A reply to the Answer (printed by His Majesties command at Oxford) to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of His Maiesties late answers and expresses by J.M. J. M. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A50950 of text R13080 in the English Short Title Catalog (Wing M2176). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 249 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 25 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A50950 Wing M2176 ESTC R13080 12254748 ocm 12254748 57338 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A50950) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 57338) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 155:11 or 266:E245, no 35) A reply to the Answer (printed by His Majesties command at Oxford) to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of His Maiesties late answers and expresses by J.M. J. M. Milton, John, 1608-1674. [2], 46 p. Printed for Matthew Walbancke, London : 1642. Attributed to John Milton. Cf. Wing. Reproduction of original in Yale University Library and Thomason Collection, British Library. eng Diggs, Dudley, 1613-1643. -- Answer to a printed book intituled Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses. Parker, Henry, 1604-1652. -- Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses. Great Britain -- History -- Charles I, 1625-1649. A50950 R13080 (Wing M2176). civilwar no A reply to the Answer (printed by his Majesties command at Oxford) to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late J. M 1643 47975 1667 5 0 0 3 0 355 F The rate of 355 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the F category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2002-09 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2002-10 Apex CoVantage Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2002-11 Emma (Leeson) Huber Sampled and proofread 2002-11 Emma (Leeson) Huber Text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-12 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion A REPLY TO THE ANSWER ( Printed by his Majesties Command at OXFORD ) to a Printed Booke Intituled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses . By J. M. LONDON , Printed for Matthew Walbancke , Anno Dom. 1642. A reply to the Answer ( printed by his Majesties Command at Oxford ) to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late Answers and expresses . THe Authour of the Answer to the Observator ( which was p●…inted a●…Oxford ( no place more fit to entertaine such cavils ) by his 〈◊〉 Command ( too good a Patron to be thus abused ) Begins his dis●…urse by way of Preface , and there would tell us the Originall of Regall Authority , were it not a losse of time ( he has been to profuse & prodigall of it in his Book , he doth well to spare it in the Preface ) for that he sees [ t is granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God . ] I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no ▪ For I take it to be very cleare and evident , that the Kings of Israel were of Divine insti●…tion ; But that Royall Authority should bee unto us , or the s●…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution , then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power , that I deny ▪ 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution , it must of necessity be , that all States must be fwayed and ruled by Kings ; and the execution of other power were sinne , and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to a●…rt . Againe , were they of Divine right , they ought to have equall power and Dominion in all places ; and that they have not , for as it is well known , in some Kingdomes they have greater Authority , in some lesse ; And all vary according to the severall Lawes and Constitutions of their Countries . Why then if they bee of humane institution , it must be agreed , that no King hath at thi●… day , any speciall Ordinance from Heaven by which to intitle himselfe to his Crowne and Regall authority : And hence the consequence is just , that Kings are bound by th●…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people , and ought to discharge and execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto . But then he goes on an●… tels us that power or governement [ was o●…yned of God for the good of mankind , which was not to bee obtained without preservation of order , and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the Lawes of society , not onely for wrath , but for conscience sake . ] With this limitation the Author saith true , we must submitt to the Lawe●… of society , where they doe not oppose the Law of God , otherwise not , for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience ? And he sa●…es we must submit , [ not onely whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors , but 〈◊〉 whilst we d●…e suffer under some accidentall abuses . ] I , but what if those abus●… prov●…●…o be wilfull ? I know that is the Authors meaning , though he will not expresse it , for if his opinion mi●…ht passe as Orthodox , the cases would be all one , I , and what if th●…se abuses strike at our Religion , at our lives , libe●…ies , and estates ; at all that God hath entrusted us with , and made us happy in ▪ must wee here submitt and quietly surrender up all our happinesse at once ▪ a most strange Doctrine . Well let him Preach it at Oxford , to those whom a foolish zeale hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their Soveraign . But let us know , that good subjects may preserve these & yet not be the lesse , but the more dutifull to their King ; Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tels mee that I ought not to grant ? or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my Soveraigne which styles mee just before God ? well , to passe this ( because I shall have occasion to speake more fully to it after ) those that maintaine this error , misery will bee this portion here , and a just judgement hereafter . But he tels us that [ we cannot reape the constant fruits of an establ●…shed policy , unlesse by comp●…ct we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences . ] The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he meanes by those inconveniences ; b●…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning ( for the whole s●…ope of his Booke speakes as m●…ch ) that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Ty●…ant , and make his boundlesse Arbitrary will to be Law , and if this fall out , ( as too commonly it doth ) yet wee must patiently doe or s●…ffer what ever ( though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience ) is imposed upon us , and which is more , wee must by solemne contract binde our selves beforehand this to doe ; and why so ? for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy . A most strange and unnaturall assert●…on , was it ever heard , or can it bee imagined , that a people should contract to their owne ruine ? there is a mutuall compact betwixt King and People , the King is to governe by a rule if he would have his people to obey ; and if he swerve from that , this dissol●…es the contract , and gives the people p●…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves . And if this were not Law , what benefit could we expect to reape of such an established destructive policy ? He hath made bad premi●…es , and worse conclusion , for marke what he has d●…uced from thence . Hence ( saith he ) it followes after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contra●… divested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them , they cannot upon what pret●…ce soever witho●…t manif●…st breach of Divine Ordinance , and violation of publique sa●…th resume that authority which they have placed in another . ) This by the way , power ( according to the Authors owne 〈◊〉 ) was primarily in the people ( a truth ingeniously acknowledged ) but the mischiefe 〈◊〉 ; they have by contract divest●…d themselves of that power : how is that made good ? why thus , they chose one to be King over them , and contracted to obey him ; what in omnibus 〈◊〉 , in all his commissions , nothing lesse ; for that might be to disodey God , and whether it bee lawfull to obey God or man , judge you . I , but they have given him an absolute Authority , and made him supreme , and therefore not to be q●…stioned by ●…ny inferiour p●…wer ; and if this were true , his Majesties counsell ( who too 〈◊〉 mal●…ne ●…he ha●…pinesse of King and peop●… , and would worke o●… their owne 〈◊〉 des●…gnes by the ruine of bo●…h ) w●…ld never have advised h●…s Maj●…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declarat●…ons , that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law ▪ in trust for the well govern●…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committ●…d to his charge . And as a trust is for the benefit and behoofe of him , for whose sake the conv●…yance in tr●…st was made , n●…t of him , who is the party intrusted . So likew●…se every trust doth impl●… a condit●…on that the party doe d●…ly perf●…rme and discharge th●… t●…st , or if h●…e doe not , that he bee 〈◊〉 so to doe . Th●…s th●…n being thus h●…w h●…ve the people tota●…ly divest●…d themselves of their power ? I d●…e n●…t speake this to defend the peoples 〈◊〉 of their Authority , or to 〈◊〉 that po●…tion of depo●…ng Princes , so farre I concurre w●…th the Author : but that th●…y should ha●…e a boundl●…sse 〈◊〉 power , that I denie . Againe ( for he maketh a second conclusion o●…t of the former premisses ) hence it 〈◊〉 ( saith hee ) though ●…he pe●…ple should 〈◊〉 th●…y ●…ght live more hapi●… , if the Ki●…gs 〈◊〉 were mor●… 〈◊〉 , his revenues diminish●…d , it were h●…gh sinne to 〈◊〉 upon his 〈◊〉 ▪ 〈◊〉 in St●…e , when that the K●…ngs Prerogative doth not invade the sub●…ects 〈◊〉 nor their 〈◊〉 entrench 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but ea●…h keepe within their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and circumference : But th●…s wee must ●…ow , that as the Kings Crowne and 〈◊〉 ●…ower was committed to him in trust f●…r the good of his 〈◊〉 , so likewise w●…re his 〈◊〉 and Prerogatives , and if these b●… abused to the 〈◊〉 of l●…berty , and the 〈◊〉 or the dest●…uction of his peo●…le , t is no entrenching upon Prerogative , to q●…estion this ab●…se , and indeavour our owne preservation . I , but then he saies , it doth no way prejudice regall Authority , that God is the Author of Aristocrat call or Democraticall power . ] Doth the observators saying that God is the auhor of those powers , any way conclude against regall authority ? where the powers are various , and no way contradictory or opposite one to another , for a man to conclude the illegality of the one , from the legality of the other , were a very simple and fallacious kinde of reasoning . But our Authour will not bee thus satisfied , for he doth here charge the Observator with ●…reading in the steps of Ma●…iana and Buchanan sworne enemies ●…o 〈◊〉 . ] And why so pray you ? why because the Observator doth shew how the infancy of the world was governed ; Most Nations being ruled by their Lords and their Arbitrary edicts , which was not ( he saith ) in a long time digested . And then for that he further sheweth the inconveniences , which in more mat●…re ages were ●…onnd to accompany unconditionate Royalty , but concludes that since most Countries have so●…nd out an art for the regulating the exorbitances of Princes , hee is very unjust that will oppose this A●… and Order . And now let any wise and indiff●…rent man j●…dge how falsely and maliciously this imputation of an enemy to Monarchy is cast upon the Observator : for doth the d●…monstrating and disproving of other Governements any way strike at Monarchy ? or doth it not rather propp or support it ? doth not the dis●…llowing of other powers ( if not commend ) yet tacitly allow and approve our owne ? Nay doth he not here ( as in other places ) expr●…sly appla●…de the order and const●…tution of 〈◊〉 Monarchy so well fenced in by the Art of Parliaments ? why then what colour or ground is th●…re for this imputation ? Is there not a wide d●…fference be●…wixt modification and extirpation ? had our Author cons●…red this , certainely he would not have beene thus unjust in his censure ; Bu●… here we may learne what Doctirine is daily delivered to the King : That it is the Kings Crown that is aimed at , & not onely so , but even the very dethroning of him & his whole posterity , and in truth so it is , but by his Majesties evill C●…ncellors ; who to magni●…ie themselves intend the ruine of t●…e Common-wealth ▪ and is not that in effect a d●…throning of his Majest●… ? all that I shall say is but this ; No Govenement more blest or happie , if not abused by the advice of vile and malignant Co●…ellours . After so long a Preface , the Author tells us , that hee will now take i●…to consideration the Observators grounds , upon which hee would overthrow so ancient and well ●…unded a Monarch●… . ] The false imp●…tation of enmity against this great and well established power will not be thus shaken ●…ff ; The truth of it is , he that resolves to say any thing , be it never so scandalous and void of truth , will againe 〈◊〉 to stand or fall upon the same principles . But give him leave and he will shew you one of the grounds that strikes at Monarchie ( p●…ay observe what an unnecessary ●…nference is h●…re made by the Author . ) T●…e observator sa●…th : that , The King a●…tributeth the originall of his Royalty to God and the Law , making no mention at all of the grant consent or tr●…st of man therein . ] A ground●…sse cavile ( s●…th the Author ) and why so ? because when God is fi●…St named , under what notion can he apprehend ●…aw but as an ag●…eement o●… the people deriving of their power , and committing the 〈◊〉 to his trust . ] You charge the Observator with a ●…avile , and you labour to ma●…e it good by so large allowance , that I could not have 〈◊〉 so much from Ox●…d . What an agreement o●… the people in the 〈◊〉 of a King , and a deriving of ●…heir power unto him , and whi●…h h●…s yet more , a 〈◊〉 of th●… 〈◊〉 to h●…s Ma●…esty ●…n tr●…st ( why then that is no absolute and 〈◊〉 power ) t●…s m●…ch all th●…s sh●…ld bee granted , but yet I feare , ●…is yo●… ▪ not the Observator that dea●…es 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , tell●…ng him that the 〈◊〉 and agreement of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 obliterated and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is not now to be taken notice of , or ●…hat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the ●…etter of th●… Law , so what else can be the meaning 〈◊〉 tha●… f●…equent ●…xpression in many of his 〈◊〉 , Declarations ? that he is responsible to God alone for his Actions , not to man . Is not this ( since no absolute power was transferred by the people , as it is here confessed , & as I have made it good before ) a denying of the consent and agreement of the people , and a granting of a boundlesse Authority ? And how can that and a trust stand together ? certainely a dependant and an independant governement are not Synonyma . T is true , that if a people doe erect a King over them , that this is confirmed a●…d ratified in Heaven ; But being of humane institution this doth no way expunge those qualifications of trust and condition which are incident to , and tacitly passe with this sacred function ; and if so , we must of necessity allow a power in some , to see the due discharge and execution of them ; nor will it derogate from the honour of God or the dignity of a Prince , that the people exact the due execution of the Law , and the performance of that compact , trust , and condition , that followes Soveraignty . By this time I hope our Author may be , satisfied , that it is he that cavils , not the Observator , since it is plaine that the word ( Law ) though it doe receive so candid an interpretation from the Observator ) may be and is denyed to be the consent and agreement of the people . But now how doth this determine against Monarchy ? why yes , thus , or not at all ; The King denies the people their right , therfore the people may take away his . Is this one of the grounds upon which the Observator doth intend to overthrow Monarchy ? yes , if our Author may be judge . Was ever imputation of so great guilt layed upon any man upon such shallow grounds ? Well , since he failes here , suspends your judgement but a while , he may make good his charge hereafter . That Dominion which is usurped and not just , yet whilest it remaines Dominion , and till it be legally againe devested , refers to God , as to its Author and Donor , as much as that which is hereditary . ] To which our Author saith , that usurpation and unjust Dominion can give no right to the possessor . Can it any way by the most scrutenous understanding be collected from the Observators words , that usurpation gaines a right ? what probability can there be of this inference ? If this could be made good , Lawes would be but Cyphers and unlawfull force upon any mans interest , the best meanes of living , so that he who could steale most would be the true proprietor of most , and the strongest prove the richest men . But doth not the Observator expresly say , that that Dominion which is usurped is not just ? if so , what needes this Cavill ? O yes , for he saith , that it is a flat contradiction to say , that God is the Author and Donor of Dominion usurped and not just , as well as of that which is hereditary ; and what is his reason ? why , for that God being Lord proprietary of all , his donation transferrs a full right to him ●…n whom he bestowes it , and this deede of gift being knowne , it is not lawfull to indeavour a recovery , ] and therfore God cannot be the Author and Donor of that dominion which is usurped and not just , for that such a Dominion doth not intitle a man to a full right , because the lawfull proprietor may regaine it by Conquest , as justice permitts , and so reestablish himselfe in his Dominion . Yet under favour this is no contradiction , for doth or can the revolution or Maeander of time produce any change or alteration , either in King or State that God is not the Author of ? the evill of sin man alone is the father of , for that sinne is inconsistent with that absolute purity and holinesse that is in God , but the evill of punishment , that is Gods . Is there any evill in the City that I have not done saith the Lord ? And if God , for the sinne of the King or people , or both , shall permit a stranger to usurpe upon the dominion of the King , and to entrench upon his Soveraignty ▪ is it any contradiction to say that God is as much the Author and Donor of this Dominion that is thus gained by usurpation , as he is of that which is hereditary ? doubtlesse not , for God is onely the confirmer , man the creator or institutor of both . And though God as absolute Soveraigne and Proprietor can transferre a full right in any thing unto whom he pleaseth ; yet it doth not follow that hee will alwaies so doe : For as sinne may divorce a King from his Kingdome , or a people from Gods blessing for a time , so true and unfained repentance may ( through Gods mercy ) reestablish and unite them againe together . When our Author had said ( as before ) that where God is the Donor of Dominion , that there it is not lawfull to ir ●…eavor a Recovery ; He further adds , that this was the case of Rehoboam , who aft●… the desect of Ten Tribes raised an Army out of Iudah & the Tribe of Benjamin in hopes to reduce them to obedience : But was warned by Shemaiah the man of God , not to fight against his brethren not because it was unlawfull in it selfe , or the successe unprobable , but for that this was from the Lord . ] I shall not dare to defend a peoples revolting from their King ( though their burden be great and their yoake heavie ) as here Israels from Reho●…oam , who ( when they could not obtaine an ease , or discharge of their pressures which they had suffered under his father Salomon ) answered the King saying , what portlon have wee in David ? neither have we inheritance in the Son of Iesse ; here they disavowed their King , and not long after have made Ieroboam King in his stead : for my part I do not beleeve this to be a warrantable Act in Israel . And I conceive that Israel taking up of Armes to reduce them to obedience was lawfull , and that he might have proceeded , and have expected a good successe upon his indeavour , had hee not had an expresse command from God to the contrary . But now on the other side , I will not justifie Rehoboam in forsaking the Councell of the sage old men , who ( as grave & wise counsellers that seeke the good of the publique , not their owne ) advised the King that if he would bee a servant unto this people , and serve them , and answer them , and speake good words to them , then they would be his servants for ever ; ( here you may learne the Office of good Kings and their Counsellers ) but the King ( as most Kings use ) rejecting such rigid counsell , betooke him to his young men and consulted with them , & asked them what Counsell they would give him , ( t is easie to judge what the effect of their Counsell would be ) and they answer him , thus shalt thou say unto them , my little finger shall be thicker then my fathers loynes : in stead of an ease of their present miseries , he promises them that he will augment them for the future ; no question this was a great sinne in Rehoboam , and I am confident had not Israel revolted , they might have justified before God , the taking up of Armes against these Malignant Counsellors , for the restoring and reducing of their ancient Rights and Liberties : Kings must serve their people by protecting and defending of them according to Law and right , as also by easing of them of all unlawfull pressures , if they expect that their people should serve them in love and obedience . The Authour goes on , and saith , Though force be not Law , yet is after conquest , a people resigne their right in part or in whole by a subsequent Act of consent , they are obliged to stand to those conditions , which they made perchance out of a probable seare of harder usage ] Who will oppose this , our Author needed not to have laboured for instances to make this good , o●… to have shewed us the strong obligation that the Law of God and man , doe impose upon such compacts and agreements , for no doubt men ought to bee fai●…ull in the discharge of their ingagements , though it be to their owne prejudice ; besides as wee say in Law , he that disseises or disposse●…es another of his ●…reehold , or other interest , hath a right against all men , except the disseisee , or the party so dispossessed ▪ so without question it is in case of Dominion or Royalty , hee that gaines a Kingdome by Conquest , 〈◊〉 absolute King against all men , except the rightfull Soveraigne , and therefore as our Law is , well knowne , he may obliterate and utterly extirpate and abolish their old Lawes and rights , and create & introduct new , which is one strong argument of true & absolute Soveraignty . But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty . There is Onus aswell as honos , that is , a great burden , charg and care aswell as honour and renowne , th●…t is inseperably incident to this great function , and therefore he that gaines the one , be it by discent , conquest , or otherwise , must discharge the other . The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people , and from hence the inference is just , the King though he be singulis major , yet he is universis minor . The author tels us : that , This inference is most weake , and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded ; pray heare his reason , The people being the efficient cause of power ( which can be no other way , but by deriving their divided power , and uniting it in him , ) since they cannot retaine what they have parted with , nor have what they gave away , it followes ●…e which 〈◊〉 their power ( I may adde his owne perticular besides ) must needs be greater and more powerfull then they . The Authors argument , to destroy the Observators inference , is but this ; that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power , yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away ; therefore it must needs follow , that the King is greater then the people . I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it ; for if it can be proved ( on that hangs the strength of his argument : ) that the people have not divested themselves of all power o●…t of his premisses , the consequence is just , that the universe is greater then the King . Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Sove●…ty ( as I have shewed before ) it must follow , that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be ( in eff●…ct ) 〈◊〉 , which hath been denied even by the King himself , who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust : and if so ( as no doubt p●…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity , ( for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments ; the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes ) why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power ? for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent , for no inferiour power can doe it , so that by this time , I hope the Author is satisfied , that the Obse●…ors inference is just , and his reason weake and defective . But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses , for ( saith he ) If the people be the true ●…ent cause of powe●… ; it is a rule in na●…ure , quicquid efficit tale , est magis tale . S●…ange ( sayes the Author ) that men upon such palpable sophistry , should endeavour to cast off Monarchy . It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason , should make the●…selves so palpably ignorant , can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatio●… , from an extreame extirpation , or eradication : if my reason faile me not , it is he that indeavoureth ( what ever he pretend ) the casting off of Monarchy : for as Monarchy is never so secure , as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments , it submits to their determinations : so it is never so much in danger , as when it exalts it selfe above and against them , and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty : hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs . But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of ? why , it is this ; he hath given you a rule that is regularly , not generally true ; that will maintaine the case in question , not all others : for instance , he tels the Observator , That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule : and why ? for that ( saith he ) he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve , let him bestow it upon me , he will make me rich , a●…d 〈◊〉 richer : for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale . I , this is tha●… , ●…hat hath made this great combustion , ma●…r of ●…ight and estate , could you perswade us out of our reason , you would quickly seize upon these : but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense , as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that , which God dispenced unto our Ancestors , and they through his mercy , ●…queathed unto us . If I should tell you . that God made man , therefore God is greater than man , or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets , is greater than those rivolets , and so conclude that therefore , quicquid efficit tale , est magis tal●… , you would presently say , that this were no infallible way of reasoning : why for you to conclude , that it doth not hold in some cases , therefore not in the case in question , is not this the same fallacy ? but as befor , s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds , for he saith , it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is ●…erent , and from whom it cannot be seperated : not true in those who by way of donation d●…st themselves of power or wealth . That power was origi●…lly inherent in the people , that I thinke will not be questioned . That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power , is cleared thus , ( as I have shewn before ) that power that is fiduciary and upon condition , must needs bee subject to a power more supream , to see the due discharge of this trust and condition , or oth●…rwise it would in effect prove absolute , but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition , therefore it must be sub●…ect to a power more su●…e , w●…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament ▪ Besides , what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think , that a people in whom all power did orig●…y reside , should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one , which being abused , must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction . I , but saith the Author , If the King be universis minor , then the people have p●…ced a King , not over , but 〈◊〉 them ; and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 , when they might command , they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject . The King is universis minor , lesse than the Publike , but he is singulis major over and above all individuals ; and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe ; for that undutifull and ●…urable passage , of commanding of his Majestie , and of making him our subject , I wish withall my soule , that the Author of this booke and his associates , were not more guilty of this , then his Parliament ▪ could ever Parliament or ●…ple , with more submissivenesse , pray or petition his Ma●…estie , than we have done ? or can all preceeding ages produce an example of greater humilitie and loyaltie to their Soveraigne ? but to passe this , we shall ever count it our dutie to petition , and acknowledge our King , while others , though not in words , yet in heart disclaime him . The Author saith , His Majestie doth most freely acknowledge , and will constantly maintaine what ever rights the Law doth give us ; ●…et he is not bound to be ray his owne . Happy England if this were made good unto us . I doe not question his royall heart , I believe it to b●…●…ull of pie●…y a●…d truth : but it is you and your Complices that have divided him from his people , and made him act a part cleane contrary to his p●…ous 〈◊〉 : obtruding the rights and liberties of his 〈◊〉 , in not d●…fending the power and priviledges of Parliament , in taking up of A●…es against his people , the●…eby to inforce that , which law and right proclaimes unjust ; but I pres●…e this no further . Happy 〈◊〉 , when that prerogative and subjects liberty doe not invade each other ▪ But let this 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 construction : if pre●…ive be abused to the endangering of the State , t is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Majesties right , to bee ruled by the Counsell of his Parliament , for the securing 〈◊〉 his people . No dissolution ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the consent of 〈◊〉 , into such and such hands , but by the same 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 it had its 〈◊〉 . The Author by a needlesse endeavour , would ●…ne have us ri●…tly 〈◊〉 this , 〈◊〉 saith he , Where a man doth by donation or promise part with any 〈◊〉 , he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it as his due upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 that it would 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hee , where there are ●…wo parties to the contract , as 〈◊〉 case of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 , there the people cannot 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 government without this 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 those few 〈◊〉 . For my 〈◊〉 I d●…e n●…t believe that ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intended to attribute such a power to the people , as is here 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no other power may abrogate , but that which did 〈◊〉 ▪ 〈◊〉 not in 〈◊〉 ●…clude , that they in all cases may doe it , 〈◊〉 the author n●…ght well have 〈◊〉 his labour . It were strange if the people subjecting it selfe to ●…mmand , should 〈◊〉 at 〈◊〉 thing but its owne good , in the fi●…st and last place . After the Author had confessed this , yet saith he , for that the peo●… could not attaine this , without a common protector to admin●…ster justice equally amongst them , they found it n●…ssary in a higher degree to provide for his good , in recompence ●…f their 〈◊〉 , &c. and so concludes , that the good of either is mu●…ally involved , and that the people may be hap●… , they must first provide for the happ●…nesse of their Ruler . That the good of both hath a 〈◊〉 dependance upon each other no 〈◊〉 , but that the constitution of government , was 〈◊〉 and principally for the good of the pe●…ple , that 's as 〈◊〉 , and therefore that ought first to be 〈◊〉 . The Author charges the Observator , with breaking out into a most scandalous and false invective 〈◊〉 the late government , and this he counts 〈◊〉 of any 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 he give any answer we should be s●…re to have it , but what he cannot answer , h●…e cannot answer , he can by some sophysticall flight evade , or els tell you , ( as ●…re ) that it is false , though the lye reflect upon himselfe ; but he may ( without offence ) give it to himselfe , as he doth in the very words following , by which he confesses , that the Subject groaned under some grievances . If I should have demanded of the Author before Parliament ( granting he were not one who added to the burden ) whether that the Kingdom were not even ready to sink and faint away under those heavie pressures of Monopolies , Ship-mony , Cote and conduct money , and the like ( most illegall charges , such as our Ancestors never knew ) I am confident that hee would have answered me in the affirmative , and have further added , that the body politike must die , if that a Parliament did not interpose ▪ for the securing of it ; and are these now become false and scandalous invectives ? t is very strange that the Author should so sodainly forget Gods goodne●…e and mercy towards us , in this Parliament , as not only to forget the blessing , but even to deny the benefit : for hee saith , Wè owe it to the goodnesse of his Majesty , that we are free , even from the feare of them for the future . No respect at all is to be had of the Parliament , as if they were not so much as instruments in the conveyance of this mercy : t is pitty that he should share in the blessing , that will not acknowledge the hand that conveyed it . We shall ever with all humilitie acknowledg●… his Majesties goodnesse and grace towards us this Parliament , in taking off those unjust burdens that pressed our shoulders ; and yet not forget our Worthies : and by the way , let me say this ; he that layes an unjust burden upon me , and after long suffering , binds himselfe to ease me of it for the future , as it is no restitution or recompence for the evill already undergone , so he doth no more then what the Law of God and an upright conscience ties him to . I but saith the Author , Compare us to any other Nation in the Christian world , we in our worst times , were least unhappy . A strange reason , that because other Nations are not so happy as wee , perchance out of defect of their Government , or themselves , that therefore wee must inslave our selves to be like them : I feare this is the labour of the time , to reduce us to their condition ; and I hope this will be our care , not to be content with a comparative happinesse only , but to labour to maintaine our ancient rights and priviledges . Againe the Author saith , that he shall not endeavour to excuse the former times , by comparison with our present miseries : though neither be defirable , yet we are too sensible , which we have justest reason to complaine of . T is certaine that no evill is defirable , but yet if Fate decree it , let me suffer under the hand of justice , rather than of wrong and oppression . Besides desperate diseases , must have desperate cures , if these times bring greater misery than the former , thanks be to the Author and his con●…derates ; the publike calamity now , is but the sad effect of that before . Had we freely enjoyed our birth-right and inheritance then , there would not have beene this civill combustion now : bad premisses must have bad conclusions . I 〈◊〉 under this word ( protect ) the King intends not only to shield us from all kinde of evill , but to promote us also to all kinde of Polyticall happinesse , according to his utmost devoyre . Saith the Author , I never did apprehend in the word ( protect ) 〈◊〉 large notion . Every particular subject hath a just title , and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word protection : is the King therefore bo●…nd to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse ? to advance all to honours , offices , power , command ? I wonder how you can now apprehend this word ( protect ) under so large a notion : or is it possible ( were you not resolved to cavill ) that these words should give you ground for it ? certainly ( if my reason faile me not ) politicall happinesse hath reference only to the body politike , and that is not capable of any advancement , to any ho●…our , office , or power , and to take the words in other sense were to make them impossible , for can it be thought or expected that his Majestie should be bound to advance all his Subjects to places of honor or power ? since if all should be in authority they might command themselvs , there would be none left to obey . The sence of the Observator is plainely this , that the King by this word protect is not only to intend a shielding us from all evill , but likewise a promoting of the commo●…wealth to all kinde of politicall happinesse : by endeavouring to inrich , not impoverish his Kingdom : by maintaining peace , and establishing good and wholesome laws amongst his people , and by putting of such in place of power and authority , that may see the due execution of the same . Though all single 〈◊〉 ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King , as matters of grace , with all thankfulnesse and humility , yet the King himselfe , looking upon the whole State , ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it &c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty . It was believed heretofore ( saith the Author ) the greatest happinesse of a Prince , that 〈◊〉 was able , and his greatest glory , to be willing to oblige his people . But now he is made not capeable of doing any courtesie . VVhen he hath done all he can , he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant . Whatsoever hath beene or could be attributed to any Prince in point of grace or humble acknowledgement , that we ascribe unto our gracious Soveraigne , with all humilitie : and we shall alwayes account it our happinesse , to have a Prince not only able , but willing to engage his people by his grace and goodnesse ; But must it therefore be thought to be a dishonour or derogation from his gracious and publike favours , to say , that hee doth but fungi officio , discharge his office , or duty , according as the law of God and man obligeth him ? certainly had Rhehoboams Sages thought that their Councell had carryed the least badge of irreverence or disrespect to their Prince , they would not have advised him in such rough and unacceptable language , that if he would be a servant to that people and serve them , &c. that then they would be his servants for ever . Good Princes have acknowledged themselves servants to the common wealth . And t is the councell of young men only that suggest the contrary . But it is a certaine position , that that Prince will never discharge his trust aright , that sacrifices too much to his Royaltie . Here the Author may see , that other ages have beene guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect ( as this Sycophantean Co●…tier is pleased to stile it ) to Princes . Againe he saith , That if all single persons ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King , as matters of grace . Then they truly are so , for no obligation can lye upon any man , to believe things ●…therwise than they are . T is true , things that are simply good , or simply evil , cannot be varied by circumstances : & and therefore no obligation may constrain a man to believe them otherwise . But that which is not in it selfe good or bad , but varies according to its severall object ; in such case , for one and the same act to produce good to one , and ill to another , is no novelty : and here the application denominates the action . So in this case , one and the same action may be matter of grace to one , and yet but matter of d●…ty to another . As when a Iudge doth Justice to a man , as to him t is grace and favour , but with reference to the law , t●…s but his dutie . I but he saith , That this ground destroyes the power of bene●…nce in a Pri●…ce , and the duty of gratitude in subjects . Under favour nothing lesse ▪ for as it is his Ma●…esties office and duty by all meanes of grace and favour , as also by justice and right , to endeavour the happinesse of the common Wealth ; so it is our duty by all meanes of humble acknowledgement , to bee gratefull , t is a great mercy for to have a Prince that will governe his people according to Law and right . And it were a great judgement , for the people not to bee thankfull . The King ought not to account that a profit , or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people , nor ought ●…ee to thinke that pe●…sht to him , which is gained to the people . By the same Argument the people may share all that be hath , and he is ●…ound to believe that be hath lost nothing . All that the observator here drives at , is but this , that the Kings strength and riches , a●…e imbarked in the happinesse and prosperity of h●…s people ; and therefore that it is not their debilitating or impoverishing , that will any way 〈◊〉 , or enrich his Majestie , but the contrary ; Blest be the King in his portion , may it increase to nonplus Arithmeticke , and his dayes , time ; But yet let him know , that the misery or happinesse of his people are by way of r●…flection made his . Is King an●… people have severall ●…ghts ( saith the Author ) what law is there which binds the King suo j●…re cedere , and enables the people to preserve their rights , nay to challenge his ? No do●…bt the King and people have severall rights ( happy State , when they doe not intrench upon each other ) but in this they va●…y ; the King , for the most part , is seized or poss●…ssed in jure 〈◊〉 , and the people in their owne right : so that the King hath n●… that 〈◊〉 of property , that the people hath : And no doubt the King at first ( as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Author ) received his demesnes from his people , as a recompence of his care , to whom they owed their securitie ; and therefore if it were law for 〈◊〉 , no question the people might most colourably justifie an incroachment . A●… the King by the Law of God and man is bound to doe justice , and to protect and de●… his people : and therefore if he have any right or priviledge that is inconsistent wi●…h these , he is obliged suo jure cedere . But againe , doth any one goe about to take away the Kings right , or to divest any property of his ? Nay rather doe they not in defect of his 〈◊〉 , and in his right , imploy and mannage them according to the trust reposed in him ; or if they did doe it , ought not the King rather to loose his right or priviledge , then that the publike ●…erish or be destroyed ? Regall dignity was erected to preserve the comminalty : But that which is the end is ●…arre 〈◊〉 honourable and valuable in nature , and policy , then that which is the meanes . The conclusion impl●…d is , therefore the commons more honourable than the Soveraigne . T is no dishonour to h●…s Majestie , for to say , that the comminaltie or body politique is more honourable than he : did he not receive his dignitie from them , and for their behalf ? is he not a servant to the Common-wealth ? and is not the common wealth of greater valuation and esteeme ? I , that the author doth agree too , but he saith , it doth not follow , that therefore it is more honourable . Pray what is honour ? but the estimate and repute of people , so that every man is more or lesse 〈◊〉 , according to the greater or lesser valuation and 〈◊〉 , that he is had in with the people . Honor est magis in hon●…rante , quam in honorato , and no d●…ubt the publike good carries the greatest price and estimate , therefore the more honourable . l , b●…t saith the Author , how doe you maintaine your Argument : That because the end is more honourable and valuable than the means , therefore the comminaltie is more 〈◊〉 than the king . For saith he , 〈◊〉 are ministring spirits for the good of men , ●…ut will it therefore follow , that because the end is more honourable than the meanes , that me●… are more honourable than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . So sai●…h hee , Christ is made the head of the Church , for the salvation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end is 〈◊〉 honourable and ●…aluable ●…an the meanes , can it therefore be , that man is more ho●…ble and valuable than C●…st ? These cases may receive a short answer , for 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 is pleased to say , that the highest 〈◊〉 of Angels ministration , and the ob●…ce of Chi●…st , is the gl●…ry of God ; 〈◊〉 ●…our it is the proximate end , and so it is not in 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 than in other humane acts or 〈◊〉 : so 〈◊〉 these cases conclude 〈◊〉 us , n●… against us ; b●…t 〈◊〉 that they could hold , this is a strange way 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 , that 〈◊〉 a rule will not stand in one 〈◊〉 case ▪ that therefore it will in no 〈◊〉 ; allow me but this 〈◊〉 in dispute , and I will 〈◊〉 overthrow , or maintaine 〈◊〉 c●…e in question : as for 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 is the meanes of the salvation of mens 〈◊〉 , is not t●…e end h●…e mo●…e 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 th●…n the meanes ? So 〈◊〉 and sord●…d labour may raise a man to g●…at rich●…s and 〈◊〉 , and is not the end here , more 〈◊〉 and valuable than the meanes . Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to ●…clude from these cases to the case in d●…bate you would say were a very fallacious 〈◊〉 , turne but the s●…ales the case is your ●…wn . But the Author saith , that 〈◊〉 rule ●…h hold in s●…ch 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as are onely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 unto their ends , and have no proper goodnes●… of their ●…wne , but a K●…ng 〈◊〉 . The 〈◊〉 were made for man●… sustinence , and here no question , the end is more ho●… and valuable than the meanes , and yet we must n●…t 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉 in the creature . So the word of God preached is good in it selfe ▪ and yet here the end is more honourable than the meanes , So the King might be an honourable person in himself which the superaddition of Royaltie doth not destroy , but en●…rease , and yet withall this , being but the meanes to preserve the 〈◊〉 ; may bee lesse honourable and valuable than they who are the end of his Royaltie . This directs us to the trancendent {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of all politiques , to the Paramount Law that shall give law to all humane lawes whatsoever , and that is salus populi . How many nations hath this abused principle brought to ruine and confusion . He instances in none ; but would subtilly insinuate such things into your beliefe , that might make you to feare your present condition ; but if phanta●…mes or chymoeraes have vainely frighted others , happily out of their wits , shall not wee therefore wisely secure ou●… selves ●…rom apparent and visible dangers ? the abuse of a good thing , doth no way conclude against the lawfull use . But a●…ter he had agreed this to be the end of all government , hee holds it without doubt , that Governours proportion all their laws to that end ; for ( saith he ) who that is wise , will not provide for their safety as well as he can , in whose destruction his owne is ●…nvolved . I wish from my very soule that this were duly pondered on , salus Regis & populi , lye now at stake for a 〈◊〉 , and is like to be lost , without the King , by the advice of his great Councell , be pleased , providere salvationi regni sui . Gratious Soveraigne , suffer not your people ( and in them your owne honour and happinesse ) to dye , who ( God knowes ) seek nothing but the maintenance and preservation of both . Well , after this , the Author tels us of a crafty kind of people ' ( who hee meanes , God knowes , for I believe he himselfe doth not ) who by faire glosses and pretences insinuate themselves into the hearts of the multitude , who pity their sufferings , and tell them they are not so well governed as they might be ; these things if applyed to our state and condition , are not bare pretences . And then he instances in the story of Absalon , who stole away the hearts of his fathers subjects , under a pretence of doing o●… them justice ; this Absolon , I feare , is neerer Oxford than London : after he saith , they promise 〈◊〉 , and to effect this , desi●…es the peopl●…s assistance , unhappy people and fit to be inslaved , that will not yeeld their aide for redu●…ing of their ancient liberties . Then , he saith , the people full of great hopes , cry up these men , as the only fit iustruments of state , none deserve better of the common wealth ( let the mo●…th of malice suggest what it can by way of detraction ) then such as have haza●…ded their lives and fortunes for reducing of its former happinesse ; and no instruments so fit as these , that are chosen by publike consent and approbation . Having thus ga●…ned the 〈◊〉 of the people , their next worke is to pick a quarrel 〈◊〉 great 〈◊〉 that by 〈◊〉 t●…m , they make 〈◊〉 for thems●…lves , is that to picke a quarrell with great officers to accuse them legally for their unjust oppression and malignity to the common wealth ? and if they ●…hance to be expulsed ( though it seldome prove so ) as justice requireth , where can you find their accusers in their roome ? which possibly might have beene had they desired it . Then he saith , if these men will not out of their preferments . the people are acquainted , the●…e are the only ●…ubs , which 〈◊〉 a ●…appy government ; ●…hese are the close enemies to the State . No wonder if the people be so informed ; those that have beene 〈◊〉 the oppreslers of the Common wealth , will , rather than suffer their actions to come to the test , prove even the destroyers 〈◊〉 it . And is not salus ●…uli now concerned , and the whole Ki●…gdome in danger and ( to use his owne words ▪ though with more reall intention ) no way to escape this imminent perill but by tearing o●… these men from the Prince ; who endeavour to rent the King from his people , and utterly to destroy both . A●…ter all this large and darke discourse , hee concludes by way of advise ; and what is that ? why wholesome counsell , I warrant you . Let them ( saith he ) rely upon their Governours , who have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 ( es●…ecially i●… they have given them great and late sig●…es of their 〈◊〉 to and care of 〈◊〉 , this is the most 〈◊〉 way of safety ▪ I marry sir , thi●… is good doctrine indeed : because 〈◊〉 will hazzard his fortune , which i●… greater ; must I therefore expose mine to ruine , which is lesse : but stay , hath any one individuall , a greater portion than the publike ? or m●…re to loose than the body politicke ? if so , we will intrust our store with him , and runne the hazzard ; if otherwise , you will give us leave to secu●…e the great●…r , and more considerable portion . A●…d under the A●…thors favour , t is no probable way of safety , ●…r a man to 〈◊〉 himselfe wit●… his enemie . I but th●…n heare what he saith immediately after the precedent words , if 〈◊〉 should miscary ( saith he ) which they can have no reason to suspect ) they would perish with a great deale of di●…cretion . The Law of God , of Nature , of Nations , and the Municipall Law of the Land , doe all inab'e a man to maintaine his life and fortunes , though by force and violence . And can it then be thought that a whole Kingdome and people should bee bound ( under I know not what divine obligation ) to yeeld themselves as a pray to the malice of their enemies ▪ T is not the bond of Governours , that can challenge a submission to things unlawf●…ll : and for that cause , that I am not bound to obey , it were unnaturall , if I migh●… not defend : and therefore with the Authors favour , it were high sin and indiscretion for me to loose my life , when I might save it . It seemes 〈◊〉 all to me , that any Nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance , meerely to abet tyranny , and support slavery . The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just Monarch●… . That is true , I but what if a just Monarch shall degenerate into a tyrant ? then I perceive you will allow , that the inconveniences of Tyranny conclude somewhat . I but , saith the author , It is so far from being unnaturall , that any nation should be bound to contribute its power to that end , that some have made it their choice , others their refuge . What , to be made slaves ? most unreasonable , most unnaturall . All creatures ( much more man ) doe by nature desire liberty . T is that we were all borne to ; and as he doth oppugne nature , so hee waves part of his right and inheritance , that consents to thralldome . No temporall blessing next to life , greater than an ample freedome ; No greater misery , than a vile and sordid slavery . I but wh●…t if the Authors position hold true ? that some Nations have so far degenerated as to exchange a Palace for a Prison ( though perchance that by force too ) as the State of Rome , Turkey , and France ; must their examples be precidents for us ? or is it any whit the lesse unnaturall because they doe it ? I but the Author saith , There may bee reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery ; as if in danger of a potent enemy , they could hire none on gentler conditions , to undertake their defence , or if reduced to extreme want , they had not wherewith to sustaine themselves , they may very probably , like Esau , ●…asse away their 〈◊〉 - right , 〈◊〉 : and he gives you an instance of both these , of the fi●…st , the 〈◊〉 to the Children of Israel : and of the last , the Egyptians to Pharaoh . T is an old and true saying , that necessity hath no law ; the law of nature bindes every man to defend and maintaine his libertie , but necessity may untie this bond ; for it is better to be , though miserable , then not to be at all . But now to conclude from a case of necessity , to a case out of necessity , is no good reasoning . To say that to save my life , I may part with my liberty ; and therefore like Esau with his birth-right , I may passe it away for a messe of pottage ; this is a most foolish and unreasonable argument . To conclude this , freedome , as it is a great mercy , so it ought of temporall blessings , next to our lives , to receive the greatest estimate ; the slavery of the body is the 〈◊〉 to the thraldome of conscience ; and if we foolishly surrender up this , the other will not be long after . From the word ( trust ) used by his Majestie , he gathers , the King doth admit his interest i●… the C●…owne in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . No ground for this collection : for there may be a trust , and that is so much the greater , if free from condition . Under the Authors favour the collection is very naturall ; for ( as I have shewen before ) every trust implyeth a condition ; that the party intrusted faithfully discharge and execute that trust that is reposed in him : and did not the King accept his crowne upon the same condition ? Beside●… , ●…ll osfices of trust and confidence , or that concerne the administration of justice ( as Lawyers well know ) carry a long with them a tacit condition ; and th●… office of a King , hath those qualifications in the most s●…perlative degree , of any other , and therefore must of necessity be conditionate . But the Author saith , That this is true in some sense , and his Majestie hath alwayes acknowledged , he is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the Subject : yet we must not so understand it , as if the right to his Kingdom were so conditionate , that it wer●… capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of covenant . It can never be thought with any candid and f●…ire interpretation , that the Observators intention was , that the King might , for breach of this condition , forfeit his crowne ; for it is cleare that the not executing of a trust , doth not forfeit the estate or interest intrusted : besides t is regularly true in our law , that that which is not grantable , is not forfeitable ▪ but the crown is not grantable , e●…go , & c. ●…ut that which most confirms me in this is , that the Observator hath in ●…art declared his judgement against the opinion o●… deposing Prin●…es , which I conc●…ive he would not have done , had he thought the crown forfeitable ; all that he intends ( if I may be thought fit to be his expositer ) is ( as I suppose ) but this , that he would not have Kings have an absolute and unquestionable power , so that their exorbitancy might not ( though with greater happinesse to the Common wealth ) be regulated by a Parliament . As for the word ( elegerit ) whether it be future or past it skils not much . If he ●…ake notice of the conclusion deduced thence , he may finde as much difference between the tenses ; as betweene Democracy and Monarchy . Give me leave to make the Premisses , and doe you raise what conclusion you will . The Observator ( who knew certainly to distinguish the Tenses as well as the Author ) seems to intend only thus much , that if elegerit be taken in the future tense , well and good ; it makes for him ; for then the King ( according to the very letter of his oath ) is bound under the heavy sinne of perjury to grant such lawes as a●…e requested of him by his people ; and then hee can have no negative voyce . But admitting it be expounded in the preter perfect tense , and not in the future ; why yet saith the Observator , it matters not : for by the oath and the Law of the land the king is bound to do justice ; and the granting of new laws unto his people upon their request , is an act of justice , & necessary as well as the dispencing of the old , & therfore there being the same necessitity , the publike trust must needs equally extend to both . But the Aethor will shew us , why elegerit , must of necessity bee taken in the preterrerfect , not in the future , as this case is , for saith he , the word ( consuetudines ) which cannot referre to the future , undenyably evinces , it was meant of the time past . ] Under favour this doth not infallibly conclude that elegerit must be taken in the preter perfect tense , for no more then the King can grant such customes as the people sh●…ll chuse , for that it must be time , not the Kings Patent , that can create a custome ; so neither can the King grant such lawes or customs unto a people , which they have already chosen , and which have beene established and ratified unto them , by all his predecessors ; for quod semel meum est ultra meum esse non potest , that which is mine owne already cannot be given unto me . So that the oath must bee construed , reddendo singula singulis , as we say in law ; that is , that he will confirme their ancient customes which they doe already enjoy . and that he will grant unto them such new laws as they shall hereafter make choyce of : other reasonable construction the oath will not admit of , and agreeing with this exposition is the first clause of his Magisties oath , where demand is made whether his Majestie will grant and co●…firm unto his people their ancient lawes and customes , who answers that he will . And contrary to that which the Author doth assert , the Parliament have made it clear and manifest by their declaration lately published , how that elegerit hath been alwayes rendered in the future tense , and not in the preter perfect tense . So that I shall passe this over without any further trouble , conceaving that the Author may ( if he have not resolved to the contrary ) upon these grounds be fully convinced in this particular . The King is bound to consent to new Laws , ●…f they be necessary , as well as defend the old . His Majestie never thought otherwise ; but he is not bound to an implicit faith , to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so . This is in plaine termes to invert the method , for the King to chuse Lawes not the people : for if he will consent to none ( be they of never so great necessity ) but such as hee himselfe holds convenient , what then is become of the peoples election ? this is to prescribe and enforce lawes upon the people , ●…ot to consent to them upon their election . Besides , who so proper a judge of the necessity or conveniency of a publi●…e law as the republike ? those that knowe the want of the benefit , must needs be most sensible of the necessity . The word elegerit ; if it be in the preterperfect tense , yet shews , that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient ●…a●…es and customes ; and why the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever , I cannot discover . The election there spoken of , is the election of the diffusive , no●… of any representative body , that with the tacit consent of the Prince , and so os much other authority . Under favour it is of no other authority , for though it should be con●…essed that at first the diffusive body did chuse their Lawes , which had the tacit consent of the Prince , and that since the people have granted the King a negative voyce in his Parliaments , which is the representative body of the Kingdome , yet being with this qualification , that his Majesty grant all necessary lawes desired by the people , hence it followes , that the representative body ( having as great power , and as good judgement , to discern of laws necessary , as the diffusive ) have the same power of election , which ought to be of as great moment and consequence as ever . For the representative , their ancient right is not denyed , no law shall be abrog●…ted , none ●…acted without their assen●… . But there is a meane betweene doing nothing , a●…d all . I wonder at the Author that he dare utter such palpable and knowne falsities . How often have the priviledges of Parliament beene infringed ? even to amazement and wonder , that all foregoing ages cannot produce the like : and is there not an illegall commission of Array , ( though not enacted ) yet ordained and set up in opposition to the Parliament . But whtch is yet above all , and strikes at their very essence , are they not ( because others doe neglect their duty , and the trust reposed in them by the publike ) denyed even the very name of a Parliament , and therein the power and vertue of it ? and whether this be not a denying of their right , , let the world judge . The Author saith true , that there is a meane betweene doing nothing and all . But I would faine know how we shall be assured of this meane if his Majestie ( upon pretence of unnecessary ) shall have power to deny whatsoever is requested by the Parlament ? The result of all is , Our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all t●…e subjects , lives , liberties , and possessions , or in any thing else to the Crowne appertaining , as subjects have in the Kings dignitie . The Author saith , That what should be meant by subjects having an unconditionate and h●…gh 〈◊〉 in the Kings dignity , surpasses his understanding . 〈◊〉 not the Author loved division , he would not have thus severed the Observators words , thereby to pu●… a dylemma upon himselfe , and others : for the Observator saith before , that the King was made for the people , and not the people for the King , and thence raiseth this conclusion ( which under savour is very naturall ) that therefore the King hath not that absolute right of property in the people and their interest , as they have in his Majestie and his possession : and now will any man ( except our Author who understands not ) deny this for a truth ? I , but he sa th , it seemes to s●…eake this wicked doctrine , that subjects may dispose of the Soveraignty as ●…hey please . T is strange that our Author will passe his judgement ( especially so severe an one ) upon any thing that he doth not understand : because happily it may conclude thus much , that his sacred person and his actions ought to be directed and ruled by his great councell the Par●… 〈◊〉 it therefore thence be deduced , that they may dispose of his Soveraignty at pleasure : this is the Authors meaning not ours . If the King 〈◊〉 such high 〈◊〉 as subjects , it were not lawfull , or naturall for him to expo●…e his 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for his 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 is it 〈◊〉 for subjects then to doe so ? What a strange 〈◊〉 is this ; is it not lawfull for a man , by the hazzard of his person , to defen●… his proper●…y ? which cannot be maintained without the defense of his Countrey . But this doth no way prove that if the Kings right were as absolute as the subjects , that he might expose h●…s life and for●…une for their defence : for no doubt hee that looseth his life when he might have saved it is a man slayer ; and if the people had beene made for the King , not the King for the people , what Law could have warranted the hazzarding of his person , ●…or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? But to disprove , this conclusion , he saith , That the people have as great , 〈◊〉 g●…eater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…or the King , and this he makes good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 , which 〈◊〉 , that I become your Le●…ge of life 〈◊〉 g●…ds . &c. as 〈◊〉 by ●…he Pro●…station and 〈◊〉 of Ligeance which are to the same effect . He is no true subject that will not expose 〈◊〉 and all that he hath , for the preservation of his King an●… Sovera●…e , we shall ever acknowledge that strong tie and obligation , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us to doe it . But yet we must 〈◊〉 that the Kings oath , and the Law of the Land ( which engage the King to protect and defend his Kingdome and people ) are equal●… 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 that the Observator had shewen the effic●…ent cause of Parliament to wit the people , an●… he finall cause safety and libertie , he descends to this , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( 〈◊〉 he ) 〈◊〉 are aimed at in Parliaments , not to be attained to by o●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 est of the people might be satisfied , ●…nd Kings better counselled . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 certainly , many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high de●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . A 〈◊〉 Monarchs , who knew no Parliaments . Th●…s possibly may be 〈◊〉 ; but I ●…ope it shall not 〈◊〉 into the hearts of English Subjects any whit the greater affection to that kind of 〈◊〉 ; I believe indeede that this is that the Author would faine perswade us to ; These are the maine grounds of the sad division our Religion and our Parliaments : God enable us to maintai●… both ; for if wee part with either , we shake hands and bid adue to all happinesse . The Author saith that two ●…her 〈◊〉 might have beene named as assentiall as the former , which are to supply his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Subsidies , and assent to the abrogation of old Lawes , and enacting new . ] The latter I 〈◊〉 agree to be so , but I never heard before , that the supplying of his Majesties wants by Subsidies , was one of the essentiall ends of the calling of Parliament . It was accounted formerly the mai●… end of calling of a Parliament , the ease or Releife of the subject , and the granting of Subsidies was then esteemed but as a congratulation or thankfull acknowledgment of the Kings grace and favour towards them in that Parliament ; and is it now become one of the maine ends ? I suppose the Author speakes out of a late experience ; 'T was never happy with England since this Law was broached . And wheresoever Kings advance their owne profit , or but make it ●…quall with that of the publique , the people will never enjoy true happinesse . In the Summes of Edward 1. ( ●…laus . 7. in 3. dors . ) We see the first end of Parliaments expressed : for he inserts in the writt , that whatsoeve●… affaire is 〈◊〉 publique concernment , ought to receive publique approbation , Quod ownes tangit , 〈◊〉 omnibus app●…obari debet & tractari . ] The Author tells us that this must be understood with due caution , lest wee reduce our selves to our primirive estate , by dissolving the bonds of Government ; and therefore saith he , the policie of all est●…tes for the avoydi●…g of all confusion hath been , to leave the transaction of publique affaires , to some certaine number , and their suffrages doe in Law binde the rest ; So saith he in absolute Monarchies what Princes doe is legally the act of all ; and hee makes the result of all to be this , Those things which the Law doth require , shall be transacted onely by Parliament , the people doe handle and approve of by their Knights and ●…rgesses : those things which the law hath intrusted the King with many of which concerne the good of the who●… ) what bee doth is their act . ] I shall not with our Author dare to confine Parliaments , whose power is vaste and incognit as my Lord Cooke speakes : And yet I shall not ascribe so unlimited a power unto them , as to give them ju●…isdiction in all cases . ( They themselves who best know their power ) have in their late Declaration protested against it ; for they say , they have power of jurisdiction of declaring the law in perticular cases before them ; then not in all cases : But who shall bee Judge of those cafes , by which they are intituled to jurisdiction ? can ther●… be any one a Competent Judge of this , but themselves ? and they having past their judgement , who ought or dare to contradict it ? no reversing of their judgement , but by the judgement of a subsequent Parliament ; why then since none can know their power , or if they could , they are not competent Judges of it ; how dare any one goe about ▪ to dispute their power or call in question their judgement ? The desire of the Commons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. was , that they might not advise in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance , the matter in debate then concerning the setling of intestine commotions , guarding the Marches in Scotland and the Seas ; concludes no more than this , that they thought themselves not ▪ competent Counsellours in thi●… case ( happily by reason of their unskilfulnesse in that way , or for that the King had then more able Counsellors to advise with in that matter ) which under favour is no renouncing of jurisdiction . But to give a more full and satisfactory answer , at that time the King complyed with his Parliament , and would not be advised by others , and then there being no breach of trust , there 〈◊〉 the lesse reason for the Parliament to advise or intermeddle with affaires of that nature ; But if the King had then deserted the Counsell of his Parliament , and cleaved to the advise of his young men like Rehoboam , certainely then they would not have deserted their power in danger of the Common-w●…alth , which by their writt and their oathes , they are bound to preserve and defend , and therefore clearely not out of their ●…gnizance ; for that passage in the Diary of 1. Hen. 4. I wonder the Author should so farre forget himselfe , as to think that author●…ty of any moment ; when he doth produce the Record , I will then give him an answer . So that I take this as an undeniable position , that where the King doth duely execute the trust reposed in him , there the 〈◊〉 are bound by his act ▪ and the Parliament in such ca●…e have no 〈◊〉 or jurisdiction : B●…t if on the co●…trary the King infring his trust to the endangering of the Kingdom , there the Parliament may & are bound to 〈◊〉 for the securing o●… the King & 〈◊〉 . The 〈◊〉 will not passe over th●…s r●…le thus ; for saith he , if quod omnes tangit , ab 〈◊〉 opprob●…ri debet ; with what equity then may the Clergie , who are a considerable part of this Kingdome be excluded ? ] Why yes , by the same eq●…ity , that the Statute of 21. Hen. 8. doth excl●…de them from being Farmers ; that those who have devoted themselves soly to Gods service , might not miscere se secularibus negotijs , incumber thems●…lves with secular affaires , for that this would be an impediment to the execution of their sacred function ; 'T was ne●…er happy with this Nation since pride and covetousnesse so possessed the Clergie ; and temporall jurisdiction was dispensed by Ecclesiasticall persons : And since they proved better Lawyers than Divines , they ●…arved their flocke , and made them more like wolves , than Sheepe , and Heathens than Christians . I wish they would not desire temporall pre●…erment , but keepe themselves ( as they ought ) in their proper Spheare , & ponder on this , that it is no small happines to be exempted from State 〈◊〉 & molestations ; & that it is the greatest honour to be the servant of God . The Author saith that the King tells them , their writt may direct them to know their power , which is to counsell , not to command . ] I wish with all my heart , that he and his associates could pleade as cleare a conscience from this , as his Parliament can , though certainely they may make a more colourable pretence to it , than the Cavalliers ; if begging and intreating with all the submissivenesse that possibly can be , be a commanding , then are the Parliament highly guilty if it , otherwise not ; Againe saith the Author , the writt runnes , super dubijs negotijs tractaturi , vestrumque consilium impensuri ; So that the cleare meaning is , their advise is not law , except the Royall assent established it into an Act. ] If the Authour please but to advise with the learned , he will finde that , tractare , is of a more large signication than to treat of or debate onely . But was it ever said , that their advise should be Law without the Regall assent ? They have power to declare what the law of the land is , in case of publique concernement , as now , but it was never so much as thought on , that they could make a new law , or alter the old , without his Majesty ; We must distinguish betweene the declaring or adjudging of a new case by the reason of the old law , and the making of a new law ; the one they may doe without his Majesties consent , the other they cannot . 'T is alleadged that the King call●…th them Counsellors , not in all things , but in quibusdam arduis , &c. and the case of Wentworth is cited by his Majesty , who being a member of the House of Commons , was committed , by Queene Elizabeth but for proposing , they might advise the Q●…eene in a matter she thought they had nothing to doe to m●…ddle with . To which the Observator answereth a meere example ( though of Queene Elizabeth ) is no Law . ] 'T is true saith the Author , but when grounded upon Authority , I pray where is it ? and no way excepted against by those who have beene alwaies earnest defendors of their priviledges , it may bee reckoned among sound presidents . ] Happily there was never the like occasion to except against i●… , as having never beene urged , how then could it be answered ? I am confident , that there was never any age before so guilty of the judging and questioning of the power of Parliaments . But pray heare the Parliament , and as you ought , so rest satisfied , who say , that some Presidents ought not to be rules , this you must agree to , for that some are not lawfull ; But furthey they say , that no presidents can bee bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament , because some ought not to be followed , and all may ●…all short and be different from the case in question . The King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons , when be withdraweth himself●… , to bee rightly named a Parl●…ament , or to have any power of any Court , and consequen●…ly to be any thing , but a meere convention of so many private men . ] This is falsely imposed on his Majesty , his answers and massages speakes the contrary , which are directed to both Houses of Parliament . ] Had it not beene doubted that other direction might have caused some mistake and miscarriage , or at least have deni●…d them that acceptance , that his Majesti●…s Messages do d●…serve , I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o●…her name and style would have beene found out , for doth he not in these very M●…ssages call th●…m an inconsiderable number , and a company of factious 〈◊〉 persons and the lik●… ? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not the stiles of a Parliament , and for th●…ir pow●…r if they can doe nothing wi●…hout his M●…jesties consent , and that not to be obtained neither ; what are they more th●…n a Cipher ? or a meere conv●…ntion of private men ? And is this a falsity ? But our Authours language sh●…ll not provoke to a retaliation . The King doth assert , that because the law hath trusted him with a P●…erogative to discontinue P●…aments , to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome , this is no breach of that trust , because in 〈◊〉 of Law , the people may not assemble in Parliament , but by his writt . ] 〈◊〉 is grosse 〈◊〉 , saith the Authour , Howev●…r I am sure the language is gros●…e ; I had no time to 〈◊〉 for to disprove the Author , but this I am certaine of , that his M●…jestie doth strongly urge that prerogative and his power and ●…lection thereby , which gives a strong intimation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 of freedome and power therein : But why is it false ? because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author , if it appeare to him necessary , or expedient for the Kingdome , hee ac●… , he is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writts . ] T is not to be 〈◊〉 ●…hat wh●…n the people granted this Prerogative to his Majestie , that they would give him so vast a power , as to make him the sole Judge of the necessitie of a Parli●…ment : for if so , upon the 〈◊〉 of not necessary , and that upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 counsellers , be the Kingdome in never so imminent , never so appa●…ent danger , it must be destroyed for want of a Parliament ; certainly this was never the intention of this trust : Besides , who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger , or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth , as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 ? However this is certaine , the Kingdome canno●… suff●…r by a Parliament , i●… may withou●… . If the Parliament make any transition in other matters , than what be pleases to propose , they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure . The sense of his inference is this , that because they cannot justifie the medling with things , which belong not to their cognizance , therefore they may bee punished , if they meddle with those that doe . This is the Authors inference , not the Observators , He doth not say , that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned , no , such inconsequent conclu●…ious we leave to the Author . But this he seemeth to speake , that it should be very hard and unreasonable , that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast , when that none can determine aright of them , but themselves ; for if so , if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power , they may be imprisoned at plea●…ure . The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament , saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 , and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance , the people by no meanes is ingaged in it , as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases . This is in plain termes to tell the people , in what cases they are to submit to , and maintain and desend the Parliament ; in what not ; certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thin●… that the illegall acts of a Parliament s●…ould bind them ; but on the other side , I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall , which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : but rather cast themselves upon their care ( as in duty they are bound ) whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie ; But I hope the Author will now be advised , that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince ( in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike ) than of the Parliament . It is impossible ( saith the King ) that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us , and our heires for ever , and the same trust , and a power above that trust ( for such is the power they pretend to ) be committed to others . It is true ( saith the Observator ) Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect . This is a weake answer saith the Author . So weake that the Author cannot reply to it ; for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this , that the King is singulis major , yet universis minor . It seemes ( sayes the Author ) the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we , and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject . Did we ever speake of two Kings ? or can there be so in one common wealth ? But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject ; certainly the Author was not himselfe : But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd , we doe not say that the King is singulis minor , but that he is universis minor , and I hope ●…he universe or body politike , never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King , neither is it possible that it should , for that it is a body only in consideration of Law , that hath neither life , nor motion like other individuals ; and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity , so that notwithstanding this shallow rea●… , the King is universis minor . I , but saith the Author , You tell us that he is greater than one , you doe not tell us that he is better than two , this is no greater supremacy , than probably he had before he was a King . The Prince is singulis major as well as ●…ee , nay , may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights , any Knight over all Esqui●…es ? What a poore and senslesse cavill is this , doe not we say that he is universis minor ? and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe ? When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two , then will his Majesty be lesse than those two , untill then he is greater ; for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince , nay in every nobleman over all Knights , and in Knights over all Esquires ; I must tell him , had not his senses b●…ene ravished by , and swallow●…d up in Mon●…rchy , he would never have so much forgot himselfe ; can there be any one singulis major but the King ? he that accounts himself so high , 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head ? the Prince himselfe is not sing●…lis major , till he survive his Father . To be short , all others are but comparatively great , the King only is great in the superlative . I , but to take us off these corrupt glosses ( I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in him●… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which ( as he saith ) 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major , the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus , that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire , governed by one supreame head and King , having the dignity and regall estate of the same , unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people &c. been bounden and owen next to God , a naturall and humble obedience . Doth this prove the King universis major ? under favour nothing lesse : for wee must not understand this , that the body politike doth owe obedience , but that the severall sorts and degrees of people , of which this body is compacted and made , that they doe owe obedience , for to take it otherwise , were to make an absurd and impossible construction . For as I have said before , how is it possible that a body politike ( which is a body only in judgement , of law or contemplation , ) that hath neither life , sense , nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one ? much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh , so that cleerly this doth not a●… all disprove the former position . If there were no King at all in England , you would call this government an Aristocracy : and why I beseech you , do you not conf●…sse the name now , seeing the thing is altogether the same ? for if they give his voyce , t is all one , as if he had no voyce ; if their p●…wer must over-rule his , t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all . Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding , or els he could not bee thus overseene . Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce , or to disrobe him of his power : more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of ? Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them , that they might enact any new lawes , or abrogate the old , without his Majesties consent ? Nay , ●…ove they not frequently prosessed the contrary ? why then , what have they done that should have the least colour of intitling them to an Aristocraticall Government ? O yes ; for they ▪ have voted and published it to the world , that the power of declaring law ( 〈◊〉 Paul amento ) in case of any publike concernment : doth refide in them ; and that though the King neither doth , nor will consent , yet he is obliged by their Votes . And is this any greater power or priviledge than every other inferiour Court hath ? or is it more than they themselves formerly without the least scruple have exercised ? by declaring law in dubious points of Stat●…s and erroneous judgements . And is their ancient , undoubted , and unquestionable right now become a power Aristocraticall ? T is strange that the times should so vary the case , and that long enjoyment or possession ( which doth usually confirme and strengthen a mans right ) should be a meanes to take it away . But before I passe this over , let me tell the Author , that it is a most idle , scandalous and false aspersion : and if I do in all this wrong him , let hee himself judge upon his owne inference , which is this , that the defending and maintaining of the ancient ●…ight and government , is a labouring for an introducting of a new , and if he chance to blush ( as he well may ) at his own inconsequent reasoning , let him mend it herea●…ter . I but saith he , I dare say that all Histories and Records ( except of such Parliaments which deposed their King , which the Observ●…or 〈◊〉 no free one ever did ) cannot produce an example of this nature , that the two Howses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King . That there is not the least colour of a pretence to such a power , I have before plainly evidenced it . Kut I pray heare his reason , why this power , as to some respects may not be greater than the King . Because ( saith he ) since the law hath given the King a power , by dissolving of the Parliament , to take away that power ( as is pretended ) greater than his owne , if they had ever made claime to superiority over him , he would quickly have put an end to that dispute . This is in plaine termes to say , that a power that is but temporary , cannot be greater , than that which is continuing and unalterable : a strange fallacy , why , if the Kingmake one high Constable of England ad 〈◊〉 , ( whom we know hath a power very extensive ) shall we conclude that his dignity or authority is inferiour to others of lesse qualitie and esteeme , because dissolvable at the Kings pleasure ? Or if the King conferre the dignitie and Office of Lord Keeper to another , by committing of the seale unto his custody , is he therefore not superiour to the rest of the Nobility because removable at his Majesties will and discretion ? an absurditie to thinke it . Before this power be challinged , it would be fit to vote down that clause in a law , made 2 H. 5 cited by his Majesty , That it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their petitions ; as pleaseth himselfe . For that this is said to be cited by his Majesty , I shall not question the truth of it , though I have searched the Statutes , and I cannot find any such clause ; But admitting it to be so , did ever any one make a question whether that there were such a Prerogative in rerum natura , as the Kings negative voyce ? certainly not . The matter in debate is whether it be so absolute and uncircumscribed that the Parliament can doe nothing , no , not so much as declare what the common law is , without his Majesties consent , or whether it be boun ed and limited ; So that this great and most supreame Court may not be like a body without a soule , or a numberlesse cypher : And for tha●… of the Statute , that he may deny their petitions , can you thence deduce , that he may deny their rights ? their right of declaring law in ca●…e of publike concernment , is not involved within the narrow compasse of a petition . To the most absolute ●…mpire in the world , this condition is most naturall and necessary , that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his . It is against common s●…nse to suppose a King that is in his ●…its , who ●…ll not provide for the safety of his people ; nay , who will not part with some of his right , rather than they should perish , because in their destruction he looseth all . I would to God that sad experience did not inform us that you speak severall languages , one thing to us , another to his Majesty , if it were not so , the setling of the Militia by his Parliament , by reason of the abuse of that trust , to the endangering of the Kingdom , by ●…he advise of ill affected counsellors , would not have ca●…sed this great combustion . I , but then the Author saith . This doth not prove a King should part with his rights , as often as they will pretend to be in danger . Nor can it be thought rea●…onable , if that a Parliament , and in that a whole kingdome can use pretences . Was ever age guilty of such disrespects to a Parliament ? If this were once admitted , what wild plots would be invented ? what strange 〈◊〉 would be received ●…rom invisible spies . Strange ! that a Parliament should fancy and invent n●…series to themselves , and should thus frighten the publike with Phantasmes or Chimaeraes . I hope th●… Author will prove it by experience , that it is not so easie a m●…tter to deceive a whole Common weal●…h . I ( saith he ) and so often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous , so of●…n the silly people were to be frighted . More strange yet ! that ambition and covetousnesse should at once possesse a whole Parliament ; and that a whole Common-wealth should be accounted but a silly people , so easie to be wrought upon . I hope this disparagement to the publike will work an answerable acceptance to the people . Since all naturall power is in those who obey , they which contract to obey to their owne ruine , or having so contracted , they which esteeme suc●… a contract before their owne preservation are sellonious to themselves and rebellious to nature . For example ( sayes the Author , an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the Ordinary tryall of law , and to suffer , if it should se fall out , t●…ough under an undeserved sentence . In this case bee that doth not make resistance , and prerr his preservation to his contract is pronounced Felo de se , and a rebell to nature . And he puts other examples of the like nature , as that of the Martyrs , ●…nd of our saviour Christ , and demands our thoughts of ●…hem , whether they were selfe murtherers or no ? What a strange affected mistake is this of the Author , can there be the least colourable inference out of what the Observator hath delivered , to justifie any individuall opposition and infringment of contract ? or to make good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice , to rescue his owne life ? I dare confidently asfirme , not the least title to this purpose . No ; a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage . And ruat Coelum , fiat 〈◊〉 , though heaven itselfe ( if it were possible ) should be destroyed , yet let justice ●…ourish . That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society , without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance . If thou suffer unjustly , God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings , and repay it upon the head of thine enemies ; wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience , than to incurr the breach of all society by d●…sobedience . I , but saith the Author , If reason will not satisfie , perhaps 〈◊〉 may , Q●…i 〈◊〉 potestati , ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt , to resist the Magistrate , 〈◊〉 . And he saith , that answer ( with which too many are deceived ) cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion ; this 〈◊〉 obliges private men , but not Magistrates , Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men , and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 . T is not usuall with mee to intren●…h upon another mans profession , but seeing I am here inforced to it , give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author . First , for the taking up of Armes , or the waging of a warre in generall : I never heard any man oppose the leg●…timation of that warre , that had these three requisites or ingredients . A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 , as the ●…agistrate . A just and lawf●…ll end , or cause occasioning it , as the defence of our Religion , liberties , and the like . And a good affection in following of it , as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured . And now I appeale to any indifferent man , whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary , whether all these are not exactly made good in this great ●…taking of the Parliament ? I , but saith the Author , how doth this an●…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King , for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him ? To this I ●…nswer , 〈◊〉 under he A●…ors favour , ●…he supr●…am power ( as I have made it good before ) is the people represented by a Parlia●…ent , and then , no doubt , that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons , do●…h ( according to his owne Argument ) justifie he Parliament in their proceed●…s , and make good ●…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence . I , but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle , that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum , Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good , and though thou suffer by him unjusty , yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum , for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward . Cer●…inly , God never made Magistrates on purpose to a●…ict and 〈◊〉 over their p●…ople , th●…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the gre●…ter happin●… hereafter . No , that they prov●… corrupt issues from hemselves , not from any divine determination ; and therefore if the M●…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum , a Minister to thee ●…or thy ill , he is , not then 〈◊〉 minister , Gods Minister , for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission , and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne , conscience do●…h not only deny obedience , but command and justifie 〈◊〉 . But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 , t is the magistrates , not any 〈◊〉 opposition , that I justifie ; and this being undertaken with the due circumstance , is not a meanes to destroy order and societie , but maintaine them ; But yet I hope our Au●…hor will be here informed that this is not our case . For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign ▪ may he perish , who in his thoughts intends him the least ill ; No , t is ( as the Parliament have often declared ) against his Malignant Councellors ? such who endeavour ( whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty ) the subversion of our Religion , and the destruction of the publike . And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this . O yes ; in opposing h●…s authority , you fight against him ; Strange ! if it should , be so ; when neither the law of God nor man , do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull . He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes , doth it at his owne perill ; and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion . I , but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it , may you in such case make resistance ▪ No question we may , for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action , that is in it selfe unlawfull : nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey . Besides the personall presence of the King , doth , or doth not countermand his authority ; if it do countermand his authority , then they have no power to warrant their act●…on ; if it do not , yet the act is 〈◊〉 . So then let them take their choise , they see their termes . Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely , might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many . It being in effect objected ( as appeares befo●…e ) That a ●…emporall power ( meaning the Parliament : ) cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable ( intending the King . ) Is this were so , saith the Observator , the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators , when any great extremity assayled them , and yet we know it was very prosperous to them , sometimes to change the ●…orme of government . Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger ; to trust to a Monarchy , not 〈◊〉 Aristoc●…y , and much lesse to a Democracy . What have we to do with Aristocracy , or Democracy ▪ God be blessed , we , nor know , nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy ▪ and we shall with all h●…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament ; But if sed●…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell , we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a pr●…y , to the ran●… and malice of his and our enemies . The King objects ; if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors , wee make them Comptrollers , and this is not ●…ble to Royalty . To which the Observator answers , 〈◊〉 say ( saith he ) that to co●…t is more than to counsell , 〈◊〉 yet not a●…es so much as to command and comptroll . True ▪ ( saith the Author ) not alwayes , but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like . Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King , than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike con●…nt , by former Parliaments , hath done ▪ or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts do●…h do ? who are so Counsellours for the King , as that the King may not countermand their judgements , and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therefore 〈◊〉 ●…nd Co●…rs of the King , therefore it holds in Parliaments a ●…tiori . I , but saith the Author the 〈◊〉 why the King cannot countermand their judgement , is , because they 〈◊〉 his person , and ●…is consent is by law involved in ●…at by law they do , for that the act of a delegated power is his act , and there would be no end if he should undoe what be hath done . But ( saith hee ) in Pa●…ament , the Lords 〈◊〉 in a personall capacity , and the House of Commo●…s as representing the body of the Ki●…me , and therefore the cases doe not agree . Under correction of the Author I shall make the case parallel , notwithstanding this objection . I do agree , that in all acts of publique 〈◊〉 , which ●…e but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only ( I hope it will not offend any one to say that they are Ministers to the Common-Wealth ) as in case of making and consenting to new Lawes , or repealing of the old , or the like ; there the Lo●…ds sit in a personall capacity , and the Commons as represe●…ting the body of the Kingdome ; But in all acts that are judiciall , as in case of reversing of 〈◊〉 judgements or of declaring or explayning the law of the Land , there they represent the person of the King ; for that he is ●…ons Iustitiae , the fountaine of justice , and no●…e c●…n 〈◊〉 such a power without it be first delegated to them by the King ; and therefore in such a case their judgements doe ●…ly involve the judgement of the King , and do oblige him as strongly as the 〈◊〉 o●… d●…terminations of the Judges . Now none can de●…y their declaring of the law in case of the Militia to be a judiciall act , therefore the consequence is cleare that the King is justly bound by it . I , but further he saith , The judges sweare they will not assent to any thing , 〈◊〉 may turne the King in damage or 〈◊〉 , by any manner , way , or colo●… . 18. E. 3. And do not the Parl●…ent ●…o the same by their oath of supremacy , and their late Prote●…tion ? If you seriously examine them , you will finde that their obligation is the same . And now I hope the A●…thor will make good his 〈◊〉 to mee ; who said , that when I could make these th●…nges agree to the two Houses , I should conclude from the Judges sentence , to their votes ; wherefore I doe 〈◊〉 that there being the s●…e reason , there o●…ght to be the same La●… . I , but for a further answere ( seing his former will not hold ) saith the Author , in matters of law there lyes an appeale to them ( a writ of errour being brought ) as to the highest Court , not so in matters of State . Be●…ause whilst they 〈◊〉 sentence according to known ▪ Lawes , the State is no way indangered thereby , but if they challenge to themselvs a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of State , they may when they please ▪ overthrow our lawes . The counties which 〈◊〉 them ▪ looke upon them as judges , ●…ot Politi●…s . T is not impossible they should be both ▪ and whatsoever the judgement of the Co●…ties were that intrusted them , certaine I am that he is not fit to occupie a place in that great Assembly , that is not at least in some reasonable measure so qualified ; that whilst the 〈◊〉 and other Sages skilled 〈◊〉 that profession , are within guiding and directing of ▪ his great Ship 〈◊〉 to ●…aw , men experienced in the Politiques , may sit at Sterne to secure it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 invasion , and civill combustion . And wh●…n the Author can produce so able a 〈◊〉 , so 〈◊〉 , so much ingaged in the welfarre of the Kindome , and so void of selfe respect ; then will we upo●… his request de●…ert our Parliament ; untill then , I hope all faithfull and true hearted people will adhereunto them . For that empty shadow and vaine dreame , of a possibili●… of the●…r 〈◊〉 the Law ; it is a wonder to me that any 〈◊〉 mans sancie should so abuse it selfe . To 〈◊〉 the Authors language upon himselfe . Can it be conceived that men in their wits , who 〈◊〉 all that they have by the benefit of the Law , and no doubt have as great a portion to lose 〈◊〉 others , should ex●…te that , which is the principall evidence of the●…r 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 of life or 〈◊〉 , and so pinne themselves and their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , upon unknowne 〈◊〉 , t is extreame madnesse and folly to thinke it . Wee ought not to conceive that they will either counsell or consent to any thing , but what is publiquel●… advantagious . When the King 〈◊〉 they doe not otherwise , hee will 〈◊〉 willingly sollow their 〈◊〉 . I dare confidently affirme , that no antiquity or Records w●… 〈◊〉 are a●…le to 〈◊〉 one example of this nature , where the Kings single conceipt or 〈◊〉 is opposed 〈◊〉 that o●… h●… whole Parliament . But it can●… be exp●… that they should 〈◊〉 , while that the King by such malignant Co●…nsell is kept a●… so great a d●…st 〈◊〉 . By such Couns●…ll and 〈◊〉 we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the K●…ng li●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Such a cons●…nt in which his is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 not so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at all ; 〈◊〉 doth not limit , but take it away . Doth this 〈◊〉 which doth ●…citely 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , more 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his power , than that of their 〈◊〉 , o●… 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 ? The 〈◊〉 ( sai h hee ) doth not 〈◊〉 to have to 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 old , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ 〈◊〉 them . Neither doe they without his 〈◊〉 , they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so would he A●…thor ingenio●…sly acknowledge , if that he were not so much 〈◊〉 ▪ with 〈◊〉 and prejudice . But happily hee doth not understand the difference b●…tweene constituting new , or repealing the old Lawes , and declaring or expounding the Lawes in being , how did Ship-money destroy our propriety ( saith he ) but by this very consequence ? What a grosse mistake is this ? Because the Ki●…gs judgement is involved in that of his Parliaments , and of his Judges according to law ; must it therefore follow th●…t the whole Kingdome should be obliged by his Majesties determination against Law ; Or because legally we coul●… not be divested of our property without our cons●…nt , must not ther●…fore the King be bound by the judgement of his Parliament , which doth tacitly include his cons●…nt ? I , but saith hee Ejus est velle , qui potest nolle . He onely ha●● freedome of consent or disagreement , that may at his election do either . 'T is true ; But this must be understood of an actuall consent , or dis●…greement and not of an implied . For in Corporations or bodies politique , wh●…re the Major part carri●…s it , will you say that the residue are not bound , because that they had not ●…lection to ●…ssent , or dissent , as the case falls out to be ? This were a way to open a gapp●… to all disorder and confusion . So the Kings consent is included in that of his Judges ; and y●…t I hope you will not say , that the King there had freedome of dissenting , which is the very cas●… of the Parliament . It is alleaged in derogation of Parliaments , wha●…soever the right of Parliament is , to assemble and treate in all cases of a publique nature ; yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions , without all vertue and power , the very name of Parliaments is not due to them . I , but saith the Author , you should deliver the Kings sense and words truely ; the summe of which is onely thus , The two Houses have not power of making lawes and altering the established governement without him . What a strange construction is this ; This is no more than will be readily agreed you ; you shall not neede disput●… it ; therefore questionlesse the words must import somewhat else . The truth of it is , your mist●…ke , ( of which you are fr●…quently guilty ) is this , that you promi●…uously counfound the making of new lawes and the altering of the establish●…d Governement with declaring of the Common-law in being ; which is palpable sophistication ; And now I would faine be resolved by any indifferent understanding , whether if th●…y may not do that , without the Kings actuall concurrence and agreement , and that not to be obteined , they be not a meere livele●…e convention of private men without all vertue or power ? It must be agreed that he that is act●…ated and moved by another power onely hath none in himselfe . This allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments , and subjects us ●…o as unbounded a regiment of the King●… meere will , as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under . The Author saith that there is no colour of reason in this ; and why ? for ( saith he ) are we not lef●… in the same state in which wee were ? His Majesty denying to bring in a new gove●…nmennt : doth not take away the old . The Author saith true , that we are in the same state indeed , but 't is as we were before , and without the Parl●…ament , subject to the Kings meere will and lawlesse regiment . And though his Majesties d●…nying to bring in a new government , doth not take away the old , yet his denying of the old governement , is an introducting of a new . Vpon the same reason , by the Kings d●●●●tion , other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void . It were a strange consequence to conclude , that because that may be done without the King , to which his consent by law is not required ; therefore that may be done without him , to which his consent is by law necessary . Under reformation , the Kings actuall consent to any legall or judiciall determination in Parliament is no more required , than it is to that of his Judges ; yet , with the Authors favour , both have the implied and tacite consent ; and therefore upon the same ground , of the Kings desertion , other C●…urts must be vertul●…sse , and quietly possesse a vacation in Terme time , as well as his Parliament . I , but saith the Author it is against common sense to fancie ; ●…hat he which en●…oyes all by the benefit of lawes should hinder the due administration of Iustice according to those ●…awes , and so wilfully endanger not onely his rights , but safety , by putting the Kingdome into tumults and combustion . T●…is is an argument to perswade a man ; no ground to convince him , or a probable inducing r●…ason , no legall conclusion . To argue from a probability to nec●…ssity , as to sa●… it is not likely it should be so , therefore it is not so , is a strang p●…ece of Logick . administration of j●…stice is delegated to the Parliament ( though in a more high and sup●…reminent way ) ●…swell as to inferiour Judges and the King gaines as much honour and benefit , nay mo●…e , by the free effl●…x and current of justice in that Co●…rt , than in any other : and yet we see the streame is stopt , so that a deluge and inundation of misery hath be-spread the face of the whole Kingdome ; and ●…o have fancied this , not long since , would have b●… as much opposite to common sense , as the other . It is attempted to divide betweene part and part in Parliament . Who those attempte●…s are , I inquire not . I suppose , be meanes those who divided the Lords into good and bad , the members of the House of Commons ●…to well and ill affected . You need not much enquire , your Booke speaks you an acquaintance with them . But know those that are bad or ill affected , made that distinction themselves , not others . It is a wonderfull thing that the Kings papers being ●…raited scarce with any thing ●…s , but such doctrines of division tending all to the subve●…sion of our ancient ●…damentall constitutions , 〈◊〉 support all our ancient liberties , ●…nd to the erection of an 〈◊〉 rule , should fi●…d such applause in the world . There is a vast difference betweene declaring what divisions are and causing them to b●… ; to shew ; is not to teach division . Farre be it from me to lay the least imputation of guilt in this kind up●…n his sacred person , No ; the confidence that I ever had of his goodnesse , pi●…ty , and love to his people , bids me silence . But this I may , without breach of charity , or staine of loyalty , conclude , that the best Prince may be corrupted , or if not so , seduced by those , who v●…w themselves 〈◊〉 servants to his Majesty , and the publique , whereas th●…ir actions , which tend to nothing but rapine and spoyle , do plainely testifie the contrary . These are they that can dispence with their breach of trust ( how they will be absolved I know not ) and not onely sequester themselves , but 〈◊〉 the King from his Parliament , and his people , and to open the gap more wide , and make the breach more incurable ; advise His Majesty ( contrary to his pious 〈◊〉 ) by published declarations to traduce his Parliament , an●… cast most strang and unheard of obliquies upon them , and to charge them with such 〈◊〉 their thoughts were never guilty of . Thereby to render them odious unto the people ; So that by destroying the mutuall bond of confi●…ence and affection , we our selves might be made actors in our owne ruine ; and if this be not to cause division , aswell as to declare it , and to teach it , aswell as shew it , let the wo●…ld judge . I , b●…t 〈◊〉 the Author , it is beyond 〈◊〉 , if the K●…ngs a●…mes are such , as he would have the world beleeve , that they should fin●… such applause . I neither d●…re , nor can charge his M●…jesty with aimes that are indirect ; but if he were guilty in this nature ( which I professe my faith is not as yet strong enough to beleeve ) we must know that all actions o●… Kings find acceptance , and renow●…e with many ; and the very worst will not want some to appla●…d them . But pray heare his reason , why 't is not propable i●… the Kings intentions were such , they should finde such applause ; for saith he , consider the persons from w●…m ; men that have muc●… more to lose , than some who may ayme at ge●…ting 〈◊〉 fo●…unes , by pretending they are in danger to lo●…e what they have . None are so ri●…h but they may have and desire more ; and t is 〈◊〉 they that have least , are best 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 young men might in all probability , have as great a portion to expose to hazard , as the grave and sage 〈◊〉 , and yet you see they preferred their vile and ambitio●… counsell before the good of the publique . I , b●…t then he sai●… , they are knowne not to value their lives equall to their 〈◊〉 . Very good , if it were true ; yet for all this , they may be to chuse their Religion . Nay , which is more , they a●…e 〈◊〉 o●… as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as honesty : it may be greater ; neither of which would permit them to be 〈◊〉 to make themselves miserable , and pull upon their posterity and Countrey perpetuall slavery . Doth the Author thinke that his i●…sinuating probabilities ( which are 〈◊〉 strongest Arguments ) shall evince us that the Sunne shines not , though our eyes 〈◊〉 the contrary . Might not this with the sam●… strength of reason , have beene urged in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 young 〈◊〉 , and yet we see what wretched advise they gave the King ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not but 〈◊〉 , that they did 〈◊〉 inslave their posterity and 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it , to ●…cuse the K●…ng to intend that , wh●… the world sees , how much 〈◊〉 ●…h s●…d ●…y to 〈◊〉 it . What 〈◊〉 of expression is it to say we accuse the King of 〈◊〉 an arbitrary rule ? 〈◊〉 we labour nothing more than to 〈◊〉 his Majesty ; No nation that ever enjoyed a Municipall law ; ev●… 〈◊〉 n●…rer to an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than wee not long since did ; and did wee in all our 〈◊〉 in the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or accuse his Majesty ? No ; w●… 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 , who wrought that 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 , and they ( as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do●… ) who dare oppresse his p●…ple , stick not ( to di●…charge themselves ) to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evill actions upon their Soveraigne ; and such is the subtilty of our Author here . If you imp●…ach him for any publike desservice , he knowes whether to flie ●…or 〈◊〉 . Could our Anc●…s ever have bele●…ved 〈◊〉 should come a King , who would plead 〈◊〉 M●…na C●…a , who would ●…rd his C●…wne in the ●…nce of his S●…bjects 〈◊〉 , and d●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rule ? This 〈◊〉 be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So●… ; ●…ut our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 pleai against Magna Char●…a , and too apparently hazard his Crowne , in the destruction of his Subjects , and their liberties ; indeavouring nothing more , than the introducting of an Arbitrary rule . If the King 〈◊〉 parted from his Parliament meerely because they sought his oppression , and he ●…d no 〈◊〉 meanes to withstand their 〈◊〉 , let this proclayme them a void Assembly . His 〈◊〉 never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 charge to the Parliament : the more impudent the Author that dare doe it , when his Majesty decli●… it : For he saith , it is most evident , there was too great rea●… to 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , when not withstanding his deepest 〈◊〉 to maintaine the true esta●… sh●… , they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 . I dare not charge his 〈◊〉 with any thing ▪ I have no authority for it : But this I say ; when justice 〈◊〉 be denied , and the course thereof obstructed , against such firebrands , 〈◊〉 , and engines of all 〈◊〉 , as Jesuites , Seminary Priests and the like ; When Papists shall approach so 〈◊〉 the Throne , and none admitted into greater favour and affection than they ; certainly I may conclude ( without prejudice to my King ) that the Pope harbours in some of his Councels 〈◊〉 ; And this meanes being used , what alteration future necessity or 〈◊〉 may impose 〈◊〉 cast upon us , is not difficult to judge . When notwithstanding 〈◊〉 ut●… 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 happy 〈◊〉 on in Ireland &c. and his frequent pressing them 〈◊〉 new 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 the people were made 〈◊〉 , he was a favourer of their bloody 〈◊〉 . It must be acknowledged the King ●…n 〈◊〉 , most wicked Councell that afterwards depressed it ; witnesse the many 〈◊〉 that did intervene su●…ly manifested to the World . And which is above all , the seizing of that poore supply that was sent unto them . Whea the baser sort of the people were 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Parliament in clamourous and 〈◊〉 able 〈◊〉 , &c. And were there not many of them ( having neither offensive nor de●… weapons ) most 〈◊〉 , inhumanely , and barbarously 〈◊〉 and butchered for their paines ? punishment sufficient for their 〈◊〉 , if they committed any . When seditious Pam●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out , and 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 day and night to abuse the King . For my par : 〈◊〉 there were any such , I was never guilty of countenancing or abetting of them ; No , not so much as by their reading . However this I am certaine of , that whatsoever , the wit of malice could 〈◊〉 was dayly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and vented against the Parliament . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 encouraged , whilest they did cast publike 〈◊〉 upon the 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and which if they bad 〈◊〉 duly executed , would have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 us to our 〈◊〉 peace and quiet , which we so long enjoyed , as wee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 . Whom our Author may 〈◊〉 wthin the compasse of this notion of factious Preachers , 〈◊〉 ●…now not . But I feare by the stile of his booke , he comprehends all such as preach th●… word of God in ●…ruth and sincerity , not fearing the face of men , that will not be wrought upon to call evill , g●…d , or good evill . Had Paul lived in these dayes , I doubt our Author would , ( 〈◊〉 like ) have accused h●…m for a pestilent fellow , a mover of sedition , and a 〈◊〉 of Sects , and the like , and for my part , I think that those whom he intends , and Paul were equally guil y of these offences . And yet you heare what testimony Paul gives of himself , after the way which 〈◊〉 call 〈◊〉 , so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the God of my 〈◊〉 . O , the 〈◊〉 of these times that we are 〈◊〉 into , that 〈◊〉 labouring for truth , honesty , and a good conscience , that will no●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by every idle and 〈◊〉 innovation , should 〈◊〉 accounted 〈◊〉 ! but I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 our Author when he speakes of faction , to reflect upon himselfe , by a serious 〈◊〉 . But 〈◊〉 us that th●… Lawes have beene 〈◊〉 ed ; 〈◊〉 if he had 〈◊〉 an answer he would 〈◊〉 shewed us in what . Delosus 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 no●… 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 aling to hide your ●…ders in generalls : the more 〈◊〉 , if 〈◊〉 , that the●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reply . The last vaine feare was ; when such seditious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 even 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 , &c. Contention with words , makes no 〈◊〉 of blood , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this should be one cause of feare , that should drive the King to so great a di●… . Well , 〈◊〉 is both 〈◊〉 and sedition in our Authors book , had they 〈◊〉 as sure ven●… in the 〈◊〉 , they would not have gone unpunished , but I believe he can sooner wri●…e sedition , 〈◊〉 he can define it ; But to conclude this , t is wonderfull that these Chymeraes which so 〈◊〉 the King at London , should likewise cause him to raise an Army in the North . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King could be 〈◊〉 wisely or faithfully advised by any other Cou●…t , o●… 〈◊〉 his single 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all advise whatsoever , t were not only vaine , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the 〈◊〉 Kingdome should be troubled to make elections , and that the 〈◊〉 e●… 〈◊〉 attend the publike 〈◊〉 . The King never refused to advise with them . What a 〈◊〉 falsitie is this , No doubt the Author can 〈◊〉 London from Yorke ; And the Commission of Array from the Mi●… ; But then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 us , that the ●…all , but not the onely forme of the Kings answere to such 〈◊〉 as they were not 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 , L'Roy 〈◊〉 , proves that after the advise of this his great 〈◊〉 , he is yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 further with persons or 〈◊〉 , as his owne 〈◊〉 shall thinke 〈◊〉 . Master Crompton in his 〈◊〉 of Cou●…ts ●…ells us , ●…at when the King did cons●… a Bill , then he endorsed it L'Koy volt , the King will h●… it so , is ●…e did not ●…gree , then he indorsed it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which as he ●…es , was an absolu●… denyall , why ●…hen no ground for this in●…erence , that the King was at election to advis●… further with any other Co●…ll . 〈◊〉 if it were so , this proves de facto that th●… King hath had this powr , but do●…h no way 〈◊〉 th●… Obs rvators reason ; how that if this might be permitted , 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 to call Parliaments . ●…sides , they are the most supreame Councell in England , and therefore according 〈◊〉 the rule of Law , in ●…he presence of this Couns●…ll , all inf●…riour Counc●…ls ought to cease . Againe , what they councell or det●…rmine , is done in a legall and judiciall way , and therefore not to bee 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 extra judiciall advice wha●…ever ; No , nor by 〈◊〉 judg●…ment of any other Court , but a subsequent Parliam●…nt . And the Observator adds this as a reason , why the Kings judgement onely ought not to bee 〈◊〉 , for saith he , the many eyes of so many chiefe Gentlemen , out of all parts see more than sewer . The same reason ( saith the Author ) which denys a li●…y of d●…ing to the King ( that is such a number who see more , because they are more ) may deny it to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons , and to that House too , in comparison of the People , and so 〈◊〉 King and Lords are voted out of Parliament . What a poore evasion is this , and contrary to common sense , that this reason should deny a liberty of dislenting to the House of Peeres , in comparison of the House of Commons : for that they are much the major part of the Parliament , and to that Ho●…se too in comparison 〈◊〉 the people ; For the first he may aswell argue that the major part of the Judges in the Kings Bench , should binde the minor in the common Pleas , or 〈◊〉 versá ; and as soone maintaine it ; for though both the Houses make but one Court , yet they are so distinct , that each doth officiate in its proper Spheare : and the conclusions of the one cannot bind the other ; and for the latt●…r , that the peoples judgement , because the greater number , should sway the House of Commons ; H●…e may aswell reason , that though I give away my ●…t , yet the property is not altered , and as soone prove it . When hee can make 〈◊〉 p●…ople to represent the House of Commons , not the House of Commons the people , then shall the peoples judg●…ment for majority carry it . Vntill then , we must , as wee are 〈◊〉 , by our election , submit to their determinations . Besides , four hundred choice , grave and solid men , may 〈◊〉 and discover as much as f●…ure hun●…d thousand ; 'T is no 〈◊〉 of number , but 〈◊〉 qualification , not the plurality of eyes , b●… the 〈◊〉 , that sees most ; y●…t as one good 〈◊〉 m●…y se●… more than many bad ones ; so i●… must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many good ones must 〈◊〉 that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Au 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 sheweth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is no●… g●…lly tru●… , i●… it be 〈◊〉 true , it is 〈◊〉 . For ( 〈◊〉 he ) I d●… 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost any Pa●…ent man , hee will 〈◊〉 us upon the 〈◊〉 of a Bill , 〈◊〉 one 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Hou●…e hath found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and urged more exceptions than 〈◊〉 hun●… would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 e●… . This possibly may be , but the str ng probability is on the o●…r fi●…le . 〈◊〉 c●…ally one may se●…●…ore than 〈◊〉 ●…ndred , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ei●…her probable or 〈◊〉 that it will be 〈◊〉 . For my part I shall never waive a propable certainty , for a meere 〈◊〉 , nor in ●…quall judgemen●…s preferre an Vnite before a Pluralitie . Th●…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Nay , whole Parlia●… 〈◊〉 beene 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Null , ●…y succeeding Pa●…liaments , and instances in many . I shall not indeavour to maintaine an infallibility in a 〈◊〉 , nor did I ever beleive ( considering them to be b●…t ●…n ) that they could not 〈◊〉 in judgement , aswell as others . But for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 to an 〈◊〉 to say that which ha h beene , may be , and therefore it 〈◊〉 : is s●…ch a peece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a●… I never 〈◊〉 o●… . The ●…w 〈◊〉 ends 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 needs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Co●…lls mo●…e 〈◊〉 , impe●…all and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Ce●… 〈◊〉 m●…y 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as any other private Subject . What , may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , casually me●… from the severall Counties ▪ strangers to each other ; the most 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 men for wisedome and mann●…rs ; and propably of the best for●…nes , intrus●…d with the publique , have as many bye and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and as soone infring their 〈◊〉 , as any 〈◊〉 su●…iect ? When ever the 〈◊〉 makes this good , I will sacrifice my reason to his will ; a●…d b●…ve all to be sound Doctrine which he preaches . They are strangly transported with the love of a pop●… state , who can so 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉 , as to force themselves to thinke , the members of it may not be extreamely sub●…ect to am●…ition , covetousnesse , batred and affection . And they are as strongly ravish●… wi●… the love of Mo●…rchy ; who can bel●…ive that all these may not sway the Scep●…er , and rule the King to the oppressing an●… i●…aving of his Subjects . But what ? do●…h the Author count this a popular State ? I never learned before , that wh●…re the people had one princip●…ll Governor over them , as a King , that , that should be a Democracy . Doubtlesse he is no●… well read in the Politiques , or if he be , he doth much wrong himselfe , and dishonour his King , so grosly to mistake a Monarchy , for a Democracy . Then hee instances in the Bishop of Durhams case , by which he saith Wee are told in the 3. cap. of the second Parliament held 1. Mariae , how that that B●…prick was d●…lved in a forme ? Par●…ament . 7. Ed. 6. Which was compassed and brought to passe by the ●…nister labour , great 〈◊〉 , and corrupt meanes of certaine ambit●…s persons , then being in 〈◊〉 , ●…ather to i●…rich themselves and their friends , with a great part o●… the possessions of 〈◊〉 sa●…d ●…shopprick , than upon just occasion or godly zeale . And then he concl●…des ; Let the wo●…ld judge whether this age may not be subject to the same temptation , and whether the desire to share the meanes of the Church , may not have as strong operations as ●…ormerly . I did never p●…ead ●…or an unerring power in that great ass●…bly , that 's too papisticall ; for though Parliament men , yet still but men , subject to th●… same infirmities with others . But as it is against law to presume any wrong of that great body , so it is as much 〈◊〉 reason to thinke that so many from severall places , of severall consti●… and 〈◊〉 sho●…ld all comb●… to labour for themselves , not the publique , or ad●… that they may ( which is very improbable ) yet still let us pay them that tribu●…e , which former ages ha●…h done , of love and obedience , and strong presumption to the contrary . our judgemen●…s are but extrajudiciall and illegall , t is ●…he succeeding Parliament only , that can or ●…th power to amend their errours , if ●…hey commi●… any ; t is our duty to pr●…ume 〈◊〉 best , and leave ●…heir actions to the ●…enning and comptrol of ●…heir wise successors ; And let us take this for a caution , that the errours of their 〈◊〉 ough●… not ( ho●…gh it be most 〈◊〉 and maliciously endeavoured ) to winn us to a beliefe , of the like in th●…m . That others have transgressed the limits of trust , is no good 〈◊〉 ●…o prove th●…t t●…ey doe so ; nor with the leave of t●…e Author will the Bishop of 〈◊〉 case any way impeach the age we live in ; t is one thing ●…o dissolve one Bishoprick , ano●…her to extirpate the function , as h●…ppily not ●…ure Divino , and therefore unwarrantable ; base and sordid lucre may perchance suggest the one , t is conscience only that must promote the other . No●…hing more common in the Romane story , than the bribing of the Senate . God be praised our stories cannot testifie the like of Parliaments , neither is there any concluding from a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to a Parliame●… , Our Author well knowes they will not hold parallel ; and he that should make such a comparison , deserves to be made an everlasting monument of distoyalti●… and d●…shonour to his Countrey . I , but saith 〈◊〉 , they must evidently have more private ends than the King , who may be misled , upon wantonnesse , but they must struggle with solid temptations , desire of riches , desire of honours , there being an emptinesse in them , whereas he is f●…ll and satisfied . No King s●… g●…eat and honourable , bu●… may extend his dominions , and he that is circumscribed by law , would fa●…ne make his Government obsolute , and are not these strong s●…ducing temptations ? Nay , is it not most frequent , that the greatest have the most vast and unlimited desires ? He that enjoyes much would y●…t be a Croesus , and every King an Alexander , and he that cannot conq●…er other parts of the world , would 〈◊〉 inslave his Subjects . Wee have ever fo●…d 〈◊〉 and Antipathy betwixt the Court and the Countrey , but never any till now , ●…etwixt the 〈◊〉 , and the body of the Kingdome ▪ ●…epresented . How , b●…wixt them , and those many that intrusted them ? are not they satisfied with their carriage ? If this were never till now , it may seeme to be upon some causes which never were til●… now . Th●… Author saith true , but let me tell him , that the grounds move from such as he ( who 〈◊〉 the good and 〈◊〉 of ●…heir Co●…trey in a happy reformation ) corrupt th●… people by their ill exampl●… , and w●…rse doctrine , dividing betwixt King and Parliament , and 〈◊〉 , telling of them that they are bound ( by I know not w●…at div●… precept and injunction ) to desert the 〈◊〉 , and adhere to the King , though it be to the apparent destruction of both Kingand p●…ple ; and whether this be true or no , let the Author and ●…hat reverend Doctor of Cambridge witnesse . Except Master Hollis ●…is rich widdow , I never ●…eard that promotion came to any one by serving in Parliament . If the 〈◊〉 propo●…ions ●…ad passed , it would have beene no newes to beare of many promoted ▪ &c. Nay it 〈◊〉 beene rare ●…o have heard of any advanced out of Parliament &c. The greater had be●…e the happinesse both for King and people . Are there not there a●…l 〈◊〉 of Nobility and Gentry ? men of approved integrity and ●…yncerity to their God , and of knowne faith and loyalty to their King and Countrey ? And can any ( let malice it selfe speak ) be more meri orious or capable to receive honour and preferment than they , who have the vote both of King and people for their true and ●…aithfull service to both ? Had it gone on , his Majesty had increased his owne honour , and add●…d to his peoples security . The Lords and Commons ought not to be deserted , u●…sse we will allow , that the King may 〈◊〉 whe●…her he will admit o●… any Counsell at all , or no , in the disposing 〈◊〉 our lives , lands , and 〈◊〉 . By law he cannot , he will not refuse to ●…earken t●… his gr●…t Couns●…ll . To be advised by them but yet to doe what he li●…t , is this to hearken to their Counsell ? That is not the way to satis●… the grounds of calling Parliaments , to make the King ●…ole Arbiter of publike 〈◊〉 . Hee only s●…yes , he is 〈◊〉 bound 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…is owne understanding , or to contradict his owre conscience ●…or 〈◊〉 Counsellors sake what soe●…er . If he should do so in things ●…ubious , and o●… which he ought not to be the sole Judge , so that his single judgement must of necessity be of lesse cons●…quence , than ●…hat of his Parliament , t were no contradiction to conscience ; But why the advise of his Parliament should be more opposite to conscience than any privie ( and at this time ) unwar●…ntable 〈◊〉 seemes a mystery . T is granted in things visible and 〈◊〉 , that Iudge which is a so●…e Iudge , and hath com●…●…ower to see his owne judgement exec●…d , o●…ght not to determine against the light of 〈◊〉 or evidence of ●…act . Sole Iudge or no●… al●…ers not the case , neither is there any 〈◊〉 o●…ely to visible and certaine things ; in the 〈◊〉 of a trust , the cons●…ence must be g●…ded ●…y a morall 〈◊〉 , or high pro●…lity . It doth plainly difference the case , for where a man is a sole ●…udge , he ought to be 〈◊〉 by the evidence of ●…act , either in certainty or 〈◊〉 , and cannot determine 〈◊〉 that ; but where he is not the sole judge , and the matter prove very d●…ous and incertaine , there 〈◊〉 may and is bound to submit to the judgement of the majoritie , and ought not to pre●…rre h●…s owne ●…udgement or opinion . The sinne of Pilate was , that when 〈◊〉 might ●…ave saved our Savi●…ur from an unjust dea●… , yet upon oc●…sations cont●…ctory in themselves , contrary to strange revelations from 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 would suffer ●…ocence to fall , and passe senten●…e of dea●…h 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 a blood-t●…sty ●…ultitude . Concerning strang revelations ●…o the 〈◊〉 , all that I meete with is this , his wise told him saving , have thou 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 , with that just man , for I have 〈◊〉 many things this day in a ●…reame because of him , what was revelation to her ; was but a single tradition to h●…m , she was obliged to believe God speaking to her , ●…e was not ●…ound to believe a woman speaking to him , &c. I shall not descant as our A●…thor d●…th , upon this reve●…ation , nor trouble my selfe to shew of what validity and esteeme it ought to have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 ; though 〈◊〉 it ought not to have beene vilipended and r●…jected ; and the rather for tha●… he him●…lfe could discover no fault in him , as he professes Ioh. 18 ▪ and againe M●… . 27. 18. he sayes he knew that for 〈◊〉 they had delivered him , wherefore it must needs aggravate his fin , who contrary to the 〈◊〉 of his wife , agreeing with his own knowledge , should thus passe sentence of death upon an innocent . Neither were these grounds 〈◊〉 in this 〈◊〉 , to challenge his assent , and make him yeeld to their vote , which the A●…thor by way of allu●…on to the Observator , h●…re 〈◊〉 down , ●…at his single judgement was not to be preferred before all advise . Th●…t the many eyes of all the people s●…e more than his . Besides there was a 〈◊〉 gro●…nded upon nature , that a 〈◊〉 can ha●…e no private ends to mislead it . No ▪ 〈◊〉 here was a sole 〈◊〉 , and knew Christ to be innocent , and therefore contrary to his owne knowledge and evidence of fact ; 〈◊〉 ●…ot to ha●…e b●…ene ●…wayed by the multi●…de ; but where there is a joynt judi●…all power , this doth no way conclude against a wise concession to the majoritie in cases dubious and 〈◊〉 . If one Iud●…e upon the Bench 〈◊〉 f●…om thr●…e , or one 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 from eleven , they may submit to the major number though perhaps lesse 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 ●…putation of guilt . The Oa●…h of the 〈◊〉 is , that t●…y will doe r●…ght bet●…ixt party and par●…y , accor●…g to ●…vidence given in , not their ●…ellowes votes . How his Ca●…uists will satisfie a mans conscience , when he violates this Oath , I know not . The Author mistakes , t is no v●…ation of oath , in matters dubious , for the 〈◊〉 to yeeld to 〈◊〉 whose verdict must needs be of greater strength 〈◊〉 validi●…y , for ●…hough poss●…ly that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the eleven ; yet ; t is eleven to one ( ods sufficient ) that he doth not . And if he doth ( as hee ought ) agree with them in their verdict , this is no complyance in vote , but a proceeding accord●…g to the information of testimony ; And therefore in this case he need not appeale to a casu●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , for if he doe right betwixt pa●…ty and party , the oath is sufficiently 〈◊〉 . T is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many 〈◊〉 , there may 〈◊〉 a legall submission , but then the Law doth not require 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 act contrary to conscience , but provides for the preservation of the innocency of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by making the act of the major part , have the force of the whole . A 〈◊〉 ought not so to sacrifice to his owne net , or to be devoted to his owne opinion , as not to 〈◊〉 to the greater number of his 〈◊〉 . Nay , we know 〈◊〉 usuall for one single Iudge being 〈◊〉 to the other 〈◊〉 , to release his opinion ; and doe we think in this he doth an act con●… to conscience ? seeing all men are subject 〈◊〉 errour , the more secure and safe way is in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for one to 〈◊〉 to the judgement of many , and not for many to 〈◊〉 to the Vote of one . 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , much more in State , wher the very satisfying a 〈◊〉 , somtimes in things not other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , may prove not only 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of peace and 〈◊〉 of strife . True , if in law , 〈◊〉 otherwise . A 〈◊〉 must not displease God to please the 〈◊〉 . If the Author intend in matters cleare and obvious to every eye , there he is in the right , a Governour ought not to displease God , to please the people . But if in matters 〈◊〉 and in●… , here he failes , it may be both convenient and lawfull in such case to subscribe to the 〈◊〉 : Many times the 〈◊〉 of an unreasonable request , doth not satisfie , but increase their 〈◊〉 . ] T is expedient sometimes for Governors to grant that which otherwise would not be necessary . There is a freedome of policy they may make use of sutable to the times and occasions , and not prejudice the law of God or their owne 〈◊〉 . That which at another time may bee unreasonable , may now be couvenient , Better to run the hazzard of an illimited desire , than to destroy all for want of their present satisfaction . That the 〈◊〉 and Magazine of Hull &c. should be entrusted into such hands , as were in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good 〈◊〉 me , conscience and understanding could plead nothing against it . The King had more 〈◊〉 of some , 〈◊〉 more confidence in the fidelity of others . The same may be verified of the Parliament , though upon better ground and 〈◊〉 ; our former sufferings could not but ingage our 〈◊〉 the future . And how could we trust those with this great ship of the Common wealth in an imminent storm , who had 〈◊〉 run it upon the rockes and quicksands in a calme ? If 〈◊〉 could 〈◊〉 beene 〈◊〉 ( as it could not ; for the contrary was true ) that this would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and have 〈◊〉 the occasion of greater danger . What hath beene the cause of these unhappy 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the taking of the Kings towne from him by 〈◊〉 , and the illegall 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 , upon 〈◊〉 of apparent danger . What impudence of Malice are these times reduced to ? that any private pen dare charge the Parliament with such 〈◊〉 ? Is 〈◊〉 the Towne of Hull possessed in his 〈◊〉 behalfe , for the securing of him and his 〈◊〉 ? and is not the 〈◊〉 thereof 〈◊〉 upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the Parliament have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it ? If his Majesty should 〈◊〉 a for●… force or 〈◊〉 to invade the 〈◊〉 , and should surrender up a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is 〈◊〉 not lawfull for his Subjects to seize his 〈◊〉 ; for his and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? And for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is said to be 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all law , and had 〈◊〉 most absolute 〈◊〉 that ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to ; yet let me tell him , that 〈◊〉 doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 to stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which the 〈◊〉 have upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be legall . And I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can imagine his 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 rate that of the 〈◊〉 ; Nay , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet 〈◊〉 , for the Par●… to 〈◊〉 all this upon 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 , and to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where no 〈◊〉 was , &c. 〈◊〉 if the 〈◊〉 ( 〈◊〉 he ) had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : it might in so many 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. Doth the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all other 〈◊〉 to be blind , 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? 〈◊〉 , are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because his confidence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 danger which 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 , hath not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; we owe it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and vi●… of the Parliament : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which 〈◊〉 have 〈◊〉 by this time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ruine and destruction . Besides there is no 〈◊〉 the cause or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 : shall we conclude the clouds which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 , to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vapours , 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 down 〈◊〉 us ? or that our 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 an idle 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 happily our care , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impediment hath 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 the ground and cause of our jealousie ? The Observator having shewed how that Kings are 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , saith what 〈◊〉 is it then in 〈◊〉 , when they will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conscience and reason in things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people No Man justifies pretended conscience , no man can condemne reall . T is true but conscience 〈◊〉 not to oppose or contradict that , which is good and behoovefor the people . I , but there is no ground of objecting of pretences ( saith the Author ) and why so ? because the people are deceived , and if they looke upon his actions , they will 〈◊〉 unto them as 〈◊〉 as the day . I am so 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 , piety and goodnesse , that I 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 so ? T is his evill 〈◊〉 that causes this misunderstanding and breach 〈◊〉 his sacred person , and his 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 that their 〈◊〉 will prejudice his right ; and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with honour and a good 〈◊〉 grant 〈◊〉 , which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to , would injure 〈◊〉 . I , but againe , 〈◊〉 , ( saith hee ) hee that hath 〈◊〉 so much in this . 〈◊〉 and that in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as put all 〈◊〉 Royall 〈◊〉 acts 〈◊〉 grace together , they 〈◊〉 much short of his . And no wonder the 〈◊〉 was sick of many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 through the long 〈◊〉 of Parliaments ; and all these ( which by their happy continuance might have beene prevented ) must now apply 〈◊〉 to the Soveraigne 〈◊〉 of his Royall Grace and favour , for their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Would not have 〈◊〉 any thing which was 〈◊〉 , not anything ( since 〈◊〉 wants 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them ) but 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 him into farre worse 〈◊〉 than that of poverty . T is not his Majesties necessity that can 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a complyance with his Parliament ; what is his necessity to them ? if theirs finde a supply , 〈◊〉 Rex & 〈◊〉 regnum , they care not . But t is strange ! would setling of the 〈◊〉 by the advise of his Parliament , put the King in a worse 〈◊〉 , than poverty ? why , yes ; he that gives away part of his 〈◊〉 , is poorer 〈◊〉 if he had divested himsefe of the 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 plus 〈◊〉 , a pretty fallacy . The vertue of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beene denyed to the Commons , and a 〈◊〉 hath 〈◊〉 made betwixt the parties chosen , and the parties 〈◊〉 , and so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 ; that immovable 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 and power , whereby the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 right of all the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of England , hath 〈◊〉 attempted to be 〈◊〉 and disturbed . There may be a 〈◊〉 in the imputation of Severance , and 〈◊〉 of representation to the Commons . For put the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 men of a county , present a 〈◊〉 to the House against ●…ed lawes , and the 〈◊〉 discipline of the 〈◊〉 ; this is received and thankes returned ; if 〈◊〉 another petition ( modestly and 〈◊〉 expressing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as that most excellent petition of Kent ) be presented , 〈◊〉 by men more 〈◊〉 then the 〈◊〉 &c and this in 〈◊〉 of the present government &c. t is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 it , this by no 〈◊〉 is to bee called a 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 of representation . T is neither number , nor 〈◊〉 of persons ( though I confesse these may 〈◊〉 somewhat the better glosse upon 〈◊〉 ) 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 a petition , either good , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; No , 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of it . And they that shall dare to make one 〈◊〉 against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and ●…terminations of the House , t is no 〈◊〉 if they be put to make a second , for their 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 in so doing , t is they , not the House , that deny the 〈◊〉 of representation . Most of our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Parliaments have proceeded 〈◊〉 this ; 〈◊〉 the people upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 accusations , have beene so 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 themselves from their representatives , and 〈◊〉 there can be nothing under Heaven , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…cing God , which can be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 , than 〈◊〉 . Here we may see the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And 〈◊〉 you may d'scover the over powring of 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for ( saith he ) certainely we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oath of 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ●…ther did ever ( as I have made 〈◊〉 good before ) the body 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 it 〈◊〉 evidently follow ( saith 〈◊〉 ) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . If one 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 ●…wise , it will prove 〈◊〉 . This he grants as 〈◊〉 , that the 〈◊〉 power of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King , and 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 can make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or Law , without the 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King . This one 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 constantly 〈◊〉 to , would 〈◊〉 prevented 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , might restore the Kingdome to 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author never read any Law , that knowes not what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 must receive an equitable & favourable 〈◊〉 , according as 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the case administers occasion ; for summum jus , est 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law may 〈◊〉 be unlawfull . And therefore the 〈◊〉 doth make a good qualification of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 ●…ing onely in 〈◊〉 cases ; but if the safety of the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto them , then an extraordinary course may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . This is it which hath so m●…serably rent this K●…ngdome , and raised these sad divisions . Most malicious and scandalous ; 't is not this ; but the want of its due observance , and negl●…ct of our duty , th●…t hath raised thes ●…ad distrac●…ions . Fi●…st the People are made beleive they are in danger . Strange ! that a Parliament should infringe their trust , and so easily deceive a whole Kingdome . Then a prevention of th●…se danges is promised . Good reason ●…oo ; a whole Kingdome ought not to be sold to misery and destruction upon an easie rate . The 〈◊〉 is this , in case of apparent and immi●…ent danger , the peoples sasety is not 〈◊〉 be negl●…cted ; they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy ; therefore most ●…it they should be put into a posture of defence . Well , what could reason or malice it selfe object against this ▪ I , but then none so fit judges of this apparent and imminent danger , as the two Houses . Is any one so fit ? Or can any discover more than the r●…presentative body of the whole Kingdome ▪ Wherefore they to order this Militia . Had on●… Author intended to have dealt fairely and candidly , he would have showne the man ▪ humble Petitions and requests of the Parliament , to his Majesty , for the ordering of the Militia , according to their advise , ●…or the better security of his people : and His Majesti●…s negative returne unto them ; before they ( according to their duty ) undertooke in his Majesti●…s and his people behal●…e , the trust and ma●…age of the same . And now it must be in their power to command men , 〈◊〉 horses , seise on all the Ammunition , send for what supples of money , they thinke necessary , for the repelling those dangers . This is but a consequence of the other , it were but in vaine to lay a foundation , if they had not power ●…o raise the Structure . I , but here wee are fallen backe againe into ( what we so much complained of ) Arbitrary powe●… . 'T is much that one , who pretends to be M●…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken . Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity ( which justice requireth , should not be regulated by the strickt rule and severity of law , as not being within the intention of it , for that such constructive might prove destinction to the rule ) is a prosecution of an arbitrary power . The manage of a businesse in case of necessity , neede not keepe correspondence and agreement with the rule , neith●…r that to be stile●… Arbitrary , which necessit●… makes lawsull . Was not this the very case of Ship-money ? there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity , and none so compelent a judge of this as the King , and therefore for the securing of the people , money must be immediatly raised without the Subjects consent . With the Authors favour these cases do no way runne parallel , for will it therefore follow , that because the King cannot ( upon no pretence whatsoever ) take away the Subjects prop●…rty , without their consent ; that the Parliam●…ent may not take it with their con●…ent ? Most inconsequent . The Parliament represent the people , which the King doth not ; And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 ●…he people ; wh●…ch the Kings cannot . But then he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money , which he saith will hold in our case . It was then laid downe as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason , that it was better for the Kingdome , though it were in reall danger , in arena 〈◊〉 capere , to 〈◊〉 for it selfe as well as it w●…s able by a suddaine defence , than that the King should pr●…vide such a remedy , which would be so easily , so ●…quently abused upon every pre●…ence of d●…nger , to p●…event such an evill , which could extremly seldome , o●… almost never hap●…en , for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided , but that we must have some intelligence of it . So 〈◊〉 ●…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old wa●… , and the Kingdome 〈◊〉 for it selfe in case of 〈◊〉 , than to 〈◊〉 the hazzard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it , to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion , upon I know not what vaine pretences . I beleive the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parli●…ment , O , the power and vertue of this great Assembly ▪ that can so Metamorphize men , as to mak●… th●…m sp●…ak acco●…ding to the dictate of reas●…n , not aff●…ction . But for his Argument the ground of the ob●…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money , was , the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy , upon eve●…y pretence of danger : which without controversie carries a great deale of wait with it . And when our A●…thor can make it good ( as he h●…th strongly 〈◊〉 , but much failed in it ) that a Communit●… ma●… have those many private ends to mislead it , that a King may , then sh●…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parrallel ; untill then , we must ●…ell him , th●…t there is ●…oure hundr●…d to one against him . I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir I●…hn Ho hams act Treason , be not contrary to the cleare●…t 〈◊〉 of humane reason ▪ and the ●…trongest inclinations of nature ; for every private man may defind himselfe by force , if 〈◊〉 , though by the force of his Majestrate , or his owne 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not , without all confidence by fl●…ght . Sir Iohn Hothams seising upon the Kings Towne and Ammunition , was , it seemes in his own defence ; who assaulted him ? Did his Majesty drive him into Hull ? No , But his Mejesty would have driven him out , he being possessed of it by the Authority of Parliament , for the securing of him and his people . And though it be not lawfull for a Subject to seise a towne in his owne defence , yet having got it by a lawfull authority : he may defend himselfe , and it , against any assault by the same power . Neither can any other extrajudiciall power or command discharge him of that trust , which was committed to him in a legall and judiciall way by another . What can he thinke of the Gunpowder Traytors , was their resistance a just defence ? Then certainely every rebellion is a just warre . His conclusion is very just ; For questionles there can be no warre unlawfull , if their resistance were a warrantable defence . But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him , that the cases are more different then a Papist , and a Prot●…stant ; they agree in somewhat , the cases in nothing ; for they had neither lawfull cause , nor sufficient authority on their side to maintaine resistance ; as Sir Iohn Hotham had . Againe they were Traytours before by their horrid unnaturall and cruell attempt ; But I hope Sir Iohn Hothams bare seising of the Towne could not proclaime him Traytor ; But enough of this in a case so manifest . He may as soone convince a man of common sense , that black and white are the same colour , as that these cases runne parallel . Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard , being uncapable of flight , must yeeld their throats , and submit to Assassinates , if their King will not allow them defence . There is a great difference , betwixt a Subjects defending of himselfe , and offending his King . His fea●…es are over witty , if they will not permit him , to thinke himselfe safe , except he get into one of the Kings Forts for his better security . Without question he that may defend , may offend ; for how is it possible that I should defend my selfe , if I may not offend my enemy ? What a sensles thing , and void of reason is it , to mainetaine that Subjects may take up Armes to defend themselves , against the unlawfull Tyranny of their Prince ; but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act , but stand like so many stocks , immoveable what is this but opposi●…um in objecto , a fl●…t contradiction ; or a taking up of Armes in iest , to make me capable of losing my life in earnest ? If this were all we could doe , the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends , would be ●…his , by Tyranny and oppression , to ingage the people , in this imaginary defensive warre , thereby to disarme them , and force obedience to their unjust desires : or slay them with their owne weapons . But to passe this . If a King shall take up armes to d●…stroy his people , no question law , reason and pollicy will warrant their seising of ●…ny fort , or publique place of defence , for their owne better security . See if we are not left as a Prey , to the same bloody hands , as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ireland &c. If we may not take up armes for our owne safety , or if it be possible for us to take up armes , without s●…me ●…otes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia . Subjects upon invasi●…n , would not have wanted Commission to take up armes . But upon a civill combustion they might ; Hee that will give me power to fight against his enemy ; will not give me authority to oppose himself , but doubtlesse this is no rule in the Politiq●…es , for a man first to receive one blow , and then to stand upon his guard , to keepe off the second , better by a vigilant providence to prevent both ; or to expect an invasion , and then be to ●…eke our Commission , enemies are more easie kept out , than th●…y can be repelled , when they are once in . I , but he saith , this would be of ill consequence to subjects , if they might have power to take up armes , as often as ambitious cholerick men for their own ends shall perswade th●…m they are in danger . For by this meanes , being easily deceived , whilest they endeavour to avoyd false , they would run them selves beadlong upon true perils . Th●…se ambitious men ( which he himselfe knowes not ) and these pretended dangers ( because he himselfe feares not ) have a strong influence upon the Authors whole booke ; T is very much that the reason and senses of a whole Nation , should be so easily captivated . But t is his onely plea , and therefore you must give him leave to make use of hi●… pr●…tences , or you bid him silence . Well , to tell our Author once for all ; as no man can or will justifie a pretended cause of feare so no man can condemne a reall . And without he will say , that there can be no cause of feare , without he be privy to it ; this aspersion is by no meanes to be suffered ; for by this we shall never know how to beleeve that we are in danger ; for that true feares may be blasted with the ignominie of feined and pretended carry the visage of true . The King sayes ; the Parliament denyes &c. to whether now in this uncertainty 〈◊〉 the subje●● bounded to adhere ? Wee may consider whether the Houses , doe not barely say ; and whether his Majesty doth not descend so farre , as to give reasons for what ●…e doth , and to shew the Kingdome the ground of his actions , by perticular citation of the Lawes , which justifie them . What the two Houses of Parliament barely say ; then belike , if his suffrage be of any account , they prove or make good nothing . Was ever age guilty of so great irreverence , or of offering so grea●… an afforo●…t an●… in ●…ignity to this great Assembly ? Of whom , as the law saith , we ought not to imagine a dishonourable thing , much lesse to speake it . I am confident that all Histori●…s that ever were , cannot give you one example of so high disdaine and presumption . What the two Ho●…ses barely say ? He hath a great measure of confidence that dare say it , for my part I dare not returne the contrary , but I leave it to the whole wo●…ld to judge , whether that they do not exactly prove and maintaine their owne assertion ; and utterly disprove and destroy the contrary objections and conclusions . I , but saith the Author , we ought to agree , whether swer●…ing from law , be to be judged by the actions , or by the au●…hors ; that is , if the King should ●…ave done what ever they did , and the Houses , what ever he did , whether all would not th●…n have be●…n l●…gall , because don by them . Certainly t is no good way of iudging , to conclude the legality or illegality of an action from the Author or Actor , t is the applying of the rule to the action , that denominates it , eithergood , or bad . However we ought not totally to reject these circumst●…nces , of place and persons , for no doubt that in some cases may be lawfull for one , that will not be lawf●…ll for another . And it is more than probable , that the Parliament may in many cases have a more extensive pow●…r than the King , However certaine I am , that it is but charity in our Author to grant them his beleife ; that they will not approve or maintaine that in themselves : which they condemne as illegall in his Majesty . The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to his authority , but is willing to make all the world the judge of his actions . And have the Parliament withheld any thing , that might give satisfaction to the people ? Neither ●…s a blind ob dienc●… a part of any mans duty to the Houses . Hee , who after so great l●…ght and evidence of the integrity and justice of the Parliaments proceedings , shall say . he obeyes , he knowes not upon what grounds ; may justly be conclud●…d to be Non compos mentis , robbed of his senses . Some things he saith , are matter of fact , here we may be guided by sense●… , and judge as wee see . With the Authors favour , this to an ordinary capacity , may be a dangerous way of determining , for though wee must alwayes judge according to the outward s●…nse in matter of fact ▪ yet wee must have this caution , that we g●…e no further , as for instance ; If I see one enter and seisea Castle , or fort of the Kings ( put the case Hull ) that he did enter , that my sense directs mee to discerne , but whether he keepe the possession for , or against the King , that is examinable upon other circumstances , and is matter of law , depending upon reason and judgement , and this every ordinary capacity cannot judge of . But saith he , this every one may ●…udge of , whether the King hath seised on any thing wherein the subject hath a property ? That 〈◊〉 thupon the ●…ower and priviledges of Parliament , the best evidence to maintaine the title that we have to ●…ll that ever we enjoy ; Or whether that the Subject hath not seized on something , wherein the King hath a property ? That we must yeeld affirmative to , that the Subject hath not seized on the Kings property ; but it is to his use and behoofe , for the securing of him and his people . So that the King looseth nothing , but both gaine protection and safety thereby . Whether the King hath raised warre against the Parliament , that is , whether his guard was an Army . A very strang and unusuall guard of 15000. or 20000. And whether Hull is now London , Very manifect it is not , but the forces , that ●…ound no b●…tter successe approaching London , may ( for ought I know ) make a speedy retreat to Yorke againe . Wee had a Maxime , and it was grounded upon nature , and never till this Parliament , withstood , t●…at a community can have no private ends , to mislead it , and make it injurious to it selfe . True , in a sta●…e where a collective bod●… 〈◊〉 : and the reason of it , is evident , for though every man aime at his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 interest , yet except it be agreeable to the in●…erest of the Major part , it will never passe into an act , and i●… it be advantagious for the most , it is to be esteemed publike ; Now what service this c●…n do the two Houses , I cannot see , because they are a representative body . O , yes , very much ; and let me tell you , none could have said more in their vindication , for 〈◊〉 your owne language upon your selfe , though every man in Parliament , aime at his 〈◊〉 ●…erticular interest , 〈◊〉 except it be agreable to the interest of the Major part , it will never 〈◊〉 into an act , and if it be advantagious for the most , it is to be esteemed publique . But you will say , it is indeed to bee esteemed so : and yet in truth it may be otherwise . First , this ough●… not to be presumed ; and againe , I dare confidently asfirme it , that the 〈◊〉 part of 3. or 4. hundred , may carry as publique Spirits , and as free from selfe respects , or the persecution of Private interest , as the Major part of the collective body . And no doubt had not our predecessours at first , and all the succeeding ages since , beene possessed with these thoughts , two should not have satisfied every Bu●…rough , nor the like number every County . I , but he 〈◊〉 , the reasons why this Kingdom hath seldom 〈◊〉 under the corruptions of a 〈◊〉 . He doth well to say seldome indeed , for he cites no example of this nature ; and had there beene any such , I know the Author would not withheld them , are First , for that it was a 〈◊〉 , for the most part , but of short continuance , so that they hold not time to ●…ould and fashion 〈◊〉 aimes ; and when called together againe , the body was much altered . The Author , no doubt , had hee beene so w●…ll disposed , as to have done his Countrey that right , could have shewne us many Parliaments of long continuance ; and when he had done , 〈◊〉 have beene able to have charged them with the least corruptions ; But h●…e is mightily carried ●… way with vaine imaginations and 〈◊〉 . He thinks short Parliaments , had they been long , would have beene adulterated , and donis empta corrupted with gifts , like the 〈◊〉 of Rome , which , he so much instances in . Had he ever beene acquainted with charity , it would have taught him better surmises of his private brother , much more of so great and reverend As semblie as the Parliament , But his second and cheife reason is , ●…or that the finall determination 〈◊〉 not in one , nor two hands , but the joynt consent of three estates is necessary . 'T is true , for the making new lawes , or altering , or repealing the old ; But not so in case of declaring of the common Law of the land , for that the two Houses may do , as an ancient right belonging to that supreame Court , without the consent of his Majesty , and why this power should be conceived more to traduce this Parliament , ( as our Author laboureth to insinuate into our beleife ) than it hath done others formerly , 〈◊〉 to me a Mystery . The king may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments . If this be all the motive , he may as safely keepe them . Must the Kingdome be put to conf●…ict with u●…ter ruine , and 〈◊〉 , the sad ( but certaine ) 〈◊〉 of cruell warre , for want of that , which 〈◊〉 granted by the Ki●…g , would no way prejudice his right , and being enjoyed by the people , would bring great happinesse and security to both . None knowes better , or aff●…cts more the sweetnesse of this so well ballanced a Mona●…chy . I bele●…ve they affect Monarchy ; why then doth this Author indeavour to take it away , by denying the king power of 〈◊〉 , which our Ancestours inviolably pres●…rved , as a most happy r●…straint of Aristocracy or D●…mocracy . It is said , that by debating or reasoning of a thing , a man shall thereby be brought at last , to discover the true reason . Which cert●…inely our Author will never do ; who labours to defend one 〈◊〉 by another , ●…he subverting of Monarchy by denying of the King a negative voice . None can sp●…ake mor●… ( that is not a ravished doctor , or fauning parasite ) to t●…stifie his affections to th●…s admira le and well established Government than the Author doth . Neither doth he througho●…t his 〈◊〉 booke , deny the Kings Prerogative of a negative voice . All that he undertakes ; i●… but to shew them their ne plus ultra , ●…nd to del neate and demonstr●…te th●… true cir●… and bo●…ndaries of Royalty ; and whether this be an end●…avour to take it away , let the weakest capacity judge . It hath be●…ne often in the power of former Parliaments , to load that rule with greater ●…etters and cloggs , but they would not . A 〈◊〉 good 〈◊〉 , there is little reason now to do it . Their 〈◊〉 of their just rights and priviledges , is no loading or settering of 〈◊〉 , but a keeping it in its equall and due 〈◊〉 . The Observato●…r having shewed the exact and Geomet●…icall distance that the three estates keep , one having no power to hurt or prejudice the other , but all labouring exactly for the good whole , 〈◊〉 us , not to secek to 〈◊〉 this purity of composition . Very good councell : but 〈◊〉 ●…e 〈◊〉 in the words 〈◊〉 following . Is not a perswading of he King that his Parliament intends the divesting of his ancient prerogatives and rights ▪ and which is more , the diss●…lution of Monarchy ; and by these 〈◊〉 insinuations , dividing him from his Parliam●…nt , a mean●…s to corrupt this 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Why then no doubt , his words following are very seasonable , That wee must not conceive that both Gent●…y and Nobility , can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 king . Therefore it will be 〈◊〉 for the king to leave all ●…o their disposall , who certain●…ly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nothing but what is fitting . This is the Authors construction and conclusion ; But t is ●…ery 〈◊〉 that he should 〈◊〉 it out of this text , that because the Parliament cannot combine 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 ▪ therefore it is fitting for the King to surrender up his power to the 〈◊〉 , I 〈◊〉 say that such a rule and predominancy never entr●…d the thoughts of any one , but himselfe . Is not the conclusion more just ; that therefore this will maintaine the Parliament in defending their owne rights ? Doub●…lesse it is . For my part , my Vote shall alwayes be , that the King may sway his Scep●…er in its just extent and latitude , that the people may b●… made to know th●…ir due distance ; and that the Parliament en●…oy their ancient rights , that the King may not 〈◊〉 upon liberty . The Observator having shewed how that no change of Government can be advantagious to the Lords and Common : hee descends to shew , how that though it might , yet it cannot be effected , For that their power is meerely derivative , so that except wee will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation , nothing can be done . Then it is confess●…d , the King hath a right of dissenting . Confest ( out Author thinks hee hath here got a great advantage of us , out of our owne confession ) why , was it ever denyed that the Kings consent w●…s not necessary , to the making of new lawes , or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old ? Nay , hath it not be●…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases , that if he will dissent ( as hee may ) nothing can be don●… without him ? why then a fortiori he shall have a n●…gative power , where the alteration of th●… forme of Government is propound●…d . But he must understand , that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certaine cases before them , without his Majesties consent , for that that is a power incident to this great Court , as well as others inferiour , and in such case the King hath no negative voyce . ●…xcept both King and people . He●…e ( saith hee ) a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lords C●…mmons and King . If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words : I le r●…nounce my understanding . All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us , is but this , that the changing of the auncient established forme , of our Government , is Casus omissus out of their Commission ; and therefore not to be accompli●…ed by them , without the consent of both King and people . 〈◊〉 doth not say , that the Collective body may doe it , without the consent of the 〈◊〉 , Lords and Commons ; This happily might be a predominant power ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary , for the introducting of a new frame of Government . Now , how this should be , a transferring of a power to the people collectively , beyond the Lords , C●…mmons and king ; I must confesse I apprehend not ; therefore the construction is either very forraigne , or my capacitie extreame dull . If the King be an affecter of true liberty , he hath in Parliament a power as ●…xtensive as ever the Roman Dictators was , for the preventing of publike d●…resses . He saith that though the Romanes could not indure a King , yet in effect they had the same thing , for in any immi●…nt dangers , necessitie of State forced them to chuse a Dictator , which ( as he sayes ) had absolute power over them ) and to submit to his Authority , which relieved them in their greatest extremities . Hence ( he saith ) we may make the truest judgement , what forme of Government the wisest Romanes esteemed most convenient . And concludes that since they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway , we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government . &c. May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and incompasse his Royall Scepter ; May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legall power ; And may this happy glo rious succesefull ( and never sufficiently ) to be encomiasted ) Government continue ( without the least interruption ) amongst us ; untill time hath spent its last period , and brought a dissolution and finall conclusion on all things ; And I take him to be no true and faithfull member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen . If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding , and good conscience , and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto , there needed no such contestation . If the Councell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience , and the Councell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto , there needed no such contestation . That the Parliament and Court should be at varience , t is no news , there hath beene alwayes a secret enmity and antipathy b●…twixt them . The Court never well digesting the happinesse and freedome os 〈◊〉 people , nor they the oppression , and publique disservice of the Court ; the one still contending for an absolutenesse of 〈◊〉 ; the other for the maintenance and desending of their liberty . But I n●…ver heard before that the Counsell or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament ; or could any way ballance with that : doub●…lesse they are not equ●…ll competitors ; the Parliament repres●…nt the publique , and those counsellors themselves onely , the one studies to augment the Common wealth , the other their owne : wherefore he is perfidious to himselfe , and treacherous to h●…s countrey , that can be so transported with words , as to renounce the Parliament ▪ for my part , I shall lay it down , as one of the Articles of my beleife , that the Counsell of ●…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding , and good conscience ; and the Councell of the Parliament , evidently consonant thereunto : good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 publike . The Observator having laid it downe as a ground that 〈◊〉 c●…nnot reasonably be supposed , the greatest counsell of the Kingdome should not gi●… the most faithfull advise , adds ; there●…ore Princes if they may not be lead by their owne opinions , rather than by the sacred and awefull counsells of whole Nations , unreasonably complaine , they are denied liberty of conscience , and 〈◊〉 out of their owne unde●…standings . I appeale to any mans judgment , whether any thing can be ●…ged for the authority of a Lay councell , that it 〈◊〉 to in●…orce a submission of judgment , and a performance of duties arising from trust agreable there●…o , which may not with ( at least ) equall advantages , be pressed for the same binding power in councels Eccleciasticall ; And yet the●…e ( he saith ( it would go hard , but a man would find some answer ( as easily he migh●… ) wherby to iustifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which he saies , we may with very little al●…eraton apply to civill counsells . I confe●…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine , than a Lawyer , but t is 〈◊〉 frequent with me to trespasse upon another mans profession : 〈◊〉 give me ●…ave a little , that our Author may not passe u●…nswered , to speake my 〈◊〉 in this perticular . Now ( with the favour of the Author ( if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not ) there is a wide 〈◊〉 , as to our case betwe●…ne lay and 〈◊〉 Counsells . For I take this for a ●…rtaine and cleare truth in d●…vinity , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsell whatsoever ( be it of never so great ability or eminency ) 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations ; for th●…t the conscience of a man , is ( if I may so speake ) out of their jurisdiction , t is God alone that hath power over that . Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God . The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. Shewing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent sayes in the 5. verse , one man esteemeth one day above another , another est●…emeth every day alike ; let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde . By this t is manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men . Againe ver. 14 there is nothing ( saith he ) uncleane of it selfe : but ●…o 〈◊〉 that esteemeth any thing to be uncleane , to him it is uncleane , by this likewise , it is cleare that what my conscience persw●…des mee is unlawf●…ll ( be the judgement of other men what it will ) ought not to be inforced upon mee . Againe the last verse , He that doubteth is damned , if he eate , because he eateth not of faith ; for whatsoever is not of faith , is finne . So that for my part I take it , as an unquestionable ●…ruth , that no Ecclesiasticall authority whatsoever hath power over a mans conscience , though it be , but in things indifferent . But now on the other side , I take it to be as evident and as 〈◊〉 an assertion , that any Lay counsell may in 〈◊〉 meerely civill or morall , no way reflecting upon the word of God , oblige the conscience ( which indeed is but the bare opinion and judgement of a man ) by their conclusions , and determinations ; and in such ease t is no sin , for a man to oppose his owne reason , by submission to the judgement of o●…hers . And if this were not a truth , Justice would be but slow payed , and the law as various as the severall dispositions of men , and every man would have power to infringe the law upon every 〈◊〉 of opposition to conscience . 〈◊〉 but the Author goes on , and tells us that though amongst probable A●…guments , that drawne 〈◊〉 the Authority of wise men , carry with it greatest weight , yet it must give place to a greater reaso●… . T is ●…rue ; where the greater or better reason is evident : but 〈◊〉 are not bound to renounce our owne understanding , and to believe that to be the better reason , which you affirme to be so . The Parliament must in strength of probability give the better reason ; and when you can prove the contrary ( which as yet you fall much short of ) then shall we be of your beliefe , untill then you must give us leave to retaine our owne . Now to every man belongs a judgement of 〈◊〉 , which must decide for what concernes his perticular duty . T is true where he is sole Arbiter , and where it co●…cernes his owne particular onely ; but where the publique is interested , there it is otherwise . So ( hee ●…aith ) in the Kings case . The Votes , which carry in them the authority of of both Houses , shall beare great sway , and is it be in things extreamely dubious ; they may turne the Scales of the other ●…ide . This truth , if firmely stood to ( as it ought ) would suddainely per●…d this sad contestation . But alas , how quickly t is broken . For he saith , if greater reason seeme to contradict them , his Majesty will not hoodwinke his understanding ▪ and blindly ●…ollow , whether they please to lead him , he will walke by the greater light . greater reason , very much that the reason of the Court , should preponderate that of the Parliament ; For example ( he sa●…h ) 〈◊〉 Majestie perceiving how much his people may suster under ar●… power , is resolved never to make use of it , and th●…nks it lesse fitting any other should . I would to God h●…s Majestic had never been wrought upon by his evill Counsell to break his resolution . Is it not an arbitrary way of rule for to tak●… away mens property without their cons●…nt ? And is i●… not arbitrary for the King to pre●…e his owne single ex●…udiciall judgement , before that of his Parliaments ▪ But it is told him now , the use of it will bee for their good , by reason of app●…ent imminent dangers . Hath the Author thus informed his Majestie , certainly never any one else did , it were happy both for King and people , that it were no more practised by t●…e Court , than it is by the Parliamen●… . Concerning the Action at Hull , the Observator agreeth , to take poss●…ssion of the Kings Towne , and shu●… the gates against h●…m , is treason , if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act , as in this case , he sayes , th●…y doe , for the first thing to be lookt on is , that the King was meerely d●…ed en●…ance for that time , his generall right was not denyed . If then a subject take up 〈◊〉 : against his Soveraigne in a t●…mporall warre , it must not come 〈◊〉 the compasse of 〈◊〉 . No , whether it be temporary or co●…nuing , so he hath the same Commission to justifie his action . And he may leg●…lly possesse 〈◊〉 of the Kings 〈◊〉 , and maintaine them against him , so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath no 〈◊〉 in them . T is not his confessing that he hath no right , for that all th●… world can judge of , but his doing no wrong that excuses him . No de●…ing language was given . If a man take away my pu●…se , shall he be acquitted from ●…elony , because he did not give mee ill language too ? Inventio tua nomen imponit operi 〈◊〉 , t is the invention ( as we say in law ) that denominates the action . And therefore though I cannot acquit him of felony that shall take away your purse , and in exchange give you only good words ; yet if he shall rescue your purse out of the hands of Robbers , or take it from your own●… person being in danger , for its better security ; and shall againe faithfully ●…ore it , when you have liberty to enjoy your owne : if he be felon , 〈◊〉 dye for him . No act of violence was used . This he may say , who hath picked anothers pocket ; but it is no sufficient plea against the Law . Yes , if he can shew a lawfull commission for it . 〈◊〉 he used no violence , though the King for 〈◊〉 ▪ 〈◊〉 together , did stand within Musket s●…t , &c. It is no argument of innocence , that he had 〈◊〉 to be more highly guilty , and abstained . T is true , had he beene guilty at all . The King used termes of desyance , &c. and this makes the Act m●…ely desensive , or rather passive . If this were true , there was never any warre , but defensive . For those who by some great injustice o●…ed provoke a nation to right it s●…e , fight aswell to maintaine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as what they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . T●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that offer any injustice or wrong , though they take up a●…mes to secure themselves , 〈◊〉 on the offensive p●…t , n●…t the defensive . But this rests to prove in our case . How 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 to the King any grounds to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yorke , many men won●… , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seeme the same 〈◊〉 to the King , as if he had beene pursued to the gates 〈◊〉 ●…ke . Certainly it was a 〈◊〉 ground not only to raise a guard , for his safety ; but an Armie to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a●…d to right his 〈◊〉 . A 〈◊〉 for his safety ▪ why Sir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not advance towards York ; nor ever〈◊〉 ●…sed it . An army to punish th●…t h●…gh indignity . Very just it should be s●… , had there beene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And to right his 〈◊〉 ve●…y reasonable ▪ had his Ma●…esty been any way dishonoured ? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Townesmen out of their 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 ▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 , who acts only by their 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 what are they ? I but he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 . This is but your bare assertion which is n●…t to be credited before the Pa●…liament . But if it had beene so , that they had beene turned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , be sayes the same law would have justified this act as well as the 〈◊〉 . So ▪ it would ; had the primer seisin of their estates beene of the like con●…equence and concernme●…t ●…o the publike . But , he sayes , since not only the Countrey about , but the inhabitants within the towne have suffered in their estates and liberties . If any have suffered without , they may thank the unlawf●…ll assaults of others : if within , their unfaithfulnesse to the Common wealth . Or if they cl●…ymed any interest in it to themselves . So much the lesse reason to 〈◊〉 on it , if he cannot so much as pretend title ▪ to it . T is sufficient if the common Wealth clayme an interest in it , though he doth not . Or have 〈◊〉 the king , utterly denying his right for the future . If any law can be produced to justifie the taking away the kings goods 〈◊〉 a time , the 〈◊〉 will be cleared . If any law , or evidence can be produced to justifie the towne of Hull to be the Kings goods otherwise than with reference to the common wealth , for the good of which he is intrusted with it , then happily the case may not be so evident . Or have made any other ●…se of their possession , but meerely to prevent civill warre . There is not any way more likely to create a civill 〈◊〉 , than indeavours to prevent it , by illegall courses . Uery just if you could demonstrate any illegall courses that have beene taken . If the Parliament ( the shutting of the King out of Hull was not their act ) if the Act of the substitute , be not the Act of him that doth authorize him ; then I understaud no law , be not vertually the whole kingdome it selfe . The King excl●…ded , it is not . T is certaine , but if he exclude himselfe , then it is . If it be not like supreame judicature , as well in matters of State , as matters of law . Till new lawes be enacted , the subject cannot justifie any act , but what is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the old . This is an unquestionable truth , if the Author doe not corrupt it by this false glosse , and interpretation ; he must know , t is one thing to declare the common law , another to ●…act a new law ; the subject may justifie an act , by the authority of Parliament , without his Majesties consent in the former , not so in the latter . If it be not the great Counsell of the kingdome , as well as of the king , to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations , to provide in all extraordinary cases , ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica 〈◊〉 the brand of treason stick upon it . No provisions are allowed , but what are legall , least the remedies prove worse than the disease . Very right , but circumstances may vary a case . And that may , and ought to be legall at one time , that nei●…her will , nor can be so , at another And in extraordinary cases , extraordinary provisions , may bee made , and ought not to be●… br●…nded with injustice , or breach of Law . Nay , if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes , unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed . It is no just cause to take away a 〈◊〉 money , and said he did first desire him to deliver it . Cleare law ; and the cases will no way vary ; if the Author can prove that the King hath as absolute a property in the towne of Hull , as any man hath in his money . Or if their grounds of 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 vaine . It is against all equitie , to d●…e a wrong , because there is a 〈◊〉 of suffering it . Right , but I hope you will prove now , that there is a wrong done , and not argue this by way of admission . Besides , it is against all reason that a whole Kingdome should be put to suffer a wrong , out of a meere possibilitie of doing one . Or if the 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 kingdome can be co●…ted vaine . Too large an expression , much the greater pa●…t of the kingdome apprehend unjust grounds of jealousies . Very good , is not this the Doctrine of division that I impeach our Au●…hor to be guilty of before . The Parliament have formerly beene esteemed the representative body of the who●… Kingdome ; But belike now ●…is otherwise , they have ( I know not how ) lost this honour and priviledge ; or it is unjustly taken from them . In the easing us of these many pre●…ures , which lay so heavin upon he Kingdome ( 〈◊〉 which we and our whole posterity are eternally ingaged unto them ) there they did represent us : and their actions for our benefi●… , had an influence upon the whole Kingdome . But if they tell us through their vigilancy and great care of us ) that we are like to be reduced to a worse condition , through the malicious couns●…ll of those men that wrought our former miseries , if not timely preven●…ed ; there they sit in a parsonall capacity only , and we are not bound to believe that we 〈◊〉 in danger , because they say so : No , ala●… they are a seditious , factious and inconsid●…rable number ; who intend to raise t●…ir own fortunes , upon v●…ine 〈◊〉 of danger , out of the publike d straction●… . O the wit and power of 〈◊〉 , that should thus work upon men , to renounce their unde standing , neglect their duty and incurre the publike ruine , upon a meere possibility tha they may be seduced by the Parliament . But t is very m●…ch ●…at the Author should dare to affirme , ●…ha much the greater part of the Kingdome appreh●…nd no ground of jealousie , b●…like he hath travailed the w●…ole Kingdom over , and examined men by the Poles , and tak●…n every ones suffrage , and so upon the to ●…l cast up on every side , is able to render you this account , or otherwise hee could never make good his assertion . O●… if they cl●…yme any such right of judging of dangers , and preventing of them without the Kings Consent as ordinary and perpetuall . As of●…en as they have a mind to make use of such a right , t is easie ●…or them to call the case extraordinary , and pretend publike dang●…rs . If it shall be suffered that their sole●…ne judgements and determinations ( which are of so great waight and credit , that they ought to awe us to a beliefe of them ) shall be blasted with the scandall of vaine and pretend●…d ; how can it possibly be , ●…hat there should fall out any case 〈◊〉 ? I , but the event ought to be Judge ; and ( he sayes ) they will never be c●…nfuted by that , if not now , for certainly apparent dang●…s did never lesse app●…e . Admirably ingenious , were it not a pure contradiction : for doub●…lesse , if apparent dangers ; they must be seene . But let me tell you , that the issue or event is no certaine de ermi●… of an imminent danger : a provident care ( as now ) or an unexpected interposing providence ( as in case of the Gunpowder plo●… ) may prevent the blow ; shall we therefore conclude it was never ofl●…red ? It would more abundantly have satisfied me , if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes . Dou●…tlesse those , whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten ; secret and concealed cannot . The King might have prevented the same repulse by send●…ng of a messenger before hand . That is , if he had not come to g●…t in , he had not b●…ene shut out , if he would have stayed away , he would not have denyed h●…m entrance . A very apt conclusion , and it had b●…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise , as to have saved hi●… labour . Or by comming without any such considerable forces . Let his forces be great , he was not to give law to his Prince . No ; nor any privie Counsell to the Parliam●…nt ; B●…t n●…ither is it likely ●…ee would have ●…ave admitted him then , for you 〈◊〉 a lit●…le above , 〈◊〉 offered to enter , with twen●…y Horse only unarmed . Whether his Ma●…esty m●…de any such profer or no , I know not : nor is i●… materiall , for t was not the paucitie of number , th t could excuse his breach of trust . The Scots in England tooke Newcastle , but by private authority , yet there w●…re other qualifications in that act , sufficient to purge it of Treason . The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you , as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act ; you might well let that passe in silence , which they have buried in an act of O●…livion . T is no wrong , either to King or Parliament , for a man to say that is no treason , which they have adjudged not to be so . Neither is that act of theirs so to be buri●…d in utter silence , as not to acquit and discharge us , if we can plead the same innocency . Then the Observator instances at large , in the example of ●…dward the second , misted by 〈◊〉 . It doth not ●…llow , because one king hath hearkned to evill Couns●…ll , therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good . That is true , but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much , that o●…hers may be misled as well as he , and when a Parliament shall declare ( as now ) that the King is misled by evill Counsell , t is not your b●…re 〈◊〉 , that can make good the contrary . 〈◊〉 p●…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes . He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales , and ballancing their r●…putations . What odds may be gained in point of estate , I know not ( though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost ) But without controversie , their reputations cannot be very good , whose cause and counsell is so bad . An Aristocracy in Parliament , cannot be erected with●…ut some meanes , and what this meanes shall be , is yet to us altogether inscrutable . Certainly he is quicker sighted , than not to perceive what is so obvious , deny the King a negative , and the thing is done . Had the Parliament ( as in truth they never did ) denyed the King a negative , yet the Author ( who pretends to be so quick sighted ) would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty , than to be so easie compassed and effected . The power of the Parliaments is but derivative , and depending upon publike consent . and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull , odious tyranny a mongst us is not disce●…able . It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them , but it may be the abuse of power , if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs ; for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election , yet not so after they are met together . If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative ( as it cannot bee denyed ) and that not absolute and illimit●…d , but qualified and circumscribed ( as it must bee agreed ) why then the consequence is very just , that where they doe exceed that power , this doth not ●…gage the consent and obedience of the people ; why then without ●…e shall allow that the peoples vote , and consent may be had ( which is so far from improbable , that it is almost impossible ) we may here judge , what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy . He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way . But yet they must needs have a great party ; considering their severall relations , and the advantage they have in advancing the interests , whether religious or civill , of some , which may be able to doe them service , and this would create division in the Kingdome . Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament ; though they be a contradiction to his owne reason . What are their severall relations compared with the publike ? or what advantage can th●…r power of preferment yeeld them , ( since but few can attaine to that ) in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny ? His Majesty expresses his indignation , that they should dare to tell their King , they may without want of modesty or duty depose him . To which the Observator answers , This cannot bee collected from these words , That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty , because ( sayes he , ) it may justly be denyed , that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England . What was there asfirmed of Parliaments , had none of his present restriction of free in it . What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it , by a faire intendment ; we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament , whose words and actions ought ( if we will be guided by the rule of law ) to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us . Wh●…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine , when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments , that they doe include forced parliaments , because ( as they well know ) these are not presidents , for free Parliaments to bee guided by . And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. ( which I make no question , the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke ) say , that in that Declaration , to which this objection refers , they delivered , that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts . And further that some presidents were such , as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow ; which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings . How dare then the Author , ( though not expresly , yet tacitly ) accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication ? But I passe itover , and leave him to his just censure . He sayes , that the King is offended at their frank expressions , disguised under the charge of a malignant party . The sense of his answer is this , they have no otherway to cleare themselves ; for there being foults somewhere , not to lay them upon others , were to take them upon themselves . Happy were our condition if his Majesties evill Counsellors could so easily acquit themselves of any wrong done to the publike , as the Parliament can . but then he goes on and sayes , that his Majesty ha●…h proposed a very good way , which will fully satisfie the world in their innocency ( I hope the world is sufficiently satisfied without that ) which is not alwayes to accuse , but some times to prove . A most unusuall and illegall way ; was it ever heard of or knowne , that evidence should be produced against any man for any kind of delinquency , before the party was brought to his tryall ? t were very unjust to condemn a man , not see●…ng his Accusers , no●… hearing their evidence ; I rather believe t●…is is to b●… a proposition of the Authors coyning , than to proceed from his Majestie ▪ And if any Messenger were sent from the Parlibe a proposition of the Authors coyning , than to proceed from h●…s Majesty . And if any Messenger were s●…nt from the Parliament , ( as I believe one was ) to demand a delinquent accused by them ; he might have beene sufficiently beaten for his paines , and have returned without him . How then could the Parliament make their proofe in a legall way , according to this proposition ? The King demands justice for Tumults , and high indignities offered , and complaines of a prohibition , sent from the House of Commons into Southwarke , to hinder the processe against a Ryot according to law . The Observators answer is , Equa●… justice could not be obteined against the Court Cavalliers . His Majestie never protected them from legall tryall , it was free for them to have proved what they could against them . It must have beene behind their backs ●…hen ; which is a p●…ece of admirable justice ; and when they had made good their proofes ; they must have sent to Yorke , for to impeach and d●…mand them and what successe that journey would have produced , your jdgmen●… could easily informe you . The k●…ng sayes it being granted by them , that their priviledges do not extend to Treason , felony , or breach of the peace , so as to exempt the members from all manner of tryall , yet if they be so priviledged in the method of their ●…yall , that the cause must first be brought before them , and their consent asked , before you can proceed , then their priviledges extend as far in these , as in the most unquestioned cases , because no priviledges exempt them fr●…m all manner of tryall , the House being acquainted and leave given . I take the law to be ( pardon me if I judge amisse ) in all cases of a criminall nature , where the person may be seised and sequestred : there though he may be arrested , or detained to appeare before them , yet he cannot be proceeded against in any other Court or way than in Parliament , whereby he may he taken or detained fr●…m the service of Parliament , without their consent , and this is no exemption from tryall , but only a priviledge in the method of it . But now on the other side , in all civill causes , if they demand their priviledg , t is the frequent practice to allow it them , and this doth totally suspend the prosecution of the suit or tryall . I but he saith . It was fully intended the members should have had a legall and speedy tryall . It cannot be conceived so , since his Majestie was advised to make such an unusuall and illegall impeachment , and prosecution against them . The Parliament do not deny the king a true , reall interest , in any thing had by him , either in jure Coronae , or in jure personae , but only affirms that in the same thing the State hath an interest paramount in cases of publ●…ke extremitie , by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its owne necessary preservation . ] The king is a part of the state , and therefore the other part hath not any power warranted by law , to do what they think fit to his prejudice , upon pretence of publike extremity . We shall a low your assertion , that the King is part of the State , and that therefore the other part cannot without him , upon any pretence whatsoever , do any thing that may turn him in pre judice . But this doth tacitly grant that they may do any thing , in case of his diser●…ion , without his consent , that is for his Majesties and the publike advantage , and if you had meant to make good your ground , by applying it to the case in qu●…stion , you should not have reasoned thus by way of admition of that , that will by no meanes be allowed you , but you ought to have proved that the Parliament have done that which is a prejudice to his Majestie , and then your consequence would have beene very just , whereas it is now but a meere scandalous and Libellious argument : I , but he sayes , this is Ship money : in every mans lands and goode the State hath an interest paramount , in cases of publike extremity , by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its owne necessary preservation . doubtles no man who pret●…nds to knowledge , were not his reason and understanding captivated , would go about to perswade any man ▪ that it is all one to be divested of his property by violence and oppression ; as to part with it by free consent and donation ; why this is all the resemblance or similitude that the Ship money and the proceedings of Parliament have then let all the world judge how these contraries can possibly run parallel . The head without the body was the State before ; now it is a body without an head . That 's a monster of your making , t is not we . but you that divide the head from the body . I will not turn Prophet , but know if heaven be just , a crime of so great aggravation cannot passe unpunished . But the kings things are still reserved for h●…m in b●…tter hands , than he would have put them . Though this were true , it were an ill president for the subject , who must be bound to give up his meanes , as often as they conceive . they could dispose it more wisely . There is no concluding from the seising of Forts , Castles and the like , things meerly of publike use and concernment , in which the King hath no other interest , but in reference to his trust , for the good of the publike . To the seizing of any mans private or particular in●…erest , in which he hath a sole absolute and unquestionable property . No , why heare what the Author sai●…h , Let what will be pretended , the subject cannot be so stupid , as not to understand thesewho undertake to manage the paramount interest of the state , may seise on any subjects fortunes , by the same right they take the 〈◊〉 . With the Authors favour he is grossely mistaken : for though it must be agreed that the State hath an interest Paramount in every mans private property : and so if occasion require may call for a part , for the preservation of the whole ( and upon such termes , he is unwise that will not freely disburse it ) yet it doth not therfore follow , that this is seized by the same right , that the Forts & Castles are , which are meerely for the publike defence and security . For the Kingdom hath a peculiar & proper interest in the one , which it hath not in the other . And though necessity may justly demand both for the Publique safety , yet it is the proper worke and office of the one , not soof the other . That ▪ there is an Arbitrary power in every state somewhere , t is true , t is necessary & no inconveniencefollows upon it . If he mean by arbitrary a lagistative power , this is granted , yet not to part but the wholebody . But what if one part do desert the other , and refuse to concurre with h●…m , must that 〈◊〉 still and do nothing ? But hee sayes , this speakes not to the case , for still they give us a certaine rule to live by . And do not the Parliament do the same ? No law can be all equity , nor all equity Law , for so the one would confound and destroy the other , but there must be a certaine rule upon which to make this equitable construction . Why now I appeale to any one that know●… any thing of the justice of their proceedings ; whether that they have not often laid downe this as an unqu●…ionable position , that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole ordering of the 〈◊〉 , of the Forts , Castles and Magazine throughout the Kingdome ( why then h●…re is your certaine rule to live by ) onely they make this equitable qualification of it , ( and I must say , that it were no just law , if it would not admit of this construction ) that in case where 〈◊〉 Kingdome is in imminent danger of for reigne invasion , or civill combustion , and that the King seduced by evill and Malignant Counsellours , will not receive their advise and Counsell for the securing of the same ; in such ca●… they , who are intrusted with the publike , may seize the Forts and Magazine , and 〈◊〉 the Militia for his Ma●…esties and his peoples safety and preservation . And doth this any whit destroy the rule ? Nay , rather doth it not mainetaine and support it ? I but he saith , that he is to justifie , there is such a Paramount Law , which shall make other lawes truely Oracles , that is , capable of contrary meanings : so that now a man may be justly punished for doing such a thi●…g , because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law ; a weeke after he shall be justly punished too , for no●… doing of the same thing , because he hath disobeyed the equity of the law . This I shall justifie , and yet let me tell the Author that this is no forcing or st●…ayning the lawes to contrary meaning , but onely a Declaration of the true intention of them . The Statu●…e de frangentibus prisenam doth ena●…t that it shall be felony for a prisoner to breake prison ; the prison by accident is set on fire , t●…e prisoners may in such case break prison for the salvation of their lives , and are no felons , and yet this is against the expresse letter of the Statute ; and shall wee in such case say that this is a contrary meaning to the law ? No , wee may not , t is cleerely agreeable with the intention of it . Aga●…ne the sole power of ordering of the Militia doth by the law reside in the King : and if in time of peace and secur●…ty , the King duely discharging of his trust , any one shall dare to execute any other Commission , and by vertue of that shall traine , muster or discipline any 〈◊〉 his Majesties sub●…ects , without his authority there hee is justly punishable as offending against the letter of the law . But now on the other side , if in time of publique distraction , and feare of invasion from abroad , or of civill and intestine combustion within , the King shall refuse to hearken to the Counsell of his Parliament , and shall listen to such advise , as being followed m●…y prove the utter ruine and destruction of the Common-wealth : In such case , if they shall take upon them for to order the Militia for the securing of his Majesty and people , and shall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commissions to that purpose ; those that in s●…ch case shall disobey , may be punished for not submitting to the equity of the law . And yet still this is no contradiction or contrary ●…eaning to the law , but an eq●…itable & just ●…planation , according to the int●…ntion of it . And if this will not give the Author satifaction , for my part I thinke nothing will . I but then he cites us Aristotle which saith Those lawes are with greatest prudence 〈◊〉 shed , which d●…fine most cases , and which leave nothing which possibly may be determined , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 breast of the judge : And the Author gives the reason of it , for that to leave an ample and large construction according to equity unto Iudges , may be a meanes to satisfie corrupt ends . T was a wise saying of Aristotle , and no doubt t is a very admirable rule and direction , for all legistative powers ; to make such lawes that might be their owne expos●…ours ; and that might ( if it were possible ) extend to all cases ; ●…hat so the selfe respect or corrupted judgement of their interpreters , might not through the dubious , ample or various , sense of them be satisfied . But since it is impossible for them , so 〈◊〉 sorsee and inlarge the law , but they must of necessity l●…ave some c●…ses unprovided for , and some incertaine , which must r●…st upon the judgement of the Iudges of it . How doth it any way oppose law or reason , where there is not for all cases an exact provision , to allow a favourable and 〈◊〉 construction ? But then covertly 〈◊〉 to the condition of our times , he tells us a large Story of the 〈◊〉 in Germany , and of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens : what a 〈◊〉 and large power they had got into their hands 〈◊〉 by insinuating themselves into the hearts of the people , and how they did abuse that power by injustice and oppression ; and so concludes that upon proportionable grounds and principles such mischeif●…s being then , may be againe . Could the Author have made a worse comp●…rison , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would ; was ever great●…r dishonour or indignity cast upon a Parliament , upon such 〈◊〉 ▪ such groundlesse and inconsequent reasons and arguments ; The Anabaptists they abused Germany , the thirty Tyrants , Athens , and therefore th●… Parliament do England , the rest of His booke shewes this to be his meaning , though hee conclude with a ( may be ) though he had not regarded his own credit and reputati●…n , yet h●…e should have had some respect to the honour and fame of his Countr●…y , and have studied a better resemblance , though he had not raised a better conclusion . The bad actions or impostures of some , are not infallible presidents for others to be judged by . But to advertise the Author that he do not for the future thus abuse his judgement and discretion ; L●…t me give him this caution , when his heart shall suggest any ill of so great and reverend a counsell ( whose actions ought to awe him to a good conceipt of them ) to consider well the grounds and reasons of his mistrust , and when he hath done this , ponder on the great disproportion and inequality that there is betwixt so great a power , and himself , and this will either ingage him to a better beleife , or force him to silence . And let th●… people take this Caveat , that the subtile pr●…ssing and urging of the ill examples of other men , ought not ( though it be most maliciously indeavoured ) to perswade us to a beleife of the like corruptions in the Parliament . The things taken from the King at Hull , were armes , which are of more danger than other kind of Chattells . By the same law , all that part of the Kingdome which is not confided in , may be disarmed . Good reason too , if in a publique 〈◊〉 , they shall appeare in opposition to them , who indeavour nothing but the publique fafety , and preservation . Nay , why may not their money be taken too , upon probable feare , they may buy armes with it . If that probability can be evidenced by a sufficient proofe , I see no reason any man should be permitted to buy a sword , to helpe to cut his owne throat , nay more , to hasten the ruine of the Common-Wealth . The Subj●…ct is in a miserable condition , that is liable to be undone , as often as they please to be fearefull . Wee should be in a farre worse condition , if we should not feare , when we have just cause , and prevent the losing of the whole , by a wise parting with some small and inconsiderate portion . Let Brainford evidence this truth . I , but he saith it is so farre from excusing , it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings armes , that is , the meanes whereby he may seize whatever else belongs unto his Majesty . It doth much extenuate the fact , to seize those things which would be more immediate Agents or instruments in his Majesties and the publique ruine ; I , but then againe hee sayes , that the law of the land hath onely intrusted the Prince with armes , so that the Subject ought not to he arrayed , trayned and mustered , but by his Commission ; He sayes very much , and of great consequence , had it beene at another time . But as circumstances may vary a case , so I hope the Author will learne to distinguish betwixt a case in nece●…ity , and one out of necessity , Betweene the Kings adhering to the advise of his great Counsell the Parliament , and his deserting of them , and betweene the due execution of his trust , and the breach of it . These layed together will much vary the case , and justifie the Parliament in their arraying , trayning and mustering without his Majesties Commission . But some determination must be supreame , and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the directions of the Parliament , or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meere direction . No necessity of either , for in cases of this nature , which is confessed to be extraordinary , if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand , and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary law . Our Author doub●…lesse hath a strong Minerva that could make so subtile a decision of a matter of so great controve●…sie ; But I beleive this concept was as soone penned , as it was thought on . For what is this , but in plaine termes to tell the Parliament hat they might aswell have saved their labour . And that if a King seduced by evill counsell shall indeavour the destruction of the publique , yet it lyes not in the power of the Parliament any way to oppose or prevent it . A sad conclusion , if it would hold . But then his Majesty maintaining of his negative power , puts this case , whether if the Papists in Ireland in truth were , or by act or accident had made themselves the Major part of both Houses of Parliament there , and had pretended the trust , ( which the Parliament here doth ) from the Kingdome of Ireland , & thereupon had voted their Religion and liberty to ●…e in danger of extirpation , from a Malignant party of Protestants and Puritanes ; and therefore that they should put themselves into a possure of defence ; that the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of that Kingdome were to be put into the hands of such persons as they could confide in &c. Whe●…her he were bound to consent to all such alterations , as these men should propose to him , and resolve to be for the publique good . I shall not need to prove the unlikely hood of their accomplishing their desired ends ; nor go about maintaine with the Observator , that there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland , as ▪ betwixt England and Wales . Neither do I thinke if it were so that the two Parliaments would joyn●… for transacting and concluding upon matters for both states . But to the question I shall give this short answere ; that I do not conceive the King in such case bound to consent to their proposalls . For I never did , nor shall allow , where their conclusions and requ●…sts are evidently against l●…w , reason or Religion ( if that may b●… presumed of a Parliament ) that in such case the Ki●…g is bound to ye●…ld to their Votes . No ; farre be it from any one thus to judge ; for that were to make him a ●…yrant , though against his will ; and to be ingaged in his peoples ruine against his conscience . But now what use or advantage can be made of this against the cas●… in question ( ●…he Parliaments proposalls being not apparently either against law , reason or Religion ) do●…h nonplus my understanding to imagine . A faction is said to have prevailed upon a Major part by cunning , ●…orce , absence or accident . The Observator argues thus aginst it . If by cunning we must suppose the Kings party in Parliament , hath lost all their law , policy and 〈◊〉 . The reason why they are overborne may be this , not because they have lesse law , but more ho●…sty , which will not permit them to maintaine a good cause , by ill meanes . No ; the reason is evidently this , that they have li●…le law , and 〈◊〉 Honesty , which wi●…hholds them from promoting the publique saf●…ty . I but how falls it out , that after so many reiterated scandalls of pretences , and deceivings of the people , the Author should now confesse that the cause is good only he adds that there is an ill prosecuting of it , which he ought to prove , if he expects we should beleive him . Certainely he did not read what he had writ●…en , or not understand it , or there is some hope now at the last ( after the venting of his sple●…ne ) that he will prove a convert ? But I dispaire of convincing him by better reason ; for he is here in his very next words , fallen into a contradiction ; where he sa●…es , that wee all know , in how great stead these Piae fraudes holy salsehoods , and religious untruth stood , the Church of Rome &c. And he concludes that wee ought to examine , whether this policy worke not ( at least in the beginning , till a discovery of their falsehoods is made , and the people is undeceived ) the same effects in a civill State ; whether there are not such things , as fraudes pretended to be Reipublicae salutares Here you have his apostasie , you may see how suddainly he hath declined the truth , for he is revolted againe into his pretences , deceipts and falsehoods . And I wish from my very heart , that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man , and such as he is , than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament , and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived . I , but then the Observator sayes , It cannot be by force , because they have no army visible . A thing is said in law to be done by force , not onely when men actually suffer ; if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfie the passion and humours of some , but then also , when they have just grounds of feare , for this workes on the minde as strongly , as the other on the body . I , but with the Authors favour , this must be such a feare as may possesse a generous and setled spirit , not every idle Phantasme or Chymaera , such as they use to bugbear●… Children withall . It remaines then , we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults . I marry Sir , here is on●… of the imaginary Spiri●…s , that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men . Doubtl●…sse this is not a sufficient ground of feare ( were it true , which I much question ) to a resolved and setled judgement , neither doth the law t●…ke hold of any such feare as thi●… is . I , but then he goes on ; whether that they were not poasted with directions to th●…ir perticular lodgings . I , here you have another of these Hobgoblins , and deformed Images , more fit to fray children with , than men ; Because ( if that were true ) they were directed to their Chambers , and never intended , ( as the event cleares it ) to approach them ; therefore they complied or were silent , and so that faction prevailed . I , but he goes yet further , whether the way to the House , were not set with clamarous multitudes , that they must passe through the middest of them , whil●…st they insorme them , what is fit to be voted , and inquire after their names , and what side they take . This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it ; May not men who are part of the collective body of the Common-wealth , whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur , it is their b●…sinesse that is there transacted , have recourse thi her , with a full desire onely to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament , and how thing●… succeed for their good , but they must be branded with those ignominious stiles of unlawfull Ass●…mblies and clamorous multitudes ? For their inquiring what their names were , and which s●…de they tooke ; certainely 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉 , and that can be no cause to make me dread a man , because he knowes my name , No ; nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉 , if I am conscious to my self , that they are such as are just and honourable ; ●…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted , that is as like to be true , as that they sho●…ld vote , what they had informed them , For the other two of absence and accident , he sayes , they may be reduced to this . I t is no wond●…r many stay away , since they must be absent , even whilest th●…y are there . If their wills were absent , by being a verse from the publique good , whose fault was it that they stood Cyphers ? better in such case , their rome than their company . The Parliament requests of the King , that all great Officers of State , by whom p●…blique affaires , sh●…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great Counsell . Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him , &c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉 Is that the ●…eason , why each man preserves his owne right , b●…cause he takes all the rest of mankinde for deadly enemies ? No , but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such mens faith and loyaltie ; I should not upon just occasion 〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them . I , but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himselfe unfit to manage that 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him ? 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his owne ability , to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great Counsell the Parliament , one may man●…ge a trust well , and yet no disho●…●…hat a whole Kingdom may do●… it better . With equall reason ( sayes he ) they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops , 〈◊〉 , Sher●…ffes , 〈◊〉 , &c. and dispose of all the preserments of England . For th●… Bishops ( thou●…h our sad experience at this day doth informe us ) that they have been very bad ) yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be , that they likewise should be , nominated by the great counsell , for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again . For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choyce and free elections of their Patrons . But now for the Sheriffes , Justices and other inferiour Officers of the law ; I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the ranke and order of great officers of State ; neither can there be the like reason possibly rendred , for the nominating of these , as for the other ; for though they may be corrupt in their way , yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests , no danger to the publike . The truth of it is , this Kingdome hath and doth still suffer under the hea●… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Sta●…e , who instead of defending and propagating the good of the publike : have , and do most vilely and traiterously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it . Was not then their req●…st and proposall very reasonable and safe both for King and people , that they might nominate such of that known and publike trust and confidence , who by their sedulous care , honest , and direct counsell , and which is above all , by their true and unfained zeale and affection to the common wealth , might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future ▪ But to passe this ; had his 〈◊〉 beene graciously pleased for to hearken and comply with this advise of the Parliament , the greater had been his honour in that certaine pledge of continued happinesse and security to h●…s people . If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his owne good liking only , or upon recommendation of such a 〈◊〉 , here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power ; but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament , who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned , this is an emptying himselfe of Majestie , and 〈◊〉 himselfe of power . Is this will cont●…nt them , th●…y shall hav●… as much power , as be ●…rants to his Courtiers . If this might be obtained , I am consident they neede not make a second requ●…st ; Nay , could they be perswaded , th●…t what●… they could propose , would be conceed by his Majesty , I dare say 〈◊〉 owne modesty , judgement and 〈◊〉 , would not permit them to be guilty of so great dishonour to their King ; as to extend their pe●…itions so farre for in●…rease of power , as some lately ( to our sad experience ) have enjoyed ; I but he sayes , 〈◊〉 must be like the outward senses , and make a true represent at con ; the 〈◊〉 of reason is 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 , to make judgement therein : 〈◊〉 informat●…n is not alwayes faithfull ; This 〈◊〉 no way 〈◊〉 have deprived the King of the Office of reason ; for their 〈◊〉 did not 〈◊〉 away 〈◊〉 Majesties power of refusall upon just ca●…se rendered . If by his last words 〈◊〉 intends the information of the Court there he is in the right this age can 〈◊〉 to him , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not beene alwayes faithfull ; But if he do intend his great 〈◊〉 the Parliament , there he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 against common judgement and understanding , for that no age is able to w●…tnesse any unfaithfulnes or 〈◊〉 in a Parliament , I , but he 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to their King , and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 , yet 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them●… , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of their owne 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 in all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to expresse their 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And why so ▪ pray 〈◊〉 his reason , For ( saith hee ) they must 〈◊〉 to suffer 〈◊〉 those 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoped for in a 〈◊〉 divided in it 〈◊〉 ? This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fire in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : For it cannot be 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 ▪ 〈◊〉 . Very tragically 〈◊〉 , though without any 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 , I 〈◊〉 that if 〈◊〉 Author 〈◊〉 , but to make a 〈◊〉 , he will easily informe himselfe 〈◊〉 that it is very 〈◊〉 to have great 〈◊〉 of State of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and it will be very difficult to 〈◊〉 men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . But if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and that dan●… incurred to by 〈◊〉 of such a power to the Parliament , 〈◊〉 since there can be no absolute 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 on this side heaven , but that all humane inventions , whether of law , or whatever else will retaine or contract ( either more or lesse ) some mixture or tincture of ill in them . Why then s●…uld 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 benefit , for a possible inconvenience ? or reject the unquestionable commodum , for ●…are of a casuall incommodum , the bread that a man doth now eat , may choak him , and his house that he now lives in fals upon his head ; shall he therefore deny himselfe the certain nutriment of the one , or the secure habitation of the other ? for feare of these visible dangers ? t were phanatick ●…nd rediculous . By this r●…le a man should 〈◊〉 and decl●…ne all terrene and sublunary happinesse whatsoever , for that there is not so 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 condition , that is not subject to a possible pollution and corruption . Now I b●…lieve it doth fully appeare that the Law of that Remonstrance laid down by his Majesti by way of 〈◊〉 , in seven positions , is just and without offence , ●…eing such as will bring unquestionable happinesse both to Church and 〈◊〉 , not denying our obedience to the King , 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 and faithfull service to God . 1 That the Parliament hath an absolute and 〈◊〉 power of declaring Law . This power must rest in 〈◊〉 or in the king , or in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Courts , or 〈◊〉 all suite must bee endlesse , and it can no where rest more safely than in Parliament . 〈◊〉 two Houses are not the Parliament , The subject of such power is the intire body , which consists of three estates . If deserted by the King they are , otherwise not . I , but he sayes , some things are cleare and evident in law , and want 〈◊〉 , if otherwise , all 〈◊〉 subjects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Iudge Very just , and some things are dubious in law and want 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( such is the case betweene the King and Parliament ) and this must rest upon the breast of the 〈◊〉 , whi●…h in this case is the Parliament . I but h●… sayes , If the Houses should vote you●…ger brothers ought to 〈◊〉 by the law of England , could this 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the first 〈◊〉 ? A 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but most easily answered and resolved . It is very manifest it could not , for 〈◊〉 this is a case which is evident and cleare , and here the law may be its owne judge , and needs no other interpreter or declarer . Besides this is a destroying or repealing of the old law , and an int●…oduction of a new , which can●…ot be done , without the three esta●…es . But they may declare what the common law of the land is , without the King , which is only a passing sen●…ence , upon the 〈◊〉 and reasoning of a new case , by the old law , so that the Judges are guided by this rule of law , 〈◊〉 eadem ratio , ibi idem 〈◊〉 , where there is the same reason , there ought to be the same law ; pray observe , and this will correct your mistake ; though the case be new , 〈◊〉 if it may be brought to the 〈◊〉 of the old law ) tis idem jus , not 〈◊〉 , the same , no new law . The truth of it is , that law is but a more pure and 〈◊〉 reason , and as reason is alwayes one and the same ; so of necessity must the law be . That the Parliament are bound 〈◊〉 no Presidents Statute are not binding 〈◊〉 them , why then should Presidents ? Yet there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 . This is an excellent ground to justifie their owne innoc●…ncy against all the world . For if they can make it appeare they are not bound ●…o keepe 〈◊〉 law , no 〈◊〉 can accuse 〈◊〉 for the breach of any . Our Author thinks he hath here got a strong hold and advantage against us . Why wee shall allow ( as without 〈◊〉 the Law is ) that 〈◊〉 are binding to the two Houses of Parliament , as well as others , till repealed ; But doth this any way disprove 〈◊〉 position , that they are not bound to Presidents ? You know what they say ( who are best acquainted with the bounds and 〈◊〉 of their owne power ) some Presidents are not to be followed , 〈◊〉 being not 〈◊〉 , and all may fall short , and be different from the 〈◊〉 case and condition of things , and therefore t is no reason that they should be bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament . 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity with●…ut the King , and dispose of any thing . They may not 〈◊〉 the King , but being 〈◊〉 by the King , when the Kingdome is in 〈◊〉 they may judge of that 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 it , and are to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 , as the whole body of the 〈◊〉 . To 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 he hath granted , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reason be d si ed. is not to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 , but then by the rule of contraries , to dissent , 〈◊〉 he hath granted whatever might in reason be 〈◊〉 , is a 〈◊〉 of the Houses ; and this you do 〈◊〉 allow . Why now the onely judge in this case of reasonable or 〈◊〉 demands , is the Parliament , and they have adjudged their request 〈◊〉 , wherefore it is your duty and mine ( 〈◊〉 wee will oppose our judgements to theirs , which will be extreame arrogancy ) to believe they are so : however what their awefull authority will not do , their reason ought . But he sayes ; upon pretence of distresse , to tak●… illegall courses , is as if th●…y should perswade us we are not in 〈◊〉 , and therefore they must break 〈◊〉 beads to forward our recovery . Right , but in case of apparent and imminent danger ( as now ) if the great Physitian of the common-wealth shall neglect his patient , it may by all lawf●…ll and legall courses ( as it doth now ) indeavour its owne preservation . Th●…y represent the people to some purposes , not the King to any , and therefore are but a part of the State . Very true , if the King do not desert them , but if he do , then they represent the whole State . 4. That no member of Parliament , ought to be troubled for treason &c. without leave . This is intended of suspicions onely , and when leave cannot s●…asonably be ●…ad , and when Competent accuse appeare not ●…n the impeachment . If by suspitions , be meant onely a bare not confiding in , this injustce cannot be sufficient ground . No ; nor if by suspitions is meant , a labouring for an Arbitrary power , for which there is no ground , and of which the whole Parliament must needs be equally guilty , this is as insufficient ●… cause of impeachment as the other . But upon Articles drawne , and proofes in readinesse , which it is not fit to produce , while the accused parties are at liberty , they may be meddled with . True if competent 〈◊〉 appeare in the impeachment , then they may be arrested and deteined to appeare before the Parliament ; but there ought to be no other pros●…cution , in any other Court or way than in Parliament , whereby they may be deprived of a member , without their consent . I , but sayes , hee , if the Houses being adjourned , were not able to give consent ; or upon too much confidence , sho●…ld not be willing hath not the law provided in such a case for tryall of treason ? For the first ; no doubt , where they are not able to give consent , there they have not power to dissent . And for the latter if upon hearing of the cause , the accusers appeare to be competent , and the cause of impeachment legall and just ; t were to much presumption and confidence in us , for to believe them so confident , as not to be willing , to give way for a legall tryall . 5. That the Sove●…aigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament , the King having no Negative voyce . This power is not claymed as ordinary , nor to any purpose ; but to save the Kingdome from ruine , in case where the King is so seduced , and that he preserres dangerous men , and prosecu●…s his loyall Subjects . Not as ordinary ; that is , they will only be Kings as long as they please , and when they are weary of 〈◊〉 the kingdome shall be out of danger , and then it shall be his turne to command againe . The Author might have spoken truth in better and more honourable language both to King and Parliament , if he had pleased . That is , they will , as of right they ought , represent the whole State , the King deserting of them , so that , they may be enabled to preserve the kingdome from ruine , and when that shall be out of danger , then shall his Majestie freely enjoy his negative , according to law and right . To save it from ruine ; the law hath better provided for the peoples safety , by prohibit●…ng all illegall executions of power , grounded upon what specious , pretences soever , 〈◊〉 . As illegall executions of power ( such as the Commission of Array ) are not to be justified . So legall ( such as the Militia ) are not to be condenmed . And in case where the King is seduced , that is , when ●…e is not so wise as he should be , because he doth not thinke as they do , and refuses to satisfie the humors and interests of some . I dare not say that the King is not so wise as he should be , No ; such irreverend dialects I leave to the Author . But this I may say , had not his Majesty waived the fa●…full advise of his Parliament ( who seek nothing but the peace and happinesse of him and his people ) and satisfied the humours and interests of others ( who ayme at nothing more than the ruine of both ) these s●…d disasters had not fallen upon us . And preferres ( this seemes to be the cause of all ; preferments do no●… goe the right way ) true for none but Commissioners of Array , do now happe preferments ) dangerous men ; that is , such as desire he should governe according to the known lawes of the land . were we before the Parliament governed according to the known lawes of the land ? they are the same men that still labour to defend the same rule and power . And prosecu●…es his loyall●… Subjects ; that is , is driven from London to Yorke ; where be long time patiently expected the undeceiving of the people . No , he pa●…ed from London , or if you please ( that I may speake truth , ) was seduced by malignant Counsell , to make so unhappy a change ; And I wish from my very soule that his sacred person were not more deceived by such , than his people are by the Parliament . 6. That leavying of forces against the personall commands of the King ( though accompanyed with his presence ) is not levying war against the King : but war against his authority , though not person , is war against the King . If this were no●… so the Parliament seeing a seduced King , ruining himselfe and the Kingdome could not save both , but must stand , and looke on . It is against common sense to sancy a King ruining himselfe and kingdome , he can neither be willing not able . T is not to be presumed that a King rightly informed will , but a King seduced may ; and uponRep. ●…reacherous and unworthy advise , for raigne aid will not be wanting to do that , which dom●…stick cannot . 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings . T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament 〈◊〉 elected . This is m●…st 〈◊〉 , but takes not off those words upon which this proposition is grounded . But it doth , with any faire and candid reading and interpretation : For when the Parliament saith , that all Presidents ought not to be rules for them to be regulated by ; this position must necessarily intend those of deposing Kings ; for that the presidents of forced Parliaments ought not to be followed . These might well have beene omitted , as being more fully handled in the booke , But least hee should complaine any thing was past over , I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer . FINIS Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A50950e-110 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 1 King. 12. Verse 8. Verse 7. Verse 8. 9. Verse 10. Obs. Ans. R●…p . Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep : Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. 〈◊〉 . R●…p . Obser. A●…s . 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. ●…ep Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . A●…s . 〈◊〉 . Obs. A●…s . Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Ans. Rep. Rom. 13 ●… Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. A●…s . R●…p . Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. 〈◊〉 . Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. R●…p . Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 5 ▪ 〈◊〉 14. 〈◊〉 . Ans. Rep. Obser. A●…s . R●… . Obser. Ans. Rep. That was a P●…pular 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. Rep. Dr. Ferne . Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Ol●… . Ans. Rep. Obs●…r . Ans. M●…t 27. 19 Rep. 〈◊〉 . 18. Obsor . Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 . Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. R●…p . Obs. Obs. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. R●…p . Obser. Ans. R●…p . Obs. Ans. R●…p . Obs. Ans. R●…p . Ob●… . Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. Rep. Ob●… . Ans. Rep. O●… . Ans. Rep. Ob●… . Ans. Rep ▪ Obs. Ans. Rep. Ob●… . A●… . Rep. Ob●… . A●… . Rep ▪ O●…s . Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. R●…p . Obs. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. Rep. Ob●… . Ans. Rep. Obs. A●…s . Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. O●…s . A●…s Rep. Obser. Ans. R●…p . Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 . Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obse●… . Ans. Rep. Obs. 〈◊〉 . Obs Ans. Rep. Ol●… . Ans. Obs. Ans. Rep.