he should have put the men in, for the success of the cause was above all personal considerations. A single division thrown in at this time would have retrieved the fortunes of the day. The delay of finding Couch would have been fatal; for immediate action was demanded. Reynolds, indeed, considered himself obliged to wait for orders, but was so desirous to go in that he directed me to send Colonel Stone's brigade forward to make a reconnoissance, in the hope the enemy would attack it and thus bring on a fresh contest; for he intended to reinforce Stone with his whole corps. Stone went close enough to the rebels to overhear their conversation. He made a very successful reconnoissance and brought back a number of prisoners, but as no hint was given him of the object of the movement, he did not bring on a fight. Had he received the slightest intimation that such was Reynolds' wish, he would not have hesitated a moment, for his reputation for dash and gallantry was inferior to none in the army. Sedgwick being on the south side of the river, three miles below the town, was farther off than Hooker supposed, and did not meet the expectations of the latter by brushing aside Early's 9,000 men from the fortified heights, and coming on in time to thunder on Lee's rear at daylight, and join hands with the main body at Chancellorsville. The Sixth Corps started soon after midnight to carry out the order. General John Newton's division led the way, with General Shaler's brigade in advance. They were somewhat delayed by a false alarm in rear, and by the enemy's pickets in front, but made their way steadily toward Fredericksburg. When they reached Hazel Run they found a considerable body of the enemy on the Bowling Green Road at the bridge in readiness to dispute the passage. Colonel Hamblin, who was in charge of Newton's skirmish line, left a few of his men to open an energetic fire in front, while he assembled the others and made a charge which took the bridge and secured the right of way. The command reached Fredericksburg about 3 A.M. As the atmosphere was very hazy, Newton found himself almost on the enemy before he knew it; near enough in fact to overhear their conversation. He fell back quickly to the town and occupied the streets which were not swept by the fire from the works above. He then waited for daylight to enable him to reconnoitre the position in his front, previous to making an attack; and that was the hour Hooker had set for Sedgwick to join him in attacking Lee at Chancellorsville. As soon as it was light Gibbon laid bridges, crossed over, and reported to Sedgwick with his division. At dawn Newton deployed Wharton's brigade and made a demonstration to develop the enemy's line. As the fortified heights commanded the Plank Road by which Sedgwick was to advance, it became necessary to attack immediately. The plan of assault which was devised by General Newton, and approved by General Sedgwick, was to attenuate the rebel force by attacking it on a wide front, so that it could not be strong anywhere, and to use the bayonet alone. Accordingly, Gibbon was directed to advance on the right to turn their flank there if possible, while Newton was to demonstrate against the centre and Howe to act against the left. Newton deployed Wharton's brigade, opened fire along his front and kept the enemy employed there, but Gibbon was unable to advance on the right, because a canal and a railway lay between him and the rebels, and they had taken up the flooring of the bridges over the latter. Howe did not succeed any better on the left, as in attempting to turn the first line of works he encountered the fire of a second line in rear and in _echelon_ to the first, which took him directly in flank. A concentrated artillery fire was brought to bear on Gibbon, Early sent Hays' brigade from Marye's Hill to meet him, and Wilcox's brigade came up from Banks' Ford for the same purpose, so that he was obliged to fall back. It was now 10 A.M., and there was no time to be lost. General Warren, who was in camp to represent Hooker, urged an immediate assault. This advice was followed. Newton formed two columns of assault and one deployed line in the centre, and Howe three deployed lines on the left. Colonel Johns, of the 7th Massachusetts, who was a graduate of West Point, led one of these columns directly against Marye's Hill, with two regiments of Eustis' brigade, supported by the other two regiments, deployed, while another column, consisting of two regiments under Colonel Spear, of the 61st Pennsylvania, supported by two regiments (the 82d Pennsylvania and 67th New York) in column, under Colonel Shaler, was directed to act farther to the right, and the Light Division, under Colonel Burnham of the 5th Massachusetts, attached to Newton's command, was ordered to deploy on the left against the intrenchments at the base of the hill. Spear's column, advancing through a narrow gorge, was broken and enfiladed by the artillery--indeed almost literally swept away--and Spear himself was killed. Johns had an equally difficult task, for he was compelled to advance up a broken stony gulch swept by two rebel howitzers. The head of his column was twice broken, but he rallied it each time. He was then badly wounded, and there was a brief pause, but Colonel Walsh, of the 36th New York, rallied the men again, and they kept straight on over the works. Burnham with his Light Brigade captured the intrenchments below, which had been so fatal to our troops in the previous battle of Fredericksburg, and went into the works above with the others.* The fortified heights on the right of Hazel Run, held by Barksdale's brigade, being now occupied by our troops, those to the left were necessarily taken in reverse, and therefore Sedgwick thought it useless to attack them in front. Howe, nevertheless, carried them gallantly, but with considerable loss of life. [* When Spear's column was broken, the 82d Pennsylvania, under Colonel Bassett, came forward in support, but was crushed with the same fire. Colonel Shaler's remaining regiment, the 67th New York, followed by the remnant of Bassett's regiment, forced their way over the crest to the right of Colonel Johns' column.] The coveted heights, which Burnside had been unable to take with his whole army, were in our possession, together with about a thousand prisoners; but the loss of the Sixth Corps was severe, for nearly a thousand men were killed, wounded, and missing in less than five minutes. The attack was over so soon that Early did not get back Hays' brigade, which had been detached to oppose Gibbon, in time to assist in the defence. Newton says if there had been a hundred men on Marye's Hill we could not have taken it. The rebel force was now divided, and thrown off toward Richmond in eccentric directions. All that remained for Sedgwick to do was to keep straight on the Plank Road toward Chancellorsville. Had he done so at once he would have anticipated the enemy in taking possession of the strong position of Salem Church, and perhaps have captured Wilcox's and Hays' brigades. But it was not intended by Providence that we should win this battle, which had been commenced by a boasting proclamation of what was to be accomplished; and obstacles were constantly occurring of the most unexpected character. After directing Gibbon to hold the town and cover the bridges there, Sedgwick, instead of pushing on, halted to reform his men, and sent back for Brooks' division, which was still at its old position three miles below Fredericksburg, to come up and take the advance. It was full 3 P.M. before the final start was made. This delay gave Hays time to rejoin Early by making a detour around the head of Sedgwick's column, and Wilcox took advantage of it to select a strong position at Guest's House, open fire with his artillery, and detain Sedgwick still longer. Wilcox then retreated toward the river road, but finding he was not pursued, and that Sedgwick was advancing with great caution, he turned back and occupied for a short time the Toll Gate, half a mile from Salem Church, where McLaws' division was formed with one of Anderson's brigades on his left. When Sedgwick advanced Wilcox fell back and joined the main body at the church. The other brigades of Anderson's were sent to hold the junction of the Mine road and the River road. When the pursuit ceased, Early reassembled his command near Cox's house and made immediate arrangements to retake the Fredericksburg heights, and demonstrate against Sedgwick's rear. McLaws formed his line about 2 P.M. in the strip of woods which runs along the low ridge at Salem Church; two brigades being posted on each side of the road about three hundred yards back. Wilcox's brigade, when driven in, was directed to take post in the church and an adjacent school-house, which were used as citadels. This was a strong position, for the rebels were sheltered by the woods, while our troops were forced to advance over an open country, cut up by ravines parallel to McLaws' front, which broke up their organization to some extent, and destroyed the _elan_ of the attack. After a brief artillery contest, which soon ended, as the enemy were out of ammunition, Brooks' division went forward about 4 P.M., and made a gallant charge, in which Bartlett's brigade, aided by Willston's battery, captured the buildings and drove in part of Wilcox's line. The New Jersey brigade charged at the same time on his right, and Russell's brigade on his left. Wilcox placed himself at the head of his reserve regiments, and aided by Semmes' brigade, made a fierce counter-charge. The combat for the school-house raged with great fury, each party breaking the other's line and being broken in turn. Finally, after much desperate fighting, Bartlett was obliged to yield the portion of the crest he had held which was a key to the position; for as he was not strongly and promptly reinforced, as he should have been, his withdrawal from the church and school-house made a gap which forced the other portions of the line to retreat to avoid being taken in flank. Brooks was therefore driven back to the shelter of the guns at the Toll House. Then Newton's division came up and formed on his right and part of Howe's division on the left. The Union artillery was well served and destructive, and as Newton had arrived, McLaws found his farther progress checked and was glad to get back to the ridge. Bartlett's attack should have been deferred until Newton's division was near enough to support it. In that case it would undoubtedly have succeeded. Sedgwick's left now rested on a point nearly a mile from Salem Church, while his right under Wheaton was somewhat advanced. Up to this time the fight had been between Brooks' division and McLaws' mixed command. It was now decided that a second attempt should be made by Newton's division, but Newton states that the design was abandoned because Howe's division, which was to support him, had gone into camp without orders, and was not immediately available. Before new arrangements could be made darkness came on, and both armies bivouacked on the ground they occupied. Brooks' division in the assault just made had lost 1,500 men, and Sedgwick no longer felt confident of forcing his way alone through the obstacle that beset him. Nevertheless, trusting to the speedy and hearty co-operation of Hooker, he stood ready to renew the attempt on the morrow, although he foresaw the enemy would fortify their line during the night and make it truly formidable. When Wilcox left Banks' Ford to aid in the defence of Salem Church, General H. W. Benham of the United States Engineer Corps, who commanded an engineer brigade there, threw over a bridge at Scott's dam, about a mile below Banks' Ford, to communicate with Sedgwick, enable him to retreat in case of disaster, and connect his headquarters with those of Hooker by telegraph. Hooker disapproved the laying of the bridges, which he thought superfluous, as Sedgwick's orders were to keep on to Chancellorsville. Warren took advantage of this new and short route to return to the main army, in order to give Hooker information as to Sedgwick's position. He promised to send back full instructions for the guidance of the latter. As soon as the bridge was laid, General J. T. Owens with his brigade of the Second Corps, which had been guarding the ford, crossed over and reported to Sedgwick. Warren found Hooker in a deep sleep, and still suffering from the concussion that took place in the morning. He gathered from the little he did say, that Sedgwick must rely upon himself, and not upon the main body for deliverance, and he so informed Sedgwick. CHAPTER VIII. MAY FOURTH.--ATTACK ON SEDGWICK'S FORCE. As Hooker seemed disposed to be inactive, Lee thought he might venture to still further augment the force in front of Sedgwick, with a view to either capture the Sixth Corps or force it to recross the river. He therefore directed Anderson to reinforce McLaws with the remainder of his division, leaving only what was left of Jackson's old corps to confront Hooker. Anderson had gone over to the right, opposite the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and had opened with a battery upon the wagon trains which were parked in that vicinity, creating quite a stampede, until his guns were driven away by the Twelfth Corps. In this skirmish, General Whipple, commanding the Third Division of Sickles' corps, was killed. In the meantime, Early had retaken the heights of Fredericksburg, which were merely held by a picket guard of Gibbon's division, so that, when Anderson arrived and took post on the right of McLaws, parallel to the Plank Road, Sedgwick found himself environed on three sides by the enemy; only the road to Banks' Ford remained open, and even that was endangered by bands of rebels, who roamed about in rear of our forces. At one time it is said they could have captured him and his headquarters. Fortunately the tents which constituted the latter were of so unpretending a character, that they gave no indication of being tenanted by the commanding general. Hooker had resumed the command, although manifestly incapable of directing affairs; for the concussion must have affected his brain. At all events, although he had almost thirty-seven thousand fresh men, ready and desirous of entering into the combat, and probably only had about seventeen thousand worn out men in front of him, he failed to do anything to relieve Sedgwick's force, which was now becoming seriously compromised. A feeble and ineffectual reconnoissance was indeed attempted, and as that was promptly resisted, Hooker gave up the idea of any advance, and left Sedgwick to get out of the difficulty the best way he could. At 11 A.M., Sedgwick wrote, stating the obstacles which beset him, and requesting the active assistance of the main army. He was directed, in reply, not to attack, unless the main body at Chancellorsville did the same. All remained quiet until 4 P.M. The Sixth Corps were then formed on three sides of a square inclosing Banks' Ford, with the flanks resting on the river. Howe's division faced east toward Fredericksburg, against Early, who confronted him in that direction, and his left stretched out to Taylor's Hill on the Rappahannock. Newton's division, together with Russell's brigade of Brooks' division, faced McLaws on the west, and Brooks' other two brigades--those of Bartlett and Torbert--were opposed to Anderson on the south. The entire line was very long and thin. Early and McLaws had been skirmishing on their fronts all day, but it was 6 P.M. before everything was in readiness for the final advance. An attempt had, however, been made by Early to turn Howe's left and cut Sedgwick off from the river; but it was promptly met and the enemy were repulsed with a loss of two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. Sedgwick felt his position to be a precarious one. His line was six miles long, and he had but about twenty thousand men with which to hold it against twenty-five thousand of the enemy. He thought, too, that reinforcements had come up from Richmond and that the enemy's force far exceeded his own. It was evident he could not recross the river in broad daylight without sacrificing a great part of his corps, and he determined to hold on until night. Benham took the precaution to throw over a second bridge, and this prudent measure, in Sedgwick's opinion, saved his command. Lee, after personally reconnoitring the position, gave orders to break in the centre of the Sixth Corps so as to defeat the two wings, throw them off in eccentric directions, and scatter the whole force. When this was attempted, Sedgwick detached Wharton's brigade from Newton's right, and sent it to reinforce that part of the line. At 6 P.M. three guns were fired as a signal from Alexander's battery and the Confederate forces pressed forward to the attack. Newton's front was not assailed, and the right of Brooks' division easily repulsed the enemy who advanced in that direction, with the fire of the artillery and the skirmish line alone. The main effort of the evening was made by Early's division, which advanced in columns of battalions, to turn Howe's left, and cut that flank off from the river. Howe's artillery, under charge of Major J. Watts de Peyster, a mere youth, was admirably posted and did great execution on these heavy columns. De Peyster himself rode out and established a battery, a considerable distance in advance of the main line, and the enemy pressed forward eagerly to capture it; after doing so they were suddenly confronted by several regiments in ambush, which rose up and delivered a fire which threw Hays' and Hoke's brigades into great confusion, and caused them to make a precipitate retreat. An attack against Howe's right was also repulsed. In the ardor of pursuit, Howe swung that flank around and captured the 8th Louisiana Regiment, but in doing so, he exposed his rear to Gordon, who came down a ravine behind him, so that he was compelled to fall back and take up a new line. Howe had carefully selected a reserve position and made dispositions to hold it. Fresh assaults on his left finally forced General Neill to retreat to it with his brigade. The enemy followed him up promptly, but were driven back in disorder by Grant's Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and Butler's regular battery of the 2d United States Artillery. Newton thinks this last attack on Howe was local and accidental, for as the other divisions were not assailed, a concentrated attack on Howe would have destroyed him. Darkness at last put an end to the strife. Newton, being an engineer officer by profession, had previously been sent by Sedgwick to select a new line to cover the bridges, and the army was ordered to fall back there. It did so without confusion, the roads having been carefully picketed. Brooks took position on Newton's left, after which Howe's division, whose right flank for a time had been "in the air," withdrew also an hour later than the others, and prolonged the line to the left. Howe complained that he was deserted by Sedgwick, but the latter appears to have sent Wheaton's brigade and other reinforcements to aid his retreat. The movement to the rear was favored by the darkness and a thick fog, which settled over the valleys, but did not extend to the high ground. As Benham and Sedgwick, who were classmates at West Point, walked on the slope of the hill where the men were lying--the crest above being held by thirty-four guns on the opposite side of the river--Benham cautioned Sedgwick not to recross under any circumstances without his entire command, nor without Hooker's express sanction, advice which Sedgwick was wise enough to follow. The enemy did not assail the new position or attempt to interfere with the crossing which soon after took place. When it was nearly concluded, an order came from Hooker countermanding it, but it was then too late to return. Howe thinks Sedgwick should not have crossed, as the last attack on the left, which was the vital point, had been repulsed. This may be so, in the light of after-consideration, but it was very doubtful at the time, and as Sedgwick had lost a fraction under five thousand men in these operations, and was acting under the false information that additional forces had come up from Richmond, he felt that he had fully borne his share of the burden, and that it was better to place his corps beyond the risk of capture, than to run the chances of renewing the battle. It would, undoubtedly, have been of immense advantage to the cause if he could have continued to hold Taylor's Hill, which dominated the country round, and was the key of the battle-field; for in that case Hooker might have withdrawn from Lee's front and joined Sedgwick, which would have been attaining the object for which our main army left Falmouth, and made the turning movement. He would thus have gained a strategic if not a tactical victory; his shortcomings would have been forgotten, and he would have been regarded as one of the greatest strategists of the age. Hooker, however, had left so many things undone, that it is by no means certain he would have carried out this policy, although he expressed his intention to do so. Sedgwick's movement, in my opinion, added another example to the evil effects of converging columns against a central force. There is little more to add in relation to Hooker's operations. On the night of the 4th, he called a council of war, and after stating the situation to them, absented himself, in order that they might have full liberty to discuss the subject. Reynolds was exhausted, and went to sleep, saying that his vote would be the same as that of Meade. Meade voted to remain, because he thought it would be impossible to cross in the presence of the enemy. Sickles and Couch voted to retreat. Howard voted to remain, without reference to the situation of the army, because in his opinion his corps had behaved badly, and he wished to retrieve its reputation. Slocum was not present. The final result was that Hooker determined to cross, although the majority of votes were against it. The votes of Meade and Howard, however, were qualified in such a way as to give the impression they were in favor of a retreat. Owing to a sudden rise in the river the bridges became too short, and there was some doubt as to the practicability of passing over them, but by taking down one, and piecing the others with it, the difficulty was overcome and the army retired, without being followed up, under cover of thirty-two guns posted on the heights on the opposite bank. Meade's corps acted as rear guard. Hooker left his killed and wounded behind, and had lost 14 guns and 20,000 stand of arms. It only remains to give a brief statement of the operations of Stoneman's cavalry. These were of no avail as regard the battle of Chancellorsville, for our army was defeated and in full retreat before Lee's main line of communication with Richmond was struck, and then all the damage was repaired in three or four days. There seems to have been a lack of information as to where to strike; for the principal depot of the rebel army was at Guiney's station on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The supplies there were but slightly guarded, and could easily have been captured. Had this been done, Lee would have been seriously embarrassed, notwithstanding his victory, and forced to fall back to obtain subsistence. Stoneman, upon setting out on the expedition, left one division of 4,000 men under Averell to do the fighting, and dispose of any force that might attempt to interfere with the movements of the main body. Averell accordingly followed W. H. F. Lee's two regiments to Rapidan Station, and remained there skirmishing on the 1st of May. His antagonist then burned the bridge, and fell back on Gordonsville. As Averell was about to ford the river and follow, he received orders from Hooker to return; he came back to Elley's Ford on the 2d, which he reached at half past ten at night. As his return was useless and unnecessary, he has been severely censured, but it was not made of his own volition. Soon after Fitz Hugh Lee made a dash at his camp, but was repulsed. On the 3d Averell made a reconnoissance on Hooker's right, with a view to attack the enemy there, but finding the country impracticable for cavalry, returned to Elley's Ford. Hooker, who was not in the best of humor at the time, became dissatisfied with his operations, relieved him from command, and appointed Pleansonton to take his place. In the meantime, the main body under Stoneman pressed forward, and reached Louisa Court House early on the morning of the 2d. Parties were at once ordered out to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad above and below that point. One of W. H. F. Lee's regiments drove back a detachment of Union cavalry which was moving on Gordonsville, but reinforcements went forward and Lee was driven back in his turn. In the evening Stoneman made his headquarters at Thompson's Cross Roads, and from there despatched regiments in different directions to burn and destroy. One party under Colonel Wyndham, 1st New Jersey, was engaged all day on the 3d in injuring the canal at Columbia, and in attempts to blow up the aqueduct over the Rivanna. Colonel Kilpatrick moved with his regiment, the 2d New York, across the country, passing within two miles and a half of Richmond, and creating great consternation there. He struck and destroyed a portion of the Fredericksburg Railroad--Lee's main line of supply --on the 4th, at Hungary Station, ten miles from Richmond, and burned Meadow Bridge, over the Chickahominy at the railroad crossing. He then turned north again, crossed the Pamunkey, and ended his long ride at Gloucester Point, which was garrisoned by our troops. Another regiment--the 12th Illinois, under Colonel Davis--went to Ashland and moved up and down the railroad, doing a good deal of damage. It captured a train full of Confederate wounded and paroled them. After a brief encounter with an infantry and artillery force at Tunstall's Station, it also turned north, and made its way over the Pamunkey and Mattapony rivers to Gloucester Point. Two regiments, the 1st Maine and 1st Maryland, under General Gregg, started down the South Anna River, burning bridges over common roads and railroads. After destroying Hanover Junction, it returned to headquarters. One of two other small parties were sent on flying excursions to assist in the work of destruction. On the 5th, Stoneman started to return, and the entire command with the exception of that portion which was at Gloucester Point, recrossed at Kelly's Ford on the 8th. The losses in each army were heavy. An extract is here given from the official reports, but it is said the Confederate statement is far from being accurate. LOSSES AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. UNION. Killed and Wounded. Missing. Total. First Corps (Reynolds). . . . . 192 100 292 Second Corps (Couch). . . . . . 1,525 500 2,025 Third Corps (Sickles) . . . . . 3,439 600 4,089 Fifth Corps (Meade) . . . . . . 399 300 699 Sixth Corps (Sedgwick). . . . . 3,601 1,000 4,601 Eleventh Corps (Howard) . . . . 568 2,000 2,508 Twelfth Corps (Slocum). . . . . 2,383 500 2,883 Cavalry, etc. . . . . . . . . . 150 150 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,197 5,000 17,197 CONFEDERATE. Killed and Wounded. Missing. Total. Early's Division . . . . . . . 851 500 1,351 A. P. Hill's Division . . . . . 2,583 500? 3,083 Colston's Division . . . . . . 1,868 450? 2,318 Rodes' Division . . . . . . . . 2,178 713 2,891 Anderson's Division . . . . . . 1,180 210 1,390 McLaws' Division . . . . . . . 1,379 380 1,759 Artillery and Cavalry . . . . . 227 227 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,266 2,753 13,019 The following extract from Harpers' "History of the Great Rebellion" states the causes of Hooker's defeat in a very able manner, but I do not agree with the author in his estimate of the great danger Lee ran from the converging columns of Sedgwick and Hooker. It is true Lee tried the same system, and succeeded, by sending Jackson around to attack Hooker's right, but the success was due solely to the utter lack of all preparations on the part of Howard to meet the emergency, and to Hooker's failure to make use of the ample means at his disposal to prevent the junction of Stuart and Anderson. Mr. Alden, the author of the work in question, says: "There was not, in fact, any moment between Thursday afternoon and Tuesday morning when success was not wholly within the grasp of the Union army. The movement by which Chancellorsville was reached, and the Confederate position rendered worthless, was brilliantly conceived and admirably executed. The initial error, by which alone all else was rendered possible, was that halt at Chancellorsville. Had the march been continued for an hour longer, or even been resumed early in the following morning, the army would have got clear of the Wilderness without meeting any great opposing force, and then it would have been in a position where its great superiority of numbers would have told. The rout of Howard's corps was possible only from the grossest neglect of all military precautions. Jackson, after a toilsome march of ten hours, halted for three hours in open ground, not two miles from the Union lines. A single picket, sent for a mile up a broad road would have discovered the whole movement in ample time for Howard to have strengthened his position, or to have withdrawn from it without loss. The blame of this surprise can not, however, fairly be laid upon Hooker. He had a right to presume that whoever was in command there would have so picketed his lines as to prevent the possibility of being surprised in broad daylight. But even as it was, the disaster to the Eleventh Corps should have had no serious effect upon the general result. That was fully remedied when the pursuit was checked. On Sunday morning Hooker was in a better position than he had been on the evening before. He had lost 3,000 men and had been strengthened by 17,000, and now had 78,000 to oppose to 47,000. The Confederate army was divided, and could reunite only by winning a battle or by a day's march. The only thing which could have lost the battle of that day was the abandonment of the position at Hazel Grove, for from this alone was it possible to enfilade Slocum's line. But surely it is within the limits of military forethought that a general who has occupied a position for two days and three nights should have discovered the very key to that position, when it lay within a mile of his own headquarters. The disabling of Hooker could not, indeed, have been foreseen; but such an accident might happen to any commander upon any field; and there should have been somewhere some man with authority to have, within the space of three hours, brought into action some of the more than 30,000 men within sound, and almost within sight, of the battle then raging. How the hours from Sunday noon till Monday night were wasted has been shown. Hooker, indeed, reiterates that he could not assail the Confederate lines through the dense forests. But Lee broke through those very woods on Sunday, and was minded to attempt it again on Wednesday, when he found that the enemy had disappeared. The golden opportunity was lost, never to be recovered, and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia gained a new lease of life." It may not be out of place, as indicating the kind of service in which we were engaged, to quote the following letter, written after the retreat: "I am so cut, scratched, and bruised that I can hardly hold a pen in my hand. My limbs are covered with swellings from the bites of insects and torn from forcing my way through briers and thorny bushes; my eyes close involuntarily from lack of sleep and excessive fatigue. My legs are cramped from so much riding, and I have not yet succeeded in getting rid of the chill caused by sleeping on the wet ground in the cold rain. My clothes, up to last night, had not been taken off for a week. As I lay down every night with my boots and spurs on, my feet are very much swollen. I ought to be in bed at this moment instead of attempting to write." The others must have suffered in the same way. Warren, especially, as a medium of communication between Hooker and Sedgwick, made almost superhuman exertions to do without sleep and perform the important duties assigned him. Each army now felt the need of rest and recuperation, and no military movements of importance took place for several weeks. Soon after the battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet's two divisions, which had been operating in front of Suffolk, rejoined Lee at Fredericksburg. That portion of Stoneman's cavalry which had taken refuge at Gloucester Point also succeeded, by great boldness and skilful manoeuvring on the part of Colonel Kilpatrick, in outwitting the enemy and getting to Urbanna, after crossing Dragon River, rebuilding a bridge there, and repulsing the rebel forces who tried to prevent them from reaching the Rappahannock. The command, when it arrived at Urbanna, passed over on the ferry-boat, under cover of a gunboat sent there for that purpose, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac at Falmouth, on the 3d of June, bringing in about 200 prisoners, 40 wagons, and 1,000 contrabands, as slaves were usually styled at that time. CHAPTER IX. PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT. The close of the battle of Chancellorsville found the Union army still strong in numbers, defeated, but not disheartened, and ready, as soon as reinforcements and supplies arrived, and a brief period of rest and recuperation ensued, to take the field again. To resist the effects of this defeat and recruit our armies required, however, great determination and serious effort on the part of the Administration; for a large and powerful party still clogged and impeded its efforts, and were allowed full liberty to chill the patriotism of the masses, and oppose, with tongue and pen and every species of indirection, all efficient action which looked to national defence. This opposition was so strong and active that the President almost preferred the risk of losing another battle to the commotion which would be excited by attempts to enforce the draft; for hitherto we had relied entirely on voluntary enlistments to increase our strength in the field. Men are chilled by disaster and do not readily enlist after a defeat; yet the terms of service of thirty thousand of the two years' and nine months' men were expiring, and something had to be done. Our army, however, at the end of May was still formidable in numbers, and too strongly posted to be effectually assailed; especially as it had full and free communication with Washington and the North, and could be assisted in case of need by the loyal militia of the free States. The rebels had obtained a triumph, rather than a substantial victory, at Chancellorsville. It was gained, too, at a ruinous expense of life, and when the battle was over they found themselves too weak to follow up our retreating forces. While the whole South was exulting, their great commander, General Lee, was profoundly depressed. The resources of the Davis Government in men and means were limited, and it was evident that without a foreign alliance, prolonged defensive warfare by an army so far from its base, would ultimately exhaust the seceding States, without accomplishing their independence. It became necessary, therefore, for General Lee to chose one of two plans of campaign: Either to fall back on the centre of his supplies at Richmond, and stand a siege there, or to invade the North. By retiring on Richmond he would save the great labor of transporting food and war material to the frontier, and would remove the Northern army still further from its sources of supply and its principal depots. One circumstance, however, would probably in any event, have impelled him to take the bolder course. The situation in Vicksburg was becoming alarming. It was evident the town must fall and with its surrender the Federal fleet would soon regain possession of the Mississippi. The fall of Vicksburg, supplemented by the retreat of Lee's army on Richmond, would dishearten the Southern people, and stimulate the North to renewed efforts. It was essential, therefore, to counterbalance the impending disaster in the West by some brilliant exploit in the East. There was perhaps another reason for this great forward movement, founded on the relation of the Confederacy to the principal European powers. England still made a pretence of neutrality, but the aristocracy and ruling classes sided with the South, and a large association of their most influential men was established at Manchester to aid the slaveholding oligarchy. The rebels were fighting us with English guns and war material, furnished by blockade runners; while English Shenandoahs and Alabamas, manned by British seamen, under the Confederate flag, burned our merchant vessels and swept our commercial marine from the ocean. The French Government was equally hostile to us, and there was hardly a kingdom in Europe which did not sympathize with the South, allied as they were by their feudal customs to the deplorable system of Southern slavery. Russia alone favored our cause, and stood ready, if need be, to assist us with her fleet; probably more from antagonism to England and France, than from any other motive. The agents of the Confederate Government stated in their official despatches that if General Lee could establish his army firmly on Northern soil England would at once acknowledge the independence of the South; in which case ample loans could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet furnished to re-open the Southern ports. While thus elated by hopes of foreign intervention, the Confederate spies and sympathizers who thronged the North greatly encouraged the Davis Government by their glowing accounts of the disaffection there, in consequence of the heavy taxation, rendered necessary by the war, and by the unpopularity of the draft, which would soon have to be enforced as a defensive measure. They overrated the influence of the _Copperhead_ or anti-war party, and prophesied that a rebel invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the principal cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce the Federal forces in the field. These reasons would have been quite sufficient of themselves to induce Lee to make the movement, but he himself gives an additional one. He hoped by this advance to draw Hooker out, where he could strike him a decisive blow, and thus ensure the permanent triumph of the Confederacy. He was weary of all this marching, campaigning, and bloodshed, and was strongly desirous of settling the whole matter at once. Having been reinforced after the battle of Chancellorsville by Longstreet's two divisions and a large body of conscripts, he determined to advance. On May 31st, his force, according to rebel statements, amounted to 88,754, of which 68,352 were ready for duty. Recruits, too, were constantly coming in from the draft, which was rigidly enforced in the Southern States. Hooker having learned from his spies that there was much talk of an invasion, wrote to the President on May 28th, that the enemy was undoubtedly about to make a movement of some kind. On June 3d, McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's corps started for the general rendezvous at Culpeper. A change in the encampment on the opposite side of the river was noted by the vigilant Union commander, who at once ordered Sedgwick to lay two bridges at the old crossing place, three miles below Fredericksburg, pass over with a division, and press the enemy to ascertain if their main body was still there. Fresh indications occurred on the 4th, for Ewell's corps followed that of Longstreet. The bridges being completed on the 5th, Howe's division of the Sixth Corps was thrown over and Hill's corps came out of their intrenchments to meet it. Some skirmishing ensued, and Sedgwick reported, as his opinion, that the greater portion of the enemy's force still held their old positions. Hooker, however, was determined to be prepared for all contingencies, and therefore, on the same day, detached the Fifth Corps to be in readiness to meet the enemy should they attempt to force a passage anywhere between United States Ford and Banks' Ford. Resolved to obtain certain information at all hazards, on the 7th of June he ordered Pleasonton to make a forced reconnoissance with all the available cavalry of the army, in the direction of Culpeper, to ascertain whether the Confederate forces were really concentrating there, with a view to an invasion of the North. Should this prove to be the case, Hooker desired to cross the river, to envelop and destroy Hill's corps, and then follow up the main body as they proceeded northward, thus intercepting their communications with Richmond. The authorities at Washington, however, did not look with much equanimity upon the possibility of finding Lee's army interposed between them and the Army of the Potomac, so they refused to sanction the plan and it was abandoned. Nevertheless, in my opinion it was about the best method that could have been devised to check the invasion, provided that Hooker did not lose his water-base; for Lee always showed himself very sensitive whenever his communications with Richmond was threatened. If that was severed no more _ammunition_ or military supplies would reach him. The amount of cartridges on hand was necessarily limited. It would soon be expended in constant skirmishes and engagements, and then he would be helpless and at the mercy of his antagonist. Consequently, the moment he heard that a portion of the Sixth Corps had crossed and confronted Hill, he directed Ewell and Longstreet to halt at Locust Grove, near Chancellorsville, and be in readiness to return to Fredericksburg to assist Hill in case there was any danger of his being overpowered. Finding Sedgwick's advance was a mere reconnoissance, the two rebel corps resumed their march to Culpeper. Hooker deemed it essential to success, that all troops connected with the theatre of invasion should be placed under his command, so that they could act in unison. In his opinion most of their strength was wasted in discordant expeditions, which were useless as regards the general result. He referred more particularly to General Dix's command at Old Point Comfort, General Heintzelman's command in Washington, and General Schenck's troops posted at Baltimore, along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and in the Valley of the Shenandoah. This request was reasonable and should have been granted. Hooker's demands, however, were not considered favorably. There was no very good feeling between General Halleck, who was commander of the army, and himself; and as he felt that his efforts were neither seconded nor approved at headquarters, he soon after resigned the command. The main body of the Union cavalry at this time was at Warrenton and Catlett's Station. Hooker, having been dissatisfied with the result of the cavalry operations during the Chancellorsville campaign, had displaced Stoneman in favor of Major-General Alfred Pleasonton. CHAPTER X. BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD). The 8th of June was a day of preparation on both sides. Pleasonton was engaged in collecting his troops and getting everything in readiness to beat up the enemy's quarters the next morning, and Stuart was preparing to cross for the purpose of either making a raid on the railroad, as Pleasonton states, or to take up a position to guard the right flank of the invading force as it passed by our army. Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, asserts the latter. Pleasonton's information was founded on captured despatches, and on interviews held by some of our officers with the Confederates under a flag of truce. The four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved down near the river opposite Beverly Ford on the 7th, to cover the proposed crossing. They were imperfectly supported by the remainder of Stuart's force. Jones' brigade was posted on the road to Beverly Ford, that of Fitz Lee* on the other side of Hazel River; that of Robertson along the Rappahannock below the railroad; that of W. H. F. Lee on the road to Melford Ford, and that of Hampton in reserve, near Fleetwood Hill--all too far off to be readily available. In fact, the batteries were entirely unsuspicious of danger, although they were a quarter of a mile from the nearest support and there was only a thin line of pickets between their guns and the river. [* A familiar abbreviation for Fitz Hugh Lee, adopted in the rebel reports.] In the meantime Pleasonton's three divisions, "stiffened"--to use one of Hooker's expressions--by two brigades of infantry, stole down to the fords and lay there during the night, quietly, and without fires, ready at the first dawn of day to spring upon their too-confident adversaries and give them a rude awakening. Pleasonton in person remained with Buford's division--the First-- which was lying near Beverly Ford with Ames' infantry brigade. The other two divisions, the Second, under Colonel Duffie, and the Third, under General Gregg--supported by Russell's infantry brigade, were in bivouac opposite Kelly's Ford. As each commander is apt to overstate the enemy's force and underrate his own, it is not always easy to get at the facts. Pleasonton claims that the rebels had about twelve thousand cavalry and twelve guns. Major McClellan of Stuart's staff, puts the number at nine thousand three hundred and thirty-five men, on paper, and twenty guns; but states there were nearly three thousand absentees. General Gregg estimates the Union cavalry at about nine thousand men and six batteries, but--as will be seen hereafter--a third of this force was detached toward Stevensburg, and their operations had little or no effect on the general result. The batteries do not seem to have been brought forward in time to be of much service. At daybreak Pleasonton's troops began to cross; Buford's division and Ames' infantry at Beverly Ford; the other two divisions, under Gregg and Duffie, with Russell's infantry at Kelly's Ford, six miles below. Each division was accompanied by two light batteries. Pleasonton's plan was founded on the erroneous supposition that the enemy were at Culpeper. He used the infantry to keep the lines of retreat open, and directed the cavalry to rendezvous at Brandy Station. They were to arrive there at the same time, and attack together. Duffie's column was to make a circuit by way of Stevensburg. Unfortunately, Stuart was not at Culpeper, but at Brandy Station; that is, he occupied the point where they were to rendezvous, and the plan therefore appertained practically to the same vicious system of converging columns against a central force. What happened may be briefly stated as follows: The First Division, under Buford, came upon the enemy between Brandy Station and Beverly Ford. A battle ensued at St. James' Church, and as their whole force confronted him, and they had twenty pieces of artillery, he was unable to break their line. After fighting some hours he was obliged to turn back with a portion of his command to repel an attempt against his line of retreat. Gregg next appeared upon the scene, and succeeded in getting in Stuart's rear before the rebel general knew he was there. Buford having gone back toward Beverly Ford, as stated, Gregg in his turn, fought the whole of Stuart's force without the co-operation of either Buford or Duffie. It can hardly be said that Duffie's column took any part in the action, for he did not reach Brandy Station until late in the day. And then, as the rebel infantry were approaching, Pleasonton ordered a retreat. For the future instruction of the reader it may be well to state that every cavalry charge, unless supported by artillery or infantry, is necessarily repulsed by a counter-charge; for when the force of the attack is spent, the men who make it are always more or less scattered, and therefore unable to contend against the impetus of a fresh line of troops, who come against them at full speed and strike in mass. Stuart's headquarters were twice taken by Gregg's division, and a company desk captured with very important despatches, but the enemy had the most men, and most artillery near the point attacked, and therefore always regained, by a counter-charge, the ground that had been lost. Stuart claims to have repulsed the last attack of Pleasonton against Fleetwood Hill, and to have taken three guns, besides driving our cavalry back across the river. Pleasonton claims to have fully accomplished the object of his reconnoissance, to have gained valuable information which enabled Hooker to thwart Lee's plans; and to have so crippled the rebel cavalry that its efficiency was very much impaired for the remainder of the campaign; so that Lee was forced to take the indirect route of the valley, instead of the direct one along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, behind his cavalry as a screen; his original intention having been to enter Maryland at Poolesville and Monocacy. GETTYSBURG. CHAPTER I. THE INVASION OF THE NORTH. An invasion of the North being considered as both practicable and necessary, it only remained to select the most available route. There was no object in passing east of Hooker's army, and it would have been wholly impracticable to do so, as the wide rivers to be crossed were controlled by our gunboats. To attempt to cross the Rappahannock to the west, and in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg, would have been hazardous, because when an army is crossing, the portion which is over is liable to be crushed before it can be reinforced. It would seem that Lee's first intention was to move along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge directly toward Washington.* The appearance of his army on Hooker's flank would be a kind of taunt and threat, calculated to draw the latter out of his shell, and induce him to make an attack. In such a case, as the rebels were in the highest spirits, in consequence of their recent victory at Chancellorsville, their commander had little doubt of the result. This plan was feasible enough, provided his cavalry could beat back that of Pleasonton and act as a screen to conceal his movements. This they were not in a condition to do after the battle of Brandy Station, and Lee was thus forced to take the route down the Shenandoah Valley, which had many advantages. The mountain wall that intervened between the two armies, was a sure defence against our forces, for it was covered by dense thickets, and the roads that lead through the gaps, and the gaps themselves, were easy to fortify and hold against a superior force. If Hooker had attempted to assail these positions, one corps could have held him in check, while the other two captured Washington. [* See map facing page 1.] The movement also favored the subsistence of the troops, for the valley being a rich agricultural region, Lee was enabled to dispense with much of his transportation and feed his army off the country. There was one serious obstacle, however, to his further progress in that direction, and that was the presence of a gallant soldier, Milroy, with a very considerable Union garrison intrenched at Winchester. It was essential to Lee's advance that the valley should be cleared of Union troops, otherwise they would sally forth after he passed and capture his convoys. With this object in view, on the 10th Ewell's corps passed through Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on their way to Chester Gap and Front Royal. The possibility of an invasion had been discussed for some days in Washington, and Halleck had come to the conclusion that it was better to withdraw the stores and ammunition from Winchester, and retain the post there merely as a lookout, to give warning of the enemy's approach. Accordingly, on the 11th, Milroy received orders from his department commander, General Schenck, to send his armament and supplies back to Harper's Ferry. Milroy remonstrated, saying that he could hold the place against any force that would probably attack him, and that it would be cruel to sacrifice the Union men who looked to him for protection. In reply to this Schenck telegraphed him that he might remain, but must be in readiness to retreat whenever circumstances made it necessary. Milroy, in answer to another inquiry, reported that he could move in six hours. On the 12th he sent out two scouting parties, and learned there was a considerable force at Cedarsville, which he thought might form part of Stuart's raid, information of which had been communicated to him. He could not believe it possible that an entire rebel corps was near him, for he supposed Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg. His superiors had not informed him, as they should have done by telegraph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper. He thought if Lee left Hooker's front at Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac would follow and he would receive full information and instructions. He telegraphed General Schenck late that night for specific orders, whether to hold his post or to retreat on Harper's Ferry, stating there appeared to be a considerable force in front of him. As the enemy soon after cut the wires, he never received any answer. He sent a messenger the same night to notify Colonel McReynolds, at Berryville, that there was a large body of the enemy on the Front Royal road, and directed him to send out scouts to Millwood, and keep himself advised of its approach, in order that he might prepare to fall back on Winchester the moment he was attacked by superior numbers. On the 13th Ewell marched with two divisions directly on Winchester, while he sent the third--that of Rodes--to take Berryville. Thanks to the timely warning McReynolds had received, his brigade got off in time, his rear being covered by Alexander's battery, the 6th Maryland Infantry, and part of the 1st New York (Lincoln) Cavalry. These detained the enemy two hours, and then caught up with the main body. Jenkins' cavalry came upon the retreating force at Opequan Creek, where he made a fierce attack, which was promptly repulsed by the rear guard, aided by the artillery with canister. After this there was no further molestation, and McReynolds' command reached Winchester at 10 P.M.--a march of thirty miles. Soon after the affair at the Opequan, Major Morris, with 200 men, was attacked at Bunker Hill, an outlying post of Winchester. He occupied a fortified church, but moved out to meet the enemy, under the impression it was only a small raiding party. When he found two thousand men in line of battle he retreated, fighting, to the church again. There, as the doors were barricaded, and the walls loopholed, the rebels could make no impression, and were obliged to fall back to a respectful distance. In the night Morris managed to steal away, and soon rejoined the main body at Winchester. The arrival of these reinforcements seriously embarrassed Milroy; and it will be seen hereafter that it would have been much better for all concerned if they had retreated to Harper's Ferry at once. They acted, however, strictly in obedience to orders. Rodes' division, after the taking of Berryville, kept on towards Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit Point. On the morning of the 13th Milroy had sent out a detachment under General Elliot on the Strasburg road, and another under Colonel Ely on the Front Royal road, to reconnoitre. Eliott found no enemy, and returned. An attempt was made to cut him off from the town, but it was repulsed. His troops were then massed on the south side behind Mill Creek and a mill-race which ran parallel to it, and were protected by stone fences. Colonel Ely had a brisk artillery skirmish with Ewell's advance, and then fell back to Winchester, taking post at the junction of the Front Royal and Strasburg roads. The enemy did not attempt to cross the creek that night, but at 5 P.M. they advanced and captured a picket-post which commanded the Strasburg road, but were soon driven out. From a prisoner captured in this skirmish Milroy learned the highly important intelligence that he was confronted by Ewell's corps and that Longstreet was rapidly approaching. The most natural course under the circumstances would have been for him to retreat at once, but McReynolds' brigade had just arrived, exhausted by their forced march, and could go no further, without some hours' rest. To move without them would be to sacrifice a large part of his force. He still cherished the hope that Hooker's army would follow Lee up closely and come to his relief. Ewell at night directed Early's division to attack the works on the north and west of the town at daylight the next morning, while Johnson's division demonstrated against the east and southeast. Early on Sunday, the 14th, Milroy sent out a detachment to see if the enemy had established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney roads. The party returned about 2 P.M. and reported the roads clear, but soon after the rebels came in great force from that direction, so that Milroy's hopes of escaping by the routes leading to the northwest were dissipated. Immediately west of Winchester, and parallel with Applebie Ridge, on which the main forts were situated, there is another ridge called Flint Ridge, where rifle pits had been commenced to command the Pughtown and Romney roads. These were held by one regiment, and part of another under Colonel Keifer of the 110th Ohio, together with Battery "L" of the 5th United States Artillery. Early's division made a sudden attack there, preliminary to which he opened fire with four batteries. He charged into these rifle-pits and took them, but the garrison retreated successfully, under cover of the fire, from the main works above, which were held by Elliot's and McReynolds' brigades. This was followed by an artillery duel, which was kept up until 8 P.M. without any special results. Johnson's division at daybreak attacked the eastern side of the town, held by Colonel Ely's brigade, but was gallantly met and repulsed by the 8th Pennsylvania and 87th Pennsylvania. These two regiments, by Milroy's order, made a bold charge against the enemy as they were retiring, but the latter were so suddenly and strongly reinforced that the two regiments were glad to get back to their shelter in the fortified suburbs. They were followed up however, and after severe fighting Johnson gained possession of a part of the town. This apparent success proved of no avail, for the forts above shelled him out. He therefore retired and made no further attempt in that direction. Darkness ended the struggle for the day. Johnson then left one brigade to prevent Milroy from escaping toward the east and went off with the remainder of his division to form across the Martinsburg pike, about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept Milroy's retreat in that direction. While these events were going on in the Valley, Imobden's cavalry was engaged in breaking up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Romney, to prevent Milroy from receiving any reinforcements from the west. The latter now found himself in a perilous situation. His cannon ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's rations for his men. He resolved to give up all further attempts to defend the place, to abandon his wagon train and artillery, and to force his way through the hostile lines that night; taking with him only the horses and small arms. This involved his leaving also his sick and wounded, but it was unavoidable. He ordered all the guns spiked, and the ammunition thrown into the cisterns. At 1 A.M. on the 15th, he moved silently out through a ravine and was not molested until he struck the Martinsburg road, about four miles from the town. There Elliot, who was in the advance with his brigade, met a rebel skirmish line, and soon ascertained that their main body were formed, partly on high ground in a woods east of the road, and partly in an open field east of and adjoining the woods. The enemy were in effect sheltered by a stone fence which bordered a railroad cut, with their reserve and artillery principally posted on elevated ground in the rear. The only thing to do was to break through their lines as soon as possible. It was now about 3:30 A.M. Elliot, whose record of long, careful, and brilliant service in the regular army is an exemplary one, formed line of battle with his three regiments and fought the six regiments that held the road for about an hour with varied success, encountering a severe artillery fire and driving back their right in disorder by a gallant charge of the 110th Ohio and 122d Ohio; but unfortunately their left held firm, in spite of repeated attacks made by Colonel Shawl with two regiments, reinforced with two more and by part of Colonel Ely's brigade. Their force in front, too, was sustained by heavy reserves both of infantry and artillery. A signal-gun fired at Winchester showed that the enemy there were aware of the flight and were in full pursuit. The main road being blocked, Milroy determined to try another, and directed the troops to fall back a short distance and turn to the right. Part of them did so, but the greater number, through some misunderstanding, filed to the left, and took the road to Bath. It was no longer possible to reunite the two columns and as Milroy's horse was shot under him about this time, he could use no personal exertions to remedy the disaster. A portion of the command who were not pursued reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield late in the afternoon. Those who moved out on the Bath road also made good their escape, crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and rallied at Bloody Run. The greater part of Colonel Ely's brigade, and Colonel McReynolds' brigade, however, were captured. Milroy claims to have brought off 5,000 men of the garrison, and that the 2,000 paroled by Early, consisted principally of the sick and wounded. Early says he sent 108 officers and 3,250 enlisted men as prisoners to Richmond. Johnson, who intercepted the retreat, says he captured 2,300 prisoners, 175 horses, and 11 battle flags. While two-thirds of Ewell's corps were attacking Winchester, the other division under Rodes, preceded by Jenkins' brigade of cavalry, pursued McReynolds' wagon train to Martinsburg, arriving there late in the afternoon of the 14th. The town was held as an outlying post of Harper's Ferry by a small detachment of all arms under Colonel Tyler, a subordinate of General Tyler, who formed his men outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until night, when his infantry escaped to Shepherdstown, and his artillery and cavalry to Williamsport. In carrying out these movements, however, he lost five guns and five caissons. He passed the river and rejoined the main body at Harper's Ferry. The latter place is wholly indefensible against an enemy holding the hills around it. It is like fighting at the bottom of a well. General Tyler had therefore very wisely moved across the river to Maryland Heights, where he had a strong fortified post. From that commanding eminence he could very soon shell out any force that attempted to occupy the town. The Shenandoah valley was now clear of Union troops, and soon became the great highway of the invasion. However disastrous Milroy's defeat may be considered on account of the losses incurred, it was not without its compensation. The detention of Ewell's force there gave time to the general Government and the Governors of the loyal States to raise troops and organize resistance, and it awakened the entire North to the necessity of immediate action. Hooker, having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, advanced his right to prevent any crossing in his immediate vicinity, and confine the enemy to the Valley route. He sent the Third Corps to hold the fords opposite Culpeper, and the Fifth Corps to guard those lower down. On the 13th he gave up his position opposite Fredericksburg, and started north toward Washington, giving orders to Sedgwick to recross and follow on to Dumfries. That night the First Corps reached Bealeton, and the Eleventh Catlett's station. Reynolds was placed in command of the left wing of the army (the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps) and I relieved him in command of the First Corps. The right wing (that is the Second, Fifth, Twelfth, and Sixth Corps) was accompanied by Hooker in person, who reached Dumfries on the 14th. As soon as Hill saw Sedgwick disappear behind the Stafford hills, he broke up his camp and started for Culpeper. Some changes in the meantime had occurred in the Army of the Potomac, and General Hancock was assigned to the Second Corps instead of General Couch, who had been sent to organize the department of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The teamsters and fugitives from Winchester, making for Chambersburg in all haste, told the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed that the rebels were close behind them. This created the wildest excitement. As many cases had occurred in which negroes had been seized, and sent South to be sold as slaves, the whole colored population took to the woods and filled up the roads in all directions. The appearance of Jenkins' brigade, who crossed at Williamsport on the morning of the 15th and reached Chambersburg the same day, added to the alarm. Jenkins was at the head of 2,000 cavalry, and soon became a terror to the farmers in that vicinity by his heavy exactions in the way of horses, cattle, grain, etc. It must be confessed he paid for what he took in Confederate scrip, but as this paper money was not worth ten cents a bushel, there was very little consolation in receiving it. His followers made it a legal tender at the stores for everything they wanted. Having had some horses stolen, he sternly called on the city authorities to pay him their full value. They did so without a murmur--_in Confederate money._ He pocketed it with a grim smile, evidently appreciating the joke. He boasted greatly of his humanity and his respect for private property, but if the local papers are to be believed, it must be chronicled to his everlasting disgrace that he seized a great many negroes, who were tied and sent South as slaves. Black children were torn from their mothers, placed in front of his troops, and borne off to Virginia to be sold for the benefit of his soldiers. There was nothing out of character in that, he thought, for it was one of the sacred rights for which the South was contending. Prompt measures were taken by the Northern States to meet the emergency. Mr. Lincoln called on the Governors of West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York to raise 120,000 men for temporary service. It was easy to get the men, but difficult to arm them, as nearly all serviceable muskets were already in possession of the Army of the Potomac. As early as the 9th two new departments had been created for Pennsylvania: That of the Monongahela, with headquarters at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major-General W. T. H. Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Carlisle, to Major-General Darius N. Couch. On the 15th Ewell reached Williamsport with a force estimated at twelve thousand men and sixteen guns. Before Couch could reach Carlisle it was already occupied by Jenkins' cavalry, and the terrified farmers of that section of country were fleeing in crowds across the Susquehanna, driving their horses and cattle before them. CHAPTER II. HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE-- ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE. A shower of telegrams came to Hooker, notifying him of these untoward events, and demanding protection; but he simply moved one step toward the enemy. On the 15th he had three corps--the First, Sixth, and Eleventh--grouped around Centreville, with the Third Corps at Manassas, and the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps in reserve at Fairfax Court House. The left flank of the army was guarded by Pleasonton's cavalry, posted at Warrenton. Hooker was not to be drawn away from the defence at Washington by any clamorous appeal for his services elsewhere; his plan being to move parallel to Lee's line of advance and strike his communications with Richmond at the first favorable opportunity. He obtained some reinforcements at this time, Stannard's Second Vermont brigade being assigned to my division of the First Corps, and Stahel's cavalry division, about six thousand strong, being directed to report to General Pleasonton for duty. As Harrisburg lay directly in the track of the invading army, Governor Curtin made strenuous efforts to collect a force there. He called upon all able-bodied citizens to enroll themselves, and complained that Philadelphia failed to respond. New York acted promptly, and on the 15th two brigades arrived in Philadelphia on their way to the front. On the same day Longstreet, having been relieved by Hill, left Culpeper with his corps and marched directly across the country east of the Blue Ridge to occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. Stuart's cavalry were to guard his right flank, but did not leave until the next day. The object of Longstreet's movement was to tempt Hooker to abandon his strong position in front of Washington and march against the Gaps, in which case it was hoped some opportunity might occur by which the rebels could either crush the Army of the Potomac in the open country or possibly outmanoeuvre it, so as to intervene between it and Washington; but Hooker remained stationary. Rodes' division of Ewell's corps reached Williamsport and remained there during the 16th, 17th, and 18th, to support Jenkins, and receive, and transmit to the rear, the cattle, horses, negroes, and provisions, taken by him. The commotion created by the approach of the invader was not all one-sided. General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, received orders to advance on Richmond, which was weakly defended at this time. As through their manifold offences in the way of starving our prisoners, etc., the rebel President and his cabinet were afraid of reprisals, there was great dismay at the weakness of the garrison there, and bitter denunciations of Lee for leaving so small a force behind. The Union troops for this counter-invasion were landed at Yorktown and sent on to the White House. General Getty, in command of one column of about seven thousand men, moved on the 13th as far as Hanover Junction to destroy the bridge over the North and South Anna, and as much of the railroad as possible, in order to make a break in Lee's communications. At the same time General Keyes, with another column of about five thousand men, moved from the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy, and thus leave a clear road for Getty's column to advance on the city. The Davis Government, however, called out the militia and concentrated enough men for defence by weakening the garrisons in South Carolina and elsewhere; but there is no doubt the fright at one time was so serious that it was in contemplation to recall Lee's forces; especially on the 15th of June, when it was learned that General Keyes' column was at New Kent Court House within fifteen miles of the city. On the 16th Stuart's cavalry left the Rappahannock--with the exception of the 15th Virginia, which remained with Hill--and bivouacked at Salem with Fitz Lee's brigade at Piedmont. Their orders were to keep along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, and guard the front of Longstreet's corps in the Gaps. Our own cavalry were concentrated at Warrenton and Catlett's. On the 17th Fitz Lee's brigade was sent forward from Piedmont to Aldie, via Middleburg, to anticipate our troops in holding the Gap there; it being considered important to occupy the Bull Run range of mountains as a screen for Lee's further operations. Fitz Lee's brigade was supported by that of Robertson which was moved to Rectortown, where it was also available as a reserve to W. H. F. Lee's brigade which had gone forward to occupy Thoroughfare Gap. No opposition was anticipated in the latter place, Pleasonton having moved to Centreville, with his main body. Stuart made his headquarters at Middleburg on the 17th. Fitz Lee halted near Dover to close up his command, and sent his pickets on to Aldie Gap. Pleasonton, who was scouting in the vicinity, had no orders to go through the pass, but felt prompted to do so by one of those presentiments which rarely deceive. He pushed on, therefore, with Gregg's division until about 2.30 P.M., when he came upon the rebel pickets, who fell back on the main body. The latter had made a march of forty miles to reach the Gap, and Fitz Lee chose a strong position on a hill directly west of Aldie, in which to fight a defensive battle. His line covered the road to Snicker's Gap, but could be turned by the road to Middleburg and Ashby's Gap. A sanguinary contest ensued, which, including the pursuit, lasted until 9 P.M. The rebel front was strengthened by a ditch and a line of hay-stacks. After fighting for three hours the battle was finally decided by a gallant charge of the 1st Maine Cavalry, who, after our line had been broken and driven back, were led by Kilpatrick in person, against a regiment of mounted infantry on the Ashby's Gap road, capturing four guns. The Harris Light Cavalry had been in disfavor for having failed in an attack at Brandy Station, but on the present occasion they redeemed themselves, made several brilliant charges, and greatly contributed to the success of the day. The rebels claim to have taken 134 prisoners, and some flags in this affair, and state that they only fell back to Middleburg in obedience to Stuart's orders. Ascertaining that Colonel Duffie was advancing on that place with his division, Stuart thought, by concentrating his entire force there, he could overwhelm him. This may account for the retreat, but it is very certain that the loss of the pass at Aldie was a serious blow to the rebel cause. This, supplemented by Colonel Duffie's operations, which will be described hereafter, gave Hooker possession of Loudon County, and threw the invading column far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded in posting forces in the gaps of the Bull Run range of mountains, and in occupying the wooded country between Thoroughfare Gap and Leesburg, they would not only have hidden all their own movements from view, but would have had command of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to within thirty miles of Washington, so that they could have operated on either side of the river. While Gregg's division were thus engaged, Colonel Duffie started under orders with his regiment from Centreville for Middleburg, by way of Thoroughfare Gap. The enemy (W. H. F. Lee's brigade) were already there, but he forced them out, and kept on to Middleburg, which was reached about 9.30 A.M. He found Stuart's rear guard or escort there, and drove them out. Stuart fell back to Rector's Cross Roads, and sent word to all his forces to concentrate against Duffie. Duffie barricaded the streets of the town and prepared to hold it until reinforcements could reach him from Aldie, not being aware that there was any impediment in that direction. At 7 P.M. the different rebel brigades advanced on him from the direction of Aldie, Union, and Upperville. By sheltering his men behind stone walls and barricades, he repelled several assaults, but at last was surrounded by overwhelming forces, and compelled to retreat by the road upon which he had advanced in the morning. He fell back until he crossed Little River, picketed the stream and halted there to get some rest. This gave time to the enemy to surround him, and by half past one the next morning all the roads in the neighborhood were full of cavalry; an entire brigade being formed on that which led to Aldie. He tried to force his way through the latter, but was received with heavy volleys on both flanks, and with loud calls to surrender. He directed Captain Bliss and Captain Bixby, who were in advance, to charge through everything in front of them, and the way was cleared for the main body, which at last gained the junction of the Aldie road with that which leads to White Plains. He then retreated on the latter, with his men all intermixed with those of the enemy and fighting every step of the way. He finally disengaged his force from this _mélée_ and made his way through Hopewell Gap back to Centreville, losing two-thirds of his command. In this affair at Middleburg, Stuart states that he was unable with his entire force to drive the 1st Rhode Island regiment from a position it had chosen, and speaks with admiration of the gallantry it displayed. On the 18th, Stuart took post outside of that town with Robertson and W. H. F. Lee's brigade. Fitz Lee's brigade was on his left at Union, and Jones' brigade was ordered up as a reserve. Pleasonton moved forward with all his available force and occupied Middleburg and Philemont on the road to Snicker's Gap; releasing some of Duffie's men who had been captured the day before. Gregg's division encountered the enemy a short distance beyond Middleburg and drove them five miles in the direction of Ashby's Gap. There was no regular line formation, but the Indian mode of fighting was adopted on both sides, by taking advantage of every stone, fence, bush, or hollow, to shelter the men. Before the action was over Kilpatrick's command came up and took a prominent part. Buford's division, which had advanced beyond Philemont on the Snicker's Gap road, also became warmly engaged. They turned the left flank of the rebels and pressed on successfully, but the squadron left to guard the bridge over Goose Creek was overpowered by numbers and the bridge was burned. Part of Pleasonton's force made a reconnoissance toward Warrenton and engaged Hampton's brigade there. On the 19th Pleasonton held the positions he had gained and sent back for an infantry support. As there were indications that the whole of Stuart's cavalry would be thrown on Gregg's division at Upperville, Pleasonton went forward with his entire force and a brigade of infantry to support it. After a series of brilliant engagements he drove Start steadily back into Ashby's Gap, where he took refuge behind Longstreet's Corps, a portion of which came up. Pleasonton then returned to Upperville and next day to Aldie. The object of these movements-- to gain possession of Loudon County--having been attained, Hooker was wary, and did not propose to be lured away from his strong position, to take part in cavalry battles at a distance without a definite object. He still found it difficult to realize that Lee would still further lengthen out his long line from Richmond, and endanger his communications, by invading Pennsylvania; and he therefore waited for further developments. Lee, however, impelled by public opinion behind him, which it was hardly safe to brave, still went forward, and directed Ewell to cross the Potomac with his main body and Longstreet to fall back behind the Shenandoah to act in conjunction with Hill, who had relieved Ewell at Winchester on the 17th, against any attempt to strike the rear of his long column. Like Achilles he felt that he was only vulnerable in his heel. Several small skirmishes occurred about this time between detachments of General Schenck's command, which picketed the north bank of the Potomac, and bands of rebel partisans. The former were surprised and captured in two or three instances. In one of these expeditions a locomotive and twenty-three cars were disabled on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Imboden, too, who occupied Cumberland on the 17th, in order to favor the general plan of invasion, tore up some miles of the track west of that town, with a view to prevent any reinforcements coming from that direction. It would have been much better for the interests of the Southern Confederacy if Lee, instead of making a downright invasion, had been content to remain in the valley and threaten Hooker with two corps, while he used the third to procure unlimited supplies in Pennsylvania, and to sever all connection between the East and West, by breaking up the railroads and cutting the telegraph wires. Such a result, however, would hardly have been sufficient to meet the expectations of the Southern people, who were bent upon nothing else than the entire subjugation of the North and the occupation of our principal cities. Pleasonton's operations having cleared the way, Hooker moved forward promptly on the 18th to occupy the gaps. The Twelfth Corps were sent to Leesburg, the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to Thoroughfare Gap. The other corps formed a second line in reserve. This covered Washington and gave Hooker an excellent base of operations. In answer to his demand for reinforcements, Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, and Abercrombie's division were sent to him. As the latter was just going out of service, it was of no use. Hooker contended that his army constituted the proper defence of Washington, and that it was not necessary to keep a large force inactive there, who could be of much more service at the front. The authorities were timid, however, did not see the force of this reasoning and therefore refused to place Schenck's and Heintzelman's commands under his orders. The enemy made a feeble attempt about this time to occupy Harper's Ferry, but were promptly shelled out by our batteries on Maryland Heights. Lee having failed, on account of the discomfiture of his cavalry, in crossing the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, was forced either to remain where he was or go forward. Impelled by public opinion he kept on his way up the Cumberland Valley. Hooker being very desirous of keeping the invasion west of the Blue Ridge, asked Heintzelman to co-operate with him by sending the 2,000 men which seemed to be of no service at Poolesville to the passes of South Mountain, which is an extension of the same range; but Heintzelman said those passes were outside of his jurisdiction, and the men were needed in Poolesville. Hooker replied somewhat angrily that he would try and do without the men. The two generals had quarreled, and there was not the best feeling between them. All of Ewell's corps were across the river on the 22d, and Jenkins' cavalry pushed on to Chambersburg. He was ordered to remain there until reinforced, but failed to do so, as Union troops were approaching from the direction of Carlisle. Longstreet and Hill were left behind to prevent Hooker from striking the rear of this long column. Hooker still remained quiescent, engaged in trying to obtain 15,000 men as reinforcements. He was but partially successful, for as soon as the New York regiments reached Baltimore, Lockwood's brigade of Maryland troops, about three thousand, was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac, and was assigned to the Twelfth Corps. The Army of the Potomac at this time was posted as follows: The Twelfth Corps at Leesburg, supported by the Eleventh on Goose Creek, between Leesburg and Aldie; the Fifth Corps near Aldie, and the Second at the next pass below, both supported by the Third Corps at Gum Springs. The First Corps was behind the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, near Guilford, on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad. Our cavalry, which had left Aldie, covered the approaches to Leesburg. On the 23d they had a sharp engagement at Dover, on the road from Aldie to Leesburg, with part of Stuart's force, who beat up their quarters, but they drove off their assailants without much difficulty. Lee now, with a prudent regard to a possible defeat, requested the authorities at Richmond to have a reserve army under Beauregard assemble at Culpeper; a request which was looked upon by Davis as one quite impossible to carry out, owing to the scarcity of troops, and the necessity of reinforcing Johnston in the West and Beauregard in the South. Two of Ewell's divisions, those of Rodes and Johnson, reached the frightened town of Chambersburg on the 23d. The other, under Early, took the road to York, _via_ Gettysburg, and halted on that day at Waynesborough. By this time twenty regiments of militia were on their way from New York to Baltimore and Harrisburg. Longstreet crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and Hill at Shepherdstown, on the 24th. Their columns united at Hagerstown the next day. Thus supported, Ewell's main body resumed its march to Carlisle, which it occupied on the 27th; gathering large supplies there and along the road by means of foraging parties sent out to depredate on the farmers. As soon as they reached the town, Jenkins' brigade left for Harrisburg. Hooker having now satisfied himself that the Capital was safe from a _coup-de-main_, and that the main body of the rebels were still marching up the Cumberland Valley, determined to move in a parallel line on the east side of South Mountain, where he could occupy the gaps at once, in case the enemy turned east, toward Washington and Baltimore. To carry out this design his army began to cross the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry on the 25th, and at night Reynolds' corps was in front and Sickles' corps in rear of Middletown, in readiness to hold either Crampton's or Turner's Gap. Howard's corps was thrown forward to Boonsborough. On the 26th Slocum's corps was sent to Harper's Ferry to act in conjunction with the garrison there--supposed to be 10,000 strong --against the enemy's line of communication with Richmond. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were advanced to Frederick, Md., as a support to the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps. Gregg's cavalry division remained behind to cover the crossing, which was all completed the next day, after which they too marched to Frederick. On the 25th, Early, leaving his division at Greenwood, went to Chambersburg to consult Ewell, who gave him definite orders to occupy York, break up the Central Railroad, burn the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and afterward rejoin the main body at Carlisle. It seems strange that Lee should suppose that the Union army would continue inactive all this time, south of Washington, where it was only confronted by Stuart's cavalry, and it is remarkable to find him so totally in the dark with regard to Hooker's movements. It has been extensively assumed by rebel writers that this ignorance was caused by the injudicious raid made by Stuart, who thought it would be a great benefit to the Confederate cause if he could ride entirely around the Union lines and rejoin Lee's advance at York. He had made several of these circuits during his military career, and had gained important advantages from them in way of breaking up communications, capturing despatches, etc. It is thought that he hoped by threatening Hooker's rear to detain him and delay his crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to capture Harrisburg, and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion was undoubtedly a mistake. When he rejoined the main body, his men were exhausted, his horses broken down, and the battle of Gettysburg was nearly over. As cavalry are the eyes of an army, it has been said that Stuart's absence prevented Lee from ascertaining the movements and position of Hooker's army. Stuart has been loudly blamed by the rebel chroniclers for leaving the main body, but this is unjust; Lee not only knew of the movement, but approved it; for he directed Stuart to pass between Hooker and Washington, and move with part of his force to Carlisle and the other part to Gettysburg. Besides, Stuart left Robertson's and Jones' brigades behind, with orders to follow up the rear of the Union army until it crossed, and then to rejoin the main body. In the meantime they were to hold the gaps in the Blue Ridge, for fear Hooker might send a force to occupy them. These two brigades, with Imboden's brigade, and White's battalion, made quite a large cavalry force: Imboden, however, was also detached to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to prevent forces from the West from taking Lee in rear; all of which goes to show how sensitive the Confederate commander was in regard to any danger threatening his communications with Richmond. At 1 A.M. on the 25th, Stuart started on his expedition and advanced to Haymarket, where he unexpectedly came upon Hancock's corps, which had left Thoroughfare Gap, and was on its way to Gum Springs. He opened fire against them but was soon driven off. He then returned to Buckland and Gainesville; for to keep on, in presence of our troops, would have frustrated the object of his expedition by indicating its purpose. This was the day in which Longstreet and Hill united their columns at Hagerstown. Some Union spies who counted the rebel forces as they passed through the town made their number to be 91,000 infantry, 280 guns and 1,100 cavalry. This statement, though much exaggerated, gained great credence at the time, and added to the excitement among the loyal people throughout the Northern States, while the copperhead element were proportionally active and jubilant. On the 26th, General French assumed command of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, then posted at Maryland Heights. On the same day the Richmond Government were much alarmed by the unexpected appearance of Colonel Spear's 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry within eleven miles of the city. Spear had made quite a successful and very destructive raid on the railroads and other lines of communication. He made, too, a very important capture by bringing in General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded at the battle of Brandy Station, and who was a son of General Robert E. Lee. The Davis Government had determined to hang one of our captains who was a prisoner in Libby, and the fact that a son of General Robert E. Lee was in our power prevented them from carrying out their intention for fear he might be hanged by way of retaliation. Early's division of Ewell's corps stopped at Gettysburg on its way to York. The other two divisions kept on toward Carlisle. These movements at once caused Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania to call out 60,000 men for the defence of the State. They were styled the emergency militia. As there was little else than shot-guns for them, these hasty gatherings did not promise to be very effective. The Governor still complained of a lack of zeal in Philadelphia. The people there, said "Isn't this awful!" but very few volunteered. They soon awoke from their apathy, however, and took prompt measures to defend the city. On the 27th the commands of Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and Ewell's two divisions occupied Carlisle, while Jenkins pushed on to Kingston, within thirteen miles of Harrisburg. At the same time Early was engaged in wreaking destruction upon the Northern Central Railroad, and by night he entered York. About the only opposition he encountered came from a militia regiment at Gettysburg, but this was soon driven away. There was wild commotion throughout the North, and people began to feel that the boast of the Georgia Senator Toombs, that he would call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument, might soon be realized. The enemy seemed very near and the Army of the Potomac far away. On the same day Stuart succeeded with great difficulty in crossing the Potomac in the vicinity of Drainsville. He found our troops were now all north of this river, so that one object of his expedition --to detain them on the south side--had failed. On the 28th he resumed his march, and as he passed close to Washington and Baltimore, he created considerable excitement in those cities. At Rockville he came upon a large train full of supplies, on its way to Frederick, Maryland, and captured it with its slender escort, after which he kept on in a northerly direction through Brookeville and Cookesville, travelling all night. On this day the Adjutant-General at Richmond telegraphed for troops to be sent there at once from the Carolinas and elsewhere, for he estimated the Union forces at the White House at thirty thousand men, and considered the capital to be in great danger. Neither Davis nor his cabinet had the slightest desire to have any successes Lee might obtain at the North supplemented by their own execution at the South, a result they felt was not wholly improbable, in the excited state of public feeling at that time, if the city should be taken. Lee, ignorant that Hooker was following him up, continued his aggressive advance. Early took prompt measures to seize the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. If successful, he intended to cross over and amuse himself by destroying all direct connection between Philadelphia and the West, by railroad and telegraph. This done, he proposed to march along the north side of the river, capture Harrisburg and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle. As Gordon's brigade approached the bridge, after driving away some militia, they found it in flames, the Union commander at Columbia, Colonel Frick, having given orders for its destruction. Early gained some compensation for his failure in this respect by levying a contribution on York of one-hundred thousand dollars in cash; two hundred barrels of flour; thirty thousand bushels of corn; one thousand pairs of shoes, etc. The Union army still remained in Frederick, with the left wing (three corps) under Reynolds thrown out toward the enemy, the Eleventh Corps under Howard at Boonsborough, the First Corps under my command at Middletown, supported by the Third Corps under Birney, two or three miles in rear, with Buford's division of cavalry holding the passes of South Mountain, the remainder of the cavalry being at Frederick. Hooker thought it useless to keep a garrison of 10,000 men in a passive attitude at Harper's Ferry. I think he was quite right, for the war could not be decided by the possession of military posts or even of cities, for hostilities would never cease until one army or the other was destroyed. He therefore applied to Washington for permission to add this force to that of Slocum, in order that the two might act directly against Lee's communications by following up his rear while preserving their own line of retreat. Slocum had been already ordered there, for this purpose, but Halleck would not consent that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn under any circumstances, and positively refused Hooker's request. Hooker then considering himself thwarted in all his plans by the authorities at Washington, offered his resignation. It was promptly accepted, and Major-General George G. Meade, then the commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac. He was a general of fine intellect, of great personal bravery, and had had a good deal of experience in the war in handling troops, but had never achieved any brilliant success, or met with any serious reverse. Upon ascertaining that the enemy were at York and Carlisle, Hooker had determined to throw out his different corps in a fan shape toward the Susquehanna, and advance in that direction with three corps on the left to defend that flank, in case Longstreet and Hill should turn East, instead of keeping on toward the North. At the same time it was his intention to have Slocum follow up Lee's advance, by keeping in his rear, to capture his trains and couriers, and to cut off his retreat should he be defeated. General Meade's first order was for all the troops to concentrate in Frederick, where he proposed to have a grand review; but at the urgent remonstrance of General Butterfield, who had been Hooker's Chief of Staff, and who stated that this delay would give Lee time to cross the Susquehanna, and capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia, Hooker's orders were allowed to stand, with some exceptions. Meade appears to have disapproved all movements against Lee's line of retreat, for he ordered Slocum to rejoin the main army, and had the hardihood to break up the post at Harper's Ferry, in spite of the fact that Hooker had just been relieved from command for requesting permission to do so. The bulk of the garrison, under Major-General French, was directed to take post as a reserve at Frederick, when our forces moved forward. The general idea of our advance was to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia if he went north, or between him and Baltimore and Washington in case he turned back. The orders at night were for Buford's division of cavalry to take post on the left flank, in the direction of Fairfield; Gregg's division on the right flank at Westminster; and Kilpatrick's division in advance of the centre, at Littlestown, the different corps to be posted between New Windsor and Emmetsburg. Ewell's corps, as stated, were at Carlisle and York, Lee and Longstreet's at Chambersburg, and Hill's corps at Fayetteville. Lee was startled to learn from a countryman who came in on the 28th that Hooker was at Frederick, and not south of the Potomac, as he had supposed. He saw at once that his communications with Richmond, about which he was so solicitous, were greatly endangered, for the Union army could be formed to interpose between him and Williamsport, and still keep a safe line of retreat open to Washington. This might not be so great a misfortune to the enemy as regards food and forage; for he could probably live on the country for some time, by making predatory excursions in different directions, but when it came to obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition, the matter would become very serious. An army only carries a limited amount of this into the field and must rely upon frequent convoys to keep up the supply, which is constantly decreasing from the partial engagements and skirmishes, so prevalent in a hostile country. The wisdom of Hooker's policy in desiring to assail the rebel communications is demonstrated by the fact the Lee immediately turned back. The head of the serpent faced about as soon as its tail was trodden upon. He came to the conclusion to prevent an attack against his rear by threatening Baltimore with his whole force. This would necessarily cause the Union army to march further east to confront him, and thus prevent it from operating in heavy force in the Cumberland Valley. Accordingly on the night of the 28th, Lee sent expresses to all his corps commanders to concentrate at Gettysburg. If he had known that Meade was about to withdraw all the troops acting against his line of retreat he would probably have gone on and taken Harrisburg. As the new commander of the Union army was a favorite of General Halleck, no notice was taken of his disregard of instructions in detaching the garrison of Harper's Ferry. General Couch, who commanded the Department of the Susquehanna, was also placed under his orders, a favor which had been denied to Hooker. The troubles of the latter were not quite over, for on his appearing in Washington to explain his action, he was immediately put under arrest for visiting the Capital without his (Halleck's) permission; a piece of petty persecution which might have been spared under the circumstances. It was, however, a short and easy method of settling all complaints that were inconvenient to answer. CHAPTER III. STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLANS. At dawn of day on the 29th, Stuart's command, after riding all night, reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and commenced disabling it, so far as the limited time at their disposal would allow, by burning a bridge at Sykesville and tearing up a portion of the track at Hood's Mill. They remained at the latter place during the day to rest, but started again in the afternoon, and reached Westminster about 5 P.M. At this place they were gallantly attacked by the 1st Delaware Cavalry, which Stuart says was driven off after hard fighting and pursued some distance toward Baltimore, adding very much to the panic there. At night the head of his column halted at Union Mills, half way between Westminster and Littlestown. It may as well be stated here that Stuart found himself greatly embarrassed by attempting to hold on to the long train he had captured at Rockville. It lengthened out his column to such an extent that it became difficult to defend all parts of the line without scattering and weakening his command. As Kilpatrick's division was waiting to intercept him at Littlestown, this consideration became a matter of considerable importance. Gregg's division also moved in the morning to head him off at Westminster, but owing to the roads being very much blocked up by our infantry and trains marching in that direction, Gregg did not succeed in reaching his destination until some hours after Stuart had passed. At night two brigades of Buford's division of cavalry covered the left flank of the Union army near Fairfield, with one brigade at Mechanicstown. The First and Eleventh Corps were at Emmetsburg, the Third and Twelfth at Middleburg, the Fifth Corps at Taneytown, the Second Corps at Uniontown, and the Sixth Corps at New Windsor. The advance of the rebel cavalry under Jenkins were now within sight of Harrisburg, and skirmishing only four miles from the town. Jenkins' object was to make a thorough reconnoissance in order to ascertain the best positions to be taken for an attack. There was a perfect exodus from the city. All business was suspended, too, in Philadelphia, and the authorities there busied themselves in hastening the work on the fortifications in the suburbs of the city. They were active enough now, and large numbers were enrolled. Pleasonton, who was under general orders to guard the flank nearest the enemy, directed Buford on the 29th to occupy Gettysburg the next day, and hold it until the Army of the Potomac came to his relief. He realized the importance of the position to the future success of our arms. Hill's corps was at Fayetteville on the 29th, but one division, that of Heth, was thrown forward on that day to Cashtown, within eight miles of Gettysburg. The object of the movement was to join Ewell at York, and co-operate with him in the destruction of the railroads on the other side of the Susquehanna, etc. This plan, as I have already stated, was suddenly changed on the evening of the 28th, when Lee found his communications endangered, and now all the advanced troops under his command turned back to concentrate at Gettysburg. Longstreet left Chambersburg and marched to Fayetteville, leaving Pickett's division behind to guard the trains. Early received the order to return in the afternoon of the 28th, recalled Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, and made preparations to start the next morning. Rodes' and Johnson's divisions left Carlisle and marched on Gettysburg; the former by the direct route, and the latter by way of Greenwood, to convoy the trains full of stolen property. A number of partisan skirmishes took place during the day, which were creditable to our troops, particularly that at McConnellsburg, to the west of Chambersburg. The raid against Richmond ended by the return of Colonel Spear's regiment to the White House. Hooker had urged that General Dix assume command of all his available troops, march against Richmond, and plant himself firmly on Lee's line of communication, but his recommendations were slighted by Halleck. There was much disappointment in the North at this failure to make a serious attack on the rebel capital, for it was generally believed that it might have been captured by a _coup de main_. On the 30th General Meade advanced his army still nearer the Susquehanna. At evening his extreme left, the First Corps, was at Marsh Creek, on the Emmetsburg road, while the extreme right, the Sixth Corps, was away off at Manchester. The intermediate corps were posted, the Eleventh at Emmetsburg; the Second at Uniontown; the Third at Taneytown; the Fifth at Union Mills, and the Twelfth at Frizzelburg. General French moved from Harper's Ferry with the bulk of the garrison and occupied Frederick. The First Corps was ordered to Gettysburg, but General Reynolds halted it at Marsh Creek, as the enemy were reported to be coming from the direction of Fairfield. Meade now resolved to take up a defensive position on Pipe Creek. He threw out his forces as before in a fan shape, but any corps encountering the enemy was expected to fight in retreat until it reached the new line, where all the corps were to assemble. This line as laid out was a long one, extending from Manchester to Middleburg, a distance of about twenty-five miles. Falling back to fight again, is hardly to be commended, as it chills the ardor of the men; nor is it certain that Lee would have attacked the intrenchments at Pipe Creek. If he found them formidable he might have preferred to fight on the defensive with two corps, while the Third Corps took Harrisburg, and broke up the railroad lines to the west, or marched directly against Philadelphia; or, as Pipe Creek did not interfere with his communications in any way he might have chosen to let it severely alone, and have kept on depredating in Pennsylvania, after capturing Harrisburg. This would have forced Meade sooner or later to attack him. On the night of the 30th Ewell's corps had reached Heidlersburg, nine miles from Gettysburg, with the exception of Johnson's division, which was at Greenwood. Rodes' division had marched direct from Carlisle by way of Petersburg. Longstreet with two divisions was at Fayetteville; the other division, that of Pickett, was left at Chambersburg to guard the trains. Hill's corps had reached Cashtown and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was still back at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road. Stuart, ascertaining that Early was no longer at York, and not knowing that the army was concentrating on Gettysburg, turned toward Carlisle. He had bivouacked half way between Westminster and Littlestown, but having ascertained that Kilpatrick was waiting for him at the latter place, attempted to avoid the encounter by going through cross roads to Hanover. He found Farnsworth's brigade of cavalry there, however, and charged their rear, driving them back and capturing some prisoners and ambulances. The 5th New York made a counter-charge under Major Hammond and drove him out again. He claims to have taken the town by the aid of Hampton's brigade, which arrived in time to reinforce him. Custer's brigade then came up from Abbotstown. The battle lasted until night, when Stuart gave up the contest and retreated, leaving Kilpatrick in possession. Part of his cavalry also attacked the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments at Littlestown, but were repulsed. He then, having no time to spare, kept on his way toward York to find the army he had lost. He passed within seven miles of Ewell's column on its way to Gettysburg, and neither knew that the other was near. Had they effected a junction it would have saved the rebel cavalry a long, fruitless, and exhausting march, which kept them out of the battle on the first day. It was one of those accidental circumstances which seemed to favor us in this campaign, while almost every incident at Chancellorsville was against us. Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle, which he found occupied by our troops. He demanded the surrender of the place under a threat of bombardment. General W. F. Smith, one of the heroes of the Peninsula, was not to be affected by menaces; and Stuart, whose time was precious and who had no ammunition to spare, turned off in hopes of reaching Gettysburg in time to take part in the battle. He arrived there on the afternoon of the 2d, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions; on their way whole regiments slept in the saddle. This force when it reached the field found Robertson's, Jones', and Jenkins' brigades, and White's battalion ready to join it. By evening Meade was fully apprised, by telegrams and Buford's scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night. He simply stated that the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces were moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in contact, and a fight or retreat was inevitable. Reynolds had the true spirit of a soldier. He was a Pennsylvanian, and, inflamed at seeing the devastation of his native State, was most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as possible. I speak from my own knowledge, for I was his second in command, and he told me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering the whole State. As he had great confidence in his men, it was not difficult to divine what his decision would be. He determined to advance and hold Gettysburg. He directed the Eleventh Corps to come up as a support to the First, and he recommended, but did not order, the Third Corps to do the same. Buford, with two of his cavalry brigades, reached the place that night, but not without considerable difficulty. He left Fountaindale Gap early in the morning and attempted to move directly to his destination, but he came upon Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's corps, and was obliged to fall back to the mountains again. Later in the day he succeeded, by going around by way of Emmetsburg. Before evening set in, he had thrown out his pickets almost to Cashtown and Hunterstown, posting Gamble's brigade across the Chambersburg pike, and Devin's brigade across the Mummasburg road, his main body being about a mile west of the town. While these great movements were going on, some minor affairs showed great gallantry on the part of partisan officers. Captain Ulric Dahlgren made a raid upon the rebel communications, capturing some guns and prisoners, and gaining very important information which will be referred to hereafter. The two armies now about to contest on the perilous ridges of Gettysburg the possession of the Northern States, and the ultimate triumph of freedom or slavery, were in numbers as follows, according to the estimate made by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial observer, and who has made a close study of the question: _The Army of the Potomac under General Meade_, 82,00 men and 300 guns. _The Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee_, 73,500 men and 190 guns. Stuart had 11,100 cavalry and 16 guns. Pleasonton had about the same number of cavalry, and 27 guns. CHAPTER IV. THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863. On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, as stated, held the ridges to the west of Gettysburg, with his cavalry division, composed of Gamble's and Devin's brigades. His vedettes were thrown far out toward the enemy to give timely notice of any movement for he was determined to prevent the rebels from entering the town if possible, and knew the First Corps would soon be up to support him. The enemy were not aware that there was any considerable force in the vicinity, and in the morning sent forward Heth's division of Hill's corps to occupy the place, anticipating no difficulty in doing so. Buford in the meantime had dismounted a large part of his force, had strengthened his line of skirmishers, and planted his batteries at the most commanding points. General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him as commander of the Left Wing of the army, that is of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, had turned over the command of the First Corps to me. He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to assist Buford. As my corps was largely engaged in the first day's operations, I must be excused for having a good deal to say in the first person in relation to them. Reynolds sent for me about six o'clock in the morning, read to me the various despatches he had received from Meade and Buford, and told me he should go forward at once with the nearest division--that of Wadsworth--to aid the cavalry. He then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the artillery and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible. Having given these orders, he rode off at the head of the column, and I never saw him again. The position of the two armies on the morning of the 1st of July, was as follows: The First Corps at Marsh Creek; the Second and Third Corps at Taneytown; the latter being under orders to march to Emmetsburg, to relieve the Eleventh Corps, which was directed to join the First Corps at Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps was at Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps at Hanover, and the Sixth Corps about thirty-five miles off to the right at Manchester. Kilpatrick's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry were also at Hanover. The Confederate army was advancing on Gettysburg from the west and north. The concentration of their troops and the dispersion of ours are indicated on the map. It must be remembered that the enemy had but _three_ corps, while the Union army had _seven_. Each of their corps represented a _third_, and each of ours a _seventh_, of our total force. The same ratio extended to divisions and brigades. Heth's division, which started early in the morning to occupy the town, soon found itself confronted by Buford's skirmishers, and formed line of battle with Archer's and Davis' brigades in front, followed by those of Pettigrew and Brockenborough. At 9 A.M. the first gun was heard. Buford had three cannon-shots fired as a signal for his skirmish line to open on the enemy, and the battle of Gettysburg began.* [* Lt.-Col. Kress, of General Wadsworth's staff, entered Gettysburg about this time and found General Buford surrounded by his staff in front of the tavern there. Buford turned to him and said, "What are you doing here, sir?" Kress replied that he came on to get some shoes for Wadsworth's division. Buford told him that he had better return immediately to his command. Kress said, "Why, what is the matter, general?" At that moment the far off sound of a single gun was heard, and Buford replied, as he mounted his horse and galloped off, _"That's the matter."_] As the rebels had had several encounters with militia, who were easily dispersed, they did not expect to meet any serious resistance at this time, and advanced confidently and carelessly. Buford gave way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground to protract the struggle. After an hour's fighting he felt anxious, and went up into the steeple of the Theological Seminary from which a wide view could be obtained, to see if the First Corps was in sight. One division of it was close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had preceded it, climbed up into the belfry to confer with him there, and examine the country around. Although there is no positive testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless attracted to Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the most prominent features of the landscape. An aide of General Howard--presumably Major Hall--soon after Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up to ask if he had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps. Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring his corps forward at once and _form them on Cemetery Hill_ as a reserve. General Howard has no recollection of having received any such orders, but as he did get orders to come forward, and as his corps was to occupy _some place_ in rear, as a support to the First Corps, nothing is more probable than that General Reynolds directed him to go there; for its military advantages were obvious enough to any experienced commander. Lieutenant Rosengarten, of General Reynolds' staff, states positively that he was present and heard the order given for Howard to post his troops on Cemetery Ridge. The matter is of some moment, as the position in question ultimately gave us the victory, and Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting it. It is not to be supposed that either Howard or Rosengarten would mistake the matter. It is quite probable that Reynolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which his force could rally if driven back, and Howard selected it as a suitable battle-field for the army. It has since been universally conceded that it was admirably adapted for that purpose. It will be seen from the above map, that there are two roads coming to Gettysburg from the west, making a considerable angle with each other. Each is intersected by ridges running north and south. On that nearest to the town, and about three-fourths of a mile from the central square, there is a large brick building, which was used as a Lutheran Theological Seminary. A small stream of water called Willoughby's Run winds between the next two ridges. The battle on the first day was principally fought on the heights on each side of this stream. Buford being aware that Ewell's corps would soon be on its way from Heidlersburg to the field of battle, was obliged to form line facing north with Devin's brigade, and leave Gamble's brigade to keep back the overpowering weight of Hill's corps advancing from the west. While this fighting was going on, and Reynolds and Wadsworth were pressing to the front, I was engaged in withdrawing the pickets and assembling the other two divisions, together with the corps artillery. As soon as I saw that my orders were in process of execution, I galloped to the front, leaving the troops to follow, and caught up with Meredith's brigade of Wadsworth's division, commonly called "The Iron Brigade," just as it was going into action. In the meantime the enemy approaching from the west were pressing with great force against Buford's slender skirmish line, and Reynolds went forward with Cutler's brigade to sustain it. He skilfully posted Hall's 2d Maine battery in the road, and threw forward two regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York, a short distance in advance on the left. At the same time he directed General Wadsworth to place the remaining three regiments of the brigade, the 147th New York, the 76th New York, and the 56th Pennsylvania, on the right of the road. When this formation was completed the cavalry brigade under Gamble, which had been fighting there, withdrew and formed in column on the left of the infantry; but the other cavalry brigade, under Devin, which was not facing in that direction, still held the position, awaiting the advance of Ewell's corps from the north. As Davis' rebel brigade of Heth's division fronting Wadsworth were hidden behind an intervening ridge, Wadsworth did not see them at first, but formed his three regiments perpendicularly to the road, without a reconnoissance. The result was that Davis came over the hill almost directly on the right flank of this line, which being unable to defend itself was forced back and directed by Wadsworth to take post in a piece of woods in rear on Seminary Ridge. The two regiments on the right accordingly withdrew, but the 147th New York, which was next to the road, did not receive the order, as their Colonel was shot down before he could deliver it. They were at once surrounded and very much cut up before they could be rescued from their perilous position. The two regiments on the right, which were forced back, were veterans, conspicuous for gallantry in every battle in which the Army of the Potomac had been engaged since the Peninsula campaign. As Wadsworth withdrew them without notifying Hall's battery in the road, or the two regiments posted by Reynolds on the left, both became exposed to a disastrous flank attack on the right. Hall finding a cloud of skirmishers launched against his battery which was now without support, was compelled to retreat. The horses of the lost gun were all shot or bayonetted. The non-military reader will see that while a battery can keep back masses of men it cannot contend with a line of skirmishers. To resist them would be very much like fighting mosquitoes with musket-balls. The two regiments posted by Reynolds, the 14th Brooklyn and 95th New York, finding their support gone on the right, while Archer's rebel brigade was advancing to envelop their left, fell back leisurely under Colonel Fowler of the 14th Brooklyn, who assumed command of both as the ranking officer present. I reached the field just as the attack on Cutler's brigade was going on, and at once sent my adjutant-general, Major Halstead, and young Meredith L. Jones, who was acting as aide on my staff, to General Reynolds to ask instructions. Under the impression that the enemy's columns were approaching on both roads, Reynolds said, "Tell Doubleday I will hold on to this road," referring to the Chambersburg road, "and he must hold on to that one;" meaning the road to Fairfield or Hagerstown. At the same time he sent Jones back at full speed to bring up a battery. The rebels, however, did not advance on the Fairfield road until late in the afternoon. They must have been in force upon it some miles back, for the cavalry so reported, and this caused me during the entire day to give more attention than was necessary to my left, as I feared the enemy might separate my corps from the Third and Eleventh Corps at Emmetsburg. Such a movement would be equivalent to interposing between the First Corps and the main army. There was a piece of woods between the two roads, with open ground on each side. It seemed to me this was the key of the position, for if this woods was strongly held, the enemy could not pass on either road without being taken in flank by the infantry, and in front by the cavalry. I therefore urged the men as they filed past me to hold it at all hazards. Full of enthusiasm and the memory of their past achievements they said to me proudly, _"If we can't hold it, where will you find men who can?"_ As they went forward under command of Colonel Morrow* of the 24th Michigan Volunteers, a brave and capable soldier, who, when a mere youth, was engaged in the Mexican War, I rode over to the left to see if the enemy's line extended beyond ours, and if there would be any attempt to flank our troops in that direction. I saw, however, only a few skirmishers, and returned to organize a reserve. I knew there was fighting going on between Cutler's brigade and the rebels in his front, but as General Reynolds was there in person, I only attended to my own part of the line; and halted the 6th Wisconsin regiment as it was going into the action, together with a hundred men of the Brigade Guard, taken from the 149th Pennsylvania, to station them in the open space between the Seminary and the woods, as a reserve, the whole being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin. [* I sent orders to Morrow under the supposition that he was the ranking officer of the brigade. Colonel W. W. Robinson, 7th Wisconsin, was entitled to the command, and exercised it during the remainder of the battle.] It is proper to state that General Meredith, the permanent commander of the brigade, was wounded as he was coming up, some time after its arrival, by a shell which exploded in front of his horse. Both parties were now trying to obtain possession of the woods. Archer's rebel brigade, preceded by a skirmish line, was crossing Willoughby's Run to enter them on one side as the Iron Brigade went in on the other. General Reynolds was on horseback in the edge of the woods, surrounded by his staff. He felt some anxiety as to the result, and turned his head frequently to see if our troops would be up in time. While looking back in this way, a rebel sharpshooter shot him through the back of the head, the bullet coming out near the eye. He fell dead in an instant, without a word. The country sustained great loss in his death. I lamented him as almost a life-long companion. We were at West Point together, and had served in the same regiment--the old 3d Artillery--upon first entering service, along with our present Commander-in-Chief, General Sherman, and General George H. Thomas. When quite young we had fought in the same battles in Mexico. There was little time, however, to indulge in these recollections. The situation was very peculiar. The rebel left under Davis had driven in Cutler's brigade and our left under Morrow had charged into the woods, preceded by the 2d Wisconsin under Colonel Fairchild, swept suddenly and unexpectedly around the right flank of Archer's brigade, and captured a large part of it, including Archer himself. The fact is, the enemy were careless and underrated us, thinking, it is said, that they had only militia to contend with. The Iron Brigade had a different head-gear from the rest of the army and were recognized at once by their old antagonists. Some of the latter were heard to exclaim: "There are those d----d black-hatted fellows again! 'Taint no militia. It's the Army of the Potomac." Having captured Archer and his men, many of the Iron Brigade kept on beyond Willoughby's Run, and formed on the heights on the opposite side. The command now devolved upon me, with its great responsibilities. The disaster on the right required immediate attention, for the enemy, with loud yells, were pursuing Cutler's brigade toward the town. I at once ordered my reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes to advance against their flank. If they faced Dawes, I reasoned that they would present their other flank to Cutler's men, so that I felt quite confident of the result. In war, however, unexpected changes are constantly occurring. Cutler's brigade had been withdrawn by order of General Wadsworth, without my knowledge, to the suburbs of Gettysburg. Fortunately, Fowler's two regiments came on to join Dawes, who went forward with great spirit, but who was altogether too weak to assail so large a force. As he approached, the rebels ceased to pursue Cutler, and rushed into the railroad cut to obtain the shelter of the grading. They made a fierce and obstinate resistance, but, while Fowler confronted them above, about twenty of Dawes' men were formed across the cut by his adjutant, E. P. Brooks, to fire through it. The rebels could not resist this; the greater number gave themselves up as prisoners, and the others scattered over the country and escaped. This success relieved the 147th New York, which, as I stated, was surrounded when Cutler fell back, and it also enabled us to regain the gun which Hall had been obliged to abandon. The enemy having vanished from our immediate front, I withdrew the Iron Brigade from its advanced position beyond the creek, reformed the line on the ridge where General Reynolds had originally placed it, and awaited a fresh attack, or orders from General Meade. The two regiments of Cutler's brigade were brought back from the town, and, notwithstanding the check they had received, they fought with great gallantry throughout the three days' battle that ensued. There was now a lull in the combat. I was waiting for the remainder of the First Corps to come up, and Heth was reorganizing his shattered front line, and preparing to bring his two other brigades forward. The remnant of Archer's brigade was placed on the right, and made to face south against Buford's cavalry, which, it was feared, might attack that flank. What was left of Davis' brigade was sent to the extreme left of the line, and Pegram's artillery was brought forward and posted on the high ground west of Willoughby's Run. Thus prepared, and with Pender's strong division in rear, ready to cover his retreat if defeated, or to follow up his success if victorious, Heth advanced to renew the attack. As I had but four weak infantry brigades at this time against eight larger brigades which were about to assail my line, I would have been justified in falling back, but I determined to hold on to the position until ordered to leave it. I did not believe in the system, so prevalent at that time, of avoiding the enemy. I quite agreed with Reynolds that it was best to meet him as soon as possible, for the rebellion, if reduced to a war of positions, would never end so long as the main army of the Confederates was left in a condition to take the field. A retreat, too, has a bad effect on the men. It gives them the impression that their generals think them too weak to contend with the enemy. I was not aware, at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed General Reynolds that the enemy's army were concentrating on Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of some kind. As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it. While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard. It seems that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps, just after the two regiments of Cutler's brigade, which had been outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth's order. Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field. It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism. About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries. By this time the enemy's artillery had been posted on every commanding position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down the Chambersburg pike. I was very desirous to hold this road, as it was in the centre of the enemy's line, who were advancing on each side of it, and Calef--exposed as his battery was--fired over the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the storm of missiles that assailed him, held his own handsomely, and inflicted great damage on his adversaries. He was soon after relieved by Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York, which was sustained by Colonel Roy Stone's brigade of Pennsylvania troops, which I ordered there for that purpose. Stone formed his men on the left of the pike, behind a ridge running north and south, and partially sheltered them by a stone fence, some distance in advance, from which he had driven the rebel skirmish line, after an obstinate contest. It was a hot place for troops; for the whole position was alive with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits and, under the impression that the place was to be held at all hazards, they cried out, _"We have come to stay!"_ The battle afterward became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down their lives there for the cause they loved so well. Morrow's brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed, and Biddle's brigade was posted on its left in the open ground along the crest of the same ridge, with Cooper's battery in the interval. Cutler's brigade took up its former position on the right of the road. Having disposed of Wadsworth's division and my own division, which was now under the command of Brigadier General Rowley, I directed General Robinson's division to remain in reserve at the Seminary, and to throw up a small semicircular rail intrenchment in the grove in front of the building. Toward the close of the action this defence, weak and imperfect as it was, proved to be of great service. The accompanying map shows the position of troops and batteries at this time. It will be seen that Heth's division is formed on the western ridge which bounds Willougby's Run and along a cross-road which intersects the Chambersburg road at right angles. Pender's division, posted in the rear as a support to Heth, was formed in the following order by brigades: Thomas, Lane, Scales, and McGowan (under Perrin); the first named on the rebel left and Perrin on the right. To sustain Heth's advance and crush out all opposition, both Pegram's and McIntosh's artillery were posted on the crest of the ridge west of the Run. While this was going on, General Howard, who was awaiting the arrival of his corps, had climbed into the steeple of the seminary to obtain a view of the surrounding country. At 11.30 A.M. he learned that General Reynolds was killed, and that the command of the three corps (the First, Eleventh, and Third) constituting the Left Wing of the army devolved upon him by virtue of his rank. He saw that the First Corps was contending against large odds and sent back for the Eleventh Corps to come up at double-quick. Upon assuming command of the Left Wing he turned over his own corps to Major-General Carl Schurz, who then gave up the command of his division to General Barlow. Howard notified General Meade of Reynolds' death, but forgot to take back or modify the false statement he had made about the First Corps, now engaged before his eyes, in a most desperate contest with a largely superior force; so that General Meade was still left under the impression that the First Corps had fled from the field. Howard also sent a request to Slocum, who was at Two Taverns, only about five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward, but Slocum declined, without orders from Meade. He probably thought if any one commander could assume the direction of other corps, he might antagonize the plans of the General-in-Chief. Upon receiving the news of the death of General Reynolds and the disorder which it was supposed had been created by that event, General Meade superseded Howard by sending his junior officer, General Hancock, to assume command of the field, with directions to notify him of the condition of affairs at the front. He also ordered General John Newton of the Sixth Corps to take command of the First Corps. The head of the Eleventh Corps reached Gettysburg at 12.45 P.M., and the rear at 1.45 P.M. Schimmelpfennig's division led the way, followed by that of Barlow. The two were directed to prolong the line of the First Corps to the right along Seminary Ridge. The remaining division, that of Steinwehr, with the reserve artillery under Major Osborne, were ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill, in rear of Gettysburg, as a reserve to the entire line. Before this disposition could be carried out, however, Buford rode up to me with the information that his scouts reported the advance of Ewell's corps from Heidlersburg directly on my right flank. I sent a staff officer to communicate this intelligence to General Howard, with a message that I would endeavor to hold my ground against A. P. Hill's corps if he could, by means of the Eleventh Corps, keep Ewell from attacking my right. He accordingly directed the Eleventh Corps to change front to meet Ewell. As it did so, Devin's cavalry brigade fell back and took up a position to the right and rear of this line just south of the railroad bridge. The concentration of Rodes' and Early's divisions--the one from Carlisle and the other from York--took place with great exactness; both arriving in sight of Gettysburg at the same time. The other division, that of Johnson, took a longer route from Carlisle by way of Greenwood, to escort the trains, and did not reach the battle- field until sunset. Anderson's division of Hill's corps was also back at the pass in the mountains on the Chambersburg road. It had halted to allow Johnson to pass, and then followed him to Gettysburg, reaching there about dusk. The first indication I had that Ewell had arrived, and was taking part in the battle, came from a battery posted on an eminence called Oak Hill, almost directly in the prolongation of my line, and about a mile north of Colonel Stone's position. This opened fire about 1.30 P.M., and rendered new dispositions necessary; for Howard had not guarded my right flank as proposed, and indeed soon had more than he could do to maintain his line. When the guns referred to opened fire, Wadsworth, without waiting for orders, threw Cutler's brigade back into the woods on Seminary Ridge, north of the railroad grading; a movement I sanctioned as necessary. Morrow's brigade was concealed from the view of the enemy, in the woods where Reynolds fell, and Biddle's brigade, by my order, changed front to the north. It could do so with impunity, as it was behind a ridge which concealed its left flank from Hill's corps, and was further protected in that direction by two companies of the 20th New York State Militia, who occupied a house and barn in advance, sent there by the colonel of that regiment, Theodore B. Gates, whose skill and energy were of great service to me during the battle. It would of course have been impossible to hold the line if Hill attacked on the west and Ewell assailed me at the same time on the north; but I occupied the central position, and their converging columns did not strike together until the grand final advance at the close of the day, and therefore I was able to resist several of their isolated attacks before the last crash came. Stone's brigade in the centre had a difficult angle to defend, but was partially sheltered by a ridge on the west. His position was in truth the key-point of the first day's battle. It overlooked the field, and its possession by the enemy would cut our force in two, enfilade Morrow's and Biddle's brigades, and compel a hasty retreat. After Hall's battery was driven back, no other artillery occupied the ground for some time, then General Wadsworth borrowed Calef's regular battery from the cavalry, and posted it in rear of the position Hall had occupied. When the remainder of the division came up, Captain Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York Artillery, as already stated, was sent to assist Calef in keeping down the fire of two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west; but when Ewell's artillery also opened, the cross fire became too severe. Calef was withdrawn, and Reynolds was severely wounded. The rebel batteries soon after ceased firing for the time being; and at Wadsworth's request, Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds' battery, under Lieutenant Wilbur, on Seminary Ridge, south of the railroad cut; Stewart's Battery "B" 4th United States being on a line north of the cut. Cooper's battery was directed to meet Ewell's attack from the north, and Stevens' 5th Maine battery was retained behind the Seminary in reserve. Barlow's division on the right and Schimmelpfennig's on the left, formed somewhat hastily against Ewell, whose line of battle faced south. Barlow rested his right on a wooded knoll, constituting part of the western bank of Rock Creek. As there was an open country to the east he considered that flank secure, for no enemy was in sight then, and if they came from that direction, there would be time to make fresh dispositions. After the formation there was an interval of a quarter of a mile between their left and the First Corps, which might have been avoided by placing the two divisions further apart. This was a serious thing to me, for the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy from penetrating there, lengthened and weakened my line, and used up my reserves. It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out. It would have been better, in my opinion, if the left had been _echeloned_ in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone foundations at the Almshouse. The enemy then could not have turned the right without compromising the safety of the turning column and endangering his communications; a movement he would hardly like to make, especially as he did not know what troops might be coming up. Still they had a preponderating force, and as their whole army was concentrating on Gettysburg, it was not possible to keep them back for any great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps were heavily reinforced. The position of our forces and those of the enemy, will be best understood by a reference to the map on page 125. About 2 P.M., after the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General Howard rode over, inspected, and approved it. He also examined my position and gave orders, in case I was forced to retreat, to fall back to Cemetery Hill. I think this was the first and only order I received from him during the day. Rodes' division of five brigades was formed across Seminary Ridge, facing south, with Iverson on the right, supported by Daniel and O'Neill in the centre, and Doles on the left, Ramseur being in reserve. Iverson was sent to attack the First Corps on Seminary Ridge, and O'Neill and Doles went forward about 2.45 P.M., to keep back the Eleventh Corps. When the two latter became fairly engaged in front, about 3.30 P.M., Early came up with his whole division and struck the Union right. This decided the battle in favor of the enemy. Barlow had advanced with Von Gilsa's brigade, had driven back Ewell's skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkinson's battery was preparing to hold the Carlisle road. He was not aware that Early was approaching, and saw Doles' advance with pleasure, for he felt confident he could swing his right around and envelop Doles' left; a manoeuvre which could hardly fail to be successful. Schimmelpfennig now threw forward Von Amberg's brigade to intervene between O'Neill and Doles, and to strike the right flank of the latter; but Doles avoided the blow by a rapid change of front. This necessarily exposed his left to Barlow, who could not take advantage of it as he was unexpectedly assailed by Early's division on his own right, which was enveloped, and in great danger. His men fought gallantly, and Gordon, who attacked them, says, made stern resistance until the rebels were within fifty paces of them. As Barlow was shot down, and their right flank enveloped, they were forced to retreat to the town. This isolated Von Amberg's brigade, and Doles claims to have captured the greater portion of it. The retrograde movement of the Eleventh Corps necessarily exposed the right flank of the First to attacks from O'Neill and Ramseur. Howard sent forward Coster's brigade, of Steinwehr's division, to cover the retreat of the Eleventh Corps; but its force was too small to be effective; its flanks were soon turned by Hays' and Hoke's brigades, of Early's division, and it was forced back with the rest. We will now go back to the First Corps and describe what took place there while these events were transpiring. When the wide interval between the First and Eleventh Corps was brought to my notice by Colonel Bankhead of my staff, I detached Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division to fill it. This brigade moved promptly, and took post on Cutler's right, but before it could form across the intervening space, O'Neill's brigade assailed its right flank, and subsequently its left, and Baxter was forced to change front alternately, to meet these attacks. He repulsed O'Neill, but found his left flank again exposed to an attack from Iverson, who was advancing in that direction.* He now went forward and took shelter behind a stone fence on the Mummasburg road, which protected his right flank, while an angle in the fence which turned in a southwesterly direction covered his front. As his men lay down behind the fence, Iverson's brigade came very close up, not knowing our troops were there. Baxter's men sprang to their feet and delivered a most deadly volley at very short range, which left 500 of Iverson's men dead and wounded, and so demoralized them, that all gave themselves up as prisoners. One regiment, however, after stopping our firing by putting up a white flag, slipped away and escaped. This destructive effect was not caused by Baxter alone, for he was aided by Cutler's brigade, which was thrown forward on Iverson's right flank, by the fire of our batteries, and the distant fire from Stone's brigade. So long as the latter held his position, his line, with that of Cutler and Robinson's division, constituted a demi-bastion and curtain, and every force that entered the angle suffered severely. Rodes in his report speaks of it as "a murderous enfilade, and reverse fire, to which, in addition to the direct fire it encountered, Daniel's brigade had been subject to from the time it commenced its final advance." [* General Robinson states that these changes of front were made by his orders and under his personal supervision.] While Iverson was making his attack, Rodes sent one of his reserve brigades--the one just referred to, that of Daniel--against Stone. This joined Davis' brigade of Hill's corps, and the two charged on Stone's three little regiments. Stone threw forward one of these --the 149th Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight, to the railroad cut, where they were partially sheltered. Colonel Dana's regiment, the 143d Pennsylvania, was posted on the road in rear of Dwight and to the right. When I saw this movement I thought it a very bold one, but its results were satisfactory. Two volleys and a bayonet charge by Dwight drove Daniel back for the time being.* In this attack Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and the command of his brigade devolved upon Colonel Wister of the 150th Pennsylvania. [* Dwight was a hard fighter, and not averse to plain speaking. Once, when Secretary of War Stanton had determined to grant no more passes to go down to the army, Dwight applied for permission for an old man to visit his dying son. The request was refused; whereupon Dwight said: _"My name is Dwight, Walton Dwight, Lieutenant- Colonel of the 149th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. You can dismiss me from the service as soon as you like, but I am going to tell you what I think of you,"_ and he expressed himself in terms far from complimentary; whereupon Stanton rescinded the order and gave him the pass.] This attack should have been simultaneous with one from the nearest troops of Hill's corps, but the latter were lying down in a sheltered position, and Daniel urged them in vain to go forward. Not being able to force his way in front on account of Dwight's position in the railroad cut, Daniel brought artillery to enfilade it, and threw the 32d North Carolina across it. The cut being no longer tenable, Dwight retreated to the road and formed on Dana's left. Daniel had been originally ordered to protect Iverson's right, but Iverson swung his right around without notifying Daniel, and thus dislocated the line. Ramseur now came forward to aid Iverson, and I sent Paul's brigade of Robinson's division, which was preceded by Robinson in person, to assist Baxter, and, if possible to fill the interval between the First and Eleventh Corps, for I feared the enemy would penetrate there and turn my right flank. When Paul's brigade arrived, Baxter was out of ammunition, but proceeded to refill his cartridge-boxes from those of the dead and wounded. General Howard has stated that the interval referred to was filled by Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries of the Eleventh Corps, but a glance at the official map will show that, before Paul's advance, these batteries were several hundred yards distant from the First Corps. Another attack was now made from the north and west by both Daniel's and Davis' brigades. Colonel Wister faced his own regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Huidekoper, to the west, and the other two regiments to the north. The enemy were again repulsed by two volleys and a gallant bayonet charge, led by Huidekoper, who lost an arm in the fight. Colonel Wister having been shot through the face, the command devolved upon Colonel Dana, another veteran of the Mexican war. There had been a great lack of co-ordination in these assaults, for they were independent movements, each repulsed in its turn. The last attack, however, against Wister by extended by Brockenborough's and Pettigrew's brigades to Morrow's front in the woods, but Morrow held on firmly to his position. I now sent my last reserve, the 151st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant- Colonel McFarland, to take post between Stone's and Biddle's brigades. So far I had done all that was possible to defend my front, but circumstances were becoming desperate. My line was very thin and weak, and my last reserve had been thrown in. As we had positive information that the entire rebel army was coming on, it was evident enough that we could not contend any longer, unless some other corps came to our assistance. I had previously sent an aide-- Lieutenant Slagle--to ask General Howard to reinforce me from Steinwehr's division, but he declined to do so. I now sent my Adjutant-General, Halsted, to reiterate the request, or to obtain for me an order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to remain where I was, in the face of the constantly increasing forces which were approaching from the west. Howard insisted that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the distance. The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his error; he still, however, refused to order me to retire, but sent Halsted off to find Buford's cavalry, and order it to report to me. The First Corps had suffered severely in these encounters, but by this additional delay, and the overwhelming odds against us, it was almost totally sacrificed. General Wadsworth reported half of his men were killed or wounded, and Rowley's division suffered in the same proportion. Hardly a field officer remained unhurt. After five color-bearers of the 24th Michigan Volunteers had fallen, Colonel Morrow took the flag in his own hands, but was immediately prostrated. A private then seized it, and, although mortally wounded, still held it firmly in his grasp. Similar instances occurred all along the line. General Robinson had two horses shot under him. He reported a loss of 1,667 out of 2,500. Buford was in a distant part of the field, with Devin's brigade, covering the retreat of the Eleventh Corps, and already had all he could attend to. He expressed himself in unequivocal terms at the idea that he could keep back Hill's entire corps with Gamble's cavalry brigade alone. As Howard seemed to have little or no confidence in his troops on Cemetery Hill, he was perhaps justified in retaining them in line there for the moral effect they would produce. About the time the Eleventh Corps gave way on the right, the Confederate forces made their final advance in double lines, backed by strong reserves, and it was impossible for the few men left in the First Corps to keep them back, especially as Pender's large division overlapped our left for a quarter of a mile; Robinson's right was turned, and General Paul was shot through both eyes in the effort to stem the tide. They could not contend against Ramseur in front, and O'Neill on the flank, at the same time. Under these circumstances it became a pretty serious question how to extricate the First Corps and save its artillery before it was entirely surrounded and captured. Biddle, Morrow, and Dana were all forced back from the ridge they had defended so long, which bordered Willoughby's Run. Each brigade was flanked, and Stone's men under Dana were assailed in front and on both flanks. Yet even then Daniel speaks of the severe fighting which took place before he could win the position. What was left of the First Corps after all this slaughter rallied on Seminary Ridge. Many of the men entered a semi-circular rail entrenchment which I had caused to be thrown up early in the day, and held that for a time by lying down and firing over the pile of rails. The enemy were now closing in on us from the south, west, and north, and still no orders came to retreat. Buford arrived about this time, and perceiving that Perrin's brigade in swinging around to envelop our left exposed its right flank, I directed him to charge. He reconnoitered the position they held, but did not carry out the order; I do not know why. It was said afterward he found the fences to be an impediment; but he rendered essential service by dismounting his men and throwing them into a grove south of the Fairfield road, where they opened a severe fire, which checked the rebel advance and prevented them from cutting us off from our direct line of retreat to Cemetery Hill. The first long line that came on us from the west was swept away by our artillery, which fired with very destructive effect, taking the rebel line _en echarpe_. Although the Confederates advanced in such force, our men still made strong resistance around the Seminary, and by the aid of our artillery, which was most effective, beat back and almost destroyed the first line of Scales' brigade, wounding both Scales and Pender. The former states that he arrived within seventy-five feet of the guns, and adds: "Here the fire was most severe. Every field officer but one was killed or wounded. The brigade halted in some confusion to return the fire." My Adjutant-Generals Baird and Halstead, and my aides Lee, Marten, Slagle, Jones, and Lambdin had hot work carrying orders at this time. It is a marvel that any of them survived the storm of bullets that swept the field. Robinson was forced back toward the Seminary, but halted notwithstanding the pressure upon him, and formed line to save Stewart's battery north of the railroad cut, which had remained too long, and was in danger of being captured. Cutler's brigade in the meantime had formed behind the railroad grading to face the men who were pursuing the Eleventh Corps. This show of force had a happy effect, for it caused the enemy in that direction to halt and throw out a skirmish line, and the delay enabled the artillery soon after to pass through the interval between Cutler on the north and Buford's cavalry on the south. As the enemy were closing in upon us and crashes of musketry came from my right and left, I had little hope of saving my guns, but I threw my headquarters guard, under Captain Glenn of the 149th Pennsylvania, into the Seminary and kept the right of Scales' brigade back twenty minutes longer, while their left was held by Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division, enabling the few remaining troops, ambulances, and artillery to retreat in comparative safety. It became necessary, however, to abandon one gun of Captain Reynolds' battery, as several of the horses were shot and there was no time to disengage them from the piece. Three broken and damaged caisson bodies were also left behind. The danger at this time came principally from Hoke's and Hays' brigades, which were making their way into the town on the eastern side, threatening to cut us off from Cemetery Hill. The troops in front of the Seminary were stayed by the firm attitude of Buford's cavalry, and made a bend in their line, apparently with a view to form square. I waited until the artillery had gone and then rode back to the town with my staff. As we passed through the streets, pale and frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food, and implored us not to abandon them. Colonel Livingston of my staff, who had been sent on a message, came back to the Seminary, not knowing that we had left. He says the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously, evidently under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for them there. They were also forming against cavalry. On the way I must have met an aide that Howard says he sent to me with orders to retreat, but I do not remember receiving any message of the kind. I observe that Howard in his account of the battle claims to have handled the First and Eleventh Corps from 11 A.M. until 4 P.M.; but at 11 A.M. his corps was away back on the road, and did not arrive until about 1 P.M. The map previously given on page 125 demonstrates that we were a mere advance guard of the army, and shows the impossibility of our defending Gettysburg for any length of time. The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed. There were but few left, but they showed the true spirit of soldiers. They walked leisurely from the Seminary to the town, and did not run. I remember seeing Hall's battery and the 6th Wisconsin regiment halt from time to time to face the enemy, and fire down the streets. Both Doles and Ramsey claim to have had sharp encounters there. Many of the Eleventh Corps, and part of Robinson's division, which had been far out, were captured in the attempt to reach Steinwehr's division on Cemetery Hill, which was the rallying point. When I arrived there I found General Howard, surrounded by his staff, awaiting us at the main gate of the cemetery. He made arrangements to hold the road which led up from the town, and which diverged to Baltimore and Taneytown, by directing me to post the First Corps on the left in the cemetery, while he assembled the Eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after he rode over to ask me, in case his own men (Steinwehr's division) deserted their guns, to be in readiness to defend them. General Schurz about this time was busily engaged in rallying his men, and did all that was possible to encourage them to form line again. I understood they were told that Sigel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction thought justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that the discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in a measure injured their morale and _esprit-de-corps_, for they were rallied with great difficulty. About 3.30 P.M., General Hancock arrived with orders from General Meade to supersede Howard. Congress had passed a law authorizing the President to put any general over any other superior to rank if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and General Meade now assumed this power in the name of the President. Owing to the false despatch Howard had sent early in the day, Meade must have been under the impression that the First Corps had fled without fighting. More than half of them, however, lay dead and wounded on the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped. Hancock being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit to his authority and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff, who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in a subsequent account of the battle that he merely regarded General Hancock as a staff officer acting for General Meade. He says "General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner and used these words, 'General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.' I replied, 'All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the right.' I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill, but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection." He adds that Hancock did not really relieve him until 7 P.M. Hancock, however, denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as a staff officer. He says he assumed absolute command at 3.30 P.M. I know he rode over to me and told me he was in command of the field, and directed me to send a regiment to the right, and I sent Wadsworth's division there, as my regiments were reduced to the size of companies. Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field. Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were great advantages. It covered the principal roads to Washington and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final success. The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly, nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other. It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting the position. He, doubtless, did see its advantages, and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took measures to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops. Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying Culp's Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth's brigade, and posting the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made a show of strength not warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ewell had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not so readily after an hour's delay, for then Sickles' corps from Emmetsburg, and Slocum's corps from Two Taverns, began to approach the position. The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson, however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy a great numerical superiority. General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the retreat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and Hancock's movements and dispositions through his field-glass. He was not deceived by this show of force, and sent a recommendation--not an order--to Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost 3,000 men, and both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general engagement. In fact they had had all the fighting they desired for the time being. Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell's staff, states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon's brigade to reinforce Smith's brigade on his extreme left, to meet a supposed Union advance in that direction. The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the arrival of Johnson's division before taking further action. When the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the opportunity for a successful attack had passed. In sending Hancock forward with such ample powers, Meade virtually appointed him commander-in-chief for the time being, for he was authorized to say where we would fight, and when, and how. In the present instance, in accordance with his recommendation, orders were immediately sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery Ridge. Two-thirds of the Third Corps, and all of the Twelfth came up, and by six o'clock the position became tolerably secure. Stannard's Second Vermont brigade also arrived, and as they formed part of my command, reported to me for duty; a very welcome reinforcement to my shattered division. Sickles had taken the responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing that we were hard pressed. His command prolonged the line of the First Corps to the left. Slocum's Corps--the Twelfth--was posted, as a reserve, also on the left. Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to Slocum and rode back to Taneytown to confer with Meade and explain his reasons for choosing the battle-field. Longstreet's corps soon arrived and joined Ewell and Hill; so that the whole rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning, with the exception of Pickett's division. At the close of the day General John Newton rode up and took charge of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and I resumed the command of my division. Several incidents occurred during the severe struggle of the first day which are worthy of record. Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York was cut off during the retreat of Robinson's division, and took refuge in a house. A rebel lieutenant entered and called upon him to surrender his sword. This he declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several of his men, formed them in line, took out his watch and said to the colonel, "You are an old gray-headed man, and I dislike to kill you, but if you don't give up that sword in five minutes, I shall order these men to blow your brains out." When the time was up _the Colonel still refused to surrender._ A sudden tumult at the door, caused by some prisoners attempting to escape, called the lieutenant off for a moment. When he returned the colonel had given his sword to a girl in the house who had asked him for it, and she secreted it between two mattresses. He was then marched to the rear, but being negligently guarded, escaped the same night and returned to his regiment. Another occurrence recalls Browning's celebrated poem of "An Incident at Ratisbon." An officer of the 6th Wisconsin approached Lieutenant- Colonel Dawes, the commander of the regiment, after the sharp fight in the railroad cut. The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect attitude of the man, that he came to report for orders of some kind; but the compressed lips told a different story. With a great effort the officer said, _"Tell them at home I died like a man and a soldier."_ He threw open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound, and dropped dead at the colonel's feet. Another incident was related to me at the time, but owing to our hurried movements and the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never had an opportunity to verify it. It was said that during the retreat of the artillery one piece of Stewart's battery did not limber up as soon as the others. A rebel officer rushed forward, placed his hand upon it, and presenting a pistol at the back of the driver, directed him not to drive off with the piece. The latter did so, however, received the ball in his body, caught up with the battery and then fell dead. We lay on our arms that night among the tombs at the Cemetery, so suggestive of the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame; but the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these and were too much exhausted to think of anything but much-needed rest. CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY. The ridge upon which the Union forces were now assembling has already been partially described. In two places it sunk away into intervening valleys. One between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill; the other lay for several hundred yards north of Little Round Top, as the lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to distinguish it from the higher peak called Round Top. At 1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw him, soon after daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed. Anxiety and want of sleep were evidently telling upon him. At dawn he commenced forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a view to descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the Twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part in the movement. It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren reported against it. The Fifth and Sixth Corps would necessarily be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To put them in at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious. If we had succeeded in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below. Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left, and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time. It is an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle- ground Hancock had selected. Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as unadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left, with a view to attack the enemy's right. This, in my opinion, would have been much more sensible. Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and, fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by ordering an assault against each extremity of the Union line. There has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and recrimination among the rebel generals engaged as to which of them lost the battle of Gettysburg. I have already alluded to the fact that universal experience demonstrates that columns converging on a central force almost invariably fail in their object and are beaten in detail. Gettysburg seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns of assault launched by Lee against our lines came up in succession and were defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive in time to sustain the attack. He realized the old fable. The peasant could not break the bundle of fagots, but he could break one at a time until all were gone. Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage, for it took him three times as long as it did us to communicate with different parts of his line, and concentrate troops. His couriers who carried orders and the reinforcements he sent moved on the circumference and ours on the chord of the arc. The two armies were about a mile apart. The Confederates--Longstreet and Hill--occupied Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery Ridge, upon which our forces were posted. Ewell's corps, on the rebel left, held the town, Hill the centre, and Longstreet the right. Lee could easily have manoeuvred Meade out of his strong position on the heights, and should have done so. When he determined to attack, he should have commenced at daybreak, for all his force was up except Pickett's division; while two corps of the Union army, the Fifth and Sixth, were still far away, and two brigades of the Third Corps were also absent. The latter were marching on the Emmetsburg road, and as that was controlled by the enemy, Sickles felt anxious for the safety of his men and trains, and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort them in. This was not done, however. The trains were warned off the road, and the two brigades were, fortunately, not molested. There has been a great deal of bitter discussion between Longstreet, Fitz Lee, Early, Wilcox, and others as to whether Lee did or did not order an attack to take place at 9 A.M., and as to whether Longstreet was dilatory, and to blame for not making it. When a battle is lost there is always an inquest, and a natural desire on the part of each general to lay the blame on somebody else's shoulders. Longstreet waited until noon for Law's brigade to come up, and afterward there was a good deal of marching and countermarching to avoid being seen by our troops. There was undoubtedly too much delay. The fact is, Longstreet saw we had a strong position and was not well pleased at the duty assigned him, for he thought it more than probable his attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to take up a position where Meade would be forced to attack him, and was not in very good humor to find his advice disregarded. The rebel commander, however, finding the Army of the Potomac in front of him, having unbounded confidence in his troops, and elated by the success of the first day's fight, believed he could gain a great victory then and there, and end the war, and determined to attempt it. He was sick of these endless delays and constant sacrifices, and hoped one strong sword-thrust would slay his opponent, and enable the South to crown herself queen of the North American continent. By 9 A.M. our skirmish line, in front of the Peach Orchard, was actively engaged with that of the enemy, who were making a reconnoissance toward the Emmetsburg road. No serious affair, however, occurred for some hours. Meade, as stated, was forming his lines on the right of the position he afterward occupied. The Fifth Corps, which came up about 1 P.M., was posted, as a reserve, south of the Twelfth Corps, with a view to the attack which has already been referred to. About 3 P.M. the Sixth Corps began to arrive from its long and toilsome march of thirty-four miles, and its tired troops were placed on the Taneytown road in the rear of Round Top, to reinforce the other corps in case our troops made an attack on the left. Lee, however, did not wait for Meade to advance against him, but boldly directed that each flank of the Union army should be assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations against our centre were to be kept up, to prevent either wing from being reinforced. It was another attempt to converge columns with an interval of several miles between them upon a central force, and, like almost all such enterprises, failed from want of proper co-operation in the different fractions of his line. [Map] GETTYSBURG.--Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Second Day.* [* The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield and Hanover roads. The second day's battle south of the same roads.] REFERENCES TO THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE. _Union Troops,_ [filled rectangle] MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD commanding the First and Eleventh Corps. FIRST CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY commanding. FIRST DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH commanding. _a. First Brigade._ Colonel Henry A. Morrow, 24th Michigan. _b. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler. SECOND DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON. _c. First Brigade._ Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul. _d. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Henry Baxter. THIRD DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOS. A. ROWLEY. _e. First Brigade._ Colonel Chapman Biddle, 121st Pennsylvania. _f. Second Brigade._ Colonel Roy Stone, 149th Pennsylvania. ELEVENTH CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ commanding. FIRST DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. C. BARLOW commanding. _g. First Brigade._ Colonel Von Gilsa. _h. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames. SECOND DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG. _k. First Brigade._ Colonel Von Arnsberg. _l. Second Brigade._ Colonel Kryzanowski. _m. Coster's Brigade,_ of Steinwehr's Division. _Confederate Troops,_ [open rectangle] LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL commanding Third Corps. MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY HETH commanding Division. 1. Archer's Brigade. 3. Brockenborough's Brigade. 2. Davis' Brigade. 4. Pettigrew's Brigade. MAJOR-GENERAL W. D. PENDER commanding Division. 6. McGowan's Brigade. 8. Thomas' Brigade. 7. Scales' Brigade. 9. Lane's Brigade. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BENJ. EWELL commanding Second Corps. MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES commanding Division. 10. Daniel's Brigade. 12. Iverson's Brigade. 11. Ramseur's Brigade. 13. O'Neill's Brigade. 14. Doles' Brigade. MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY commanding Division. 15. Gordon's Brigade. 17. Hoke's Brigade. 16. Hays' Brigade. 18. Smith's Brigade. Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and although Ewell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on our extreme right, it was due to an unfortunate order given by General Meade, by which the force in that part of the field was withdrawn just as Ewell advanced against it. But we are anticipating our narrative. Hood, who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps, complains that he was not allowed to go past Round Top and flank us on the south, as he might have done, but was required by his orders to break in at the Peach Orchard and drive Sickles' line along the Emmetsburg road toward Cemetery Hill; but it seems to me, as he started late in the afternoon, if he had made the detour which would have been necessary in order to attack us on the south, he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and Sykes might have interposed to cut him off from the main body. Before describing Longstreet's attack we will give the final disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary to fight a defensive battle. The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe. The Twelfth Corps was on the extreme right; next came one division of the First Corps on Culp's Hill, then the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First Corps at the base; next the Second Corps; then the Third, and the Fifth Corps on the extreme left, the Sixth Corps being posted in rear of Round Top as a general reserve to the army. Sickles, however, denies that any position was ever marked out for him. He was expected to prolong Hancock's line to the left, but did not do so for the following reasons: _First,_ because the ground was low, and _second,_ on account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned him, and which afforded the enemy an excellent position for their artillery; _third,_ because the ground between the valley he was expected to occupy, and the Emmetsburg road constituted a minor ridge, very much broken and full of rocks and trees, which afforded excellent cover for an enemy operating in his immediate front. He had previously held an interview with General Meade and asked that an experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in locating a suitable position for his corps. At his request, General Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose. They rode out to the ridge and Sickles directed that his troops should be posted along that road, with his centre at the Peach Orchard, which was about a mile from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top; his right wing, under Humphreys, extending along the road, while his left wing, under Birney, made a right angle at the Peach Orchard with the other part of the line, and bent around, so as to cover the front of Little Round Top at the base. The disadvantages of this position are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force to hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides which constitute the right angle. The diagram shows that the force _A_ will have both its lines _a1_ and _a2_ enfiladed by batteries at _b1 b2_, and must yield. The ground, however, may be such that the enemy cannot plant his guns at _b1_ or _b2_; but under any circumstances it is a weak formation and the enemy easily penetrate the angle. When that is the case, and it was so in the present instance--each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and the position is no longer tenable. [Diagram] _________________________ | _b2_ | |_b1_ _________________ | | _a1_ | | | | _A_ | |_a2_ | | | | If one side of the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot be enfiladed, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes permissible. Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of General Meade, who, however, censured the movement afterward. As soon as Sickles took position, General Buford's division of cavalry was sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there; and Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the rebel left. Sykes' corps--the Fifth--came up from the right about 5 P.M., soon after Longstreet's attack on Sickles was fairly under way, and formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves at their right and front. There had been a Council of War, or Conference of Corps Commanders, called at Meade's headquarters, and it was universally agreed to remain and hold the position. As the Third Corps, in answer to the guns of Clark's battery, was suddenly assailed by a terrible concentrated artillery fire, General Sickles rode back to his command and General Meade went with him. The latter objected to Sickles' line, but thought it was then too late to change it. The severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to a furious attack against Ward's brigade on the left. This attack soon extended to the Peach Orchard. The fight became very hot against Birney's division from the left to the centre, but the troops on the right of the centre--Humphreys' division--were not at first actively engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Birney with one of his brigades, and subsequently with a regiment. The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines was so complicated that it is hard to follow and difficult to describe the movements of the contestants. Some idea of it can probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram: It will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A, and that one of them was brought up to enfilade the side AB. The angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the west, was broken in. In consequence of this, several batteries on the line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward and took the position DE. The Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade on the left, the latter was forced back, and the exulting rebels advanced to seize Little Round Top. They attacked the force there with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were ultimately repulsed, and finally took up the line GL. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps and one of the Second Corps were sent in, one after the other, to drive back the strong rebel force posted from D to G, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked by the rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to retreat, although each performed prodigies of valor. Indeed, Brooks' brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries, HI. The rebels gained the position LG, confronting our main line and close to it; but a fine charge made by Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels gave up the contest for the night as regards this part of the field. The attack against Humphreys' division which followed the breaking in of the angle at A will be described further on. The general result was that Sickles' entire line, together with the reinforcements sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to the ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of Crawford's division which maintained a somewhat advanced position. The details of this contest are full of incident, and too important to be wholly omitted. About 3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left, by sending a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two lines, around to attack Sickles' left, held by General J. Hobart Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches to Little Round Top; Ward's line passing in front of the mountain, and his flank resting on a rocky depression in the ground called the Devil's Den. The right extended to the minor spur or wooded ridge beyond the wheat-field. The engagement was furious; commencing on the rebel right, it extended to the left, until it reached the Peach Orchard, where it became especially violent. This central point of Sickles' line was held by eleven regiments of Birney's and Humphreys' divisions. Birney's two brigades, commanded by Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought with Kearney in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line was too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three- quarters of an hour. It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced line, and Sykes the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left. With this idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road, and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from Sykes' corps. Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank. Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant charge upon the rebel advance. The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first. General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top, to get a better view of the field. He saw the long line of the enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our whole line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' division, which Sykes had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go to the relief of De Trobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment he rode down the slope, over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top. He then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of what he had done and to represent the immense importance of holding this commanding point. The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a battery on Little Round Top, and to another farther to the right; but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and rushed eagerly up the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top which seemed to be defenceless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and not having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in time to save the height. The contest soon became furious and the rocks were alive with musketry. General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular battery, supported by the 140th New York under Colonel O'Rorke of Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the 140th were posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre, had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Weed, who was on the crest with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief. Colonel Rice of the 44th New York now took command in place of Vincent. The enemy having been foiled at the centre and right, stole around through the woods and turned the left of the line; but Chamberlain's regiment--the 20th Maine--was folded back by him, around the rear of the mountain, to resist the attack. The rebels came on like wolves, with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over the crest; but they rallied and drove their assailants back in their turn. This was twice repeated and then a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed over the hill. The 20th Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels from the valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number of prisoners. Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition. Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five hundred men prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms. Hill in his official report says "Hood's right was held as in a vise." We will now return to the Peach Orchard. In answer to a shot from Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries opposite. Graham's infantry were partially sheltered from this iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the beginning, which were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under Major McGilvery, were very much cut up; and at last it became necessary to sacrifice one of them--that of Bigelow--to enable the others to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham still held the Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west. A battery was brought forward to enfilade Sickles' line on the Emmetsburg road, and under cover of its fire Barksdale carried the position, but was mortally wounded in doing so.* Sickles lost a leg about this time (5.30 P.M.), and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The command of the Third Corps now devolved upon General Birney. [* Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had known him as an officer of volunteers in the Mexican war. As a member of Congress he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.] The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road below the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time but was driven off temporarily by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered by Major McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to give the others time to form a new line. He fought with _fixed prolonge_ until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men. Phillips' battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience. McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner with which this artillery was served. He says one shell killed and wounded thirty men, out of a company of thirty-seven. The capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy directly on Humphreys' left flank and De Trobriand's right. The disaster then became irremediable, because every force thrown in after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and an enfilading fire from the right. While the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity, which had a general relation to the defence of Sickles' line. A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to the cross road, and about five hundred yards south of it, and then turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing through a rocky wooded country, to empty in Plum Run. De Trobriand held the north bank of this stream with a very insufficient force --a front of two regiments--and his contest with Semmes' brigade in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very destructive. At the same time as Ward's left was turned and driven back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and occupied the wheat-field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his assistance. The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined fight, and would not yield the ground. When relieved by Zook's force they fell back across the wheat-field. There Birney used them as a basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments, charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone fence which bounded it. Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the contest. Caldwell formed his men with the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear. In the advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed in both directions, was soon so cut up that the rear line came forward in its place. Zook was killed, but Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second time to aid Brooke, but it was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach Orchard by this time was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was really a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned. Semmes' brigade, together with parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades, rallied behind a stone wall, again came forward, and succeeded in retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost. Caldwell, under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy loss, for both Zook's and Kelly's brigades were completely surrounded. Then Ayres,* who had been at the turning-point of so many battles, went in with his fine division of regulars, commanded by Day and Burbank, officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who would have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and drove them back to the position Caldwell had left; but his line, from the nature of things, was untenable, for a whole brigade with ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained but to face about and fight his way home again. This was accomplished with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed and wounded. His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps. When the troops were all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a time, and withdrew by piece. [* General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced with the first Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation of the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its battles and minor engagements.] The enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades, now swarmed in the front of our main line between the wheat-field and Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded a division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which at one time I had the honor to command, were veterans of the Peninsula, and were among the most dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State, and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors of one of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward with an impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter behind a stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field, but McCandless stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms. The other brigade of Crawford's division--that of Fisher--had previously been sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the slope of Little Round Top. The enemy retired before it, so that it was not engaged, and it then took possession of the main Round Top on the left of Little Round Top and fortified it. As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevin and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little Round Top. The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther advance. The enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and held a fortified line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which rocky cavern they took shelter. It remains now to describe the effect of the loss of the Peach Orchard and the wounding of Sickles and Graham--which took place soon after--upon the fate of Humphreys' division, posted on the right along the Emmetsburg road. When Sickles lost his leg, Birney assumed command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his left wing back to form a new oblique line to the ridge, in connection with Birney's division. Humphreys, up to the loss of the Peach Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely demonstrated along his front; but now he was obliged, while executing the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division on his left at the Peach Orchard, and enfilading batteries there also, while his entire front was called upon to repel a most determined assault from Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and which now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to the road. Four regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that part of the line, but the attack was so sudden and violent that they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys received orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock, who had been placed in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was indefatigable in his vigilance and personal supervision, "patching the line" wherever the enemy was likely to break through. His activity and foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture. Toward the last Meade brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the right and sent them in to cover Sickles' retreat. Humphreys was followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright--about the best fighting material in the rebel army. Perry was driven back by the fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between the other two, his retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported on the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to do so, and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not move forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would have been ruinous to us if followed up, was fruitless of results. Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached the crest with his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps. Webb gave him two staggering volleys from behind a fence, and went forward with two regiments. He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned it upon them. Wright, finding himself entirely isolated in this advanced position, went back again to the main line, and Wilcox did the same. On this occasion Wright did what Lee failed to accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, _for he pierced our centre,_ and held it for a short time, and had the movement been properly supported and energetically followed up, it might have been fatal to our army, and would most certainly have resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was but another illustration of the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike at the hour appointed. Each came forward separately, and was beaten for lack of support. Wright attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him. The latter was closely followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops rushed in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily in extricating himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to have captured temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight. As they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped off. The last gun was delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line of muskets pointing at him within a few feet, deliberately drove off the field. The Georgians manifested their admiration for his bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at him.* I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's name. [* As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire to state that this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian, a relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright. Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered.] In the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as Chief of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round Top to Culp's Hill to make himself familiar with the line. As he passed by headquarters he noticed some new troops, the Second Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed part of my command. They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up in close column by division, ready to go to any part of the field at a moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged he passed over to the right. On his return late in the day he saw Sickles' whole line driven in and found Wright's rebel brigade established on the crest barring his way back. He rode rapidly over to Meade's headquarters and found the general walking up and down the room, apparently quite unconscious of the movements which might have been discerned by riding to the top of the hill, and which should have been reported to him by some one of his staff. Tidball said, "General, I am very sorry to see that the enemy have pierced our centre." Meade expressed surprise at the information and said, "Why, where is Sedgwick?" Tidball replied, "I do not know, but if you need troops, I saw a fine body of Vermonters a short distance from here, belonging to the First Corps, who are available." Meade then directed him to take an order to Newton and put the men in at once; the order was communicated to me and I went with my division at double quick to the point indicated. There we pursued Wright's force as it retired, and retook, at Hancock's instigation, four guns taken by Wright earlier in the action. When these were brought in I sent out two regiments, who followed the enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more guns. I have been thus particular in narrating this incident as Stannard's Vermont brigade contributed greatly to the victory of the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to be located in that part of the field. It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position Hood's division would have turned our left, have forced us from the shelter of the ridge, and probably have intervened between us and Washington. The movement, disastrous in some respects, was propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which after all was of no particular benefit to them. They were still outside our main line. They pierced the latter it is true, but the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood triumphantly on that crest were obliged to retire because the divisions which should have supported them remained inactive. I must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command exerted a benumbing influence on the second day. It is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance against Little Round Top in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's corps coming into line he gave up the idea of capturing the heights as impracticable. This eminence should have been the first point held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of the field, but no special orders were given concerning it and nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from falling into the hands of the enemy. Meade was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had pierced our centre. He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him orders to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of the army. Indeed, in an article on the "Secret History of Gettysburg," published in the "Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey, of the Confederate army, he states that the movement to the rear actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets heard and reported that artillery was passing in that direction. After a short time the noise of the wheels ceased. He also says that in a conversation he had with Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told that while the battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a Confederate scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the presence of a large Union force at City Point. Dahlgren said a retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would probably fall back on Westminster. General Pleasonton testifies that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat of the army. Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such a movement was contemplated. Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it to the fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two brigades up the York road. There is always some reason why columns never converge in time. Johnson's division, which was on the extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted. In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum, sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to detach this large force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades should not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done. Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek about half and hour before sunset. It suffered so severely from our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however, advanced against Wadsworth, and Greene on his right; but as these generals had their fronts well fortified, the attack was easily repulsed. Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed, took possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M. and thus endangered our communications. Gregg's division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's position saw this movement of Johnson. Gregg opened fire on the column with his artillery and sent out his men dismounted to skirmish on the flank of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to meet him, and the contest continued until after dark. Greene, in the meantime, swung his right around on the edge of a ravine, perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to avoid being flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having graduated second in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what ought to be done and how to do it. He held on strongly, and as it was dark, and the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or where our troops were posted, they waited until daylight before taking any further action. Yet they were now but a short distance from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy reach of our reserve artillery. A night attack on the rear of our army, in conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have succeeded. During the night Ewell sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson. Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report to Sykes, and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as the battle was over in that part of the field. There was a mystery about his movements which needs to be cleared up. To supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent reinforcements from being sent there, Early's division was directed to carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks, replied and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's infantry moved forth, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left, under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve. It was supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while Rodes' and Pender's divisions would come forward in time to prevent any attack against his right. The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was Ames' brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's and Stevens' batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first day, were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders not to attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last. The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by Stevens' battery. Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the approaching line energetically. The rebel left and centre fell back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill, through the batteries. In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of Ricketts' guns were spiked. The enemy, in making this movement, exposed their left flank to Stevens' battery, which poured a terrible fire of double canister into their ranks. The 33d Massachusetts also opened a most effective oblique fire. The batteries were penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They shouted, _"Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose our guns."_ Hancock, all this time should have been kept busy on his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as they did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined by the 106th Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous silence and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They came over the hill and went in with a cheer. The enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said that out of 1,750 men of the organization known as "The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned. Hays attributes his defeat to the fact that Gordon was not up in time to support him. The failure to carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our extreme right. As it could only be reached by a long circuit it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without unduly weakening other parts of his line. That Rodes' division did not reach Cemetery Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to any lack of zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer. He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been repulsed. The day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to continue his efforts. He could not bear to retreat after his heavy losses, and acknowledge that he was beaten. He resolved to reinforce Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's troops, the _élite_ of his army, who had not been engaged, against our centre. He hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in front and Johnson in rear, would yet win those heights and scatter the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been resting the tired men and horses of his cavalry division at Abbotsford after the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown. This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of Stuart's cavalry from its long march. They reached that part of the field about 4 P.M. After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and Custer's brigades and Estes' squadron were principally engaged against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body, darkness put an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then turned back and bivouacked at Two Taverns for the night. Gregg's division of cavalry left Hanover at noon and took post opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's Corps on the right. There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the attack and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own skirmish line and advanced against the one they threw out to meet him. At 10 P.M. he withdrew and took post on the Baltimore pike where it crosses Cress Run, near Rock Creek. By so doing he guarded the right and rear of the army from any demonstration by Stuart's cavalry. At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously voted to stay and fight it out. Meade was displeased with the result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily, "Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to fight a battle in." The fact that a portion of the enemy actually prolonged our line on the right and that our centre had been pierced during the day, made him feel far from confident. He thought it better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing all.* [* Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in the public prints as to whether General Meade did or did not intend to leave the field. So far as the drawing up of an order of retreat is concerned, it ws undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it is the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency. It is easy to criticise, and say what should have been done, after a battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid down on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in official reports; but amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat, where there has been great loss of men and material, it is not always so easy to decide. On the night of the 2d the state of affairs was disheartening. In the combats of the preceding days, the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated; the Fifth Corps and a great part of the Second were shattered, and only the Sixth Corps and Twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh. It was possible therefore that the enemy might gain some great success the next day, which would stimulate them to extra exertions, and diminish the spirit of our men in the same proportion. In such a case it was not improbable that the army might be destroyed as an organization, and there is a vast difference between a _destroyed_ army and a _defeated_ army. By retiring while it was yet in his power to do so, General Meade felt that he would assure the safety of our principal cities, for the enemy were too exhausted to pursue; and being out of ammunition, and far from their base of supplies, were not in a condition to do much further damage, or act very energetically. Whereas our troops could soon be largely reinforced from the draft which had just been established, and, being in the centre of their resources, could be supplied with all that was necessary for renewed effort. There is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to, General Meade did desire to retreat, and expressed fears that his communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at Gettysburg. It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this is an error. They merely recommended some additional precautions to prevent the enemy from turning our left at Round Top, and thus intervening between us and Washington. Hancock, in giving his vote, said the Army of the Potomac had retreated too often, and he was in favor of remaining now to fight it out.] CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT. At dawn on the 3d the enemy opened on us with artillery, but the firing had no definite purpose, and after some hours it gradually slackened. The principal interest early in the day necessarily centred on the right, where Johnson's position not only endangered the safety of the army, but compromised our retreat. It was therefore essential to drive him out as soon as possible. To this end batteries were established during the night on all the prominent points in that vicinity. Geary had returned with his division about midnight, and was not a little astonished to find the rebels established in the works he had left. He determined to contest possession with them at daylight. In the meantime he joined Greene and formed part of his line perpendicular to our main line of battle, and part fronting the enemy. On the other hand, Ewell, having obtained a foothold, swore he would not be driven out, and hastened to reinforce Johnson with Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades from Rodes' division. As soon as objects could be discerned in the early gray of the morning our artillery opened fire. As Johnson, on account of the steep declivities and other obstacles, had not been able to bring any artillery with him, he could not reply. It would not do to remain quiet under this fire, and he determined to charge, in hopes of winning a better position on higher ground. His men--the old Stonewall brigade leading--rushed bravely forward, but were as gallantly met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division and a close and severe struggle ensued for four hours among the trees and rocks. Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps came up and formed on the rebel left, taking them in flank and threatening them in reverse. Indeed, as the rest of our line were not engaged, there was plenty of support for Geary. Troops were sent him, including Shaler's brigade, which took the front, and was soon warmly engaged in re- establishing the line. At about 11 A.M., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat threatened by a force sent down to Rock Creek, Johnson yielded slowly and reluctantly to a charge made by Geary's division, gave up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until night. Our line was once more intact. All that the enemy had gained by dogged determination and desperate bravery was lost from a lack of co-ordination, caused perhaps by the great difficulty of communicating orders over this long concave line where every route was swept by our fire. Lee had now attacked both flanks of the Army of the Potomac without having been able to establish himself permanently on either. Notwithstanding the repulse of the previous day he was very desirous of turning the left, for once well posted there he could secure his own retreat while interposing between Meade and Washington. He rode over with Longstreet to that end of the line to see what could be done. General Wofford, who commanded a brigade of McLaws' division, writes in a recent letter to General Crawford, United States Army, as follows: "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade Friday morning before the artillery opened fire. I told him that the afternoon before, I nearly reached the crest. He asked if I could not go there now. I replied, 'No, General, I think not.' He said quickly, 'Why not?' 'Because,' I said, 'General, the enemy have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing a broken enemy and the situation was now very different.'" Having failed at each extremity, it only remained to Lee to retreat, or attack the centre. Such high expectations had been formed in the Southern States in regard to his conquest of the North that he determined to make another effort. He still had Pickett's division, the flower of Virginia, which had not been engaged, and which was full of enthusiasm. He resolved to launch them against our centre, supported on either flank by the advance of the main portion of the army. He had hoped that Johnson's division would have been able to maintain its position on the right, so that the Union centre could be assailed in front and rear at the same time, but Johnson having been driven out, it was necessary to trust to Pickett alone, or abandon the whole enterprise and return to Virginia. Everything was quiet up to 1 P.M., as the enemy were massing their batteries and concentrating their forces preparatory to the grand charge--the supreme effort--which was to determine the fate of the campaign, and to settle the point whether freedom or slavery was to rule the Northern States. It seems to me there was some lack of judgment in the preparations. Heth's division, now under Pettigrew, which had been so severely handled on the first day, and which was composed in a great measure of new troops, was designated to support Pickett's left and join in the attack at close quarters. Wilcox, too, who one would think had been pretty well fought out the day before, in his desperate enterprise of attempting to crown the crest, was directed to support the right flank of the attack. Wright's brigade was formed in rear, and Pender's division on the left of Pettigrew, but there was a long distance between Wilcox and Longstreet's forces on the right. At 1 P.M., a signal gun was fired and one hundred and fifteen guns opened against Hancock's command, consisting of the First Corps under Newton, the Second Corps under Gibbon, the Third Corps under Birney, and against the Eleventh Corps under Howard. The object of this heavy artillery fire was to break up our lines and prepare the way for Pickett's charge. The exigencies of the battle had caused the First Corps to be divided, Wadsworth's division being on the right at Culp's Hill, Robinson on Gibbon's right, and my own division intervening between Caldwell on the left and Gibbon on the right. The convex shape of our line did not give us as much space as that of the enemy, but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, promptly posted eighty guns along the crest--as many as it would hold--to answer the fire, and the batteries on both sides suffered severely in the two hours' cannonade. Not less than eleven caissons were blown up and destroyed; one quite near me. When the smoke went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be heard along a line of several miles. At 3 P.M. General Hunt ordered our artillery fire to cease, in order to cool the guns, and to preserve some rounds for the contest at close quarters, which he foresaw would soon take place. My own men did not suffer a great deal from this cannonade, as I sheltered them as much as possible under the crest of the hill, and behind rocks, trees, and stone fences. The cessation of our fire gave the enemy the idea they had silenced our batteries, and Pickett at once moved forward, to break the left centre of the Union line and occupy the crest of the ridge.* The other forces on his right and left were expected to move up and enlarge the opening thus made, so that finally, the two wings of the Union Army would be permanently separated, and flung off by this entering wedge in eccentric directions. [* The attack was so important, so momentous, and so contrary to Longstreet's judgment, that when Pickett asked for orders to advance he gave no reply, and Pickett said proudly, "I shall go forward, sir!"] This great column of attack, it was supposed, numbered about seventeen thousand men, but southern writers have a peculiar arithmetic by which they always cipher down their forces to nothing. Even on the left, on the preceding day, when our troops in front of Little Round Top were assailed by a line a mile and a half long, they figure it almost out of existence. The force that now advanced would have been larger still had it not been for a spirited attack by Kilpatrick against the left of Longstreet's corps, detaining some troops there which otherwise might have co-operated in the grand assault against our centre. It necessarily took the rebels some time to form and cross the intervening space, and Hunt took advantage of the opportunity to withdraw the batteries that had been most injured, sending others in their place from the reserve artillery, which had not been engaged. He also replenished the ammunition boxes, and stood ready to receive the foe as he came forward--first with solid shot, next with shell, and lastly, when he came to close quarters, with canister. General Meade's headquarters was in the centre of this cannonade, and as the balls were flying very thickly there, and killing the horses of his staff, he found it necessary temporarily to abandon the place. Where nothing is to be gained by exposure it is sound sense to shelter men and officers as much as possible. He rode over to Power's Hill, made his headquarters with General Slocum, and when the firing ceased rode back again. During his absence the charge took place. He has stated that it was his intention to throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the flanks of the attacking force, but no orders to this effect were issued, and it is questionable whether such an arrangement would have been a good one. It would have disgarnished the left, where Longstreet was still strong in numbers, and in forming perpendicular to our line of battle the two corps would necessarily have exposed their own outer flanks to attack. Indeed, the rebels had provided for just such a contingency, by posting Wilcox's brigade and Perry's brigade under Colonel Lang on the left, both in rear of the charging column under Pickett and Pettigrew. Owing to a mistake or misunderstanding, this disposition, however, did not turn out well for the enemy. It was not intended by Providence that the Northern States should pass under the iron rule of the slave power, and on this occasion every plan made by Lee was thwarted in the most unexpected manner. The distance to be traversed by Pickett's column was about a mile and a half from the woods where they started, to the crest of the ridge they desired to attain. They suffered severely from our artillery, which opened on them with solid shot as soon as they came in sight; when half way across the plain they were vigorously shelled; double canisters were reserved for their nearer approach. At first the direction of their march appeared to be directly toward my division. When within five hundred yards of us, however, Pickett halted and changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees, so that the attack passed me and struck Gibbon's division on my right. Just here one of those providential circumstances occurred which favored us so much, for Wilcox and Lang, who guarded Pickett's right flank, did not follow his oblique movement, but kept on straight to the front, so that soon there was a wide interval between their troops and the main body, leaving Pickett's right fully uncovered. The rebels came on magnificently. As fast as the shot and shell tore through their lines they closed up the gaps and pressed forward. When they reached the Emmetsburg road the canister began to make fearful chasms in their ranks. They also suffered severely from a battery on Little Round Top, which enfiladed their line. One shell killed and wounded ten men. Gibbon had directed his command to reserve their fire until the enemy were near enough to make it very effective. Pickett's advance dashed up to the fence occupied by the skirmishers of the Second Corps, near the Emmetsburg road, and drove them back; then the musketry blazed forth with deadly effect, and Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall behind; for the nature of the ground was such that they were more exposed than other portions of the line. They were much shaken by the artillery fire, and that of Hays' division sent them back in masses.* [* The front line of Hays' division, which received this charge, was composed of the 12th New Jersey, 14th Connecticut, and 1st Delaware. The second line was composed of the 111th, 125th, 126th, and 39th New York.] Before the first line of rebels reached a second fence and stone wall, behind which our main body was posted, it was obliged to pass a demi-brigade under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, of the 20th New York State Militia, and a Vermont brigade under General Stannard, both belonging to my command. When Pickett's right became exposed in consequence of the divergence of Wilcox's command, Stannard seized the opportunity to make a flank attack, and while his left regiment, the 14th, poured in a heavy oblique fire, he changed front with his two right regiments, the 13th and 16th, which brought them perpendicular to the rebel line of march. In cases of this kind, when struck directly on the flank, troops are more or less unable to defend themselves, and Kemper's brigade crowded in toward the centre in order to avoid Stannard's energetic and deadly attack. They were closely followed up by Gates' command, who continued to fire into them at close range. This caused many to surrender, others to retreat outright, and others simply to crowd together. Simultaneously with Stannard's attack, the 8th Ohio, which was on picket, overlapping the rebel left, closed in on that flank with great effect. Nevertheless, the next brigade--that of Armistead-- united to Garnett's brigade, pressed on, and in spite of death- dealing bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbon's line and capture his guns. Although Webb's front was the focus of the concentrated artillery fire, and he had already lost fifty men and some valuable officers, his line remained firm and unshaken. It devolved upon him now to meet the great charge which was to decide the fate of the day. It would have been difficult to find a man better fitted for such an emergency. He was nerved to great deeds by the memory of his ancestors, who in former days had rendered distinguished services to the Republic, and felt that the results of the whole war might depend upon his holding of the position. His men were equally resolute. Cushing's battery, A, 4th United States Artillery, which had been posted on the crest, and Brown's Rhode Island Battery on his left, were both practically destroyed by the cannonade. The horses were prostrated, every officer but one was struck, and Cushing had but one serviceable gun left. As Pickett's advance came very close to the first line, young Cushing, mortally wounded in both thighs, ran his last serviceable gun down to the fence, and said: _"Webb, I will give them one more shot!"_ At the moment of the last discharge he called out, _"Good- by!"_ and fell dead at the post of duty. Webb sent for fresh batteries to replace the two that were disabled, and Wheeler's 1st New York Independent Battery came up just before the attack, and took the place of Cushing's battery on the left. Armistead pressed forward, leaped the stone wall, waving his sword with his hat on it, followed by about a hundred of his men, several of whom carried battle-flags. He shouted, "Give them the cold steel, boys!" and laid his hands upon a gun. The battery for a few minutes was in his possession, and the rebel flag flew triumphantly over our line. But Webb was at the front, very near Armistead, animating and encouraging his men. He led the 72d Pennsylvania regiment against the enemy, and posted a line of wounded men in rear to drive back or shoot every man that deserted his duty. A portion of the 71st Pennsylvania, behind a stone wall on the right, threw in a deadly flanking fire, while a great part of the 69th Pennsylvania and the remainder of the 71st made stern resistance from a copse of trees on the left, near where the enemy had broken the line, and where our men were shot with the rebel muskets touching their breasts. Then came a splendid charge of two regiments, led by Colonel Hall, which passed completely through Webb's line, and engaged the enemy in a hand-to-hand conflict.* Armistead was shot down by the side of the gun he had taken. It is said he had fought on our side in the first battle at Bull Run, but had been seduced by Southern affiliations to join in the rebellion; and now, dying in the effort to extend the area of slavery over the free States, he saw with a clearer vision that he had been engaged in an unholy cause, and said to one of our officers who leaned over him: "Tell Hancock I have wronged him and have wronged my country." [* Colonel Norman J. Hall, commanding a brigade in Hancock's corps, who rendered this great service, was one of the garrison who defended Fort Sumter at the beginning of the war. At that time he was the Second Lieutenant of my company.] Both Gibbon and Webb were wounded, and the loss in officers and men was very heavy; two rebel brigadier-generals were killed, and more prisoners were taken than twice Webb's brigade; 6 battle-flags, and 1,463 muskets were also gathered in. My command being a little to the left, I witnessed this scene, and, after it was over, sent out stretcher-bearers attached to the ambulance train, and had numbers of wounded Confederates brought in and cared for. I was told that there was one man among these whose conversation seemed to indicate that he was a general officer. I sent to ascertain his rank, but he replied: "Tell General Doubleday in a few minutes I shall be where there is no rank." He expired soon after, and I never learned his name. The rebels did not seem to appreciate my humanity in sending out to bring in their wounded, for they opened a savage fire against the stretcher-bearers. One shell burst among us, a piece of it knocked me over on my horse's neck, and wounded Lieutenant Cowdry of my staff. When Pickett--the great leader--looked around the top of the ridge he had temporarily gained, he saw it was impossible to hold the position. Troops were rushing in on him from all sides. The Second Corps were engaged in a furious assault on his front. His men were fighting with clubbed muskets, and even banner staves were intertwined in a fierce and hopeless struggle. My division of the First Corps were on his right flank, giving deadly blows there, and the Third Corps were closing up to attack. Pettigrew's forces on his left had given way, and a heavy skirmish line began to accumulate on that flank. He saw his men surrendering in masses, and, with a heart full of anguish, ordered a retreat. Death had been busy on all sides, and few indeed now remained of that magnificent column which had advanced so proudly, led by the Ney of the rebel army, and those few fell back in disorder, and without organization, behind Wright's brigade, which had been sent forward to cover the retreat. At first, however, when struck by Stannard on the flank, and when Pickett's charge was spent, they rallied in a little slashing, where a grove had been cut down by our troops to leave an opening for our artillery. There two regiments of Rowley's brigade of my division, the 151st Pennsylvania and the 20th New York State Militia, under Colonel Theodore R. Gates, of the latter regiment, made a gallant charge, and drove them out. Pettigrew's division, it is said, lost 2,000 prisoners and 15 battle-flags on the left. While this severe contest was going on in front of Webb, Wilcox deployed his command and opened a feeble fire against Caldwell's division on my left. Stannard repeated the manoeuvre which had been so successful against Kemper's brigade by detaching the 14th and 16th Vermont to take Wilcox in flank. Wilcox thus attacked on his right, while a long row of batteries tore the front of his line to pieces with canister, could gain no foothold. He found himself exposed to a tremendous cross fire, and was obliged to retreat, but a great portion of his command were brought in as prisoners by Stannard* and battle-flags were gathered in sheaves. [* As Stannard's brigade were new troops, and had been stationed near Washington, the men had dubbed them _The Paper Collar Brigade_, because some of them were seen wearing paper collars, but after this fight the term was never again applied to them.] A portion of Longstreet's corps, Benning's, Robertson's, and Law's brigades, advanced against the two Round Tops to prevent reinforcements from being sent from that vicinity to meet Pickett's charge. Kilpatrick interfered with this programme, however, for about 2 P.M. he made his appearance on our left with Farnsworth's brigade and Merritt's brigade of regulars, accompanied by Graham's and Elder's batteries of the regular army, to attack the rebel right, with a view to reach their ammunition trains, which were in the vicinity. The rebels say his men came on yelling like demons. Having driven back the skirmishers who guarded that flank, Merritt deployed on the left and soon became engaged there with Anderson's Georgia brigade, which was supported by two batteries. On the right Farnsworth, with the 1st Vermont regiment of his brigade, leaped a fence, and advanced until he came to a second stone fence, where he was checked by an attack on his right flank from the 4th Alabama regiment of Law's brigade, which came back for that purpose from a demonstration it was making against Round Top. Farnsworth then turned and leaping another fence in a storm of shot and shell, made a gallant attempt to capture Backman's battery, but was unable to do so, as it was promptly supported by the 9th Georgia regiment of Anderson's brigade. Farnsworth was killed in this charge, and the 1st Vermont found itself enclosed in a field, with high fences on all sides, behind which masses of infantry were constantly rising up and firing. The regiment was all broken up and forced to retire in detachments. Kilpatrick after fighting some time longer without making much progress, fell back on account of the constant reinforcements that were augmenting the force opposed to him. Although he had not succeeded in capturing the ammunition train, he had made a valuable diversion on the left, which doubtless prevented the enemy from assailing Round Top with vigor, or detaching a force to aid Pickett. The Confederate General Benning states that the prompt action of General Law in posting the artillery in the road and the 7th and 9th Georgia regiments on each side, was all that saved the train from capture. "There was nothing else to save it." He also says that two-thirds of Pickett's command were killed, wounded, or captured. Every brigade commander and every field officer except one fell. Lee and Longstreet had seen from the edge of the woods, with great exultation, the blue flag of Virginia waving over the crest occupied by the Union troops. It seemed the harbinger of great success to Lee. He thought the Union army was conquered at last. The long struggle was over, and peace would soon come, accompanied by the acknowledgment of the independence of the Southern Confederacy. It was but a passing dream; the flag receded, and soon the plain was covered with fugitives making their way to the rear. Then, anticipating an immediate pursuit, he used every effort to rally men and officers, and made strenuous efforts to get his artillery in position to be effective. The Confederate General A. R. Wright criticises this attack and very justly says, "The difficulty was not so much in reaching Cemetery Ridge or taking it. My brigade did so on the afternoon of the 2d, but the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Federal army was massed in a sort of horse shoe, and could rapidly reinforce the point to any extent; while the long enveloping Confederate line could not support promptly enough." This agrees with what I have said in relation to the convex and concave orders of battle. General Gibbon had sent Lieutenant Haskell of his staff to Power's Hill to notify General Meade that the charge was coming. As Meade approached his old headquarters he heard firing on the crest above, and went up to ascertain the cause. He found the charge had been repulsed and ejaculated "Thank God!" When Lee learned that Johnson had yielded his position on the right, and therefore could not co-operate with Pickett's advance, he sent Stuart's cavalry around to accomplish the same object by attacking the right and rear of our army. Howard saw the rebel cavalry moving off in that direction, and David McM. Gregg, whose division was near White's Creek where it crosses the Baltimore pike, received orders about noon to guard Slocum's right and rear. Custer had already been contending with his brigade against portions of the enemy's force in that direction, when Gregg sent forward McIntosh's brigade to relieve him, and followed soon after with J. Irvin Gregg's brigade. Custer was under orders to join Kilpatrick's command, to which he belonged, but the exigencies of the battle soon forced Gregg to detain him. McIntosh, having taken the place of Custer, pushed forward to develop the enemy's line, which he found very strongly posted, the artillery being on a commanding ridge which overlooked the whole country, and covered by dismounted cavalry in woods, buildings, and behind fences below. McIntosh became warmly engaged and send back for Randol's battery to act against the rebel guns on the crest, and drive the enemy out of the buildings. The guns above were silenced by Pennington's and Randol's batteries, and the force below driven out of the houses by Lieutenant Chester's section of the latter. The buildings and fences were then occupied by our troops. The enemy attempted to regain them by a charge against McIntosh's right flank, but were repulsed. In the meantime Gregg came up with the other brigade, and assumed command of the field. The battle now became warm, for W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Chambliss, advanced to support the skirmish line, and the 1st New Jersey, being out of ammunition, was charged and routed by the 1st Virginia. The 7th Michigan, a new regiment which came up to support it, was also driven in; for the enemy's dismounted line reinforced the 1st Virginia. The latter regiment, which had held on with desperate tenacity, although attacked on both flanks, was at last compelled to fall back by an attack made by part of the 5th Michigan. The contending forces were now pretty well exhausted when, to the dismay of our men, a fresh brigade under Wade Hampton, which Stuart had kept in reserve, made its appearance, and new and desperate exertions were required to stem its progress. There was little time to act, but every sabre that could be brought forward was used. As Hampton came on, our artillery under Pennington and Randol made terrible gaps in his ranks. Chester's section kept firing canister until the rebels were within fifty yards of him. The enemy were temporarily stopped by a desperate charge on their flank, made by only sixteen men of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Captains Triechel and Rogers, accompanied by Captain Newhall of McIntosh's staff. This little band of heroes were nearly all disabled or killed, but they succeeded in delaying the enemy, already shattered by the canister from Chester's guns, until Custer was able to bring up the 1st Michigan and lead them to the charge, shouting "Come on, you wolverines!" Every available sabre was thrown in. General McIntosh and his staff and orderlies charged into the _mélée_ as individuals. Hampton and Fitz Lee headed the enemy, and Custer our troops. Lieutenant Colonel W. Brooke-Rawle, the historian of the conflict, who was present, says, "For minutes, which seemed like hours, amid the clashing of the sabres, the rattle of the small arms, the frenzied imprecations, the demands to surrender, the undaunted replies, and the appeals for mercy, the Confederate column stood its ground." A fresh squadron was brought up under Captain Hart of the 1st New Jersey, and the enemy at last gave way and retired. Both sides still confronted each other, but the battle was over, for Pickett's charge had failed, and there was no longer any object in continuing the contest. Stuart was undoubtedly baffled and the object of his expedition frustrated; yet he stated in his official report that he was in a position to intercept the Union retreat in case Pickett had been successful. At night he retreated to regain his communications with Ewell's left. This battle being off of the official maps has hardly been alluded to in the various histories which have been written; but its results were important and deserve to be commemorated. When Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the whole plain covered with fugitives, we all expected that Wellington's command at Waterloo, of _"Up, guards, and at them!"_ would be repeated, and that a grand counter-charge would be made. But General Meade had made no arrangements to give a return thrust. It seems to me he should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth Corps in rear of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's infantry were seen emerging from the woods, a mile and a half off. If they broke through our centre these corps would have been there to receive them, and if they failed to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could have followed them up promptly before they had time to rally and reorganize. An advance by Sykes would have kept Longstreet in position. In all probability we would have cut the enemy's army in two, and captured the long line of batteries opposite us, which were but slightly guarded. Hancock, lying wounded in an ambulance, wrote to Meade, recommending that this be done. Meade, it is true, recognized in some sort the good effects of a counter-blow; but to be effective the movement should have been prepared beforehand. It was too late to commence making preparations for an advance when some time had elapsed and when Lee had rallied his troops and had made all his arrangements to resist an assault. It was ascertained afterward that he had twenty rounds of ammunition left per gun, but it was not evenly distributed and some batteries in front had fired away all their cartridges. A counter-charge under such circumstances is considered almost imperative in war; for the beaten army, running and dismayed, cannot, in the nature of things, resist with much spirit; whereas the pursuers, highly elated by their success, and with the prospect of ending the contest, fight with more energy and bravery. Rodes says the Union forces were so long in occupying the town and in coming forward after the repulse of the enemy that it was generally thought they had retreated. Meade rode leisurely over to the Fifth Corps on the left, and told Sykes to send out and see if the enemy in his front was firm and holding on to their position. A brigade preceded by skirmishers was accordingly sent forward, but as Longstreet's troops were well fortified, they resisted the advance, and Meade--finding some hours had elapsed and that Lee had closed up his lines and was fortifying against him--gave up all idea of a counter-attack. CHAPTER VII. GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE OFFICERS. Lee was greatly dispirited at Pickett's failure, but worked with untiring energy to repair the disaster. There was an interval of full a mile between Hill and Longstreet, and the plain was swarming with fugitives making their way back in disorder. He hastened to get ready to resist the counter-charge, which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind which the fugitives could rally. He also made great personal exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in. He did not for a moment imagine that Meade would fail to take advantage of this golden opportunity to crush the Army of Virginia and end the war. The most distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they were in at this time, and express their surprise that they were not followed up. The fact is, Meade had no idea of leaving the ridge. I conversed the next morning with a corps commander who had just left him. He said: "Meade says he thinks he can hold out for part of another day here, if they attack him." This language satisfied me that Meade would not go forward if he could avoid it, and would not impede in any way the rebel retreat across the Potomac. Lee began to make preparations at once and started his trains on the morning of the 4th. By night Rodes' division, which followed them, was in bivouac two miles west of Fairfield. It was a difficult task to retreat burdened with 4,000 prisoners, and a train fifteen miles long, in the presence of a victorious enemy, but it was successfully accomplished as regards his main body. The roads, too, were bad and much cut up by the rain. While standing on Little Round Top Meade was annoyed at the fire of a rebel battery posted on an eminence beyond the wheat-field, about a thousand yards distant. He inquired what troops those were stationed along the stone fence which bounded the hither side of the wheat-field. Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps, he directed that they be sent forward to clear the woods in front of the rebel skirmishers, who were very annoying, and to drive away the battery, _but not to get into a fight that could bring on a general engagement._ As Crawford unmasked from the stone fence the battery opened fire on his right. He sent Colonel Ent's regiment, deployed as skirmishers, against the guns, which retired as Ent approached. McCandless, who went forward with his brigade, moved too far to the right, and Crawford ordered him to change front and advance toward Round Top. He did so and struck a rebel brigade in flank which was behind a temporary breastwork of rails, sods, etc. When this brigade saw a Union force apparently approaching from their own lines to attack them in flank, they retreated in confusion, after a short resistance, and this disorder extended during the retreat to a reserve brigade posted on the low ground in their rear. Their flight did not cease until they reached Horner's woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched themselves. These brigades belonged to Hood's division, then under Law. Longstreet says, "When this (Pickett's) charge failed, I expected that, of course, the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only support that I could given them." . . . "I knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the enemy." . . . "For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage." Longstreet always spoke of his own men as invincible, and stated that on the 2d they did the best three hours' fighting that ever was done, but Crawford's* attack seemed to show that they too were shaken by the defeat of Picket's grand charge. [* Crawford was also one of those who took a prominent part in the defence of Fort Sumter, at the beginning of the war. We each commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion.] In regard to the great benefit we would have derived from a pursuit, it may not be out of place to give the opinion of a few more prominent Confederate officers. Colonel Alexander, Chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in a communication to the "Southern Historical Papers": "I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive. They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe. I suppose the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very short time without our knowledge. Our line was an enveloping semi- circle, over four miles in development, and communication from flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult, the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads all running at right angles to our lines, and, some of them at least, broad turnpikes where the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very centre, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think General Lee himself was quite apprehensive the enemy would _riposte_, and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the indications." General Trimble, who commanded a division of Hill's corps, which supported Pickett in his advance, says, "By all the rules of warfare the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched against our shattered columns and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat." Colonel Simms, who commanded Semmes' Georgia brigade in the fight with Crawford just referred to, writes to the latter, "There was much confusion in our army so far as my observation extended, and I think we would have made but feeble resistance, if you had pressed on, on the evening of the 3d." General Meade, however, overcome by the great responsibilities of his position, still clung to the ridge, and fearful of a possible disaster would not take the risk of making an advance. And yet if he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army then and there, he would have saved two years of war with its immense loss of life and countless evils. He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's corps, which had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if it was repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy little inclination to again assail the heights. At 6.30 P.M. the firing ceased on the part of the enemy, and although they retained their position the next day, the battle of Gettysburg was virtually at an end. The town was still full of our wounded, and many of our surgeons, with rare courage, remained there to take charge of them, for it required some nerve to run the risk of being sent to Libby prison when the fight was over, a catastrophe which has often happened to our medical officers. Among the rest, the chief surgeons of the First Corps, Doctor Theodore Heard and Doctor Thomas H. Bache, refused to leave their patients, and in consequence of the hasty retreat of the enemy were fortunately not carried off. After the battle Meade had not the slightest desire to recommence the struggle. It is a military maxim that to a flying enemy must be given a wall of steel or a bridge of gold. In the present instance it was unmistakably the bridge of gold that was presented. It was hard to convince him that Lee was actually gone, and at first he thought it might be a device to draw the Union army from its strong position on the heights. Our cavalry were sent out on the 4th to ascertain where the enemy were, and what they were doing. General Birney threw forward a reconnoitering party and opened fire with a battery on a column making their way toward Fairfield, but he was checked at once and directed _on no account to bring on a battle._ On the 5th, as it was certain the enemy were retreating, Sedgwick received orders to follow up the rear of the rebel column. He marched eight miles to Fairfield Pass. There Early, who was in command of the rear guard, was endeavoring to save the trains, which were heaped up in great confusion. Sedgwick, after a distant cannonade, reported the position too strong to be forced. It was a plain, two miles wide, surrounded by hills, and it would not have been difficult to take it, but Sedgwick knew Meade favored the "bridge of gold" policy, and was not disposed to thwart the wishes of his chief. In my opinion Sedgwick should have made an energetic attack, and Meade should have supported it with his whole army, for our cavalry were making great havoc in the enemy's train in rear; and if Lee, instead of turning on Kilpatrick, had been forced to form line against Meade, the cavalry, which was between him and his convoys of ammunition, in all probability might have captured the latter and ended the war. Stuart, it is true, was following up Kilpatrick, but he took an indirect route and was nearly a day behind. I do not see why the force which was now promptly detached from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore and sent to Harper's Ferry could not have formed on the Virginia side of the Potomac opposite Williamsport, and with the co-operation of General Meade have cut off the ammunition of which Lee stood so much in need. As the river had risen and an expedition sent out by General French from Frederick had destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, everything seemed to favor such a plan. The moment it was ascertained that Lee was cut off from Richmond and short of ammunition the whole North would have turned out and made a second Saratoga of it. As it was, he had but few roads for his cannon, and our artillery could have opened a destructive fire on him from a distance without exposing our infantry. It was worth the effort and there was little or no danger in attempting it. Meade had Sedgwick's fresh corps and was reinforced by a division of 11,000 men under General W. F. Smith (Baldy Smith). French's division of 4,000 at Frederick, and troops from Washington and Baltimore were also available to assist in striking the final blow. The Twelfth Corps was also available, as Slocum volunteered to join in the pursuit. Meade, however, delayed moving at all until Lee had reached Hagerstown and then took a route that was almost twice as long as that adopted by the enemy. Lee marched day and night to avoid pursuit, and when the river rose and his bridge was gone, so that he was unable to cross, he gained six days in which to choose a position, fortify it, and renew his supply of ammunition before Meade made his appearance. In consequence of repeated orders from President Lincoln to attack the enemy, Meade went forward and confronted Lee on the 12th. He spent that day and the next in making reconnoissances and resolved to attack on the 14th; but Lee left during the night, and by 8 A.M. the entire army of the enemy were once more on Virginia soil. The Union loss in this campaign is estimated by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial observer, at 2,834 killed, 13,700 wounded, and 6,643 missing; total, 23,186. The rebel loss he puts at 2,665 killed, 12,599 wounded, 7,464 missing; total 22,728. Among the killed in the battle on the rebel side were Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, Pender, and Semmes; and Pettigrew during the retreat. Among the wounded were Generals G. T. Anderson, Hampton, Jenkins, J. M. Jones, Kemper, and Scales. Archer was captured on the first day. Among the killed on the Union side were Major-General Reynolds and Brigadier-Generals Vincent, Weed, and Zook. Among the wounded were Major-Generals Sickles (losing a leg), Hancock, Doubleday, Gibbon, Barlow, Warren, and Butterfield, and Brigadier-Generals Graham, Stannard, Paul (losing both eyes), Barnes, Brooke, and Webb. APPENDIX A. _Roster of the Federal Army engaged in the Battle of Gettysburg, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, July 1st, 2d, and 3d, 1863._ MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. GORDON MEADE _STAFF._ MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Chief of Staff. BRIG.-GENERAL M. R. PATRICK, Provost Marshal-General. " " SETH WILLIAMS, Adjutant-General. " " EDMUND SCHRIVER, Inspector-General. " " RUFUS INGALLS, Quartermaster-General. COLONEL HENRY F. CLARKE, Chief Commis'y of Subsistence. MAJOR JONATHAN LETTERMAN, Surgeon, Chief of Medical Department. BRIG.-GENERAL G. K. WARREN, Chief Engineer. MAJOR D. W. FLAGLER, Chief Ordnance Officer. MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON, Chief of Cavalry. BRIG.-GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT, Chief of Artillery. CAPTAIN L. B. NORTON, Chief Signal Officer. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS,* Commanding the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps on July 1st. [* He was killed and succeeded by Major-General O. O. Howard.] MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. SLOCUM, Commanding the Right Wing on July 2d and July 3d. MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, Commanding the Left Centre on July 2d and July 3d. FIRST CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS, PERMANENT COMMANDER. MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Commanding on July 1st. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN NEWTON, Commanding July 2d and 3d. FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH _First Brigade._--(1) Brigadier-General SOLOMON MEREDITH (wounded); (2) Colonel HENRY A. MORROW (wounded);* (3) Colonel W. W. ROBINSON. [* See page 130.] 2d Wisconsin, Colonel Lucius Fairchild (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel George H. Stevens (wounded), Major John Mansfield (wounded), Captain Geo. H. Otis 6th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes 7th Wisconsin, Colonel W. W. Robinson 24th Michigan, Colonel Henry A. Morrow (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel Mark Flanigan (wounded), Major Edwin B. Wright (wounded), Captain Albert M. Edwards 19th Indiana, Colonel Samuel Williams _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER 7th Indiana, Major Ira G. Grover 56th Pennsylvania, Colonel J. W. Hoffman 76th New York, Major Andrew J. Grover (killed), Captain John E. Cook 95th New York, Colonel George H. Biddle (wounded), Major Edward Pye 147th New York, Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Miller (wounded), Major George Harney 14th Brooklyn, Colonel E. B. Fowler SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GABRIEL R. PAUL (wounded); Colonel S. H. LEGNARD; Colonel RICHARD COULTER. 16th Maine, Colonel Charles W. Tilden (captured), Lieut.- Colonel N. E. Welch, Major Arch. D. Leavitt 13th Massachusetts, Colonel S. H. Leonard (wounded) 94th New York, Colonel A. R. Root (wounded), Major S. H. Moffat 104th New York, Colonel Gilbert G. Prey 107th Pennsylvania, Colonel T. F. McCoy (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel James McThompson (wounded), Captain E. D. Roath 11th Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard S. Coulter, Captain J. J. Blerer.* [* The 11th Pennsylvania was transferred from the Second Brigade.] _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER 12th Massachusetts, Colonel James L. Bates 83d New York, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph R. Moesch 97th New York, Colonel Charles Wheelock 88th Pennsylvania, Major Benezet F. Faust, Captain E. Y. Patterson 90th Pennsylvania, Colonel Peter Lyle THIRD DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY PERMANENT COMMANDER on July 2d and 3d. BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS A. ROWLEY, July 1st. _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General THOMAS A. ROWLEY, July 2d and 3d; Colonel CHAPMAN BIDDLE, July 1st. 121st Pennsylvania, Colonel Chapman Biddle, Major Alexander Biddle 142d Pennsylvania, Colonel Robert P. Cummings (killed), Lieut.- Colonel A. B. McCalmont 151st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel George F. McFarland (lost a leg), Captain Walter L. Owens 20th New York S. M., Colonel Theodore B. Gates _Second Brigade_.--(1) Colonel ROY STONE Commanding (wounded); (2) Colonel LANGHORNE WISTER (wounded); (3) Colonel EDMUND L. DANA 143d Pennsylvania, Colonel Edmund L. Dana, Major John D. Musser 149th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Walton Dwight (wounded), Captain A. J. Sofield (killed), Captain John Irvin 150th Pennsylvania, Colonel Langhorne Wister (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel H. S. Huidekoper (wounded), Major Thomas Chamberlain (wounded), Capt. C. C. Widdis (wounded), Captain G. W. Jones _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEO. J. STANNARD (wounded) 12th Vermont, Colonel Asa P. Blunt (not engaged) 13th Vermont, Colonel Francis V. Randall 14th Vermont, Colonel William T. Nichols 15th Vermont, Colonel Redfield Proctor (not engaged) 16th Vermont, Colonel Wheelock G. Veazey _Artillery Brigade_.--Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT 2d Maine, Captain James A. Hall 5th Maine, G. T. Stevens Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain J. H. Cooper Battery B, 4th United States, Lieutenant James Stewart Battery L, 1st New York, Captain J. A. Reynolds [NOTE.--Tidball's Battery of the 2d United States Artillery, under Lieutenant John H. Calef, also fought in line with the First Corps. Lieutenant Benj. W. Wilber, and Lieutenant George Breck, of Captain Reynolds' Battery, and Lieutenant James Davison, of Stewart's Battery, commanded sections which were detached at times.] SECOND CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, PERMANENT COMMANDER (wounded). MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON (wounded). BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. CALDWELL. FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. CALDWELL COLONEL JOHN H. BROOKE (wounded) _First Brigade_.--Colonel EDWARD E. CROSS (killed); Colonel H. B. McKEEN 5th New Hampshire, Colonel E. E. Cross, Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Hapgood 61st New York, Lieut.-Colonel Oscar K. Broady 81st Pennsylvania, Colonel H. Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Colonel Amos Stroho 148th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Robert McFarland _Second Brigade_.--Colonel PATRICK KELLY 28th Massachusetts, Colonel Richard Byrnes 63d New York, Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Bentley (wounded), Captain Thos. Touhy 69th New York, Captain Richard Maroney (wounded), Lieutenant James J. Smith 88th New York, Colonel Patrick Kelly, Captain Dennis F. Burke 116th Pennsylvania, Major St. Clair A. Mulholland _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General S. K. ZOOK Commanding (killed), Lieut.-Colonel JOHN FRAZER 52d New York, Lieut.-Colonel Charles G. Freudenberg (wounded), Captain Wm. Scherrer 57th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Alfred B. Chapman 66th New York, Colonel Orlando W. Morris (wounded), Lieut. Colonel John S. Hammell (wounded), Major Peter Nelson 146th Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard P. Roberts (killed), Lieut.- Colonel John Frazer _Fourth Brigade_.--Colonel JOHN R. BROOKE Commanding (wounded) 27th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel Henry C. Merwin (killed), Major James H. Coburn 64th New York, Colonel Daniel G. Bingham 53d Pennsylvania, Colonel J. R. Brooke, Lieut.-Colonel Richard McMichael 145th Pennsylvania, Colonel Hiram L. Brown (wounded), Captain John W. Reynolds (wounded), Captain Moses W. Oliver 2d Delaware, Colonel William P. Bailey SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON, PERMANENT COMMANDER (wounded). BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM HARROW. _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WILLIAM HARROW, Colonel FRANCIS E. HEATH 19th Maine, Colonel F. E. Heath, Lieut.-Colonel Henry W. Cunningham 15th Massachusetts, Colonel George H. Ward (killed), Lieut.- Colonel George C. Joslin 82d New York, Colonel Henry W. Hudson (killed), Captain John Darrow 1st Minnesota, Colonel William Colvill (wounded), Captain N. S. Messick (killed), Captain Wilson B. Farrell, Captain Louis Muller, Captain Joseph Perham, Captain Henry C. Coates _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ALEX. S. WEBB (wounded) 69th Pennsylvania, Colonel Dennis O. Kane (killed), Lieut.- Colonel M. Tschudy (killed), Major James Duffy (wounded), Captain Wm. Davis 71st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Richard Penn Smith 72d Pennsylvania, Colonel De Witt C. Baxter 106th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Theo. Hesser _Third Brigade_.--Colonel NORMAN J. HALL Commanding 19th Massachusetts, Colonel Arthur F. Devereaux 20th Massachusetts, Colonel Paul J. Revere (killed), Captain H. L. Abbott (wounded) 42d New York, Colonel James E. Mallon 59th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Max A. Thoman (killed) 7th Michigan, Colonel N. J. Hall, Lieut.-Colonel Ames E. Steele (killed), Major S. W. Curtis _Unattached_.--Andrew Sharpshooters. THIRD DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER HAYS _First Brigade_.--Colonel SAMUEL S. CARROLL 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Colonel James H. Godman, Lieut.-Colonel L. W. Carpenter 8th Ohio, Colonel S. S. Carroll, Lieut.-Colonel Franklin Sawyer 14th Indiana, Colonel John Coons 7th West Virginia, Colonel Joseph Snyder _Second Brigade_.--Colonel THOMAS A. SMITH (wounded); Lieut.- Colonel F. E. PIERCE 14th Connecticut, Major John T. Ellis 10th New York (battalion), Major Geo. F. Hopper 108th New York, Colonel Charles J. Powers 12th New Jersey, Major John T. Hill 1st Delaware, Colonel Thomas A. Smyth; Lieut.-Colonel Edward P. Harris, Captain M. B. Ellgood (killed), Lieutenant Wm. Smith (killed) _Third Brigade_.--Colonel GEORGE L. WILLARD (killed); Colonel ELIAKIM SHERRILL (killed); Lieut.-Colonel JAMES M. BULL 39th New York, Lieut.-Colonel James G. Hughes 111th New York, Colonel Clinton D. McDougall (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel Isaac M. Lusk, Captain A. P. Seeley 125th New York, Colonel G. L. Willard (killed), Lieut.-Colonel Levi Crandall 126th New York, Colonel E. Sherrill (killed), Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Bull _Artillery Brigade_.--Captain J. G. HAZARD Battery B, 1st New York, Captain James McK. Rorty (killed) Battery A, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant William A. Arnold Battery B, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown (wounded) Battery I, 1st United States, Lieutenant G. A. Woodruff (killed) Battery A, 4th United States, Lieutenant A. H. Cushing (killed) [NOTE.--Battery C, 4th United States, Lieutenant R. Thomas, was in the line of the Second Corps on July 3d. Some of the batteries were so nearly demolished that there was no officer to assume command at the close of the battle.] THIRD CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES (wounded) MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID B. BIRNEY FIRST DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID B. BIRNEY PERMANENT COMMANDER. BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. H. H. WARD _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General C. K. GRAHAM (wounded, captured); Colonel ANDREW H. TIPPIN 57th Pennsylvania, Colonel Peter Sides, Lieut.-Colonel Wm. P. Neeper (wounded), Captain A. H. Nelson 63d Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John A. Danks 68th Pennsylvania, Colonel A. H. Tippin, all the Field Officers wounded 105th Pennsylvania, Colonel Calvin A. Craig 114th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Frederick K. Cavada (captured) 141st Pennsylvania, Colonel Henry J. Madill, Captain E. R. Brown.* [* Colonel Madill commanded the 114th and 141st Pennsylvania.] [NOTE.--The 2d New Hampshire, 3d Maine, and 7th and 8th New Jersey also formed part of Graham's line on the 2d.] _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. H. H. WARD, Colonel H. BERDAN 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Colonel H. Berdan, Lieut.-Colonel C. Trapp 2d U. S. Sharpshooters, Major H. H. Stoughton 3d Maine, Colonel M. S. Lakeman (captured), Captain William C. Morgan 4th Maine, Colonel Elijah Walker (killed), Major Ebenezer Whitcombe (wounded), Captain Edwin Libby 20th Indiana, Colonel John Wheeler (killed), Lieut.-Colonel William C. L. Taylor 99th Pennsylvania, Major John W. Moore 86th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Benjamin Higgins 124th New York, Colonel A. Van Horn Ellis (killed), Lieut.- Colonel Francis M. Cummings _Third Brigade_.--Colonel PHILIP R. DE TROBRIAND 3d Michigan, Colonel Byron R. Pierce (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel E. S. Pierce 5th Michigan, Lieut.-Colonel John Pulford (wounded), Major S. S. Matthews 40th New York, Colonel Thomas W. Egan 17th Maine, Lieut.-Colonel Charles B. Merrill 110th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel David M. Jones (wounded), Major Isaac Rogers SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JOSEPH B. CARR 1st Massachusetts, Colonel N. B. McLaughlin 11th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Porter D. Tripp 16th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Waldo Merriam 26th Pennsylvania, Captain Geo. W. Tomlinson (wounded), Captain Henry Goodfellow 11th New Jersey, Colonel Robert McAllister (wounded), Major Philip J. Kearny (killed), Captain Wm. B. Dunning 84th Pennsylvania (not engaged), Lieut.-Colonel Milton Opp 19th New Hampshire, Captain J. F. Langley _Second Brigade_.--Colonel WILLIAM B. BREWSTER 70th New York (1st Excelsior), Major Daniel Mahen 71st New York (2d Excelsior), Colonel Henry L. Potter 72d New York (3d Excelsior), Colonel Wm. O. Stevens (killed), Lieut.-Colonel John S. Austin 73d New York (4th Excelsior), Colonel William R. Brewster, Major M. W. Burns 74th New York (5th Excelsior), Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Holt 120th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Cornelius D. Westbrook (wounded), Major J. R. Tappen, Captain A. L. Lockwood _Third Brigade_.--Colonel GEORGE C. BURLING 5th New Jersey, Colonel William J. Sewall (wounded), Captain Virgel M. Healey (wounded), Captain T. C. Godfrey, Captain H. H. Woolsey 6th New Jersey, Colonel George C. Burling, Lieut.-Colonel S. R. Gilkyson 7th New Jersey, Colonel L. R. Francine (killed), Lieut.- Colonel Francis Price 8th New Jersey, Colonel John Ramsey (wounded), Captain John G. Langston 115th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John P. Dunne 2d New Hampshire, Colonel Edward L. Bailey (wounded), Major Saml. P. Sayles (wounded) _Artillery Brigade_.--Captain GEORGE E. RANDOLPH Battery E, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant John K. Bucklyn (wounded), Lieutenant Benj. Freeborn Battery B, 1st New Jersey, Captain A. J. Clark Battery D, 1st New Jersey, Captain Geo. T. Woodbury Battery K, 4th U. S., Lieutenant F. W. Seeley (wounded), Lieutenant Robt. James Battery D, 1st New York, Captain George B. Winslow 4th New York, Captain James E. Smith FIFTH CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE SYKES FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES BARNES _First Brigade_.--Colonel W. S. TILTON 18th Massachusetts, Colonel Joseph Hayes 22d Massachusetts, Colonel William S. Tilton, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Sherman, Jr. 118th Pennsylvania, Colonel Charles M. Prevost 1st Michigan, Colonel Ira C. Abbot (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Throop _Second Brigade_.--Colonel J. B. SWEITZER 9th Massachusetts, Colonel Patrick R. Guiney 32d Massachusetts, Col. Geo. L. Prescott (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel Luther Stephenson (wounded), Major J. Cushing Edmunds 4th Michigan, Colonel Hamson H. Jeffords (killed), Lieut.- Colonel George W. Lombard 62d Pennsylvania, Colonel J. B. Sweitzer, Lieut.-Colonel James C. Hall _Third Brigade_.--Colonel STRONG VINCENT (killed); Colonel JAMES C. RICE 20th Maine, Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain 44th New York, Colonel James C. Rice, Lieut.-Colonel Freeman Conner 83d Pennsylvania, Major William H. Lamont, Captain O. E. Woodward 16th Michigan, Lieut.-Colonel N. R. Welch SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROMAYN B. AYRES _First Brigade_.--Colonel HANNIBAL DAY, 6th U. S. Infantry 3d U. S. Infantry, Captain H. W. Freedley (wounded), Captain Richard G. Lay 4th U. S. Infantry, Captain J. W. Adams 6th U. S. Infantry, Captain Levi C. Bootes 12th U. S. Infantry, Captain Thomas S. Dunn 14th U. S. Infantry, Major G. R. Giddings _Second Brigade_.--Colonel SIDNEY BURBANK, 2d U. S. Infantry 2d U. S. Infantry, Major A. T. Lee (wounded), Captain S. A. McKee 7th U. S. Infantry, Captain D. P. Hancock 10th U. S. Infantry, Captain William Clinton 11th U. S. Infantry, Major De L. Floyd Jones 17th U. S. Infantry, Lieut.-Colonel Durrell Green _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General S. H. WEED (killed); Colonel KENNER GARRARD 140th New York, Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke (killed), Lieut.- Colonel Louis Ernst 146th New York, Colonel K. Garrard, Lieut.-Colonel David T. Jenkins 91st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph H. Sinex 155th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John H. Cain THIRD DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. WILEY CRAWFORD _First Brigade_.--Colonel WILLIAM McCANDLESS 1st Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel William Cooper Talley 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel William McCandless, Lieut.- Colonel George A. Woodward 6th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Wellington H. Ent 11th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel S. M. Jackson 1st Rifles (Bucktails), Colonel Charles J. Taylor (killed), Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Niles (wounded), Major William R. Hartshorn _Second Brigade_.--Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER 5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel J. W. Fisher, Lieut.- Colonel George Dare 9th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieut.-Colonel James McK. Snodgrass 10th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel A. J. Warner 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel M. D. Hardin _Artillery Brigade_.--Captain A. P. MARTIN Battery D, 5th United States, Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett (killed), Lieutenant B. F. Rittenhouse Battery I, 5th United States, Lieutenant Leonard Martin Battery C, 1st New York, Captain Albert Barnes Battery L, 1st Ohio, Captain N. C. Gibbs Battery C, Massachusetts, Captain A. P. Martin _Provost Guard_.--Captain H. W. RYDER. Companies E and D, 12th New York. SIXTH CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General A. T. A. TORBERT 1st New Jersey, Lieut.-Colonel William Henry, Jr. 2d New Jersey, Colonel Samuel L. Buck 3d New Jersey, Colonel Henry W. Brown 15th New Jersey, Colonel William H. Penrose _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. J. BARTLETT 5th Maine, Colonel Clark S. Edwards 121st New York, Colonel Emory Upton 95th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Edward Carroll 96th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel William H. Lossig _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General D. A. RUSSELL 6th Maine, Colonel Hiram Burnham 49th Pennsylvania, Colonel William H. Irvin 119th Pennsylvania, Colonel P. C. Ellmaker 5th Wisconsin, Colonel Thomas S. Allen SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. P. HOWE _Second Brigade_.--Colonel L. A. GRANT 2d Vermont, Colonel J. H. Walbridge 3d Vermont, Colonel T. O. Seaver 4th Vermont, Colonel E. H. Stoughton 5th Vermont, Lieut.-Colonel John B. Lewis 6th Vermont, Lieut.-Colonel Elisha L. Barney _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General T. A. NEILL 7th Maine, Lieut.-Colonel Seldon Conner 49th New York, Colonel D. D. Bidwell 77th New York, Colonel J. B. McKean 43d New York, Colonel B. F. Baker 61st Pennsylvania, Major Geo. W. Dawson THIRD DIVISION BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANK WHEATON _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ALEXANDER SHALER 65th New York, Colonel J. E. Hamblin 67th New York, Colonel Nelson Cross 122d New York, Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Dwight 23d Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John F. Glenn 82d Pennsylvania, Colonel Isaac Bassett _Second Brigade_.--Colonel H. L. EUSTIS 7th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Franklin P. Harlow 10th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Jefford M. Decker 37th Massachusetts, Colonel Oliver Edwards 2d Rhode Island, Colonel Horatio Rogers _Third Brigade_.--Colonel DAVID I. NEVIN 62d New York, Colonel D. L. Nevin, Lieut.-Colonel Theo. B. Hamilton 102d Pennsylvania,* Colonel John W. Patterson 93d Pennsylvania, Colonel James W. McCarter 98th Pennsylvania, Major John B. Kohler 139th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel William H. Moody [* Not engaged.] _Artillery Brigade_.--Colonel C. H. TOMPKINS Battery A, 1st Massachusetts, Captain W. H. McCartney Battery D, 2d United States, Lieutenant E. B. Williston Battery F, 5th United States, Lieutenant Leonard Martin Battery G, 2d United States, Lieutenant John H. Butler Battery C, 1st Rhode Island, Captain Richard Waterman Battery G, 1st Rhode Island, Captain George W. Adams 1st New York, Captain Andrew Cowan 3d New York, Captain William A. Harn _Cavalry Detachment_.--Captain WILLIAM L. CRAFT Commanding. H, 1st Pennsylvania; L, 1st New Jersey. ELEVENTH CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD PERMANENT COMMANDER. MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ, July 1st. FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANCIS C. BARLOW (wounded) BRIGADIER-GENERAL ADELBERT AMES _First Brigade_.--Colonel LEOPOLD VON GILSA 41st New York, Colonel L. Von Gilsa, Lieut.-Colonel D. Von Einsiedel 54th New York, Colonel Eugene A. Kezley 68th New York, Colonel Gotthilf Bonray de Ivernois 153d Pennsylvania, Colonel Charles Glanz _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ADELBERT AMES, Colonel ANDREW L. HARRIS 17th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel Douglass Fowler (killed), Major A. G. Brady (wounded) 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Colonel Jeremiah Williams (captured), Lieutenant William Maloney (wounded), Lieutenant Israel White 75th Ohio, Colonel Andrew L. Harris (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel Ben Morgan (wounded), Major Charles W. Friend 107th Ohio, Captain John M. Lutz SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. VON STEINWEHR _First Brigade_.--Colonel CHARLES R. COSTER 27th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Lorenz Cantador 73d Pennsylvania, Captain Daniel F. Kelly 134th New York, Colonel Charles R. Coster, Lieut.-Colonel Allan H. Jackson 154th New York, Colonel Patrick H. Jones _Second Brigade_.--Colonel ORLANDO SMITH 33d Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Adin B. Underwood 136th New York, Colonel James Wood, Jr. 55th Ohio, Colonel Charles B. Gambee 73d Ohio, Colonel Orlando Smith, Lieut.-Colonel Richard Long THIRD DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ PERMANENT COMMANDER. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG Commanding on July 1st. _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General A. VON SCHIMMELPFENNIG (captured); Colonel GEORGE VON ARNSBURG. 45th New York, Colonel G. Von Arnsburg, Lieut.-Colonel Adolpus Dobke 157th New York, Colonel Philip F. Brown, Jr. 74th Pennsylvania, Colonel Adolph Von Hartung (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel Von Mitzel (captured), Major Gustav Schleiter 61st Ohio, Colonel S. J. McGroarty 82d Illinois, Colonel J. Hecker _Second Brigade_.--Colonel WALDIMIR KRYZANOWSKI 58th New York, Colonel W. Kryzanowski, Lieut.-Colonel August Otto, Captain Emil Koenig, Lieut.-Colonel Frederick Gellman 119th New York, Colonel John T. Lockman, Lieut.-Colonel James C. Rogers 75th Pennsylvania, Colonel Francis Mahler (wounded), Major August Ledig 82d Ohio, Colonel James S. Robinson (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel D. Thomson 26th Wisconsin, Colonel Wm. H. Jacobs _Artillery Brigade_.--Major THOMAS W. OSBORN Battery L, 1st New York, Captain Michael Wiedrick Battery I, 1st Ohio, Captain Hubert Dilger Battery K, 1st Ohio, Captain Lewis Heckman Battery G, 4th United States, Lieutenant Bayard Wilkinson (killed), Lieutenant E. A. Bancroft 13th New York, Lieutenant William Wheeler TWELFTH CORPS. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS H. RUGER _First Brigade_.--Colonel ARCHIBALD L. McDOUGALL 5th Connecticut, Colonel Warren W. Packer 20th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel William B. Wooster 123d New York, Colonel A. L. McDougall, Lieut.-Colonel James G. Rogers 145th New York, Colonel E. L. Price 46th Pennsylvania, Colonel James L. Selfridge 3d Maryland, Colonel J. M. Sudsburg _Second Brigade_.*--Brigadier-General HENRY H. LOCKWOOD 150th New York, Colonel John H. Ketcham 1st Maryland (P. H. B.), Colonel William P. Maulsby 1st Maryland (E. S.), Colonel James Wallace [* Unassigned during progress of battle; afterward attached to First Division as Second Brigade.] _Third Brigade_.--Colonel SILAS COLGROVE 2d Massachusetts, Colonel Charles R. Mudge (killed), Lieut.- Colonel Charles F. Morse 107th New York, Colonel Miron M. Crane 13th New Jersey, Colonel Ezra A. Carman (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel John R. Fesler 27th Indiana, Colonel Silas Colgrove, Lieut.-Colonel John R. Fesler 3d Wisconsin, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Flood SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN W. GEARY _First Brigade_.--Colonel CHARLES CANDY 28th Pennsylvania, Captain John Flynn 147th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Arlo Pardee, Jr. 5th Ohio, Colonel John H. Patrick 7th Ohio, Colonel William R. Creighton 29th Ohio, Captain W. F. Stevens (wounded), Captain Ed. Hays 66th Ohio, Colonel C. Candy, Lieut.-Colonel Eugene Powell _Second Brigade_.--(1) Colonel GEORGE A. COBHAM, JR.; (2) Brigadier-General THOMAS L. KANE 29th Pennsylvania, Colonel William Rickards 100th Pennsylvania, Captain Fred. L. Gimber 111th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas M. Walker, Lieut.- Colonel Frank J. Osgood _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEORGE S. GREENE 60th New York, Colonel Abel Godard 78th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Von Hammerstein 102d New York, Lieut.-Colonel James C. Lane (wounded) 137th New York, Colonel David Ireland 149th New York, Colonel Henry A. Barnum, Lieut.-Colonel Charles B. Randall _Artillery Brigade_.--Lieutenant EDWARD D. MUHLENBERG Battery F, 4th United States, Lieutenant E. D. Muhlenberg, Lieutenant S. T. Rugg Battery K, 5th United States, Lieutenant D. H. Kinsie Battery M, 1st New York, Lieutenant Charles E. Winegar Knap's Pennsylvania Battery, Lieutenant Charles Atwell _Headquarter Guard_.--Battalion 10th Maine. CAVALRY CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN BUFORD _First Brigade_.--Colonel WILLIAM GAMBLE 8th New York, Colonel Benjamin F. Davis 8th Illinois, Colonel William Gamble, Lieut.-Colonel D. R. Clendenin two squadrons 12th Illinois, Colonel Amos Vos three squadrons 3d Indiana, Colonel George H. Chapman _Second Brigade_.--Colonel THOMAS C. DEVIN 6th New York, Colonel Thomas C. Devin, Lieut.-Colonel William H. Crocker 9th New York, Colonel William Sackett 17th Pennsylvania, Colonel J. H. Kellogg 3d Virginia (detachment) _Reserve Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WESLEY MERRITT 1st United States, Captain R. S. C. Lord 2d United States, Captain T. F. Rodenbough 5th United States, Captain J. W. Mason 6th United States, Major S. H. Starr (wounded), Captain G. C. Cram 6th Pennsylvania, Major James H. Hazeltine SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL D. McM. GREGG (HEADQUARTERS GUARD--Company A, 1st Ohio.) _First Brigade_.--Colonel J. B. McINTOSH 1st New Jersey, Major M. H. Beaumont 1st Pennsylvania, Colonel John P. Taylor 3d Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Edward S. Jones 1st Maryland, Lieut.-Colonel James M. Deems 1st Massachusetts at Headquarters Sixth Corps. _Second Brigade_.*--Colonel PENNOCK HUEY 2d New York, 4th New York, 8th Pennsylvania, 6th Ohio. [* Not engaged.] _Third Brigade_.--Colonel J. I. GREGG 1st Maine, Colonel Charles H. Smith 10th New York, Major W. A. Avery 4th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel W. E. Doster 16th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John K. Robison THIRD DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JUDSON KILPATRICK (HEADQUARTER GUARD--Company C, 1st Ohio.) _First Brigade_.--(1) Brigadier-General E. J. FARNSWORTH; (2) Colonel N. P. RICHMOND 5th New York, Major John Hammond 18th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel William P. Brinton 1st Vermont, Colonel Edward D. Sawyer 1st West Virginia, Colonel N. P. Richmond _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEORGE A. CUSTER 1st Michigan, Colonel Charles H. Town 5th Michigan, Colonel Russell A. Alger 6th Michigan, Colonel George Gray 7th Michigan, Colonel Wm. D. Mann HORSE ARTILLERY.* [* A section of a battery attached to the Purnell Legion was with Gregg on the 3d.] _First Brigade_.--Captain JOHN M. ROBERTSON Batteries B and L, 2d United States, Lieutenant Edw. Heaton Battery M, 2d United States, Lieutenant A. C. M. Pennington Battery E, 4th United States, Lieutenant S. S. Elder 6th New York, Lieutenant Jos. W. Martin 9th Michigan, Captain J. J. Daniels Battery C, 3d United States, Lieutenant William D. Fuller _Second Brigade_.--Captain JOHN C. TIDBALL Batteries G and E, 1st United States, Captain A. M. Randol Battery K, 1st United States, Captain Wm. M. Graham Battery A, 2d United States, Lieutenant John H. Calef Battery C, 3d United States ARTILLERY RESERVE. (1) BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. O. TYLER (disabled) (2) CAPTAIN JOHN M. ROBERTSON _First Regular Brigade_.--Captain D. R. RANSOM (wounded) Battery H, 1st United States, Lieutenant C. P. Eakin (wounded) Batteries F and K, 3d United States, Lieutenant J. C. Turnbull Battery C, 4th United States, Lieutenant Evan Thomas Battery C, 5th United States, Lieutenant G. V. Weir _First Volunteer Brigade_.--Lieut.-Colonel F. McGILVERY 15th New York, Captain Patrick Hart Independent Battery Pennsylvania, Captain R. B. Ricketts 5th Massachusetts, Captain C. A. Phillips 9th Massachusetts, Captain John Bigelow _Second Volunteer Brigade_.--Captain E. D. TAFT Battery B, 1st Connecticut;* Battery M, 1st Connecticut;* 5th New York, Captain Elijah D. Taft 2d Connecticut, Lieutenant John W. Sterling [* Not engaged.] _Third Volunteer Brigade_.--Captain JAMES F. HUNTINGTON Batteries F and G, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain R. B. Ricketts Battery H, 1st Ohio, Captain Jas. F. Huntington Battery A, 1st New Hampshire, Captain F. M. Edgell Battery C, 1st West Virginia, Captain Wallace Hill _Fourth Volunteer Brigade_.--Captain R. H. FITZHUGH Battery B, 1st New York, Captain Jas. McRorty (killed) Battery G, 1st New York, Captain Albert N. Ames Battery K, 1st New York (11th Battery attached), Captain Robt. H. Fitzhugh Battery A, 1st Maryland, Captain Jas. H. Rigby Battery A, 1st New Jersey, Lieutenant Augustin N. Parsons 6th Maine, Lieutenant Edwin B. Dow _Train Guard_.--Major CHARLES EWING Commanding. 4th New Jersey Infantry. _Headquarter Guard_.--Captain J. C. FULLER Commanding. Battery C, 32d Massachusetts. DETACHMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. _Command of the Provost-Marshal-General_.--Brigadier-General M. B. PATRICK 93d New York* 8th United States* 1st Massachusetts Cavalry 2d Pennsylvania Cavalry Batteries E and I, 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry Detachment Regular Cavalry United States Engineer Battalion,* Captain Geo. H. Mendel, United States Engineers [* Not engaged.] _Guards and Orderlies_.--Captain D. P. MANN Independent Company Oneida Cavalry. APPENDIX B. _Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, June 1, 1863._ GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE _STAFF._ COLONEL W. H. TAYLOR, Adjutant-General. " C. S. VENABLE, A.D.C. " CHARLES MARSHALL, A.D.C. " JAMES L. CORLEY, Chief Quartermaster. " R. G. COLE, Chief Commissary. " B. G. BALDWIN, Chief of Ordnance. " H. L. PEYTON, Assistant Inspector-General. GENERAL W. N. PENDLETON, Chief of Artillery. DOCTOR L. GUILD, Medical Director. COLONEL W. PROCTOR SMITH, Chief Engineer. MAJOR H. E. YOUNG, Assistant Adjutant-General. " G. B. COOK, Assistant Inspector-General. FIRST CORPS. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET McLAWS' DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL L. McLAWS _Kershaw's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. B. KERSHAW 15th South Carolina, Colonel W. D. De Sausssure 8th South Carolina, Colonel J. W. Mamminger 2d South Carolina, Colonel John D. Kennedy 3d South Carolina, Colonel James D. Nance 7th South Carolina, Colonel D. Wyatt Aiken 3d (James') Battalion South Carolina Infantry, Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Rice. _Benning's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General H. L. BENNING 50th Georgia, Colonel W. R. Manning 51st Georgia, Colonel W. M. Slaughter 53d Georgia, Colonel James P. Somms 10th Georgia, Lieut.-Colonel John B. Weems _Barksdale's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WM. BARKSDALE 13th Mississippi, Colonel J. W. Carter 17th Mississippi, Colonel W. D. Holder 18th Mississippi, Colonel Thomas M. Griffin 21st Mississippi, Colonel B. G. Humphreys _Wofford's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General W. T. WOFFORD 18th Georgia, Major E. Griffs Phillips' Georgia Legion, Colonel W. M. Phillips 24th Georgia, Colonel Robert McMillan 16th Georgia, Colonel Goode Bryan Cobb's Georgia Legion, Lieut.-Colonel L. D. Glewn PICKETT'S DIVISION MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE E. PICKETT COMMANDING. _Garnett's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General R. B. GARNETT 8th Virginia, Colonel Eppa Hunton 18th Virginia, Colonel R. E. Withers 19th Virginia, Colonel Henry Gantt 28th Virginia, Colonel R. C. Allen 56th Virginia, Colonel W. D. Stuart _Armistead's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General L. A. ARMISTEAD 9th Virginia, Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Gilliam 14th Virginia, Colonel J. G. Hodges 38th Virginia, Colonel E. C. Edmonds 53d Virginia, Colonel John Grammer 57th Virginia, Colonel J. B. Magruder _Kemper's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. L. KEMPER 1st Virginia, Colonel Lewis B. Williams, Jr. 3d Virginia, Colonel Jospeh Mayo, Jr. 7th Virginia, Colonel W. T. Patton 11th Virginia, Colonel David Funston 24th Virginia, Colonel W. R. Terry _Toombs' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General R. TOOMBS 2d Georgia, Colonel E. M. Butt 15th Georgia, Colonel E. M. DuBose 17th Georgia, Colonel W. C. Hodges 20th Georgia, Colonel J. B. Cummings _Corse's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General M. D. CORSE 15th Virginia, Colonel T. P. August 17th Virginia, Colonel Morton Marye 30th Virginia, Colonel A. T. Harrison 32d Virginia, Colonel E. B. Montague HOOD'S DIVISION MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. HOOD. _Robertson's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. B. ROBERTSON 1st Texas, Colonel A. T. Rainey 4th Texas, Colonel J. C. G. Key 5th Texas, Colonel R. M. Powell 3d Arkansas, Colonel Van H. Manning _Law's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General E. M. LAW 4th Alabama, Colonel P. A. Bowls 44th Alabama, Colonel W. H. Perry 15th Alabama, Colonel James Canty 47th Alabama, Colonel J. W. Jackson 48th Alabama, Colonel J. F. Shepherd _Anderson's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General G. T. ANDERSON 10th Georgia Battalion, Major J. E. Rylander 7th Georgia, Colonel W. M. White 8th Georgia, Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Towers 9th Georgia, Colonel B. F. Beck 11th Georgia, Colonel F. H. Little _Jenkins' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General M. JENKINS 2d South Carolina Rifles, Colonel Thomas Thompson 1st South Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel David Livingstone 5th South Carolina, Colonel A. Coward 6th South Carolina, Colonel John Bratton Hampton's Legion, Colonel M. W. Gary ARTILLERY OF THE FIRST CORPS. COLONEL J. B. WALTON COMMANDING. _Battalion_.--Colonel H. C. CABELL, Major HAMILTON Batteries: McCarty's, Manly's, Carlton's, Fraser's. _Battalion_.--Major DEARING Batteries: Macon's, Blount's, Stribling's, Caskie's. _Battalion_.--Major HENRY Batteries: Bachman's, Rielly's, Latham's, Gordon's. _Battalion_.--Colonel E. P. ALEXANDER, Major HUGER Batteries: Jordan's, Rhett's, Moody's, Parker's, Taylor's. _Battalion_.--Major ESHLEMAN Batteries: Squires', Miller's, Richardson's, Norcom's. Total number of guns, Artillery of the First Corps, 83. SECOND CORPS. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. S. EWELL. EARLY'S DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. EARLY _Hays' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General H. S. HAYS 5th Louisiana, Colonel Henry Forno 6th Louisiana, Colonel William Monaghan 7th Louisiana, Colonel D. B. Penn 8th Louisiana, Colonel Henry B. Kelley 9th Louisiana, Colonel A. L. Stafford _Gordon's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. B. GORDON 13th Georgia, Colonel J. M. Smith 26th Georgia, Colonel E. N. Atkinson 31st Georgia, Colonel C. A. Evans 38th Georgia, Colonel W. H. Stiles 61st Georgia, Colonel J. H. Lamar _Smith's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WILLIAM SMITH 13th Virginia, Colonel J. E. B. Terrill 31st Virginia, Colonel John S. Hoffman 49th Virginia, Colonel Gibson 52d Virginia, Colonel Skinner 58th Virginia, Colonel F. H. Board _Hoke's Brigade_.--Colonel J. E. AVERY Commanding (General R. F. HOKE being absent, wounded) 5th North Carolina, Colonel J. E. Avery 21st North Carolina, Colonel W. W. Kirkland 54th North Carolina, Colonel J. C. T. McDowell 57th North Carolina, Colonel A. C. Godwin 1st North Carolina Battalion, Major R. H. Wharton RODES' DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES _Daniel's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JUNIUS DANIEL 32d North Carolina, Colonel E. C. Brabble 43d North Carolina, Colonel Thomas S. Keenan 45th North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel Saml. H. Boyd 53d North Carolina, Colonel W. A. Owens 2d North Carolina Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Andrew _Doles' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEORGE DOLES 4th Georgia, Lieut.-Colonel D. R. E. Winn 12th Georgia, Colonel Edward Willis 21st Georgia, Colonel John T. Mercer 44th Georgia, Colonel S. P. Lumpkin _Iverson's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ALFRED IVERSON 5th North Carolina, Captain S. B. West 12th North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel W. S. Davis 20th North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel N. Slough 23d North Carolina, Colonel D. H. Christie _Ramseur's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General S. D. RAMSEUR 2d North Carolina, Major E. W. Hurt 4th North Carolina, Colonel Bryan Grimes 14th North Carolina, Colonel R. T. Bennett 30th North Carolina, Colonel F. M. Parker _Rodes' Brigade_.--Colonel E. A. O'NEILL 3d Alabama, Colonel C. A. Battle 5th Alabama, Colonel J. M. Hall 6th Alabama, Colonel J. N. Lightfoot 12th Alabama, Colonel S. B. Pickens 26th Alabama, Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Goodgame JOHNSON'S DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL ED. JOHNSON _Steuart's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEO. H. STEUART 10th Virginia, Colonel E. T. H. Warren 23d Virginia, Colonel A. G. Taliaferro 27th Virginia, Colonel T. V. Williams 1st North Carolina, Colonel J. A. McDowell 3d North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel Thurston _"Stonewall" Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JAMES A. WALKER 2d Virginia, Colonel J. Q. A. Nadenbousch 4th Virginia, Colonel Charles A. Ronald 5th Virginia, Colonel J. H. S. Funk 27th Virginia, Colonel J. K. Edmondson 33d Virginia, Colonel F. M. Holladay _Jones' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JOHN M. JONES 21st Virginia, Captain Moseley 43d Virginia, Lieut.-Colonel Withers 44th Virginia, Captain Buckner 48th Virginia, Colonel T. S. Garnett 50th Virginia, Colonel Vanderventer _Nicholls' Brigade_.--Colonel J. M. WILLIAMS Commanding (General F. T. NICHOLLS being absent, wounded) 1st Louisiana, Colonel William R. Shirers 2d Louisiana, Colonel J. M. Williams 10th Louisiana, Colonel E. Waggaman 14th Louisiana, Colonel Z. York 15th Louisiana, Colonel Edward Pendleton ARTILLERY OF THE SECOND CORPS. COLONEL S. CRUTCHFIELD _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel THOMAS H. CARTER, Major CARTER M. BRAXTON Batteries: Page's, Fry's, Carter's, Reese's. _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel H. P. JONES, Major BROCKENBOROUGH Batteries: Carrington's, Garber's, Thompson's, Tanner's. _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel S. ANDREWS, Major LATIMER Batteries: Brown's, Dermot's, Carpenter's, Raine's. _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel NELSON, Major PAGE Batteries: Kirkpatrick's, Massie's, Millege's. _Battalion_.--Colonel J. T. BROWN, Major HARDAWAY Batteries: Dance's, Watson's, Smith's, Huff's, Graham's. Total number of guns, Artillery of the Second Corps, 82. THIRD CORPS. LIEUT.-GENERAL A. P. HILL R. H. ANDERSON'S DIVISION. _Wilcox's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General C. M. WILCOX 8th Alabama, Colonel T. L. Royster 9th Alabama, Colonel S. Henry 10th Alabama, Colonel W. H. Forney 11th Alabama, Colonel J. C. C. Saunders 14th Alabama, Colonel L. F. Pinkhard _Mahone's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WILLIAM MAHONE 6th Virginia, Colonel G. T. Rogers 12th Virginia, Colonel D. A. Weisiger 16th Virginia, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph H. Ham 41st Virginia, Colonel W. A. Parham 61st Virginia, Colonel V. D. Groner _Posey's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General CARNOT POSEY 46th Mississippi, Colonel Jos. Jayne 16th Mississippi, Colonel Saml. E. Baker 19th Mississippi, Colonel John Mullins 12th Mississippi, Colonel W. H. Taylor _Wright's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General A. R. WRIGHT 2d Georgia Battalion, Major G. W. Ross 3d Georgia, Colonel E. J. Walker 22d Georgia, Colonel R. H. Jones 48th Georgia, Colonel William Gibson _Perry's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General E. A. PERRY 2d Florida, Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Pyles 5th Florida, Colonel J. C. Hately 8th Florida, Colonel David Long HETH'S DIVISION _First, Pettigrew's Brigade_.--42d, 11th, 26th, 44th, 47th, 53d, and 17th North Carolina. _Second, Field's Brigade_.--40th, 55th, and 47th Virginia. _Third, Archer's Brigade_.--1st, 7th, and 14th Tennessee, and 13th Alabama. _Fourth, Cook's Brigade_.--15th, 27th, 46th, and 48th North Carolina. _Fifth, Davis' Brigade_.--2d, 11th, 42d Mississippi, and 55th N. Carolina. PENDER'S DIVISION _First, McGowan's Brigade_.--1st, 12th, 13th, and 14th North Carolina. _Second, Lane's Brigade_.--7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, and 37th Georgia. _Third, Thomas' Brigade_.--14th, 35th, 45th, and 49th Georgia. _Fourth, Pender's Old Brigade_.--13th, 16th, 22d, 34th, and 38th North Carolina. ARTILLERY OF THE THIRD CORPS. Colonel R. LINDSEY WALKER _Battalion_.--Major D. G. McINTOSH, Major W. F. POAGUE Batteries: Hurt's, Rice's, Luck's, Johnson's. _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel GARNETT, Major RICHARDSON Batteries: Lewis', Maurin's, Moore's, Grandy's. _Battalion_.--Major CUTSHAW Batteries: Wyatt's, Woolfolk's, Brooke's. _Battalion_.--Major WILLIE P. PEGRAM Batteries: Brunson's, Davidson's, Crenshaw's, McGraw's, Marye's. _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel CUTTS, Major LANE Batteries: Wingfield's, Ross', Patterson's. Total number of guns, Artillery of the Third Corps, 83. Total number of guns, Army of Northern Virginia, 248. LIEUT.-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART'S CAVALRY CORPS. Brigadier-General Wade Hampton's Brigade. Brigadier-General Fitz Hugh Lee's Brigade. Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee's Brigade, under Colonel Chambliss. Brigadier-General B. H. Robertson's Brigade. Brigadier-General William E. Jones' Brigade. Brigadier-General J. D. Imboden's Brigade. Brigadier-General A. G. Jenkins' Brigade. Colonel White's Battalion. Baker's Brigade. [NOTE.--The regimental roster of this Cavalry Corps is unfortunately unobtainable.] INDEX. [omitted] MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS are publishing, under the general title of THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR a series of volumes, contributed at their solicitation by a number of leading actors in and students of the great conflict of 1861- '65, with a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full and authoritative military history of the suppression of the Rebellion. The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a whole generation has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field--for a strong, vivid, concise by truly proportioned story of the great salient events. The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materials of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading, an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader does not possess. There have been no attempts at general histories which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public. Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very great class of readers;--and there has seemed to be great danger that the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. From every department of the Government, from the officers of the army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received every aid that could be asked in this undertaking; and in announcing the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to express elsewhere. The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250 pages each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under the direction of the authors. They will appear, as far as possible, in the chronological order of the Campaigns of which they treat; and by their preliminary and concluding chapters will be so far connected that the completed work will practically cover the entire field of the war. The price of each volume will be $1.00. _The following volumes are now ready:_ I.--THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION. By JOHN G. NICOLAY, Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late Consul-General to France, etc. A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering the period from the election of Lincoln to the end of the first battle of Bull Run. II.--FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH. By the Hon. M. F. FORCE, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati; late Brigadier-General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding First Division, 17th Corps: In 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh; Treasurer of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, 1862; covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc. III.--THE PENINSULA. By ALEXANDER S. WEBB., LL.D., President of the College of the City of New York; Assistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1861-'62; Inspector General Fifth Army Corps; General commanding 2d Div., 2d Corps; Major General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac. The history of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the end of the Seven Days' Fight. IV.--THE ARMY UNDER POPE. By JOHN C. ROPES, Esq., of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Historical Society, etc. From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to the appointment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1862. V.--THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG. By FRANCIS WINTHROP PALFREY, Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l, U.S.V., and formerly Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry; Lieut. Col. of the 20th Massachusetts at the battle of the Antietam; Member of Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of the Massachusetts Historical Society, etc. From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, Sept. 1862, to the end of the battle of Fredericksburg. VI.--CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A., and Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V.; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc. From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle. VII.--THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. By HENRY M. CIST, Brevet Brig. Gen'l U.S.V.; A.A.G. on the staff of Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterwards on that of Major Gen'l Thomas; Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland. From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the battles at Chattanooga, November, 1863. IX.--THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. By the Hon. JACOB D. COX, Ex-Governor of Ohio; late Secretary of the Interior of the United States; Major General U.S.V., commanding Twenty-third Corps during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc., etc. From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to the beginning of the March to the Sea. X.--THE MARCH TO THE SEA.--FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. By the Hon. JACOB D. COX. From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the Surrender of Johnston--including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee. The following volumes, now preparing for early publication, will complete the series: VIII.--THE MISSISSIPPI. By FRANCIS VINTON GREENE, Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army; late Military Attaché to the U. S. Legation in St. Petersburg; Author of "The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78," and of "Army Life in Russia." An account of the operations--especially at Vicksburg and Port Hudson--by which the Mississippi River and its shores were restored to the control of the Union. XI.--THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY in 1864. The Campaign of Sheridan. By GEORGE E. POND, Esq., Associate Editor of the _Army and Navy Journal_. XII.--THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA. By ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS, Brigadier General and Bvt. Major General, U.S.A.; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, 1863-'64; commanding Second Corps, 1864-'65, etc., etc. Covering the Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and '65, to Lee's surrender. [Asterism] _The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, post-paid, upon receipt of price by_ CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 743 AND 745 BROADWAY, NEW YORK. Transcriber's note: Footnotes follow the paragraph in which they are referenced. Small caps have been set as caps. Regimental numbers, which were all spelled out in the text (but not the Appendixes), have been converted to numerals. Personal names have been corrected, place names have not when they could be a contemporary variant. The possessives ending in "s's" or "s'" have been made uniformly the latter. The Appendixes have been rearranged from paragraph to tabular style; the words "Commanding" and "Regiment" have been deleted when possible. It seems that the end of Appendix B was originally shortened to fit the signature. LoC call number: E468.C2 v.6