An appendix to the late answer printed by His Majesties command, or, Some seasonable animadversions upon the late observator and his seaven anti-monarchicall assertions with a vindication of the King and some observations upon the two houses. Parker, Henry, 1604-1652. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A56168 of text R30081 in the English Short Title Catalog (Wing P397). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 52 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 12 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A56168 Wing P397 ESTC R30081 11242881 ocm 11242881 47063 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A56168) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 47063) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 1447:21) An appendix to the late answer printed by His Majesties command, or, Some seasonable animadversions upon the late observator and his seaven anti-monarchicall assertions with a vindication of the King and some observations upon the two houses. Parker, Henry, 1604-1652. 22, [i.e 21] p. [s.n.], [London] : 1642. Reproduction of the original in the Bodleian Library. With: Animadversions upon those notes which the late observator hath published upon the seven doctrines and positions which the King, by way of recapitulation (he saith) lays open so offensive p. 13 [i.e. 12]-22 [i.e.21] eng Great Britain -- History -- Charles I, 1625-1649. A56168 R30081 (Wing P397). civilwar no An appendix to the late answer printed by His Majesties command, or, Some seasonable animadversions upon the late observator and his seaven [no entry] 1642 10083 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 B The rate of 4 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the B category of texts with fewer than 10 defects per 10,000 words. 2005-01 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2005-03 SPi Global Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2005-05 Melanie Sanders Sampled and proofread 2005-05 Melanie Sanders Text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-10 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion AN APPENDIX TO THE LATE ANSWER , Printed by His Majesties COMMAND : OR , Some seasonable ANIMADVERSIONS upon the late Observator , and his seaven Anti-monarchicall ASSERTIONS . TOGETHER With a VINDICATION of the KING , And some OBSERVATIONS upon the TWO HOUSES . Printed Anno Dom. 1642. Seasonable ANIMADVERSIONS upon the late Observator , and his seaven Anti-monarchicall ASSERTIONS . IT is usuall ( I know ) for Books to have Prefaces , and Playes Prologues ; but whosoever peruseth this , must expect nothing but concise reasons ; forasmuch as Vnusq●isque suo sensu abundat , so let him reflect and censure of this at his pleasure . The Observator , pag. 1. saith , That power is originally inherent in the people , &c. To this the answer is , that power is in God primariò & per se , according to that of the Apostle ; Rom. 13. and in the King or people , but onely secundariò & derivativè : Power or Dominion is not a gift of Nature , that is to say , naturally inherent in us ; for if it were , then might all men have equall power , for that by nature we are all equall ; but power is a gift of God to Nature , and is gratia gratis data ; and yet power is congruous in nature , as was the power of King , and office of Priesthood in Melchisedec : for surely he had them both given , or appointed to him by God , being by interpretation King of Righteousnesse , and King of Peace , Heb. 2.7 . And therefore it is not likely that he usurped to himselfe the Regall title of King , no more then he did of being Priest ; and yet it was very probable that it was also agreeable in Reason and Nature , and although not tyrannicall , yet peaceable Kingly reigne , and sacred Priesthood did fitly belong to him : for he is by most Divines thought to have been Sem , the eldest sonne of Noah ; and by the law of Nature , of Moses , and of most Nations , the eldest is to inherit ; so that what was the right of Adam , Seth , and Noah , might belong unto him by birth-right , although it may be God confirmed it unto him extraordinarily . But to returne , power and dominion is derived from God , and congruous in Nature : but the power is in the people onely , when they are absolutely free to chuse to themselves what forme of government they please , as were the Jewes before they subjected themselves to Kings , being formerly freed from the bondage of Egypt by the finger of God . The Romanes when they erected their Senate and Consuls , having rebelliously ( for it was no better ) shaken off the yoke of Kings . The Venetians , when they first instituted their Common-wealth . But in Monarchies , where the people have been brought into subjection , either by the sword , as in Turky , Persia , and the like ; or by innate , and prescribing , and prevalent authority , as in Florence ; or by both , as in France and Castile ; in these Dominions power is not inherent in the people , but in the Prince . And although some hereditary Monarches are more limited then others , as is the King of France more then the great Turke , and the King of England more then the King of France : yet is their power derived immediately from God , and inherent in themselves , not in the people : for those limitations are ( in conquered Nations ) but mere donatives of grace , proceeding from the Prince or his Successors to the people , touching certaine immunities and priviledges ; so that the Prince his power is the efficient cause of them , and such immunities or priviledges are but as materiall effects . Now as it is most improper to say , that the effect should cause his owne cause , so is it to say , that a priviledged people should cause the Princes power , or that Power should remaine originally in such a priviledged people . Some Nations elect their Kings , or Princes , and restraine them far more by conditionall inaugurations , then hereditary Monarches are , or ought to be restrained or limited : Yet have not such Nations power in themselves totally , but onely partially ; that is , they have power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes , how farre forth they will be subject , and by what Rules they will be governed ; but they have not power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes , that they will only be subject at their owne pleasures , and as themselves shall thinke good ; that is to say , if they please at any time to assume more liberty unto themselves , and to alter and disanull former Constitutions of Government , that they may do it without the consent of their Kings or Princes . This they cannot doe without treason to their Crownes or Diadems : For although the persons of such Princes be elective , yet is their power permanent , jure constituto Coronae ; which though they claime not as from progenitors , yet are they invested therewith as from Predecessors . And therefore being enthroned , they enjoy their dignities by prescription ; that is to say , what belonged to their Predecessors ; belongeth in the same manner to them , being once invested ; nor can such Nations revolt from their elected Princes , without being reputed Rebels . Now of this nature are the Kings of Poland , Hungary , and some other ( to speake nothing of the Duke of Venice , for he is meerly titulary , and a cypher ) and such Kings first and principally claime their authority from God the author of all power , who enspheareth them in the Orbe of dignity above others . And secondly , they acknowledge it from the generall consent of the Nation , which made choyce of them , and over which they rule . And surely such was the right and title of Saul , the first King of Israel : for he was appointed by God , 1 Sam. 9.17 . then anointed by Samuel , Chap. 10. v. 1. afterwards approved by the people , ibid. vers. 24. And finally , confirmed in his Kingdome , Chap. 11. vers. 14. And in the same manner was David likewise established in his Kingdome ; so that their first and chiefe claime was immediately from God , and their second from the consent of the people . Nor is it of any consequence to alleadge , as the Observator seemeth to inferre , pag. 1. that those Kings had an extraordinary Institution from God ; and therefore they might more lawfully claime their right , as appointed and appropriated to them by God . For to such Allegation it will be answered , That there is no power but of God , Rom. 13. So that whether God institute Kings by extraordinary , or ordinary meanes , it maketh no matter . For although Saul and David were instituted extraordinarily by Gods speciall appointment ; yet most of the Kings of Judah and Israel reigned afterthem but by ordinary succession ; had they not therefore the same power that Saul and David had ? Surely the Scriptures tell us they had . The Priests and Prophets in the old Law had an extraordinary vocation , especially the Prophets : the Priests or Ministers of the Gospell have but an ordinary vocation , are they therefore defective in power to those of the old Law ? or have they not their vocation from God , because they have not extraordinary calling ? Surely no . For how could Sacraments be administred , and the word preached ? So is it with Monarchs : For though they have but ordinary succession ; yet is their power immediately from God . Our Soveraigne is a free ( though in some things a limited ) Monarch , and derived therefore his power immediately ( not mediately , as do other inferiour Ministers of justice ) from God . And as touching limitations and priviledges , they are nothing else ( as is aforesaid ) but acts of grace conferred on this Nation by His Majesties predecessours in severall ages , and at severall times , and some of them lately by His Majesty himselfe , as the continuation of this present Parliament , the abolishing of the Starre-Chamber , and High Commission censures , and the like . But these priviledges , and others granted to the subjects , dis-invest the King of no primary , or Birth-right-royalty , but onely oblige him in honour to observe them as covenants . A Lord purchaseth a Mannor for himselfe and his Heires for ever ; his sonne and successors grant certaine Franchises to the tenants , and oblige their heires for ever to performe them : so the tenants live-in a more free state and condition , then they did in the first purchasers dayes ; and paying their rents , and performing their services , they are not altogether subject to be turned out at the pleasure ( or rather displeasure ) of the Lord ; but doth this Franchisement or freedome of theirs , cause the Lord to derive his right or title from his tenants ? Law and experience tels us no . And this is our Soveraignes case ; The Conquerour by his sword , or by deed of gift , or rather indeed by both , came in as a purchaser of the Kingdome of England , for himselfe , and his heires for ever , and by the Law of conquest had power to have made greater alteration in the State then he did , and to have induced what forme of government he had thought good , even as the King of Spaine hath done in Navarre , and the West Indies ; yet hee did not , but onely imposed some hard things , as the having of Lawes in the French tongue , which the people generally understood not , Cover-fue-bell , and the like : his successours afterwards did immune , and ease the people from such grievances , so that they lived , and live at more liberty , and enjoy more securely their liberties and properties . But do therefore such immunities granted to the people , cause the King to derive his power and right from the people ? The Lawes and customes of all Nations and Kingdomes that live under Monarchs , tell us no . The ancient and present Monarchies of the world being sufficient witnesses thereof , besides the Dictamen of Scripture , and reason already inserted . The Observator , pag. 2. saith , that it is an errour in some Princes , to strive more to be great over their people , then in their people . It may be some Princes have committed such an errour ; but withall let the Observator take notice , that it is convenient for a free Prince to be both ; that is to say , to have them wealthy , and yet obedient Subjects : for if he be onely great in his people , and not over them , hee may resemble the now Roman , or German Emperor , or the ancient Kings of France , the one whereof is daily in danger to be disinvested by commotion , & combinations of his Princes ; the other were heretofore almost continually molested by factions of their Peeres and people : And sure the French themselves have greatly occasioned the heavie burthen of divers tributes and impositions which they undergoe : for they ever and anon rising in Armes against their King , gave him occasion to enslave them the more by his reconquering of them , or reducing them into his obedience , so that had they subsisted in due allegiance , 't is likely their King had been as equally great over as in them ; which equality , or parity in government , is ( no doubt ) the most happy and blessed co-union that any Prince and people can enjoy . The Observator telleth us in the same page , that the King , though he be singulis major , yet he is universis minor . But why so ? The Head Naturall is not only singulis , but also universis membris majus dignitate , ( though it may , 't is not so in universis , as shall be by and by declared ) For the Head hath in it selfe all Senses , other Members receive from it , but Feeling only , and Motion ; the head governeth and directeth the whole Body , and is therfore in dignity more Noble then all the Members of the Body considered together : and yet though it be more noble and excellent then them all ; ( for as much as Motion and Feeling dimane from the Braine , which is in the head , to them all ) notwithstanding in universis , in all things , or faculties , the head is not more excellent then all the members ; for the Heart is the seat of Life ( according to most Philosophers ) being primum vivens , & ultimum moriens , and from it proceedeth naturall heat ; the stomacke likewise administreth sustenance , and aliment ; the Feet goe , and the Hands worke , and without them the head cannot subsist , yet are they all subordinate to the Head : and even so is it , or ought it to be in the body politicke , unlesse we must beleeve the Observator , who in his 19. Page saith , That the Head Politicall receives more subsistence from the Body then it gives , &c. But by his leave , if priviledges and Immunities are ( as they are ) matters of Grace , proceeding from free Monarchs ( for of such the Treatise is ) to the people , do not such Heads give as much subsistence to the body Politicke , as they receive from it ? The Observator telleth us , Pag , 6. That Edward the first was the first ( whether he were , or not , it is not materiall ) that repaired the Breaches which the Conquest had made upon this Nation ; if so , did not hee , by such his reparation , give as much subsistence to the Common-wealth , as he received from the Common-wealth , or Body Politicke ? And do not his Successors give likewise as much as they receive , when they conferre the like acts of Grace ? Surely , hee that considereth rightly Magna Charta , and all other Priviledges and Immunities , which now extend to the free-borne people of this Kingdome , will finde them first to have proceeded from the Grace and Grant of our Kings : and therefore it is improper to say , That the Head Politick doth not give as much subsistence to the Body Politick , as it receives from it . The Observator saith likewise in his second Page , That id quod efficit tale , est magis tale ; meaning thereby , that the people conferring , as the efficient cause , Power on the King , have joyntly more Power in themselves . It hath been shewed already , that free Monarchs , such as our King is , derive not their power from the people , but immediately from God : But suppose our King did secundarily acknowledge his power from this Nation 's generall consent ; as it may be , the King of Poland doth acknowledge his power in part from the Aristocracie of that Kingdome ; and as Saul and David did in part from the Jewes approbation and consent : notwithstanding , it followes not from hence , that the people are the sole efficient cause of the Kings power , but onely the secundary and partiall . Now , when it is said , that id quod efficit tale , est magis tale , it is to be understood of entire and totall causes ; but in this case , the people being at the most but the partiall cause of the Kings power , the Axiome or Rule faileth : as for example , the Moone being of her selfe a body darke , receives her light ( at least-wise her chiefest ) from the Sunne , as from an entire cause ; the Sunne is therefore truely said to be more light , being the totall subordinate cause of light ; in this case therefore it is truely said , id quod efficit tale , est magis tale : but the Sunne , mediante homine , producit hominem ; & mediante Leone , Leonem ; & mediante Plantâ Plantam ; for that the Sunne affordeth to all sensible and vegetable creatures an influx of vigour and naturall heat : yet for as much as the Sunne is , in the production of these creatures , but a partiall , and not an integrall cause , it were absurd to say , that the Sunne were more a man , then is a man ; or more a Lyon , then is a Lyon ; or more a Plant , then is a Plant : and so is it to say , that because a King may acknowledge his power in part received from the peoples generall consent , that therefore the people have more power then himselfe . The Observator telleth us , Page 3. That the Kings dignity was erected to preserve the Communalty , the Communalty was not created for his service . This is somewhat too harsh , especially if we consider our King to be , in all Causes , as well Ecclesiasticall as Civill , next and immediately under Christ , supreame Head and Governour : such words would have beene better accommodated to a Duke of Venice , then to a King of England . The Jewes , I beleeve , when they asked a King at Gods hands , were somewhat inclining to the Observators opinion ; for they desired a King for their owne ends , chiefly to judge them , and to fight their Battailes ; not well considering , that if they had a King , hee must and ought to have a Kingly Dominion over them : Wherefore God caused the Prophet Samuel to instruct them concerning the Praeeminence of a King ; and , that if they would have a King , a King would be such , and such a man , as is evidently characterized in the first of Samuel , chap. 8. where amongst other things , vers. 17. the Prophet saith , He will take the Tenth of your Sheepe , and yee shall be his servants : Where , by the word will , he sheweth the Authority which Kings would have ; and by the word shall , hee sheweth the obedience that Subjects should have : nor did the Prophet speake of some , or to some few onely ; but of all , and to all the people , ( at least-wise to all the chiefest of them ) saying , Yee shall be his servants . I desire therefore that the Observator , and all his other adherents , would take more speciall notice of this Text of the Prophet , and that of Saint Pauls confirmation of this Text , Let every soule be subject to the higher Powers : For , though Christian Monarches ought not , by the Rules of Christianity , to Tyrannize , or make our Sonnes their Slaves , or our Daughters their Concubines , and the like ; as did many of the Kings of the Gentiles , and some of the Jewes ; yet ought they not to be thought so contemptible , as that the Communalty was no way created for their service . The Observator saith in the same Page , That the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people , as the authors and ends of all Power ; for meere Force cannot alter the course of Nature , and frustrate Law ; and if it could , there were more reason why the people might justifie Force to re-gaine due liberty , then the Prince might to subvert the same . By the Observators leave , for his first Clause it is answered already , That in Monarchies the people are not the authors or ends of Power . For the second Clause , That meere Force cannot alter the course of Nature , or frustrate the tenour of Law ; that is to say , That meere Force cannot captivate and debase a people by nature free , and living under a law of common consent . I suppose the words , cannot alter , should have beene , cannot , de jure , alter ; or ought not to alter , &c. For that force can alter , and de facto hath altered the freedome and lawes of People and Nations , is knowne to most men ; Histories and Chronicles testifying to the world the severall alterations and formes of Government which Conquerours have induced ; but whether they ought so to have done , is a question . Yet should the Observator and his adherents take advice , that though in Nature there is a parity of mankinde , and therefore Dominion may not seeme to be intended by Nature , yet God the author of Nature , fore-seeing the fall of Man , and the depravation in Nature , which did ensue thereof intended power and dominion , and that some should bee masters , and others servants ; some command , and others obey ; some should become slaves to Tyrants , others subjects to free Monarches ; others members of popular Estates : and these things God hath ordained by his divine wisedome according to his will , and disposes and alters them at his pleasure : But as for the pot , it ought not to say to the Potter , Why hast thou made me thus ? It is enough for it to know , that there is no power but of God , and so to be applyable to the use it was made for ; if for honour , to honour ; if for servility , to servility ; being subject for conscience sake : Rom. 13.5 . Of a strange nature therefore are those words , viz. There were more reason why the people might justifie force , to re-gaine due liberty , then the Prince might to subvert the same . If this Doctrine had beene good , our Saviour would surely have counselled the Jewes ( when they asked him whether it were lawfull to give tribute to Caesar ) to have kept their money in their purses , or to have made up a stock of it , and by force to have sought to re-gaine their due liberty from Caesar , and not have bid them Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's . If it be alleadged , that in case Christ had counselled the Jews so , they would have played the Jews indeed , and have accused him of high Treason : What then ? Would Christ have concealed , or did he at any time conceale the truth for feare of the Jewes accusations ? When he was conjured to expresse whether or no he were the Sonne of God , ( a thing more hatefull to the Jewes eares , then the denying of tribute could have beene to the eares of the Romans ) Christ answered , Thou hast said it ; which is as much as Yes . But suppose the Jewes would have accused him of high Treason , in case he had denied tribute to Caesar , and that God would not have such a vile imputation as Treason laid on the Redeemer of the World : Yet had re-gaining of due liberty by force beene lawfull , Christ might have said , Yee may give tribute to Caesar , in the Potentiall Mood , ( in which words no exceptions could have beene taken ) and not have said , Give tribute to Caesar , or Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's , in the Imperative Mood . Or otherwise , when they asked him , Whether it were lawfull to pay tribute to Caesar , he might onely have answered them , Yes ; but fore-seeing in his divine wisedome , that some indirect constructions might bee made of such a single word as Yes , 't is lawfull to pay it , yee may pay it if yee please , 't is not against the law of God , if yee doe pay it , &c. therefore Christ bid them shew him a piece of money , and bid them Give it unto Caesar , informing the covetous mindes of that perverse people , that they ought and were obliged to part with their money and substance to Caesar , if demanded as a tribute . But to let Arguments of Divinity passe , and to induce a few State reasons : If the people may justifie force to re-gaine due liberty , what Monarchy , what Aristocracy , what Popular estate can remaine secure ? The French subjects being in generall oppressed with taxes , may revolt from their King , if this Tenet be good ; and so may the Spanish : The Polish Peasants may rebell against the King and their Lords , for that they hold them in villinage : and the Townsmen and Boores in Holland , and the Pisani in Venice against the States , for their imposing on them terrible excizes . This Tenet , or Position , may quadrate , it may be , with the Irish Rebels , ( for they pretend by force to re-gaine due liberty ) but never with loyall subjects . And surely this Tenet , or Position afore-said , is dangerous to all the Monarchies and States of the world , yea , even to Parliaments themselves , if rightly considered ; and opposite also to the law of God and Nations . The Observator telleth us , Page 13. That where the people by publike authority will seeke an inconvenience to themselves , and the King is not so much interested as themselves , it is more inconvenience to deny it , then grant it . This is a strange assertion , and against all rule of Monarchicall Government . Suppose ( for a supposition is no fallacie ) that a Christian people should generally ( which God forbid ) desire to revolt from Christianity to Mahometanisme ; should their King grant it ? they seeme to be more interessed then the King , because it concernes their salvation or damnation ; is it injustice therefore to deny it ? Surely no ; but most just and acceptable to God to hinder them from it . Suppose this Nation should in generall ( which God of his goodnesse prohibit ) desire to turne Anabaptists and Brownists , whereof there are too many already ; is the King bound , or ought he to condescend to their desires ? Surely no : but as Gods Vice-gerent , to oppose such exorbitant inclinations of the people . But if the Assertion of the Observator be good , Pilate seemes to be excuseable , whom the Observator condemneth in the page before : for the Jewes sought by authority of the Priests and Elders to crucifie Christ , ( an inconvenience enough to themselves ) and instanced a law , and that by that law he ought to die , Joh. 19.7 . and the Jewes were more interested in Christ , ( he being their Countrey-man , and subject to their lawes , as they conceived ) ▪ then was Pilate ; so that according to this Assertion of the Observator , It was more inconvenience and injustice for Pilate to have denyed to the Jewes Christ to have beene crucified , then to have granted it . Judica Deus . The Observator saith , Page 17. The name of a King is great , I confesse , and worthy of great honour ; but is not the name of a People greater ? The Observator must give me leave to tell him , that in Monarchies , where there were or are Kings , the name of a people neither was , nor is greater then the name of a King : Senatus populúsque Romanus , ceased to be , and gave place to the name of Caesar . The Ottoman name at this day , dignifies that great Empire subject to that family ; and so doth the name of Sophy the Persian . The name of the House of Austria decorates their dominions ; and so doth that of Bourbon , France : And I see no reason but why the name of Stewart should doe as much in England . If it be asked , But what availeth the names of these great Monarches , without their Kingdomes or Dominions ? The answer is , That Dominions are to Monarches , as it were , materiall subjects ; themselves ( from whom their names result ) as Formes . Now as the Forme is more worthy then its Matter , so is a free Monarch more worthy then his Empire , in respect of dignity politicall . And indeed the word Monarch inferres as much ; for Monarchy is derived from Monarch , not Monarch from Monarchy . But it may be some will instance from hence , that if it be so , the good of a Monarch seemes to be preferred before the good of all his Subjects in generall , so that a whole Kingdome or Empire should bee utterly pillaged , wasted , and consumed , rather then his Treasures be destroyed . Not so : for though Empires and Kingdomes are but as materiall subjects , and Monarches as formes politicall ; yet even as in nature , formes cannot subsist without matter , ( from whose power all formes , except the rationall soule , are educed ; ) so in policy , Monarchs cannot subsist without their people , from whose subjection and obedience their power is educed immediately from God , as are formes from matter by nature : the good of both therefore must be consistent together , so that not salus populi alone , as the Observator would have it , but salus Regis & populi , is the true end of Monarchicall government . Thus have I briefly answered the Observators chiefe arguments , from whence all his other assertions and conclusions are drawne , desireing him and all others , rather to study how to produce reasons for obedience ( where it is due ) to Monarchs , then to derogate from Monarchicall government : to endeavour how to incline , and not to disaffect ( by nice positions ) the distracted mindes of the people towards the King : to propound prudent Arguments which might move the King to accommodate with his Parliament ; and not by lessening his authority , to divert him from it . Finally , to seeke how to unite the King and Common-wealth , and not to dis-unite them by impertinent and invalid conclusions . God of his goodnesse grant co-union ( as much as in this world may be ) betweene our Soveraigne and His people , that He may know truely how to rule , and they to obey . ANIMADVERSIONS upon those Notes which the late OBSERVATOR hath published upon the seven Doctrines , and Positions , which the KING by way of Recapitulation ( he saith ) layes open so offensive . POSITION I. THat the Parliament hath an absolute , indisputable power of declaring Law : so that all the right of the King and People depends upon their pleasure . To this the Observator saith ; It hath beene answered , That this Power must rest in them , or in the King , or in some inferiour Court ; or else all suits will be endlesse , and it cannot rest more safely then in Parliament . ANIMADVERSION I. THe Observator hath contracted His Majesties words , but hath kept the sense in more generall termes , and seemes ( though but faintly ) to justifie the Position , by approving ( I know not whose answer ) that this Power can rest no where m●re safely then in Parliament . He meanes the Parliament without the King ; if he had allowed the King his place in Parliament , I know no understanding man but will easily subscribe , That the King in Parliament , or the Parliament with him , have an absolute , undisputable power , both to make , and declare Law ; and to end all suits of what kind soever , determinable by humane Law within the Kingdome . And here is the most safe resting of this power ( and here it hath ever rested ) & not in the King alone ( who claimes not that Power , but is willing to governe His Subjects according to the known Lawes ) and much lesse in any inferiour Court . But that such an absolute undisputable Power of declaring Law , as hath lately beene assumed , by the Major part of the present sitting Parliament , should be resting in them , is neither necessary for the ending of suites , nor can be safe either for King or Subject . If they may declare that for a Law , a fundamentall Law , which never yet was exacted , or had any being ; and deny the plaine undoubted Lawes that have beene Enacted , or frustrate them by some unheard of interpretation , ( as if such interpretation had been some mentall ( or rather Parliamentall ) reservation , laid up within the Parliament wals , to be produced upon emergent occasions , by their Successours ) they will have so full an Arbitrary power , that the right and safety of King and People must wholly depend upon their Votes . Which power can never be safe , either for King , or People , nor can they produce one president that may warrant such a Power . But they are not bound , or limited by such presidents , That 's the second Position . POSITION II. THat Parliaments are bound to no Presidents . OBSERVATOUR . Statutes are not binding to them , why then should Parliaments ? Yet there is no obligation stronger then the honour & justice of a Parliament . ANIMADVERSION II. IF Statutes be not binding to them , there is no reason that presidents should be . And he saith true , Statutes are not binding to them , that is , de facto , they are not ( for they in some things goe directly against them ) but de jure , they are ; that 〈◊〉 they ought to be binding to them , till they be repealed by the same power they were made , that is , by Bill orderly passed both Houses , and ratified by His Majesties Royall assent . And unlesse they can shew better reason then their bare Assertion , Presidents ( as they are the best warrant , so ) they are , and ought to be the limits and bounds of their proceedings . He might have said as truly , That Oathes are not binding to them : and therefore neither Statutes , nor presidents , But the Observator tells us ( Pag. 44. ) That the Oathes of Supremacie and Allegiance are not endangered , by making the Kingdome , & not the King , the proper subject of power . And he yeelds reason for it . For ( saith he ) hee that ascribes more to the whole Vniversality , then to the King , yet ascribes to the King a true Supremacie of Power and Honour above all particulars . I wonder what he meanes by a true Supremacie of Power and Honour above all particulars : Surely he meanes nothing but priority of place , and height of Title ; for hee is allowed little power over some particulars , namely , over the Members of either House , and whom else they please to exempt ( as they did Serjeant Major Skippon for his Power and Commands . ) But this distinction helpes them The Members of either House are sharers in that Supremacie which is in the Universality and above his ; and by the power of that Supremacie they can exempt whom they please from the power of this , Inferiour ( pardon the phrase , and the absurdities cannot be exprest without a Solecisme ) Supremacie . Very good : but in good sober sadnesse , doth the Observator thinke this distinction was thought on by the Framers and enjoyners of that Oath , or that the Members of the House , at their entring the House , did take their Oath to the King , as to the Supreme over all , with exception of themselves , or reservation of an higher Supremacy to themselves , when they should be entred ? It is hardly credible : Nor do all ( that desire to tender all due honour to the Parliament ) beleeve that they are so the Universality , or the Kingdome , as the Observator presumes . They are trusted by the Universality and Kingdome , and we pray , that they may discharge that trust , not knowing , but that a multitude of men subject ( every one of them ) to errour , may faile in their judgement , and being not exempted from the common condition of the sinfull Sons of Adam , may possibly , not rightly discharge the trust committed to them , as well as the King , who is blasted with foule failings and errours , in judgement . Me thinks , men that so much detest Popery , should not borrow the grounds of their reasoning from them : and I shall as soone beleeve the Councell of Trent , telling us that they are the Universall Church , and therefore cannot possibly erre , as that the Parliament is the Universall , unerring , and unpervertibly just body of the Kingdome . And surely , the Spirit of declaring must needs reside in a strangely large measure in them , who have power thus to declare , not onely Law , but Oathes too : a greater , then which the Popes flatterers never gave him : and hardly ever any Pope assumed so great : Quo te constringam mutantem Protea nodo ? How shall these men be bound to do right , who so easily untie the knots of these sacred bookes of Law and Oathes ? why , yes : There is a bond that will do it ; The obligation of the Justice , and honour of a Parliament . But can any man be sure , that they whom neither Law , Custome , & Presidents of their Ancestors , nor Oathes can bind , will be alwayes held in by the obligation of Justice and Honour ? Is it not possible that they may ( in time ) finde a power in themselves of declaring that obligation void , as well as they have done the other ? The same obligation of Justice and Honour , is as strong upon Kings , ( and hath ever beene held more powerfull and obstrictive in them , then in any State mannaged by a Community ; ) and yet they dare not trust His Majesty , though so obliged . The Observatour then must pardon me , if I desire , they may rather be held in , ( and hold themselves so to be ) by the old obligations of Law , Presidents , and Oathes , rather then that the Kings liege people should be put wholly to confide to that single obligation of the Justice and Honour of a Parliament . POSITION III. THat they are Parliaments , and may judge of publike necessity without the King , and dispose of any thing . OBSERVATOUR . They may not desert the King , but being deserted by the King , when the Kingdome is in distresse , they may judge of that distresse , and relieve it ; and are to be accompted by vertue of representation , as the whole body of the State . ANIMADVERSION III. HIs Majestie sets downe this Position in more words , but these are much to the same purpose ; and upon these the inference which His Majestie makes , followes undeniably , That then the life and liberty of the subject , and all good Lawes made for the security of them , may be disposed of , and repealed by the major part of both Houses at any time present , and by any wayes and meanes procured so to be ; and His Majestie shall have no power to protect them . They see nothing that see not the misery which may follow upon such a vast transcendency of arbitrary power , if it were invested in the Parliament , which ( I dare boldly say ) was never claimed by any Parliament , though in conjunction with ( the head of it ) the King . Every ( the meanest ) Subject hath such a right and propriety in his goods , that without Law they cannot bee taken from him , though to be employed for the publike good . And though the safety of the people be the highest Law , and that doe ( many times ) give a power above other Laws , and against them , to the supreame Magistracy in a State , to dispose of private mens estates , yet the unchangeable rule of Justice must have place , even in that highest Law , and that requires a compensation to be made to those , whose estates or goods are so disposed of ; and never gives power to uphold the publike good with private injury . Nor can it be imagined , that a State upheld by such helpes , should not be able to make a just compensation to those , by whom it was upheld . But let us heare our Observatour : They may not ( saith hee ) desert the King . Gramercy for that ; I am glad to heare they have yet any obligation upon them to tye them to the King . Yet I know not well what he meanes by deserting the King : if hee meane it in that sense , which he doth the Kings deserting of them , which ( out of question ) is his not assenting to whatsoever they shall thinke fit ; Then in reason they should not , by their disallowing all his Proposals , have driven him to dissent from theirs , and so to have deserted them . Well : But being deserted by the King , when the Kingdome is in distresse , they may judge of that distresse , and relieve it . All their power then is upon supposition of the Kings deserting them : So that if it appeare ▪ that His Majestie hath not deserted them ( as many good men beleeve He hath not , in the redresse of any reall grievance , ) then they have no such power . And however , they claime this power onely when the Kingdome is in distresse ; But how if the Kingdome be not in distresse , or ( at least ) that distresse be only or principally caused by their claiming of that power , which cannot consist with the Honour and Royall Estate of His Majestie , which all men ( by their late Protestation ) are bound to defend ? If it be so , wee may easily discerne how farre they may stretch this power , which they claime onely in order to distresse ; and that they may make as much use of it , as the Pope doth of his power in temporals ; In ordine ad spiritualia . He claimes no more , ( though some have said he hath right to more ; ) and the Parliament will need no more , to doe as much as he takes upon him to do with Christian Princes and States . But they must have a right to their power in this case of distresse ; Whence have they that ? why , they have it as the whole body of the State , and that they are , and must be so accompted , by vertue of representation . Very good . But let us consider his words a little more . There is no understanding man , but must and will acknowledge ( unlesse he wilfully derogate from them , ) that the Parliament represents the body of the State , for those ends for which they convene , as an Ambassadour doth the Prince that sends him , in the mannage of that businesse for which he is sent : But this is not an absolute representation to all intents and purposes . Besides , whom doe they represent ? The body ( saith he ) of the State . Be it so : but it is onely the Body without the Head . And if they were not by representation onely , but really , the whole body of the People ( if it were possible they should convene together ) they are all but an assembly of Subjects , of men to be governed , not to rule ; to be commanded , not to command their Head and Soveraigne : and then there can be no virtue of representation that can advance them to the power , which the Observatour ascribes to them , when such power was never in the whole Body , which is represented . No ? never such power in the whole body ? I know the Observatours stomack will rise here . Did not the Peoples consent at first make Kings , and conveigh power into their hands ? Truely Sir , not solely : but grant it , what then ? Marry , he saith , then it is a principle in nature . Quicquid efficit tale , est magis tale ; In English , If the People make a King , they are more King themselves ; or if they give power , they have more power : and may resume and exercise that power when they please . Excellent learning , and well applyed ; I beleeve hee learn'd this piece from Suarez the Jesuite . But the Observatour may know , that that rule admits many limitations ; and surely , it holds onely in causis totalibus , which the People are not in the constitution of Kings . But suppose their consent did at first give power to Kings ; when their consent is given for them and their Successours , to a King and His Heires , can the succeeding people cut off the entaile , and retract the consent their Ancestours have given ? By what right ? with what justice ? I know not : but the people may contract for them and their Successours in the conveighance of Soveraigne power , ( if ever they had it in their hands to give ) as any man may in the conveighance of his lands or goods : and that such conveighance may be as binding to Successours in the one , as in the other ; and then I am sure they cannot have power at all times , and in all succeeding ages , to resume what they have so given . Our Kings right ( so far as it is derived from the people ) is of this kinde . And if he had no other grounds for his claime of Soveraignty , ( as it is most certaine that he hath ) such a consent once granted , were sufficient to binde the people , that it cannot ever be lawfull for them , by a major part of them , ( comming in with a Nolumus hunc regnare super nos ) to deprive him of that right . But surely , they would never make so absolute a grant of their power to Princes , as to devest themselves of it . Good Sir , shew me that proviso in their grant . But it seemes to you unnaturall they should : I doe not wonder it should seeme so to you , who make it agreeable to the clearest beames of humane reason , and the strongest inclinations of nature ; ( and by consequence , as you would perswade the World , justifiable : ) For every private man to defend himselfe by force , if assaulted , though by the force of a Magistrate , or his owne Father ; and though he be not without all confidence by flight , &c. I wish whilest you have such recourse to nature , you would not forget Christianity , which teaches subjection and obedience , and gives no liberty ( either to private men , or the major part of the Communalty ) of resistance ; but saith , They that resist , shall receive to themselves damnation . And if the Observatur be a Gentleman , he should tender how he hath recourse to nature in point of right , lest he give occasion to some Wat. Tyler's Chaplaine , to preach againe upon that Text : When Adam dolve , and Eve span , Who was then a Gentleman . He may finde a goodly Sermon upon that Text , set downe by John Stow , in Richard the second , and such Doctrine delivered upon it ; the use of which would shake his title to his inheritance , and the name of Gentleman . POSITION IV. THat no Member of the Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason , &c. without leave . OBSERVATOUR . This is intended of suspitions onely , and when leave may seasonably be had ; and when competent accusers appeare not in the impeachment . ANIMADVERSION IV. HIs Majestie hath said so much of this , and so little of it hath beene answered , ( or indeed is answerable , ) that I shall not need to say much : Onely I observe the modesty of this Observatour , that hee doth not absolutely say they are not to be troubled for those crimes , but not upon suspition onely ; &c. I know not what hee may call suspitions , but I beleeve the best evidences may easily be held for bare suspitions , if they may not have liberty to speake out ; and that they cannot have , unlesse the accused be first in safe custody , and brought to tryall , where they may legally be produced . And , I beleeve , few wise men will thinke it reasonable , that the grounds of suspition of Treason should necessarily be opened before tryall . POSITION V THat the Soveraigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament , The King having no negative voyce . OBSERVATOUR . This power is not claimed as ordinary , nor to any purpose , but to save the Kingdome from ruine ; and in case , where the King is so seduced , as that he prefers dangerous men , and persecutes his loyall Subjects . ANIMADVERSION V. HIs Majestie infers upon this Position , That himselfe must be subject to their Commands . This sounds but harshly in the eares of loyall Subjects . That any posture wherein they can be put , can raise Subjects to a capacity of Soveraignty , and reduce their Soveraigne to become their Subject . But hee comforts us here , and tels us , this power is not claimed as ordinary , nor to any purpose , &c. This is but poore comfort : it is not , but it may be in good time , if they please . Hee doth not say , they shall not hereafter , and cannot claime it as ordinary , and to other purposes then that he names . So that there may be other causes that may make them claime this power , as well as this . But indeed they need no other , if it be in their power to declare that to be the case of the King and Kingdome when they please : But they will never doe it , but where there is a just cause for it , and the truth leads them to it . Truly , I believe honourably of the Justice and Wisedome of Parliaments ; but I doe beleeve that they are not either infallible , or that they cannot possibly do amisse . And the Observator must bring better arguments ; ( and I fear he cannot bring so good ) to make me beleeve otherwise , then ever yet were brought for the infallibility of a generall Councell . But I have said enough for the present of the residence of soveraigne power in the Parliament , and the ground of their claime to it , by the vertue of representation in my third Animadversion . I shall here onely give the Reader a briefe glosse upon the language here used by the Observatour to save the Kingdome from ruine , ( that is from Monarchy or being governed by the King . ) The King is seduced , that is , he is perswaded ( by his owne understanding , and other evill Counsellours , ) not to part with his Soveraignty , nor to become a Subject to his Subjects . He preferres dangerous men , ( that is , such as would have him still to be their King . ) persecutes his loyall Subjects , that is , such as would rule him , and the people at their pleasure . POSITION VI . THat the Levying of Forces against the personall commands of the King , ( though accompanied with his presence ) is not levying of warre against the King : but warre against his authority , not Person , is warre against the King . OBSERVATOUR . If this were not so , the Parliament seeing a seduced King , ruining himselfe , and the Kingdome , could not save both , but stand and looke on . ANIMADVERSION VI . I Thought this Position so strangely Paradoxall , and so apparently contrary to reason , and common sense , that no man would have appeared in the defence of it . Yet this Observator never blushes , nor blinkes at it , but affirmes it stoutly . But for all that , I shall beleeve very slowly , That the Kings Person can at any time be without the King , or without his Authority : Or that they may destroy the Kings Person to preserve the King . My faith is not strong enough to beleeve these sublime points , and mysteries of State : I shall subscribe thus farre , That warre against the Kings Authority ( though in the absence of his Person ) is warre against the King : But that the King and his Person should be ' intwo places , will never ( I feare ) downe with mee . But however I le see his reason : What 's that ? Why else the Parliament seeing a seduced King , ruining himselfe and his Kingdome , could not save both , but must stand and looke on . Surely this reason is full of weight , and ready to burst , it is so big with probability . I suppose the Reader understands his language here by my former glosse : But if we should take the words as they sound , the reason would seeme as strange , as that which it is brought to confirme . The King ruining himselfe , and his Kingdome , a mad King , or an Ideot ( hee meanes ) and then 't were fit the Parliament appointed him a guardian . Ruining himselfe and his Kingdome . Is it possible , that the King should ruine himselfe and his Kingdome . What ? The King alone ? Is he alone able to doe it without the people ? It is hardly credible : If he have the people on his side , and a prevailing major party , I thinke the Observatour ( standing to his own Principles ) will not deny that he hath Soveraigne power with him , and that it is unnaturall to thinke the Community should destroy it selfe . But the Community ( he will say ) is to be lookt at in Parliament . Well , But good Sir , may not the people withdraw the power of representation , which they granted to the Parliament ; was their grant so absolute , and so irrevocable , that they dispossesse themselves wholly of taking or exercising that power , in their owne proper persons ? Remember your principles about the conveying of Soveraigne power into the hands of Kings ; and if you can shew no better Cards for their power of representation , than the peoples revocable consent , ( and I would faine know why it should be more revocable from Kings than men ) you will find their tenure in it very tickle . POSITION VII . THat according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings . OBSERVATOUR . 'T is denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament , fairely elected . ANIMADVERSION VII . I Like this note better then all the rest , and am wholly of his mind : That never any free Parliament , fairely elected , deposed any King : and I hope ( whatsoever his principles seeme to insinuate ) they doe not beleeve they have power to do it , pray that they may never attempt , ( at least , not be able ) to depose the King , or destroy Monarchy . FINIS . Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A56168e-100 Seth and his generation began first to call upon the name of the Lord , that is to say , to give to God some set forme of worship , as Priests did , &c. Notes for div A56168e-1860 Pag. 2. Pag. 3. Pag. 16 Rom. 13