A view of a printed book intituled Observations upon His Majesties late answers and expresses. Spelman, John, Sir, 1594-1643. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A93661 of text R6700 in the English Short Title Catalog (Thomason E245_22). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 167 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 24 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A93661 Wing S4941 Thomason E245_22 ESTC R6700 99873027 99873027 125474 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A93661) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 125474) Images scanned from microfilm: (Thomason Tracts ; 42:E245[22]) A view of a printed book intituled Observations upon His Majesties late answers and expresses. Spelman, John, Sir, 1594-1643. 8, 7-22, [24] p. Printed by Leonard Liechfield [sic], printer to the University., Oxford [i.e. London], : 1642. [i.e. 1643] Attributed to John Spelman by Wing. The imprint is false; a London counterfeit -- Madan. Text continuous despite pagination. Annotation on Thomason copy: "Jan: 26.". Reproduction of the original in the British Library. eng Parker, Henry, 1604-1652. -- Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses. Great Britain -- History -- Charles I, 1625-1649 -- Early works to 1800. A93661 R6700 (Thomason E245_22). civilwar no A view of a printed book intituled Observations upon His Majesties late answers and expresses.: Spelman, John, Sir 1642 30512 435 0 0 0 0 0 143 F The rate of 143 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the F category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2007-05 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2007-06 Apex CoVantage Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2009-01 Emma (Leeson) Huber Sampled and proofread 2009-01 Emma (Leeson) Huber Text and markup reviewed and edited 2009-02 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion A VIEW OF A PRINTED BOOK INTITULED OBSERVATIONS UPON HIS MAJESTIES LATE Answers and Expresses . OXFORD , Printed by Leonard Liechfield , Printer to the University . 1642. The Printer to the Reader . YOu will wonder , it may be , that this comes forth no sooner , and yet comes forth now , so long after the publishing of those Observations . That it comes forth no sooner , is not that it was no sooner ready , but having passed the Authors hand long since , it waited till now the conveniency of a Presse . That it comes forth now ( wanting not a President ) is to free and undeceive such who are either entangled , or misled by his dangerous Doctrines ; and to vindicate the Kings just Rights and Priviledges : All which you will finde so cleerly done in the ensuing Treatise , that I doubt not but it will satisfie every impartiall Reader . A VIEW OF A PRINTED BOOK Intituled OBSERVATIONS UPON HIS MAIESTIES LATE Answers and Expresses . I Have read of the Citizens of Abdera , That one hearing a strange Tragedy full of seditious designes , they were all strucken into such a fit of Phrensie , That for many dayes after , they did nothing but act the same Tragedy , with furious gestures in their streets ; I would it were not too late to wish that licencious Pulpits and seditious Pamphlets might not work a like effect upon our London Citizens . Among the many other Libells I have not observed any that hath so much intoxicated the vulgar , or intangled the more understanding , as thse Observations , wherein Treachery is more cunningly mixed with some shew of reason : Those other Spiders spun their Web for insnaring only weak and silly Flyes ; But Prentices and Porters are below our Observator : A King and His Answers shall be His Subject , and His Discourse shall soar alost u●to the head and origen both of regall and Parliamentory Power , wherein as in a Laborinth of implicatory and inextricable Errours , some Reader may unhappily loose himself . I shall not follow him in his maze of incertainties ; I hope some able pen will undertake to give him a sharp and just Answer ; mean while to those Animad versions formerly made , I shall adde some few Observations . And first , I would have you observe the boldnesse of his undertaking ; A Privad● , interposing himself betwixt a King and His Parliament , being in earnest debate of the highest Rights that ever have come in question twixt King and Parliament : It hath been the modesty and wisedome of former times , with a Veyl of Reverence , to reserve from vulgar insolence the Rights of Supreme Majesty . And although at this time , by unhappy occasions , they are fallen into question betwixt a King and His Parliament , yet should not any private man presume to meddle . What ? Are not the Parties a King and His Parliament , exempt from our Observators Jurisdiction ? No ? nor is the Matter above his Cognizance ? No surely , both are subject to his Tribunall ; and therefore he observes , and boldly censures His Majesties late Answers and Expresses . His Pamphlet treating matter of so high concernment . I was somewhat scrupled whether I might lawfully deal with it : But I considered , and be pleased likewise to consider , That I make not the Messages and Answers , either of the King , or Houses , subject to my Consure or Observation , I onely encounter with the Observator : Nor do I deal with the Matter it self otherwise then I finde it in his Observations , examining his Principles , and proposing some Arguments , as against him onely ; upon all which , I presume not to make any determinate Conclusion . But now although his undertaking were bold , yet perhaps his expressions are so full of humility , and dutifull regard towards his King and Soveraigne , as will make amends ; for which purpose , be pleased to observe these Particulars [ Pag. 37. ] As for those absurd , unreasonable , incredible supposicions , &c , He speaks of the Kings suppositions . [ Pag. 39. ] He first sets down the Kings Reasons against Parliamentary Election of the great Officers : 1. That it would be prejudiciall to the people ; 2. Dishonourable to Himself : upon which the Observator thus replies ; Man is by nature of restlesse ambition ; Antoninus Pius was greatly renowned for communicating weighty Affairs , and following publike advice : What will Nero more d●spise , then to condescend as Antoninus did ; yet it were more necessary that Nero were limited , then Antoninus . Pag. 7. He tells us the King may not think to justifie His Acts by a President of Queen Eliz. For the gracious Acts of soft Princes may more easily invade the Subjects Liberty , then the furious proceedings of such as Caligula was . Pag. 10. 'T is a wonderfull thing that the Kings Papers ( so he is pleased every where to term His Majesties Answers ) being fraughted scarce with any thing else but such Doctrines of Division , tending all to the subversion of our ancient Fundamentall Constitutions , should finde such applause in the world . See Pag. 3. how he checks at the King for using the word ( Grace . ) Pag. 31. he charges the King to have left the Parliament out of good opinion to Papists and Incendiaries ; and that His solemn Oathes of cordiall love to them , hath wanted integrity and faith . See Pag. 38. how he scornfully taunts the King : If he spare not the King , do you think he will spare the Court ? Pag. 42. He regards not those fond things ( Courtiers ) which cannot see in humane nature what is depraved in it , and what not ; But what if he be bold with the secondary derived Majesty of the King , yet he will be more respectfull of that he calls the underived Majesty of the people . Pag. 11. We have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and Countrey , but never any till now , betwixt the Representatives , and the Body of the Kingdom represented ; and were we not now those dregs of humane Race , &c. What ? the Kingdom represented to whom you say so great a Majesty is due , in whom Majesty is underived , will you say they are the dregs of humane Race ? Will you charge them with deserting their Representatives , then which , you say ( Pag. 16. ) there is nothing , next to renouncing God , more persidious . I fear our Observator is some one of the malignant party , in saying , There is now enmity and antipathy betwixt the Representatives , and the Body of the Kingdom represented ; he would then have us believe they are only Apprentices , and some of the courser sort , who unjustly assuming the name of whole Counties , being hired with publike Moneyes , brought up those Petitions , extolling and approving their Proceedings , when as the Body of the Kingdom represented , had ( as he saith ) forsaken their Representatives . Who sees not the Observator's modesty ? I will give you but a taste of his sincerity in citing the Kings words . ( Pag. 7. ) he cites these in a small Character , as if they were the Kings formall words : When Parliaments are assembled , they have no Commission to counsell , but in such points as the King pleases to propose : And if they make any transition into other matters , they are laable to imprisonment , at the Kings pleasure ; witnesse Wentworth's Case . The King onely cites the Writ ( the Form whereof is ancient ) whereby they are summoned to counsell the King de quibusdam arduis , not in all things , but in some things , saith the King ; Is this to say , only in such points as the King shall please to propose ? Did not His Majesty in expresse words at the beginning of this Parliament , leave them to their own method ? Again , Doth the King say , If they make any transition , they are liable to imprisonment at His pleasure ? Not His pleasure , but the Law is the Rule he tyes Himself unto ; these then are but false Calumnies . Pag. 8. 9. 46. he charges the King with this Position , The Lords and Commons in Parliament , are meerly to councell the King , As if without their consent the King might make a Law . That they are limitted by the Writ , ad consilium onely , That if we make the Lords and Commons to be more then Counsellors , we make them commanders and controllers , and this is not suitable to royalty . From hence the Observator takes occasion to argue very sadly , That the Lords and Commons are summoned not onely ad c●nsilium , but ad consensum also , in the making and altering Laws ; And in this ( though in nothing else ) he brings authority to back his reasons withall , citing the close Roll , 7. Ed. 1. Quodomnes tangit ab omnibus approb●ri d●bet ▪ or trat●ari . He did well to corrupt the Record , by putting approbari d●bet , for tractari : otherwise it would not have served his turn . But surely the Point needed not proof , for never did the King , nor any body else deny it ; the King no where sayes , They are called ad consilium onely , meerly , or that to allow them mere then to counsell , were to make them Commanders : He saith they are called to counsell ( that 's true ) not to command , ( that 's true ) but he doth not deny them power of consenting , which the Observator contradicting himself , doth afterwards acknowledge ( Pag. 16. ) It is l●s● unq●●s●imed ( saith he ) That the legislative power is partly in the King , partly in the Kingdome ; and that the King in ordinary cases cannot make a Law or Ordia●n●● , without the Parliament . Is it left unquestioned ? why then would you abuse the people as if the King had claimed a legislative power to himself , whereto the consent of the Lords and Commons were not requisite , ( Pag. 7. ) The King ( saith he ) deni●s the Lords and Commons , if h● withdraw himsel● ▪ to have any power of any Court . ( Pag. 10. ) He cites these , as the Kings precise words , 'T is improbable and impossible , that His Cabinet-Councellors , or His Bishops , or Souldiers , who must have so great a share in the misery , should take such pains in the procuring thereof . ( Pag. 25. ) He tells you , That the King ( saith he ) cannot without renouncing His own conscience and reason , preforce the Parliaments counsell before the Courts ; All which , and many more , are falsly imposed upon the King , to alienate and corrupt the affections of His Majesties Subjects . ( Pag. 25. ) He saith , The King charges the Parliament with these Doctrines , as so offensive : 1. That the Parliament hath an absolute indisputabl● power of d●●laring Law . 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents . And then the Observator justifies these Doctrines , as well as he may , for they are most true ; And had the King denied them , as the Observator wou'd have it thought , he had indeed destroyed the power of Parliaments . But the Doctrines the King chargeth them with , are , That the then major part of the two Houses , had indisputable power of declaring Iaw , and were not bound to Presidents : Had the Observator taken the Charge aright , he would not have answered , Statutes are not binding to them , why then should Presidents ? For I hope the now major part of the Houses are bound by Statutes and cannot repeal them , though the Parliament may . What though his Pamphlet be stuffed with such corruptions ? yet let me speak one word for him , He is no more faulty in this kinde then others . You see his i●genuity ; I shall now consider the solidity of his Reasons , and the goodly Consequences he draws from them . Omitting then those loose extravagant Passages , which have no connexion with the Body of his Discourse ; the sum of that part which seemeth rationall , is as followeth ; Quicquid efficit tale , est magis tale : The efficient cause is ever superiour unto , and more excellent then that which it causeth : But the people in whom Power is originall , and Majestie underived , are the efficient cause conveying Regall Power and Majestie unto Princes , not God , who is no more the author of Regall , then Aristocraticall Power : The same people being the efficient cause , are also the finall cause , for whose good and preservation onely that Power is conveyed ; and their conveyance is fiduciary , upon trust , and under such Conditions as they please . The people being the efficient cause of Kingly Power , he hence inf●rres , They are above the King , Rex etsi sing●lis major , universis minor est . And from thence ( to bring it on to his purpose ) it must needs follow ( as he thinks ) the people being above the King , The Houses ( being by vertue of representation the same people ) must likewise be above the King ; The Houses then being by vertue of representation the efficient cause , conveying Regall Power upon Trust , and to no other end , but to the good and preservation of the people , may , when they please to say , That it is not disposed of by the King to that end , and according to that Trust , re-assume that Power , and make themselves the disposers thereof ; from all which Grounds he inferres their power of making Ordinances , obliging the People in generall , The Ordinance of the Militia to be legall , and consequently the Commissions of Array illegall , The taking and retaining Hull to be justifiable , The taking the Magazine , and whatsoever else hath been taken from the King . That the King hath in nothing appertaining to His Crown , an unconditionable Property , That whatsoever Acts he hath passed , whatsoever he hath done , or can do for His subjects , is meer Duty , That He ought to acknowledge , that he can in nothing merit of the whole State ; That he ought to assent to all Bills that they approve , and adjudge fit to passe ; That His great Officers be such as they shall allow of ; That without him , they may authoritivè , declare the Law , and consequently , make and repeal Laws and Statutes at their pleasure ; That when they adjudge the Power intrusted with Him for the Kingdoms safety to be turned against them , they and all are ipso facto , absolved of all Obedience , of all Oaths and Tyes of Allegiance whatsoever to His Majesty , and bound to seek their preservation by resistance and defence . Desperate Conclusions . I shall examine his Grounds ordine retrograd● , beginning with that immediately antecedent to all his Conclusions , Wheth●r the Parliament ( so he would have you call the major part of the Lords and Commons remaining ) are above the King , by reason of their representing the whole Kingdom . How true it is , That the Houses , without the King , represent the Universall Realm , shall be considered anon , passing that by . I conceive that the Parliament ( truely so called ) is above the King , taken solely , for that it doth involve the King , without whom they are not truely a Parliament . The Parliament then , thus considered , is a whole compared with some part , and the King but a part ( though the most excellent part ) of the whole ; Now every whole is greater then any part ; the Head ( though more excellent then all the other Members , yet ) not more excellent then the whole Man : whereof the Head is but a part . But the King solely compared with the Parliament ( or rather the Houses of Parliament ) excluding or not involving the King , is superiour and above them , whether you consider them scorsim , or conjunctim ; for taken conjunctim , they make but a Body , which though it be greater then , then the Head in Bulk , yet doth the Head excell in Vertue , Excellence , and Authority ; And although , by vertue of representation , they are the Body of the whole Kingdom , yet is the King the Head of that Body , and the Representative of God himself , who , I am sure , is above the Body they represent . It is a Principall undeniable , Pax in parem non habet imperium , multo minus in superior●●● . If then the Houses be above , nay , if but equall with the King , He can have no Command over them ; But it is evident He hath Command over them ; He calls and commands them to assemble ; being assembled , or united together , He may command them to prorogue , or adjourn for time or place ; upon which Command , it is then their Duty to rise ▪ and remove ; and again at His pleasure He can dissolve them : Although for this time His Majesty hath been graciously pleased to restrain Himself from the exercise of that Power , yet the Power it self is still in Him , as an Inheritance inseparable from His Crown . The Representatives of the Kingdom either are Subjects , or not ; That they are not Subjects , by reason that they are assembled , is absurd , and so would not the Kings Protection due unto Subjects , belong unto them . If they are Subjects , then doth the King remain their Soveraign and Superiour : And indeed , so far is their uniting and assembling in Parliament from diminishing the Kingly Soveraignty to which they were before all and every one Subject , as that the Regall Majesty is thereby much more encreased and augmented . ( Cromp. Juris● . 10. ) We are informed by Our Judges ( saith King H. 8. to His Parliament ) That We at no time stand so highly in Our Estate Royall , as in the time of Parliament ; wherein We as Head , and you as Members , are con●oyned and knit together in one Body Politique . If the Houses , as representing the Universall Realm , are above the King , then they may judge Him , punish , or depose Him ; But they cannot judge Him , 22 Edw. 3. 3. Le Roy per cux ne doit estre ajuge . 3 Edw. 3. 19. Scrope . Those which are Judges of Parliament , are Judges of their P●●rs ; but the King hath no Peer within His Own Kingdom , and therefore ought not to be judgedly them . And for deposing a King , or depriving Him of His Right and Authority , or any necessary part thereof , no Act of Parliament can prevail , much lesse the Lords and Commons . An Attainder by Parliament , could not barre the title to the Crowne from descending on King H. 7. nor was an act of Parliament disabling King H. 6. to reassume the Government of his people of any force , but without any repeale in it selfe frustrate and voyd , 7. Rep. 14. Calvins case , an act of Parliament cannot take away the Kings protection , or the Subjects service which is due by the Law of nature . 11. Rep. Sur de la wares Case William de la ware although disabled by act of Parliament was neverthelesse called by Q. Eliz. to sit as a Peere in Parliament for that it seemes the Queene could not be barred of the service and Counsell of any of her Subjects 2. H. 7. 6. A statute that the King by no non obstante shall dispence with it , is void , because it would take a necessary part of Governement out of the King : If then no act of Parliament be of force to take away the government or any necessary part thereof from the King ; then surely is not any Ordinance of the Lord and Commons of force to doe it ; And consequently the Lords and Commons as representing the vniversall Realme cannot be above the King , but inferior to him . Before the King commanded them to assemble , each particular and all of them were his Subjects and inferior to him : If by assembling into one body , and the vertue of representation they cease to be his Subjects and inferiors , why doe they then in all their petitions , and declarations or Answers ( proceeding from them not as particular men , but as houses of Parliament united ) stile him , Their gracious Soveraigne and themselves , His Majesties most humble Subjects , the Lords and Commons in Parliament . Let our Observator judge whether these representatives have not ill discharged their duty to the Kingdome by debasing thus the underived Majestie ( so he calls it ) of the people ; by petitioning in so low and humble a forme , him that is but their creature , and in whom there is no Majestie , but what is from them derived downe unto him ( for so the Obseruator conceives it . ) But now to answer the Observators Argument , which is thus , There is nothing , saith he , more known or assented to then this , that although the King be singulis major , yet universis minor , being below the people then in universali , he must likewise be below the representatives of that universalitie . I will not stand to question what necessary connexion these propositions have , The people are above the King : therefore their representatives are so : The King of England is above the King of Spain , doth the English Embassadour , therefore take place of the King of Spain ? But admitting a necessary Connexion . The people are above the King , ergo , the houses representing them . Why then è converso , The houses representing are not above the King , ergo , the people represented are not , and so having proved the houses below the King I have already proved the King above the people : yet a word more . 'T is true ( as the Observator saith ) nothing is more known , or assented to then this , that the King solely is Minor universis , the universalitie including the King ; For no part , be it the head , can exceed or be greater then the whole ; But againe if the King and universalitie bee contradistinguished , nothing is more known or assented to then this , That the King ( I speake of the King of England , a Soveraign King , not a Duke of Venice ) is not onely singulis major , but major universis . Nay most properly is the King above the people , considered as an entire Congregation ; For chiefly as he is King , he is above all others ; Now King relates to kingdome , Rex to Regnum : and Kingdome or Regnum denotes an universalitie or body collected . As he is head , so is he in place , power and dignitie above the body politique or universalitie , and not otherwise the head of any particular , but as he is a part of that universalitie . As out of the Embrion ( saith Fortescue ) ariseth a body naturall ruled by one head , even so of a multitude of people ariseth a kingdome which is a body mysticall governed by one man , as by its head : As then in the naturall body the head is improperly said to be the head of the arme , or of the leg , but the head of the body , so in truth must the King be made the head of the misticall body , not of the particular members . The King is but one head , and therefore but of one body , not then of the particulars which are many bodyes but of the universall one body . There is a politique body wich is the Vniversalitas Angli● : hath this body politique no head ? or is the head inferiour to its body , and yet no Monster ? The Observator will object that the politicall head must be s●bservient to its body , for that it received its first being and subsistence from the body , we shall hereafter prove that the Regal power hath alwayes its being from God though it be sometimes with the peoples approbation : And as the politicall head hath its subsistence with the body , and must be destroyed by its dissolution , so if you destroy the head or kingly power , you destroy the kingdome , and dissolve it into a Chaos and confused multitude : Nec populus Acephatus ( saith Fortescue ) corpus vocari meretur , quiaut in naturalibus capite detru●cato residuum non corpus sed truncum appellamus ; Sic in politicis sine capite communit as nullatenus corporatur . But admitting that in the body politique the head hath its power & authority derived meerly and solely out of the politique provision , that radically and habitually was in the people to provide for its own safety and weale ; yet I cannot see how it will follow that therefore the Regall power must be subservient and subject unto the people : for as in the naturall body , the heart being primum vivens , distributeth blood and spirit unto all the members , and giveth life and vertue unto the head it selfe , yet must that and the whole body be subject unto the head , which as Supreame , governeth and directeth the whole man . A second kingly Attribute is this that he is Spons●s regni and at his Coronation wedded with a Ring unto the kingdom : The Observator saith this must be applyed to subjects taken devisim not conjunctim : Otherwise as the wife is inferiour to the husband , so would the people be in politiques to the King : But in sadnesse is the King wedded to the particular men and women within this kingdome with beards , and without , I pray how many wives will he so have ? The Observator foresaw the Arguments which might be drawne from these and other attributes , whereby Princes are 〈◊〉 Gods , Lords , Fathers , &c. and that therefore subjects must stand by the same relation ; as Creatures , Servants , Children , &c. all Which he would shift off by his misapplyed distinction of Kings are such singulis , but not universis . But indeed a King is said to be a Father , or Pater patriae , that is of the universalitie , not of particular persons ; And elsewhere the King is termed an Oeconomus , or Pa●e●familuis , which with no congruity can be said in respect of particulars ; Nor can the Observator satisfie any man considering that Domesticall government is the very Image and modell of Soveraignty in a Common-weale ; why children and servants might not as wel use this distinction against their Parents , and Masters , as subjects against their Soveraign , for may it not be objected though the Father in relation to his Children , or a Master of a Family in relation to his servants , be singulis major , yet Vniversis minor , and therefore if all the sons or servants hold together , they may command their Father or Master , or turn him out of doores ; which was wisely foreseen by Agesilaus , when he returned this answer to a Citizen of Sparta that desired an alteration of the Government : That kind of Rule which a man would disdain in his own house , were very unfit to governe great Regions by . But the Observator will object that the relation holds not alike betwixt King and Subjects , as between Master and servants ; For that the Master ( saith he ) is more worthy then his servants , and above them all : but this holds not in relation betwixt a King and his Subjects . Why that 's the question , For proofe whereof although he neither doth , or can alleadge any one authority ; yet to prove the contrary that the people neither conjunctim nor divisim , and much lesse then representatives , are more worthy or above the King ? amongst many peruse these few . Bracton l. 1. cap. 8. Omnis quidem sub eo ( rege ) & ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub Deo , parem non habet in regno suo ; quia sic amitteret praeceptum , nam par in parem non habet imperium , item nec multò fortiùs superiorem nec potentiorem habere debet , quia sic esset inferior sibi subditis . If he be tantum sub deo , then not under the people or their representatives . 19. E. 4. 6. If all the people in England would make a warre , yet if the King will not assent , it cannot be said a warre ; but the King alone may make a warre or league ; Is not the King in this above all the people in England ? 24. H. 8. cap. 12. Where by divers sundry old authentique histories and Chronicles , it is manifestly declared and expressed that this Realme of England is an Empire , and so hath been accepted in the world , governed by one Supreame head and King , having the Dignity and royall estate of the Imperiall Crowne of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people been bounden and owen to beare next to God a naturall and humble obedience &c. Note the King the supreame head ( true saith the Observator singulis , not universis ) unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts been bounden and owen next to God . ( Then no mediate underived Majestie 'twixt God and him ) a naturall obedience , that is due by the law of nature , or the Divine Law , not onely by the pactions and agreement of politique Nations . 25. ●● , 8. 25. H. 8. This your Graces Realme recognizing no Superiour under God , but only your Grace . By Realme is meant either Subjects divisim or conjuncti● . If divisim then no particular is subject to Judges and Justice , nor to the Lords and Commons in Parliament , but onely to the King , which is absurd : If conjunctim then is the King in the act recognized Major universis . Camb. Eliz. pag. 39. The Queene explaines the Oath of Supremacie , that she claymes nothing thereby , Quam quod ad coronam Angliae jam olim jure spectavit , scilicet se sub Deo summam & supremam gubernationem & potestatem in o●nes regni ordines habere ; Here is no distinction of being superiour singulis , but not universis . 16. R. 2. cap. 5. The Crowne of England immediately subject to God , and to none other . If immediately subject to God , then will not that distinction salve that the people in universali are above it . The iudgement then of Bodin may be well applyed unto this observator : They which have written of the duetie of magistrates , and other such like books have deceived themselves in mayntayning that the power of the people is greater then the Prince ; A thing which oft-times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their Soveraigne Prince : And ministreth matter of great troubles in Common wealthes ; of which their opinion , there is neither reason , nor ground ▪ except the King be Captive , furious , or in his infancy , and so needeth to have a protector or Lieutenant appoynted him by the suffrages of the people : For otherwise if the King should be subiect unto the assemblyes and decrees of the people , he should neither be King nor Soveraigne and the Common wealth neither Realme nor monarchy , but a mere Aristocracy of many Lords in power equall , where the greater commandeth the lesse in generall and every one in particular , and wherein the Edicts and Lawes are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth , but in the name and authoritie of the States , as in an Aristocraticall Seigniory , where he that is cheife hath no power ▪ but oweth obeysance unto the Commandements of the Seigniory unto whom yet they all and every one of them feigne themselves to owe their faith and obedience ; which are all things so absurd , as hard it is to say , which is farthest from reason . Thus , he , which he doth a little after apply unto the state of England . Consider I pray whither it be not true , which this author saith , that the maintayners of this doctrine , doe but feigne themselves to owe faith and obedience unto their Soveraigne . They will take the Oath of Allegiance to be every one true and faithfull ; But then they will tell you that they were particulars onely that tooke the Oath , and each in his particular is thereby bound , but the people in generall is a certaine universall body , in power and nature divided from every man in particular , and as an universall body they neither did nor could sweare , and consequently are not bound . Each particular member to bee admitted into the house of Parliament may sweare that the King is the onely Supreme Governour in all things or causes ; but being admitted they may altogether deny the King to be supream Governour in any cause or thing . Is the King onely supream Governour in disposing of the Militia ? The making of Laws is a cause or thing , and by and under them are all causes & things governed , yet so far is the King in this thing from being supream Governour , that he must be governed , and ought to follow the major vote : And it were well if he might as a Burgesse intervote , or at least as an honest Tradesman , might be admitted to vote in election of some Burgesse , for so at least by his proxie hee should have some share in the supreame Government , though not the only supream Governour : But how inconvenient soever this position may be , that the people in universali , are above the King yet the Observator will prove it true , for that the people are the efficient cause , and authour of Regall power : But we shall first deny that ground , And secondly , we shall prove , that admitting they were the authour of the Regall power , yet it doth not follow that therefore they are above it . For the first ▪ Let us examine , whether the people are the authour , and efficient cause of conveying Regall power . For better understanding whereof it will be requisite , first to search out the originall cause and ground of Politicall Government , or power to govern in generall , and surely wee shall finde that to be no other , then the very Law of nature it self ; The naturall condition of mankind is such as necessarily requires society : Naked and impotent weaklings are we , when we enter the World , and unable without mutuall help and assistance to preserve our selves , whence society is absolutely requisite for the preservation of mankind in his infant being , as likewise for his future protection , from the violence of beasts and brutish men ; Againe , would wee preserve our being without Civill society yet should we be more like beasts then men , dumbe and void of all discourse : Man therefore naturally needeth Civill society , and that society necessarily requires some forme of Civill Government , without which it were a confused assembly ( not a society ) and such as would ere long become destructive to it self ; Vbi non est Gubernator , corruet populus . So then from the Law of nature and necessity is government in generall derived , which Law of nature is no other then the Divine Morall Law it self , whence I conclude that God is the fountaine , & efficient cause of all Government or power to governe in the generall , So S. Paul Rom. 13. Non est potestas nisi à Deo , and again , Qui potestati resistit ▪ Dei ordinationi resistit ; True it is , although God be the Authour of all politicall power , yet doth he not always determine it to this or that particular forme , but with the peoples mediate election ▪ So that it is lawfull ( yet not altogether indifferent ) for a multitude among whom no forme of Government is already established , to chuse to themselves either a Democraticall , Aristocraticall , Monarchicall or mixt Government , and to designe the particular person or persons that shall be therewith invested , But the power so determined by their vote , unto a particular forme , and person , is from God still , not onely as hee is the Authour and universall cause of all things , but as from the immediate efficient cause , As when anciently Bishops and Presbyters were elected by the people , their order or power was not from the people , but immediatly from God , The people onely nominated or designed the person , but neither did , nor could confer the power or order of Priesthood ▪ Surely the Observator doth not believe that a Horse was the authour of Darius his power , and yet was the neighing of his horse the means by which the Kingdome was determined unto him ; before all the other Persian Lords . Neverthelesse , he cannot imagine but that this peoples election is the very efficient cause of that Regall power that is elected and setled in some particular person , whereas in truth it is but a medium used in the conveyance of it from God , the onely authour , which instrumentally operates in the conveyance , but hath no causall influx at all into the Regall power conveyed ; whence it is that God challengeth to be acknowledged the authour of Regall power ▪ Dan. 2. Hee ( GOD ) removeth Kings , and setteth up Kings , The God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdome , power , &c. Dan. 4. Cuicunque voluerit det illud . Prov. 8. By mee Kings reigne , by mee Princes rule : By these places it is manifest ( I thinke ) that although the peoples election may sometimes operate in the specifying of power , and designing the person , yet never is it a cause of that power ; God onely is the authour and efficient cause thereof . See Kitchin fol. 10. Le Roy est ordaine de Dieu . And therefore was that ever renowned Elizabeth acknowledged by her Parliament , to be the lawfull Queen of England , Iure Divino , so saith Cambden , pag. 25. And the Parliament thought it just that King H. 8. Having his Kingly and Regall power given by God ( saith the Act ) should in case of necessity , that would not abide the calling of a Parliament , by his Proclamation , or Edicts , provide for the safety of the Realme . Regall power in specie , if it were conveyed or given by the people , then must it first have been in the people , for Nihil dat quod non habet , Now that Regall power could be in the people is impossible , for 't is against the nature of Regality , to be in more then one . Rex unicus esto . If the people had Regall power , I would know over whom . Multitudo Deorum , nullitas est Deorum . Were supream power radically and originally in the people , and by them delegated to some particular person , that should governe as a King , the King as their instrument would but propound Laws , but the people must enact them ; As in Rome while it was a popular State , and that Magistracy was but beneficium populi . Leges ( saith Livy ) à Magistratu proponuntur tantum sed â populo jubentur . But now in the government of this Realme ▪ 't is cleere contrary , Leges tantum proponuntur à populo , jubentur à Rege , By which it is manifest , that Regall power with us cannot be beneficium populi . But again , the Observator must not take it for granted , that the determination of power to Regall rather then Aristocraticall , &c. or the placing of it in such particular person , was always with the peoples election , for surely Regall power and the persons that should governe , without any choice of the people , hath been determined by God himselfe . I shall not insist on the particular institution of Monarchicall Government amongst the Angels , good and bad ; nor on that which Bees and other sensitive Creatures doe observe by that instinct of nature that the Divine Goodnesse hath implanted . Nor on that Monarchicall Government amongst the Iews , which was often particularly determined by speciall ordinance sent from Heaven , by the Ministery of Angels , or Prophets , though this were sufficient to disprove what the Observator affirmeth , That God is no more the Authour of Regall then Aristocraticall power . I shall only observe that even in Adam , and after among the Patriarchs , Noah , Abraham , Iacob , and others , the common Fathers of Mankind . Regall Government was instituted by GOD himselfe , without any Election of the people ; GOD created Mankinde ex uno , ut esset inter homines non Democratia , sed Regnum : after which the Elders , or Fathers of Families successively , had by their Eldership , not only paternall , but Regall power , as appears by their making war , and execoting sentence of death upon offendors : And from these originall Stock-fathers , Kingdoms and Monarchies , I suppose for the most part , have had their beginning , without popular Election , in their first commencement , and therefore I would have our Kings style continued , Carolus Dei gratia , rather then , Carolus electione populi . This is excellently declared by Sir Thomas Smith , in his Commonwealth , lib. 1. cap. 12 to have bin the naturall source , or beginning of that Government , which is termed legitimum regnum , to difference it from Tyranny and absolute Dominion , Such as Nimrod and others first gained by usurpation , and after held by violence , over the people , And which is not otherwise from God ▪ then as the Divine providence pleaseth to direct it , to the punishment of a sinfull people , or to such other purpose as to his divine wisdom seems best : But with such absolute Dominion England hath nought to d●e , 't is legitimum regnum that takes place with us ; where the royall power ( saith Fortescue ) is restrained by power politique , that the King can neither change the law , without the consent of the subjects , nor charg them with any strange impositions against their will ; And hee there cites Aquinas to prove , that by this Rule , and kind of Regiment should all Mankind have been governed , if in Paradise they had not transgressed : By which i● appears , that God in the Law of nature , instituted this forme of Government : And whether we call it Paternall , or Regall , it refers to that institution , and is from thence derived ; True it is that violence of war , and vulgar Commotions may in most places have interrupted , and altered the course of succession according to this Divine institution ; upon which occasion popular Elections may have interposed , But the King once Elected and seated in his Throne , is thenceforth d●●m●d to reigne by that Paramount right ▪ unto which the peoples election is but a restitution , or as that learned Historian , Kings are made by God , and Laws divine ; and by humane Laws only declared to be Kings ; and thereupon he observes , that David thought himself accountable onely to God : Tibi soli peccavi , Psal. 51. But againe , if it were admitted , that the people originally were the Authours of that Regall power by which they are governed : I cannot see how it doth necessarily follow , that therefore there remayns in them a power above the King : I acknowledge , that Maxime with its just limitations , holds truly in naturall causes , Quicquid efficit tale , est magis tale : but surely it is mightily misapplyed by the Observator , who would have us imagine , if the people made a King , they are themselves more King then he ; I should rather think if Regall power were originally conveyed from the people , they by conveying it over , have devested themselves of it ; If it were conveyed with conditions , then under those conditions may it be held against them : if absolutely , then may it be held absolutely over them ; It was necessary by the Law of nature , that they should convey over a power unto some , for will they , nill they , a people cannot be without a Government : Or were their conveyance voluntary , have they therefore a power over it , at pleasure to revoke it , although it were often ratified by Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy ? Doth not this doctrine destroy not one y Monarchy , but all Government whatsoever ? The people you say are the Authors , and efficient cause of that power , that the Parliament Members have by Conveyance from them ; may the people therefore conclude themselves to be above the Parliament , and at pleasure revoke and controll their power ? May Newcastle , or any other particular Borough , or County disauthorize those they have impowred ? Or if a particular Borough or County cannot remove their proxies , yet the major part of the Electors throughout the whole Kingdome may according to this doctrine revoke the trust and authority , that all the Members have ; If so , how can my obedience be required to their Votes when as it is doubtful whether the major part of the Free-holders do not disavow their proceedings . Most certain it is ( whether the people were the authors of Regall power , or not ) there neither is , nor can be any power remayning in the people , above that which is in a Monarch or King : for if the supream power remayn in the people , it must be a popular State , such as Rome sometimes was ; The Lacedemonians had a King in name but their Estate was truly a popular Estate the supream power being in those 5 worthy Members called the Ephori , who figuring & patronizing the people had power to controll the doings of their King ; and their custome was ( as Plutarch relates ) every ninth yeere upon some cleer night to gaze upon the Firmament , and if they observed the Moon to twincle , or any Star to sparkle or shoot , they thereupon would commit their King to prison , who might not thence be delivered , untill the Oracle of Apollo , had so declared . A happy Government ( I assure you ) both for King , and people . But if you will allow of a true King in power , as well as in name , the sovereigne power next under God , must be in him , not controllable with the breath of the fickle multitude . Princeps — Nec ponit aut sumit secures Arbitrio popularis aurae . The Roman Emperour was anciently chosen by the Souldiers , but did there remayne in them a power over the Emperour so elected ? T is recorded that the Souldiers having chosen Valentinian the elder , would have added ao lleague unto him in the Imperiall government : but the Emperour answered them , me ad imperium eligere penes vos erat , sed cum jam à vobis electus sim , consortem imperii quem postulastis non amplius in vectra , sed in mea potestate eligere situm est : and with this answer were the Souldiers well contented , whereby it appeares , there remained no superour power in them . Did there remaine a superintendent power in the people over the King , it would then be lawfull to appeale from the K●ng to the people as to the more supreame power : but such appeales were never heard of , at least not till of late , nor are they consistant with Monarchy , or any government , but necessarily tend to Anarchy , and destruction ; Omnis honestae rei malus judex est vulgus : there is no Common-wealth wherein there are not more evill then good , more simple then wise ; if then the majority of the people shall determine upon the last Appeale , what judgement shall we be ruled by . You see whereunto the Observators principles do lead , and if you desire to know the fountaine from whence he drew these goodly doctrines , that little Treatise entituled , Puritano-Iesuitismus will point it out unto you . I shall forbeare to consider any further , by what authority Kings doe reigne ▪ And I heartily wish , that this Anti-monarchist had spent his time in praising God , for giving us that forme of government , which experience teacheth , and all the learned in the world do acknowledge to be the best , and most convenient , rather than by presumptuous enquiry after the cause and origen thereof , to have endeavoured to shake and unsettle the same . As concerning the finall cause of Regall Authority , it must be acknowledged , the generall end thereof is no other , then the conservation and good of the people ; and true it is , that the King is bound not only by his Oath , but also by the very end of his Regall Office , to protect us , and to endeavour our promotion to all kinde of politicall happinesse , even as much as he intends his owne honour and right : But I cannot swallow that ingratefull inference the Observator makes from thence , daring to tell his King , That hee cannot merit of the State , that whatsoever hee doth for them , is me●re duty : May not the same act be of duty , and yet meritorious , or deserving ? Is it not the duty of a Father to take care for his children ? and yet your selfe acknowledge the Father doth all his offices meritoriously . You suppose ( though falsly ) Kingly authority commenceth by pact and agreement with the people , is not honour and obedience , even by that very pact , to be paid him as a due reward ? and doth not reward presuppose desert ? although after such pact made , his care and protection be of duty , yet being free , to oblige himselfe by that pact to preserve , nourish , and defend his people , was an act meritorious . Omnium domos illius vigilia defendit , omnium otium illius labor , omnium delitias illius industria , omnium vacationem illius occupatio . For which the Law doth attribute unto him , all Honour Dignity , and P cheminence : and yet you say he deserveth , nay he can deserve , nothing . The word ( Grace ) you tell him sounds not well in his mouth ; yet surely former Kings have used the word without being checkt for it . 28. ● . 1. cap. 1. The King ●f his speciall grace for redresse of the grievances of his people , sustained by his warres , and for the amendment of their estate , and to the intent that they may be the more ready to doe him service , the more willing to assist and ●yde him in time of need , grants , &c. You see that King tearms it of speciall Grace , though for amendment of their estate ; and for those Articles hee granted them , hee expected in retribution , that his subjects should bee the more willing to assist and ayde him in time of need : And so I hope will all good subjects bee at this time the more willing to ayd his Majesty for those many Acts of greater grace he hath pleased to passe unto us . You may see sundry other Acts , wherein the King himselfe speaking ▪ pronounceth them to be of his speciall grace : W. 2. cap. 10 cap. 29. 18. E. 1. Stat. de quo warranto &c : Statutum de gratia regia di●itur quando Rex dignatur cedere de jure suo regio pro quiete & comodo populi sui . Pr●m Regall , the Observator passeth on to consider Parliamentary power , ( pag. 5. ) Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies , if not higher , for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments , and Parliaments have also the same shall cause as Monarchies . Well , 't is agreed , that the good of the Kingdome is the end whereto Parliamentary power should direct it selfe ; but then as concerning the power of Parliaments , and the efficient cause of that power , it will be requisite to consider the parts distinctly , and then the power of all together . The Parliament is a Body consisting of three distinct Estates , the King , the Lords , and the Commons : Unto the Commons considered alone , it most properly appertaines to present the grievances of the people , and in humble manner to pray such redresse , as the King with their consent , and advice of the Lords , shall deeme to be just and fit . And this power ( or rather trust ) they derive from the people their Electors , yet not without dependance on the King : The Knights are sent by the County , but the County had power and command by the Kings Writ to send them : And as for the Burgesses , their trust or power ( call it what you will ) doth more especially referre unto the King , as the author thereof ; for whence had the elected Burgesses their power , but from the Borough that sent them ; whence had the Borough power to send , but from the King , who by his Letters Patents incorporated them into a Borough , and gave them power to send Burgesses to the Parliament ; which otherwise they had no more right to doe , then any other vile whatsoever . And this is the ground of that power which the house of Commons have , as concerning the generalty of the Kingdome : And besides this the house of Commons , although a great and honourable Assembly , yet of themselves ( as I think ) they are no Court either of Record , or of ordi●ary Iustice , unlesse it bee with respect to their owne Members , which is rather a necessary priviledge then any power : They can neither administer an Oath , nor give any judgement twixt party and party ; nor have they power to controll or reverse a judgement given in the meanest pipowder Court . I speak not this with a minde to derogate from the due honour of that Assembly , but to occasion some friendly brother ( if I am in errour ) to instr●ct me how the imposing of the Protestation by order of the Commons only , upon all the subjects in generall , under a penalty of being branded with malignancy , and adjudged unfit to beare any publike office , may be defended : How that order for levelling Chancels , and making other alterations in the Church , which issued from the Commons without the King , and in opposition to the Lords , may be justified either by reason or president : How that Remonstrance ( a chiefe meanes of all our succeding dissentions ) that was voted , with so much opposition , in their owne house , and was after published ( I will not say to disaffect the people from his Majesties government ) may be defended and justified . In briefe , may I be instructed with some grounds , by which these and many other their actions and Votes may be warranted ; I shall thenceforth acknowledge them ( whom now perhaps by mistake I think to be no Court at all ) to be the most supreme Iudicatory both for Law and State : In the meane while I am ignorant of any trust they have , other then a trust from the people , to consult and assent to the King and Lords in the making of Lawes , which without the consent of the Lords , and his Majesties concurrence , is altogether uselesse , and of no vertue ; And in them apart I know no Iurisdiction , but with respect to their owne Members : and surely that ( such as it is ) they have from the Crowne the fountaine of all Iustice , and the spring head of all Iurisdiction . The house of Peeres considered simply have power by assent , or disassent , to enable or disable the making or repealing of any Lawes and generall Ordinances ; but without the concurrence of King and Commons , this of it self is of no use : They are likewise an high Court of Iudicatory in respect of particular causes orderly brought before them , having Iurisdiction in many , though not in all , Cases . In criminall causes concerning life , and member , I think they have not Iurisdiction without the Kings speciall Commission ; and therefore they cannot attaint any man for treason , murder , or felony : They are not only a Court of Iustice , but of Record , they may take a recognizance , and by the Kings Writ or Commission may reverse for errour the Iudgements given in any of the ordinary Courts : But all these powers , as likewise their Baronies , by reason of which they have place and vote in Parliament , are immediately and meerely derived from the Crowne , the fountaine of all honour and jurisdiction ; and they doe so necessarily depend upon the King , in matters of Iudicatory , as that in iudgement of law they speak ove bouch le Roy mesme . Thus much concerning the Lords and Commons apart from the King : The King alone he is Capitalis Angliae Iusticiarius , the fountaine of all Iurisdiction , and above all other Iurisdictions . Britton speaking in the person of King E. 1. nous volousque nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions in nostre royalme . By the law of Nations , and by the very end of Regall power , the King is to iudge the people , 1 Sam. cap. 8. Give us a King to judge us , ( vers. 20. ) We will have a King over us , that we also may be as the Nations , and that our King may judge us . Bracton tels us , That the King alone , if he could suffice , ought to judge the people , and that by his Oath he is bound thereunto . And as the ordinary iuridicall power is supreme , and originally in the King ; so likewise is the legislative , it being a principall end of Regall authority , dare jus populo ; which power was in Kings by the law of nature , while they governed the people by naturall Equity , long before either municipall lawes , or Parliaments had a being . Before Moses there were no standing municipall lawes , or at least not before Pharoneus ; long before which there were Kings of S●it●●● , Assyria , Egypt &c. who according to naturall Equity gave law unto their people . Rhemo cum fratre Quirinu● — jura dabat . Hoc Priami g●stamen erat ●um jura vocati● M●r● d●ret popul●● — But their lawes they so gave , ought to bee agreeable to naturall Equity , aiming no lesse at the good of the people , then of themselves : Such conditions and limitations as are agreeable to naturall Equity , Kings by the divine institution , were bound to observe ; and some by their voluntary Oaths , for themselves and their successours , many times bound themselves to more strict limits , then were absolutely requisite ; yet being agreeable to Equity , and consistent with Royalty , ought to be observed . And then●e it is , according to the severall degrees that the latitude of naturall Equity doth admit , in giving lawes , that some Kings are more strictly limi●ed then others ; and according to the oaths and promises made by the King of this Realme , they can neither give , nor repeale any law , but ●ith the assent of the Peeres and people . The Observa●or doth not deny the Legislative power to bee in the King , but ( saith he ) partly in the King , partly in the Kingdom ; which I shall admit to be true in this sence , viz. that the Legislative power is not so in the King onely , as that he being sole can either in ordinary or extraordinary cases , make or alter any Law ; for thereunto is necessarily required the assent both of Lords and Commons : But yet to speak properly the Legislative power is solely in the King , although not in the King being sole , Rex solus legislator , non si solus ; the assent of Peeres and Commons gives weight and testimony unto the Law , but the King only gives it force and authority : And it will be thus proved , the Legislative is the most soveraign power , jus dare , is somewhat more then jus dicere ; If then this most supreame power were formalitèr & subjectivè , aswell in the Lords and Commons , as in the King , the Government of this kingdome during Parliament ; would be Democraticall or Aristocraticall , not Monarchichall or Regall ; Nor would it be a kingdome or Realme , but a Republique ; For what else is Aristocracy , but the supreme power seated in divers of the Nobilitie ? or what Democracy , but a like power in the people ? The Legislative power is then solely in the King , ut in subjecto , and the consent of Lords and Commons is no parting or sharing in that power , but onely a condition requisite to the use of that power in the King . And this ( I conceive ) is evidently proved by the Oath of Supremacy , whereby the King is acknowledged the onely Supreame Governour , and likewise by the forme of all our ancient Statutos , in which the King only speaks as the Law-maker ; some Statutes are in forme of a Writ in the Kings name only , directed to the severall Sheriffs : some in form of a Charter made by the King , sometimes it runs , the King wills , the King ordained , or the King in Parliament , or the King with the assent of the Lords and Commons , &c. And never did any Act runne thus , The Lords and Commons with the assent of the King ; or the Lords and Commons in Parliament ordaine or order , &c. And in the passing Bills to this day , the imperative is only by the King , Soit fait come est desire , or Le Roy voet , 22. E. 3. 3. Pl. 25. Le roy fist les leyes per ass●nt des Peeres ▪ & de la comune , & non pas l●s Peeres & le comune . In a learned argument made in Parliament against impositions , and printed by command of a Committee this Parliament , that Champion for liberty , examining where the soveraigne power is in this kingdom , The soveraigne power ( saith he , ) Is agreed to be in the King , but in the King is a twofold power , the one in Parliament , the other cut of Parliament , the correcting of the errors of the ordinary Courts is by him , Acts of Parliament be they Lawes grounds , or whatsoever , the Act and power is the Kings , but with the assent of the Lords and Commons , which maketh it the most supreame power , not controlable by any , but controling the regall power out of Parliament , so he . Now by all that hath been said , 't is apparant , That in the Lords and Commons severed from the King , there is onely power in particular cases , as is before expressed ; but that power that may oblige the subject in generall by Lawes , Ordinances , or such like Acts , or Orders , is solely in the King : In the name of goodnesse then , what is that which the people speak of , when they talke of the power of the Parliament in such generall cases , without and in opposition to the King ? How can they without the King ( the power being only in the King ) make Lawes , and Ordinances , and with binding authority declare the Law ? Is the Legislative power solely in the King , and yet hath he not a free assent , but must of necessity follow the major Vote ? The Royall assent was that which onely did give power and force unto the Law , and it is now turned to an empty piece of formality ▪ a matter of course , that without any Election must follow which way the Vote shall lead it ? Or if the Royall assent bee not added , yet if the major part at any time shall deeme it necessary that their Votes stand for Lawes , without it , they are as compleatly and firmely binding as if they were added . I wish some man would first sadly consider , and then give me satisfaction , if by these very Votes , the Government be not already altered , and Monarchy regulated by Law , turned into an arbitrary boundlesse Cligarchy ; altered I say , as farre forth as meere Votes are ab●e to prevaile , which yet I hope will never be actually effected : This , and many other Observations that may be made out of the premisses , I shall remit unto the ingenious reader : I shall only make application of what hath been said against the Observator , pag. 9. It is alleadged ( saith he ) in derogation of Parliament , that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble , and treat in all cases of a publike nature , yet without the Kings concurrence or consent , they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power ; the very name of Parliament , not due to them , This Allegation ( saith he ) at one blow confounds all Parliaments , and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will , as any Nation under heaven , ever suffered under . Patience good Observavator ! The very name surely is not due but to the very thing , In conjunction with the King , I can say the King and Parliament , n●ming the King specially propter excellentiam , but I cannot rightly say the King or Parliament , or the King against the Parliament ; can you shew me where the Lords and Commons opposed to the King , are termed a Parliament ? Did ever any man describe a Parliament to be a body consisting of Lords and Commons only ? with some difficulty I could find where it is said to be a body consisting of King , Lords , and Commons . I would not strive about words , but that I see the very name of Parliament misapplyed to the two Houses doth somewhat abuse the people : As for Parliamentary power itselfe I have proved it to be formally and immoveably in the King only , ut in subjecto , and that the consent of Lords and Commons is but a requisite condition to compleat that power , as to the doing of some Acts to which it cannot other wise extend : If then there bee no concurrence of the King in whom only the power is , what are they but a livelesse Convention without all value and power ? What 's a confirmation of the Deane and Chapter , without a grant of the Bishop to be confirmed ? An assent o● Lords and Commons without an Act to be assented to , is somwhat like two cyphers without any figure , which yet if added to a figure make it centuple . If this Allegation against which the Observator doth exclaime with so much vehemency , be any new doctrine , I am content to bee discarded ; but if it shall appear to be a most known truth , and such as doth not more support the Royall Prerogative , then the liberty of the subject , then I trust men will be satisfied , upon what grounds that odious scandall is raised against his Majesty , of intention to bring in an Arbitrary Government such as the French are subiect to : A calumny not a little practised to beat off the subiects from their due Allegiance . The truth then of this position , that the Houses without the King ( as to the making of any publike Acts , Orders , or Ordinances ) are livelesse Conventions , will appeare by these ensuing proofes , Com. 79. Although the Lords and Commons agree to a thing , it is but as an Embrio , or issue in the belly , and yet unborne : It were to bee wished these Embrio's ●id not at present too much trouble this part of the world . Lamberts Archeion , 271. The necessitie of the assent of all the three Estates in Parliament is such , as without any one of them , the rest doe but lose their labour . 11. H. 7. 27. per Davers . Le Roy est assentus , ceo fait un Act de Parliament . Polidore 185. Nihil ratum habetur nisi quod major pars utriusque concessus senserit , idque rex comprobarit . Cowell ●nter ▪ verbo prorog. . The King may quash any Law . 8. Rep. 20. b. Cromptons Iurisd. 8. 6. Institut . 1 ▪ part . 90. b. Institut . 2. part . 158. accord ' . Sir Tho. Smyth at Republica Anglicana lib. 2. cap. 3. No Bill is an Act of Parliament , Ordi●ina●ce , or Edict of Law , untill both the Houses severally have agreed unto it , No nor then neither , but the last day of that Parliament or Session , the Prince commeth in person , and declares his pleasure concerning their proceedings , whereby the same may have perfect life and accomplishment by princely authority , and so have the whole consent of the Realm : those that the Prince doth ●●ow , be taken as perfect Lawes and Ordinances of the Realm of England , and none other : to those which the Prince liketh not , he answereth , Le Roy advisera , and th●se be accounted utterly dashed ▪ and of none effect . Bodin de Republica . lib. 1. cap. 8. Albeit that in the Parliaments of England , which have commonly been holden every third yeare , there the Estates seeme to have every great libertie ( as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter ) yet so it is that in effect they proceed not but by way of supplications , and requests unto the King : As in the Parliament of England holden in October , 1566. When the Estates by a common consent had resolved ( as they gave the Queene , to understand ) not to entreat of any thing untill they had first appointed who should succeed her in the Crow● : shee gave them no other answer , but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead . All those resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking ; neither did she in that any thing that they required . Now also the Estaies of England are never otherwise assembled ( no more then they are in this Realm of France or Spaine ) then by Parliament Writs , and expresse commandments proceeding from the King , which sheweth very well that the Estates have no power of themselves to determine , command , or decre● any thing , seeing that they cannot so much as assemble themselves , neither being assembled , depart without expresse commandment from the King : Yet this may seeme one speciall thing that the Lawes made by the King of England at the request of the States cannot be againe repealed , but by calling again of the States , which is much used and ordinarily done , as I understood by Master Dale , the English Embassadour , an honourable Gentleman , and a man of good understanding ; who yet assured me that the King received or rejected the Law as seemed best unto himselfe , and stuck not to dispose thereof at his pleasure , and contrary to the will of the Estats . I might adde many more , but that by understanding men I should be laught at , as holding a Candle to the Sun . Let the Observator tell me , which of all these doth not say fully as much as that which he saith , at one blow confounds all Parliaments , and subiects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will , as ever any Nation under Heaven suffered under : Let him against all these , and such others as I might adde , alledge but one single opinion from the beginning of the world till 1640. that in publike Cases the Lords and Commons have any vertue and power , without , nay , maugre the King , to oblige the subiect in generall by any Law or Ordinance they shall make , and I promise him upon that to turn Reformado ; Meane while ( I must think ) not the King , but the Observator , with one blow confounds all Parliaments ; for it doth not only cut off the head , with which the vertue , life , and soule of that body expires ; but by the same reason it cuts off likewise the Lords from being any necessary part of the Parliament : For if the Commons shall adiudge that the Militia for repelling danger , ought to be put into such a way as dislikes the King and maior part of the Lords ( that 's in truth now the Case ) yet ought the House of Commons being virtually the whole kingdom , to be obeyed by the people against the will and command of King and Lords , and against the desire of the minor part ( perhaps by two Votes ) in the House of Commons ; If the maior part of the Lords shall be b●uited to bee Popishly affected or Malignant , and thereupon their names shall be required that so the Rabble-rout may take a course with them , by meanes whereof they are necessitated to absent themselves ; and by like seditious courses , a considerable part ( if not the maior ) of the Commons shall be driven from Parliament : if after this by the cunning practise of some few , the Major part of Lords and Commons , that shall be remaining shall adjudge such Assemblies , not to have bin riotus and seditious and that therefore themselves have power , as a free Parliament to provide for the safety of the Realme : and shall therupon by or dinante require a Levy of Subsidies , to be presently made throughout the Kingdome : you will say the Subjects are bound in such case , to lay along their necks ▪ and pay ; and is not this to subject us , to as unbounded a regiment of meere will , as any Nation under heaven , ever suffered under . This is more then ever the King pretended to he never claimed a power ●o make Lawes and lay taxes without the consent of Parliament ; he onely layes claime to a negative voice , that they without him may not make any Lawes , or charge his Subjects , but that all be done by the joynt consent of him and his people ; and otherwise their proceedings without him to be vertulesse and of no force . Against which so well knowne right let us see what worthy argument the Observator brings forth : By the same reason ( saith he ) that Parliaments are thus vertulesse , and void Courts , upon the Kings desertion of them , other Courts must needs be the like ; and then what remaines , but that all our Laws , rights and liberties be either no where at all determinable , or else onely in the Kings brest . He is very wary not to fall under the Kings determinations , though ( as appeares before ) the ●nd why a King was set over Nations , was to judge them : and Bracton tels us , That the King by his oath is obliged ( if he were able ) in person to judge his people . And t is a known principle in the Lawes of England , Rex presumitur habere omnia jura in scrinio pectto●s sui : And yet as the government of this Kingdome is now setled , the King cannot make void or vertulesse the setled Courts of Justice , and thereby draw all things to a determination within his owne breast . And if any cause shall come before him as a Judge , to determine , yet he hath a rule to follow , and that 's the Law , not his will : which Law in respect of the King , hath somewhat more then a directive force , restrayning him and disabling him to goe against it , so that he can doe no wrong . The Lawes are made by the Kings power , with the peoples or Parliaments assent , which is a superiour power ( or rather the same power in a higher degree or extent ) to the Regall power alone , and with●●●● their assent : And therefore the Regall power out of Parliament cannot change nor al●●● the Lawes and Ordinances made in Parliament , but is bound by them , as being made by a superiour power : whence it is that Bracton every where affirmes the Law to be above the King solely . And by this superiour power ( that is by the King with the assent of his people or Parliament ) were the ordinary Courts of Justice founded and established and their jurisdiction assertained , and therefere may not be altered by the Regall power alone ; and by the same reason , the King cannot alter the Constitution of the Court of Parliament , but is the Constitution of all Courts alike ? the ordinary Courts are so constituted as that the Kings speciall Concurrence is not neeessary . Arts and Judgements by the ordinary Judges alone , are compleat , and binding : their assembling and departing is setled and doth not depend on the speciall pleasure of the Prince . But the Court of Parliament hath another kind of Constitution , the Kings speciall concurrence is in that a necessary and essential part , Rex est cap●t principium , et finis Parliamenti . Their assembling expects his speciall call ▪ their continuance depends on his will , the Judgemements , Arts and Ordinances , made in Parliiament , and concerning the Kingdome in generall , are the Kings onely , and without him frustrate and null . Consider this good observator , and then tel me , if you did not endeavor grosly to abuse your reader , by telling us , that by the same reason the Parliament , is not a Court comple● without the King , the Common-pleas , and all other Courts are not : I confesse I have wondred to see it of late so often a●●i●med , That as the King cannot , nor ought to declare by pr●claimation , or otherwise his disalowance of the acts & judgments of the ordinary Courts so not of the Votes & Ordinances of the Lords & Commons in Parliament , being the highest Court ▪ Should the ordinary Courts take upon them to dispose of the Militia , by vertue of an Ordinance by them made , might not the King by his Proclamation declare the Militia of that Ordinance , and forewarne his Subjects , not to be abused by it ? if the Observator can prove that the Lawes and Ordinances made by the now major part of the Lords and Commons , are ( without and against the Kings pleasure ) of any more validitie : that they are in themselves Lawes and Ordinances , and not onely so called : then I shall admit that the King either by Prociamation , or otherwise , ought not to declare against them : meane while let every man judge , how well the observatour hath maintained the power of the Lords and Commons ( mauger their King ) to make Lawes and Ordinances that shall bind the people in generall : By which Ordinances the Militia , the taking of Hull , the Navy , the Magazine , ▪ the intercepting all mony and other provision , that is but suspected to be passing towards the King the imprisoning all such as appeare dutifull towards his Majesties commands and such like Acts must be justified or acknowledged unjust . The Observator finding it more then difficult in a plain field to maintaine his cause , endeavours to shelter it under famed pretences of extraordinary danger and necessity ▪ in this extremity the King neglecting the helme , nay purposely stearing towards rocks and shelves ; It is the duty of his Parliament in this case , to oppose , and preserve him and his Kingdome from utter wrecke and ruine . He will then acknowledge that in ordinary cases , without the King , they cannot make a binding Law or Ordinance , but in danger ( that is , when they please : ) In the miast of our calamities ( we are sensible of none , thankes be to God , but what their Ordinances have occasioned ) the Parliament seeing they must make use of their legislative power , and make Ordinances to secure s●me Forts , and settle the Militia , or else two Kingdomes probably will be lost ; they doe accordingly , the King proclaimes to the contrary ; in this contrariety consider if the Parliament 〈◊〉 vertually the whole Kingdome , if it be not the supreame Judicatory , as well in ma●●●●● of State as Law , if their grounds of jealousie be vaine . To what purpose shall we consider of their jealousies , if we thinke them to be but pretended by the cunning and practise of some few for accomplishing their designes and plots , invented by some of their owne partie ▪ to be againe by them discovered ; yet must King and people submit to their judgement . Are not the now major part the supreme Judges of danger , to whom King and people are bound to submit ? If they are , is it lesse then a mockery to bid us consider , when as after consideration , will we , nill we , we must subjugate our understandings and opinions to whatsoever they already have or hereafter shall declare ? But yet at your bidding , I le consider , in this contrariety whether the Parliament ( pray call them the Lords and Commons now assembled ) may not make use of their legislai●e power ; yes , if they have any such : but I would not have them make use of the King legislative power , without him , and against him : had they beene partners in that power , some colour you might have had to have called it theirs ; but it seemes the power is solely the Kings , they are onely to give an assent to the use of it . Then you will , I consider whether they be not the supreme Judicatory . I thinke not : the Parliamenti● supreame and above them both in matters of State and Law : but againe I must consisider you say , if the Lords and Cammons be not vertually the whole Kingdome , why doe you put in the Lords , whom at other times you can be content to spare ? The Lords Vote in respect of their Barronies derived from the Crowne , the Commons Vote in right of their electors whom they represent , at least nine parts of the Kingdome , neither doe nor may Vote in their election , the Clergie in respect of their spirituall livingt , may not , nor the most substantiall Coppy-holders , Farmours nor Lessees for yeers , not inheritrixes , Jointresses , nor reversioners , Heirs apparrent , and men that live upon Interest are excluded ; and all that have not 40. s. per annum free ▪ hold Land , which I imagine , cannot be above a tenth part of the Kingdome . Tell me good Sir you that list to unsettle principles , power being ( you say ) nothing else but that might and vigour which a society of men containes in it selfe , why should the might and vigour of these being farre the major part , be over mastred , and concluded by the Votes of those that are deputed by a miner number of the people ? or why should halfe the Kingdome in which there are but few Burroughes , be equalled and overborne in Voting by two Counties , out of which many Burgesses are chosen ? Old Sarum shal have as many Votes in Parliament , as the Citty of London , or County of Wiltes : By which it seemes the Commons are not sent with equallity from all parts , nor sent by all : how doe they then represent all ? what reason is there that all the Kingdome should sit downe with their Votes ? the truth is , the King , Lords and Commons in conjunction are vertually the whole Kingdome , for that all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination . 25 H. 8. 21. your royall Majestie and your Lords and Commons representing the whole Realme , in this your most high Court of Parliament , have power , &c. So that in the King principally , but yet in conjunction with the Lords and Commons , is the vertue and power of the whole Kingdome contained : But if we shall admit that the vertue and power of the whole Realme is by representation in the Commons alone , or at least in the Lords and Commons , what will thence follow ? the Kingdome ( you will say ) are the efficient cause of Kingly power , and consequently above it , they being above it have power over it , may reassume it , or dispose of it to such persons as they can confide in , and this power the Kingdom may confer upon such as they shall choose for that purpose . The Observator hath met with a free Gamster : though his principles have beene particularly disproved , and are distructive , not onely to Monarchy , but unto all government , yet at present let him take all for granted . First , that the people have such power ; and secondly , that they may transmit it unto such as they shall choose for that purpose ; But the question is , whether they have done it ? whether they have chosen the new members for that purpose , or for some other ? The King did not create the Lords ( I beleeve ) for that end , nor create Borroughes with power to send Burgesses for that end , nor command the Counties to elect Knights for that purpose : nor did the Borroughes and Counties when they did elect , give any such power , upon the receipt of the Kings Writ by the Sheriffe , and warning or notice given to the Freeholders , they meet , and cry up some mans name ; this in it selfe imports nothing but with reference to the Writ so that the people intrust them to doe onely what the Writ requires , and thereupon the Sheriffe returnes Elegi feci duos milites , who have power from the County , ad faciendum ( what I pray ) quod breve in se exegit : in that they have no avthority without the King , to judge of dangers and oblige the King and people to goe their way for repelling the ●ame , and yet doth the Writ continue as large as ever it hath been ; seeing neither the Kings writ , nor the peoples election made thereupon doe give it ; I demand whence have the Lords and Commons , excluding the King , this soveraign power to judge of danger●● and thereupon if they so cause , to take from the King the power of the Kingdome , and according to their pleasures , to dispose thereof unto certaine confiding persons , unto which disposition the King and people are all required to conform , and give consent . We have beene often told that it is by the fundamentall Law of the Land ; a foundation so deepe , that like the River Nilus , it hides its head from all that seeke it ; never yet could any the most learned instruct us where to finde out this fundamentall Law ; which hath layen buried so long that no Law-booke , Record or Chronicle , makes any the least mention thereof . But yet at length a certaine Pamphleter , defending the Observatour , hath hapt upon it , but not amongst the Lawes of this Land , ( he was nessitated to dig a little deep for it ) but amongst natures principles ; It is radically couched in nature it selfe , and irrepealably enacted in her Magna Charta ( to which all positive Lawes must in equity vaile ) that the State may lawfully of its selfe provide for its preservation , espectally if the King either see not the danger , or seing it , will not provide for it in such m●nner as may give best security to himselfe and the Common-wealth . Certaine it is there is no state but is endued with ability and meanes to preserve it selfe : instinct of nature will force all men preserve themselves from present destructior , and providence teacheth all to provide against future emergent dangers ; and this surely the State of England hath done in submitting it selfe to the care and protection of a King , on whose good foresight and wisdome , next under God , the welfare of the whole Realme dependeth : he sits as on a watch Tower , survaying his owne dominions , and by the vigilancy of his Councell at home , and Embassadours abroad , hath timely intelligence of any approaching evill ; against which if he shall need any extraordinary advise or aide of his Subjects he hath power by his writ to assemble them in Parliament , and with their assent to raise mony and other necessary provision for their defence and safeguard : And this I say , is that meanes of safety wherewith the State of England hath provided it selfe , by putting themselves for better for worse , under the protection of a King against all dangers : And certainly he that ought to protect them against dangers , to him it appertaines to judge of danger , and so much was admitted by those who argued for the Subject , in case of Ship-mony , that the King was sole Judge of the dangers , but that he could not therupon tax the Subject , but by assent in Parliament . But what ( you will object ) if the King will not see the danger , or seeing it will neverthelesse suffer the Kingdome to f●eat at all hazzards ? or what if being carried away with Malignant Counsell , he himselfe shall steere it towards rocks and shelves ? May not the Kingdome in such case save themselves from ruine , and oppose the King ? There can be no Generalissime so uncircumscribed , but that if he shall turne his Cannons upon his owne Souldiers , they are ipso facto absolved of all obedience , of all Oathes , and tyes of Allegiance whatsoever , for the time , and bound by higher duety , to seeke their owne preservation , by resistance and defence . For my part , I cannot but thinke that a state after much sufferance , seeing utter destruction to be at hand ready to swallow them up , may use any good and lawfull meanes , as flight , and avoydance to preserve themselves from ruine by the hand of a tyranizing Lord : yet I dare not approve of active resistance , by taking up armes against a lawful Soveraign Prince ▪ though ●yranizing over his Subjects . If the Prince ( saith Bodin ) be an absolute Soveraigne , as are the true Monarches of Spaine , England , &c. where the Kings themselves have the Soveraignty without all doubt , or question , not divided with their Subjects ; in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the Subjects in particular , nor all of them in generall , to attempt anything either by way of fact , or of justice , against the honour , life , or dignity of the Soveraigne : albeit that hee had committed all the wickednesse , ●mpiety , and cruelty that could be spoken : for as to proceede against him by way of justice , the Subjest hath uo such jurisdiction over his Soveraigne Prince , of whom dependeth all power and authority to command . Now if it be not lawfull for the Subject , by way of justice to proceede against his Prince , how should it then be lawfull to proceede against him by way of fact or force ? for question is not here , what men are able to doe by strength and force , but what they ought of right to doe ? the subject is not onely guilty of Treason in the highest degree , who hath slaine his Soveraigne Prince , but he also which hath appempted the same , who hath given Counsell , or consent thereto . And then he goes on to prove the same by sundry examples taken out of Scripture , and then saith he , to answer vain objecti●ns were but idely to abuse both time and learning : But as he which doubteth whether there be a God or noe , is not with arguments to be refuted , but with severe punishments , so are they which call into question a thing so cleare , and that by Book●s publiquely imprinted , that the Subjects may take up armes against their Prince being a Terant ; Howbeit the most learned Divines are cleare of opinion , that it is not lawfull , without especiall command from God ; And as for that which Calvin faith , if there were at this time Magistrates appointed for the defence of thee people , and to restraine the insolency of Kings , as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia , the Tribunes in Rome , and the Demarches in Athens ; that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse and cruelty : He sheweth sufficiently that it was never lawfull in a right Monarchy , for he speaketh but of the popular and Ar●stocratique States of Common-weales . We read also that the Protestant Princes of Germany , before they entred into armes against Charles the Emperour , demanded of Martin Luther , if it were lawfull ? who frankly told them that it was not lawfull , whatsoever Tiranny , or impiety were pretended , yet was he not therein of them beleeved : So thereof ensued a most deadly and lamentable Warre , the ●●d whereof was most miserable , drawing with it the rume and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germany , with exceeding slaughter of the Subje●ts . The Prince we may justly call the Father of the Countrey , and ought to bee more deare unto every one then any Father , Et nulla tanta impretas nullum tantum scelus est , quod sit parricidio vindicandum . I say therefore that the Subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soveraigne Prince , how naughty and cruell soever he be . Lawfull it is not to obey him in all things contrary unto the Lawes of God and nature , to fly and hide our selves from him , but yet to suffer stripes , yea and death also , rather then to attempt any thing against his life or honour . This is the substance of that learned Protestants discourse , which is worth your reading at large . But alas , all this discourse is besides the present businesse , nothing is attempted against the life or honour of the Prince ; the taking up of Armes , and shooting bullets at him , is in defence of his Majesties person ; there are no expressions in this observatour , nor yet in him that hath made observations upon a speech of King James ▪ with eight and twenty Queres , nor in any other Pamphlets that licenciously slye about , that doe at all touch the honour of the Kings Subjects may not resist ( saith Bodin , and our best Divines ) without speciall command ; but ou● Brethren now have speciall instruction from the Spirit to doe what they doe , or if they have not the Spirit assuring them that they may take armes against their Prince , yet Master Cal. hath well distinguished , that it is one thing to sight against a King , another thing to fight against the lusts of a King : Against the lusts of a King , my beloved Brethren , we may fight , nay we ought to fight against them . And our Observatour stands in defence of that distinction , That levying Forces against the personall commands of the King ( though accompanied with his presence ) is not levying warre against the King , but warre against his authory , though not person , is warre against the King . But in truth , are not all these shifting distinctions , like a Shipmans hose , that will fit an Jrish Rebell as well as an English : I dare not speake my minde of that distinction the Observator maintaines , but you shall heare what an honourable Chancellour of England hath long since said of it ; This is a dangerous distinction betweene the King and the Crowne , and betweene the King and the Kingdome ; it reacheth too farre , I wish every good Subject to beware of it . It was never taught but either by traytours , as in Spencers Bill , in Edward the seconds time , or by treasonable Papists , as Harding in his confutation of the Apologie maintaineth , that Kings have their authority by the positive Law of Nations , and have no more power then the people have , of whom they take their temporall jurisdiction , and so Ficlerus , Simanca and others of that crew : by seditious sectaries and puritans as Buchanan de Jure Regni apud Scotus , Penry , Knox , and such like , in Calvins case it is reported that in the reigne of Ed. 2. the Spencers to cover the treason hatched in their hear●s , invented this damnable and damned opinion , that homage and oath of ligeance was more by reason of the Kings Crowne , ( that is of his politique capacity ) then by reason of the person of the King : upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestable consequence . 1. If the King doe not demean himself by reason in the right of his Crown , his leiges are bound by oath to remove the King. 2. Seeing the King could not be removed by suit of Law , that ought to be done per aspertee . 3. That his leiges be bound to govern in aid of him , and in default of him : All which were condemned by two Parliaments . I will not say that this concernes the Observator , or any body else , let others judge ; I only say , I am unsatisfied how we may lawfully use active resistance with our swords in our hands , against a lawfull soveraign Prince , though tyrannizing : or if it might be done yet certainly not till after much sufferance , and that destruction shall open its jawes ready to swallow us up ; and not upon imagenary feares and jealousies , such as we have had now at lest twelve moneths past ; from Papists training under ground , and conspiracies against the State discovered by a traytor lying in a diteh , and which have bin wrought in us by weekly relations of horrible , terrible strange newes from Denmarke , France , Spaine , and from all places in Christendome , excepting Amsterdam , from thence no danger at all to be feared . But what if a kingdome may not resist , shall they not therefore have meanes to save themselves , if a seduced King shall indeavour to lead them backe to popery , or to bring them under an arbitrary rule ; may they not in good time foreseeing the danger , arme themselves for defence , and not suffer themselves to be led on to the ruine of their lives , fortunes and religion ? For Religion , surely no Subjects ought to depart from it at the pleasure or command of any Prince or Potentate , how great or absolute soever his power be ; and for their lives and fortunes no Common-wealth may want a meanes of preservation , Salus populi supremalex . But I thinke the best way to preserve a Kingdome or people , is not to allow them a power upon such suppositions , to rise against the pleasure and command of their King or Governour ; Caligula in a suddaine fit of cruelty might wish that all his Subjects heads grew upon one mans shoulders , that so at one blow he might cut them off : But is it possible that after deliberation , such an unnaturall wish should settle in the minde of any Tirant ? certainly t is neer bordering on impossibility , that a King should seriously desire to destroy the lives and fortunes of all his Subjects , with which his own Soveraignty will necessarily be destroyed : or if he should endeavor to make them slaves and vassals to his arbitrary power , what doth he else but change the good title of a King , to that of a Tirant ? which before a lawfull Prince will ever doe he must be extreamly blinded with ambition , and cruelty : And if a King of England should affect it , yet hath the Law disabled him to effect it ; his commands must all run in the right Channels of Justice , and equity , or by no particular officer ought to be obayed , Nihil aliud potest Rex in terris , cum sit Minister Dei , et ejus Vicarius , quam quod de jure potest , it is then a very remote danger , and almost impossible , that can this way befall the Subject : and yet seeing it is not altogether impossible , a mischiefe I must acknowledge it is , to be under such a possibility . But on the other side , if you g●ve way to the inconstant multitude , upon pretence of saving themselves and the kingdome ▪ to rise against authority , we shall every day have the government hazarded , if not destroyed ; and in such case , doth not even naturall prudence instruct us to live under a possible mischief , then under a daily inconvenience ? this Doctrine ( of the peoples power to judge of danger against the commands of their Soveraigne , and upon that to take up defensive armes ) if it should be admitted , will be more pernicious to Kingly government out of Parliament , then it will be to Parliaments themselves ; for as the people may preserve themselves against a wilfull seduced Prince that would destroy them , so may they against an Ordinance of the Lords and Commons , if they shall judge it to tend to the destruction of the Kingdome , or subversion of Government , the Charter of nature by its supreame Law , intitles all to seeke their salety , and against this it will be of little purpose for you to tell the people , that next to renouncing God , nothing is more pernitious then to forsake thier representatives : when they shall judge their representatives , forsake their trust , and would leade them on to Anabaptisme or any other way to destruction . The King is Judge of danger , at least out of Parliament , but if he will not see dangers , or if he himselfe shall become a danger to the Kingdome , the Kingdome may save it selfe : In Parliament we will suppose the Lords and Commons are Judges of danger , but if some driven away by force , and the rest seduced by a Malignant party , will not see dangers from Anabaptists , Brownists , &c. or shall themselves become a danger to the State and setled government , the people may save themselves from ruine ; t is so written in Natures Magna Charta , cap. 1. Will not this cloak sit exceeding well upon the backe of . Irish Rebels ? they judge their Religion restrained , and ready to be destroyed by a Prince seduced by the advise of English Protestants , and defence and maintainance of their Religion they take up armes ; let 's first lay this ground in England , and then let a Doctor in Divinity or some seditious IMP , walke up and downe under hand , like the pestilence in the darke to infect the minds of silly men , and make up a faction , whether against King or Parliament ; thereupon what thinke you will become of Regall and Parliamentary power , will not they both be made subject to the designes of such seditious , Protestants as at any time shal be able with the glorious names of Liberty , and selfe preservation to abuse and intoxicate the minds of the wavering multitude ? If the King being led away with an old error of Protestancy , shall endeavour to extirpate the beleeving Brownist , or orthodox Anabaptist ; may not the Brownists , or Anabaptists ( judging their Religion to be true ) save themselves , nay ought they not to catch at all advantages , whereby they may deliver their blinded King , and Kingdome , from following after their owne destruction , in an Antichrist way of Protestancy ? It was long siince suspected by the King , and by many of his good Subjects , that the ordinance of the Militia , would be used to the overthrow of Government and destruction of the Realme , and since that hath raised unto the Authors of it a sufficient strength to over master all opposition we see they have already adventured to root out Episcopacy , together with Deanes and Chapters , Archdeacons , Chancelours , and the ancient and honourable profession of Eclesiasticall and Imperiall Law , besides a good part of the common Law overturned , and in likelyhood the rest will not stay long by us : And how farre this willfull rejection ( I say wilfull rejection , not barely the want ) of Episcopacy is destructive to the very essence of a Church , is much to be doubted . After so good e●rnest given of their intentions , I suppose a major part of the Realm , are well satisfied that their Militia , and the ordinances send to the destruction of the Realm , if so , then by this ground they may lawfully save themselves and oppose their destruction : Admit this , or forsake your principle . And yet if it will do you any service I am content at present you take advantage of it : I will admit the Kingdom , if they see the King would destroy them , may preserve themselves ; you will say ●f the people have power to preserve themselves against the danger a seduced K. would bring upon them , then must they have power to judge of that danger , when it is , and when not : and if the people have power to Iudge of danger , and defend themselves , without and against their King ; then may they intrust that power unto some others , for that all should assemble ●● next to impossible , and could not be without confusion ; a few th●refore may bee intrusted to judge for all , and to direct the manner of their defence : well , It is admitted they may intrust this power with some few , but that they have intrusted it with the Lords and Commons , I must deny . There is no colour to say it is intrusted with the Lords , they judge only for themselves , and if the King intended to alter the Government , or Religion , it is likelie he would create such as should assist his intentions ; and therefore it will be of little purpose to give the kingdome a power to judge of dangers , and save it selfe , unlesse they may doe it by the major part of their proxies alone , both against King and Lords . You put in the Lords only to glosse your actions , for the present , but by your principles the power must bee in the Commons onely , if anywhere ; Now cleerely there is no such trust imparted to the Commons their trust is limited by the writ to advise with the King , not to make Acts and Ordinances in any case , against him : Nor can I possibly see why the Coroners elected by the body of each Countie according to the Kings writ , might not as reasonably claime this trust , as the major part of the Commons alone , unlesse we must therefore thinke it to bee the Commons right , because they now pretend unto it . The Observator tells us , We may not imagine the Houses should be injurious , no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament , freely elected and held , that ever did injure a whole kingdome , or exercise any Tyranny . I 'le charge tirannie on none ; only I say if the now major part of Lords and Commons against the Kings pleasure , and authenticke Proclamations , have power to command the subiects in generall , and to imprison , kill , and slay such as withstand their commands , and obey his Maiesties Proclamations , I would gladly bee instructed how this power is derived unto them , either from King or people , or whether we must think they above all other men , were naturally borne unto it ? Meane while , I like well the Observators note in honour of free Parliaments , that never any such iniured a kingdome . But yet such as have called themselves free Parliaments have injured King and kingdome , this have the Lords and Commons done when they have left the head free in His Royall assent , or disassent to such Bills , as they had a minde to passe ; of which take one Example , 15. E. 3. The Lords and Commons pressed the King to passe a Law derogatorie to his just prerogative , that Parliament being ended , and the kingdome representing it selfe againe the same yeare , it was enacted , Whereas in the last Parliament certaine Articles expressely contrary to the Lawes of England and the Prerogatives and Royall rights , were pretended to be granted by manner of a Statute , the King considering how that by the bond of his Oath , he was bound to the defence of such Lawes and Prerogatives , because the King never freely consented to the said pretended Statute ; It seemed good to the Earles Barons , and other wise men , that sithence the said statute did not of the Kings free-will proceed , the same should be voyd . It seemes at this time , the King was not bound to passe whatsoever the Lords and Commons Voted to be for the good of the kingdome : And his oath did tye him to seeke a restitution of his prerogative against such forced lawes , so farre was it from tying him to passe all such lawes as the Houses should judge fit . Questionlesse the King is bound by oath and office , to passe all good and just lawes ( yet that part of the oath that hath beene urged doth not prove so much ) But the question is whether hee bee not free to judge what is a good and just Law , and what not ? But must submit his understanding , judgment , and Conscience to the votes of Lords and Commons , so that the sixe Articles for poperie passe them he is bound to passe it . Queene Elizabeth was boun● to passe an Act abolishing popery , because the Lords and Commons had Voted a Bill again●● Protestancie , Queene Mary was bound to passe that likewise . So againe the King wishes all good subjects to put the case to themselves ; If the Papist● in Ireland should make themselves the major part of both Houses , and pretending their Religion to bee in danger of extirpation by a Malignant party of Protestants and puritans should passe a Bill for setling the Militia in such as they should confide in , is not the King bound to assent unto it ? Not in that case , saith the Observator , For England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion , there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them and England , as betwixt England and Wales , though they meete not in one Parliament ; yet to s●●● purposes their Parliaments are not to be held severall Parliaments , and therefore if Papist● were stronger , and more in Parliament there , yet would they want authority to over rule any thing voted and established before in England , and they being the minor part of Ireland 〈◊〉 ENGLAND both ought to sit downe , for that the major part will probability prevaile against them ; and in all suffrages , the minor part that bloud may not bee shed● , ought to 〈◊〉 downe . Alack , alack , how doth the good man bestirre himselfe to bedge up a seeming answer unto this objection ? He supposeth England and Ireland to be one and the same dominion which is certainely false ; Statutes that are limitted to the Realme and Dominion of England , do not extend to Ireland : That there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland , as betwixt England and Wales , is con●radicted by himselfe , acknowledging England and Ireland to be governed by severall Parliaments , severall to most ( if not to all ) purposes ▪ T is true Ireland is united to the Imperiall Crowne of England , and so is Scotland , yet all three are distinct kingdomes : He saith they want authoritie there , to over rule any thing established before in England : But Ireland will say the English Parliament wants authority to establish a Religion in Ireland : Or admit the Irish Parliament hath not authoritie to over rule any thing established before in England , yet the point that the King instanteth in , that is the Militia of Ireland , is not established by Parliam●nt in England ; why ought not the King then to ass●nt to the disposall of it according as the Irish parliament shall desire ? or if he will not assent , why may not the Irish of themselves dispose of it , as now the English doe ? If we shall admit them to be one Dominion , why then if the papists in Ireland , the popish partie in England , and their adherents the Episcopall party , and the misnamed Malignant partie shall joyne in one desire against our superfine Reformers , the Reformers being farre the minor part , ought to sit downe and acquiesse , otherwise bloud will be shed , and the major part in probabilitie prevaile ; you to lay a Calumny on the King , will say they speake all one language , and conspire in one end , which although no sober man will credit , yet this is certaine , that they all concurre in some things against new Confounders ( I should say Reformers ) In these things then by your owne rule , the minor part ought to yeeld and acquiesse . If the major part present of Lords and Commons shall desire it , the King you will say , is bound to passe an Act that no marriage for any of his Children shall be concluded , not treated on without the Parliaments assent ; By the same reason that he is bound to passe this Law to the English , hee will bee bound to passe the like to the Irish , and againe the like to the kingdome of Scotland , because the Lords and Commons in the severall Parliaments desire it , and the kingdomes have a like interest and right to warrant that desire ; If these Lawes bee passed what will become of the Royall line ; Besides a match may bee mentioned or treated on , a Parliament for that 〈◊〉 purpose must bee called in each kingdome , and being called , is it probable three Nations so different in their constitutions should agree in one ? The Scots ●●y approves marriage desired with the French . The Irish will rather desire the alliancs of Spaine , The English of Denmarke . In this case to observe one Law , is to breake two ; yet such a Law being Voted , or any thing else , the King you say is bound to passe it , and you seeme to prove it thus : T is acknowledged the King is bound by Oath and Office to passe all just Lawes that are either for preservation or good of the Subjects : to grant this say you , that hee is bound to passe just ●awes , and yet to leave him to his owne free Iudgement , what is a just and good Law , is to give us a dry right without a remedy : So againe you obiect , If the King will not call the Parliament . For making Lawes when it is expedient , that must not conclude the people , for the● they would have a dry right to Parliaments without a remedy : And upon this ground , and for that the King hath his power given him ( as you suppose ) by the people , and that upon trust , you will have him accomptable to the Lords and Commons the representatives of the people , how he hath discharged his trust : and if he shall be found neglectfull or faulty , there must bee you say , a meanes to inforce , otherwise wee are subject to the boundlesse will of the Prince , and a gappe is opened to , as past and arbitrary power , as ever the Grand Seignior had : If the King may so assume a share in the Legislative power , as that without his concurrence , the Lords and Commons may not Judge of dangers , and by temporary Ordinances put the kingdome into a posture of defence , God hath not then left humane nature any meanes of sufficient preservation . Thus the Observator . Although he mention God , yet I doubt his Argument , is grounded in Atheisme , because forsooth , we have not the remedy in our own hands , therefore are we without remedy expos●● to the will of any tirannous Prince that may bee : either then hee thinkes there is no God , or with Epicurus , that hee is ot●osum inexer●itum et neminem i●t humanis rebus ad ●●li cardines o●●●b lat , & nulla tangitur mortalium cura . For if there be a God with providence , why should we be affraid to trust our remedy with him ? There is a bridle to restraine the licencious will of ambitious Princes , and that 's the Law , but the reynes must not be layd in the hands of subjects , The Heart of the King , must be in the hands of the Lord , he will direct it towards the subjects good ; or if a Prince shall incline to Tyranny , he will in good time remove him , unlesse it be his pleasure by him to chastice the sinns of that people , or to try and improve their patience , in which case there is a blessing for them , that can content themselves with a fiat voluntas Domini . God only ( I have proved ) is the Author , and efficient cause of Kingly power , Kings are his annoynted his vicegerents , and therefore properly occomptable to him alone . Where the word of a King is , there is power , and who may say unto him what doest then ? Non potest ei ( Regi ) necessitatem aliquis imponere quod injurian● s●●m corrigat et emendat nisi velit , cum superiorem non habeat nisi Deum , et satis erit ●i ad pae●●● quod dominum expectat ultorem . Punishment enough indeed , if you consider how much more severe God is , in taking an Account of Kings , then of other men subject to temporall punishments , which you may see sett downe by a King himselfe . Heare therefore O ye Kings and understand , learne ye that be Iudges of the end of the Earth , Give ●are you that rule the people , and glory in the multitude of Nations , for power is given you of the Lord and sovereignty from the highest , who shall try your workes , and search out your Councels , because being Ministers of his kingdome , you have not judged aright , nor kept the law , nor walked after the councell of God ; horribly and speedily shall he come upon you , for a sharpe Iudgement , shall be to them that be in high places , for mercy will soone pardon the meanest , but mighty men shall be mightily tormented . Were there not a God to take this severe accompt from Kings , and to straine their ambitious desire from tyrannizing over their subjects , yet by what hath been formerly said , it will appeare to be more safe for a people , to live subject to the inconvenience then to give power to the people , upon pretence of saving themselves , to ri●e against Sovereigne authority . A supreme indisputable power must be somewhere , this the observator acknowledgeth , and al must acknowledg that are not in love with Anarchy : the question then is only this , whe● is its most safe resting ? In the Parliament saith the observator ▪ ● agree with him in the King in Parliament , is the most safe resting of the supreame indisputable power : But the mischeife is , the observator by Parliament meanes only the Lords & Commons distinguished from the King : Now whether it be more safe resting in them , or in the King with them , th●● is the question ? which in effect is all one with this whether Democracy be a better forme of Government alwayes followes the disposition of the Sovereigne power ; If therefore the Sov●reigne power rest incontrollably in one alone , then is the Government simply Monarchicall , If it rest in the cheife Peeres , then it is an Optimacy : If in the people Democracy : If it r●●t in one alone and yet to the use of it in the most weighty matters , a consent of Peers , and people is to be had ▪ then it is not an absolute , but an admirably well tempered Monarchy . Now if you compare the 3 simple formes of Government , A●istotle will thus determine Har●●●● optima est Regnum , deterima Democratia : In so cleere a truth , the spirit of opposition could not force him to dissent from his Master Plato , who having set downe those 3 simple formes of Government , with three mixt and compounded , thus delivers his judgment . V●i●● dominatio bonis instructa leg●bus sex illarum omnium optima est , Gubernationem vero ●a●in qu● non multi imperant mediam cens●re d●b●mus , caeterum multorum administration●m ●●●ibus is rebus debilematque infirm●m . And surely if this judgement be not right , neare all the world are in error ; But n●w though simple Monarchy , doe farre excced their Cons●●ar or popular Government , yet is it not without its inconveniencies , and therefore it may be so tempered and mixt , as that it may still remaine Monarchy , and yet have its inconveniencies restrayned & avoyded as farforth as may be , then will it of all others , whether absolute , or mixt , become the most usefull and convenient forme of Government . Now such , and no other is the constitution of Government in England , so well poysed and molded by the wisedome of our ancestors as that it gives to this Kingdome ▪ the conveniencies of all , without the inconveniencies of any one ; as far forth as by humane prudence they may be prevented . The supreame power therefore of making Laws whereby to governe and judge the people in time of peace , as likewise the power of armies for preventing of invasions and insurrections , rests in a King only , & immovably , whereby he is sufficiently enabled to protect his people : And againe as the King himselfe acknowledgeth those lawes by which he is to govern may not be made but by the Consent of the house of Peers and by the house of Commons chosen by the people , all h●ving free votes and particular priviledges ▪ And that the Prince , may not make use of his high and perpetuall power , to the hurt ●f ●ho●e for whose good he hath it , the house of Commons ( as an ●●cellent conserv●r of liberty ) is solely intrusted with the first propositions concerning the levies of m●●y ( the sinewes of pe●c● , a●●●● ) and for the impe●cki●g of tho●e who for their own ends ( though countenanced by any surreptiti●usly gotten command of the King ) have violated that law ▪ which the King is bound ( when h● knows it ) to protect and to the protection of which , they were bound to advise him , at the least not to serve him in the contrary , And the Lords being trusted with a jud●●atory power are an exc●llent sk●●ene and bank between the prince & people , to assist each ●gainst the incroachment of the other . Now whether it be more safe for the supreame indisputable power after this manner to rest in the King , or els to be in the Lords and Commons , excluding the king , that 's the question ? The ●bser●ator vrgeth these inconveniences that s●eme to rem●i● in this regulated Monarchy , so that it is at the kings pleasure when h● shal iudg● fit to cal parliament● and being called , by dissent hee my frustrate their proceedings , and at his pleasure dissolve ●heir being : If this be so , how have they a power more than sufficient to restraine Tyrannie ? ●●●●ly if these principles hold , Parliaments will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect ▪ a Government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other kingdome : What ●●mes doe we live in , when the known principles of ancient Government shall be thus impudently railed at ? That it is left at the Kings just pleasure to call Parliaments , ( upon which o●●er rights depend ) is a truth so manifest , that I am ashamed to alleadge any proofe of it ; that the King hath indisputable power of dissolving of Parliaments , is equally manifest , and acknowledged by the Act for not dissolving this present Parliament ; and that the King in his ●udgment dissenting may thereby quash their proceedings , for as much as it is at this time denied , I have formerly proved it . But if this be so , what is left to restraine Tyrannie ? Marry as much as conveniently may be : For though it be at the Kings pleasure to call and dissolve Parliaments ; he is disabled to make any new Lawes , or repeale the old , how great need so●ver there be for it : Nor may he raise Subsidies for his Warres , or other occasions , without 〈◊〉 in Parliament : If impositions be otherwise indirectly laid upon the subject , the ministers ought not to levy it , or if it be levied , experience teacheth that the King will be thereby the greater looser : These and many other motives there are inforcing a King to call Parliaments , and to comply with the just desires of his subiects : And yet of late I must confesse , we have had occasion to bewaile the too long intermission of Parliaments of which a reverend Iudge complaining , gives us the probable reason : At the last meeting in Parliament ( saith he ) either by ill choice of the members , of that House , or by the great increase of the number , or by the ambitious humours of some Members of that House , who aimed more at their owne ●●ds , and designes , then the generall good of the Common-wealth ; things were so carried , not ●● was used in ancient time , but so disastrously , that it hath wrought such a disease of this course of Parliaments , as we and all that love the Common-wealth , have just cause to be sorry for it . But now the fruits that have sprung from this error in Government , are discovered , the remembrance whereof will ever hereafter put Princes in mind of calling Parliaments . And to secure this unto us , His Maiestie hath now passed an Act for Trieninall Parliaments , not d●●●olvable within the space of 50 ▪ dayes ; then which can there be a better assurance against Tirannie , not destroying Monarchie it selfe ? Yet all this will not satisfie the Observator ; If the King shall have the disposing of the Militia , or power of the kingdome , according to the established laws , and may so claime a share in the Legislative power , as that the Lords and Commons may not without him , make lawes and ordinances whensoever themselves shall think fit and necessary so to do ; or if at any time ( without presupposing a necessity ) he shal not according to his oath and office , assent to what lawes and ordinances the Houses shall Vote , though they go against his own Iudgment and Conscience ; there will be still a meanes left for the King to make himselfe a tyrant , or an absolute Lord , not limited by Law , but disposing all things according to his lawles●e wil , and pleasure ; A power you say , is left that hee may these , but the Law trusts him presuming he wil not abuse it , and that obiection that is against the presumption of the Law , none should presume to make . Something must be left if it cannot be restrained , but that Monarchy will be destroyed , or disabled to performe its office ▪ that restraint that you would put upon it by placing a superior power in the Lords & Commons , into whose command the King shal be but a meere Minister , changes the government to popular or consular , having lesse appearance of Monarchy in it , then that of Venice , wher● the Duke in the highest power of making lawes , hath a concluding voice freely allowed him , and yet is that government acknowledged to be Aristocraticall , if not Democraticall . If then the King should so abuse his power , as to make himsel●● an absolute Monarch , yet we are better to live under that , then under an optimacie mixt with democracie . How are Consular estates almost continually tossed vp and downe , with the bill●●●● 〈◊〉 surges of ambitious discontented factions ? what Republique could ever preserue it selfe fro● being torne in peeces with intestine disentions ? or over runne with forragne invasion ? di● not Rome when it was a Republique any other while degenate into seditions di●cord , and Civill warres ? with in the space of 500 ▪ yeares ( to which period it could not reach how many thinges and rechanges had they of their Gouernment : vnder all which it 〈◊〉 came to flourish , soe as vnder the sole Gournement . of Iulius and Augustus ▪ And yet R●●● of all states haue best thriven vnder such popular Gouernment the other three empires Assirian , Grecian ▪ and Persian grew to their greatnesse vnder Monarchy , and were of lon●●● continuance then the Republique of Rome : but I will not inlarge my selfe vpon soe co●●● a Theame , where in all learned men agree and experience conformeth an Optima●●●● Rep●●lique vnlimited . to be farre worse then vnlimited ▪ Soureigntie . The Obs●ruator ▪ neu●rthe●●● stands vp●n defence of the contrary , the King obiecting that the houses clayme an arbir●●●● illimited power to vnsettle the security of all mens estates , and that they are sed●●ible ▪ 〈◊〉 may nay have abused this power : To this the observator answereth . That there is an Arbit●●ry power in every state somewh●re , t is true t is necessary every man hath absolute power ov●r himselfe ; but because no man can hate himselfe this power is not d●ngerous : So every State ha● a● arbitrary power over it selfe , and there is no danger in it for the same reason ; if the state 〈◊〉 his to one man , or fe● , th●r● may be danger in it , but the Parliament is neither on● , or fe● it is noe good consequence the Parliament doth abuse power because it may ; and again● ▪ The King challenges a greater power then Parliaments . Is not this to preferre Democracy , if not Anarchy before Monarchy ? Not onely suprem● power regulated by Law , is safer in many then in one or few , but an arbitrary power is likewise in them without danger , because as one man cannot hate himselfe , so a state cannot h●●● it selfe : But yet a state may hate one another , some few may ambitiously seeke to overto●● the rest ; the rest may tumultuously rise against the few ; divisions may b●eake th●● into pe●ces and make them a prey for forreigne invasion : and there wants a Sovereigne King to sett●● differences , to suppresse tumults , and invasions , and yet no danger , because no man can ●ate himselfe : But what though arbitrary power in the people , or their proxies the Parliment ▪ may be thus abused ? t is no good consequence therefore they do or will abuse it ; If it be not a good consequence against Parliaments , then not against Kings , that because they may abuse their power to make themselves absolute , therefore they doe it , or will doe it : Again you tell us the King challenges a greater power then Parliaments , you meane the Lords and C●●mons , and t is true he challenges a greater power then they have ; but not ● greater then they challenge or you give them , for you say Every state hath an absolute arbitrary power ▪ and ●● Parliament is indeed the state it selfe , and so have an absolute arbitrary power ; a greater the● which I am sure , neither King , nor Tyrant can clayme ; and the King of England ne●ther lawfully can , nor doth claime so much ; He claimes a supreame power not absolute bu● politicall , regulated by law , not arbitrary , nor can he make Parliament ordinances or lawes binding to the kingdome in generall without them , upon any pretended necessities , but without him they make such . The observator ha●h another Argument to prove Domocracy , or the Soverai●ne power in a Committee to be better and more safe then in one . The King asketh , why not the King predominate rather then the Lords and Commons ? The observator answers , We ●●● a maxime , and it was ground●d up●n nature , and never till this Parliament with-stood ▪ That a Committe● can have no private e●ds ●o misl●ad it ▪ no Parliament ever injured a whole king●●●● , o● exercised any Tyranny , nor is there ●●y possibility how it should . True it is a Committee or Corporation Metaphisically abstracted from those of whome it is compounded , can have no private end , as not being subject to any lust , appetite , or passion , 〈◊〉 yet to death ; but the particulars compounding that body may have private or at least evill 〈◊〉 . What doth the Observator thinke of the Councell of TRENT ? Could it ayme 〈◊〉 nothing but good ? cannot a Committee exercise Tyrann●e ? D●d the vas●alls unto ●●●thage never suffer under that Committee ? would they not have chosen to groane under the oppressions of a Dionisius , rather than under the intollerable exactions and Ordinances ●f that Tyran●zing Dame ? Did not Athens suffer under thirtie Tyrants , who at first had the peoples consent to governe ? Did never any Parliament in Rich. 2d . time abuse the ●ingdome ▪ Why then did one Parliament condemne another ? Was there not a Parliament sometimes branded with the name of Parliamentum insanum ? and hath there not bin ● Parliament termed Parliamentum Doctorum in quo jugulum Ecclesiae atrocius petebatur ? I speake not this to cast any the least blemish upon that thrice Honourable , and never enough commended Counsell ; but onely to shew that by the fury and practise of some Members , the whole body may possibly bee lead into error , and injure the Common-wealth : Some members may possibly combind themselves for alteration of Government in Church and State , and if they can backe their designe which the force of an unruly multitude , they may with that force and hypocrisie mixt together , prevaile with the major part of the Houses , and then having got an Act to bee indissolvable , they may goe on with their designe , making ●se of such schismaticall and seditious dispositions as the Common-wealth shall then abound with , and abusing the rest of the people with imaginary feares and Iealousies from forraigne kingdomes , and pretending an alteration of Government to be indeavoured a prelaticall popish malignant partie at home , who have so farre seduced their King , as that hee will not ●earken to the advise of his great Councell ▪ they may then upon pretence of prepelling such dangers , make themselves Monsters of the Militia , and strength of the Realme ; That ●one , it is possible they may proceed to destroy the Hierarchie of Church , and Monarchie in the State , and then what will let but that they may reigne as arbitrary Lords ? possible I say it is , that some Members in a Committee may thus make themselves Lordly Tyrants , and the● too late will the people wish to have kept under a King , though hee should have proved ● Tyrant ; for so there might have beene some end of their miseries : Many Tyrants have againe changed into worthy Kings , or if that hope should delude their expectations , yet his death would ere long make place for a successor , who probably may prove a milder Lord : but a tyrannizing community will be an immortall slavery . I da●e not say this is now aymed at by any , yet I could wish men would wa●ily consider circumstances , and well weigh with themselves whether our Observators principles doe not make way for some such end ; which the wisdome of Parliament cannot but deterre ; and I hope , will ever present . Hee gives an absolute arbitrary power to such as shall by what meanes soever make themselves a major part in the Houses ▪ neither Statutes nor presidents shall be binding unto them : all oaths and tyes of Allegiance unto their King must cease , if they Vote their Soveraigne bee their danger ; and yet for●ooth they are obliged by Iustice and honour not to doe wrong to King nor kingdome , that is all the security this observator will allow for our Religion lives ●●●●erties : and yet what applause and approbation hath his desp●rate principles received amongst many of us , as if they all tended to a glorious freedome . O that men would wisely consider what enemies they are unto themselves , who blindly hinting after the name of libertie , overtorne and destroy their ancient sec●●ities . T is not prerogative that is now contending with the Subiects libertie , but liber●ie struggles with Othlocracie , the established protestant Religion with scisme and heresie ; whether learning , Law , the flower of Nobility , the best and choyce of the commonalty may live an● not be destroyed , is the question ? An Act of oblivion wherein all unhappy difference● and contentions may lye forever buried , hath once and againe bin offered and refused ▪ So●● mens debts and necessities must be satisfied out of the skinns of those they call malignant● Are not all such as meddle with the Commission of Array , or assist and stand by his Majestie in this opposition , declared by those whose well meaning integritie , his Majestie supposeth to be abused by some few malignant spirits , to be wicked and traiterous enemies to the State ? Is it not ag●ine required that all who are or shall be voted Delinquents be delivered up to the Iustice ( as they call it ) of Parliament ? will they be content to be tried o● both sides , by the kingdome representing it selfe in a second Parliament ? No saith the Observator , that were to exceed in infinitum . Will they then allow the King to be an essentiall part of this Parliament ? or if not , will they remove this Parliament to any other plac● but London ? that so all the members may freely resort unto it , and deliver their conscience● without being posted or prescribed or torne in peeces by a rabble of people that shall requir●● their names : : They see no reason for that . What remaines then but that themselves be justified by themselves , and all that dissent from them be at their mercy or destruction ? And do not three parts of foure of the Nobility dissent from them ? Are not neer an equall part of the Commons house dis-inclined to these proceedings ? If you intermingle the Lords , and Commons elected , are they not opposed with equall number ? Besides the King and his Royall Line to turne the State , survey the kingdome , are not the most and most learned of the Divines against them ? Are not the most and most learned in the professions of Cano● and Common law , disapproving their proceedings ? will they in that propertie fals within the cognizance of Iudges , as the legalitie or illegalitie of the Commission of Array , be directed by the Iudges and Serjeants for such purposes attending in the house of Lords ? On which side stands the visible major part of those Seminaries of learning the Vniversities , and Innes of Court ? which way are the most of the Gentrie and such of the Commonaltie , whose education or nature gives them abilities to discerne further into things then other men ? Must these be all turned out of the Kings protection , to be at pleasure destroyed ? Must the Militia be delivered up , that so the King may be disabled to give them , and such as shall hereafter , finding themselves abused , returne unto their Soveraigne , a due and just protection ? because those that demand the disposall of it , have found a meanes to betray a multitude unto their cause , amongst whom , and on whose side , all the Anabaptists , Brownists , Familists , and Non-conformists , are to be found even to a man ; and yet besides them , I verily beleeve there are very many able , honest , and well minded men , as likewise many right noble Lords and Members in the House of Commons , most heartily desiring the good of their Countrey , whose innocence and noble disposition making them unapt to suspect a foule face of treachery to be masked under the pretence of libertie , subjects them to the deceipts and hypocrisie of some few furious deformers , who as they want not art to abuse the integritie of many good subjects , so have they many other meanes and inducements to make their cause suitable with the common sort of men : They adorne it , with assuming ( but unjustly ) the glorious name of Parliament , with the very ty●le of Reformation they so tickle up the crasie minds of the multitude , ( who ever are in dislike with what is present , and beleeve much vertue to be in that which they never tryed ) that to witnesse their affections and forwardnesse in such a cause , they will be content to charge , and overcharge themselves , and some of them to hazard their owne lives , rather then ( as they are perswaded ) to live like vassals under a tyrannizing Prince , or Popish superstition ; and these slanders of an intention to bring in Popery , and superstition , and arbitrary rule , with such other falsities , are ever made the Triarian Legion , in which they put their last and chiefest strength ; were in soundnesse of reason that did support their cause , it would not prevaile chiefely where least abilitie of judgement , is ? But as which the simpler sort ( ever jealous over the intents and purposes of wiser men ) imaginary feares and slanders are the aptest meanes to prevaile ; So in others , ambition and selfe conceipt meeting with an unquiet and factious spirit , is that which ( I am perswaded ) hath given the greatest furtherance unto this unhappie cause . Let every man enter into his owne heart , and aske himselfe , what it is that he particular wants ? what point of libertie his Ancestors ever had , which hee now hath not , or may not have granted by the King ? Let him aske himselfe whether more be not granted then ever our Forefathers had ? and whether it be not as well , Nay better secured unto us , then ever any liberty was unto them ? Why then are wee not happie and contented as they were ? Surely wee shall finde no other cause of our present misery , but that unquiet spirit within our selves ; were wee not possessed with this unquiet spirit , strong in its illusions , vaine and ridiculous feares could not have so far prevailed with us ? Who to affright the world hath invented day by day those many plotts of Treason , which experience hath assured us to bee all but vaine , or wickedly invented ? What is it that carries on with fury and madnesse those disturbers of Church and State the Brownist , the Anabaptist , and those of the Family ? Is not this unquiet spirit that rages within their owne breasts ? This is that spirit with which some seditious preachers being themselves professed , labour to infuse the same into their ignorant auditory ? with this seditious spirit some members finding themselves to have beene hurried on to the hazard of their lives and fortunes , indeavour as much as they can to draw others into the same danger , hoping thereby to make the multitude of offenders , a refuge and safe guard for their owne offences : It is the desperate fury of this bloud-thirstie spirit that rejects all tearmes of Accommodation . The way of peace it will not know . O most unhappie England ! Thou that for happinesse stoodest so lately in the envie of all Europe , shalt now through the raging fury of this infernall spirit , lye weltring in thine owne bloud : Dead Carcasses shall be strowen up and downe thy streets , the Father devided against his owne bowels , brother against brother , like the Children of Sadmus , each slaying and imbruing their hands in the others bloud . In this violent storme of intestine Warre , who can promise to himselfe security of his fortunes , family , or life in it selfe ; Shall not we bee all split upon the rocks of selfe division , or overwhelmed with the stormy wind of forraigne invasion , unlesse with timely resistance , wee either cast out or destroy this unquiet spirit ? Let us not delud● our selves with imaginations that to give way to its fury , will be the shortest way to end our misery : Consider those that are in opposition to it : Consider the justnesse of their cause , and you will not exact , that they while there runnes but one drop of bloud in their v●ines should yeeld themselves to be trampled on by the fury of their insulting adversaries , betraying their Religion and Liberty to the destroying Anabaptist ; or when they shall bee overborne and destroyed , doe you that shall survive them , expect to enjoy a calme after so bloudy a Tempest ? will there not arise dissentions amongst your selves ? You doe not all surely conspire the same end , who neverthelesse infected by some few malignant spirits , are united in opposition to your Soveraigne : of many of you I cannot but say , O quam honesta voluntate miseri●stis ? Yet are there not Anabaptists Brownists and other Sectaries abounding amongst you ? and do not each ayme at the establishing of his owne Sect ? Against all which you that are truely Protestants must oppose your selves , and so must ingage your selves in a second war , as bloudy as the former , unlesse you will comply and suff●r your selves to be carried on beyond your proposed ends of reformation ; which is an effect that often befalls well-minding reformers , when they at empt it by tumultuous force , by some furie ▪ amongst them to bee forced on beyond their ayme and intended scope . These and many other miseries will assuredly encount●r with you , unlesse God shall please timely to unite the hearts of the King and His Parliament , to the confusion of those s●ismaticall and seditious spirits , who hope by abusing the good intentions of th●se ●onourable Houses , to establish their design●s in the destr●ction of the Common-wealth . If any harsh expressions have fallen from me in this discourse , I desire they may bee applyed against the destroying pests , and onely against them . If in the matter which the Observator hath given occasion to treate of , I have through error too strictly limitted the Royall power , or in ought derogated from the right and au●hority of the houses of Parliament . I shall be most sorry for such my mistake , and be ready to retract the same upon the first intimation . It was necessary if I would say any thing against the Observator , that I should insist upon the actions of the major part of the House ; in which whatsoever hath beene said , is by way of proposall of my doubts rather than dogmatizing any conclusions , and that the observator may not from h●nce have any occasion further to debate and bandy the principles of Government , which ought to remaine sacred and untouched ▪ I shall abstract from thence in way of recapitulation such doubts , as ( without examining the cause and origen of Regall and Parliamentary power ) being well satisfied , will much settle my now scrupulous mind , and will I thinke , goe farre in satisfaction of many others : They arise from consideration of the meanes used in composing the House of Commons , of the proceedings and Acts of the Houses so composed , or from the consequences a and effects that from those acts and proceedings are likely to ensue . His Majestie objects , that in the determination of elections , no other rule was observed then affection to the persons , with reverence to their opinions for the abolition and destruction of Ecclesiasticall government , &c. witnesse the excelling at one clap a great number of persons fairely elected , upon pretence of having had their hand in some Monopoly : against whom to this day they never have proceeded , whereby they might bee restored if innocent , or if faultie others might be elected in their roomes to serve for the Coun●ry : And yet they continue among them , some that are notoriously knowne to be promoters of Monopolies , because their opinions are such as doe well please them . This objection and many others in that Declaration concerning the determination of elections , doth and will somewhat stagger me untill the observator shall furnish me , with a sufficient answer . Again I desire to be instructed ▪ whether it be but a calumny raised against some worthy Members , that by their meanes and countenance terror and force should be used to amate the courage of some members , who would not otherwise comply with their opinions , whether nippie reprehensions and sometimes imprisonment and other punishments were not rigorously used towards such as did not run with the happie vote of the prime and worthy members ? whereas others combined for alteration , did and might take a libertie to say and propose even what they pleased themselves ? If there be a truth in these objections , it will be to little purpose to dispute what is the power of the Houses of Parliament fairely chosen and freely vo●ing . Concerning their arts and proceedings , I am unsatisfied by the Observator , whether the Commons alone may make binding Ordinances , even out of the case of necessity ? Jf not , how shall I defend their imposing the Protestation upon all the kingdome , by a Declaration , that what person soever shall not take it , is unfit to beare office in Church and Common-wealth , and yet before that the Lords had rejected a bill for imposing the same Protestation ? How sha●l I defend their published orders , as that of the ninth of September in derogation of the book of Common prayer , and for suspension of some lawes in force concerning Church-government : Or if not in ordinary ●ases , yet informe me , whether in case of ne●essitie , the Commons may make O●dinances , mauger the King and Lords , and dispose of the strengeh of the Realme ? And if so , whether they may not likewise levie Subsidies , and impose taxes in such manner as they shall think fi● . Whether is it pliamenta●y when a Bi●l hath been once and againe rejected to obtrude it a third time in the same Session , taking advantage of the absence of such , as are knowne to oppose it ? Thus it is said was done to passe the Ordinance for the Militia . How shall I satisfie such as saw heard , and felt the frequent tumults resorting to the Parliament house d●ores , o be no tumults but lawfull assemblies , although they threatned and assaulted some Members , and af●righted very many ? If I yeeld they were tumults , I contradict a Declaration in the name of the Lords and Commons , defining them to be lawfull assemblies : If I say they were not tumults , I am threatned by a Decl●ration formerly made by a fuller house of Peers , and s●nt downe to the house of Commons to have had their assistance for the suppressing of such tumul●s . If it be objected to me , that the new major part of the Houses doe assume and challenge ordinary power to make new , and repeale old lawes ; shall I answer , that they have not as yet so farre incroached upon the libertie of the Subject , my opponent will I doubt reply , that indirectly and implicite●y they have alr●ady done it , though pol●●ie will that they forbeare a while to claime it in downe right termes , for feare it should too much sta●tle the subject , whose libertie must be invaded by degrees ; at first th●refore the v●te shall be onely thus , Whensoever the Lords a●● Commons shall d●cla●e what the law of the land is , the same must be asse●ted to and obeyed : Let this be ●rst swall●wed , and it w●ll ●hence be early proved in good time , that those that may authorative declare the law , l●ying an obligation immediately upon all to obey such Declaration , may likewise whensoever they please , make new or repeale the old law : this will wil● be proved by a Declaration of the Lords and Commons . If it were admitted ( say they ) that the King by his Proclamation ( ●he ●ow major part of Lo●ds and Commons by their vote ) may declare a law , thereby his Proclamation ( their vote ) will in effect become lawes : which would turne ●o the subversion of the law of the land , and the rights and liberties of the Subject . This againe the Observator proves , There is ( saith hee ) in the interpretation of law upon the last appeale the same supremacy of power requisite , as is in making it , and therefore grant the King to be supreme interpreter , and t is all one as if we grant him to be supr●m● maker of law ; grant him this , and we grant ●im to be above all limits , all conditions , all humane bounds whatsoever , we resigne all into his hands , Lives , Lawes , Liberties , Parliaments , all to be held at me●re discre●ion . But the King ( will my opponent say ) never c●aimed to himselfe alone any such power ; but the now major part of the two Houses do claime to themselves ( and such as shall at any time make themselves a major part ) this supreme power of interpreting and declaring law ; and accordingly they declare that the King may not send for Serjeant Skippon , nor require any subject to come to him , which by some speciall service is not bound to come to him . That the K●ng could not by the law adjourne the Terme to York and many such other Declarations , and Interpretations of law they have made , to all which they require the kingdome should obey without appealing . And so they ( not the King ) will have our Lawes , Lives , Liberties , Parliaments , all to be held at meere discretion : Now what cleere answer may be made to this reply , I desire to be instructed , Another doubt that perplexeth me , ariseth from their declaring the priviledge of Parliament to extend to high treason ; now I do not know that any priviledge can have its ground or commencement , unlesse it be by statute , grant , or prescription ; no statute , grant , or presciption can be alledged for this priviledge against treason ; nor indeed can a grant in such case hold fo●ce , if the King and Pope ( when the Pope was conceived to have had plenitude of power ) should have both joyned in granting a Sanctuarie for treason , although it were not to exempt traytors from all manner of triall or punishment , yet was such a grant in it selfe meerly void , 1 Hen. 7. Staff●rds case , &c. And by the statute 26 Hen. 8. cap. 13. it is enacted , that no offendor in any kinde of high treason shall have the priviledge of any manner of Sanctuarie : And as there is neither statute nor grant , so no prescription neither to exempt the members of Parliament wholly from punishment , nor yet to change the method and manner of their triall : for no prescription can be , but it must be both reasonable in it selfe , and also used and allowed ; now there hath not been nor can be any one instance given to prove that this priviledge was either allowed , or so much as claimed : nay the contrary practise hath been witnessed by Wentworths case cited by his Majestie , whereunto many others might be added : and as it wants allowance or claime , so is it in it selfe unreasonable ; for if after the rising of the House , I shall overheare or discover a Parliament man plotting treason , and ye● may not attach him till I have acquainted the House , which cannot be till next day , or perhaps two dayes after that they againe sit , the treason in the meane while will be executed , or the traytor perceiving himselfe discovered , will be fled . So if a Parliament man at York commit treason , murder , or robberie , if you may not arrest him till you have been at London , and got leave of the House , the offendor without doubt will not stirre away , till you returne to apprehend him . Can we imagine any should have greater priviledge , then the law of Nations gives to Embassadours , and yet they have no priviledge i● case of high treason ; being an offence against the lawes of Nations and Nature , Cambd. Eliz. fol. 201. May not every Iudge in Westminster Hall claime this priviledge with better colour then a Member of Parliament , though the Parliament be a higher Court then any of them ? For as the King may impeach one Iudge , so more , and then it will be in his pleasure , or of any other accuser , to make the ordinarie Courts ( though setled by prescription and Acts of Parliament , and lesse depending upon the will of the King , then doth the being of the two Houses ) what they will , when they will : and then if the King hath any suit depending in the Common Pleas , and finds some of the Iudges inclyning against him ; they may be held under a fained accusation of Treason , till the others have given judgement for the king : Surely though the Parliament be a superiour Court , yet have the ordinary Courts as firme a foundation as that can have , and are more necessary for the people : and yet without question upon such pretence no judge ▪ may claime a priviledge from arrest in Case of Treason . If wee consult with our Law bookes , they tell us that the priviledge of Parliament doth not extend to Treason , nor yet breach of the peace , nor yet ( as I thinke ) against the kings debt ; for the reason and ground of priviledge is , because the king hath an Interest in the members , to have their advice , therefore no subject may arrest them for his debt ; But that cannot give them priviledge against the king himselfe . Vid● , Dyer , 59. 60. Every Burgasse hath priviledge quant larrest nest forsque al suite dun Subject 2 : 8. 4. 8. b. per Danby Dyer . 275. Crompton . 8. b. 9. 10. 11 Elsm●re Postnati . 20. 21. Now whereas the observator saith , that this priviledge is Claymed in case of suspition onely , and when leave may be had , and when competent accusers appeare not ; This overthrowes the reasons given by the Houses , and is not in it selfe satisfactory : For th●e Attorney Generall in the most competent accuser , and the accusation was of downe-right High Treason , not onely of suspition : and yet upon probable suspition the accused ought to be imprisoned . I must therefore intreat the observator in this particular for that it hath beene a cause of so great combustion , and taking up of armes within this Kingdome , to give me a more full satisfaction . There remaines one other scruple wherewith I am perplexed : and it ariseth for their voting the Commissions of Array to be illegall ; whether they deny the power it selfe , or onely dislike ▪ the ●orme of this present Commision , is uncertaine ? Now as concerning the first , it seemes to me that posse regni , or the power over the Militia muster array &c. is by the fundamentall Law inmovably setled in the Crowne , or rather the Crowne , setled on it : ● being such an individuall right of the Crowne , as if a King without it , is in truth nothing Op●rtet ( saith Glanvill ) regiam potestatem armis esse decoratam . Jn rege ( saith Bracto ) qui recteregit , necessaria sunt hac duo , arma viz et leges : and the Statute ma●e El●●ven Henry the Seaventh . Cap 1. tells us that by duty of All glance , the Subjects are bound to serve their Sovereigne Lord for the time being , in his warres , f●r d●f●nce of him and the Land , against every Robellion ▪ power and miget reared ag●inst ●im , And with him to enter and abide in service in battail● if the case so require &c. And another Statute . 4. & 5. Phil. & Mary : Cap 3 : Shewes that the Ki●gs of his Realm have ever used to muster their Subjects , and to Levy a number of them for serv●ce in wa●res : And so those Reverend Iudges Hutton and Crooke , arguing for the S●●ject in Case of Shipmoney , acknowledge the mustering and arraying of the Subjects by Commissions to be undoubted right of the Crowne . Hutton fol 39. That there have beene Commissions of Array , and provision for Armes , and for preparing Armour , according to the variety of times , for training and disciplining of Souldiers to be prepared for defence &c. That this hath beene in use , no man can or ever could deny : But the armes where-with they were charged were still their owne proper goods ; And doth not the whole frame of Government of the Realme depend ( and ever hath done ) upon Commissions granted by the King to Shereiffs and Iustices of peace ? whi●h are in substance the same with this : 12. Hen 7. 17. tels us , that at first all administration of Iustice , was in the Crowne , till people multiplying , Shereiffs were deputed , under whom are all to be ready for defence of the Realme , when enemies come ; And the Sherif●e is to attend the King in time of warre , and shall cause the people to goe with the King for the defence of the Realme against enemies and now by all this it appeares , that it is the kings right to discipline , and array the souldier● and to dispose of the strength of the Realme : And that this power is inseperable from him , even an act of Parliament . if it would disable the king t● defend the kingdom , is voyd , being ag●inst Law and reason . Cook●s Argument 56. But you sa● , that the Parli●ment ●esires no ●em vall of that power which was in the King , but that which was in such or such a substitu●e : But whether they desire it or no , they have by th●i ordinance of Militia , taken away that power which was in the King ; unlesse we shall thinke those to be his substitutes that take it against his wi●l , and hold it , and imploy it against him . Againe you tell us , it is but for a time disposed of by a t●mporary Ordinanc and not absol●tely and for ever tak●n from the King , and seeing th●y de●●red it not for the present occasion ▪ why sh●uld the King d●ny it . Should a good fellow desire the observators wi●e f●r the present occasion , I doubt he would not be so kind hearted , as to grant it ? And surely there bee some kinde of things that are not to be departed with though for a day ; Semiramis desired of her husband king Ninus , that he would grant unto her the sovereigne power for five dayes ( as Diodorus Siculus or ) as Plutarch reporteth , but for one day , which being granted her , she in that place caused her husband to be slaine and ever after ruled as Queene ; I hope no body is so wicked as to imagine any such vile intention : and yet this story may well shew how a king is no more himselfe , i● he but for a day ; depart from his individuall right : And such it appeares by his right to the Militia of the Realme , and therefore the Commission of Array , is in substance undeniably good . But then whether the forme of the Commission , be legall , I can see as little reason to doubt , seeing it is for substance and forme both by a very act of Parliament now in force , and by his Majesties Ceclararation , cleared from all colour of objection ? So that in mine owne understanding , it seemes unquestionable both for matter and forme : You will say neverthelesse , that I ought to submit my understanding , and implicity beleeve it illegall , because so voted : But this sound somewhat harsh , that we should be bound to submit to such votes , against an Act of Parliament , upon record ; vnlesse you can assure me that they are proper ●udges against the king , and all such as discent from them , wheather it be an Act of Parliament or not ? And if they are , yet I pray satisfie mee concerning the manner of their proceedings ▪ why was it so hastily determined being a question of that weight , and which required a perusall of many ancient Statutes , and Records ? Why were none of the Iudges nor Sarjeants advised within such a qu●stion of legalitie , or illegalitie ? The Commission is in Latine , and old legall Latine , are all the members that voted against it , able to give the Grammer Construction of it ? But above all , why was it voted without so much as hearing the King or his Counsell to speake in his cause , before it were condemned ? You know what the Poet saith , Qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera , aequum licet statuerit , haud aequus futi . I spare to load the Observator with any more doubts concerning their past votes , the good Consequences whereof and of other concomitant proceedings , I doe much feare . If the observator shall give me but probable hope of the good event of things ; and satisfy my doubt in these perticulars I shall with cheerefulnesse , ever after pay an humble obedience unto all such votes and proceedings , and shall from thenceforth acknowledge my selfe for his industry in setling and satisfying my yet unsatisfied Conscience to be much indebted unto him ; Meane while I bid him heartily farewell . FINIS Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A93661e-80 Decl : of the Lo : & Com : of the 2 of Novemb. Notes for div A93661e-140 Luci●● . S●●m● . 158. 1. H. 74. 6. Plow . Com. 238. 244. Camb. Britan. 163. The King hath Soveraign power , hee acknowledgeth no superiour but God alone . See Sir Tho. Smith de Rep. Ang. li 2. cap. 4. 5. Rep. so . 86. de Iure regis Eccl. siastico . Rodin de Rep. cap 8. 7 Rep. 12 13. C●lv . Case . Prov. 11. Livy . Gen. 14. ●●od . 32. Sir W. Rawley . l. 2. Hist. Mund. Sozomen . li . 6. Seneca . Stamford Preface . Cokes Insti● . 2 part pag. 379. ● H. 7. 20. Stamf. 72. 12 H. 7. 17. Mirror of Iustice . Bracton lib. 3. fol. 107. Fortescue cap. ●● . 13. ● Rep. Cal●ins ●ase 13. Virg ▪ Davis rep. Rex Angliae est monarcha & Imperator in regno suo . Cassaneus in catol. glor. . mundi . Rex Angliae est absolutus Monarcha in regno suo . Vide Crompt . Ju●i●d . 108. Modi● tenendi Parliament . Page 1. Page 4. Bodin de Reput . l. 2. cap. 5. Vide Cambd. Eliz. pa. 118. accord . Page 45. Elsmere postnati 99. 33. H. 8. ca. 1. 28. H. 8. c. 19. Davis Rep. 25. Eccles. 8. v● 8. Bracton l. 5 tract. 3. c. 3. & li. 1. cap. 8. W●sd . 6. pag. 45. Arist. Eth. 18. Cap. 10 Plato in Bolitico ▪ His Majesties Answer to the 19. propositions Huttons Argument against Ship mony p. 33 page . 34. De●lar . Maii 27 concerning the Stat. of E. 1.